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PLATONIS PROTAGORAS.
PLATONIS PROTAGORAS

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES

BY

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PREFACE.

THE present edition of the Protagoras is on the same lines as the Pitt Press editions of the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro.

The Editors venture to hope that the study of this delightful dialogue, for which much has already been done in English by Mr Wayte and more recently by Mr Turner, may be still further encouraged by the publication of this edition.

Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, has kindly read through the proofs, and contributed various criticisms and suggestions.

CAMBRIDGE,
July 26, 1893.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN this edition a few errors and misprints have been corrected, but we have not thought it necessary or desirable to introduce any further changes.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
September 28, 1905.
INTRODUCTION.

The Protagoras of Plato is one of the few dialogues whose authenticity has never been called in question by any eminent scholar. None of the dialogues attributed to Plato is so full of fallacious reasoning; perhaps none contains an ethical theory so difficult to reconcile with ordinary Platonic teaching; but the extraordinary vivacity and power of the dramatic representation, as well as the charm of style, have furnished proofs of authenticity which even the most sceptical critics have been unable to resist.

§ I. Analysis.

A brief analysis of the Protagoras will form a fitting introduction to the discussion of its scope and purpose.

Socrates narrates the dialogue to a friend (309 A—310 A).

Hippocrates had visited Socrates in great excitement at an early hour, in order to obtain from him a personal introduction to Protagoras, who had just arrived in Athens. In the interval before they set out, Socrates subjected his young friend to an interrogatory, which forced him to admit that he was
about to entrust his soul to a sophist, without knowing what a sophist really is. Such a course of action Socrates declared to be perilous in the extreme (310 A—314 C). Socrates and Protagoras presently proceeded to the house of Callias, where Protagoras was staying, and having with some difficulty obtained admittance, found themselves spectators of an animated scene, in which Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are the leading figures (314 C—316 A).

At this point the true business of the dialogue begins. After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter delivers a speech claiming for his profession a high antiquity. Poets, religious teachers, musicians and others who were in reality 'Sophists', have vainly tried to disguise themselves by other names: Protagoras has found it both more prudent and more honest to profess himself openly that which he is, a Sophist and Educator of men. Prodicus and Hippias with their respective adherents assemble to hear Protagoras publicly explain the advantages of his teaching (316 A—317 E).

Aided by a little Socratic questioning, Protagoras explains that his art consists in making men good citizens. Socrates professes to have thought that civic virtue could not be communicated by teaching, and that on two grounds: first, because the Athenians do not think it can, since they allow any man to advise them in matters connected with the state without requiring from him evidence that he has been taught, whereas they will only listen to an expert when they are deliberating on matters connected with the arts: and second, because as a matter of fact, great statesmen have not succeeded in transmitting
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their civic virtue to their sons and wards (317 E—320 C).

The reply of Protagoras is in the form of a ἄριστος and falls into three sections.

In the first he endeavours to justify the Athenians for permitting any one to give counsel on politics, by relating a myth of pre-historic man, according to which no one is destitute of the foundations of civic virtue, Justice and Shame (320 C—323 A). That every man has part by nature in this virtue is, moreover, a universal belief, for he who publicly declares himself to be wicked is universally looked upon as mad (323 A—323 C).

Protagoras next endeavours to prove that the Athenians regard virtue as capable of being taught. In the first place, we hold men responsible for lacking that only which it was in their power to acquire, and we hold them responsible for their wrong-doing (323 C—324 A). Punishment, in the second place, is intended both by the Athenians and by all other men to be a means of teaching virtue (324 A—324 D).

Finally, Protagoras addresses himself to the question—why do not the sons of great statesmen possess the same virtue as their fathers? It is not from lack of teaching: for it would be absurd to suppose that statesmen teach their sons everything except the one thing needful for life as a citizen, and in point of fact, virtue is taught at every stage of human life—by parents, nurses, tutors, professional teachers for soul and body, and finally by the state herself, through the medium of the laws and the punishment which their violation entails. But children are often inferior to their parents in the capacity
for learning, and it is for this reason that they seem to fall short in civic virtue, although, compared with untutored savages, even the worst products of civilization might seem models of morality. Protagoras concludes by declaring himself a teacher of virtue and explaining his method of taking fees (324 D—328 D).

After thanking Hippocrates for bringing him to hear so fine a display, Socrates requests the Sophist to explain a matter which he had left obscure—Are the single virtues each of them parts of virtue, or only different names for one thing? They are parts of virtue, says Protagoras, in answer to the cross-examination of his rival, distinct from each other and the whole, as the parts of the face are different from the whole face and from one another. In number they are five—justice, temperance, holiness, courage, and wisdom, and wisdom is the greatest of them. We may possess one without possessing all the five. Each has its own peculiar efficacy and no one of them is like another (328 D—330 B).

Socrates endeavours in the first instance to make Protagoras admit that justice and holiness are identical, or nearly so. It is admitted that justice is just and holiness holy: but if justice and holiness do not resemble each other, justice will not be holy, but unholy, and holiness will not be just, but unjust—a conclusion which the Sophist rejects. Protagoras graciously concedes that there may be a considerable resemblance between justice and holiness, without however allowing that the two virtues are alike (330 B—332 A).

The next step in the argument seeks to establish the identity of temperance and wisdom. Æphrosúnda,
Protagoras admits, is the opposite of σοφία, and nothing can have more than one thing which is opposed to it. ἀφροσύνη is however opposed to σωφροσύνη, as well as to σοφία; from which it follows that σοφία and σωφροσύνη are nothing but two names for one and the same thing (332 A—333 B).

If Socrates had also proved the identity of temperance and justice, four out of the five virtues would have been equated, but as he embarks upon his argument, Protagoras seizes the opportunity to plunge into a ἰταίον on the relativity of the notion 'good' or 'beneficial' (333 B—334 C).

Here ensues an interlude, in which Socrates protests against his rival's lengthy speeches, and threatens to depart. At last, in deference to the entreaties of Callias, backed up by some remarks from Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Socrates consents to stay, on condition that Protagoras shall first question him and afterwards submit to be questioned in his turn (334 C—338 E).

Protagoras proposes for criticism a poem of Simonides, remarking that the subject of the discussion will still be ἀρετή, though it is transferred from human conduct to the sphere of poetry. A good poem, Socrates admits, will not contradict itself: but Simonides, after asserting that it is hard to become good, proceeds in this poem to censure Prodicus for saying 'It is hard to be good'. That Simonides contradicts himself, Socrates denies, on the ground that 'to be good' is not the same as 'to become good': perhaps Simonides agreed with Hesiod in the view that it is hard to become, but easy to remain, good. Your cure is worse than the disease,
replies Protagoras: it would be the height of folly to call being good an easy thing. Socrates thereupon, with Prodicus' approval, at first suggests that 'hard' may mean not 'difficult', but 'evil', since the word 'hard'—so says Prodicus the Cean—means something evil in Ceos; but soon abandoning these sophistries he volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem (338 E—342 A).

Sparta and Crete are in reality the chief seats of philosophy in Greece, though they try to conceal the fact. The wise men of old knew this and in imitation of the Spartans compressed their wisdom into short and pithy sentences, one of which was the saying of Pittacus 'It is hard to be good'. Simonides wrote his poem to overthrow this maxim (342 A—343 C).

Socrates proceeds to support his theory of the poem by an exposition conceived (as will be afterwards shewn') in the most sophistical spirit, but he correctly apprehends the central idea, viz. that in a world where it is not hard, but impossible to be good, we should not expect too much in the way of moral excellence (343 C—347 A).

The exposition of the poem being finished Socrates expresses himself disparagingly on the value of poetical criticism as a means of arriving at the truth, and the original question is resumed with Socrates for interrogator, as before. Conceding all that Socrates has hitherto been trying to prove, viz. that justice, holiness, wisdom and temperance are of the same kind, Protagoras takes his stand upon the sole remaining virtue and denies that courage bears any resemblance to the other four. By way of reply,
Socrates draws a distinction between \( \theta \omega \rho \rho \omega s \) with knowledge, and \( \theta \omega \rho \rho \omega s \) without knowledge, and endeavours to identify the former with courage. The proof which he offers is far from conclusive\(^1\), as Protagoras points out: it is therefore dropped and a subtler train of reasoning now begins (347 A—351 B).

To the proposal of Socrates, that pleasure should be identified with good, and pain with evil, Protagoras is unwilling to assent. He allows however that knowledge and wisdom, whenever they are present in a man, control his impulses and determine his conduct. But how is this to be reconciled with the common belief that a man having knowledge of that which is better, does the worse, because he is overcome by pleasure? In what sense are pleasures thus called evil? It is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they are followed by pain, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but pleasure in itself is good and pain in itself is evil. To be overcome by pleasure is therefore to be overcome by good: but as the phrase implies a censure, it is evident that the good which overcomes is unworthy to overcome the evil. Unworthy the good can only be because there is less of it: from which we infer that ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ is to choose less in place of greater good. Such a choice can only be the result of ignorance, so that it is incorrect to say that we ever knowingly choose the worse, and pleasure may still be identified with good, pain with evil (351 B—357 E).

Socrates now makes use of this identification to prove that knowledge and courage are the same. If pleasure is good, so likewise is every action which

\(^1\) See note on 349 E.
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aims at pleasure: and as no one knowingly chooses evil rather than good, no one ever does that which he knows to be evil. Now fear is the expectation of evil, so that no one, neither the hero nor the coward, encounters that which he believes to be fearful. It follows that the coward who refuses to fight when he ought to fight, refuses by reason of his ignorance. In other words cowardice is ignorance, and therefore courage, its opposite, is knowledge (358 A—360 E).

It is pointed out in conclusion that whereas Protagoras had started by maintaining that virtue could be communicated by teaching, and Socrates by doubting whether it could, they have now changed places: since if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, but otherwise not. Socrates expresses a desire to resume the subject after he has discovered what virtue is in itself (360 E—362 A).

It appears from the preceding analysis that the Protagoras falls naturally into these sections:

I. Introduction to the narration of the dialogue (309 A—310 A).

II. Introduction to the dialogue itself (310 A—317 E).

III. Protagoras' description of his profession, followed by the objections of Socrates (317 E—320 C).

IV. A ὁμοιόμορφος from Protagoras, containing both μῦθος and λόγος (320 C—328 D).

V. Cross examination of Protagoras by Socrates, ending abruptly with a short ὁμοιόμορφος by Protagoras (328 D—334 C).

VI. Interlude (334 C—338 E).
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VII. Cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, ending with a ρήσος by Socrates (338 E—347 A).

VIII. Conclusion of the cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, and final defeat of the Sophist (347 A—360 E).

IX. Epilogue (360 E—362 A).

§ 2. The General Scope and Purpose of the Protagoras.

In seeking to understand the scope and purpose of the Protagoras, we shall find it convenient, in the first instance, to view the form of the dialogue as far as possible apart from the matter.

Considered as to its form, the dialogue is an indictment primarily of Protagoras as an educator of young men. It is not however as an individual that Protagoras is attacked, but as the most distinguished representative of the Sophists: ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι, he says in 317 B, καὶ παιδεύειν ἄνθρωπος; and before Protagoras appears on the scene, Plato is careful to instruct us as to the nature of that which was called ‘Sophist’. Prodicus and Hippias, as well as Protagoras, receive their share of ridicule, and may be supposed to suffer with him in so far as the aim and method of their teaching agreed with his, although they are not directly associated with him in his fall, which, as rivals in the profession, they doubtless viewed with something more than equa-

1 312 C ff., 316 D ff.
2 315 C ff., 337 A ff., 337 C ff., 347 A.
3 Socrates himself expressly separates them off in 359 A.
4 318 E, 340 B ff., 341 A ff.
nimity. It is part of the irony of the situation when Prodicus and Hippias fail to see that whereas in the actual discussion it is only Protagoras who is worsted, the attack is in reality directed against the professional Sophist in general—the ἐμπορός τις ἢ κατηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἢφ' ὃν ἰψιχὴ τρέφεται.

Pitted against Protagoras, as the representative of the Sophists, we find, as usual, Socrates. Whether in this case we are to regard Socrates as speaking for Plato or for himself, we shall presently inquire: in the meantime, it is well to notice one particular aspect in which the contrast presents itself. Protagoras represents the principle of μακρολογία, Socrates that of βραχυλογία: the former excels in continuous discourse, the latter in the method of investigation by question and answer. In the only section of the dialogue where Socrates deserts his usual method, in order to deliver a harangue upon the poem of Simonides, he expressly asserts that the method of Protagoras is futile, and it must be admitted that he is himself, whether intentionally or not, altogether unsuccessful in applying it.

In its formal aspect, therefore, the Protagoras may be regarded as an attempt to shew the superiority of

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1 In 341 A ff. Prodicus furnishes Socrates with weapons against his rival: and in 358 A—359 A they lend their assent to the train of reasoning by which Protagoras is finally overthrown. Bonitz (Platonische Studien p. 260) is surely wrong in regarding their assent to Socrates' counter-reasoning as a proof that they too are refuted: what is refuted is the statement that courage is different from the other virtues—a statement to which they never assented.

Socrates to Protagoras—of dialectic to continuous discourse. But the dialogue is not merely a "philosophical prize-fight": the subject-matter of the dispute between the rival interlocutors is one of great importance for the theory of education. It is first expressly raised in 319A: Can virtue be communicated by teaching? If not, education, as it was understood by Socrates no less than by Protagoras, is impossible. The doubts expressed by Socrates upon the subject nowhere throughout the dialogue amount to a denial of what every self-respecting teacher must hold to be true: that the Athenians do not think virtue teachable proves nothing, as they may be mistaken: that Athenian statesmen do not teach it to their sons may prove only that it cannot be taught by Athenian statesmen. But the reasons adduced by Socrates against the view that virtue can be taught are judiciously chosen in order to drive Protagoras into a defence of his position. Protagoras was not only professionally a teacher of virtue, and therefore bound to hold that virtue could be taught, but as the representative of the Sophists, he was bound to maintain that the beliefs and practice of the Arch-Sophist of them all, the Athenian Demus, were in harmony with his own. Accordingly he meets Socrates with a flat denial—the Athenians do hold virtue to be teachable and teach it in a multitude of ways. It is possible to hold this view and still believe that the elements of virtue are present by nature in every man, as Protagoras also asserts: and such was no doubt in reality the belief of the Athenians, as it is perhaps of the ordinary practical man in all ages.

1 319A—320B.
2 See Rep. VI 492 A ff.
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Plato's own view of education as the development of the faculties innate in soul may itself be regarded as the psychological counterpart of this ethical creed. But there still remains the question, what must we suppose virtue to be, in order that it may be taught? It is here that Socrates differs from the Athenians and Protagoras. Virtue, according to Socrates, can only be communicated by the teacher if it is identical with knowledge, and to prove this identity the whole of the dialogue from 329 c, with the partial exception of the section on the poem and of the interlude in 333 b—338 e, is devoted. The conclusion to be drawn is that Virtue can indeed be taught, but not by the Sophists, any more than by the educational system, public opinion, and laws of the Athenians, because in them there is no knowledge.

In connexion with this conclusion, we naturally ask: If virtue is not taught by the Sophists, how is it to be taught? To this question the dialogue itself furnishes an implicit answer. Inasmuch as virtue is knowledge, it must be taught by dialectic, the only means by which knowledge can be communicated. The method of Socrates, which it is the object of the formal side of the dialogue to represent as triumphant over the Sophistic μακρολογία, is to be understood as the method which will succeed where Sophistic has been shewn to fail. It is thus that form and matter are reunited and the dialogue attains its unity as a work of art.
§ 3. On the myth of Protagoras.

So much it was needful to say about the central theme of the dialogue, but there remain three episodes which call for special discussion, partly from their connexion with the subject of the whole, and partly on account of their substantive philosophic value.

The first of these is the myth of Protagoras. The place of this episode in the argument is to shew that the Athenians do right in permitting all and sundry to advise them on political questions. It is not unlikely that the introduction of the mythical form as a vehicle of exposition was due to Protagoras'. There can at all events be no doubt that it was rapidly coming into favour in the literary circles of the day, and that it was sometimes employed not only by the so-called Sophists, but by the other Socratic schools as well as the Academy. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that the myth with which we are concerned was written by Protagoras himself. The style shows many marked peculiarities of the kind which we should suppose that Protagoras affected, and although this might be set down to Plato's skill as an imitator, it is difficult to see why Plato should have taken such pains to imitate where he manifestly did

1 Dümmler's Akademika p. 236.
2 See note on ch. xi. ad init.
3 As for example the Cynics: see Dümmler l.c. p. 1 foll.
4 See on 320 E.
not intend to caricature. Zeller has recently lent the weight of his authority to the view which we are advocating, and an Italian scholar has made it seem probable that the work from which this fable is taken had among other motives the polemical one of maintaining against the theories of Hippias and his followers the superiority of νόμος to φύσις. In the catalogue of Protagoras' works preserved by Diogenes Laertius, two books are mentioned, in either of which the fable may have occurred, περὶ πολιτείας and περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχὴν καταστάσεως; most probably it formed part of the latter.

We have commented in detail in the notes upon the subject-matter of the myth: but its general bearings and literary connexions require to be noticed here.

We may say broadly that two views of early society were current in antiquity. On the one hand the laudator temporis acti loved to represent the past as a golden age, from whose glories we have fallen away:

1 Grote (II p. 47) perhaps states the case too strongly when he says that the fable is "fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—"in my judgment it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato": but hardly any one will now deny that the episode is one of the most valuable and interesting parts of the dialogue. It should be borne in mind that the fable differs in style from what Protagoras says in the rest of the dialogue (except at 334 A, where see note) as much as it differs from the myths of Plato. If Plato could insert in one of his works a speech by Lysias (Phaedrus 230 E foll.) I see no reason to suppose that he might not have made Protagoras deliver a speech of his own making.

2 In the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie V 2 p. 175 ff.
3 Chiapelli ibid. 111 p. 15 and p. 256 foll.
4 IX 55.
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while others again saw in the far-distant past little but savagery and woe, out of which humanity has by slow degrees climbed upward. Not a few—and this is perhaps the original view, whereof the others are fragments—maintained that the reigns of good and evil succeed each other in ever-recurrent cycles, as we find in the myth of the Politicus. The fable of Protagoras represents mankind as having risen. It is in effect a novel version of the story of Prometheus superinduced upon a cosmological theory. So far as concerns the creation of man out of the four elements, and the assumption of a period of time during which there were no men upon the earth, we can find


2 269 c foll. When Eichhoff (l.c. p. 596) asserts that there is no hint of a golden age awaiting mankind in the future in Greek profane writings, he ignores the evidence of Hesiod. In the Works and Days 174–175 we read: μηκέτ’ ἐπετ’ ὄφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοιοι μετείναι ἄνθρώποι, ἀλλ’ ἣ πρόσθε σαβείν ἢ ἐπείτα γενέσθαι, and ibid. 180–181 ζεϊς δ’ ἀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μέρποι ἄνθρώπων, εὔτ’ ἄν γεινόμενοι πολιοκρήταφοι τελεύσωσιν. It has been pointed out elsewhere (The Nuptial Number of Plato, p. 60) that the sign of the recommencement of the golden age is when children are born with grey hairs (cf. Polit. 273 ξ): an interesting parallel is afforded by the Testament cited by Mr James in his account of the Revelation of Peter p. 57, where it is stated that one of the signs of the end shall be “children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired.” There are traces of a similar tradition in Greek mythology; the three Graeae, for example, had grey hairs from their birth.
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parallel views in Plato, and to a certain extent in Empedocles; but there seems to be nothing in contemporary or previous literature to account for the peculiarities of the Prometheus legend as it meets us here. According to Hesiod, mankind originally possessed fire, but lost it through the impious cunning of Prometheus. When Prometheus steals it back again for the use of man, both he and humanity are severely punished, he by the eagle preying on his vitals, humanity by the creation of woman. In Aeschylus, Prometheus appears in like manner as the befriender of man against the gods, but we hear nothing of Pandora, nor does it appear that man had ever possessed the use of fire till Prometheus came and stole it. On the other hand, Aeschylus greatly amplifies the services of Prometheus to mankind, assigning to him the invention of astronomy, number, writing, medicine, and divination, as well as the elements of material happiness and comfort. Although it is not expressly stated by Aeschylus that we owe the political or social art to Prometheus, the poet can hardly have intended expressly to exclude it from the list of his benefactions, since the arts which are attributed to Prometheus presuppose that man has already become in some measure a πολιτικόν ζών. It was reserved for Protagoras to represent πολιτική as a later gift, not from Prometheus, but from Zeus himself, in direct and perhaps conscious antagonism to Hesiod, according to whom the age in which we are now living knows

1 See the notes on 320 D foll.
2 Theogony 521—616: Works and Days 47 ff.
3 Prom. 445—506.
4 Prom. 506 πάσαι τέχναι βροτοίς ἐκ Προμηθέως.
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neither Justice nor Shame. But the great and fruitful innovation introduced into the legend by Protagoras, whether on his own responsibility, or in accordance with his authorities, consists in making Prometheus and Epimetheus assist the gods in the making of mortal things. The work of the gods ended when they had moulded man and the lower animals: it was Prometheus and his brother who were charged to furnish them with such accidentals as size, strength, hoofs, hair and hide, not to speak of food and procreative power. Protagoras' version of the legend, in which Prometheus already takes part in the creation of man, proved the germ of the later representation of the hero as the artificer of mankind out of clay. In this form the story was transmitted by the poets of the New Comedy to Rome, and appears in quaint and interesting reliefs upon Roman Sarcophagi.

§ 4. On Socrates' criticism of Simonides' poem.

The second episode which it is needful to discuss is the criticism given by Socrates of the poem of Simonides.

As we have endeavoured to shew, the aim of the Protagoras is to prove that virtue cannot be communicated by teaching, unless knowledge and virtue are

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1 Works and Days 192 δίκη δ' ἐν χεροί καὶ αἰῶνω σοικ ἐστιν.
3 See Baumeister's Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums p. 1413.
4 On the restoration of the poem see Appendix.
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identical. Now Poetry, in the days of Plato, was regarded as perhaps the most powerful means of teaching virtue, and Protagoras had already maintained its educative value in his speech. It was therefore necessary to inquire whether the claims of the Muses were well founded. It became all the more necessary when the Sophists—or some of them—in this as in many other respects went with the stream, and developed the practice of poetical criticism into an art. Socrates' exposition of the poem is intended to shew by a practical demonstration that poetry does not teach virtue because in poetry there is no knowledge. There cannot be knowledge in the written words of poets εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν τοὺς λόγους μὲν ταῦτα φανὲρον ποιήσασθαι, εἰς τὸν ποιήτην νοεῖν, οὐ δὲ ἐτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλέγομενοι δὲ ἀδύνατον ἔξελέγξαι (347 ε) : for knowledge implies the power to ask and answer questions—its method is, in short, dialectic. Browning and other societies would have received short shrift from Socrates, unless the members communicated with the poet to find out what he meant: and even then the poet would himself require to be cross-examined—an ordeal from which he would not be likely to emerge successfully, being in fact but a Sophist himself. Plato's objection to poetry in the Protagoras is not yet based upon ethical and metaphysical grounds as it was when he wrote the Republic, but rather reminds us of his condemnation in the Phaedrus of written books in general as a means of

1 See note on 338 ε.
2 See 316 δ and note in loc.
3 275 δ.
education. The poet is a \( \theta \epsilon \iota \sigma \) \( \delta \alpha \nu \gamma \rho \), who says what he does not know: even when alive he cannot explain his meaning: how much less shall another when he is dead! Socrates might have been content to prove his point without doing so much violence to Simonides' meaning. His exposition of the poem is admittedly sophistical. To begin with, there is nothing in the poem itself to indicate that Simonides' primary intention was to overthrow the maxim of Pittacus, as Socrates avers: Pittacus is censured for saying not what is untrue, but what is less than the whole truth. The real subject of the poem is the impossibility of continued perfection among mankind: the mention of Pittacus is but an episode, which might have been omitted without injuring the argument as a whole. But it is in the explanation of details that Socrates runs riot most. His comments upon \( \mu \epsilon \nu \), upon \( \alpha \lambda \gamma \theta \omega \), upon \( \kappa \kappa \kappa \delta ' \) \( \epsilon i \) \( \kappa \kappa \omega \), are obviously and intentionally absurd, while in dealing with \( \epsilon \nu \pi \rho \delta \xi \alpha s \) and \( \epsilon k \omega \nu \) he contrives by the most perverse sophistry to wrest the plain meaning of Simonides into his own favourite theories of the identity between knowledge and virtue and the impossibility of voluntary sin. But the exaggerated perversity of his exposition is doubtless intended as a satire on the epideictic displays in vogue among some of the Sophists: Plato would fain make it plain that he can beat a Sophist on his own ground.

1 342 A—343 C: 344 B et al. Schleiermacher’s reference to the fragment of Simonides (in Schneidewin’s Delectus fr. 2 of Simonides = Bergk fr. 57) proves nothing for this particular poem.

2 343 D.

3 343 D.

4 345 A.

5 345 A.

6 345 D.
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At the outset, he borrows some features from the speech of Protagoras in 316 c: and the remark of Hippias, when the episode is ended, ἐὰν μὲν μοι δοκεῖ—περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι may be taking as indicating that Hippias at least accepted the picture as a fair representation of his method. We have not sufficient data to say for certain whether the picture is a caricature or not: probably it is just as much and as little of a caricature as the representation of the Sophists in the Euthydemus. At all events, if the sketch is even approximately true to nature, no one will deny that the Sophists had better have “put the poets on their shelves” if they desired to reach the truth of things.

If the view which we have taken is correct, it will be vain to look for reasoned ethical teaching in the episode. The opinion of Dümmler, that Plato is here attacking Antisthenes for regarding virtue as ἀναπόβλητος, receives no support from the dialogue, even if we allowed that the truly virtuous man could ever have seemed to Plato or even to Socrates capable of losing his virtue.

1 From this point of view, the whole episode should be compared with the speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus 237 b—241 d.
2 348 a, where Socrates virtually confesses that his exposition is naught.
3 Akademika p. 50.
4 Diog. Laert. vi 105.
§ 5. On the identification of the Pleasant and the Good.

The last episode which requires to be discussed in connexion with the argument of the dialogue is the identification by Socrates of the good and the pleasant. This identity is the hypothesis from which the final refutation of Protagoras is deduced: it is not a substantive result of the dialogue, but only a means to an end.

We remark at the outset, that Protagoras is at first unwilling to accept the identification: still more noteworthy is it that Socrates in reality offers no proof, beyond the είδής fallacy\(^1\), which begs the question by equating είδος with ἕδεως. The long discussion on the meaning of the common phrase ‘to be overcome by pleasure’ does indeed remove one obstacle in the way of the identification, but beyond this it does not go. Even here there are fallacies, as when Socrates infers that knowledge always determines the conduct of its possessor because it is her nature to rule\(^2\), and in the subtle reasoning of 355 D\(^3\), which, in point of fact, presupposes the theory that might is right. The only convincing proof, from the Socratic point of view, of the identity of the good and the pleasant, would be to demonstrate their essential unity by an analysis of the connotation of the two names: but of this there is no hint in the Protagoras. The meaning of ‘Good’ and of ‘Pleasant’ is supposed to be already known.

\(^1\) 351 B.\n\(^2\) 352 B. The fallacy lies in a confusion of the ideal and the real: knowledge may be λαχυρόν, ἄγεµονικόν and ἄρχικόν, and yet not λαχυρέων, ἄγεµονεδείων, or ἄρχεων in each individual case.\n\(^3\) See note in loc.
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The teaching of the Protagoras on the relation between Pleasure and Good, as is well known, differs toto caelo from that of nearly every other dialogue of Plato. Not to mention the Philebus¹, and the Republic², where the point is rather that Pleasure is not the i.e. the Chief Good, in the Gorgias³ and the Phaedo⁴ we have the most explicit assertion of the distinction between the two notions. Contrast the following passages:

\[
\text{oùκ ἄρα τὸ χαλεῖν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνάσθαι κακῆς,}
\]

\[
\text{ὡςτε ἐτέρον γίγνεται τὸ ᾑδον τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ (Gorg. 497 Α).}
\]

\[
\text{οὔ ταῦτά γίγνεται, ὥ φίλε,}
\]

\[
\text{τάγαθα τοὺς ἁδέων οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοὺς ἀνιαρῶς (Gorg. 497 D).}
\]

\[
\text{λέγεις δὲ τινας, ἕφην, ὃ Προταγόρα, τῶν ἄνθρωπων εὖ ἥν,}
\]

\[
\text{τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; "Ἕφη. "Αὐτὸ ποτὲ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς ἥν,}
\]

\[
\text{εἰ ἀνιψίει τά καὶ ὀδυνώμενος}
\]

\[
\text{ἄφη; Οὔκ ἔφη. Τὸ d’, εἰ ἡδεῖς}
\]

\[
\text{βίους τὸν βίον τελευτήσειειν, οὔκ}
\]

\[
\text{εἰ δὲν ποτὲ ὑπαίτερος ἰδιοκενέτα; "Εμοίγ’, ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδεῖς}
\]

\[
\text{ἄφην ἄγαθων, τὸ δ’ ἀνιαρῶς κακῶν (Prot. 351 B).}
\]

\[
\text{ὁ μακάριε Συμμείλα, μὴ γὰρ}
\]

\[
\text{οὔχ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπῆρ πρὸς ἁρπην}
\]

\[
\text{ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονάς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς καὶ}
\]

\[
\text{λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον}
\]

\[
\text{πρὸς φόβον καταλλάσσεσθαι καὶ}
\]

\[
\text{μείζων πρὸς ἔλαττων ὑσπερ νομίσ-}
\]

\[
\text{ματα κτλ. (Phaedo 69 Α).}
\]

\[
\text{ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖα πρὸς ἡδεῖα}
\]

\[
\text{ιστῆσαι, τὰ μεῖζων αἰεὶ καὶ πλεῖον}
\]

\[
\text{λυπτέα. ἔὰν δὲ λυπτέα πρὸς}
\]

\[
\text{λυπτέα, τὰ ἕλαττων καὶ σμικρότερα. ἔὰν δὲ ἡδεῖα πρὸς λυπτέα,}
\]

\[
\text{ἔὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβαλλεῖται}
\]

\[
\text{τῷ τῶν ἡδεῶν, ἕὰν τὸ τὰ ἐγγύς}
\]

\[
\text{ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἕὰν τὸ τὰ πόρρω}
\]

\[
\text{ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταῦτην τὴν}
\]

\[
\text{πράξεων πράκτεαν ἐν ἦν δὲ ταῦτ’}
\]

\[
\text{ἐνή; ἔὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδεῖα ὑπὸ τῶν}
\]

\[
\text{ἀνιαρῶν, οὔ πράκτεα (Prot.}
\]

\[356 B).}

¹ 53 C foll.
² VI 509 A oδ γάρ δῆτοι σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ (i.e. τὸ ἄγαθον)
³ 495 A foll.
⁴ 64 D, 68 E foll.
Such passages, which might be multiplied at will, shew that, if there is any meaning in words, the antithesis is a real one. Nor does the contrast lurk merely in isolated passages, for the whole tone and argument of the Gorgias and the Phaedo are opposed to any communion between pleasure and good.

Various explanations of the difficulty have been offered.

Those who (like Grote) hold that the dialogues of Plato "are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose," find of course no difficulty to explain: the Protagoras is perhaps the strongest bulwark in their argument. The most thorough-going adherents of the opposite school deny that Plato is serious, Plato's object being merely to prove that whatever we take to be the Chief Good, virtue can only be identified with the knowledge thereof. Between these two extreme views comes the theory that the identification of Pleasure and Good is seriously meant, either as the view of Plato himself when he wrote the Protagoras, or as a faithful historical picture of the teaching of his master upon this subject. It seems clear to us that Plato is serious, but we do not find sufficient evidence to justify us in holding that the view which he advocates—whether he believed it formerly or not—was at this time held by the philosopher himself. To the opposite theory, it seems a fatal objection that in none of the minor dialogues which are universally admitted to be earlier

1 Plato and the companions of Socrates II p. 89.
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than the Protagoras does there seem to be any hint of hedonism. On the contrary, the analogues to the Measuring or Calculating art which meet us in the Charmides\(^1\) and Laches\(^2\) are concerned not with the weighing of pleasure, but with the determination of what is good\(^3\).

The most probable view is that which regards the episode in question as intended to represent the views of the historical Socrates. It is true that even in the Memorabilia Socrates never in so many words declares that Pleasure is Good\(^4\), but he frequently inculcates the practice of the virtues on account of the pleasures which they bring\(^5\). Moreover, if Socrates actually did sometimes call pleasure good, it is easier to understand how the Cyrenaics could have fathered their Hedonism upon him. It is of course quite possible that the formulating of the doctrine is due to Plato, and that the historical truth of the picture suffered by the introduction of greater brevity and precision: we may even suppose that Plato, for dramatic or other reasons, was not careful to represent his Master in all respects as he was. But to stigmatis the doctrine as "utterly un-Socratic," as Schleiermacher

1 174 A foll.
2 199 c.
3 The nearest approach to a unification of pleasure and good elsewhere in Plato seems to be in Laws II 663 A ff. οὐκόνον ὁ μὲν μὴ ζωοκίων λόγος ἡδον τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανόν γ', εἰ μηδ' εἴρησεν, πρὸς τὸ τιμα τὲθελείν ἐτην τὸν ὦσιν καὶ δίκαιον βίον κτλ.: where, however, Plato is merely insisting on the practical importance of the identification for the welfare of a state.
4 He identifies ὑφέλιμον with good in Mem. IV 6. 8 ff.
5 e.g. II 1. 19: IV 5. 9: see Zeller Philosophie der Griechen\(^3\) II 1 p. 126.
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does', seems to involve a misconception of its moral worth. There is nothing degrading in the theory as it is worked out by Socrates, since it is not the balance of pleasure in each individual species of pleasure which we are recommended to choose, but the balance of pleasure generally and in the long run: it would be quite open to Socrates to maintain that the lower pleasures are never to be chosen, because they are always followed by more pain, or even that they are not even pleasant.

If we accept this explanation, the identification of pleasure and good will be in harmony with the general realistic tone of the dialogue, and we shall be justified in holding that in the Protagoras we see the ethical no less than the educational theories of Socrates and Protagoras brought face to face.

§ 6. Date of Composition.

Of external evidence as to the date when the Protagoras was written, there is none.

The internal evidence, so far as it goes, is in favour of an early date. It rests upon indications furnished by (1) the language and style, (2) the doctrine, (3) references and allusions in the dialogue itself.

1 Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95.
2 Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. Χ 2. 1173 b 20 πρὸς δὲ τῶν προφέροντας τὰς ἐποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἥδων λέγει τις ἀν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ παρθένεια. The historical Socrates would have stopped short of this assertion, if we may judge from such evidence as Xen. Mem. 14. 12.
3 See Dr Jackson's article on the Sophists in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
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On linguistic grounds, Ritter holds that the dialogue was composed before 399 B.C. But the evidence upon which he relies is chiefly derived from the relative frequency of certain particles and formulae throughout the dialogue, and (as usual with evidence of this kind) it is by no means clear that Plato's choice of particles and the like is not a result of the character of the composition rather than an index to its date. It is also unlikely on many grounds that any of Plato's dialogues are anterior to the death of Socrates. The proofs derived from the exuberant vivacity, the boisterous juvenility and dramatic fire of the dialogue are surer, if more intangible, and all point to a comparatively early date.

In two points of doctrine the Protagoras shews its affinity with the earlier and purely Socratic dialogues. Holiness, as in the Laches, is reckoned as a virtue and placed by the side of δικαιοσύνη, whereas in the Republic and Phaedo δεσιώτης is excluded, and it is only the four cardinal virtues that are recognised as such. Too much stress ought not to be laid upon this argument, but at least, if we may trust Xenophon, the recognition of δεσιώτης as a distinct virtue had the sanction of Socrates. The second point is of more importance. Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that

1 Untersuchungen über Plato, p. 127.
2 This subject is well handled by Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 70 foll.
4 Mem. IV 6. 4.
‘demotic virtue’ of which Plato made so much, no allusion to it is made. It is perhaps a natural conclusion that Plato had not yet elaborated the distinction—unknown to Socrates—between scientific and unscientific virtue: but it should at the same time be remembered that Plato may have deliberately refrained from adverting to this subject in order to make his picture of Socrates more true to nature. However this may be, the distinction in question is only an ethical deduction from the metaphysical distinction between knowledge and true opinion: its absence from the Protagoras is therefore in harmony with the purely Socratic tone of the dialogue, where we look in vain for the metaphysical speculations or presuppositions of Plato’s mature age.

1 It is in the Meno that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down. See on the whole subject Archer-Hind’s Phaedo, Appendix i.

2 The nearest approach to a recognition of two virtues, one scientific and the other unscientific, is in the speech of Protagoras 320 C foll. The elements of πολιτικὴ ἄρετῇ implanted in mankind at the beginning and transmitted by father to son are in their essence distinct from scientific virtue, and so far resemble the δημοτικὴ ἄρετῇ of Platonic teaching: but this part of Protagoras’s speech is not taken up by Socrates, who will not even allow that the (so-called) virtue which the sophists and public opinion try to teach is virtue in any sense of the word, since it is not knowledge. Schöne (Über Platon’s Protagoras, p. 51) thinks that the Platonic Socrates does recognise the distinction between true and demotic virtue when he expresses (319 A) a doubt whether virtue can be taught, since he afterwards proves himself that it can. No doubt Socrates’ change of position in the course of the dialogue finds its justification in this distinction between true and spurious virtue (as it is found in the Meno), but so far as we can see, there is nothing in the Protagoras which shews that Plato had as yet made the distinction explicit to himself.
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From the allusion in the dialogue to the art of the Peltasts\(^1\), Teichmüller\(^2\) has endeavoured to fix the date of composition more precisely. It is known that there were Peltasts in Thrace before the time of Iphicrates\(^3\), but there is no proof that they formed a regular corps of the Athenian army till the military reforms of 391, which are associated with his name. Teichmüller points out that Plato speaks of Peltasts in such a way as to imply that they are no longer unfamiliar or foreign to his readers\(^4\), and assigns the dialogue to 393 or 392 B.C., when Iphicrates probably began to organise the new arm.

On all these grounds we cannot go far astray in assigning the dialogue to the second half of the first decade of the fourth century B.C.

§ 7. Date of the Action.

The majority of critics are agreed in supposing the dialogue to be conceived as taking place before the war, in 433 or 432 B.C.

It is in harmony with this that Pericles and his sons are represented as still alive\(^5\), that Socrates is still young\(^6\), and that Alcibiades\(^7\) is but a youth and

\(^{1}\) 350 A πίνει δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἡ οἱ μὴ; Οἱ πελταστικοὶ: cf. Theaet. 165 D πελταστικὸς ἄνήρ.
\(^{2}\) Literarische Fehden, p. 20.
\(^{3}\) Thucydides IV III. 1: cf. (with Teichmüller) id. II 29.
\(^{4}\) Eurip. Alcest. 498 Θρηκτικας πέλτης ἄναξ et al.
\(^{5}\) Contrast Xenophon Mem. III 9. 2, where peltasts are similarly cited in illustration, but called Θρήκες εἰν πέλταις.
\(^{6}\) 315 A et al. They died in 429.
\(^{7}\) 314 B et al. In 432 he would be 36.
\(^{7}\) 309 B. He was born in 451.
Agathon a lad\(^1\). Other indications of minor importance point in the same direction. But in patent contradiction to this date come the facts—authenticated by Athenaeus\(^2\)—that the ‘Wild Men’ of Pherecrates, which Plato alludes to as represented last year (\(\pi\varepsilon\rho\iota\varsigma\sigma\iota\))\(^3\), was produced in 420 B.C., and that Hipponicus, the father of Callias, is apparently supposed to be dead, whereas he was alive till nearly 421 B.C. Athenaeus is not always an unprejudiced witness when Plato is concerned, but we have no reason to reject his evidence here. Plato frequently introduces anachronisms in matters not essential to the action of his dialogues\(^4\).

\(^1\) 315 D. He was born about 448.
\(^2\) Athen. V 218 B and XI 505 F.
\(^3\) 327 D.
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

[Ἡ σοφισταὶ ἐνδεικτικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ,
ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

St. I

309 I. Πόθεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὦτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιά-
δον ὄραμ; καὶ μήν μου καὶ πρῷγν ἱδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέν-
τοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἦν αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἦδη ὑποπυμπλάμενος.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τί τούτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὀμήρου

β' εὐπαίνετης εἰ, δὲ ἐφ' χαριεστάτην ἡβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἢν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. Τί, οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ ἰὸ

πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἐμοί γε ἐδοξεῖν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ

νῦν ἡμέρα· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν

A. Ρ.
ἐμοί. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ’ ἐκεῖνον ἔρχομαι. ἀτοπὸν
15 μέντοι τί σοι ἔθελο εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκεῖνον,
oύτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελαύνανόμην τε αὐτοῦ
θαμά.

ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονός εἰη περὶ σὲ κάκεινον C
tοσοῦτον πράγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίων
20 ἐνέτυχες ἄλλος ἐν γε τῇ ἡ τῇ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

ΕΤ. Τί φήσ; ἀστὸ ἡ ξένη;

ΣΩ. Ξένη.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπτό;

ΣΩ. 'Αβδηρίτη.

ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλὸς τις ὁ ξένος ἐδοξέεν σοι εἶναι,
ὡς τοῦ Κλεινίου νίεος καλλίων σοι φανήναι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ μέλλει, ὃ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον
κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

ΕΤ. 'Αλλ' ἢ σοφὸς τινὶ ἡμῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες,
ἐντυχὼν πάρει;

ΣΩ. Σοφώτατῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ οὐ
dsοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. 'Ο τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ὡθή ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκεῖνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις;

ΣΩ. Πάννυ γε | πολλὰ καὶ εἰπόν καὶ ἄκουσας. 31ο

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ
μὴ σὲ τὶ κοιλὺς, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθῆ, ἐξαναστήσας
40 τὸν παιδα τουτοῦ;

ΣΩ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν καὶ χάριν γε εἰσομαι, εἰαν
ἀκούσητε.

ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἥμεις σοί, εἰαν λέγης.

ΣΩ. Δυτικῇ ἄν εἰη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ' οὖν ἀκούστε.
II. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέως ὄρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου νῖός, Φάστωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν ἐπειδή αὐτῷ ἀνέφεξε τις, εὐθὺς εἰσώ ἦε ἐπεισόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων Ὅ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύ- δεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνώς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἐφην, οὗτος. μή τι νεότερον ἀγγέλλεις;

Οὐδὲν γ', ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Ἐν ἀν λέγοις, 10 ἢν δ' ἐγὼ· ἔστι δὲ τῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἑνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκους; Πρωταγόρας, ἐφη, ἢκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. Πρώην, ἐφην ἐγὼ· σὺ δὲ ἀρτὶ πέπυσαι; Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, Ἐφη, ἐσπέρας γε. καὶ ἀμα ἐπιφυλακήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθῆνετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ 15 εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὄψε ἄφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνοῖς. ὁ γάρ τοι πάις με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλον σοι φράξειν, ὧτι διωξοὶμην αὐτόν, ὡπό τινος ἁλλόν ἐπελαθόμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἠλθον καὶ δε- δειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε 20 μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει, ὧτι ἢκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἑναι, ἐπειτὰ μοι λιαν

D πόρῳ ἐδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστα μὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόπτου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκειν, εὐθὺς ἀναστάς οὕτω δεύρῳ ἐπερεύμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γυγυόσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν 25 ἄνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τί οὖν σοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τούτο; μῶν τὶ σε ἀδίκεί Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὃς γελάσασ, Νη τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐφη; ὁ Σώκρατες, ὧτι γε μόνοις ἑστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλα καὶ μᾶ Δία, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἂν αὐτῷ διδόσ ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης 30 ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἶ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁ
Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ, ἐν τούτῳ εἰη· ὥς οὖτ' ἄν τῶν· ἔμων· ἔπιλεπτωμι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἦκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεξῆς αὐτῷ. 35 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀμα μὲν καὶ νεότερός εἰμι, ἀμα δὲ οὔδε ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πῶς τοὺς οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἠτὶ γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ Σάκρατες, πάντες τῶν ἄνδρα ἑπαϊνοῦσι καὶ φασι σοφώτατον εἰναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτῶν, ἰνὰ ἐνδον | καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ 311 ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴδομεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Μήτω, ὁγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἰώμεν, πρὸ γὰρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεύρο ἐξαναστώμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἐως ἀν φῶς γενη- 40 ται· εἰτα ἰώμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἐνδον διατρίβει, ὡστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐνδον.

Ⅲ. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν περιήμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειράμενος τοῦ «Ἱπποκράτους τῆς βρόμης διεσκόπουν αὐτῶν καὶ ἠρώτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ίέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκεῖνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥστερ δὲν εἰ ἐπε- νόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτὸν ὅμωνυμον ἑλθὼν Ιπποκράτη
tον Κρόνον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ τίς σε ἱρετο, Εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, Ἰπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὁντι; τί δὲν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἰπόν δὲν, ζ ἐφη, ὥτι ὡς ἱατρῷ. Ὡς τίς γενησόμενος; Ὡς ἱατρός, 45 ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργείων ἦ

Before setting out Socrates elicits by questioning that Hippocrates wishes to obtain for money from Protagoras not a professional but a liberal education.
Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναίον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελείων ἐκεῖνοις, εἰ τῆς σε ἡρετοῖ ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τοῦ ἄργυρου ὡς τῶι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἐχεῖς Πολυκλέιτο τε καὶ Φειδία; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Ἐπιτεύχον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. Ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; 20 Δήλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός. Εἰπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ. παρά δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἄργυρου ἐκεῖνος μισθὸν ἐτοίμοι εὐσεβείᾳ τελείων ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἄν μὲν εὑρίσκηται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτων πείθωμεν αὐτὸν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων 25 προσαναλάσκοντες· ei οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· εἰπεν μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατές, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τοῦ Πρωταγόρα ἐν νῷ ἐχέτε χρήματα τελείων; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί δ' ὅμως ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου 30 ἄκοιμομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιοῦ καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητῆς, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἄκοιμομεν; Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοὶ ὅνομαζοντι γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄλλα ἐκεῖ, ἐφη. Ὁ σοφιστὴ ἄρα ἐργόμεθα τελεύτες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ 35 οὖν καὶ τούτο τίς σε προσέροιτο· αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς 312 τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχει παρὰ | τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ ὅσ εἰπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἡ δὴ γὰρ ὑπεθεῖνεν τι ἡμέρας, ὡστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔφικεν, δήλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γενησόμενος. 40 Σὺ δὲ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπερ γε ὁ διανοοῦμαι χρῆ λέγειν. Ἄλλα ἀρα, ὁ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὖ τοιαύτην ύπολαμβάνεις σου τῇ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, 45 Ἄλλα σ' ἀπερ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ
κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην
οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.

50 Πάνω μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

IV. Οἴσθα οὖν ὁ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἣ σε λανθάνει; ἣν δ' ἐγὼ. Τοῦ πέρι; "ΟΤι
μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρα-σχείν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρὶ, ὡς φής, σοφιστή; ὁ τι δὲ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστὶν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν εἰ οἶσθα. καλτοὶ εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτι παραδίδωσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῶ ὑπὲρ εἰ κακὸ πράγματι. Οἴμαι γ', ἐφη, εἰδέναι.

Δέγε δὴ, τί ἦγεῖ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν; 'Εγὼ μὲν, ἡ δ' ὁς, ὁσπέρ τούνομα λέγει, τούτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὔκοιν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὧτι οὕτως εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες. ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἔρωτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσίν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες, εἴποιμεν ἂν ποι ἄντω, ὧτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως. εἰ δὲ τις ἐκείνῳ ἔροιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν, τὶ ἂν ἀποκρινομέθα αὐτῷ; ποῖαι ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τὰ ἀν εἴποιμεν αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὁ Σῶκρατες;

15 ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἠσος ἂν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀληθὴ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μὲντοι ἰκανῶς γε' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἐτί ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν. ὡσπέρ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δεινὸν δῆπον ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὕσπερ καὶ Ε ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως—ἡ γὰρ; Ναι. Εἴεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστής περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;
Δήλον ὅτι περὶ οὔτερ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι. Εἰκὸς γε. 
τι δὴ ἐστὶν τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; Μᾶ Δί', ἐφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

313 V. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον | μετὰ τοῦτο. Τί οὖν; οἶσθα 

eis oίōn tina kíndunou ἐρχεῖ ὑποθήσων 

τὴν ψυχὴν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν 

σε ἐδει τῷ, διακινεῖν όντα χρηστὸν 

αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ ποιηρῶν, πολλὰ ἀν 

περιεσκέψω, εἰτ' ἐπιτιθέμεν εἰτε οὐ, 

καὶ εἰς συμβουλὴν τοὺς τε φίλους ἀν 

παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἥμερας 

συχνας· ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἤγεῖ, τὴν 

ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐν ὧ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακὸς ἤ 

πράττειν, χρηστὸ ἢ ποιηρῶν αὐτοῦ γενομένον, περὶ 


B ὃ δὲ τοῦτον οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω 

οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενὶ, εἰτ' ἐπιτρέπτειν εἰτε 

καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τοῦτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, 

ἀλλ' ἐσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φής· ὀρθριός ἦκὼν περὶ 15 

μὲν τοῦτον οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴ ποιεῖ· οὗτο 

χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἰτε μή· ἔτοιμος δὲ εἰ 

ἀναλίσκειν τὰ τε σαυτὸ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, 

ὡς ἢ ἂν διενωκός, ὅτι πάντως συνεστῶν Πρωταγόρα, 

ὅν οὔτε γυμνάσκεις, ὡς φής· οὗτο διελέξαι οὐδεπώ· 20 

C ποτε, σοφιστὴν δ' ἀνωμάξεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν· τὸ τι 

ποτ' ἐστῖν, φαίνει ἀγνοοῦν, ὃ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπ- 

τειν; καὶ δς ἀκούσας, "Εὔικεν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, 

εἰς δ' οὖν σὺ λέγεις. "Αρ' οὖν, ὁ Ἰππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς 

τυχικάνει ὁν ἐμπορός τῖς ἡ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγνούμοιν, ἂφ' 25 

ὡν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; διανέγεργα τοιοῦτος τίς. 

Τρέφεται δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ψυχῇ τίνι; Μαθήμασιν
δήποτε, ἣν δ′ ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μη, ὦ ἐταίρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥστερ 30 οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σῶματος τροφῆν, ὁ ἐμπορός τε καὶ ἐκ λάρηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πον δὲν ἁγουσιν ἁγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοι ἔσασιν ὁ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπεισινώσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὁνομασοῦντες παρ’ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τούτη γυμναστικὸς ἢ 35 ἰατρὸς ὄν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ κατηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντε ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἢ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ’ ἄν τινες, ὦ ἀριστε, καὶ τούτων ἁγουσιν ὁν πωλοῦσιν ὁ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν 40 ψυχήν· ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ ὁνομασοῦντες παρ’ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τούτης ἐπηρεαστῆσαι οὔν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυχανεῖς ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὁνείσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ’ ἀλλού ὅπουν· εἰ 45 δὲ μὴ, ὁρᾷ, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβερνής τε καὶ κινδυνεύσῃς. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ 314 μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὧν ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ κατῆλου καὶ ἐμπόρου ἐξεστὶν ἐν ἀλλού 50 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πίνοντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἰκαί ἐξεστὶν συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίτοντα, ὃ τι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὃ τι μὴ, καὶ ὅπότεν καὶ ὅποτε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὧν ὦν μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος· μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ’ Β ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμῆν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπίεναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταύτα οὖν σκοπῶμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν
VI 315 A  ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐτὶ νέοι ὡστε τοσοῦτον πράγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὀσπερ ὄρμησαμεν, ὅτως καὶ ἄκουσομεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἐπείτα ἄκουσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἔστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἡππίας ὁ Ὅ. Ηλέος· οἴμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κέιον· καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

VI. Δόξαν ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐπορεύμεθα· ἐπείδη δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἑγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντας περὶ τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὅτι ἡμῶν κατὰ τὴν ὀδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ὅτι οὖν μὴ ἀτελῆς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐστοίμεν, στάντες ὑπὸ τοῦ προθύρου διελεγόμεθα, ἐως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὔνοοχός δτις, κατήκουσιν ἡμῶν. κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἀχθεσθαί τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπείδη γόν τούτον ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἱδὼν ἡμᾶς, Ἐα, ἐφι, σοφιστάι τινες· οὐ σχολή αὐτῶ· καὶ ἀμα ἀμφοῖν τῶν χερόν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οὕος τῇ ἐπίραξε. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούσμεν, καὶ ὅτι ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρυνόμενος ἐέπευν, Ὡ ἀνθρωποί, ἐφι, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολή αὐτῶ; 15 Ἀλλ' ὄγαθε, ἐφην ἐγώ, οὐτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἦκομεν ἐπτε σοφιστάι ἐσμεν· ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γὰρ τοι δεόμενοι ἤδην ἠλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν. μόρις οὖν ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἀνθρωπος ἀνέφεξε τὴν θύραν· ἐπείδη δὲ εἰσήλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ 20 προστῷ περιπάτοντα, ἔξης ὃ αὐτῶ συμπεριπάτητον ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἡππονίκου 315 καὶ ὁ ἄδελφος αὐτοῦ ὁ ὀμομήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέος, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαῦκων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
25 ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἄλλος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθηππος καὶ Φίλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμωρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὡσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνη μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος. τοῦτον δὲ οἱ ὁπισθεν ἥκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν 30 λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὔς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὅν διεξέρχεται, κηλών τῇ φωνῇ ὡσπερ Ὁρφεὺς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκηλημένοι. ἦσαν δὲ τινὲς καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ τούτου τὸν 35 χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγνως ἤδων ἤσθην, ὡς καλὸς ηὐλα- βούντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἰναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἑκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περισκήξοντο οὕτως οἱ ἐπήκουν ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ 40 περιώντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὁπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

VII. Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἐφη Ὁμήρος, Ἰπ-

Further description of the scene.

αὐτοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ 5 μενοῦ καὶ Φαίδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρον ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολίται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅλλου τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικά ἄττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, ὃς ἐν χρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστως αὐτῶν διεκρίνει καὶ 10 διεξέχει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδαι. ἐπιδημεῖ γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. ὁ δὲ ἐν οἰκήματι τινί, ὃ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμιεῖρο ἐχρήτῳ Ἰππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν κατα-

καταλύσων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσασι ξένως κατὰ- 15 λυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὃ μὲν ὁμὶν Πρόδικος ἐτὶ κατέκειστο,
γεγεκαλυμμένος ἐν κραδίοις τισίν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτὸ· ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναίς Παυσανίας τε ὁ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς Ἕμεν ἐγώ ἦμαί καλὸν τε κάγαθδι τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ᾿ ὅλων 20 ἰδέαν πάνυ καλὸς. ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι δύομα αὑτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομε, εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει ὁν. τοῦτ᾿ ἂν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ Ἀδεμάντῳ ἀμφοτέρῳ, ὃ τε Κύπιδος καὶ ὁ Δευκολοφίδος, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὅν διελε-25 γοντο ὅν ἐνυπάμην ἠγωγει μαθεῖν ἤξωθεν, καὶ περὶ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου· πάσοφος γάρ 316 μοι δοκεῖ ἀνήρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος· ἂν δὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φώνης βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γγνώμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποιεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα.

VIII. Καὶ ἦμεις μὲν ἀρτι εἰσελθόλυθειμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλὸς, ὡς φής ὅσ καὶ ἐγὼ πεϊθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρον. ἦμεις οὖν ὡς εἰσήλθομεν, ἐτί σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεσάμενοι, προσή-β μεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἐγὼ ἔποιν· Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σὲ τοι ἠλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὔτος. Πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθήναι ἂ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ἡμῖν μὲν, ἢν το ὅ ἐγώ, οὔδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκοῦσας δὲ οὐ ἕνεκα ἠλθομεν αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τι οὖν δὴ ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὐ ἕνεκα ἥκετή; Ἰπποκράτης οὔτε ἔστιν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου νῦς, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαιμονος, C αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεὶ ἑνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἥλι-15 κιόταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ἐξλόγιμος γενέσθαι

Socrates introduces Hippocrates to Protagoras. The latter justifies his profession, and the rival sophists assemble to hear him discourse.
ἐν τῇ πόλει, τούτῳ δὲ οἶτε τά ἐσταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἄν γενέσθαι, εἰ
σοὶ συγγένειοι· ταῦτ' ὥν ἦδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον
περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἷς δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους,
ἡ μετ’ ἄλλων. Ὅρθως, ἐφη, προμηθεῖ, ὁ Σάκρατες,
ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ἔξονον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἱόντα εἰς πόλεις
μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς
βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συννοισίας,
καὶ οἰκεῖον καὶ θυεῖον, καὶ προσβυτέρων καὶ νεω-
τέρων, ἐαυτῷ συνείναι ὡς βελτίως ἐσομένους διὰ
τὴν ἐαυτοῦ συννοισίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα ἰ
πράττοντα· οὕ γὰρ σμικρὸν περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε
γίγνονται καὶ ἀλλαὶ δυσμένεια τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.
ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι πα-
λαίαν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτήν τῶν παλαιῶν
ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποίησων,
οἷον Ὅμηρον τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς
δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμοφόρας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε
'Ορφέα καὶ Μουσαίον· ἐνίοις δὲ τινας ἡσθημαι καὶ
γυμναστικὴν, οἷον Ἰκκος τε ὁ Ταρατώνος καὶ ὁ νῦν
ἐτὶ ὄν, οὐδενὸς ἦττων σοφιστῆς, Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμ-Ε
βριανός, τὸ δὲ ἄρχαίον Μεγαρέως· μουσικὴν δὲ
'Αγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὤμετερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο,
μέγας ὃν σοφιστῆς, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ
ἄλλοι πολλοὶ. οὕτων πάντες, ώσπερ λέγω, φοβη-
θέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπτασ-
μασιν ἐχρήσαντο· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτου ἀπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο
εἶναι οὐ τυμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς, οὐ τι
διαπράξασθαι δὲ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὗ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν
ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους εὖ ταῖς πόλεις πράττεν,
ὡσπερ ἑνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστίν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οὐ γε
πολλοὶ ός ἔπος εἶπεν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀν οὐκοὶ διαγγέλλωσι, ταύτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ ὅν πάροικός ἐσθίκτησον μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδράναι, ἀλλὰ κατα-50
Β φανῇ εἶναι, πολλῇ μωρίᾳ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄνθρωπος: ἢγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανούργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ τῆν ἐναντίαν ἀπᾶσαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὀμολογῶ τε 55
σοφιστής εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εὐ-
λαβειν ταύτην οἷμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὀμο-
lογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρχον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτῃ ἔσκεμμα, ὅστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν
C πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὀμολογεῖν σοφιστής εἶναι. καὶ τοῖς 60
πολλά γε ἐάτι ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔξωπαντα πολλά μοι ἐστὶν. οὐδενὸς ὁτου οὖ πάντων ἄν ύμων καθ' ἥλικιαν πατήρ εἶναι. ὅστε πολὺ μοι ἡδιστὸν ἐστὶν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε περὶ τούτων, ἀπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὅντων τῶν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ 65
ἀγῶ—ὑπόπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τῷ τῷ Ἐμ-
dίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππίῳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλοπτίσασθαι ὅτι ἐρασταί αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἶμεν—Τι οὖν, ἐφ' ἦν
D ἐγὼ, οὖ καὶ Ἐρωτίκον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ
tους μετ' αὐτῶν, ἱνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ μὲν 70
οὖν, ἐφ' ὁ Ἐρωτάγορας. βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας
ἐφ' ἐν εὐνοίαν κατασκευάσομεν, ἵνα καθεξίμενοι δια-
lέγησθε; Ἑδόκειν χρήναι· ἀσμένοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ός ἀκουσόμενοι ἄνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτὶς-
βόμμοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευά-75
ζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππίᾳ· ἐκεί γὰρ προϋπήρχε τὰ
E βάθρα· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης
ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Ἐρωτίκον, ἀναστήσαστε ἐκ τῆς
κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Ἐρωτίκον.
IX. 'Επεί δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεξόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἂν, ἐφ' έλεγοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι πάρεισιν, περὶ ὅν ὄλιγον πρότερον μνείαν ἔποιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι ἄρχη | ἔστιν, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, 318 ἦπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὅν ἀφικόμην. Ἐποκράτης γὰρ ὄδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὅν τῆς σῆς συνοισίας: ὅ τι οὖν αὐτὸ ἀποβῆσεται, εὰν 10 σοι συνῇ, ὥδεως ἄν φησί πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἠμέτρεσος λόγος. ὑπολαβῶν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν: Αἴτω νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, εὰν ἔμοι συνῆς, ἢ ἄν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγενή, ἀπίεναι οἷκαδε βελτίων γεγονότι, καὶ εἰν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτα ταῦτα: καὶ ἐκάστης 15 ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίων ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ Β ἄκουσας εἶπον: Ω Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν βαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἄλλα εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὃν καὶ οὐτω σοφός, εἰ τίς σε διδάξειν τὸ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο: 20 ἄλλα μὴ οὖτως, ἄλλ' ὅσπερ ἄν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἐποκράτης ὃδε ἐπιθυμήσειν τῆς συνοισίας τοῦτο τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωτέρος ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτὸν, ὅσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, 25 ἄκουσεν αὐτὸ ταῦτα ταῦτα, ἀπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης Ψ ἡμέρας ξυνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει: εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο: τὶ δὴ φῆς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὶ ἐπιδώσειν; εἴποι ἄν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζευξίππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν: καὶ εἰ Ὁρθαγόρα τῷ ὘ησαίῳ συν- 30 γενόμενος, ἄκουσας ἐκείνου ταῦτα ταῦτα, ἀπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὁ τι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγενόμενος ἐκεῖνι, εἴποι ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλησιν'
οὕτω δή καὶ σὺ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἔμοι ὑπέρ
δ' τοῦτον ἐρωτῶντες, Ἰπποκράτης ὁδε Πρωταγόρα συγγενόμενος, ὥς ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρᾳ συγγένεται, βελτίων 35 ἀπεισὶ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδόσει εἰς τί, ὥς Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμὸν ταῦτα ἀκούσας, Σὺ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶς, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἰππο- 40 κράτης γὰρ παρ᾽ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὖ πείσεται, ἀπέρ ἀν ἐπαθεῖν ἄλλο τῷ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν·
Ε οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λαβόνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἀκούτας πάλιν αὖ ἁγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμοῦ τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἁμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δὲ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἡ περὶ οὐ ἡκεῖ. τὸ δὲ μάθημα ἐστὶν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἄν ἀριστα τῆν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διώκοι, 45 καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατος ἀν εἰη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρα, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ υπερχυεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολιτάς. Ἀντὸ μὲν ἄνω τοῦτο ἐστὶν, ἐφη, 50 ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ἡ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.
X. Ἡ καλῶν, ἡν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἀρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· ὅ γὰρ τι ἄλλο πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἀπέρ νοῦ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ἠμὴν ἑαυτοῦ 5 319 καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατος ἀν εἰη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρα, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ υπερχυεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολιτάς. Ἀντὸ μὲν ἄνω τοῦτο ἐστὶν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ἡ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

Socrates gives reasons for his belief that the art of politics cannot be taught.
καίος εἰμι εἴπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖος, ὡσπέρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἐλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὡς οὖν, ὅταν συνλέγωμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἔπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δή πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπτομένους συμβουλέων περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυτηγίας, τοὺς ναυτηγοὺς, καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἤγονται μαθητὰς. 

15 τε καὶ διδακτά εἶναι· ἔαν, δὲ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, δυνέειν μὴ οὖνται δημιουργόν εἶναι, κἂν πάνω καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὕτως τί μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἄλλα καταγελώσαν καὶ ὀρυβοῦσιν, ἔως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθεῖς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτῶν ἀφελεύσωσιν, ἢ ἔξαερωνται κελεύοντων τῶν πρωτάνων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅπερ οὐσίαν ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, ὡς ὁ διαπράττονται· ἔπειδὰν δὲ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέχονται συμβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς.

25 ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τοῦτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεῖς, σκυτότομος, ἕμπορος, ναύκληρος, πλούσιος, τένης, γενναῖος, ἀγεννήσης, καὶ τοῦτοι οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττεται ὡσπέρ τοῖς πρότεροι, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν οὐδὲ ὁντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ ἐπειτείτα συμβουλεύειν ὁπιχειρεῖ· δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἤγονται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τούτων ὅτι ἃ τοῦτον τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλα ἢδίᾳ ἢμῖν οὶ σοφότατοι ἐν καὶ ἀριστοὶ τῶν πολυτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢν ἐχοῦσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδίδονται· ἐπεὶ Περὶ·

35 κλῆς, ὅ τοῦτον τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τοῦτος ἡ μὲν διδασκάλου ἐχέτο καλῶς καὶ εὗ ἐπαιδεύσεν, ἢ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφὸς ἐστὶν, οὕτε αὐτὸς | παίδευει οὕτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, οὕτε αὐτοῖς περισσότερο νέμονται.
XI 320 D  ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.  17

οὔπερ ἀφετοὶ εἰώ ποὺ ἀυτῶματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βοῦλει, Κλεονίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου 40
tουτου νέοτερον ἄδελφου, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὖ-
tos ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδώσει αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῆ
δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποστάσας ἀπὸ τοῦτον, κατα-
θέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρουνοι ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἐξ μὴνας
Β γεγονότες, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσατο 45
αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οὐ
αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πῶς τε βελτίω ἐποίησαν
οὗτο τῶν οἰκεῖων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὁ
Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὗ ἡγούμαι
dιδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοι ἀκούσ ταῦτα
λέγοντος, κἀµπτομαι καὶ οἶμαι τί σε λέγεω διὰ τὸ
ἡγεῖσάκει σε πολλῶν μὲν ἐμπείρον γεγονότες, πολλὰ
dὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν
C ἔχεις ἐναργεστέρον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς διδακτὸν ἐστὶν
ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξον. Ἀλλ', ὁ 55
Σώκρατες, ἐφὶ, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑµῖν, ὡς
προσβύτεροι νεωτέροις, μὐθὸν λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἡ λόγω
διεξελθῶν; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπελαβοῦν τῶν παρακαθ-
ηµένων, ὑποτέρως βούλωτο, οὕτως διεξέλναι. Δοκεῖ
τοῖνυν µοι, ἐφὶ, χαριέστερον εἶναι µῦθον ὑµῖν λέγειν. 60
XI. Ἡν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ µὲν ἡσαν,
D θυντα δὲ γένη σοι ἦν. ἐπειδή δὲ καὶ
τούτως χρόνος ἤλθεν εἰμαρµένοις γενέ-
σεως, τυπούσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἐνδον, ἐκ
γῆς καὶ πυρὸς µέξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ
5
κεράννυται. ἐπειδή δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἐµελλον,
προσέταξαν Προµηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιµηθεῖ κοσµῆσαι τε
καὶ νεῖµαι δυνάµεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προµηθεῖα
δὲ παρατείται Ἐπιµηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖµαι, νεῖµαντος δὲ

A. P.  2
μου, ἐφη, ἐπίσκεψαι· καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων
δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἱσχύν ἀνευ τάχους προσήπτεν, τὰ δὲ Ἐ
ἀσθενεῖστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δὲ ὀπλίζε, τοῖς δὲ
ἀστικοὺς φύσιν ἀλλήν τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανάτο
dύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἀ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι
ημετέρχετο, πτηνὸν φυγῆν ἤ κατάγειν οὐκ ἐνεμεν·
ἀ δὲ ηὗτε μεγέθει, τὸδε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἐσφέζεν· καὶ τάλλα
οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἐνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανάτο εὐλά-
βειαν ἔχων μὴ τι γένος αἰστώθειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτῶι
ἀλληλοφθορίων διαφυγάς ἐπηρέκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ
Δίδω ὥρας εὐμαρίαν ἐμηχανάτο ἁμφιεναν αὐτὰ
πυκναῖς τε θρίξιν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἰκανοῖς μὲν
ἀρνεῖται χειρῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καίματα, καὶ οὐ
ἐνιαίι οὐσίαν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρομμὴ
οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυις ἐκάστος· καὶ ὑποδὼν τὰ
25 μὲν ὀπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. ὑ
τούντεύθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπορίζεν, τοῖς
μὲν ἐκ γῆς βωτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δεύδρων καρποὺς,
toῖς δὲ ρίζας· ἐστὶ δ' οἷς ἐδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ἔφων
ἀλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλυγογονίας προσήψε,
30 τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτοι πολυγονίαν,
σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζον· ἀτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάντως καὶ
σοφὸς ὅν γ' Ἐπίμηθεν ἐλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας C
τὰς δυνάμεις· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκοφήντων ἢτι αὐτῷ ἤν τὸ
ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὃ τι χρήσατο. ἀπο-
35 ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος
τὴν νομὴν, καὶ ὅρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ξώα ἐμμελῶς πάντων
ἐχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ
ἀστρατον καὶ ἀστρατον· ἴδῃ δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα
παρὴν, ἐν ἡ ἐδει καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐξείναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς
40 φῶς. ἀπορία οὖν ἐχώμενος ὁ Προμηθεύς, ἦντινα
σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὐροὶ, κλέπτει 'Ηφαίστοι
d καὶ 'Αθηνᾶς τὴν ἑντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ—άμή-
χανον γὰρ ἣν ἀνευ πυρὸς αὐτήν κτητήν τῷ ἥ
χροσίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ.
tὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν βίων σοφίαν ἀνθρωπός ταύτῃ 45
ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ
Δίη· τῷ δὲ Προμήθειες εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ
Δίος οὐκήσων οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ
Ε ἀι Δίος φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς
καὶ 'Ηφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινὸν, ἐν ὧν ἐφιλοτεχνεῖται, 50
λαθῶν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τῇ ἐμπυρον τέχνην
tὴν τοῦ 'Ηφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς 'Αθηνᾶς
dίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀν-
322
θρώπῳ τῶν βίων ἄγνωμα, Προμήθεα δὲ | δὶ’Επιμήθεα
ὑστερον, ὑπὲρ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκῃ μετήλθεν.

XII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνθρώπος θεῖας μετέσχε μοίρας,
πρῶτον μὲν ἥς ὡς μόνον θεοὺς ἐνομίσειν,
καὶ ἐπεξεφύλαξε βωμοῦς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ
ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνό-
ματα ταχύ διηρθρόσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ
οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθήτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ
στρομβάς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἑνρετο,
οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι καὶ ἄρχας ἀν-
B θρώπον ὄκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν· ἀπόλ-
λυτον οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῦ αὐτῶν 10
ἀσθενεστεροὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτῶι
πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἰκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τῶν τῶν
θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδείης· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὕτω
εἶχον, ὡς μέρος πολεμικῆς. ἐζήτουν δὴ ἄθροιζον
καὶ σφάζονται κτίσοντες πόλεις· ὅτ’ οὖν ἄθροιζον, 15
+
Post πρώτον μὲν addunt codices διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν.

2—2
ήδικον ἄλληλους ἀπε οὔκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικήν τέχνην, ὅπετε πάλιν σκεδασμὺνευοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δεῖσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἠμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιπο πάν, Σ Ἐρμῆν πέμπτει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰών τε καὶ 20 δίκην, ἵν’ εἰεῖν πόλεων κόσμου τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φίλιας συναγωγοί. ἀρωτὰ οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοκῇ δίκην καὶ αἰών ἀνθρώπους πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενεμημέναι, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτας νείμω; νενεμημέναι δὲ ὀδε‘ εἰς ἔχον ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἰκανὸς ἰδιώται, καὶ 25 οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰών οὕτω θῷ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἦ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, ἐφ’ ὦ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄν γένοντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θεῖς παρ’ ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον 30 αἰώνας καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σῶκρατε, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὗ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἀλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις ἵν αντίνοι μετείναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ εὰν τὸ ἑκτὸς ὁν τῶν ὀλίγων 35 συμβουλεύῃ, οὔκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φής· εἰκότως, ἐφ’ ὦ οὐκ εἴη φημὶ· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ ἰστοιν, ἢ ἐπὶ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἱέναι 323 καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἀπαντος ἄντρος ἀνέχονται, ὡς πάντες προσήκοι πάντως γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, 40 ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὐτὴ, ὦ Σῶκρατε, τοῦτον αἰτία.

ἔνα δὲ μὴ οἷς ἀπατάσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται πάντες ἀνθρώποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἀλλῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ δὲ αὐξαβεῖ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ 45 σὺ λέγεις, εάν τις φή ἁγαθὸς αὐθεντής εἶναι, ἡ ἅλλην ἡμτινοῦ ἰστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐστιν, ἡ καταγελῶσιν ἢ B
χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσίσταντες νοεθετοῦσιν ὡς μαίνομενοι· ἐν δὲ δικαίωσθη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἁρετῇ, ἕαν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τάληθ᾽ λέγῃ 50 ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὁ ἐκεῖ σοφροσύνην ἤγουντο εἰναί, τάληθ᾽ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μαίναν, καὶ φασών πάντως δεῖν φάναι εἰναι δικάιοις, ἕαν τε ὅσιν ἐὰν τε μὴ, ἥ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιοῦμενον δικαίωσθην, ὡς κ ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντων οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γε πως μετέχειν 55 αὐτῆς, ἡ μὴ εἰναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἁρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἤγεισθαι παντὶ μετείναι αὐτῆς, ταύτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἤγονται εἰναι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτὸν τε καὶ εἴ̃ ἐπιμελείας παραγγελῶσθαι ὧ ἄν παραγγέλληται, τούτῳ σοὶ μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὡς γὰρ ἤγονται

Moreover, the art of politics is capable of being taught, otherwise cities would not inflict punishments on those who violate it.

D ἅλληλοις κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώποι φύσει ἡ τύχη, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νοεθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζεται τοὺς ταύτα ἔχοντας, ἕνα μὴ τοιοῦτον ὅσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλεοῦσιν· οἴον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἡ σμικροὺς ἡ ἁσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἄνοιχτος ὡστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταύτα μὲν γὰρ, ὡμοί, ἵσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντια 15 τούτους· ὥστε δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οὖνται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἕαν τίς

Ε ταύτα μὴ ἔχη, ἅλλα τάναντια τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ τούτους ποι ὡς τι θυμοῦ τίνι ζυγοῦνται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νοεθετήσεις. ὡν ἔστιν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἄδικα καὶ ἡ 20 324 ἁσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολι-
τικής ἀρετῆς· ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ
νουθετεῖ, δήλον ὅτι ὡς εἴ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως
κτητῆς ὁυσίας. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοησαι τὸ κολάζειν,
25 ὁ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτῷ
σὲ διδάξει, ὅτι οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστῶν εἶναι ἀρετῆν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδι-
κοῦντας πρὸς τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τοῦτον ἔνεκα, Β
ὅτι ἧδικησέν, ὅστις μὴ ὃσπερ θηρίον ἄλογίστως
30 τιμωρεῖται: ὃ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν
οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἄδικήματος τιμωρεῖται
—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θεία—ἄλλα τοῦ
μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὕθει ἄδικής μήτε αὐτὸς
οὔτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τούτῳ ἱδών κολασθέντα· καὶ
35 τοιαύτῃ διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι
ἀρετῆν· ἀποτροπής γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταῦταν οὖν
τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοι περὶ τιμωροῦνται καὶ
C ἱδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἱ
τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ἂν οἴσανται ἄδικειν, καὶ οὐχ
40 ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίοι, οἱ σοι πολίται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον
τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναίοι εἰς τῶν ἠγουμένων παρα-
σκευαστῶν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὼν ἀρετῆν. ὡς μὲν οὖν
εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοι πολίται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ
σκυτωτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
45 διδακτὼν καὶ παρασκευαστῶν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετῆν, ἀποδέ-
δεικταί σοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. D

XIV. Ἔτι δὴ λοιπῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἕστων, ἢν ἀπορεῖς

and, in point of fact, virtue, which is the product of the political art, is taught to all,
πέρι, οὐ τὸν λόγον ὃδε ἵνα ἐννοήσον. τότε ἔστιν τι ἐν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. 
Εὔον ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολιτάς μετέχειν, εἴπερ 
μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τῷ γὰρ αὐτῇ λυται ἢ ἂν 
ἀπορία, ἢ γὰρ ἀπορεῖς, ἡ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν 
γὰρ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικῇ οὐδὲ 
325 χαλκείᾳ οὐδὲ κεραμείᾳ, ἄλλα δικαιοσύνη | καὶ σωφρο-
σύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν ἄυτῳ 
προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἄνδρὸς ἁρετὴν; εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν, οὐ 15 
δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, 
ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, 
οὕτω πράττειν, ἀνευ δὲ τούτου μὴ, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα 
καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ παίδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ 
γυναίκα, ἐωσπέρ ἄν κολαζόμενοι βελτίων γένηται, 20 
ἄς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενοι καὶ διδάσκομενος,

Β ὥς ἀνιάτου ὄντα τούτων ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ 
ἀποκτείνειν. εἰ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτό του 
περικότου οἱ ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται 
τόσον νόεις, τούτο δὲ μή, σκέπαι ὡς δαιμόσιοι 25 
νήγονται οἱ ἄγαθοι. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ 
ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσία, ἀπεδέξαμεν· διδακτοῦ 
δὲ οὕτως καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς νόεις 
διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία ἐὰν μὴ 
ἐπιστῶται, ἐφ' ὃ δὲ ἢ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς 30 

C παίσι καὶ φυγαί μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς 
ἀρετήν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις 
καὶ ὡς ἔτοι εὕπειν ἕπεξῆς ἕπεξῆς τῶν οἰκῶν ἀνατροπᾶι, 
ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἑπιμελεῦνται 
πᾶσαν ἑπιμέλειαν; οὔεσθαι γε χρῆ, ὁ Ὁ τὸν λόγον 

XV. Ἠκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι 
οὐπερ ἂν ξῶσι, καὶ διδάσκοντι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν.
ἐπειδὰν θάττον συνη τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφός καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγός καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὡς ὁ βέλτιστος ἐσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τὸδε μὲν καλὸν, τὸδε δὲ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ τὸδε μὲν ὀσίον, τὸδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, 5 καὶ τὰ μὲν πολεῖ, τὰ δὲ μὴ πολεῖ, καὶ έάν μὲν ἐκῶν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον ευθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα εἰς διδασκάλους πέμπτους πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἡ 10 γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδασκάλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὐ γράμματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὡσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα 15 καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις | ἐνείσιν, πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἐπαίνοι καὶ 20 ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἄνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἕνα ὁ παῖς ξηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὄρεγήται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οὐ τ' αὖ κιθαριστικαῖ ἐτέρα τοιαύτα σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελούντας ταῖς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκεῖοθεῖα παῖς φυχαῖς 25 καὶ ὅπως ἄν οἱ νεόπολειν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπειδὰν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλως αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκοντες μελοποιοῖ, εἰς 30 τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκεῖοθεῖα παῖς φυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἔνα ἣμερώτεροι τε ὡσιν, καὶ εὐρυμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γινόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὡσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώ- 35 πού εὐρυμοίς τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοῖς
πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παίδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἕνα τὰ σώματα βελτίων ἔχοντες ὑπηρετώσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. 35
C χρηστῇ οὐσῇ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδειλιῶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι· καὶ οὶ τούτων νεῖσι, προϊάλητα εἰς 40
dιδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτάν, ὅφειλτατα ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ έκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγώσιν, ἡ πόλις ἀδ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάσεις μανθάνειν
D καὶ κατὰ τούτους ξῆν,† ὡνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῇ
πράττοσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ οἱ γραμματισταῖ 45
τοῖς μῆπω δεινοὶς γράφειν τῶν παιδῶν ὑπογράφαντες
γραμμᾶς τῇ γραφίδι οὔτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδάσκιαν καὶ
ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν υφήγησιν τῶν γραμ-
μῶν, ὅσ δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράφασα, ἀγαθῶν
καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους 50
ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὅσ δ' ἄν ἐκτὸς
βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει, καὶ ὁνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτη
Ε καὶ παρ' ὡμίν καὶ ἀλλοθεὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνόνσις
tῆς δίκης, εὐθύναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας
οὔσῃς περὶ ἄρετῆς ἱδία καὶ δημοσία, θαυμάζευς, ὅ 55
Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτῶν ἐστὶν ἄρετη; ἀλλ' οὐ
χρή θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτῶν.
XVI. Διὰ τὰ οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάτερῶν πολλοὶ
νεῖσι φαίλοι γίγνονται; τούτῳ αὖ μάθειν
οὔσιν ὅπ' θαυμαστῶν, εἴπερ ἀληθὴ εἴω
ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔληγο, ὅτι τούτῳ
tοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει
tοῖς τοῖς ὑπολογίοις ἄρθο
327 πόλεις εἶναι; οὐδένα δὲ ἰδιοτευχίν. εἰ
γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγων ὑντῶς ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ
† Post ἤ ὅ ἐν add. codd. κατὰ παράδειγμα,
μάλιστα πάντων ούτως-ἐνθυμήθητι ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὅτι οὖν καὶ μαθημάτων προελάμβανος. εἰ 10 μὴ οἶδον τῷ ἐν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ἐδύνατο ἔκαστος, καὶ τῶν καὶ ἕκαστος καὶ δημοσία πᾶς πάντα τοι ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέτηλητε τῶν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθάνει τούτων, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς

15 φθονεὶ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἀλλῶν τεχνη-μάτων· λυσιτελεὶς γάρ, οἴμαι, ἥμων ἡ ἁλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα· εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθύμως μίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαιν εἴχομεν ἁλλήλους διδάσκειν, οὐεὶ ἀν τι, ἔφθη, μᾶλλον, εἰ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἁγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἁγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς γύροις ἡ τῶν φαύλων; οἴμαι μὲν οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γύροις εὐφυέστατος
c gενόμενος εἰς αὐλήσει, οὔτως ἄν ἐξέγοισός τι οὐδεὶς, οὔτως οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡστε σοι ἀδικότατος φαίνεται

20 ἀνθρώποις τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένοι, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτῳ τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτῶν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, δ οἷς μήτε παῖδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζοντο ἀρετὴς ἑπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ εἰεὶν ἀγροῦ τίνες, οἴοι τερ οὗς πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητής ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Δηναιῷ, ἦ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἴ ἐν ἑκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποί, ἀγαπήσας ἂν, εἰ ἐντύχως Εὐρυβάτη καὶ Φρυνώνδα, καὶ ἀνολο-
Ε φύρασ τὸν τὴν τῶν εὐθανὸ νοθρώτων ποιήσαν. 40

νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως ἠγείρει, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαναμᾶτο τῶν ἁγαθῶν 65

πατέρων φαύλους νικεῖς γινεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἁγαθοὺς, ἐπει διὶ Οἰλυκλείτου νικεῖς, Παράλοις καὶ Ἐμβῆπτον τούδε ἠλισθάται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλου δημιουργῶν. τῶν δὲ οὕτως ἠξίων τούτῳ κατηγορεῖν· ἐτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπίτεις· νέοι γὰρ.
XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδείκειμένος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἐτὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐβλεπον ὡς ἐρᾳύτα τι, ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀκούειν· ἔτει δὲ δὴ ᾽γάθω-μην ὅτι τῷ ὠντὶ πεπαυμένου εἰς, μόνος πῶς ἐμαυτὸν ὡσπερεὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέπας πρὸς τὸν Ἰπποκράτην· Ἡ ὑπ’ Ἀπολλοδόρου, ὅς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προὔτρεψάς με ὡδὲ ἀφικέσθαι·

10 πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαί ἀκηκοέναι ἁ ἀκήκοα, Πρωταγόρας ἐρω; ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἡ ἀγαθοί ὁ ἀγαθοῖ γίγνουται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρών τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, δήλου ὅτι Πρωταγόρας 15 βάδιον ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τάχτα ἐξεδιδάξει. καὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων | συγγένειω ὄρθων τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ’ ἀν καὶ 329 τοιούτων λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἡ Περικλέους ἡ Ἀλλοῦ τινὸς τῶν ἰκανῶν εἰπείν· εἵ δὲ ἐπανεροντό τινὰ τι, 20 ὡσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὕτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὕτε αὐτοὶ ἔρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐάν τις καὶ σμικρῶν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἥχει καὶ ἀποτείνει ἐάν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες 25 δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ β ὅσον ικανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοι, ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρὸμενος περιμείναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ᾧ ὀλίγοις ἔστη παρεσκευασ- 30 μένα. νῦν οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, σμικρὸς τινὸς ἐνδείξεις εἰμὶ πάντ’ ἐχειν, εἶ μοι ἀποκρίνασο τόδε. τὴν ἀρέτην φῆς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπέρ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνθρώ-
C των πειθομένων ἂν, καὶ σοι πείθομαι· δ’ ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτο μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποτπλήρωσον. Ἐλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδώ 35 πέμψειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτό πολλαχῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα ταύτα ὡς ἐν τι εἰς συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταύτ’ οὖν ἄντω διέλθες μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν τὶ ἐστίν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς 40 ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, ἢ

Π. "Virtue is one, and the single virtues are parts of virtue, distinct from each other like the parts of the face."

Εἰ μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃςτε τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, 10 ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνωσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάντερ τις ἐν λάβη, ἀπαντῆ έχειν; Οὔδαμὼς, ἐφή, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἶσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὐ. Ἐστὶν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταύτα μόρια τῆς 15 ἀρετῆς, ἐφήν ἐγώ, | σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δήποτε, ἐφή· καὶ μέγιστὸν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. "Εκαστὸν δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστίν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναί. "Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἔκαστον ἰδίαιν ἐχει; ὃςτε τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἐστὶν 20
όφθαλμος οἶον τὰ ὅτα, οὔτ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢ
αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὔδεν ἔστιν οἶον τὸ ἐτερον
οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἀρ' οὖν
οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἐτερον οἶον
25 τὸ ἐτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἦ δὴ λα B
dὴ ὅτι οὔτως ἔχει, εἶπερ τῷ παραδείγματι γε ἐσίκεν;
'Αλλ' οὔτως, ἐφή, ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·
Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἄρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἶον ἐπι-
στήμης, οὖδ' οἶον δικαιοσύνη, οὔτ' οἶον ἀνδρεία, οὔτ'
30 οἶον σωφροσύνη, οὖδ' οἶον ὀσιότης. οὐκ ἐφή. Φέρε
δὴ, ἐφήνει ἐγὼ, κοινὴ σκεψιώμεθα ποίον τι αὐτῶν ἔστιν
ἐκαστὸν. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα C
tί ἐστὶν ἡ οὗδεν πράγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ
σοι; Καὶ ἐμοὶ, ἐφή. Τί οὖν; εἰ τις ἔροιτο ἐμὲ τε
35 καὶ σὲ· ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπον δὴ
μοι, τούτῳ τὸ πράγμα, ὅ ὀνομάσατε ἀρτί, ἡ δικαιο-
σύνη, αὐτὸ τούτῳ δίκαιον ἐστὶν ἡ ἅδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἄν
αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν φησίν
θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἔμοι ἡ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτήν, ἐφή.
40 Ἐστὶν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι,
φαίνει ἄν ἐγὼ γε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτώντι· οὐκοῦν D
καὶ σύ; Ναὶ, ἐφή. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἐρωτο-
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁσιότητα τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἄν, ὡς
ἐγινόμην. Ναὶ, ἡ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τούτο
45 πράγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἄν· ἦ οὖ; Καὶ τούτῳ
συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα φατε
τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἶον ἄνοσίου εἶναι ἡ οἶον ὅσιον;
ἀγανακτήσαμμ' ἂν ἐγωγ', ἐφήν, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ
eἴπωμ' ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὁ ἄνθρωπος σχολὴ μεντάν τι E
50 ἄλλο ὅσιον εἶνῃ, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἐσται. τί
dὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίνασθο, Πάντως μὲν οὖν, ἐφή.
XIX. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τούτ' εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς: πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἀρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδοξάτε μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἐχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὖκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον αὐτῶν οἶον τὸ ἐτερον εἰπομί 'ἂν ἐγὼ γινεῖτι ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἱκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἴπειν τοῦτο, παρ'-

331 κουσας: Πρωταγόρας | γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἡρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὅ ἤν Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φης οὖκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον μόριον οἶον τὸ ἐτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἐστι; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναι; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὀμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινοῦμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὀμολογήσαντες, εἶν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται: 15 οὓς ἁρὰ ἐστὶν ὁσίότης οἴον δίκαιον εἶναι πράγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἴον ὁσιον. ἄλλ' οἶον μὴ ὁσιον· ἢ δ' ὁσιότης οἴον μὴ δίκαιον, ἄλλ' ἄδικον ἁρα, τὸ δὲ Β ἁνόσιον; τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινοῦμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς υπὲρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίνει ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην 20 ὁσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, καὶ υπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἰ μὲ ἐφης, ταῦτα ἂν ταύτα ἀποκρινοῦμεν· ὅτι ἦτοι ταύτων τῇ ἐστὶν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι η ἂ τι ὁμοιό- τατον καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἴον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἴον δικαιοσύνη. ἄλλ' ὁρα, 25 εἰ διακυψύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ

C οὕτως. Οὐ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρήσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην ὁσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἄλλα τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἄλλα τί τοῦτο δια- 30 φέρει; ἐφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἐστώ ἡμῖν καὶ δικαίο-
σύνη ὁσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μὴ μοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ
οῦδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοι δοκεῖ
ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ· τὸ δ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ
35 τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενοι οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστον' ἀν
ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἰ τις τὸ εἰ ἄφελοι αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, Δ
ἡ δ' οὐ, προσεόικεν τι δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ
ὅτιον ὅφειν ἀμὴ γε πῇ προσεόικεν, τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν
τὸ μέλαιν ἐστὶν ὅτι προσεόικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τὸ
40 μαλακόν, καὶ τὰλλα ᾧ δοκεῖ ἐναντιότατα εἶναι ἄλλη-
λοις: καὶ ἡ τότε ἐφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ
οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον οἶον τὸ ἐτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου
μόρια, ἀμὴ γε πῇ προσεόικεν καὶ ἐστὶν τὸ ἐτερον οἶον
τὸ ἐτερον· ὅτε τοῦτο γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα
45 ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἀπαντᾷ ἐστὶν ὁμοία ἄλλη-
λοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοία τι ἔχοντα ὁμοία δίκαιον
καλεῖν οὖδὲ τὰ ἀνόμου τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμων, κἂν
πάνι σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὁμοίαν. καὶ ἐγώ θαυμάζας
εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
50 τὸ ὁσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὡστε ὁμοίον τι σμικρὸν
έχειν ἄλληλοις; Οὐ πάνι, ἐφη, οὐτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ
ἀν ὃς σὺ μοι δοκεῖς οἷοςθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφην ἐγώ, 332
ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο
μέν ἐάσωμεν, τότε δὲ ἄλλο ὃν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.

ΧΧ. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλείς; Ἐφη. Τοῦτῳ τῷ
πράγματι οὐ πάνι τοῦνατ' ἔστὶν ἥ
σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη. Πότερον
dὲ ἄταν πράπτοντι ἄνθρωποι ὄρθως τε
καὶ ὁφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκι-
oύσιν οὕτω πράπτοντες, ἥ τοῦνατ' ὅ
Σωφρονεῖν, ἐφη. Οὐκοιν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; B
4 ὃ ἣ τοῦνατ' ἐπράπτον; codd.
Ανάγκη. Ούκον οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττοντα καὶ οὐ σῳδρονοῦσιν οὐτῳ πράττοντες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη. Τούναυτίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἁφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σῳδρόνως; Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἁφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφρόσυνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σῳδρόνως σῳδροσύνη; Ὀμολογεῖ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἢσχύν πράττεται, ἢσχυρὸς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείς, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδοκεῖ. Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ 15 τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως;

Ε. Εφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὄσαυτως πράττεται, ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὅτι τοῦ ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἐστὶν τι καλὸν; Συνεχώρει. Τοῦτῳ ἐστὶν τὶ ἐναντίον πλὴν 20 τὸ αἰσχρὸν; Οὐκ ἐστὶν. Τί δὲ; ἐστὶν τὶ ἀγαθὸν;

Ἐστίν. Τοῦτῳ ἐστὶν τὶ ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακὸν;

Οὐκ ἐστὶν. Τί δὲ; ἐστὶν τὶ δὲν ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τοῦτῳ μὴ ἐστὶν τὶ ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρὺ;

Οὐκ ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν 25 ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;

Συνομολογεῖ. Τίθε δὴ, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀναλογισμὸμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἢμιν. ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλεῖον δὲ μὴ; Ὀμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ ἐναντίος πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; 30 Ἐφη. Ὀμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίος πράττεσθαι δ’ ἂν ἁφρόνως πράττεται τῷ σῳδρόνως πραττομένῳ;

Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σῳδρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σῳδροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἁφρόνως ὑπὸ ἁφροσύνης;

Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ 35 ἐναντίον πράττοιτ’ αὖ; Ναὶ. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σῳδροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἁφροσύνης; Ναὶ.

Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὁντον;

Α. Ρ. 3
Ναι. Ἐναντίον ἂρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σοφροσύνη;
40 Φαίνεται. Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὀμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίας ἐναντίον εἶναι;
Συνωμολογεῖ. Ἐν δὲ ἐνι μόνων ἐναντίον εἶναι; Ψηφ. Πότερον οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν | τῶν λόγων: 333
tὸ ἐν ἐνι μόνων ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκείνων ἐν δὲ ἐλέγετο
45 ἔτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἄρτης, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὕτωι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνω μουσικῶς λέγονται: οὐ γὰρ
50 συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλους. πῶς γὰρ ἐν συνάδουν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη εἶναι μὲν ἐν μόνων ὑπό ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μὴ, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἐνὶ ἄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐθεντήτα; ἢ γὰρ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλος πῶς; Ὁμο-
55 λόγησεν καὶ μᾶλ' ἀκόντως. Οὐκόν ἐν ἐν ἐν εἰς ἡ
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐτ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὀσίότης σχεδον τι ταυτὸν ὄν. ἢθι δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμω-
μεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψόμεθα. ἀρά τίς
60 σοι δοκεῖ ἄδικῶν ἀνθρώποις σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἄδικεῖ;
Ἀλσκυνοῖμην δὲ ἐγώ; ἐφη, ὁ Σωκρατῆς, τοῦτο σ
ὀμολογεῖ, ἐπεί τοῦλοι γε φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τόν λόγον ποιήσομαι,
ἐφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; Εἴ βούλει, ἐφη, πρὸς τοῦτο πρῷ-
65 τον τόν λόγον διαλέξητο, τόν τῶν τοῦλοιν. Ἀλλ' οὔτε μει διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σὺ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἰτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἰτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐγώγη
μᾶλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἵσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν
ἐρωτώντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.
XXI 334 B

D  XXI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπιζέτο ἦμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐτίατο δυσχερὴ εἰναι· ἐπειτὰ μὲντοι συνεχωρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 'Ἰδι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσι τινὲς σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικούντες; 'Εστω, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; 'Εφη. Τὸ δὲ εὐφροσύνῃ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; 'Εστω, ἔφη. Πότερον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικούντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἀττα εἰναι; Λέγω. 10 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἂ ἐστιν ὁφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δι', ἔφη, καὶ Ε μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁφέλιμα ζῇ, ἔγγυε καλῶ ἀγαθὰ. καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἥδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· 15 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐὼρων αὐτῶν οὖτος ἔχοντα, εὐλαβοῦμενος ἥρεμα ἥρομην. Πότερον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὃ | Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μηδὲν ἀνθρώπων ὁφέλιμα ἐστιν, ἂ ὁ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὁφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἄλλ' ἔγγυε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἂ 20 ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνοφελή ἐστί, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ὁφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ὅποιος δέ· τὰ δὲ βοσίν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν· τὰ δὲ γε τοῦτον μὲν οὐδείν, δενδροίς δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθά, 25 ἐπὶ ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις ποιηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος, πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθελοῖς ἑπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλώνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἔτει καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἀπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς 30 θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἀλλῷ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλου τι ἐστιν τὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ παντοτάπτων, ὡστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν
35 τοῦ σῶματος ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δὲ ἐντὸς τοῦ ταύτου τούτῳ κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τούτο οἱ ἱεροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοὺς ἁσθενοῦσι μὴ χρῆσθαι ἑλαίῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ τὰ συμκροτάτα ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἐδεσθαί, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν
40 ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν βιων γνωριμένην ἐν τοῖς συτίοις τε καὶ όψοις.

XXII. Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεδορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον. Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμοιν τις ὧν ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ἐὰν τις μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλαμβάνομαι περὶ ὅροι ἄν ἢ ὁ λόγος. ὃσπερ οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὅν, ὃν ἀν χρῆναι, εἰτερ ἐμελλέσθη οἱ διαλέξεσθαι, μείζον φθέγγεσθαι ἐπὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ
10 ἐπιλήσμοιν ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμενε μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχύτερας πολει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἐπεσθαί. Πῶς οὖν κελεύσεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἡ βραχύτερὰ σοι, ἐφι, ἀποκρίνομαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδαμῶς, ἣν δ' ἐγώ. 'Αλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἐφι. Ναί, ἣν δ' ἐγώ. Πότερα οὖν ἐν
15 ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσατά τοι ἀποκρίνομαι, ἡ ὅσα σοι; 'Ακήκοα γοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ ὁδὸς τ' εἰ καὶ αὐτοῦς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως, ὡστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλυπεῖν, καὶ αὐ βραχέα οὕτως, ὡστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχύτεροις | εἰπείν· εἰ οὖν 335 μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς
με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἐγὼ πολλοὶς ἦδη εἰς ἁγώνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τούτῳ ἐποίουν ὑμῖν κελεύεις, ὅσ ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευνε μὲ διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδὲν ὁ δὲ βελτίων 25 ἐφαινόμην οὐδὲν ἀν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἐλλησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ—ἐγών γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἦρεσιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἐμπροσθείν, καὶ ὅτι Ἔκας ἐθελήσαι ἐκάνειν εἰκών εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι—ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν 30 ταῖς συνομίασις, 'Αλλά τοι, ἐφη, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδὲν ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνομίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐπεσθαί, τότε σοι διαλέξωμαι. σὺ μὲν γὰρ, ὅσ λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φής δὲ 35 καὶ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ.

C οἱός τ' εἰ συνομίας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γὰρ εἰ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἄδυνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλομένην ἂν οἶδ' τ' εἶναι. ἀλλ' σὲ ἐκρήγον ἡμῖν συγχωρείν τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον ἡν συνομία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ 40 οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοὶ τὴν ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἶδ' τ' εἰνον σοι παραμείναι ἀποτείνουντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ποι ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἱσως οὐκ ἁθῶς σου ἥκουν. καὶ ἄμα ταὐτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιῶν· καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπὶ-45

D λαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτούν, καὶ εἰπεν· ὁμικαὶ ἀφησομένει σε, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἐδὲν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθης, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἐσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δεύματον οὐν σου παραμείναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδος ἂδιον 50 ἀκούσαμι ή σου τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων· ἀλλά χάρισαι ἡμῖν πάσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπον—ἡδη δὲ
πολυστήρα τής εξιών—Ω παί Ιππόνικου, αὐτῷ μὲν ἐγὼγέ σου τήν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαί, ἀταρ καὶ νῦν 55 ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ἦστε βουλοῖμην ἀν χαρίζεσθαι ἐςοι, εἰ μου δύναται δέοιος νῦν δ' ἐστιν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιο μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραιῳ δρόμει ἀκμάζοντι ἐπισθαί, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθέειν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαί, εἴποιμι ἀν σοι ὅτι | πολὺ σοῦ 336 60 μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θεούσιν τούτους ἀκο-
λουθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἰ τι δεῖ θεά-
σασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμὲ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας,
τούτου δέοι συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὖ δύναμαι 
ταχὺ θεῖν, οὕτως δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπὶ-
65 θυμεῖς ἐμού καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέοι,
ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ 
αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ 
δὲ μή, τίς τὸ τρόπον ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ 
β έγων' ὑμνὴν εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλέγο-
70 μένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. 'Αλλ' ὁρᾷς, ἐφη, ὁ 
Σωκράτης· δικαίως δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξίων 
αὐτῷ τε ἔξειναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βουλέται καὶ σὺ 
ὄπως ἀν αὐτῷ βούλῃ.

XXIII. Ἐπολαβῶν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὦν 
καλῶς λέγεις, ἐφη, ὁ Καλλία. Σωκράτης 
μὲν γὰρ ὅτε ὄμολογει μὴ μετεῖναι οἱ 
μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρας, 
τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἴος τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ-
στασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζομι. 
ἀν εἰ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ 
Πρωταγόρας ὄμολογει φαινότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους 
διαλέχθηναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, 
ίο διαλεγόσθω ἔρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ'
εκάστη έρωτήσει μακρύν λόγον ἀποτελέσων, ἐκκρούων
toús λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἑθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ’

Д ἀπομηκτικῶν ἐως ἄν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρω-
tημα ἢν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη
gε ἐγώ ἐγγυνοῦμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παῖζει 15
cαὶ φησίν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἔμοι μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ
ἐπεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν. χρῆ γὰρ ἐκατόν
tὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνεσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὸν
"Αλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἑγοῦμαι, Κριτίας ἢν ὁ εἰπὼν. Ἡ Ω
Πρόδικε καὶ 'Ιππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μᾶλα 20

Ε πρὸς Προταγόρον εἶναι, Ἄλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλο-
νικὸς ἔστι πρὸς ὃ ἄν ὀρμήσῃ ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν
dei συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Προταγόρα,
ἀλλὰ κοινὴ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι

καὶ ἀλλήλων περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν,
ἐρίζειν δὲ μὴ ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δ’ εὖνοιΑ 35
οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροι τε καὶ
ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλως. καὶ οὕτως ἀν καλλίστῃ ἡμῶν ἡ
συνουσία γίγνοντο. ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ’
ἀν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκουόσιν εὐδοκιμοῦτε καὶ
οὐκ ἐπανοίσθε. εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῖς 40
ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἀνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπανεισθαί
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΙΙΙ 337 B

de ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς τ’ αὐτ’ οἱ ἀκούοντες μᾶλιστ’ ἄν οὕτως εὐφραινοῦμεθα, καὶ ὁμιλῆσαι εὐφραίνωσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διάνοιᾳ, ἡςθαῖ βε ἐσθιόντα τι ἡ ἀλλ’ ἢδ’ πᾶσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σῶματι.

XXIV. Ταύτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνω τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς ἐίπεν, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἐφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκεῖοις καὶ πολίταις ἀπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίων τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενεῖς ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος δ’ ὑμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτοις δὲ ἀντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τούτῳ νῦν συνελήλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρωτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἴκον τὸν δέ, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήμασθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡστε τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διά-Ε φέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλευόω, ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβηκών δὲ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ διανοητῶν ἠμῶν συμβιβασάμουσών εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μὴ τε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβές τοῦτο 338 εἰδος τῶν διαλόγων ἔστειν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, ἐν μὴ ἢδ’ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ’ εἴειν καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμίας τοὺς λόγους, ἰδια μεγαλοπρεπὲστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονεστεροὶ ἡμῖν φαίνονται, μὴτ’ αὐτ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, ἔφενεν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλ’
μέσον τι ἁμφότερονς τεμεῖν. ός οὖν ποιήσατε, καὶ πείθεσθε μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν
Β ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ὕμιν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μήκος τῶν
λόγων ἐκατέρω.

XXV. Ταύτα ἦρεσε τοῖς παρούσι, καὶ πάντες
ἐπήνευσαν, καὶ ἔμε γε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη
ἀφήσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην.
εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἰη βραβευτήν
ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων, εἰτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθεὶς, οὐκ ὥρθως ἄν ἔχοι τῶν χειρῶ
τῶν βελτιώνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἰτε ὅμοιος, οὐδὲ ὦτος ὥρθως· ὁ γὰρ ὥμοιος ἡμῶν ὥμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὅστε
C ἐκ περιττοῦ ἦρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίων ἡμῶν
αἱρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὃς ἐγὼμαι, ἀδύνατον τὸ ἡμῖν, ὥστε Προταγόροι τοῦτο σοφωτερὸν τινα ἐλέ-
σθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε
dὲ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τὸδὲ γίγνεται, ὡσπερ φαύλο
ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἔπει τὸ γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν
μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτωσι ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἐν δὲ προ-
15 θυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνονται·
eὶ μὴ βούλεται Προταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὔτος μὲν
D ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἀμα πειράσομαι
αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὃς ἐγὼ φημὶ χρήναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον
ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνομαι ὅποσ' 20
ἀν οὔτος βούληται ἐρωτάν, πάλιν οὔτος ἐμοὶ λόγον
ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι
πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ
ὑμεῖς κοινὴ δεησόμεθα αὐτῶν ἀπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ
dιαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δει τοῦτον 25
Ε ἑνεκα ἑνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινὴ
ἐπιστάτησετε. ἐδοκεῖ πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι·
καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνω μὲν οὐκ ἦθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἦναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἑρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπιείδαν ἰκα-30 νός ἑρωτήση, πάλιν δὲ δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXVI. Ἡράκτων οὖν ἔρωτάν ὥστοι πως: Ἡγοῦν-5 μαί, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔγω ἄνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἑπών δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν | δὲ τούτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιη-339 τῶν λεγόμενα οἶνον τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἃ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ᾧ μῆ, καὶ ἐπὶ- στασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἑρωτόμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέν, περὶ οὖ̄περ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν 10 διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετεννησεμένου δ' εἰς ποίησιν: τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ ποι Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος νῦν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ, ὅτι ἄνδρ' ἁγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι β
15 χαλεπόν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῷ τετρά- γινον, ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.
τὸ τοῦ ἐπιστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πάν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δει· ἐπιστασαι τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ 20 μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. Ἐδ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεὶ πεποίησθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὖ; Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. Δοκεὶ δὲ σοι καλῶς πεποίησθαι, εἰ ἐναυτία λέγει αὐτός αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής; Οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' 25 ἐγώ. Ὁρὰ δὴ, ἔφη, βέλτιον. Ἀλλ', ὡγαθέ, ἐσκεμμαῖς ικανῶς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προϊόντως τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει που
οὔτε μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται καλτοὶ σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον·
χαλεπτὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὼν ἐμμεναι. 30
έννοεις ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὐτὸς καὶ τάδε λέγει κακέων τὰ ἐμπροσθεν; Οἶδα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἑκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; Φαίηται ἐμοίγη. καὶ ἀμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τί λέγοι. Ἀτάρ, ἔφην
Δ ἐγώ, σοι οὐ φαίηται; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίηντο ὀμολογέ-35
γείν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὡς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπτὸν εἶναι ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἄληθεία, ὄλγον δὲ τοῦ ποιῆματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακοῦν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπτὸν ἐσθλὸν 40
ἐμμεναι, τούτων μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φησίν ἀποδε-χεσθαὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καλτοὶ ὅποτε 45
τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεταί, δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἑαυτῶν μέμφεται, ὡστε ἦτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ὑστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοὶς θόρυβον
Ε παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκούόντων· καὶ ἔγὼ τὸ 50
μὲν πρῶτον, ὀσπερεῖ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πῦκτον πληγεῖς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τάληθη, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, τρεῖτοι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικου, καὶ καλέσας αὐτοῦ, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἔγω, 55
σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἴ βοηθεῖν
340 τῷ ἀνδρί. | δοκό οὖν μοι ἔγω παρακαλέιν σὲ—ὀσπερ ἔφη "Ομηρός τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ 55
τὸν Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόευτα παρακαλέιν, εἰπόντα
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροι περ
σχῶμεν,
ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἤμων ὁ Πρωταγόρας
60 τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ
ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἑπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἢ τὸ
τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἑπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὖ ταυτὸν Β
δὲν, καὶ ἁ νῦν δὴ εἰπτες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν
σκόπηπτε, εἰ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται
65 ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γὰρ, ὃ
Πρόδικε, προαστοφηναὶ τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταυτὸν
σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;
'Αλλο νῦ Νί', ἐφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐν
μὲν τοῖς πρῶτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώ-
70 μην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν ἀληθεία γενέσθαι
χαλεπῶν εἶλ; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν C
de γε Πιττακόν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μέμφεται, ὅνιχ, ὡς οἶται
Πρωταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο.
oc τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακός ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι
75 ἐσθλῶν, ἀτεπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμμεναί· ἐστιν
de οὐ ταυτῶν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησίν Πρόδικος
οδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστιν
τὸ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. καὶ ἱσως ἀν φαίν Πρόδικος ὁδε καὶ
80 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἁγαθὸν D
χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐμπροσθὲν τοὺς
θεοὺς ἑδρῶτα θείναι· ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρον
ἐκεῖν, ῥηίδην δὴπετα πέλειν, χαλεπὴν περ
εὑσαν, ἐκτῆταί.

XXVII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα
ἐπέηρεσέν με· ὁ δ' ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἑπαν-
ὄρθωμα σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, μείζον ἄμαρτημα ἔχει ὁ ἑπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ
85 εἶπον, Κακὸν ἀρα μοι οὐργασταί, ὡς
d and, after some
playful sophistry,
offers finally to
give his own ex-
planation of the
poem.
Ε ἔδωκεν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἶμι τις γελοιος ἱατρός· ἴδωμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Ἀλλ' ὦτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Πῶς δή; ἂν δ' ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἂν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἰς τὸν ποιητὸν, εἰ ὦτω φαινόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτήσθαι, ὃ ἐστὶν πάντων χαλεπῶτατον, ὡς Ἰο ἀπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγώ εἰπον, Νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχθηκεν ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος οἶδε. κινδυνεῦει γὰρ τοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, 341 ἡ Πρόδικος σοφία θεία τις εἶναι τάλαι, ἣ ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἐτὶ παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀλλων πολλῶν ἐμπειρὸς ὃν ταύτης ἀπειρός εἶναι, σὺν ὀστὴρ ἐγὼ ἐμπειρὸς διὰ τὸ μαθητής εἶναι Πρόδικον τοιτούτι· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς ὁμοί μανθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἵσως σὺν οὕτω συμφωνίδης ἐπελάμβανεν, ὅστις συν ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἐστὶν ὀστὶν ὃς περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικος με οὕτωσι νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἡ σὲ ἡ ἂλλον. Β' τινὰ λέγω ὃτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθα δεινὰ καλῶν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν, φησὶν, κακὸν ἐστὶν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει 25 ἑκάστοτε, δεινοῦ πλοῦτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ δεινῆς υφείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος—ἵσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὖ τὸ Κείλοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντι οὕτος τῷ σὺν οὐ μανθάνεις. 30 ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτῶν· τὶ ἔλεγεν, ὃ Πρόδικε, τὸ 35 χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακὸν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πειττακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί, ὅστερ ἄν εἰ 35 ἦκουν αὐτὸλ λέγοντος ὃτι ἔστιν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν.
εἴμεναι. Ἄλλα τι οἶει, ἐφη, λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τότο, καὶ ὀνείδιζεν τῷ Πυθακῷ, ὥστε τα ὁνόματα οὐκ ἥπιστατο ὅρθως διαίρειν ἀτε 40 Δέσβιος ὄν καὶ ἐν φωνὴ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος; Ἀκούεις δὴ, ἐφὴν ἐγώ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς τὰ τάτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Πολλὸν γε δεῖ, ἐφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς Πρόδικος ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν 45 ἔλεγεν ὅτερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακὸν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀν μὴ ράδιον ἢ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλὸν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. Ἄλλα καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐφη, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικον γε τόνδε εἶδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειράσθαι, εἰ οἶδ' τ' 50 ἐσεὶ τῷ σαυτῷ λόγῳ βοήθειν· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης, οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακὸν, μέγα τεκμηρίων ἐστὶν Ἐ εὖθυς τὸ μετὰ τὸν ῥήμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας.

οὐ δήπον τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἑσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἴτα 55 τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε σάραφ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμὸς Κεῖον. ἄλλ' ἂ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἔθελον σοι εἰπέσθαι, εἰ βούλεις, λάβεῖν μοι πείραν ὅπως 342 60 ἔχω, ὦ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἑπτῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι. ὃ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ σὺ βούλεις, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες ὃ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας ἐκελευθερεῖν πάνω, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

XXVIII. Ἐγὼ τοῖνυ ν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὃ γε μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος τοῦτον, πειράζομαι ὅμων διεξέλ-θείν. ἐπιστοφοία γὰρ ἐστὶν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ
πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Δακε-

B δαίμονι, καὶ σοφίσται πλείστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ
eἰσίν. ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματι-
ζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι
δοῦν ὦτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεσιν,
ὡσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ
dοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρεία περείναι, ἡγοῦ-

C μενει, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν ὁ περίεσιν, πάντας τούτο ἁσκή-
σειν, τὴν σοφίαν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο
ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ
οἱ μὲν ὦτα τε κατάγονται μιμούμενοι αὐτοῦς, καὶ

D ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξείναι, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες, ἵνα μὴ
ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκοντος. εἰσίν δὲ ἐν 25
ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἀνδρεῖς ἐπὶ παιδεύεσθαι
μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γινοίτε δ' ἂν,
ὅτι ἐγὼ ταύτα ἀλήθη λέγω καὶ Δακεδαίμονιοι πρὸς

E συγγενεσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει

αὐτὸν φαίλλον τινα φαινόμενον, ἑπείτα, ὅπου ἂν
τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου
βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὡσπερ δεινός ἀκοντιστής,
35 οὕστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παίδος μηδὲν βελτίω. τούτῳ οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν ὁι κατανενοίκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὡτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μάλλον ἐστὶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἡ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἶνον τ' εἶναι ρήματα φθέγγονται
40 τελέσω πεπαιδευμένον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. | τούτου ἢν 343 καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακός ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βιάς ὁ Πριηνεύς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λύνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἐβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Δακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι
45 πάντες ξηλωται καὶ ἔρασται καὶ μαθηταὶ ἵσαν τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τουαίτην ὰμαν, ρήματα βραχέα ἀξιομημόνευτα ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινὴ ξυνελθόντες ἀπαρχῇ τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ὁ
50 εἰς τὸν νεόν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράφαντες ταῦτα, ὅ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γυνώθι σαντόν καὶ μηδὲν ἀγαν.

τοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἢν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Δακονικής· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο
55 τούτῳ τὸ ρήμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθολὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἀτε C χρόνος ὁ ἐπὶ σοφίας, ἔγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτῳ τὸ ρήμα ἄστερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἄθλητήν καὶ περιγένειον αὐτῶν, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε
60 ἀνθρώποις· εἰς τούτῳ οὖν τὸ ρήμα καὶ τούτῳ ἔνεκα τοῦτῳ ἐπιβουλεύσει κολούσαι αὐτὸ ἄπαν τὸ ἅσμα πεποίηκεν, ὅς μοι φαίνεται.

XXIX. Ἐπισκεφάλωμεθα δὴ αὐτῷ κοινῇ ἄπαντες, εἰ ἀρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τού ἅσματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, D
P Categoria 344 B

The poet says that it is truly hard to become good.

5 ὁτὶ ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἕπευτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μὲν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐνα λόγον ἑαυτὴ ἐμβεβληθαί, ἐὰν μὴ τὶς ὑπολάβη πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥῆμα ὁσπερ ἐρήστοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην—λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι Χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα ἐιτείν ὅτι Όὐκ ἂν, ἄλλα γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὦ Πιττακε, ὡς ἀληθῶς,—οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ ἁγαθὸν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἀρὰ ὅντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἁληθῶς ἁγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ ἁγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἁληθῶς· ἐνθεὶς γὰρ τούτῳ γε φανεῖ ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ’ ὑπερβατὸν δεὶ 15 θείαιν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἄλαθέως, οὕτως πῶς ὑπερτόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὁσπερ ἂν εἰ θείμην αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον, εἰπόντα ω ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι, τὸν 344 δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ω Πιττακε, ὦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· 20 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἄλλα γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόρῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυμμένου, χαλεπὸν ἁλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἁλαθέως ὅρθος ἐπὶ ἕσχατῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπίοντα πάντα τοῦτο 25 μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως ἐρήται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι εἰρημένων ἀπο-

Β δεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποίηται· πάνυ γὰρ χαρίεντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἄλλα μακρὸν ἄν εἰ ἄυτὸ ὑπὸ διελθεῖν· ἄλλα τῶν τύπων αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν 30 καὶ τὴν βουλήσιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐλεγχός ἐστὶν τοῦ Πιττακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

XXX. Δέξει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὅλγα διελθῶν, ὡς ἄν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν

A. Ρ.
καλετὸν ἀλαθέως, οἵν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ τὴν χρόνον τινά.
γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει
cαι εἶναι ἄνδρα ἄγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Κ
Πιττακέ, αὐδυάτον καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρώπειον,
ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τούτο ἐχοῖ τὸ γέρας,
ἀνδρὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι,
ἀλλ' ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.
10 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαίρει ἐν πλοίῳ ἄρχει; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἱδίωτην· ὥς ἢρ ἱδίωτης
ἀεὶ καθόρηται· ὡσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενον τις ἂν
καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτα ποτὲ καταβάλοι
ἀν τις, ὡστε κείμενον ποιήσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ,
15 οὖτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον οὕτα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν δ συμφορὰ καθέλου, τὸν δὲ ἂεὶ ἀμήχανον οὕτα οὐ·
cαὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμών ἐπιπεσον ἀμή-
χανον ἂν ποιῆσειν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπή ὃρα ἐπελ-
θοῦσα αμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ιατρὸν ταύτα ταύτα·
20 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὡσπερ
cαὶ παρ' ἄλλοι ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖ τοῦ εἰστὸνος
αὐτάρ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθος τοτὲ μὲν κακὸς, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλὸς·
tὸ δὲ κακῶ ὡστ' ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἂεὶ εἶναι Ε
25 ἀνάγκης· ὡστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ
ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ, οὐκ ἔστι
μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι· οὐ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν
ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν
(δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλὸν, ἐμμεναι δὲ ἀδυνατον·
30 πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἄγαθος,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.
tίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἄγαθὴ πράξεις ἐστῖν, καὶ | τίς 345
ἀνδρὰ ἄγαθὸν ποτειε εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἂ
τούτων μάθησις· τίς δὲ εὐπαγία ἄγαθον ιατρόν
ποιεῖ; δήλου ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας 35
μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ιατρὸς
γένοιτο; δήλου ὅτι ὁ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ιατρὸς
εἶναι, ἐπειτα ἀγαθὸς ιατρὸς· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς
γένοιτο· ἥμεις δὲ οἱ ιατρικῆς ὕδωται οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ
γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὐτε ιατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες 40
Β οὔτε ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιοῦτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ιατρὸς ἂν
γένοιτο κακὸς πράξας, δήλου ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ιατρὸς.
οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἄνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ
κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ τόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ
ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὐτὴ γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ 45
πράξεις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθήναι ὃ δὲ κακὸς ἄνὴρ οὐκ
ἀν ποτὲ γένοιτο κακὸς· ἔστω γὰρ ἂεί· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει
κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.
ὡστε καὶ τούτο τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι
C εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἰον τε, διατελοῦντα 50
ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἰον τε, καὶ κακὸν γε
τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτων· ἐπὶ πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστοὶ
eἰσιν οὖς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

XXXI. Ταῦτα τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν
ἐίρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπίστατα γε τοῦ ἄσματος
ἐτὶ μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γὰρ· 5
τούνεκεν οὖ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ
γενέσθαι δυνατόν
διεζήμενος κενεάν ἐσ ἀπρακτόν
ἐλπίδα μοὴραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμομον ἀνθρωπον, εὐρυδοὺς ὅσοι
κατὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
D ἐπὶ θ' ὕμιν εὐρων ἀπαγγελέω,
φησὶν· οὗτος σφόδρα καὶ δ' ὄλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξ-
ἐρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ρήματι.

Simonides is content to praise a moderately good man: he seeks not for perfect virtue." Conclusion of Socrates' speech.
πάντας δ’ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκών ὡστις ἐρδη
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μά-
χουται.
καὶ τούτ’ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τούτ’ εἰρημένου. οὐ
γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Συμωνίδης, ὡστε τούτους
φάναι ἑπαίνειν, δὲ ἂν ἐκών μηδὲν κακὸν ποιή, ὡς
οὕτων τινῶν οὐ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ
σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι τούτο, ὅτι οὐδὲς τῶν σοφῶν ἄνδρῶν
ηγεῖται οὐδὲνα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ
αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εὐ Ἐ
ίσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες
ἀκόντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Συμωνίδης οὐχ ὅς ἂν
μὴ κακὰ ποιή ἐκών, τούτων φησίν ἑπαίνετης εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἐκών. ἦγεῖτο
γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κάγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἑπαναγ-
κάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἑπαίνετήν, οἷον 346
ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκο-
τον ἡ πατρίδα ἡ ἀλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων. τοὺς μὲν
οὖν πονηροὺς, ὅταν τοιούτοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὡσπερ
ἀσμένους ὅραν καὶ ψέγοντας ἑπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατη-
γορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἡ πατρίδος, ἢν
αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι
μηδ’ ὁμελίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσίν, ὡστε ἥτι μάλλον
ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐχθρας ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἐ
ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ’ ἀγαθοὺς ἑπικρύπ-
τεσθαι τε καὶ ἑπαίνειν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι
ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἡ πατρίδι ἅδικηθέντες,
αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι
προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ

† Post ἑπαίνετην add. codd. φιλεῖν καὶ ἑπαίνειν.
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

οὐ οὖσαν τότε θυραννῶν ἂλλοι τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐπαινεῖσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἔκοιν, ἄλλ' 45

C ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταύτα δὴ καὶ τὰ Πιττακὸν λέγει ὅτι ἐγὼ, ὁ Πιττακόν, οὐ διὰ ταύτα σε ψέγω. ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψυχος, ἐπεὶ ἐμοίγ' ἐξαρκεῖ ὅσον μὴ κακὸς ἢ μὴ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμμος· εἰδώς γ' ὑνησίπολιν δίκαν ὑγίης ἀνήρ. οὐ μὴν ἔγώ μοιήσομαι (οὐ γὰρ εἰμὶ φιλόμομος)

τῶν γὰρ ἠλθίον

ἀπείρων γενέθλια· ὅστ' εἰ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπληθείη ἄν ἐκείνους μεμφόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖς τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέ-μικταί.

ὁ δ' οὖ τοῦτο λέγει, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, δὸς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται. γελοιον γὰρ ἂν εἰπ' πολλαχῇ ἄλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὅστε μὴ ψέγων καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἀνθρωπον, εὐρυδεὺς ὅσοι καρπον αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπὶ θ' ύμῖν εὐρών ἀπαγγελέω. ὅστε τοῦτο γ' ἕνεκα 65 οὐδένα ἐπαινεσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἢ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιή, ὃς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταύθα κέχρηται τῇ τὸν

Ε Μυτιληναίων, ὁς πρὸς Πιττακὸν λέγει τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἕκοιν (ἐνταύθα δεῖ ἐν ἕν τῷ ἐκόν. διαλαβέων λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσχρῶν, ἄκων δ' ἐστιν οὕς ἔγω ἐπαίνω καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὁ 347 Πιττακόν, ὁ χώκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐψέγων. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γὰρ
75 καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταυτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

XXXII. Ταυτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, Συμανίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τούτο τὸ ἄσμα. καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφ', ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι, ἐφ', καὶ ἔμοι λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐ ἔχων, ὅν ὑμῖν ἐπὶ-β δεῖξω, ἃν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναὶ, ἐφ', ὃ Ἰππία, εἰσαύθις γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιον ἔστων, ἀ ὁμο- 
λογοσάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλων Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἑρωτάν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἑρωτάν τὸν ἔτερον. καὶ ἐγώ εἰπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἐγώγε Πρωταγόρα ὅποτερον αὐτῷ ἔδων· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἄσματος τε καὶ έπὶ τν ἔασωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὅν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ σε ἡρώ- 
tησα, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἡδέως ἀν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμπο- 
20 σίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλους δὲ ἑαυτῶν συνειναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαίδευσις, τιμίας Δ ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθούμενοι ἄλλο-
25 τρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλους σύνεισιν· ὅποιον δὲ καλοὶ κάραθαι συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἃν ἰδοισ οὐτ' αὐλητρίδας οὕτε ὁρχηστρίδας οὕτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἀνευ τῶν 
30 λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς,
λέγοντας τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως,
Ε κἂν πάνυ τολύν ὦνον πῶσιν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδες συννουσίαι, ἕαν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἰούπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φαινιν εἰναι, οὔτε δέονται ἀλλοτρίας 
φανής οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὐς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἰον τ' ἔστιν 35
περὶ ὧν λέγοντιν ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φαινὶ τῶν ποιητῆς νοεῖν, 
οἱ δὲ ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλέγομενοι δ ἀδύνατος ἐξελεύγαν. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συννουσίας
348 ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοὶς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, 40
ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πειραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες 
καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς ποιοῦτος μοι δοκεῖ χρὴν μᾶλ-
λον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμὲ τὲ καὶ σὲ καταθεμένους τοὺς 
ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς 
λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν 45
πειραν λαμβάνοντας· κἂν μὲν βούλῃ ἐτὶ ἐρωτῶν, 
ἐτοιμὸς εἰμὶ σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ 
βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχεις, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπανσα-
Β μεθα διεξιόμενε, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθείναι. λέγοντος
οὖν ἐμοὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἄλλα ὦδ᾽ ἀπεσάφει 50
Πρωταγόρας ὅποτερα ποιῆσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκι-
βιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας· Ὡ Καλλία, δοκεῖ 
σοι, ἐφι, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ 
ἐθέλων εἶπε δῶσει λόγον εἶπε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὦν 
δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἦτοι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ 55
ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδὸμεν,
Σωκράτης δὲ ἠλλὰ τῷ διαλέγεται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν
C βούληται ἄλλῳ. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθεῖς, ὡς 
γέ μοι ἐδοξῆ, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος 
καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν τι 60
τῶν παρόντων, μονὴς προντάπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι 
καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτῶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινοῦμενος.
Socrates again formulates the question to be discussed, "Are wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, five names for one thing, or are they all parts of virtue, differing from one another?"

Et loco postulat: "Socrates again, (having) formulated the question to be discussed, "Are wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, five names for one thing, or are they all parts of virtue, differing from one another?"

έπειτα οὖν διαλέγεσθαι μὲ σοί ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἄπορώ ἀκάστοτε, ταύτα διασκέψασθαι. ἤγοιμαι γὰρ πάνω λέγειν τι τοῦ "Ομηρον τὸ σὺν τε δὺ ἐρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνόησεν.

εὐπορώτεροι γὰρ πως ἀπαντήσει εἰμεν οἱ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς ἄργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα. μοῦνος δ᾽ εἶπερ τε νόησῃ, αὐτίκα περί πόνων ἤστεὶ ὅτι ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ᾽ ὅτι βεβαιῶσεται, ἐὼς ἄν ἐνυχθῇ. ὤσπερ καὶ ἐγώ ἕνεκα τοῦ τοιοῦτοι ἄδεως διαλέγωμαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τίλη, ἤγοιμενὸς σε βέλτιστον ἐν ἐπισκέψον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ δὲν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖν τοῦ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπεί ἀρέτης. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σὲ; ὅσ γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὁ οἷος καλὸς καγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ των ἄλλων αὐτοί μὲν ἐπιεικεῖσι εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν: σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἁγαθὸς εἰ καὶ ἄλλους οἶδο τ᾽ εἰ ποιεῖν ἁγαθοὺς. καὶ οὔτω πεπίστευκας σαντῷ, ὅστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ᾽ ἀναφαίνοι τε σαντὸν ἀποκρυφάμενος εἰς πάντας 349 τοὺς "Ἑλλήνας, σοφίστην ἐπονομάζον, σαντὸν ἀπεφήνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἀριστηθαί. πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρῆν παρακάλειν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἔρωτι καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔστι οὕτως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἐκείνα, ἀπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμοῦ ἢ ἄρχης τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθήναι παρὰ 30 σοῦ, ὁ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἢν δὲ, ὅσ ἐγχύμαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ δεός φοιλα καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσίωτης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε
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όντα ὅνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἑστιν, ἢ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὅνομάτων τοῦτων ὑπόκειται τις ἰδίως οὐδὲ καὶ πράγμα ἔχον ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν ἑκαστὸν, οὐκ ὃν ὤν 35 τὸ ἑτερον αὐτῶν ὁ ἑτερον; ἐφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὅνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἑκαστὸν ἰδίῳ πράγματι

C τῶν ὅνομάτων τοῦτων ἐπικείσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἄλληλοις καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μορία ἐστὶν, 40 ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μορία ἐστὶν καὶ ἄλληλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαι ἑκαστὰ δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἐτι ὡσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τούτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἑγώγη οὐδὲν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, εάν πη ἄλλῃ 45 νῦν φήσῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, εἰ τότε ἀποτελεί·

D μενὸς μοι ταῦτα ἔλεγες.

XXXIV. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, λέγω, ὅ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μέν ἑστὶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήγια ἄλληλοις ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρείᾳ πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὥδε δὲ γνώσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἄληθεν λέγω' εὕρησεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄδικοτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνόσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστότατους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφέροντας.

Ἐ' Ἐχε δή, ἐφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον γὰρ ταύτι ἐπισκέψασθαι δ ἔλεγες. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἐτας γ', ἐφη, ἐφ' ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἑναὶ. Φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλὸν ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον 15 σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν ὄν, ἐφη, εἰ μή
μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέν τι
αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ τι καλὸν, ἢ ὀλον καλὸν; "Ολον
πον καλὸν ὡς οἴδων τε μάλιστα. Οἴσθα οὖν τίνες
20 εἰς τὰ φρέατα | κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; "Εγώγε, ὃτι 350
οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δ' ἄλλο
ti; "Οτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων
πολέμειν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἵππικοι ἢ οἱ
ἄφισσοι; Οἱ ἵππικοι. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχουσι;
25 οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μῆ; Οἱ πελταστικοὶ. καὶ τὰ
ἀλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες
τῶν μὴ ἐπιστημένων θαρραλεώτεροι εἰσίν, καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἔαντον, ἐπειδὴ μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. "Ἡδὴ δὲ τι
τίνας ἐώρακες, ἐφη, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας
30 ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἑκαστὰ τούτων; "Εγώγε,
ἡ δ' ὡς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρ-
ραλέοι οὖν καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσίν; Αἰσχρόν μεντάν,
ἔφη, εἴη ἢ ἀνδρεία. ἐπει οὖν γε μαίνομενοι εἰσίν.
Πῶς οὖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς
35 θαρραλέους εἰσί; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὖν, οὐ
ἡ δ' ἐγὼ, οἱ οὖν θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ
μαίνομενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφῶσται
οὖν καὶ θαρραλεώτατοι εἰσίν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ
ὄντες ἀνδρεώτατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ
40 σοφία ἄν ἀνδρεία εἰ; Οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις,
ὅ Σώκρατες, ὃ ἐλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἐγώ-
γε ἐρωτηθεῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν,
ὁμολογησα; εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ
ἤρωτήθην; εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἦρως, εἶπον ἄν ὅτι οὐ
45 τάντας; τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρεῖους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ
ἐμὸν ὀμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθοὶς
ὁμολόγησα. ἑπείτη τοὺς ἐπιστημένους αὐτοὺς ἔαυ-
τῶν θαρράλεωτέρων ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἔσται τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταύτων εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ 50 μετίων καὶ τὴν ἴσχυν οὐνθεῖσι ἃν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὕτω μετίων ἔροιο με εἰ οἱ ἐσχυροὶ δυνατοὶ εἰσίν, φαίνω ἂν· ἐπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαιεῖς δυνατώτεροι εἰσίν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαιεῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, 35 ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίνω ἂν· ταύτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογησάντως ἐξείη ἃν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίως τούτοις, λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὁμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστίν ἴσχυς. ἐγώ δὲ οὐδαμοὶ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ὁμολογῶ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἴσχυροὺς εἰναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἴσχυροὺς 60 δυνατοὺς· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων εἶναι δύναμιν τε καὶ ἴσχυν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας τε καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, ἴσχυν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κακεὶ οὐ ταύτων εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ ἀνδρείαν· 65 ὡστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρράλεους εἰναι, μὴ μέντοι τοὺς τε θαρράλεους ἀνδρείους πάντας· θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥστε ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν το γίγνεται.

XXXV. Λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφη, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ξῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς; Ἐφη. Ἀρ' οὖν δοκεῖς σοι ἀνθρώπος ἄν εὖ ξῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδύνωμενός ξῆν; Ὅυκ ἔφη. Τὰ δ', εἰ ἤδεως βιοῦ τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοι', ἔφη.
Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἦδεως ξῆν ἄγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἄνδρος κακόν. 
Εἴπερ τοὺς καλοὺς γ', ἔφη, ξῆν ἦδομενος. Τι δὴ, 

10 ὁ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σὺ, ὁστεροὶ οἱ πολλοὶ, ἦδε 
ἐττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἄγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, 
καθ' ὁ ἦδεα ἐστὶν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαθά, μὴ 
ei tι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβῆσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὕθις αὖ 
tα ἀνιαρὰ ὁμαντῶς οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὁσον ἀνιαρὰ, 

15 κακὰ; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, 
ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾶς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν, ὡς τὰ ἦδεα 
te ἄγαθά ἐστιν ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά. ἀλλά 
μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ 
ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρινασθαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς 

20 πάντα τῶν ἄλλων βίον τῶν ἐμοῖ, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἄ 
tῶν ἦδεων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἄ 
tῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστιν κακά, ἔστι δ' ἄ ἐστιν, καὶ τρίτων 
δ' οὐδέτερα, οὕτε κακὰ οὕτ' ἄγαθά. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, 

25 ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, οὐ τὰ ἢδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἢδο- 

νῆν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν λέγω, καθ' ὁσον 
ηδέα ἐστιν, εἰ οὐκ ἄγαθά, τὴν ἢδονήν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν 
eι οὐκ ἄγαθόν ἐστιν. Ὅστερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάσ 

tote, ὁ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς 

30 λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνει 

τὸ τε καὶ ἄγαθόν, συνχαρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότε 

ηδὴ ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, σὺ 

βουλεῖς ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγόμαι; 

Δικαιο, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις 

tοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τρ' δὲ πτ' την καταφαίεις 

35 ἀν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὁστερεὶ τις ἀνθρώπων σκοπῶν 352 

ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ πρὸς υγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τῆς 
tοῦ σώματος ἑργῶν, ἵδων τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς 

χεῖρας ἄκρας εἶποι· ἦδι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ
στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξιν, ἵνα ἐπισκέψομαι σαφέστερον. καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτον τι ποθὸ πρὸς τὴν 40
σκέψιν. θεασάμενος ὁτι ὁ线路 ἐχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδί, ὡς φής, δέομαι τοιοῦτον τι εἰπεῖν. ἦθι
dὴ μοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τὸδε τῆς διανοίας ἀπο-
B καλυψον πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότεροι καὶ
tοῦτο σοι δοκεῖ ὡσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ 45
ἄλλως; δοκεὶ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμην τοι-
οῦτον τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἤγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἄρχικὸν
eῖναι οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ὄντος διανοοῦται,
ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν
eπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν 50
θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονὴν, ἐνιότε δὲ ἐρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι
C περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὡσπερ περὶ ἀνθραπόδου, περιελ-
κομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἂρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ
tοιοῦτον τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἡ καλὸν τε εἶναι ἢ 55
ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶδον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἕαντερ
γνωσία ὁ πᾶς τὰ γαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἄν κρατήθηναι
ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἀλλ' ἢττα πράττειν ἢ ἄν ἡ
ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἰκανὴ εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν
βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡσπερ ὑπὸ 60
λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ἀμα, ὡσπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἀισχρὸν
D ἐστὶ καὶ ἔμοι σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων
κράτιστον φαναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων.
Καλὸς γε, ἐφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. ὅσθα
οὖν ὁτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ 65
οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς φασὶ γνωσίσκοντας τὰ
βέλτιστα οὐκ ἑθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ
ἄλλα πράττειν καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὃ τι τοτὲ
αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τούτο, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασὶν ἤττομένους
70 ἡ λύτης ἡ ὄν νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τινος τούτων ἐκρατούμενος ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἴμαι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ἡθι δὲ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἄνθρωπος καὶ διδάσκειν ὁ ἐστιν 75 αὐτὸς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡμᾶς ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γυνώσκειν γε αὐτά. Ἰσωσ γὰρ ἂν λέγοντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὁ ἄνθρωποι, ἄλλα ψευδεσθε, ἐροῦτ᾽ ἂν ἡμᾶς. ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ 80 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τι ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, καὶ τί ὡμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε εἶναι; εὔπατον ἡμῖν. Τι δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, δεδ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἄνθρωπον, οἱ τι ἂν τύχωσέ τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Οἴμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, B 85 εἰναι τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τάλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πόσ ποτ᾽ ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἐδοξῆν ἡμῖν, ἐμέ ἡγήσασθαι, ἦ ὦμαι ἂν ἐγώγας κάλλιστα φανερῶν γενέσθαι, ἐποῦ. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον, ἐδῷ 90 χαίρειν. 'Αλλ᾽, ἐφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὦσπερ ἡμᾶς.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔρωντο ἡμᾶς. τι οὖν φατὲ τοῦτο εἶναι, δ ἡμεῖς C ἢττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εὔποιμ ἂν ἐγώγας πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁδῆ· ἀκούετε δὴ· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρω- ταγόρας φράσαι. ἀλλο τι γὰρ, ὁ ἂν- θρώποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε—οἶοι πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἠδέων ὄντων, γυνώσκουτες


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δὲ αὐτὰ τὴν φατείν ἐναὶ; πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἑδοὺς τὰῦτην ἐν τῷ παραξερήμων παρέχει καὶ ἢδύ ἐστὶν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὦστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἀλλα τουαῦτα πολλὰ 15 παρασκευάζει; ἡ κἂν εἰ τοῦτον εἰς τὸ ὦστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ’ ἂν κακὰ ἢν, ὃ τι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀπηροῦν; ἢ’ οἰόμεθ’ ἂν αὐτοῖς, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ’ τι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτής 20 τῆς ἑδοὺς τῆς παραξερήμων ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστίν, ἐ ἄλλα διὰ τὰ ὦστερον γυγυόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τάλλα. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἴμαι, ἐφ’ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν ταύτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. Ὁὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας 25 354 ποιεῖ; ὁμολογοῦσθαι οὖ, ὅς ἐγὼ μὲν. Συνέβη ο Πρωταγόρας. Ὁὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὁ ἀνθρώποι, ὦμιν, ὅς φαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δ’ οὐδὲν ἀλλό ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα, ἡ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελεῦτα καὶ ἀλλων ἑδοὺν ἀποστερεῖ; ὁμολογοῦσθαι οὖ; Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν 30 ἀμφοῖν. Ὁὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροίμεθα· ὁ ἀνθρώποι οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ ἄγαθα ἀνιώρᾳ εἶναι, ἀρα ὅτα τοιάδε λέγετε, ὅσον τα τε γυγυάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεων τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακείων καὶ 35 λιμοκτονῶν γυγυμένας, ὅτι ταύτα ἄγαθα μὲν ἐστὶν, Β ἀνιώρᾳ δὲ; φαίνειν ἂν; Συνεδόκει. Πότερον οὖν κατὰ τὸ δὲ ἄγαθα αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραξερήμων ὦδόνας τὰς ἐσχατὰς παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὄστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαν τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὑγιονται 40
καὶ εὐθεῖα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαν καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαῖ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαίεν ἄν, ὅς ἐγὼμαι. 

Συνεδόκει. Ταῦτα δὲ ἄγαθα ἐστὶ δι’ ἄλλο τι, ἣ ὅτι εἰς ἥδονας ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπᾶς; ἡ ἐξετεί τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὁ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἄγαθα καλεῖτε, ἀλλ’ ἥ ἥδονας 

καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἄν φαίεν, ὅς ἐγὼμαι. Οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη ο Ἡρωταγώρας. Ὁ γὰρ τῆν μὲν ἥδονὴν 

dιόκετε ὡς ἄγαθον ὅν, τῆν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς 

50 κακῶν; Συνεδόκει. Τοῦτ’ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ’ εἶναι κακῶν, 

τῆν λύπην, καὶ ἄγαθον τῆν ἥδονὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ 

tὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακῶν εἶναι, ὅταν μειζὸνον 

55 τινὸς ἄλλο τὸ χαίρειν κακῶν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τὶ D 

τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχουτε ἄν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· 

ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ’ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἐφη ο Ἡρω- 

60 ταγώρας. Ἀλλ’ τι οὖν, πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ 

λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ 

λυπεῖσθαι ἄγαθον, ὅταν ἡ μείζονας λύπας τῶν ἐν 

αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλαγῆ ἡ μείζονας ἥδονας τῶν λυπῶν 

65 ἡρωταγώρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἐφη δὲ ἐγὼ, εἶ μὲ ἀνέροισθε, ὁ ἀνθρώποι, τίνος οὖν 

δὴ πολλὰ πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχότι; 

συγγεγρώσκετε μοι, φαίην ἄν ἐγώγε. πρῶτον μὲν 

γὰρ οὐ βάδιον ἀποδείξαι, τί ἐστίν ποτὲ τούτο, ὁ ὡμείς 

70 καλεῖτε τῶν ἥδονῶν ἥπω εἶναι· ἐπειτα εὖ τούτῳ εἰσὶν 

πᾶσαι ἐάν ἀποδεῖξεις. ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι
355 ἐξεστιν, εἰς τὴν ἐχέτει ἀλλο τι φάναι | εἰναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονῆν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἀλλο τι τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδεῖος καταβιώναι τὸν βίον ἀνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μη ἐγείρετε μηδὲν ἀλλο 75 φάναι εἰναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, δὲ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοιοῦ τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε, ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἀνθρωπος, ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτὰ, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, 80 ἐπὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖ θὶς θὰ λέγετε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων δὲ άνθρωπος ταῦτα πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρήμα ἡδονᾶς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἠττόμενοι.

XXXVII. Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοιὰ ἔστιν, κατάδηλουν ἔστιν, εἰς μὴ πολλοὶς ὄνομασι χρώμεθα ἄμα, ἤδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυ- 85 ων καὶ ὄνομασιν προσαγορεύσωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἐπειτὰ αὖθις ἤδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ. τέθεμοι δὴ 90 οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρω- πος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἔστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν 95 οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τὰ ἤττόμενοι, φήσομεν· ὅπι τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἐξέστιν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὄνομα μετελήφθην ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὑπὸ ἀγαθῶν· ἐκεῖνος δὴ ἀπόκρισεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἠττόμενοι· ὑπὸ τῶν ἠττόμενοι—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσει νῦν Ἰήσον. ἂν οὖν τύχῃ ὁ ἐρώμενος 100 ἡμᾶς ὑβριστής ἂν, γελάσεται καὶ ἔρει· ἡ γελοιοῦν

D λέγετε πράγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακὰ, γιγνώσκων ὅτι 105 κακὰ ἔστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἠττόμενον ὑπὸ

A. P.
τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἀρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἄξιων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν
20 ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἡ ἄξιων; φήσομεν δὴ λόγον
οτὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὃτι οὐκ ἄξιων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄν
ἐξημάρτανεν ἃν φαμεν ήττω εἰναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. κατὰ
tι δὲ, φήσει ὅσως, ἀναξία εστίν τὰ γαθά τῶν κακῶν ἡ τὰ
caká τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείξοι,
25 τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἢ; οὐχ ἔ
ἐξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δήλου ἀρα, φήσει, ὃτι τὸ
ηττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἁγαθῶν μείξοι
κακά λαμβάνειν. ταύτα μὲν οὖν οὔτω. μεταλάβομεν
δὴ τὰ ὄνοματα πάλιν τὸ ἥδυ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς
30 αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὃτι ἀνθρωπός πράττει,
tότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν τὰ ἀνιαρά,
γιγνώσκων, ὃτι ἀνιαρά ἐστίν, ἦττωμεν ύπὸ τῶν
ἡδεῶν, δήλου ὃτι [ ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τὸς ἄλλο 35
ἀναξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύτην ἐστίν, ἂλλ’ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἄλ-
λήλων καὶ ἐλλειψις; ταύτα δ’ ἐστὶ μείξω τε καὶ σμι-
κρότερα γιγνώμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ
μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον. εἰ γὰρ τις λέγω ὃτι ἄλλα πολὺ
dιαφέρει, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἥδυ τοῦ εἰς τὸν
ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδεος καὶ λυπηροῦ, μῶν ἄλλω τῷ,
40 φάινην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἡ ἡδονῆ καὶ λύτη; οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ’ ὅτῳ
ἄλλω. ἂλλ’ ὀστερ ἀγάθοι ἵσταναι ἀνθρωπος, συνθεῖς Β
τὰ ἡδεά καὶ συνθεῖς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ
πόρρω στῆσας ἐν τῷ ἄγω, εἰπὲ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.
ἐάν μὲν γὰρ ἡδεά πρὸς ἡδεά ἐστις, τὰ μείζω ἀει καὶ
45 πλείω λυπητέα· εάν δὲ λυπητά πρὸς λυπητά, τὰ ἐλάτ-
τω καὶ σμικρότερα· εάν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπητά, εάν
μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλλεται ύπὸ τῶν ἡδεῶν, εάν τε
τὰ ἐγγύς ύπὸ τῶν πόρρω εάν τε τὰ πόρρω ύπὸ τῶν
ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πράξιν πρακτεόν ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταύτ’ C
εὖν: έαν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα υπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα: 50 μὴ πη ἄλλη ἔχει, φαίνη αὐ, ταῦτα, ὦ ἀνθρωποί; οἷδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκεῖνοι. 'Οτε δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τὸδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ἡμῖν τῇ ὑφει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζον, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἔλαττω. ἦ οὐ; Φήσουσι. 55 Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὤσατως; καὶ οἱ φωναὶ αἱ ἑσαὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; 

D Φαίειν ἄν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὗ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μῆκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, 60 τὸς ἵν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἄρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἦ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἦ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἂνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ 65 σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἀκιροὺ μὲν ἂν ἐποίησεν τούτῳ

Ε τὸ φαντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἄληθες ἦσυχιαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ἰσχὺν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἄληθεὶ καὶ ἐσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῦν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σοφείν ἂν τέχνην, τῷ ἄλλῃν; Τὴν μετρητικὴν, ὁμολογεῖ. Τί δ', εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτιον αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἦν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, ὅποτε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὅποτε τὸ ἐλαττῶν, ἦ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐαυτὸ ἦ τὸ ἐτερον πρὸς τὸ ἐτερον, εἰτ' ἐγγὺς εἶτε πόρρω εἶ, τὸ ἂν 75 357 ἐσφοιν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἢ ἂν ἢ ὁμολογήσῃ; καὶ ἄρ', ἄν ἂν μετρητικὴν τίς, ἐπειδὴ ήπερ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἐνδείξ ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἄρτιον, ἄρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητικῆ; ὁμολογοῦν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἂνθρωποί, ἦ οὖ; 'Εδόκουν ἂν καὶ τῷ Πρω-80 5—2
ταχύρα ὀμολογεῖν. Εἶπεν, ὦ ἀνθρώπου· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡ ἡδονὴς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφανῇ ἦμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου ἡθοῦ, τοῦ τε πλεὸν καὶ ἐλάττωνος καὶ μείζουνος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρου β 85 καὶ ἑγγυτέρω, ἀρα πρῶτον μὲν ὁ μετρητικός φαινεται, ὑπερβολὴς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὐσα καὶ ἱσοτητὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; ἂλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκη δὴτο τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν.

'Ἡτις μὲν τοινυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὐτή, 90 εἰςαύθης σκεψομέθαν, ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, τοσοῦτον ἔξαρκεί πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἢν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὄν ἡρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἡρεσθε δὲ, εἰ c μέμνησθε, ἢνικα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλως ὠμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖ, 95 ὅποιον ἂν ἐνῇ, καὶ ἡδονής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἐφατε τὴν ἡδονήν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὠμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἡρεσθε ἡμᾶς. ὁ Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡτ- 100 τάσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τὶ ὑμεῖς αὐτῷ φατε δ εἶναι; εὑπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εὐ- πομέν ὅτι ἄμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ ἔξαρμα-

τάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τούς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτί ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικής· ὁ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη πράξει ἂνεν ἐπιστήμης ιστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἁμα- Ε 110 θία πράττεται. ὡστε τούτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἢττω εἶναι, ἄμαθία ἢ μεγίστη· ἂς Πρωταγόρας ὃδε φησὶν ιατρὸς
XXXVIII. Ταύτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι
5
| ἂν ἤμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρον ἐρωτῶ, ὁ Ἰππίας τε καὶ Πρόδικος—
κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἐστὼ ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—
πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ
ψευδεσθαι. 'Τπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἀπασίν ἀληθῆ εἶναι
τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὄμολογεῖτε/ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν ἢδυ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακὸν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου
tοῦδε διαφεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραίτομαι· εἴτε γὰρ

Now fear is expectation of evil; and as no one willingly enters on what he believes to be evil,
ο ὃν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἔτι γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἐρχεται οὐδ’ ἔτι ἀ οἰεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔω-κεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, ἐπὶ ἀ οἰεται κακὰ εἶναι ὁ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυνάν κακοῖς τὸ ἐπερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρῆσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον. "Ἀπαντα ταῦτα συνεδο-κεί άπασιν ἦμιν. Τί οὖν; ἐφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτε τι δέος καὶ φόβοι; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὃ Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῖς τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβοι εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. 'Εδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Πρόδικος δὲ Ε δέος, φόβος δ’ οὖν. 'Αλλ’ οὐδέν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὃ Πρόδικε, διαφέρει, ἄλλα τὸδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθέλησε ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἀ δεδοι-κεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἢ μή; ἡ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων; ἢ γὰρ διδοικεν, ὁμολογηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἡγεῖται κακὰ, οὐδεναι οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἑκόντα. 'Εδόκει καὶ ταῦτα | πᾶσιν.

XXXIX. Οὐτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὃ Πρόδικε τε καὶ Ἰππία, ἀπολογείσθω ἦμιν Πρωταγόρας ὧν, ὅ το πρῶτον ἀπε-κρώνοτο, πῶς ὄρθως ἔχει, μη ὅ το πρῶτον παντάπασιν· τότε μὲν γὰρ ἄρῃ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδέν ἐφη εἰναι τὸ ἐπερον οἶνον τὸ ἐπερον, ἰδιὰν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστὸν ἔχειν δύναμιν—ἄλλ’ οὔ ταῦτα λέγω, ἄλλ’ ὅ τὸ ὑστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὑστερον ἐφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῆς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλους εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνω πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἀλλῶν, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, Β γνώσεσθαι δὲ μ’ ἐφη τεκμηρίω τοῦδε· εὐρήσεις γὰρ, ὃ Σωκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ
άδικοτάτους καὶ ἀκόλουστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαδεστάτους,
ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ ὃ γνώσει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἄν-15
δρέα τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἔγω εὐθὺς
tοτε πάνω ἑθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
ἐπειδὴ παῦτα μεθ’ ύμων διεξῆλθον. ἥρομην δ’ οὖν
tοῦτον, εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὅ δὲ, καὶ

C ἵτας γ’, ἐφη. Μέμνησαι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα 20
ἀποκρινόμενος; Ὄμολογει. Ἰθι δή, ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰπὲ
ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ
ἐφ’ ἀπερ οἱ δειλοὶ; Οὐκ ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἔτερα;
Ναὶ, ἢ δ’ ὦς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἔπτι τὰ θαρράλεα
ἐρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρείοι ἔπτι τὰ δεινά; λέγεται δὴ, ὁ 25
Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἀλήθη, ἐφη

D ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φής
ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἀρ’ ἔπτι τὰ δεινὰ, ἡγομέ-
νους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἔπτι τὰ μῆ; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ’, ἐφη,
ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοὺς λόγους ἀπεδείχθη ἀρτί ὅτι ἀδύ-
νατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἀλήθὲς λέγεις· ὡστ’
ei τοῦτο ὅρθως ἀπεδείχθη, ἔπτι μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἠγεῖται
εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἐρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἦττω εἶναι έαυτῳ
ηὕρεθη ἀμαθία οὕδα. Ὄμολογει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔπτι ἃ ἔγε
θαρροῦσιν πάντες αὐτ’ ἐρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, 35
καὶ ταῦτα γε ἔπτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἐρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ

Ε οἱ ἀνδρείοι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πᾶν γε
τοῦναντίον ἐστίν ἐπὶ ὅ οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἐρχονται καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρείοι. αὐτικὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν
ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἐφην ἐγώ, καλὸν 40
ὅν ἕναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλὸν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν·
tὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσαι ἀγαθὰς ὠμολογή-
σαμεν. Ἀλήθη λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
45 Ὄρθως γε, ἐφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ | ποτέρους φής εἰς τὸν 360
πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν λέναι, καλὸν ὅν καὶ ἀγαθὸν;
Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἢ ὃς ὁς. Οὕκοιν, ἢν ὃ ἐγώ, εἰπερ.
καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἱδύ; 'Ωμολογηταί γοῦν, ἐφη.
'Αρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν λέναι
50 ἐπὶ τὸ κόλπιον τε καὶ ἀμείνων καὶ ἱδίου; 'Αλλὰ καὶ
tοῦτο ἐὰν ὀμολογῶμεν, ἐφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἐμ-
προσθεν ὀμολογίας. Τί δὲ ὁ ἄνδρεως; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ
kόλπιον τε καὶ ἀμείνων καὶ ἱδίου ἔρχεται; 'Ανάγκη,
ἐφη, ὀμολογεῖν. Οὕκοιν ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρεοι οὐκ αἰσ-
χρῶν φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ
θάρρη χαρροῦσιν; 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ,
ἄρ' οὖ καλά; 'Ωμολογεῖ. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;
Ναι. Οὕκοιν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ
μαυρόμενοι τοῦναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται
55 καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη χαρροῦσιν; 'Ωμολογεῖ. Θαρροῦ-
σιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν
καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὔτως ἔχει, ἐφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δὲ ὁς
dειλοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ δειλοὶ, δειλίαν ἢ ἄνδρειαν καλεῖς;
Δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἐφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν
ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν δντες; Πάνα γ', ἐφη. Διὰ ταύτην
ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσὶν; 'Ωμολογεῖ. Δι' οδὲ
dειλοὶ εἰσὶν, δειλία ὀμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη.
Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἄν
eἰη; 'Επένευσεν. 'Αλλὰ μήν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον
70 ἁνδρεία δειλία. 'Εφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ
dεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τοῦτον ἀμαθία ἐστίν;
Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐτί ἐπένευσεν. 'Η δὲ τοῦτον ἀμαθία
δειλία; Πάνα μόνης ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. 'Η σοφία
ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἁνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία
75 οὖσα τῇ τοῦτον ἀμαθία; Οὔκετι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ' ἐπι-
νεύσαι ἥθελησεν ἔστηγα τε· καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπὼν· Τί δή, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φής ἢ ἔρωτώ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτῶς, ἐφί, πέρανον. "Εν γ’, ἐφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρὸμενος ἐτί σέ, εἴ σοι ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτί δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τινας ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἄνδρεύτατοι δέ. 8ο Φιλονίκειν μοι, ἐφη, δοκεῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. χαριούμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀδύνατον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

XL. Οὐτοί, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ, ἀλλιών ἑνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέφασθαι βουλύμενος, πῶς ποτ’ ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἄρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἄρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτον

361 φανερῶν | γενομένου μάλιστ’ ἀν κατά-

δηλον γένους ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγου ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὅσι οὐ διδακτὸν ἄρετή, σὺ δ’ ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτη ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνῇ λάβοι, 10 εἴπειν ἀν ὅτι ἀτοποὶ γ’ ἐστέ, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἄρετή ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ ταναντὶα σπεύ-

V. δεις, ἐπισχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὃς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ 15 ἄνδρεια, ὁ τρόπῳ μάλιστ’ ἀν διδακτὸν φανείη ἡ ἄρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλο τι ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἄρετή, ὡσπερ Πρω-

ταγόρας ἐπισχειρεῖ λέγειν, σαφῶς οὖκ ἢ ἦν ἢ διδακτῶν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὥσι σὺ σπέυδεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτόν ὃν. Πρω-

ταγόρας δ’ αὖ διδακτῶν τὸτε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τούναντίον

C ἑοίκεν σπεύδοντι, ὅλιγον πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτῷ ἡ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἀν ἦκιστα εἶν ἔδακτόν. ἐγὼ
οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἂνω κάτω
25 ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμιὰν ἔχω καταφανῆ
αὐτὰ γενέσθαι. καὶ βουλοῦμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας
ημᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὃ τι ἐστὶ, καὶ πάλιν
ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ
didaktὸν, μὴ πολλάκις ημᾶς ὁ Ἑπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ
30 ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλη ἔξαπατήσας, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄ
διανομῇ ἠμέλησαν ἡμῶν, ὡς φήσον ὑμᾶς τι. ἤρεσεν ὁδὴ
καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἑπιμηθέως
ὅς χρώμενος ἔγω καὶ προμηθοῦμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου
tοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύσαμαι, καὶ
35 εἰ σὺ ἐθέλοις, ὡσπερ καὶ κατ᾽ ἄρχας ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ
ἂν ἡδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποῖν. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
Ἔγω μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Ῥόκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυ-
μίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε τάλλα Ἕ
οίμαι κακῶς εἰναι ἀνθρωπος, φθονερὸς τε ἡκιστᾷ ἀν-
40 θρώπων, ὑπὲρ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς τολλοῦς δὴ εἰρήκα, ὃ
τι ἄν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἁγαμαί σε, τῶν μὲν
tηλικούτων καὶ πάνω, καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι ὁδὴ ἄν θαυ-
μάζοιμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἱέναι ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφία.
καὶ περὶ τοῦτον δὲ εἰσαύθη, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν·
45 νῦν δ’ ὧρα ἡδὴ καὶ ἔπει ἄλλο τι | τρέπεσθαι. Ἀλλ’, ἦν 362
δ’ ἔγω, οὐτὸς χρή ποιεῖν, εἰ σου δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ
οὕτε ἐφην ἐνεῖα πάλαι ὧρα, ἄλλα Καλλία τῷ καλῷ
χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.
ταῦτ᾽ εἰτόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.
NOTES.

Πρωταγόρας ἡ σοφισταλ· ἐνδεικτικός. This is how the title appears in B, except that ἐνδεικτικός (which is absent in T) is apparently from a later hand. Plato probably called the dialogue Πρωταγόρας (compare the titles Crito, Euthyphro, etc.—the majority of the dialogues are named after an interlocutor): the words ἡ σοφισταλ and ἐνδεικτικός were added by Thrasylus, whose date is about the Christian era. The Protagoras is the sole example of an 'endeictic' dialogue: it is so called because it was thought to be an arraignment (ἐνδείξις) of the Sophists. That this is the meaning of ἐνδεικτικός, and not 'probative', can be inferred from the fact that Albinus used ἔλεγχικος in its place (ἐλεγχογῆ εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους Ch. v. Cobet takes the right view: see his edition of Diog. Laert. iii 51). The arrangement of the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies is also probably due to Thrasylus. The Protagoras is the second dialogue of the sixth tetralogy, the others being (1) Euthydemus, (3) Gorgias, (4) Meno. See Grote’s Plato, Vol. i p. 158 foll.

CHAPTER I.

Socrates meets a friend, who asks him to describe his interview with Protagoras.

1. πόθεν—ὤραν. The opening words of Cicero's translation of 309 A the Protagoras are preserved by Priscian (vi 63): "quid tu? unde tandem appares, o Socrate? an id quidem dubium non est, quin ab

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1 B denotes the Bodleian ms = Bekker's Φ: T a manuscript in the library of St Mark's at Venice (append. class. 4 cod. i) = Bekker's τ. The former is the best representative of the mss of the first class: the latter is supposed by Schanz to be the source of all the mss of the second class.
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Alcibiade?" ἦ = Latin an? introduces a second question intended to forestall Socrates' answer to the first: compare Apol. 26 ἐπὶ τῶς μὲ φής διαφθείρειν, ὥς Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἦ δὴ λοι δὴ ὅτι κτλ.;

2. κυνηγεσθοῦ—ὡραν. For the metaphor in κυνηγεσθοῦ Sauppe quotes Soph. 222 ὡς τῶν ἐρωτῶν θήρᾳ τὸν νυν, ὥς εὐκας, οὕτω προσεχέεες and Xen. Mem. I 2. 24 Ἀλκηβιάδης—διὰ μὲν κάλλος—θηρώμενος κτλ. τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκηβιάδου ὡραν (=τὸν ὡραῖον Ἀλκηβιάδην, cf. θη δ' Ἡρακλῆθι for βίας Ἡρακλῆς) is a slight παρὰ προσδο-

κίαι as in the English: 'From hunting, no doubt—after the young and blooming Alcibiades'. It was part of Socrates' habitual irony to pretend to be in love with young men of ability (cf. the words of Alcibiades in Symp. 316 Ἰπικόμενος Ηρακλῆς and 216 Ἐ: see also infra, note on 310 A line 38).

3. καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ. καὶ μὴν is merely 'well' as in Phaedo 84 ἔν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν—τάλαθν οὐ ἔριο. The second καὶ goes with πρόγραμ: 'well, it was only the other day that I saw him etc.' In the next line καὶ ἀνήρ is in the predicate: the readings of Bekker (ἀνήρ) and Athenaeus (ὁ ἀνήρ) are less good. ἀνήρ μὲντοι is 'but yet a man')(παῖς. At the age of 18 an Athenian ὑπὸ ἀνδραὶς ἐνεγράφετο.

5. ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν—ὑποτιμοπλάμενοι. αὐτοῖς—μονοῖς is emphatic as in the usual αὐτοῖ γὰρ ἐσμέν and therefore precedes ἡμῖν. ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήθησαι apologises for ἀνήρ μὲντοι: for this use of ὡς γ' cf. Euthyd. 307 A ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τάλαθν εἰρήθησαι and infra 339 Ἐ: καὶ in καὶ πῶγονος is 'and' not 'even'. ὑπο—ὑποτιμοπλά-

μενος is diminutive, like sub- in Latin. So in 312 ἢδη γὰρ ὑπεφαινέν τι ἡμέρας.

7. οὐ σοῦ μέντοι. “In interrogationibus haec particula” (μέν-

τοι) “ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quiserit summam veritatis ingerit speciem” (Hoefer, de particularis Platonici, p. 34).

The idiom is very frequent in Plato, e.g. Rep. I 339 Ἐ, Crat. 439 Α, Theaet. 163 Ἐ. Translate ‘You don’t mean to say that you dis-

approve of Homer’.

309 Β 8. ὃς ἔφη χαριστάτην ἣβην κτλ. Homer II. xxiv 348 and Od. x 279 πρῶτον ὑπενήθη τούτερ χαριστάτη ἢβη. Το insert τὴν (with Hirschig) before ἢβην would make the reference to Homer less precise. The line in Homer refers to Hermes, and Sauppe quotes Clement to shew that sculptors modelled their busts of Hermes after Alcibiades.
12. εὖ ἐμοι γε ἔδοξεν, sc. διακείσθαι. Socrates replies to his friend's second question (καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διακείεται;) first, and to his first question (ἡ παρ’ ἐκείνου φαίνει;) second, in the words καὶ ὅν καὶ ἄριτ ἀν’ ἐκέλων ἐρχομαι, where ὅν marks the regression to the earlier inquiry. Both B and T read ἐρχομαι by mistake for ἐρχομαι: ἐρχομαι is found in a Vienna codex (suppl. phil. gr. 7) which Kral and Wohlrab place along with B in the first class of MSS.

16. οὔτε προσείκον—ἐπελαυθανόμην τε. τε following οὔτε throws emphasis on the second clause: e.g. Apol. 26 C παντάπασι με φής οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοῦς τοῦ τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδόσκειν. The idiom is very common in Plato (e.g. infra 347 E, 360 D, 361 E) and corresponds to neque—que or (more frequently) neque—et in Latin. For the interchange of pronouns ἐκείνον—αὐτοῦ see on 310 D.

21. καὶ πολὺ γε, i.e. καλλίον ἐνέτυχον.

25. Ἀβδηρίτη. Abdera, on the coast of Thrace, was the birthplace of Democritus and of Protagoras. The reputation of the city for heaviness and stupidity seems not to be earlier than the age of Demosthenes: see pseudo-Dem. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον 23 ὡσπερ ἐν Ἀβδηρίταις ἦ Μαρυνεταις ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις πολιτευόμενοι and Cic. ad Atticum VII 7. 4.

27. ὑέος. Schanz writes υέος in conformity with the general usage of inscriptions about Plato's time, but MSS upon the whole favour υέος: see the Editor's note on Crito 45 C.

28. τὸ σοφώτατον. So the MSS: Schanz and others read σοφώτερον, apparently the reading of Ficinus, who translates the word by sapientius. Socrates however is thinking of Protagoras, who is not σοφός, but σοφώτατος (line 32): the effect of the neuter τὸ σοφώτατον is to generalise the statement into a kind of adage. σοφώτερον would introduce a somewhat frigid comparison between Alcibiades and Protagoras in respect of wisdom; and it should also be noted that the MSS reading σοφώτατον was more likely to be changed to σοφώτερον by mistake than vice versa. There may be an allusion to some proverbial form of speech resembling that in Theognis 255 καλλιστον τὸ δικαιώτατον λῄστον δ’ ἐγκαίνειν κτλ.: cf. also the Scholium referred to in Gorg. 451 E. The sentiment is an interesting anticipation of the Stoic paradoxes as to the beauty of the wise man.

30. ἀλλ’ ἦ expresses surprise and interest: 'What! have you just left etc.' So in Gorg. 447 A ἀλλ’ ἦ τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τιν
NOTES ON I 309 C

309 D 33. σοφωτάτους εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. The interest is sustained by reserving the name of Protagoras to the end.

310 A 37. πάνυ γε τολλά καὶ εἰπάν χτ. Sauppe places a comma after πάνυ γε, but it suits the rapid movement of the dialogue better to take πάνυ with τολλά.

38. τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω. Literally 'why didn't you relate', i.e. 'tell us at once'. So in 317 D τί οὖν—οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν; This construction of τί οὖν and τί οὖν οὐ is common in animated conversational style, especially with the second person: e.g. Gorg. 503 B τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτῶν ἔφρασας τίς ἔστω; = φράσου ὅτι τάχιστα—οὐκ ἀν φθανός φράξων as Thompson remarks.

τὴν ἥνοικαν recalls συνγεγονός in line 36. The continual use of the words συνέδω, συγγεγένθαι, πλησίαζεν, λέναι ἐπὶ, ἐρῶν and the like to denote the relation between learner and teacher in Plato's dialogues depends upon the conception of the philosophical impulse as ἔρως: see Symp. 210.

39. ἔξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τοῦτον. The slave was doubtless in attendance on the Friend.

42. ἀκούστε. From this, as well as from ἡμεῖς and ἀκούστε, it appears that the Friend was not the only listener.


CHAPTER II.

Socrates begins his story. Hippocrates called on him at an early hour and entreated him to apply to Protagoras on his behalf.

1. ἔτη βαθέως ὁρθροῦ. ὁρθρός βαθὸς is the period just before daybreak: ὁρθρός is the morning twilight, and βαθὸς implies that it was more dark than light: Crito 43 A. A similar use of βαθὸς is seen in the expressions βαθεία νῦς and βαθεία ἐστέρα.

2. Ἡπποκράτης—Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός. Hippocrates is known only from this dialogue. δὲ without preceding μὲν is regular in such twofold descriptions of a person: Sauppe refers to Aesch. Pers. 151 μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασιλεία δ' ἐμῆ and Hdt. vii 10 πατρὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ,
5. ἢμι ἐπειγόμενος. So BT: neither in the 3rd singular of such forms nor elsewhere do Plato's MSS always avoid hiatus. Schanz (Vol. XII p. xv) would insert the v ἐφελκυστικῶν in such forms before a vowel, unless a pause follows.

9. Ἰπποκράτης, ἕφην, οὗτος. We have followed Heindorf in printing a full stop after οὗτος. Heindorf (following Ficinus) correctly takes the words as an aside; Socrates recognises Hippocrates by his voice. The neuter comparative of νέος regularly implies that the new is worse than the old: see on Euthyphr. 2 a.

10. εἴ μή ἀγαθὰ γε. Compare Ar. Knights 186 μὸν ἐκ καλὸν εἴ κἀγαθῶν; μὰ τὸν θεὸν, εἴ μή’ κ ποιηρῶν γε and Blaydes in loc. The idiom originally meant 'unless by νεώτερα you mean ἀγαθὰ', which would be a contradiction in terms, since νεώτερον is κακῶν. Preceded by οὖδὲν it has come to mean little more than 'except good'.

12. τρόπην: see 309 D τρίτην γε ἡ ὡδὴ ἠμέραν.

14. ἐσπέρας γε: χθές is unnecessary, as the Athenians counted the interval between two sunsets as one day (Kroschel, referring to Varro ap. Gell. Noct. Att. III 2. 4).

ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκληποδος. The σκληπος was a low stool or bed. According to a Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 254 the word means properly a 'lame stool' (χωλὸν κραββάτου) and is connected with σκυμπάξεων = χωλαίνειν. ἐπιψηλαφῶ is followed by the accusative where it does not (as here) contain the idea of search for, e.g. in Rep. II 360 A (ἐπιψηλαφώτα τῶν δακτύλων).

17. Οἰνόης. Oenoe (probably = the Wine-country) was a δῆμος in the φυλὴ Ἰπποθοωντίς, near Eleutherae, on the road to Thebes. The slave had endeavoured to escape across the frontier into Boeotia. There was another δῆμος of the same name near Marathon, belonging to the φυλὴ Αλατίς.

19. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον. For this sense of ἐρχομαι ('come back') Heindorf quotes Lysias ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου § 4 ἀλλ’ ἦλθομεν πρὶν τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυλῆς εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατελθεῖν πρότερον πένθ’ ἠμέραις.

21. ἀδέλφος. So (not ἀδελφός) the MSS. The article is not rarely omitted with names denoting relation, as we usually omit it with 'father' and 'mother'. See Kühner's Griechische Grammatik II p. 522. The force of ἔτι is 'late though it was'. δὲ is commonly omitted after ἐπειτα and εἰτα: so infra 350 D πρῶτον
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μὲν γὰρ—ἐπείτα : Symp. 211 A πρῶτον μὲν ἄδει ὅν—ἐπείτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλῶν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρῶν.

310D 23. πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. The plural is idiomatic: cf. Symp. 217 D διελεγήμεν ἄδει πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν: Ar. Clouds 2 ο Ἡράκλειον τὸ χρήμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὑφόν. So μέσαι νύκτες for 'midnight'. "In quibus loquendi formulæ" remarks Heindorf “νύκτες horas nocturnas denotant”.

24. ὁ ὕπνον ἀνήκεν is modelled on Homer (e.g. Π. ΠΙ 71 ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὸς ὕπνος ἀνήκεν), but Plato gives a different turn to ἀνήκεν by adding ἐκ τοῦ κόπου, where ἐκ is 'from', not 'after' (as Stallbaum thinks). Note presently that ὅπως to introduce the apodosis after participles is especially common in Plato: cf. infra 314 C, 326 D.

26. ἀνδρείαν. ἀνδρείας occurs in much the same sense in Meno 81 D ὁδὸν καλῶν—τὰλλα πάντα αὐτῶν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐὰν τις ἄνδρείας ἦν καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ θητῶν. σοι is emphatic and should therefore be accented, like οὐ in line 31.

27. ἀδικεῖ. ἀδικεῖν is often used of a past injury because the injury is regarded as continuing till atonement is made: see on Crito 50 C.

30. ἃν αὐτῷ δίδῳς ἀργόροιν καὶ πεῖθες ἐκεῖνοι. For the variation of pronouns cf. Euthyphr. 14 D ἄλλα μοι λέξον τίς αὐτῇ ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς; αὐτεῖν τε φης αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκεῖνοις; supra 309 B and infra 318 C. The change is most frequent where the second pronoun is different in case from the first: compare Classen on Thuc. I 132. 5. Cobet ejects the words καὶ πεῖθες ἐκεῖνοι, but they are supported by the parallel expression of 311 D ἃν μὲν ἐξικνήσει τα ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πεῖθωμεν αὐτῶν.

31. ὁ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ i.e. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ. The exclamation is common: see Blaydes on Ar. Plutus 1.


310E 33. οὔτε τῶν φίλων. The English idiom would lead us to expect οὔτε τῶν τῶν φίλων: but in Greek the double article is avoided by substituting 'my friends' for 'my friends' property'. Analogous is the usage known as comparatio compendiaria, e.g. κύριαι Χαρίτεσσαι ὁμοια (Π. ΧVII 51), where 'the Graces' is put for 'the Graces' hair'.

ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα. See on Apol. 23 B. ταῦτα = ἄλλα ταῦτα is frequent in Plato and Aristophanes.

37. οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεδήμησεν. Probably about 445 B.C., if
the date of action of the dialogue is 433—432. (See Introd. p. xxxvi.) Protagoras went to Thurii in 443 B.C. being charged by Pericles to draw up a code of laws for the new colony.

41. Καλλίας τῷ Ἰππονίκου. Callias, son of Hipponicus, belonged to one of the richest families in Athens (infra 337 D αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως—τῶν μέγατων καὶ διξιώτατων οἶκων τῶν·). His devotion to the ‘Sophists’ in general is remarked upon in Apol. 20 αὐθτὶς τῇ τετέλεκτῃ χρήσει σοφιστικῆς πλείω η ἐξουσιώσας οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίας τῷ Ἰππονίκου (cf. Crat. 391 κ): but he seems to have been particularly attached to the doctrines of Protagoras: see Theaet. 164 ε ὁ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ἥ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου (i.e. Προταγόρου λόγων) ἐπιτροπής. One of his two sons (Apol. 20 A), Protarchus, appears as an interlocutor in the Philebus. In 393—392 Callias was associated with Iphicrates in the command of the Athenian forces at Corinth, and as late as 371 we find him acting as ambassador to Sparta (Xen. Hell. vi 4). It appears that he spent all his money and died in actual want (Athenaeus XII 52).

42. μῆτω, ὁμάθε. The MSS have μῆτω ἐκαθέ: probably the archetype had μῆτωγαθέ, by a natural mistake. Cobet rejects ἐκείνη ἐλευθεριν, reading μῆτω γε, on the ground that with μῆτω γε the Greek idiom does not repeat the verb: but there is no proof that the verb could not be expressed with μῆτω (without γε).

43. δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν. Herwerden needlessly suggests that ἐξαναστάντες should be read, or εἰς τὴν αὐλήν rejected: εἰς τὴν αὐλήν goes with ἐξαναστῶμεν: cf. εἰς δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστήσωμαι in Theages 129 δ. δεῦρο we should translate by ‘here’: ‘let us rise and go out into the court here’. Classic Greek does not admit of τῇδε in such a case: see Cobet’s Novae Lectiones p. 91.

CHAPTER III.

Socrates cross-examines Hippocrates as to his purpose in putting himself under Protagoras, and elicits from him that his object is liberal education.

1. ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν. For ἀναστάντες after ἐξαναστῶμεν cf. infra 314 c where ἐπιστάντες is followed by στάντες, 328 ε ἐπεκδιάζει—ἐξειδιδάζει: 331 c διεξελεδότας—ἐξελεδέων: Phaedo 104 δ ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δῆ, φαμέρ, ἡ ἐναντία ἴδεα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἄν τούτῳ ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἄν ἔλθοι—ἐλράξετο δὲ γε ἢ περιττή; Euthyd. 281 c οὐκ ἐλάττων πράττων ἐλάττω ἄν ἐξαμαρτάναι,
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82 Phaedo 50 B: Crito 44 D: Crat. 399 A—B.

311 B 2. ἀποσπειρώμενος—διεισδύον. ρύμη of strength of will and resolution (cf. ἀνθρεία above 310 D) as in Polit. 259 C πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ρύμην. γνώμης, the suggestion of Hoenebeek, would be much less forcible and exact.

8. ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ κτλ. ἄν goes with ἀπεκρίνω in line 13. The application of the similes follows in B, and each illustration contains two subordinate protases, viz. (in B) (1) εἰ ἔπενεις—ἐκείνω, (2) εἰ τίς σὲ ἥρετο, and (in C) (1) εἰ δὲ—ἐκείνως, (2) εἰ τίς σὲ ἥρετο. With this multiplication of protases Heindorf compares Meno 74 B μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὕτωι ἔχει περὶ παντὸς: εἰ τίς σὲ ἄνεργοι τούτο ὦ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστι σχήμα, ὦ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἄπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχήμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστιν ἡ σχήμα τί; εἶπες δὴ ποῦ ἄν ὅτι σχήμα τί. The reasoning from analogy is quite in Socrates’ style: see for example Gorg. 44 B foll.

9. Ἰπποκράτη—τῶν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. It is unnecessary (with Naber) to bracket Ἰπποκράτη. Hippocrates, the founder of medical science, born about 460 B.C. in Cos, was at the height of his renown about the year 400. He is referred to also in Phaedrus 270 C (εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἰπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τί πείθεσθαι) as holding the view that the human body could not be understood apart from ἡ τοῦ ὄξου φύσις. The expression τῶν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν constituted a sort of medical degree, since it marked a man as one of the ‘sons of Asclepius’—a recognised school of medicine in Cos and Cnidus. See Blümmer Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 354.

311 C 15. Πολύκλειτον—Φείδιαν. As Hippocrates was the leading doctor, so Polycitus and Phidias were the foremost sculptors of the fifth century B.C. in Greece. Polycitus is not elsewhere mentioned in Plato (except infra 328 C): according to Pliny (Nat. Hist. xxxiv 55) he was born at Sicyon, but Argos was the centre of his school. Phidias is referred to in Meno 91 D οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἐνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἦ Φείδιαν τε, δι' οὗτῳ περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλος δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν and in Hipp. Maior 290 A—D.

21. εἶναι—παρὰ δὲ δὴ. εἶναι is explained by Timaeus in his Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum as expressing συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. According to the testimony of ancient grammarians the particle was pronounced εἶν with inter-
vocalic aspiration as in ταῦτα. See note on Apol. 18 E. The rough breathing may possibly be due to popular etymology from εἰά ἐν, ἐν being used as in ἐν μὲν τὸν ἦδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων Aesch. Eum. 589. In the best MS of the Republic (Paris A) εἰάν is regularly written, and the same orthography is found in B, e.g. Gorg. 466 c. δὲ δὴ is used to introduce the application as in 312 E. See also note on 357 A infra.


27. εἴπε μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτες. ἄγε, φέρε, ἱδὲ, εἴπε are not rarely used in addressing subjects in the plural. Compare Ar. Peace 383 εἴπε μοι τὰ πάσχετ' ἄνδρες: Pl. Euthyd. 283 b εἴπε μοι, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ἱμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι. The exhortation or command is in general primarily addressed to one man: contrast however infra 330 b and Lach. 186 E σὺ δ', ὃ Λάχις καὶ Νικλα, εἴπετον ἡμῖν ἐκάτερος.

30. ἄλλο γε, i.e. other than the name 'Protagoras'. It is more 311 E in accordance with Plato's usage to make the first question end with the first ἄκοβομεν, and regard the ὡσπερ clause as introducing the second question τι τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἄκοβομεν; This second question is rejected by Cobet as spurious, but the punctuation which we have adopted seems to remove the difficulty. The ὡσπερ clause defines in advance the meaning of τοιοῦτον: for this and for the asyndeton compare Sophist. 258 b—c πότερον οὖν—δὲλ θαρροῦντα ἦδη λέγεν ὅτι τὸ μη δὲν βεβαιός ἐστι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον; ὡσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μῆ μέγα μῆ μέγα καὶ τὸ μῆ καλὸν μῆ καλὸν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ἦν τε καὶ ἐστὶ μὴ δὲν, ἐνάρμον τῶν πολλῶν οὕτων εἶδοι ἐν; Crat. 394 A—B: Theact. 172 D with Heindorf's note. See also 330 A ὡσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου, where the same punctuation should be adopted. In line 33 the MSS read ἥκοβομεν by mistake for ἄκοβομεν.

33. σοφιστήν—εἰναι. On σοφιστήν see infra, note on 312 C. γε implies that Protagoras may be a sophist only in name. εἰναι is frequently used with verbs of naming: compare Lach. 192 a ὃ ἐν
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πὰσων ὄνομαξεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι. Cobet's suggestion to read εἰεν, ἑφη, ὡς for εἶναι, ἑφη. ὡς is ingenious but needless.

36. αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ—παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν, sc. τι ἐν ἀποκρίναυι;

38. ὑπεφαίνειν τι ἡμέρας. Ὑποφαίνει ἡμέρα is used, as Heindorf says, de die illucescente. Here τι ἡμέρας = 'something of day', 'some daylight'.


41. εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας σαυτόν. εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας goes with παρέχων: cf. Symp. 179 B ἰκανήν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεσται—εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας. Young men of fashion were fond of looking to Greek, as opposed to Athenian, public opinion. The MSS have αὐτὸν, but the use of the third personal reflexive pronoun for the first and second in the singular number does not seem to be certain in Plato: and it is simplest to suppose that σ fell out after Ἐλλήνας: Schanz Vol. vii p. xii.

44. ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην. οὐ goes closely with τοιαύτην, and μὴ is virtually 'perhaps' (originally 'lest' as in ἄρα μὴ Theaet. 145 B): 'but perhaps after all (ἄρα) this is not the kind of learning which etc.' Compare Euthyd. 290 εἰ ἄλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἢν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών. Apol. 25 άλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οἷς εἰ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους. Meno 89 C μὴ τούτῳ οὐ καλῶς ὑμολογήσωμεν. In all of these passages it is better to take μὴ in this way than as equivalent to Latin num. From this use of μὴ grew up the use of μὴποτε = 'perhaps', frequent in Aristotle and later, e.g. Eth. Nic. x 2 1173 a 22 μὴ ποτί οὐ λέγουσιν τὸ αἰτίον.

46. οἷατερ ἡ παρά is the reading of T: B has οἷα περὶ. The γραμματισταί of Athens were Schoolmasters, who besides teaching reading and writing (cf. infra 326 D) translated (ἐρμηνεύειν) Homer and interpreted his γλώτται. They were distinct from the γραμματισκοὶ or κριτικοὶ who pursued more scientific literary and grammatical studies. The κιθαριστής and γραμματιστής between them taught μουσική, and the παιδιστής γυμναστική; and μουσική and γυμναστική were the two parts of παιδεία or liberal education: Rep. ii 376 Ε.

48. ἐπὶ τέχνη—ἄλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία: cf. 315 A ἐπὶ τέχνη μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσῶμενος. The distinction between professional and liberal (ὡς τὸν ἁμαρτήν καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει) education is fre-
quently emphasized by Plato (see especially Laws 1 643 D): his word for the latter is always παιδεία, cf. Gorg. 485 λ, Rep. vi 492 ε. The ‘arts’ are throughout the Republic looked on as βαναυσί, and unfit for men whose souls are free.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates continues his cross-examination, and reduces Hippocrates to ἀπολα.

3. παρασκέυαι θεραπεύσαι ἄνδρι σοφιστῇ. The word παρέχω 312 ε is often used of putting oneself in the hands of a doctor: compare Gorg. 456 ε φάρμακον πιέων ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καθαίρει παρασκεύαι τῷ λατρῷ. ἄνδρ is regularly used (mostly in a complimentary sense, real or feigned) with words which denote one’s profession, standing or the like, e.g. ἄνδρ μάντις, ἄνδρο νομείς, ἄνδρες δικασταί; compare Euthyphr. 15 D. For παρασκεύαι Cobet reads παρέχειν, but if MSS can be trusted, Plato used the aorist infinitive with μέλλω tolerably often: see Schanz Preface to Symposium p. vii.

7. οὔτ' εἰς ἄγαθόν οὔτ' εἰς κακόν πράγματι. So in Gorgias 520 B οὐκ ἔγχωρειν μέμφεσθαι τοῦτῳ τῷ πράγματι (their pupils) δ αὐτόν παιδεύοιν. Here Socrates uses the most general form of expression because ex hypothesi nothing is yet known as to the sophist: cf. infra 330 ε ἡ δικαίωσθην πράγμα τι ἐστών ἡ οὐδέν πράγμα; Cases like Crito 53 D οὐκ οἶει δοξηθεὶν ἂν φανεροθεὶ τῷ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; are somewhat different and contain a slight admixture of contempt: see the Editor’s note in loc.

8. οἱμαλ γ' εἰδέναι. Hippocrates oίειαι εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδῶs: he is thus, according to Socrates, in the worst of all states: compare Apol. ch. vi foll. Socrates now proceeds to convict him of ignorance.

10. ἀφορ rapeμομα λέγει—τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμων. Hippocrates derives σοφιστής from σοφός and (ἐπ') ἵστ (αμαλ) “quasi sit ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἵστη” (Heindorf, comparing the derivation of Ἡφαιστος in Crat. 407 C from Φάεος ἵστωρ). The correct derivation is perhaps given by Suidas s.v.: σοφιστής καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος ὡς σοφίζων (cf. σωφρονίζω = make σωφρος), but -ίζω is very elastic in meaning, and σοφίζω may very well mean ‘play the σοφός’.

14. τῶν τί σοφῶν. τῶν πρὸς τί σοφῶν would be more precise, 312 D but the accusative of reference is preferred for brevity. For the construction Kroschel compares Theages 125 C τῶν τί σοφῶν
NOTES ON IV 312 D

συνώναρ φής σοφός εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους; where however σοφόν is masculine. The neuter of σοφός is not here used ironically as in Theaet. 157 C παρατήθη οίκαστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

17. ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν. Heusde suggested ἐπιστήμων after ἐστίν, but the sense can be supplied out of the -ωτής of σοφιστής, according to the derivation of the word just given: the full sense is as it were ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν (σοφ)ιστής.

18. τί ἂν ἀποκρινομέθα αὐτῷ. There is no need to change the verb to ἀποκρινομέθα, as was done by Bekker to suit ἔρωτο: compare infra 354 A εἰ ἐρωτεύει—φαίνει ἂν and Phaedr. 259 A εἰ δὲν ἰδοὺει—δικαίως ἂν καταγελῶσιν.

πολασ ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης. These words are not of course part of the imaginary questioner’s interrogation, but are spoken by Socrates to help out Hippocrates’ answer. Socrates suggests that Hippocrates should say that the sophist is ἐπιστάτης of some sort of ἐργασία, but in order that the answer should come from Hippocrates himself, he substitutes for the desired answer: ‘(The sophist is) ἐπιστάτης—of what kind of ἐργασία?’ Hippocrates then replies by explaining the ἐργασία, viz. τὸ ποιήσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. The full grammatical construction would be πολας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης (ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀποκρινομέθα ἂν αὐτῷ); If we take this view, it is not necessary to insert ἐστίν after ἐπιστάτης (with Hirschig).

Note that ἐπιστάτης is substituted here for ἐπιστήμων: it is clear from Crito 47 B that Plato connected the two words—probably because both contain the syllable -στής—ασ as in ἔστω: he frequently plays on the similarity of form between ἐπιστάμαι ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστάτειν: see the Editor’s note on ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαινεῖν in the Crito l.c.

19. τί ἂν ἐπημεν—ὁ Σοκράτης; Hippocrates is on the verge of ἀπορία, and merely throws out his suggestion ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιήσαι δεινὸν λέγειν for what it is worth. The words ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιήσαι δεινὸν λέγειν are strictly speaking a reply to the question of Socrates πολας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; for τοῦ ποιήσαι δεινὸν λέγειν answers πολας ἐργασίας, and but for the intervening clause (τί ἂν ἐπημεν αὐτῶν εἶναι;) the word ἐπιστάτην would have been in the nominative.

Thus explained, the mss reading need not be changed. The next best view is to read (with Schanz) τί ἂν <εἶ> ἐπημεν αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὁ Σοκράτης, ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιήσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;
23. ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς κτλ. Compare Gorg. 449 E and 451 A foll., where much the same reasoning is employed to discover τί ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ἀπόθεμα ὧν ὁδοῖ οἱ λέγοι εἰσίν, ὡς ἡ ὑποτική χρήσει (Gorg. 451 D). Rhetoric and Sophistic were regarded by Plato as sisters: cf. Gorg. 464 B foll. The clause ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς κτλ. is logically the protasis to εἶναι ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς κτλ. see on 311 E above.

25. εἶναι ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστής. For εἶναι and δὲ δὴ see on 311 C 312 E above.

27. δὴ λοι ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστασθαι. Stahl’s emendation (ἐπιστασθαι for ἐπισταται), which had occurred to us independently, seems to be certain. Most editions read ἢ δὴ λοι ὅτι περὶ οὗπερ καὶ ἐπιστασθαι; inserting ἢ before δὴ λοι (with Heindorf) and giving the words to Socrates, but it is surely more natural to regard them as giving Hippocrates’ reply to Socrates’ question, in which case δὴ λοι ὅτι is right. The MS reading ἐπιστασθαι gives a non sequitur; for the harpist makes one δεῦσι λεγεῖν περὶ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα i.e. περὶ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπιστασθαι, not περὶ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν i.e. ἐπισταται. The next sentence τί δὴ ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστής καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν πουεῖ (sc. ἐπιστασθαι); in no way invalidates the reading ἐπιστασθαι: it is everywhere assumed in the Platonic writings that he who makes others know has knowledge himself: see for example Alcib. 111. 3 οὐκ ἀδεθ’ ὅτι χρῆ τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὡς τοὺς αὐτῶς πρὸς τὴν εἴδέναι; ἢ οὗ; τῶς γάρ οὗ; and ibid. 113 C, 118 C.

30. οὐκέτι. See below on οὐκέτι in 321 D.

CHAPTER V.

Socrates points out that Hippocrates is running a grave risk in submitting himself to one of the ‘Sophists’ without knowing what ‘Sophist’ means.

3. ἢ ἐλ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κτλ. For ἢ compare Crito 50 E ἢ πρὸς 313 A μὲν ἡρα σοι τὸν πατέρα—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἡρα καὶ τῶν νόμων ἔσται σοι; and for the general form of the sentence Apol. 28 E ei ὅτι μὲν—τοῦ μὲν—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος—ἐνταύθα δὲ, Meno 94 C—D, Gorg. 512 A: see the Editor’s note on Apol. l.c.

5. πολλὰ ἄν περιεσκέψοι: but ἔθει in line 4 and παρεκάλεσις in 8. The effect is to represent the process of reflection by oneself as prior to consultation with friends. Heindorf on Gorg. 514 B quotes a
parallel from the Theaetetus (144 E): ἀτὰρ εἴ, νῦν ἐχθυτῶν ἐκατέρου λῦμαν, ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡμίσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἄν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεοικεψάμεθα ἄν (i.e. should have inquired first) εἰ μονοκὸς ὑπὸ λέγοι;

9. τὴν ψυχήν. Compare (with Heindorf) Rep. ix 583 E δ Μηταξίδι ἀρν νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἥσυχαν, τοῦτο ποτε ἀμφοτέρα ἑσται. ἐν ὧ δε présenté is like ἐν τούτῳ in 310 D where see note: Heindorf cites Eur. Iph. T. 1057 καὶ ταύτι ἀν ὡμιν ἐστιν ἡ καλὸς ἔχειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι. For καὶ ὧ δε we should at first sight expect καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ: for the Greek idiom is Relative+Anaphoric pronoun, not Relative+Relative when the two pronouns have the same antecedent and are connected by a conjunction: e.g. Gorg. 452 D τι ἐστι τούτῳ δ ψῆς ὑπὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—καὶ δε δημιουργοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ: see the Editor's note on Apol. 40 A. Here however the fact that the relative precedes its antecedent (δ δὲ περὶ πλείουν —περὶ δὲ τοῦτον) makes the rule inoperative; and there are other exceptions: e.g. Rep. 11 374 B καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐὰν ἐκάστῳ ὄνομα ἐν ἀπειδομουν, πρὸς δ̆ περὶκει ἐκατός καὶ ἑφ' ὧ ἐμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχόλιον ἄγων διὰ βλου ἀντὶ ἐργαζόμενον—καλὸς ἀπεργάζεσθαι, and Theaet. 192 B καὶ δ ὃθεν καὶ δ ἀλαθάνεται (where however Bonitz rejects the second δ, perhaps rightly).

313 V 14. τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ. Heindorf's suggestion τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ τῷ ξένῳ would convey a somewhat different meaning, viz. 'this arrival, the foreigner'. The presence of ἀφικομένῳ renders the article after τούτῳ unnecessary: cf. infra 337 E τὸ ἀκριβῆς τοῦτο εἶδος. There is some contempt in τούτῳ=isti (see note on Apol. 45 A), and much scorn in τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, repeated slowly at the end of the clause.

15. ὀβριός: the MSS have ὀβρίων by mistake. The adjectival construction of this word is found in Laws XII 961 B δεῖν δὲ ὀβρίων εἶναι τῶν σύλλογων.

20. γνωσκεῖς. The present is regularly used of being acquainted with a person: e.g. Phaedo 60 A ξανθίππης, γιγνώσκεις γάρ: Theaet. 144 C ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν. γιγνώσκω. In Plato the perfect is generally used of knowing things: e.g. Apol. 23 B ὅτα—ἐγνωκεν δι' κτλ., Euthyphr. 2 C τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέαν.

οὗτε διελέξαι οἰδεπάποτε, sc. αὐτῷ: cf. on 313 A line 9 above.

313 C 22. ὤ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν is wrongly rejected by Cobet.
The words are to be taken closely with τὸν δὲ σοφιστήν ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστων φαίνει ἄγνοιῶν: that Hippocrates should entrust himself to that of which he knows nothing is the climax of Socrates' rebuke.

23. έλευκαν: see εἶναι, i.e. be true (not ἐμὲ ἄγνοεῖν, which is doubtful Greek for έλευκα ἄγνοεῖν). The subject is simply 'it', as in Rep. 1 333 c where έλευκαν is similarly for έλευκα εἶναι.

25. τυγχάνει ὁ — ψυχή τρέφεται. τυγχάνει ὁ is virtually equivalent to 'really is': cf. Gorg. 468 D οἶδενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῶ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὁν κάκιον, and note on Euthyphr. 4 e. The εμπόρος is a travelling merchant who trades on a larger scale than the retail dealer or καπτῆλος: see Rep. II 371 D ἥ ὁ καπτῆλος καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὄντην τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦμεν ἵδρυμένου ἐν ἄγορα, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἑπὶ τὰς πόλεις εμπόρους; The same account of the Sophist as εμπόρος τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθῆματα (Soph. 231 E) is given in Soph. 223 c—224 E.

26. φαίνεται γὰρ ἐμοίγε τοιούτος τις. We follow Schleiermacher in giving these words to Socrates. Turner judiciously points out that γε in ἐμοίγε is only appropriate if Socrates speaks the words, and that Hippocrates could hardly assent till he knew what τρόφη ψυχῆς meant.

28. ὅπως γε μή — ἐπαινῶν ὁ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσει. πωλεῖν is 'to have on sale': 'to sell' is ἀποδίδοσθαι. Cobet, Novae Lectiones p. 159. For ἐξαπατήσει the MSS have ἐξαπατήσῃς, but the 1st aor. conj. is very doubtful in Plato after ὅπως μή (see on the whole question Kühner's Griechische Grammatik II p. 899), and final -η and -ει are frequently confused in the MSS.

30. ὁ εμπόρος τε καὶ κάπτηλος. εμπόρος τε καὶ κάπτηλος together 313 D make a plural, and according to strict logic would require a plural article; but ὁ is written by attraction instead of the grammatically impossible οἱ. Compare Symp. 186 c ὁ διαγιγυρώσκων—τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἔρωτα: infr. 355 E τὰ ὀνήματα—τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀναρήν.

42. τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων. τυγχάνεις has sunk to a mere 313 E copula. It is not necessary to insert ἦν after ἐπιστήμων, although it is only in a few cases that τυγχάνω (in this sense) occurs in Plato's MSS without the participle expressed, viz. Phaedr. 263 c μέγιστον τῶν ἄγαθῶν τυγχάνει: Gorg. 502 B εἶ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ἄρες καὶ ὄφελμοι: Rep. II 369 B τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἐκάστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδέχεται: Alc. I 129 Λ ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γενώναι ἐαντόν: ibid. 133 Λ ἐκεῖνο ὃ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὤμοιον. In these cases (as here in the
Protagoras) it is easy to suppose that the participle has fallen out from 'lipography': but in Hipp. Maior (perhaps pseudo-Platonic) 300 A and in Laws xi 918 c and Timaeus 61 c the participle cannot be so easily supplied: and that the construction without the participle was used in every-day speech appears from Ar. Eccl. 114.1 kal τῶν θεατῶν eί τις εινόνυς τυγχάνει. See Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

45. περί τοίς φιλτάτοις. τὰ φιλτατα is used here of the soul's health as in Gorg. 513 A σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ ἀλησεις ἡμῶν ἐσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ τολει.

46. κυβεύς τε καὶ κυνδυνεύς. Cobet rejects τε καὶ κυνδυνεύς, but Plato often puts metaphor and interpretation side by side. Compare infra 314 B ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα (where Deuschle wrongly rejected καὶ μαθόντα): 334 D σύντεμνε μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας πολει. Euthyd. 297 c πολύ γάρ ποὺ ἐμι φανέρωσος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς όντι όντι τῇ τῇ τῇ δύο διαμάχεσαι, σοφιστρία ὁδοῦ καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνέχεις, εἰ μίαν κεφαλήν ἀποτιμθεῖ τοῖς λόγοις, πολλάς ἄνει τῇς μᾶς, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινι ἐτέρῳ σοφιστῇ... ὃς ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν ἐλύπη όστως ἐκ τοῦ εἰ' ἀριστέρᾳ λέγων καὶ δάκνων κτλ.. Lach. 194 c χειμαζομέναις ἐν λόγω καὶ ἀποροῦσιν: Theaet. 174 c εἰς φρέατα τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων. See also note on τοὺς τῶν νεὼν τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας in Euthyphr. 3 A.

49. παρά τοῦ κατῆλου καὶ ἐμπόρου: so B. The κάτηλος is put in the foreground as the most usual seller of στία and ποτά: the article is expressed only once, because the κάτηλος and ἐμπόρος both belong to the same genus 'merchants': cf. Hdt. IV 71 τῶν οἰνοχῶν καὶ μάγευρον καὶ ἰππόκομον καὶ διήκονον καὶ ἀγγεληφόρον κτλ. There is no sufficient ground for bracketing the words παρά τοῦ κατῆλου καὶ ἐμπόρου as is done by Schanz, nor for reading παρά τοῦ (with T) and omitting κατῆλου καὶ ἐμπόρου, as Hermann did.

ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις: i.e. other than our own bodies. Cf. 31.11 Ε τὸ ὅνωμα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περί Πρωταγόρου ἄκοντομεν; It need not be implied that the body is itself an ἀγγείον (viz. of soul), though the notion is not unplatonic, and kindred expressions are found in later philosophy, e.g. Marcus Aurel. X 38 τὸ περικείμενον ἀγγείωδες καὶ τὰ ὀργάνων ταῦτα τὰ περιπετειαμένα (said of the body).

56. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα. Λαμβάνεις ἐν (not eis) as in Rep. VII 511 Α ἐν πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναυτο λαβεῖς: Soph. 243 C ταῦτα τὸῦτο πάθος εἰληφθὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. For καὶ μαθόντα,
which is explanatory of ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβώντα, see note on κυβεύεισ τε καὶ κυδικεύεισ.

59. νεώτεροι τοσούτων. Heindorf quotes Eur. Andr. 80 γέρων ἔκεινος ὡστε α' ὀφελεῖν παρόν, and points out that whereas νεώτεροι ἔκεινος would deny altogether ἡ τοῦ διελέσθαι δύναμις: the words νεώτεροι ὡστε are less strong “nobis nonnisi iuvenilis quaedam facultas suppetit ad tantam rem diiudicandam”. The best MSS of Plato read ταύτων, τοιούτων, τοσούτων, etc. in the great majority of cases rather than ταύτω etc. Schanz (Preface to Laws, p. vi) thinks it probable that Plato always used the forms in -v. In inscriptions of Plato’s time τὸ αὐτῷ and τὸ αὐτὸν occur side by side, but apparently only τοιούτων, τοσούτων. See Meisterhans Grammatik der Griechischen Inschriften p. 122.

63. Ἰππίας. Hippias of Elis was one of the most accomplished and—if we may trust the Platonic writings—ostentatious of the Sophists. According to the Hippias Maior (285 a foll.) he claimed to be at home in all the learning of the day—in Astronomy, Geometry, Arithmetic, Philology, Music, Mythology, History and Archaeology. See Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen 14 p. 956 foll.

64. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον. Contrast Crat. 402 b 314 c οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος. Either construction is admissible. Prodicus of Ceos is repeatedly mentioned in the Platonic writings. A fellow-citizen of the poet Simonides (infra 339 e), he professed like Gorgias and Hippias to educate young men (Apol. 19 e, Theages 127 e, Rep. x 600 c) and received very large sums in return for his instruction together with the gratitude of his pupils. On one occasion, when in charge of a political mission from Ceos, he is said to have won great reputation in the βουλή at Athens for his conduct of public business, and to have given at the same time private lectures, which were popular and well paid (Hipp. Maior 282 c). He laid great stress on the importance of using words in their correct sense (ἀρσάτος ἀναμάτων): see infra 337 a, 358 a, and Euthyd. 277 e, Charm. 163 d, Lach. 197 e; cf. also Phaedr. 267 b; but this was only taught (we are told) in his 50 drachma lecture; the impecunious Socrates had only paid one drachma and was not quite master of this subject (Crat. 384 b). Socrates is fond of professing himself a pupil of Prodicus, e.g. infra 341 a, Meno 96 d, Charm. 163 d. Prodicus wrote eulogies of Heracles and others (Symp. 177 b): the substance, if not the actual words, of his Apologue of Heracles at
the cross-roads is given by Xenophon Mem. ii. 1. 21. A scholiast
on Rep. x 600 c says the Athenians put him to death by hemlock
for corrupting the youth, but there is no other authority for this

CHAPTER VI.

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed together to Callias' house.
1. δοξαν ώμιν ταύτα. This idiom seems not to occur elsewhere
in Plato. We can hardly supply ποιεῖν: rather δοξαν ταύτα is like
δόξαντα ταύτα, an accusative absolute, the singular verb being kept
as in ἔδοξε ταύτα. See Goodwin's Moods and Tenses (new Edition)
p. 339 § 854.
2. προθύρω. The rooms of a Greek house opened on the
cloisters surrounding the αὐλή or court: from the αὐλή a passage
(θυροπείων, so called because the porter's lodge was situated in it)
led into the πρόθυρον or space in front of the main door (αὐλείως θόρα
or αὐλεία without θόρα). Blümmer, Griechische Privatalterthümer
p. 147 ff.

ἐπιστάντες διελεγόμεθα. The situation recalls Symp. 175 a foll.,
where Socrates, on his way to Agathon's house, is discovered stand­
ing wrapt in thought in front of a neighbouring house.
5. οὕτως ἔστιομεν. οὕτως with the apodosis after participles is
extremely common in Plato: see above on 310 d.
6. στάντες. For the dropping of the preposition after ἐπι­
στάντες see on 311 a. The Bodleian has ἕσταντες, but T στάντες:
Schanz reads επιστάντες, Cobet ἐστώτες. Tr. 'we came to a stand
and conversed'.
7. δοκεῖ ὁμιλοὺ. Compare Phaedo 108 D ὃ βίος ὁμιλοῦ δοκεὶ
ὁ ἐμὼ—τῷ μὴ ἔχει τοῦ λόγου οὕκ ἔξαρκεῖ: the construction is fairly
common in Plato: see on Crito 43 D. To have a eunuch for porter
was rare, and a mark of wealth: they were supposed to be more
trustworthy than others and fetched a higher price in the East (Hdt.
viii 105).

314 D 8. κινδυνεύει—ἀχθενθαί. Present, because the dialogue is nar­
rated just after it took place (see 309 b), and as Protagoras is still
with Callias, the stream of visitors probably continues. It is not
quite clear why the number of the sophists should have made
the porter annoyed with the visitors: unless the visitors themselves were
sophists. Probably therefore τοῖς φοιτῶσιν means τοῖς φοιτῶσιν
tro0i<rrats: m the porter's judgment the house was already too full of sophists, φοιτάω implies frequent visitation: cf. Lach. 181 C χρήμ μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸτερον σε φοιτάω αὐτῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ οἰκείος ἤγείσθαι.

10. ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν. There was a metal knocker (ῥῆπτρον, κόραξ, ἐπιπαστρόν) on the αἰθλείων θύρα. Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 149.

11. οὐ σχόλη αὐτῷ. For αὐτῷ 'the master' cf. infra 315 B, Rep. I 327 ἥρμην ὅπου αὐτὸς ἔη, and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἔφα 'ipse dixit'.

12. ἀμφότερον τοῖν χερῶν. So B: T has ταῖν for τοῖν. Cobet has shewn that the dual feminine of the article is the same as the dual masculine: Variae Lecitones p. 70.

13. ἐκρούσαμεν, but ἐκρούσαμεν in line 10. Socrates pretends to be somewhat staggered by the rebuff.


19. ἄνθρωπος. According to Ast, the Greeks sometimes used 314 E ἄνηπ and ἄνθρωπος without the article of a definite person "sed ut vel contemtionem vel reprehensionem aliquam simul indicaret". But in the cases quoted in support of this usage where the word is in an oblique case, the meaning is quite general like the English 'a man', e.g. Rep. X 595 C δεών τινὰ λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἄνδρα: Phaedo 98 B ὅρω ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρωμένον: Soph. Phil. 1228 ἀπάταις αἰσχραίς ἄνδρα καὶ δόλαις ἔλων: Theaeet. 155 D εάν σοι ἄνδρός, μάλλον δὲ ἄνδρῶν ἀνυφαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν—σεισῆδερευρίσκωμαι: it is therefore safer to suppose (with Schanz and most Platonic scholars) that where ἄνηπ and ἄνθρωπος of the MSS can only be translated by 'the man', the rough breathing should be restored: e.g. infra 315 E and Phaedr. 267 A, 268 C: Rep. I 331 E.

21. προστήρ. The αὐλή was surrounded by cloisters. This προστήρια is doubtless that on which the passage from the πρόθυρον opened.

23. Πάραλος—Ἀντίφασις. The mother of Xanthippus and Paralus had once been the wife of Hipponicus, to whom she bare Callias: Plut. PericL xxi 9. In 320 A as well as in Meno 94 B Plato remarks that Pericles was unable to teach the art of statesmanship to either of his two sons: cf. Alc. I 118 E τῶ—Περικλήους νική ἔγενεσθήν. They both died of the plague. One of
the most interesting fragments of Protagoras describes the fortitude of Pericles when his sons died: see Appendix II. p. 203, Frag. 3. Charmides, son of the elder Glauccon, was Plato’s maternal uncle: the dialogue Charmides is named after him. He was φιλόσοφος τε καὶ πάνω πονηρικός (Charm. 155 A), and as remarkable for σωφροσύνη as for personal beauty (ibid. 157 D). He was afterwards one of the Ten, and fell along with Critias at the battle of Munychia in 404 B.C. (Xen. Hell. II 4. 19). Of Philippides and his father Philomelus and Antimoerus of Mende (on the west coast of the peninsula Pallene) nothing further is known.

29. τούτων—ἔφαίνοντο. B and T omit ὅ, which was inserted by Stephanus: Heindorf prefers to insert ὅν after λεγομένων. The MSS reading could only be defended if ἔφαίνοντο could be regarded as parenthetical = ὃς ἔφαίνοντο, like δοκεῖ μοι=ὡς δοκεῖ μοι (see on 314 C above), but there seems to be no authority for such a use of φαίνωμαι. It is hardly to be supposed that in ἕπαικοντες and ἔπηκον (in B below) there is an allusion to an outer circle of Protagorean students, deemed unworthy of the subtlest teaching of the master, in spite of Theaet. 152 c, where Socrates is hardly serious.

31. ἔξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων. The plural is used as in Theaet. 157 c παρατίθημι ἐκάστον τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογενθασθαι and Rep. X 601 A χρώματ' ἄττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνών.

315 B 34. χορῷ. The tragic chorus consisted of 15 χορευταί, arranged in 3 rows (στοίχοι) of 5 each, the leader (κορυφαῖος) being in the middle of the first. So here Protagoras occupies the middle of a row of 7. With the metaphor cf. Theaet. 173 B—τοῦ ἡμέτερου χοροῦ and ibid. c λέγωμεν δῆ—περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων: Phaedr. 246 E f. s.

35. ηὐλαβοῦντο. The MSS have εὐλαβοῦντο, but in the classic period εὖ- (and εὐ-) were always augmented in the past tenses, while after 300 B.C. ηὐ- does not appear on inscriptions. See Meisterhans Gr. der Att. Inschr. 2 p. 136.

CHAPTER VII.

The scene in the house of Callias is further described.

1. τὸν δὲ μετ᾿ ἐλεντόνησα, ἔφη Ὀμηρος. Homer Od. XI 601 τὸν δὲ μετ᾿ ἐλεντόνησα βίον Ἡρακληῖν. The reference is not to be pressed beyond the words quoted: for there is no special likeness
between Homer's Heracles (ἐν ὁμοίῳ πανταίνον, αἰὲι βαλέοντι ἐνικώνος 608) and Plato's Hippias, whose situation as here described is more like that of Minos in Homer ibid. 569 foll. χρόσσεων σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα θεματεύοντα νέκνυσιν, ἣμενον· οἱ δὲ μὲν ἀμφι δίκαι εὔροντο ἁνάκτα ἣμενοι ἐστάτητε τε κατ' εὐρυπυλῆς "Ἄιδος δὼ. With ἔφη "Ὡμηρος ("as Homer said") cf. Meno 76 D ὁ σῶν ὁ τοῖς λέγω, ἔφη Πλάτωνος.

3. ἐν θρόνῳ—ἐπὶ βάθρων. Hippias is depicted as a school-master among his pupils.

4. Ἐρυξίμαχος τε—Ἀνδρων ὁ Ἀνδροτιώνος. Eryximachus and his father Acumenus were doctors. The former delivers one of the speeches in the Symposium, defining his art as ἕπιστήμη τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐρωτικῶν πρὸς πλησιμονήν καὶ κένωσιν (Smp. 186 C). Phaedrus, son of Pythocles, of the deme of Μυρρηνὼς in the tribe Πανδιωνίους, also appears in the Symposium, and gives his name to the dialogue Phaedrus. Andron, son of Androtion (so T here, and both B and T in Gorg. 487 C—the Ἀμφιτιώνος of B is therefore a mistake) is in the Gorgias described as one of those who shared the view of Callicles, that too much φιλοσοφία ruined men. His son is believed to have been the orator Androtion.

7. περὶ φύσεως. The primary substance which early Greek philosophy sought to discover was called by them φύσις: see Aristotle Met. IV 4 p. 1014b 32 foll. τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καλ τῶν φύσεων ὑπων τὰ στοιχεῖα φασιν εἶναι φύσιν, οἱ μὲν πῦρ, οἱ δὲ γῆν, οἱ δ' ἄερα, οἱ δ' ἄδωρ, οἱ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον λέγοντες, οἱ δ' ἐνια τούτων, οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα. Thus (among others) Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles called their books περὶ φύσεως, i.e. on the substance which gives birth (φέι) to all else. By Plato's time the word had acquired a wider meaning equivalent to 'de rerum natura', our 'Nature', and it is in this sense that the word is here used.

8. ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα. Schanz brackets ἀστρονομικὰ, but the word is meant to be taken rather with μετεώρων than with φύσεως. On Hippias' skill in astronomy compare Hipp. Minor 367 E ἦν (sc. ἀστρονομίης) αὖ σὺ τέχνης ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἷοι εἶναι ἡ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

10. Τάνταλον γε. Od. XI 582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσείδον κρατέρ' ἄλγε' ἔχοντα. Prodicus is compared to Tantalus because of his physical wretchedness: see Crat. 395 E καὶ ἄστεχων ἔθεκεν ὡσπερ ἄν ἐν τε βουλόμενος ταλαντατον ὑπομάσκε, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὑπομάσκε καὶ εἶσιν ἄντ' ἐκείνων Τάνταλον· τοιοῦτον τι καὶ τοῦτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἔθεκεν ἐκπορίσαι ἡ τῶν ψήφων.
315D  II. ἐπιδημεὶς γὰρ ἄρα. Heindorf’s correction ἐπιδημεὶς for ἐπιδημεῖς seems to be necessary, as Prodicus is still in Athens. Just so the present tense is used in 314 D κινήσεως δὲ—ἅχθεσθαι and infra line 15 κατάλωσιν πεποίηκεν. If the clause is taken as a parenthetical clause of explanation, there is nothing harsh in the construction: ἦν δὲ ἐν οἴκηματι τινι naturally enough follows on εἰςεἰδών. For γὰρ ἄρα (a somewhat rare combination) Heindorf quotes Rep. IV 438 A πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, Symp. 205 B ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα (so T: B has only γὰρ) τοῦ ἐρωτῆς τι εἴδος ὑμνάζομεν, Laws III 698 D συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑρετρικήν. γὰρ ἄρα always introduces something supposed to be known to the person addressed: see 314 B οἷμαι δὲ καὶ Πρδίκου τὸν Κειοῦ.

18. Παυσανίας is known from the Symposium 180 c foll. The deme Κεραμῆς was in the tribe Λευκίμης. ὧς μὲν ἐγὼμι is to be taken closely with καλῶν τὰ κάγαθα τὴν φύσιν.

315 E  20. τὴν δ’ οὖν ἰδέαν πάντω καλῶς. Compare Symp. 174 A τάφτα δὴ ἐκκαλοποιῶμεν ἵνα καλῶς παρὰ καλῶν (i.e. 'Αγάθωνά) ιώ. There is no ground for reading καλῶν for καλῶς with Stephanus: cf. Lach. 180 E τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε—διαλεγόμενοι.

22. 'Αγάθωνα. It is at the poet Agathon's house that the scene of the Symposium is laid. From his speech in that dialogue 194 D foll. we should infer that he had studied under Prodicus to some purpose. Born about 447 B.C., Agathon was first successful on the tragic stage at an early age: cf. Symp. 175 E ἣ δὲ σῆ (sc. 'Αγάθωνος σοφία) λαμπρὰ τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἣ γε παρὰ σοὶ νέου ὄντος οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφάνης ἐγένετο πρώην ἐν μέρτισι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ᾧ τρισμυρίους. He visited the court of Archelaus about 407 B.C. and died probably about 400. That he was held in esteem by the Athenians appears from Ar. Frogs 83 foll. 'Αγάθων δὲ ποὺ 'σθ'; ὅπου 'στ'; ἀπολιπὼν μ’ οἰχεταί ἀγάθος ποιητὴς καὶ ποθείρω ὑπὸ φίλοις. For παιδικά Παυσανίου compare Symp. 193 B.

23. τοῦτ’ ἦν τὸ μαράκιον. So BT: the idiom is like our 'There was this young man'. The nearest parallels seem to be Phaedo 59 B ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτῆσιππος ὅ Παιασσιος and Rep. x 615 D ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιωταὶ τινες. τοῦτο τε δὴ (Ast); τοῦτὸ τ’ οὖν (Heindorf), τοῦτ’ ἐνδοὺ ἦν (Schirlitz), have been suggested, while Kroschel rejects the words, but the text is probably sound.

τὸ Ἀδεμάντω. Adimantus son of Cepis is not elsewhere
named. The son of Leucolophidas was afterwards στρατηγὸς under Alcibiades, whose policy he supported (Xen. Hell. 1 4. 21): he was taken prisoner at the battle of Aegospotami, but spared by the Spartans. He was afterwards put on his trial by Conon on the charge, not improbably a true one, of having betrayed the Athenian fleet at this battle: see Kock on Ar. Frogs 1512.

27. πάσσοφος—ἀνήρ—καὶ θεὸς. For ἀνήρ B T read ἀνὴρ, but see on 314 E above. πάσσοφος is often ironical: e.g. Euthyd. 271 c ὃ δὲ ἄν ἐρωτᾶς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῶν, θαυμασία, ὃ Κρίτων. πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε, οὐδ' ἥδη πρὸ τοῦ ὃ τι εἶναι οἱ παγκρατιασταί. For the meaning of θείους cf. Meno 99 c ὅποιος ὁ θεὸς καλεῖ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὕτως νῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦν ὅν πράττοντοι καὶ λέγοντοι; θείος (in the form σείος) was the favourite Spartan word of praise and was much affected by the Socratic circle in Athens.

CHAPTER VIII.

After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter enlarges upon the antiquity of his profession. At the suggestion of Socrates a circle is formed to hear the Sophists discourse.

4. Κρυτίας the foremost of the Thirty so-called tyrants was related to Plato on the mother's side: Perictione Plato's mother being granddaughter of the elder Critias, who was father of Callaeschus. He is one of the dramatis personae in the Charmides and Timaeus, and the dialogue Critias is named after him. A Scholiast on the Timaeus 20 A (quoted by Stallbaum) describes him as γενναίος καὶ ἀδραῖος φύσεως, ἥπετο δὲ καὶ φιλοσόφων συνοιωσῖν, καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἰδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ἰδιώταις. For the fragments of his poems see Bergk's Poetarum Lyricorum Graecorum 11 p. 279 foll.

5. ἦτι σμίκρ' ἄττα—διαθεσαμένοι. σμίκρ' ἄττα is the plural of σμικρὸν τι, and as ἦτι σμικρὸν τι διατρῆσαντες would mean 'after a little further delay', so ἦτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρῆσαντες means after 'some little further delays'. The reference in ἦτι is to 314 ι. ταῦτα in καὶ ταῦτα refers to the causes of the delays, which were, as usual, some topics of discourse: its antecedent is involved in διατρῆσαντες.

8. πρὸς σὲ τοίς ἄλλοις. Here, as in 314 E, both B and T have 316 B τι for τοῖς: but τι is impossible here, and this use of τοι is very frequent in address: Heindorf refers (inter alia) to Ar. Plut. 1100 σὲ τοι σὲ τοι λέγω, Καρλων, ἀνάμενον.

A. P.
NOTES ON VIII 316 C

316c 17. ολεταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἀν γενέσθαι. B and T read μάλιστα without ἀν: see on Crito 51 e. It is more likely that ἀν should have dropped out after μάλιστα here than that Plato's usage should have varied with ολομαυ and the aorist infinitive referring to the future: cf. infra 353 B ὡς ολομαυ ἄν ἐγωγε κάλλιστα φανερῶν γενέσθαι, where ἀν is in all the MSS.

19. μόνος οἰς δεῖν—πρὸς μόνους. οἰς δεῖν is virtually like one verb, δείως or the like: it therefore takes the nom. (not the acc.) with inf.; cf. Demosth. Fals. Leg. 235 ἡγοῦμην ἐν τοῖσοι—αὐτὸς περίκειν δεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι πολίοι γενέσθαι, quoted by Stallbaum on Crito 50 e. Note that Protagoras here uses the more precise μόνος πρὸς μόνους, but above only μόνος (316 b)—unless (with Cobet and Schanz) we there insert μόνοι before μόνω.

21. ἐξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἑντά κτλ. For καὶ ἑντά T reads in the margin κατῆντα: Liebhold suggests καταλόγοντα. ἑντά however is parallel to ἐξένον and to πείδουντα 'a man who is a stranger and goes—and tries to persuade etc.' The whole passage recalls Apol. 19 E—20 A τοῖσοι (viz. Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias) γὰρ ἐκαστὸς—οἶδος τ' ἐστιν ἰὸν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοῦτος νέος ὅσἐ ἐξεστὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν τοιτῶν προίκα ἐξειναι ὃ ἂν βούλωσιν—τοῖσοι πείδουν τὰς ἐκείνους ἐξουσίας ἀπολιποῦντας σφίων ἐξειναι χρήματα διόδοντα καὶ χάριν προσεδέειναι. Notice throughout the longwinded character of Protagoras' speeches: cf. Philostrat. Vit. Soph. 1 494 (quoted by Kroschel on 320 c), γροῦς δὲ τὸν Πρωταγόραν ὁ Πλάτων σεμώνος μὲν ἐρμηνεύοντα, ὑπτιάζοντα δὲ τῇ σεμινοτητῇ καὶ τοῦ καὶ μακρολογώτερον τοῦ συμμέτρου τὴν ἔδειν αὐτοῦ μῦθῳ μακρῷ ἐχαρακτήρισεν.

316d 31. τὸ ἑπαξθές αὐτῆς. ἑπαξθές like φορτικὸν means what hearers will resent (think a burden or ἄχθος) as in bad-taste because presumptuous: cf. Demosth. de Pace 4 τὸ λέγειν περὶ ἅν αὐτὸς ἐιπὲ τις καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ—ὁτῶς ἡγοῦμαι φορτικὸν καὶ ἑπαχθές ὡστε κτλ.

32. τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν. σοφός and its derivatives are often used especially in early writers in connexion with poetry, e.g. Theognis 19—20 Κύρη ς σοφιζμένῳ μὲν ἐμὸν σφρηγῆς ἐπικελεσθόν τισὶν ἐπεσων, Pindar Isthm. 4. 29—30 μελέταιν δὲ σοφισταῖς Διὸς ἐκατι πρὸσβαλον σεβιζόμενοι.

34. τοὺς ἀμφι τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίων—'Orpheus and Musaeus and their schools'. The Editors quote Ar. Frogs 1302 foll. 'Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἦμων κατέδειξε φάνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, Μουσαίοις δ'
[Translation]

36. Ἰκκός—Ἡρόδικος. Iccus is mentioned in Laws VIII 839 B foll. as a model of temperance. According to Pausanias, he won in the pentathlon at the Olympic games and afterwards set up* as a trainer (γυμναστής). Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace combined the professions of the γυμναστής and λατρής (μίξας γυμναστικήν λατρικήν). He is described in Rep. III 406 A as the inventor of the παιδαγωγική τῶν νοσημάτων λατρία—by means of which he tortured first himself (by prolonging his own dying) and afterwards others: δυσθανατών—ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο (ibid. B).

39. Ἀγαθοκλῆς—Πυθοκλεῖδης. Agathocles is mentioned in 316E Lach. 180 D as teacher of Damon: according to the Alc. 118 C Pythoclides also taught Pericles. A Scholiast on the Alc. 1 (1. c.) remarks: Ὑποκλέιδης μουσικός ἦν τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὐ μαθητὴς Ἡ Ἀγαθοκλῆς, οὐ Δαμφρόκλῆς (Δάμφρος, van Prinsterer), οὐ Δάμων. With the sentiment compare the imitation in Plut. Pericl. 4. 2 ὅ ὅ Δάμων ἑοκέν ἄκρος ὅν σοφιστής καταδύεθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὑμοῦ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικριτῶμενος τὴν δεινότητα.

42. ταῖς τέχναις ταῦταις παραπετάσμασιν ἔχρησαντο. Compare Plut. Pericl. 1. c. οὐ μὴν ἔλαβεν ὃ Δάμων τῇ λύρᾳ παρακαλόματι χρώμενος.

43. κατὰ τοῦτο ἐναι. ἐναι is tautological as in Isaeus peri τοῦ 317 A Μενεκλέους κλήρου 32 ἡμέρας ὁμόσαμεν εἰς ποιεῖν ἄλληλους—κατὰ δύναμιν ἐναι, καὶ λύγῳ καὶ ἐργῷ, and in the common ἐκὼ ἐναι: but no other instance of the precise phrase κατὰ τοῦτο ἐναι is quoted.

47. οὐ γε πολλοῖ—οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονταί. Compare Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἑώ χαρέων, καὶ ἐνα ἐπιλυθήσει ἐπιστάμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. For ὡς ἢτοι εἰπέω τοῖς δὲ (to be taken with οὐδὲν) see on Apol. 17 A. The phrase is used to qualify the comprehension of a word or phrase, generally οὐδὲν or πάντες.

49. τὸ οὖν—ἐπιχειρήματος. B and T read τὸν for τὸ, by a natural error. Heindorf compares Theaet. 144 A τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ διντι
NOTES ON VIII 317 A

—πράον αὖ εἶναι διαφερθέντως—ἐγώ μὲν οὖτ' ἂν ὡμὴν γενέσθαι κτλ. and Rep. I 331 B τὸ γὰρ μὴδε ἀκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι—μέγα μέρος εἰς τούτῳ ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβαλλεται. Here καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος is a virtual repetition of ἀποδιδράσκοντα: cf. τὸν ταῦτα πράσσωντα above in 316 C. The sentence reminds one of the practice observed in Spartan education—to punish the youths not for stealing but for failing to escape with their booty: Xen. Rep. Laced. 2. 8 εἴποι δ' ἂν οὖν τις τί δήτα, εἴπερ τὸ κλέπτειν ἀγαθὸν ἐνῶμεν, πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπέβαλε τῷ ἀλισκομένῳ; ὅτι, φημὶ ἐγώ, καὶ τάλλα, ὅσα ἀνθρωποί διδάσκουσι, κολάζουσι τὸν μὴ καλῶς ἑπερετοῦντα: compare Rep. I 361 A τῶν ἀλισκόμενων δὲ φαύλων ἑγγείων.

317 B 54. τούτων τῇ ἐναντίαν ἀπασαν ὅδον. “h. e. τὴν ὄδον ἡ ἀπασά ἐστὶν ἐναντία τούτων. pro τούτων eadem comparatione quae vocatur comparandia dici potuit τούτων. Andocid. or. I 4 ἐγὼ πολὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτων γνώμην ἔχῳ” (Kroschel). For ἀπασαν with an adjective compare (with Kroschel) Xen. Anab. I 5. ἢ ἡ γῆ πέδιον ἀπαν ὁμαλές ὄσπερ θάλασσα and the common phrase πάν τοῖς τούτων.

56. σοφοτής εἶναι καὶ παιδεεῖν ἀνθρώπους. The σοφοτής σοφίζει, i.e. παιδεεῖ: see note on 312 C above. Theaet. 167 C (where Socrates is speaking for Protagoras) ὁ σοφοτής τοὺς παιδεομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῦτο παιδευθεῖν.

59. σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν. “Crebra modestiae formula, bene explicat Steph., quod ita dico, ut in eo opem divinam agnoscam.” Heindorf on Theaet. 151 B καὶ σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανώς τοπάζῳ ous ἄν συγγενεμένοι ὕμνοι.

317 C 61. πολλά γε ἔτη ἣδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. Meno 91 E οἴμαι γάρ αὐτῶν (i.e. Πρωταγόρα) ἀποθανεῖν ἔγγυς καὶ ἐβδομήκοτα ἄτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοτα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὑπά. The phrases εἶναι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ and the like are common.

62. οὐδένος ὅτου οὐ. For the asyndeton Heindorf compares Hom. Od. xiv 96 ἢ γὰρ οἱ ζωῆς ἢ ἢν ἄσπετος· οὗ τοις τόσον ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων. The nearest parallel to πάντων (which Cobet rejects) after οὐδένος ὅτου οὐ seems to be in Dem. Adv. Lept. § 3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστων ἐφ' ὅτου τοῦτο οὐ πεπόθθη τῶν πάντων (quoted by Heindorf).

64. ἀπάντων goes with τῶν ὑδῶν ὄντων. It seems better to take περὶ τούτων with βούλευθε than with τῶν λόγων ποιεῖσθαι: otherwise it is hardly possible to separate τούτων from ἀπάντων.
67. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι—ὅτι ἐραστάλ. ὅτι depends rather on ἐνδείξασθαι than on καλλωπίσασθαι: compare infra 327 A ἐδιδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, and ibid. B τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων ὀδεῖς φθονεὶ ὀὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὁσπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων, Phaedo 94 D τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νυκτοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. See also notes on 327 A and 335 E below.

68. εἶµεν. BT read εἶηµεν, but in Plato's time the short form of the optative plural is regular: see on Apol, 22 E.

71. οὐ—οὐ—ἐκαλέσαµεν. See above on 310 A; and for ἐπακοῦσων note on 315 A.

72. καθεδρόµενοι. So T: B has καθιζόµενοι, but presently in 317 D 317 E both MSS read συνεκαθεδρόµεθα.

74. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόµενοι. This passage is difficult and different views are possible as to the construction and meaning. The MSS read καὶ αὐτοὶ τε. If the MSS reading is retained, τε must be regarded as answering to δὲ in ἐν δὲ τοῦτω (cf. Euthyphr. 3 E), and καὶ αὐτοὶ=etiam ipsi, i.e. even without waiting for servants—a harsh explanation both for καὶ and αὐτοὶ. If τε is left out (with most of the editors, following Heindorf), καὶ αὐτοὶ means 'ourselves also' as opposed to Callias and Alcibiades in ἐν δὲ τοῦτω Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης. There is still a slight difficulty in contrasting αὐτοὶ with these two, because they also would seem to be included in αὐτοὶ (πάντες ἡµεῖς—καὶ αὐτοὶ), but such slight inaccuracies of expression are common in actual dialogue, which Plato's style is intended to imitate.

77. Καλλίας. Hermann read Κριλας in order to escape the slight difficulty remarked on in the preceding note: "sed hospitis erat Prodicum ut accederet invitare" Kroschel.

78. ἀναστήσατες: but ἄγωντε just before. Euthyd. 273 B offers an exact parallel (if we follow the reading of the Bodleian ms) ἰδόντες δὲ αὐτὸν ὅ τε Διονυσίδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδῆμος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάτανε διελέγεσθην ἄλληλον, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἄποβλέποντες εἰς ἡµᾶς: cf. ibid. 273 A εἰσελθόντες—παρεπατεῖτην and D ἐγελασάτην γοῦν ἀμφο βλέψατε εἰς ἄλληλους. The dual in Plato as in Greek generally is apt to sink into the plural.
Protagoras explains his profession. It is to teach civil virtue and make men good citizens.

8. γάρ used like Latin enim to introduce a speech (introductory γάρ): see on Apol. 20 e.

9. δι —ἀποφθέγματι—ποιεθαί. For the situation compare Gorg. 455 c—d where Socrates says ἵνα γάρ καὶ τυγχάνῃ τις τῶν ἐνδοι ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλήμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἔγώ τινα σχεδον καὶ συχνον ἀλαθάνομαι, ὥς ἵνα συλησκόντι ἀν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ’ ἑμοῖν ὀν̄ ἁνερωταμενος νύμοιν καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνων ἁνερωταμενος τι ἡμῖν, ὥς Γοργία, ἐσταί, ἕαν σοι συμβιβάι; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οὐδὲ ἐσθήθα;

14. ἐν τῇ ὑπεραλη ταύτα ταύτα: sc. ἐσταί σοι. ἐν (bracketed by Schanz after Hirschig) before τῇ ὑπεραλη means ‘during’: cf. (with Kroschel) Thuc. i 44. ἐν τῇ μεν προτέρα ὅχ ἡσον—ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑπεραλη μετέγρωσαν κτλ. and add infra 321 c ἡ εἰμαρμὴν ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν γὰρ ἐδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον εἰξείη ἐκ γῆς.

19. ὅ μη τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος. τυγχάνεις (suggested by Bekker) would be the usual periodic structure: but the indicative is looser and more direct: Kroschel compares Gorg. 464 D χτ—καὶ ἂν—διαγωνίζεσθαι—πότερος ἐπαλεί. Notice the usual Socratic implication that virtue is knowledge.

20. ἄλλα μη οὕτως. Cf. Meno 74 D ἄλλα μή μοι οὕτως and infra 331 c. So μη γάρ, μη σο γε, μη τοι γε and the like are often used without a verb expressed. ἠσπερ ἄν belongs to εἰπο γν in lines 28 and 32: it is answered by οὕτω δή in line 33. αὐτικα here does not mean ‘for example’ but goes with μάλα (which intensifies it): ‘as if Hippocrates were to change his desire on the spot and conceive a desire (ἐπιθυμήσειν) for etc.’ αὐτικα μάλα is idiomatic, cf. Gorg. 469 D αὐτικα μάλα δειν τεθνάιναι, Crat. 384 b αὐτικα μάλα εἴδέναι.

22. γνών νεωτή: nunc nuper as in Meno 90 A. The more general word is followed by the more specific exactly as in Theaet. 161 c βατράχου γυρίνον where γυρίνον according to a Scholiast is το έκ του βατράχου παυλίον.

23. Ζευξίππου. An obscure sculptor (not painter) of this name is mentioned in Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 1229 (quoted by Overbeck, Die Antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste
The Zeuxippus here mentioned is supposed to be the same as the famous painter Zeuxis of Heraclea (the Greek colony in Italy, most probably) who is mentioned by Plato in Gorg. 453 c, and several times by Xenophon (Mem. 1 4. 3, Oecon. 10. 1, Symp. 4. 63 τῶν Ἡράκλεωτην ξένων): see Overbeck, l.c. p. 311 foll. Zeuxis began to rise into fame probably about 424 B.C.: he would therefore be still a young man about the date when this dialogue is supposed to take place: see Introd. p. xxxvi. Brunn would read Zeuxidos for Zeuxippos here, but according to Fick (quoted by Sauppe) Zeuxis is nothing but a familiar diminutive of Zeuxippos: for other similar examples see Fick, Die Griechischen Personennamen p. xxviii foll. -ιππος in proper names was aristocratic (Ar. Clouds 62 foll.) and could upon occasion be omitted or added without prejudice to personal identity: compare Clouds 929 οὐχὶ διδάξεις τοῦτον Κρόνος ὡν with ibid. 1071 σὺ δὲ εἰ κρόνιππος, where -ιππος adds mock dignity to κρόνος.

29. Ὠρθαγόρα τῷ Ῥηβαίῳ. Orthogoras is said by Athenaeus 318 c (IV 184 E) on the authority of Aristoxenus to have taught Epaminondas how to play the flute.

31. αὐτὸν but ἐκεῖνον in 30 and ἐκεῖνῳ in 32: see on 310 d. εἰς δὲ τὰ βελτίων is here used rather than δὲ τὰ or τὰ βελτίων (as in line 27) to prepare for εἰς αὐτόν with the proposition could hardly be dispensed with.

33. οὕτω δή. Heindorf would write οὕτω δὲ, which is frequent after ὡσπερ, e.g. 328 B: see his note on Phaedo 72 c.

34. Πρωταγόρας συγγενόμενος: "gravius hoc quam soi συγγενύ. 318 d μενος" Kroschel. See also note on 335 A.

43. λαμβάνηται is here rather κακῶς ποιεῖν than κακῶν πολίν, 318 E although (like κακουργεῖν, λυμαίνομαι and the like) it unites both meanings: cf. Rep. 1 335 B foll., and see on Euthyphr. 3 A κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν. With the words of Protagoras compare those of Anytus in Meno 91 c Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὡς Ἀδρατῆς, μηδένα τῶν συγγενέων, μὴν οἰκεῖοι μὴν φιλῶν, μὴν άστον μὴν ξένον, τιμᾶτος μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρά τούτοις ἐλθόντα λαμβηθή ναι, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε φανερὰ ἐστὶ λαμβηθὴ τε καὶ διαφθορά τῶν συγγεγνυμένων.

τὰς γὰρ τέχνας—ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας. τέχναι is used of Arithmetic, Geometry, Solid Geometry and Harmonics in Rep. vii 532 c: elsewhere in Plato al τέχναι generally means the mechanical arts, e.g. Rep. vi 495 d and vii 522 b. Here τέχναι can only mean the subjects taught in schools (γραμματική, λογιστική, κυβαριστική) as
Sauppe remarks, but there seems to be no precise parallel to such a use of the word.

47. εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν: see on 314 B.

49. εὐθυλία περὶ τῶν οἰκελων. The editors quote Meno 91 A οὗτος γὰρ—πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με ὅτι ἐπιθύμεις ταῦτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἣν ἂνθρωποι τὰς τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰς δοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν τεραπεύοντες, καὶ τῶν κοινὸν ὑποδεξασθαι τέ καὶ ἀποτεύμφαι ἐπὶ σύναγωγο πόλεως ἀγαθοῦ: Euthyd. 273 D ἀρετὴν—ὡς Ὀδυσσέας, οὕτως εἰς τ’ ἐν τέω παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ’ ἄνθρωπων καὶ τάχιστα.

319 A 54. ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας forms a single expression: ‘good citizens’ are the ἐργαὶ of πολιτικῆ τέχνη. So Ar. Knights 1304 ἄνδρα μοιχθηρὸν πολίτην.

56. ἐπάγγελμα ὀ ἐπαγγέλλομαι. ἐπαγγέλλομαι and its derivatives are often used of sophistic ‘professions’.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates professes to disbelieve that ἀρετή can be communicated by teaching. His arguments are twofold: (1) while in matters connected with the arts of building, ship-carpentry, and the like, the Athenians will listen only to the professional man, in politics they give ear to any and every one: (2) Athenian statesmen have not been able to communicate their political virtue to their sons.

2. εἴπερ κεκτήσαι. Cobet’s rule (Mnemos. xi p. 168) “ubi praecedet vocalis, semper (Plato) κέκτημαι ponit, ubi consonans, promiscue κεκτήσατε et ἐκτῆσατε” represents the usage of the best MSS, but Schanz now writes κεκτήσατε universally after consonants. See also Mnem. viii 336. ἐκτῆσατε is in reality an old Ionic form: it is used by Aeschylus Prom. 795 κοινὸν ὃμικράκησαν.

319 B 5. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. The MSS reading ὅπως ἦν ἀπιστῶ was corrected by Heindorf, ὅπως ἦν with the subjunctive being only used in final clauses. The subjunctive is deliberative: cf. Euthyphr. ii B οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼ ὅπως σοι εἰπω δ νοω.

6. οὐ διδάκτον—μηδὲ. οὐ negatives διδάκτον only, μηδὲ the whole of its clause: a similar case is Eur. Andr. 586 δράν εἰ, κακὼς δ’ ὅ, μηδὲ ἀποκτείνεις βία. μὴ after verbs of thinking and saying is tolerably common in Plato. See on Euthyphr. 6 ομολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι.
8. ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἔλληνες, sc. φασὶ. Compare 337 D where Hippias calls Athens τῇς Ἑλλάδος αὐτῷ τὸ πρωτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας: a somewhat less favourable judgment is given in Laws I 641 εἰ τῷ πόλιν ἀπαντᾷ ἡμῶν Ἔλληνες υπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογος τε ἕστι καὶ πολύλογος, Δακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύλογον μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν.

12. metapemptoménous is probably middle: Plato does not seem to use metapépmws in the sense of 'send for' (like Thucydides e.g. I 112. 3 'Αμυρταίου μεταπέμπτοντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως: VI 52. I et al.). The subject is τοὺς πολῖτας to be supplied from τὴν πόλιν. Compare Gorg. 455 B foll. ὅταν περὶ λατρῶν αἱρέσεως ὣς πόλεις ἄλλοις ἄλλοις ναυτηγῶν ὁ περὶ ἄλλου τῷ πόλει δημουργικόν ἔλον, ἄλλο τῷ τοῦτο ὁ ἤθορκός συμβουλεύει; δήλου γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τῶν τεχνικώτατων δεί αἱρέσθαι and Alc. 1107 A—C. Kroschel well remarks that the words περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων (which Hirschig wrongly rejects) are added to shew that it is only about the actual buildings that the builders are consulted, "non de necessitate, utilitate, magnitudine", as to which the orators advise: compare Gorg. 455 D.

17. κ애ν πάυνα καλὸς ἢ κτλ. Imitated in Alc. 1107 B and C: 319 C εάν τε γε σμικρός ἢ μέγας ὡς, εάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχρός, ἢ τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννησίαν, τωσ γὰρ οὖ;—ἀλλ' ἂν τε χένης ἂν τε πλούσιος ἢ ἅ παραιών, οὐδὲν διός 'Αθηναίοις, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλευόντας, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ δητοῦσιν λατρῶν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

20. οἱ τοξόται. The τοξόται (bowmen) or Σκυθαί (so called from their nationality) or Πευσίνοι (from one Πευσίς who according to the Schol. on Ar. Ach. 54 had the chief hand in establishing them) were the police. ἔλκω was regularly used of removing an offending orator: e.g. Ar. Knights 665 καθ' εἴλκον αὐτῶν οἱ πρωτάνεοι καλ' τοξόται.

21. ἐξαιρέωνται. So T (B has ἐξερέωνται): the present is perhaps due to tense-assimilation to κελεύοντων. The active αἴρεων is used in the same connexion by Ar. Eccl. 261 ἡμεῖς δὲ γ' ἢν αἵρω' (sc. οἱ τοξόται), εάν κελεύσομεν, but no exact parallel for the use of the middle has yet been found—the nearest seems to be Eur. I. T. 1201 οἱ γὰρ τοξ' ἢν τῶν ἡγάμην βάθρον ἀπο: cf. Ar. Ach. 1140 τὴν ἄσπιδ' αἴρου καὶ βάδιτ' ὁ παῖ καβαβων: ibid. 953.

23. περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως. So B and T, but in both 319 D the copyist had doubts as to the text. It is usual to drop either τῶν
or διοικήσεως: Kroschel transposes τῶν and περὶ. Sauppe retains the MSS reading, making περὶ govern διοικήσεως—but this is very harsh. τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως is a periphrasis for ἡ πόλεως διοικήσεις (for the omission of the article with πόλεως cf. Polit. 296 ε τούτον δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτα τὸν δρόν εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθείαταν ὅρθης πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὕν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων): ‘the city’s administration’ being contrasted with τῶν ἐν τέχνῃ διοικήσεις. The whole phrase περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως corresponds to 318 ε καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατος ἄν εἰγ καὶ πράττει καὶ λέγειν.


29. μαθών. Heindorf quotes many cases of the transition from plural to singular in Plato (e.g. infra 324 β): the change is justified here because in each case the reproach would be addressed to a single person.

31. μὴ τολύνῃ ὅτι—ἄλλα ἴδια. See on Apol. 40 δ οἶμαι ἢν μὴ δτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἄλλα τῶν μέγαν βασιλέα κτλ.

319 E 34. οὐχ οἶοι τε ἄλλοι παραδιδόναι. Plato comments on the inability of statesmen to teach their sons political sagacity in Meno 93 b foll., citing Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides as cases in point. Compare Alc. I 118 b foll.

35. ἂ μὲν διδασκάλων ἐξῆτο. The phrase is used by Plato in the other passages where he deals with this topic: cf. infra 324 d, Meno 93 d and 94 a.

320 A 38. νέμονται ὠσπέρ ἄφετοι. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze’, and ἄφετος is said de grege numini alicui consecrato (Heindorf): cf. Critias 119 d ἄφετων ὄντων ταύτων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσείδώνος ιερῷ. The same expression occurs in Rep. VI 498 C ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ βίωσι, πολιτικών δὲ καὶ στρατεύων ἕκτος γέγονετι, τότε ἢδη ἄφετος νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν. Here the object of νέμεσθαι is virtually the clause ἐὰν ποῦ—τῇ ἁρέτῃ ‘going to and fro by themselves they graze like creatures set apart upon whatever excellence etc.’: cf. (for the use of ἐὰν) Rep. VII 528 A φθονοῖς μὴν οὖδ’ ἄν ἄλλω εἶ τίς τι δύναιτο ἀπ’ αὐτῶν δυνασθαι.

39. ἐὰν ποῦ αὐτόματον περιτύχωσι τῇ ἁρέτῃ. αὐτομάτῳ (used as in Theaet. 180 c, Polit. 271 d ὅ ὅρον περὶ τοῦ πάντα αὐτόματα γέγρασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) agreeing with ἁρέτῃ would make the expression more pointed, and avoid the slight contradiction involved
in the expression αὐτόματον περιτώχωσιν (since one cannot spontaneously *fall in with* a thing), but αὐτόματον is not to be pressed, and should be understood as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου (cf. 323 c).

40. Κλεανίαν. The author of the First Alcibiades makes Alcibiades himself speak of his younger brother as μαυθενος ἀνθρωπος (118 B).

42. μὴ διαφθερᾷ δὴ. δὴ adds a touch of irony to spare the feelings of Alcibiades.

43. καταθέμενος εἰν’ Ἀριφρονος. According to Plutarch (Alcib. ch. 1) Arhipron shared with Pericles the guardianship of Alcibiades. Arhipron was Pericles’ brother.

45. ἀπέδωκε τοῦτῳ, i.e. Pericles to Alcibiades. Pericles is 320 B humourously represented as restoring his ward in despair to the very man who was suspected of corrupting him: and Alcibiades is again appeased.

48. οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. See Gorg. 515 c foll., where it is argued that Pericles, Cimon and Miltiades made none of their fellow-citizens better.


52. πολλῶν μὲν—τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἔξουρηκέκαναι. It is implied that Protagoras’ originality is not equal to his industry. The MSS have ἔξουρηκέκαναι, but in the perfect as in past tenses generally initial εὐ became ην: see on 315 B above.

55. ἀλλ’ ἐπίθειεσον. See below on ἐπίθειεσον in 328 D. 320 C

56. ἀλλ’ εἰς τριτέρους νεωτέρους. Gorg. 527 Α τάχα β’ οὖν ταῦτα μόνος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὡσεπεργράδος.

57. ἡ λόγων διεξελθών. So BT: Cobet requires ἡ λόγω διεξελθῶ, but λόγω διεξελθῶν contrasts with μόνον λέγων, not with ἐπίθειεσον, which belongs to both participial clauses. For the aorist participle (where we should expect the present) compare with Sauppe Theaet. 167 D ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθῶν.

CHAPTER XI.

Protagoras’ reply falls into three sections: viz. (1) 320 C—323 C, (2) 323 C—324 D, (3) 324 E—328 D: compare Introduction, p. xi. In the first he is concerned to justify the Athenians for allowing everyone to address them on political questions: this he does in the first instance by relating a myth of pre-historic man.
It is probable that this myth comes from Protagoras’ treatise περὶ τῆς ἐν ἄρχῃ καταστάσεως, mentioned in Diog. Laert. IX 55. It does not resemble the other myths of Plato in point of style, and if not actually written by Protagoras, it is at least carefully modelled on his way of writing: compare the similar imitations of the style of Agathon in Symp. 194 D foll. and of Prodicus infra 337 A foll. See Introd. p. xxi. That the ‘Sophists’ taught by means of parables we can see from Prodicus’ Apologue of Heracles in Xen. Mem. II 1. 21 foll. The other passages in Plato treating of the primitive constitution of man are Polit. 269 C foll., Tim. 42 E foll. and Symp. 189 C foll. In Rep. III 414 C foll. there are also some points of resemblance to the present story.

1. ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος. γάρ introduces the story: see on Apol. 30 Ἑκατερίνα γάρ ἐστε τούς. ἦν χρόνος was usual in beginning a tale: the editors quote Theocr. 8. 1 ἦν χρόνος ἄνεκ' ἐγών κτλ.

2. θυντά δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. In the Timaeus 42 E foll. the creation of men takes place after that of gods. The lower animals in the Timaeus arise from the degeneration of the souls of men in later births, every soul being first born as man: cf. Tim. 41 E with 90 E foll. Here the lower animals are created simultaneously with man, for θυντά γένη is of course not limited to the human race.

3. χρόνος ἠλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως. The omission of the article, as well as the whole turn of expression (ἠλθεν αὐτοῖς χρόνος), is somewhat poetic.

4. θεός γῆς ἐνδον: so in Tim. 42 E it is the created gods, not the δημιουργός, who make men. There however it is not said that human creatures were made within the earth: but compare the γενναῖον ψεῦδος of Rep. III. 414 C ἦσαν δὲ (i.e. the citizens of Plato’s state) τότε τὴν ἀληθείαν ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν τὸς πλαττόμενον. The wide-spread tradition of autochthonous races among the Greeks no doubt helped to produce such anthropological theories, with which compare Empedocles (ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. p. 143) οὐκοφονεῖς μὲν πρώτα τύποι χθόνος ἐξανέτολλον: Symp. 191 C έγένειν καὶ ἔτικτον (sc. primitive men) οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἄλλα εἰς γῆν ὅπερ οἱ τέττιγες: and Polit. 272 A ἐκ γῆς γάρ ἀνεβιοκοιτο πάντες. It is to be noticed that Plato regularly uses ἐντὸς (not ἐνδον) as a preposition: ἐνδον (so used) is the more poetic word.

ἐκ γῆς—κεραννυταῖ. Compare Tim. 42 E (of the creation of man) μμούμενοι (i.e. the created gods) τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὀδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δανειζόμεναι μόρια.
For 'air and water' is substituted here τῶν ὁσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράνυνται.
Fire is the rarest and earth the densest of the four elements: Protagoras' theory is that air and water are produced by mixing these in different proportions, for κεράνυνται cannot mean merely that the elements interchange. Compare the theory attributed by Aristotle to Parmenides: Met. I 5. 986b 33 δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, ὁδὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. It is noteworthy that Plato himself regards all four elements as differentiated, although imperfectly, before the creation of the κόσμος by the δημιουργὸς: compare Tim. 53 A foll. The chiasmus in γῆς καὶ πυρὸς followed by πυρὶ καὶ γῇ is part of Protagoras' art.


7. Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἑπιμηθεῖ. In Gorg. 523 D Prometheus again appears as the servant of Zeus, commissioned to put a stop to man's foreknowledge of his day of death: in Polit. 274 c he is mentioned as the giver of fire to mortals. The Hesiodic and Aeschylean form of the legend, in which Prometheus steals the fire, does not appear in Plato, except at 321 D, nor is there any hint in his works of the story in Hesiod about the gift of Pandora—the source of human ills—to Epimetheus (Works and Days 50 foll.), though it is worth noting that Plato like Hesiod makes the creation of woman posterior to that of man (Tim. 42 B).

9. παραιτεῖται—αὐτὸς νεῖμαι. The object clause, as usual with verbs like παραιτεῖσθαι (deprecati) depends on the positive part of the verb (here αἰτεῖσθαι): see on Apol. 31 B. αὐτὸς is 'by himself', without Prometheus' aid. We follow Cron and Turner in retaining the MSS νεῖμαντος δὲ μου as against Bekker's δ’ ἐμοῦ: the antithesis, as Cron remarks, is between the actions—νεῖμαντος and ἐπισκέψαι. The point to be noticed is that Afterthought invites Forethought to exchange offices with him: it is Afterthought whose duty it is to inspect (ἐπισκέψασθαι: cf. Gorg. 526 C ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν καθηταί).

11. τὰ δ’ ἀσθένεστερα—τὰ δέ. B and T have τοὺς δ’ ἀσθενε· 320 Ε στέρους—τοὺς δέ, a natural mistake, which can hardly be due to Plato.

The whole passage is full of rare and often poetic rhythms, words, constructions, and turns of expression: e.g. ἀσπέρ ἀστέρας, ὑμμύραυα, ἡμιπυγχεῖς, πτηνὸν φυγῆν, τίθε ἀυτῷ (for ἀυτῷ τοῦτῳ), Αἰστωβῆλης, ἀλληλοφορίας διαφυγὰς ἐπήρχεσθαι, ἑμμαριαν (as against ἑμμαρειαν), and many more: note also the effort after balance and variety in ἰκανοὶ μὲν ἀμώναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοὶ δὲ καὶ καύματα (321 Α), τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς—Ἀλλοίς δὲ—τοῖς δὲ—ἔστι δ’ αἰ. "Summum opinor," says Heindorf, "in his imitantis philosophi appareret artificium, si quid de propria Protagorae dictione superesset". See Introd. p. xxi.

14. σμικρότητι ἡμμύραυα. The usual construction would require σμικρότητα: the change is perhaps due to the desire for balance with ἀ δὲ ηθὲ μεγέθει, but the same construction occurs infra in line 21 with ἄμφιεννυς.


20. ἑμμαριαν. So Schanz with BT: the editors generally read ἑμμαρειαν. The older form is intentionally used here: see above on line 13.

24. ὑποδὼν is Cobet's correction for ὑπὸ ποδῶν of B and T. See infra on 321 C γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόθητον κτλ.

321 B 25. τὰ δὲ δερμάσων στερεοῖς καὶ ἀνάλμοις. After τὰ δὲ the MSS read θρίψιν καλ. The words seem to have been wrongly introduced from line 21. This (the suggestion of Ast, adopted by Schanz and others) seems better than to read for θρίψιν καλ the words ὄνειξιν καλ.

31. οὐ πάνυ τί = non satis: cf. note on Euthyphr. 2 B oδδ' αὐτός πᾶν τί γεγυνόσκω. οὐ πάνυ is the English 'not quite', sometimes equivalent to 'not at all' by meiosis: the addition of τί makes the phrase a little less emphatic. πάνυ οὐ is quite a different phrase and means 'altogether not'.

321 C 32. κατανάλωσας τὰς δυνάμεις. After τὰς δυνάμεις, the words εἰς τὰ ἄλογα are found in T, but not in B.

36. ἐμμέλεις πάντων ἔχοντα: like ἰκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα in Theaet. 194 D and the genitive after καλῶς ἔχειν and the like.

37. γυμνὸν τε καὶ ἀνυπόθητον καλ ἀστρῶτον καλ ἄσπλον. Compare the description of Ἐρως in Symp. 203 C: ἀνυπόθητος καλ ἄσπλος, χαμαπετής ἄει ὄν καὶ ἀστρῶτος. ἀνυπόθητον contrasts with
υποδῶν in 321 B (line 24), and justifies Cobet’s emendation for υπο
ποδῶν. Aristotle (περὶ ξιφῶν κυρλον IV 10, p. 687a 23) alludes to
this passage of the Protagoras: ἀλλ’ οἱ λέγοντες ὡς συνέστηκεν οὐ
cαλὸς ὁ ἀνθρωπός, ἀλλὰ χειράτα τῶν ξιφῶν (ἀνυπόδητον τε γὰρ αὐτῶν
εἶναι φασὶ καὶ γυμνῶν καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντα δεῖλον πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθη), οὗθεν ὀρθῶς
λέγοντος.

39. ἐν ᾗ. See above on ἐν τῇ ὑπεραλήγη 318 A. All the ὑπεραλήγη
gένη then according to Protagoras issued forth on the same day.
Plato thought otherwise: see on 320 D line 2.

40. εὐχάριστος: so T: “σχόρευν B, sed in marg. vitii nota.”
Schanz. σχόρευν is occasionally found in this passive sense,
especially in compounds (Sauppe quotes Soph. 250 D ἱσσεχάρισμα
and Isocr. XIX 11 φθόνο σχόρευν), but the present participle is at
least equally well attested here and suits the meaning better: cf.
(with Kroschel) Laws VI 780 B ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀπορίας εὐχάριστος.

42. τὴν ἐντεχνὸν σοφίαν σὺν τυρί. Aesch. Prom. 252—254 321 D
πρὸς τοίδες μέντοι πῦρ ἐγὼ σφίν ὡπασα, καὶ νῦν φλογωτὸν πῦρ
ἐχομενερ έφημεροι, ἄφ’ οὖ γε πολλᾶς ἐκμαθήσονται τέχνα—which is
the usual form of the story. In Polit. 274 c Plato attributes fire to
Prometheus, and the arts to Hephaestus and Athena. ἐφ’ denotes
a much closer connexion than μετά: it is seldom used by Plato
except in a few adverbial phrases, or in religious uses (like ἐφ’ ὑπὸ
Χάριοι καὶ Μοῦσας Laws III 682 A), or in semi-poetic passages like
the present: see on οὐδένι ἐφ’ νῦ in Crito 48 c.

46. ἐσχέτος is ‘obtained’: see on ἐσχέτο in Apol. 19 A. ἢν
gὰρ παρὰ τῷ Δι μέρει reminds one of Sophocles’ Δικὴ ἐξέδρος Ζηνὸς
O. C. 1382.

48. οὐκέτι means that Prometheus had to draw the line there;
he had been able to steal the fire, but farther he could not go—no
doubt because time pressed. The same idiomatic use of οὐκέτι(ἡδ’
occurs above in 312 D µᾶ ἐνετ’, ἐφ’ οὐκέτι ἐχὼ σοι λέγειν: it is
extremely common in Plato and in Greek generally: see note on
Euthyphr. 3 E and Cope on Arist. Rhet. A i. 1354b 7 referred to
there.

49. Διὸς φιλακαί are no doubt Κράτος and Βία, as in the 321 E
Prometheus. Compare Hesiod Theog. 385 foll. (quoted by Hein-
dorf) καὶ Κράτος ἡδ’ Βίαν ἁριδείκτεα γεννατο τέκνα (sc. Στυέ) τῶν
οὐκ ἐστ’ ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δόμος οὔδε τις ἐδρή οὔδ’ ὄδός ὑπ’ οὕτως
θεὸς ἡγεμονευεί: ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ πάρ Ζηνι βαρυκτύτυπον ἐδρικώταται.

eis δὲ τῷ τῆς ᾨθήνας κτλ. Protagoras reverts to the story of
the theft. Similarly in 346 D below Socrates reverts to a part of the 'poem which he has quoted some time before in 345 C.

51. ἐξήφθων τέχνην is τέχνη which works by πῶς, as ἐνεχθος σοφία in line 42 is σοφία working by τέχνη.

322 A 54. τοῦ βίου—δι' Ἐπιμήθεα. βίος is 'means of living' as in line 45. The words δι' Ἐπιμήθεα mean 'thanks to Epimetheus': cf. Ar. Clouds 12—14 ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι δεῖλαίς εὖδην δακυθμένον ὑπὸ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ τῆς φάτνης καὶ τῶν χρεῶν, διὰ τούτοι τόν υἱόν, and in Rep. I 354 A οὗ μεντοί καλῶς γε εἰστιμαί, δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὗ διὰ σέ. The words are rejected by Schanz (after Sauppe), but without reason: the jingle (Προ-μηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπι-μηθέα) is quite in Protagoras' style.

55. ᾧπερ λέγεται. Aeschylus relates the punishment but not the trial: cf. Prom. 7—9 τὸ σὸν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχθου πυρὸς σέλας, θυντοῖς κλέψας ὥπασεν' τοιούτῳ τοῦ ἄμαρτιας σφέ δεῖ θεός δοθοῦν δίκην.

CHAPTER XII.

The myth is continued (322 A—322 D) and used to justify the Athenians for listening to promiscuous political advisers, since according to it all men are endowed with πολιτικὴ ἀρετή—as indeed all men believe, otherwise they would not (as they do) regard as insane the man who does not at least pretend to possess justice and πολιτικὴ ἀρετή generally.

1. θελας μετέχει μοίρας: μοίρα is 'dispensation', and refers to the ἐνεχθος σοφία, which is θελα because derived from Hephaestus and Athena.

2. [διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγενείαν]. These words are open to objection on two grounds. The singular τοῦ θεοῦ is inaccurate—no single god has been mentioned as akin to man: nor can τοῦ θεοῦ well be taken as God in the monotheistic sense, or as generic for τῶν θεῶν—both usages are alien to the whole tone of the myth. These difficulties might perhaps be got over by reading τοῦ βελοῦ = τῶν βελῶν, but another difficulty remains. The reference in τῇ συγγενείαν can only be to 320 D τυποῦσον αὐτὰ θεοῖ, the creatures being regarded as children of their creators as in Tim. 42 E νοσαντες ὁι παῖδες (the created gods) τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διάταξιν, but there it is not only man but all θυγατα γένη that are in this sense 'akin to gods'—why then should not the lower animals also have built themselves fanes? As the phrase is at best a bad case of loose thinking
and inaccurate writing in an otherwise careful and elaborate piece of composition, I have followed Kral and Schanz in rejecting the whole phrase. The words were perhaps an (inaccurate) gloss on θείας in θείας μοιρας. For the sentiment which they express see the Editor's Introduction to the Euthyphro p. xvi.

μόνον: man alone θείας μετέχει μοιρας: see note in loc. Cobet's μόνος would be more grammatical, but the attraction of ξίφων is too strong.

4. ἐπειτα. πρῶτον μὲν and ἐπειτα refer to logical sequence rather than temporal: Protagoras follows the maxim ἐκ Δίως ἄρχω-μεθενα.
7. ἥμερον. MSS εὕρετο, but see on 315 B above.

14. ἦς μέρος πολεμικῆ. πολεμικῆ is recognised as a part of πολιτικῆ in Rep. II 273 D foll.
15. σφιζόμενα κτιζόντες πόλεισ. The insufficiency of the individual for his own wants is assigned as the cause of city life in Rep. II 369 B γίγνεται τῶν—πόλις, ὃς ἐγίμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἔκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἄλλα πολλὰ ενέδεις η τίν' οἰεὶ ἄρχην ἀληθὴν πόλιν οἰκίζεων; οὐθεμιαν, η δ' ὦς.
19. αἴδω τε καὶ δίκην. The editors cite Hesiod (Works and Days 192) δίκη δ' ἐν χερόι καὶ αἴδως οὐκ ἐσταί (of the γένος σιδήρεον, where man is corrupt). αἴδως is a part of δέος (Euthyphr. 12 C): it keeps men together by making them fear the censure of their fellows (Laws I 647 A—B); compare Homer Iliad XV 561 foll. ὁ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἑστε, καὶ αἰδῶς θεόθ' ἐν τυμῷ, ἄλληλοις τ' αἴδεισθε κατὰ κρατεράς υμῖνας. αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέον σοι ἡ πέφανται-φενυγόντων δ' οὔτ' ἂρ κλέως ὅρνουται οὕτε τις ἄλκη. δίκη is here the abstract principle 'law' like Latin ius: for the original meaning of the word see Verrall on Eur. Med. 411.
20. πόλεων κόσμου—συναγωγοί. The phraseology no less than the rhythm is highly poetical.
21. τίνα οὖν τρόπον. For οὖν retained in the indirect the editors cite Symp. 219 D ὡστε οὖθ' ὅπως οὖν ὁριζόμεν εἶχον οὖθ' ὅπῃ

A. P.
NOTES ON

114 XII 322 C

prosagagoriphn avtou nuptrovn. Cobet’s δω for δολη is attractive but unnecessary.


24. Εἰς ἔκων ἰατρικῆς—ἰδιώται. This division of labour takes place as soon as men begin to unite in cities: compare Rep. II 369 ε. foll.

322 D 30. κτένειν ως νόσον πόλεως. κτένειν is poetical for the ἀποκτένειν of prose.

32. Ἀθηναίοι: without the article as in 319 B and 324 C.

322 E 35. οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ως σὺ φής: 319 C οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται. The antithesis between οὐκ ἀνέχονται ως σὺ φής and εἰκότως ως ἐγὼ φημι is a poor one, since οὐκ ἀνέχονται has to be repeated with εἰκότως. We should expect some word like ἀλόγως before ως σὺ φής, or perhaps οὐκ εἰκότως has dropped out after φής.

323 A 37. ήν δει δια δικαιοσύνης—λέναι. The antecedent to ήν is συμβουλήν not ἀρετής: cf. Laws I 632 C (quoted by Heindorf) κατιδῶν δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ἀπασίων τοῦτοις φιλάκας ἑπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν (sc. φιλάκας) διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δὲ ἀληθῶς δόξης ἤλπιας. The phrase δια δικαιοσύνης λέναι is equivalent to δικαλαρ εἶναι as διὰ φιλίας λέναι to φιλον εἶναι.

38. ἀπαντός. Schanz reads παντός on account of παντὶ following: but Plato frequently interchanges ἀπας and πᾶς; see on Euthyphr. 9 θ. It is natural that the more emphatic form ἀπαντός should come first.

40. ή μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. ή=aliaquin is regular with δει, προσηκει, and the like, in the preceding clause: compare infra 323 C ή μὴ εἶναι ἐν αὐθρόπωσις and 325 λ.

αὐτή—τοῦτου αὐτία: asyndeton as in 318 Α τοσοῦτος δ’ γε ἡμετέρος λόγος.

41. ως τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται. The presence of τῷ ὄντι, as Sauppe remarks, shows that ως depends on τεκμήριον in line 44: compare infra 324 C ως μὲν ὦν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—ἀποδέκτατι σοι.

323 B 54. προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην: elsewhere in Plato προσποιεό­θαι takes the infinitive. Thuc. I 137. 7 has ἢν ψευδός προσποιεό­στα.
CHAPTER XIII.

Protagoras now passes to the second part of his reply (323 c—324 D), in which he seeks to prove by two arguments that men believe that virtue can be taught: (1) as we hold men responsible for ἀδικία, it is clear that we conceive of it as capable of being acquired (323 c—324 A); (2) punishment is in point of fact intended to teach well-doing (324 A—324 D).

4. οὐ φύσει ήγονται εἶναι—ἀλλὰ διδακτόν. Sauppe (on 322 c) remarks that the giving of δίκη and ἀλήθες to all is inconsistent with the theory that πολυτική ἀρετή can be acquired by teaching. What Protagoras no doubt means is that while all men have a part in δίκη (323 A), because they possess δίκη and ἀλήθες, they may be improved by teaching, but it must be allowed that his words are hardly consistent with themselves. See Introduction, p. xix.

15. τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντία τοῦτοι. This, the MSS reading, 323 D retained by Heindorf, and recently by Kral, is, we think, right. ταύτα in line 14 does not have its antecedent in the previous sentence, but is explained by τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντία τοῦτοι. Protagoras in fact divides 'goods' into two classes, viz. (1) goods φόσει, (2) goods ἐξ ἑπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς, and calls the former καλά, the implied examples being personal beauty, stature and health. Schanz's rejection of τὰ καλὰ is therefore needless.

The editors mostly read τὰ κακά, but (in spite of Ficinus' haec mala eorumque contraria) this would seem to be precluded by the μἐν and δὲ in ταύτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ οὐσι δὲ—ἄγαθα: the contrast requires that one class of goods shall be set over against another, and is much weakened if we put 'evils' in the foreground by reading τὰ κακά. Further, ταύτα is too remote to be easily taken with τὰ κακά in the sense of 'these evils', whereas if we take the pronoun merely as anticipating τὰ κακά, then the statement becomes too wide: for not all κακά, not all ἄγαθα (τάναντία τοῦτοι, on this view) come to men φόσει, as indeed the next clause states.

21. συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἔναντίον—ἀρετῆς. We have here the first hint of the unity of the different vices and (by implication) virtues: compare infra 329 C.
NOTES ON XIII 324 A

324A  24. εἰ γὰρ ἔθελες—διδάξει. Cf. infra 342 D.

25. αὐτό οὖν διδάξει: ‘fact will shew you’: Theaet. 200 E ὁ τῶν ποιμῶν καθηγοῦμένος—ἐφη ἄρα δεῖξειν αὐτό: the idiom is a frequent one.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει κτλ. Plato's own theory of punishment so far agrees with this, but goes deeper: see Gorgias 525 A foll. 

29. ἣδίκησεν. See above on 319 D.

30. τιμωρεῖται. The editors quote Aristotle Rhet. I 10. 1369b ἅ διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις: ὡς μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐνεκά ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἦνα ἀποπληρωθῆ. The distinction is not invariably observed in Plato, although he generally uses τιμωρεῖσθαι in passages where the gravity of the sin is more insisted upon.

31. οὗ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος—ἀγένητον θεί. Turner (on 324 B) quotes Laws XI 934 A ὡς ἐνεκα τοῦ κακουργήσαι δίδοις τὴν δίκην, οὗ
CHAPTER XIV.

Here begins the third part of Protagoras' reply: 324 E—328 D. In this chapter he begins to show that virtue is in point of fact taught to all by shewing that it would be absurd to suppose that it is not.

1. ουτή ἀπορία. For the omission of the article before a relative clause (Heindorf suggested the insertion of η after ουτή) Sauppe quotes Rep. III 413 E φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὡν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μονοικῆς ἢς ἐμάθηνεν. The ἀπορία was raised by Socrates in 319 D foll.

4. διδάσκονται. Contrast infra 325 B τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς μετέξις and ibid. τοὺς μετέξις διδάσκονται, said of the parents as διδάσκονται (in the usual sense of διδάσκονται) is said here and in Meno 94 B. Similarly in Prot. 320 A ἑπαίδευσε is used where we should expect ἑπαίδευσεν: cf. ἑπαίδευσατο in Meno 93 D.

ά διδασκάλων ἔχεται. See note on 319 E supra.

7. οὐκέτι μίθου ἄλλα λόγον. Gorg. 523 Α ὡν ὅν ἡγησία μίθον, ὡς ἐγὼ σοί, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὃτα σοι λέξω ἀ μέλλω λέγειν.

13. δικαίωσθην—τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι. Thus for the first time 325 A Protagoras definitely speaks of the virtues in language implying their unity: cf. 323 E.


16. μετὰ τούτου: not μεθ' ὦ, see on 313 A καὶ ἐν φ. For the use of μετά cf. Phaed. 69 Α ff. (μῆ) ἡ ἑκείνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὅρθων,
NOTES ON XIV 325 A

19. καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα: nearly equivalent to 'not only child but etc.': παῖδα is put first as the natural object of κολάξεως—“et nos ergo manum ferulae subduximus” (Juvi. i 15).

21. ὑπακούη is more than obey: the word means 'to hear and answer' (cf. Crito 43 A): tr. 'respond', sc. by becoming better (as explained in line 20).

325 B

22. ὃς ἀνιατον ὄντα—ἀποκτέλειν: Rep. III 410 A tous—κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοῖς ἀποκτενοῦσι. In the next line αὐτὸν περικρότος is still this 'one thing', viz. ἄνδρος ἀρετῆ.

25. ὃς θαμμάτωι γίγνονται. The MSS have ὃς θαμμασίως γίγνονται which could only mean 'in what a strange way are produced'—a meaning irrelevant here. The point is that it is θαμμαστὸν if 'good men'—virtue having been proved to be teachable—teach their sons everything except virtue. θαμμάτωι (with Kroschel and other editors) seems the simplest of the many emendations proposed: cf. Euthyd. 305 B θαμματίωι εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. The mistake may have arisen from the influence of the common θαμμασίως ὃς. Next best is Hirschig's θαμμασίως γίγνονται ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (cf. 328 E ὅπερ εἰναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἡ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται) or θαμμασίως γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ: cf. Meno 89 B οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται and Heindorf's emendation on 326 C below. As to γίγνονται "Saepius a Platone id quod argumentatione colli­gitur, γίγνεσθαι dicitur, ut p. 355 A φημι ἡμῶν τοῦτον οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοίον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι ὅταν λέγητη κτλ., Euthyd. p. 298 E οὐκοῦν ὃ κών πατήρ ὃν σὸς ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ γίγνεσθαι ὃ κών". Kroschel. The same use of γίγνεσθαι is common in Aristotle.

28. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα. For the form of the sentence and for ἄρα here and in line 34 compare note on Crito 50 E ἧ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα.

29. διδάσκονται (but not of course ἄρα) is interrogative: so ὃς διδάσκονται in line 34.

30. ἐφ’ ὃ. This, and not ἐφ’ ὃν (as asserted by Schanz) is after all the reading of B: see Adamson in Cl. Rev. VII p. 445. In itself, ἐφ’ ὃν (so T) is not indefensible: ἐφ’ ὃν (i.e. ἐπὶ τοῦτων ἃ) κτλ. would mean 'in the case of subjects which if they have not learnt' (ἐκ μαθουσι), the latent ἃ depending on μαθοῦσι. This use of ἐπὶ with the genitive is common in Plato, e.g. Rep. VII 534 E ὡσπέρ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικτύλου ἐλέγομεν. But ἐφ’ ὃ (which Heindorf had already
conjectured) is simpler and better. For the misplacement of τε in ἦ τε ζημία see note on 316 D above.

33. ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν is to be taken with ξυλλήβδην, which goes 325 C with the verbal noun ἀνατροπαί: ‘almost whole sale subversion of their house’. ξυλλήβδην means not κατὰ σμικρῶν, but so as to embrace everything: cf. Rep. 1 344 A—B τυραννικ ἦν κατὰ σμικρῶν τάλλοστρα καὶ λάβρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρέται—ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην, and Theognis 147 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετή ν. For ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν see on 317 A.

35. οὐσθαλ γε χρῆ: a way of answering one's own question: Crito 53 D, 54 B.

CHAPTER XV.

In this chapter Protagoras shews that the whole scheme of Athenian education is intended to teach ἀρετή.

1. μέχρι οὔπερ ἀν ᾧτ, i.e. ol παιδευόμενοι: in 326 D foll. it is shewn that education does not end when school is left, but goes on through life.

3. ἐπειδὰν θάττον seems not to occur elsewhere in the Platonic writings: in Alcib. I 105 A is εἶν θάττον. τάχιστα is more usual after such conjunctions. Kroschel quotes an imitation of this passage from De Rep. Laced. 2. I ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα οἱ παιδεὺς αὐτοῖς τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνίσων, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς παιδαγωγοῦς θεράποντας ἐφιστάσων, εὐθὺς δὲ πέμπουσιν εἰς διδασκάλων μαθησομένους καὶ γράμματα καὶ μουσικήν καὶ τὰ ἐν παλαιστρα.

5. ὡς ἐπιλίπτοσος: so BT: there is no reason for inserting ὡς 325 D after ὡς with Kroschel and Turner: βελτιστότος does not mean better than all others, but very good.


10. τὸ μὲν πολεῖ, τὰ δὲ μὴ πολεῖ: τὰ μὲν is not δίκαιον, καλόν, ὁμοί, but quite general: ‘this do, that do not’. The τάδε μὲν—τάδε δὲ of T is unnecessary; cf. τὸ μὲν—τὰ δὲ in line 8. The symmetry of the sentence is worth noting (a, b, b, a): first τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ, next τὸ δὲ μὲν—τὰ δὲ δὲ twice, last τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ, the end recalling the beginning. Compare note on καὶ κακὸν καὶ αλοχρόν in Crito 49 B.

ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πειθήται: without apodosis: see Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses (1889) p. 179. This idiom occurs more than once in Homer: it is perhaps a remnant of the days when the conditional particles introduced a main sentence: certainly the Greeks were not conscious of any such ellipse as εἰ ἐξει.

11. ὠσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον. ξύλον is 'a piece of wood', not necessarily a dead log, as appears from Hdt. III 47 εἴρησα ἀπὸ ξύλον (of the cotton tree) and other exx. in L. and S. The growing child is compared to a tree growing up and becoming crooked (note the present διαστρεφόμενον—καμπτόμενον). Plato frequently applies the metaphors 'crooked', 'warped' and the like to victims of vice and vicious education: compare Gorg. 525 A πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας. Theaet. 173 A σμίκροι δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς.

12. εὐθύνουσιν—πληγαίς. Cf. Arist. Ἀθην. πολιτ. Ch. 8 τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ηθονεν κυρία οὕσα τοῦ ξημιοῦν καὶ κολάζειν (of the Areopagitic council). For εὐθύνεων (here passing into the meaning of 'chastise') see note on 324 A οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει. To illustrate πληγαίς Sauppe quotes the well-known line of Menander ὁ μὴ δαρεις ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεῦεται.

13. εἷς διασκάλων πέμποντες. It appears from 326 c that there was no regular age for going to school; the parents decided in each case. Plato ordains (Laws VII 809 E) that children shall learn γράμματα (i.e. reading and writing, ibid. 810 B) from 10 to 13, and the lyre from 13 to 16.

τολὺ πάλλον—εὐκοσμίας. Protagoras' description of the aim of Athenian education agrees with the account of the Δικαιον λόγον in the Clouds 961 foll.

325 E

17. ὠσπερ τότε: supra 325 C ἐπειδὰν θάττων συνή τις τὰ λεγόμενα.

18. ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων: i.e. as they sit on the benches: cf. above 315 C. παρατιθέσων represents the works of the poets as intellectual food: cf. Theaet. 157 C παρατίθησιν ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσοσθαι.

19. ποιητῶν ἁγαθῶν: Homer especially, and also Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Compare Laws VII 810 E, from which passage it also appears that extracts were frequently made for committing to memory (ἐκμαθάνειν).

20. ἀναγκάζοσιν: μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις: Arist. Pol. VIII 1339 θ 28 (quoted by Sauppe). So Niceratus in Xenophon Symp. III 5 says that his father ὕπαγκασε με πάντα τὰ Ὀμήρου ἐπη μαθεῖν,
21. **dieξ̄oι οι** means finished narratives or descriptions (cf. λόγος 326 A dieξ̄oινον and dieξ̄ονα in 320 C). It is to be noted that so far we have not got beyond ποιήσις ψιλή (i.e. unaccompanied by music): lyric poetry begins to be studied when the lyre has been learnt (line 26).

24. **έτερα τοιαύτα**: for the phrase see on Apol. 26 A. The accusative (internal) depends on ἐπιμελεύονται as in 325 C ἐπιμελεύονται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν and Laws VII 812 E ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὣ παιδευτῆς ἐπιμελεύοντω: the whole phrase is equivalent to έτέραν τοιαύτης σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦντα. Verbs taking the external object in the genitive or dative are not precluded from taking the internal object in the accusative.

28. **εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες.** ἐντείνειν εἰς is to stretch into, i.e. to ‘put into’: whence ἐντείνειν εἰς κύκλον χωρὸν τρέγων ‘to describe a triangle in a circle’ (Meno 87 A); περὶ γὰρ τοῖς τούτοις ποιημάτων δὲν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τὸσ τοῦ Διούσιον λόγοις of adapting to metre (Phaed. 60 D); and here of accompanying poems on the lyre: the boys learn the poems and tunes (made by the poet) together, while the Citharist plays the lyre. Plato in the Laws VII 812 D foll. requires the κιθαρίσματα to be identical with the tune to which the poem is sung: δὲι—τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προστίθεσθαι—τὸν τε κιθαρίσμαν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀπόδιδοντα πρὸς χορὸν τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι: τὴν δὲ ἐπερωφημάν καὶ ποικίλαν τῆς λύρας, ἄλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ιείσων, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελῳδίαν ἔνθεντος ποιητοῦ—πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ.

**ρυθμοῖς τε καὶ ἀρμονίας.** ρυθμοῖ times or rhythms (cf. Rep. III 399 E foll.), ἀρμονίαι scales (ibid. 398 D foll.). ρυθμός and ἀρμονία between them make up μουσική in the narrower sense: see Symp. 187 A foll., where music is defined as περὶ ἀρμονίαν καὶ ρυθμοῦ ἐρωτικὸν ἐπιστήμη—περὶ ἀρμονίαν since it reconciles ἐξ ὧν and ἑαυτῆς, περὶ ρυθμοῦ since it reconciles ταχῦ and βραδύ.


30. **εὐρυθυμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι.** See Rep. III 400 C foll., where, after it is shewn that τὸ εὐρυθμὸν and τὸ εὐαρμοστὸν imply εὐλογία, Plato continues (400 D) εὐλογία ἡρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθυμία ἐνοθεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὓς ἦν ἁνικαν ὁσιον ὑποκορίζουσιν καλοῦσιν ὡς εὐθείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑπὸ ἀληθῶς εἰ. τε καὶ καλὸς τὸ ἂθιος κατεσκευασμένη διάνοιαν,
34. εἷς παιδοτρίβουν: Protagoras passes to γυμμαστική, the second great division of Greek education: Rep. II 376 E.

35. ὑπηρετῶσιν τῇ διανοα. Plato asserts that the true object of γυμμαστική is not to cultivate the body, but to educate the soul to the proper mean between hardness and softness: Rep. III 410 C foll. On the soul as the mistress of the body see Phaedo ch. 43.

326 C 39. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι. The first μάλιστα is due to Heindorf: it is necessary to the meaning. Most of the editors insert the word μάλιστα not after ποιοῦσιν but after δυνάμενοι, explaining its loss by the presence of μάλιστα following: but it comes (we think) more naturally after ποιοῦσιν.

42. ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγός: ἐκ is rejected by Cobet (cf. Gorg. 514 C ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν): but the phrase is just as stereotyped as εἷς διδασκάλων, to which (in line 40) it forms an appropriate contrast—in neither of the two cases were the Greeks (in all probability) conscious in common parlance of an ellipse. Sauppe quotes a fragment of Ar. Banqueters 42 οὐκ ἐφθος ἀπεδιδρασκοτες ἐκ διδασκαλου, Plutus 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἔρχομαι, and other parallels.

43. ἀναγάζει μανθάνειν: hardly to be taken literally, but only in the sense that ignorance was no excuse for breaking the laws.

44. κατὰ τούτους ξῆν. After ξῆν occur in the MSS the words κατὰ παράδειγμα. "Facile succurrat cuivis κατὰ τούτους ξῆν καθάπερ παράδειγμα—quamquam talia notanda quam statim corrigenda" says Heindorf. Most recent editors bracket or reject the words, which are open to objection on several grounds, that the laws are not an example but a rule of life, and Plato does not use παράδειγμα precisely in this way, as well as from the harsh omission of ὁς. The suggestion of Sauppe that the words are a gloss on κατὰ τούτους by a scribe referring to the illustration which follows—as for example—has much probability.

326 D 45. γραμματιστα: see on γραμματιστωδ 312 B.

46. ὑπογράφαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμα) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμα as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; "ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere inuentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt", Kroschel. Such a view is however inconsistent with
the meaning of ὑπογράφειν and of ὑφήγησις, and (in view of Plato's statements as to the nature of Law) renders the simile inexact. ὑπογράφειν in Plato regularly refers to an outline drawing (as ὑποτυπώσασθαι to moulding in outline Tim. 76 Ε) and is opposed to ἀπεργάσασθαι and (in Aristotle) to ἀναγράφειν, e.g. Rep. viii 548 c—d οὐκοῦν—ἀυτὴ μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτως γεγονεῖ καὶ ταὐτὴ ἃν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντι μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογράφης τὸν τε δικαίωταν καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, and Theaet. 172 ε, where a litigant's ἄντωμοσία is called ὑπογραφή—a sort of outline drawing ὃν· ἓκτος οὐ ρητόν, but which his speech must simply ἀπεργάσασθαι. ὑφηγεύσαι is similarly used, only with the added idea of guiding: e.g. Rep. iii 403 d—e οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἰκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδόθηκεν αὐτή τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγεύσαι μεθα—δρόμος ἐν ποιοίμεν; and Laws x 890 c δὲ ταῦτα οὕτως πράττειν διανοου­μένους δώπερ ἢν ὅνομοθετήσῃ ὑφηγήσῃται γράφοις. The point of the simile is this. As the child draws his pen between the outlines of the lines forming letters (making e.g. ( ) into ( ) ), so we must keep our actions between certain outlines, which are the laws. Plato invariably regards νόμοι as only τύποι, within which our actions should fall: cf. Rep. ii 383 c παντάπασιν—ἔγγυε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἐν χρόνην (whence νόμος ὑπογράφειν here and in Laws v 734 ε): see also Polit. 294 a foll. τὸ δ' ἁριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστίν ἐσχῆν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὸν μετά φρονήσεως βασιλείαν—ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύνατο τὸ τε ἁριστον καὶ τὸ δικαίωτον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἀμα περιλαβῶν τὸ βέλτιστον ἑπτάττειν. αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιώσεις τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων—οὐδὲν ἐσθον ἀπλοῖον ἐν οὐδεὶς περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τῶν χρόνων ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ' ἐντυνοῦν—for which reason in the Republic (vi 497 δ) there must always be a power above the laws. The explanation which we have given does not disagree with the account of Seneca in his Epistles xv 2. 51 “Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digitii illorum tenentur et aliena manu per literarum simulacra ducuntur”; it is supported by Quintilian i 1. 27 “cum vero iam ductus sequi coeperit, non inutile erit eas (sc. letteras) tabellae quam optime insculpi, ut per illos velut suis cos ducatur stilus”. It is probable that both these authors had the present passage in view.

It should be noted that γράφειν νόμοις was a regular phrase: compare the image in Rep. vi 501 a.
NOTES ON

49. ὡς δὲ καλ. ὡς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose: Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. vii 530 D κυστικεῖα ὡς πρὸς ἄστρονομον ὄμματα πεπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἕναρμονον φορὰν ὡτα παγίμαι. For δὲ see above on 318 c.

326 E 54. εὐδύναι regularly denotes the ‘putting straight’ or examination of a magistrate when his office expired. It is not clear whether Protagoras’ philological zeal does not cause him to stretch a point in giving to the word a wider signification: but see on εὐθύνονος in 325 D.

CHAPTER XVI

Protagoras at last comes to the difficulty raised by Socrates in 319 E. Virtue having been proved to be teachable, it is only from a lack of natural aptitude that good men’s sons sometimes turn out badly: compared with men who have never been taught virtue, even they are good. Protagoras concludes with a manifest bid for pupils.

4. ἐμπροσθεν: viz. at 324 E.

327 A 6. οὐδένα δει ἰδιωτευν: equivalent to πάντας δει εἶναι δημιουργοῦν: no one must be a layman in ἀρετᾷ.

12. ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπλησσε τὸν μὴ καλὸς αὐλούντα. As ἐδίδασκε is the important word, ἐπέπλησσε has no effect on the construction, but is in effect enclitic: see on 317 C ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλωπισάσθαι.

327 B 19. έι οὖν οὕτω. οὖν marks the reversion to the original protasis, viz. έι μὴ οὖν τ’ ἦ—καὶ τοῦτο κτλ., from λυκεῖται to νόμιμα being parenthetical: it therefore seems better to print a colon rather than a full stop after νόμιμα.


27. ἀλλ’ οὖν αὐληταὶ γ’ ἄν: γ’ ἄν for γοῦν was Shilleto’s conjecture, which can hardly fail to be right. ἀλλ’ οὖν—γε is an emphatic ‘but at all events’: cf. Gorg. 496 D μαθάνω· ἀλλ’ οὖν τὸ γε πεινὴν αὐτὸ ἀναιρήν.

29. οὔτως οἷον καὶ νῦν. Sauppe’s οἷον καὶ νῦν seems to be quite needless: the conclusion is naturally put as a command—‘so in the present case, you are to think’.

30. τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἄνθρώποις. So BT. ἄνθρώποις in this emphatic sense is a little awkward with ἄνθρώποις two lines below
and ἀνθρώπος said seven lines below of savages (though the word is qualified in both cases), but the text is probably right: cf. 323 C ἀναγκαίον οὐδένα δυντι' οὐχὶ ἀμώς γέ τως μετέχειν αὐτὴς (sc. τῆς δικαιοσύνης), ἡ μή ἐστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Of the suggested emendations the most reasonable is perhaps Sauppe’s ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποι—which he has now given up in favour of the mss reading.

31. αὐτὸν is not emphatic: to be δίκαιος is to be a δημουγοῦσ δικαιοσύνης, cf. 326 E τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὐδένα δεὶ ἰδιωτεύειν.

33. μήτε—μήτε—μήτε—μηδέ. μηδέ introduces the climax: see 327 D note on οὔτε—οὔτε γέ in Apol. 19 D and Cope on Arist. Rhet. I 4. 4. Presently ἄλλ' εἰεν is used rather than ἄλλ' εἰσι (in spite of εἰστὶν in line 33) because the hypothetical nature of the case is becoming more prominent. For the passage of a relative clause into a main clause (οἱ is not to be repeated after ἄλλα) see on 313 A.

35. ἄλλ' εἰεν ἀγριοὶ πνεύμ. It appears not only from Athenaeus (V 218 D), but from Suidas and others that the play in question was called "Ἀγριοὶ. The few fragments of it which remain (see Kock’s Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta I pp. 146—150) give us no indication of the plot or treatment. The probability is that the "Ἀγριοὶ formed the chorus (compare the names Νεφέλαι, Βάτραχοι etc.), "ad quos"—as we should infer from the words of Plato—"Athenienses quidam, pauci sine dubio, vitae civilis in sua urbe pertaeiti (μυσάνθρωποι) sicut Pithetaerus et Euelpides, accedebant imprivdenter sperantes se inter homines immanes meliorem iustioremque quam in civitate sua vitam inventuros esse" (Kock). Plato was perhaps thinking of the same play again in Rep. VI 496 D ωστερ εἰς θηρία ἀνθρώπως ἐμπεσόν, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἵκανός ὁν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγριοὶς ἀντέχειν.

οἰοὶ περ οὕς πέρσουν: so BT, and there is no sufficient reason for altering the text to οἷος πέρσοι (with Sauppe, after Athenaeus V 218 D) or οἷος περ πέρσοι with Schanz. Plato does not always avail himself of the liberty of attraction: a parallel is quoted from Crat. 432 E ἤνα κομίδη ὡ τοιοῦτον οἶον περ οὖ δύναμι ἐστιν.

36. πέρσων. Athenaeus V 218 D ἐδιδάχθησαν δὲ οἱ "Ἀγριοὶ ἐπ'. Ἀριστίωνος ἄρχοντος, i.e. Ol. 89 4 = 421/420 B.C. For the bearing of the date of the "Ἀγριοὶ on the question when the dialogue of the Protagoras is assumed to have taken place see Introd. p. xxxvii.

Φερεκράτης. The fragments of Pherecrates—a poet of the old comedy who gained his first victory in 438 B.C.—are given in Kock’s Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta I pp. 145—209.
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εἶδοσεν ἐπὶ Δήναιῳ. The Δήναιον (also called Λυμναὶ and τέμνεσι τοῦ Διονύσου) was an enclosure sacred to Dionysus on the south-east slope of the Acropolis. Compare Photius s.v. Δήναιον: περίβολος μέγας Ἀθήνης, ἐν ὅ τοῦ ἄγνωσ ἥγον, πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ θεάτρου ὀικοδομηθῆκαί, ὄνομαζότατε ἐπὶ Δήναιῳ. The phrase ‘at Lenaeum’ seems to have survived even after all plays were given in the Dionysiac theatre, as by this time they were, and to have been understood as equivalent to ‘at the Lenaean festival’ (cf. Ar. Ach. 504 οὔπι Λήναιος τῷ ἁγῶν), for which the expressions ἐν Δήναιοισ and (εἰς δήναιοι) εἰς Δήναια are more usual in the didascaliae (see Müller’s Bühnenalterthümer p. 316 note 3). The Lenaea took place in the month Gamelion.

38. ὃσπερ οἱ ἐν ἑκέλυφ τῷ χορῷ, sc. γενήμενοι. γέγενεθαί εἰς is ‘to come to be in or among’, ‘to fall among’. ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμενα of 314 C is the same idiom.

μυσάνθρωποι. So the MSS. The various suggested emendations (ἡμᾶνθρωποι Heinrich, μεσάνθρωποι Jacobs, μεσάνθρωποι Lehr) proceed on the supposition that the word is an epithet of the ἄγριον, which is most improbable: “allii sunt ἄγριοι, allii μυσάνθρωποι, neque in illa sermonis iunctura” (sc. if we regard the ὃσπερ clause as explaining τοῖς τοιούτοις) “scribendum ὃσπερ sed 鹯ol περ fuit” (Heindorf).

39. Εὐφρατίκαι καὶ Φρυνώνδαι. Two proverbial scoundrels of real life: see Suidas s. v. Εὐφρατίστος πονηρός, ἀπὸ τοῦ πεμβέντος ὑπὸ Κροίου ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν μετὰ χρημάτων, ὡς φθον. “Εφορος, εἶτα μεταβαλομένου πρὸς Κύρον. ἦν δὲ Ἡφαίστειος κτλ. Φρυνὼν ὃν δασα τῶν ἐπὶ πονηρία διαβοσπομένων, ὡς ξένον ὅν κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ διέτριβεν Ἀθήνησι—ἐκ τοῦτον τοὺς πονηροὺς Φρυνώνδας καλοῦσι. They are frequently mentioned in Greek literature: see Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 861. Blaydes remarks that -ώνδας is a Boeotian termination: cf. Ἐπαμεινώνδας, Χαρώνδας and the like.

327 E 42. οὐδές σοι φαίνεται εἴναι. εἴναι is Heindorf’s emendation for eth of the Bodleian. For the asyndeton with ὃσπερ see above on 311 E.

43. τῆς διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἐλληνίζων. The same illustration occurs in Alc. I 111 a.

328 A 48. τούτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἄν διδαχεῖεν repeats τῆς ἀν—διδαχεῖεν τοῦς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν νείς: and οὐ δάδον σοιμαί εἴναι—τούτων διδάσκαλον φανήματε is a variety on οὐδ' ἄν εἰς φανείῃ, which the οὐδέ γ' ἄν of line 44 might lead us to expect would be repeated—but the sentence is a
slight anacoluthon. This is better than to take ἀν of οὐδὲ γ’ ἂν in line 44 with ἐλθαι of line 49.

51. οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς. On οὕτω δὲ see above note on 318 c.

52. κἂν εἶ: κἂν = καὶ εἶ is somewhat rare in Plato, e.g. Meno 72 c κἂν εἶ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἶσον, ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ἀπασαι ἐχοὺς: it is extremely common in Aristotle. The ἂν shews that the idiom must have arisen from cases where the apodosis contained a verb with which ἂν could go, e.g. κἂν εἶ ἀποδύσκου, εὖ ἔχοι. Such cases as Symp. 185 ἄ κἂν εἶ τις—ἐξαπατηθεὶς, καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, where the verb after εἶ is in the optative, preserve traces of the origin of the construction.

55. ὄνησαι τινα πρός. ὄνησαι is Dobree's correction for νοήσαι: 328 B cf. Rep. x 601 D ἐπερ ὅθεν τ’ ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὄνησαι ἀνθρώπους.

58. τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ. Aristotle Eth. Nic. ix 2. 1164 a 24 ὁπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν ὅτε γὰρ διδάξεις ἀλήτητε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθητὴν ἐκέλευν ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπιτεταγματικαὶ καὶ ἑλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. This is more than Plato says: see next note.

60. ἀποδέδωκεν: but κατέθηκεν (gnomic aorist) two lines lower down. It is not necessary to reject ἀποδέδωκεν (with Sauppe and Schanz) or to read ἀπέδωκεν (with Kroschel and Kral). ἀποδέδωκεν is hardly to be explained as a gnomic perfect (Goodwin), certain examples of which are rare, if not unknown, but is to be taken in its natural sense: 'if he prefers, he has already paid...if not etc.': this is also Heindorf's view. Unless the pupil had paid in advance, Protagoras left the fee to his own conscience and (according to his own account, ὡστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθητῷ) generally fared better, even though (if Diogenes Laertius IX 52 may be trusted) his fee was 100 minae. If Protagoras made no bad debts, he escapes the censure of Plato in Gorgias 519 c, where it is said that, if teachers of δικαιοσύνη do not receive their fees, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and deserve no fees.

61. ἔλθων εἰς ἱερόν. "Tactis sacris aramve tenentes veteres 328 C iurare satis est notum" Heindorf, quoting Aeschin. in Timarch. § 114 λαβὼν εἰς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ χειρὰ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅμοιας μὴ λαβεῖν δώρα— ἐλπιθώς ἡλέγχῃ.

69. τώνδε. Protagoras is more encouraging than Socrates in 319 E.
CHAPTER XVII.

Here begins Socrates' criticism of Protagoras' speech. The question is first raised—Is Virtue one, or many? The connexion between this question and the speech of Protagoras is that if Virtue has a unity in knowledge, it is teachable, otherwise not: see Introd. p. xx.

328 D 2. ἐπιδεῖξάμενος. ἐπιδείκνυσθαι and ἐπιδείξεις are regularly used of a Sophistic display: e.g. Gorg. 447 A πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὠλγον πρῶτερον ἐπεδείξατο, Crat. 384 B τὴν πετυκουντάραχιν ἐπίδειξιν. ἐπιδείκνυμι is also sometimes used in the same way, e.g. Euthyd. 274 D and infra 347 B: in 320 C above ἄλλα ἐπιδείξον is intended to suggest this meaning, which comes out more clearly in ἐπιδείξιον two lines below.

3. έπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον goes with ἐβλεπὼν and έτι with κεκηλημένον.

8. ὡς παί' Απολλοδόρων: with mock solemnity: so 335 D ὡς παὶ Ἰππονίκου, Rep. II 368 A ὡς παῖδες ἐκέινων τάνδρος.

9. ὁδε in the sense of δεύμο is noted as a Platonic idiom by the lexicographers. The usage is found in tragedy, but no other example is quoted from Plato.


15. ἐπεκδιδάξει—ἐξεδιδάξεν: see on 311 A.

329 A 17. τάκ' ἢν καὶ τοιοῦτος λόγους: καὶ goes with τοιοῦτος—'even such', 'just such': τοιοῦτος should not be inserted (with Sauppe, Schanz, Kral) before τοιοῦτος.

20. ὥστερ βιβλία. Hermann wished to read ὃς ὥστερ βιβλία, since the orators do make a speech when spoken to: but the point is that like books they do not answer the questions asked, or put questions themselves, as the true dialectician does: cf. Phaedr. 275 D δείνῳ γάρ ποι—τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς διόμοιον χαραγματία, καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἐγκόμου ἐστίκε μὲν ὡς ἔξωτα, εἶν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνὸς πάνυ συγά. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· διόχας μὲν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἶν δὲ τι ἐξ ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενοι μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαινεῖ μὸνον ταῦτα ἀεὶ: infra 347 B and Hipp. Min. 365 D τὸν μὲν ὡς Ὄμηρον—ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανέφθει, τι ποτὲ νῦν ταῦτα ἐποίησε τὰ ἐκεῖ. A similar objection applies to laws: see Polit. 294 A (quoted above on 326 D).

22. ὥστερ τὰ χαλκία. The mss have χαλκεῖα, but (as Kro-
schel points out) in Crat. 430 A εἰ τί χαλκίον κυήσει κρυόσας. χαλκεῖα would mean 'smithies'.

23. μακρον ἥξει καὶ ἀποτείνει: ἀποτείνει is used absolutely as in Gorg. 458 B καὶ νῦν ἔως τὸ πόρρῳ ἀποτενούμεν. Compare Euthyd. 300 B ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγης καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρα, ὅ περγώντα λέγεις; οὕκων α' γα εγώ, ἐφέ, παρέχοντο ἐν τοῖς χαλκεῖοις (MSS. χαλκίοι), ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μεγίστον τὰ σιδήρα λέγει.

25. δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. δολιχόν is the reading of B and T, but (1) the adjective δολιχός seems to be exclusively poetic, the word surviving in Plato's time only in the form δόλιχος δρόμος (cf. for the change of accent κάκη by κακή, Φαιδρός by φαιδρός and the like); (2) δολιχός τοῦ λόγου would be a rare construction, though not without parallels, e.g. πολλήν τῆς χώρας in Xen. Cyrop. III 2. 2 and τῆς μαρίλης αὐχήν in Ar. Ach. 350: ἅμηχαν τῆς εὐθαυμὸν of Apol. 41 C is different: (3) after the expressive simile which we have had, 'a long speech' sounds very weak. On the other hand δόλιχος τοῦ λόγου, the suggestion of Stephanus, is strongly supported by 335 B where Socrates compares Protagoras, because he plays the ρήτωρ and not the dialectician, to a δολιχόδρομος: νῦν δ' ἐστιν ὄσπερ ἄν εἰ δεδούλα μου Κρίσων τῷ Ἰμεράῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι ἦ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῆς ἡ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι, and the editors quote a number of parallels to the metaphor, such as Plut. Phoc. 23. 3 καλῶς ἔφη πρὸς τὸ στάδιον, τὸν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι; Epicrates in Kock's Com. Att. Frag. Vol. II p. 283 ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἦδη τρέχει, Ar. Clouds 430 τῶν Ἐλλήνων εἶναι με λέγεται ἑκατὸν στάδιον ἀριστον and Frogs 91 πλεῖον ἦ στάδιον λαλοτερα, Euolus (Kock 1. c. I p. 281) (of Pericles) ὑπότε παρέλθει δ' ὄσπερ ἀγαθόν δρομής ἐκ δεκά τοιοῦ ἤρει λέγων τοὺς ῥήτορας. Dropping the sporting metaphor we may say 'spin out a league of verbiage against you'. The δόλιχος was 24 στάδια, the στάδιον being covered 12 times both ways: cf. Pind. Ol. III 33.

27. ὃς αὐτὰ δῆλοι. The MSS read αὐτά, which most recent 329 B editors change to αὐτό with Stephanus, regarding the idiom as analogous to that in 324 A αὐτό σε διδάξει, but in this idiomatic use of αὐτό the verb is generally, if not always, in the future. αὐτό ποιν λέγει in Ar. Eq. 204 and the cases quoted by Blaydes in loc. are different, since in each case αὐτό has a definite antecedent expressed. ὃς αὐτὰ δῆλοι is simply as 'things themselves' i.e. 'as facts shew': the reference is to the speech which Protagoras has just delivered.

A. P.
Compare Arist. Pol. iv 12. 1331 a 21 δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται κτλ. and (with Heindorf) Xen. Cyr. vi 1. 7 οὐκ οἶδα μὲν ἔγωγε, εἰ τι δεῖ λόγων, δποῦ αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα δείκνυοι τὸ κράτιστον.

31. εἰ μοι ἀποκρίναι τόδε. The optative follows σμικρῷ τῶν ἐνδείξεις εἰμὶ πάντ' ἐξειν as virtually equivalent to πάντ' ἄν ἔχωμι (Heindorf).

32. εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθόμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. The fulness of expression is no doubt intentional: Socrates politely dwells upon his compliment. The objections to the syntax are twofold: (1) ἄν with the optative in protasis; (2) εἴπερ (in clauses of this kind) with its verb expressed. Cases of the potential optative in the protasis are given by Goodwin MT. p. 192 (e.g. Xen. Mem. i 5. 3 εἰ γε μηδὲ δῆλον ἀκρατὴ δεξαίμηθ ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἔξων αὐτὸν ἴε υφιλάξασθαι τοιούτων γενέσθαι;) for εἴπερ with verb expressed Heindorf cites Meno 98 B ἄλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλῳ φαίνῃ ἄν εἶδοι (δῆλα δ' ἄν φαίνῃ) ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τούτῳ ἑκέννων θείυ ἄν ἄν οἶδα. Socrates' νῦν δὲ πέπεσομαι (hardly serious) in 328 E is not inconsistent with πειθόμην ἄν, since he at once qualifies his assent by πλὴν σμικρῷ τι μοι ἐμποδῶν: it is sufficiently represented here by καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. We therefore agree with Heindorf, Wayte, and Turner in retaining the MSS reading: other editors mostly read either εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθόμην ἄν καὶ σοὶ, or drop πειθόμην ἄν and retain καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.

329 C 35. ἐλεγες γάρ: 322 C δικαιοσύνη and αἰδώς are looked on as two distinct virtues.

36. πολλαχοῦ: 324 E—325 A: cf. 323 A and E.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Socrates elicits from Protagoras (1) that while Virtue as a whole is one, the single virtues differ from each other and form the whole like the parts of the face: that it is possible to possess one virtue without possessing all: and that in all there are five virtues, justice, temperance, holiness, bravery, wisdom, of which the last is greatest (329 D—330 A): (2) that the virtues differ from each other not only in themselves, but in their δύναμες (330 A—330 B): (3) that justice is just, and holiness holy (330 B—330 E). The refutation of Protagoras does not begin till the next chapter.
7. ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὀλοῦ: so the MSS and Heindorf (who suggests ἀλλήλων τε καὶ τοῦ ὀλοῦ): recent editors mostly omit either ἀλλήλων or τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων. τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων should be taken quite generally, τῶν ἑτέρων (and thus, by implication, τὰ ἑτέρα) having its meaning defined by the clause ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὀλοῦ. τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων could be dropped without injury to the sense, but hardly ἀλλήλων: without ἀλλήλων Plato would have written οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἑτέρον τοῦ ἑτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὀλοῦ: cf. 330 Α ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστω τὸ ἑτέρον οἷον τὸ ἑτέρον (not τὰ ἑτέρα οἷα τὰ ἑτέρα): and so 330 E, 331 A, 331 D, 349 B, 359 Α.

11. μεταλαμβάνουσιν—μορίων—Ἀλλο. μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέ. 329 E χεις, μεταδιδόναι and the like take an accusative of the part as well as a genitive of the whole. μεταλαμβάνειν μόριον = to receive a part of a whole: μεταλαμβάνειν μορίον = ‘to receive a part of a part’.

14. ἀνδρείας ἐστιν ἄδικοι δὲ: cf. Laws 1 630 Β πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσειν οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο ἄνευ ἐξίπτασις ἀρετῆς. διαβάντες δ’ εὖ καὶ μαχαίριν έθέλουντες ἀποβηθήκειν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὡς φράξει Τύρταιος τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰς πάμπολλοι, ὡν οἱ πλείστοι γίγνονται θερατεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχέδον ἀπάντων.

15. καὶ ταῦτα: for σοφία and ἀνδρεία have not yet been named—only δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη and ὁσίωτης. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

17. καὶ μέγιστον γε σοφία: Protagoras speaks as a σοφιστῆς, 330 Α glorifying his profession.

18. Ἀλλο, τὸ δὲ Ἀλλο: equivalent to τὸ μὲν Ἀλλο, τὸ δὲ Ἀλλο. τὸ δὲ, τὰ δὲ etc. without preceding τὸ μὲν, τὰ μὲν etc. is a frequent idiom. Crat. 399 Α πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλουμεν γράμματα, τὰ δ’ ἐξαιροῦμεν. Soph. O. T. 1229 ὀλιγὰς γὰρ οὕτω ἀν Ἰστρὸν ὄμω Φάσον ἄν νήψῃ καθαρμῷ τίμων τὴν στέγην ὡς κείθη, τὰ δ’ αὐτικ’ εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακά.

20. ὡστερ τα τοῦ προσώπου: we have placed the mark of interrogation before ὡστερ: see on ἄλλο γε in 311 E. The sentence ὡστερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὖκ ἔστων ὀφθαλμὸς οἶον τὰ ὄτα thus corresponds exactly to ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστω τὸ ἑτέρον οἶον τὸ ἑτέρον. For τὰ τοῦ προσώπου followed by its parts in the same case compare infra 349 Α ἐκεῖνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ and Theaet. 151 Α οἷς ὅταν πάλιν ἐλθὼσι—ἐνίοις μὲν—ἀποκωλθεὶς συνειναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἑπ. For the asyndeton regular in explanatory and ampliative clauses see note on Apol. 22 Α.
NOTES ON XVIII 330 B

330 B 27. ἀλλ' οὖτως, ἔφη, ἐχει, ὦ Σωκράτες. So T: B has only ἀλλ' οὖτως, ἔφη. The longer form of answer is more suited to Protagoras' style.

330 C 32. ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τι ἐστιν. Compare infra 332 A ἀφροσύνη τι καλεῖς; 332 C, 358 D. Plato frequently begins a train of reasoning in this way.

34. καὶ ἐμὸι: so T: B has καὶ μοι. καὶ ἐμὸι seems slightly better than καί μοι, as forming a more effective balance to ἐμὸι μὲν in the last line.

35. ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σωκράτες: but ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ as Greek usage requires. Protagoras is addressed first on the principle seniores priores and honoris causa; contrast 311 D, and compare 353 A (Kroschel).

ἐπετευν: contrast 311 D εἰτέ μοι, ὦ Σωκράτες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, where see note. The dual gives prominence to the notion in κοινή σκέψιμη (line 31). The connexion of this part of the argument with the rest is this: in 330 A—330 B it is said that no one part of virtue is οἷον τὸ ἄτερον, e.g. that δικαιοσύνη is not οἷον ὀσίτης (major premise): here it is said that δικαιοσύνη is δίκαιον, ὀσίτης ὀσίον (minor premise): from which the conclusion (in the next chapter) is drawn that δικαιοσύνη is not ὀσίον, nor ὀσίτης δίκαιον. This stage of the argument is therefore neither "tautological nor unmeaning" as Grote (quoted by Turner) asserts.

330 D 47. οἷον ἀνόσιον ἐλναι ἢ οἷον ὀσίον. Notice the identification of the 'not ὀσίον' with ἀνόσιον: see below on 331 A.

330 E 49. εὐφήμης, ὦ ἀνθρώπε. ὦ ἀνθρώπε is somewhat brusque: so ὦ ἀνθρώπων in 314 D above. ἀνθρώπε without ὦ would border on rudeness: e.g. Gorg. 518 C οἶων ἄν ὁμναύκα τείς, ἐλ σοι ἕλεγεν, ἀνθρώπε, οὐδὲν ἐπαλεῖς περὶ γνωριστικῆς. εὐφήμης is frequent to express shocked surprise, real or feigned: e.g. Rep. I 329 C, Meno 91 B (Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμης, ὦ Σωκράτες), Gorg. 469 A, Euthyd. 301 A.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates endeavours to refute Protagoras and to shew that Justice and Holiness are identical. If ὀσίτης is not οἷον δικαιοσύνης, nor δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὀσίτης, it will follow (says Socrates) that ὀσίτης is ἄδικον and δικαιοσύνη ἄνδικον. This is absurd, and therefore ὀσίτης is δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη ἄδικον. Protagoras will only admit that there is a certain likeness between the two virtues.
4. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια. B and T omit the article, which can hardly be dispensed with—since the assertion was made not of parts of virtue, but of ἐκείνοις, i.e. all the parts: see 330 Α ἀρ' ὀν ὀνυτὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστων τὸ ἐτερον ὀλον τὸ ἐτερον; ἡ δήλα δὴ ὦτι ὀνυτὶ ἐκεῖν κτλ.

οὖτος—ὡς. ὦτε for ὦς would be more usual: cf. Rep. II 365 Β ἐξ ἢν τὰ μὲν πείμαμεν, τὰ δὲ βιασμέθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. Perhaps the ὃς of Phaedo 108 Ε τεπεισμαῖ—ὡς πρώτων μὲν—μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μὴτε ἀδέρος κτλ. is the same in kind: cf. the old English 'so as'. Here οὖτος—ὡς with the infinitive is natural in view of τοιοῦτον ὀλον in the vicinity: 330 Ω and Δ.

11—12. σὺ—σὺς: notice the mock asperity: I expected better 331 Α things of you.

16. οὐκ ἀρα ἐστῖν: the interrogation begins here and ἀρα is illative.

17. ἀλλὰ ὀλον μὴ ὦτιν. Σo far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (line 18) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato’s dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7 Α θεομυσίων, where are cited Alcib. II 138 Ο foll., Rep. IV 437 Δ: add Phileb. 48 Β foll. where φθάνον is said to be joy at a friend’s misfortune because envy of a friend’s success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. ibid. 50 Α), and Euthyd. 276 Β οὐκοίνον ἐλ μὴ σοφοὶ, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201 Ε—202 Α), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to rest content with negations; whence words like ἀνομαλία, ἀθάνατα acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact ('Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία Ch. 8 ad fin.) ὅσ ὄν στασιαξόσις τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθήται τὰ ὀπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων, ἀμιμου ἐναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332 Α line 3.

18. ἀλλὰ ἄδικον ἀρα: Heindorf’s emendation for ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἀρα, the reading of the best mss, which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shews how to correct. Heindorf’s correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἀρα is illative. For τὸ μὲν unexpressed (the words are equivalent to ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ἀρα) before τὸ δὲ see on 330 Α ἀλλα, τὸ δὲ ἄλλα.

22. ὦτι is 'because', not 'that': see note on line 24 below.

23. δικαιοτης ὀσιότητι. Socrates gives the words the same termination to suggest their closer likeness ('justness' to holiness): δικαιοτης is found also in Gorg. 508 Α as a balance to κοσμοτητα.
Plato was fond of this suffix and coined by it the word ποιότης Theaeet. 182 Α.

24. καὶ μάλιστα πάντων—οἶον δικαίωσύνη. Kroschel objects to the emphasis, and inclines to doubt the genuineness of this clause. If ὅτι in line 22 is translated as ‘because’ and not as ‘that’, the difficulty disappears. ταῦτα ἄν ταῦτα in line 22 thus means simply that δικαίωσύνη is ὅσον and οἰσίτης δίκαιον (lines 20—21), which is the meaning also assigned to ταῦτα ἄν ταῦτα by Protagoras in his reply (line 27 foll.). Socrates (for Protagoras) will reply that δικαίωσύνη is ὅσον and οἰσίτης δίκαιον for two main reasons: (1) because δικαίωσύνη is the same as οἰσίτης—this he does not much insist on—or because δικαίωσύνη is ὅτι ὅμωτατον οἰσίτητι—this he insists on more: (2) because δικαίωσύνη is ὅσον οἰσίτης and οἰσίτης ὅσον δικαίωσύνη—this he insists on most of all (μάλιστα πάντων), and with reason, because it expressly refutes Protagoras’ assertion in 330 Α—Β. On the other hand if ὅτι is translated as ‘that’, Kroschel’s objections can hardly be got over—viz. that ἦτοι ταῦτα—δικαίωσύνη is not the same as Socrates’ reply on his own behalf; that the words are ignored both by Protagoras in his reply and by Socrates himself in 333 Β; and that the emphasis of μάλιστα πάντων is strained and unnatural.

331 C 28. ἀπλοῦν: opposed to ἀλλὰ τι μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι in 29. Plato uses ἀπλοῦν, as opposed to ἀπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, τοικίλον and the like, of that which is uniform, simple, true without any difference or qualifications: Bonitz in Hermes ii (1867) p. 307 foll.

32. μὴ μοι: see on μὴ οὕτωσ in 318 Β.

33. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο—ἐλέγχεσθαι, cf. infra 333 C τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐγὼν μᾶλιστα ἐξετάξω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ὡς καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἑρωτώτα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. Here τὸ, as often, introduces a quotation.

34. τὸ δ’ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ τοῦτο λέγω: τοῦτο (cf. line 33) belongs to the τὸ δ’ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ and not to λέγω in the usual sense of τοῦτο λέγω ‘I mean this’.

331 D 38. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. Anaxagoras went so far as to say that snow was black (because it is still water, though congealed): Ritter and Preller § 128 note b.

39. ἐπὴ: an old emendation for δ ἐπὴ.

44. ταῖτα: the parts of the face.

331 E 47. καὶ πᾶνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὀμοιον. This (the mss reading) is successfully defended by Kroschel. The emphasis is on the first
part of the sentence (‘it is not right to call what has some likeness like—any more than to call what has some unlikeness unlike—even if the likeness be very small’), to which accordingly κἂν πάντα συμμάτριν ἔχω τὸ ὑμεῖον reverts: compare Socrates’ reply, which says nothing of τὸ ἄνθρωπον, in the next sentence. The German editors (except Cron and Kroschel) either reject τὸ ὑμεῖον (Schanz, Sauppe, Bertram), or read τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ ὑμεῖον (Heindorf) or reject altogether the words οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπον τι ἔχουσα ἄνθρωποι (Kral).

CHAPTER XX.

Without establishing more surely the identity of justice and holiness, Socrates now seeks to prove the identity of temperance and wisdom, and begins to discuss the relation between temperance and justice.

The proof that temperance and wisdom are the same is briefly as follows: ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σοφία, and also of σωφροσύνη: but a thing can have but one opposite: therefore σοφία and σωφροσύνη are identical. It is admitted at once that ἀφροσύνη and σοφία are opposites: the proof that ἀφροσύνη is ἐναντίον σωφροσύνη is of some length and (as well as the assertion that a thing can have but one opposite) assumes the identity of the contrary and contradictory. The usual sense of ἀφροσύνη (intellectual folly) and the meaning natural from its derivation (as the opposite of σωφροσύνη) are also—as is natural to one who holds that vice is ignorance—identified, and the whole argument is unnecessarily spun out.

1. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖ. See above on 330 c.

3. πότερον δὲ ἔτι. Here begins the proof that σωφροσύνη is ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνη. (1) τὸ ὀρθῶς and ὀφέλιμως πράττειν is σωφρονεῖν, and σωφροσύνη is that by which one σωφρονεῖ: (2) τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττειν is ἀφρόνως πράττειν and οὐ σωφρονεῖν: from which it is inferred that ἀφρόνως πράττειν is the opposite of σωφρόνως πράττειν, or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σωφροσύνη. In equating μὴ ὀρθῶς with ἀφρόνως πράττειν in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory and contrary: see on 331 A.

6. ἡ τοίνυντιον. So Stallbaum, after Heindorf’s ἡ τοίνυντιον πράττειν: the MSS have ἡ εἶ τοίνυντιον ἐπράττου, which is faulty both because it in no way corresponds to the answer σωφρονεῖν and because εἶ with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In ἡ τοίνυντιον it
will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between σωφροσύνη and its opposite: see above on line 3.

332 C 19. φέρε δή. From here to line 27 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one ἐναντίον. This is true only if we confine ἐναντίον to the meaning of 'contradictorily opposite' throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the ἐναντίον of καλόν is μὴ καλόν: as soon as we say that its ἐναντίον is αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since μὴ καλὸν is not αἰσχρόν but may be anything in the whole world except καλὸν. This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

332 D 27. ἀναλογισώμεθα: of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. I 330 ε, x 618 c.

333 A 49. οὐ πάνυ μονοσικῶς—συναρμόττουσιν. "In his lenem agnosco Sophistae irrisionem, qui supra § 43" (326 B) "πάντα τὸν βλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὑρεθαί τε καὶ εὐαρμοσταίς δείσθαι dixisset". Heindorf.

333 B 52. πλεῦω δὲ μὴ. B reads πλεῦσων, τὸ πλεύσει: πλεῦω is a suggestion of Heindorf's, adopted by most editors. The nominatives ἐν μὸνον in line 51 and σοφία and σωφροσύνη in 53 are strongly in favour of πλεῦω. If πλεῦσων is retained, it must be regarded as a blemish in Plato's style.

59. τὰ λοιπὰ. If δικαιοσύνη = ὀσίτης and σωφροσύνη = σοφία it remains to identify either δικαιοσύνη or ὀσίτης with either σωφροσύνη or σοφία in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that δικαιοσύνη = σωφροσύνη.

60. δὴ διδάξει: δὴ (cf. infra 333 D, and Parm. 155 B) is equivalent to κατὰ τοῦτο δὴ: cf. Rep. I 340 ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἵστρον καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τῶν κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δ ἐξαμαρτάνει; δὲ τὴν the relative and δὲ the conjunction shade into one another here. There is much to be said for Cron's view that the words should be written alike: see on Apology, Appendix II. p. 123.

asserts that ἀδικία is εὐβουλία, ἀρετή, καλὸν and ἴσχυρὸν: compare also Polus in Gorg. 469 b foll. Notice that Protagoras' own opinion—that ἀδικία is not compatible with σωφροσύνη—makes for the identification of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη.

65. τὸν τῶν πολλῶν: on account of the τῶν here, Heindorf wished to insert οἷος before πολλοῖς in line 62, but such a view could hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf. Rep. I 348 e οἷος γὰρ λυσιτελεῖ μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐπίθεσο, κακίαν μὲντοι ἢ ἀλήθρον αὐτὸ ὁμολογεῖ ενιαὐσπέρ ἄλλοι τινὲς, εἰχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομίζομενα λέγοντες κτλ. As Sauppe points out, the article τῶν refers only to the above-mentioned πολλοῖς. With the situation compare Rep. VII 527 e foll. οὐκετί οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διάλεγει, ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδὲτεροὺς ἀλλὰ σαυτῷ ἔνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τὸς λόγος, φθονοὺς μὴν οὖθ' ἄν ἄλλῳ οἷά τις τι δύνατο ἄπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

66. εἰτ' οὖν—εἴτε: see on Apol. 34 e.

CHAPTER XXI.

Before Socrates has completed his proof that σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are identical, Protagoras takes occasion to deliver an irrelevant though carefully constructed harangue on ἀγαθά.

1. ἐκαλλωπίζετο. Cf. Phaedr. 236 δ παύσαι πρὸς μὲ καλλωπί- 333 D ἰόμενος· σχεδόν γὰρ ἔχω δ' εἰπὼν ἀναγκᾶσο σε λέγειν: so also τριφάν, cf. Euthyphr. I i i Επειδὴ δὲ μοι δοκεῖ σοι τριφάν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσαμαι, where see note.

6. ἔστω. Protagoras has already disclaimed this view in 333 Β.

8. οὕτω διδυκούσιν: Hirschig suggested ὅ τι διδυκούσιν, but see on 333 B. Schanz rejects the words, but without sufficient reason.

9. εὖ πράττοντιν διδυκούντες. εὖ is here primarily of success, and κακός of failure, but the collocation of εὖ πράττειν with διδυκόν is intended to suggest that the view which Protagoras is defending is a paradox. Plato frequently makes use of the double sense (as we should call it: but see on Euthyphr. 3 A) of εὖ πράττειν, εὖ ἔχω and the like, to imply that the virtuous life is the happy one: e.g. Alcib. I i i 6 b foll.: Rep. I 353 E foll.: Charm. 172 A, 173 D: compare Euthyd. 281 c.

10. λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθά. Socrates proceeds to elucidate the definition of εὖ in εὖ πράττειν.

12. ὃφέλειμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Xen. Mem. ΙV 6. 8 ἀλλὰ δ' ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἰμι ἢ τὸ ὁφέλειμον; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἐφή. τὸ ἀρα ὁφέλειμον
NOTES ON XXI 333 D

15. ἀγωνιάν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. The martial metaphor in the desiderative ἀγωνιάν is carried on by παρατετάχθαι, which is the MSS reading, and means literally 'to be set in array', cf. Thuc. iv 43. 3 ἀντι γὰρ παρατεταγμένον ἕσαν ἔσχατοι. For the metaphorical use cf. Rep. iii 399 B ἐν πάσι τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις καὶ καρπεροῦντος ἄμυνομένον τὴν τύχην. The whole clause describes the outward demeanour of Protagoras, which causes Socrates to fear an imminent personal conflict. Kock's παρατετάθαι, accepted by Schanz, does not suit, since παρατετάθαι means 'to be tired, worn out', e.g. Euthyd. 303 B καὶ γελόντε καὶ κροτοῦντε...δίλγων παρατάθησαν, cf. Ar. Clouds 213. It is noteworthy that κυνεταγμένοις and κυνεταμένοις are frequently found as variants in Platonic MSS.

334 A 20. οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. The argument is here broken off, and not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is ὁμολογούμενον for man is for him ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore been: σωφρονεῖν, it is said, is ἀδικεῖν. But σωφρονεῖν = ἐν φρονεῖν = ἐν βουλευόσθαι ἐὰν (but only if) ἐν πράττειν (i.e. σωφρονόμα πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words σωφρονόμα πράττειν = ἀδικεῖν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the Gorgias to refute.

τολλὰ οὐδ' ἂν. The speech which follows may be from some work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie v 2, p. 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν, mentioned by Diog. Laert. ix 8. 55 (since ἀρετὴ is a general word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion 'true' was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος) as relative, so here the notion 'good' is represented as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.

21. ἄνθρωπος μὲν—ὁμολογεῖ: ἄνθρωπος μὲν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the sentence would be very cumbrous, running somewhat as follows: ἔγγειγε τολλὰ οὐδ' ἂν ἄνθρωπος μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἄνωφελής ἐστι, καὶ σῖτια—μυρία, <τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἔφοι καὶ φυτοῖς ὁμολογεῖ>, τὰ δὲ γε <ὁμολογεῖ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἄνωφελής>. For μὲν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι in Euthyphr. 3 c, and on 339 A above for τὰ δὲ without a preceding τὰ μὲν. ἄνωφελής is 'hurtful', as frequently: see above on οἶνον μὴ ὅσιον in 331 A. With Protagoras' classification of ὁμολογεῖ—
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ánwphel — oudêtera compare Gorg. 467 e ἄρι  ὃ  ὀν ἔστων  τι  τῶν  ἄντων, δὲ οὐχὶ ἱτιά ἢ ἂν ἀγαθῶν  γ' ἔστω ἢ ἡ  κακῶν  ἢ  μεταξ'  τῶν  ὀστῶν  ὀπὸ  ἄγαθῶν  ὀπὸ  κακῶν (where see Thompson’s note) and infra 351 D.

24.  οὐδὲν: Schanz follows Naber in reading οὐδεν against the MSS both here and in Euthyd. 302 c. The plural would be more appropriate here, but what is denied of all individuals is denied of the species, and the dative plural of οὐδέν seems to lack authority.

28.  εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις — πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν. Heindorf suggests εἰ δ' 334 B ἐθέλοις — the indicative being generally used in this phrase, e.g. Alcib. I 122 B εἰ δ' αὐτ ἐθέλοις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψατε κτλ.— αἰσχυνθεῖσα ἄν ἐπὶ σαυτῷ: but Goodwin MT. p. 188 § 500 quotes a precisely similar example from Thuc. II 39. 5 καὶ τοις εἰ παθημα μᾶλλον ἢ πόνον μελέτη — ἐθέλοιμεν κυδώνεαν, περίγλυμενταί Ἦμιν κτλ. In both examples the present in the apodosis contains a reference to the future.


ταῖς θριξίν — ἀνθρώπου. Arist. peri ἕων γενέσεως v 5. 785a 30 foll. says that a mixture of oil and water is a remedy against grey hairs.

34.  ἐναύδα, i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.

36.  ταυτόν. This form, not ταυτό, of the neuter of ὁ ἀυτός is almost regular in Plato: see on 314 B.

38.  μέλλει, sc. ὁ ἀσθενῶν: see on 319 D.


τὴν δυσχέρειαν — ὅσοις. The nausea is of course that felt by a sick person at the smell of food: so far there is therefore no reason for holding ῥενῶν to be corrupt and reading χυμῶν (as Kroschel formerly read), still less ἐκχρυμῶν with Bergk. But it is not clear how oil could thus prevent nausea, nor does there seem to be any parallel among the ancients to such a statement. It is known that the ancients (like many modern peoples) used oil in cooking much as we use butter (see Blümmer’s Privataltherthümer p. 228), but the present passage seems rather to point to the use of some kind of fragrant oil sprinkled on the food after it was cooked. The Greeks were at all events not unfamiliar with the use
of scents in banqueting: see Xen. Symp. II 2 foll. Kroschel thinks Plato is making fun of Protagoras by putting into his mouth the word ‘μυυν pro πυκρῶν vel χυμῶν’, but this view will hardly command assent.

CHAPTER XXII.

This and the next three chapters form a kind of interlude. In this chapter Socrates, protesting against Protagoras’ long replies, remembers an engagement and is about to go, and Callias beseeches him to stay.

334 D II. καὶ βραχυτέρας πολεί. Hirschig would reject the words, but they explain the metaphor in σύντεμω: see on 314 A κυμένης τε καὶ κυμάνενης.

334 E 15. ὡσ ἡμοὶ δοκεῖ. Compare Gorg. 461 D τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξεσται μοι λέγεω ὑπόσα ἰν βούλωμαι;

19. καὶ αὖ βραχέα. Sauppe cites Gorg. 449 C καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἐστὶν ἰν φημι, μηδένα ἰν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοὶ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπέων. τοῦτο μὴν δεί, ἦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειεν αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαθήσει: cf. also Gorg. 461 D and Phaedr. 267 B.

335 A 24. ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων—οὕτω διελεύσην. Asyndeton is frequent in such sentences: cf. Rep. II 359 B (cited by Heindorf) εἰ τοιῶνδε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διαινῷ, δόντες ἐξουσίαν—εἰτ’ ἐπακολούθησαμεν κτλ. See on 311 E.

26. ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα. With ἐγένετο ἰνομα (for which Kroschel reads ἐλέγετο ὄνομα) cf. Apol. 20 D τί ποτ’ ἐστιν τοῦτο ὡ ἡμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν: γίγνεσθαι is the usual passive to ποιεῖν. With the sentence generally cf. Euthyphr. 4 E—5 A where Euthyphro says οὐδὲν γὰρ ἰν μοῦ ὀφελοῦ εἰη, ὦ Σωκράτε, οὖδέ τι ἀν διαφεροῦ Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ κτλ.: see note in loc. for more parallels.

27. οὐκ ἤρεσεν—καὶ—οὐκ ἐδελήσου. The combination of indicative and optative in the same sentence in indirect speech is fairly common: Goodwin MT. p. 261 § 670.

335 B 30. ἡγησάμενος. Heindorf conjectures ἡγησάμενος οὖν, but οὖν may be dispensed with after a short parenthesis.

40. ἔνα συνόντια ἐγίγνετο. For this construction see note on Crito 44 D ei γὰρ ὀφελον—οἰοι τ' ἔναι—ἔνα οἶοι τ' ἤσαν. A secondary tense of the indicative is found with ἔνα and ὅπως (without ἄρ) in final clauses dependent on a wish which can no longer be fulfilled, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: Goodwin MT. p. 120 § 333. The idiom is frequent in Plato and sometimes corrupted by scribes e.g. Meno 89 B ἡμεῖς ἀν παραλαβώντες—ἐφυλάττομεν—ἲνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέθειερην, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκουτο ἐλς τὴν ἥλικιαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσι—where perhaps we should read ἀφίκουτο and ἐγίγνοντο. See Cobet’s Variae Lectiones pp. 102, 359.

47. τρίβωνος. The ordinary clothing of an Athenian consisted of a χιτών, or shirt, with a ἰμάτιον or short mantle worn above it. The τρίβων was a short cloak of coarse material worn by the Spartans and sometimes by the Laconisers in other states to take the place of both χιτών and ἰμάτιον. It was the ordinary garment of Socrates (Symp. 219 B), and was afterwards much affected by the more ascetic philosophers, such as the Cynics (Diog. Laert. vi i. 13). Its use was supposed to be a mark of sturdy simplicity and austerity of manners.

50. οὗδ’ ἀν ἐνὸς. The two parts of οὗδεις are sometimes separated by ἀν or a preposition, often with the effect (as here) of increasing the emphasis by making οὗδε = ne—quidem, cf. infra on 343 D οὗδε πρὸς ἐνα λόγον.


54. φιλοσοφίαν. The original meaning of the word φιλοσοφία was ‘love of knowledge for its own sake’, no particular kind of knowledge being specified. The verb φιλοσοφεῖν is first found in Herod. i 30 ὡς φιλοσοφεῖν γάρ πολλῆς θεωρῆς έλεγε καὶ ἐπελεύθερα. In the present passage (as in Thuc. ii 40 φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας) the word retains its original wider meaning, viz. ‘love of knowledge’ in general; but side by side with this in Plato it has the more restricted meaning of ‘Philosophy’, e.g. Rep. vi 496 A πάνομικρὸν δὴ τι...λειπέσαι τῶν κατ’ ἄξιαν ὀμιλοῦντων φιλοσοφία. The wider meaning is also found in Aristotle, where he calls Theology the ‘Highest Study’ (πρώτη φιλοσοφία), and elsewhere.

57. Κρίσων. Criso of Himera, a famous σταδιοδρόμος, won...
three times at Olympia, viz. Olymp. 83, 84, and 85 (448, 444, and
440 B.C.). His chastity during his prime as an athlete is mentioned
in Laws VIII 840 A. ὑμηρόδρομοι is rejected by some editors,
but ὕμηροι should be taken with Ἰμεραίοι and ἀκμάζοντι with ἑπεσθαί: 'to keep up with Criso, the runner of Himera, when
he was in his prime'—presumably at the assumed date of this
dialogue he was past his ἀκμή.

58. δολιχοδρόμων: δολιχοδρόμοι εἶσον οἱ τῶν δόλιχων τρέχοντες,
says the scholiast: see on 329 A.

Ἡμηρόδρομων. Heindorf quotes Livy xxxi 24. 4 'Hemerodromos
 vocant Graeci ingens die uno cursu emetientes spatium'. Such was
Phidippides; see Hdt. vi 105 Ἡμηροδρόμῳ τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετώντα.

59. διαθέσαι τε καὶ ἑπεσθαί. δια- in compounds frequently
denotes competition: for διαθέσαι cf. Theaet. 148 C εἴτε διαθέσαι τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχύστων ἡττήθης. As the emphasis is on ἑπεσθαί ('keep up with') διαθέσαι τε καὶ ἑπεσθαί is equivalent to διαθέσαι ἑπεσθαί: cf. note on 317 C ἐνθέξασθαί καὶ καλλωπίσασθαί, where καὶ καλλωπίσασθαί is (so to speak) enclitic as διαθέσαι τε καὶ is proclitic [cf. the English 'Some—must be talked over by the hour
before they could reach the humblest decision, which they only
left the office to return again (ten minutes later) and rescind').

336 A 63. συγκαθεῖναι: intransitive as in Rep. VIII 563 A οἱ δὲ
γέροντες ἐνυκαθίκεντες τοὺς νέους: so παρέχω for παρέχειν ἐμαυτόν infra
348 A ἐτειμῶς εἰμι σοι παρέχειν ἀποκριβήμενος: cf. also ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀπέκρυψαν (sc. ἐμαυτός) Thuc. v 65. 5. The omission of the reflexive
pronoun is a well-recognised way of making transitive verbs into
intransitive.

336 B 68. χωρίς. Soph. O. C. 808 χωρίς τὸ 'τ' εἴπείν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ
calma. "In talibus locis δια- χωρίς etc. non ut vulgo, seinctionem
et separationem, sed diversitatem et oppositionem significant".
Kroschel. The usage is frequent in Plato. δημηγορεῖν is contionum
—platform oratory.

70. ὅρας. Almost like our colloquial 'don't you know' (when
used parenthetically and without interrogative force): the ἄλλα
belongs in strict logic to δικαία δοκεῖ λέγειν. Heindorf quotes
parallels from Aristophanes e.g. Peace 330—331 οὐκ ἄν ὄρθοσαλμεθ',
eπερ ὡφελήσαμεν τι σε. ἄλλα ὅρατ', οὕτω πέπταυσθε. Where ὅρας
or ὅρατε stand in this way as the first word of a sentence, editors
generally regard the usage as interrogative, e.g. Eur. Orest. 581 ὅρας;
'Οδυσσέως ἀλοχον οὐ κατέκτανε.
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72. καὶ σοὶ. So the original hand in T: B has καὶ σοι. If we read καὶ σοι, the construction is ἀξίων αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ἐξεῖναι κτλ., but Protagoras has nowhere asked that Socrates should be permitted to converse as he likes: quite the contrary. With σοὶ the construction is καὶ σοὶ δίκαια δοκεῖς λέγειν ἄξιων διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως ἂν κτλ. i.e. and your demand that Protagoras should converse as you wish likewise seems fair. Protagoras asked to be allowed to use his own style in 335 A: Socrates requested that Protagoras should converse as Socrates wished in 334 D, 335 C, 335 E. Alcibiades' defence of Socrates in the next chapter seems also to imply the reading σοὶ here. The only objection to this view lies in the position of τε after αὐτῷ: we should expect it to follow Προταγόρας. τε is however frequently misplaced (see above on 316 D). σοὶ can only be retained if we either (1) take καὶ σοι as altogether independent of ἄξιων—which is barely possible, or (2) regard Plato as guilty of inaccurate writing.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Alcibiades defends Socrates, and together with Critias and Prodicus hopes that the conversation will be continued.

1. οὐ καλὸς λέγεις, ὁ Κάλλια. The jingle is intentional: Handsome is that handsome says. Plato loves to play upon the names of his interlocutors (ὁ λοιπὸς Πολε in Gorg. 467 B): see Riddell's Digest of Idioms, § 323, and cf. the Editor's notes on Euthyphr. 2 E, 4 E, 5 C.

6. λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι. We should expect τε to follow δοῦναι: see on 316 D.

11. ἐκκρούων. "Vox ducta a pugilatu, cuius proprium κρούειν de rep. IV p. 422 B οὖν' ei ἐξείη—ὑποφεύγοντι (τῷ πόκτῃ) τῶν πρῶτων αἰτὶ προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν etc." Heindorf. The simple verb is used metaphorically in Theaet. 154 E of beating arguments with arguments ἤδη ἂν—συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκκρούομεν, and the compound in Phaedr. 228 E ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος. Here the idea is of beating off, staving off by force, i.e. here by μακρυγορία: ἐκκρούειν διὰν is used by Demosthenes of staving off a trial by συγκαταφθαρία and the like.

15. οὐχ ὡτι: 'not but what'. The idiom (as if οὐ λέγω ὡτι, 336 D omittis quod) is tolerably common in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 450 E οὐχ ὡτι
336 E 21. **philónikos.** The MSS read *philónikos* and presently *sýmphilónikoi*. It is however clear that the word comes from *φιλο-* and *νικη*, not from *φιλο-* and *νέκος* (in which case the form would be *philoneikēs*: compare *φιλοκερδῆς*, *φιλοκυνῆς*, but *φιλότιμος*, *φιλόδοξος*, *φιλόθηρος* and the like). Schanz has found only two traces of the original spelling with *ι* in Plato's MSS (A, B, T): viz. in Laws xi 935 B where Paris A has *dπιαρε'ίωv ἐριπὶ τπιξον, and Alcib. i 122 C where *τπιξονικίαν* appears as a correction for *τοιξονικίαν* in T. We might in consequence be tempted to suppose that Plato himself wrote *philónikos* through the influence of a false etymology, were it not that the derivation from *νικη* alone suits the meaning, and that in more than one passage he shews himself conscious of the connexion of the word with *νικη*, notably in Rep. ix 580 C τι δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἐτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, δόν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττεται ἡ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ *philoneikían* (philoneikían A) ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησιμοὶ τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμῶν διάκων ἀνεὶ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Compare also ib. 581 A-B. The orthography of this word is an old subject of dispute (see Stallbaum on Rep. viii 545 A): Schanz (Preface to Vol. vi p. x) declares himself, after a full discussion, for *philónikos*.

337 A 25. **ὁ Πρόδικος—ἐφη.** Prodicus contrives to make his remarks an ἐπίδειξις on ὄρθοτης ὄνομάτων, which was his leading subject of instruction: see Euthyd. 277 E and cf. above on 314 C. The distinctions drawn by Prodicus are on the whole sound if somewhat wiredrawn and pedantic. The carefully balanced style of the speech finds a parallel in the story of Heracles in Xenophon Mem. ii 1. 21 f.: compare especially §§ 31—33.

28. **κοινὸς—ἀκροατάς—ίσοις.** *Koinόs* and *ίσοι* are found as epithets of *ἀκροατή* in the orators: e.g. Dem. De Cor. 7 τα τοῦ λέγοντος ὅστερον δικαία εὐδοκίκης προσδέεται καὶ παρασχέσον ἐαυτῷ ἰσὸν καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφωτέρος ἀκροατήν ὥστε τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιήσῃ τέρ πάσην, and Andoc. in Alcib. § 7 δέομαι ὡς μήν, τῶν λόγων ἰσούς καὶ κοινοὺς ἦμιν ἑπιστάτασ γενέσθαι (Heindorf).

31. **τὸ μὲν συφωτέρῳ πλέον κτλ.** In other words ἰσότης γεωμετρικῆ and not ἰσότης ἀριθμητικῆ should be observed by the audience (Gorg. 508 A): the regard paid to the speakers should be in proportion to their merit.
CHAPTER XXIV.

Hippias, anxious for a compromise, proposes the selection of an umpire in a speech marked by his characteristic doctrines and style.

If we may judge from this speech, Hippias must have been devoted to metaphor: e.g. τύραννος, προπαγεῖον in D, ὁσπερ ὑπὸ διαμετρῶν in E, and in 338 ΄ ἀρειναὶ καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμιάς, κάλων ἐκτείναντα οὐράς ἐφένα, πέταλος λόγων, ἁποκρύψαντα γῆν, μέσων τι τεμεῖν, ῥαβδοῦχον and πρύτανιν. Zeller (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie V 2, p. 175) thinks that the opening part of the speech may have come from some book of which Hippias was himself the author.

2. ἀπεδείγαντο means simply 'assented': cf. Theaet. 162 e.
5. ἡμᾶς is Heindorf’s correction for ἔμᾶς: “uti mox ἡμᾶς ὦν αἰσχρῶν etc., neque video cur se a ceteris h. I. segreget Hippias”.

6. φύσει οὐ νόμῳ. The opposition between φύσις and νόμος frequently appears attributed to different sophists or their representatives in the Platonic dialogues: the historical Hippias was a leading champion of φύσις (see Introd. p. xxii.). Usually however νόμος is represented as a convention binding men together into friendship and φύσις (whose teaching is that might is right) as responsible for the enmity of man to man in the savage state: e.g. Rep. II 358 D foll., Gorg. 482 D foll. From the natural principle of ‘Like to like’ is here deduced something like the Stoic doctrine of the kinship between wise men.

τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Gorg. 510 B φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἐκαστὸς ἐκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶον τε μάλιστα, ὅπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Laws IV 716 C. The proverb appears in the most various forms in Greek literature from Homer (Od. xvII 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοίον ἀγεῖ θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοίον) downwards. For more examples of its use in Plato see Stallbaum on Gorg. I. c.

7. τύραννος—βιαζεῖται. Hippias has in view the lines of Pindar quoted in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλέως θρατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων—ἀγεῖ δικαίων τὸ βιαστάτων ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ κτλ.

12. πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας. The prytaneum (like the temple of Vesta at Rome) was the religious centre of a Greek πόλις. It was sacred to Ἑστία, in whose honour fire was always kept burning, and contained what was called the ‘Common Hearth’ of the city: see Frazer in Journal of Philology, Vol. xiv pp. 145—172. The editors refer to Athenaeus v 187 D τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν, τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσείων, ἢν ὁ μὲν Πινδαρός Ἑλλάδος ἑρετικὰ εἶπεν, ὅτι κυβίσθη ὅ ἐν τῷ εἰς ἐφραίμιον ἐπηγράμματι Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα, ὁ δὲ Πίθυς ἑστίαν καὶ πρυτανεῖον τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

17. συμβήναι—ὡσπερ ὑπὸ διαίτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων. συμβαζόνω forms a passive to συμβιβάζω as πάσχειν to ποιεῖν, whence ὑπὸ: see note on Apol. 17 A. συμβιβάζω is regular in the sense of bringing together, effecting an arrangement between: compare (with Sauppe) Thuc. II 29. 8 ἐνεβιβάσθη δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. Note that ἡμῶν has no preposition with it—this is frequent (but not universal) in similes where ὡσπερ and a preposition precede the object compared, and the effect is almost to make the simile an identification: if on the other hand the object compared comes first, the preposition must be expressed twice. Compare
Theaet. 170 A ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας (which might have been πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν) and see notes on Crito 46 c, Euthyr. 2 c.


21. ἐφεύναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡμίες τοῖς λόγοις. For the metaphor Kroschel compares Laws III 701 c καθαπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον κτλ.

23. ἡμῖν: so most editions: BT have ὑμῖν, which can hardly be right, as Hippias is at this moment addressing Socrates alone. "Pro ὑμῖν dici potuit sol, sed ὑμῖν recte explicari nequit". Kroschel.

24. πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα. παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν πάσης προθυμίας χρωμένων, says a Scholiast (quoted by Sauppe). This nautical metaphor means to stretch out every reefing rope and so set all sail: κάλως does not refer to the sheet, which is ποὺς. κινεῖν, σεῖειν, ἐξεῖναι, ἐφεύναι, ἐκλεῖειν are also found with κάλων in much the same sense.

οὐρία ἐφέντα: see on συγκαθείναι 336 a. For the asyndeton before these words Heindorf compares Euthyr. 4 c συνεῖθας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλῶν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεύτερο ἀνδρα κτλ.


ἀποκρύψαντα: like Virgil’s “protinus aerias Phaeacum abscandidus arces” (Aen. III 291): cf. the use of καταδύω in Callimachus Epigr. 2 ἡμῶν ἐν λέσχῃ κατεδόσαμεν and Virgil’s imitation “saepe ego longos Cantando puerum memini me condere soles” (Ecl. IX 51).


ὁς οὖν ποιήσατε καὶ πείθεσθε. ὅς (so B: T has ὥς) is best understood as for οὗτος—a rare usage, except after a preceding ὅς or ὥσπερ as in 336 D, but it is found in Thuc. III 37. 5 (with οὖν and a
form of τουείν as here) ὃς οὖν χρῆ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας—παραμεῖν. For ποιῆσατε the mss read ποιῆσετε, which is very harsh before πείθεσθε, and is probably a mistake for ποιῆσατε, due to the influence of the common construction of ὅτως with 2nd person Fut. Ind. It is however possible that this use of the future as well as the use of ὃς for οὕτως was characteristic of Hippias' style.

27. ῥαβδοῦχον—πρῶτανυς. ῥαβδοῦχος, ἐπιστάτης and βραβευτὴς are said of umpires or presidents at games: ῥαβδοῦχος εἴπε τοὺς κρῖτας τοῦ ἀγώνος, says the schol. on Ar. Peace 733: for ἐπιστάτης cf. Laws XII 949 A γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἵππικῶν ἄλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβεύς. πρῶτανυς is an old word with lofty associations for ruler or prince. Cron thinks Hippias made this proposal with a view to be chosen President himself: he was probably still sitting on his ἄριστος, cf. 315 B, 317 D.

28. τὸ μέτριον μήκος: Phaedr. 267 B αὐτὸς (sc. ὁ Πρόδικος) εὐρισκέται ἐφὶ ὅν δὲ λόγου τέχνη: δεῖν δὲ οὕτε μακρῶν οὕτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

CHAPTER XXV.

Socrates protests against appointing an umpire, and in order that the conversation may go on is willing that Protagoras should become the interrogator. The others assent, Protagoras reluctantly.

2. ἐμὲ γε. The mss read τε not γε: γε is due to Heindorf. The position of τε is usually explained as due to displacement (see on 316 D), e.g. by Kroschel “nam haec dicit Socrates; omnes laudabant meque et Callias retinebat et (omnes) orabant ut praesidem deligerem”: but Καλλίας can hardly be coupled in this way with an unexpressed πάντες. If τε is right it must be taken (with Turner) as coupling the whole clause ἐμὲ ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἐφῆ ἄφησεν with καὶ ἐλέοςαι ἑδέντω ἐπιστάτην: this is possible, but strikes us as harsh.

9. ἀλλὰ δὴ like at enim introduces a possible objection: see on Crito 54 Α. The fuller form of the comparative (βελτίονα and the like) is less common in Plato than the contracted.

11. ὡστε. Heindorf cites (inter alia) Phaedr. 269 D τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὁ Παῖδρε, ὡστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλευν γενέσθαι. The insertion of ὡστε with the usual infinitive after ἀδύνατον increases the emphasis of ἀδύνατον by making it appear more than a mere auxiliary notion. Badham's conjecture ἀδύνατον ἐν ὑμᾶν ὡστε deserves mention for its ingenuity. For Προταγόφου see above note on 318 D.
CHAPTER XXVI.

Here begins an episode (lasting down to the end of Chapter XXXII), in which Protagoras cross-examines Socrates upon a poem of Simonides. For the bearing of this episode on the general subject of the dialogue see Introduction p. xxv. foll.: and for the different restorations of the poem Appendix I.

3. ἐπὶ ἐπὶν δεινον ἐναι. ἐπὶν is 'verses'. As education in poetry formed part of the usual curriculum at Athens, it was natural for the Sophists to pose as poetical critics, and Sauppe gives a number of references to shew that they did so: it will suffice to quote Isocrates Panath. 18 ἀπαντήσαντες γὰρ τινὲς μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐν τῷ Δυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἤ τέταρτες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἰδέναι—διάλεγοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσίοδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως κτλ.: compare infra 347 A, where Hippias says he has a speech ready on the poem, and Hipp. Minor 363 c foll. καὶ ἀλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου. Protagoras appears as a critic of poetry in Arist. Poet. 19, p. 1456'15 ft', (where he censures Homer ὅτι εὐξείαβαι οἰδίμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν 'μὴν ἄειδε θεά') and in Soph. El. 14, p. 173'b 19 ff. The popularity of such discussions as the present may be inferred from the well-known scene between Euripides and Aeschylus in the Frōgs 1119 foll.

9. νῦν διάλεγόμεθα: so B and T: the editors mostly read νῦν δὴ 339 A (νυνὶ) διαλεγόμεθα. νῦν does not mean 'at this present moment', but simply 'now', 'on the present occasion', = ἐν τῷ νῦν συνώσας: translate 'about the same subject as you and I are now discussing', i.e. about the subject of our present discussion. A discussion which has never been finished (see on 334 A) and is to be resumed (cf. 338 Ε ἐπειδὰν ἴκανον ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δύσειν λόγου, and 338 D) ought not to be spoken of as past. We have in fact in νῦν διάλεγόμεθα an indication that the subject of the dialogue is the same throughout: see
Introd. p. xix. foll. νῦν in καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν (line 8) is simply 'in the present case' and introduces the application of the general statement contained in ἥγουμαι—λόγον δοῦναι: cf. Apol. 17 D—18 A ὅσπερ ὄν ἄν—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν.


12. Σμυμωνίδης. It is a saying of Simonides of Ceos (circ. 556—468 B.C.) that forms the text on which the discussion in the first book of the Republic is based: see Rep. I 331 D foll. Plato seems also to allude to him in two other places, viz. Rep. II 365 C ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὃς δῆλον μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιῶται καὶ κύριον εὔδαιμονικά κκά. and Rep. VI 489 μ o ὑπὲρ ἐγείρει τούτων σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς πλουσίαν θάρασιν λέναι ἀλλ’ ὁ τοῦτο κομψωσάμενος ἐξεύθεντο (compare Arist. Rhet. II 16. 1391 a 8 ff. with Cope's note).

Σκόπαν. The Scopadae were a ruling family at Crannon and Pharsalus in Thessaly. Simonides seems to have frequently been their guest, and wrote poems in their honour: the most famous is that referred to by Cicero de Or. II § 352—353.

339 B 14. ἄγαθὸν is here more than morally good: it includes bodily and external as well as internal well-being: whence χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ as well as νῦν: see also note on 344 B line 4 below. The notion of external well-being belonged to the word from very early times: see Grote Vol. III p. 45 note 3: 'good' and 'bad' are applied in Theognis and Solon "to wealth as contrasted with poverty—nobility with low birth—strength with weakness—conservative and oligarchical politics as opposed to innovation". This sense survived in classical times in the political meaning of καλὸς καγαθὸς, e.g. Xen. Hell. II 3. 12, Pl. Rep. VIII 569 Α.

16. τετράγωνον. Simonides avails himself of a Pythagorean notion: among the Pythagoreans the number 4 was sacred, as being the first square number: see Ritter and Preller § 54. The expression τετράγωνον ἀνὴρ became afterwards almost proverbial for a perfect man: Sauppe refers to Arist. Rhet. III 11. 1411 b 27 οἷον τῶν ἄγαθων ἀνήρα φῶναι εἶναι τετράγωνον ἀμφότερον γὰρ τέλεια.

19. καὶ πάνιν μοι—μεμεληκός. From this and 347 A, where the same is implied of Hippias, it would seem that the poem was thought to be difficult.

22. ἔφην ἔγω καλὸς τε καὶ ὄρθως. This, Bergk's emendation, is generally accepted. Β has ἔφην ἔγω τε καὶ ὄρθως: Τ ἔφην ἔγωγε καὶ ὄρθως.
28. ἐμμελέως—νέμεται. ἐμμελέως belongs to εἰρημένον and 339 C νέμεται is poetic for νομίζεται: cf. (with Sauppe) Soph. O. R. 1080 ἐγὼ δ' ἐμματον παῖδα τῆς τύχης νέμουν. The story is (Schol. to Plato Hipp. Maior 304 E quoted by Sauppe) that Pittacus, when ruler of Mitylene, on hearing of Periander's rapid conversion into a tyrant, sat down at an altar and begged to be released of his rule, assigning as his reason ὅσ χαλεπῶν ἔσθλων ἐμμεναι. The Scholiast adds that Solon when he heard the remark capped it with χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. Pittacus is mentioned side by side with Bias and Simonides as one of the σοφοὶ καὶ μακάριοι ἄνδρες in Rep. I 335 E.

33—35. ὀμολογεῖσθαι—ὁμολογεῖν. The middle is said of things, and the active of persons, according to the general rule.

38. ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν: these words as 339 D well as προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος in 339 C are in favour of the supposition that some verses are wanting between ἀνεύ ψόγου τετυγμένου and ὑδὲ μου ἐμμελέως: see App. I p. 198.

44. τὸ πρότερον: adverbial.

45. θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον. θόρυβος denotes only 'noise', 'tumult' (cf. Rep. vii 492 C θόρυβον—τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἔπαινον): καὶ ἔπαινον is needed to show that the noise was favourable. So supra 334 C ἄνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὗ λέγοι. With παρέσχεν in this sense cf. the phrase παρέσχεν γέλωτα in Gorg. 473 E and Theaet. 174 C.

47. ὥσπερ εὶς ἀγαθοῦ πῦκτον πληγεῖς. For the metaphor 339 E compare Euthyd. 303 A ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ὡς περ πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκείημν ἀφώνοι. Socrates describes the effect of Protagoras' questions on himself in words which recall the descriptions of his own dialectic in its effect on others: compare e.g. Meno 80 A foll.


49. ὡς γε—ἀληθῆ: see on 309 A.

50. ἐγγέννηται: B and T have ἐγγέννηται: ἐγγέννηται is Heindorf's correction, now found in a Vienna ms (Kral's i): cf. Phaedo 86 E ἴνα χρόνον ἐγγενομένῳ βουλευόμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν.

53. σὸς μέντοι—πολὺτης. Iulis in Ceos was their native place. μέντοι is 'surely'. Notice the emphasis on σὸς and compare σὲ in lines 54 and 59.

54. παρακαλεῖν is future: cf. Theaet. 183 D ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ—340 A οὖ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ: Phaedr. 228 C δοκεῖσι σὺ ousamaw με ἀφήσειν: 
tr. ‘therefore I think I will call you to my assistance’. ἐγὼ and σὲ are contrasted in view of the illustration which is about to follow.

ὡσπερ ἐφη κτλ.: ὡσπερ corresponds to καὶ ἐγὼ in line 59: as, according to Homer, Scamander called on Simois, so look you, I call upon you. For ὡσπερ used in this way see above note on 330 A. The other editors take δοκῶ ὦν ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σὲ with the ὡσπερ clause, and, regarding παρακαλεῖν as a present, print a full stop after σχῶμεν in the quotation: but (1) there is a certain awkwardness in the repetition ‘I think I am summoning you’ and ‘so look you, I am summoning you’; (2) the quotation does not finish with σχῶμεν, but ἐκπέρσῃ in l. 60 belongs to it also—a point which is against separating φιλε κασίγνητε—σχῶμεν from the following clause. In the view which we have taken a fresh start begins with ὡσπερ, after which the actual summons follows in the present ἀτάρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ.

55. ἐφη Ὅμηρος. Iliad xxi 305 foll. οὐδὲ Σκάμανδρος ἔληγε τὸ δὲ μένος ἄλλῳ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον χρόνο Πηλεων—Σαμβεντί δὲ κέκλετ' ἄσας. Φιλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροι περ σχῶμεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ὦστι μέγα Πραμώου ἀνακτὸς ἐκπέρσει. This ἐκπέρσει explains the occurrence of ἐκπέρσῃ in line 60, although (as Heindorf shews) the same metaphor is occasionally found in tragedy (but hardly in prose), e.g. Trach. 1104 τυφλῆς ὑπ' ἄτης ἐκπέρσῃ βροθημαι τάλας.

59. ἀτάρ: cf. supra 335 D.

61. μονοκής: ‘culture’, as often; here not without some sarcasm, in reference to Prodicus’ ὄνομάτων ὡρθήτης, exemplified in 337 A foll.

340 B 62. βουλεσθαί—ἐπιθυμεῖν. βουλεσθαί is of will: ἐπιθυμεῖν of desire. The distinction is generally well marked in Plato: see note on Apol. 25 c and compare Cope on Arist. Rhet. ii 19. 9. Prodicus does not touch on this example in his speech in 337, but it is quite in Plato’s way to select a fresh example (compare Theaet. 147 A—B, 166 B by the side of 159 C, 169 A—B), which may in this case be supposed to come from Prodicus’ lectures (cf. 341 A). We should expect the article to be repeated with ἐπιθυμεῖν, as the two words are to be distinguished (cf. infra in line 67 το γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν): but the article is sometimes dropped with the second of two words even when the words are contrasted, e.g. Euthyphr. 9 c τὸ ὄσιον καὶ μή. Here the effect of its omission is perhaps to suggest that the two notions are after all more like than different.
67. γενέσθαι—εναι. The distinction though long ago recognized by the philosophers was not always present in ordinary speech: otherwise (as Kroschel points out) Protagoras’ censure of Simonides would be too absurd, and Socrates’ pretended bewilderment out of place. But that Simonides in this poem drew a distinction between γενέσθαι and εναι is certain: whether it was the same distinction as Socrates himself draws later is another question: see on γενέμενον δὲ ἀδύνατον in 344 B.

73. τὸ αὐτὸν. B and T here have τὸ αὐτὸν, which Schanz retains: 340 C the form occurs on inscriptions and once or twice in Plato’s mss: v. Schanz Vol. xii p. vii.

74. ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι. So Heindorf. ἔλεγεν is ‘said’, not ‘meant’, and the sentence is intended to prove what is stated in the last sentence, viz. that Pittacus ὅπ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπιτυγχάνειν (said), ἀλλ’ ἄλλα. τὸ goes with the whole clause χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν; the emphasis is on γενέσθαι: for which reason τὸ ἐμμεναι in the next line (for τὸ ἐμμεναι ἐσθλὸν χαλεπὸν) suffices. It is unnecessary to read (with Schanz and Kroschel) ἔλεγεν(ν) χαλεπὸν, τὸ γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν, or ἔλεγε χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν with Sauppe.

79. Πρόδικος ὤδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ. Socrates dissociates himself from the others, because he is about to give a different solution of Simonides’ apparently contradictory statements (in 344 B foll.).

80. Ἡσιόδος: in Works and Days 289 foll. τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς 340 D ἱδρώτα θεοῖ προπαράθειν ἐθηκαίν ἀθάνατοι μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὁρθὸς ὁμοίος ἐσί αὐτὴν καὶ τρχχῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ ὃς ὤθε ἄκρον ἵκηται. ὅμιδὴ δηπετεῖ πέλει, χαλεπῆ περ ἐοῦσα. This passage was very famous in antiquity: Plato cites it again in Rep. II 364 C, Laws IV 718 E. Hesiod in effect says it is difficult to become good, but easy to be good. Simonides himself refers to Hesiod’s verses in Frag. 58 (Bergk) ἐστὶ τις λύγοι τῶν ἀρετῶν ναλεῖν δυσαμβατὸς ἐπὶ πέτραις, νῦν δὲ μν θεῶν χώρον ἀγνὸν ἀμφέτειν, ὅπ δ’ ἀπαντῶν βλεφάροις θυατῶν ἐσοπτον, ὃ μὴ δακένυμος ἱδρὼς ἐνδοθεν μόλις ὥθε ἰκηται τ’ ἀκρον ἀνδρεῖς.

84. ἐκτήσθαι: to be taken with ἰδίδιν. B and T read κτήσθαι, but cf. 349 E. For the form see above on 319 A.
CHAPTER XXVII.

After some dialectical skirmishing, Socrates volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem.

7. ἰόμενος µείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Socrates is thinking of the proverb κακὸν κακῶ τῶσθαι.

9. ποιητοῦ —ἐκτήσοιαί. The poet is not of course Hesiod but Simonides. Socrates nowhere said that in censuring Pittacus Simonides implies that it is easy to 'keep virtue', i.e. to be virtuous: the quotation from Hesiod was put in the mouth of Prodicus and ἄλλοι πολλοί (340 c). At the same time Protagoras might fairly turn Socrates' fallacies (see on 331 A) against himself and say that if Simonides said it was 'not difficult' to be virtuous, he meant that it was 'easy' to be so.

13. κατενεχθεῖ οὖρ τοῖς: the art of Prodicus (Socrates means) can lay as good claims to antiquity as yours: cf. 316 D.

14. ἐκεῖ τις εἶναι πάλαι. Kroschel's reading εἶναι καὶ παλαιὰ would somewhat change the meaning, which is 'has long been an art divine': divine because practised by poets and the like, cf. Rep. 331 B ἄλλα μέντοι —Σιμωνίδη γε ὦ ἄρδιον ἀπιστεῖν' σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἄνήρ: supra 315 E and note. In ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου there is an allusion to 316 D.

341 A 17. οὐχ ὅσπερ ἕνω, sc. εἰμὶ. The idiom is frequent in Plato, e.g. Symp. 179 E οὐχ ὅσπερ ἕνω 'Ἀχιλλέα —ἐτήσιον καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν.

μαθητής. Socrates calls himself a disciple of Prodicus also in Crat. 384 B, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D.

19. τὸ χαλεποῦν τοῦτο. τὸ marks χαλεποῦν as a quotation: see above on 331 C.

21. ἄλλ' ὅσπερ κτλ. The application of the illustration follows in 341 B line 28 foll. ἵνα ὀν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν —ὑπολαμβάνοιν, where see note.

341 B 23. Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστὶν. The ἥ ἄλλοι τινὰ is neglected, and Πρωταγόρας takes us back to σέ: cf. note on ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι in 317 C. The collocation σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς is tolerably frequent in ironical characterizations, e.g. Theaet. 173 B δεινὸ τε καὶ σοφὸν γεγονότες, ὡς δολοταί.

24. ἐρωτᾷ explains νοθετεῖ: whence the Asyndeton explicationum: see on 335 A above.
25. τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν—κακὸν ἐστὶν. Prodicus’ canon—which rests on the derivation of δεινὸν from δέος—is not borne out by Greek usage, except to this extent, that when a man is called δεινὸς, it is generally implied that he is more clever than good.

26. δεινὸν πλούτου κτλ. Genitives of exclamation in the Platonic dialogues are generally (as Turner remarks) preceded by an interjection, e.g. Euthyd. 303 A πυππαίξ ὁ Ἡράκλεις καλοῦ λόγου and ibid. ὁ Πόσειδον δεινῶν λόγων. Here of course the exclamation is left out as irrelevant: the only relevant point is the use of δεινὸς.

28. ἵσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν. Sauppe remarks that we should expect οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν to introduce the apodosis to the ὀποπερ clause (341 A line 21): καὶ is however enough to show that we have reached the application: οὖν is introduced on account of the parenthesis from τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑντος: and ἵσως marks the suggestion as only tentative.

32. φωνὴν: ‘dialect’ as often, e.g. Phaedo 62 A καὶ ὁ Κέβης—ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς, ἐφη, τῇ αὐτῷ φωνῇ εἰπὼν.

33. κακὸν, ἐφη. Prodicus enters into the spirit of the joke: 341 C in view of C and D it would be absurd to take this seriously: see note on ἄλλα παίζειν in D below.


40. ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ: a malicious exaggeration inspired by the odio philologicum.

49. ἄλλα παίζειν. The editors suppose that Socrates is here 341 D turning the tables on Prodicus, who it is supposed meant his criticism seriously, but the tone of the passage seems to imply that Prodicus is in league with Socrates to make fun of Protagoras, who is represented throughout the whole dialogue as lacking all sense of humour. It would not be wit, but sheer buffoonery in Plato to represent Prodicus as seriously believing that Simonides had censured Pittacus for having said: ‘It is bad to be good’.

καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ὁ δῶκειν is not pleonastic after ὁμαί but means ‘think fit’—a very idiomatic use, cf. Aesch. Ag. 16 ὦταν δ’ ἄείδειν ἦ μυθρεσθαι δοκῶ. See Classical Review III
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p. 148, where Mr Arthur Sidgwick discusses and illustrates this usage.

341 E 54. οὖ δήπου τούτο γε λέγων. οὖ δήπου goes with λέγων, which is ‘meaning’ not ‘saying’, and τούτο is explained by κακὸν ἐσθολὸν ἐμμεναι. For the asyndeton see on 335 A: and for the use of εἶτα compare 311 A and Symp. 200 A πότερον ἐχων αὐτὸ οὖ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καλ ἐρα, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καλ ἐρα, ἢ ὁ δὲ ἐχων;

55. τούτο γέρας. Heindorf reads τούτο τὸ γέρας as in 344 C: but γέρας may be regarded as predicative and going closely with ἀπένεμε, so that τούτο—τούτο balance each other. Sauppe compares Symp. 179 C εὐαριθμητοι δὴ τίσων ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί.

56. ἀκόλαστον—οὔθαμως Κεῖον. This seems to be the earliest passage making allusion to the sobriety and uprightness of the Cians, to which, perhaps, Aristophanes sarcastically alludes in Frogs 970 (οὐ Χίος, ἀλλὰ Κεῖος). In Laws I 638 B (quoted by Sauppe) Plato cites the subjugation of the Cians by the Athenians as a proof that victory does not always favour the more virtuous side. Strabo (X 486) quotes from Menander the lines Καλὸν τὸ Κεῖον νὸμιμὸν ἔστι, Φανία. δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος ἕνω καλῶς οὐ ἕνω κακῶς and explains them by saying that a Cean law required those above the age of 60 to take hemlock so as to make their country’s produce suffice to feed the others.

342 A 60. δ οὖ λέγεις τούτο refers to περὶ ἐπῶν 338 E. For the idiom cf. the usual τὸ σῶν δὴ τούτο, e.g. Symp. 221 ι.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Socrates introduces his exposition of the poem with a paradoxical theory that Sparta is the oldest home of philosophers. The wise men of old accordingly expressed their wisdom in pithy Laconic sayings, and such a saying is that of Pittacus. Simonides, as a rival craftsman, wrote this entire poem to overthrow that saying.

This chapter is intended as a kind of counterblast to Protagoras’ claim on behalf of σοφοστική in 316 D foll. In general tone as well as in many of the particular statements it is elaborately ironical: but it should be remembered that Plato thought highly in many respects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions and borrowed much from them in constructing his ideal city.

3. φιλοσοφία γὰρ κτλ. Compare 316 D ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφοστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιὰν κτλ.
4. τῶν Ἑλλήνων: ‘among the Greeks’. The genitive belongs rather to ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ Δακεδαλίμων than to πλεονή: cf. Thuc. II 18. 1 ὁ δὲ στρατὸς—ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰλονῆν. Similarly in γῆς ἐκεῖ, γῆς belongs to ἐκεῖ rather than to πλεονή: there would seem to be no exact parallel to justify us in taking πλεονή γῆς together. For the meaning of σοφιστά see on 312 C.

6. ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται. σχηματίζονται of ‘posing’ 342 B as in Soph. 268 ἄγνοει ταῦτα ἀ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἶδὼς ἐποιοῦνται.

9. οὐς—ἐλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς: viz. in 316 D. The attraction is common enough, e.g. Crito 48 C ὡς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τὰ ἀναλώσεων χρημάτων καὶ δίδξης κτλ. and infra 359 D.

12. τὴν σοφίαν. So B and the second hand in T: the first hand omits the words (so Schanz, Kroschel and Kral).

13. τοὺς—λακωνίζοντες. The editors refer to Ar. Birds 1281 ἐλακωνομάνων ἀπαντεῖς ἀνθρωποί τόσο, ἐκόμων, ἐπείνων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτων and Demosth. κατὰ Κόνωνος 34 μεθ’ ἤμεραν μὲν ἐσκυλρωτάκασι καὶ λακωνίζοντες φασὶ καὶ τρίβουν ἔχουσι καὶ ἀπλὰς ὑποδέχεntαι. The Laconisers in Athens were tolerably numerous: Plato himself (Rep. viii 544 C) places ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία nearest in merit to his ideal city.

14. οἷς μὲν ὅταν τε κατάγγυνται: thanks, of course, to boxing: cf. Gorg. 515 ἐ τῶν τὰ ὅτα κατασαγότων (i.e. τῶν λακωνίζοντων) ἀκοὐεῖς ταῦτα, ὡς Σδράπατες, and Martial vii 32. 5 “at iuvenes alios fracta colit aure magister”.

15. ἴμαντας περιειλπτοῦνται. The ἴμαντας were thongs of 342 C leather bound round the knuckles for greater efficacy in boxing: Hom. Iliad xxiii 685. The caestus, being loaded with balls of lead, was a much more brutal instrument (Virg. Aen. v 404—405).

16. βραχεῖας ἀναβολὰς: ‘short cloaks’ in imitation of the τρίβων (the national Spartan dress: see on 335 D). ἀναβολὴ (here almost concrete) and ἀναβάλλεσθαι were said of the ἴματον, to wear which rightly and like a gentleman was ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀναβάλλεσθαι (Theaet. 175 E), not ἐπὶ ἀρσετέρα (Ar. Birds 1567—1568, a passage which seems decisive against reading ἐπιδέξια in this phrase). From Suidas (s.v. ἀναβάλλει—ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἴματον, οὐ περιβάλλεσθαι λέγουσιν) we may infer that ἀναβολὴ refers not to the throwing back of the ἴματον over the shoulder (since in point of fact it was thrown back over the left shoulder) but to pulling it round the back (from left to right) before throwing the end over the left shoulder in front.
NOTES ON XXVIII. 342 C

ws δὴ—κρατοῦντας is “quasi vero—his supererent” (Kroschel). For the construction cf. (with Kroschel) Rep. I 345 E οὐκ ἔννοεις ὅτι οὔδεις ἔθελεν ἄρχειν ἐκ νῦν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αὐτοῦσιν, ὥς οὐ χί αὐτοῦσιν ὥφελεν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; Madvig's Gk Syntax p. 168.

20. ἔφηλασίας. Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Ar. Birds 1012 ὠσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐφηλασίασται and Plut. Lyc. 27. 6 τῶν ἀθροιζομένων ἐπὶ οὕδεις χρησίμως καὶ παρεισφέροντας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀπήλλακτον (sc. Λυκούργος), οὕτως ἡ Θεουκτίδης (II 39) ἡσιω, δεδώς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας μιμητὴ γένουσι καὶ πρὸς ἀρέτῃ τι χρήσιμον ἐκμάθοσιν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὅπως μὴ διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ τινος ὑπάρχωσιν. The reasons assigned by Plutarch are no doubt the true ones.

23. οὐδένα ἔσων—ἐξείλαι. Plut. Lyc. 27. 5 οὐδ' ἀποθεμεῖν ἔδωκε (Λυκούργος) τῶν βουλομένων καὶ πλανάσθαι ἔφηλασίαν ἡδυ καὶ μιμητὰ βίων ἀπαιδεύων καὶ πολιτεμάτων διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀθροιζομένων etc. (see last note). In Laws xii 950 c foll. (quoted by Sauppe) Plato lays down similar though less stringent regulations as to ἀποθημεῖα.

342 D 24. ὠσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες. There seems to be no other authority for this statement, but (as Sauppe remarks) the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan institutions is well known.

27. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. Women in Sparta held a position of much greater power and influence than in the rest of Greece, partly at least in consequence of their superior education, physical and otherwise: cf. Arist. Pol. II 9. 1269 b 32 πολλὰ διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν Λακεδαίμονών) and see Grote Vol. II p. 383 foll. Heindorf remarks that wise and pregnant sayings by Spartan women (such as are given in pseudo-Plutarch’s Δακαίων ἀποθεμένα, e.g. the famous τέκνων, ἢ τὰν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς) were probably already current in Plato’s time.

30. εἶ γὰρ ἔθελεν—ἐφηβίσει. Compare 324 A.

342 E 33. ἐνεβαλεν ῥῆμα—συνεστραμμένον. The aorist is like ‘behold! he has thrown in’; it expresses rapidity by representing the action as no sooner begun than over. The idiom is very frequent in Plato: Turner refers to Stallbaum on Rep. III 406 D ἐὰν δὲ τὸς αὐτῷ μικρῶν διαστὸν προστάτηρ—ταχύς ἐπεφέν ὁτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμυβε. With συνεστραμμένον compare Arist. Rhet. II 24. 1401 a 5 συνεστραμμένος—ἐλπεῖν: the metaphor is apparently from an animal gathering itself for a spring (cf. Arist. Hist. Anim. IX 48. 631 a 27 συστρέψαντες
34. ὀσπερ ἀναστικής. With the metaphor compare Theaet. 165 D καὶ ἄλλα μυθά ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἄν τελταστικός ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρήμωνος—ἐμβαλῶν ἄν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν—ηλεγχέν ἄν ἐπέχω ἢν ἑν ἰνείς κτλ., ibid. 180 A ἄλλο τι ἐρήμω ὀσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ἤματικαίναι ἀνυγματώδη ἀναστικοὺτε ἀποτοεύουσιν.

35. παῦδος μηδὲν βελτίω. The phrase is almost proverbial: see on Crito 49 B παῦδον οὐδὲν διαφέροντε.

39. φθέγγεσαι, here of an impressive (almost mystic) utterance, as often in Greek, e.g. Ar. Clouds 315 ἀνταὶ αἱ φθεγγάμεναι τοῦτο τὸ σεμνὸν.

41. Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος κτλ. This list of the seven wise men is remarkable as excluding Periander, who was canonized later (Diog. Laert. I 13). Plato refused to allow that a tyrant could be truly σοφός (Rep. IX 587 D) or even (in the true sense of the term) powerful: see Rep. I 336 A οἷμαι αὐτὸ (sc. the view that justice is doing good to friends and evil to enemies) Περί αὐτὸν εἶναι ἦν Περίδικκον ἢ Ξέρον ἢ Ἰσομήνου τοῦ Ἰππάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰκομένων δύνασθαι πλοῦσιν ἄνδρῷ.

Myson (the least known of the seven) figures as early as Hipponax (Frag. 45, quoted by Sauppe) καὶ Μύσων δοὶ Ὀμῆλλων ἀνείπτεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονεστατον πάντων. According to a tradition preserved in Diogenes Laertius I 106 the Pythian priestess being asked by Anacharsis to say if there was any man wiser than himself replied Οἰραίαν τινὰ φημὶ Μύσων ἐνι Χηρὶ γενέσθαι σοῦ μᾶλλον πραπιδέσουν ἄφροτα πεικαλίμασι: but another account placed his birthplace in Chen in Laconia, and a third (reading Ἡτέεν τινὰ φήμει for Οἰραίαν τινὰ φήμι in the oracle) in Etea, which was variously placed in Laconia and in Crete. Sauppe remarks that the presence of Ἀκεδαμίδως with Χήλων seems to shew that Plato did not regard Laconia as Myson’s birthplace, but favoured the view which made him a native of Chenae by Mount Oeta. Thales (flor. circ. 585 B.C., the eclipse of which year he is said to have predicted) is mentioned in two other passages in Plato (in neither of which is his philosophical teaching—that the ἄρχη is ὅραμα—referred to), once as an author of useful inventions (Rep. X 600 A), and once as the hero of an anecdote illustrating the philosopher’s want of worldly wisdom (Theaet. 174 A). Pittacus (flor. circ. 612 B.C.) and Bias of Priene in Ionia (contemporary with or earlier than Hipponax, who refers to
him in Diog. Laert. I 84) are mentioned together again in Rep. I 335 Ἐ Βίας τὰ Ἡ Πειττακόν—ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἄνδρῶν. Cleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes and Chilon of Sparta (both about the beginning of the 6th century B.C.) are not again referred to by Plato.

The traditions relating to the wise men and many of the aphorisms with which they are credited are given in Diog. Laert. I 22—122: for the authorities for their lives, and for their sayings, see Mullach's Fragmenta Philos. Graec. II pp. 203—234. This passage of the Protagoras, apparently the earliest in which seven are named together, probably contributed in large measure to the canonization of the wise men.

44. Δακεδαμόνιος: Heindorf would read ὁ Δακεδαμόνιος, but Plato may well have said 'a Lacedaemonian, Chilon'.

48. εἰρημένα: ὅτι. The sentence beginning with ὅτι shews how one is to learn αὐτῶν τῶν σοφῶν τοιαύτην ὅσαν: the asyndeton (as Heindorf observes) resembles that after σημείων δὲ, τεκμήριον δὲ and the like. Here ὅτι καὶ κτλ. is so far removed from καὶ καταμάθωι—ὁσαν that we might have expected ὅτι γὰρ καὶ or (as Kroschel reads) ὅτι for ὅτι, but the emphatic ὅτι (parallel to ὅτι in line 44 above) renders the explanatory particle unnecessary. Hermann's correction εἰρημένα ἃ for εἰρημένα—adopted by Sauppe—gives a wrong meaning: for ἀπαρχή 'first-fruits' (line 49) coming after καὶ κωι ἡ ἐξελθόντες, in marked antithesis to ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, cannot mean merely the sayings of each individual—as it will have to mean if ἃ is read, ἃ being then in apposition to ἀπαρχήν. Kral's ρήματα βραχέα δέξιομενήντα <σκοπῶν> ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, ἃ ὅτι κτλ. suffers from the same fault, besides that it is very unlikely that σκοπῶν should have fallen out.

κοινὴ ἐξελθόντες—ἀνέθεσαν. The editors cite Pausanias X 24. ἰ ἐν δὲ τῷ προνάω τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γεγραμμένα ἐστὶν ὑφελήματα ἀνθρώπως ὁπλικηττος εἰς θλί̃—οντοι σο̆ν οι ἄνδρες ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰ ἀδέμενα Γνώθι σαυτὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν. The same explanation of the presence of these maxims on the temple at Delphi meets us in other authors; but in each case the author is obviously borrowing the story from Plato. Plato states that these two maxims were the cream of the wisdom of the wise men: it would be hardly too much to say that upon them the whole structure of Greek ethical philosophy was based. For the construction, and for the practice of thus dedicating wisdom to a god, Kroschel aptly quotes Diog. Laert.
CHAPTER XXIX.

Socrates develops his theory of the poem and applies it to the first two lines, not without much sophistry.

3. μανικόν. Notice the extreme dogmatism of Socrates, suggesting a weak case: cf. οὖδέ πρὸς ἑνὰ λόγον (line 5).

5. οὖδέ πρὸς ἑνὰ λόγον: see on 335 D. πρὸς λόγον = εὐλόγων or 343 D εὐλόγως is frequent in Plato: see on 351 E.

6. ἐδν μὴ τις ὑπολαβῇ κτλ. The natural interpretation of the μὲν (since it follows ἀγαθὸν, not γενέσθαι) is this. While it is difficult 'γενέσθαι' truly good, it is yet possible to reach a fair standard of ἀρετή. The antithesis is implied if not actually expressed in the sequel: see 345 D and 346 C. Compare Introd. p. xxvii.

8. λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ: a fresh start is made, to explain ὅσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν.

10. εἶπεν but λέγειν in line 8: the past tense is used because Socrates is about to put Simonides' meaning in the form of an actual address in past time to Pittacus.

11. ὃς ἀληθῶς to be taken with χαλεπὸν ἔστω: see infra 344 A (line 23). Here again Socrates' interpretation is opposed to the
natural sense of the passage, according to which ἀληθέως in the poem goes with ἀγαθῶν, and has nothing to do with χαλεπῶν.

343 E 12. εἶπ τοῦτῳ—τῆν ἀληθείαν. τοῦτῳ is τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and τῆν ἀληθείαν = τῷ ‘ἀληθέως’.

14. εὔθες—Σμικρόνδου. As well might Socrates say it is εὐθεῖα to use the word ἀριστος.

15. ὑπέρβατόν is used in its technical grammatical sense. Heindorf quotes Long, de Sublim. 22 ἐστιν δὲ (sc. τὰ ὑπέρβατὰ) λέξεων ἡ νόησεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις καὶ οἷον εὐχαριστήρι ἐναγωγοῦν πάθους ἀληθεύσατος.

16. ὑπειπόντα. There is no need to explain ὑπειπόντα here as ‘interpreting’ (a sense for which no exact parallel is quoted). ὑπειπένι is used here in its regular sense ‘to say before’, ‘to say first’ as in Ar. Wasps 54—55 φερε νυν κατείπτω τοῖς βηθαίς τὸν λόγον, ὅλος ἄτοθ᾽ ὑπειπένι πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν ταδί. The meaning is: if we would arrive at Simonides’ meaning, we must regard the adverb ἀληθέως as transposed, and speak the words of Pittacus first (ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ): i.e. instead of saying ἀνδρ’ ἄγαθον μὲν ἀληθέως γενόσθαι χαλεπῶν first, and quoting Pittacus’ saying afterwards, we should begin with χαλεπῶν ἐσθθάν ἐμεναι (line 19 εἰπόντα, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, χαλεπῶν ἐσθθάν ἐμεναι), and make ἀνθρ’ ἄγαθον etc. follow as Simonides’ answer (lines 20—23), putting ἀληθέως last. οὔτωσι πῶς shews that ὑπειπόντα is to be explained in the sequel viz. from ὁσπερ ἀν το ἀληθέως in line 23.

19. εἰπόντα: i.q. τὸν μὲν εἰπόντα: see on 330 A. Note the precision in the use of the tenses (εἰπόντα, but ἀποκρινόμενον).

344 A 21. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἄλλα γενόσθαι μὲν. Compare Crito 43 D οὔτω δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἡ ἑξει κτλ. μὲν without following δὲ is frequent in a clause introduced by ἄλλα, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative clause.

23. οὔτω φαίνεται. After φαίνεται the MSS have τό: “vel expungendum vel in τοι mutandum hoc τό” says Heindorf. For πρὸς λόγον see on 351 E.

25. τὰ ἐπιτόντα: see Appendix I. p. 198.

344 B 30. τόπου. Socrates’ criticism of the poem so far has been δι’ ἀκριβείας: cf. Rep. II 414 A ὃς ἐν τόπῳ, μὴ δὲ ἀκριβείας εἰρήθαι. See also note on ὑπογράψας γραμμάς τῇ γραφήν in 326 D above.

31. παντὸς μᾶλλον is frequent in Plato for ‘assuredly’: cf. Crito 49 B.
CHAPTER XXX.

Socrates expounds the next section of the poem in accordance with his theory of the purport of the whole and finds therein his own doctrine that ill doing comes from want of knowledge.

1. *μετὰ τοῦτο—διελθὼν.* This sentence is somewhat difficult. τοῦτο means from ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθὸν to ἀνέυ ψύχου τετυγμένῳ. The reference in διελθὼν must be to the verses omitted between τετυγμένον and οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως etc. The logical object of λέγει is the sentence (in line 4) γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν etc., which is Socrates’ paraphrase of οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως etc., but the grammatical object begins with ὅτι γενόθηκε—the stress being, as often happens, thrown upon the ὅτε clause: ‘While it is truly difficult to become a good man (albeit possible for some length of time), to continue in that state after you have become good and to be a good man etc.’ γενόθηκε μὲν ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν etc. is not, as Socrates says, μετὰ τοῦτο, but his desire to expound the τοῦτο τοῦ διον of the poem throughout (διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἀσύστου) leads him to begin at the beginning, even at the cost of an error not unnatural in conversational style. See Appendix I. p. 196.

ὡς ἄν εἰ λέγοι λόγον: ‘as if he were making a speech’, i.e. not a poem. The speech begins at γενόθηκε μὲν, for ὅτι here introduces oratio recta.

3. *οἷον τεμέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά.* These words do not give the gist of the lost lines: still less are they to be assigned (with Bonghi) to the poem itself, for [as Aars remarks Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras (1888) p. 12 note 3] it is implied by Socrates in 343 D f. that μὲν in γενόθηκε μὲν has no expressed antithesis: they are educed by Socrates himself from χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. Cf. Infra 346 κ. πάντας δὲ εἰπάλημι καὶ φίλεω ἐκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρθη μηθὲν αἰσχρόν, ἀκών δ’ ἔστω ὅσι ἐγὼ ἐπανῶ καὶ φίλῳ. The likeliest supposition is that of Blass—that the lost verses contained a further elaboration of the idea in ἄγαθὸν ἀλαθέως.

4. *γενόμενον δὲ...ἀδύνατον.* Socrates correctly apprehends the gist of Simonides’ objection to the saying of Pittacus, although Simonides himself no doubt read more into the ἐμμεναι of Pittacus than Pittacus intended it to express. Simonides here takes ἐμμεναι to denote a permanent state, and γενόθηκε as not permanent, although in ἀνδρὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μη ὡς κακῶν ἐμμεναι he himself uses ἐμμεναι more...
loosely: see infra on 344 E line 27. It is however most improbable that Simonides meant by γενέσθαι 'to become', i.e. 'to be made', as Socrates everywhere implies: by ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν γενέσθαι ἄλλα ἔλεος he meant only 'that a man should prove himself truly good', i.e. quit him like a perfect man; compare Hdt. VII 224 Δεινόθης—πιπτεῖ ἀνδρ' γενόμενοι ἀριστος, Xen. Anab. IV 1. 26 ἐρωτάντων εἰ τις αὐτῶν ἔστιν δобр ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸς ἔθελοι γενέσθαι. The usage is thoroughly idiomatic.

344 C 7. ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἄν μόνος—γέρας. Plato Symp. 204 A θεῶν οὖδεις φιλοσοφεῖ οὖν ἑπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἐστὶ γάρ.

8. ἄνθρωπος δ' οὐκ ἔστι—καθέλη: see below on 344 E line 30.

12—14. οὐ τὸν κείμενον—τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὖ. For the repetition compare (with Sauppe) Gorg. 521 E οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἄδιστον.

344 D 15. ὁντα ποτὲ—καθέλοι. ποτὲ goes with καθέλοι as with καταβάλοι in line 13.

19. καὶ λατρῶν ταῦτα ταῦτα. ταῦτα ταῦτα is virtually adverbial as in Meno 90 D οὐκ οὖν καὶ περὶ αἰλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα;

20. ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι. Socrates says γενέσθαι, although Simonides said ἐμμεία; see on E (line 27) below.

21. παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ. Xenophon Mem. I 2. 20 ἐμμεία ὁ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δ' τε λέγων ἑσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἑσθλὰ διδάσκειν· ἕν δὲ κακοῦς συμμάχους, ἀπολείπεις καὶ τῶν ἐστίν χρών', καὶ ο̄ λέγων ἁρτάρ' ἄνθρωπ' ἀγαθὸς τοτε μὲν κακός, ἀλλοτε δ' ἑσθλὸς'. The first of these quotations is known (see Meno 95 D) to be from Theognis, so that it seems clear that the second must be from some other poet. It is difficult to resist the impression that the author of this line intended ἄγαθος, κακός, and ἑσθλὸς to have a political sense, and was alluding to the ups and downs of an aristocrat's life in times of civil dissension: compare Theognis 1109—1110 Κέρν', οἱ πρὸσθ' ἄγαθοι νῦν αὖ κακοί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ πρὶν νῦν ἄγαθοι· τίς κεν ταύτ' ἄνχωτ' ἐσηρόν; Euripides Hecuba 595 foll. (quoted by Cron) pointedly contradicts the sentiment of this line (as interpreted by Socrates) ἄνθρωποι δ' οὖν δὲ μὲν πονηρός οὖδέν ἄλλο πλήν κακός, δ' ἑσθλὸς ἑσθλὸς, οὖδὲ συμφορᾶς υπὸ (alluding to Simonides' poem) φῶνει διάηθερ' ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' οὖν.

344 E 25. ἐμφήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἄγαθόν. ἐμφήχανος is identified with ἄγαθός by means of the middle step σοφός: σοφὰ being ἄγαθὸν because it is one of the virtues. See on τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπιτοντι in Crito 47 B.
26. οὐκ ἑστὶ μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι. If Simonides had consistently carried out the distinction between γένεσις and οὐσία attributed to him (in part rightly: see on 344 B line 4), he would have used γενέσαι, not ἐμμεναι here. Socrates throughout interprets ἐμμεναι as equivalent to γενέσαι in this part of the poem, in spite of his previous distinction: but so (apparently) did Simonides: see on 344 B.

28. τὸ δ’ ἐστὶν κτλ. τὸ δὲ ‘whereas in point of fact’ is very frequent in Plato: see on Apol. 23 A. Notice how Socrates reverts to the beginning of the poem: see note on 346 D and Appendix I. p. 196.

29. (δυνατὸν δὲ) ἕσθθλον. There is not sufficient ground for rejecting (with most of the editors) ἕσθθλον: its position is a trifle awkward, but not more, since δυνατὸν δὲ is parenthetical, the μὲν after γενέσαι being balanced by δὲ in ἐμμεναι δὲ. Heindorf reads δυνατὸν δὲ, ἕσθθλον δ’ ἐμμεναι with slight MS authority.

30. πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ κτλ. γὰρ is probably due to Plato, who represents this sentence as adducing a reason for ἐμμεναι δὲ δύναται: see Appendix I. p. 199. πράξας εὖ is ‘if he has prospered’: the whole sentiment is the converse of ἀνδρὰ δ’ οὐκ ἑστὶ μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι and is characteristic of the ordinary Greek moral code: cf. Homer Od. XVIII 136—137 τοῖς γὰρ νῦσ ἐστὶν ἐπιχειρίων ἄνδρῶν οὖν ἐπ’ ἵμαρ ἄγγιος πατὴρ ἄνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. The view that affliction involves moral degeneracy appears in the transition of meaning in πονηρὸς and μοιχηρὸς from ‘afflicted’ to ‘depraved’: the common view that ‘prosperity’ brings virtue is involved in the usual equivocation on εὖ πράττειν ‘fare well’ and ‘do well’: see on Crito 47 E and Euthyphr. 3 A. After κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς, is to be understood ἐπραξῖν.

32. τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα κτλ. In order to read into Simonides 345 A the doctrine that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, Socrates assigns to πράξας εὖ in the poem the meaning of acting well, rather than faring well.

36. κακὸς δ’ κακῶς, sc. πράξας: a free rendering of κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς of the poem, which Kral (following Ast) reads here against the MSS.

40. κακῶς πράξαντες, i.e. εἰ κακῶς πράξαμεν, as the words of the poem shew. Socrates’ reasoning is: to become a bad doctor by practising badly, you must first have been a good doctor: for if you cannot become a doctor by practising badly, obviously you
cannot become a bad doctor. The argument is as fallacious as it is ingenious: it assumes that kakós iatrós is a twofold notion, and more than iatrós, whereas it is a single notion and less. It would be more in conformity with experience to say that the idiótēs does become by practising badly a kakós iatrós.

345 B 45. αὐτή γὰρ μονή—στερπθηκαί. This sentence (necessary as the converse of the statement in 345 A that good action comes from knowledge) is introduced as an explanation of ὑπὸ χρόνου κτλ., because χρόνος, πόνος, νόσος, etc. produce ἐπιστῆμης στήρισις.

47. μέλλει—γενέσθαι. See on 312 C above.

345 C 50. διατελεόντα ἀγαθὸν explains ἀγαθὸν more precisely: cf. 344 B γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν. διατελεῖν without a participle seems not to be elsewhere found in Plato, though it occurs in Thucydides and others.

52. ἐπὶ πλείστον: "diutissime, ut επι πολὺ saepe significat ἄν." καὶ is 'also' not 'and', and balances οὖς ἐν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν: οἱ θεοφιλεῖς are also ἀφροτοί.

CHAPTER XXXI.

The rest of the poem is now expounded and the theory that no man sins willingly discovered in it.

3. δηλοὶ (sc. εἰρημένα) is used as in Soph. Ant. 242 δηλοὶ δὲ ὡς τί σημανῶν κακῶν.

6. κενεάν goes proleptically with μοῦραν αἰῶνος.

8. πανάμομον ἄνθρωπον in apposition to τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν. Kroschel compares Simonid. Amorg. πάμπαυ δ᾽ ἀμοιμον οὖτις οδις ἀκήρος (Frag. 4).


315 D 10. ἐπὶ θ' ύμιν εὐρὸν ἀπαγγελέω: after Bergk's emendation for the ἐπειθ' ὄμιν of the MSS, which cannot be made to scan: see Appendix I. p. 199. It might be possible (in view especially of φησὶν in the next line) to regard ἐπεῖστα here as no part of the poem, were it not for 346 D where it must be part. ἐπὶ θ' ύμιν is the most probable of the many emendations proposed and accounts by far the most easily for the reading of the MSS. ἐπὶ is to be taken with εὐρῶν, and τε is like the quasi-gnomic τε in Homer, e.g. II. 1 218 ὡς κε θεοὶ ἐπιπείθηται, μάλα τ' ἐκλυον αὐτοῦ. Translate "'trust me,
I will tell you when I've found your man', says he'. ὅμω (a kind of ethic dative) does not belong so much to ἀπαγγελεῖν as to ἐφευρών. What Simonides himself wrote was no doubt ἐπὶ τῇ ὅμω (availing himself of the Aeolic form as in the next line); this Plato put in Attic as ἐπὶ θῇ ὅμω, from which to ἐπειθ' ὅμω the step was easy. Sauppe’s ἐπὶ δὴ μὲν ἐφευρών and Kroschel’s ἐπεὶ οὕτω' ἐφευρών are hardly happy.

11. φησίν applies only to the last line: the former φησὶ γὰρ covers the first sentence.

13. πάντας ὅσις: so infra in line 18 ὅστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαν- νεῖν ὅσ ἃν and in line 25 ὅσ ἃν—τούτων: see also note on 319 D.


19. ὅσ ἃν ἐκών—ποιή: but ἐκὼν ὅσις ἔρθη without ἃν above, as often in poetry: Goodwin MT. p. 208, § 540.

21. οὐδέσ τῶν σοφῶν—ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν. The doctrine that no one sins willingly—a corollary of the view that vice is only ignorance—is characteristic of the ethical teaching both of Socrates and Plato (compare note on 324 A and on Euthyphr. 2 c), but not of all Greek sages, and it is only by the most perverse sophistry that Socrates here reads it into Simonides, ignoring entirely the words ἀνάγκη ὅ' οὐδὲ θεόλ μάχονται.

25. καὶ δὴ καὶ: see on 343 B above.

28. καλὸν κάγαθον: see on Apol. 21 D.

29. καὶ ἐπανείπην. The words φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπανεῖν which follow in the MSS were ejected by Heindorf.

30. μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον. Sauppe remarks that from Homer onwards μητρὶ generally comes first in such enumerations—an interesting survival, perhaps, of the greater importance assigned to the mother in primitive Greece. ἀλλόκοτον (‘eccentric’ as in Rep. vi 487 D) from ἄλλος (in its sinister sense) and κότος (i.q. τρόπος, ἱδρος, δργγ) according to Phrynichus (quoted by Kroschel).

31. ἡ πατρίδα: see Crito 50 c—51 c.

36. ἐπὶ μᾶλλον: not = μᾶλλον ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν, but—as is presently explained—because they 'add voluntary feuds to those which they cannot avoid'.

38. ἀναγκαῖος: Heusde's correction for ἀνάγκας of MSS.
Plato is probably thinking of Socrates after his trial as he depicts him in the Crito. 'are constrained' is of course passive.

41. παραμυθεσθαι, like mulcere, as often. Sauppe quotes Hor. Epod. xiii 18 "deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus alioquiiu".

43. 'ηγήσατο—αναγκάζομενος: 'believed—that he had praised etc.' Plato deals a sly thrust at Simonides' notorious avarice, as Pindar (quoted by Sauppe) does in Isthm. II 6 ά Μοίσα γάρ οὗ φιλοκερδής πω τότε ἦν οὖν ἐργάτις. The words ἀλλ' αναγκαζόμενος contain the sting: for the life of the χρηματιστής is βιαίος (Ar. Eth. Nic. 1 3. 1096a 5).

346 C 48. ἐμοι' ἐξαρκεῖ κτλ. See Appendix I. pp. 196 foll. for the arrangement of this part of the poem.

50. γ' ὄνησιτολων. The MSS read γ' οὖν χαί τόλων, which G. Hermann emended to τ' ὄνησιτολων, Bergk to ὄνησιτολων.

51. οὐ μὴν: so the MSS, and so, most probably, Plato; but Simonides can hardly have written this, which will not scan; see Appendix I. p. 199.

53. οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμομος probably belongs to an earlier part of the poem (before ἐμοι' ἐξαρκεῖ: cf. οὐ διὰ ταυτά σε ψέγω, δτι εἰμι φιλόψαγος in line 47): see Appendix I. p. 199.

55. γενέθλα is Stephanus' correction for γένεθλα of the MSS, a mistake due to supposing that ἀπειρον (not from ἀπειρος) went with ἅλθεων: it belongs to γενέθλα.

58. πάντα τοῖς καλὰ—μέμικται sums up the whole moral teaching of the poem.

346 D 63. καὶ οὐ ξητῶ κτλ. Socrates recapitulates part of the poem by way of interpreting the final text: see note on τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέθλαι κτλ. in 344 E above and Appendix I. p. 196.

65. τούτων γ' ἐνεκα: "si hoc spectetur s. requiratur, τὸ πανά-μομον εἶναι" Heindorf: cf. Phaed. 85 Β ἀλλὰ τούτων γ' ἐνεκα λέγειν τε χρη καὶ ἔρωταν δ τι ἀν βούλησθε. The sense is: if I must wait for perfection before beginning to praise, I shall never praise anyone.

346 E 69. ὡς πρὸς Πιττακόν λέγων: not serious, of course, nor true.

71. διαλαβεῖν: i.e. make a division, 'pause', virtually 'punctuate'. The editors compare the use of διαστήμα in Ar. Rhet. III 5. 1407b 14 τὰ γἄρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστήμα ἐργον διά τὸ ἀδηλὸν εἶναι ποτέρω πρόσκειται.

72. ἄκων δ' ἐστιν οὐς: see on 344 B.
CHAPTER XXXII.

The original question is now resumed, Socrates expressing himself disparagingly on poetical criticism. With some reluctance Protagoras consents to submit himself again to Socrates' interrogatory.

6. ἐστι μέντοι καὶ ἐμοὶ κτλ. Imitated in Hipp. Maior 286 A where Hippias says ἐστι γὰρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν πάγκαλος λόγος συγκείμενος καὶ ἄλλως εὐ διακείμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι. Like Socrates in his recent exposition, Hippias looks upon poetical criticism as a legitimate field for the exercise of sophistry and wit.

7. ἐπιδείξω: see on ἐπιδείξαμεν in 328 D.

9. ἐκκολογησάτην: in 338 D, where however the terms of the agreement are somewhat more stringent.


18. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι κτλ. This passage (from τὸ περὶ σοφίσσως down to κἂν πάνω πολὺν οἷον πίσον) is quoted by Athenaeus III 51. It is doubtful whether Plato is here animadverting on Xenophon's Symposium, in which (2. 1 and 9. 3 foll.) both a flute-girl and a dancing-girl appear: the words τοῖς αὐτοποιοῖσι τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων would contain a very pretty hit at Xenophon, if the evidence for the allusion were more complete. There is a similar passage in the Symposium of Plato (176 E) εἰ συγγράφα τὴν μὲν ἄριστο εἰσέβαλον αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἥν, ἀκούσαν ἱκανὴ τὴν βούλησαι ταῖς γυναικὶ τᾶς ἔνδον: this passage Athenaeus (XI 112) cites in support of his theory of a literary rivalry between Plato and Xenophon.

20. ἀγοραῖοι: like the Latin circumforanei, "ἀγοραῖος, vel ut critici veteres volunt, ἀγόραιos, est ó en ἀγορᾶ τεθραμμένος, s. qui totos dies forum conterit, quem ἀγορᾶς περίτρημμα Comicus appellat, vilis et ex ima plebe homo, Aristoph. Eqq. 181 ὅτη ποιήσας κἀς ἀγορᾶς καὶ θρασύς: 214 τὰ δ’ ἄλλα σοι πρὸςεται δημαγωγικά, φωνή μαρά, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγόραιος εἰ" Heindorf.

23. τιμίας ποιοῦσι ταῖς αὐλητρίδαις: "run up the price of 347 D flute-players": τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον—τιμίον Euthyd. 304 B. Heindorf aptly quotes Xen. De Vect. IV 10 χρυσὸν ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῆ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον τιμώτερον ποιεῖ.
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27. καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι. So Athenaeus (III 51) and the second hand in T: B and T read πεπαιδευμένοι. Schanz brackets πεπαιδευμένοι, but ύπο ἀπαιδευσίας in line 23 is in its favour.

οὖκ ἐν ἔδοις—ψαλτριάς. Compare Theaeet. 173 D δείπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κώμοι, οὔδε διαρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτός (i.e. τοῖς ὦς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοῖς).

347 E 32. κἂν πάνυ πολύν οἶνον πίωσιν: like Socrates in the Symposium: see 220 A, 223 c. In Laws I 637 B foll. Plato argues that wine properly used is the means of teaching self-control, since the man who will be σώφρων when drunk will a fortiori be σώφρων when sober: cf. ibid. II 673 E foll.

33. έάν μὲν κτλ. μὲν suggests that in different society the same would not be the case—an antithesis which is already expressed in 347 C—D. Compare Apol. 17 B εἰ μὲν γάρ τῶτι λέγουσιν, ὀμολογοῦν ἂν ἐγώγοι οὐ κατὰ τούτοις εἶναι ρήτωρ. Φορά δίπωοι τι. (with Sauppe) Symp. 218 A νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφνούσι ὅταν λάβωνται (sc. oi ἐν φιλοσοφία λόγοι).

35. οὔτε ἑινερέσθαι—ἐπαγόμενοι τε: for the sentiment see on 339 A above: for οὔτε—τε on 309 B: for αὐτοίς after ὡν on 313 A. ἐπάγομεν θαυμάζει is the regular word for 'cite', e.g. Rep. II 364 C μάρτυρας ποιητᾶς ἑπάγονται.

38. θ ἀδυνατοῦσιν: θ, not in B and T, was restored by Heindorf: it has since been found in a Vienna MS.

40. ἐόσιν: the subject is supplied from ἀνδρῶν οἰολυπορ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἰναι.

348 A 43. καταθεμένους: for the asyndeton see on 330 A. Both here and in Tim. 59 C κατατέθεσθαι is not used in the sense of laying aside for good, but rather (as generally) putting away to be resumed again. 'Putting the poets on their shelves' would give the effect of the Greek.

47. παρέξειν: see on συγκαθείναι in 336 A above.

348 B 53. καὶ νῦν: as before 336 B.

56. ἵνα τοὺτο μὲν τάυτα συνεδίομεν. Symp. 193 E εἰ μὴ συνήδον Σωκράτει τε καὶ Αγάθων δεινοῖς οὕτω περὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα. ἐν σῶν οδοίᾳ ἐκμαινᾷ ἀγαθῶ εἶναι συν—goes with ἐμαινᾷ—I am conscious with myself that I am good—by the convenient fiction which separates the observing ego from the observed. Cases where the dative is not a reflexive pronoun are later in development and presuppose only knowledge about, not knowledge along with, the object.
CHAPTER XXXIII.

After a prefatory compliment to Protagoras, Socrates again asks whether the five virtues are only different names for one thing or differ in reality from one another.

5. τὸν Ὀμηρὸν τὸ. τὸ goes with the whole quotation to which τι is in predicative apposition (cf. τί τοῦτο λέγεις and the like), literally 'I think that what Homer says etc. is something', i.e. 'I think there is sense in what Homer says'. Schanz brackets τὸν Ὀμηρὸν, so as to make the articular clause the subject to λέγεις as in Ar. Knights 334, but there is no occasion for the change. The quotation had become almost proverbial (cf. Symp. 174 D, Alc. 11 140 A) for 'Two heads are better than one': it is from Iliad x 224 ff. where Diomedes says: σὺν τέ δὲ ἐρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸ ὦ τοῦ ἐνόησεν, ὃππος κέρδος ἔγε μοῦνος δ' εἶ πέρ τε νοήσῃ, ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βρασσων τε νόσος λεπτὴ δ' τε μῆτις. Leaf (in loc.) explains ἐρχομένῳ as a pendent accusative and for the order of words in ἐρπο ὦ τοῦ cites II. V 219 ἐπὶ νῦ τῷ δ' ἀνδρί.

8. εὐπορώτεροι—ἐσμεν, i.e. οὕτως ἔχοντες (viz. σὺν διό εἰρχομένῳ); 348D it is hardly necessary to read οὕτως πως or to change πως into οὕτως as Heindorf suggests.

10. αὕτης περιήκα—ἐντύχῃ. The ἐπιδείξηται and ἑβηνιόσηται—deliberative subjunctives—of the MSS would imply too much eagerness: the change to ἐπιδείξηται and ἑβηνιόσηται is adopted by Sauppe and others. This mistake (or the reverse) is tolerably frequent in Plato's MSS, cf. Gorg. 489 A (βεβαίωσομαι Τ, βεβαιώ-σομαι Β), 505 E (ποιήσωμεν ΒΤ), 510 A (ἀδικήσωμεν ΒΤ).

12. ἐνεκα τοῦτοι refers to the following clause introduced by
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Heindorf refers to his note on Phaedo 102 D λέγω δὲ τοδὸ
ένεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι δόπερ ἐκολ.

348 E 21. ὥστε καὶ κτλ. The reference is to 316 D foll. καὶ does not
go with ἄλλων but with the whole sentence (as Sauppe points out).

349 A 22. ὑποκηρυξάμενος ‘having had yourself heralded as a
sophist’: compare Aeschin. in Ctes. 42 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκηρυξά-
μενοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκήτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρωσ. The force of ὑπο-
is probably the same as in ὑπείτον: see note on 343 E. Notice the
effect of the double σεαυτὸν (both of them after a natural pause):
σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος—σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας: the -αυτόν is brought
out so strongly as to suggest that Protagoras is the only true Ἀδρός
or Master.

25. μισθὸν—ἀρνύσθαι: 328 B, where however it is not said that
Protagoras was the first to take a fee. The Homeric word ἀρνύσθαι
is occasionally used by prose writers in the phrase μισθὸν ἀρνύσθαι:
whence μισθαρπεῖν.

28. ἐκείνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ: see above on 330 A.

349 B 30. ἦν δὲ—πάρε 329 C foll.

349 C 42. ἐκαστὰ attracted for ἐκαστὸν: so Rep. VIII 546 C δεσμένων
ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, i.e. ‘lacking—each of them—one’.

45. οὐδὲν σοι ὑπόλογον τιθέμαι. ὑπόλογον τιθέμαι like ὑπόλογον
τιοῦμαι (Lach. 189 B) and ὑπολογίζομαι (Apol. 28 B) is to ‘set
down against’, ‘per contra’, whence ‘object’ as here.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and
contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different
from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage and
knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of which
Protagoras rightly protests.

349 D 2. μόρια μὲν. The antithesis to μὲν was already expressed in
ἐφησότι, οὐ πάντων ὑπόματα ἐπὶ ἐν ὑπέλ. 349 B.

4. η ἐλάτει κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates’
arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the
only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been
discussed: see on 333 C and D and Introd. p. xiv.

II 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron,
which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:

...
"And strange to say, the sons of pleasure,
They who have revelled beyond measure
In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure,
Die calm, and calmer oft than he
Whose heritage was misery”.

10. ἀνδρειότατος δὲ διαφερόντως. The extreme difference (cf. πάντα πολύ διαφέρον in line 5) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359 B the διαφερόντως is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23 C ἣ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὖσα πόλις ἄριστῃ πρός τινὸς πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως: compare also Gorg. 487 B αἰσχυντηρότερω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

11. ἐξε δῆ. “Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam 349 E viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460 Α, aut revocatur, qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349 D”. Wohlrab on Theaet. 186 B.

12. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλεῖοι: (2) ἐπιστήμων are θαρραλεῖοι (349 A line 19—350 B line 28): (3) none who are θαρραλεῖοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἀνδρείοι (350 B line 28—line 33). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμων) are ἀνδρείοι, i.e. that σοφία is ἀνδρεία. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to assume (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλεῖοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλεῖοι with knowledge, and θαρραλεῖοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in Chapter xix foll.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμων is ἀνεπιστήμων. Now as ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλεῖοι and no ἐπιστήμων (in the class θαρραλεῖοι) are ἀνδρεῖοι, it follows that ἀνδρεῖοι are ἐπιστήμων, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted—that ἐπιστήμων are ἀνδρεῖοι, since ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμων. Socrates—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when
about to draw his conclusion in 350 B lines 34 and 38: where see note.

13. καὶ ἔτις γ', ἐφή: i.e. they not only have ἄθρος (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἐναῖ Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of ἔτις: Sauppe refers to the Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 444 ἔτις: ἐταύμος, ἀναίδης, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν χωράν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρείαν is coupled with ἔτις in Symp. 203 D and with θρασύς in Ar. Clouds I.c.

14. φέρε δή κτλ. This section (from φέρε δή to ὡς οἴνον τε μάλιστα in line 19) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on line 12) in 350 B: see note on line 32, and compare Laches 192 C, where the proof that ἀφρόν καρτέρησις is not ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way: σχέδων γάρ τι οίδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνω καλῶν πραγμάτων ἥγει σοὶ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

16. εἰ μὴ μαλώνομαι γε: 'as I'm a sane man.' This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283 E, Rep. Χ 608 D (εἰ μη ἀδικῶ γε), Gorg. 511 B οίδα—εἰ μη κωφὸς γ' εἰμι.


350 A 20. κολυμβῶσιν. This and the next example are given also in Lach. 193 B foll. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.


27. αὐτοὶ οὐντὸν—ἡ. The notion 'than' is expressed twice: see note on Crito 44 C καὶ τοῦ τίς ἂν αἰσχῶν εἰς ταύτης δόξα ἡ δικαιος κτλ., and cf. infra 350 E and (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII 86 ἐγένοτο—μακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἐν τῶν ἡ πρὸς Εἰδομοῖ.

350 B 32. αἰσχρὸν μεντὰν—ἀνδρεία: and if αἰσχρὸν, not ἀρετὴ (which it is), since all ἀρετὴ is καλὸν (349 E). Compare Lach. 182 C ἡ δὲ γε ἀνδρεία ὁμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι and with the general sentiment Meno 88 B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μη ἐστί φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἶον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὡταν μὲν ἄνει νοῦ ταρρῆ ἀνθρώπος, βλαστεῖται, ὡταν δὲ σῶν νυ, ωφελεῖται.

34. λέγεις: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὅπερ λέγω in Apol. 21 A. With λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense compare Symp. 199 E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἐρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἐρως ἔρως ἐστίν οὐδενὸς ἡ τινὸς;
This Protagoras did not say, but only that *οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι* are *θαρραλεῖοι*: see 349 E. For this reason Sauppe and others reject *τοὺς* before *θαρραλεῖον*, and in favour of this urge the reply of Protagoras (*καὶ νῦν γε*): but inasmuch as (1) *οὐκοῦν ὁποῖοι*—μανύμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be incompatible with *τοὺς ἄνδρεῖοις οὐχί*—*εἶναι*, (2) *θαρραλεῖστατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρεῖστατοι* in line 38 clearly implies that *θαρραλεῖοι* are conceived of as *ἄνδρεῖοι* (no less than *ἀνδρεῖοι* as *θαρραλεῖοι*), we must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS reading. Protagoras' *καὶ νῦν γε* is an unwary admission: he does not at first catch the difference between *οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι εἰσὶν οἱ θαρραλεῖοι* and *οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ θαρραλεῖοι*, and Socrates avails himself of his opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this misrepresentation could only be expressed as *ἄνδρεῖοι* are *σοφοὶ* (= ἐπιστήμονες), not *σοφοὶ* are *ἄνδρεῖοι*: see on 349 E and 350 D.

37. ἐκεῖ, i.e. in the case of *θάρρος* based on *σοφία*, illustrated in 350 C 350 A. Sauppe (after Schöne) reads *οἱ σοφότατοι, οὕτω κτλ.*; but *οἱ σοφότατοι* need not go closely with *οὕτω* (which is resumptive) any more than *οἱ οὕτως θαρραλεῖοι ὄντες* with the preceding *οὕτω*. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order *οὕτω*—*οἱ—θαρραλεῖοι*/*οἱ σοφότατοι οὕτω*. 38. *οὐ καλῶς—μυθικοὺς κτλ.*. Protagoras sees now that 'All brave are bold' is not equivalent to 'All bold are brave', and rectifies his *καὶ νῦν γε* by pointing out that he originally said only 'All brave are bold': but he confines his attention to this point, without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from 349 E to 350 B.

43. ὁμολογησα in 349 E. 44. τότε ἔριον. So B and T. In τότε there is perhaps a latent contrast to *καὶ νῦν γε* of line 35. Protagoras is correcting his recent slip—had you asked me then (viz. at 349 E), I should have answered rightly. *τοῦτο* has inferior MSS authority.

45. *τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρεῖους ὡς οὐ θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν.* The *ὡς* after ὡς is 350 D due to a confusion between (1) *τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρεῖους ὡς οὐ θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν*, *οὐδαμοῦ ἑπεθεῖκας* and (2) *οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς θαρραλεῖοι εἰσίν*, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολογημα, *οὐδαμοῦ κτλ.* The insertion of *ὁμολογημα* is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is refuted, whence ἐλέγχειν ὡς ὡς, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς ὡς etc.

49. *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἷοι κτλ.*. Protagoras ignores Socrates' *third*
proposition in 350 B (28—33), where it is shewn that ἰσχὺς without ἐπιστήμη is not ἀνδρέας: see next note.

52. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ., i.e. you might as well argue (1) ὅταν ἵστασις ἐστιν, (2) ὅταν ἐπιστήμης ἐστιν, therefore ὅταν ἐπιστήμης ἐστιν. This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted ὅταν ἰσχὺς ἐστιν. To make Protagoras' picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are ἰσχὺς without ἐπιστήμη are ἰσχὺς—this is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates' reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras' objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350 C (37—40), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

351 A 62. ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ. Protagoras says in effect: ἰσχὺς and ἰσχὺς are of the body, ἰσχὺς and ἀνδρέας of the soul. ἰσχὺς may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: supra 350 E), or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance: such men have no real physical strength or ἰσχὺς as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of ἰσχὺς). ἰσχὺς comes from natural constitution (φύσις) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly ἰσχὺς may result from art (τέχνη is substituted for ἐπιστήμη in view of the illustrations in 350 A), from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna): ἀνδρέας comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III 410 D τὸ θυμοειδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—ὁρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρέας ἄν εἰς, μάλλον δ' ἐπιτάθεν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρῶν τε καὶ χαλεπῶν γλυκοτ' ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἶκός).

CHAPTER XXXV.

Here Socrates, taking a fresh start, endeavours to make Protagoras assent to the doctrine that pleasure is good. Protagoras desires to have the question examined. He allows that wherever knowledge is present, it must rule, but this is inconsistent with the view that one can know the better and do the worse. It is agreed to examine this popular view, in case the inquiry should throw light on the relation between courage and the rest of virtue. On the ethical doctrine of this and the following chapters see Introd. p. xxix.
4. ἐδ᾿ ἓν εἰ ἀνώμενος—ζῆν. There is the usual ambiguity in 351 B ἐδ᾿ ἓν: see on 344 E above.

6. οὐκ ἐδ᾿ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ. The mss have δοκεῖ, which all the editors (except Heindorf) retain. The meaning required is: 'would he not, think you, have lived well?' (to which Protagoras replies ἔνομος sc. δοκεῖ), not 'would you not think he has lived well?' and δοκεῖ is as necessary here as in ἀρ’ οὐν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἄν εὗ ζῆν εἰ—ζῆν above. The idiom is attested by abundant examples, e.g. Ar. Plut. 380 καὶ μὴν φίλως γ᾿ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς, νὴ τοῦς θεοὺς, τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀναλώσας λογίσασθαι δώδεκα: Wasps 1404—1405 εἰ νη Δ᾿ ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλάττης πὸθεν Πυροῦς πρίαν σωφρονεῖν ἄν μοι δοκεῖς: in Plato it is extremely frequent, e.g. Rep. I 335 B πάνι μὲν οὖν ὦτας ἄν μοι δοκεῖς καλὸς λέγεσθαι, Alc. I 105 C εἰ ἀδ’ σοι εἰποὶ—οὐκ ἄν ἀδ’ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν, Gorg. 514 E, cf. Euthyd. 294 B, 306 B, Gorg. 522 A, and infra 357 A. The corruption is natural: it occurs also in the mss. of Ar. Wasps i.c.

11. ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω: i.e. 'I mean' not 'I say': cf. infra line 25 351 C in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an affirmative answer. After ἡδέα in the next line Heindorf would insert τὰ ἡδέα, but the subject is easily supplied.

12. μην εἰ τι—ἀλλο. So B and the first hand in T. The clause εἰ τι—ἀλλο defines negatively the meaning of κατὰ τοῦτο, as καθ᾽ ή ἡδέα ἐστιν defined it positively. μην deprecates or forbids the possible misunderstanding: its use in the idiomatic μην εἰ is the same in kind: see above on 319 D. To read εἰ μην τι (with the second hand in T) would be to beg the whole question—that step is not reached till 353 D.

20. ἐστὶ μὲν ἀ κτλ. See on ἄνθρωπος μὲν—ὀφέλιμα in 334 A. 351 D

28. ἐὰν μὲν πρός λόγον κτλ. πρός λόγον does not (except 351 E per accidens) mean 'relevant' but is equivalent to εὐλογον: compare the phrases μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγου; and, for the use of πρός, πρός ὀργῆν, πρός βιαν and the like. So in 343 D, 344 A. Here the meaning is further explained by the clause καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ—ἄγαθον. τὸ σκέμα is quite different from σκέψις: it is not the inquiry itself, but the proposition to be inquired into, viz. that Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it, if only we catch the force of πρός λόγον, σκέμα and ἀμφισβητήσομεν.

33. δίκαιον—σοῦ. Plato very frequently omits the copula

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éstiv: el and ésomé more rarely: énai often: ἢ rarely: parts of the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae 31—35.

catáρχεις: a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony) with religious associations: the middle is used of beginning a sacrifice. Cf. Symp. 177 E ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ παράστασις καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἐρμότα and ibid. 176 A.

352 A

36. ἡ πρὸς ἀλλο τι. It is not of course implied that ἡγεία is an ἔργον σώματος, i.e. something ἐστὶ σῶμα ἐργάζεται. Examples of σώματος ἐργαί would be different kinds of bodily labour. ἡ πρὸς ἡγείαι κτλ. is equivalent to πῶς ἔχει ἡ πρὸς ἡγείαι κτλ.: cf. infra 352 B πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην;

37. τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀκρας: the rest being covered by clothes. χεῖρ is not hand here (otherwise χεῖρας ἀκρας would be the tips of the fingers), but the arm, as in Homer's φίλας περὶ χεῖρες βαλόντε (Od. XI 211).

39. ἐπισκέψομαι. The word is apt here, as it is often used of a medical inspection: compare Phaedo 117 E ἐπεσκόπησε τὸν τόδα καὶ τὰ σκέλη. With the whole passage compare Theaet. 162 Α ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαιμονα ἐλθὼν—πρὸς τὰς παλαιστρὰς ἄξιοις ἄν ἀλλος θεώμενος γυμνοὶ, ἐνίοις φαίλουν, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιθεούναι τὸ εἶδος παρ-αποδίομενος;

41. θεασάμενος: with the usual asyndeton: see on 330 A.

352 B

44. καὶ τὸύτο: καὶ refers to 351 C—D.

47. ἡγεμονικόν: this word was afterwards selected by the Stoics to denote τὸ κυρίωτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ὧν ἐν η διάφορα καὶ η διάφορα γνωσταί (Diog. Laert. VII 159).

48. ὡς περὶ τοῦ ὑποτούσαν αὐτοῦ ὑπότοσ: see on 337 E.

352 C

53. περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὁσπερ περὶ: see the reference in the last note. Aristotle alludes to this passage in Eth. Nic. VII 3 1145b 23 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνοῦσης, ὡς φέτο Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τι κρατεῖ καὶ περιέλεκεν αὐτῶν ὁσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

56. ἐάντερ γυγώσκη—μή ἢ κρατηθήναι: a frequent theme in Plato, e.g. Meno 77 B ff., Gorg. 466 D ff., two passages which contain much in common with the discussion in this and the next chapter.

58. ἡ ἢ ἢν ἢ: the reading of Stephanus: B has ἢ ἢν ἢ: T ὡ ἢν ἢ.

Although pleasures are sometimes called evil and pains good, it is in such cases their consequences which are intended to be so called: at the time itself all pain is evil, and all pleasure good.

The argument proceeds by these stages: First, the meaning of ἐντῷ εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν is explained (353 c): next, it is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they bring pain in their train or loss of pleasure, not because they are pleasant themselves (353 c—354 a), and that pains are called good because they bring pleasure in their train or escape from pain, not because they are painful themselves (354 a—354 c); therefore pleasure in itself is good, and pain evil (354 c—e). The rest of the chapter forms an introduction to the chapter which follows.

3. ἐλέγομεν is more humble than λέγομεν—the idea is 'used to call' till you said it was wrong.

4. ἄκοιτε ὃ: Socrates bespeaks 'Attention!' like a herald. ἄκοιτε λέγο (e.g. Ar. Peace 551) was the usual way of beginning a proclamation at Athens. Compare Apol. 20 D, 32 A, Theaet. 201 D.

6. ἄλλο τι. This, the shorter form of this particle of interrogation, is probably not a deliberate abbreviation for ἄλλο τι ὃ. Thus ἄλλο τι τούτο ἄλληθες ἢστιν—'this is true—anything else?' i.e. isn't it?, the words being thrown in parenthetically like nicht wahr and n'est ce pas.

7. ἐν τοῖσδε—οἶνον: τοῖσδε would lead us to expect an enumeration of the cases: as it is, only examples are given. The effect of the Greek may be brought out by 'in the following cases—that often for example etc.' With this punctuation it is needless to write (as Kroschel does) τοῖσδε for τοῖσδε.
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9. γυνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἔστων: compare Meno 77 C ἢ γὰρ
dοκεῖ σοι, ὁ Μένων, γυνώσκον τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἔστων ὄμως ἐπιθυμεῖν
ἀυτῶν; μάλιστα.

353D 16. καίν εἶ: see note on 328 A above.

17. ὃμως δὲ ἀν κακὰ ἢν. So the MSS: most recent editors
(except Kral) read εἴη. The imperfect is used because the answer
'No' is expected and desired: would they be evil just because they
give us pleasure? Certainly not. See Goodwin MT. p. 190 § 503.
Schleiermacher wrongly rejected δὲ after ὃμως: the 'apodotic δὲ' is
frequent after ὃμως, ὅσαίτως, ὠπτῶ and the like.

18. ὅ τι μαθώντα ποιεῖ κτλ. So the MSS. A variety of emenda-
tions have been proposed for μαθώντα, such as ἀμαρτώντα (Schleier-
macher, followed by Heindorf), ἀμαθώντα (Orelli), παρώντα (Her-
mann), παθώντα (Sauppe and others), while Kroschel doubts the
entire passage ἢν—ὑπηρεῖν, saying "Totus autem locus ita comparat-
tus est ut de eius emendatione desperandum esse videatur". It
would be natural to regard this particular passage as corrupt if this
were an isolated example of the idiom in question: but—not to
mention other authors—it occurs also in the following passages of
Plato: Apol. 36 B τι δίος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ
βίῳ οὐχ ἥρκειαν ἢγον: Euthyd. 283 εἰ ἐλθ ἄγρυκότερον—ἡν ἐπείν,
ἐπον ἄν, σοι εἰς κεφαλὴν, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐμοῖ—καταφείδει κτλ.: ibid.
299 A πολὺ μὲντοι—δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτομι, ὅ τι
μαθῶν σοφοῖς ὑπέρ ὑπ᾽ ὠπτῶς ἔφυεν. In each of these cases the MSS
reading μαθῶν (not παθῶν) should be retained. In the direct
speech τὶ μαθῶν is used in an impatient question: τὶ μαθῶν τῶτο
ἐπολῆσαι is 'whatever made you think of doing this?' (e.g. Ar.
Clouds 1506, Wasps 251, Ach. 826): cf. the idiom τὶ ληφεῖς ἔχων;
in which τὶ depends on ἔχων (see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 624). τὶ μαθῶν
becomes in the indirect ὅ τι μαθῶν, but in every case in which this
phrase occurs in Plato ὅ τι μαθῶν means not 'why' but 'because'.
The transition in meaning is sometimes explained as parallel to the
use of ὅσος, ὅσα, ὡς etc. for ὅ τι τοιοῦτος, ὅτι τοσοῦτος, ὅτι ὠπτῶς, so
that ὅ τι μαθῶν = ὅτι τῶτο μαθῶν: but a simpler explanation is per-
haps possible (see my edition of the Apol. Appendix II. p. 123).
ὁ τὶ μαθῶν is an impatient ὅ τι just as τὶ μαθῶν is an impatient τὶ:
but as ὅτι and ὅ τι are in reality the same word (see on 333 B),
and ὅτι means 'because', ὅ τι μαθῶν comes also to mean 'because'
(impatiently), the original interrogative force being lost. Similarly,
in sentences like ληφεῖς ἔχων, the interrogation is dropped, and
the participle alone survives, conveying the same sense of blame or impatience as in τι ληφεὶς ἔχω; which is probably the form of sentence in which this idiom originated. Here μαθώντα is of course the nom. plur.: if (as we suppose) the original force of the participle is no longer felt in this idiom, there is nothing harsh in finding it in agreement with a neuter subject.

31. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἄν—ἐροῦμεθα. There is no sufficient reason for changing ἄν to ἄδ or for omitting ἄν: ἄν points forward to the apodosis in line 37 φαίην ἄν and is just as idiomatic as ἄν in ὅσπερ ἄν ἢ, e.g. in 311 b above.

33. οἶλον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ. Rep. II 357 c τρίτων δὲ ὀρξά τι—εἰδος ἁγαθοῦ, ἐν ὧν τὸ γυμναζόμενον καὶ τὸ κάμυσιναι ιατρεῖσθαι καὶ ἱατρεύσεις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμὸς; ταῦτα γὰρ ἑπίπονον φαίημεν ἄν, ὁφελεῖν δὲ ἤμας, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῷ ἔνεκεν οὐκ ἄν δεξαμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μεθόν τε τὰ χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.


35. καίστεων τε—λιμοκτονών. Gorg. 531 e πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ δὲ ἐφράσται ἀνήρ (sc. ὁ ιατρός)—τέμων τε καὶ κῶν, καὶ ισχυαλῶν καὶ πνεύμων—πικράτησα πολύματα δίδοσι καὶ πεινήν καὶ δεψήν ἀναγκάζων. λιμοκτονία (“Hungerkur”, says Stallbaum) is part of the μικρὰ δίωντα of Rep. III 406 d.

42. ἄλλων ἀρχαί: ‘dominions over others’—not ἄλλων πόλεων: 354 b cf. Gorg. 452 d αἰτίων ἀμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αἰτίως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἀρχεῖν ἐν τῇ αἰτίῳ πόλει ἑκάστῳ. Heindorff’s conjecture ἄλλαι (i.e. ‘besides’) is not necessary, in view of Gorg. 514 a (quoted by Sauppe) ἡ χρηματα πολλα λαμβάνει ἡ ἀρχή τιων ἡ ἄλλην δόναις ἡμίν χρησίν.

45. τέλος. The philosophical sense of this word—as an end of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: compare Gorg. 499 e ἀρα καὶ σοι συνδοκεῖ σωτῷ, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τῷ ἀγαθόν κτλ.

46. ἄλλ’ ἡ ἡδονᾶς is Stephanus’ emendation for ἄλλ’ ἡδονᾶς. 354 c

49. ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἄν: the copula is attracted to the predicate, as regularly: cf. infra 359 d τὸ ἡττῳ εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ηδρέθη ἁμαθία ὡσα.

66. εἰ μὲ ἀνέροισθε: without the φαίην ἄν which we should expect. Socrates apostrophises the ἀνθρώποι as if they stood before
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him; the φαίνω ἂν ἔγνωκέ of line 68 is part of what Socrates says to the ἀνθρώποι.

70. ἐν τούτῳ: see on 310 D above. πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείκτες means all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.

71. ἀναθέσθαι suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in Rep. vi 487 B—C.

73. ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι. B and T have ἢ before ἄλλο τι by a natural mistake: it is corrected in T by a later hand.

79. ἀνθρώπος: so the MSS, but ὁ ἀνθρώπως in line 82. Kroschel refers to the variation in 321 D ἀνθρώπων—τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ—ἀνθρώπως. Compare infra 355 E.

81. καὶ αὐθες αὖ λέγετε. We should of course expect λέγετε, but the second part of a logically subordinate clause in Greek tends to become an independent clause: see on 313 A.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The meaning of the phrase 'to be overcome by pleasure' is now explained in conformity with the results of the last chapter.

If we substitute 'good' for 'pleasure', the common saying that we do evil, knowing it to be evil, because overcome by 'pleasure', becomes 'we do evil knowing it to be evil, because overcome by good' (355 B—C). 'To be overcome by good' is shewn to be the choosing of greater evil in place of lesser good (D—E). Similarly, substituting pleasure for good, and pain for evil, we have the sentiment 'we do the painful, knowing it to be painful, because overcome by pleasure', and here also 'to be overcome by pleasure' is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains (355 D—356 A). No doubt in this case the pleasures are present and the pains remote, but we make allowance for this in our process of weighing pleasures and pains against themselves and one another (356 A—C). 'Near' and 'Far' have the same bewildering effect on the eyes when we look at size and number: but there the arts of measurement and of arithmetic resolve our perplexity (356 C—357 A). In like manner there must be some art or knowledge whose function it is to settle the value of 'more' and 'less', 'near' and 'far' etc. in their application to pleasure and pain. In other words τὸ ἴδον ἡγίστε καὶ ἀποδείκται is due to ignorance (357 A—357 E).

2. χρόμεθα ἄμα. ἄμα is due to a correction in one inferior ms,
approved by Cobet and Kroschel: BT have χρώμεθα ἄρα. If we read χρώμεθα ἄρα, there are difficulties serious enough to suggest an error in the reading: (1) the position of ἄρα is to say the least most unusual: no example is quoted of ἄρα coming at the end of a conditional clause in this way: (2) is ἄρα to be taken with εἶν in the usual sense (st forte) or as inferential? The inferential meaning strikes us as somewhat farfetched, and the other is both inappropriate here and impossible from the position of the particle. On the other hand ἄμα is almost necessary to the sense: without ἄμα, the words εἶν μὴ—χρώμεθα would not correctly describe Socrates’ procedure in the following discussion, in which he does use all four names. But as he does not use them together, his procedure is accurately described by the addition of ἄμα to χρώμεθα.

7. Θέμενοι—οὕτω: οὕτω is explained by ὅτι γεγυρώσκων—αὐτὰ ποιεῖ: ‘let us lay it down and say etc.’ The thesis of the many is stated in order to be demolished. With the style of reasoning which follows compare Gorg. 499 A—B where (as a reductio ad absurdum of the view that pleasure is good and pain evil) it is argued that in that case the bad man would be just as bad and just as good as the good man since he feels just as much pain and pleasure as the other: see also Alc. 116 A ἄρ' ὁμ ὁ ἀγαθὸν καλὸν, ὁ δὲ κακὸν ἀλὰχρὸν; ναλ. τὴν ἄρα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δὲ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσέπτεις αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δὲ.

11. οὗτο μὲν ἡδονής. The antithesis is not expressed by a μὲν 355 C clause but in ἐκείνῳ ὁ—τοῖ ἀγάθοι below.

12. μετεληφθέν: the subject is ἡδονή and τὸ ἀγαθόν is in opposition to ἄλλο ὄνομα. ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς means in place of pleasure, i.e. the name pleasure.

19. ἐν ὑμῖν: not ‘before your tribunal’, but ‘in you’, i.e. 355 D inside you, in your souls. The idea is of a conflict between the good and evil in the soul before you do the evil. ἐν ὑμῖν might have been ἐν αὐτῷ, but the ὑβριστής now selects his interlocutors as his examples. The subtle reasoning which follows may be put thus: We do evil, knowing it to be evil, because we are overcome by good. But—since that which we do is evil—the good which overcomes is less worthy than the evil in us which it overcomes. ‘Less worthy’ (to overcome) means that ‘there is less of it’: to be overcome by good is therefore to choose less good than evil.
argument is extraordinarily ingenious but hardly sound—the flaw
lies in substituting 'the evil in us' for 'us'. It was not 'the evil in us',
but 'we' who were overcome by good. See also Introd. p. xxix.
The usual way of taking ἐν ὑμῖν as 'before your tribunal' or the like
(cf. Gorg. 464 d) makes the false step much more serious—since it
substitutes not 'the evil in us' but simply 'the evil' for 'us'.

23. ἀνάξια ἐστὶν τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν should be translated
literally—'the good is unworthy of the bad'. The expression—in
Greek as in English—is somewhat strained in order to correspond
to οὐκ ἄξιον above (line 19); but after all 'I am unworthy of you'
is much the same as 'I am less worthy than you'. The Greeks can
even use ἄξιος in the sense of 'more worthy than', 'too good for':
e.g. Soph. Philoct. 1009.

24. τὰ μὲν μεἴξω—ἡ: i.e. when τὰ κακὰ are μεἴξω and τὰ ἁγαθὰ
συμκρότερα, then τάγαθα are ἀνάξια τῶν κακῶν: τὰ κακὰ are ἀνάξια
tῶν ἁγαθῶν, when τὰ ἁγαθὰ are μεἴξω, and τὰ κακὰ συμκρότερα.
Similarly with πλεῖω and ἐλάττω. It must be borne in mind that
ἄξιον does not here denote moral, but rather physical strength or
value: good is ἄξιον κακοῦ, because it is smaller or less numerous.

355 E 25. πλεῖω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἡ. See on 330 A.

28. μεταλαβομεν, i.e. 'let us change and take the names
pleasant and painful and apply them to etc.' Compare infra 356 D.
ἐπὶ follows ὄνομα as in τίθεσθαι ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῶν and the like.

356 A 33. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀνάξια. This—the MSS reading—is un-
doubtedly right. Plato coins the word ἀνάξια for 'unworthiness'
to complete the parallel with D above: cf. lines 19—23 οὐκ ἄξιον
οῦν κακῶν—κατὰ τὰ δὲ—ἀνάξια ἐστὶ τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν κτλ.
Similarly in Phaedo 105 E Plato coins ἀνάρτιος, in 106 A ἀθέρμος
(rightly accepted, in spite of MS authority, by editors) and ἀψυχός
(see MSS, but Wytkens's ἀψυχός is—what we think rightly—accepted
by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to ἀρτιος,
θερμός, ψυχός. Cicero's translation "quaetigitur potest esse indignitatis
voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine
alterius utrius posita?" (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313) shows that ἀνάξια
was read in his time: so in Ficinus' "quaer vero alia inest ad dolorem
indignitatis voluptutati quam, excessus inter se atque defectus?" The
word ἀνάξια hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found
in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is
ἀπάξια. ἥδονὴ (now found to be the reading of some MSS) for
ἥδονὴ is due to Heindorf.
35. τάντα δ' ἐστι: as Sauppe remarks, we should expect τάντα δ' ἐστι τὸ μείζω—γλυκεσθαι, but the words are said as if for καὶ τὸς ἄλλης ἀνάξια κτλ. had been written καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἀνάξια τὰ ἥδεα πρὸς τὰ λυπηρά, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἄλληλον καὶ ἐλλεῖποντα;

37. μᾶλλον καὶ ἡπτον: this case is not given above (D—E) because the notion of intensity is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. Phileb. 24 A foll. with 27 E ἡδονή καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἡπτον δεχομένων ἐστιν; ναὶ, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι. So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are now, the pains remote. Socrates tries to shew that this makes no real difference.

38. τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδόν. When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present pleasure and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply καὶ λυπηρῶν after ἡδόν.

41. ἀλλ' ὀσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι κτλ. Compare Rep. x 602 D 356 B ἃρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθεια χαρέστατα πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν; ὡστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζων ἢ ἑλπτον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ.

42. καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς κτλ.: in order that a near pleasure might count for more than a remote.

44. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα κτλ. Compare Laws ν 733 B ἡδονήν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὖθεν αἰροῦμεθα οὐτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μαθήτευσαι ἁπλὲς μὲν ἡδονής οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα. λύπην δὲ ἑλάττω μετὰ, μείζων ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονῆν δὲ ἑλάττω μετὰ μείζων λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα κτλ.

47. ἐὰν τε τά ἐγγὺς κτλ. When once you have equated 'near' and 'far' (see last note), then (but not till then) your final choice is not affected by the question of proximity in time. Theoretically, no doubt, this is right: but no man is so ἀγαθὸς ἱστάναι as to weigh ἐγγὺς and πόρρω correctly; whence the saying "Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die". 'Near' and 'far' can only be weighed aright on the supposition that man is immortal and will live hereafter under the same moral laws as rule us here: but of immortality there is no hint in this dialogue.

49. ταῦτα: i.e. τὰ ἡδέα.
53. öte: the notion of time readily passes into that of cause as in quoniam and cum.

54. φαίνεται ύμιν κτλ. Two examples are given: (1) size—of which παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι (according to the Greek and Roman way of viewing sound) are special varieties, (2) number, i.e. τὰ πολλά. The specific varieties παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι are not dealt with in the sequel. With what follows compare (besides Rep. X 602 D cited above) Euthyphr. 7 B foll. and Alc. I 126 C foll., and with the present passage Phileb. 42 A and Rep. VII 523 C—524 C. The resolution by the intellect of such contradictory sense-perceptions is made the basis of Plato's scheme of higher education in the Republic.

57. ai ἵσαι is Heindorf's correction for ἵσαι.

59. μῆκος—πράττειν: as we ἢδεα πράττομεν. πράττειν (with μῆκος) is explained by λαμβάνειν: see above on 314 A.

61. ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη. See Introd. p. xxxii.

62. ἡ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις. ἡ is omitted in B and T. 'The power of that which appears' is its power to affect us.

63. ἐπάνα καὶ ἐπολεῖ κτλ. ἄν is not to be supplied. Plato is reverting to the illustration in c. The imperfect is idiomatic for 'causes us, as we saw, to wander' etc. (viz. because τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη seem to us both μείζων and ἐλάστω): it is what Goodwin calls the 'philosophic imperfect': compare Crito 47 D διαφερομένει ἐκεῖνο καὶ λογισμομεθα, δ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιαν ἐγίγνετο (becomes as we saw), τῷ δὲ ἄδικῳ ἀπώλευτο. By adding καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεωι—συμφρῶν Plato treats his hypothesis that εἴδο πράττειν is to select μεγάλα μῆκος as a fact: he does so also in ἄν ἐποίησε κτλ. i.e. 'would have made', viz. if we had made use of it, but we did not. If the hypothesis were still treated as a hypothesis, we should have had ἄν ἐπολεῖ (and not ἄν ἐποίησε) to correspond to what then would have been ἄν (expressed or understood) ἐπάνα καὶ ἐπολεῖ.

ἀνω τε καὶ κάτω. ἄνω κάτω (Theaet. 195 c) and ἄνω καὶ κάτω (Gorg. 493 A) are other forms of this proverbial phrase.

79. ἀριθμητική. In Gorg. 451 B foll. ἀριθμητικὴ is said to be a science concerned with τὸ ἀρτιὸν τε καὶ περίττὸν, ὡσα εκάτερα τυγχάνει ὡντα: whereas the function which is here assigned to ἀριθμητική is there given to λογισμική: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογισμικὴ ἔχει. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τὸ τε ἀρτιὸν καὶ τὸ περίττὸν: διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὡς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πῶσ ἔχει πλῆθος (cf. lines 73 ff. τὸ πλέον—τὸ ἐλαστὸν ἂν
81. **ἐλευ—ἐπειδὴ δὲ δὴ.** The MSS read **ἐπειδὴ δὲ** δὴ, but after **ἐλευ** Plato regularly uses **δὲ** δὴ in coming to the *application* of a train of reasoning or illustrations: compare 312 Ε ἐλευ—ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τῶν ἐκλέον ποιεῖ λέγειν; and 311 Ε ἐλευ—παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν κτλ.

90. **ἐλαύνεις σκέψομεθα.** Siebeck, who asserts (Zur Chronologie der Platonischen Dialogen p. 121 foll.) that this and similar formulas were intended by Plato to be a distinct promise of future dialogues (if not a reference to a later part of the same dialogue) finds here a reference to Politicus 283 D foll., where the 'measuring art' is discussed and described as the βασιλική τέχνη.

93. **ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς—ομολογούμεν:** 352 Β foll.

96. **ἐφατε:** in 352 Β. The original ἡρεσθε has to be repeated in consequence of the introduction of this independent clause.

98. **ἡρεσθε:** in 353 Α.

101. **ἐίπατε:** but **ἐπατων** in 353 Α: otherwise there is no 357 Ν change in the quotation. B and T have **ἐπιει** but Stobaeus (who cites from τοσοῦτον in 357 Β to μεγασθη 357 Ε in his Florilegium) reads **ἐπατε.** According to Rutherford (New Phrynichus p. 219) **ἐπειεί** is not Attic, but this is doubtful, if any faith can be placed in MS authority.

107. **ὑς τὸ πρόσθεν.** This—the reading of the best MSS—has been unjustly rejected in favour of **ἑλς τὸ πρόσθεν**; but **ἑλς τὸ πρόσθεν** can hardly be justified here. Sauppe refers to 339 Δ ὀλγὼν δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος **ἑλς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθῶν,** where however **ἑλς τὸ πρόσθεν** goes with **προελθῶν,** and in all the cases which he quotes there is a verb containing the idea of progress to go with the phrase, and so in Ar. Knights 751 Δ ἄλλ' ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν χρὴ παρεῖν' ἐς τὴν πύκνα (where probably we should read παρεῖν' **as** in Ach. 43 πάρει' ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν). Where there is no such verb (which is very rarely the case) the phrase means 'with a view to what lies in front', e.g. Alcib. 1 132 Β οὐκούν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν ἐλς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται. It need hardly be said that the phrase cannot mean simply **ἐμπρόσθεν.** On the other hand **ὑς** seems to be just what is needed: the construction in full would be καὶ οὗ μὸνον ἐπιστήμης (ἐνδεικνύει), ἄλλα καὶ (ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεικνύει) ἡν τὸ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ ὑμωλογήκατε ὅτι μετρητική (sc. ἐστι: for the omission of ἐστι after ὅτι cf. infra 359 Δ ἀπεδείχθη ἃρτι ὅτι ἀδύνατον): 'and from lack, not merely of
knowledge, but of the knowledge which you have further admitted above to be measuring knowledge. The attraction of the relative extends to μετρητική also in spite of ὅτι: compare Apol. 37 B ὅν εὖ οἰδ᾽ ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων ὅταν τούτων ἄ εὖ οἰδ᾽ ὅτι κακὰ δύτα (ὅτι being used with the participle as in Gorg. 481 E: see note on Apol. l.c.).

357 E 111. ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη: compare Laws III 689 A τίς οὖν ἢ μεγίστη δικαίως ἢ λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;—ταύτην τὴν διαιφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημῇ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δὲ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.

113. οὔτε αὑτοῖ: the verb hangs fire: we should expect Plato to continue οὔτε οἱ νῆστεροι παῖδες ἔρχονται κτλ. Stephanus thought προσέρχεσθαι had fallen out after αὑτοῖ, Madvig ἵτε, while Kroschel suggests οὔτε ἐφούτατε αὑτοῖ. It seems probable that the text is corrupt: at all events no parallel has yet been adduced. The two cases quoted by Sauppe (Dem. πρὸς Ἀφοβον § 54 and pseudo-Dem. πρὸς Τιμόθεον § 52) are more than doubtful in respect of their text, which (as Sauppe quotes it) is not according to the MSS. Madvig's ἵτε is simplest, but the future seems out of place: perhaps ἤτε should be read.

115. ὃς οὖν διδακτοῦ ὄντος: i.e. τοῦ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἡπτάσθαι.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Socrates begins to apply the results of the previous discussion to the subject of his dispute with Protagoras.

Pleasure is good and pain evil, and no one willingly encounters what he believes to be evil. But fear is the expectation of evil: therefore no one will willingly encounter what he fears.

358 A 3. ὁ Ἰππία τε καὶ Προδίκη. Here and in 358 E and 359 A ἃ has dropped out in the MSS after preceding -ω. The effect of its omission would be to render the address unduly abrupt.

4. όμων. So the MSS. Sauppe's ὀμῶν is not necessary. ὀμῶν means all three sophists: and ὁ λόγος is not the discussion as a whole, but the speaking, viz. in answer (cf. δοῦναι καὶ δεξασθαι λόγον). Throughout this chapter all the Sophists reply: in the next Socrates makes use of their united admissions to destroy Protagoras alone.

9. διαίρεσιν τῶν ὁνομάτων: see note on 314 C.

358 B 10. ἐπὶ οὖθεν καὶ ὅπως—ὁνομάζων. This mode of address insinuates that Prodicus was a θεῖος ἀνήρ, since a God was addressed in a similar way. See Crat. 400 E ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νῦν ὅσπερ
12. πρὸς δ' βούλομαι: emphatic ‘with a view to my meaning’

14. ἐπὶ τούτου. This usage can only be on the analogy of ἦ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων ὀδὸς and the like: actions are looked on as ways leading to a goal or destination or τέλος: cf. supra 354 C and D. To take the words (with Sauppe) as ‘in the case of this’ ‘in this domain’ would give a wrong meaning: the moral character of an art being determined by its end, it is καλὸν only if it aims at the end. The expression is however very curious, and perhaps unique. I once thought that ἀπασαί might conceal some present participle such as ἀγούσαι—agreeing with πράξεις: but the occurrence of ἀπάσασ in 359 E shews ἀπασαί to be probably genuine here. The reasoning is this. Pleasure, the end, is good, pain evil: consequently all actions aiming at the end are καλαί, and therefore good (as usual ὀφθείμος is but a synonym for ‘good’): therefore—as no one willingly selects evil rather than good—no one willingly does the worse (i.e. selects evil actions) when he might act better. As it is with πράξεις that bravery and cowardice are concerned it is necessary for Plato to establish that ‘no one willingly seeks the worse’ is true of individual acts as well as of ultimate ends.

15. ἅρ' οὖ καλαί. The words καλὲς ὀφθείμοι which follow οὖ καλαί in the MSS are rightly rejected because they anticipate the identification in the next line.

18. Ἦ δ' τοιεὶ, καὶ δύνατὰ is Heindorf’s emendation of the corrupt Ἦ δ' ἐποιεῖ καὶ δύναταί of the MSS.

20. ἤττω εἶναι ἄντω κτλ. The phrases ἤττων ἄντω and 358 C κρείττων ἔαντο are here substituted for ἤττων τῆς ἠδονῆς and κρείττων τῆς ἠδονῆς. Compare the discussions in Rep. IV 430 E foll. and Laws I 626 E foll., where κρείττω and ἤττω εἶναι ἔαντο are inter-
preted as the victory of the better part in us over the worse and conversely. As the worse part is the part which seeks ἡδονή, i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, the identification is just.

358 D 31. καλεῖτε τε δέος. Heindorf’s emendation for καλεῖτε δέος of the MSS. See note on 330 C above.


198 B δέος γὰρ εἶναι προοδοκιαν μελλοντος κακοῦ. φόβος in Laws 1 644 C is defined as ‘expectation before pain’ (πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς).

358 E 36. δέος, φόβος δ’ οὖ. Prodicus’ distinction is just, though often dropped in practice: in φόβος ‘the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παραντικά πτώσις, says Ammonius) is the leading idea’, in δέος the apprehension of evil to come (κακοῦ ὑπόνοια). See note on Euthyphr. 12 B, where Plato implicitly recognises the difference.

37. διὰλα τόδε: sc. διαφέρει. όνδὲν διαφέρει does not of course mean ‘there is no difference’, but ‘it doesn’t matter’.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

It is here proved that courage is wisdom.

Socrates first reverts to the point at which the discussion on ἡδονής ἡπτάσθαι began (359 A—C): next, Protagoras asserts that ἄνδρειοι and δειλοὶ are willing to encounter opposite things, but Socrates shews that both encounter what they take to be θαρακλέα, i.e., so far, the same things (359 C—E). Protagoras thereupon objects that ἄνδρειοι will encounter e.g. war, while δειλοὶ will not. Socrates replies by shewing that if cowards do not willingly enter upon war, the reason is their ignorance (359 E—360 A). In general, while brave men fear and feel courage honourably, i.e. well, the reverse is true of cowards, owing to their ignorance (360 A—360 B). And since it is through δειλὰ that men are δειλοὶ, and we have shewn that men are δειλοὶ through ἀμαθία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, cowardice is ignorance, and consequently bravery is wisdom, viz. δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ δεινῶν (360 B—360 E).

359 A 5. τότε: 330 A foll.


359 B 18. ἡπόμην: 349 E.

19. καὶ ἔτας γ’, ἐφῆ. The recapitulation stops here. ἐφη ἐγὼ in the next line is the usual ‘said I’ of narrated dialogue.

359 C 22. ἐπὶ τί: so MSS: the second hand in B reads ἐπὶ τίνα, but cf. infra line 27 where the question is repeated with ἐπὶ τί. For the
common passage from singular to plural the editors compare Phaedo 191 58 C τι ἢν τὰ λεγότα καὶ πραγμάτα; 25. δεῦρα: the mss read δειλὰ by mistake, and so in 360 C below δειλῶν three times for δεινῶν.

30. ἐν οἷς σὺ ἦλεγες τοῖς λόγοις: see on 342 B. 359 D
33. ἐπειθῇ τὸ ἡπτω-ἀμαθία οὖσα. The only proof given that we 'encounter evils believing them to be evils' was the phrase ἡπτω εἶναι ἡδονῆς (for which ἡπτω εἶναι ἐαυτὸν is here substituted: see on 358 C). We have demolished this proof by shewing that the phrase means ἀμαθία, and we therefore infer that ἐπὶ αὶ δεινὰ γεῖται εἰναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται (δεινὰ being a subdivision of κακά).

34. ηὐρέθη. The mss have εὑρέθη: but see on 315 B.
39. αὐτίκα: "veluti, ne longe hinc abeam" (Kroschel) and so 359 E 'for example': a very frequent use in Plato.
40. πότερον—καλὸν ὅν κτλ. Compare 349 E.
42. ἐμπροσθεν: 358 B.
53. καλλιόν τε. The mss read καλὸν τε. Stephanus made the 360 A necessary change.

58. καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μανόμενοι. In 350 B 360 B foll. those who are βαραλέωι without ἐπιστήμη are called μανόμενοι by an expressive metaphor. Here the μανόμενοι—which is suggested, but no more—by the μανόμενοι in 350 B—are treated as a distinct class: the word is to be understood of literal madmen like Ajax in the play of Sophocles. The word θρασεῖς has an evil connotation as in Laws I 630 B θρασεῖς καὶ ἀδικοὶ καὶ ὑβρισται καὶ ἀφοσιώτατοι σχεδὸν ἀπάντων: Plato could not have said βαραλέωι here since βαραλέωι throughout the dialogue is applied also to ἄνδρεῖοι. It would be better to reject (with Kral) both καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς and καὶ οἱ μανόμενοι than only καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς with Sauppe and Schanz: we should then—as throughout this chapter—have only one negative to ἄνδρεῖοι, viz. δεῖλοι, but we may allow some latitude of expression to Socrates, and καὶ after οὐκοῦν is slightly in favour of supposing that other classes follow οἱ δεῖλοι, though it may go with the whole sentence.

69. ἐπένευσεν: Protagoras dies hard: see on Euthyphr. 8 A. 360 C
75. οὔτε—τε: see on 309 B.
77. αὐτὸς—πέρανον. Gorg. 506 C λέγε, ὦ γαθή, αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανον.

81. φιλονικεῖν—τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι. For the orthography of φιλονικεῖν 360 E see note on 336 E above. Apparently φιλονικεῖν is not elsewhere
used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. 1 338 A we have προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικίην πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκριμῆμενον.

CHAPTER XL.

Socrates points out that while Protagoras' theory would point to the conclusion that virtue is not teachable, he himself in trying to prove that virtue is knowledge goes near to maintaining that it is. Thus the interlocutors have as it were exchanged places. The dialogue ends with mutual compliments.

4. αὐτῶ ἡ ἁρετή: 'virtue itself', literally 'virtue, the thing itself'. Compare Crat. 411 D ἐὰν δὲ βοῦλει, αὐτῶ ὡς τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἐσις: Theaet. 146 E γρώναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶ ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν: "αὐτῶ (per se) substantivis et adiectivis adiunctum rei alicuius naturam ac vim per se et universe spectatam significat", says Ast. This use of αὐτῶ furnished Plato (as in αὐτοπανθρωπος and the like) with a convenient way of denoting his Ideas, but here of course αὐτῶ does not denote the Idea but is ἵπσιν as opposed to τὰ περὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς.

361 B 14. πάντα χρήματα: exaggeration—as if Socrates held ἐπιστήμην to be the ἀρχή of the universe and said ἐπιστήμην πάντα as Heraclitus might say τῶν πάντων.

19. ὅλον: i.e. ἡ ἁρετή—the gender is like αὐτῶ in line 4. Sauppe cites Meno 79 B ἐμοὶ δεδεμένος ὅλον εἰσεῖν τὴν ἁρετήν.

361 C 22. ἑικεν σπεῦδοντι: a frequent usage in Plato: see on Apol. 27 A ἑικεν γὰρ—διαπειρομένῳ.

24. ἄνω κατω: see on 356 D above.

27. ἐξελθεῖν—ἐπὶ. There is a slight hint of military metaphor: 'fare forth against virtue also to see what she is', 'also attack the question what is virtue': cf. Rep. II 374 A δ (στρατόπεδον) ἐξελθὸν—διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιστήμοις: cf. the similar use of ἦνει ἐπὶ in Rep. v 473 C ἐπὶ αὐτῶ δὴ, ἵνα δ' ἐγώ, εἴμι δ' τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. Here ἐξ- is appropriate, because the first campaign is as it were ended (ταῦτα διεξελθόντας): it is moreover natural to retain it, on account of the tendency noted on 311 A. A later hand in T has ἐλθεῖν, but the MSS reading is unobjectionable, nor is there any need to read διεξελθεῖν or διεξελθεῖν τὴν ἁρετήν as Korschel suggests. For the sentiment cf. Meno 100 B τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰσάρμεθα
tôe, òtan prìn òtôn trôpôs toûs ánthrôpopous paraqûnynei arêth, prôteron épixeirhôsomen autò kal' autò xprêîn ti pot' estin arêth.


29. mi peri plôlikus: ne forte, as often in Plato. What often happens may happen in a future case: so Lucretius uses 'saepe' for 'ut saepe fit'.

32. Prômêðewos—prômêðou'menos. Puns on proper names are 361 D frequent in Plato: see Riddell's Digest of Idioms § 323.

35. kat' drô'as, viz. 348 C ff., 320 B.

38. ou'te—te: see on 309 B.

41. òn éntuphînou: a somewhat rare attraction, since in the unattracted form the relative would be in the dative and not in the accusative case: compare Theaet. 144 A òn òh òpôstote éntuphûn—kai òanûn plôlois pêplhôsaka—oudêna òw yôsthûn ktl., where Wohlrab cites also Gorg. 509 A.

42. thlîkout'ôv: Socrates was about 36 at the date of action of the Protagoras.

47. êfhn: 335 C.

Kalîa tê kàlêf: see on 336 B above. For kàlê cf. Symp. 174 A toûta òh ékallwpsiôma mi kalês parâ kalôn (viz. Agathon) âs. Sauppe reminds us of the use of kalôs on vases, and also cites Ar. Ach. 143 èn toûsî tolîchos êgrâpîf 'Asthnâdoi kàlôi (of Sitalces) and the famous Kêtîa toûtp estw tê kàlêf of the dying Theramenes (Xen. Hell. II 3. 56).
ON THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.

The difficulties of this poem are well known, and have called forth many pages of comment\(^1\). The restoration proposed by Schneidewin has met with most favour, and is printed in most texts of the Protagoras, not because it is thought to be certain, but as the nearest approach to certainty of which the case admits. It may be at once allowed that no restoration can claim to represent with certainty just what Simonides wrote in the order in which it was written. Plato is seldom careful to make his quotations accurate, and the perverse exposition of the meaning of this particular poem is hardly calculated to increase our confidence in his verbal accuracy here. Nevertheless, Plato is our sole authority for the poem in question, and consequently that restoration will be the most probable which, while it satisfies every metrical requirement, involves the fewest changes in the text and sequence of the poem as it stands in Plato.

The words apparently quoted from the poem, as they occur in the Bodleian manuscript, are according to Schanz as follows (we note obvious corrections at the foot of the page).

339 B. \(\alpha ν\partial\rho\alpha^2 \alphaγαθόν \muέν \alphaλαθέως \gammaενέσθαι \chiαλεπόν \chiερ\sigma\iota^3 \tauε \kαλ\nu\sigmaι \kαλ \nu\rho\ ιτετράγυμνον \\delta\nu\epsilonυ \ψ\\gamma\υ\nu \τετυγμένον\)

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\(^1\) On p. 20 of his fourth edition of the Protagoras, Sauppe enumerates the discussions on the subject down to 1884. The most important contribution since that year is Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras, von J. Aars, Christiania, 1888. Aars's restoration has received the approval of Peppmüller (in the Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift for 1890, p. 174 foll) and others: and there now seems to be some prospect of finality in the criticism of the poem. In his program (Das Simonideische Gedicht in Platons Protagoras und die Versuche dasselbe zu reconstituiren, Graz 1889) Schwenk follows Aars in every essential point.

\(^2\) \(\alpha ν\partial\rho\).

\(^3\) \(\chiερ\sigma\iota\nu\).
APPENDIX I.

339 C. οδέδε μοι ἐμιμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκιον¹ νέμεται καλτοὶ σοφοὶ παρὰ
φωτὸς εἰρημένον χαλεπῶν φάτον² Æσθλὸν ἐμμεναι

341 E. θεὸς ἀν μόνον τὸῦτον ³ ἔξοι γέρας

344 C. ἀνδρὰ δὲ ⁴ οὐκ ἐτῶν ⁵ μὴ ὡς κακὸν ἐμμεναι δὲ ἄν ἀμήχανος
συμφόρα καθῆλη

344 E. πράξαις μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνήρ ἀγαθὰς κακὸς ⁶ εἰ κακός

345 C. ἐπὶ πλείοτον δὲ καὶ ἀριστοὶ εἰσὶν οὐς ἀν ἢ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν

345 C. τούνεκεν οὗ πατρ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνάτον δικήμενον κεν
ἐὰν ⁶ ἐστὶν ἐπικτὴν ἥλπία μοῖραν αἰώνος βαλέω πανάμωμον ἀνθρωπὸν
εὐρυνεὺς δοῦν καρπὸν αὐτόμεθα χθονὸς ἐπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὸν ἀπαγγέλειν

345 D. πάντας δ' ἐπαινήμους ⁷ καὶ φιλῶν ἐκὼν ὅσις ἐρώτη 
μὴ δὲν αἰσχρῶν ἀνάγχῃ δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται

346 C. ἐμοιγε ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ ἄν μὴ κακὸς ἥ μὴ δ' ἀγαν ἀπάλαμας εἰδὼς
γε ὡς ἑπὶ πόλει ⁸ δίκαις υγιῆς ἀνὴρ οὐ μὴν ἐγὼ μοιχωμέοιμαι οὐ 
γὰρ εἰμὶ φιλόμομος τῶν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀπείρων γένεθλα ⁹ πάντα τοι 
καλὰ τοῖς τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ ῥέμακται.

In 346 D—E part of the poem is paraphrased and repeated in the
words οὗ ἔτη πανάμωμον ἀνθρωπὸν εὐρυνεὺς ὁς ὁ καρπὸν αὐτόμεθα χθονὸς,
ἐπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρὸν ἀπαγγέλειν ὥστε τὸῦτον γ' ἐνεκα οὐδὲνα
ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ γ' μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ,
ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλῶν καὶ ἐπαινήμου ἐκὼν ὅσις ἐρώτη 
μὴ δὲν αἰσχρῶν.

The only words whose place in the poem is somewhat doubtful
are ἐμοιγε ἐξαρκεῖ and αὐ γὰρ εἰμὶ 
φιλόμομος. They are excluded
both by Bergk and Blass, but it is not likely that they come from 
Plato, since μοι ἐξαρκεῖ occurs also in the final recapitulation, and
ἵ ὁ δὲ ταῦτα σε ψέως, ὅτι εἰμὶ 
φιλόσοφος is said (346 c) as well as αὐ
γὰρ εἰμὶ φιλόμομος. Bonghi (quoted by Aars ¹⁰) assigns the words
οὗ τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνῳ τινὰ in 344 B to a place in the poem after
ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον: it is however tolerably clear that they come
from Socrates, who is merely developing the latent antithesis in
χαλεπῶν.

Schneidewin's ¹¹ restoration is as follows:

Στροφή.

"Ἀνδρ' ἀγάθῳ μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν
χερσῶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νότῳ τετράγωνῳ ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

(Desunt quinque versus.)

¹ Πιπτάκειον ¹ (i.e. Vind. suppl. Phil. gr. 7) rightly.
² φάτον.
³ τοῦτον.
⁴ δ.'
⁵ εἰσ.
⁶ κερεαν τ', rightly.
⁷ ἐπαινήμου.
⁸ γ' ψοτῆτολον after Bergk: Hermann ψοτῆτολον.
⁹ γενέθλιο.
¹⁰ p. 8, note τ.
¹¹ In his Delectus poesis Graecorum, p. 375.
There is little probability in this arrangement. Schneidewin altogether neglects the evident metrical resemblance between the words from "έμοιγ' ἐξαρκεὶ τοὐθ' οὖν άλοχρά μὴ μέμκται" and the other sections of the poem. But the obvious and indeed fatal objection to Schneidewin's restoration is that he makes a wide departure from the order of the words as they come in Plato, placing the "έμοιγ' ἐξαρκεὶ κτλ." of 346 C before the τοὐθ' οὖν άλοχρά μὴ μέμκται of 345 C. That Socrates reverts in 346 D to τοὐθ' οὖν άλοχρά μὴ μέμκται is no reason for placing these words in the last part of the poem, any more than we should place the words "Ανδρ' άγαθον μὲν ἀλαθεώς κτλ." after άνδρα δ' οὖν ἐστι κτλ. because Socrates reverts to them in 344 E. A man who professes to be giving a continuous exposition of a poem may revert to the middle of it when he has come to the end, in order

1 See the restoration below on p. 198.
to illustrate the sentiment with which the poem concludes, but it would be the superfluity of naughtiness to put the end of the poem into the middle, which is what Schneidewin makes Socrates do. If οὐ ἔγνω κτλ. in 346 D were in reality the conclusion of the poem, we ought to frame our Στροφὴ β' out of these very words, and not from τούθεκεν οὔποτε ἐγνώ κτλ. We should then have to omit the words ἀνάγκη δ' οὔδε θεοὶ μάχονται, because they are not found in 346 D—ἐ, but it is beyond question that these words are part of Simonides' poem. It is tolerably certain that in 346 D we have but a recapitulation of part of the argument, presented as a commentary on the concluding text πάντα τοι καλὰ κτλ., which sums up the whole ethical teaching of the poem. This is practically admitted by Schneidewin himself when he writes his final strophe not as it appears in 346 D, but as it stands in 345 C—D.

Bergk⁴ arranges the poem in three complete strophes. His restoration has the merit of recognising the similarity in rhythm between Schneidewin's Epode and the other parts of the poem: several of his emendations are also in all probability right². It may however be doubted whether he does well in altogether excluding from the poem the words ἐμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ and οὐ γὰρ εἶμι φιλόμωμος, and he deserts the Platonic order even more ruthlessly than Schneidewin when he places δὲ ἀν ὃν κακὸς—μὴ μέμκεται directly after ἀνευ ψόγου τευγιμένων, besides that Plato clearly indicates by the words προιόντος τοῦ ἅσματος (339 C), ὀλίγων—εἰς τὸ πρῶτον προελθὼν (339 D), and ὀλίγα δειλὴδων (344 B), that there is a lacuna after τευγιμένων.

Blass⁴ agrees with Bergk in regarding the poem as a sequence of strophes, but discovers four of these in place of three. In the first strophe Blass's arrangement agrees with that of Schneidewin: in the second, he supposes the two first verses to be lost, and the rest to contain δὲ ἄν ὃν κακὸς κτλ. down to τοῖς τις ἀλοχρά μὴ μέμκεται: the third consists of οὔδε μοι ἐμμελέως—τούς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν: the fourth and last extends from τούθεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγνώ ἀνάγκη δ' οὔδε θεοὶ μάχονται. This arrangement (which further agrees with that of Bergk in rejecting ἐμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ and οὐ γὰρ εἶμι φιλόμωμος) upsets even more completely than either of the others the sequence of the poem as it is given by Plato, and for that reason is most unlikely to be right.

¹ Poetae Lyr. Graeci⁴, iii p. 384 ff.
² See the footnotes on p. 195.
³ Bergk's emendation for μὴ.
⁴ In the Rheinisches Museum for 1872, p. 326 ff.
The only arrangement which faithfully adheres to the Platonic order of citation is that of Aars, in the treatise referred to already.

STROPHE 1.
1. "Ανδρί αγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
2. χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἀνει ψόγου τετυγμένον.

Verses 3—7 are wanting.

STROPHE 2.
1. Οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
2. καὶ τοις σφοιδῷ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φῶς ἐσθολὸν ἐμμελεῖ,
3. Θεὸς ἀν μόνος τοῦτ’ ἔχοι γέρας· ἀνδρὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὗ κακὸν ἐμμελεῖ,
4. ὅν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.
5. Πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
6. κακὸς δ’ εἰ κακῶς <τίς>,
7. καὶ τὸ πλείοντον ἄριστο, τοῦς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

STROPHE 3.
1. Τοῦτουκεν ὁ πτο’ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
2. διζήμενος κενεὼν ἐς ἀπρακτὸν ἐπίθεα μοῦραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
3. πανάμομον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεὐθὸς οὐκ αἰῶν μακελθα χθονός.
4. ἐπὶ δ’ ὅμων εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελεῖ.
5. Πάντας δ’ ἐπαλήμμι καὶ φιλέω,
6. ἐκὼν ὡς τε ἔρθη.
7. μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγyk δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

STROPHE 4.
1. Wanting.
2. — — — — — — [οὐκ εἰμ’ ἐγὼ φιλόμομος] ἐξαρκεῖ γ’ ἐμοὶ,
3. ὅς ἄν ὑ κακὸς μηδ’ ἄγαν ἀπαλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ’ ὄνησιπολιν δίκαν,
4. ἵγης ἀνήρ, οὐδὲ μή μιν ἐγὼ
5. μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἡλιθίων
6. ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
7. πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖς τ’ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμκεται.

This restoration seems to us on the whole the most probable.
In line 4 of Strophe 2 Plato no doubt wrote ὅν ἄν (the mss reading) for ὅν, using the more common construction in defiance of metre,
just as in line 5 γάρ after μὲν is due to the desire to shew the 
sequence of thought. In lines 6 and 7 of the same Strophe Plato 
omits some monosyllable after κακῶς, perhaps τις or τι or αὖ: 
Hermann's view that καὶ of the next line should be written in line 
6, and line 7 be made into τοῦπελειστον ἄριστοι κτλ., is perhaps less 
probable. For line 7 we should prefer as nearer to the words of 
Plato καὶ πελειστον ἄριστοι κτλ. In the third Strophe we prefer ἐπὶ 
τ ὁμοῦν for the reasons given in the note upon the passage on p. 166. 
In the last Strophe δς ἀν ὁ κακῶς is Bergk's emendation for δς ἀν μὴ 
κακῶς ἦ: here again Plato substitutes the commoner idiom for the 
rarer and more poetic, with which we may compare Aristophanes 
Birds 694 γῆ δ' οὐδ' ἀνὴρ οὐδ' οὖραν ὡς ἦν. It is however more likely 
that Simonides wrote δς ἀν ὁ κακῶς μήτ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, i.e. μήτ' 
κακῶς μήτ' κτλ., for this idiom is seldom found with μηδέ or οὐδέ: 
see Jebb on Sophocles Philoctetes 771. To take μηδέ for ἀλλὰ μὴ 
would give a wrong meaning, as can be seen from the paraphrase in 
346 D ἀλλὰ μοι ἔξαρκεῖ ἂν ὁ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακῶν ποιῇ. It seems 
better too, in this line, to take εἰδὼς γ' ὑπεστόλων δικαίν ὑγίαν ἀνήρ 
(sc. ἐστιν) together, and print colons before εἰδὼς and after ἀνήρ. In 
line 4 οὐδὲ μὴ μν is Bergk's restoration for μὴν of the MSS. The 
position assigned by Aars to οὐκ εἰμι ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος (in line 
2) is only tentative, but it is slightly supported by οὐ διὰ 
ταῦτα σε ψέγω ὅτι εἰμι φιλόφυγος coming before ἐμοῦ' ἔξαρκεῖ 
in 346 C. There is nothing in Plato to indicate that the first line 
(with part of the second) is wanting in Strophe 4, but neither is 
there anything to prove the reverse, and (since the poem is not in 
any case preserved entire, five verses being omitted in the first 
Strophe) it is much more reasonable to assume an omission here 
than violently to distort the sequence of the poem as quoted by 
Plato.

Whether the poem is to be ranked as an ὕδη ἐπίνικος, an 
ἐγκώμιον, or a σκόλιον is a question which should not be raised 
until the poem has first been restored from the quotations in the 
Protagoras. If the restoration given above is even approximately 
correct, the poem cannot be classed as an epinikion: an encomium 
it is not likely to be, since no one is praised. There is no reason 
whatever for identifying it with the famous encomium referred to by 
Quintilian (XI 2. 11). Blass holds that the poem was a scolion, 
and this is by far the most probable view, but no certainty is attain­
able on the point. With the exception of the lacunae which we
have noted, the poem is most probably complete, for Socrates is trying to prove that Simonides attacks Pittacus throughout the whole poem: see 345 D ὄντω σφόδρα καὶ δὲ ὄλων τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρ-
χεται τῷ τοῦ Πίττακον ῥήματι and 343 C, 344 B.

We add a translation of the poem, incorporating the few changes which we have made in Aars’s restoration.

**STROPHE 1.**

It is hard to quit you like a truly good man, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without blame.

(The five lost vv. may have further elaborated the meaning of ‘truly good’).

**STROPHE 2.**

Nor do I deem the word of Pittacus well said, wise though he was that spake it: ‘it is hard,’ he said ‘to be noble.’ To a god alone belongs that meed: a man cannot but prove evil, if hopeless calamity overthrow him. Every man if he has fared well is good, evil, if ill: and for the most part best are they whom the gods love.

**STROPHE 3.**

Therefore never will I cast away my portion of life vainly upon a bootless hope, seeking what cannot come to be, an all-blameless man, of us who take the fruit of the broad earth: when I find him, look you, you shall hear. I praise and love all them that willingly do nothing base: against necessity even gods do not contend.

**STROPHE 4.**

--- [I love not fault-finding]: enough for me if one be not evil nor exceeding violent: yea sound is the man who knoweth justice, benefactress of cities: nor will I find fault with him: for the tribe of fools is infinite. Surely all is fair wherein is no alloy of foul.

The easy-going morality of the poem is in harmony with what we know both of the life and poetry of Simonides: he was ever ‘a genial and courtly man,’ anxious to make the most of life, “dwelling with flowers like the bee, seeking yellow honey” (Sim. *Frag.* 47).
APPENDIX II.

PROTAGORAS' LIFE AND WORKS.

We give the life of Protagoras as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (ix 50—56) and add the fragments of his works, according (in the main) to Frei's arrangement.

BIOΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΟΥ.

Πρωταγόρας Ἀρτέμιδος ἦ, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Δεῖμων ἐν Περσικοῖς, Μαρανθόν, Ἀβδηρίτης, καθά φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων, δό καὶ Θουρίος νόμους γράφαι φησὶν αὐτῶν· ὡς δ’ Ἐὔπολις ἐν Κόλαζε, Τήδεος· φησὶ γάρ,

"Ἐνδον μὲν ἔστι Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήδεος.

οὗτος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος λόγους ἀναγεννώσκοντες ἥρανξύντο· καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ φησὶ βαρύφωνον εἶναι τῶν Προδίκου. διῆκονε δ’ ὁ Πρωταγόρας Δημοκρίτου. ἐκαλεῖτο τε Σοφία, ὡς φησὶ Φασιβρίνος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ. καὶ πρῶτος ἐφῆ δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἄλληλοις’ οίς καὶ συνερχότα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡρξάτο ποὺ τοῦτον τὸν πρόπον· Ἀντώνων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστὶ· τῶν δὲ ὄντων ὃς ὄν ἔστιν.· ἐλεγε τε μὴ δὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (καθά καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεατητῷ) καὶ πάντες εἶναι ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἄλλα καὶ τὸν ἡρξάτο τὸν πρόπον. 'Περὶ μὲν θεῶν ὄν ἐγὼ εἰδέναι οἴδ᾿ ὡς εἰδόν οἴδ᾿ ὡς ὃδε εἶδόν. πολλὰ γάρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥ τ’ ἄδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὃν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.· διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἔξειθεν πρὸς Ἀθηναίων· καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὕτω κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ὅτα ἱήρυκε ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ’ ἐκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων. οὕτω πρῶτος μεθοῦ εἰσεπράξατο μνᾶς ἐκατὼν· καὶ πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διόρισε καὶ καιροῦ δύναμιν ἐξέθετο

1 Quaestiones Protagoreae, p. 176 foll., where the references are fully given.
APPENDIX II.

καὶ λόγων ἀγώνας θέτο, καὶ σφίσματα τοῖς πραγματολογοῦσι προσήγαγε· καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφεὶς πρὸς τὸν πολιτικὸν διελέξθη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπολάζον γένος τῶν ἐρημικῶν ἐγένεθην· ὑπὸ καὶ Τίμων φησὶν περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Πρωταγόρης τ’ ἐπίμακτος ἐρίζεται εἰς εἰδώς.

οὕτως καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκκίνησε. καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένεον λόγον τῶν πειράματος ἀποδεικνύει ὡς οὐκ ἦθεν ἀντιλέγει, οὕτως πρῶτος διείλεται, καθά φησὶ Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ. καὶ πρῶτος κατεδώκετο τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησὶν Ἀρτεμιδώρος ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χρύσιττον. καὶ πρῶτος τὴν καλομένην τὸλην, ἡρ’ ἦν τὰ πολτικά βαστάζοντα, εὑρέν, καὶ φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας· φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ποὺ φησὶν. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πρὸτον ἡρθ’ πρὸς Δήμοκρίτον, ἓπιλα δεδεκὼς ὀφθεὶς. διειλέ τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέταρτα· εὐχαλλήν, ἑρωτήσασθαι, ἀπόκαλλθαι, ἑντολήν· οἱ δὲ, ἐς ἑτ’ διήγησιν, ἑρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἑντόλην, ἀπαγγελλάν, εὐχαλλῆν, κλήσιν, ὡς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων. Ἀλκιδάμασ δὲ τέταρτα λόγους φησὶ· φάσιν, ἀπόφασιν, ἑρώτησιν, προσαγόρευσιν. πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐνεποτὶ ἀνέγοι τῶν περὶ θεῶν, οὐ τὴν ἄρχην ἄνω παρεθέμεθα· ἀνέγοι δ’ Ἀθηνησίου ἐν τῇ Εὐβοῖα ὄκλη, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι δ’ ἐν Δικείῳ, μαθητοὺ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρήσαντο Ἀρχαγόρον τοῦ Θεοδότου. κατηγόρησε δ’ αὐτοῦ Πυθαδώρος Πολυχρῆλον, εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων. Ἀριστοτέλης δ’ Εὐαθλὸν φησιν.

ἐστι δὲ τὰ σωζόμενα αὐτοῦ βιβλία τάδε. Τέχνη ἐρημικών. Περὶ πάλης. Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων. Περὶ πολιτειῶν. Περὶ πληθυσμοῦ. Περὶ ἀρετῶν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐδού. Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσαμομένων. Προστατεύκτων. Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Ἀντιλογίων δύο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ βιβλία. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων εἰς αὐτοῦ διάλογον.

φησι δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλέοντος αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικέλλαν, τὴν ναὸν κατα-ποντοῦθαι· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίστεθαι Εὐρυτίδην ἐν τῷ Ἰξίουν. ἔνοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὄνομ τελευτήσας αὐτῶν, βιώσαντα ἢτ’ πρὸς τὰ ἐνεπείσθαι· Ἀπολλώδρος δὲ φησιν ἐβδομήτορα, σοφιστεύσα δὲ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἀκμάξεων κατὰ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ ὑγιείκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα. ἐστὶ καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἡμῶν ὄντως ἑχόν,

Καὶ σεῦ, Πρωταγόρη, φάτων ἐκλινο, ὡς ἄρ’ Ἀθηρέων
“Εἶκ τοῦτ’ ἵον καὶ’ ὄνομ πρέπεσιν ἐνών ἑθανες.
Εἶλετο γὰρ σε φυγεῖν Κέκροπος πόλις· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν ποὺ
Παλλάδος ἄστε φύγε, Πλούτεα δ’ οὐκ ἐφυγες.

1 (et) ἔχεν.
APPENDIX II.

A. Physical.

1. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρησον άνθρωπος: τών μέν οιντόν ως ἕστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ οιντόν ως οὐκ ἕστι (from Ἀλήθεια ἣ περὶ τού ὄντος s. Καταβάλλοντες: see Pl. Theaet. 152 A).


From Protagoras' περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀίδου no fragments seem to survive.

B. Ethical.

Of the περὶ ἀρετῶν there seem to be no fragments.

3. τῶν γὰρ οἰνῶν νεφρῶν οἰντῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὀκτὼ δὲ ταῖς πάσης ἡμέρας ἀπολαμβάνων νηπιερίως ἀνέτλη. εὑδης γὰρ ἐχετο, εἴ δὲς πολλὰ ἄντρα κατὰ πάσαν ἡμέραν εἰς ἐνυπνάμην καὶ ἀνωδύνην καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν. πᾶσ γὰρ τὸς μην ὄρη τὰ ἐνυτὼν πένθεια ἐρρυμένως φέροντα μεγαλόφρονα τὰ καὶ ἄνδρεῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐνυτῶν κρέασι, κάρτα εἶδος τῆς ἐνυτὼν ἐν τοιοῦτο δὲ πράγματε ἄμηχανή (from (?) περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώπως πρασσομένων ap. Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. 33. 118 E—F. The subject is the fortitude of Pericles on hearing of the death of his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus).

The περὶ φιλοτιμίας is known only from Diogenes' catalogue (ix 55).

C. Political.

Of the περὶ πολιτείας nothing (so far as is known) survives.


D. Grammatical.

Of the περὶ ὀρθοστηλια (mentioned in Pl. Phaedr. 267 c) nothing remains.

* The Ionic is as it appears in Plutarch. Following the example of Frei, we have not written the other fragments in Ionic.
APPENDIX II.

E. Rhetorical.

5. (?) δύο λόγοι εἰς τὸ περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικείμενοι ἀλλήλους (from the ἀντιλογιῶν δύο ap. D. L. IX 51).


The δίκη ὑπὲρ μουθοῦ (D. L. IX 55) and the "rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci" (Cic. Brut. 46) have apparently left no trace.

F. Various.

7. φόσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένου δεῖ μαθήματιν (from the μέγας λόγος—probably identical with the Προστακτικός—: see Cramer Anecdot. Paris. I p. 171).

8. [Προσταγόρας ἐλεγε] μήδεν εἶναι μήτε τεχνῆν ἀνευ μελέτης μήτε μελέτην ἀνευ τεχνῆς1 (perhaps from the same, ap. Stob. Flor. 29. 80).

Another fragment, probably from the same work, is quoted by J. Gildermeister and F. Bücheler from a Syriac translation of Plutarch's περὶ ἀσκήσεως [Rhein. Mus. vol. XXVII (1872) p. 526]. The original perhaps ran:

9. οὐ βλαστάνει θαύμαλα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐὰν μὴ οἴσει βυθὸν ἐλθη.

Of the περὶ μαθημάτων, and the περὶ τεχνῶν (of which perhaps the περὶ πάλης was a part) nothing (so far as is certainly known) survives. Gomperz's ingenious and learned attempt2 to prove that the 'Defence of Medicine' which under the title of περὶ τεχνῆς appears in the collection of Hippocratean works3 was written by Protagoras and belongs to the treatise περὶ τεχνῶν has not, as yet, commended itself to critics.4

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1 Compare Gomperz (cited in the next note), p. 11.
2 Reprinted from the Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien: Philosophisch-Historische Classe, Band CX.
3 Littre, vi 1—27.
4 See Wellmann in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, v p. 97 foll.
**INDICES TO THE NOTES.**

*The references are to pages.*

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