

**BALTIMORE'S DOWNTOWN CORPORATE CENTER STRATEGY: THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION**

Can the lessons learned assist in revitalizing city's neighborhoods



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SECTION 1

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

Jamaica's development and growth which has its foundation in modern urbanism (urban sprawl, less government accountability and so on), have catapulted the economy into unfamiliar channels of urban growth with many associated "ills" and problems.

Deregulation and privatization, both components of the "new development order" in Jamaica, have assisted in creating an economy where minimum concerns for human and natural resources are the prevailing tendencies. This *'laissez faire'* philosophy has manifested itself into a highly problematic and bureaucratic economy.

Within the aegis of the complexity and bureaucracy, the Jamaican economy is experiencing many other diverse problems. These include; decay in the country's main cities and their urban neighborhoods and environment, an exodus of the wealthy population to suburbs or "guarded communities", cities losing its tax base to rural retreats or dormitory communities, a strong perception by the public that adequate service is not being provided by local government to the city and its disenfranchised groups, inaccessibility of information necessary to mobilize the public, poor institutional arrangements and linkages. However, not-withstanding the importance of these issues: degradation of human and natural resources within city centers and particularly their peripheral neighborhoods, are the main focus of this study.

Collectively, urbanization, deregulation and privatization in Jamaica, have created serious and identifiable problems with urban and environmental degradation and management. One of the greatest impacting areas of environmental degradation in Jamaica is in tourism. The tourism industry depends on a clean and aesthetically healthily environment which is presently endangered with poor environmental practices and poor conditions in the surrounding neighborhoods. Also, most tourist resort areas are located near cities that are losing their neighborhood identity, culture and environmental vitality. It should be noted that tourism is separated from the general public in Jamaica and will be selectively referred to in this study as a "suburb or guarded activity." This is to try to establish a synonymous identity, relative to Baltimore city and its suburbs. In the context of the Jamaican situation, it is important to look at the Baltimore experience since tourism is one of the main focus of Baltimore's corporate center strategy. Presently in Jamaica, the tourism industry is in a precariously balanced position with disaster looming. It is argued and well accepted by many, that the tourism industry is suffering because not too much emphasis is placed on neighborhood improvement and social pursuits. The Baltimore experience will be examine from the perspective of how the city manages its pursuits of business (which relatively is very successful) and neighborhood improvement. This relationship is explored to harness opportunities for the purposes of problem identification and resolution that may be applicable for rebuilding cities locally and internationally.

Being a native of a developing country like Jamaica, with a vision to effect influential growth in the future, it's therefore necessary to obtain valuable understanding for

economic development and neighborhood development. Henceforth, a key understanding of the process (economic pursuits and neighborhood vitality) in Baltimore—a city to which success has been accorded for its much lauded strategies, will assist in developing more sustainable policies for cities of the future, not only within the USA, including Baltimore, and those in developing countries like Jamaica.

Cities and their surrounding neighborhoods also faced more problems other-than business pursuits, that have lead to their present problems and deteriorating growth. These include water quality and contamination, loss of watersheds and solid waste disposal and management. Problems with water quality include; contamination of streams and rivers, over-exploitation, and a higher demand for water because of urban sprawl and expansion, which is not been met adequately. Problems with watersheds include, over-exploitation and cutting of timber and urban sprawl into watershed boundaries.

Although these associated problems are important for sustainable city development, it is necessary to confine the study to addressing the issue of corporate center pursuits, neighborhood development and the implications for city and metropolitan growth. These areas are considered by many urban experts as being the main pulse for the American and developing countries' cities initiating and having sustainable development and growth.

It will be argued within the realm of this study that the city and its metropolitan region are in jeopardy because the city neighborhoods have been neglected and, conversely, city neighborhoods are dying because downtown corporate center strategy focuses more on businesses and their pursuits. Within the context of this argument, I suggest a hypothesis that indicates if a balance is not sought between business pursuits and neighborhood development, eventually the problems of neighborhoods will filter into the businesses and city hubs that may lead to their demise. This hypothetical argument also suggest that if policies are geared towards neighborhoods improvement, then a sound foundation can be built, on which the business and corporate center interest can be based. Eventually if these efforts are balanced then some of the problems associated with urbanism will be reduced.

The seriousness of the problems in urban city's economy has increased significantly over the last two decades. This is evident with the perception by development practitioners that a comprehensive interdisciplinary thought process that has evolved in a spatial and temporal context has not been applied to problem solving. This is particular true of major cities in Jamaica such as Kingston and Montego Bay which are the main economic hubs for the country. Hence the problems persist and continue to permeate into other sectors (tourism and business pursuits and neighborhoods) of the economy.

This study will also focus on formulating an approach that encompasses an evolutionary thought process for minimizing the city's problem. The approach will be tested and measured using Baltimore's experience and solutions to incorporate a strong

neighborhood improvement component in the nexus of the approach. Some of the criteria's that are used includes;

- Social and physical development, for example neighborhood degradation housing, education crime rate and poverty, etc.
- Level of economic development, income, tax base, property values and GDP/GNP, etc.
- Political development and leadership.

Inherent to the process of achieving the evolutionary approach, is the belief that the city can only be saved if its neighborhoods and environment are saved. The belief extends to incorporate a policy framework within the city, that pursue collective efforts that embody the environment, neighborhood improvement and business development. This may be achieved by approaching the problems from a sound interdisciplinary foundation that promotes self interest, balance development and responsibility. Neighborhood improvement and business development will be used as illustrations to identify inherent problems and more importantly to assist in formulating an approach to problem solving that has evolved with the pursuits of the corporate center strategy. If a resolution can be reached to effectively address the problems identified, it would go extensively in offering a solution to revitalizing cities which would lend more credibility to neighborhood improvements in the economies of Baltimore and other cities, locally and internationally.

Again, I should remind the readers of this report that the successful approach being sought to be developed from the Baltimore experience is primarily in principle. It would be

great if actual policies and initiatives developed from the Baltimore experience were transferable and applicable to other cities, but it is important to extract the principles because of the differences that exist in most sectors of our economies. Principles in theory, normally flexible and applicable in varying degrees to different situations. This is one of the premises on which this study is predicated.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology to reach the goal of providing a workable approach, incorporated interviews with professionals and agencies in Baltimore, reliance on Johns Hopkins personnel's resources and other research mechanisms.

The final approach when developed will be presented through workshop efforts. The workshops will focus on civic associations, non government organizations (NGOs), grass root organizations (GRO's), and grass roots support organizations (GRSO's) serving as mediators and facilitators to the process. The final product should contain a comprehensive set of policies and strategies that should promote local government and individual accountability to the neighborhoods, environment and the city. The approach will also seek to encourage the local communities to be more active and sensitive in saving their cities as well as being better advocates for their community and the city.

SECTIONS OUTLINE

1. **Section 2:** Will try to explore some of the following;
 - The evolution of Baltimore's development strategy from a historical and contemporary perspective. These will assist in identifying and chronicling the policies undertaken, why and how they were undertaken?
2. **Section 3** will to explore some of following:
 - A comprehensive assessment of Baltimore Development policy strategies from the historical and contemporary perspectives. The impact of the corporate center strategy on neighborhoods and collective prosperity within the city and vice-versa.
 - Important questions: Has the redevelopment focus of city corporate center strategy created an aggregate level of city prosperity? Has Baltimore strategy facilitated the rapid adjustment of new urban realities and done so in such a way that it becomes a more livable city for the majority of its residents?
 - Questions how equitable distributed have been the benefits and burdens of Baltimore Corporate Center Strategy. This section will try to answer an important question: Have certain groups-developers, real estate speculators, young professionals - disproportionately benefited from the city's downtown revitalization, while conditions in Baltimore distressed neighborhoods continue to deteriorate?
3. **Section 4 and Section 5:** Will examine some of the following;
 - How the lessons learned policies, mistakes, successes and so on, in principle may be applied in other cities to effect downtown growth and at the same time effect positive neighborhood improvement.

- A brief examination of the reasons, why Baltimore strategy has produced uneven growth? How can the strategy be adjusted to try to produce even growth? The explanation will try to focus on;
- The inherent pitfalls of building an urban economy on downtown centered corporate services and tourism-convention trade,
- The flaws in the city public and private partnership and,
- The absence of mechanism linking downtown and regional development redevelopment to the revitalization of low-income neighborhoods. This section will also examine how the corporate center strategy may provide a stimulus for neighborhood revitalization. I will conclude by exploring the principles and implications of the Baltimore case and how they can be used to generate equitable and transferable policies **in principle** to effect sustainable economic development in other cities.

SECTION 2:

THE CORPORATE CENTER STRATEGY

THE BALTIMORE EXPERIENCE 1950-1985

“Baltimore , the 13th largest city in the United States, has been termed “ Charm City” because of its residents well established concern with growth and prosperity and its extremely desirable location: it lies further west than any other major Atlantic port, a point which endeared its harbors to shippers. Baltimore now ranks fifth among United States ports, with major railways and trucking lines carrying cargo to and from docks at Canton and Curtis Bay, as well as raw materials to the city many factories. Still, the cosmopolitan influences of geography, economy and cultural life are conditioned in Baltimore to a markedly local orientation. Baltimore tend to have roots in clearly identified neighborhoods, and sense of local identification that this imparts has done much to counter the alienation associated with modern city life” (O Neil, 1976). Has it really!

“Baltimore is a city committed to a thriving business climate and a rich quality of life. Baltimore recognize world wide for the redevelopment of the Inner Harborand a port of entry to the United States is pursuing an aggressive economic strategy for the 21st century. We recently completed a new 20-year strategy for downtown entitled ‘The renaissance Continues’ and identified five economic missions for future growth: Life Sciences, International Business, Financial

Services, Links with Washington DC and Urban Tourism" (Mayor Schmoke, 1995, extracted from one of Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC) brochure's). Are local neighborhood growth initiatives incorporated in any of the above economic mission issues mentioned by Schmoke? Somehow I don't think so, but then I could be wrong. Other hyped-up rhetoric includes;

"Since the early 1970's, Baltimore economic redevelopment strategy has been heralded as a model of how older US cities can be revitalized. The strategy which focuses on creating a corporate center strategy that focus on improving advanced services and tourism is one of the best within the United States" (Pierce, 1987).

"Baltimore provides an ideal study to examine the economic impact of the corporate center strategy. The city has been heralded as the Cinderella City of the 1980's: a model of how port cities can be turned around" (time 1982, p.42: Pierce et al., 1983 p.2480).

"Baltimore's downtown redevelopment business incentives and public-private partnership approach to urban economic development has been lauded in numerous publications. Other cities have sought to copy Baltimore strategy to revive their decaying downtown's "(Pierce, 1986, p.69).

After decades of rhetoric such as that of O'Neil, Pierce and Schmoke about Baltimore Urban Renaissance, the tones in most cities tend to suggest otherwise. The renaissance is decidedly on the decline for most city neighborhoods surrounding the downtown centers according to many urban experts. Before I address the question of decline, I will try to chronicle the much lauded corporate center strategy that focuses mainly on tourism development and other business pursuits. Why did Baltimore adopt this strategy?

The Strategy: Why Was It Necessary

Baltimore, once a great thriving east coast blue-collar manufacturing city began to experience many financial, social, political and other problems associated with other prominent east coast cities during the 50s-70s. Some of the major problems then included;

- **Manufacturing demise:** Baltimore lost approximately 70,000 jobs between 1950 and 1985 (Levine, 1987)
- **The middle class moving to the suburbs.** This created a reduction in "real" tax paying residents living within the city. Thus the city tax base was reduced.
- **Falling property values.** This created many vacancies in the city and had a serious negative impact on the city neighborhoods and their social survival.
- **City leadership was in a quandary..** It was thought by many critics then, that many of the city problems could be attributed to poor leadership. The urban experts suggested that the city needed new direction and impetus.

- **Increasing downtown blight.** The blight created a serious problem for the city to attract business that would increase city's tax base.
- **Development opportunities had moved to suburban areas.** The businesses were moved without being replaced. For example, the port. The exodus of these opportunities created a reduce tax base within the city.

With these problems, the city decided that something had to be done. An elite organization of 100-downtown oriented corporate executives, called Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) was formed in 1954 to address and look for solutions to the city's problems (interview with Barbara Conrad from BDC, November 1995). The general mission of the organization and the mayor was to do good deeds for the region and the city. It should be noted that Baltimore's political structure and hierarchy give a considerable amount of power and autonomy to the mayor.

The demise of Baltimore's manufacturing economy with its past strategies, force the BDC change to and adopt a corporate center strategy that had these public benefits as its main goals according to its proponents (CEO executives and the mayoral administration).

- **Symbolic Enhancement of the local business climate.** Glittering downtown development was seen as the means for providing a strong catalyst that would filter benefits into the other sectors (for example, city neighborhoods) of the economy. The plan was to start by building office space. The office space would then create jobs

that would result in the need for more restaurants (which it did) and eventually residential development would also have extensive positive spin-off effects.

- **Broaden tax base and create jobs.** Jobs could be created by the development of commercial office space. This would attract more people into the city and subsequently the increase in tax base would spillover and create other initiatives such as more hotels, shopping space. These activities would attract more money and replace ruins and run-down housing. Also the benefits from the increase revenue would help to pay for education and social services.
- **Aesthetic Improvement.** This was supposed to compliment and provide a major stimulus for the downtown tourism and the corporate center strategy that focus on providing the “good climate” (business, scenery, etc.,).
- **Creating 2-3 projects per year.** This was a target for the group. It was suggested that something new had to be done each year in-order to attract and keep business interest sustained. By keeping businesses sustained there would be much more long term benefit for the city in the future.
- **The creation of effective leadership.** It was thought that the city leadership at the time lack credibility and did not possess a workable strategy. The corporate center strategy was expected to provide a framework for effective leadership. The strategy created high profile jobs and opportunities, thus a certain levels of accountability is necessary and because of the structure, poor leadership could easily be identified and be made accountable.

- **Economic Adjustment and Restructuring of the city of Baltimore:** Baltimore would not be where it is today according to one proponent of the strategy, if the downtown corporate strategy had not been adopted.
- **The formation of public and private sector partnership.** This partnership will enable viable support for activities to be funded that may otherwise not be funded.
- **Strong federal government focus.** The federal government focus heavily on urban revitalization in this period. This strategy enabled the city to receive more money.
- **Strong business climate and foundation.** A strong business climate would create a sound foundation on which the city's other sectors could be built on.
- **Ripple effects:** Once a critical mass of downtown is leveraged, the proponents suggest it will spill-over into surrounding neighborhoods.

THE STRATEGY

Baltimore's downtown strategy unfolded into two phases. The strategy featured two specific projects: Charles Center and the beginnings of the Inner Harbor. This was from 1954 to approximately 1970.

Charles Center which began in 1959 was a project costing approximately \$180 million, that comprised of Offices, apartments, and retail shops located in the heart of downtown (Millsbaugh, 1964). The Inner Harbor which was a much more ambitious plan, was unveiled in 1964 and called for a 30 year, \$270 million conversion of Baltimore's decaying downtown waterfront into 240 acres of shoreline promenades, marinas, offices, retailing establishment, residences and entertainment facilities (Levine, 1987). However,

early progress on the Inner Harbor Development Plan was slowed by investors skepticism over the long-term prospects of downtown. It was not until the election of William Donald Scheafer as mayor in 1971, and his aggressive implementation of an entrepreneurial corporate center strategy, that the Inner Harbor transformation moved into high gear (Levine, 1987). Both projects, Charles Center and Inner Harbor were planned and largely controlled by the elite organization of 100-downtown oriented corporate executives formed in 1954, called Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) (Interview with Barbara Conrad from BDC, November, 1995).

The city agencies did propose an urban renewal strategy which emphasized neighborhood improvement over downtown, but they fail to build a constituent or gather support for the plan. This coupled with the overwhelming private support for the GBC proposal, pushed Baltimore urban renewal strategy into a pro-downtown direction, rather than neighborhood improvement or even achieving a balance between neighborhood improvement and the pro-downtown direction (Lyll, 1982, p. 35). The Charles Center plan was conceptualized as a single dramatic project to boost investors confidence in downtown, and the Inner Harbor Plan was promoted as the next logical step (Brambilla & Longo, 1979 pp. 45-65).

During the first and second phase of Baltimore Downtown Redevelopment Plan the ground rules were laid. These were; private priorities shaped development plans while the city role was limited to exercising the application of urban renewal powers, for example land acquisition and site clearance. Within the second and more critical phase,

the downtown redevelopment took a stronger and more comprehensive pro-business economic development strategy aimed at enticing corporate investment in a restructured Baltimore (Berkowitz, 1984). All of this happened prior to 1970. During the 1970's the city became saddled with more economic problems that probably was a direct result of disinvestment in the city's surrounding neighborhoods and the greater Baltimore Metropolitan Region as a collective entity or growth pole (US, Bureau of the Census 1978, 1980).

Scheafer's strategy for counteracting these trends hinged on the creation of a good business climate (Levine, 1987). Scheafer sent signals that Baltimore was a pro-business community. The signals included statement such as, "Baltimore wants you so badly, we will let you write your own terms" (Goodman, 1979, pp. 4-5). Policies that emphasized business development priorities were placed over social spending and that business could count on a local government to be sympathetic to their interest. In this era Scheafer fiscal policy "Spartan" (Breckenfeld, 1978 p.108), saw real economic development rose by 400% while municipal spending was slashed by 20% (City of Baltimore, 1974-1984). These measures help to established a strong credit status for the city in an attempt to raise the money needed to underwrite the massive downtown transformation envisaged (Levine 1987).

In addition to this Scheafer created a network of 24 quasi-public corporations designed to entice investors (Berkowitz, 1984). The network was dubbed by critics as a Scheafer "shadow government " (Levine, 1987) because of their explicit purpose of shifting

redevelopment decision making away from the city council to the quasi-public entities controlled by the Scheafer administration and his allies (C. Smith, 1980a).

The most important (and controversial) of the quasi-public was the “Baltimore City Trustees and Loan Guarantee Program,” a recently dismantled quasi-public development bank. Operated with virtually complete autonomy by two trustees appointed by the mayor, the bank's purpose was to creatively package public funds (UDAG's and CDBG's City Bonds) in loans and loan guarantees to provide the “gap financing” necessary to make redevelopment deals go through (Levine, 1982). The trustees were credited as being a central ingredient in the Baltimore approach to urban redevelopment and making the city an attractive place to do business (Banisky, 1986).

Scheafer and his administration focused particularly on the Inner Harbor Waterfront area. This was envisaged as the symbolic linchpin of the Baltimore Renaissance as well as the most alluring district for investors. Scheafer by the mid 1970's created a coherent strategy for Metro Center comprising of Charles Center, The Inner Harbor and the city's traditional financial and retail districts (Levine, 1987). The city's role, as the Department of Planning put it “was limited to identifying further opportunities that private investors may develop. Under the Metro-Center Plan, public expenditures will once again be used strategically to stimulate private investment” (Department of Planning, 1977, pp. 49-51). This was evident in HUD's estimates that reported, Baltimore spent almost 40% of the \$300 million it received from UDAG's and CDBG's and special grants between 1975 and 1981 on Inner Harbor projects alone (US Commission on Civil Rights, 1981, p.154). The

vast spending on downtown was evident with the city redevelopment priorities. The three main priorities were formulated by the city officials and private investors. They were; office development, the promotion of tourism and conventions and the revitalization of retail and commercial activity (Levine, 1987).

As Baltimore industrial base continued to erode, the new Baltimore economy reflected a corporate service center, with entertainment and commercial activities to attract tourist, conventioners, and retail shopping (Garland, 1988). The Inner Harbor revitalization continued to be the major focus of the Scheafer Administration. Public buildings within the framework of the harbor revitalization strategies were built. These include, the Maryland Science (1976), the world Trade Center (1972), the Baltimore Convention Center (1978), the National Aquarium (1981) and finally the crowning investment, the 1980 completion of the Harbor Place, the Rouse company multi-million dollar waterfront festival market place (Department of Planning, 1985, p. 79).

The Inner Harbor Place was a huge success and created more funds being pumped into Charles Center and other harbor projects (Levine, 1987). The success of the Harbor Place further reinforced the city's agenda of focusing their attention on tourism and other service oriented industries: more hotels were built, historic sites refurbished, street paving and other downtown development. By 1985 all available lands in the Inner Harbor were targeted for development. Private investment began to move, displace and disrupt traditional working class communities. Areas in the Eastern Harbor such as Canton and Fells Point were developed with the same vision because of its proximity to downtown

Inner Harbor (Department of Planning, 1985, pp. 33-44, 89-96). In 1985 a \$600 million retail, luxury residential marina project was planned for the southern edge of the Inner Harbor as a symbolic acceptance of Baltimore's transforming economy. This project along with the many others began to worry city planning officials more, however, their hands were tied and authority was limited to paper pushing and basic non-essential tasks. However, they started to examine studies that showed that problems were on the horizon for the sophisticated tourist attractions if sufficient planning steps were not taken (Department of Planning, 1985). The studies were both quantitative and qualitative. The city planners hoped the city decision makers would take notice and redefine their goals and objectives to avoid the problems predicted. However, a redefinition of goals and objectives did not materialize with corporate strategists (CEOs) main downtown focus.

Summarizing this period, the 1980's reflected a glittering example of physical redevelopment: Inner Harbor a booming metro center (Charles Center, Inner Harbor and retail districts) and a modern corporate center (Levine, 1987). But the questions that must be asked again include;

- How widespread were the benefits of the corporate center strategy?
- Have aggregate levels of prosperity in the city risen because of the strategy's policies and development activities.
- Which groups benefited the most from the corporate center strategy?
- Did the city's quest to maximize tourism benefits killed its neighborhood's vitality and culture permanently?

Some of the above questions are extracted from Marc Levine's previous analysis. In fact this analysis is a very parallel to the research he did on the urban renaissance of Baltimore's downtown. The objectives are the same: examining equity and redistribution services and who benefit. Levine's analysis proved to be useful within the analytical framework of this study, as such, some of his analysis and parameters will be used in this report. *However, this study is primarily examining the success and/or failure of policies adopted in Baltimore corporate center pursuits and how the lessons learned can provide better direction in the future for Baltimore and other cities including Jamaican's.* How and why did the strategy lead to the identified impacts? This question is very important and must be understood for the purpose of addressing the hypothesis and reaching the goals and objectives.

Again, before the I attempt to address the questions raised in sections 1 & 2, I will explore the contemporary corporate center strategy and the parallel contemporary neighborhood movements in section 3. This analysis will assist in determining if there have been changes in policies over the decades, and if so or not, what needs to be done?

SECTION 3

THE SOCIAL DIASPORA OF BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS HISTORICALLY AND CONTEMPORARY AND THE CORPORATE CENTER STRATEGY APPLICATION

PUBLIC POLICIES AND DOWNTOWN NEIGHBORHOODS

Over the last 20 – 30 years, many urban cities, all across the country have been concerned with revitalizing their downtown's. Since the first suburban shopping malls opened their doors, more people have fled the *plights* and hardships that many of our contemporary cities are now faced with. The suburbanite's associations are limited to working in the central city and taking the resources – tax-base, aesthetic housing, night life, etc., out to the suburbs.

Mayors and community leaders have aggressively promoted and implemented many “counter flight” strategies and policies to revitalize their downtown's. The extents of these were broad, and encapsulated a variety of mythical downtown revitalization tenets. Such tenets¹ include;

Field of Dreams Approach to downtown enhancement. This centers on the belief that a community only needs to undertake physical improvements for customers and investors to flock downtown, and in the process, real benefits will filter into surrounding communities.

Urban Renewal Approach- this approach holds that, if old buildings are torn down and land is cleared, developers will flock downtown. This would then create a ripple effect

outwards and surrounding communities would become physically and aesthetically improved.

Completing one major project, for example the Inner Harbor in Baltimore. This **Silver Bullet Approach** holds that if a community identifies and implements one key, major project, then every thing else will take care of itself, including surrounding neighborhoods.

The **Traditional Anchor Approach** - If we can get a major department store to come back downtown, downtown and its surrounding neighborhoods will be healthy again. The chances of attracting, the traditional “anchors” are becoming much slimmer for most cities. However, new anchors are been defined and formed-tourism, cultural facilities, professional office buildings, and so on. The premise that outward filtering will occur, has remained, although the traditional concept has evolved and changed. Is something wrong with this? I think so!

Large Scale Retail or No Retail Approach. This approach to downtown revitalization holds that large scale will attract people downtown. This may be true! However, the contention here is predicated on the fact that downtown retail are often isolated from the endemic interest of the surrounding neighborhoods.

The **Head In The Sand Approach** to revitalizing downtown's is in full effect in Baltimore. Essentially, this approach advocates clustering business only in the core or the immediate vicinity of the core. Progressive small business owners in Old Town

Alexander, Virginia, have proven this false by taking the initiative themselves to create several business clusters. Will this (business clustering) be encouraged in the Baltimore's disenfranchised communities surrounding the core and the peripheral of the core? It should be!

The above approaches are only a few that have been incorporated wholly or in part within the contextual and conceptual framework of the Baltimore Corporate Center strategy. Has it help the surrounding neighborhoods?

GENERAL MANIFESTATIONS FROM THE POLICIES

Themes in emerging literature, pertinent to Baltimore and other cities, inferring that the urban crisis is over-i.e., that cities have put their fiscal house in order and that the transition from an industrial to a service and high technology economy is being effected and that there is a back-to-the-city movement, are negated by a more accurate definition of urban crisis as a crisis of opportunity rather than of financial management. Minority poor have become more isolated in abandoned areas of cities without economic or social opportunities and do not benefit from the trickle down of gentrification or downtown redevelopment – the focus of many corporate center strategy. It may be argued that the historical, structural, and political factors that sustain the isolation of disenfranchised groups are still in place, resulting in dependency on illicit economies and drugs, racial and gang violence, teenage pregnancies and other problems of an urban underclass (Weiher G, Journal of Urban Affairs; 1989, 11, 3, 225-242). Some of these negative issues define most of Baltimore's inner city neighborhoods. 'Defining away' the urban

crisis with sophisticated *verbiage* and inequitable success (limited primarily to the suburbs), spatially and temporally, do not erase the problems of cities or improve the quality of life for the disenfranchised groups.

Baltimore's approach to downtown redevelopment, typify the emerging ideologies and policies and their resulting consequences. Baltimore has virtually become two cities over the last 25 years – one upscale in development, the other being a crime infested, poverty consumed community. As the city lost its manufacturing base, city leaders made the conscious decision that the service industry and tourism would be its future. To that end, billions of dollars in public subsidies were poured into Downtown redevelopment. New projects took shape, from Charles Center a generation ago, to the gem of the '90s Oriole Park at Camden Yards and a new stadium to be built for the former Cleveland Browns National Football Franchise (NFL). No significant investments were made in the communities surrounding Baltimore's downtown. The Empowerment Zone (EZ) concept is meant to correct some of the "ills." This report in section 4 & 5 will also explore how effective the EZ concept can be.

The history of redevelopment in Baltimore is full with broken promises. Promises of jobs that would be plentiful and of average and above average caliber that would enable the citizens of Baltimore to make a decent living have not been fulfilled. The Job market in Baltimore is such that many people lead a third world existence, (Miles D, Baltimore Sun, 13A July 14 1995).

Downtown workers hold jobs that don't pay enough to support families; many families are locked into seasonal dead-end jobs that don't pay living wages. Others have fallen victim to the current trend among employers who have turned full-time permanent jobs with benefits into part-time contractual and temporary jobs without benefits.

As one of the pastors from Baltimore United In Leadership Development (BUILD) calls this new trend – “Urban Share Cropping”– a job market in which workers labor long hours for few benefits (ibid.). Many of the downtown workers find themselves dependent on government assistance or private charity efforts. BUILD members are very much aware of these issues because they are continuously being approached to assist with feeding efforts.

While millions of dollars are spent to improve downtown, the city's social fabric is unraveling with the rise in crime, escalating violence and the growth of an incredible social service bureaucracy necessitated by the low-wage service economy.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC MANIFESTATIONS AND OTHER EVIDENCE

Although Baltimore seemingly has gotten its house in order, the economic performance has lagged behind that of other comparable cities (see appendices I-III). The striking and flashy improvements downtown and at the Inner Harbor mask a “rot beneath the glitter.” Without innovative economic strategies, Baltimore faces an economic future of shrinking quality employment and increasing neighborhood distress (Szanton, 1987). This study, as with so many before, has chronicled the

despair facing the city. The leaders have acknowledged the problems, however, their understanding varies concerning their disposition, constituents and sometime inexplicable ignorance.

Julius Wilson, professor, formerly at the University of Chicago and now preparing to continue his work at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government has provided research on why poor neighborhoods are and continue to be distressed. He has highlighted a critical issue, the disappearance of jobs is seen as a critical factor in the decline of inner city neighborhoods. Thus unemployment is one of the most critical reasons why urban neighborhoods continue to deteriorate. Some of the other reasons are;

- Education
- Housing
- Sub-urbanization
- Poverty and Income


It's therefore not surprising that many socio-economic indicators continue to spiral downwards, in the city over the last 25 years. Baltimore's economic development strategy has hinged on the creation of a "good business climate"; the linchpin of the strategy has been based on advanced services and tourism. Despite the favorable publicity accorded to Baltimore's transformation, systematic analysis of social and economic trends, suggests that the corporate business climate redevelopment has not been fulfilling as expected to the city's aggregate prosperity. Moreover, the Baltimore

strategy has generated uneven pattern's growth and exacerbated urban dualism. Baltimore has become a city of developers with handsome profits and a city of impoverished minorities and displaced manufacturing workers, who continue to suffer from shrinking economic opportunities, declining services, and neighborhood distress. Figure 1 show that not only is Baltimore City home to many of the area's and State's low income residents, but it is also home to the very poorest of the poor. For example, the City has 70% of the metro area residents who live in households where the ratio of income to the poverty level is less than 50% (.50). All of the suburban counties combined have only 30% of the people in this very lowest income group.

EMPLOYMENT

Unemployment and Underemployment, and significantly less per capita income than the suburbs is endemic to the city's neighborhoods. This is a direct result of the city not focusing on its families, particularly low and middle income families. Virtually all the public housing and other subsidized housing and the community services infrastructure to serve low-income families in the Baltimore Metropolitan region are located in the inner city. This fact tends to lower such measures as per-capita and household income for this area of the city. This along with other factors has resulted in the city having an unemployment rate of 9.8%, while the average for the state of Maryland is 5.5% (U. S. Census, 1990). The lack of employment and meaningful jobs are reflected in figure 1, which display some of the characteristics that have contributed to the city's high unemployment statistics and high poverty levels (see fig 1).


FIG 1: INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT




EDUCATION

Between 1971 and 1985 municipal spending on public education, in inflation adjusted terms, was slashed by more than 25%.² This figure is projected to reach 37% by 1996 and 44% by the year 2000 if current trend continues. In the inner city neighborhoods, the graduation rate is below 50% in almost all cases, while in the more affluent communities, the rates are well over 70% (see fig 2). There is a strong correlation between where one live and one's likelihood of not graduating from high school. Only about 61% of the City's adult (25 years and older) population had graduated from high school in 1990 (see fig 2). The number of students enrolled in the City's elementary and high schools— both public and private — has declined dramatically since 1970 (ibid.). Figure 3 illustrates that city residents are more likely to have only an elementary education or a partial high school education than residents of the other jurisdictions, and they are less likely to have college or graduate degrees (see fig 3).

FIG 2






Nothing can more tragically illustrate the perverse short-term logic of the city's urban renaissance. The true long term economic future of the city-educated and productive, being seriously compromised to help provide resources for tourist attractions – NFL stadiums, convention facilities, and specialty retailing. It's obvious that these things are necessary, but do they have to be achieved at the expense of disenfranchised groups. Ironically, the cost of this strategy is painfully obvious to local business leaders today, as many regards Baltimore's disastrously flawed public schools as the city's most serious impediment to economic development.

HOUSING

Other comparative data presented by research scientist such as Marc Levine suggests that, despite the existence of a booming corporate center, the city is still one of the neediest in the country. Another unfortunate result from the city policies is the concentration of minorities in depressed communities, with the majority of them being renters. Housing conditions in Baltimore neighborhoods remained among the worse during the renaissance years. The impoverishment of Baltimore's neighborhoods has a strong racial dimension. Of the 60% (sixty percent of the City's total population is minority) and rising minority neighborhoods, over 40% of their renter occupied units contained some structural deficiencies. As the data reveals, the renaissance was and still is a chimera for Baltimore's distressed neighborhoods. Approximately, 57% of city dwellers are renters or would be renters (see fig 4).³ Some residential property renting within the city is associated with dangerous hazards. These include crime, lead



poisoning, asbestos, no commitment to maintain property or neighborhood, and a general lack of caring and interest for mobility and stability.


SUB-URBANIZATION

People leaving the City to go and live within the suburbs have contributed significantly to the City's problem (see appendices I-III).⁴ There is a leadership vacuum and the traditional family values, ethics, etc., are also moving with those who have become frustrated with the lack of meaningful progress in the City's disenfranchised communities. As Julius Wilson, formerly at the University of Chicago said "the biggest problem facing most urban cities is the lack of homegrown leadership in the disenfranchised communities."

POVERTY

Coupled with inadequate jobs, many communities are crippled when urban-oriented federal spending for community and social programs were significantly slashed. The result; social and economic hardship and poverty in most of the city's neighborhoods. This trend has continued into the 90s. The City is the home to the vast majority of the metropolitan area's poorest residents. 70% of the people in the region whose income is less than half of the poverty level (i.e., whose income is less than \$6,367 for a family of four) live in the city. In Baltimore the poverty rate is approximately 22%. It is 14% points higher than the state's poverty rate and over 16 percentage points higher than the closest municipality.⁵ The city's poverty rate is 4.5 times higher than the combined rate for the state of Maryland six combined counties (see fig 5).

FIG 5: POVERTY




Source: 1990 Census

HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY INCOME

The figures also show that blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics (who live in the city) are more likely to be poor than whites. The average median household income for the city is approximately \$24,000, while the state’s average is approximately \$40,000.⁶ Baltimore city is the poorest municipality in the state of Maryland (see fig 6).

The evidence, therefore, clearly suggests that residents of Baltimore neighborhoods, particularly derived little benefit from the downtown boom. For most Baltimore neighborhoods the 1970s were years of increasing poverty, deteriorating housing and shrinking economic opportunities. Combined with federal budget cuts for social and community programs the renaissance years were grim for Baltimore. It has not changed much since.

FIG 6. HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY INCOME



I will reiterate that the chief beneficiaries of Baltimore’s downtown renaissance is the developers and suburban professionals. One city official (declined to give his name) insists that they have targeted downtown projects to maximize employment opportunities for unemployed city residents. However, jobs that have been produced over last couple of years in downtown include low-wage jobs by the orioles, the new hotels and now the new NFL team. The percentage of workers in downtown Baltimore who are residents of the City’s neighborhoods is approximately 30%, a decline from 47 % in 1987. This display the fact that suburban communities disproportionately capture the quality employment opportunities in Baltimore’s Metro-center.

If we explore some other facts, property revenue for neighborhood based investment is lacking. In the fiscal year of 1987, Baltimore’s property tax revenues were \$33.2 million. The cost of servicing the CBD (for example, fire, police transit and traffic) was 40.1 million.⁷ The cost of servicing the CBD in 1996 is projected to be approximately

60 million, while the revenue from property tax is projected to be \$50 million. If any thing has change since 1987, I would have to say the gap is becoming wider. The city official, not willing to give out the numbers, indicated that 'Baltimore City expenditure absorbs approximately 3% more capital than it generates'.

Baltimore's corporate center strategy has failed to produce balanced and equitable economic growth. The city has fared worse economically than other big frostbelt cities. The city living standards have plummeted due to continuous myopic growth ideology that emphasizes a flashy downtown profit machine, with pockets of gentrification.

In essence after a decade of hype up rhetoric about an "urban renaissance," the word from most city halls across the country these days is decidedly downbeat. Cuts in social programs, the collapsing school system, coupled with rising crime and inadequate housing are endemic to Baltimore's disenfranchised neighborhoods, historically and contemporary, and are getting worse, as more moneys are diverted from the neighborhoods to the building up of downtown. While the strategy yielded handsome profits for developers and plaudits for entrepreneurial mayors, few direct benefits reached city neighborhoods. Many of the "good" jobs created, went to suburbanites. In Baltimore in 1989, 60% of the managerial and professional jobs in downtown are held by suburbanites.⁸

Neil Pierce and associates in their 1991 report "Baltimore and Beyond," concluded that Baltimore is becoming poorer and poorer and losing more middle class residents every year. Without some real help, Baltimore is in danger of becoming America's next Newark or Detroit.

These are some other issues surrounding the corporate center strategy and neighborhood development debate.

CORPORATE CENTER ADVOCATES :

- Economically the city is aggregately more prosperous.
- The intention was to effect growth in downtown and if it occurred in the adjoining neighborhoods, then that would be a added positive.

CORPORATE CENTER DETRACTORS

- The strategy has not facilitated the adjustment for new urban realities from the standpoint that it becomes a more livable city for majority of its dwellers.
- Certain groups such as developers, real-estate agents/speculators, young professionals have disproportionately benefited from the strategy.
- The city neighborhoods continue to deteriorate.
- To a few, the strategy inherently possesses little benefits for the city's neighborhoods. They suggest that a new concept must be employed for those neighborhoods. It may mean diverting some of the funds set-aside for further

corporate center redevelopment. This analysis may also be identified with advocates for the strategy.

After exploring the strategy, its implementation, goals and objectives achieved, I think I would debate alongside the detractors. With this perspective, it's only fitting that we explore ways to correct the dilemma and develop policies to improve the city neighborhoods and the entire region.

SECTION 4

NEIGHBORHOOD BUILDING:

THE KEY TO CITY AND METROPOLITAN GROWTH

DIVERSITY: THE CORNERSTONE TO REBUILDING THE CITY

As a result of my experiences, including working with the Baltimore Urban League, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, residents in urban areas and conducting a few planning efforts with community organizations, primarily from disenfranchised communities, I have come to accept that a holistic plan that emphasize the strengths of cities and their neighborhoods will create more successful cities, locally and internationally. The plan itself should advocate diversity and differences as one of the cornerstones for a successful policy planning effort to be achieved. Although rarely said, the lack of diversity, increasing class and social delineation and segregation have contributed significantly, to the problems facing the City and its' neighborhoods

As Edward Pellegrino, a well-known ethicist of Georgetown University says "my difference from you is my gift to you." The difference between the core of the city and it's surrounding neighborhoods, can be dynamically intertwined to reflect the strengths from both, that will create a stronger and more economically viable city.

As policy analysts and urban practitioners, we have to know how issues of difference and diversity can become proactive and be incorporated into our thinking and policy process, so that the positive components to be gained from the process can be

supported and become successful. By its very nature, the differences between the city and the core, suggests views, values, positions, economic status, etc., although some of the more obvious sources of the difference are ethnicity, race, class and in some lesser cases, gender. However, this should not serve as a deterrent to creating a palatable foundation for diversity.

In Jamaica, most of the urban problems experienced are similar to the existing problems in Baltimore and other US cities and their neighborhoods. However, the source(s) of the problem are much less obvious. Race, ethnicity and gender are not significant factors. Class is the main factor in Jamaica. The problem within Baltimore and other US cities *may* have other major contributing factors to the disparity and inequity than we might have imagined. However, we will not seek to identify those issues in this paper, although their credence would lend more substance to our call for diversity being accepted and promoted to reflect stronger cities.

In many instances, I have found that, to the most rational person, conflicts and misunderstandings occur due to one five problems;

- Lack of information tailored so that all groups can understand it
- The lack of opportunities for meaningful communication with objective mediation
- Suspicion and fear of divergent groups or persons within the community so that mutual policy planning and problem solving cannot take place
- Lack of a strong legislative influence in the community to support community needs and,

- Lack of strong leadership in communities to coerce positive decision making and policy planning.

We have to address these issues, many of which are typical to most of Baltimore's neighborhoods: We have to find ways to bring these peripheral neighborhoods together with the core of the city, so that they can accept and experience positive exposure, economic, social and physical sustainability, establish good communication and understanding with each other, so that mutual policy planning and problem solving can take place. Addressing the afore-mentioned issues will create a foundation upon which solutions for the diversity can be pursued.

Whether we like it or not, we must face that American cities are not the melting pot they once seem to be. It never was. Rather cities were and still are like a "fruit basket" where each ingredient provides and retains a distinct flavor and color. However, when combined properly and blended, creates a unique end-product, something better and larger than itself. To further extend this analogy, each fruit is important to the juice, and the trick is acknowledge that each is distinctly different, but their harmony will become a solid "fruit cocktail."

In most instances, in our society, the stirring has stopped, and the mix is increasingly separated. This is evident in the city, with the continuing flight to the suburbs. To break down into its component ingredients, may prove detrimental to the mix as a whole. We have to try to avoid the radical shift in our contemporary policies that

promote suburbanisation and corporate center planning, while neglecting the local communities. They are all a part of the mix.

Incorporating the local neighborhoods in the mix is a fundamental necessity for them to be developed. The stark facts of demographics show that the growth in the US labor force now and for the future will largely compose of women, minorities and immigrants. According to some recent studies (including a recent US Labor Department report) women, minorities and immigrants will constitute about 85% of the new entrants in the work force by the between 1985 and 2000. This is slowly taking place, but once it starts to increase more rapidly, then the sustenance of the local neighborhoods and their ability to provide quality individuals and employees become an issue of major proportion.

All cities must invest in their central districts and their neighborhoods. The crucial questions are: what should be the spatial mix of investments? What types of downtown projects are likely to spin-off into neighborhood growth? What policy instruments can ensure that downtown growth is channeled into distressed neighborhoods? Insofar as policies go, the spatial trajectory of Baltimore's economic development has been driven by profit opportunities for developers and the rich. There is little consideration of social equity, as a consequence, downtown redevelopment in Baltimore has been the engine of uneven growth and dualism, rather than the dynamic hub of balanced city wide renaissance (Levine, 1987 p. 118).

CITY, STATE POLITICS AND POLICIES

In January 1995 the governor 's state of the state address, clearly pointed out some issues that his team foresee could help the city and its declining neighborhood. The governor had several committees who recommended a major focus on revitalization. Their package intended to create a Neighborhood Business Development program that would award funds to small businesses in economically, disadvantaged communities. This is a very good suggestion, however, the recommendations have not come to fruition on a large scale. This suggestion can become even more effective for the local communities, if they are stipulations that suggest that the businesses in the local communities have to be owned by their respective residents. However, before any of this happens, a commitment has to be made to ensure the recommendations are implemented and supported.

The governor also mentioned the creation of a new Department of Business and Economic Development to help streamline and rationalize the overlapping and contradictory regulations in the state of Maryland. One of the goals of the new department is to focus on redirecting growth to protect our natural resources and our businesses. This according to the department is a strong coordinated policy that emphasizes revitalization and encourages the retention and attraction of businesses and residences in urban areas. Again, this suggestion is good, however, 'whenever' the commitment is made to implement the recommendation wholeheartedly, the plan must focus on specifically on attracting middle class residents into the city.

I believe that state and city politics and policies over the last two decades, have been mundane, myopic and in some case non-committal. Eventually, the state, city and businesses will realize that they must maintain their commitment and follow-ups with implementation in the City's disenfranchise neighborhoods and to their residents. They will also realize that they must attract, retain, and produce this full spectrum of people and the development of their neighborhoods to keep their business running.

The city political and business leaders also have to broaden their visions to reflect the needs of the larger communities. The approaches when developed should be done with the assistance and solicitation from the communities. The politicians and community leaders have to accept the realities of being a change agent. The tasks proposed aren't easy, it requires will, courage and leadership -- skills that I hope most of the city politicians, community and business leaders have. The leaders should seek to encourage community empowerment to make the communities more independently sustainable, thus becoming a stronger in partner in the mix.

The city leaders need to identify clearly, that the communities have a role and responsibility to play in the entire process. This will accomplish a variety of things including; "feeling wanted, " roles clearly defined, and tasks clearly defined. There are many current models of citizen participation that can be tailored to induce support from communities and their residents. The one that I advocate surrounds, self interests and benefits. These communities have experienced too much turmoil over the many years of new strategies and politicking. They have to made aware of the

long term and short term benefits for them and their communities. This is important when dealing with diverse ethnicity and neighborhoods, especially, in Baltimore City. The negative stereotyping must be avoided. The positives should be built upon and emphasized. The city has a role in assuring that this takes place.

“Our economic development goals must include improving the balance between downtown and neighborhood growth. A vibrant downtown surrounded by deteriorating neighborhoods is a formula for economic and social disaster. We must build upon the successes of our downtown redevelopment program and ensure that the benefits of growth reach the neighborhoods” (Schmoke, 1987).

Baltimore’s generation of leaders, in short, is beginning to come to grips (or so we think) with the irrefutable evidence that notwithstanding the “feel good” rhetoric of renaissance, Baltimore is a city in deep economic trouble and the time is at hand for a critical reevaluation of the city’s economic development strategies. Baltimore’s redevelopment strategy has resulted in increasing neighborhood distress and poverty, shrinking numbers of quality jobs, and an unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. Aggregate trends in Baltimore look so bad because the city is so concerned about poor and minorities--and thus has attracted so many of them.

The EZ concept is envisaged as the solution to city’s problems by most of the region’s leaders. However, if it’s implemented as proposed, I fear, it will only be a

wrapping of the same old package (more considerations and insights surrounding the EZ are forthcoming in latter part of this section and section 5).

Rebuilding the city's neighborhoods must be the main focus of the regions' politicians, if they expect regional prosperity. This can be accomplished through and by a variety of methodologies. For the purposes of this report we will concentrate on some issues that can make the local community stronger, thus preparing them to be more independently sustainable to the holistic process. Again, the reason why this form (neighborhood rebuilding) is chosen is essentially to advocate that your "house" must be in order before you bring others into it, and also I genuinely think that local neighborhoods, especially their economic sustenance and culture is the pulse for cities and their metropolitan growth. Therefore, if rational and genuine policies can be developed in the local communities to effect community growth and sustainability, then, the tasks for them contributing positively to the city and themselves become more probable and perceivable.

GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP

While the Greater Baltimore Community has a concentration of negative socio-economic indicators, the city disenfranchised neighborhood's face challenges which can be turned into opportunities. The reversal of negative indicators, will require the development of a strong partnership between the neighborhoods, government, and private organizations.

The neighborhoods will have to play the strongest role in initiating the much needed coalition for community change. A vibrant networking community organization, that provides comprehensive coordination for the various neighborhoods and their individual community development corporations, “housed” in an accessible setting *(this is important from the citizens viewpoint – it reflects stability and “belonging to,” which are extremely important to-the-end of obtaining community trust)*, is a fundamental requirement for Baltimore’s Neighborhoods revitalization and mobility.

Undoubtedly plans are in place, while others are being formulated and created, that will continue to accord to Baltimore City “successful urban renaissance” status. However, this is confined primarily downtown core. A significant paradox to this so call success in the core, is the overwhelming poverty of the city, that this report along with so many before and no doubt others to follow have documented.

One of the major contributing factor to the poverty in light of the core’s success, is aggregation of statistical data that defines the city within its inelastic boundaries. One city official estimate that, 95% of the city’s poor ranking is directly associated with its poor neighborhoods (see additional poverty statistics in section 3).

This figure, although not precise, tells a portion of Baltimore’s plight. Pockets of the are extremely successful, but when aggregated with the majority, the city as a whole reflect the depressing statistics that have defined Baltimore over the last four decades and will continue to do so if radical changes are not implemented.

Henceforth, one of Baltimore City's focus has to be, creating a sustainable city that emphasize redevelopment and revitalization of the city depressed neighborhoods: Partnerships between communities, government and businesses will go a far way in accomplishing some of these tasks.. Generally, any plan that even remotely attempt suggests policies to create a better Baltimore, has to first address the city neighborhoods. The plans from the past have had a different focus, but the daunting realization suggest that we have to undergo a "real" departure, philosophically, and practically, to formulate resolute policies that will develop strategies that can assist to create a more sustainable Baltimore. The plan must start with some core strategists (partnership members), creating policies within the framework of an umbrella organization that will guide their implementation.

These ideas recognize a need for a coordinated approach, leadership and focused attention to strengthen the City's neighborhoods and maximize the opportunities.

The activities proposed can be undertaken by a Greater Baltimore Neighborhood partnership comprising the communities, the city government, and the business sector. The partnership can serve as a strong anchor that could be the magnet for future and sustained economic development and strengthening the city neighborhoods. The necessary expertise within the partnership must be developed to maximize a neighborhood's resources. The partnership should be an independent authority to manage and strengthen the neighborhoods.

Energy, innovation and creativity are assets found in every neighborhood, and it's important to maximize these resources to stimulate economic development and neighborhood empowerment. Technical expertise provided to neighborhoods can facilitate that process. The expertise can help neighborhoods to revitalize their communities by creating a Neighborhood Development Revitalization Council. The council should hire economic development counselors for neighborhoods and establish guidelines for funding community programs and projects. This council could be an "arm" of the partnership. These organizations should try to achieve the following general recommendations that I think can assist in revitalizing Baltimore's impoverished neighborhoods.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(Most of the recommendations are extracted from Baltimore's Empowerment Zone plan)

SOCIAL, PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

- Create a nonprofit "Community Development Center (CDC)" to assist the community, homeowners, and developers, to acquire and hold properties, assemble needed financing, address property management and maintenance needs, oversee the development of community gardens, play areas, recreational facility, and general assistance with other "community building" activities. Smaller communities can share CDCs.
- Coordinating physical and economic development, health and human services, and education in the community.
- Raising and allocating funds for programs and activities.
- Create a community agenda that will guide community building, physically, socially, and economically.
- **ONE STOP SHOP:** The different services could be contracted out or be undertaken by volunteers from the churches and the community etc. The services can include;
 - Career advising
 - Resume writing
 - Housing advising
 - Legal Services
 - Doing Taxes
 - Selecting HMO's

- α More efficient and well organize day care facilities

Day care is extremely necessary to accommodate the rising children's population and provide some important stability to the young kids while their “mothers” pursue more meaningful activities.

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

- Establish a clearinghouse that assists with housing information, training and other community services.
- The overall housing stock in most of Baltimore’s neighborhoods is relatively unstable and with low owner occupancy rate. The neighborhoods have also seen their housing stock deteriorate in quality. Therefore, accessing loans and grants to assist with home improvement, and encouraging other families and individuals to own homes could stabilize and strengthen the city neighborhoods.

RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND OPEN SPACE DEVELOPMENT

- Undertaking plans for recreational facilities that promote proactive social interaction and community dynamics.
- A regional recreational, gymnasium type of facility (one for every four community, etc.) is needed to serve the entire city neighborhoods. The facility could serve some of the following purposes;
 - α Sports Clinic
 - α Computer training facility
 - α Aerobics

- α Community hall and meeting place
- α Fund raising venue

The businesses, churches and communities, could collectively maintain the day-to-day operations of the facility. It could be a YMCA concept.

- Researching, documenting and celebrating the history and cultural identity of the city Neighborhoods.
- Starting a community “greening” project to plant community gardens, trees and maintain open space.
- Renovating existing open spaces: making them more defensible.

COMMERCIAL AND RETAIL DEVELOPMENT

- There are opportunities for a neighborhood to create internal opportunities for business expansion and employment to generally stimulate neighborhood business. These include;
- Establishing a neighborhood economic development loan program to provide low interest gap financing to small businesses and community based services that create jobs targeted to low income families.
- Developing revitalization plan, especially for neighborhoods retail centers. The plan should emphasize aesthetics, defensible spacing, crime prevention and business growth.
- Create a program to encourage large business to purchase products and services from smaller local and neighborhood businesses.

- Create a program establishing volunteer screening centers to provide coordinated access and linkage for prospective employment to fill employment vacancies in local businesses.
- Strengthening some neighborhood convenience stores.

HEALTH CARE

- Providing home health care for residents in need.
- Working with the health care system to fund health services for all residents regardless of ability to pay.
- Beginning school-based health programs.
- Expand and utilize existing health Centers.

EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT

- Providing basic life skills training and human service support for those who need it.
- Creating an “entrepreneurial assistance” to help residents start and strengthen existing business.
- Expand computer facilities to incorporate the city’s large labor force to improve skills and marketability. This could be coordinated with local colleges; Coppin State College, Morgan State, University of Baltimore, Hopkins, and University of Maryland for examples.
- More employment opportunities and training facilities must be offered and expanded. Employable skills should be the focus.

CRIME, SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AND SAFETY

- Offering drug and alcohol prevention program at churches and other sites in the various neighborhoods.
- Expanding youth recreation programs and community crime and safety education in churches and the community centers, existing and the ones to be built.
- Churches and other community organizations should offer programs that teaches children non-violent ways to resolve conflicts. The program should also be offered at the schools in the city' neighborhoods.
- Involve residents in crime prevention and build a foundation for community oriented policing. This can be done through the implementing "drug and crime free zones and block watch."

Because of city's primary focus being the downtown, the neighborhoods have to be initiators for change in their communities. The activities proposed are expected to be strongly supported and also lend themselves to community residents having more available resources and easy access to other city services.

SECTION 5

CONCLUSIONS

COMMUNITY BASE POLICES

I will not argue that community-base activity is solely the answer to bringing about social, economic and physical change in the City. It is one of many, but probably, the most important. As David Rusks argues in his recent book “Baltimore Unbound”⁹ cities that have consolidated their municipalities and have pursued annexation vigorously, have continued to grow and experience little of the problems that are so prevalent in Baltimore. Baltimore’s inelasticity (no counties or areas available which Baltimore can annexe and/or consolidate) suggests that the city has to look for other growth channels. The neighborhoods can and should provide that channel. The time has come for us to realize that pumping all the capital in a core whose carrying capacity is sagging, is not realistic. The fact is, the future of the city lies in the ability of the policy makers to seize the “moment” and opportunities. The “moment” may be the untapped and possibly unlimited resources and capital present in the neighborhoods.

For many, the resistance to change that is so evident in Baltimore, may make the suggestions of annexation and consolidation inapplicable. In any case, although this suggestion would definitely help the city, the fact remains, in the success cases Rusks mentioned—Gainesville, Nashville and others, the surrounding communities are not disenfranchised as with the case of Baltimore’s Neighborhoods. Before Baltimore can pursue other policies to initiate growth the city, the tasks of revitalizing its neighborhoods must be addressed. If the entire city expects to grow, it has to depart from its ideological

orientation of core building, to incorporate the neighborhoods and encapsulate the visions of their residents in a diverse city plan.

The neighborhoods share most characteristics and scale with schools and the workplace, and if you stretch it a bit, even the household. Spatially, and politically, neighborhoods are intertwined with state, regional national, and even global systems, institutions and directions of change. With this understanding, it should be easy for us to push forward aggressively to initiate the growth of capital and resource utilization in the local neighborhoods. If this happens in Baltimore, undoubtedly, the positives to be gained would be unlimited and probably, will catapult Baltimore from its current demise into one of the nation's elite agent for positive economic and social change. Building the city's neighborhoods will create the foundation for building the city and region, ultimately to their unrealized potentials.

A METROPOLITAN APPROACH TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION

Including the Importance of Incorporating the City's
Empowerment Zone Proposals into a Broader Plan.

It is important to note that the strategies proposed (including the entire empowerment zone policies) for neighborhood revitalization should be a part of a regional metropolitan plan. This plan should be developed under the aegis of a regional development or metropolitan authority. The authority would in-turn administer the implementation and management of the plan for the entire region versus the "band aid" solution being proposed through the empowerment zone policies.

Lessons must be learned from these experiences (empowerment zone type strategies) that the infusion of one federal program after another targeting city neighborhood has not created nearly half the success anticipated. Baltimore city--like so many other inelastic cities have traveled this path before. The past programs which include the city's current annual \$28 million Community Development Block Grant for community development, the U.S. Department of Labor \$12 million annually under the Job Training Partnership Act, and not to mention in excess of \$200 million annual public housing federal support mostly for Baltimore's poorest neighborhoods, all have not created the impact anticipated.

"There was the infusion of tax dollars (the Big Buck Strategy), the infusion of economic and moral incentives (the Big Bootstrap Strategy), or both together (the empowerment zones), the basic philosophy is the same. Quarantine "them" in inner city ghettos and barrios away from "us" and help "them" build from within--with money or suasions. Both ideological camps believe that separate can be made equal, or at least equal enough to be tolerable" (Rusks, 144). I could never have said it better than Rusks, our fears inhibit us from bridging the gaps. In my view the empowerment zones can work, but they will have to be a part of a metropolitan wide strategy or else they will only be a prescription of the past that will have to be filled after the five years and \$100 million: The problems will remain and intensify.

If the policies are implemented within the context of how the empowerment zone proposes them, I am afraid we are just embracing the "latest wrapping of an old

package”(Rusks, p.142) and delaying the inevitable--regional development or the continued deterioration of our Baltimore city and ultimately the region.

Rusks notes that in the Baltimore region the poor are a few, the middle class are many. The problem is not the overall level of poverty (I do agree, but the poverty level is higher than Rusks think, which makes his argument more pertinent). The problem is the high concentration of poverty among African-American residents in many Baltimore City neighborhoods. Rusks continues, “the Baltimore region as a whole has the social and economic capacity to absorb the minority poor into middle class neighborhoods readily, if it has the will to do so. That political will must be supplied through the political processes of state government.” The city neighborhoods also have the capacity to absorb middle class groups into their neighborhoods, if a political will to facilitate the process is enacted. David Rusks idea of the will is an enacted state statute to create a Municipality of Metropolitan Baltimore (Metro). It would function as the upper tier of a two-tier system of local government. The Metro authority would create and implement a metropolitan conscious plan. Within this authority, there should be a metropolitan tax sharing scheme geared at effecting and maintaining sustainable growth for the region.¹⁰ All existing local government would remain in place, However, “Metro’s central mission would be to carry out the metro-wide planning, zoning and housing assistance programs that are necessary to dissolve the high concentration of poverty in many of Baltimore neighborhoods. At the same time Metro would protect suburban neighborhoods from becoming the next generation’s slums, as is now occurring in so many older, inner suburbs around the country. Diversity, balance and stability would be Metro’s themes” (Rusks, 1996).¹¹

Rusks's proposal is critical in achieving regional sustainable growth, but of more importance is policy maker's recognition of the city's neighborhoods to the regions overall sustainability. Presently, in many ways, suburbs pay the cost for the dying cities. This is done by some of the following measures;

- Suburbs pay through higher state and federal taxes to support increased social service and urban aid. This tax will become greater, when social service and urban aid increase as I anticipate if the correct mechanisms aren't in place to prevent that from happening.
- Suburbs pay for costly duplication of major regional facilities because they no longer feel comfortable and secure in using city based facilities.

Rusks's insights suggest that the region is dangerously mortgaging its future, for immediate solution in a 'band aid form' that has the potential to spread and lead to the demise of the entire region. I do agree with Rusks insights, most of which can form the foundation to create a Metro authority that can lead to neighborhood rebuilding and regional equity .

Integration should also be a component Metropolitan plan. More middle class residents going to live in the inner city and more poverty stricken people being dispersed and absorbed into more affluent communities. The concentration of poverty has had a chilling effect on urban neighborhoods. This should be a task for the metropolitan authority. However, I truly think that redistribution of social class to alleviate poverty in urban neighborhoods may not be necessary, if a metropolitan business and tax sharing scheme is adopted. If this happens, with businesses and resources evenly dispersed, then infrastructure and character of the regions'

communities would improve not only in aggregate statistics, but also for individual communities, particularly, urban neighborhoods. The businesses have to be the corner stone of the community. They have to make a strong commitment to support the community. Inadvertently, more empowering jobs (not the regular under-employed jobs) would be available in all communities, rich, poor and middle class. The metropolitan government will have to play a critical role in ensuring that the businesses that are dispersed, are equally supported and each have the economic potential to promote sustainable growth in their respective communities -- ultimately to the metropolis.

REFLECTIONS (Final Thoughts)

Baltimore City has many strengths and assets. Its downtown business district and institutions continue to be major centers held in high esteem and more importantly, they continue to be regional hubs for employment, entertainment, trade and the anchor for the entire state. It has a legacy, rich in tradition of excellent leaders -- Mayor Scheafer and Mayor Schmoke, etc., and excellent neighborhoods -- Edmonson Village and Pennsylvania Ave, etc. However, the city cannot rest on its laurels and boast the beauty of its downtown, when the neighborhoods which once defined the character of the city and the state are dying. Unfortunately, if this happens, I am afraid the character of the city will also be lost. Baltimore has an impeccable tradition in overcoming adversities, I see this challenge as one, when hurdled, the city will become 'the gem,' the standard for excellence of how cities should be developed. We have to stop exploring piece meal development, it has never created effective development and I certainly do not see it happening as envisaged with the enterprise zone concept. I have learned one important

lesson from this study—do it right initially, and we can avoid wrapping the same old destined to be failed policies we adopt every few years. The principle and lessons learned (diversity, balance, vision and integrated and holistic plans, etc.) is definitely applicable to other cities including those in developing countries like Jamaica. Vision must initiate the political will and courage to regain for the Baltimore Region, the once healthy status it held when compared to its neighbors. The city's neighborhoods were once strong they can become strong again. The generic watchwords shall be; empowerment, leadership, diversity, courage, will, balance, vision, partnerships, coalitions, and reducing income and class disparity, etc. We will make up other watchwords as the tasks become a part of us and as we realize that we are a part of tasks and are all in this together.

NOTES

- ¹ These six (6) tenets have been extracted from *Downtown Revitalization: The Myths and Secrets*, written by Delores P. Palma, published in the *Journal of Economic Development Commentary*, Volume 19 / Number 2 / Summer 1995
- ² Raw data compiled by Goodman and Taylor (1883); Basic projections to 1990 and beyond from 1985 are done using the same principles as Goodman and Taylor did.
- ³ Baltimore City Department of Planning, *CENSUS NEWS*, 1990
- ⁴ These appendices have been extracted from Karti Zomboski's Masters thesis, *Suburbs and the City*, Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1996.
- ⁵ Baltimore City Department of Planning, *CENSUS NEWS*, 1990
- ⁶ Baltimore City Department of Planning and U.S, *CENSUS NEWS*, 1990
- ⁷ *ibid*
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ See David Rusks's 'Baltimore Unbound: A Strategy for Regional Renewal', published by Abell Foundation in 1996 for additional information on Metro's strategies.
- ¹⁰ *ibid*, for a metropolitan tax sharing plan (p.122).
- ¹¹ See David Rusks's 'Baltimore Unbound: A Strategy for Regional Renewal', published by Abell Foundation in 1996 for additional information on Metro's strategies.

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Appendix I.

The steps of the calculation of the Nathan-Adams disparity hardship indicator

1. Calculation of the ratio of central and suburban data

$Y = \text{city data} / \text{suburban data}$, except for per capita income, where

$Y = \text{suburban data} / \text{central city data}$

2. Standardizing the ratio with the range of variation in the sample

$$X = ((Y - Y_{\min}) / (Y_{\max} - Y_{\min})) * 100$$

3. Calculating the composite index

$$\text{Composite index} = (\text{sum } X) / 6$$

4. Normalizing the composite index/ the Adjusted Composite Index

The Adjusted Composite Index = (Composite index / z) * 100, where

$$Z = \text{total } ((1 - Y_{\min}) / (Y_{\max} - Y_{\min})) * 100$$

Intercity and Intersuburb hardship index

The steps of the calculation are the same, except that the last step, the normalization of the composite index is left out.

In the intercity and intersuburb comparison the income data were adjusted with the price differences in the different jurisdictions. For the adjustment we used the consumer price index published by the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers' Association. For those cities whose price index was not available, we used the price index of the closest jurisdiction.

Appendix II.

Differences between the data used for the calculation of the disparity index from the data of Nathan and Adams

1. For the calculation Nathan and Adams adjusted the poverty data with price differences and recalculated the number of people under the poverty level. However, these data were not available for us for 1990, therefore, we did not change the data for 1980 either.
2. We could not obtain data on crowded housing for 1980. Instead, we used the number of occupied units with plumbing facilities to calculate the number of units with more than one person per room. The difference between the two measures is negligible.

Appendix III.

Tables for the Nathan -Adams indicator

Table 1. Comparison of the Disparity Index for 1980 and 1990

	Disparity index, 1990	Disparity Index, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Hartford	456.81	239.21	-2	90.97
Newark	376.49	305.21	1	23.35
Detroit	346.31	224.89	-1	54.02
Milwaukee	339.14	189.17	-5	79.28
Baltimore	326.43	242.21	3	34.77
Cleveland	307.79	220.66	1	39.49
Chicago	291.24	219.60	1	32.62
Philadelphia	274.77	194.78	0	41.07
Anaheim	267.20	173.29	-6	54.19
Rochester	248.62	183.23	0	35.69
St. Louis	244.09	194.92	4	25.22
Buffalo	236.19	183.22	1	28.91
Washington	230.44	159.46	-7	44.51
New York	227.29	176.06	2	29.10
Toledo	213.29	159.62	-3	33.62
Atlanta	209.16	165.39	0	26.47
Miami	206.67	140.80	-8	46.79
San Jose	205.28	173.89	5	18.05
Birmingham	204.42	147.38	-3	38.70
Richmond	201.53	137.36	-8	46.71
Akron	200.34	166.50	6	20.32
Louisville	196.71	151.83	1	29.56
Cincinnati	190.61	127.90	-7	49.03
Memphis	186.69	102.52	-19	82.10
Denver	183.13	137.99	-1	32.71
Sacramento	183.04	145.26	2	26.01
San Antonio	180.50	181.14	16	-0.35
Minneapolis	176.81	137.58	1	28.52

	Disparity Index, 1990	Disparity Index, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Stockton	170.13	96.52	-18	76.27
Boston	157.38	131.56	1	19.63
Houston	155.01	91.81	-19	68.83
San Francisco	152.93	152.24	12	0.45
New Orleans	150.78	11.04	-2	35.79
Kansas City	148.75	125.73	3	18.31
Dallas	148.69	101.43	-9	46.59
Omaha	146.75	117.00	3	25.35
Pittsburgh	140.65	117.07	5	14.16
Jersey City	140.36	122.88	15	-3.97
Indianapolis	138.95	146.17	-2	35.42
Tucson	137.55	102.61	0	33.76
Colorado Springs	132.29	102.83	7	16.03
Columbus	127.68	114.01	3	22.61
Oklahoma City	121.33	104.13	-3	25.29
Jacksonville	120.57	96.84	-4	26.12
Wichita	119.64	95.60	-6	35.64
Portland	116.86	106.26	5	13.91
Baton Rouge	109.13	102.59	-7	55.77
St. Petersburg	104.46	85.55	11	-0.86
Las Vegas	101.43	93.87	14	-7.18
Seattle	101.09	80.64	-1	18.17
Los Angeles	100.64	84.44	3	7.22
Fresno	96.60	69.19	-1	19.79
Phoenix	89.56	65.67	1	6.06
San Diego	88.97	65.52	-1	28.59
Nashville Davidson	85.94	44.50	-1	30.86
Riverside	79.12	239.21	-1	20.75
Tulsa	73.38	305.21	-4	64.90
Charlotte	62.06	63.59	1	-2.41

	Disparity index, 1990	Disparity Index, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Norfolk	56.93	54.41	0	-4.61
El Paso	55.88	98.37	17	-43.19
Corpus Christi	54.31	57.21	3	-5.06
Raleigh	46.48	42.19	1	10.17
Albuquerque	41.82	40.76	0	2.61
Lexington-Fayette	41.63	39.89	0	104.35

Table 2. Intercity hardship ranking and change, 1980-1990

	Intercity hardship, 1990	Intercity hardship, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Miami	75.86	59.82	-3	2.00
Detroit	66.82	63.35	0	-27.12
New Orleans	60.45	52.90	-9	-16.91
Stockton	60.05	46.22	-18	22.71
Newark	58.63	72.95	4	28.93
El Paso	58.36	53.28	-5	30.86
Cleveland	57.52	53.91	-1	6.23
Fresno	56.22	41.00	-24	49.29
St. Louis	56.15	62.15	6	26.23
Hartford	54.85	56.45	5	-12.01
Atlanta	51.88	51.98	-3	36.44
San Antonio	51.83	49.83	-4	-3.32
Chicago	51.64	53.45	4	-6.62
Corpus Christi	49.22	43.67	-10	19.48
Houston	48.83	33.09	-28	1.31
Baltimore	48.50	55.87	9	9.17
Louisville	48.32	49.84	2	10.54
Memphis	48.00	47.77	-3	5.95
Birmingham	47.66	48.55	1	2.16
Buffalo	47.55	53.42	10	22.16
Cincinnati	46.86	49.16	4	8.07
Los Angeles	46.37	43.06	-4	19.87
Philadelphia	45.28	52.07	11	-14.76
Dallas	44.53	35.34	-15	2.25

	Intercity hardship, 1990	Intercity hardship, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Milwaukee	44.48	39.55	-8	18.26
Pittsburgh	44.10	41.42	-4	4.86
Baton Rouge	43.59	35.35	-11	24.06
Akron	43.23	42.55	0	-11.45
Rochester	43.03	48.50	11	4.48
Toledo	42.87	44.40	8	7.72
Anaheim	42.33	36.02	-6	-15.30
St. Petersburg	41.40	43.60	8	1.01
Richmond	41.24	42.81	6	26.82
Sacramento	41.16	40.35	2	5.48
Jersey City	41.10	56.40	30	14.27
New York	40.26	48.45	17	29.93
Tucson	39.78	32.42	-6	-19.63
Riverside	39.08	30.31	-14	9.53
Oklahoma City	38.89	29.72	-14	6.70
Kansas City	37.16	34.98	0	37.12
Tulsa	37.04	24.81	-23	-9.65
Denver	36.95	29.27	-13	-2.83
Washington	36.59	41.59	14	-0.20
Wichita	35.97	26.36	-15	4.02
Indianapolis	35.10	36.31	9	-3.39
Jacksonville	34.30	36.73	13	12.71
San Jose	34.25	28.67	-8	47.55
San Francisco	34.18	33.74	8	-13.18
Las Vegas	33.91	31.06	2	-3.04
Phoenix	33.69	30.48	1	0.48
Omaha	32.59	30.76	3	-1.83
Nashville-Davidson	32.51	31.82	9	-10.99
San Diego	32.13	26.30	-7	-4.68
Minneapolis	32.11	29.71	1	6.19

	Intercity hardship, 1990	Intercity hardship, 1980	Change in ranking	Absolute (%) change
Albuquerque	31.62	26.38	-2	-13.03
Boston	31.20	36.60	22	26.01
Portland	30.91	31.62	11	12.48
Austin	30.89	26.12	-3	6.48
Charlotte	28.97	30.45	9	23.31
Colorado Springs	28.46	22.94	-4	1.59
Columbus	28.06	31.80	17	-11.28
Lexington-Fayette	27.53	26.35	3	-3.45
Seattle	27.34	25.38	1	17.53
Norfolk	23.56	27.82	8	-5.05
Raleigh	19.93	19.74	0	-3.67