PLATO

MENO

STOCK
THE

MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PART I.—INTRODUCTION AND TEXT

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PREFACE.

All books are written to satisfy a want, if not on the part of the public, at all events on that of the author. But this book needs less apology than some others; for the Meno is prescribed for the Oxford course, and there is no English edition of it.

The text that has been followed is that of K. F. Hermann. It has not formed part of the scope of this work to discuss differences of reading. My object has been, in the first place, to clear away any difficulties that might present themselves to a novice, except such as merely required a reference to the dictionary, and, in the next place, to supply whatever aids seemed necessary for the full appreciation of the substance and style of the dialogue.

My debt to Stallbaum is immense—far greater than appears from the acknowledgments: but what has been borrowed has become so mixed up with what has been supplied as to render discrimination impossible. A general acknowledgment is therefore the more necessary. Next to Stallbaum most help has been derived from Riddell’s admirable Digest of Platonic Idioms, appended to his edition of the Apology, to which a reference has in every case been given.
My thanks are due to my friend, the Rev. R. L. Clarke, of Queen's College, who kindly spared time from more important work to look over the notes. As an examination made under such circumstances was necessarily hasty, any mistakes that may have escaped his vigilance must be credited to me alone. Since writing the above I have found myself laid under deep obligation to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow of Balliol, for his careful supervision of the whole work during its passage through the press, in the course of which many corrections and improvements have been suggested.

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8 Museum Villas, Oxford,
April, 1887.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In this second edition the text has been brought into conformity with that of the Zurich editors, except where the readings of Hermann are reinforced by those of Schanz. In one passage (84 E ad fin., εἰς γονίαν ἀντίαν) where the reading is admittedly doubtful, I have followed Schanz exclusively. The work has been revised throughout and a grammatical index added.

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8 Museum Road, Oxford,
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INTRODUCTION.

Plato is valuable for his method, rather than for any positive dogmatic truth which he teaches.

‘Out of Plato,’ says Emerson, ‘come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought’—a sentiment which I remember to have heard expressed in more homely language by one of our own professors—‘There’s no sort of rubbish or nonsense that you won’t find in Plato.’

Plato’s merit is that he taught the world to think—at least the western portion of it: he did not think for it, as Aristotle did after him. Neither scientific terminology nor dogmatic system are to be found in Plato, save in a most rudimentary form. To say that a man is a ‘Platonist’ does not really give us any definite idea of his philosophical tenets. We infer that he has an enthusiastic belief in the immortality of the soul, grounded on somewhat shaky arguments, and thinks that ignorance lies at the root of evil. We might credit him also with a belief in the power of the mind to acquire knowledge by the royal road of ideas, independently of experience. There perhaps the matter ends. We should hardly go on to suspect him of being in favour of a community of women among the upper classes of society.

It was a question among the Ancients whether Plato dogmatized at all. Those who thought that he did found his own opinions expressed through four characters in the dialogues—Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian stranger in the Laws, and the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist. But even the opinions ascribed to Socrates are detached and tentative rather than final and systematic; they are so many isolated and independent efforts to follow out the train of thought of
the moment—mere random ventures on the sea of thought of a mind that was ready to sail wherever the wind of the argument might blow. It is quite true to say with Voltaire—'Un homme qui saurait tout Platon, et qui ne saurait que Platon, saurait peu, et saurait mal,' only it is slightly off the point. One does not go to Plato for facts of science or ready-made doctrines; but for a spirit and a method, that we may learn to question all things, while at the same time we become kindled with his enthusiasm for truth and virtue.

2. Dramatic form of Plato's writings—perhaps borrowed from Sicily.

One of the main reasons for this combination of infinite suggestiveness with such meagreness of positive results is the form which Plato adopted for his writings. Plato dramatised the world of thought as completely as Shakespeare dramatised the world of action. The mind of the Greeks, at the time when Plato wrote, was dominated by the drama, as it had been dominated, in an earlier age, by the forms of epic poetry. Add to this that philosophy—at least moral philosophy—began in conversation amid the gymasia and porticoes of Athens, and we see that nothing could be more natural than that the first mould into which it ran should be that of the dramatic dialogue. Zeno, the Eleatic, is credited with having been the first to employ the dialogue, or shares the honour with one Alexamenus, otherwise unknown. But before him, we find an anticipation of Plato in a quarter where it might least have been expected, namely, in the great comic poet of Sicily, Epicharmus, whose plays seem to have abounded in philosophical discussions, conducted in due form of dialectic, though in broad Doric verse. Epicharmus predicted that somebody would come after him, who would strip his words of their metre, in place of which he would invest them with stately robes of diction, and prove himself invincible in the arena of thought, while giving a fall to all his antagonists. Whether this prophecy was fulfilled by Plato or not, in the shape of a debt to Epicharmus, it is with his
name alone that the philosophical dialogue is indissolubly associated.

It has been often noticed that in Aristotle the influence of the dialogue is not yet extinct. Though his works assume the shape of formal treatises, yet we are everywhere conscious of the presence of a suppressed antagonist—a kind of Devil’s Advocate, whose business it was to test the claims of every proposition before it was admitted to the canonisation of truth.

3. Tendency of the Greeks to dramatise philosophy.

 Partition of Philosophy.

The connexion, on which we have been dwelling above, between philosophy in its earliest form and the drama was recognised by the Greeks themselves. The dialogue was defined as being ‘composed of question and answer, on some philosophical or political subject, with appropriate character-drawing of the persons who take part in it, and in an ornate style.’ This definition was a common-place of antiquity, for we find it not only in Diogenes Laertius, but in identically the same words in the ‘Introduction to Plato’s Dialogues’ by Albinus. Further, it was pointed out how the progress of philosophy presented an analogy to the progress of the drama. As Thespis first added a single actor to the original song of the chorus, then Aeschylus a second, and Sophocles a third: so philosophy had at first only a single department, namely, physical speculation, to which Socrates added moral science, while Plato perfected its structure with the third division of dialectic. Ever after this the form of philosophy was as rigidly fixed as the form of a tragedy; and every systematic exponent or critic started with the assumption of a tripartite division into φυσική, ἡθική, and διαλεκτική, or, as it was called later, λογική. Nor is the division without ground of reason. For philosophy must study either nature (including the divine nature) or man, and if it studies man, it must

1 The celebrated mime-writers of Sicily, Sophron and Xenarchus, are said to have been great favourites with Plato.
regard him either from the side of the emotions or of the intellect.

4. Trilogies and tetralogies among the dialogues of Plato.

The desire to trace an analogy between Plato's philosophy and the drama was pushed to an extreme by those commentators who variously distributed his works into trilogies or tetralogies. The former plan was adopted by Aristophanes the grammarian, whose arrangement starts with the Republic, Timaeus, and Critias, but the cogency of the connexion is in no case very apparent, and, after five trilogies have been established, the attempt at further classification is abandoned. The other distribution into tetralogies, which has been ascribed, though hardly on sufficient grounds, to Thrasylus, is resolutely carried out from beginning to end. There are just thirty-six works, including the Letters as one, which were acknowledged in antiquity to be Plato's own, so that they fit conveniently into nine tetralogies. Here we start with a very plausible combination in the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. In the Euthyphro, we become aware of the indictment of Socrates by Meletus; in the Apology we listen to the philosopher's defence of himself before his judges; in the Crito we find him refusing to violate the laws of his country by escaping from jail: in the Phaedo we are admitted as auditors to the dying discourse of

'Him, the Master of all thought,
Who took the hemlock and superbly died.'

Here, however, the tie of connection is a historical one, which necessarily fails us in the bulk of the dialogues, from which the biographical element is absent. If the principle were pressed, however, our own dialogue, the Meno, would have a right to precede the four just mentioned, for it shows us the motives which induced Anytus, the real mover in the matter, to get up the indictment against Socrates. But the Meno, as a matter of fact, is ranked along with the Euthy-
demus, Protagoras, and Gorgias in a quartette which deals more especially with the views and pretensions of the Sophists.

5. Division of the dialogues into theoretical and practical, etc.

Quite apart from the division into trilogies or tetralogies, there was current also among the Ancients a subtle logical division of the works of Plato, which possesses a real philosophical value.

It is assumed, to begin with, that the works of Plato fall into two main classes, one in which there is a more or less definite conclusion present in the author’s mind, to which he wishes to guide the reader, the other in which the object is vague inquiry. This gives us the two principal ‘characters’ of the λόγος Πλατωνικός—υφηγητικός and ζητητικός. The foregone conclusion may be of a merely speculative nature or one bearing upon life and practice. Thus we are led to a subdivision of the first of the two main classes into theoretical and practical; and these again are subdivided respectively into physical and logical, ethical and political. It is on the other side of the division that we must look for the Meno. The ‘inquisitory’ dialogues are all so many exhibitions of the art of mental wrestling, but may be distinguished into dialogues of practice and of combat (γυμναστικός and ἀγωνιστικός). The latter may end either in proving one’s own proposition or upsetting the adversary’s (ἐνδεικτικός or ἀνατρεπτικός); the former may assume the shape either of eliciting a conclusion from an unpractised thinker or of demolishing his successive attempts to reach one (μαθητικός or πειρατικός). Here then are the eight infima species which we reach in our division. Plato’s works are either—physical, logical, ethical, political, elicitory, tentative, probative1, or eversive. Below these

1 It is worth noticing that Albinus has ἔλεγχικός in his list (Hermann’s Plato, vol. vi. p. 148), and makes no mention of ἐνδεικτικός. The latter therefore may be a mistake in Diogenes Laertius, iii. § 49. The Protagoras is the only dialogue referred to this head.
there is only the enumeration of the individual dialogues falling under each class, which gives scope for difference of opinion, and we find the list presented by Albinus very different from that of Diogenes Laertius. As to the tentative nature of the Meno, however, all are agreed.

6. Order of the Platonic dialogues.

Into the vexed question of the order of the Platonic writings we need not enter here. There is not sufficient internal evidence to establish a chronological order; and, if there were, it would be no clue to the logical order. Plato did not think systematically, but piecemeal, and whoever thinks in that way—and who does not?—will often have suggested to him by one train of reasoning, and supply later, another which seems necessary to lead up to it. Perhaps no more sensible enunciation has been made touching the order of Plato's writings than that of Albinus, who declared that they constituted a perfect circle, and therefore presented no one point which could rightly be considered prior to another. Only it may be said generally that in its leading idea the Meno presents a connection with the Protagoras; for in that dialogue it is ultimately maintained by Socrates that virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be taught. In the Meno this idea seems to be struggling into the light of certainty, when we are plunged back into confusion again by the admitted absence of teachers. On the subordinate, though intrinsically more important, point of the proof of the pre-existence of the soul from the doctrine of reminiscence, the Meno connects itself with the deeper discussion of the same subject in the Phaedo. In its general tone, and in the conduct of the argument, it reminds the reader of the Theaetetus, though that again is a deeper dialogue than ours.

7. Date of the composition of the Meno.

As regards the date of composition, Stallbaum and others of the German critics consider the Meno to have been written
during the lifetime of Socrates. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, with whom both Grote and Professor Jowett agree, finds a clear reference to the trial and death of Socrates in the concluding words of the Meno; and indeed it is difficult to understand how any other opinion could be arrived at, unless the critic were throttled by a theory. Professor Jowett goes so far as to say—‘There is no reason to suppose that any of the dialogues of Plato were written before the death of Socrates,’ setting aside, apparently, as unworthy of credence, the anecdote told by Diogenes Laertius of how Socrates exclaimed, on hearing Plato read the Lysis—‘Good heavens! How many lies the young man has been telling about me!’ This is really too good not to be true. And it leads us on to another point. For if Plato thus began to make Socrates his mouth-piece even during the lifetime of the latter, with how much more freedom is the process likely to have been carried on after his death! We can well believe therefore that Plato was so penetrated with the habit of uttering his own thoughts through the medium of Socrates, that he became quite indifferent to chronological accuracy. Any thought which was in Plato’s mind was liable to be put into Socrates’ mouth. Granting this, we can recognise in the Meno an allusion to the bribing of Ismenias the Theban by the Persians, which would fix the approximate date of the dialogue to a period shortly after B.C. 394.

THE TETRALOGIES,
commonly ascribed to Thrasyllus.

- Εὐθύφρων, ἣ περὶ ὀσίου ................. πειραστικός.
- Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους ..................... ἡθικὸς.
- Κρίτων, ἣ περὶ πρακτέου ................. ἡθικὸς.
- Φαίδων, ἣ περὶ ψυχῆς ..................... ἡθικὸς.

- Κρατίλος, ἣ περὶ ὑρθότητος ὅνομάτων .... λογικὸς.
- Θεαιττος, ἣ περὶ ἔπιστήμης .......... πειραστικός.
- Σοφιστῆς, ἣ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ........ λογικὸς.
- Πολιτικὸς, ἣ περὶ βασιλείας ........ λογικὸς.
Παρμενίδης, ἦ περὶ ἰδέων ... λογικὸς.
Φίλημος, ἦ περὶ ἠδονῆς ... ἠθικός.
Συμπόσιον, ἦ περὶ ἁγαθοῦ ... ἠθικός.
Φαῖδρος, ἦ περὶ ἔρωτος ... ἠθικός.

'Αλκιβιάδης, ἦ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ... μαίευτικός.
'Αλκιβιάδης δεύτερος, ἦ περὶ προσευχῆς ... μαίευτικός.
"Ἰππαρχος, ἦ φιλοκρῆς ... ἠθικός.
'Ἀντερασταί, ἦ περὶ φιλοσοφίας ... ἠθικός.

Θέαγης, ἦ περὶ σοφίας ... μαίευτικός.
Χαρμίδης, ἦ περὶ σοφροσύνης ... πειραστικός.
Δάχης, ἦ περὶ ἀνδρείας ... μαίευτικός.
Δύσις, ἦ περὶ φιλίας ... μαίευτικός.

Εὐθυδήμος, ἦ ἑρυθρός ... ἀνατρεπτικός.
Πρωταγόρας, ἦ Σοφοσταί ... ἐνδεικτικός.
Γοργίας, ἦ περὶ ἡπτορικῆς ... ἀνατρεπτικός.
'Μένων, ἦ περὶ ἄρετῆς ... πειραστικός.

'Ἰππίας πρῶτος, ἦ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ... ἀνατρεπτικός.
'Ἰππίας δεύτερος, ἦ περὶ τοῦ ἰενδοῦς ... ἀνατρεπτικός.
"Ἰων, ἦ περὶ Ἰλιάδος ... πειραστικός.
Μενέξενος, ἦ ἐπτυτάφιος ... ἠθικός.

Κλειστοφῶν, ἦ προτρεπτικὸς ... ἠθικός.
Πολιτεία, ἦ περὶ δικαίου ... πολιτικός.
Τίμαιος, ἦ περὶ φύσεως ... φυσικός.
Κριτίας, ἦ Ἀθλαντικὸς ... ἠθικός.

Μίνως, ἦ περὶ νόμου ... πολιτικός.
Νόμοι, ἦ περὶ νομοθεσίας ... πολιτικός.
'Ἐπινομίς, ἦ νυκτερινὸς σύλλογος, ἦ φιλόσοφος ... πολιτικός.
'Ἐπιστολαῖ ... ἠθικός.
DIVISION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO.

Λόγος Πλατωνικός

υφηγητικός
(expository)

ζητητικός
(inquisitory)

θεωρηματικός
(theoretical)

πρακτικός
(practical)

γυμναστικός
(exercitatory)

ἄγωνιστικός
(controversial)

ϕυσικός
(physical)

λογικός
(logical)

ηθικός
(ethical)

πολιτικός
/political)

μανειτικός
(elicitory)

πειραστικός
(tentative)

ἐνδεικτικός
(probative)

ἀνατρεπτικός
(ersive)

Timaeus.
Apology.
Republic.
Alcibiades I.
Euthyphro/

Politicus.
Crito.
Laws.
Alcibiades II.
Protagoras.

Cratylus.
Phaedo.
Minos.
Theages.
Meno.

Parmenides.
Phaedrus.
Epinomis.
Lysis.
Ion.

Sophistes.
Symposium.
Critias.
Charmides.
Theaetetus.

Menexenus.
Letters.
Laches.

Philebus.
Hippias I.
Hippias II.

Hipparchus.
Anterastae.

Gorgias.
COURSE OF THE DIALOGUE.

How is virtue to be attained?

Meno, a somewhat sophisticated youth, who has studied under Gorgias, propounds to Socrates an inquiry as to how virtue is to be attained. Does it come (1) by teaching, (2) by training, or (3) by nature? (70 A).

What is virtue?

Socrates objects to this question on the ground that he does not know what virtue is, and, what is more, has never met with anybody who did (70 B–71 B). Meno is of opinion that Gorgias knew all about it, and undertakes to answer the question himself (71 C, D).

Meno’s account of virtue; he enumerates many virtues.

The virtue of a man, he says, is to be competent to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to help his friends and hurt his foes, and avoid being hurt himself. The virtue of a woman is to manage her household well, taking care of the things, and obeying her husband. Again, there is the virtue of a child, whether girl or boy, and of an elder person, of a freeman, and of a slave. In fact, every age, sex, and condition has its different virtue (71 E–72 A).

What is the common element in these?

This first attempt to define virtue is really an enumeration, and not a definition. Accordingly Socrates asks for the essential attributes which cause these various virtues to be called by the same name, illustrating his question by the example of the word ‘bee’ (72 B).

Explanation of what is meant by a common element or general idea.

Meno only dimly grasps the conception of a general idea (72 C), and Socrates proceeds to enforce his meaning by the
parallel examples of health, strength, and size. Does Meno think that the health of a man is different from the health of a woman? Or that health has one and the same form (εἶδος), wheresoever existent? (72 D, E). Meno is willing to grant the essential unity of these ideas, but thinks that the case of virtue is somehow different from the rest (73 A). Socrates, however, gets him to admit that man and woman, child and elder will alike require the same things, namely, justice and temperance, if they are to be virtuous (73 A, B).

**Virtue is the capacity of ruling over men.**

It being agreed then that virtue is one and the same thing, wherever found, Meno is again called upon to define it. He does so offhand, declaring virtue to be ‘the capacity of ruling over men’ (73 C).

**Faults of the definition.**

This first attempt at a formal definition falls an easy prey to the dialectic of Socrates. For (1) it cannot possibly apply to the virtue of a child or a slave, whereas it is essential to a logical definition that it should be co-extensive with the thing defined; and (2) the mere capacity to rule is not virtue, but only the capacity to rule justly. Meno admits the force of both these objections, saying as to the latter—‘For justice, Socrates, is virtue’ (73 D).

**What is wanted is definition, not enumeration.**

Hereupon Socrates asks him whether justice is virtue or a virtue, and sets him floundering once more amid the difficulties of a general idea. Socrates illustrates his own question by the case of figure. He would not call roundness ‘figure,’ but ‘a figure,’ because there are other figures. ‘Yes,’ says Meno, ‘and so I say that there are other virtues as well as justice’ (73 E). When asked what these are he specifies temperance, wisdom, and magnificence, showing incidentally how wide was the Greek conception of virtue, including, as
it did, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic elements. Socrates again reminds him that what he wants to arrive at is the one idea which underlies these different phases of virtue (74 A).

The definition of figure.

Meno confesses his inability to arrive at this, and Socrates helps him to understand the question by the parallel instances of 'figure' and 'colour' (74 B, C). To say that the round and the straight are both figures is not to say that the round is straight or the straight round, but it is to say that there is something called 'figure' which is common to both (74 D, E). Let Meno then say what this something is (75 A).

Meno throws the task on Socrates, under promise that he, in his turn, will attempt to define virtue; and Socrates accordingly defines figure as 'the only thing which invariably accompanies colour' (75 B). Meno jeers at this definition on the ground that it assumes a knowledge of colour, and thus involves what is known in logic as the fault of ignotum per ignotius, or, as in this case, per aequo ignotum (75 C). Accordingly Socrates, admitting the principle that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined (75 D), propounds another definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid' (75 E–76 A).

Colour defined in the style of Gorgias.

Meno now calls for a definition of colour; and Socrates, after bantering him on his imperiousness (76 A, B), asks him whether he would like a definition in the style of Gorgias. To this Meno eagerly assents; whereupon Socrates, assuming the Empedoclean doctrine of sense-perception being due to emanations from bodies, defines colour as 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight'—a definition which is hailed with enthusiasm by Meno (76 C, D). Socrates hints that Meno likes this definition on account of its pomposity, and expresses his own preference for the definition of figure (76 E).
Meno once more defines virtue.

It is now Meno's turn to define virtue, for which the other definitions were meant by way of practice (77 A).

Adopting the sentiments of some poet, Meno defines virtue as 'the desire for honourable things combined with the power of procuring them' (77 B).

To this it is objected by Socrates that to desire things honourable is to desire good, and all men desire good, so that the definition is wider than the thing defined (77 C–78 A). It follows from this that the difference between one man and another must lie in the power of procuring good, so that Meno's definition now assumes this shape—'Virtue is the power of procuring good things' (78 B).

But in vain.

This third attempt of Meno's at a formal definition of virtue is upset on the ground that good things must be provided justly, if there is to be any virtue in the matter; so that we are in fact defining the genus, virtue, by its species, justice, and are involved in our old vicious circle. It will be necessary to begin the whole thing over again (78 C–79 E).

Socrates confesses his own ignorance, but he is willing to help Meno in finding out what virtue is.

On hearing this, Meno's patience gives way, and he compares Socrates to a torpedo which paralyses everything which comes near to it (80 A, B).

Socrates playfully rejoins that he suspects Meno is fishing for compliments, and wants to hear a simile about himself in return. He pleads guilty to filling others with doubt, but declares that it is because he is full of doubt himself. But though he does not know what virtue is, he is quite ready to join Meno in searching into the matter (80 C, D).

Is such discovery possible? How can we acquire knowledge?

At this point the dialogue takes an unexpected turn, for
Meno suddenly produces a weapon from the armoury of the Sophists, in the shape of a dilemma against the possibility of mental search—

If one knows a thing, search is superfluous; and if one does not know it, search is useless.

Either one knows a thing or one does not.

\[ \therefore \text{Search is either superfluous or useless (80 D, E).} \]

**Knowledge is reminiscence.**

Socrates bodily accepts one horn of this dilemma, declaring that, as a matter of fact, we do know all things. For the soul is immortal, and, though subject to what we call birth and death, is in its essence indestructible. Having therefore existed from all time, it has seen and learnt all things (81 A–C). Now inasmuch as nature is all of a piece, and its truths all connected one with another, there is nothing to prevent the soul which has forgotten anything from tracking it out within itself, by following up any clue, if only it has the energy and perseverance to do so. This is how men can evoke knowledge from their own minds on subjects of which they seemed at starting to be frankly ignorant (81 D).

Meno does not appear at all surprised at the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and metempsychosis, for which we may suppose him to have been prepared by the philosophy of Empedocles; but he is not quite so ready to accept the corollary of reminiscence (81 E).

Socrates accordingly proceeds to illustrate this latter doctrine by a practical example.

*Practical illustration of the doctrine. Examination of the slave.*

He asks Meno to call one of his numerous pages, a perfectly uneducated lad. Showing this boy a square, Socrates elicits from him that if the side of such a figure were two feet, the figure itself would be four square feet; likewise that a square twice as big as this would consist of eight square feet (82 A–D). Then Socrates asks how big the line would be on which the double square would be described, and the
boy promptly replies that it would be double the size of the other (82 E).

So far the process serves only to illustrate the self-confidence of fancied knowledge. The next thing necessary is to administer the electric shock of doubt, in order to dissipate this fatal presumption. This is effected in a series of questions, by means of which the boy is brought to see that it is a figure of sixteen square feet which would be described on a line eight feet long (83 A–C); and again that the line on which the eight foot square is described must be something more than two and less than four feet (83 C, D). The boy tries three feet for the answer, but is shown by the questions that this would give a square of nine feet. Then at last the boy is led to the Socratic wisdom of knowing that he does not know (83 E).

Socrates now enlarges to Meno upon the benefits that attend this cathartic process. The boy indeed knows no more than he did before; but at all events his mind is not preoccupied with a false conceit of knowledge, and he will be ready now to apply himself to search (84 A–C).

*Latent truths elicited by questions from the slave.*

The advantages of doubt are soon manifest. For presently, under the intellectual midwifery of Socrates, the boy’s mind is safely delivered of the conclusion that the square on the diameter of a given square is double of that square (84 D–85 B)—a truth which was somehow latent in his mind, and required only to be called into consciousness by judicious questioning (85 C). But what else can this recovery of knowledge out of oneself be called but ‘recollection?’ (85 D).

*How did the slave acquire this truth?*

Now how did the boy come by these true opinions, which require only to be repeatedly evoked in order that they may become certain knowledge? Clearly he must either have got them at some time or have always had them. If he always had them, he must have existed from all eternity. If he got them, it must either have been in this human life of his or in
some other. Admittedly he did not get them in this human life. Therefore he must have had them before. This must have been when he was not a man. But during all time he either is or is not a man. The soul therefore has existed from all time (85 D–86 A).

Such is one of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul. It is more ingenious than convincing. For

(1) The boy may have got these true opinions on his entry into this human life.

(2) Plato has no right to assume that if he did not get them in this life, he had them from all time; since he may have got them in some prior existence.

Plato is probably a little conscious that the argument is unsound; for he makes Socrates insist only, as the outcome of it, on the duty of vigorously applying oneself to mental search, instead of succumbing to the sophistical argument against its possibility (86 B, C).

Once more, can virtue be taught?

After this interlude Socrates proposes that they should resume the attempt to define virtue. Meno, however, expresses a preference for the original question as to whether it can be taught (86 C). Socrates, after protesting against his waywardness, consents to discuss this question in the only way in which it can be discussed, namely hypothetically, and illustrates his meaning by a mathematical example (86 D–87 A).

Virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be taught.

The hypothesis which is now laid down is, that if virtue is knowledge it will admit of being taught. Accordingly we ask—Is virtue knowledge? (87 B, C).

Now virtue is admittedly a good thing. If then it should turn out that there is no good but knowledge, we should be right in asserting virtue to be knowledge.

But all good things are useful,

And virtue is a good;

\[ \therefore \text{Virtue is useful} \] (87 D, E).
If we examine lower goods such as health, strength, beauty, and wealth, we shall find that they are beneficial only when we make a right use of them. The same is true even of such ethical and intellectual qualities as temperance, justice, courage, aptitude to learn, memory, magnificence, and so on (88 A). So far as these are divorced from wisdom they are not necessarily good. Courage, for instance, undirected by reason, is often more hurtful than helpful. In a word, all that the soul attempts or endures must be directed by reason, if happiness is to be the result (88 B, C). Virtue, therefore, being one of the things of the soul, and being necessarily useful, it follows that virtue must be wisdom, since that is the only thing in the soul which is necessarily useful (88 C, D). As for lower goods they are useful only to the wise soul. In man, in fact, everything else depends upon the soul, and everything in the soul depends, for its goodness, upon wisdom (88 D, E).

Virtue has thus been proved to be φρόνησις, or inseparable from it. We may notice in passing that φρόνησις is tacitly assumed to be identical with ἐπιστήμη, from which the argument started. This renders more intelligible the corollary which is immediately drawn, that goodness is not a natural gift (89 A). For, if it were so, we should doubtless have had experts under whose guidance we might select those of the young who were naturally good, to be guarded carefully in the Acropolis for the future service of the State (89 B). Goodness then not being a natural gift, it follows that it comes by teaching, and this is in accordance with our hypothesis, that virtue is knowledge (89 C).

But where are the teachers?

But here we are met with a difficulty. For if a thing admits of being taught, there must be both teachers and learners of it (89 D)—a proposition of which the contrapositive has also to be admitted, namely, that anything of which there are neither teachers nor learners does not admit of being taught.
'Are there not then teachers?' asks Meno, to which Socrates replies that he has often sought for them in vain (89 E).

At this point in the dialogue we become aware of the presence of a third person, Anytus, who is represented as a highly respectable Athenian citizen. He is a family friend of Meno's. So Socrates enlists his services in the inquiry (90 A, B).

*Are not the Sophists teachers of virtue?*

Socrates is of opinion that the proper teachers of any subject must be those who make a profession of it, and demand a fee for imparting instruction (90 C–E). The persons who answer this description in the present instance are—the Sophists (91 A–C).

*Anytus stoutly denies this view of the Sophists. They are the corrupters of youth.*

On hearing this Anytus flares up, and denounces the Sophists as the corrupters of society. Socrates professes surprise at this view. Any other class of men who were in the habit of spoiling what they were supposed to improve would quickly be found out. How is it then that the Sophists are not found out? How is it that Protagoras, for instance, could spend forty years in the exercise of his profession, and die universally respected? If the Sophists really corrupt the young, it must be either voluntarily or involuntarily. In the latter case they must be mad, instead of being, as some people suppose them to be, the wisest of men (91 C–92 A).

'No,' says Anytus, 'it is not they who are mad, but the young men and their parents, and the states for not expelling them' (92 A, B).

At this point Socrates gently hints that Anytus may be animated by personal feeling against the Sophists—an insinuation which Anytus meets with an indignant declaration that he never had anything to do with them, and hoped he never might (92 B).

Socrates is at a loss to know how Anytus, on his own
showing, came to form so decided a judgment, unless indeed
he were aided by divine inspiration (92 C). But, after all,
the question is not who spoil the youth, but who teach them
virtue. Will Anytus kindly impart his assistance to Meno
in this matter? 'Why didn't you tell him yourself?' says
Anytus. 'Well, I did,' replies Socrates, 'but it seems I was
wrong. It is now your turn' (92 D).

**Cannot the good teach virtue?**

Anytus, on being thus challenged, gives it as his opinion
that any respectable citizen of Athens would be a better
teacher of virtue than the Sophists: whereupon Socrates in-
quires whether these teachers were taught by any one them-
selves (92 E). Anytus supposes that they were; and asks
Socrates whether he does not think that there have been
many good men in Athens? Socrates is quite ready to admit
this: but insists that the question before them is whether
this goodness is transmissible by teaching (93 A, B).

**After all; can virtue be taught? Experience is
against it.**

Socrates now adduces examples to show that virtue cannot
be imparted by teaching. If it could, surely such men as
Themistocles (93 C–E), Aristeides (94 A), Pericles (94 B),
and Thucydides the statesman (94 C, D) would have taken
care to impart it to their sons? But this they admittedly
did not, though they had them carefully trained in minor
accomplishments.

These examples only serve to enrage Anytus, who retires
into silence, after advising Socrates not to make so free with
people's characters (94 E).

*Socrates resumes with Meno. Experience seems to show
that virtue cannot be taught.*

Socrates and Meno are now left to finish the dialogue by
themselves. Socrates begins by remarking that Anytus was
mistaken if he supposed that there was any personal reflection
intended upon himself, after which he addresses himself directly to Meno (95 A). It appears that in Meno's country there is the same diversity of opinion as elsewhere with regard to the teachability of virtue (95 B). Gorgias never professed to teach it, nor can Meno make up his mind as to the claims of the Sophists generally (95 C). Socrates reminds him that there is a similar vacillation of opinion to be found in the poet Theognis (95 D, E).

Here, then, is a curious paradox. Those who profess the theory of virtue are said to fail themselves in practice; those who admittedly succeed in practice are not clear as to whether it can be taught or not. On the whole it would seem that neither Sophists nor statesmen can be admitted to be teachers of virtue (96 A, B).

But where there are no teachers there can be no learners.
And where there are no teachers nor learners a thing does not admit of being taught.

. . . Virtue does not admit of being taught (96 C).

Knowledge and right opinion.

We now come to the final turn in the dialogue, which leads us to such conclusion as it contains. Socrates suddenly discovers that there was something which they overlooked in the preceding arguments, namely, that knowledge was not the only thing by which action could be rightly guided (96 D, E). There was something else which could serve the same purpose, and this thing was right opinion (97 A, B).

Wherein then lies the difference between knowledge and right opinion? And whence the acknowledged superiority of the former? The difference perhaps consists in the permanence of knowledge, which is secured by the chain of causation. For right opinion is a runaway thing, like the fabled statues of Daedalus, and needs to be bound, if it is to be of any service (97 C–98 A).

Some such difference there must be between knowledge and right opinion. For Socrates does not wish to dogmatise upon the exact nature of the difference: but that there is a difference is one of the few things he is prepared positively
to assert. Still, as far as regards action, right opinion is no less useful a thing than knowledge (98 B, C).

Coming back now to our question as to how virtue is acquired—

We have seen that good men are useful; and that usefulness implies either knowledge or right opinion. But neither of these comes by nature (this point is allowed to pass unchallenged). It follows therefore that men are not good by nature (98 C, D).

The other alternative would seem to be that virtue is the result of teaching. As to this, we came to the conclusion that it would admit of being taught, if it were wisdom, and, conversely, that, if it did admit of being taught, it would be wisdom (98 D).

But here we become involved in a difficulty. For we saw reason to admit that, if there were teachers of a thing, it could be taught, and that, if there were not, it could not be taught. And now we have admitted that there are no teachers of virtue; and, in so doing, have admitted that it cannot be taught, and therefore is not wisdom (98 E).

But virtue is good, and this goodness consists in right guidance; and, chance apart, there are two things only which guide rightly, namely, true opinion and knowledge; and of these knowledge has been shown not to be the guide in political conduct, since no statesman can teach others to be like himself (98 E–99 A).

Is virtue the result of right opinion and divine dispensation?

From all these considerations there emerges the conclusion that the successful conduct of politics is due to sound opinion (εἰδοκία), not based on knowledge: so that statesmen are in much the same condition as diviners and soothsayers, who say many things that are true, but understand nothing of what they are saying; and we may fairly call them inspired persons, and say that virtue comes by divine dispensation, without intelligence, if it comes at all (99 C–E), unless indeed we were
to meet with some one who was able to make others like himself, in which case we should instantly set down such a person as the one reality among a set of moving shadows (1oo A). This then is the answer to the question with which we started, namely, that virtue comes by divine dispensation (θεία μοίρα). But we shall have a better chance of arriving at truth, if, at another time, we begin by inquiring what virtue is.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT.

The argument of the Meno seems to fall naturally into three main divisions—

I. The attempt to define virtue, arising out of the initial question—'Can virtue be taught?' 70 A–80 D.

II. The exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence, in answer to the sophistical argument against the possibility of search; 80 D–86 C.

III. Hypothetical resumption of the original question; 86 C–100 C.

These three parts may be further subdivided as follows—

I. The attempt to define virtue; 70–80 D.
   a. Introductory; 70–71 D.
   b. Enumeration of virtues in mistake for a definition; 71 E–73 C.
   c. First definition of virtue, as 'the capacity to rule over men,' refuted; 73 C–74 A.
   d. Method of definition illustrated by the case of figure, which is defined to be
      (1) the sole invariable concomitant of colour;
      (2) the termination of a solid, 74 B–76 A,
      and of colour, which is defined, in accordance with the philosophy of Empedocles, to be 'an emanation from bodies commensurate with and perceptible by sight;,' 76 A–E.
   e. Second definition of virtue, 'To desire noble things and be able to attain them,' refuted; 77 A–78 B.
   f. Third definition of virtue, as 'The power of providing what is good,' refuted; 78 C–79 E.
   g. Despair of Meno; 80 A–D.
II. *Exposition of the doctrine of reminiscence;* 80 D–86 B.
   a. Dilemma against the possibility of search; 80 D, E.
   b. Statement of the doctrine of reminiscence; 81 A–82 B.
   c. Illustration of the doctrine in the person of Meno's page (82 B–86 B) comprising
      (1) The dissipation of fancied knowledge; 82 C–83 E.
      (2) Inculcation of the advantages of doubt; 84 A–C.
      (3) The recovery of knowledge within the soul; 84 D–86 B.

III. *Hypothetical resumption of the original question;* 86 C–100 C.
   a. Illustration of the meaning of hypothesis; 86 C–87 C.
   b. Proof that virtue is knowledge or prudence, and must therefore come by teaching, and not by nature; 87 D–89 B.
   c. Objection. There are no teachers (89 C, D); for
      (1) The Sophists, who profess virtue, are not so; 89 E–92 D.
      (2) Neither are the statesmen who display it; 92 E–94 E.
   d. General uncertainty as to the teachability of virtue; 95 A–96 B.
   e. Resulting conclusion that virtue cannot be taught; 96 B, C.
   f. Discovery that right opinion may serve as a substitute for knowledge; 96 D–98 C.
   g. Recapitulation of the argument, culminating in the conclusion that virtue, as we know it, is not founded on knowledge, and must therefore be a kind of inspiration; 98 C–100 C.
MENO.
ΜΕΝΩΝ

[ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς' πειραστικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΜΕΝΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΑΙΣ ΜΕΝΩΝΟΣ,
ΑΝΤΟΣ.

ἀγέ 70 ΜΕΝ. Ἐχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σωκράτει, ἀρα διδακτόν ἡ ἀρετή; ἡ οὖ διδακτόν ἄλλη ἀσκητῶν; ἡ οὔτε ἀσκητῶν οὔτε μαθητῶν, ἄλλα φύσει παραγίνεται τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἡ ἄλλῃ τινὶ τρόπῳ;]

ΣΩ. Ὡ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θεταλοῦ εὐδόκιμων ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἐλλησι καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ' ἑπτακήτῃ τε Β καὶ πλουτῷ, νῦν δὲ, ὅσ' ἔμοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφία, καὶ οὖχ ἦκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολίται Δαρισαίοι. τούτου δὲ υμῶν αἰτίος ἐστὶ Γοργίας ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστᾶς ἐπὶ σοφίας εἶληφεν Ἀλεναδὼν τοῖς πρώτοις, δῶν ὁ σὸς ἐραστὴς ἔστιν Ἀριστίππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θεταλῶν καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ἔθος υμᾶς ἔδικεν, ἀφάλομος τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς τούς C εἰδότας, ἄτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἔρωταν τῶν Ἐλληνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὃ τι ἂν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτι
οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. ἐνθάδε δέ, ὃ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμός τῆς σοφίας γέγονε, καὶ τὸ κινδύνευε ἐκ τῶν τῶν τόπων παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινὰ ἐθέλεις οὐτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἔρει· ὃ ἔξε, κινδύνευος σοι δοκεῖν μακάριος τὸν εἶναι ἁρετὴν γοῦν εἶτε διδακτὸν εἰδὸς ὅστις τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι· ἐγώ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἶτε διδακτὸν εἶτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτό, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἁρετή, τυγχάνω εἰδῶς.

Ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὃ Μένων, οὐτως ἔχω· συμπένωμας τοῖς πολίταις τούτοις τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτῶν καταμέμφομαι ὅς οὖν εἰδὼς περὶ ἁρετῆς τὸ παράπαν ὃ δὲ μὴ οἴδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἄν ὅποιον γέ τι εἰδεῖν; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδα τὸ εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει το παράπαν ὅστις ἐστιν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἶτε καλὸς εἶτε πλούσιος εἶτε καὶ γενναῖος ἔστιν, εἶτε καὶ τὰναντία τοῦτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἶδα τ' εἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς οὖν ὃ τὶ ἁρετὴ ἔστιν οἴθα, ἀλλὰ τἀῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οὐκας ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

ΣΩ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὃ ἔταὑρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

ΜΕΝ. Τι δαλ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε.

ΜΕΝ. Εἴητα οὐκ ἔδοκει σοι εἰδέναι;

ΣΩ. Οὔ πάνω εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὃ Μένων, ὅστε οὐκ ἔχω εἴπειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πῶς μοι τὸτε ἔδοξεν· ἀλλ' ἰσως ἐκεῖνος τοι οἴδη, καὶ σοὶ ὃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν· ἀναμνησθοῦνυ ὁμοὶ με, πῶς ἔλεγεν. ἐλ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἶπε· δοκεὶ γὰρ ἡ που σοι ἀπερ ἕκειψ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοιγε.
ΣΩ. 'Έκείνου μὲν τούτων ἐσμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀπεστίων σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τι φής ἁρετὴν εἶναι; εἰπὼν καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐνυχεστατον ψεύσμα ἐψευσμένος ὥ, ἄν φανής σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργλας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκῶς μηδενὶ πῶς τε εἰδοπε ἐντευχηκέναι.

Ε' MEN. 'Αλλ' οὐ χαλεπῶν, ὃ Σωκράτες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἶ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἁρετῆν, ῥάδιον, ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἁρετῆ, ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πολεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἕχθροις κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβείςθαι μηδὲν τοιούτων παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἁρετῆν, οὐ χαλεπῶν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεὶ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἶκεῖν, σωζούσαν τε τὰ ἐνδον καὶ κατήκουσιν οὕσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἀλλή ἐστὶ παιδὸς ἁρετῆ,

72 καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἔλευθερον, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὄνου. καὶ ἀλλαὶ πάμπολλαι ἁρεταὶ εἰσίν, ὡστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἁρετής πέρι ὧ τ' ἐστί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικίῶν πρὸς ἐκαστόν ἔργον ἐκάστῳ Ἴμων ἢ ἁρετή ἐστιν ὁ σαῦτοις δὲ, οὕμα, ὃ Σωκράτες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

ΣΩ. Πολλῆ γέ τινι εὐνυχία ἕοικα κεχρήσθαι, ὃ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ἥττων ἁρετὴν σμὴν τὶ ἀνεύρηκα ἁρετῶν παρὰ σῷ κειμένῳ. ἀγά, ὃ Μένων, κατὰ ταυτὴν τὴν

Β' εἰκόνα τῇ περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἰ μου ἐρομένου μελίτησιν περὶ οὐσίας ἦ τ' ὄργανος ἐστι, πολλᾶς καὶ παντοδάπας ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἰ σε ἡρόμην ἅρα τούτῳ φής πολλὰς καὶ παντοδάπας εἶναι καὶ διαφιερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδέν διαφερόουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς τε, οἷον ἡ κάλλει ἡ μεγέθει ἡ ἀλλ' τῷ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτήθεις;

MEN. Τοῦτ' ἐγώγε, ὅτι οὐδέν διαφερόουσιν, ἢ μελίττας εἰσὶν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.
ΜΕΝΟ, 72 Ρ - 73 Α.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ὅν πεποίησό μετὰ ταῦτα, τοῦτο τοῦτον μοι αὐτὸν εἶπέ, ὡς Μένων, ὃς ὅδε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταύτων εἰσὶν ἀπασαι' τί τοῦτο φής εἶναι; εἷχες δὴ ποι ἂν τί μοι εἰπέων;

MEN. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΩ. Οὗτοι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσὶν, ἐν γε τί εἴδος ταύτων ἀπασαι ἔχονσιν, δι' ὃ εἴδον ἀρεταῖς, εἰς δὲ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψας τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτησάντι ἑκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὐσα ἁρετή ἢ ὃ μανθάνεις ὅ τι λέγω; Τὸ τὸ καθό γε μοι μανθάνειν ὅμως βουλομαί γε πως κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτήμενον.

ΣΩ. Πάτερος δὲ περὶ ἁρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὡς Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἄνδρος εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναῖκος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἵσχυος ὀσφαύσως; ἄλλη μὲν ἄνδρος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγιεία, ἄλλη δὲ γυναῖκος; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἰδὸς ἐστιν, εάν περ ὑγιεία ἢ, εάν τε εὐ ἄνδρι εἀν τε εὐ ἄλλῳ ὅρων ἢ;

MEN. Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὑγιεία γε εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναῖκος.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἵσχύς; εάν περ ἵσχυρα γυνὴ ἢ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἤσχυρα ἵσχυρὰ ἴσται; τῷ γάρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἵσχυς εἶναι ἢ ἵσχυς, εάν τε εὐ ἄνδρι ἢ εάν τε εὐ γυναίκι ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

MEN. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ ἁρετή πρὸς τὸ ἁρετῆ εἶναι διόλους τι, εάν 73 τε ἐν παιδί ἢ εάν τε ἐν πρεσβύτη, εάν τε εὐ γυναίκι εὰν τε εὐ ἄνδρι;

MEN. Ἐμοιγε πῶς δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
ΣΩ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἀνθρώπος μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὐ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἶκαν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐξαγαγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οἶον τε εὐ διοικεῖν ἃ πόλιν ἢ οἶκαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιόν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοὶν ἄν περ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσι, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη διοικήσουσιν; 
ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοί εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἄνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνονται.
ΣΩ. Τί δαί; παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ἄντεσ καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοί ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο;
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖ καὶ δίκαιοι;
ΜΕΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πάντες ἄρ' ἀνθρωποὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ εἰσὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.
ΜΕΝ. Ἐοικεῖν.
ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄν δῆτοι, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ ἢν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἄν τρόπῳ ἄγαθοι ἔσον.
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τούτων ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ πάντων ἦστι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι, τι αὐτῷ φησὶ Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου.
ΜΕΝ. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἄρχειν οἶον τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώ-
Πων; εἴπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων. Ἀνεπίκρ.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ, ὁ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οὖν τε
eînai toû dešpótou, kal ô dokêi soi ëti ãn õûllos eînai õ ár{xhov

MEN. Òn pánû mou dokêi, òv Sôkrates.

ΣΩ. Oû gàp eîkós, òz árístê. ëti gàp kal tôde skôpcu: árçeîn fîh sóv t' eînai: ou prosothîsoumen autòsê to dikaios, ãdzkws de m'h;

MEN. ÒÎmaî ëgôge: ò gàp dikaiosûnh, òv Sôkrates, áret'h ëstîn.

ΣΩ. Póteron áret'h, òv Mênnw, òz áret'h tîs;

MEN. Pôs òûto légeîs;

ΣΩ. 'Wî perî ãllou ôtouon. sóv, eî õûllei, stroy-
gulôtîtos perî ëpoum' an ëgôge, ôti skîma tî ëstîn, óúx oútws ãplôs ôti skîma. diâ tàûta de oútws ãn ëpoum, ôti kai ãllal ëstî ñkîma.

MEN. 'Oròws ge légon sô, ëpetê kai ëgôw lègon ou mövon dikaiosûnh ãllal kai ãllalas eînai áretâs.

ΣΩ. Toûnas tâûtas; eîpê' sóv kai ëgôw sól ëpoumî 74 ãn kai ãllal skîma, ë' me këleûnos kai só sô ouî ëmîl eîpê ãllalas áretâs.

MEN. 'H ìvôreîa tôûnh ëmoïge dokêî áret'h ëînai kai swfrhosûnh kai sôfia kai megaloîprépîa kai ãllal pámpollal.

ΣΩ. Pálw, òv Mênnw, tàûtn pepoonhameun' pollâs aû eufrîkaumen áretâs múan ëttoûtes, ãllou trôpun ô vûn ð'h tîn de múan, ô diâ pàntwv tòûtwv ëstîn, ou dúnamètha ìvneíren.

MEN. Òn gàp ðûnamal pòw, òv Sôkrates, òs sô ëttês, B múan áret'h ëgôw lâbeîn kâtâ pàntwv, õûper ën tôis ãllalos.

ΣΩ. Eîkòtwos ge' ãll' ëgôw prôsûnhîsoumai, ênàn oîs t' ò, ãmás prôsbîdsai. múthaînes gàp pòw, õû oútws i' êxei perî pàntos' eî tîs ñe ànérîoto tòûto, ò vûn ð'h
ἔγω ἔλεγον, τί ἐστι σχῆμα, ὡς Μένων; εἶ αὐτὸ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἀπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμα τι; εἶπες δήπον ἂν ὅτι σχῆμα τι.

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἐστὶ σχῆματα; MEN. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε προσαναρώτα σε ὅποια, ἔλεγες ἂν; MEN. Ἐγώγε.  

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὕτε εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὁσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὃ τι ἐστι, καὶ εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἔρωτῶν, πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρώμα ἐστιν ἢ χρώμα τι; εἶπες ἄν ὅτι χρώμα τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυχάνει ὅντα; MEN. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ γε σε ἐκεῖλεν λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες ἄν ἄλλα, ἃ ὅδεν ἦττον τυχάνει ὅντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ;  

MEN. Ναί. 

ΣΩ. Εἶ ὅπερ ἐγὼ μετήρει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἂεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἄλλα μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἄλλ' ἑπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐνὶ τινὶ προσαγορεύεις ὅνοματι, καὶ φής οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὃ τι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑναυτία ὅντα ἀλλήλοις, τί ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ οὐδὲν ἦττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλου ἢ τὸ εὔθυ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα, Εἰ καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῇς τὸ στρογγύλου σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθῦ; ἢ οὖχ οὕτω λέγεις;  

MEN. Ἐγώγε. 

ΣΩ. Ἂρ' οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγης, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῇς τὸ στρογγύλου εἶναι στρογγύλου ἢ εὖθυ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὔθυ ἢ στρογγύλου;  

MEN. Οὐ δήποτε, ὡς Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν σχήμα γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῆς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλου τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἔτερον τοῦ ἔτερου.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο, οὔ τοῦτο ὅνομά ἔστι τὸ σχήμα; πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτώντες οὖτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἐγώγη ὃ τι βούλει, ὃ ἀνθρώπε, οὐδὲ οἴδα ὃ τι λέγεις· ἵσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταύτῶν; ἢ οὖδε ἐπὶ τούτοις; ὃ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἴπειν, εἰ τις ἔρωτής τι ἔστι, ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὔθει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταύτων ἐπὶ πᾶσι· πειρῶ εἴπειν, ἵνα καὶ γεννήται σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρυσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Μὴ, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴπε. Β

ΣΩ. Βούλει σοι χαράσωμαι;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἴπειν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώγη.

ΣΩ. Προθυμητέον τοῖνυν· ἄξιον γάρ.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πειρώμεθά σοι εἴπειν, τί ἔστι σχήμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχει αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γάρ δὴ ἡ ἳμιν τοῦτο σχήμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν οὖτων τυχάνει χρώματι αἰτὶ ἐπόμενον. ἰκανός σοι, ἡ ἄλλος πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γάρ κἂν οὖτως ἀγαπητῇ εἴ μοι ἀρετῆν εἴποις.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε εἴπησε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΜΕΝ. Ὅτι σχήμα ποῦ ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὃ αἰτὶ χρῶς ἐπέται. εἶπεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρῶαν τις μὴ φαίη ἐιδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἀσκοῦσας ἀποροῖ ὅσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;
ΣΩ. Τάληθη ἐγώγετα καὶ εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εὑρήκατι ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρωτόμενος, εἴποιμι. 

Δὲν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰρηκόμενοι εἶ ἐν ἕος ὑπὸφορὰς λέγωσιν, σὺν ἑργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἑλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὀσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ὑπὸ φίλοι ὤντες βούλουντο ἀλλήλους διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρατήριαν πῶς καὶ διαλεκτικῶτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ὅσω τὸ διαλεκτικῶτερον μή μονὸν τάληθη ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ ἐκεῖνοι δὲν ἀν προσομολογή εἰδόθαι ὁ ἐρωτάμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. δὲν ἕγεργα μοι τελευτητικῶς τελευτητικῶς; τοιοῦτος λέγω οἶον πέρας καὶ ἐσχατὸν πάντα ταῦτα ταῦτόν τι λέγω. ἵσοσ δὲν ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροντο. ἀλλὰ σὺ γέ που καλεῖσ τετελευτηκέναι τὸ τοιοῦτον βουλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὁ λέγεις.

76 ΣΩ. Τί δ’; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖσ τι, καὶ ἐτερον αὐτοτικῶν, οἶον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίαις; 

ΜΕΝ. Ἑγώγε καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἦδε τοῖνυν δὲν μάθοις μοι ἄτοῦτων, σχῆμα ὁ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντός σχῆματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὅ τὸ στερεόν περαινεῖ, τοῦτ’ εἶναι σχῆμα ὑπὸ περὰν συλλαβῶν εἴποιμι στερεοῦν πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Τῷ δὲ σχῶμα τί λέγεις, ὁ Σῶκρατες; 

ΣΩ. Τῆρβριστῆς γ’ εἰ, ὁ Μένων ἄνδρὶ πρεσβύτηρον πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἔθερε. 

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴν μοι σὺ τοῦτ’ εἴπης, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.
ΜΕΝΟ, 76 B – E.

ΣΩ. Καν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γυνη, ὁ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς· εἰ καὶ ἐραστάι σοι ἐπὶ εἰσίν.
ΜΕΝ. Τί δὴ;
ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδέν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ὁπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυπῆτες, ἀτε τυραννεύοντες, ἐὼς ἄν ἐν ὀρα ὃς. καὶ ἀμα ἔμοι ἵσως κατέγυνωκας, ὅτι ἐμὲ ὁ ἦττων τῶν καλῶν. χαρισμαί σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν ὦν χάρισαι.
ΣΩ. Βούλειν οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίλαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ἄν σοῦ μᾶλιστα ἀκολοουθήσαι;
ΜΕΝ. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροᾷ τινα τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;
ΜΕΝ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὐς καὶ δὴ ὃν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττεις ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μελζοὺς εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. ᾧ ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅψιν καλεῖς τί;
ΜΕΝ. ᾧ ἔγῳς.
ΣΩ. ᾧ ἐκ τοῦτων δὴ ἔννεσ᾽ ὅ τοι λέγω, ἐφ᾽ Ῥύδαρος. ἔστι γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροῇ σχημάτων ὃψιν σύμμετρον καὶ αἰσθητὸς.
ΜΕΝ. ᾧ Ἀριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῦτη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.
ΣΩ. ᾧ ἰσως γὰρ σοι κατὰ συμπυγνωμαί ἔρηται· καὶ ἀμα, οἴμαι, ἔννοεῖς, ὅτι ἔχοις ἄν ἔξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν, ὁ ἔστι, καὶ ὀρμῆν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τραγική γάρ ἐστιν, δὲ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὡστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἡ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.
MEN. 'Εμοιγε.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὖκ ἐστιν, δὲ παί 'Αλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πεῖθω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη βελτίων οἶμαι δὲ σοῦ ἀν σοι δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὡσπερ χθές ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖον σοι ἀπείναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ' εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μνημείας.

77 MEN. 'Αλλὰ περιμένοιμ οὖν, δὲ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι εὐπολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλ' ὅπως μή σοι ὅλος τ' ἐσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἦθι δή πειρώ καὶ σοῦ ἐμοὶ τὴν υπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετής πέρι, ὃ τι ἐστι, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασί τοὺς συντρίβοντας τι ἐκάστοτε οἱ σκόπτοντες, ἀλλ' ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιὴ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἁρετή τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρ' ἐμοῖ εὔληφας.
MEN. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, δὲ Σώκρατες, ἁρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαῖρειν τε καλοῦσι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατῶν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.
ΣΩ. Ἀρα λέγεις τῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;
MEN. Μάλιστα γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, Ἕτέρων δὲ οἱ τῶν ἁγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ἀριστεῖς, δοκοῦσι σοι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;
MEN. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;
MEN. Ναί.
Σω. Οίλομενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκουσθε, ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. 'Αμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Σω. Ἡ γὰρ δοκεῖ τὸι σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Μάλιστα.
Σω. Τὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἢ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;
ΜΕΝ. Γενέσθαι τῷ γὰρ ἄλλῳ;
Σω. Πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὕφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ὃ ἀν γένηται, ἡ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ὃ ἀν παρῇ;
ΜΕΝ. Εἰσὶ μὲν ὦ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὕφελεῖν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὖ· γιγνώσκουσθε ὅτι βλάπτει.
Σω. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσθι σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ, ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὕφελεῖν;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.
Σω. Οὐκοῦν δήλου ὅτι οὕτωι μὲν οὖ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἁγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ, ἄλλα ἐκεῖνοι, ἢ ὄντω ἁγαθὰ εἶναι, ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα· γε κακὰ· ὡστε οἱ ἁγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἵομενοι ἁγαθὰ εἶναι (δήλου ὅτι) τῶν ἁγάθων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὖ;
ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὕτωι γε.
Σω. Τὶ δὴ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φηγε σὺ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον, ὃ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσι δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσουσιν ὑπ' αὐτῶν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη.
Σω. Ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὕτωι οὖκ οἴονται 78 ἄθλιους εἶναι καθ' ὁσον βλάπτονται;
ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.
Σω. Τοὺς δὲ ἄθλιους οὖ κακοδαίμονας;
ΜΕΝ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σῶκρατες.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὡς Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδέ尔斯, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται (τοιουτόσ) εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι, ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτάσθαι;
Β. ΜΕΝ. Κινδυνεύεις ἄληθή λέγειν, ὡς Σῶκρατες· καὶ οὐδέ尔斯 βούλεσθαι τὰ κακὰ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρετή βούλεσθαι τε τάγαθα καὶ δύνασθαι;
ΜΕΝ. Εἰπον γάρ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πάσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἐτερός τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων;
ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δήλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλον, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἀν εἰ πάρειν.
ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἅρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σοῦ λόγον κ ἁρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τάγαθα.
ΜΕΝ. Παντάπασι μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σῶκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.
ΣΩ. Ἰδοὺ οὖν δὴ καὶ τούτῳ εἰ ἀληθῆς λέγεις· ἵσως γὰρ ἄν εὖ λέγοις. τάγαθα φής οἶτον ὃ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἁρετὴν εἶναι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἀγαθᾶ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἶτον ὑγιεινὸν τε καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ χρυσὸν λέγω καὶ ἀργυρίου κτάσθαι καὶ τιμᾶς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχᾶς; μὴ ἄλλ’ ἄττα λέγεις τάγαθα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

f. 3rd deﬁnition of virtue, as ‘The power of providing what is good’, refuted, 78 C-79 E.
MENO. Οὐκ, ἄλλα πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ χρυσόν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι δ ἄρετή ἔστιν, ὡς φησί Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστίθησι τι τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὁ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ δικάς, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἄλλα κἂν ἄδικως τις αὖτα πορίζηται, ὅμοιως σὺ αὖτα ἄρετῆν καλεῖς;

MEN. Οὐ δήποτε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλα κακλαν.

ΣΩ. Πάντως δήποτε δεὶ ἁρα, ὡς ἐοίκε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνη ἡ σωφροσύνη ἡ ὀσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἡ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἄρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἔσται ἄρετή, ἡ κατὰ πρότερον τάγαθά.

MEN. Πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἄρετὴ γένοιτ' ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζων χρυσόν καὶ ἀργύριον, ἢταν μὴ δικαίων ἢ, μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἄρετὴ καὶ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ ἀπορία;

MEN. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἁρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἄρετὴ ἄν εἰη, ἄλλα, ὡς ἐοίκεν, ὃ μὲν ἄν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γλυκνηταί, ἄρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δὲ ἄν ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὃς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων ἐκαστὸν ὄλγον πρότερον μόριον ἄρετῆς ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

MEN. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Εἴπα, ὁ Μένων, παίζεις πρὸς με;

MEN. Τί δή, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὁτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἄρετήν, καὶ δῶντος παραδείγματα καθ' ὃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἡμέλησας, λέγεις
δὲ μοι, ὅτι ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν οἴνον τ' εἰναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης. τοῦτο δὲ φησὶ μόριον ἀρετῆς εἰναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκούν συμβαίνει ἔξ ὅποι ὀν ὁμολογεῖσ, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν, ὅ τι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φησὶ ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἑκαστὰ τούτων.

ΜΕΝ. Τί οὖν δή;

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ λέγω, ὅτι ἐμοὶ δεηθέντος ὅλου εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἐστί, πᾶσαν δὲ φὴς πράξειν ἀρετῆν εἰναι, ἕκαστῃ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττεται, ὅσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅ τι ἀρετή ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ Ἡδὴ γνωσμένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅσο ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὃ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πράξεις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράξεις ἀρετὴ ἐστιν. ἢ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἄλλ' ὁτί τινα εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅ τι ἐστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ' ἐγὼ σοι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν τοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἑτὶ ζητομένων καὶ μῆπω ὀμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὡς Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τούνως, ὡς ἀρίστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἑτὶ ζητομένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὃ τι ἐστιν, οἶον διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὅτι οὖν, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοιν ἢ τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς
δεχόσεθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὑπότοις ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἢ λέγεις; ἣ οὖν ὑπὲρ σοι δοκῖ λέγειν;
ΜΕΝ. Ἑμοίγε δοκεῖς ὁρθῶς λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριμαι τοῖνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί φῆς, ἀρετῆρι εἴσαι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἐταύρος σου;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ Σώκρατες, ἥκουν μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ οὖν ἀλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύει με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις, οὕτως με στὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δέ τι καὶ σκόψαι, ὁμοίωτάτως εἴσαι τὸ τε εἴδος καὶ τάλλα ταυτίᾳ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ, καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀλλ' πλησιάζουτα καὶ ἀπτόμενον ναρκῶν ποιεῖ· καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτον τι πεποιηκέναι, ναρκῶν. ἠλθός γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ Β στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὦ τι ἀποκρίνωμαι σοι. καλτοὶ μυριάκες γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἰρήκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνω εὖ, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν νῦν δὲ οὖν ὧ τι ἐστί τὸ παρὰπαν ἔχω εἴπειν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖς εἰ βουλεύσεθαι οὐκ ἐκπλεών ἐνθεύον οὖν ἀποδημῶν εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαύτα ποιεῖς, τάχ' ἄν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθεῖς.
ΣΩ. Πανοῦργος εἰ, ὁ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἕξηπατησάς με.
ΜΕΝ. Τί μάλιστα, ὁ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Γεγυνώσκω οὐ ἔνεκά με εἰκασας.
ΜΕΝ. Τίνος δὴ οἴει;
ΣΩ. Ἄνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτο οἴδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὃτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι. ἄνυσι· τελεί γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γὰρ, οἴμαι, τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαι σε. ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μὲν ἡ
νάρκη αυτή ναρκώσα ούτω καὶ τοὺς άλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔσκα αυτήν· εἶ δὲ μή, οὐ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς άλλους ποιώ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν ούτω καὶ τοὺς άλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς, δέ

D ἐστιν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μέντοι ἱσως πρότερον μὲν ἥδησθα πρᾶ γνοῦ ἄφασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὁμοιος εἰ οὐκ εἶδότι. οὕμω δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὃ τι ποτὲ ἐστιν.

MEN. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ξητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατε, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἴσθα το παράπαν ὃ τι ἐστὶ; ποιον γὰρ ἄν οὐκ οἴσθα προθέμενος ξητήσεις; ἢ εἴ καί ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἶσε ὅτι τούτο ἐστιν, ὃ σὺ οὐκ ἥδησθα;

Ε ΣΩ. Μανθάνω οἷον βοῦλει λέγειν, ὥς Μένων. ὃς τοῦτον ὃς εἰστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὁς οὐκ ἀρα ἐστὶ ξητείν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ὃ οἴδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἴδεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἀν γε ὃ οἴδε ξητοῖ· οἴδε γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ξητήσεσι: οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἴδεν οὔδε γὰρ οἴδεν ὃ τι ξητήσει.

81 MEN. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι δ λόγος οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατε;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MEN. Ἐχεῖς λέγειν ὅπῃ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγώγα ἀκήκοα γάρ ἀνθρῶν τε καὶ γνωστῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεία πράγματα—

MEN. Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλὸν.

MEN. Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;

ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσὶ τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ ἱερεῖων ὥσιν μεμέληκε περὶ ὃν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷος τῷ

Β εἴναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡσι θείοι εἰσιν. δὲ δέ λέγουσι, ταυτὶ
εστιν ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἰ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. 
φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ 
tοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὅ ὅ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ 
pάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλυτωσθαι ἐκ οὐδέποτε δὲν ὅ ὅ 
ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβίωντω τοῖς βλών·
οὖν γὰρ ἂν Φερσεφόνα ποιῶν παλαιοῦ πένθεος 
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὑπερθεν ἀλιον κελουν ἐνάτῳ ἔτει 
ἀνδιδοὶ ψυχῶν πάλιν,
ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆς ἁγανολ 
καὶ σθένει κραπτοι σοφία τε μέγιστοι 
ἀνδρεῖς αὐξοντι· ἐς δὲ τοὺν λούτων χρόνων ἠρωες ἁγνοι 
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέσων.

"Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος τε οὕσα καὶ πολλάκις 
γεγονὼν, καὶ ἑωρακὼν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἁἰδον 
καὶ πάντα ἁρῆματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν ὃ ὅτε 
οὐδὲν ϑαμμαστόν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἴο 
τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμυνθήναι, ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἡπί-
στατο. ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦσα οὕσης, 
καὶ μεμάθηκας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν τοῖς 
μόνον ἀναμυνθέντα, ὃ ὅ ταῖς ἀθανάσις ἀνθρώπωι, 
τάλλα πάντα αὐτῶν ἀνευρεῖν, εάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ἢ καὶ μὴ 
ἀποκάμηρ ἄητων τοῦ γὰρ ἄητων ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν 
ἀνάμυνσις ὀλον ἔστιν. οὐκοίν δεὶ πείθονται δοῦ 
ὁ ἐρυθρικὼ τοῦ ἐρυθρικῷ λόγῳ οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢμᾶς ἄργους ποιῆσει 
καὶ ἔστι τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁδύνατον, ὅ ὅ 
δὲ ἐργατικὸς τε καὶ ἐργατικὸς ποιεῖ· ὃ ἐγώ πιστεύων 
ἀληθεὶς εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ἄρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν.

MEN. Ναὶ, ὅ Σῶκρατες ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, 
ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἂν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνα-
μυνήσις ἔστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξας ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀρτι εἰποῦ, ὃ Μένων, ὃτι πανοῦργος εἰ·
καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾶς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὥστε οὐ φημὶ διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀνάμμησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τάναντι λέγων.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους αὐτοῦ εἶ πῶς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδειξαθαί, ὅτι ἔχει ὀσπέρ λέγεις, ἐνδείξαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐστι μὲν οὐ βίον, ὄμως δὲ ἔθελον προ-
θυμηθήναι σοῦ ἔνεκεν. ἀλλὰ μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν

Πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τοις τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἑνα, ὅντων βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδειξώμαι.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε. δεύτερο πρόσελθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλλην μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἐλληνίζει;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὀλοκερνής.

ΣΩ. Πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ὅποτε ἀν σοι φαίνηται, ἡ ἀναμμηνευκόμενος ἡ μαθήματός παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλὰ προσέξοι.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι, ὦ παῖ, γυγνώσκεις τετράγωνον

Κ χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἔστων;

ΠΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὶν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἵσας ἔχων τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὖσας;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ταυταῖς τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἵσας ἔχουν;

ΠΑΙ. Ἑλ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἑλαττοῦν;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ὅπως εἰ ἄυτῇ ἡ πλευρὰ ὅπως ποδὸν καὶ ἄυτῃ ὅπως, πόσων ἂν εἰ ἄυτῃ ποδὸν τὸ ὅλον; ὥστε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἂν ταύτῃ ὅπως ποδῶν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἔνος ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἀπαῖ ἄν ὅπως ὅπως ποδῶν τὸ χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοὶ ποδοῖ καὶ ταύτη, ἄλλο τι ἡ 
δις δυοὶ γίγνεται;
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνεται.
ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἄρα δις γίγνεται ποδῶν;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πόσοι οὖν εἶσιν οἱ δύο δις πόδες; λογισάμενος 
eιπέ.
ΠΑΙ. Τέταρτος, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν γένοιτ' ἀν τούτον τοῦ χωρίου ἔτερον 
διπλάσιον, τοιούτου δέ, ἵππας ἑχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς 
ἀσπερ τούτο;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πόσων οὖν ἦνται ποδῶν;
ΠΑΙ. Ἄκτω.
ΣΩ. Φέρε ὅ, τειρῳ μοι εἶπεῖν πηλική τις ἦνται ἐκεῖ- 
νού ἡ γραμμὴ ἐκάστη; ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτε δυοὶ ποδοὶν 
τι δὲ ἡ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ διπλασίον;
ΠΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅ, τῷ Σῶκρατες, ὃτι διπλασία.
ΣΩ. Ὅρας, ὁ Μένος, ὡς ἐγὼ τούτον οὐδὲν διδά-
σκω, ἀλλὰ ἔρωτο τάντα, καὶ νῦν οὕτω ὦεται εἰδέναι, 
ὅποιᾳ ἦσιν ὃ ἂ ἢ τὸ ἑκτάπον χωρίον γενήσεται; ἡ οὖ 
δοκεῖ σοι;
ΜΕΝ. Ἐμοίγε.
ΣΩ. Οἴδεν ὦν;
ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. ὦεται δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;
ΜΕΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Θεῶ· δὴ αὐτῶν ἀναμιμησόμενον ἑφεξῆς, ὡς 
δὲ ἀναμιμησόκεσθαι. σὺ δὲ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας 
γραμμῆς φῆς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι; τοιὸνθε 83
λέγω, μὴ ταύτη μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἵσον πανταχῇ ἐστώ δοσπέρ τοιτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὅκτωπον ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἐσεθῶς.

ΠΑΙ. Ἑμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διπλάσια αὐτῇ ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἔτεραν τοσάντην προσθῆκεν ἐνθένδε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης δὴ, φής, ἐσται τὸ ὅκτωπον χωρίον, ἂν τέταρτος τοσάνται γένωνται;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

Β. ΣΩ. Ἀναγραψόμεθα δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἵσον τέταρας.

ΠΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ταυτὶ τέταρα, ἂν ἐκαστὸν ἵσον τούτῳ ἐστὶ τῷ τετράποδι;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Πόσουν οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ Δία.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον;

ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὅποι, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

ΠΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα, οὐχὶ;

ΠΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ὁκτώπον δ' ἀπὸ πολας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;

ΠΑΙ. Φημ.λ.
ΣΩ. Τετράπονυ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησί τούτῳ;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Εἰς εὖ τὸ δὲ ὀκτάπονυ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν διπλάσιον ἐστὶ, τούτου δὲ ἡμῖν;
ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἐσται ἡ τοσαῦτης γραμμής, ἀπὸ ἐλάττωνος, δὲ ἡ τοσησθὶ ἡ οὖ;
ΠΑΙ. 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Καλῶς τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνον. καὶ μοι λέγει· οὐχ ἣδε μὲν δυοίν ποδοῖν ἢν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα τῆν τοῦ ὀκτάπονος χωρίου γραμμήν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ὄπονος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετρά-

ΠΑΙ. Δεῖ.
ΣΩ. Πειρὼ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῆς αὐτῆν εἶναι.
ΠΑΙ. Τρίποδοια.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀντέρ τρίπονος ἢ, τὸ ἡμισυ τούτης προ-
ληψόμεθα καὶ ἐσται τρίπονος; οὐκοῦν γὰρ οἴδε, ὅ δὲ εἰσ· καὶ ἐνθένθαι ὀσαῦτως ἄνω μὲν οἴδε, ὅ δὲ εἰσ· καὶ
gήγεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὁ φῆς.
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ἢ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον
χωρίον τριῶν τριῶν τριῶν ποδῶν γήγεται;
ΠΑΙ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Τρεῖσ δὲ τριῶς πόσοι εἰςὶ πόδες;
ΠΑΙ. 'Εννέα.
ΣΩ. 'Εδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;
ΠΑΙ. 'Οκτώ.
ΣΩ. Οὖν ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς τρίπονος πω τὸ ὀκτώπονν
χωρίον γήγεται.
ΠΑΙ. Οὔ δήτα.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἀπὸ πολας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς
καὶ ἐι μὴ βούλεις ἀρίθμειν, ἀλλὰ δείξου ἀπὸ πολας.

ΠΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ
οἶδα.

ΣΩ. 'Εννοεῖς αὐ, ὁ Μένων, οὗ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ βαδίζων ὦδε
tου ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦδει μὲν οὖν,
ἡ τις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτὼποδος χωρίου γραμμῆ, ὡσπερ
οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἔτο τ’ αὐτὴν τότε εἶδέναι,
καὶ θαρραλεῖς ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἶδός, καὶ οὐχ ἥγειτο
ἀπορεῖν νῦν δὲ ἥγειται ἀπορεῖν ἡδη, καὶ ὡσπερ οὐκ
Β οἶδεν, οὐδ’ οἴεται εἶδέναι.

ΜΕΝ. 'Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὖκον νῦν βέλτιον ἐχεῖ περὶ τὸ πράγμα ὃ οὐκ
ἡδεῖ;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσατε καὶ ναρκᾶν ὡσπέρ
ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ὁυκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Προβργον γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ως ἐοικε, πρὸς
tο ἐξευρεῖν ὧτη ἐχεῖ. νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειν ἂν ἴδεως
οὐκ εἶδός, τότε δὲ ὥρδισ ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολ-
C λάκις ὀτ’ ἄν εὐ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς
δεὶ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἐχεῖν μήκει.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οἰεὶ οὖν ἄν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν
ἡ μανθάνειν τοῦτο, ὦ ψετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἶδός, πρὶν εἰς
ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγοσάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησε
το εἰδέναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὁ νητο ἀρα ναρκῆσας ;
MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὁ τι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὖθεν ἀλλ' ἡ ἐρωτώτων ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάκοντος φύλαττε δὲ ἂν ποῦ εὑρήσῃς με διδά-σκοντα καὶ διεξίοντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτώντα.

Δέγε γὰρ μοι σύ ὅτι μὲν τετράπον τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστὶ χωρίον; μανθάνεις;
ΠΑΙ. 'Εγώγε.
ΣΩ. 'Ετέρου δὲ αὐτῷ προσθείμεν ἂν τούτ' ἴσον;
ΠΑΙ. Ναλ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ τρίτου τόδε ἴσον ἐκατέρφ τούτων;
ΠΑΙ. Ναλ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσάμεθ' ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;
ΠΑΙ. Πάντως.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' τι οὖν γένοιτι ἂν τέτταρα ἵσα χωρία τάδε; Ε
ΠΑΙ. Ναλ.
ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίνεται;
ΠΑΙ. Τετραπλάσιον.
ΣΩ. Ἐδει δὲ διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι; ἢ οὐ με-μνησάι;
ΠΑΙ. Πάντως.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν ἀντίλαν τέμνουσά δίχα ἐκαστὸν τούτων τῶν χωρίων;
ΠΑΙ. Ναλ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὕται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἵσαι, περιέχουσαι τούτι τὸ χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Γίγνονται.
ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ πηλίκου τι ἐστὶ τούτο τὸ χωρίον;
ΠΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.
ΣΩ. Ὅχι τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἦμισυ εἰκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέμμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ ο_questus; ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Πόσα οὖν τηλικά ἐν τούτῳ ἐνεστὶν;
ΠΑΙ. Τέτταρα.
ΣΩ. Πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ;
ΠΑΙ. Δῶ.
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυνόν τί ἐστὶν;
ΠΑΙ. Διπλάσια.

Β
ΣΩ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπον γλύγεται;
ΠΑΙ. Ὅκτωπον.
ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ πολας γραμμῆς;
ΠΑΙ. Ἀπὸ ταύτης.
ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος;
ΠΑΙ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καλοῦσι δὲ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταῖοι ὅστ' ἐν ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνημα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀν, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ὃ παλί Μένωνος, γλύγοιτ' ἀν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρλον.
ΠΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὧν Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Τὰ σοι δόκει, ὃ Μένων; ἐστιν ἦπιτιν δόξαν οὐκ αὐτοῦ ὁστὸς ἀπεκρίνατο;

C
ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἐαυτοῦ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἤδει γε, ὡς ἐφαμεν ὀλύγου πρῶτερον.
ΜΕΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἐνήσαν δὲ γε αὐτῷ αὐταί αἱ δόξαι; ἢ οὐ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Τῷ οὐκ εἰδότῃ ἀρα περὶ ὃν ἄν μὴ εἰδῇ ἐνεισιν ἀληθείας δόξας περὶ τούτων ὃν οὐκ οἶδεν;
ΜΕΝ. Φαινεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν μὲν γε αὐτῷ ὅσπερ ὡναρ ἀρτὶ ἀνακε-
κήνηταί αἱ δόξαι αὐτὰ· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν τις ἀνερήσεται
πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶος οὐ τελευ-
τών οὔδενὸς ἦττον ἄκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων. 

ΜΕΝ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὔδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ’ ἐρωτήσαντος
ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς εἰς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην
οὐκ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὐν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἂν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει,
ἤτω ἐλαβὲ ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ ἐίχεν;

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἐίχεν, ἂει καὶ ἂν ἐπιστήμων
εἰ δὲ ἐλαβὲ ποτε, οὐκ ἄν ἐν γε τῷ νῦν βίω εἰληφῶς
ἐκῃ. ἢ δεδίδαξέ τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει Ε
περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταῦτα ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
μαθημάτων ἀπάντων. ἔστων οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα
dedidaxe; δικαιο γὰρ πον εἰ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν
tῷ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονε καὶ τέθραπται.

ΜΕΝ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδα ἐγώγε ὃτι οὔδεις πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐξεὶ δὲ τάστας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχὶ;

ΜΕΝ. Ἀνάγκη, ἢ Σωκρατεῖ, φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίω λαβὼν, οὐκ ἥδη τούτο
dèlou, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τῶν χρόνων εἴχε καὶ ἐμεμαθῆκεν;

ΜΕΝ. Φαινεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἢ τι οὐκ ἂν
ἀνθρώπος;

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΜΕΝΟ, 86 Α–Δ.

ΣΩ. Ἐλ σὺν ὑν ἂν ἡ ἁρώνοι καὶ ὑν ἂν μὴ ἡ ἀνθρωπός, ἔνσενται αὐτῷ ἀλήθεις δόξαι, ἂ ἐρωτήσει ἔπεγερθείσαι ἐπιστήμης γλύνονται, ἃρ' ὑν τὸν ἂεὶ ἁρώνον μεμαθηκὼν ἔσται ἡ ψυχή αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα ἁρώνον ἔστω ὁ οὖκ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπός.

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλ ἂεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὠντων ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ὅπως ἡ ψυχή εἶν, ὡστε θαρροῦντα χρή, ὅ μὴ τυχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος υὐν, τοῦτο ὅ ἔστιν ὅ μὴ μεμημένον, ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐν μοι δοκεῖσ ὅγειν, ὡς Σωκρατές, οὐκ ὁδὸν ὅπως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοὶ, ὡς Μένων. καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οὖκ ἂν πάνω ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διυσχυρισάμην· ὅτι ὁ οἴσμενοι δεῖν ςήτειν, ὅ μὴ τις οἶδε, βελτίων ἂν εἴμεν καὶ ἀνθρικότεροι καὶ ἕττον ἄργολ ἂς οἰολύμεθα, ὅ μὴ

C ἐπιστάμενα, μηδὲ δυνατον εἰναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δείν ζητεῖν,

περὶ τοῦτο πάνω ἂν διαμαχομὴν, εἰ οἶδον τε εἴην, καὶ

λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γε δοκεῖσ μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὡς

Σωκράτες.

ΣΩ. Βοῦλει ὅντιν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμοουσίως, ὅτι ζητητέους περὶ τοῦ μὴ τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κατοικίᾳ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἄρετή·

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὡς Σωκράτες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἡδονα, ὅπερ ἡρόμην τὸ πρώτον, καὶ σκέψασαι καὶ ἀκούσασα, πότερον ὡς διδάκτῳ ὄντι

D αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὃς φύσει ὃς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ

παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἄρετῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἡρχον, ὡς Μένων, μὴ μοῦν
ἐμαυτῷ ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴπε
didakτὸν εἴπε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅ τι ἔστι πρῶτον
ζητήσαμεν αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτόν μὲν οὖν ἐπιχειρεῖ
άρχειν, ὥσας ἐλεύθερος ἦς, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖσ τε
άρχειν καὶ ἀρχεῖς, συγχωρήσομαι σοι· τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν;
ἐσκεπτέον εἴναι, ποιῶν τί ἔστιν ὁ μήτω ἵσμεν Ε
ὁ τι ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἄλλα σμικρὸν γέ μοι τής ἀρχῆς
χάλασον, καὶ συγχωρήσον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αυτὸ σκοπεῦ
σθαι, εἴπε διδακτὸν ἔστιν εἴπε ὑποσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ
ὑποθέσεως ὁδὲ, ὥσπερ οὐ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται,
ἐπειδὰν τις ἔρηται αὐτοῦ, οἶνον περὶ χορλοῦ, εἰ οἶνον τε ἐς
τόν τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθήμαι, 87
εἴποι ἃν τις οὐ ποιήσῃ οἶδα εἰ ἔστι τούτῳ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’
ὥσπερ μὲν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προῴγγον οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ
πράγμα τοιάδε· εἰ μὲν ἔστι τούτῳ τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον,
οἶνον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ γραμμὴν παρατείνατα
ἐλλεῖπεν τοιοῦτῳ χωρίῳ, οἶνον ἂν αὐτῷ τὸ παρατεταμένον
ἡ, ἀλλ’ εἰ συμβαίνει μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνα
tόν ἔστι ταύτα παθεῖν’ ὑποθέμενοι οὖν ἔδειλο εἴπεῖν σοι
τὸ συμβαίνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, Β
εἴπε ἀδύνατον εἴπε μή.

Οὖτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὐθ’
ὁ τι ἔστιν οὐθ’ ὑπολογῶν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν
eἴπε διδακτὸν εἴπε οὐ διδακτὸν ἔστιν, ὅδε λέγοντες·
eἰ ποιῶν τί ἔστι τῶν περὶ τῆν ψυχῆν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρετῆς,
didakτὸν ἂν εἰῆ ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν· πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστω
tοιοῦ ἢ οἶνον ἐπιστήμη, ἢρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὖ, ἢ ὁ νῦν
dῆ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστὸν διαφέρετο δὲ μηδὲν ἤμιν
ὅποτέρω ἂν τῷ ὑμοῖματε χρώμεθα· ἀλλ’ ἢ ἣρα διδακτόν ἢ Σ
τοῦτο γε παντὶ δὴλον, οτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρω-
πος ἢ ἐπιστήμην.
MEN. Ἕμοιογε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτῶν ἂν εἴη.
MEN. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Τούτου μὲν ἀρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτῶν, τοιοῦτο δὲ οὐ.
MEN. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεὶ σκέψασθαι, πότερον ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή ἢ ἀλλοίου ἐπιστήμης.

D
MEN. Ἕμοιογε δοκεῖ τούτῳ μετὰ τούτῳ σκεπτέον εἰναί. b. Proof that virtue is knowledge or prudence, and must therefore come by teaching, and not by nature, 87 D–89 B.
ΣΩ. Τί δαί δή; ἄλλο τι ἡ ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸ φαμεν εἰναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἰναι;
MEN. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τί ἐστιν ἁγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωρὶς ζῷμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετή οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μὴδέν ἐστιν ἁγαθὸν, ὁ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἂν τιν' αὐτὸ ὑποτεύοντες εἰναι ὀρθῶς ὑποτεύοιμεν.

MEN. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἁρετὴ γ᾽ ἐσμὲν ἁγαθοὶ;
MEN. Ναὶ.

Ε
ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἁγαθοὶ, ὅφελιμοι πάντα γὰρ ἁγαθὰ ὁφέλιμα. οὐχί;
MEN. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὅφελιμόν ἐστιν;
MEN. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὄμολογημένων.
ΣΩ. Σκεψάμεθα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποιά ἐστιν ἡ ἡμᾶς ὁφελεί. ὑγίεια, φαμεν, καὶ ἴσχυς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιάτα ὁφέλιμα. οὐχί;
MEN. Nai.

ΣΩ. Ταύτα δὲ ταύτα φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν ἃ σὺ 88 ἄλλως φῆς ἢ οὕτως;

MEN. Οὐκ, ἄλλῳ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Σκότει δῆ, ὅταν τι ἐκάστου τούτων ἡγήται, ὦφελεί ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἥρ' οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὄρθη χρῆσις, ὦφελεί, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, βλάπτει;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψῆμεθα. σωφροσύνη τι καλεῖσ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μυκῆν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

MEN. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Σκότει δῆ, τούτων ἄττα σοι δοκεὶ μὴ εἰσιτήμη ἐϊναι ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ εἰσιτήμημα, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὦφελεί; οἶνον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φράσις ἢ ἀνδρεία ἄλλῳ οἶνον θάρρος τι, οὐχὶ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἀνθρώπως, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὰφελεῖται;

MEN. Nai.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη φωσάτως καὶ εὐμαθία: μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυμομεν ὑφέλιμα, ἀνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερὰ;

MEN. Πάνω σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δὲ εἰς τοιναντίον;

MEN. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα ἅρετη τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαίον αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμοι εἰναι, φρόνησιν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερὰ ἐστὶ, προσγενομένης δὲ φρο-
κατὰ δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ὁφέλιμον γε οὕσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν
φρόνησιν δεὶ τιν' εἰναι.

MEN. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἀλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, πλοῦ
tον τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ
εἶναι, ἃρ' οὐχ ὁσπέρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγου-
μένη ὁφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη
βλαβερά, οὔτως αὐτὸ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχή ὁρθῶς μὲν χρο-
μένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὁφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὁρθῶς δὲ
βλαβερὰ;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως δὲ γε ἢ ἐμφρον ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δὴ
ἥ ἀφρον;

MEN. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὔτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστι, τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτηθοῦσαι,
tά δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ
eῖναι· καὶ τούτω τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἀν εἶν ἡ ὁφέλιμον;
φαμέν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁφέλιμον εἶναι;

MEN. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φρόνησιν ἀρα φαμέν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, Ἡτοι ἐξυμπασαν
ἡ μέρος τί;

MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὰ
λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὔτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν εἰσὶν φύσει οἱ
ἀγαθοὶ.

MEN. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν ποι καὶ τὸδ' ἦν' εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
ἐγλύνοντο, ἢσαν ποι ἄν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐγλύνωσκοι τῶν νέων
tοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὕς ἡμεῖς ἄν παραλαβόντες
εκείνων ἀποφημάτων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατα-
σημηναμένου πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ τὸ χρυσόν, ἵνα μηδεῖς αὐ-
τοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν,
χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.

MEN. Εἰκός γέ τοι, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. 'Αρ’ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγ-
νονται, ἄρα μαθήσει;

MEN. Δοκεὶ μοι ἡδὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δήλον, ὁ
Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
ἀρετή, οὕτως διδακτόν ἑστιν.
ΣΩ. 'Ἰσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὄμο-
λογήσαμεν;

MEN. Καὶ μὴν ἐδοκεῖ μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέη αὐτὸ δοκεῖ
καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπειτα, εἰ
μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ υγίες εἶναι.

MEN. Τι οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ δ
καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἡ ἀρετή;
ΣΩ. 'Εγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὁ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν
ἀυτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ
καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι ο’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι εάν
σοι δοκῶ εἰκότεως ἀπιστεῖν. τὸδε γὰρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἐστι
διδακτῶν διεισοῦν πράγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετῆ, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθηταῖς εἶναι;

MEN. "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ·"

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούναντιν αὐ, οὐ μήτε διδασκάλοι μήτε Ε
μαθηταῖς εἰσέν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκαζοῦτες εἰκάζοιμεν μή
διδακτὸν εἶναι;

MEN. "Εστι ταῦτα· ἀλλ’ ἀρετῆς διδασκαλοῦ οὐ δο-
κούσι σοι εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν, εἰ τινὲς εἰσεν αὐτῆς δικά-
σκαλοί, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καί τοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ἄντω καὶ τούτων μάλιστα, οὐς ἄν οἶωμαι ἐμ-
πειρατάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ ἡ καὶ νῦν, ὦ
Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἀνυτος ὢδε παρεκαθέζετο, πο
μεταδόμεν τῆς ἐξήγεσις. εἰκότως ὦ ἀν μεταδόμεν ἂν.

90 Ἀνυτος γὰρ ὢδε πρῶτον μὲν ἐστὶ πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ
σοφοῦ Ἀνδρεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ
αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντων τινὸς, ὡσπερ ὦ νῦν νεωτό εἰλη-
phasis τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ ᾿Οηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ
τῇ αὐτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ
ἀλλὰ οὐχ ὑπέρφανοι δοκῶν εἶναι πολύτις οὐδὲ ὅγκοδχης

Β ὡς καὶ ἑπαχθῆς, ἀλλὰ κόσμος καὶ ἐνσταλῆ ἄνηρ
ἔπειτα τούτων εὖ ἠθρεύσε καὶ ἑπαλάβεσθέν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ
πλήθει: αἱροῦντα γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς.
ὁκαίον ὄη μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἄρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους,
εὔτε εὖ τε καὶ ὀἄτεις.

Σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ ᾿Ανυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τῷ
σαντοῦ ἐκείνῳ Μένωνι τῷ δὲ, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος,
tίνας ἄν εἶνεν διδασκάλοι. ὥδε δὲ σκέψαται: εἰ βουλο-
μέθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν λατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας
ἄν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἀρ’ οὔ παρὰ τοῦς
ἰατρῶν;

AN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ὦ εἰ σκυτοτόμοι ἀγαθὸν βουλολίμεθα γενέσθαι,
ἀρ’ οὖ παρὰ τοῦς σκυτοτόμοις;

AN. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τάλλα οὕτως;

AN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. ὢδε δὴ μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἴπε. παρὰ
τοὺς ἱατρῶν, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόεδε καλῶς ἄν ἑπέμ-
πομεν, βουλολίμενοι ἱατρὸν γενέσθαι: ἀρ’ ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-
γωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτοις πέμπτοντες αὐτῶν σωφρονοῦμεν ἣν, τοὺς ἀντιποιομένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἡ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττόμενον ἐπί αὐτῆς τούτῳ, ἀποφήματα αὐτῶς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἕναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἂρ' οὖ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἄν πέμπτομεν;

ἈΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὅνικοικαὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλή ἄνοιὰ ἐστὶ βουλομένους αὐλητήν των ποιησαὶ παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχυνμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττόμενον μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δὲ τοὶ πράγματα παρέχειν, ξητοῦντα μανθάνειν παρὰ τούτῳ, οἱ μὴ προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἰναι, μὴ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν μαθητής μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν δὲν ἄν πέμπτομεν. οὐ πολλὴ σοι δοκεῖ ἄλογα εἰναι;

ἈΝ. Ναί μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθὰ γε πρὸς.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἦν τοι̇ς ἐξεστὶ σε μετ' ἐμοῦ κοινῆς βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἔξους τοι̇ς Μένωνοις. οὗτος γάρ, ὧν Ἀνυπερβηλεῖς πρὸς με, ὃτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ὃ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε σοι̇ς καὶ τάς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ἔξους ὑποδέχασθαι τε καὶ ἀποεἴμησαι ἐπιστανται ἄξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην σοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἄν πέμπτοντες αὐτῶν ὑρθῶς πέμπτομεν. ἡ δὴ καὶ τοῦ ἁρτὶ λόγου, ὃτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχυνμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἴναι καὶ ἀποφήματα αὐτῶς κοινοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττόμενοι;

ἈΝ. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὃ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. Οίσθα δήποι καὶ σύ, ὅτι οὕτω εἴσων οἴνουσ οἱ ἀνθρώποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

C ἈΝ. Ὡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, διὸ Σῶκρατες. μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν μηδε οἰκεῖων μηδε φίλων, μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων, τοιαύτη μανία λάβαι, ὡστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε φανερά ἔστι λάβη τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγενομένων.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, δι᾽ Ἀνυτε; οὕτω ἀρα μόνοι τῶν αντιποιομένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐρεγετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέροντως, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὄφελοῦσιν, ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὃ τι ἂν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρον; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἦγο μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὡς σοι πιστεύσω, οἴδα γὰρ άνδρα ἐνα Πρωταγόραν πλεῖω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, δε οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν καὶ τοίς τέρας λέγεις, εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ υποδήματα ἑργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἴματια ἔξακομενοι οὐκ ἀν δύναις λαθεῖν τριάκονθο ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἴματὰ τε καὶ υποδήματα, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοιαύτα ποιοῖς, ταχὺ ἀν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιες, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἀρα ὅλη τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανε διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγενομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανε πλεῖον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη· νῦμί γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποδανεῖν ἔγγυς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα· καὶ ἐν ἀπαντε τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτήν εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαντα· καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ 92 καὶ ἄλλους πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκεῖνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πρότερον δὴ οὔν φῶς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἴδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβὰσθαι τοὺς
νέους, ἡ λεληθέναι καὶ ἔαντοὺς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσωμεν τούτους, οὐς ἐνιοῦν φασὶ σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

ΑΝ. Πολλοὶ γε δέωσι μαίνεσθαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόμετε ἀργύριον τῶν νέων τούτων ὦ ἐτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐώσει αὐτῶς Β εἰσαφικεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσι, εἶτε τις ἄνεως ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτον τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀκτός.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ, ὁ Ἀνυτε, ἡδίκηκε τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἰ; 

ΑΝ. Οὐδὲ μᾶ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὔδεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαμε τῶν ἔμων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. "Ἀπειρος ἁρ' εἰ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν; 

ΑΝ. Καὶ εἴην γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν, ὁ δαιμόνιε, εἰδεῖς περὶ τούτοις τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἄγαθον ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῷ εἴτε φλαύρον, οὐ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἰς; 

ΑΝ. 'Ραδίως τούτους γούν οἴδα οἶοι εἶσιν, εἴτε οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή.

ΣΩ. Μάντης εἰ ἱσως, ὁ Ἀνυτε ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οὕσθα τούτων πέρι, ἡ εἰ δὲν αὐτός λέγεις θαυμάζομί ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτοις ἐζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσί, παρ' οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο οὕτω μὲν γὰρ, εἰ δ' οὖ βούλει, ἐστωσαν οἱ σοφισταὶ. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἴπε ἦμιν, καὶ τοῦ πατρικοῦ τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργετήσον, φράσας αὐτῷ, παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενον ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἥν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ' ἀν ἄξιος λόγου.

ΑΝ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἐφρασας; 

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐς μὲν ἐγὼ ἄμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἰπούν, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω σοῦ οὔδεν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φής καὶ
Εἶ σος τῇ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναῖων εἰπὲ όνομα ὅτου βούλει.

АН. Τί δὲ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου όνομα δεὶ ἀκούσαι; ὅτι γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἐστίν ὅσ οὐ βελτίω αὐτῶν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταὶ, εὰν περ ἑθέλην πεῖθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ οὕτω οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ’ οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὁμοιοί οὖν τις πάλαι διδάσκειν οἷοι τε οὕτως ταῦτα, ἢ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἐκαθαρεῖν;

АН. Καὶ τούτους ἔγγυε δὲ ἑξίῳ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, οὕτως καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ὅ ὦ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἄγαθοι γεγονότοι εἰν τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, ὅ Ἀντε, καὶ εἴναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθόν τὸ πολιτικόν, καὶ γεγονότοι ἐτί οὐκ ἤτοι ἢ ἐναι ἀλλὰ μόνι καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγονοῦσι τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς; τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἧμιν τυγχάνει οὖν οὗ καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν ἄγαθοι ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδὲ εἰ 

Β γεγονόσιν ἐν τῷ πρῶτεν, ἀλλ’ εἴ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή πάλαι σκοποῦμεν. τούτῳ δὲ σκοποῦσι τὸδε σκοποῦμεν, ἄρα οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢν αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι ἤσαν, ἡπόστατο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦσι, ἢ οὖ παραδοτόν τούτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτῶν ἄλλῳ παρ’ ἄλλου τούτ’ ἐστιν οὗ πάλαι ἤτοι μεινήσει εἰς τὸ καὶ Μένων.

ΣΩ. Ὑδὲ οὖν σκόπησι ἐκ τοῦ παῦτον λόγου Θεομυστοκλέα

C οὐκ ἄγαθον ἀν φαίησιν ἄνδρα γεγονόντα;

АН. Ἔγγυε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἄγαθον, εἰπὲ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἢν, κακεὶνον εἴναι;

АН. Οἴμαι ἐγγυε, εἰπὲ ἐβούλετό γε.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ', οίει, οὐκ ἄν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τε τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ ποι τὸν νῦν τὸν αὐτοῦ; ἢ οίει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδίδοναι τὴν ἁρετήν, ἂν αὐτὸς ἁγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἄκήκοας, ὅτι Θεομυστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντος τὸν νῦν ἵππεα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἁγαθόν; ἐπέμενε γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππῶν ὅρθος ἑστηκὼς, καὶ ἥκοντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππῶν ὅρθος, καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ εἰργάζετο, ὡς ἐκεῖνός αὐτὸν ἐπαίδευσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφῶν, ὡσα διδασκάλων ἁγαθῶν εἶχετο· ἡ ταῦτα οὐκ ἄκηκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

ΑΝ. Ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν ἀρα τὴν γε φύσιν τοῦ νῦνος αὐτοῦ ἠτίασαι ἄν τις εἶναι κακὴν.

ΑΝ. Ἰσωσ οὐκ ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ο Θεομυστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἁγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἀπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἥδη τούτου ἄκηκοας ἡ νεωτέρου ἡ πρεσβυτέρου;

ΑΝ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἴομεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ νῦν παιδεύσαι, ἢν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἢν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἶπερ ἢν γε διδακτῶν ἡ ἁρετή;

ΑΝ. Ἰσωσ μᾶ Δῆ οὖ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτως μὲν ὡς τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἁρετῆς, διὰ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστοι τῶν πρωτέων εἶναι· ἄλλου δὲ ὡς σκεψᾶμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσίμαχον ἡ τούτου οὖχ ὁμολογεῖς ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

ΑΝ. Ἔγωγε, πάντως δήτου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὕτως τὸν νῦν τὸν αὐτοῦ Λυσίμαχου, ὡσα μὲν διδασκαλῶν εἰχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαιδευσεν, ἀνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὅτονον πεποιηκέναι;
τούτῳ γὰρ ποι καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὅρᾶς οἷος ἐστιν. 
Β εἰ δὲ βαύλει, Περικλέα, οὐτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφῶν ἄνδρα, οὐθ' ὅτι δύο νείεις ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιττον;
ΑΝ. ἩΕγώγε.
ΣΩ. Τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οὐσθα καὶ σύ, ἵππεας μὲν ἔδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τάλλα ἐπαίδευσεν, ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρους ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μὲν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτὸν. ἦνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οὖν καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων
Σ ἀδυνάτους γέγονενα τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα, ἐνθυμὴθητι ὅτι Ὀθουκυδίδης αὐ τὸ ποιεῖς ἔθρεψε, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσε τὰ τε ἅξια ἐν καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθία ἐδωκε, τὸν δὲ Ἐὐθώρφ' οὕτω δὲ ποιεῖν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;
ΑΝ. ἩΕγώγε, ἄκοη.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὔτος οὖν ἄν ποτε, οὐ μὲν ἔδει
Δ δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἔδίδαξε τοὺς παιδᾶς τοὺς αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοῦς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἔδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἵσως ὁ Θεουκυδίδης φαύλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλείστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς Ἑλλησσίων, ὡστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρέω ἄν ὅστις ἐμμέλλει αὐτοῖς τοὺς νεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιῆσεν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ἔνων, εἰ αὐτῶς μὴ ἐσχόλαξε
Ε διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ ἔταίρε 'Ανυτε, μὴ οὐκ ἢ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.
ΑΝ. ὩΣ ὉΜώκρατες, ὑδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν
ανθρώπους. εγώ μὲν οὖν ἂν σοι συμβουλεύσαμη, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἰσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλη πόλει βραχίων ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνω οἴμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

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ΣΩ. Ὀ Μένων, Ἀνυτοσ μὲν μοι δοκεὶ χαλεπαίνειν καλὸν δὲν θανάμαξω· οἶεται γὰρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἐπειτὰ ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτῶς εἶναι εἰς τούτων. ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν εὰν ποτε γνῷ, οἶον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· οὔ δὲ μοι εἰπὲ, οὔ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν καλὸι κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;

MEN. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὔτοι παρέχειν αὐτοὺς διδακτοὺς. Βούκαλοι τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἢ διδακτῶν ἁρετήν;

MEN. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτε μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσας ὃς διδακτῶν, τοτὲ δὲ ὃς οὔ.

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τούτο ὁμολογεῖται;

MEN. Οὐ μοι·δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δαλ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὔτοι, οὔπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἁρετής;

C

MEN. Καὶ Τοῦρλου μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἀγαμαί, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἀκούσας ὑπισχυομένου, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγέλα, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχυομένων· ἄλλα λέγειν οἶεται δέν τοιεῦν δεινοὺς.

ΣΩ. Οὖν' ἄρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

MEN. Οὖν ἔχω λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.
οὗτοι πολυκός τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτε μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτε δ' οὗ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεογνίω τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ' ὅτι ταύτα ταῦτα λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐπεσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἑλεγεῖοις, οὗ λέγει
καὶ παρὰ τοῦσιν πῶς καὶ ἔσθε, καὶ μετὰ τοὺσιν
ἔσθε, καὶ ἀνδανε τοῖσ, δὲν μέγαλη ὀψήφισ.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξειν ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν

ΣΥΜΜΙΣΘΩΣΙ, ἀπόλεισ καὶ τὸν ἑόρτα νῦν.
οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὅς διδακτοῦ οὐσίας τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ γε ὁλίγον μεταβάς,
ἐἰ δ' ἢν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἐνθέτον ἀνδρὶ νόμιμα, λέγει

πως ὅτι

tολλοῦσ ἄν μισθοῦσ καὶ μεγάλους ἐφερον
οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ

οὗ ποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἐγεντο κακός,

πειθόμενοι μύθοις σαφροσύν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκον

οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθὸν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ταναντία

λέγει;

ΜΕΝ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐξεῖς οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὑπονόμων πράγματος,

οὐ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων

διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπιστασθαι,

Β ἀλλὰ ποιηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα οὐ φασὶ

didaskaloi einai, oi de omologoumenoi autoi kalois kagy

thoi totet mev fasin autou didaktou einai, totet de ou; tois

ouv ouv teteragmenous perip hypon fingi an ou kuriws 96 B, C.

didaskalous einai;
ΜΕΝ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐγώγη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μὴτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοι εἰςι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὦτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλοι γε;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

ΜΕΝ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὀμολογήκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὐ μὴτε διδάσκαλοι μὴτε μαθηταί εἰςιν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτῶν εἴναι;

ΜΕΝ. Ὀμολογήκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄρετὴς οὐδαμοῦ φαϊνονται διδάσκαλοι;

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἴ δὲ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

ΜΕΝ. Φαϊνεται οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἄν εἰν διδακτῶν;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἰπέρ ὅρθως ἡμεῖς ἑσκέμμεθα. Ὁ ὥστε καὶ θανάμαζο δῆ, ὥς Σώκρατες, πότερον ποτε οὐδὲ εἰςιν ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἰν τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἁγαθῶν γυνομένων.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύομεν, δὲ Μένων, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοι τίνες εἴναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σὲ τε Γοργίλας οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἔμε Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὐν προσεκτέουν τὸν νοῦν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐκτιμητέουν ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἐν γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίως ποιήσει—λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας Εἰ πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἑλαθε καταγελάστως, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὅρθως τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα—ἡ ἱσως καὶ διαφευγεῖν ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἁγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

ΜΕΝ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥς Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅδε οἰ μὲν τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεὶ ὥφελλομοι
ΜΕΝΟ, 96 Ε – 97 Ψ

εἶναι, ὁρθῶς ὁμολογήκαμεν τούτο γε, ὦτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως
97 ἔχοι ἡ γάρ;
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι γε ὕφελιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὁρθῶς ἤμως ἤγιν
tῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτο ποὺ καλῶς ὁμολο-
γοῦμεν;
ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Ὅτι δ’ οὖν ἔστιν ὁρθῶς ἤγείρθαι, ἔαν μὴ φρό-
νυμος ἢ, τοῦτο ὁμοιοὶ ἐσμεν οὐκ ὁρθῶς ὁμολογηκόσιν.
ΜΕΝ. Πᾶς δὴ ὁρθῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. εἰ τις εἶδος τὴν ὄδον τὴν εἰς Δάρισαν
ἡ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζαι καὶ ἄλλοις ἤγοιτο, ἄλλο τι
ὁρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἤγοιτο;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.

Β ΣΩ. Τι δ’ εἰ τις ὁρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων, ἥτις ἔστιν ἡ ὄδος,
ἐληλυθός δὲ μὴ μηδ’ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὁρθῶς ἤγοιτο;
ΜΕΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐως γ’ ἂν ποὺ ὁρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ δὲν ὁ
ἔτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμόνων ἔσται, οἶμένοις
μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.
ΜΕΝ. Οὐδὲν γάρ.
ΣΩ. Δόξα ἄρα ἀληθῆς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν
χείρων ἡγεμών φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ νῦν ἡ
παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει, ἀποίον τι
C εἰη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἤγείται τοῦ ὁρθῶς
πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἡ ἄληθής.
ΜΕΝ. Ἑοικέ γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἦττον ὕφελιμόν ἔστιν ὁρθὴ δόξα
ἐπιστήμης.
ΜΕΝ. Τοσοῦτο γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τῇ ἐπι-
στήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν
tοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ᾿ οὐ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἂεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἂεὶ
tυγχάνοι, ἔωστερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

MEN. Ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται ὡστε θαυμάζω, ὡς Σω-
kρατες, τούτου οὔτως ἔχοντος, ὃ τι δὴ ποτὲ πολὺ
tιμιωτέρα ἢ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι᾿ ὃ τι
tὸ μὲν ἔτερον, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν δι᾿ ὃ τι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγὼ σοι εἴπω;

MEN. Πάνω γ᾿ εἶπέ.

ΣΩ. Ὡτι τοῖς Δαιδάλοις ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέχηκας
tὸν νοῦν ἱσως δὲ οὔδ᾿ ἐστι παρ᾿ υμῖν.

MEN. Πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τούτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὡτι καὶ ταῦτα, εὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ἢ, ἀποδιδρά-
σκει καὶ δραπετεύει, εὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

MEN. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τῶν εκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένοι μὲν ἐκτήσθαι
οὐ πολλῆς τινὸς ἄξιόν ἐστὶ τιμῆς, ὡσπερ δραπέτην
ἀνθρώπου· οὐ γὰρ παραμένει· δεδεμένου δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον
πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστὶ. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω
ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι
αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ
χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τάγαθα ἐργαζόμεναι· πολὺν δὲ χρόνου
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οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς
ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὡστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἐως
ἀν τις αὐτὰς δὴσῃ αἵτις λογισμῷ· τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶν,
Μένων ἐταίρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὃς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἤμεν
ἀμολογηται. ἐπειδὴν δὲ δεθῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμῃ
γίγνονται, ἐπειτα μόνῳ· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον
ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμῃ
ὀρθῆς δόξης.
ΜΕΝ. Νή τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε τοιούτῳ τυι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰκάζων
δι' ὃ δ' ἐστι τι ἄλλοιον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάντων
μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἄν
εἰδέναι, ὅλγα δ' ᾧν φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων
θείην ἄν ὅν οἶδα.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε οὖν ὅρθως, ὅτι ἀληθῆς δόξα ἡγού-
μένη τοῦ ἐργον ἐκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπερ-
γάζεται ἡ ἐπιστήμη;

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὔτεν ἀρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ
/popper ωφέλιμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἀνήρ ὁ ἔχων
ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἣν ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

ΜΕΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ ωφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὁμο-
λόγηται εἶναι.

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίων οὐ μόνον δι' ἐπιστήμην ἄγαθοι
ἄνδρες ἄν εἶναι καὶ ὀφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἴεν,
ἄλλα καὶ δεὶ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτων δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει

D ἔστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὕτε ἐπιστήμη οὕτε δόξα ἀληθῆς,
οὔτε ἐπίκτητα—ἡ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὀποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν
eἶναι;

ΜΕΝ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδῆ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει
eἶεν ἄν.

ΜΕΝ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ
tοῦτο, εἴ διδακτόν ἄστιν.

ΜΕΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδακτόν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φῶνησις ἡ ἀρετή;
MEN. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Κἂν εἴ γε διδακτόν εἴη, φῶνησις ἂν εἶναι;
MEN. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ εἴ μὲν γε διδάσκαλοι εἴεν, διδακτόν ἂν εἶναι, ἐμὴ ὑπότων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;
MEN. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν διδάσκαλος;
MEN. Ἡστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ὄμολογήκαμεν ἀρα μήτε διδακτόν αὐτὸ μήτε φῶνησιν εἶναι;
MEN. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄγαθὸν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;
MEN. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Ὅφελίμον δὲ καὶ ἄγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγοῦμενον;
MEN. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. Ὅρθως δὲ γε ἢγείροντα δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, 99
doξαν τε ἀληθῇ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἀ ἑχὼν ἀνθρωπὸν ὀρθῶς ἢγείρω. τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται: ὃ δὲ ἀνθρωπὸς ἡγεμόνι ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
MEN. Δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη
dὴ ἐτὶ γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;
MEN. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Δυοῖν ἀρα ὄντων ἄγαθῶν καὶ Ὅφελίμων τὸ Β
mὲν ἔτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμόνι.
ΜΕΝ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες ὦ τριῶτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὐδὲ ἄρτι Ἀντίοκος ὃδε ἔλεγε· διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοι τε ἀλλοι ποιεῖν τοιούτως οἴοι αὐτοῖ ἔστω, ἄτε οὐ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὃντες τοιοῦτοι.

ΜΕΝ. Ὅσοις ὄντως ἔχεις, ὦ Σάκρατε, ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην, εὐδοξία δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίνεται· ἢ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὁρθῶσιν, οὔτεν διαφερόντως ἔχουτες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοὶ τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἱσασθε δὲ οὔδὲν δὲν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Κινεῖτε τις ὄντως ἔχεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτως θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὕτως νοῦν μὴ ἔχουτες πολλά καὶ μεγάλα καταρθώσων δὲν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσιν; 

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ἄν καλοίμεν θείους τε, οὐδὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγο- μεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικούς ἀπαιτεῖς· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἂν θείους τε εύναι καὶ ἐνθουσίαξειν, ἐπίπνους οὕτας καὶ κατεξομέ- νους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν καταρθῶσι λέγουτες πολλά καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες δὲν λέγουσιν.

ΜΕΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ αἴ γε γυναῖκες ὅπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Δάκωνες ὅταν τιμᾶ ἐγκομιάζωσιν ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρα, θείος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὕτος.

ΜΕΝ. Καὶ φαίνονται γε, ὦ Σάκρατε, ὅρθως λέγειν. καίτοι ἵσως Ἀντίοκος ὃδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

ΣΩ. Οὔδέν μέλει ἐμοίγε. τούτῳ μὲν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ
αὕτως διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἥμεις ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ
tοῦτῳ καλῶς ἐξητήσαμεν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετῇ ἂν
εἰς οὕτως φύσει οὕτω διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεία μοιρά παρα-
γυνομένη ἂνευ νοῦ, οἷς ἂν παραγίγνωται, εἰ μὴ τις εἴη 100
tοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄνδρῶν, οἷος καὶ ἄλλους ποιήσαι
πολιτικῶν. εἰ δὲ εἰη, σχεδὸν ἂν τι οὕτως λέγοιτο τοι-
οῦτος ἐν τοῖς ξώσιν, οἶνον ἔφη Ὁμήρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι
τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἷος πέπνυται
τῶν ἐν Ἄιδον, αἰ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀνισοῦσι. ταύτων ἂν καὶ
eὐθὺς τοιοῦτος ὁσπερ παρὰ σκιαὶ ἀληθὲς ἂν πράγμα εἴη
πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

ΜΕΝ. Κάλλιστα δοκεῖσ μοι λέγειν, ὁ Σάκρατες.  B

ΣΩ. Ἐκ μὲν τοῖνυν τούτων τοῦ ἱσομοῦ, ὁ Μένων,
θεία μοιρὰ ἕμων φαίνεται παραγυνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς
παραγίγνεται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε,
ὅταν πρὶν ἀπὸ τούς ἄνθρωποις παραγίγνεται
ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐπὶ
tὶ ποτ' ἐστιν ἀρετή· νῦν δ' ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι λέναι, συ
δὲ ταύτα ἄπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πείθε καὶ τὸν ἔξων τόνδε
Ἀντοῦν, ἵνα πραότερος ἂς ἐὰν πείσῃς τούτων, ἐστιν ὁ C
τὶ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὁμήσεις.
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THE

MENO OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

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PART II.—NOTES

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NOTES.

MENON] Of the person who gives his name to this dialogue we know from the text itself that he was a Thessalian (70 A), the son of Alexidemus (76 E), that relations of hospitality existed between his family and that of Anytus (90 B, 92 D), that he was a favourite of Aristippus of Larissa, one of the noble family of the Aleuadae (70 B), that he was a disciple of Gorgias, and familiar with the philosophy of Empedocles (76 C), and that his family stood well with the court of Persia (98 D); we are led to infer also that he was handsome, rich, and noble (71 B), and was still in the bloom of youth (76 A–C).

From the connection with Aristippus the Thessalian and the court of Persia, there is good reason for identifying the Meno of Plato with the Meno of Xenophon’s Anabasis. For in the Anabasis we meet with an Aristippus, the Thessalian, who was a guest-friend of Cyrus the Younger; and Xenophon relates how, being hard pressed by the opposite faction at home, he came to Cyrus and procured means for maintaining a mercenary force, which was not to be disbanded till Cyrus could avail himself of its aid against his brother Artaxerxes (Anab. I. 1. § 10). Now we find 1500 men from this force joining Cyrus at Colossae under the command of Meno the Thessalian (Anab. I. 2. § 6), whose youth and good looks had won him the favour of Aristippus (II. 6. § 28).

At first Meno appears to have enjoyed the chief place in Cyrus’ favour. He commanded the right wing at the review held at Tyriaeum, while Clearchus commanded the left (Anab. I. 2. § 15); and it was he who was chosen to escort the Phoenician queen, Epyaxa, back into her own country (I. 2. § 20). On this expedition he sacked the town and palace of Tarsus, in revenge for the loss of 100 hoplites on the mountains, who, it was supposed, might have been cut off by the Cilicians (I. 2. § 25).

When the army was halting at Thapsacus, on the banks of the Euphrates, and it was doubtful whether the soldiers would consent to march against the King, Meno persuaded his men to be the first to cross the river, and was magnificently rewarded by Cyrus in con-
sequence (I. 4. § 17). This seems to have been the culminating point of Meno’s fortunes.

Shortly after this a feud arose between him and Clearchus, originating in a soldier’s quarrel, and they were only prevented from engaging their forces by the intervention of Proxenus the Boeotian (who, like Meno himself, had been a disciple of Gorgias (II. 6. § 16)), reinforced by the energetic interference of Cyrus himself (I. 5. §§ 11–17). From this time forward Clearchus seems to have gained in favour both with the army and with Cyrus. In the review held in the plains of Babylonia, as in the battle of Cunaxa itself, the right wing was commanded by Clearchus and the left by Meno (I. 7. § 1; I. 8. § 4).

Subsequently to the death of Cyrus, Meno, who was the guest-friend of Ariaeus (II. 1. § 5), was suspected of treason by Clearchus (II. 5. § 28), a belief which was shared by Xenophon himself (II. 4. § 15). After the treacherous seizure of the generals by the Persians, Ariaeus told the Greeks that Clearchus was dead, but that Proxenus and Meno were held in high honour, because they had revealed his plots (II. 5. § 38). This appears to have been a mere lie. Proxenus, according to Xenophon, was a man of stainless honour, and shared the fate of the other generals (II. 6. §§ 19, 20), and although Meno was spared at first, it was only to linger out for a year an ignominious life crowned by a wretched death (II. 6. § 29). His character is drawn in the blackest colours by Xenophon (II. 6. §§ 21–28).

η περί ἀρετῆς It is important to bear in mind that intellectual as well as moral excellence is conveyed under the Greek term ἀρετῆ, and that the former rather overshadowed the latter in the popular use of the term. This is why Anytus so unhesitatingly answers that Themistocles was ‘a good man,’ using the word as an equivalent for a clever or able man, as in the slang sense which it carries among ourselves. By ‘virtue’ in fact was meant, in popular parlance, that assemblage of qualities which makes a man a capable statesman.

The aim of every ambitious young Greek at this period was to become δυνατός λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά. The scions of wealthy houses did not mind spending money, if only they could acquire the art whereby men manage houses and cities well, and become capable of ruling, and of doing good to themselves and others (Xen. Mem. IV. 2. § 11). The demand created the supply (Prot. 318 E), and the class of Sophists arose, professing to be able to teach men ‘virtue.’ It was this claim of the Sophists which led Socrates to raise the previous question, whether virtue could be taught.

πειραστικός] i.e. tentative. This term belongs to an elaborate
philosophical division of the works of Plato, which has been preserved to us by Diogenes Laertius (III. §§49–51), but which was certainly not devised by himself. Grote (Plato, vol. I. p. 160 note) thinks it ‘certain’ that he borrowed it from Thrasyllos, to whom the division into tetralogies is ascribed. But the division into tetralogies itself may not have been the work of Thrasyllos. Albinus, the author of an ‘Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato’ (printed in Hermann’s Appendix Platonica), and a contemporary of Galen (born about A.D. 130), after speaking of the division into tetralogies, adds ‘of this opinion are Dercyllides and Thrasyllos.’ Thrasyllos, then, is not necessarily the author of the division into tetralogies with which his name has been coupled by Diogenes (III. 56).

For the philosophical division, into which the term πειραστικός enters as one of the dividing members, see the scheme prefixed. It embraces several works which modern critics regard as spurious.

ἐξεις μοι ἐπειν, κ.τ.λ. Contrary to his general habit, Plato, in 70 A this dialogue, plunges straight into the discussion. But the omission of an introduction, in which the Meno resembles the Cratylus, Philebus, Hipparchus, and Minos, is more apparent than real, since the first two pages (70–71 D) effectively set before us the personality of Meno.

The same question which is here propounded is touched on in the Nicomachian Ethics in connection with happiness, in which virtue is infinitely the most important ingredient. The ninth chapter of the first book of that treatise commences thus: ὁθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερον ἢστι μαθητῶν ἢ ἐνικών ἢ ἄλλων ποι ἀσκητῶν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θειαν μοίραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ χήνη παραγίνεται. The drift of Aristotle’s discussion is to show that happiness is the outcome of human effort, and not in any special sense the gift of Heaven—least of all the result of chance. The precise question which forms the subject of the Meno is alluded to as an unsettled one by Aristotle in the tenth book (ch. (9), § 6), where, speaking on the question of how virtue is to be acquired, he says, Γνῶσθαι δ’ ἀγαθὸν ὄνομα, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ’ ἐθεὶ, οἱ δὲ δίδαξαι. So far as moral virtue is concerned, Aristotle, while allowing some weight both to nature and teaching, ascribes by far the most important part to training.

διδάκτον] The employment of the neuter adjective with a substantive not of the neuter gender imparts a more abstract air to the question. Translate, ‘Whether virtue is a thing to be taught.’ Cp. Eur. Hipp. 443 (Dindorf)

Κύριος γὰρ οὗ φορητῶν, ἢν πολλὴ ῥυῆ.

ἐφ’ ἵππικὴ] On the reputation of the Thessalians for horsemanship see Laws 625 D; Hipp. Maj. 284 A. Thessaly is a great plain
enclosed by mountains, which adapts it for horses. When Anchi-
molius invaded Attica, the Peisistratidae cleared the plain of Pha-
lerus, and let loose upon him a body of Thessalian horse, who
effected the destruction of himself and the main part of his army
(Herod. V. 63).

καὶ ἐπὶ οὖσία] θαυμάζονται or θαυμασθήσονται has to be sup-
plied from θαυμάζοντο.

'Αριστίππου] For Aristippus see the note on Meno prefixed.
He is not to be confounded with Aristippus of Cyrene, the disciple
of Socrates, and the founder of what is called the Cyrenaic philosophy.

'Αριστοκράτης] The regular construction would require the repeti-
tion of the article. For its suppression cp. Apol. 32 B, ἡ φυλή
'Αντιοχίς and Phaedo 57 A, τῶν πολιτῶν Φιλασίων. Stallbaum.

Γοργίδας] A celebrated rhetorician, a native of Leontium in Sicily.
He was himself a disciple of Empedocles, to whom the invention
of the art of rhetoric is ascribed (Quint. III. 1. §§ 8, 9, Diog. Laert. VIII.
§§ 57, 58), and among his pupils were Aeschines (the philosopher, not
the orator) and Antisthenes, who left him for Socrates (Diog. Laert.
II. § 64, VI. § 1). He composed an Art of Rhetoric, which has not
come down to us, though two orations, alleged to be his, are extant.
He was deputed as ambassador from his native city to Athens, to
implore aid against Syracuse, and produced a fatal effect there on the
public mind by his eloquence (Diod. XII. ch. 53. p. 514): at the
same time he won for himself disciples in private, from whom he re-
ceived handsome fees (Hipp. Maj. 282 B, C). He is said to have
lived to the age of 107 or more (Cic. De Sen. ch. v; Quint. III. 1.
§ 9; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists,
p. 494).

τῆν πόλιν] i.e. Larissa, the city of the Aleuadae, a powerful
family of nobles among the Thessalians. They are called Θεσσαλῆς
βασιλέες by Herodotus (VII. 6).

ἐθος ύμᾶς εἴθικεν] The first of these is a cognate accusative,
which falls under the more general head of accusative of the internal
object. To append ἐθος to εἴθικεν does not add any new idea, but
merely sets out what was already contained in the action of the verb.
In ύμᾶς, on the other hand, we have an accusative of the external
object.

C παρέχων αὐτῶν ἐρωτάν] Cp. Apol. 33 B, ὅμοιος καὶ πλούσιος
καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἐρωτάν. On Gorgias' undertaking to
answer everybody see Gorg. 447 C, D, and for some comments of
Cicero on the practice see De Fin. II. ch. 1.

οὐδενὶ διότι οὐκ] The way in which this expression comes about
is perhaps this: οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ first becomes stereotyped as an equiva-
lent of πᾶς τίς (as below 71 A, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάστει = πᾶς τίς γελάστει), and then the new expression is declined throughout. Here we have it in the dative, where the original expression would have been so. Similarly we have the gen. masc. in Prot. 317 C, the gen. neut. in Theaet. 178 B, the acc. masc. in Phaedo 117 D, οὐδένα ὄντων οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, and the acc. neut. below 74 D, καὶ φίς οὐδεν αὐτῶν ὃ τι οὐ σχήμα εἶναι.

περιέστηκεν] Cp. Thuc. VI. 24 τοῦναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ, 'it turned out quite the opposite to what he expected.'

κινδυνεύει] On the force of κινδυνεύω see L. and S. sub voce, 71. 4 b.

μακάριος τίς] Cp. Theag. 128 B; Menex. 249 D.

τοσοῦτον δέω ... εἰδον] Stallbaum quotes Axiochus 372 B for the full construction with the article, and a passage of Lucan (Icaromenippus 5) for its omission. With a genitive of the pronoun the omission of the article is the rule. See note on 92 A.

ἀς] ὁστε.

τυγχάνω εἰδός] Verbs which express being in a state or condition, such as ἔχω, and, as here, τυγχάνω, are constructed with a participle. ὁς οὐκ εἰδός. Here the natural construction would be ὁς οὐκ Β εἰδότα, but it is the well-known tendency of Greek to put into the nominative whatever relates to the subject of the principal verb. It is one of the many forms of the figure called Attraction.

ὁ δὲ μὴ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.] A similar difficulty occurs in the Laches, where Socrates declares that, before we can discuss the training of the soul, we must know what virtue is. (See especially 190 B.) Cp. also Rep. I. 354 C, ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δικαίον μὴ οἶδα τὶ ἐστι, σχολὴ εἰσομαι εἴτε ἄρετὴ τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ.

τὶ ἐστι] The phrase τὶ ἐστι is the technical expression for what is called in Logic the 'genus' of a thing; ποιῶν τι signifies the 'species,' which consists of 'genus' (τὶ) and 'differentia' (ποιῶν). We have ὅποιὸν τι here because the question is indirect.

τὶ δαι] A mere formula of transition. Cp. 73 A, B; 77 E; 87 C D.

ἐγώ] Notice how in Greek dialogue 'yes' and 'no' are implied rather than expressed. This is one of the most marked differences between the modern and the classical languages. Modern Greek uses μάλιστα or παί for 'yes,' and δχι for 'no.'

ἐστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν] 'So that, in point of fact, I am not able.' The infinitive here after ἐστε would denote merely the logical consequence.

δοκεὶ γὰρ δὴ ποι. κ.τ.λ.] This is a sly intimation that Socrates D does not expect originality from Meno.
MENO, NOTES. 71 D—72 B.

δ' πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων] Cp. Apol. 25 C, εἰπέ, δ' πρὸς Διός, Μέλητε; 26 E, ἀλλ', δ' πρὸς Διός. See Riddell's Apology, Digest of Idioms § 288.

eἰπον] Imperative from εἰπα. Cp. ἤνεγμα, Attic, and ἠλθαμεν, Alexandrian. This form is noticeable as having the stem of a second aorist and the terminations of a first. Though so rare in classical Greek, it is the prevalent mode of formation in the modern language. εἰπα is not to be confounded with what is sometimes called 'the Homeric Aorist,' ἤξε, ἤξον (imper.), βῆσετο, δῦσετο, etc., which have the terminations of a second aorist appended to the stem of a first.

φανῆς . . . εἰδώς] 'Be found to know.' With an infinitive the meaning would be 'seem to know.'

Ε' αὐτή ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς ἅρη] The article is omitted with ἅρη in accordance with the rule that the subject takes the article and the predicate not. Stallbaum.

τοὺς μὲν φίλους, κ.τ.λ.] This is the definition of justice which Polemarchus endeavours to uphold in the first book of the Republic (332 D). Socrates maintains against it that it cannot be just to harm anybody (335 B—D).


καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρεσ] We have here an unusual, but at the same time perfectly natural grammatical phenomenon—namely, adjectives of different genders agreeing with the same substantive.

72 A καθ' ἐκάστην γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The whole answer is given from the point of view of Gorgias. Aristotle, evidently with an eye to this passage, says that his enumeration of different virtues is preferable to the vague generality of a definition of virtue in the abstract. See Pol. I. ch. 13 καθόλου γάρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατώσειν εὐαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἅρη, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τὶ τῶν τοιούτων. πολύ γάρ ἀμείνον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαιρημοῦστες τὰς ἅρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων.

Β' οὐσίας ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστι] Riddell (Digest § 229) classes this as a case of what he calls 'binary structure,' as though the words ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστι simply repeated οὐσίας in another form. But perhaps we have here the same construction as above γῆ Ε, ὥστε οὐκ ἄπορα εἰπέν ἅρης πέρι ὅ τι ἐστι, both of them being in accordance with the common Greek idiom by which the subject of the dependent clause is attracted into the principal one.

The word οὐσία denotes the being or essence of a thing, that is, the collection of attributes without which it would not be what it is. The Romans cared so little for the subtleties of thought that they had no word to express this idea until the term 'essentia' was coined.
by Plautus (see Quint. II. 14. § 2 ; III. 6. § 23 ed. Bonnell ; there is some doubt as to the reading of the name). ‘Essentia’ was used by Cicero, and after him by Fabianus, an elegant writer contemporary with Seneca; but it was always regarded as a monstrosity by the Romans (Sen. Epist. 58 ad in.). Seneca complains of the inadequacy of the Roman language to deal with the conceptions of Plato.

κἂν εἰ] In this compound, however originated, the ἄν has lost its force. The meaning of the expression is ‘even though.’ It may be followed by the indicative, as here, or by the optative, as in Rep. III. 408 B. Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. V. (9), § 13 ; Pol. I. 3. § 3. ἀλλὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι] In order to account for the nominative, a personal δοκεῖ has to be supplied here from the impersonal δοκεῖ preceding. Cp. Apol. 25 A, B, where the ellipse is more manifest owing to the change of number.

tὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τούτῳ λέγω. We have here the construction only with a neuter object. Any word, or collection of words, when cited merely as such, is neuter in Greek. This is called in Logic the ‘suppositio materialis’ of a word or phrase. Thus τὸ ἄνθρωπος, the word ‘man,’ and here τὸ τῇ αὐτῇ, the expression ‘the same.’ Translate, ‘By the expression “the same,” I mean this.’

πρὸς τὸ ἵσχυς εἶναι] In the nominative, because referring to the subject of the verb διαφέρει. Cp. note on ὁς ὁπεὶ εἰδώς, 71 B.

δικαιοσύνη, κ.τ.λ.] The modern reader is often inclined to feel surprise and impatience at the platitudes of Plato. He should bear in mind that Dialectic was a game of which the laws were exactly enforced. One of the interlocutors was not allowed at his own discretion to assume the identity of one form of expression with another. Thus, if the point to be proved were some proposition relating to λέγω, and the questioner had already extracted from his opponent a confession of the point at issue with respect to ἰμάτιον, it required an additional question and answer to effect the transition, though the one was admittedly a mere synonym of the other (Arist. Sophist. Elench. 6. § 3 ; Top. I. 7. § 1).

εἶπεν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι] This seems at first sight a case of ὅτερον πρῶτον; but the καὶ is probably corrective—‘or rather.’ Socrates is sure that Meno’s telling would be equivalent to his recollecting what Gorgias had said.

τι αὐτὸ φησι] αὐτό is put vaguely for ‘the thing in question.’ This usage is common enough both in Plato and Aristotle. Cp. below 86 C ad fin. πρῶτον ὡς διδακτῷ δότι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιξειρεῖν; where αὐτῷ stands for ἀρετῆ. Cp. Rep. IV. 430 C ; Apol. 21 B, ἐπὶ ζήτησιν
\[ \text{MENO, NOTES. 73 C–74 B.} \]

\[ \text{oúto}: \text{Ar. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 14, also X. (9), § 9, where the plural} \]
\[ \text{ôvta is used in the same loose way.} \]

\[ \text{áρχειν οἱν τι εἴναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] This was the specious} \]
\[ \text{prospect with which the Sophists dazzled the imagination of} \]
\[ \text{ambitious youths. See note on Ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς in the title of the} \]
\[ \text{dialogue.} \]

\[ \text{D áρχειν όφι τε εἴναι] The construction is slightly irregular, as the} \]
\[ \text{dative presupposes παιδὶ καὶ δούλῳ.} \]

\[ \text{έτι γάρ] The γάρ here introduces a new point, instead of sup-} \]
\[ \text{porting the former one.} \]

\[ \text{Ε πῶς τούτο λέγεις] If there is anything calculated to make us} \]
\[ \text{believe in a real growth of the human faculties within historical} \]
\[ \text{times, it is the extreme difficulty under which Socrates always labours} \]
\[ \text{in knocking into the heads of his hearers the meaning of a general} \]
\[ \text{idea. Even the intelligent Theaetetus makes the same false start as} \]
\[ \text{Meno, and begins with an enumeration of various branches of knowl-} \]
\[ \text{edge, when he is asked for a definition of knowledge in general} \]
\[ \text{(Theaet. 146 C, D).} \]

\[ \text{74 A μεγαλοπρέπεια] We have now had mentioned the four cardinal} \]
\[ \text{virtues of Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice—a division} \]
\[ \text{which plays an important part in the Republic, and underlies Cicero’s} \]
\[ \text{treatise De Officiis. It is remarkable that the one virtue named in} \]
\[ \text{addition to these should be μεγαλοπρέπεια. There is a certain dra-} \]
\[ \text{matic propriety, as Stallbaum points out, about the mention of this} \]
\[ \text{quality in the mouth of a disciple of Gorgias, who taught his pupils} \]
\[ \text{to answer ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς. But it occupies pretty} \]
\[ \text{nearly the same post of honour where there is no such dramatic} \]
\[ \text{motive discernible (below 88 A; Rep. III. 402 C). μεγαλοπρέπεια} \]
\[ \text{is a conception peculiar to the honour-loving Greek, for which we} \]
\[ \text{have no real equivalent in English. As defined and specialised by} \]
\[ \text{Aristotle, it means ‘expenditure on a large scale with propriety’} \]
\[ \text{(Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 1): but this is no clue to the vaguer use of the} \]
\[ \text{term by Plato (see Rep. VI. 486 A). Socrates in Xenophon speaks} \]
\[ \text{of the attribute of magnificence (τὸ μεγαλοπρέπειός, Mem. III. 10. § 5) } \]
\[ \text{revealing itself in the features. For a sketch of a μεγαλοπρεπῆς see} \]
\[ \text{Herodotus VI. 121, 122.} \]

\[ \text{διὰ πάντων] ‘Running through all.’ See L. and S. and for} \]
\[ \text{Riddell’s view Digest of Idioms § 112.} \]

\[ \text{B προσβιβάσαι] Light is thrown on the meaning of this word by its} \]
\[ \text{use in Xenophon, Mem. I. 2. § 17 τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας, ‘win-} \]
\[ \text{ning them over to their theory.’ προσβιβάζειν would mean ‘to ad-} \]
\[ \text{vance.’ See Xen. Mem. I. 5. § 1.} \]

\[ \text{εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο] Notice that the indefinite τίς takes the opta-} \]
tive, whereas when greater definiteness is imparted by the substitution of *αὐτῶ*, lower down, the mood is changed into the indicative. The superposition of three conditional clauses, *εἰ... εἰ... εἰ*, before we reach the apodosis at *εἰπες*, is very remarkable. Stallbaum. For two such clauses cp. Rep. 331 C and Theaet. 147 A.


**οὖδὲν οὖτων ἢ τι οὗ**] See note on οὐδενὶ οὐτω οὐκ, 70 C.

**ἐναντία οὖτα**] This is in agreement with τα τολλὰ ταύτα above, the intervening clause, καὶ φήμ. κ.τ.λ. being parenthetical.

**εἰπες ὧτι ἀλλ' οὖδε μανθάνω**] ὧτι, unlike the English conjunction, 75 A. ‘that,’ may be used with the direct as well as with the oblique narration. Cp. below C, εἰπομι' ἄν αὐτῳ ὧτι ἐμοί μὲν εἰρηται.

**τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ταύτον.** ‘That which is the same thing in all of them.’ The article is already contained in ταύτον: but the product of crasis has become so much an independent word that it is again prefixed. Stallbaum. Cp. τὸ θάτερον, Soph. 255 D.

**μελέτη**] This is equivalent in meaning, if not in etymology, to the Latin word ‘meditatio.’ Both words are used of an actor or orator getting up what he has to say, and may sometimes be rendered by the English word ‘rehearsal.’

**Μὴ**] Deprecatory. Riddell, Digest § 136.

**βούλει οὖν χαρίσωμαι**] Cp. Phaedo 79 A, Θώμεν οὖν βούλει; ἵκανος σοι] So also Phaedo 71 D, ἵκανος σοι, ἐφη, ἣ οὖ; ἀγαπών] This Attic form of the optative is preferred in vowel verbs to the ordinary ending in -ομι, κ.τ.λ. It is somewhat remarkable that though the verb ἀγαπῶν was common in classical Greek it was left to Jewish writers (Philo and St. Paul) to give circulation to ἀγάπη.

**εὐθῆς**] Because involving the logical fault known as ‘ignotum per ignotius’ or ‘per aequum ignotum,’ i.e. defining a thing by something less known, or no better known than itself. Socrates tacitly accepts Meno’s correction. See 79 D, ἀπεβάλλομεν ποιν τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν.

**ἐριστικῶν**] The ἐριστικὸς is defined by Aristotle to be one who argues with a view to victory rather than to truth (Sophist. Elench. XI. §§ 5, 6). The ἀγανιστικὸς is much the same (see Theaet. 146 C ad fin.).

**δει**] The indicative marks a transition from a mere supposition to the actual case in hand, for which the way is paved by the introduction of the words ὅσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ.

**διαλεκτικῶτερον**] That is, in a way more conducive to the attainment of truth, the proper end of διαλεκτική. Cp. Arist. Top. VIII.
II. § 2 Δυσκολάνοντες οὖν ἀγωνιστικά καὶ οὔ διαλεκτικά ποιοῦνται τὰς διατριβάς.

δι’ ἐκεῖνων, κ.τ.λ.] We have here in effect the logical rule that a definition should be clearer than the thing defined. The object of a definition is to explain the meaning of one term by the use of others; but this object will be defeated, if the others selected are no more intelligible, or less intelligible, than the original one. See Aldrich, ch. I. § 8 ad fin. ‘Ut per se clarior sit et notior definitio: alias non explicat omnino.’

ὁ ἔρωτόμενος] ‘The person interrogated.’ But the same person is indicated as by the term ὁ ἔρωτος, ‘the questioner,’ above. For the objector’s doubts would be satisfied by a series of questions to which he would be expected to respond.

τελευτήν καλεῖς τι.] This form of expression occurs several times in the Meno. Below E.; also 76 A, D; 88 A. Cp. Phaedo 103 C, θερμῶν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρῶν: Crat. 399 D, ψυχή γὰρ ποιούν καὶ σώμα καλούμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: Prot. 358 D, καλειτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον. Cp. Theaet. 163 E ad in. μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι:

It shows the wariness with which the dialectical wrestlers were wont to grapple with one another, that the one should demand of the other his formal assent to the existence of ever so common a notion before he proceeded to argue about it. We should say bluntly, ‘Do you admit the existence of so and so?’ But the Greeks, with a finer logical faculty, were content with the recognition of an idea in men’s minds as indicated by language.

Ε Πρόδικος διαφέρωτο] For a somewhat burlesque specimen of Prodicus’ skill in distinguishing shades of meaning in words see Prot. 337 A–C.

Prodicus was a native of the island of Ceos, a fellow-countryman of the Poet Simonides (Prot. 339 E). Socrates at one time derived instruction from him (see below 96 D, with which cp. Crat. 384 B; Char. 163 D; Prot. 341 A, and Xen. Mem. II. 1. § 21). He is said to have amassed a great fortune by his lectures (Hipp. Maj. 282 C). He is best known as the author of ‘The Choice of Hercules,’ related in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.


76 A ταύτα· τά ἐν γεωμετρίαις] οὗτος is sometimes used to indicate that a thing is well-known. Cp. below 80 A, ταύτη τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκη τῇ θαλαττίᾳ.


Β ἔρασται σοι] What Socrates is made to say in joke, with
questionable taste on the part of Plato, is stated in earnest by Xenophon (Anab. II. 6. § 28).

κατέγνωσκα] καταγγέλωσεν τινός may be used of favourable as well as unfavourable judgments. Cp. Xen. Oec. II. §§ 1, 18 with Mem. I. 3. § 10.

ἐμι ἦττον τὸν καλῶν] In the Theages (128 B) Socrates is made to declare that the one art of which he was really master, was the art of love (τὰ ἐρωτικά), with allusion to the magnetic influence which he exercised over his disciples. That this way of speaking was characteristic of the real Socrates is evident from the similar language put into his mouth by Xenophon (Mem. II. 6. § 28).

λέγετε] The plural shows that the opinion is ascribed to the school of Gorgias in general.

κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα] Gorgias was himself a disciple of Empedocles (Quint. Ill. 1. § 8; Diog. Laert. VIII. § 58). Empedocles was famous as a philosopher, poet, orator, physician, and magician. He was a native of Acragas in Sicily, and a member of a wealthy family. Romantic legends have collected round his name, and little is known with certainty of his life. His father’s name is usually given as Meton, though some say Exaenetus, and some Archimous. He is variously stated to have been a disciple of Pythagoras, of Parmenides, of Xenophanes. The invention of rhetoric is ascribed to him by Aristotle, as that of dialectic to Zeno. His philosophy was embodied in hexameter verses, of which some fragments have been preserved to us. His style was lofty and full of metaphors. He flourished in Olympiad 84 (B.C. 444–0). See his life by Diogenes Laertius, book VIII. §§ 51–77. Empedocles’ theory of vision assimilates sight to smell. Just as in smell there is an actual contact of particles with the organ of sense, so Empedocles supposed it to be in the case of sight.

ἔφη Πίνδαρος] See Boeckh’s Pindar, vol. III. p 597, fragments—

σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ζαθέων ἵερων ὄμωνυμε πάτερ, ἀπίστωρ Λύννας.

ἔστι γὰρ χρόνα] For the same theory see Timaeus 67 C, where colours are compared to flames radiating from the object.

τραγική] ‘High-flown,’ ‘pompous.’ There is perhaps an allu-

sion to the style of Empedocles. Diogenes Laertius speaks of a ‘tragic inflation’ as characteristic of the whole man (VIII. § 70). For the expression cp. Rep. III. 413 b ad in.

'Αλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν] We certainly seem to require αὕτη here in contrast with the ἐκείνη following. Without it, we must understand ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν to mean ‘But it is not better,’ as opposed to the ‘It seems better,’ which is implied in ὀφέησκε σοι. For the phrase ἡς
\[\epsilon \mu a u t \delta \ \pi e i \theta o\] cp. Gorg. 453 B. \(\epsilon k e i n\) refers to the amended definition of figure as 'the termination of a solid.'

\[\alpha l l' \ e i \ \pi e r m e i n a i s\] The \(e i\) merely repeats the former one. Render \(e i \ \mu h\) above 'if you had not.'

77 A ἡ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω] Cp. Symp. 210 A; Rep. VII. 533 A.

\[\alpha l l' \ \delta πως \ \mu h \ \sigma u x \ \o i o s \ \tau ' \ \epsilon σομαί\] 'But I am afraid I shall not be able to tell you many things of the sort.' The whole phrase recurs in Rep. VI. 506 D. For \(\delta πως \ \mu h\) followed by the indicative cp. Phaedo 77 B and Soph. Oed. T. 1074, 5, where we have the verb of fearing expressed—

\[\delta ε δουχ' \ \delta πως\] 
\[\mu h \ 'e \ \tau h s \ \sigma i o n t h s \ \tau h o d' \ \alpha ν a r r h ξ e i \ k a k a.\]

Similarly Aristoph. Knights 112. See also Riddell, Digest § 59.


\[\o l e n\] That is, a logical whole, not divided into its component species—courage, temperance, etc. Elsewhere Plato aptly compares a bad logical division to hacking a quarter of meat instead of jointing it (Phaedrus 265 E).

B δύνασθαι] It has been conjectured that the poet meant this absolutely, in the sense of 'power.' But as we know nothing of the passage except from Plato, we had better accept his interpretation. We have a similar construction below 78 A, ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν, where two verbs requiring different cases are coupled with the same noun. For the construction δύνασθαι τι cp. ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τούτο τὸ πράγμα, below § 94 B ad fin.

\[\pi o r i ξ e s t h a i\] Supply \(a u t h\). Cp. last note.

C λέγεις] It is more usual to find \(φίς\) used thus parenthetically. See Phaedo 59 C ; Theact. 151 E.

\[\eta \ \gamma e n ε s t h a i \ \a u t \phi\] Cp. Symp. 204 E, \(\delta \ \epsilon r o ν \ τῶν \ \alphaγαθῶν \ τι \ \epsilon r\); 
\[\Gamma e n e s t h a i, \ \eta n\ \ \delta ' \ \epsilon γω, \ \a u t \phi.\]

78 A κακοδαίμονας] κακοδαίμων means a man who is attended with an evil genius; hence 'unfortunate.' The word is used also for the evil genius itself. See the appalling story of Cassius of Parr a in Valerius Maximus, bk. I. ch. 7, De Somniiis § 7. A belief in spirits attendant upon human beings was common to the \(s\) rs, Greeks, and Romans. There are two passages in the New Testament, which seem to imply it, Matt. xviii. 10 ; Acts xii. 15. Among the Romans the guardian-spirit of a man was called his Genius, that of a woman her Juno (Tibullus IV. 6. 1 ; 13. 15). The conception was turned to a religious use in the later Paganism. Epictetus finely says: 'So that when ye have shut to the doors, and made it ' urk
within, remember never to say that ye are alone; for neither are ye. For God is within, and your Genius is within; and what need have they of light to behold what ye are doing?’ (Arrian, Epict. bk. I. ch. 14 ad fin.).

κτάσθαι] See note on δύνασθαι, 77 B.
βούλεσθαι] Supply κινοῦνει.
τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] It might be remarked on this that all men desire the apparent good, but differ in the degree in which their view of it approximates to, or recedes from, the real good.

'Αγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the hyperbaton in this sentence, i.e. the displacement of the natural order of words, the emphatic part being brought in last for the sake of giving it a greater prominence. Riddell, Digest § 309.
καὶ χρυσὸν . . . κτάσθαι] κτάσθαι might be coordinate with νυξιᾶν τε καὶ πλοῦτον, and λέγω parenthetical. See note on λέγεις, 77 B. But it is perhaps simpler to take λέγω as directly governing κτάσθαι, ‘And the getting of gold and silver too I mean.’

ἄττα] Attic neut. pl. of the indefinite pronoun τις, for τινὰ; to be distinguished from ἄττα, neut. pl. of δότις, 88 B.

τι] If τι is substantival, we must regard τὸ δικαίως καὶ δόσις as in apposition to it; but probably it should be taken adverbially—‘at all.’

αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς] Meno had made out virtue to lie in the procuring of worldly goods; but Plato imparts still greater invidiousness to his position by representing him as confounding virtue with these lower goods themselves.

ἐκπορίζοντα] The participle is attracted into the gender of ἀρετῆ, which stands nearest to it in the sentence. In sense it belongs to πόρῳ preceding.

ἀπορία] This word generally signifies physical incapacity. Here it means the moral incapacity of the virtuous man to degrade himself.

μόριον] Logically a part, as being one of the constituent species of a genus.


τὸτε δὲ φής μόριον] τοῦτο refers really to δικαίωσϑην, but is attracted into the gender of μόριον. See note on ἐκπορίζοντα, above 78 B. For a somewhat different instance cp. Cic. Phil. II. 22 ‘Pompeium, quod imperii Populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit.’

τι δὲν πράττῃ] Supply τις. For its omission cp. 97 A; also Char. 167 B; Euthyd. 284 A. Similarly τινὰ is omitted below, 81 B Apol. 29 A, δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα.
The impersonal passive construction is rare.

τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.] ‘For this is what one is saying, when one says that every action which is attended with justice is virtue.’

ἀλλ’ οίει τινά] To attempt to define a thing by means of its own species is a kind of ‘circulus in definiendo,’ since to define a thing by its species is to define it by itself. The procedure, however, more directly offends against the principle laid down by Aristotle in the Organon—that no definition can state the essence of a thing, if its elements are not prior and better known (Top. VI. 4. § 2). Now the species of a genus, though they may be better known to us, are not better known universally; they are, in fact, intelligible only through the genus, so that we are involved in an ‘ignotum per ignotius.’

D ἀπεβάλλομεν] See 75 D.

Ε τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς] The question—τί ἐστιν ἀρετῆ;—is here latent, to the predicate of which, τί, the participle is accommodated. Cf. below 87 C, ὡς τοιοῦτο μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, where the thing spoken of is ἡ ἀρετῆ. Similarly Prot. 354 C, ὃς καὶ τὴν μὲν ἰδιότητα διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν.


διοικότατος] This striking metaphor deserves to be compared with that of the magnet in the Ion (533 D, E), by which Plato illustrates the secondary inspiration of students of poetry.

τὸ τε εἰδὸς] Similarly Alcibiades, in the Symposium, rallies Socrates on his personal appearance (215 A, B), and Theodorus tells him that the youthful Theaetetus is not handsome, but like himself (Theaet. 143 E), οὗτος ἐστιν καλός, προσέχει δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν δμιάτων. It was a permitted subject of jesting. When a man is very ugly he becomes proud of the distinction!


πεπουηκέναι, ναρκᾶν] ναρκᾶν is intransitive, as in the line preceding. It is epexegetical of τοιοῦτον τι only, not of τοιοῦτον τι πεπουηκέναι. Cf. 76 A, ἀποκρίνεσθαι; Crito 45 C, σουτὸν προδοῦναι.

Β οὔκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένει οὐδ᾿ ἀποθημάων] On the fondness of Socrates for Athens see Crito 52 B; Phaedrus 230 D. On the treatment that he might have met in another state see Apol. 37 C, D.

MENO, NOTES. 80 C–81 C.

αὐτῇ ναρκῶσα] Pliny testifies to the opposite: ‘Novit torpedo C vim suam, ipsa non torpescens.’ Stallbaum.

toús ἄλλους] Masc., because, though speaking of the torpedo, he is thinking of himself.

ἐντύχοις] On the optative subjoined to an indicative sentence see D Riddell, Digest § 74.

ἐρωτικὸν λόγον] Grote says in a note (Plato, vol. II. p. 16), E ‘If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by so doing they rendered service to the interests of philosophy,’ and in the text, ‘Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries—What is the criterion of truth?’

κατάγεις] It is difficult to see why this particular word should be used here. Perhaps we may render it ‘you are bringing home to us.’ L. and S. explain it as a metaphor from spinning, like Latin ‘deducere filum.’

ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἐστι ζητεῖν] By search is meant mental search—the process of evoking knowledge out of one’s own inner consciousness. Plato accepts one of the horns of the dilemma, maintaining that one really knows the thing, having seen it in a prior state of existence. Things thus seen are forgotten, yet not so far as to be beyond recognition in case of their being alighted upon, so that search is always a hopeful task.

Πινδάρος] The lines below are assigned by Boeckh (Pindar, vol. 81 B III. p. 623) to the Θρήνιο of Pindar.

οἷς γὰρ ἄν ... δεῖται] = παρ’ ἄν ἄν δεῖται.

πένθεος] Here = ‘guilt,’ which sooner or later brings suffering. πένθος is another form of πάθος, as βέθος of βάθος.

ἥρως] The ω is shortened before the following vowel, so that the C word scans as a dactyl.

'Ατε οὖν ἡ ψυχή] The logical order is—Οὖν ἕστιν οὖν ὁ τί ἡ ψυχή, ἀτε ἀδάνατός τε εὔσα, κ.τ.λ., οὐ μεμάθηκεν.

ἔφαρκυιά] Notice this word. What we call ‘learning’ is merely recollection, while the origin of knowledge is in an intellectual intuition of the truth of things. In the κόσμος νοητός things are visible to the eye of the mind, which are mere abstractions in the world of sense.

D ἀνάμνησθέντα] Supply τινα. See note on 79 B.

τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις δόλον ἔστιν] This is one of the most famous of Plato’s doctrines. Cp. Phaedo 72 E–77 A. Cicero (Tusc. Disp. I. 24) admits the partial truth of it in an interesting passage, which will serve as an introduction to the coming interlude in the dialogue: ‘Habet (sc. animus hominis) primum memoriam, et eam infinitam, rerum innumerabilium; quam quidem Plato recordationem esse vult superioris vitae. Nam in illo libro, qui inscribitur Menon, pulsionem quemdam Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione quadrati. Ad ea sic ille respondet, ut puer; et tamen ita faciles interrogationes sunt, ut gradatim respondens eodem perveniat, quo si geometrica didicitset. Ex quo effici vult Socrates ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari.’

St. Augustine too, no mean metaphysician, accepts the substantial truth of Plato’s doctrine without drawing his inference as to a previous state of existence. He says (Conf. X. 11): ‘Quocirca invenimus, nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensum haerimius imaginies, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per se ipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea quae passim atque indisposite memoria continebat, cogitando quasi colligere, atque animadveendo curare, ut tanquam ad manum posita in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, jam familiari intentioni facile occurrant.’ St. Augustine had studied Platonism through the medium of a translation (Conf. VII. 9).

οὗτος . . . δὲ] οὗτος is here used, like ‘iste,’ as the pronoun of the 2nd person, ‘that of yours;’ δὲ means ‘this of mine.’ We have a clear instance of the same use in Homer II. VIII. 109, where Diomede says to Nestor:

τούτω μὲν θεράποντε κομέτων, τάδε δὲ ναῖ

Τρωσίν ἐφ’ ἴπποδάμοις ἱθύνομεν.

Here τούτω refers to the horses of the person spoken to, and τάδε to those of the speaker.

ἀργοῦς ποιήσει] Cp. Phaedo 85 C, D, where Simmias insists on the duty of speculative inquiry, even if certainty be unattainable.

Ε Ναὶ, ὡ Σώκρατες] Meno accepts the doctrine of metempsychosis without surprise, and demurs only to that of ἀνάμνησις. Meno, we may remember, was imbued, through Gorgias, with the teaching of Empedocles, who held the doctrine of metempsychosis at least as firmly as Plato. Witness what he says of himself:

ηδη γὰρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόμην κούρσ τε, κόρη τε,
θάμνος τ’, οἶκων τε, καὶ ἐξ ἀλὸς ἐμπυρος ἱχθύς.

(Dioc. Laert. VIII. § 77, Tauchnitz.) Ritter and Preller read καὶ εἶν ἀλλ ἐλλατὸς ἱχθύς, which saves the line from absurdity. Empedocles is hardly likely to have said that he had been a broiled fish in his time.
"ويتو". "As you say." Cp. note on 81 D above; also Apol. 26 E, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πρὸς Διόσ, οὔτωσι σοι δοκῶ, 'Do I seem to you, as you say?' Rep. II. 370 A, 'Ἀλλ' ἵσως, ἐπὶ Σωκρατεῖς, οὔτω μᾶλλον ἢ 'κείνω, where οὔτω means 'in the way you suggest.'

μοι] 'Pray.' Ethic dative.

πολλῶν ἀκολούθων] A sign of Meno's wealth.

ἐντονα βούλα] In proof of the genuineness of the experiment, as Β a conjurer asks for any hat from the audience.

"Ελλην μέν] We may suppose an ellipse of some counterbalancing clause with δὲ—'a Greek in race and language, but not educated.' Cp. 86 C, Καὶ τὸῦτο μὲν γε δοκεῖσ μοι ἐν λέγειν; 89 C, Καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει μὲν ἄρτι καλῶς λέγειναι. This isolated use of μέν is especially frequent with verbs of thinking, e.g. οἶμαι μέν, Phil. 63 B, Laws 625 C, 633 D, 676 B; δοκῶ μέν, Soph. 242 B; έσκας μέν, Laws 629 D; and with pronouns, e.g. Ἐγώ μέν, Gorg. 506 E, Rep. 499 C; ἐμοῖ μέν, Crat. 428 E; ὁδε μέν, Laws 629 B; τοῦτο μέν, Apol. 21 D; τοῦτο μέν, Phil. 49 D, Laws 628 A.

δύστερα] For the pl. cp. Soph. 222 B; Euthyd. 275 E.

Εἰς τὴ δή μοι, κ.τ.λ.] We may now suppose Socrates gradually to construct the following diagram on the sand:

![Diagram](image)

tοιοῦτον. The figure ABCD.

"Ευτιν . . . έχον] Notice the analytic form. Cp. 84 A, ἔστι βαδίζων.

ἀλλο τι] In full ἀλλο τι; ἢ, a common interrogatory formula in Plato. Cp. 97 A. It is practically equivalent to the Latin 'nonne.'
There is an avoidance of bluntness about it characteristic of the polite Hellenic mind. To exhaust the negative is an indirect way of asserting the affirmative. Greek abounds in such negative terms as οὐκ ἁγιεύς, οὐκ ἐδήλου.

83 A  ἔτεραν τοσαύτην] The line DG.
     ἀπὸ ταύτης δῆ] The line AG.

B  ἀπ' αὐτῆς] This is speaking inclusively, as the line AG itself is one of the four.
     τούτι] The square AHIG.
     ταυτὶ τέτταρα] ABCD, DCKG, BHLK, CLIK.

C  τεττάρων γάρ] In full—τεττάρων γάρ τετράκων ποδῶν χωρίων ἐστὶν ἐκκαίδεκα ποδῶν χωρίων: ‘Four times a space of four feet is a space of sixteen feet, is it not?’
     τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτητῆ:] The original line AD. Notice the Ionic form ἡμισέας. See L. and S.
     τούδε] The original square ABCD.
     τούτου] The whole figure AHIG.
     τοσαύτης] The line AD. Observe that the second of the terms compared has been attracted into the case of the first. Riddell, Digest § 168.

D  τοςημὲν] The line AG.

E  τὸ ἡμισὺ ταύτης] DM, the half of DG.
     οἴδε] AD, which was originally supposed to be two feet.
     δὲ] The line DM.
     ἐνθενδε, κ.τ.λ.] οἴδε is now the line AB, and ὅδε the line BN.

84 B  προφυγοὺ] Crasis for πρὸ ἔργου. For its use cp. below 87 A.
     τότε δὲ βαδίωσ] This is a hit at Meno for his readiness to preach about virtue. See 80 B.

D  τετράπον τούτο] The original square ABCD.
     τούτι] DCKG.
     τρίτον τόδε] CLIK.
     τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε] BHLK.

E  τὸ ὀλον τόδε] AHIG.
     τοῦδε] ABCD.

     Οὐκοῦν .... γραμμῆ] ‘Have we not then a line here?’ αὕτη γραμμῆ must not be taken as ‘this line.’ In Phil. 16 C we may construe ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ‘delivered this as their utterance.’ In Gorg. 489 οὗτος ἀνήρ οὐ παιδεύει φλυνόρων and 505 C, οὗτος ἀνήρ οὐχ ἵπτετο ἐφεκλούμενος, the οὗτος is exclamatory, ‘Here’s a man who, etc.’ Cp. Rep. 506 B, where οὗτος ἀνήρ is in the second person, meaning ‘You fellow there!’

85 A  τετταρες αὕται] BD, DK, KL, LB.
     τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων] The four squares bisected by the four lines.
The triangles BCD, DCK, KCL, LCB.

Of the size of BCD.

In DBLK.

'The multiple of two is four.'

This question is abrupt as compared with the preceding ones, though the leap is not more than a boy's intelligence would be sure to take unaided. Schleiermacher supposes a lacuna in the text, which he ingeniously supplies thus:

Σ. Τόδε οὖν ποσαπλάσιον γίγνεται τούτου;
Π. Βιβλίακινον ήν;
Π. Τετράπουν.
Σ. Τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν;

The eye of the抄写员 might easily glance on from ποσαπλάσιον to ποσάπουν: but, on the other hand, the mind of Plato might easily have glanced over the missing link in the chain of argument.

Socrate says this as insisting on his position that the truths of science are latent in the minds of all. This is true of an a priori science like geometry, the truths of which are such that the mind cannot but recognise them when they are put before it.

We seem able to dispense either with the words περὶ δὲν ἄν μὴ εἰδή or with περὶ τούτων δὲν οὐκ οἶδεν. Stallbaum tries to vindicate the passage from the charge of redundancy by taking the first περὶ in close connection with εἰδότι, and translating thus: 'Itaque qui ignorat aliquid, quidquid illud sit, is tamen de eo quod ignorat, rectas verasque opiniones habere potest.' He takes περὶ δὲν ἄν μὴ εἰδη as a periphrasis for περὶ οὕτων. This seems somewhat forced, and perhaps the true explanation is that Plato, having started the question as a hypothetical case, περὶ δὲν ἄν μὴ εἰδη, drives home the apparent contradiction at the end by representing it as an existing fact, περὶ τούτων δὲν οὐκ οἶδεν—'Then in one who does not know, and about things which he is not supposed to know, do there exist true opinions about those things which as a matter of fact he does not know?'

The periphrastic form of the perfect optative, which is invariable in the middle and passive, is usual in Plato in the active also. Other writers have it too; thus Hdt. I. 210, ὃς βασιλεῦ, μὴ εὖ ἄνυρ Περσῆς γεγονὼς ὀστὶς τοι ἐπιβουλεύει; III. 64, ἀπολωλεκτὸς εὗρ.

It appears from the words that are put into the mouth of Socrates below, that Plato was himself conscious
of the weakness of this remarkable argument for the immortality of
the soul. It breaks down from the first, for there is no notice taken of
the possible supposition that the boy got the knowledge on coming
into this life, that is to say, that it is part of his human nature. If
necessary truth be the result of the structure of the human faculties,
this a priori knowledge is got at the moment when the faculties are
inherited. Neither is any notice taken of the position, which is a
possible one, that the soul may have pre-existed, and yet not from
eternity.

καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] For a similar distinction between
essential and non-essential points of credence see Phaedo 114 D.

C οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα] Of the same force as οὐ μὴν ἄλλα, ‘however,’
‘not but that.’ ‘After οὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition
the contrary of that which follows the ἄλλα,’ Riddell, Digest §
155. The instance given in the Student’s Greek Grammar makes
this very clear—δὲ ἵππος μικρὸν ἑκείνον ἐξετασάμενον οὐ μὴν
(ἐξετασάμενοι) ἄλλα ἐπεμείνειν δὲ Κύρος.

didaktō ὁντι αὐτῷ] See note on didaktōn, 70 A, and on τι αὐτὸ
φησι, 73 C.

D εἰτε οὐ διδακτόν] The οὐ may be supposed to coalesce with the
didaktōn so as to form a negative term. Otherwise we might expect
μὴ, as below 87 B, εἰτε ἄδωνατον εἰτε μὴ. For οὐ after εἰτε cp.
Rep. I. 354 C.

ἔνα δὴ ἔλευθερος ὡς] Cp. the words of Philo, himself a Platonist
—Ἀναμφιβολῶς καὶ ἕξ ἀνάγκης ὁ σπουδάσων ἔλευθερός ἐστι (Π. 452.
§ 7, Tauchnitz).

E ποιῶν τι] See note on τι ἐστι, 71 B.

eἰ μὴ τι οὖν ἄλλα] ‘At all events then.’ Cp. Rep. VI. 509 C;
Riddell, Digest § 20.

λέγω δὲ τὸ ἕξ ὑποθέσεως, κ.τ.λ.] On τὸ ἕξ ὑποθέσεως see note τὸ
γάρ τῇ αὐτῇ, 72 E.

The passage which follows is the only difficulty in the Meno, and
perhaps an insoluble one. The key to it has been lost for want of
the diagram which should accompany it. Taking the words exactly
as they stand in the text, they seem to run as follows:

‘By “hypothetically” I mean something of this kind. In a
question of geometry, when one has asked, for instance, about a
figure, whether it be possible for a given figure to be inscribed as
a triangle in a given circle, a man might say, “I do not yet know
whether your figure is of the kind required, but, as an hypothesis, I
think the following consideration will help us. If this figure be of
such a kind that when a man has described a figure on the given line
of it, he falls short by a figure similar to the figure itself which
has been described thereon, one consequence seems to me to ensue, and again another, if it be impossible for it to be treated thus. Hypothetically, then, I am willing to tell you the result with regard to the inscribing of it in the circle, whether it be impossible or not."

As to the meaning of these words, the following explanation may be attempted for want of a better:

Socrates wishes merely to illustrate the nature of a hypothesis, and he supposes a student to be asked whether it be possible for a given triangle to be inscribed in a given circle. The student replies that if it be a right-angled triangle, the case is one, and if it be not, the case is another, and would have to be considered separately. But, in order to make the hypothesis more elaborate, the student, instead of speaking directly of a right-angled triangle, attempts to describe it by one of its properties. Unfortunately this property is not so distinctly stated as to be peculiar to the right-angled triangle.

Let ABC be a right-angled triangle. To let fall a perpendicular upon BC from the vertex A amounts to describing a triangle upon the line AC (or upon AD itself, see note on τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτῷ γραμμήν, 87 A), and the effect of such a perpendicular is that the remainder ABD is a triangle similar to ADC. To render the description peculiar to the right-angled triangle, it should be stated that the triangles into which it is divided are not merely similar to each other, but to the whole triangle (Euclid VI. 8). As a matter of mathematical fact, a circle can be described round any triangle whatever (Euclid IV. 5). But the question is not whether a triangle generally can be inscribed in a circle, but whether a given triangle can be inscribed in a circle of a given magnitude. To decide this is easier in the case of the right-angled triangle than in that of a triangle of another kind. For as the angle in a semi-circle is always a right angle, we have only to measure the length of the base and compare it with the diameter of the circle.

\[\chi\alpha\rho\iota\nu\] Properly 'space,' 'area.' But as every definite portion
of space must have some shape, it is permissible to render it 'figure.'

87 A  τόδε τὸ χωρίον] Stallbaum's contention that these words refer to the square previously described by Socrates seems put out of court by the words immediately preceding, τὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον. Socrates had not already described a circle in the sand. Notice that the τοῦτο following refers to the same thing as τόδε above, only that the point of view has shifted from the first to the second person. See note on αὐτὸς . . . δὲ, 81 D, above.

εἰ μὲν ἔστι, κ.τ.λ.] We have no clause with δὲ following, but the force of one is got from the words below, καὶ ἀλλο ἄν, εἰ ἀδύνατον.

τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμήν] These words admit of being construed 'the line given here,' in which case they might be referred to the perpendicular AD.

παρατείνατα] Supply πίνα. Cp. ἀναμηνησθέντα, 81 D, and see note on ὅ τι ἀν πράττῃ, 79 B.

B  εἰτε οὐ διδακτόν] See note on 86 D.

εἰ ποίον τι ἔστι] English idiom does not admit of our bringing in a question in this hypothetical way. We have to say, 'What kind of thing in the soul must virtue be, to admit of being taught, or not to admit of it?' Cp. Rep. I. 333 C; Xen. Mem. I. 4. § 141; ἀλλ' ὅταν τί ποιήσωσι, νομεῖς αὐτῶς σοῦ φροντίζεσθε; here we should say, 'What must they do before you will think that they have a care for you?'

C  τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος] See note on τίνος ὄντος ἀρετής, 79 E.

D  ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, κ.τ.λ.] 'That virtue in itself is good,' i.e. absolutely good. Cp. Phaedo 65 D, φαμὲν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτῷ ἡ οὐδὲν; Theact. 146 E, γρώναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτῷ ὃ τοῦ ποτ' ἐστίν; Phil. 60 A, καὶ δὴ καὶ τάγαθον τοῦτο' αὐτῷ εἶναι ἑύμασαί; Prot. 60 E, τί ποτ' ἐστίν αὐτῷ, ἡ ἀρετή; Rep. 363 A, οὐκ αὐτῷ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, 493 E, αὐτῷ τι ἐκαστὸν. Sometimes the neuter article is used after αὐτό, as αὐτῷ τὸ ἱσον, Phaedo 74 A; αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν, Rep. 493 E. It is rare to find the pronoun otherwise than in the neuter gender, as αὐτῇ κῦνησις, Soph. 256 B; αὐτή ὡμοίτης, Parm. 130 B. The pronoun and noun are never compounded by Plato, as in Aristotle's αὐτο-ἐκαστον, αὐτοἀνθρωπος, etc.

Ε  πλούτος δή] 'Wealth, of course'—said with allusion to the avarice of the Sophists and the character of Meno. The enumeratio of bodily and external goods here given—health, strength, beauty, and wealth—is derived from a popular drinking-song, to which we have a reference in the Gorgias (451 E), οἴομαι γὰρ σε ἄκηκονέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἄδιντον ἀνθρώπων τούτῳ τὸ σκολῖον, ἐν ὑδαταριθμθλ μοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὃτι ἔγιαίειν μὲν ἀριστόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν.
MENO, NOTES. 87 E–89 C.

Aνεσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φήσιν ὁ ποιητής τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλούτειν ἀκόλου. Beauty, according to Greek ideas, was even more essential to happiness than strength. Cp. Euthyd. 279 A; Laws I. 631 C; Ἱδιὰ Α.

σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] See note on τηλευτήν καλεῖς τι; 88 A 5 D.

ἀττα. See note on ἀττα, 78 C.

φρόνησις] Notice the tacit assumption of the identity of φρόνησις with ἐπιστήμη. In Xen. Mem. IV. 6. § 7, and in Plat. Theaet. 145 E Socrates makes a similar identification of σοφία and ἐπιστήμη. It was left for Aristotle to discriminate the meaning of the three terms.

οὔτως μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρὴν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. what Nicias says in the Laches 197 A, ὃς γὰρ τι, ὃ Δάρκης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεία καλῶν οὕτως θηρία σύντε άλλο οὐδὲν τὸ κάθεια ὑπὸ ἀνόιας μὴ φοβοῦμεναι, ἀλλ' ἀφοβον καὶ μαρτῦν. In this dialogue courage is tentatively defined as 'the knowledge of what is calculated to inspire fear or confidence, both in war and in all other matters' (195 A). On the subject of brute courage see Arist. Eth. Nic. III. (8), §§ 10–12; and cp. Plato, Rep. IV. 430 B.

καὶ μαθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα] 'Both learning and training.' We have here the rhetorical figure 'chiasmus,' καταρτυόμενα referring to the former word, σωφροσύνη, and μαθανόμενα to the latter, εὐμάθεια.

αὐτῷ] This refers to ἄρετή, but the intervention of τῶν ἐν τῇ C φυχῇ τι is sufficient to account for the neuter. The dative ἀφελέμω is the regular construction with a copulative verb. For Riddell's view see Digest § 183.

καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰλλα] This is an accusative, which is taken D up again by the pronoun αὐτά at the end, owing to the long suspension of the construction.

τὸ ἀνθρώπων, κ.τ.λ.] For the supremacy of the soul in man cp. E Rep. III. 403 D, ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φανεται, δ' ἄν χρηστὸν ἕ σώμα, τούτο τῷ αὐτῷ ἄρετή ψυχήν ἀγαθήν ποιεῖν, ἀλλα τοιούτιον ψυχήν ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὐτῆς ἄρετη σώμα παρέχειν ὡς ὁμί τε βελτιστόν.

ἐνα μηδεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] There is a zeugma underlying the use of ἐνα 89 B here, since with the indicative it signifies a purpose not realised, while with the optative, in the next clause, the question of realisation is not raised. See Riddell, Digest § 57.

ἄλλα μὴ τούτο οὐ καλῶς ὄμολογήσαμεν] 'But can we have been wrong in admitting this?'—'Num hoc minus recte concessimus?' The question is conveyed by μή, while οὐ coalesces with καλῶς. Cp. Lysis 213 D; Prot. 312 A ad fin.
For the absence of any clause with δε cp. note on "Ελλην μέν, 82 B.

Εν τῷ ἐπείτα] Cp. Phaedo 67 C ad fin. καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπείτα: and again 116 A ad fin. τὸν ἐπείτα βίον. When used strictly it means the time immediately following, and is not synonymous with τὸ μέλλον. Soph. Ant. 611:

τὸ τ’ ἐπείτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον
καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει
νόμος ὁδ’, κ.τ.λ.

Äπιστεῖς μη ὅθε, κ.τ.λ.] After a verb involving a negative notion, such as that of 'distrust,' it is the usual construction in Greek to have the two negatives μη οὔθ. So below, οὔκ ἀνατίθεμαι μη οὔ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Ἀνατίθεμαι] The mode of speaking which would be employed in some such amusement as draughts is transferred to the game of dialectic. Cp. Rep. 487 C, ὡς πεττείας αὐ ταύτης τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὔκ ἐν ψήφοις ἄλλ’ ἐν λόγοις.

Εἰεν] The optative imparts a hypothetical air to the question, οὔ being equivalent to εἰ τινὸς. Cp. Chaim. 171 E ad fin.; Lysis 214 D ad in. Stallbaum. We may represent the force of the optative by using the past tenses in English—'that if there were neither teachers nor learners of a subject, we should be right in conjecturing that it did not admit of being taught.' So below 96 C.


"Ἀνυτός] Anytus is here represented as the type of conventional propriety. He is referred to in the Apology as the most important of the three accusers of Socrates, who are called collectively οἱ ἄμφι Ἀνυτόν (Apol. 18 B; cp. Hor. Sat. II. iv. 3 'Anytique reum'). Personally he took up the quarrel of the manufacturing classes and political men against Socrates (Apol. 23 E). His father, Anthemion, had made his fortune as a tanner. Anytus was a prominent leader of the popular party at Athens, and was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants at the same time as Thrasybulus (b.c. 404. Xen. Hell. II. 3. § 42). His character has suffered more at the hands of later writers than of Plato. The Scholiast on the Apology calls him Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐφαστής: and states further that out of annoyance at some jest of Socrates he bribed Meletus to prefer a charge of impiety against the philosopher. Diogenes Laertius (II. § 43) states that when the Athenians repented too late of their treatment of Socrates, Anytus was sent into banishment, while Meletus was condemned to death.

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Polycrates was a tyrant of Samos, who flourished in the reign of Cambyses, and possessed the most powerful navy then in the world (Thuc. I. 13 ad fin.). His preternatural good fortune lost him the friendship of Amasis, king of Egypt, who surmised that he was destined to come to a bad end. This foreboding was verified through the gratuitous treachery of the Persian satrap, Oroetes, who entrapped and crucified him. He was a patron of the poet Anacreon (Hdt. III. 40-3; 120-5).

Σουμηνίας ὁ Ῥηβαῖος] He is mentioned again in the Republic (I. 336 A) as an ambitious and wealthy man. We read in Xenophon’s Hellenics (III. 5. § 1) that he was one of the leading men among the Greeks who received a bribe from the Persians to make war on the Lacedaemonians during the campaign of king Agesilaus in Asia (about B.C. 394). As the death of Socrates took place in B.C. 399 this bribe cannot be alluded to as the origin of his wealth, though the words δῶντος τινός look like it, unless Plato is here guilty of an anachronism, and has made Socrates anticipate an event which was fresh in his own mind as he wrote. In that case we would have here a clue to the date of the composition of the Meno.


ἄρ' ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν] ‘Does not the preceding question amount to the following?’ The three demonstrative pronouns, ὁδε, οὗτος, and ἐκεῖνος, correspond to the three personal ones, με, σε, ἐ, and derive their force from them. Now what a speaker has said is already in possession of his hearer; whereas what he is going to say, no one can know but himself. Hence ὁδε with its derivatives is used in introducing a speech or idea, while οὗτος with its derivatives is used in referring to what has already been stated. τοῦτο here means ‘what you have now heard;’ τόδε, ‘what I am going to tell you.’ Cp. note on οὗτος ... ὁδε, 81 D, and on τόδε τὸ χαρίων, 87 A; also Apol. 37 A, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ Ἀρηναῖοι, τοῦτον (as you imagine), ἄλλα τοιώνδε (what I am going to tell you) μᾶλλον.

ἰέναι] = φοιτᾶν. Lat. ‘ventitare.’

tὰ αὐτὰ ταὐτά] ‘Does not the same thing hold?’ But probably the words ought to be taken adverbially, and the note of interrogation after ταὐτά abolished. The sentence will then run thus, ‘With regard to flute-playing then and the rest, is it not in the same way great folly,’ etc. In this case the pronoun, while referring to the sentence just expressed, is in apposition to the sentence succeeding, Riddell, Digest § 18.

ζητοῦντα] In agreement with αὑτῶν, which has to be supplied as
the subject of παρέχειν, as is evident from the μανθάνειν following. Otherwise there is no reason for the change from the plural βουλομένους.

τούτων, οί μήτε προσποιοῦνται, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Persons who do not claim.’ ούτε would refer to some definite individuals.

μήτ’ ἔστιν αὐτῶν] For the transition from the relative to the demonstrative cp. Gorg. 452 D; Rep. III. 395 D, ὅν φαμεν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθος γενέσθαι.

ἐξεστὶ σε] This is more complimentary than ἐξεστὶ σοι would have been. The latter would have meant ‘you have the opportunity;’ this means ‘there is the opportunity,’ i.e. ‘I have the opportunity of your assistance.’

91 A ἣ οί ἀνθρωποι, κ.τ.λ.] See the note on ἣ περὶ ἀρετῆς in the title of the dialogue.

ἐνόνυς ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι] This is specified by Aristotle as coming under the sphere of the virtue of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Eth. Nic. IV. (2), § 15 καὶ περὶ ἔνων δὲ ὑποδοχᾶς καὶ ἀποστολᾶς.

B ὑποχνομένους] Cp. Laches 186 C.

οὔτοι εἰσιν] In full οὔτοι εἰσι τοιοῦτοι.

C λωβηθῆναι] ‘To get himself ruined.’ Riddell, Digest § 88, classifies this as an instance of the ‘semi-middle’ sense of the verb. Cp. Apol. 35 C, where θείζεσθαι means ‘to let yourselves be accustomed.’ There is a good instance of this use in Aristotle (Eth. Nic. III. (1), § 9) ὅθεν ἐπαινοὶ καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μῆ, ‘according as men let themselves be compelled or not.’

οὔτοι γε φανερὰ ἐστὶ λάβῃ] Notice that the copula is attracted into agreement with the predicate, Riddell, Digest § 202. Cp. note on τοῦτο δὲ φῆς μόριον, 79 B.

D Πρωταγόρας] Protagoras of Abdera, an elder contemporary of Socrates. He was the first to call himself a Sophist, and to demand a fee for teaching (Prot. 349 A). This fee is said to have been fixed at 100 minae: but if any pupil demurred to paying it, he allowed him to go to the temple, and deposit under oath whatever sum he thought equivalent to the benefit he had received (Prot. 328 B C; Arist. Eth. Nic. IX. (1), § 5; Diog. Laert. IX. 52). According to the statement of Heracleides Ponticus, a disciple of Aristotle, Protagoras gave laws to the Thurians. As the colony of Thurii was founded by Pericles in B. C. 443, this statement exactly tallies with that of Apollodorus, who says that he flourished (ἀκμάζειν) in the 84th Olympiad, and accounts for the selection by the latter of that particular date (Diog. Laert. IX. Cp. § 50 with § 56). For the well-known story of how when a lad he was sent out to gain his living
as a porter, and attracted the attention and patronage of Democritus by his ingenuity in tying wood, see Aus. Gell. Noct. Att. V. 3, and cp. Diog. Laert. IX. § 53. Chronological difficulties have been started with regard to it, on the ground that Democritus was younger than Protagoras (see Smith's Dict. of Gk. and Rom. biography). According to Philostratus, the father of Protagoras was extremely rich, and entertained Xerxes on his way to Greece. This, however, would be quite consistent with subsequent poverty.

τῷ λιμῷ] 'The hunger that would overtake them.'

ἐγγὺς καὶ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Just about seventy years of age;' Lat. 'Fere septuaginta annos natum.'

εὐδοκίμων οὐδέν πέπαυται] It is extremely difficult to reconcile this statement with the often-repeated story that Protagoras was banished from Athens for blasphemy, and his books publicly burnt. After all, our earliest authority for this anecdote is Cicero (De Nat. Deor. I. ch. 23). The next best is Josephus (against Apion II. 37). It is told also by Philostratus (p. 494, Teubner's ed. vol. II. p. 13), by Diogenes Laertius (IX. § 52), and by Eusebius (Praep. Ev. XIV. 19. § 6. ed. Heinichen). By the time the story reaches Philostratus, Protagoras is hunted over land and sea, and drowned in a small boat in attempting to escape the Athenian trieremes. How is it that in all that has been written by Plato and Xenophon with regard to the trial of Socrates for impiety, there should not be a single reference to the similar charge brought against Protagoras, who was, intellectually, the most prominent man of his day?

ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι] e.g. Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus 92 A of Acragas. See Prot. 314 C; Rep. X. 600 C; Theag. 127 E ad fin.

πολλοῦ γε δεύοντι μαίνεσθαι] The usual construction with πολλοῦ δεῖν is the simple infinitive, as here and above 79 B, πολλοῦ δεῖς εἴπειν (cp. Apol. 30 D, 35 D, 37 B; Dem. de Cor. p. 263 ad fin., de Fals. Leg. p. 356): but it may be followed by the accusative article (Theaet. 166 D).

οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες. This might be taken to mean 'who intrust' the young men to them (i.e. to the Sophists): but it seems more natural to take it in the sense of 'who allow them to.'

ἄλλον] We have here the idiomatic use of ἄλλος, which allows B of such expressions in Greek as 'there was no tree nor any other grass in the place.' In this passage we may render it 'either;' sometimes 'besides' suits better. Cp. Apol. 36 B, τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων, Rep. III. 401 A; and see Riddell, Digest § 46.

οὗ ... εἰπη] 'If you were entirely without experience of it.' See C note on εἶπη, 89 E.
Δαλα γάρ] The γάρ points to an ellipse. ‘But let this pass, for,’ etc.

D ἐκείνους εἰπέ, κ.τ.λ.] ἐκείνοις here, like the Latin ‘ille,’ looks on to what is coming. The natural construction would be a relative clause after it—ἐκείνους εἰπέ τινα ὅσο ἀφικόμενος, but owing to the parenthetical clause which intervenes, we have this replaced by a dependent question—παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος. Stallbaum.

φράσας] The aorist may be used of a contemporaneous act, if it be not regarded as continuous—‘benefit in the telling.’ Stallbaum remarks that it would certainly have been φράσον in the imperative.

Ε παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ] The conjunctive here is deliberate. Cp. Phaedo 115 C ad fin. καὶ ἐρωτᾶ δή, πῶς με θάπτῃ;

Τί δὲ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου, κ.τ.λ.] So in the imaginary cross-examination in the Apology Meletus is made to say that the jurors, the audience, the members of the council, the members of the assembly, in fact the whole body of Athenian citizens, were fitter to be intrusted with the education of the young than Socrates.


93 B τοῦτο δὲ σκοπούντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν] ‘And in investigating what you have heard me say, I will tell you what we are investigating.’ See note on 90 C.

ἡν αὐτοὶ ἁγαθοὶ ἦσαν] Notice that adjectives can be followed by a cognate accusative as well as verbs. Cp. Apol. 20 A ad fin. δὲ ἐμελλεν αὐτὸ καλῶ τε κἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν: ibid. D, τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύον ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. See Riddell, Digest § 3.

ἡ οὖ παραδοτόν, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Or whether this is not a thing that a man can transmit, or one receive from another.’ The force of the verbal adjective is active.

C κάκεινον εἶναι] Supply ἄν φαίης from above.

φθονεῖν] Imperfect infinitive.

D ἵππεα μὲν ἐδίδαξε αὐτοῖς For the construction cp. Rep. IV. 421 E ad in. τοὺς νεῖν ... χείρον δημιουργοῦσι διδάσκεται. Riddell says that the ascription to the middle voice of the meaning ‘to get a thing done by another’ is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (διδάσκεται) by some passages in the Meno. He declares that the whole point of the present passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself, fortifying his assertion by a comparison with 94 C, where the active ἐπαιδεύεσθαι is used of a father getting his son taught by others (Digest § 87). But, if this be so, why did Plato add ὅσα διδασκάλων ἁγαθῶν
eiχετο? Besides, is it likely that Themistocles would have had time, even if he had the ability and inclination, to teach his son circus-riding? As for the argument that the active voice in 94 C really conveys (on the principle of 'qui facit per alium facit per se') the meaning that is supposed to be peculiar to the middle, this is a reason for allowing the use to the active voice rather than denying it to the middle. Cp. the parallel passage in the Protagoras (319 E). On the whole then we may safely say that 'the third sense of the middle voice' need not be expunged from the grammars.

\[σοι\] Ethic dative.

ἐν τοῖς ἀριστον] Cp. Theaet. 186 A, ἐν τοῖς μᾶλιστα, where Campbell remarks that in such expressions the article retains its demonstrative force, comparing Euthyd. 303 C ad fin. and Oed. Col. 742 (Dindorf).

Ἀνοίμαχον] This son of Aristeides the Just appears along with 94 A Melesias, the son of Thucydides, among the interlocutors in the Laches. They are there represented as old men, lamenting the neglect of their own education, and resolved not to let their sons suffer in the same way. Lysimachus had been intimate with Sophroniscus, the father of Socrates, and belonged to the same deme as the philosopher—that of Alopecae (Laches 179 C, D; 180 C, D). We learn from Demosthenes (against Leptines, p. 491) that the Athenians, in gratitude for his father's services, assigned him an allotment of land in Euboea, together with a sum of money, on the motion of Alcibiades. Aristeides, the son of this Lysimachus, was committed to the charge of Socrates: but the latter confessed subsequently that his attempts to educate him had proved a complete failure (Laches 200 C; Theaet. 151 A ad in.). He does not appear to have succeeded much better with Thucydides, the son of Melesias (Theag. 130 A, B).

\[νιτές\] These sons of Pericles figure in the Protagoras (315 A, B 319 E, 328 C); they are referred to in the First Alcibiades (118 D, E) as being foolish. The Scholiast on the passage adds the information that they were nick-named, each of them, βιωτουμάμας, which practically amounts to 'booby' (cp. Aristoph. Clouds 1001). Valerius Maximus, therefore, is rhetorical in speaking of them as youths of great promise ('duobus mirificis adolescentibus') when describing the strength of mind with which Pericles bore their loss. They fell victims to the plague within four days of one another, B.C. 429 (Val. Max. V. ch. 10, ext. § 1).

ἄλλα μη ὡδ ση διδακτόν] The phrase is repeated in E below. Cp. Apol. 39 A, ἄλλα μη ὡδ τοῦτ ἢ καλεστόν. The easiest explanation of such expressions is to suppose an ellipse of some word like
διδουκα or ἦρα. Riddell classifies them as instances of the presumptive variety of the deliberative conjunctive; Digest § 59.

τοὺς φαυλοτάτους] There is a touch of the Socratic εἰσωνεία about this. The instances already selected had really been the strongest possible.


C Θουκυδίδης] The son of Melesias. A conservative statesman at Athens, and unsuccessful rival of Pericles.

Μελησίαν] See note on Λυσίμαχον, 94 A.

ἀκοὴ] ‘To remember by hearsay’ is certainly a loose expression: but μέμνησαι preceding is practically equivalent to οίσθα, and accepted by the speaker as such.

Οὐκοῦν δὴλον, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence is perfectly perspicuous, though highly involved. It contains two dependent clauses, the former of which has a μὲν both in the protasis and the apodosis, which is answered by a corresponding δὲ in the protasis and apodosis of the latter. For a similar arrangement of particles cp. the long sentence in the Apology, 28 D, E, beginning Ἔγω οὖν δεινά. In the sentence at present before us the influence of the negative in οὖν δὲν ποτὲ extends over both the dependent clauses. The real gist of the dependent clauses lies in the participles διαπανάμενον and ἀναλάοσαντα respectively, and not in the verbs. Cp. Apol. 31 B, where see Riddell’s note and Digest § 303. The second of the two dependent clauses may be rendered thus—‘and yet have omitted to teach them those things in the case of which he had no need to spend anything, in order to make them good men.’

D ei διδάκτων ἦν] The singular is sufficiently accounted for by supposing that the writer has in his mind the question ἦρα διδάκτων ἦ ἀρετή;

καὶ οἶκια, κ.τ.λ.] We have here an answer to the rhetorical question just put—‘Why, he was not only a member of a great house, but,’ etc.

τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις] τις is put for τίνα by attraction to the relative clause intervening. Cp. Apol. 41 A, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἄληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονταί ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μῖνος τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθος. See the instances collected by Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 192.

Ε 'Αλλὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. ‘But the fact is, my friend Anytus, I am afraid that virtue is not a thing that can be taught.’ For ἀλλὰ γὰρ in this sense cp. Apol. 19 C, D and 25 C ad in., and see Riddell, Digest § 147. It is usual to explain ἀλλὰ γὰρ by supposing an ellipse (cp. note on 92 C). Here, for instance, the full expression might be—‘But why say more? For,’ etc.
Here equivalent to ὑπὸν by ellipse of μᾶλλον. Cp. Soph. Aj. 966

and see Riddell, Digest § 170.

Ἀνυότας μὲν] This is answered, though late, by οὐ δὲ below. 95 A

Two pairs of counter-balanced clauses, one pair with πρῶτον μὲν and ἔπειτα, the other with the ordinary μὲν and δὲ, intervene before we get the antithesis which was latent in the mind of the speaker when he began.

dιδάσκαλοι τε εἶναι ἦ, κ.τ.λ.] For τε followed by ἦ instead of the usual καὶ cp. Theaet. 143 C; Ion 535 D. Stallbaum.

οἷς μὴδὲ, κ.τ.λ.] ‘If they are not even agreed about this.’

Γοργίοι] This is a kind of partitive genitive—‘What I most C admire in Gorgias.’ Cp. Laws 631 A, καὶ σοῦ τὴν μὲν ἐπιχείρησιν τῆς ἐγγυήσεως περὶ τοὺς νόμους παντάπασιν ἀγαμαί.

πέπονθα] πάσω ὀνειροτικός is often used thus to express a state of mind, Cp. Apol. 17 A ad in.; ibid. 22 A.

οἶδ' ὅτι] ‘Are you aware, I say?’ An infinitive clause, τὸν D ποιητὴν ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγειν, would have sufficed, except for emphasis. The οἶδ' ὅτι is repeated for the third time below.

ἐν ποίοις ἔπεισιν] The use of ποῖος for the simple τίς seems generally to indicate surprise, indignation, or a tendency to objection. Compare Gorg. 490 D, ποίων ἵματιν; ‘Clothes indeed! Nonsense’ (Cope). So also Char. 174 B; Euthyd. 304 E; Hipp. Maj. 285 D.

ἐν τοῖς ἑλεγέλοις] See Theog. lines 33–6. The second distich is quoted also by Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (I. 2. § 20).

συμμίσγης] The Epic and Ionic form συμμισγω, for συμμίσγωμ, E is used sometimes by Plato himself. See Phileb. 23 D ad in.; Laws III. 678 C.


λέγει πως] ‘He somehow says.’

Ἐξεῖσ ὡν εἰπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] On the divorce of practice from theory 96 A in the case of political virtue see Arist. Eth. Nic. X. (9), § 18, who evidently has the conclusion of the Meno before his mind. See also Laches 186 C.

ἄλλων ὁτουόν πράγματος, οὐ, κ.τ.λ.] A strong instance of inverse attraction, where the antecedent is drawn into the case of a relative not yet expressed. So below C, πράγματος οὐ μὴ διδάσκαλοι, κ.τ.λ. It is like Vergil’s ‘Urbem, quam statuo, vestra est.’ It differs from the case in 94 D, in that the relative clause has there already come in to modify the subsequent construction. Here
we have the effect produced during the process of mental conception. See Riddell, Digest § 191. To the instances there given add two from Stallbaum, Lysis 221 B ad fin.; Rep. VII. 520 D. In another part of the Digest (§ 26 D) Riddell explains this genitive on a different principle and refers us to § 191 for reasons why it is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative. Perhaps he intended to alter the later passage.

οὖχ ὅπως] ‘Not only not,’ which is sometimes the meaning of ‘non solum,’ or ‘non modo,’ in Latin. Riddell remarks that the negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὖχ ὅπως clause; Digest § 152.

C Ἐἰ δὲ γε μη, κ.τ.λ.] Supply οὐκοῦν from the last question.

πραγματος οὐ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. 89 E and note.

D ἡ τίς ἂν εἴη] Render ἡ, ‘or if there are.’ It does not introduce the second member of the dependent question, which is suppressed.

καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος] See note on 75 E.

προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν] The parallel construction of the neuter gerundive was an archaism in classical Latin.

‘Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est.’

Lucr. I. 112.

Yet Cicero has it in the De Senectute (ch. 2 ad fin.) ‘viam ... quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit.’

E ἡ ἵσως καὶ διαφεύγειν, κ.τ.λ.] The construction here appears hopeless. Two things seem clear, namely, that the ἡ refers us back to ζητητέον before the parenthesis, and that τὸ γράφαι is subject to διαφεύγειν. Stallbaum explains the passage by supplying ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι from ζητητέον. The best of the instances he adduces as parallel are Crito 51 B; Gorg. 492 D; Rep. VII. 525 B: but none of these present the change of subject which constitutes the difficulty here. This passage could only be assimilated to the rest by taking ἡμᾶς as subject to διαφεύγειν, and forcing upon the words the meaning ‘or else perhaps we must abandon the attempt to ascertain.’ With a different punctuation it would be possible to say that διαφεύγειν is loosely put for ὅτι διαφεύγει and is coordinate with the clause immediately preceding. In that case render, ‘Or that else perhaps we cannot know;’ etc.

ὅτι μὲν] This is answered by ‘Ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν below in 97 A. In what follows we have an instance of what Riddell calls ‘binary structure,’ as the clause ὅτι οὐκ ἂν, κ.τ.λ. simply repeats in a slightly different form the preceding one ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, κ.τ.λ. Riddell, Digest § 229.
ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ἢ] Supply ὁ ἡγούμενος.
Πῶς δὴ ὁρθῶς λέγεις] Stallbaum says that ὁρθῶς is here used ‘materially,’ quoting Soph. Ant. 567
ἀλλ' ἤδε μέντοι μὴ λέγετ' οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ἐτι.
He might have quoted Theact. 147 A, ὅταν εἰπώμεν πηλός, or Phil. 34 E, Διψᾷ γε που λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε τι; But surely the sense is against him? Meno does not want Socrates to explain the meaning of the word ‘rightly;’ he wants to know what else could guide rightly but wisdom. Supply ἡγεῖσθαι therefore with ὁρθῶς.
oὔδεν χείρων] ‘Quite as good’—by the figure ‘meiosis’ or B ‘litotes.’
τὸ δὲ ἀρα καὶ δόξα ἢν ἀληθῆς] ‘Whereas right opinion was that C too,’ namely, ‘a guide to right action,’ understood from ἡγεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ introduces a counter-statement, and may be rendered ‘whereas,’ ‘but in fact,’ or quite literally, ‘but for that matter.’ Instances of this idiom abound everywhere in Plato, e.g. Pol. 263 D; Char. 165 B, 166 C; Lysis 204 D ad fin.; Rep. 527 D; Laws 642 A.
oὐκ ἄει τυγχάνοι] The ἄει has to be supplied from above. Its repetition there, perhaps, led to its omission here. There are, however, occasional instances to be found of the optative used potentially without ἄει. See Riddell, Digest § 66.
πολὺ τιμωτέρα] On the superiority of knowledge to right D opinion cp. Rep. VI. 506 C.
eἰπω] Deliberative conjunctive.
ἰσος δὲ οὐδ' ἐστι παρ' ὑμίν] The language here is playful, and we are not to infer that such marvellous automata existed at Athens any more than in Thessaly. The way in which Aristotle speaks of them plainly shows that they were mythical—ὡσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασίν ἢ τοῦ τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας. (For the latter see Homer II. XVIII. 376.) The Scholiast on this passage of the Meno supplies a rationalistic explanation of the legend. He says that the early statuaries used to make images with their eyes closed, and their legs in one block. But Daedalus, by representing the eyes of his statues as open, and giving an air of motion by the separation of the legs, made them so life-like that they actually seemed as if they might walk off, if they were not looked after.
πρὸς τί οὖν δή, κ.τ.λ.] Notice the ‘rhetorical interrogation,’
answered by the speaker himself, the object being to awake attention. Riddell, Digest § 325.

καὶ γὰρ αἰ δόξαι] ‘For true opinions also,’ καὶ γὰρ is here equivalent to καὶ γὰρ καὶ. Cp. Apol. 18 E, καὶ γὰρ ἤμεις, κ.τ.λ.

καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα] ‘Tis a mighty fine thing.’ Somewhat colloquial.


B ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶς, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Am speaking from conjecture, not from knowledge.’

οὐ πάνω] ‘Non omnino,’ but used by litotes for ‘omnino non.’


C εἴπερ εἶν] Subjunctive use of the optative, where the principal clause is itself optative. Riddell, Digest § 73.

D οὐδ’ ἐπίκτητα] ‘Nor are they so to be acquired,’ i.e. in the course of nature. οὕδετερον preceding is plural in sense.

εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν] ἡ ἄρετὴ has to be supplied from οἱ ἀγαθοὶ.

Καν εἰ γε διδακτόν εἰη, φρόνητοι ἄν εἴναι] This was implied in the words in 87 C, ἥ τοῦτο γε παντὶ δῆλον, οὗτοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;


B οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα] ‘Themistocles and the like.’ Cp. Apol. 18 B, τοὺς ἄμφὶ Ἀντων, ‘Anytus and his coadjuditors.’ The person mentioned is himself included. So Crat. 399 E ad fin. This way of speaking is as old as Homer. See Iliad III. 146; VI. 436, 7.

C οὐδὲν διαφερόντως] We have here extended to practical statesmen the same half-jocular theory of inspiration which Plato elsewhere applies to poets and rhapsodists. See Apol. 22 B, C; Ion 533 E.

ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά] It may be, as Stallbaum says, that this is not the same thing as πολλὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, but that the καὶ serves to intensify the πολλά—‘a great many true things.’ But cp. Arist. E. N. I. 10. § 12.

θείους τε] Notice the curious anticipatory use of τε.

D αἱ γε γυναῖκες] Women of all countries are strong in the language of admiration. In the Cratylus (418 C ad in.), Plato alludes to the conservative influence exercised by women upon language. Compare the admiration expressed by Crassus for the diction of his mother-in-law, which reminded him, he declared, of Plautus and Naevius (Cic. de Orat. III. § 45).

θείος ἄνὴρ] Plato has Atticized the expression. In the Laconian dialect it would be σεῖος ἄνηρ (Arist. Eth. Nic. VII. (1), § 3).

100 A ἐφτ"Ομηρος] Od. X. 495.
ταυτὸν ἀν καὶ εὐθὺς] ‘In the same way such a man would be at once (καὶ εὐθὺς).’ For this adverbial use of ταυτὸν cp. Phil. 37 D. ad fin.

φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.] ‘It is plain that virtue comes.’

εἰσοδέμεθα τότε] Cp. the end of the Protagoras, 360 E, 361 A, where the same question is shelved in the same way.

ἐστιν ὅ τι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις] By saving them from the dis- grace of condemning Socrates.
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