METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
IN POSTWAR MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE:
A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE

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This is a preliminary draft of my research conclusions during the period of my Senior Fellowship at the Johns Hopkins University. The work was completed at the JHU Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research in Baltimore and at the Library of Congress in Washington. As I had also worked on "Southern European" projects of the UN, ECE and the OECD, I was lucky to have at my disposal unpublished material on the four countries under review.

As it seems, this is the last study to appear under the auspices and support of the JHU Metro Center. As of 1987, this will be succeeded by the Institute of Policy Studies. I think a report on metropolitan cities, their structure and development, is quite relevant in this conjuncture.

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Residents of Mediterranean Europe and the USA are familiar with each other's urban cultures and life styles through the media and tourism. There is a form of unequal exchange here. Movies, TV, rock music, and other forms of culture transmitted through the mass media and controlled by Northern Europe and the USA, have not only familiarized the rest of the world with life styles in advanced capitalism, but have also exerted considerable influence in our daily lives. The so-called "American way of life" carries with it an appealing urban imagery. By contrast, Mediterranean countries are remembered by the northerners in the summer as tourist resorts and recreation places with friendly people, sunshine, small towns and islands, and some antique treasures. Other than this, they exert no influence on everyday life, and of course they are forgotten in the winter.

This contrasting imagery of the two cultures is quite distorted and romantic, stereotypical and colourful. My own everyday experience of urban America provided the first impetus for the more detailed presentation of urban structures and processes in Mediterranean Europe. The following introduction presents the main contrasts found between the two regions. The report which follows then constitutes a review of evidence indicating the main aspects of metropolitan development in Southern Europe.

It has been pointed out that two traditions around the city and housing have emerged in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Northern one (Rapoport 1969). Southerners see the whole city as the context for urban life and the housing units as small private enclaves; Northerners see houses as the essential setting. In the USA I think I encountered the distillation of the Northern European tradition. People do not usually stroll, except perhaps in the sidewalks of working-class or ethnic neighbourhoods; they visit specific spots, and move around in cars. The Mediterranean tradition involves people in the casual and intimate outdoor urban life in piazzas, open-air restaurants, but also sidewalks and doorsteps. I would attribute this tradition to the warm climate, which encourages outdoor life, and to to poverty, and hence restricted housing space.

The contrast is very important, since it implicates the use of residences, of city streets, and of the automobile. Let us start from the latter.

It has been said that in the USA "the simple needs of the automobile are more easily understood and satisfied than the complex needs of cities" (J. Jacobs). A lot of city life revolves around and takes for granted the ownership of a private car - large, preferably, so that it survives long distances. Cities seem to be planned to accommodate the automobile, suburban developments take it for granted, and even gas is cheap - about 4 times as cheap as in Greece. Everyone has to drive because they should reach specially zoned malls, large parks, recreation centers, as well as workplaces, of course. Public transport is selectively routed, and even the airport is practically left out.
If driving is the American way, strolling is the Mediterranean way in all manifestations of everyday life, from shopping and working to leisure and recreation. Small cars are used, and motorbikes form part of the youth culture (and song lyrics) but are also used by all classes. This can be exaggerated, because actually car ownership is mounting fast in Southern Europe — it doubled within a decade in the case of Greece. Still, however, city districts function and live regardless of the automobile, and there are large districts where only pedestrian ways are possible. In our traffic jams, pedestrians mingle with cars and motorbikes in shabby, narrow city streets — it's all a mess, as our inner cities are now increasingly immobilized by traffic.

Let us attribute this contrast, provisionally, to the difference between suburban sprawl and zoning in the USA and the popularity of the city center, as well as mixed land uses, in the Mediterranean cities; and let us see what conclusions this may lead us to.

In Southern Europe the popularity of the city center is immense. It is considered as the heart of the city, overcrowded yet cheerful, a place for informal encounters (not just business or shopping). Dominant landmarks are usually non-economic, and have been mostly constructed in the past. They are not banks or skyscrapers, as in the USA, but churches and monuments. Of course the center also concentrates shops, workshops, offices and residences.

The Southern middle classes prefer central location in smaller apartments rather than spacious single-family houses with gardens in the suburbs. The apartment house has been said to have originated in Italy and spread to Western Europe from the 16th century onwards via France and Austria. Throughout mainland Europe urban life is apartment life. By contrast, single-household buildings predominate in Britain and the USA, with interesting exceptions, of course, such as the Gold Coast in Chicago and areas of lofts in New York, built in height. But in general, while the American city sprawls outward, the Mediterranean one is still compact, with high densities. Open spaces and parks are relatively small. Peak population densities in metropolitan cities range between 400 and 1000 persons per hectare. The Athens centre reached this level by 1971, and more could be expected if the plot exploitation coefficients were exhausted. Athenians even destroy their cultural heritage to create their multi-storey buildings. Building regulations preclude the erection of skyscrapers, so that Mediterranean multi-storey buildings have little of the dominance and glamour of the American cityscape. I would say they are ugly constructions, which contrast with the beautiful older architecture in the area. It is fortunate that Rome or Barcelona are not as destructive as Athens. This is turning into an overcrowded city with high rates of plot exploitation, traffic jams and air pollution, which recently makes its inhabitants reconsider their love for the city center and start moving to the suburbs.
The popularity of the urban center has had a lasting effect on urban geography. Social classes who have the choice, prefer central location, even if this means high densities. Consequently, they are distributed according to the land-rent gradient. The richer occupy more central locations. In Anglo-American cities, the high land prices in the centre resulted in popular overcrowding in small, subdivided dwellings, with middle classes spreading to suburbs in expansive single-family houses with large gardens. The mainland European, and especially Mediterranean, solution is the inverse: because of high land prices, only the richest can afford large central apartments despite high rents, and the poor are excluded to the urban periphery.

This is the famous "reverse-Burgess" spatial pattern, which has created the peculiar (and erroneous) theory that cities like Athens and Rome are "preindustrial". In all Southern European cities, the bourgeois and middle-class districts radiate from the centre to a sector along the best areas or garden suburbs, initiated in the 1920s in Rome and Athens. In Venice, the social status of central districts increases rapidly because of differential out-migration of the working classes; in Barcelona, high status areas are just to the north of the crowded city centre; in Madrid, central areas and inner nineteenth-century suburbs have the highest housing values; in Lisbon the current tendency is for an increase in the proportion of the middle classes in the center.

The proletariat lives predominantly in slums and peripheral shanty towns and grands ensembles, which usually happen to be near industrial concentrations. But they are not segregated as in the USA.

I have to confess that I was shocked by the extent of segregation of black populations in Baltimore and Chicago, even though I knew about it through literature and films. There are whole urban blocks where not a single white person lives. Besides the questions of social justice this raises, it provides yet another contrast between cities. In Southern Europe, not ethnic groups, nor the poor, but the wealthiest social classes tend to be the most segregated. They cluster together and exclude other social groups. The workers, the self-employed and the middle classes live in more mixed areas - or "integrated", according to American terminology - because of various alternatives to neighbourhood segregation, which are not encountered in the USA, nor in Northern Europe. The most usual one is vertical segregation. In many urban central areas, with the exception of slums and modern housing districts, the middle and working classes live together in vertically stratified apartment blocks, the middle classes usually on upper floors and penthouses.

In the urban periphery, squatter settlements and pirate subdivisions proliferate. They have come to constitute a symbol. Shanties built on the Johns Hopkins campus for divestment from South Africa carried important connotations for me, as, I am sure, for each student from Africa, but also from Latin America and the Mediterranean. Shacks have come to symbolize protest (as
well as poverty; Leontidou 1985a). They represent urban social movements demanding a stake to land and housing, but also more generally to urban life and the political system.

Squatting and illegal building are by no means unknown in Northern Europe and America, but they have been rare and usually short-lived. The same holds for central slums in Southern Europe. On a first level, the contrast with American cities is location-al: the majority of the poor live in central slums in America, in peripheral shantytowns in the Mediterranean. Every major city here is encircled by shantytowns - bairros clandestinos in Portugal, viviendas marginales in Spain, borghetti in Italy, afthereta in Greece, and a little further gececondus in Turkey.

On a deeper level, the contrast with the USA has to do with life prospects. Squatter communities are usually self-built and self-developing urban neighbourhoods and hubs of alternative cultures of migrants, the poor, and the working class. Where they can only afford a minute shack, people live a cheerful outdoor life, also keeping their small private gardens. But the shacks are not just temporary relief. Poverty is creative, houses are erected by mutual aid to improve as income permits. They open up future prospects. The contrast with the USA is strong on this level. One wonders what prospects there are for improvement in areas of public superblocks, where the blacks live.

Still, squatting areas are thought to have their negative aspects, since they demonstrate uncontrolled urban development. In fact, it is a misery to be a planner in Lisbon or Athens. Planning faded in the history of the Mediterranean, and today conditions range from the municipal socialism of Bologna to the free-market forces left unchallenged in the cities of Portugal and Greece. In Athens, plans have been drafted but never implemented. Peacemeal urban development is pretty obvious on maps: almost all urban areas were added to the city plan (or "legalized") after they had been settled. The first plan of the city in the 1830s was revised about 2000 times. Rationality in urban development as known in the USA is continually undermined by a multitude of interest groups and individuals. The "urban crisis" in the two cases is a completely different matter.

It is also very difficult to draw a land use map, because a significant proportion of urban land serves multiple purposes, from residential and commercial to industrial. Single land-use zoning is uncommon. Many buildings have commercial, administrative or industrial uses at ground level and residences at upper storeys. Even industrial activities are scattered, and traditional concentrations are not due to any zoning regulations. Artisans and small traders, but also lawyers and doctors, often live in the same building as their workshops, offices and studios. Journeys to work are thus kept short, and people return home at noon for a three-hour lunch break and siesta and avoid prolonged journeys during the 4 rush hours, worst in Athens and Madrid. Cities are kept alive day and night. The large informal
sector is also immediately visible in the small shops, the stalls of petty traders, the workshops everywhere. In the USA, by contrast, it is hidden.

The cities of Southern Europe thus share certain common characteristics which set them worlds apart from their Northern European counterparts. At the same time, they will always astonish the researcher by their complexity. "What is common to most of them, crucial though it is, lies buried under their conspicuously diverse personalities" (Giner, 1986). The most striking similarities among these cities mostly stem from the image of a "developing world" evoked by the coexistence of tradition and modernity on many levels. But there are also other similarities which will be explored in this report. It is peculiar that postwar urban growth in the Mediterranean has not attracted any attention. The region is also omitted in comparative studies of Europe in general, for lack of data: maps in van den Berg et al (1982), omitting the Iberian peninsula and Greece, are a sad sight.

The gap can not be filled overnight. This paper should be considered as a step to this direction, as a review of evidence, or even an annotated bibliography on urban growth in Southern Europe. Four countries are examined (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), and their major cities only are considered. Table 1 presents these countries and their adjoining ones, for which frequent references will be made in the following.
2 COMMON TRAITS OF THE "EUROPEAN SOUTH"

Despite their different historical background until the late 19th century, the countries of Southern Europe have shared certain geo-political and socio-economic characteristics and level of economic development after the wars, which render them comparable. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece can be set against the rest of Europe as a group - Mediterranean Europe. The theories (or even the concepts) devised for Northern Europe and the USA are inadequate for the study of Southern European socioeconomic, urban and regional development. The concept of the semiperiphery as used by Wallerstein (1979:100) is relevant here. It refers to place in the world economy (intermediate world regions), economic structure (contradictions of peripheralization and late industrialization), and socio-political development.

2.1 The legacy of emigration

One of the most basic axes of differentiation of Mediterranean Europe from advanced capitalism on the one hand and peripheries on the other, is the legacy of emigration. The Mediterranean people have been travellers throughout centuries, as Braudel (1966) details, responsible for explorations, discoveries, for the foundation of city-states and the creation of colonies. In the 19th century Antonio Vieria observed that "God gave the Portuguese a small country as a cradle and the whole world as their grave" (cited by Lewis et al., 1984a).

The nature of emigration changed radically as it became a massive phenomenon after the wars. The political economy of the Mediterranean region has been greatly shaped by the export of its surplus labour to advanced countries. First the Italians, then the Spaniards and later the Greeks, the Portuguese, the Yugoslavs and the Turks (Gaspar 1984:209), left the poorer regions of their countries heading for Northern Europe, where capitalist development in the postwar period led to labour shortages. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece thus became the "proletarian nations" of Europe.

The recruitment of emigrants was selective and organized by both sending and receiving countries. Greek authorities signed official agreements with France in 1955, Belgium in 1959, and Germany, the great winner out of Greek emigration, in 1960 (Nikolinakos, ed., 1974). Emigration rates in relation to the Greek population were lower than during the early 20th century: in 1900-1921 Greece was losing a yearly average of 5.6 emigrants in 1000 inhabitants which fell to 1.7 in 1946-74. The net population loss, however, rose to 440,000 in 1961-71, and there were 2.1 emigrants per 1000 inhabitants yearly in 1960-64 and 3.2 in 1965-69. These numbers are actually underestimates. In the case of Portugal almost as many people emigrated in 1961-70 as over the previous 70 years, especially toward Northern Europe (Lewis et al., 1984a). Outflow from Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey was no less impressive (Castles et al., 1973; Nikolinakos, ed., 1974).
found to be working in other countries on a short-term basis, with low wages and poor working conditions, without recourse to unionization (Lewis et al., 1984).

The migration stream changed through history. While in 1896 Belgians, Germans and Swiss together constituted 52% of the total foreign population of Paris (Ogden, 1977), by 1975, 82% of foreigners came from the Mediterranean basin, especially Portugal, Algeria, and Spain. By the later 1960s Turks and Yugoslavs began to replace Italians as the chief migrant groups in the cities of Central Europe. In Stuttgart, e.g., Italians were the dominant group until 1970 when they were overtaken by the Yugoslavs, but also Greeks, whose number by 1975 pushed Italians into the third position (Borris et al., 1977:109 in White:111). In the mid-1970s, 70% of Mediterranean migrants to Stuttgart have been born in villages, especially those from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy, while Turks appear to arrive via towns (Borris et al., 1977:65-7).

Mediterranean migrants work in the least desirable occupations, and sub-contracting systems make them especially vulnerable to evasion of registration and control. The building and construction industries are particularly dependent on migrant labour (Borde and Barrere, 1978:34). In Lyon in 1977, 77% of the first jobs of illegal Portuguese migrants were on building sites (Poinard, 1972:39-42). Many are also absorbed in manufacturing industry as unskilled and semiskilled workers. In Stuttgart in 1975, 67% of working foreigners were employed in the secondary sector, 40% in manufacturing industry, and a total of 92% of the Mediterranean foreigners were categorized as manual workers against only 37% of the German population of the city (Borris et al. 1977:206-25).

Migrants are segregated in the cities of Northern Europe (White, 1984:115-31 for a review). The first places of residence in West Germany and Switzerland were provided by employers (O'Loughlin, 1980:256); in France foyers-hotels have been used as accommodation for single workers, in which employers have played a role (El Gharbaoui, 1969:46). Usually, however, migrants are housed in the private market: as lodgers (Belgium and the Netherlands, Cortie cited in White 1984:117); in central slums; and, in the case of France until the early 1970s, in bidonvilles.

Emigration has been usually considered as a "mixed blessing" for the places of origin. It has been maintained that it eases or exports unemployment and social tensions. In the case of Greece, emigrants and seamen would provide the valuable foreign currency to finance the chronic trade deficit and the lagging public debt; but their remittances, increasingly crucial for the subsistence of their families, would cease to flow during periods of economic crisis. The selectivity of the migration process, moreover, meant that the younger, more literate and more industrially skilled left the rural and provincial areas. Emigration would deprive the Mediterranean of the flower of its productive labour, which would gradually exhaust its ability to work in foreign lands.

Massive emigration has stopped by the mid-1970s, after relevant legislation in receiving countries. Later on, return migration to Southern Europe began. The contribution of returnees to economic development has not been studied adequately. They
appear to change jobs before and after emigration from agriculture and industry to commerce, construction, and not working, and shift their position from employees to owners and self-employed. The returnees' investments were found to be directed more to bolstering consumption than to production, but in many cases, such as Portugal, this was consumption in provincial rather than metropolitan areas (Steinle, 1985).

2.2 Economic development and social classes

Another crucial axis for differentiation between Northern and Southern Europe is the pace of industrialization. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the years of the industrial revolution, precapitalist social structures still prevailed in the Mediterranean. The church was a major force in urban landownership and society, and the clerical population formed a substantial part of the urban inhabitants (White 1984:11): the 'religious' amounted to between 1/7 and 1/5 of Madrid's total population in the 18th century (Soubeyroux, 1978); in Bologna at the time, 6% of the urban population were priests, monks, nuns and 1/6 of the intra-mural land was used for religious buildings (Ricci 1980:117).

Large-scale industrial growth was generally a post-war phenomenon which did not affect all of the countries simultaneously. Only a limited number of cities, such as Barcelona, Bilbao and Milan, were affected by industry before the end of the 19th century (White 1984:16, 82). The years of the Italian "miracle", though based on earlier foundations, were those of the 1950s, and a difference developed since then between the economy of Italy (central Fordism) and the rest of the Southern countries (peripheral Fordism; Lipietz, 1985). Still, however, even in Italy industrialization arrived late and involved a process of economic polarization and regional inequality.

During the postwar period the countries of the Mediterranean have constituted the poorest areas of capitalist Europe - to various degrees, ranging from Portugal to Italy (table 2). Except slow or arrested industrialization, they offer services as tourist resorts and are financed to a large extent by emigrants' remittances. Rapid urbanization preceded industrialization. The 1950s saw the acceleration of urban growth in Spain, Italy, Greece, and throughout the postwar period Mediterranean cities have been flooded by migrants who influenced urban patterns and class structures. In Spain since the 1910s and through to the civil war, the Barcelona-born have been a minority in the city, and non-Catalans a majority (Bolos y Capdevila 1959:214-7). By 1970, 35% of the city's population had been born in non-Catalan-speaking areas and 41% of the population habitually used Castilian instead of Catalan (White 1984:85). Migrants, mostly of rural background with no skills, formed the new industrial proletariat (Ferras 1977b, 1978:179), and filled the least desirable jobs (White:91).
The wave of southern migration to Italian cities, such as Turin, created a new marginal class singled out by its low levels of educational attainment and skill, its openness to exploitation, its housing difficulties, its cultural distinctiveness and its spatial clustering (White 1984:85).

In the case of Greece, a survey in 1960 found that 56% of the Greater Athens population were migrants who arrived during the postwar period. During the 1960s females exceeded males in the domestic migration stream (Carter, 1968:103-5) and worked as servants. Social mobility was considerable, especially during the 1950s.

As Southern European cities modernize and industrialize, their migrant characteristics change. Female servants are replaced by male labour migrants. In a recent study of Madrid, rural migrants were found to decline by the mid-1970s and migrants drawn from larger urban settlements and from developed areas increased. By 1973, technical and managerial workers constituted 25% of Madrid's in-migrants (Ballesteros et al., 1977).

2.3 The informal sector

It could be said that the informal sector is just being discovered by researchers in advanced capitalist countries, while it is a well-entrenched fact in popular consciousness in all peripheries. The Mediterranean variant of polarization has presented many faces and variations through history, and is different from that of other peripheries because of the legacy of emigration to Northern Europe in the past, and of a recent process of depolarization. Anyway, the self-employed artisan or the shopkeeper, the family entrepreneur and the peddler, are the most familiar figures in Mediterranean cities, and marginal populations have been gathering there during the years of fast urbanization. The informal circuit, often confused with the so-called "black economy", along with the wide distribution of small property, counterbalances the defective system of social insurance and sustains a large number of the population in subsistence activities and income sharing processes among members of extended families.

If the informal sector and the "black economy" has sinister connotations in cities of advanced capitalism, it is an openly admitted, widespread, and traditionally familiar aspect of urban life in the Mediterranean. Sub-contracting, putting-out systems, multiple employment, part-time employment and self-employment are as widespread as wage labour. A larger percentage of the population is thus vulnerable to the economic ups and downs (like blacks and hispanic populations in American cities), but also creates a substratum helping these economies to survive crises, and to figure as full-employment regions in international comparisons.

The contrast can be carried further. Workshops of repair of everything - from clothes to cars - and recycling of various used raw materials proliferate in Mediterranean cities. For example, cars may have a life span of 20 years in the South, and are circulated as used cars among consumers for that long, whereas huge
car cemeteries are outside large US cities. I do not evaluate the Mediterranean way in a positive manner - far from it. It creates environmental pollution and other types of waste. But, after all, it is dictated by poverty.
3 CONTRADICTIONS OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT

3.1 The regional problem

During the postwar period, Northern Europe has been only one of the destinations of Southern European rural populations. The other pole of attraction have been, of course, the large Mediterranean metropolitan regions. For many people urbanization was linked with emigration. The case of Greece is indicative: the working class outside the national frontiers has been always substantial. Even excluding sailors, by 1969 the Greek labour force in manufacturing was almost equally divided among three locations: Athens, rest of Greece, and Germany (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981: Chapter 5). The number of workers abroad is indicative of the losses to the Greek labour market, as well as the importance of Athens for retaining a large section of these populations within Greek territory. It is also indicative of the outlets for the reduction of marginality and the export of social tensions.

Urban growth in Southern Europe has been associated with surplus population in the countryside rather than industrialization. The hypothesis that urbanization caused industrial development will be explored for the case of Greece in the following Chapters. Industrial and tourist development have been spatially selective. They affected only certain sectors and regions, especially the metropolitan and coastal ones. This resulted in spatial polarization, taking various forms in the different countries: the south/ north inequality in Italy, the mainland/ coastal disparities in Portugal, the rural/ urban polarization in Greece.

In the case of Italy, the regional problem evident in the acute inequality between the South and North, was already observed by Gramsci. In Portugal rural population decreased at times more than 50% between 1950 and 1970, while urban areas grew and smaller towns experienced lesser increases. The most significant trend was the imbalance between the western coastal strip (from Braga to Setubal) and the remainder of the country. However, during the 1970s all urban centres increased in population, even in the most remote areas. This was attributed to the arrival of retornados from the African colonies (Gaspar 1984: 215; Lewis and Williams 1981).

In Greece inequality persists between urban and rural areas, or between the two largest cities and the rest of the national area. This polarization has intensified after the wars, but especially in 1961-71. The population of Greece outside Athens decreased then by 307,444 people and the economically active population declined by 565,587 people. There was a relatively dynamic urban S-shaped corridor between Athens and Salonica, while the rest of the country was losing population and productive activity. In fact, Greece displays the greatest regional imbalance among Mediterranean European countries.
This trend was reversed in the 1970s, as we shall show in part 5.2. Some provincial towns based on industry and transporta-
tion (Volos, Patra, Kavala), tourism (Heracleio) or agriculture
(Larissa) have experienced significant growth (Drewett et al.

3.2 Metropolitan bipolarity

In addition to regional disparity, contemporary Mediterranean
countries have developed bipolar urban networks where two
metropolitan areas dominate the urban hierarchy, while the third
largest cities constitute practically insignificant provincial
centres. The exceptions in this case are Greece, where primate
distribution is pronounced (see part 3.3) and the second city,
Salonica, is quite small; and Italy, where Naples and Turin, the
third and fourth cities, are significant metropolitan areas.

Metropolitan dualism can be found in other world regions. In
Mediterranean Europe, however, it has permeated cultures around
the city and the country for a long period going back in history.
Material and cultural tensions have developed between the two
major cities in each country: Lisbon and Oporto, Rome and Milan,
Athens and Salonica, and much more acutely between Madrid and
Barcelona, Ankara and Istanbul, Belgrade and Zagreb (Giner,
1986).

"Milan and Barcelona, Rome and Madrid, epitomized industry and
bourgeois society on the one hand, political and administra-
tive power on the other" (Giner, 1986).

In some cases this can be attributed to the "constructed" or "artificial" character of capital cities. Athens, founded in
1834, Rome (1864), and Ankara (1923) were nominated in different
ways as new political capitals, centres of the state and bureau-
cracy, despite the historical or industrial dominance of some
other urban centres or regional/ national capitals. In other
cases, tensions are due to ethnic differences. In Spain and
Yugoslavia different ethnic groups identify with "their" city and
metropolitan bipolarity even takes the form of skirmishes in
Spain.

Moral terms are most often used to stigmatize Mediterranean
capitals as "parasitic", which have taken perhaps their more
acute form in the cases of Madrid and Athens. The distance of
Madrid from the productive metropolis of Barcelona is stressed in
Spain (Salceda 1977a), while in Greece moral indignation against
the "parasitic city" peaked in the late 1970s, exactly when it
was most unjustified (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981b).

Like urban dualism, regional polarization is manifested in
culture with criticisms against cities and the idealization of
the "productive countryside". In this case, however, it is note-
worthy that criticisms against metropolitan cities usually become
louder during periods of authoritarian regimes. In Spain an anti-
urban ideology was preached by state-controlled institutions from
the moment the civil war ended: the city was the centre of vice
and evil — communism, divorce, prostitution, crime (Wynn, 1984).
During the Italian fascist era emphasis was placed on rural deve-
15 Mediterranean Europe

lopment, and "peasant Italy" was idealized as an alternative to the ills of urban living (Calabi, 1984). Authoritarian regimes have also tried to control urbanization. Mussolini imposed restrictions on internal migration in Italy (Gabert, 1958). The fascist laws of 1931 and 1939 attempted to control rural-urban migration: workers had to have a permit before they could legally obtain a job, but they also had to have a job before a residence permit could be issued. These regulations were circumvented through an illegal system of recruitment. Illegal migrants soon appeared in Turin and other Northern cities receiving low wages (Gabert 1958; White 1984:82-3). Occasional threats of the Greek military government to control domestic migration to Athens (Carter, 1968) were not realized, but there was a consistent policy to curb urbanization through the control of popular housebuilding and policies for industrial decentralization (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981: Chapter 7). Dictatorial governments seem to have been apprehensive of the social threat presented by the urban populations.

3.3 Urbanization and primacy

Mediterranean metropolitan cities have always kept a tight but ambiguous relationship with the countryside, receiving flocks of migrants. The different countries have evidenced striking similarities in their urbanization model after the wars, ranging from population levels of the capital cities to more structural aspects. By 1971 Rome, Madrid and Athens had 2.6-3.5 million inhabitants. Although nationwide rates of growth were homogeneously moderate, at the 1% level, the three capital cities grew with the same rapid pace in 1951-71: average annual rates rose to 2.8%, 3.3% and 3% respectively. The second or third largest cities were less dynamic: during the same period the rate for Milan was 1.6%, for Barcelona 1.9%, and only Salonica reached 3.1% in 1951-71, but on a smaller initial basis than the rest of the cities.

Urban primacy at the national level has characterized Greece and Portugal, while Italy and Spain exhibited primacy at the sub-national level (Gaspar 1984:209; Evangelinides 1979; Burgel 1981; Ceccarelli 1981; Lewis and Williams 1981; Papayannis 1981; Ponsetti-Bosch 1981). National-level primacy, as measured by the ratio of the second city compared to the first one by Jones (1966:82) was highest in France and the U.K. in 1962 (13% and 29% respectively). As shown on table, among southern European countries only Greece approached these levels at the time. On the contrary, Istanbul was twice as large as Ankara, Milan larger than Rome, Barcelona larger than Madrid. In Portugal and Yugoslavia the second cities were well near the size of the capital cities, although different metropolitan boundaries indicate urban primacy in Portugal as well (Gaspar 1984).

It is interesting that, despite views to the contrary, distances between the major two cities increased everywhere (the primacy ratio decreased) in 1961-81, except in the case of Greece, where primacy was slightly reduced, and the cases of
Turkey and Yugoslavia, where the ratio oscillated. It is therefore wrong to speak of an "accentuation of urban primacy" in Greece (Gaspar 1984:211). It is true, however, that in the cases of Greece and Portugal we can speak of bipolar urban development around two metropolitan areas.

A final observation on the basis of table 3 is that in almost all of the countries examined except Italy, the third largest cities have been quite small. This has supported metropolitan bipolarity.

Comparisons of the employment structure of the cities of postwar Mediterranean Europe are shown on table 4. In general, about 23-33% of the economically active population of Mediterranean capital cities is employed in industry, except the cases of Rome and Ankara, the least "industrialized" capital cities (and most "parasitic", according to widespread terminology) in 1971. Their employment structure diverges sharply from that of the second cities of the respective countries - Istanbul and Milan - which also happen to be larger in size than the capital cities. This is an especially interesting conclusion, since it disconnects urban economic structure from the level of economic development in Southern Europe. In other words, the capitals of the most underdeveloped and most developed Mediterranean countries respectively are the least "productive" cities. Then Lisbon, Madrid and Belgrade are also "administrative" capitals, but Athens, the only "primate" city, is the most industrialized capital, with a very short distance from Salonica in this respect. This provides an effective counterargument against views of the "parasitism" of Athens within the Mediterranean context.
Table 1: Basic data for OECD countries

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Table 2: Economic data for OECD countries

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[NOTES]
Table 3

Urban population and primacy* in Mediterranean Europe, 1961-1981

All cities over 1 million inhabitants as well as the three largest cities of each country are included below. Population, 000

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Sources: adapted by the author from various tabulations of the OECD (1983) and the National Statistical Service of Greece.

* Primacy measured as % of second city population in relation to the capital city.
Table 4 Employment structure in large Mediterranean cities, 1970/71

All cities over 1 million inhabitants as well as the three largest cities of each country are included in the following table.

Columns 1-5 indicate composition % of the economically active population* by sector: 1, primary sector; 2, construction; 3, industry; 4, administration, public and social services; 5, rest of economic activities.

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Sources: adapted by the author from various tabulations of the OECD (1983) and the National Statistical Service of Greece; since errors were found (and corrected) for the case of Greece, this table should be considered provisional for the rest of the countries.

* Only those who declared sector of employment are included here.
4 MEDITERRANEAN URBAN GEOGRAPHIES

4.1 Urban spatial patterns

The city centre in the Mediterranean concentrates symbolic as well as economic functions and is inhabited by social classes who have the choice and rent-paying ability. As a result, social classes are distributed according to the land-rent gradient. The bourgeoisie is represented in the city-centre and the working class in the periphery. This is the famous "inverse-Burgess" spatial pattern. As it is also evident in third world cities, it has created evolutionary theories for the "preindustrial" city, such as those by Sjöberg (1960) and Schnore (1965), which have been persisting and creating misinterpretations of Athens or Rome, e.g., as "preindustrial" cities (White 1984:161). The pattern has been attributed to the legacy of the city walls. In many Mediterranean cities the fortifications separated the inner city from the suburbs and, along with them, the social classes in a very clear way, unlike in Britain and the new world (White 1984:27). For example, during the construction of fortifications in the case of Barcelona in the 18th century, the inhabitants of the 1,350 houses demolished to build a citadel became the nucleus of the first extramural settlement (Wynn 1979: 185-6). As the city walls were gradually removed (dates in White 1984a:23: Barcelona 1854, Madrid 1866, Bologna 1902, Paris 1926-32), the same social class distributions remained. This, however, does not apply to all cities, e.g. Athens. The popularity of the city centre is due to more general cultural traditions.

In all Southern European cities, the middle-class districts radiate from the centre to a sector along the best areas or garden suburbs, initiated in 1920 in Rome (Regni & Sennato, 1973: 922) and a little later in Athens (Leontidou Emmanuel 1985b). This pattern is clear in Greek metropolitan cities. Similarly in Italy, social rank has been found to be highest in the old city centre of Rome, slightly declining in the early 20th-century suburbs and becoming the lowest in the most recent peripheral areas (McElrath, 1962:309-90, social area analysis). In Turin, except the high-status central city which has somewhat shrunken in size since Agnelli's (1975) description in the interwar period (White:161), a peripheral high-status district exists on the hills (White 1984:161-5). In Venice, the social status of central districts increases rapidly because of differential out-migration of the working classes (Costa et al.,1980:404). The same pattern exists in Spanish cities. In Barcelona, high status areas are just to the north of the crowded city centre, in the areas of the earliest 19th-century suburban expansion of the ensanche (White 1984:161,24; Serra 1986). In Madrid, central areas and inner nineteenth-century suburbs have the highest housing values (Abrahamsen & Johnson 1974:526-7; Gago Llorente 1979). In Lisbon, various social classes live in the centre in close proximity but different subdistricts, but the current tendency is for an increase in the proportion of the middle classes (Gaspar 1976: 131-5).
The proletariat lives in all sorts of areas, but with more marked concentrations in the urban periphery. The city-centre area is exemplified by the area around the Via Roma in Naples, Trastevere in Rome, or Sant Cugat del Rec in Barcelona (White 1984:167), where artisans mostly concentrate since the 19th century. They are increasingly rehoused through urban renewal programmes and creeping gentrification (Ferras 1977b:193-4). Peripheral shanty towns and grands ensembles, by contrast, which usually happen to be near industrial concentrations, are still growing, as we shall see in the following.

In urban studies, decisively influenced by the American tradition, segregation is usually discussed with reference to ethnicity or migrant status rather than social class (White 1984:120). This is also true in Southern Europe, where the segregation of rural migrants is usually pointed out. Some researchers lament the lack of ethnicity data in cities like Rome (McElrath, 1962) and Madrid (Abrahamson et al., 1974:522) without questioning whether they would be relevant (White 1984:171). However, actually much migrant segregation can be interpreted as social class segregation (White 1984:91).

The bourgeoisie is the most strongly segregated social class. Unlike the case of the North and the USA, where working-class areas are the most socially homogeneous, in Southern Europe it is the highest social classes who tend to cluster together and exclude other social groups. Professionals coexist with the self-employed in the city centre. In Naples the small traders and workshops form the economia del vicolo (the alley economy; Bastano, 1976), since suburban commercial centres are non-existent. The self-employed mingle with other social classes in all city centres (Costa et al., 1980; White 1984:192). Otherwise, however, the bourgeoisie is the only highly segregated social class.

This mixture of classes peculiar to Southern European social geographies, is due to alternatives to neighbourhood segregation, which are not met in Northern Europe and the USA (White 1984:156). The most widespread one is vertical segregation. For example, in central Naples, with the exception of slum areas and modern housing districts, the middle and working classes live together in vertically segregated apartment blocks, the middle classes on the first and second floors (Dopp 1968:238). The same is true in Athens, but here it is the working class and service labourers, such as the concierges of apartment blocks, who occupy lower floors, while the wealthier live on top floors and pent-houses (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a). This coresidence, however, becomes less frequent as older apartment block areas decay or new housing ceases to create the variety of dwelling-sizes necessary for vertical segregation. A more rare alternative to neighbourhood segregation, is segregation between the front and the back of residential buildings. This is encountered in areas where apartment blocks have interior courts, such as Paris (Deneux, 1981:55 in White:156), and originates in nineteenth-century architecture where large, light, airy and desirable dwellings overlooked the street and small, dark, airless flats overlooked back interior courts (Bobek & Lichtenberger, 1966:72-89 in ibid.).
The mixture of social classes among themselves and with economic activity, as well as the reverse-Burgess spatial pattern, can be explained also by the strong employment linkage in the Mediterranean. In Turin, e.g., industrial distribution explains both working-class and bourgeois residential patterns (White: 164-5; also Warnes 1973). The average journey to work in Athens in 1963 was found to be only 3.7 km (Pappas & Virirakis 1972; Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a: Chapter 6). Journeys to work are kept short for all social classes, and often middle classes live in the same building as their offices and studios. The three-hour lunch break throughout Mediterranean Europe as well as France compels people to live near, so as to avoid prolonged journeys during the 4 rush hours.

4.2 A "dual" housing market

4.2.1 The apartment building

A grave housing shortage appeared in Southern Europe as a result of the economic recession of the 1930s and wartime destruction. After the second world war this resulted in overbuilding and the generalization of the monolithic apartment block. In some cases this was built in the periphery at low cost as a grand ensemble (Barcelona). In most cases, however, the private sector was artificially boosted to produce it in central areas. The popularity of the city centre exacerbated this trend. Today, while single-household buildings predominate in Britain, throughout Western Europe urban life is apartment life (White 1984:48). According to Lichtenberger (1970:53-4; 1976:88-90) the apartment house originated in Italy and spread to Western Europe from the 16th century onwards via France and Austria. Medieval houses in Naples had been two-storey, but population pressures led to tenement blocks already in the 18th century (Dopp, 1968:139-43; Lichtenberger, 1970:54). Throughout Mediterranean Europe today the city is compact, with high densities. Occupancy densities are also higher than in northern cities, exceeding 3 persons per room (White 1984:53). In the case of Italy, peak population densities in 1951 were 825 persons per hectare in Naples, 348 in Turin, 442 in Venice, 698 in Rome, 607 in Palermo, 791 in Genoa (Dopp, 1968:242). In Spain the average number of dwellings in apartment blocks of 5 dwellings or more for large cities in 1970 varied from 11.6% in Seville to 15.7% in Madrid (White 1984:48). Free-market housing starts amounted to 74% in Madrid in 1977, with the publicly-supported sector much reduced (Gago Llorente 1979:111). Peak population densities in Barcelona in 1945 were 1,361 persons per hectare (Olives Puig 1969:53-8).

Apartment blocks are built in the context of a fragmented, often speculative, urban market. During the postwar period the production of housing is much more piecemeal than in Northern Europe. Free-market construction of privately rented property is customary in Portugal, Spain and Greece. The most usual constructions are low-quality multi-storey apartment buildings. The decline of building standards means that large proportions of
recently-built housing are already in need of repair and, in many cases, replacement. Increasing obsolescence also stems from the system of rent control, amounting sometimes (for example, in Portugal) to a total freeze, which obviously discourages owners from financing improvements (Gaspar 1984:226). Government policy in Spain recently eased the possibilities of financial institutions lending for house purchase (King 1971), but a recent study of new building for sale found that a large deposit and mortgage period was required (Gago Llorente 1979:125). In Barcelona new housing provision is lopsided, and de luxe housing stands empty while the poor inhabit shanty-towns and marginalized properties for lack of access to the normal market (Ginatempo et al. 1977).

4.2.2 The self-built sector

In fact, the housing market is dual - and not because of any large-scale public sector. On the contrary, public participation in housebuilding has declined in all four countries. In Portugal, the public sector used to build 10% of the new stock during the 1970s, but the percentage dropped during the 1980s. In Italy during the fascist period, government policy supported the construction of middle-income housing through the allocation of grants to the public housing authorities (as in Greece during the dictatorship, see Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a). The share of housing directly built by the public sector in Italy fell from an annual average of 18% in the early 1950s to less than 3% in the 1970s (Ceccarelli 1981). Spain experienced a marked decrease in the housing shortage since 1961 from 1 million to 300-600,000 dwellings (Gaspar 1984:226). This has been mainly due to extensive building activity in the 1961-67 period (Santillana 1980). Public sector participation decreased sharply from 8.1 to 4.9% in 1973-6 (Gaspar 1984:227). In Barcelona the supply of new public-sector housing has not kept pace with the need to absorb population from the cleared squatter settlements (Ferras 1977a:270-7).

A large self-built sector exists between the commercial and the public one and forms the second part of a dual housing market (Emmanuel 1981). This makes home ownership quite widespread in Mediterranean cities. In a study of two districts in Barcelona, no meaningful relationship was found between home ownership and occupation (Lowder, 1980:29-30). In Venice high status was not related with type of tenure nor with housing age, but with housing size and amenities (Lando, 1978; Costa et al.,1980: 400-1). In Mestre, the industrial satellite of Venice, by contrast, social status related with tenure: middle classes tended to rent in the centre rather than own in the periphery (Zanetto & Lando, 1980:246). In Greece urban homeownership is widespread among all social classes (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a).

A large part of the self-built sector consists of illegal settlements.
4.3 Mediterranean illegal settlements

Squatting and illegal building are by no means unknown in Northern Europe and America, but they have been short-lived. Shanty towns appeared in the periphery of both German and Swedish towns in the late 19th century during periods of rapid urbanization (Niethammer et al. 1978:125-7). In London, Amsterdam and West Berlin, squatting has occurred in the inner city in the form of illegal occupation of property awaiting redevelopment.

In Southern Europe, by contrast, illegal building is widespread and peripheral shanty-towns are almost a systematic occurrence. Housing problems are most severe in Portugal, followed by Greece, while Spain and Italy are in relatively stronger positions (Gaspar 1984:225, Santillana 1980, Ceccarelli 1981, Papayannis 1981). Slums only exist in Portugal, while control over illegal development is most efficient in Spain and Italy (Gaspar 1984:231). The workers have lived in central slums as in their northern counterparts, but the predominant places of residence were peripheral. Central slums are present throughout the world, but less important in the Mediterranean, as evidence suggests. Peripheral settlements were still growing in the 1970s.

Illegal settlements in Mediterranean cities have been often attributed to lack of planning. In fact, planning faded as the history of the Mediterranean proceeded. Building control regulations were extremely common during the medieval period. Expropiatory powers were used for a variety of purposes. During the 20th century planning conditions range from the municipal socialism of Bologna to the free-market forces left unchallenged in the cities of Portugal and Greece (Wynn ed 1984a). It is these cities which show the highest incidence of illegal building.

The scarcity of supply of urban land is said to further speculation and to be one of the causes of growth of illegal markets in land and housing (Romanos 1970; Berlinguer & Della Seta 1976; Williams 1981). Each country presents some particularities, as discussed in the following.

4.3.1 Spain

Viviendas marginales appear in every large Spanish city. Shanty town households are estimated at 1.1% in Madrid (unofficially estimated at 3.9%), 1.4% in Malaga, 2.6% in Seville (Ferras 1977a; Montes Mieza et al 1976). In 1973 in Madrid an estimated 128,000 lived in a variety of types of illegal housing (Montes Mieza et al 1976:161). Half of the households were tenants. In outer suburban areas of squatting and illegal housing in Madrid recent migrants and gypsies are over-represented (survey in Montes Mieza et al. 1976:162-3), while southern migrants tend to concentrate on the southern part of Madrid (Salcedo 1977b: 532).

In Barcelona proletarian housing is largely peripheral, either in shanty-towns or in the grands ensembles that have replaced them. Only for single migrants have inner-city locations been of major importance (Ferras 1978:182-3). Central slums have
been basically open only to single male in-migrants, in areas where a process of "invasion and succession" might be operative (Olives Puig 1969), though upper-class groups seem to have been replaced rather than displaced. Squatter settlements or shanty towns, by contrast, have been more attractive to migrants accompanied by their families, and to the working class more generally.

Peripheral illegal housing in Barcelona dates back to the 1920s, and by 1927 there were some 6,500 barracas in the city (Lowder 1980:6). In the postwar period massive immigration led to the rapid expansion of the city (Naylon 1981). Planning attempts were thwarted by fears of the central government of encouraging Catalan nationalism. New settlements mushroomed in the periphery of Barcelona, poorly serviced and badly integrated into the larger urban system. In the 1950s 15,000 shanties existed, housing nearly 70,000 people (Ferras 1977a:266). The most enduring illegal housing areas have lain on the Montjuic hill just to the south of the city-centre (Ferras 1977a:255-6), along the coast north of the city, and in inland areas to the north where vacant land close to industries has been available (Martinez-Mari 1966: 545-6). Of these shanty zones, that of Montjuic is the oldest and has housed a stable population originally of Murcian migrants but more recently consisting of the Barcelona-born descendants of the original movers. The other areas, still of active shanty growth in the 1960s, provided shelter for the first large waves of Andalusians (White 1984:87).

The population of squatter settlements was increasing in the 1960s, and their surrounding municipalities were undergoing proletarianization (Martinez-Mari 1966:543). Still in the 1970s, municipalities near the northern coast of Barcelona have seen rapid in-migration, and peripheral shanty towns and worker housing blocks there have reproduced conditions in Barcelona (Naylon 1981:245; Sola-Morales Rubio 1970:178). Peripheral shantytowns do not appear to be transitory places of residence for migrant families, but display a good deal of compositional stability. Ferras (1977a:251-2, 263-4) reports on shanties in Barcelona where 19% of the residents had been present for over 20 years. Many had arrived as unskilled workers and had improved their occupational status. In the case of Madrid, 50% of the household heads in the illegal settlement areas in 1971 had been there for 12 or more years (Montes Mieza et al. 1976:172).

In recent years publicly-financed working-class housing has replaced several shanty-towns, but there are always some remaining squatter areas for recent migrants (Ferras 1977b:194). After such rehousing, the percentage of shanty dwellers in Barcelona dropped to 1% total households by 1970 (White 1984:46). In the case of Madrid, the authorities tried to assimilate shantytowns by providing basic amenities, but there have also been periodic drives for their demolition, though replacement is costly. In Barcelona, by contrast, shantytowns were successfully eliminated, but actually substandard dwellings replaced them with barraquismo vertical, huge apartment blocks with minimal services (Naylon 1981:245).
4.3.2 Italy

A case study of Turin showed the residential patterns of migrants to be the inverse from those of Barcelona. As in the latter, migrants from the South in the 1950s settled in two types of areas: the city centre, and the periphery. In the former, they displaced more upper class populations (Adamo 1969:41), although even in the late 1950s the real bourgeois core at the southwest had been scarcely affected (Gabert 1958:42). The peripheral ex-villages of the outer fringe, however, where housing rent was cheaper, housed transient migrants aspiring to move into the city itself (Adamo 1969; Garbagnati 1962).

Official and unofficial estimates vary for the rest of the Italian cities, but borghezzi are usual in Rome, and squatting in disused buildings is almost institutionalized in Naples (Dopp 1968:157-9). Messina, Sicily was rebuilt after the 1908 earthquake and the 1943 bombing with bourgeois dwellings in the centre and barriche (shantytowns) in the periphery, perpetuated for many years (Ginatempo et al 1977:166; Ioli Gigante 1980:154). Many of the minimal-standard dwellings were built by the authorities (as in refugee Greece), and in the early 1970s 14% of the city’s residents lived there (Ginatempo et al 1977:115). Workers’ housing was also provided later, but shanty towns persisted. A 1973 survey in Messina showed that only 5 out of 100 shanty-town families had arrived within the last 5 years (Ginatempo et al. 1977:119).

4.3.3 Portugal

Internal migration brought about the rapid expansion of Lisbon and Oporto, creating a “housing crisis” - overcrowding in the inner city and shantytowns on the periphery (Gaspar 1984: 222; Lewis & Williams 1984b). The present housing shortage in Portugal is estimated at about half a million dwellings, of which 40,000 correspond to the need to replace shanties which have increased recently, particularly around Lisbon. Illegal building in the last decade represents nearly 20% of the total housing stock (Gaspar 1984:226).

The bairros clandestinos, shanty towns around Lisbon, are constructed by perishable materials such as cardboard and corrugated iron. However, there is also a number of substantial masonry properties built without permits (Lewis et al 1984b). However, the majority of dwellers (about 6000 households) inhabit shanties. Official estimates indicate that in 1970 they involved 5.9% of total households or 6.4% of the urban population in Lisbon, but only .2% and .1% respectively in Oporto (Ferras 1977a; Montes Mieza et al 1976).

Their existence is most often attributed to the exclusiveness of private building and the small amount (5% of completions each year) of public housing (Salgueiro, 1977). As in all Mediterranean cities, there is a dual housing market in Lisbon.
4.3.4 Greek "arbitrary" settlements

This is the literal translation of the Greek word for squatting and pirate subdivisions: afthereta. They have a very long history, going back to the 19th century when Athens was declared the capital of Greece. During the postwar period the number of illegal housing was impressive. Calculations in various alternative ways lead to the conclusion that people who housed themselves illegally in the first place were about 450-500,000 or between 32% and 35% of the population increase of Greater Athens between 1940-71 (1,416,000 people; see Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a: 217). Consequent "legalizations" reduced their number to 90,000 people or 3.63% of the urban population by 1971 (ibid.)

4.3.5 France

It is worthwhile to refer to squatting around Paris, since it is comparable with that in the Mediterranean, though ethnic segregation is much more acute here. Foreign immigrants have built bidonvilles around Paris since the period of the rag-pickers in the 19th century (Faure 1978 in White:45), and the residents of the Parisian fortification belt in the early 20th century (White:25-6, 45). More recently, however, the bidonvilles are populated by North Africans. Their growth around the major French cities was a feature of the 1950s and especially of the massive influx of North African labour in the 1960s (White:118). There is a tendency for single male migrants to move to central slums and for families on the peripheral shanty towns and public housing, as in Barcelona and Athens (White:130). Bidonvilles were therefore places of residence of families. According to a detailed study in the suburbs of Paris (El Gharbaoui 1971), the commune of Nanterre had 13 bidonvilles housing 8,180 people in 1970 (32% of the total immigrants and 9% of the population), of whom 59% in family groups.

By the later 1970s the bidonvilles had been reduced, slowly resorbed into "normal" housing after a 1964 law. Foyers and cites de transit were designed for the temporary rehousing of these populations, but a study in the western suburbs of Paris in the mid-1970s showed that families had lived there since 1961 (Gokalp & Lamy 1977:63). The peripheral grands ensembles are not popular with the migrants. Still, rehousing proceeded. Bidonvilles in Lyon were eliminated (Poinard 1972), as well as those in Bordeaux, except one housing 3,000 gypsies (Borde et al.,1978:48). In Marseille, by contrast, the bidonville population remained at 15,000 in 1973 (Dulhac et al. cited by White 1984:118).

Paris approaches Mediterranean urban patterns in another respect as well. The lowest middle class with some elements of the upper working class created a suburban slum (Evenson 1979: 226-31), as follows. Suburban land was bought up by speculators who divided it up into small plots and sold it. Purchasers could not afford to employ a builder, with self-help construction circumventing building and planning controls as a result. No public
services were laid in these areas, and suburban slums similar with bidonvilles emerged.
MEDITERRANEAN URBAN PROCESSES

The investigation of stages of urban growth (as outlined in van den Berg et al., 1982, and summarized by UN, 1983, 351-3) has recently much focused on the process of disurbanization or counterurbanization. The process was first observed in American cities (Berry (ed) 1976; Bradbury et al. 1982). Hall et al. (1980) have expressed scepticism about the similarity with Western Europe. Still, patterns change toward this model, as comparative studies have shown. European cities are undergoing population decline. By the late 1970s, among the larger cities only those of Southern Europe were experiencing population increase: Lisbon, Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Athens, Salonica, Marseille, Toulouse, Rome, Palermo (White 1984:57). A closer examination, however, indicates a radical change of patterns since the 1970s.

5.1 Diffuse industrialization and depolarization

There are signs of overall industrial decline in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal (Hudson & Lewis, 1985:12). To a degree, this coincides with a trend toward a "tertiarization of society" (Lipietz, 1980). This overall process seems to have affected the cities and the provinces in inverse ways. The large cities have suffered industrial decline, while the provinces were revitalized. There was a twofold process. On the one hand, private and public investments have shifted to rural areas and small towns, producing the the pattern of diffuse industrialization. On the other hand, some basic industries located in metropolitan areas declined: the automobile industry in Torino, shipbuilding and repair in Lisbon (Gaspar 1984:224), and building industries in Athens.

This constitutes a new trend in Mediterranean Europe. Until the 1960s, industrialization was related with fast urban growth, increased the development/underdevelopment dichotomy, and created a shift of labour from backward to advanced regions and sectors. In the case of Greece during the two first postwar decades, industry was attracted to the most urbanized regions because it was demand-led and market-oriented, characterized by consumption goods sectors (Leontidou 1983). Similarly in Italy during the 1950s and 1960s, industrial structure was based on the use of ever-increasing amounts of labour force and the large-scale economies embodied in large plants; it was therefore concentrated in space and increased regional disequilibria (Garofoli, 1984). Throughout the Mediterranean world the 1950s and 1960s have been the period of concentration: emigration, urbanization, and industrial structure led to virtual rural depopulation and rapid urban growth - in other words, to regional polarization. This pattern, which by the late 1960s received alarming dimensions, is more or less familiar. Recently, however, a process for its reversal seems to be under way.

In the case of Greece, since the mid-1970s a set of economic and political factors were found to operate toward industrial and urban decentralization and deconcentration in Athens and Salonica
Industrial employment stabilized and a trend toward "quaternarization" began (Leontidou 1986a). The decline of manufacturing employment hit especially the traditional industrial axis between Athens and Piraeus (Leontidou, 1983).

Industrial stagnation and deconcentration is a novel fact in the urban history of Athens and Salonica, but seems to belong in a more general pattern in the Mediterranean. The clearest case of deindustrialization and the transition toward a new regional structure is Italy, the most developed of the countries considered. Here the old development pattern broke down as a consequence of working-class struggle at the end of the 1960s, and an alternative pattern has been emerging, where regional disequilibria no longer increase (Garofoli 1978). During the recent years of the economic crisis, deindustrialization did not affect the whole country, but only the most developed areas, especially the metropolitan ones. Consequently it was followed by a process of disurbanization, especially in the North, and the expansion of tertiary activities.

The "economic miracle" in both Italy and Greece was, then, accompanied by urbanization and the territorial concentration of production; this pattern is now replaced by a process of decentralization. In France, the new regional pattern has been usually attributed to powerful actors, such as the State and large capital. The significance of industrial restructuring is stressed by Lipietz (1985), while State intervention appears in studies of the impact of regional policy. In the case of Greece policies for industrial decentralization have been adopted in accordance with the needs of industrial capital restructuring and the relevant coordination of the regional supply of labour rather than any social goals. Their role in reversing the regional pattern was profound and effective. Greece is a case where the State and large capital cooperated in initiating the new decentralization trend (Leontidou, 1983).

However, the "success" of State policy in producing a new regional pattern can be overestimated. The Italian example is the clearest. Since the period of the establishment of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, government activity was considerable in Italy. Despite its major efforts for the provision of public service infrastructure, land reclamation and reform schemes in the 1950s and its industrial incentives in the 1960s, however, the Cassa did not much influence the direction of urbanization. Other rigorous economic processes of industrial restructuring would later reverse the pattern. Capital restructuring in Italy occurred after the "hot autumn" of 1969. The decentralized regional pattern was sought by large firms (including Fiat and Benetton) interested in a non-unionized and flexible labour force with a lower cost of reproduction, and smaller factories, easier to govern (Garofoli, ed., 1978). The new strategies were also dictated by the crisis in the metropolitan areas. As diseconomies accumulated, better exploitation of social fixed capital was sought in small and medium-sized towns, while metropolitan diseconomies in areas of excessive urban rents, congestion and conflict were avoided by firms (Garofoli, 1984). Provincial towns were preferred for their flexible, low-paid labour force and land
with low prices for industrial establishments. In the case of Italy the new regional pattern can be thus attributed to industrial restructuring.

The existence of an informal sector exacerbated the trend for decentralized local development, especially during the recent years of the economic crisis. The informal economy assumed a new role in provincial Italy (Garofoli, 1984) and Greece (Leontidou, 1986a,b). Small-scale production has been developing as a prime force of regional revitalization. The alternative decentralized pattern emerges benefitting from the existence of small firms and social strata who combine seasonal work in agriculture, tourism, and industry in provincial areas.

Polarization and marginalization - attributes of the Latin American pattern as well - have been succeeded by informalization and growth even during the economic crisis. This led to a process of diffuse development and the depolarization of society. It has been even claimed that the treble, rather than dual, structure of economy and society should be stressed, i.e. the rising role of intermediate or peripheral sectors and regions, as opposed to central vs marginal ones.

Factors facilitating territorial "valorization" include flexibility of labour markets typical of small towns, new technologies suited for small plants, and the collapse of the mass-production and standard goods markets and of megastructures because of their excessive rigidity (Garofoli, 1984). The most important factor conducive to depolarization is spontaneous informalization, a specifically Mediterranean phenomenon, related with economic as well as cultural particularities. In most of these countries the informal economy and return migration exacerbated the trend toward regional revitalization. Such "endogenous" processes of local development become increasingly important and "exogenous" conditions of peripheral fordism, which have been stressed in analysis until today, behave only as catalysts in promoting autonomous decentralized development (Garofoli, 1984).

Deindustrialization affects the largest cities throughout Europe (e.g. Massey, 1984), but the process of informalization is qualitatively different in the Mediterranean. Studies of diffuse industrialization are too recent to permit generalizations: they are just beginning in Greece, are recent in Spain (Vasquez Barquero 1983), and more developed in Italy (Bini 1976; Bagnasco 1977, 1981; Garofoli 1978, 1984; Fua 1980). The fragility of the economic base of metropolitan cities is due partly to their specialization in economic sectors depending on demand from the wealthier countries, and partly to the strong competition by newly industrializing countries (Gaspar 1984:225).

5.2 Counterurbanization in the Mediterranean?

The metropolitan areas of Mediterranean cities have shown more vitality than those of the rest of Europe. In Northern Europe population decline in larger cities started earlier, and is currently the norm (Ogden 1985). By contrast, the largest Southern European cities still experienced notable growth in the
Despite this aggregate observation, however, there are indications of a reversal of urbanization trends in Mediterranean Europe. The rates of growth of all metropolitan areas were recently lower than those of the 1960s (Gaspar 1984:213). The exception here is Portugal. The dominance of Lisbon and Oporto can still not be challenged by any city, and in 1981 this dominance over the urban hierarchy has been strengthened (Williams, 1984). The population of the rest of the Mediterranean metropolitan regions, however, stabilizes more or less. The trend toward regional imbalance tends to slow down after the mid-1970s, especially in Italy and Spain. The power of attraction of larger cities has decreased.

At the same time, an unexpected revitalization of the old decaying towns seems to be under way. An old, all-European pattern, the "stage" city between two important capitals, the middle-sized regional or provincial capital, revives (Giner, 1986). Although the growth of smaller towns has not yet surpassed that of larger cities, it seems that metropolitan dualism and regional polarization—a pattern prevalent throughout the 20th century—is undermined during the last decade.

In the case of Italy intense migration to the North in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to stability in the 1970s (Gaspar 1984:213); even the Mezzogiorno was transformed from a rural to an urban, or even industrial, society (Garofoli, ed., 1978).

Similar processes can be observed in Portugal (Gaspar 1981).

In Spain during the 1970s, while traditional migration flows continued, an important change occurred: growth in the major cities started to slow down whereas the populations of medium sized cities began to stabilize or even grow (Ocana 1979; Ponsetti-Bosch 1981). Diffuse urbanization can be found in Valencia, Murcia and Alicante among others (Gaspar 1984:231).

In the case of Greece, regional inequalities were gradually reduced after the mid-1960s (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981a: Chapter 5; Drewett et al 1985). Differences among various estimates of regional income are mostly due to the area taken as "Athens", and the nature of income considered. On the basis of the per capita income of the poorest Greek region (Epiros = 100), the relative income of Athens rose from 245 in 1954 to 291 in 1958 and then fell to 148 in 1960 and 139 in 1972. In relation to the national average (Greece = 100), the Athens relative income fell from 163 in 1961 to 153 in 1971, and from 143.3 in 1970 to 121.5 in 1974. Monthly expenditures and earnings in kind per capita in Greece outside Athens amounted to 27.6% of the corresponding expenditures in Greater Athens in 1964, but rose to 63.2% by 1974. If comparisons with later periods were possible, regional equalization would appear even more dramatic (Leontidou Emmanuel 1981b). These recent trends in Southern Europe have parallels in more advanced economies. Their causes, however, are different. Financial pressures on the metropolitan areas and the redirection of public investment to the provinces have been quite important. Deindustrialization has been a prime force in the process of diffuse urbanization. The informal sector, tourism, and international labour migrations have also played a major role. Gaspar (1984: 212) stresses the convergence of two interrelated pheno-
mena in the explanation of the new process: the reduction of internal and external migratory flows, and the pattern of a spatially diffuse industrialization based on small and medium sized enterprises frequently located in rural areas. Other factors include the rate of financial transfers to less developed regions (pensions, unemployment pay, emigrant remittances), the spread of tourism, and the development of negative externalities in large cities.

Although the behaviour of the returnees has not been investigated adequately, it is evident that the growth of cities has been already affected by international conditions which curbed emigration after 1973 (Hudson & Lewis 1985:22). In Portugal the dominant pattern has been labelled "ruralization" (Gaspar 1984: 209): the returnees settle in their rural areas of origin (with some exceptions preferring urban centres (Boura et al. 1984). By contrast, they seem to prefer towns or cities rather than their villages of origin in all other cases — especially Greece, but also Spain and Italy. Unger (1983) reported a surprisingly high percentage of returnees established in Athens rather than their birthplace, unlike the case of Portugal (Hudson & Lewis 1985:25).

Immigration toward Southern Europe, on the other hand, is also relatively neglected by researchers. North African migrants increase in Italy’s major urban areas, and Greece, Spain and Portugal are also importers (as well as exporters) of labour (op.cit.: 23). In view of such tendencies, the universality of the trend toward diffuse urbanization remains an open question. The evaluation of the influence of diffuse industrialization processes on the urban system has not been undertaken yet in a systematic manner. True, we are dealing with a sort of counterurbanization, but it would be wrong to adopt a "convergence" theory expecting a repetition of Western European experience in this respect.

Large-scale urban development in the Mediterranean now belongs to history. The idea of new towns and growth poles was abandoned. The newest venture, the Sines project in Portugal, was apparently a failure (Gaspar 1984). The deepening economic and financial crisis in the country has contributed to the return of shanty development, especially in Lisbon, and an increase of the "black" economy. Metropolitan cities will stagnate or decline, especially in Spain and Italy, while the important regional role of Athens in the eastern Mediterranean may jeopardize attempts to control its growth. At the same time, some small centres will continue to attract small and medium-sized industrial units, promoting counterurbanization or diffuse urbanization (Gaspar 1984:232).

Through such processes, the city/ country dichotomy in Mediterranean cultures is modified, and the process of informalization is accompanied by cultural changes. In Italy a sort of "neolocalism" emerges on the political as well as economic level. "Territorial social formations" appear, centred in intermediate towns (Garofoli, 1984). As Giner (1986) points out, "perhaps Italy is becoming again what it was in the past, to the wonder and fascination of all, il paese delle cento citta".
5.3 Urban deconcentration

As the larger cities cease to be major poles of attraction, their surrounding regions have been growing. Except diffuse urbanization and out-migration, middle-class suburbanization is transforming the character of Mediterranean urban geographies and societies.

Population decline in inner urban areas initially affected only older historic urban centres. Population in the historic core of Milan fell from 113,000 in 1901 to 35,000 in 1971, a decline of 69% (Dalmasso, 1978:172). In 1951-71 the historic centre of Venice witnessed a net loss of 59,000 migrants (Piasentin et al. 1978:582). In 1967-76, only 56% of the lower middle class leaving the city centre was replaced, 73% of the working class, but 111% of managerial and administrative occupations (Costa et al., 1980).

Later on, the process of deconcentration spread to all major cities. This has been attributed to: a) gentrification, slum clearance, and reduction of population densities, b) the conversion of residential land uses to other activities, and c) demographic changes (household sizes, age structure, etc; White 1984:201). However, these processes are universal in capitalist cities and sometimes irrelevant for the Mediterranean. For example, Castells' (1975) renovation-deportation thesis for the analysis of gentrification is only relevant in cities of monopolistic market structure. An insight into the particularities of Southern Europe can be gained if the countries are studied individually.

In the case of Greece, Athens experienced a reversal of the process of population and employment concentration, which has characterized its development pattern for over a century (Leontidou Emanuel 1981a,b, 1983, 1985c).

In Italy, deconcentration seems to be under way in Rome. Population decline in the city-centre has been occurring since 1931, after a major housing clearance and public works according to Haussmann's model (Rossi, 1959:27-9). The technique of nodal flow analysis (Bell 1980) for the investigation of an intra-urban migration matrix, used by White (1984:147-8) for 1964, indicated that most migrants (central districts of the city) send their largest migrant flow away from the city centre. This out-migration has been relatively simple in structure, while movements within the suburbs were more complex: "this is far from being a straightforward continuous wave of sectorally outward-bound migration like the ripples from a stone dropped into a pond" (White 1984:148-9). A sectoral pattern of intra-urban migration was discernible, with net migrant losses occurring even in the suburbs to the east and south-east of the city-centre in areas of relatively old pre-war suburbanization. The most recent suburban growth in 1964 had been in the south-west and extreme north. In Naples, deconcentration reduced the average inner-city density of 467 persons per hectare in 1951 to 295 in 1971, after the out-migration of 482,000 people (Bastano, 1976; Dopp 1968:341-4).

During the 1970s in Spain, parts of central Madrid started to witness natural decline for the first time (Ballesteros 1977). Barcelona also experienced deconcentration (Serra 1985).
In Portugal, deconcentration on the intra-urban level was evident in Lisbon. The 1981 population census indicated moderate population increase in the cities of Lisbon and Oporto and high rates of increase in their surrounding satellite towns (Hudson & Lewis 1985:15).

5.4 Urban social movements vs popular integration

Urban restructuring was evident in an upsurge of urban social movements in the 1970s. The postwar type of urban struggle in Mediterranean European cities has been considered as interconnected with the events of May 1968 in France. It was often interclass and polarized around issues of reproduction, usually housing and service provision by local government. It has been argued that urban movements can not be understood outside the broader context of the labour struggle, and that the Marxist distinction between primary and secondary contradictions is no longer acceptable in advanced capitalist countries (Gaspar 1984:215). Squatting has been the most political action among "non-political" urban movements, but others were also significant, such as infrastructure provision in illegally built areas (Gaspar 1984:219).

In the second half of the 1970s there has been a decline of urban social movements in all four countries, particularly in Italy and Portugal. This coincides with the increasing role of left-wing groups in local politics. The most important cities in Southern Europe, except Lisbon and Oporto (not their suburban municipalities), became controlled by the left.

According to Santos (cited in Gaspar 1984:221) one of the means activated to neutralize the politicization of the urban crisis is "regionalization and decentralization whereby political conflict with the central State is fragmented or atomized into several conflicts with the local authorities".

5.4.1 Italy

Economic, social and political processes made urban movements the most advanced in Italy among Mediterranean countries. Della Seta (1978) points out that urban movements have been at the centre of the postwar workers' movement and sees them as a vehicle for reform. Marcelloni (1979), by contrast, emphasizes the importance of gains by left-wing parties in local government elections, and distinguishes 5 periods. During the first (1969-70), dwellings in older buildings were occupied, especially in Rome, and traditional political forces (PCI, PSIUP) were involved. During the second period (1971-2) and the division between the old and the new left, the latter attacked the PCI, developed new squatting operations and defended earlier occupations. In the third period (1972-3), the comitati di quartieri appeared, corresponding to greater organization, and demanding infrastructure and services. After the rise in oil prices, most struggles focussed on rising prices of services. After 1974,
however, housing occupations increased again in all cities. There were 5000 occupations in Rome, and many in Milan, Turin, Naples, Florence, and other cities (Marcelloni 1979; Bagnasco et al. 1979; Lagana et al. 1982).

5.4.2 Spain

In Spain urban movements were an important focus of opposition to non-representative government: they even contributed to the crisis of Francoism (Castells 1978), and became a crisis factor in the political structures of Spain (Borja 1977:203). However, their role increased after the death of Franco and especially after the shift to democratic conditions (Castells 1978). The early movements were oriented against the ruling powers and often focused on specific national issues, such as the regional question (Gaspar 1984:215-6).

Urban social movements began to be structured at the end of the 1960s with the emergence of the asociaciones de vecinos, legally recognized in 1964. In the early stages some associations were created by the municipal authorities sometimes in opposition to "popular" associations created by residents who opposed the dictatorial regime (Bier 1979 in Gaspar:216). These nowadays represent hundreds of thousands of inhabitants and are most active in Barcelona. Castells (1978) shows that there were 7 types of neighbourhood associations in Madrid, with different social compositions and demands. Shanty-town associations were involved in the solution of housing problems and local scarcities of basic equipment; public housing movements were interested in improvements and rents; privately promoted associations demanded social infrastructure; exclusive upper and middle-class associations promoted social and cultural activities; and "downtown" associations opposed the transformation of the city centre after 1975.

5.4.3 Portugal

In Portugal urban movements had a weaker role than in Spain but were an important focus of opposition to non-representative government. They often focussed on specific national issues, such as the colonial wars of Portugal. Da Costa (1975) has indicated the political significance of the tenants' movements organized in public housing areas in the early 1970s.

The revolutionary period (1974-5) witnessed a climax of urban struggles along with revolutionary agrarian movements. Occupations of dwellings and of large estates took place, with the clear support from the Armed Forces Movement. The PCP (Communist Party) was involved in agrarian struggles, but was cautious and even suspicious in the case of urban struggles (Dows 1980; Leitao et al 1978). The 1974-5 urban movements were of two types. One, controlled by the PCP, was oriented to the demands of the working class and the revolution; the other involved the extreme left. The struggle for decent housing resulted, by May 1974, in
the occupation of some state housing schemes by inhabitants from the shanties. The peak of the urban movement, as measured by housing occupations, occurred in February 1975. Cases of opportunism by well-off populations have been reported in occupations (Dows 1980), and the shanty residents seem to have preferred to cooperate with SAAL self-help schemes.
CONCLUSIONS: RESUMING URBAN CONTRASTS

The particularities of Mediterranean cities depict an image of the peripheral world. Historical antecedents which encourage this image are the colonial and cultural associations between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Libya, Greece and Egypt; the experience of dictatorships and military governments, which have ruled all of these countries for considerable periods; and contradictions in the forms of sociopolitical structuration, like religion vs secularism, traditionalism vs radicalism, corporatism, clientelistic and personalistic power networks and poor civil societies. In urban life, we find the coexistence of tradition and modernity on many levels (Giner 1986); as their class structure approaches the pattern of late capitalism, self-employment persists; artisans, shopkeepers and marginal populations coexist with white-collars and executives; in the location of economic activity, as CBDs are rebuilt with modern office blocks, mixed land uses predominate; as modern apartment blocks and hotels spring up, squatter settlements are still mushrooming.

These antitheses create contradictions and disorder; but Mediterranean societies are not precapitalist. This is their specific way of adaptation to capitalism, contrasting with the Northern European and American way. Mediterranean urban life styles, allowing for irrationality and squalour, constitute a humane and leisurely way of adapting to capitalism, and a very modern way, too. Recent presentations of postcapitalist utopias (Gorz 1980) have criticized central planning and the work ethic, and defended leisurely, communitarian life styles. Will the Mediterranean cities be the first to realize the postindustrial images? It is difficult to say. We only know that these disorderly cities are alive and growing, never sacrificing their diversity to any disciplined planning ideals, work routines, or production processes.

It has been said that "the history of the Mediterranean is the history of its cities" (Giner 1986). Southern Europe includes some of the oldest cities of the region, dating from ancient times and the pre-roman period, while the cities of Northern Europe and Scandinavia, and of the USA, of course, are much younger. However, after the war the metropolitan areas of Mediterranean cities have still been more vital than those of advanced countries. It seems that the cities of the New World aged first. In the USA and Northern Europe population decline in metropolitan cities started earlier, and is currently the norm. By contrast, the largest Southern European cities are still experiencing notable growth, though rates slow down. The power of attraction of metropolitan cities has decreased. But their appeal in the popular mind seems to be still quite powerful.

The cultural tradition of the Mediterranean celebrates these cities. Except during periods of dictatorship, the countryside has been considered as the domain of ignorant peasants, while the city represented progress and civilized cultural life (Weber 1977). This provides a contrast with the Anglo-American tradition, which idealized nature and life near the countryside.
The startling urban imagery of the USA contrasts with the rural purity of Mediterranean tourist resorts. These images are turned on their heads when urban cultures are contrasted. Urban dominance in the USA conceals a substratum of anti-urbanism reflected in American intellectual tradition, from Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright, or a quest for flight from the cities, from Ernest Hemingway to Bruce Springsteen. The Mediterranean rural images, by contrast, in reality coexist with remarkably urban cultures. As long as these persist, the metropolitan cities of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal will retain their vitality and creativity.
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