Abstract

Few theories of politics in Soviet Uzbekistan have received greater attention, affirmation, and debate than the importance of regionalism, often depicted as manifested in elite “clans” or solidarity groups. Concentrated primarily in Tashkent, Samarkand, Ferghana, and to a lesser degree Khorezm, these groups are asserted to have been vying and scheming for power throughout the Soviet era. Three path-breaking works have been authored on the topic: Kathleen Collins’ *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*, Pauline Jones Luong’s *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, and Olivier Roy’s *The New Central Asia*.

Two circumstances compel a reappraisal of this hypothesis. First and foremost, neither these contributions nor any of the dozens of scholarly articles published on the topic build on primary archival sources. This dissertation fills this lacunae. Second, conflicting claims regarding this proposition give room for doubt. Luong, for example, averred in the early 2000s that cadre recruitment on the basis of region of origin in Soviet Uzbekistan was “overt” and well-known. What is puzzling is that Irwin Selnick’s 500-page doctoral dissertation on elite recruitment in Uzbekistan, defended in 1984, did not even mention the possibility of such local favoritism, let alone using the concepts of “clan”, solidarity groups, or regionalism. If it was as overt as has been claimed and if the
Politburo was filled with figures from Rashidov’s Samarkand why did Selnick not recognize it?

The reason, this dissertation contends, is because the notion of “clans” and strong regionalism in Uzbekistan is largely a myth. The origins of this myth trace to the dubious, populist, and demonstrably false information on Uzbekistan presented by Soviet authorities in the mid-1980s. Older readers may remember the “cotton scandal” during these years, in which hundreds of Uzbek officials were purged following revelations of widespread corruption, embezzlement of cotton, and “mafia-rule”. This was also the catalyst of the clan/region hypothesis, pioneered by Donald Carlisle in 1985. This theory of extensive nepotism and subnational loyalties corresponded seamlessly with the picture portrayed by the Prosecutor General’s anti-corruption investigators, Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov, as well as that of Rashidov’s successor Inamzhon Usmankhodzhaev, all of whom had a political agenda and, as will be detailed below, used biased or falsified information to support it.

To back up these claims, this dissertation builds primarily on a close examination of primary sources in Moscow’s RGASPI and RGANI archives, biographical information gleaned from official Soviet Central Asian encyclopedias, Soviet newspapers, and party plenum reports. The main archival material used has been drawn from the Party Control Commission, which monitored party violations in the Soviet Union, including the presence of nepotism, localism (zemlyachestvo or mestnichestvo), and corruption. The focus is Soviet Uzbekistan, from its formation in
1924 to independence in 1991, although plenty of material has been drawn also from other Soviet republics. Needless to say, whether locally based loyalties were more or less present in Uzbekistan than elsewhere in the Soviet Union can only be assessed comparatively.

The main findings are: First, the archival record contains scant evidence that subnational loyalties were a major problem in Soviet Uzbekistan. While there were rifts to be sure, these were mostly limited to antagonisms between Uzbeks and Russian/Slavs in the Central Committee, “groupism” in the agricultural sector on the specific technologies to be used, and oligarchic decision-making in obkom and republican bodies. Locally based loyalties were noted elsewhere in the Soviet Union, especially in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and several Russian oblasts but only rarely in Uzbekistan.

Second, it is true that figures hailing from Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand dominated politics throughout the Soviet period. This could in part be explained by demographic factors: in 1976 Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ferghana oblast made up 29.7%, 27.5%, and 26.5% of the population respectively, i.e., more than 80% of Uzbekistan’s total population. The supremacy of any one or two of these regions at any point in time could also be explained by Moscow’s intricate “hierarchy of regions” in which cadre were drawn from the most important oblasts, the ranking of which varied over the Soviet period; Minsk and Vitebsk filled analogous roles in Belarus, just as Vilnius and Kaunas did in Lithuania.
Notably, however, when power over cadre appointment was extensively decentralized, principally during the Brezhnev era, this hegemony dissolved. At no point in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history did members of the Politburo hail from more varied regions than during the zenith of Rashidov’s powers, who served as First Secretary throughout the Brezhnev era. That Selnick did not detect any regionalism with this set up is not surprising since no such clear-cut pattern existed but is an erroneous construction of the post-Soviet era.

Third, at the very moment when the clan/region hypothesis gained traction among Western scholars, in 1989, the Politburo and Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paradoxically, discussed a set of important classified and hitherto unexamined documents which questioned the revelations of the “cotton scandal”. One established that the corruption investigations in Uzbekistan had not only implicated a great number of innocent Uzbek officials but also fed the media with false information. Another made similar claims, calling on the Prosecutor General’s office to reassess the cotton scandal due to the slender or inexistent evidence on which many had been convicted. However, Uzbekistan was never “rehabilitated” from this morass since the Soviet Union collapsed two years thereafter. If it ever would have been revealed is doubtful since these findings were hushed while the USSR still existed.

Why, then, does all of this matter? Beyond the obvious reasons that scholars may have been wrong, that the claims of tightly organized regional clans or “solidarity groups” in Uzbekistan rest on a shaky foundation, and that several hundred Uzbek
officials may have been wrongly convicted -- several of whom committed suicide -- the findings of this dissertation matter because they offer alternative hypotheses about Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics.

Here, as elsewhere in the USSR, coalitions of protégés formed at the oblast and republican-levels primarily among former co-workers and associates. Region of origin played a marginal role at most in this calculus, as a careful tracing of the origins of members in protection pacts attests to. That the Uzbek elite typically served on average in three or more oblasts during their careers, as established in this dissertation, and were generally less “rooted” than the Soviet average diversified loyalties beyond home regions. Coalitions formed among figures of diverse origin, resulting in essentially non-territorialized factions.

In stark contrast stood neighboring Tajikistan whose Leninabad oblast supplied all of Tajikistan’s First Secretaries from 1946 to 1991 and all Chairmen of the Council of Ministers but one -- none of whom ever served outside of Leninabad or the capital oblast Stalinabad. Whereas heads of party and state came from heterogenous origins in Uzbekistan and a majority, as a rule, had traversed several oblasts during their careers, in Tajikistan political power was concentrated to a single region. This lopsided arrangement contributed to unleashing and sustaining a devastating civil war in Tajikistan after independence when power was transferred to officials hailing from Kulyab. Stability in Uzbekistan was helped, though not ensured, by the non-territorialization of its elite
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This dissertation is dedicated to my son Arvid.
Note on Transliteration

This dissertation employs the American Library Association – Library of Congress (ALA-LC) system in the romanization of the Russian Cyrillic alphabet. Diacritical marks have been omitted for the reader’s convenience. For Uzbek sources written in Cyrillic I adhere to the ALA-LC system but with the addition of the letters ų (transliterated “u”), ƙ (transliterated “q”), ʁ (transliterated “gh”), and ҳ (transliterated “h”). For consistency, names, place-names, etc. during the Soviet period have been transliterated using the ALA-LC system (e.g. Khodzhaev) from archival sources rather than using the post-Soviet spellings in either the national Central Asian languages (e.g. Hojaev) or the common English variant (e.g. Khodjaev). For a few very common words, e.g. mahalla, the typical spelling in the English language has been used and not the ALA-LC transliteration from Russian (i.e., makhalla). Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, which during the Soviet period were known as “Kirgizia” and “Turkmenia”, are throughout the dissertation referred to as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan is also referred to as “Tajikistan” and not the transliteration from Russian Cyrillic “Tadzhikistan” or Tajik Cyrillic “Tojikistan”. Needless to say, the choice of transliterations used does not represent any political statement but is solely to facilitate the reader’s use and verification of my sources and data consistently.
1. Introduction

The Soviet Union, no less so than any other political system, was defined by a degree of regionalism. Regional networks developed in the state and party apparatuses when leading officials brought in their former co-workers from lower administrative-territorial levels of government. National-level officials incorporated clients from the oblasts (provinces), oblast-level officials smoothed the way for former colleagues in the rayons (districts), and so on. Since a position at the national level, with few exceptions, came through long service in the rayons and oblasts, place-based networks resulted from the Soviet pattern of upward mobility.\(^1\) The USSR’s intricate “hierarchy of regions” added impetus to this regionalism since a few prominent oblasts tended to be privileged sources of cadre recruitment.\(^2\)

While this source of regionalism has been recognized by most scholars of Soviet politics as valid in the Western parts of the empire, it has not been considered applicable


to regionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan. Instead, contemporary Central Asia analysts maintain that Uzbekistan’s politics was defined by indigenous “clans” or a Central Asian regionalism fuelled by its “clan-based” history as opposed to “career-based” regionalism. The belief in these cultural singularities is so firm that the alternative theory of Soviet career-based regionalism has largely passed unnoticed in this literature’s explanation of Central Asian regionalism.

Whether expressed as “clans”, regional factions, or “solidarity networks”, each of these theses on Central Asian regionalism share the assumption that politics in Soviet Uzbekistan was distinct and contested between groups bound by identity and territory representing specific cities or provinces. Of these, Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ferghana

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For similar accounts in Russian, see, e.g., D.A. Trofimov, “Klanovost kak element politicheskoy kultury Tsentralnoy Azii (na primere Kazakhstana, Uzbekistana i Kyrgyzstana),” in Politicheskaia Kultura Stran Azii i Afriki (Moscow, 1996); and S.N. Abashin, Natsionalizmy v Srednej Azii: v Poiskakh Identichnosti (St. Petersburg, 2007).
have generally been regarded as the most powerful contestants even if other lesser ones e.g. Khorezm/Karakalpakstan and Kashkadarya also made their presence felt. An assumption of such region-based groups is that, if given a chance, they pursue a “winner takes all” policy and smooth the way for their rodstvenniki (relatives or people from the same place of birth) into governing positions. Conversely, Moscow had to engage in a constant balancing act to prevent any one of the regional groups from shoring up too much powers, lest they challenge its authority.

Thus, politics in Soviet Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia, in this interpretation, took on a fundamentally different character than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In Central Asia regionalism concerned “identity” and “territory”; in other parts of the USSR, regionalism did not involve identity and territory per se. Place-based networks were merely epiphenomena of the Soviet career pattern, structures of trust in Soviet politics, and the hierarchy of regions. National solidarities, it follows, were all but inexistent in Central Asia since strong regional identities among the elite transcended

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5 For an assessment and critique, see S. Frederick Starr, “Political Power in Uzbekistan,” Unpublished manuscript, p. 2.
loyalties to the nation. Clan and region as sources of identity are rather presumed to have been activated in response to the Bolsheviks’ imposition of national republics.

A number of factors speak in favor of the clan/region hypothesis: Uzbek family bonds are traditionally strong, analysts have provided a wealth of information on the workings of these groups even if often abstract, and the Bolsheviks adopted a tribal policy for the neighboring republic of Turkmenistan to balance the tribes.7 Besides, this is not only a Western finding or construct. The same view prevails among many local analysts. A group of Central Asian specialists wrote in 2011, for instance, that competition among Uzbekistan’s regionally organized “clans” presents “one of the most serious challenges to the Uzbek system”.8 That strong regional identities among the Uzbek populace derive from late state formation, as has been postulated, is also sound.9

Not formed until 1924, Uzbekistan was an agglomeration of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Karakalpaks and peoples from the three khanates that comprised Central Asia prior to the Russian conquest, and rural-urban migration that could inculcate in citizens a spirit of national identity was low throughout the Soviet period.

On the other hand, a retrospective tracing of the evolution of this hypothesis and sources employed suggests that it must be treated as tentative. The clan/region hypothesis emerged after the unfolding of the “cotton affair”, which from 1984 and onwards condemned Uzbekistan as the most corrupt and nepotistic Soviet republic. Thus in 1984 Rashidov’s successor First Secretary I. Usmankhodzhaev, at the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee, accused his predecessor’s regime of staffing positions on the basis of “kinship, local favoritism, or personal devotion” among other unseemly habits.¹⁰ Such accusations were novel. Uzbekistan had rarely been associated with the specific charge of kinship- or region-based promotions since its formation in 1924, as this dissertation will show. The notion of Uzbek regionalism, emerging two years thereafter in a pioneering article by Donald Carlisle, in all likelihood emanated from Moscow’s


portrayal of events. In 1989 scholars reconceptualized this “regionalism” into Uzbek elite “clans”. The timing is noteworthy since Soviet press a year earlier, from mid-1988 and on, had begun proposing the existence of elite “clans” (klany) in Uzbekistan. In other words, there are grounds to believe that the scholarly conception of regionalism and “clans”, its subsequent elaboration, and projection far back into Soviet history stems consciously or unconsciously from Usmankhodzhaev’s unflattering judgments (or other related ones at the time) and Soviet central media.

If this is a correct interpretation of events, is this a problem? It is since propaganda was part of the job descriptions of Soviet leaders and central media. Everything that was said should not necessarily be believed since propaganda was a weapon of policy. When push comes to shove, Uzbek officials may have acted no differently from other Soviet politicians who at times incorporated individuals from their native regions. For example, when coming to power in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev

immediately elevated his protégé Murakhovskii, the former Party Secretary of Gorbachev’s native Stavropol, to Chairman of Gosagroprom.¹⁴ And Leonid Brezhnev stood in a class of his own in his favoritism of former associates from his native Dnepropetrovsk, as will be detailed later in the dissertation.

Which of these hypotheses, clan/region or “normal” Soviet regionalism, that most accurately describe politics in Soviet Uzbekistan is yet to be resolved. As noted by Frederick Starr, the analytical and scholarly literature [on clans and regions in Uzbekistan] is almost entirely based on unproven assumptions.”¹⁵ One reason for the “unproven” nature of these assumptions is the scholarly neglect of Soviet archival sources among both proponents and critics of the clan/region hypothesis. Soviet Communist Party organs closely monitored and kept tabs on nepotism, localism, and corruption in its ranks and its confidential documents are thus clearly a rich source on this question. Adrienne Edgar’s thorough-going account on Soviet Turkmenistan noted above points the way. Even if limited to the formative 1920s and early 1930s, her archival research shows how Soviet authorities perceived tribal loyalties among the nomadic

Turkmen “elite” to be a problem and that they responded to it.\textsuperscript{16} Whether such strong place- or kinship-based loyalties could be observed also in the settled Uzbekistan and among its elite is for this dissertation to determine.

Unlike existing works on patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan, my research is based on archival sources, which were closed to scholars during the Soviet period but which have been made available since. It takes note of the theories on informal politics outlined above just as it acknowledges the workings of the Soviet Union’s formal system of appointments, the \textit{nomenklatura}.\textsuperscript{17} But it defers judgment on the accuracy of both, asking instead: To what degree was patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan, to use Merle Fainsod’s phrase, “a mirror of Soviet reality”? Or, alternatively, how and how much did it deviate from Soviet patronage politics exercised elsewhere?

\textbf{The Stakes of These Hypotheses}

Proponents of the clan/region hypothesis argue that Soviet Uzbekistan and independent Uzbekistan was and is profoundly split along regional lines. This holds for


\textsuperscript{17} I am indebted to Frederick Starr’s similar way of formulating the problem, though his account concerns post-Soviet Uzbekistan. See his “Political Power in Uzbekistan,” Unpublished manuscript, p.1.
both the general citizenry and elite groups. This implies that the regional groups have
both identity, territory, and resources under their control, i.e., all those attributes that
typically are associated with the risk of civil war. Some recent observers have even
argued that Moscow during the Soviet period manipulated Uzbekistan’s seven “clans”
(Samarkand, Tashkent, Ferghana, Jizak, Kashkadarya, Khorezm, and Karakalpak) to
preempt the formation of a united Uzbek people. Exploiting these clan divisions was, in
this interpretation, a delicate task since “Moscow had to ensure that the rivalries did not
erupt into outright war between the clans because Moscow was not certain that it could
contain such hostilities.” A number of publications in the past two years have made
similar claims on the importance of Uzbekistan’s regional “clans” and their potentially
destructive impact.

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18 See, for example, David Laitin, “Ethnic Unmixing and Civil War,” Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4
Part one of the three part series “The Clans of Uzbekistan”.
20 See e.g. Alexey Malashenko, The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie
Statehood: The Neopatrimonial Regime in Uzbekistan,” in Emilian Kavalski (Ed.), Stable Outside, Fragile
Inside? (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 206-210; David Lewis, “Understanding the Authoritarian State:
115-126.
Most prominent among them, Kathleen Collins argues that had Uzbekistan’s regional “clans” not hammered out a pact prior to independence the republic would likely have spiraled down into a similar civil war that ripped neighboring Tajikistan apart in the 1990s.\(^1\) The assumption is that regionalism was equally pronounced in both cases and that the absence or presence of pacts among the regional elites were the critical factor shaping their post-Soviet trajectories. However, if the extent of regionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan has been exaggerated and if the politics related more to “normal” career-based Soviet patronage politics, this explanation may be spurious. Hypothetically, differences in the extent and nature of regionalism in these two cases may to some degree have accounted for the absence or presence of civil conflict and its sustenance.

**Purpose and Definitions**

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the extent of “localism” and regionalism in Uzbekistan during the Soviet period. This topic has never been explored using primary archival sources. Yet far-reaching claims have been made about regionalism and “clans” in Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics and its implications for post-

Soviet politics. The Soviet period is crucial since no contemporary analyst asserts that the Uzbek “clans” were created *ex nihilo*; they were products of pre-Soviet and Soviet government and society. In other words, if their presence during the Soviet period has been overstated, or perhaps even significantly exaggerated, then it is reasonable to question their existence also in the post-Soviet period.

My original contribution is to address this topic by using hitherto unexamined primary archival sources from the RGANI and RGASPI archives in Moscow. The study is primarily limited to Uzbekistan, even if some evidence and implications have been gleaned from archival and other material relating to the rest of Central Asia and other Soviet republics.

For reasons that were expounded upon above, several circumstances render the evolution of the clan/region hypothesis and proof for it suspect. This dissertation aspires to bring an objective approach to this puzzle without preconceptions. All material relevant to the theme has been included regardless of whether it supports or contradicts the clan/region hypothesis. Biographical source references have also been specified for each individual to provide verifiable data on backgrounds.

I should define the analytical terms employed here, regionalism and localism, more precisely. Regionalism implies that the primary socio-political identities of citizens and the elite are oriented regionally rather than nationally and consequently that loyalties are directed towards regions (oblast in Russian) rather than the Uzbek nation. While regionalism may or may not be a relevant “category of analysis”, it was not a Soviet “category of practice”. The concept used for sub-national loyalties in Soviet documents was the related concept of zemlyachestvo (people from the same city, county or province) who associate to generate mestnichestvo (the promotion or acquisition of privileges on the basis of place of origin and family status, not merit). In the English language, a better cognate than “regionalism” to these two Russian words is “localism”, which is less geographically precise. “Localism”, in a political sense, should here be understood as a

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23 It should be noted that the notion of “regionalism” in the Soviet polity differs depending on level of analysis. At least three levels existed in the Soviet period: federation, republic, and oblast. The second and third might both be called “regionalism” depending on the analyst’s point of view.


25 The Tajik and Uzbek language equivalents are mahalgaroi or mahallachilik. See, I. Aloev, Anglo-Uzbek-Uzbekskij Slovar’ (Tashkent: Qomuslar Bosh Taririiati, 1993). The concepts of “clans” and “tribe” are blurred in the Uzbek language. Thus, the Uzbek Academy of Sciences’ Russian-Uzbek dictionary translates “klan” as both urug (tribe) and qawm (“village solidarity group”). See Ruscha-Uzbekcha Lughat (Moscow: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1954), p. 291.
preference for personnel from one’s home-town or region of origin and the extension of certain privileges to it. This dissertation will employ this concept, not “regionalism”, as the English translation of zemlyachestvo and mestnichestvo, even if the original terms are provided whenever possible. “Clan”, it should be said, is not used when analyzing archival material in this dissertation for the sole reason that the Russian loan word “klan” was rarely, if ever, used in correspondence and primary sources.

The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to portray and analyze politics as understood and interpreted by contemporaries in primary sources. The critic may object that some nuances of the modern concepts of “clan” or regionalism may have eluded contemporaneous observations. In simple terms, the Russian concepts of localism and nepotism may not test “clans” or regionalism precisely since these are modern categories of analysis rather than Soviet era categories of practice. If one is intent on using primary sources there is no conceivable way of bridging this conceptual gap perfectly. But the benefits with using primary sources and categories of practice, I trust, is greater than projecting modern concepts on the past without primary sources that could test the relevance of them.
Sources and Method

Archival Material

This dissertation relies primarily on material gathered at the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RGASPI) and the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI). RGASPI’s holdings include primary documents up to the death of Stalin and RGANI’s stretches from the early 1940s to the collapse of the USSR. Parts of the RGASPI archive have been digitized and is since 2013 available online at the website “Dokumenty Sovetskoy Epokhi” (DSE). This forms the backbone of sources used for the formative years 1917-1953 explored in this dissertation. The coverage in DSE is uneven with the majority of documents dating to the 1920s and 1930s. Even so, several relevant documents relating to Uzbekistan from the 1940s and early 1950s have been found, examined, and complemented with material from RGANI.

The RGANI archives are only available on site and I therefore undertook a month-long research trip to Moscow. Their holdings are divided into 9 Fonds. Of these,

27 Apart from the ones specified, these are Fond 1, 2, and 5 which cover sessions and plenums of the all-Union Central Committee and Otdel 1939-1966; Fond 9 includes Central Committee material (all-Union) from 1983-1986; Fond 13 encompasses documents from the Central Committee Bureau of RSFSR (Russia) 1956-1966; And Fond 72 contains material from the Central Committee ideologies commission 1962-1964.
Fond. 6, which contains material of the Party Control Commission (*Komitet Partiinogo Kontrolia*) 1939-1966, was used most extensively. The Party Control Commission was an organ of the Central Committee tasked with ensuring that official rules and norms of party life were observed and that *nomenklatura* rules were adhered to. As such, no material of any other individual agency in the Soviet Union is arguably as valuable for establishing the extent of patronage, localism, and other violations of party members as the evaluations of the Party Control Commission. My focus was on files relating to Uzbekistan but documents for other republics have also been examined since the absence or presence of localism, nepotism, or any other transgression of party rules must be viewed comparatively. Needless to say, whether a specific violation was more or less present than elsewhere can only be determined through comparison. Regrettably, the vast majority of documents from the Brezhnev-period remains classified for all Soviet republics, including those of the Party Control Commission. This inevitably creates a gap of archival sources in this dissertation for the years 1961 to the early 1980s. The key material for the 1980s was obtained in Fond 89, a “special collection” of classified documents, which contained a number of valuable documents on the “cotton affair”.

Beyond RGANI and RGASPI, other archival sources used include: the Dmitri Volkogonov papers at the Library of Congress, containing some other declassified material on the “cotton affair” in the 1980s; the Alexander Yakovlev archives whose holdings include a few relevant primary sources (http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org); and George Washington University’s collection of Soviet documents (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/rus/Collections.html). Primary sources and contemporaneous Russian writings used for the pre-Soviet background in Chapter 2 have been gathered principally at the Russian State Library in Moscow and at the Library of Congress.

In parallel to examining archival material, I have employed the Uzbek Central Committee’s official resolutions and plenum reports published in Pravda and Pravda Vostoka. These provide a useful check to the classified material and an opportunity to examine the extent to which public reports correspond or deviate from it. Additional information has been gleaned from some of the Party Control Commission’s published material dating to the early 1980s, which included assessments on the status of party
violations in each Soviet republic. These informative publications previously belonged to the library of the USSR Central Committee but are now accessible at RGANI.

When evaluating archival documents the strategy was in part to search for references to localism (mestnichestvo or zemlyachestvo), nepotism (kumovstvo) and promotion of rodstvenniki (relatives or “kinsmen”). The language used in Soviet party documents is Russian which make these Russian terms the categories of analysis here rather than their Uzbek or English equivalents (e.g. mahalgaroi, clan). The contemporary English word used, “clan”, or its Russian loanword “klan” was never encountered during this author’s archival research on either Uzbekistan or elsewhere, even if Siberian, Caucasian, Kazakh, and Turkmen tribes (plemya) are occasionally referred to. The use or non-use of these concepts for Uzbekistan’s politics were compared also with their use or non-use in other Central Asian and non-Central Asian republics to gain an appreciation of the incidence of these phenomena comparatively. The employment of these terms formed the main benchmarks for comparison.

However, archival documents were not only assessed on these criteria but also what they reveal about Soviet politics in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in general. For

29 The volumes consulted are: V.M. Lyukov et. al., Partijnyj Kontrol’: Printsipy, Praktika, Zadachi (Moskva: Polizdat, 1983); Spravochnik Partijnogo Rabotnika (Moskva, 1983); and Organizatsionnaya Rabota v Organakh Narodnogo Kontrolya SSSR (Moskva: Ekonomika, 1982).
example, what were the main sources of conflict in the Uzbek Central Committee and between what types of groups? What were the respective powers of the native First Secretary and non-native Second Secretary in cadre policy and appointments, the powers of which formally belonged to latter? And what were the main forms of party violations in Uzbekistan and in what ways, if any, did they differ from other republics? Answers to these questions and other related ones have been sought persistently, though the nature of archival material and their often uneven temporal coverage inevitably renders some data and analysis more exhaustive on these questions than others.

Biographical Data

By far the most difficult, though not insurmountable, obstacle on this topic is the sparsity of biographical data. Reliable biographical data are essential since career patterns and birth places cannot be established without it. Yet there is no single comprehensive source of biographical information on leading Uzbek province- and republic-level officials in either the English and Russian languages. General sources such as the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (in Russian and English) only provides data on Uzbek heads of state and party, not officials at lower levels or even members of the Central Committee Bureau. Instead, this information must be pieced together from other more obscure sources. The foremost biographical resource for Uzbek officials is the Uzbek Soviet
Encyclopedia, which was published only in the Uzbek language. This 14-volume encyclopedia was published sequentially from 1971 to 1980, starting with the first volume A-B in 1971 and ending with “Kh”, the last letter in the Uzbek Cyrillic alphabet, in 1980. The Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia includes biographical information, including birthplace, for most though not all leading Uzbek officials at the province- and republic-level. Some of those omitted, however, appear in the equivalent encyclopedias for the other Soviet Central Asian republics, especially the Tajik Soviet Encyclopedia, the Kyrgyz Soviet Encyclopedia, and the Kazakh Soviet Encyclopedia. These have also been employed for establishing career patterns and origins of some Tajik officials. The importance of this primary source of official biographical data on Uzbek and Central Asian officials cannot be understated since there exists no other comparable source, except for the obituaries and other tidbits of biographical material published in Pravda Vostoka and other local newspapers. Less comprehensive but still informative is the Sovetskij Enstikopedicheskij Slovar’, published in the Kyrgyz Soviet republic, which

contains thumbnail sketches of a few leading Central Asian officials.\textsuperscript{34} Another source used is the 2010 edition of the \textit{O`zbekistan Milliy Entsiklopediyasi}, which is less exhaustive than its Soviet predecessor, more arbitrary in its selection of Uzbek officials, but a valuable complement since it contains biographical information of several since rehabilitated Soviet Uzbek officials excluded in the 1970s version.\textsuperscript{35}

Biographical data have been employed, in part, to test the assertion that figures from particular Uzbek regions clustered in specific state institutions during the Soviet period. Because of the dearth of biographical material on Soviet Uzbek officials, this inquiry must be limited in scope and focus mainly on the top executive body of Soviet Uzbekistan – the Central Committee and its Bureau. This alone is a challenge since a few disgraced officials have vanished from the pages of encyclopedias, but it is nevertheless an indicator to the prevalence of regionalism and localism, and a test of the accuracy of existing data on the subject. Biographical data also shed light on elite mobility between oblasts and the extent of “rootedness” among officials, potentially intersecting careers among patrons and clients, the amount of native/non-native oblast first secretaries, and the degree to which republican-level officials rose through the provinces. The latter has proven to be a catalyst of “regionalism” elsewhere in the USSR and deserves to be tested

\textsuperscript{34} Sovetskij Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar’ (Frunze: Kyrgyz Soviet Entsiklopediyasynyn Bashky Redaktsiyasy, 1986).

\textsuperscript{35} O`zbekistan Milliy Entsiklopediyasi (Tashkent, 2010).
in Uzbekistan as well. No comprehensive study of politics in Soviet Uzbekistan can do without reliable biographical sources. They are thin evidence alone, however, since they do not reveal motives, sources of conflict, Moscow’s perceptions of the absence or presence of localism, in whose hands political power over appointments were, and what happened behind the curtains of publicly available data in general. This lacunae must be filled with archival sources – policy directives, party control documents, letters, evaluations, and other assessments.

The Evolution of the Clan/Region Hypothesis

The Neglect of Primary Sources

A primary source is typically defined as a document written or created during the time under study by someone present and with “inside experiences” and a secondary source the interpretation of primary sources. In this definition, the present literature on clans and regions in Soviet Uzbekistan has been based on neither primary nor secondary sources unless Soviet media is treated as a “primary source”. Evidence has appeared in five main forms: biographical data on birth places and regions of origin of officials

whereby officials from particular places are declared to have dominated the state apparatus at various points in time;\textsuperscript{37} circumstantial “cultural” evidence regarding Central Asia’s traditionally tribal and patriarchal society;\textsuperscript{38} material on Soviet administrative-territorial policy and “stability of cadres” in regions;\textsuperscript{39} interviews with officials pertaining to the post-Soviet period;\textsuperscript{40} news media; as well as references to other published books and articles.

This absence of primary sources, rarely reflected upon by adherents of the clan/region hypothesis, generates a risk of unintended abstraction, reification and a cumulative chain of reinterpretations and misinterpretations. Hypotheses may be amplified and reformulated yet without the addition of new real evidence based on primary sources. Even if several scholars have brought considerable insight to bear on Uzbekistan’s opaque politics, it is necessary to insert a “reality check” by tracing how the clan/region hypothesis evolved in the absence of primary or secondary sources. This, in turn, may offer initial clues to the robustness of this premise.

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\textsuperscript{38} See e.g. Olivier Roy, \textit{Det Nya Centralasien} (Stockholm: Alhambra, 2002).
\textsuperscript{39} See e.g. Pauline Jones Luong, \textit{Institutional Change and Political Continuity in post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{40} See e.g. Kathleen Collins, \textit{Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
\end{flushright}
The Pre-1986 Literature

The role of personal linkages bypassing or interfering with the *nomenklatura* system and formal channels became an intensely studied area of Soviet politics in the 1960s and 1970s. But these analyses were generally confined to the politics of the center or the national republics in the Western part of the empire -- in particular Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Lithuania -- and did not extend to Central Asia. Only a handful of publications hinted to the presence of recruitment on a “local” or kinship-basis in Uzbekistan. Of these, the *Handbook of Central Asia* in 1956 noted the “special problem” of “bribes, nepotism, and friendship ties in choosing personnel for remunerative posts in Central Asia.” Likewise, Alexandre Bennigsen remarked in 1979 that the kolkhozes [in Turkmenistan and in particular in Kazakhstan] were “often based on clan kinship” and in some places even cadres “were selected for certain positions in local party and government organs according to clan/tribal structure”. Citing both the *Handbook of Central Asia* and Bennigsen’s article, Nancy Lubin similarly postulated in 1984 that

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kinship was of “importance” in Central Asian cadre selection and that “blood ties or ancestry” had simply been “transferred to modern day-hiring practices in Uzbekistan”\(^\text{44}\). Except for these observations, none of which provided any specific examples, regionalism or localism were still peripheral concerns and undeveloped hypotheses at this point.

It is true that some Russian and French experts spoke about a social basis of “clans” in Central Asia from the late 1950s.\(^\text{45}\) But there were no suggestions in this literature that these “clan” impulses had penetrated politics.\(^\text{46}\) Bennigsen, cited above, even criticized Soviet ethnographers at the time for “exaggerating” the problem of surviving clans for political purposes. Bennigsen did recognize the presence of intact “clans” in a kolkhoz in Uzbekistan’s rural Khorezm oblast, parts of Kazakhstan, and a


few other places but viewed these as “isolated cases”.\textsuperscript{47} Extended families were still an important part of Central Asian society but these were “clans” in name only, and the shape and strength of these varied enormously and among the sedentary Bashkir, Tatar, Azeris, Uzbeks and Tajiks they “had practically disappeared.”\textsuperscript{48}

Even in the nomadic areas, S.M. Abramzon in the 1950s distinguished an evolution of kinship bonds from one of “totem clans” or \textit{rodo\textsuperscript{v}aya obshchina} in the first centuries of the first millennium, to \textit{aul\textquotesingle na\textsuperscript{v}aja obschina} (village society) towards the end of the millennium, patriarchal extended families thereafter, conjugal smaller extended families in the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} centuries, and unions of these families by the time of the Bolshevik revolution. Economic development broke up the traditional “totem clan”, diversified loyalties from territory, introduced a class element to the extended families, and bound families together on an economic basis. Thus, in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century family units in the nomadic areas had undergone quite a transformation. Even if the “unions of families” often shared the belief in a mythical common ancestor, the “clans” at this point in time were quite different from their predecessors in history.\textsuperscript{49} The Kyrgyz and

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\item[]\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, p.88.
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Kazakhs, Alexander Park remarks, were “in a transitional stage between nomadism and agriculture [where] tribal ties, though still important were slowly disintegrating”. Only the Turkmen retained the old tribal political organization almost intact.

Conceivably, the general scholarly neglect of “localism” in Central Asia stemmed from the assumption that politics in Central Asia followed general Soviet norms and was not distinct from other Soviet republics. Thus, Irwin Selnick’s dissertation on elite recruitment in Uzbekistan from 1984 inferred that nationality was the main determinant of power distribution whereby Central Asians and non-Central Asians were allocated institutionalized quotas in placement of cadre. As such, the share of natives/non-natives was not determined by either the lack of qualified Central Asian cadre or Moscow’s preference for central appointees. Offices were distributed by a carefully elaborated formula whereby some offices were reserved for natives and others for non-natives. Thus, “the mechanism of political recruitment [in Uzbekistan],” he concluded, “is based more on central determinations than personal decisions”. Selnick


52 Ibid., p. 7.
speaks about “localism” in Uzbekistan at a few points in the dissertation. However, by localism he means not the power of regions and cities but Uzbek “localism” vis-à-vis Moscow, i.e., the protection of Uzbek interests against Russia. If someone demonstrated tendencies of “localism”, this implied the favoring of Uzbek interests over Soviet ones. Region of origin, birth place, and the like were not mentioned, let alone considered to be of importance.

Likewise, Gregory Gleason’s dissertation on the politics of Uzbekistan’s cotton complex during the Brezhnev era (also completed in 1984) did not perceive these factors. Other first-rate scholars -- Richard Pipes, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, and others -- did not take note of these phenomena either at the time. If anything, what defined the literature of the 1960s and 1970s was the emphasis on the uniting force of nationalism among the Uzbek and Central Asian elite, not divisive forces of regionalism.


By the time of Gorbachev’s launch of glasnost and perestroika in 1986, this literature underwent a profound transformation. While nationalism and ethnicity remained in focus several years thereafter the analysis of political power in Central Asia was incrementally overtaken by the emphasis on regionalism and “clans”. Perhaps the reorientation towards regionalism was to be expected since similar observations had been made elsewhere in the USSR.\(^{56}\) However, the regionalism in Central Asia was disjointed and asserted to be of a different quality than in other Soviet republics. Here, it was attributed to pre-Soviet history and Central Asia’s clan-based society and not primarily to Soviet policies and structures of trust in Soviet society.

**The Pioneering Contribution: Carlisle’s 1986 Article**

The first contribution on regionalized power was Donald Carlisle’s pioneering article on the Uzbek “power elite” published in 1986.\(^{57}\) Identifying a number of regionally based power groups in Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Ferghana Valley, Samarkand/Bukhara, Khorezm/Karakalpaks, and Kashkadarya/Surkhandarya), this article


was the embryo from which the post-Soviet literature on clans and region would develop.™ Carlisle’s argument was that the geographical subdivisions in the Moscow-published book “Uzbekistan” of Uzbekistan’s “Salient Regions” could also be translated into a political map with the regional loyalties and geographic power bases of Uzbek politicians corresponding neatly with these regions.⁵⁹

Hence, (1) and (2) in Map 1 below matched with the salient regions/political factions of Tashkent and Ferghana Valley, (3) to Samarkand/Bukhara, (4) to Kashkandarya and Surkhandarya, and 5) to Karakalpakstan and Khorezm. Carlisle did not define these factions as “clans” but as a “type of regional ‘group politics’” founded upon a politician’s “local loyalties and regional roots”, which ostensibly were unique to Uzbekistan and Central Asia”.⁶⁰

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⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 92.
Map 1: Uzbekistan’s “Salient Regions”

1) Northeastern, 2) Eastern, 3) Central, 4) Southern, and 5) Northwestern.


Carlisle’s main body of evidence in support of this regionalization was biographical/career data of Uzbek officials and a compilation of the “regional roots” of the Uzbek elite in the Politburo and Secretariat during the Rashidov era. This map and
analysis formed the foundation for the “regionalism” framework which Pauline Jones Luong and other prominent authors nearly two decades thereafter would further refine.\textsuperscript{61}

While pathbreaking, at least two problems could be identified with this regional theory: First, the “Salient Regions” conflicted with the regional political identities spoken of. For example, the Tashkent region (1) on this map includes the entire Jizak oblast (which surrounds the placement of the number “1” on this map). Politically, however, Jizak has been associated by Carlisle and others with the Samarkand faction and as the primary antagonist of the Tashkent-based group. Second, the “Salient Regions” coincide neatly with Uzbekistan’s six original oblasts at the time of delimitation in 1925 – Zaravshan, Kashkadaria, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khorezm, and Ferghana. But these were broken up into smaller units and constantly readjusted. As soon as a year thereafter, in 1926, they had nearly doubled to 10 oblasts and these were also the main building blocks that were to define Uzbekistan’s oblasts ever since.\textsuperscript{62} If the hypothesis that administrative-territorial borders served to reinforce loyalties is correct, then the


\textsuperscript{62} The 1926 oblasts (then called okrugs) were Bukhara, Urta-Zaravshan, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khodjent, Khorezm, Andijan, and Kokand. See S. K. Abdurazakov, \textit{Administrativno-Territorial’noe Ustroistvo Uzbekskoj SSR} (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1987).
proliferation of oblasts should rather have broken up than fostered the regionalism associated with the “Salient Regions” and the original six oblasts.

Nonetheless, this was a novel framework and it competed with several other interpretations of elite recruitment in the same volume of the journal, ranging from ethnic determinants of politics to the force of nationalism. Of these, however, the clan/region hypothesis would eventually emerge as the “paradigm”. Uzbek nationalism was generally confined to citizen nationalism in the literature and not a property of a united nationalistic Uzbek elite. The dissolution of the Soviet Union also partially dislodged the “ethnic” aspect of politics since Russians were gradually purged from the state apparatus in the first decade of independence.


64 Thus, James Critchlow’s insightful Nationalism in Uzbekistan speaks about a fractious Uzbek elite, even if united when battling Moscow. See James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

65 From the late Stalin period and on non-Central Asians (principally Russians and Ukrainians) almost invariably made up a third of the personnel in the state/party apparatus. After independence these numbers dwindled. For example, in the Uzbek cabinet of 2002 all 15 ministers were Central Asian. See Irwin Steven Selnick, The Ethnic and Political Determinants of Elite Recruitment in the Soviet National Republics: The Uzbek Soviet Elite, 1952-1981, PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1984; and Sostav
The Post-1986 Literature

Putting the past in a new light, Carlisle’s pioneering article inspired a new post-1986 literature whose common denominator was the emphasis on clans, regionalism, and solidarity groups. Several dozen articles and book chapters were subsequently published, most of which were concentrated in the 1990s and 2000s.66 Carlisle only superficially


elaborated on the causes behind the Uzbek regional power groups but this lacuna was filled by subsequent scholars. Henceforth, the roots of factionalism were generally understood to be three: Uzbekistan’s traditionally “clan-based” social organization, the Soviet Union’s empowerment of particular regions, and/or the paternalism of Central Asian Islamic society. Some stressed the synergy of all of them, others only one or two. Novel in this new literature, however, was the turn to society as a determinant of politics in Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

A key contribution was Olivier Roy’s *The New Central Asia*, first published in French in 1997. This book devotes several chapters to Uzbekistan’s and Central Asia’s “solidarity groups”, the “core unit” of social organization in pre-Soviet Central Asia. These groups were often but not always place-based in the *qawm*, *mahalla*, or *avlod* -- all terms relating to extended families and communal forms of living -- and tribally organized only among the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, and Turkmens. In Roy’s interpretation, Soviet rule breathed new life into these networks whose manifestations in politics became region-based elite power groupings (e.g. Khodkent or Kulabi in Tajikistan and Tashkent or Samarkand in Uzbekistan). To acquire and retain power, the leaders in the Soviet Central Asian republics built power bases which “always were regional”. Power holders rose to the top with the assistance of figures from their native regions and once there they

reciprocated by promoting their *rodstvenniki* into positions of power. This gave solidarity groups a social territorial anchoring that “their Russian counterparts were lacking”.\(^{68}\) Soviet government territorialized these groups with its administrative divisions into oblast, rayon etc., and at lower levels collectivization in kolkhozes and sovkhozes produced the same effect. The result was regionalized “political webs” competing for state resources. In Soviet Uzbekistan these were manifested in tightly organized “solidarity groups” from Tashkent, Ferghana Valley, and Samarkand/Jizak.\(^{69}\) Roy cites few biographical data but builds his case on an intimate knowledge of Central Asian “solidarity groups” historically.

Roy’s argument subsequently branched out in two separate interpretations: Kathleen Collins’ “clans” and Pauline Jones Luong’s “regionalism”. Collins’ *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) is the most extensive published study on “clans” in Central Asia to date and builds on her doctoral dissertation. Collins defines “clans” in Central Asia as informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by “kin and fictive kin identities”.\(^{70}\) Bound together by “tight-knit, pre-national collective identities”, clans

\(^{68}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{70}\) The adjective “fictive” denotes ties that “go beyond blood ties and incorporate individuals into the network through marriage, family alliances, school ties, localism (mestnichestvo), and neighborhood
should be distinguished from ethnicity since “clan identity is associated with a particular geographical region”.\textsuperscript{71} Further, unlike clientilism, which is transitory, dyadic, non-kin-based and “without group or identity content”, clan relations have both “an organization and an identity.”\textsuperscript{72} The operational core consists of a kin unit at the center, which radiates outwards in multiple levels incorporating “extended kin relations, including kin by marriage, and the relations of marital kin.”\textsuperscript{73} Thus, the “dominant principle of appointments” in Uzbekistan and Central Asia was \textit{zemlyachestvo}, defined as the “appointment of one’s family, kin, and friends from the place of one’s birth.”\textsuperscript{74} Collins’ work is undoubtedly strong theoretically but like the other contributions discussed here it is not based on primary sources. It is therefore unclear, for instance, how she can state with such certainty that \textit{zemlyachestvo} was the “dominant principle of appointment” in (mahalla) and village (qishloq).” Collins includes the notion of “fictive kinship” to emphasize how “the subjective sense of identity” and the “the norms of kinship” e.g. in-group reciprocity and loyalty are “more important than the objective reality of kinship” in binding the group and protecting its members. See Kathleen Collins, \textit{Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.


\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 167.
Soviet Uzbekistan since the only record containing such information is in party
documents.

Luong’s approach differs from Collins in her emphasis on formal politics and
“strong regions”. Regionalism is defined in terms of the predominance of regional
political identities and should be distinguished from both “clan” and “solidarity groups”. In this interpretation, “Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created,
transformed, and institutionalized regional political identities, while at the same time
eliminating tribal, religious, and national identities.”

This does not negate the earlier presence of “clans” and tribes in Central Asia’s pre-Soviet history, Luong argues, but
Soviet rule repackaged these in Soviet administrative institutions. Tribal powers were
usurped by the vast authority vested in the Soviet obkom (oblast committee) First
Secretaries, which eliminated informal “clan” politics. The First Secretary had access to
scarce resources, something which was reinforced by the Soviet command system based
on shortages. This redefined existing clan and tribal-based patronage networks to the
regional level while disempowering the tribal structures of pre-Soviet Central Asia since
these lacked any official recognition or institutional resources.

Moreover, Central Asian officials throughout the Soviet period tended to be much more “rooted” in single oblasts

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than elsewhere in the USSR, which fuelled these strong regional identities.\textsuperscript{77} The creation of strong regional identities, at the expense of tribal or “clan” networks, was the rudimentary factor which preserved stability and continuity with the Soviet system after independence. The end result, however, is highly similar since these strong “identities” have led Uzbekistan’s leaders to promote figures from their home regions.\textsuperscript{78} The main evidence furnished in support of strong regional identities is a compilation of tenures of obkom First Secretaries and the extent to which they served their careers in single oblasts.

The contributions of Collins, Luong, and Roy are variants of Carlisle’s initial framework and all cite it in their works. Where they diverge is in the emphasis placed on kinship. Collins asserts that kinship is the cement of these alliances. Roy’s interpretation is slightly different since solidarity groups could but need not be focused on kinship. Luong, finally, proposes that the Soviet legacy privileged political affiliations based on region over those based on “kinship, religion, or nationality”.\textsuperscript{79} Her emphasis is on regional affiliation as an indicator of loyalty rather than birth place or primordial

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 88.
attachments. Whatever the differences between these approaches, they all seek to explain
the same outcome of officials from particular oblasts that cluster together and favor each
other and that this was, essentially, exceptional for Central Asia. In other words, all have
derived different explanations for an outcome which they all identify as undisputed.
Thus, Pauline Jones Luong notes that Sharaf Rashidov, who ruled the republic from 1959
to 1982, surrounded himself “with leaders from his own region [and] accomplished this
in a very overt manner”\footnote{Pauline Jones Luong, ”Sources of Institutional Continuity: The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia,” Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 2, 2000, p.19.}. Regional identities were and are the main cleavages in politics, and this \textit{leitmotiv} represents a significant departure from pre-1986 interpretations when
no such politicking had been uncovered. Other than this, all also view regional and
national identity as dichotomous: strong regional identities by definition imply a weak
national identity.

It should be noted, however, that this shift in thinking is not primarily a
consequence of the surfacing of new evidence, data, and sources. While some new
evidence on “clans” have been introduced on Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet politics published
in the post-Soviet period, typically based on interviews,\footnote{Kathleen Collins, \textit{Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).} no existing study of “clans” or

\footnote{Pauline Jones Luong, ”Sources of Institutional Continuity: The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia,” Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 2, 2000, p.19.}
region during the Soviet era is based on archival sources. That the shift in emphasis
towards “clans” and regions coincided with Moscow’s determined anti-corruption
campaign during perestroika to portray Uzbekistan in this light is also ground for high
suspicion. Thus, it is worth asking if the assumed powers of “clans” and regional
identities in Uzbekistan were more a function of Moscow’s discourse and the gradual
amplification of these claims than conclusions based on primary sources and real
evidence.

Patron-Client Relationships Elsewhere in the USSR

An alternative hypothesis to “clans” and regionalism in Uzbekistan is the form
of patronage politics elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Even if “clan” and region were not
factors in analyses of Uzbek and Central Asian politics up until the Gorbachev era, what
did fill the pages of Soviet Studies, Slavic Review, and other journals throughout the
Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras was the pervasive favoritism and protégé networks in the
drew cadres from his native Dnepropetrovsk, \(^83\) Khrushchev smoothed the way for former colleagues in Moscow oblast and the Ukraine, \(^84\) and Zhdanov did similarly with figures from Leningrad. \(^85\) Rarely were these portrayed as forming “clans” or “regional groups”. They just worked within the informal rules of the Soviet system, and those who were good at it were also the ones who reached the top.

Diverse as their aims were, the practitioners of Soviet politics had one thing in common, namely that career success was determined by building “networks of reciprocal favor”. \(^86\) Such networks may have been created from friendships and understandings formed from intersecting past careers, shared values, similar personalities, or early political associations with a particular province. \(^87\) Because upward mobility was the goal of most aspiring officials, informal patron-client linkages were built vertically through the state from district up to the all-Union level. \(^88\) Beginning with Stalin’s control of the


\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 709.


Orgburo in the 1920s, few slots in the state machinery were more potent than controlling the nomenklatura and the ability to place one’s protégés in leading state and party positions. It had the added benefit of cultivating loyalties among those who were appointed, creating links of mutual dependence.

Thus, V. Kruzhkov and Yu. Zhdanov wrote in a confidential party report in 1950 how “cadres [in the Soviet system] are selected not on the basis of political qualities but on the basis of friendly relations…linked by mutual responsibility (svyazannykh krugovoj porukoj)”. Soviet patron-client relations could but needed not involve kinship. Nor was there any general concern for the well-being of the coalition of protégés per se, by contrast to the group solidarities of “clans”. Rather networks formed on the basis of rapport established between specific individuals who sustained each other to advance in their careers. The roots of such career-based loyalties are deep. In imperial Russia they reach back to the 18th and 19th centuries when “kinship” and “monarchical proximity” as sources of career advancement gave way for, first, “geographical location” which drew in

those who had served in the same province and, second, “institutional position”, assembling figures who had worked in the same office or functional organ.\textsuperscript{92} Stalin’s speech to the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee perhaps captured this most authoritatively, lamenting that some party leaders had “dragged along large numbers of their protégés to serve under them in their new posts” when “transferred from region to region”.\textsuperscript{93} Similar networks pervaded all areas of the state and party, not least academia. In the Soviet Academy of Sciences, for example, researchers sometimes clustered in institutions on the basis of nationality since they brought in former colleagues from the republics. Once in Moscow they returned the support given by former colleagues by promoting them.\textsuperscript{94}

Work place, not region of origin \textit{per se}, bound these officials to each other and served as the source of patron-client relations. Thus, the formative years of Khrushchev and Brezhnev in the Ukraine would be consequential for their promotions two decades

\textsuperscript{94} RGASPI, f. 17, op. 119, d.183, l.185-186. “Otdel Propagandy i Agitatsii Ts.K. VKP (B) – v Sekretariat Ts.K. VKP (B) o Neobkhodimosti Zameny Rukovodstva Upravleniya Kadrov AN SSSR”, December 15, 1950.
later. By the time of the 20th Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev had replaced the party secretaries in seven of 14 republics and 41 of 69 regions within Russia. Among these, three of the republic secretaries and six of the regional secretaries were his former subordinates from the Ukraine.95 In 1951, no Ukrainian served on the Politburo; two decades later, in 1971, four of the fourteen voting members on this board were Ukrainians.96 When a regional leader obtained a position higher up, “he or she promoted members of the regional family circle to prominent positions.”97

The changing patterns of upward mobility in the Soviet system gave further impetus to the “localism” of these coalitions of protégés. The career path from province to republic or all-Union level became straighter with Stalin’s demise.98 Khrushchev and Brezhnev presided over a system which became increasingly oriented towards recruiting Politburo personnel beyond the central organs of government, and this was reflected in

regionalization of politics as members and candidates in the Politburo brought in friends and colleagues from the provinces. The consequence was a “territorialization” of elite factions. In the Brezhnev Politburo and Secretariat at least five such factions can be distinguished: Brezhnev’s group from his native Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine, the Suslov-Pelshe Ponomarev clique, a Kharkov faction headed by Nikolai Podgorny, a Belarussian group presided over by Piotr Masherov, and a Moscow group led by Ivan Kapitonov.

A parallel development occurred in the republics, where oblast secretaryship became a spring board to the highest offices at the republic level. Because the First Secretaries of the republics, as a rule, had previously served in provincial organs, their former colleagues and clients in these provincial apparatuses were favored. The cliques that formed in each republic therefore often took on the character of place-based networks, skewed towards appointees who had previously served in the same province or republics as their patron. Lithuania is a case in point. Having served as First Secretary of Vilnius prior to being named Lithuania’s First Secretary, Grishkiavichus soon named former colleagues from the Vilnius party organization to key party and state positions at


the republic level. Such networks could be pinpointed in Belarus as well where cadres from Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts dominated republic-level leadership in the two decades from 1966 to 1986, the clusters of which formed under the patronage of First Secretary N.N. Sliunkov (Minsk, 1983-1987) and Second Secretary A.N. Aksenov (Vitebsk, 1971-78) among others.

That provincially rooted officials in the Soviet Union brought in their friends and former co-workers to the national level created something which resembled “clans” but which was in essence a function of Soviet cadre policy and the nature of trust in Soviet society. The difference being that in Uzbekistan this favoritism became known as “clans”; in Russia and the Slavic republics they were just normal Soviet politics. In Uzbekistan this phenomenon was linked with “identity”; in Russia, Belarus, and elsewhere it concerned career advancement and self-interest. Regional patronage networks in the Western republics did not preclude national solidarities; in the Eastern they did. These distinctions are important since they strike at the core of national consolidation and the degree of regional cleavages.

101 Ibid., p. 168.
The nodes in this Soviet patronage system were the First Secretaries at each level of the party apparatus. Organized on the principle of *edinonachalie* (one-man management), the obkom First Secretaries and the First Secretaries of the republics possessed enormous powers in the Soviet command economy, especially during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods when powers were transferred from the “state” to the party. They were in control of the supplies and scarce resources to the local and oblast level, factory managers, and kolkhoz chairmen, and became the center of politicking from the local level and up as well as the arbiters of resources distributed from the center.\(^{103}\) Thus positioned as the middlemen for production and investment, the First Secretaries became a source of some of the most destructive patron-client relationships in the Soviet system.

If First Secretaries were the primary actors, *blat* was their main currency. Banned in official Soviet discourse but present in confidential telegrams and documents, *blat* referred to the size of one’s informal network and ability to command loyalty and favors from others. In a confidential Soviet document, *blat* is described as the marriage of “nepotism and protection” (*kumovstvo* and *protektsiya*) whereby “cronies [are] appointed to positions exempt from hard work…in short through connections made involving all

sorts of privileges and covered in crime.”¹⁰⁴ Not only an elite term, blat or “connections” was used extensively among Soviet citizens as a measurement of one’s capability to acquire consumer goods, favors from others, repairs on one’s apartment, and virtually any service or good that were in short supply.¹⁰⁵ Blat, in turn, gave rise to the tolkach (the “five percenter”) who knew “who had what and how to make the proper arrangements.”¹⁰⁶ All things being equal, an official with extensive blat was bound to move upward significantly faster in the food chain of Soviet politics than one with lesser. Because blat was acquired through interactions with others, it was primarily centered on the primary locales where officials interacted, i.e., in party and state organs at all levels, creating geographical or functional stove-pipes of political power according to the particular career mobility patterns.

All of this culminated in “family groups” whose members collaborated in the attainment of production goals and other shared interests. With supplies being scarce and

production goals often set exceedingly high, family groups covered up for and protected each other. This acted as a safety valve when production goals could not be met: they could conceal failures but only through collaboration with others. As such, “family groups” were a defense mechanism against the controls of the omnipresent state and its often unrealistic and contradictory demands.  

Curiously the literature cited above on “family groups” and regionalism in the rest of the USSR has eluded the attention of Central Asia analysts who tend to assert the uniqueness of Central Asia’s “clan-based” history or a peculiar “Central Asian regionalism”. Consequently, the debate has centered on “Central Asian factionalism” as if it were wholly separate from that elsewhere in the USSR. If such entities as “clans” from Ferghana, Tashkent, and Samarkand exist the question is how these can be meaningfully distinguished from the dozens of other regionally based factions and “family groups” in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Russia and other places cited above. Deferring this issue until later, it is worth noting at this point that patron-client relations

elsewhere in the Soviet Union, even if different from those of Central Asia, may have had similar or nearly identical manifestations.

**Scope and Limitations**

The temporal scope of this dissertation is the Soviet period, 1917 to 1991, but it also touches on pre-Soviet and post-Soviet government and society. Emphasis is on the post-Stalin period but archival research has been conducted also for the Stalin years down to 1953. The time period covered is extensive but justified on several grounds. First, the focus on localism is quite narrow in itself. The archival material available on the topic as regards Soviet Uzbekistan in the RGANI and RGASPI archives is not extensive and manageable within the time and resources of this project. There was thus no compelling reason to leave parts of this material aside. This, of course, precludes a thorough elaboration of other aspects of the politics and economy in Soviet Uzbekistan, e.g. collectivization, labor, and nationalities policy, which have been the focus of other insightful studies.\(^\text{110}\)

That archival sources for much of the Brezhnev period remain classified is one obvious limitation of this dissertation. When these archives are opened, other documentary sources may surface that challenge the conclusions reached herein. As such, this dissertation does not aspire to provide “final answers” to the questions asked even if it goes beyond existing works by building on primary sources.

A further limitation is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve in each and every individual case whether the appointment of a particular official was primarily centrally or locally determined. The documentary evidence in the RGASPI and RGANI archives contain such information for only a handful of senior-level appointments. Whether a state official was selected for a particular position from the nomenklatura on the basis of central or local influences is, of course, highly important for the questions asked. Formally, the Second Secretary, who almost invariably was a central appointee, was in charge of cadre policy. If this rule had always been followed, it would be meaningless to speak of appointments of key officials in the obkom and republican-level on the basis of “clan” ties since the locals were not empowered to make such decisions. But as this dissertation shows, this rule was often circumvented. Not infrequently, the First Secretaries, who uniformly were Uzbeks since 1929 in Uzbekistan, took over the Second Secretary’s powers of cadre appointment and oftentimes with Moscow’s tacit approval. This was particularly pronounced during the post-World War II Stalin and Brezhnev periods even if the extent of local powers then is not yet fully known.
The inability to determine with precision if political powers rested primarily centrally or locally and how it varied from case to case strikes a discordant note to any scholarly research on the topic. No available source exists to judge the power of cadre appointment precisely for each case. Until such archival material appears, if it exists, one must be content with acknowledging this lacunae, state every instance in which appointment power is revealed in archival documents, cautiously draw some general trends on this basis, and be cognizant of the limits to this inquiry.

Outline of Dissertation

The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of pre-Soviet state and society. This is followed by an assessment of Soviet nationality policies and the Soviet national delimitation in 1924, which created modern Uzbekistan and the Central Asian republics. The main finding is that the national delimitation, contrary to what has been assumed, counteracted subnational loyalties since the privileges and power of the native elite were embedded in the formation of the new republic. It was a vehicle to careers and power and a prize to which the Uzbek elite attached their allegiances.

Chapter 3 compares forms of party violations in Stalin era Uzbekistan with patterns elsewhere in the Soviet Union and analyzes sources of internal conflict in the Uzbek elite. Three main findings are presented. First, the Stalin-period has typically been
considered an era of extensive centralization. This was true down to the early to mid-1940s but thereafter the local First Secretaries in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan wielded significant powers, especially on cadre appointments. Second, the main split in Uzbekistan’s Central Committee during this era was not within the Uzbek elite, as has been assumed, but between Uzbeks and Russians. Third, in contrast to his Tajik counterpart Gafurov, the Uzbek First Secretary Yusupov’s promotions had only a weak, if any, territorial basis. Most were rather acquaintances he had encountered during his career in Tashkent as several independent sources attest to, including biographical data, archival material, and Yusupov’s biographers.

Chapter 4 appraises party violations and loyalties in Uzbekistan under Khrushchev. Determined to eradicate the nepotism that flourished in the post-World War II period, Khrushchev launched a union-wide campaign on the ills of *zemlyachestvo*. Yet Uzbekistan never became a part of this even if the Party Control Commission identified other party violations in Uzbekistan. Khrushchev’s dizzying reforms and the creation of winners and losers nonetheless infused the political system with “groupism”, i.e. sectional groups that pursued distinct policy-related interests, which became particularly salient in Uzbekistan’s Cotton Production Complex. This development served to further reinforce career-based as opposed to place-based loyalties.

Chapter 5 examines the Brezhnev period, focusing in particular on Uzbekistan’s long-standing First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov. There is scant evidence that Rashidov one-sidedly favored individuals from his native Samarkand, as has been argued. To the
contrary, Rashidov’s “coalition of protégés” came from more diverse origins than at any
time in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history, which was reflected in the Central Committee
Bureau. Reports of the Party Control Commission did neither single out zemlyachestvo as
a particular concern in Uzbekistan. However, a transcript of the Tashkent obkom party
congress in 1964 attests to the prevalence of career-based loyalties among the individuals
who spoke up. This period, which typically has been viewed as the most clear-cut
example of region-based politics, is probably the one in which empirical support for it is
the weakest.

Chapter 6, covering the Andropov and Gorbachev periods, examines the
ubiquitous nepotism in the USSR as a whole, the evolution of Uzbekistan’s “cotton
affair”, and reasons for skepticism towards the data presented. Evidence on “clans” has
been drawn from this period but later in the 1980s it was revealed that many of the claims
by Soviet authorities surrounding the affair had been fabricated.

Chapter 7 analyzes Gorbachev’s determination to uproot the Uzbek power elite,
Uzbekistan’s “silent rehabilitation” from the “cotton affair” in 1989, and the construction
of “clans” in Soviet media and scholarship during the 1980s. Paradoxically, at the same
moment that scholars began speaking of “clans”, in 1989, the Soviet Politburo (behind
closed doors) addressed the flaws of this discourse and how the anti-corruption
investigators, Gdlyan and Ivanov, had manipulated media to portray Uzbekistan in an
unfavorable light. The chapter concludes by touching on President Karimov’s strategy in
curtailing regionalism after independence.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, distinguishes the myths from the realities of Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics, and notes implications for the understanding of post-Soviet conflict in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The main finding of this dissertation, that Uzbekistan’s coalitions of protégés were fundamentally non-territorial, has implications not only for our understanding of the Soviet political system. It also has implications for the republic’s prospects of building a viable nation-state and chances of avoiding civil conflict in the future.

Introduction

The literature on “clans” and regions has typically treated Soviet Central Asia as a homogenous whole. Or, at least, that similarities in its common history, culture, and social organization were more pronounced than the differences. But there were and are important distinctions and these crystallized in the early Soviet period. Just as Tsarist Russia emphasized the distinct social bases of politics and life in the settled versus the nomadic areas of Central Asia, the Bolsheviks adopted separate policies for the nomadic territories surrounding Uzbekistan’s settled core. Whereas policies in Turkmenistan were oriented to manage and subdue the tribes, no such initiatives were considered necessary for the settled population in Uzbekistan.

See, for example, Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
National loyalties were undoubtedly weak or inexistent throughout Central Asia prior to the national delimitation in 1924. Solidarities were not directed to ethnic nations but rather to villages, cities, Islam, in some areas tribes, and in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century pan-Turkism. However, the creation of national republics and the Soviet “affirmative action” policy accelerated the process of national consciousness. The Bolshevik challenge was to break down traditional loyalties among the indigenous “elite” and replace them with new loyalties directed to Moscow and its aims. Lenin and Stalin were successful in this endeavor. The new national elite in Soviet Uzbekistan derived significant benefits from the national delimitation and rallied to the Bolsheviks’ cause. Stalin’s shrewd policy of empowering the native elite while disempowering the Russian and Slavic prefects posted in the region gave the former vested interests in collaborating for their own ends.

When the Soviet Union had consolidated its rule in the region by the early 1930s, the cadres associated with those areas in Soviet Uzbekistan perceived as disloyal were purged, as were the Russian/Ukrainian prefects in Moscow’s regional organ (the \textit{Sredazbyuro}). Particularly pronounced was the marginalization of officials linked to the party apparatus in Bukhara but their counterparts in Kokand had been thoroughly destroyed earlier. Thus, Soviet Uzbekistan came to be dominated by individuals from Tashkent and later, after the bloodletting of 1937-38, Ferghana. In Uzbekistan, at least, Moscow’s calculus had little to do with managing indigenous “clans” but was an externally imposed regionalization of politics to consolidate Soviet rule.
Pre-Soviet Central Asia

Settled versus Nomadic Society in Pre-Soviet Central Asia

Prior to Soviet rule there had existed no state, nation, or province named Uzbekistan and no other state had historically inhabited its borders. When Tsarist Russia annexed Central Asia in the 19th century, these territories were ruled by three khanates – Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara. By most definitions they could be considered “states” but there were no “nations” attached to them. The concept of nation and its corollary, nationality (Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Kazakh etc.), was only marginally present in these territories up until Soviet rule. However, a majority of the peoples of these three khanates would eventually become Uzbeks since Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara all fell entirely or partially within Uzbekistan’s borders.

Nearly two centuries of Russian encroachments into the region had preceded the Bolshevik conquest: The Kazakh territories were swallowed between 1731 and the mid-19th century and the Kokand khanate was fully incorporated in the 1860s. Russia’s new administrative entity Turkestan was formed between 1863 and 1885 and comprised mainly the territories of the former Kokand khanate. Bukhara and Khiva preserved a
degree of independence and were not to be entirely submerged under Russian influence until Soviet rule in the 1920s.112

Moscow’s early settlers encountered settled forms of life in Central Asia’s oasis-areas, comprising contemporary Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and predominantly tribal territories surrounding them, in what are today Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.113 The less Islamicized, nomadic, Turkic-speaking, and tribal steppe-culture, it was quickly recognized, had shaped a civilization which was quite distinct from the settled, Islamicized, Persianized, city-culture of the oases annexed later. The dependency on irrigation as well as collection of taxes and tariffs had compelled strongly centralized forms of government in the settled parts in contrast to the decentralized authority structures of the nomads. In the desert and steppes life was a constant struggle against nature. In the densely populated areas of the oases, by contrast, man’s primarily struggle was with other men, requiring government to settle differences between them.114

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114 Paul Kunhenn, Die Nomaden und Oasenbewohner Westturkestans (Langendreer: Heinrich Poppinghaus, 1926).
Thus, St. Petersburg categorized the Central Asian population by both ethnicity (Kyrgyz, Uzbek etc.) and habitat (urban vs. nomadic or semi-nomadic). *Sarts* denoted the Turkic-Persian town-dwelling population that existed alongside “pure” ethnicities (Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Karakalpak, the Persian Tajik, as well as Russians and Chinese), and was consequently a fusion of habitat and ethnicity.\(^{115}\) Habitat was a dichotomy of progress whereby the urban or settled were considered more advanced than the nomadic, in effect making *Sarts* the most “advanced” population of Central Asia.\(^{116}\) These categories were not invented but built on local self-ascriptive identities. The term *Sart*, for instance, was a relabeling of the indigenous Turki (the settled Turks who did not claim tribal affiliation) and Uzbek referred to a common tribal heritage which traced back to the confederation which three centuries earlier had brought the Shaybanids to power.\(^{117}\)

Several more specific distinctions between the nomadic and settled areas could be observed. First and foremost, political power was contested among a more heterogenous set of actors in the *Sart* sedentary core – e.g. the ruling dynasty, the *ulama*

\[\text{\footnotesize \begin{align*}
^{115}\text{A. I. Dobrosmyslov, } & \text{*Tashkent v Proshlom' i Nastoyashchemi* (Tashkent: O.A. Portseva, 1912), Chapter 1.} \\
^{117}\text{Olivier Roy, } & \text{*Det Nya Centralasien* (Stockholm: Alhambra, 2002), p. 15.}
\end{align*}\]

60
(religious authority), and the merchantry – in contrast to the power struggle between more “horizontal” tribal groups in the nomadic areas. Second, in contrast to nomads who typically held property in common, city dwellers were owners of private property (mulk) and could accumulate wealth as well as purchase, sell, donate, or transfer property by will. Third, in contrast to the Turkmen obas or Kazakh auls (villages), there was no recognition of solidarity or political affiliation with outside tribal groups among residents of mahallas (neighborhood organizations) in towns and non-tribal qishloks (villages). Nomadic tribal groups who settled along the river oases also typically surrendered their tribal affiliations and submitted themselves to the protection of the state and stronger influence of Islam on their lives. The fusion of peoples in cities produced identities which were only in part derived from place of origin or tribe; the multiethnic and multi-tribal category Sart derived from this intermingling of identities. And fourth, the sedentary population observed Sharia law and was more devoutly Muslim than the Muslims of the steppes who practiced customary law.  

In light of these differences, administration of the hierarchically organized town dwellers required Imperial policies which were different from government in the sparsely populated nomadic and rural areas. The mix of assimilation and imposition of Russian

118 A. I. Dobrosmyslov, Tashkent v Proshlom’ i Nastoyashchemi (Tashkent: O.A. Portseva, 1912), Chapter 1.
institutions was determined by this distinction. Just as Western colonial powers commissioned reports about the characteristics of tribes in its imperial areas, the Tsarist government engendered a field of study on *Sarts*. In Russian government writings, the *Sarts* were portrayed as obedient to authority, susceptible to state administration, and placing order high in the hierarchy of values. Nomads, by contrast, were depicted as more malleable, primitive, inclined toward democratic values, and bound to another in tribes or clans.¹¹⁹

A new system of administration was promulgated in 1867 in which locals were preserved a marginal political role, especially in the higher echelons of power. Headed by Konstantin von Kaufman, the General-Gubernat of Turkestan put the politics of Turkestan under almost complete Russian control. Tsarist imperial government divided Turkestan into oblasts and okrugs with town centers where Tashkent became the center of Syr Darya oblast and Samarkand that of Zerafshan."¹²⁰

These were later reconfigured and redrawn with the adoption in 1886 of a
general body of law on Turkestan, the *Svod Zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii* when three new
oblasts were formed: Syr Darya, Ferghana, and Samarkand (see Map 2 above). The
Soviet government did not redraw these borders noticeably, and the core areas of
Uzbekistan’s Soviet Republic would be built from these administrative blocks.

It might be an exaggeration to say that “a native middle class and intelligentsia”
had been formed at this time. It is true, however, that a small but not insignificant
group of Muslim reformers emerged. The Tatar usul-i jadid movement, propagating
Western ideas of Muslim reform, self-government, reason over dogma, and nation (*millet*
or *vatan*) gained foothold in Turkestan during the late 19th Century. Building on
discontent with Russian rule, the Jadids were to play a minor but not insignificant role
when the Russian revolution of 1917 opened a temporary vacuum of authority in Central
Asia. The Jadids seized the opportunity and organized the 4th Extraordinary Conference
of Central Asian Muslims in the Ferghana Valley. The Conference called for the election

121 Syr Darya oblast was created from Amu Darya and included five districts: Kazalinsk, Perovsk,
Shimkent, Aulieatnisk, and Tashkent; Ferghana Oblast consisted of the five districts of Kokand, Margelan,
Namangan, and Osh; and Samarkand Oblast from the four districts of Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan,
Khodzhent, and Dzhizzak. See *Svod Zakonov Rossiskoi Imperii* (St. Petersburg, 1892), Chapter 7, Articles
1-4.

p. 22.
of a constituent assembly, autonomy in a federated Russian republic, and the setting up of a provisional government. This agenda was realized in part in 1917 with the establishment of the Kokand Republic, headed by Mustafa Chokayev. Squeezed between the feuding Tashkent Soviet and the Tsarist officials of the ancien régime, the Kokand Republic managed to remain afloat in the unfolding chaos for a year before it was crushed by the former in January 1918. Two months later, in March, the “Young Bukharans” headed by Faizullah Khodzhaev set up the Bukharan Republic, which was inspired by the same principles as the Kokand republic, but enjoyed support from the Bolsheviks.

The transitional period from Tsarism to Bolshevik rule had implications for the distribution of power in the future Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, depending in part on the nature and extent of opposition to Bolshevik rule in Turkestan’s territories. The elite associated with the anti-Bolshevik Kokand autonomy fell by the wayside and were decimated by the Bolsheviks, in part because Kokand had become a symbol of the anti-Bolshevik resistance.¹²³ The restiveness of Ferghana initially precluded the remaining parts of its elite from an influential role under Bolshevik rule. Bukhara, by contrast, had

succumbed to the realities of Bolshevik predominance, was effectively bought off, and its new leadership headed by F. Khodzhaev declared its loyalty to Soviet rule. This ensured the elite associated with Bukhara prominent positions in the Turkestan ASSR and later Soviet Uzbekistan. Bukhara, too, however were subsequently to be marginalized when the USSR had consolidated its rule in the region.

**Nation Versus Tribe: Early Soviet Uzbekistan**

*Soviet Nationality Policy and the National Delimitation*

In 1924 the Soviet Union divided the Turkestan ASSR (the successor of Tsarist Russia’s Turkestan *krai*) into four republics and autonomous oblasts -- the Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR with the Tajik ASSR (now Tajikistan), Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast (now Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), and the Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast (now part of Uzbekistan). Uzbekistan’s present nation-hood date back to this delimitation, whose borders only have been modified by the detachment of Tajikistan in 1930.\(^{124}\) The delimitation in Central Asia was anything but simple since national self-consciousness was weak throughout the region by the time of the Soviet conquest. Needless to say, how

\(^{124}\) RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.133, l.28-31.
to draw borders on the basis of national ethnicity when many people did not conceive of themselves as having any or were unsure was an arduous task.\textsuperscript{125}

The national delimitation in Central Asia formed part of Soviet nationality policy for the empire as a whole. The Russian revolution of 1917 coincided with a rising tide of nationalism and Soviet nationality policy was adopted to disarm it by allowing “forms” of nationhood. Nationality policy aspired to buttress Soviet rule by granting rights and privileges to the USSR’s diverse nationalities, actively promoting national consciousness among them, and giving them the institutional forms of the nation-state. Hence, a dozen large national republics were formed throughout Soviet territories alongside tens of thousands of national territories.\textsuperscript{126} Three more specific premises undergirded the convictions in this policy: First, nationalism was considered dangerous since it had the potential to form “an above class alliance in pursuit of national goals”. Second, national consciousness was portrayed as an inevitable stage in the modernization

\textsuperscript{125} Robert Kaiser, \textit{The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 156. The level of consciousness was nonetheless sufficiently advanced so that Uzbeks argued persuasively but unsuccessfully for the creation of an autonomous oblast for the Uzbeks in Osh in the Kara-Kirgiz autonomous oblasts; the Kazakhs sought the “Kazakh” parts of Tashkent oblast; and the Turkmen some of the Khivan territories lost to Uzbekistan. See I. Khodorov, "Natsional'noe Razmezhevanie Srednei Azii," \textit{Novyi Vostok}, Vol. 8-9 (1926), p. 69.

process that all peoples had to go through prior to the Marxist-Leninist ideal of “internationalism”. Third, Lenin and Stalin viewed the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union as having justifiable distrust towards the Great Russians, resulting from the “Great Russian chauvinism” under Tsarist rule.127 By granting the non-Russian nationalities equal status with the Russians, the Bolsheviks could gain the support among the formerly suppressed non-Russian nationalities.128 “Nativization” (korenizatsiia), a crucial corollary of Soviet nationality policy, was to ensure that indigenous nationalities occupied prominent leadership positions in the party, government, industry, and schools in each national territory. Extensive training programs were implemented to this end, especially in the underdeveloped Eastern territories of the empire.129

In practice, then, Soviet nationality policy in Central Asia amounted to a de-Russification of the Russified Turkestan state apparatus the Bolsheviks inherited from

127 Ibid., pp. 4-8. With the partial exception of such instances as the toleration of non-orthodox religions in the time of Catherine the Great, Tsarist Russia gave scant recognition of minority cultures and the existence of separate nations. Since St. Petersburg did not have a policy towards nationalities, such as by giving them administrative structures of their own, a gradual worsening of relations ensued between the Tsar and various ethnic groups. The Bolshevik nationality policy was in some ways a pro-active response to this failure. See Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation, (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 189-190.
129 Ibid., pp. 10-13.
Tsarist rule. Hence, already in November 1921 the Turkestan Central Committee declared its ambition to absorb more loyal natives and to purge disloyal elements, Russian and natives alike. Inclusion of committed native communists, particularly peasants, and prevent those with “nationalist convictions” from entering were the new declared goals, even if it was acknowledged that the Turkestan population “was behind the times” and uneducated. Oblast committees, for example, were to ensure that they had at least one voting member of the indigenous population and similar quotas were established elsewhere in the governing apparatus.\footnote{RGASPI, f.558, op.1, d.5636, “Tezisy po Proverke i Ochistke Partii sredi Tuzemnykh Kommunistov” November 1921 in “”Turkestan’ Sekretariata Narkomnata po Delam Natsional’nostej,” September 15, 1921 – January 9 1922.} Thus, in December 1921, Asfendiarova (Turkestan), Sultan-Galiev (Tatar Republic) and Rysukulov (Kyrgyzstan), were put on the board of the \textit{Narkomnats}, splitting the influence in this heretofore Russified body between locals and Russians/Slavs.\footnote{RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.244, l. 2, Dokument No. 8, “O Kollegii Narkomnatsa”, December 14, 1921.} Nativization in Moscow’s regional organ of government could also be observed: In the \textit{Sredazbyuro} of 1922 – only two of eight were natives, Rakhimbaev (Khodjent) and Khodzhaev (Bukhara).\footnote{RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.309, l. 2,10, Dokument No.6 ”O Predsedatele Sredneaziatskogo Byuro Ts.K.” August 24, 1922; For Rakhimbaev’s biography see, \textit{Entsiklopediyai Sovetii Todzhik}, Vol. 6 (Dushanbe: Akademiyai Fankhon RSS Todzhikistan, 1986), p. 229.} Twelve years
later 14 out of 30 were Central Asians.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, Stalin was demonstrably keen from the outset to include natives in decisions taken. In 1923, for instance, he reproached Lyubimov and Svetlov of the \textit{Sredazbyuro} for sending a cable to the Central Committee in Moscow without all members of the body as signatories, noting the absence of Malyabaeva and other locals.\textsuperscript{134}

The content of Soviet nationality policies and its “affirmative action” program was formally passed in the resolutions of the 12\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in April 1923 and at a separate conference of the Central Committee in June 1923. Encompassing the entire Soviet Union, Soviet nationality policy and its delimitations was obviously a central policy. Even so, Stalin initially portrayed the initiative to divide Turkestan as locally, not centrally determined, and left some room for local input on the process. Thus, Stalin ordered on June 1, 1924: 1) To adopt in principle the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan, Central Committee of Bukhara, and Central Committee of Khorezm to divide these territories into the republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; 2) That Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan should enter into the USSR independently and not through Russia; 3) That economic questions arising in this matter

\textsuperscript{133} RGASPI, f. 17, op.3, d.492, l.11, Dokument No. 36/12 “O Sostave Sredazbyuro Ts.K. VKP (b),” March 23, 1934.

\textsuperscript{134} RGASPI, f. 558, op.1, d.2561, ”Telegramma Sekretarya Ts.K. RKP (b) Stalina I.V. v Sredazbyuro,” November 10, 1923.
should be left at the discretion of the three Communist Parties of Central Asia; and 4) that the detailed aspects of this question should be left to the commission constituent of representatives from the three republics and the USSR ispolkom.\textsuperscript{135} The regional organs of Moscow’s control were sidelined in this process, the powers of which were usurped by representatives of the new nations. Far from being passive recipients of the imposition of borders, the native elite took an active part in the delimitation.\textsuperscript{136} Yet whatever the initial input and initiative of locals in the process, Stalin telegraphed Central Asian authorities in October 1924 resolving that the issue had been “removed from the agenda of the assemblies” and was to be settled conclusively in the center’s Politburo.\textsuperscript{137}

Uzbekistan was apportioned territories from all of the three post-17th century historical state-entities – the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand as well as the Emirate of Bukhara – and all of their capitals fell under Uzbekistan’s suzerainty. As can be discerned in Map 3 below, the new republic centered on the Bukharan Emirate whose borders were preserved more or less intact, including Uzbekistan’s present provinces of Samarkand, Bukhara, Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, Syrdarya, and Navoi up to the Aral

\textsuperscript{135} RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.133, l.28-31.
\textsuperscript{137} RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.32, doc.56, “Shifrotelegramma Stalina I.V. v Tashkent Udarovu o Prekrashchenii Diskussii”, October 23, 1924.
Sea. In recognition of national divisions, the delimitation commission declared that the
“Uzbek parts of Bukhara” would belong to the Uzbeks, and the rest to Turkmenistan. The
other parts of Uzbekistan comprised Fergana, Andijan, Namangan and Tashkent, which
had been part of the Khanate of Kokand, as well as Khorezm oblast and the Karakalpak
Autonomous Republic, remnants of the Khivan Khanate. Tajikistan was made an
autonomous republic within Uzbekistan and Tashkent was declared to belong to
Uzbekistan “because it was populated principally by Uzbeks”. ¹³⁸ The commission left
the issue of naming the new republic to the “Bukharans and Uzbeks” to be determined in
a session between them, testifying to the Bukharans leading role in the new republic as
well as the distinctions made between these two groups.¹³⁹ The Tsarist category of Sarts
was decreed out of existence and replaced by “Uzbeks”, comprising the Turkic-speaking
population of Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara, and the more remote Pamir
communities became “Tajiks”.¹⁴⁰ On May 13, 1925, at the Third Congress of Soviets of
the USSR, Uzbekistan was officially incorporated into the Soviet Union.

¹³⁸ RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.467, l.5, Dokument No. 22, “O Natsional’nom Razmezhevanii Srednej Azii,”
October 9, 1924; and Dokument No.10, “Zapiska Stalina I.V. ob Uzbekistane i Turkmenistane, “ June 1,
1924.
¹³⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴⁰ Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic
Contemporary analysts have singled out *zemlyachestvo* as a predominantly Central Asian phenomenon. Yet it was a present concern throughout the USSR at this formative stage. For example, when the Orgburo of the Central Committee met in 1924 to evaluate secretaries for the country’s gubkoms (predecessor to obkoms) they considered not only the level of crime in the province in question, corruption in the provincial organ, but also the state of “localism” among the secretaries. A letter from Felix Dzherzhinsky to V.V. Kuibyshev likewise singled out “localism” (*zemlyachestvo*) and “speculation” (*spekulyatsiya*) as the paramount management problems in the Union next to “labor discipline” and “cooperation”. Another document dated five years later from the Secretary of the Ivanov obkom in Russia noted the widespread “patronage” (*pokrovitel’stvo*) and localism in his oblast, other regions of Russia, as well as Kazakhstan but no mention is made of the other territories in Central Asia. Similarly, Moscow

141 RGASPI, f.76, op.3, d.325, l.1, Dokument No. 874, “Zapiska V.P. Menzhinskoum o Podgotovke Materialov k Zasedaniyam Orgbyuro Ts.K. RKP (b)” March 1, 1924.
142 RGASPI, f.76, op.2, d.270, l.29-30, Dokument No. 1141, “Pis’mo V.V. Kujbyshevu o Sovetskoj Sisteme Upravleniya,” July 3, 1926.
143 GA Ivanovskoj Obl., f. 327, op.4, d.514, l.18-27, Dokument No. 510, “Doklad 1 Sekretarya Obkoma VKP (b) Ivanovskoj Promyshlennoj Oblasti I.P. Nosova v Svyazi s Zakrytym Pis’mom Ts.K. VKP (b) o Zabastovkah Rabochikh v Vichugskom, Lezhnevskom, Puchezhskom i Tejkovskom Rajonakh”, Not later than April 24, 1932.
lambasted the party leadership in Siberia for * grupovshchiny* ("groupism") and nepotism and Kazakh authorities were called upon to speed up a “management plan…designed for a settled way of life…and the transition to a sedentary lifestyle”, a hint of existing “localism” among the tribally organized Kazakhs. Yet no comparable requests were issued to Uzbeks whose “settled” cadres were depicted as capable professionals. This is also why Uzbeks were sent to staff government agencies in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

The only factionalism and indigenous conflict documented in earlier confidential correspondence, relating to the territories of Uzbekistan, was infighting among the hegemonic Bukharan elite. Even though Bukhara natives administered the Turkfronta (fighting the Basmachi insurrection against Soviet rule in Central Asia), the Upolnarkomvoe (the main internal troops), and were best represented in the *Sredazbyuro,*

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147 The Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule in Central Asia began in 1917. Often described as a fusion of “Muslim traditionalists and bandits”, the Basmachi movement threatened to reverse many of the territorial gains the Bolsheviks had attained in Central Asia. But the Bolsheviks proved to be much better organized and by 1926 the Basmachis had been suppressed. See Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, *The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study in Political Development* (New Delhi: Emjay, 1985).
Bukharans had trouble uniting among themselves. Strains were seen with the most overt competition for leadership occurring between Khodzhaev, the head of Bukhara’s communist party, and Mukhitdinov another communist whose loyalties were questioned in Moscow. In April, 1922, Moscow’s prefect in Bukhara relayed that this “crisis in the Bukhara government had reached its climax” and that the brief absence of Khodzhaev had thrust the government into “complete confusion”, with the “left communist” unwilling to take part in the struggle with the Basmachi revolt, the local Islamic uprising. Instead, what they had spent their time doing was to collect a dossier of the “criminal activities” of Khodzhaev’s government, forcing Stalin to recommend a thorough Sovietization of the Bukhara government, support of Khodzhaev, and a complete turnover of personnel. In December 1924, on the Sredazbyuro’s proposal, the Politburo in Moscow withdrew Islamov from Uzbekistan and sent him to Moscow as a consequence of “internal squabbles” among the local elite. The Politburo also warned that unless terminated, Abdulla Rakhimbaev, Fayzullah Khodzhaev, and Ishan Khodzhaev (all Bukharans or in the case of Rakhimbaev, Khodjent, adjacent to the city of

150 RGASPI, f.558, op.1, d.2275, “Pometki Stalina I.V. na Pis’me Petersa,” 1922.

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Bukhara) would be “immediately withdrawn”.\(^{151}\) Stalin’s foremost concern in Uzbekistan was not localism but Bukhara’s feuding elite, which would leave a permanent mark of disloyalty and untrustworthiness.\(^{152}\) In Moscow at least this conflict was interpreted and portrayed as one between “leftist” and “rightist” communists and did not concern power disputes between cities, regions, or the Bukharan tribes.\(^{153}\)

The contrast with the nomadic areas is illuminating. Soviet writings of the 1920s considered genealogy key to grasp the nomadic cultures of the Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz and the Bolsheviks also incorporated this element into policy.\(^{154}\) Thus, by 1928 the republics and areas of the USSR defined by nomadism -- principally the Kara-Kirgiz, Siberia, northern Caucasus, and the Turkmen – were endowed with native executive committees (tuzriki), native soviets (tuzemnye sovety), aul (aul'nye) soviets, clan


\(^{152}\) RGASPI, f.558, op.5, d.1, Untitled document, May 18, 1922.


(rodovye) soviets, and nomadic (kochevye) soviets. However, with the exception of the mahalla’s new role as an appendage to the soviets and the creation of mahalla committees, the fusion of soviets with kinship-based structures such as those above were not seen in Uzbekistan.

Beyond the soviets, the Bolsheviks sought equitable representation of the rivalling Turkmen tribal groups in the future Turkmen republic. Hence, in 1924, a deputy head of the Sredazbyuro, stated: "If we promote someone from one tribe into an administrative post, we have to make sure that we give a similar promotion to the others. If we give an award to someone from one tribe, we have to do the same for the others as well. If we form a police force, then it must be with the calculation that we will take an equal number of people from each tribe, and that they all will have equivalent positions, 


156 This was expressed in the decree: "Postanovleniie ob utverzhdenii o makhallinskikh komitetakh v gorodakh UzSSR." See David Abramson, From Soviet to Mahalla: Community and Transition in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 1998, p. 29.
and the same for those who work in the military, in the secret police, and so on.¹⁵⁷ This “tribal parity” proposal even went beyond balancing the major Turkmen tribes and prescribed equal representation for rivalling segments within each tribe. The Sredazbyuro protocols in which this issue was discussed contain no similar provisions for the sedentary Uzbek areas, which testify to the important differences between the settled and nomadic cultures.¹⁵⁸

If this balancing served to acknowledge tribal rights, a second component of this policy aimed at defeating them. Collective land tenure was a primary factor undergirding descent group affiliation in Turkmenistan, and the Bolsheviks therefore proceeded to undermine this economic basis, principally with the 1925 Land-Water Reform program.¹⁵⁹ The land reform in Turkmenistan followed closely that of Uzbekistan, “apart from a number of distinctive features resulting from special forms of land tenure peculiar to Turkoman tribes”.¹⁶⁰ Similar deliberations of defeating descent groups were not


present in the implementation of the program in Uzbekistan. The Bolsheviks did not anticipate similar dangers with the land reform in Uzbekistan since the landowners of Uzbekistan were less entrenched than the tribal leaders of Turkmenistan, who had “a stronger grip on the loyalties of the people”. Thus, confiscation of land could proceed more easily in Uzbekistan than in the tribally organized Turkmenistan. This key distinction between the settled and the nomadic was mirrored in the form loyalties were expressed.

For example, when rumors were swirling that the capital of Turkestan would shift from Tashkent to Samarkand in 1921, the Chairman of the TurkTsIka, Abdullo Rakhimbaev – himself a native of Khodjent in Tajikistan, a Chairman of the Samarkand obkom in 1919, and later in 1923 secretary of the Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party – wrote at a state of “urgency” and inquired why this decision had not been coordinated with the TurkTsIka, noting that this decision (if correctly reported) would “stir up a lot of trouble”. In other words, his loyalties do not seem to have been with this particular city, region, or with the Tajiks since the transfer of the capital

161 Ibid., p. 348.
potentially would have been a feather in the hat of this region and, hence, something which he should have welcomed. Instead, he resolutely questioned the transfer of the capital. This should be compared with the intense inter-tribal struggles between Tekes and non-Tekes that surrounded the discussions over the transferring of the capital in Ashgabat to Chårjev in the 1920s. Unlike Rakhimbaev’s national orientation, the non-Teke party official K.A. Böriev accused the Tekes of striving for “Teke hegemony” with the placement of the capital in Ashgabat. In this abortive attempt to transfer the capital and others, sub-national loyalties among the settled population appear to have been subdued.

The absence of a tribal policy in Uzbekistan suggests that the Bolsheviks viewed kinship- and other sub-national loyalties a lesser problem than in the nomadic areas. The policy did not exist in Uzbekistan not only because of the difference in social structure between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan but also because of differences in Soviet perceptions about the social structures of these two republics. Similar to their Tsarist predecessors, they rather simplistically considered the Turkmen and Kazakhs as nomadic


164 In Terry Martin’s words, “the formation of national republics not only increased ethnic conflict, but also turned local disputes [in Central Asia], often with a clan or regional aspect, into national ones.” Terry D. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 69.
and tribal and the Uzbeks and Tajiks as sedentary and non-tribal. But perhaps this was not all that surprising in view of the mélange of identities present in the settled areas. Even in the partially tribal territories of Bukhara and Khorezm, adjacent to Turkmenistan, individuals had difficulties comprehending their identity, at least in categories used by Europeans. This point came across an expedition of Soviet ethnographers when they, in 1924, departed for this remote region to bring clarity to the matter. When asked “to what tribe or clan do you belong”, respondents in these areas reportedly were puzzled and “did not understand the question”.

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165 It is true that the Leningrad Academy of Sciences published a series in the mid-1920s speaking about “tribes” in the areas comprising Turkestan, Samarkand, Siberia, the Caucasus and other places. However, the meaning of this concept appears to have been loosely used since prior publications spoke about “tribes” in places such as Belarus, which ordinarily was not considered tribal at the time. See I. I. Zarubin, *Spisok Narodnostei Turkestanskogo Kraia: Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu Plemennogo Sostava Naselenia Rossii*, Vol. 9 (Leningrad: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1925); I. I. Zarubin, *Naselenie Samarkandskoi Oblasti: Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu Plemennogo Sostava Naselenia Rossii*, Vol. 10 (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1926); and E. F. Karskii, *Etnograficheskaia Karta Bielorusskago Plemen: Trudy Komissii po Izucheniiu Plemennogo Sostava Naselenia Rossii*, Vol. 2 (Petrograd: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1917).

“Empowering” the New Nationally and Career-Oriented Elite

Uzbekistan’s first entirely native leadership constellation was formed in 1929, before which the heads of the Uzbek Communist Party had been non-natives. Akmal Ikramov was named First Secretary of the republic in 1929 by the local Sredazbyuro\textsuperscript{167}, holding this office until 1937 when he was executed in Stalin’s purges. Though a Tashkent native, Ikramov rose to power through party work in Namangan, Ferghana, and then Tashkent, serving first as deputy head of the Namangan revkom and Secretary of the Ferghana and Syr Darya obkoms. In 1925 at the age of 27 he was nominated member of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee.\textsuperscript{168} Slightly older was Faizullah Khodzhaev, the native leader of the People’s Republic of Bukhara before it acceded to the USSR. He was instated chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars in 1924 at the age of 26 and occupied this position until he too was shot in the purges of 1938.\textsuperscript{169} The head of the central ispolkom (the “legislative” organ and predecessor of the Supreme Soviet) was a Ferghana native from Margelan, Yuldash Ahunbabaev. Ahunbabaev had previously served as Chairman of the Margilan (Ferghana) soviet and was its representative at the 


\textsuperscript{168} RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.494, l.6, Document No. 33, “Pros’ba Sredazbyuro Ts.K. RKP (b) ob Ikramove,” March 26, 1925.

founding Congress of the Uzbek SSR in 1925, at the time of which he also was elected to the Central Committee. Seven years younger than Stalin, Ahunbabaev was part of the older generation of Bolsheviks who had reached adulthood by the time of the 1905 revolution. Stalin had no intention of promoting his generation to power, however, but aimed to leapfrog it in favor of the younger one. The seniority principle was also offset. Khodzhaev was the most powerful of the three since political power initially rested with the head (predsovnarkom) of the Council of People’s Commissars (sovnarkom) and not the First Secretary of the Communist Party.

Though Stalin had been perturbed by the infighting among the Bukhara elite, he sought to shield Khodzhaev from the party apparatchiks in Tashkent. In April 1926 Stalin telegraphed Ikramov, Zelensky, and Ivanov instructing them not to “depersonalize the sovnarkom [Council of People’s Commissariat], isolate the predsovnarkom [Khodzhaev], and undermine his influence”. “The party in Uzbekistan” he continued “should consider the authority of the sovnarkom…and make this an asset for the party”.

That the capital of Uzbekistan at first was located to Samarkand, part of the Emirate of Bukhara and

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172 RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.34, doc.28, “Shifrotelegramma Stalina I.V v Tashkent,” April 23, 1926.
People’s Republic of Bukhara, further enhanced the Bukhara/Samarkand region as the predominant center of power in the republic.

The empowerment of this native elite was paired with the establishment of direct links between the new national republics and Moscow, bypassing the regional organ of government, the *Sredazbyuro*. In part because of the *Sredazbyuro*’s desire to undercut Moscow’s authority, transform Central Asia into a federated entity akin to the federated organization of the South Caucasus, and the localism and “Ukrainization” of this body, Stalin and Molotov in 1931 warned this group of employees and subsequently acted upon these warnings.\(^{173}\) Chastised for several unsanctioned activities, the *Sredazbyuro* leadership was accused of “forcing the establishment of a Central Asian federation” through the creation of a number of institutions operating effectively “as agencies of a federation.”\(^ {174}\) Zelensky, Moscow’s proconsul in the region since 1924, was recalled the


same year and the *Sredazbyuro* itself was abolished in 1934. The result was a more vertical relationship of authority between the center and the Central Asian national republics. Consequently, in 1931 control over cotton production was transferred from the *Sredazhlopok* to national cotton boards and the *Narkomzem* in Moscow was reorganized to have direct links with the cotton producing Central Asian republics. Ikramov’s powers grew correspondingly since he was put in charge of this. “It was decided”, minutes of the Politburo reveals, “to defer consideration of the cotton sovkhozes of Uzbekistan to Ikramov before the issue is brought to Moscow.” A regional organ of government, the *Sredazbyuro*, had been useful as an interim body to maintain Soviet control but eventually turned into a source of opposition which had sustained other district and province-level pockets of local dissent.

Whatever ulterior motives Stalin may have had national delimitation did catapult a local indigenous elite to power and degrade the influence of Russians and other Slavs in

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the Sredazbyuro. The native elite were the tertius gaudens, the third-party beneficiaries, of the revolution. The new nations became the vehicle to party careers for the native elite and thus something which was embraced by many however frail the Uzbek national identity was per se. Korenizatsiia allowed both qualified and unqualified Uzbeks unprecedented career opportunities and was, if not an ideological awakening, a bread-and-butter affair. The newly established Lenin University in Tashkent, to which the native party members were sent for training, acted as a melting pot and cement for new loyalties directed to the Communist Party.¹⁷⁹ Even if not entirely foolproof, the procedure of selection of non-Russian personnel into governing positions also tended to favor those individuals who were most committed and loyal to the revolution and Stalin’s national program.¹⁸⁰

The rapid upward mobility of the Uzbek elite is likely to have presented them with a dilemma: To play by the new rules and stay loyal to the Bolshevik national idea or revert to old loyalties in their home regions. Archival evidence suggests that the former often took precedence, even if not always. Thus, a Soviet document remarked: “It is characteristic that groups which were in conflict within a given nationality before

national division (razmechevanie) have not been united by general national interests.”

This held particularly true for Uzbekistan since it emerged as a regional leader following the delimitation. More than half of the region’s population found themselves within Uzbekistan’s borders. The republic also contained 60% of Central Asia’s agricultural lands and generated 70% of the region’s total economic profits. This endowment prescribed that the republic’s elite became “model leaders for Soviet Central Asian policies.” The most egregious forms of nepotism that Khodzhaev among others had engaged in could no longer be sustained under Stalin’s watchful eye. “With the sudden creation of the Uzbek nation,” Roger Kangas writes, “the indigenous elite began to coalesce around this concept”.

The proposed transfer of ethnically Tajik territories to Tajikistan in 1930 is a case in point. That year Ikramov had an opportunity to dismember Khodzhaev’s Tajik “power base” but did not do so. When the all-Union Presidium of the ispolkom adopted a decision in 1930 to transfer Surkhandarya okrug (oblast) to Tajikistan, Ikramov filed a

complaint and the ispolkom “decided to propose to temporarily reverse its decision”. This temporary reversal was later made permanent. Surkhandarya remained in Uzbekistan and this is noteworthy since it was Ikramov and not Khodzhaev who objected, even though Surkhandarya was former Bukhara territory. If Ikramov wanted to reduce Khodzhaev’s clout he could have detached Surkhandarya. But he did not, which points to that national concerns trumped narrow local ones.

Such nationally oriented concerns were paralleled with career-based loyalties among the elite. An example is Abdulla Karimov’s replacement as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (the predecessor of the Council of Ministers) in 1937. Expressing their dissatisfaction with Karimov (“a member of the anti-Soviet group led by Khodzhaev”), Stalin and Molotov solicited the Uzbek First Secretary Ikramov to propose alternative candidates for this position. Under pressure from the center Ikramov put forward two candidates, S. Baltabaev from Ferghana Valley and D. Tyuerabekov from

Khodkent (Tajikistan),\textsuperscript{187} both of whom were acquaintances from Tashkent. Baltabaev had been the First Secretary of Tashkent gorkom since three years back and Tyuerabekov had “recently returned to Tashkent from Moscow”.\textsuperscript{188} Stalin penciled Comrade Yezhov in a hand-written note, “to check both immediately and report to the Central Committee”.\textsuperscript{189}

Ikramov’s choice was Baltabaev with Tyuerabekov as deputy, but Stalin opted for Tyuerabekov, who would only serve two months, however, before he was executed in the purges.\textsuperscript{190} Regionalism does not appear to have been part of Ikramov’s calculation since none of the figures recommended hailed from Ikramov’s native Tashkent but were associates whom he had encountered in the capital. Stalin’s primary concern was not that sub-national loyalties would split the republic apart but that “anti-Soviet” elements from different parts of the republic would unite and conspire against Stalin’s rule. Jotting down a note on a cable Stalin accordingly warned the local leadership not to place “Karimov, Baltabaev, and Tyurabekov together”.\textsuperscript{191} The intention was to isolate those perceived as

\textsuperscript{187} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65, l. 51., Dokument No. 1263, "Shifrtelegramma A.I. Ikramova I.V. Stalinu," July 15, 1937.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{190} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, l. 19, Dokument No. 1167, "Shifrtelegramma I.V. Stalina v Ts.K. KP (b) Uzbekistana o Zamenakh v Sostave Rukovodyashchikh Kadrov," August 2, 1937.

\textsuperscript{191} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 56, l. 128—129, Dokument No. 123 "Shifrtelegramma I.V. Stalina i V.M. Molotova A.I. Ikramovu o Zamene v Sostave Trojki," July 9, 1937.

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anti-Moscow and eventually remove them, lest they challenge central control over the region.

Locals did evidently have some input into the nomenklatura process and they were often empowered to “recommend” figures for top state and party positions that were scrutinized and vetted in Moscow, as testified to by the appointment of Baltabaev. Proposing candidates, Ikramov discussed both their merits and party history, their intellectual abilities, their “reliability” (solidnost’), prior government work, and their devotion to the party and the Central Committee in Moscow. When portrayed in Soviet media, however, responsibility for appointments rested exclusively with the local scapegoats. Thus, Ikramov was subsequently snared for filling positions with “protégés” such as Baltabaev, on the grounds that these often were of the bourgeois-nationalist character, and that figures excluded from the party had miraculously been pardoned and reinstated. Tyurabekov was singled out as one who had “very cleverly bypassed all sharp corners” with the help of Ikramov. If this indeed was a “pact” it was composed of individuals from all three power centers of the republic, which speaks against strong subnational loyalties.

End of the “Honeymoon”: The Power Transfer from Bukhara to Tashkent/Ferghana

Uzbekistan’s first generation of leaders may have coalesced around the nation but Stalin forcefully imposed a regionalization of political power upon them. Not soon after the establishment of Uzbekistan it became evident that the power awarded to figures from the Bukharan half of the republic was a Trojan horse. Early signs that their influence was being eclipsed were expressed already in 1925 when the composition of the Sredazbyuro shifted away from Bukhara and the Tajik areas with the removal of Islamov and Rakhimbaev (Khodkent) and towards Tashkent-Ferghana with the incorporation of Ahunbabaev (Ferghana) and Tashmukhamedova, the Secretary of Tashkent city.\textsuperscript{194} Capping this trend was the transfer of the capital itself from Samarkand to the bustling Tashkent in 1930.

Stalin had empowered Khodzhaev to ensure Bukhara’s loyalty only to clip his wings when Moscow had consolidated its rule in the region. This conformed to Stalin’s overall tactic to divide and rule among the Central Asian leadership, often defending the natives against the Slavic appointees.\textsuperscript{195} In 1928, for instance, First Secretary I. Zelensky

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[195] The antecedents of this tactic could be traced to the civil war period when the Bolsheviks triumphed in part because the Mensheviks held a more uncompromising position towards Ukrainian, Polish, and
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
telegraphed Stalin demanding an investigation of Khodzhaev, Abdulla Karimov, Burnashev, and others. Without pressing the point, Stalin considered such an investigation “certainly inappropriate” but offered Zelensky to refer the cases to “other higher non-judicial bodies…which you find most comfortable”.\(^{196}\) Stalin’s tacit support of Ikramov was manifested in early 1929 when Zelensky and his predecessor Nikolaj Gikalo also sought the then 31-year old Ikramov’s retirement. However, Stalin retorted that “retirement of Ikramov is unacceptable and politically and practically harmful. You cannot create the illusion that the Central Committee supports elements like Faizullah [Khodzhaev] against Bolshevik workers like Ikramov. The Central Committee considers it compulsory to support Ikramov and keeping him as secretary.” The futile attempt to “isolate” Ikramov, as had been proposed, was also deemed “wrong.”\(^{197}\)

Seven months later Ikramov would cut into Zelenski’s powers as Ikramov was appointed in his place, ostensibly at Zelenski’s own initiative, making Ikramov First Secretary of the republic.\(^{198}\) As the 1930s wore on, Ikramov would also figure as the most Caucasian independence than the Bolsheviks. Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 104.


\(^{197}\) RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d.37, Document No. 31, “Tashkent Zelenskomu, Samarkand Ikramovu i Gikalo,” March 2, 1929.

\(^{198}\) RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.766, l.11, Document No. 77 “Ob Osvobozhdenii Zelenskogo ot Raboty Sekretarya Ts.K. KP (b) Uzbekistana,” November 23, 1929.
prominent source of policy initiative while many of Khodzhaev’s proposals increasingly fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{199} Steadily accumulating power, Ikramov was selected Third Secretary of the \textit{Sredazbyuro} in 1931, the highest position of any native nationality in this organ. Similar to his shifting support of Zelensky, Stalin pitted Ikramov and Khodzhaev against each other. By constantly reallocating the powers between them Stalin could play the role of arbiter all the while, in a piecemeal fashion, bolstering his own powers and centralization of policy making. In principle, this was little different from how Stalin maneuvered his way to power in the center by flip-flopping between the “leftists” (Preobrazhensky, Trotsky) and “rightists” (Bukharin, Rykov) during the 1920s.\textsuperscript{200}

The “honeymoon” of Uzbekistan’s first generation of leaders ended with Stalin’s degradation of Bukhara. Consequently, five of the six native members of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau in 1937 hailed from Ferghana and Tashkent (see Appendix, Table 4). Thus, political forces associated with Tashkent and Ferghana Valley were increasingly privileged at the expense of their counterparts in Bukhara, which since the early 1920s had dominated politics in the \textit{Sredazbyuro} and later Uzbekistan itself. And

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second, political power tilted from the state to the party, empowering the First Secretary (head of the Communist Party) and disempowering the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissariat (head of government).

Contemporary analysts have interpreted the gulf between Ikramov and Khodzhaev in terms of severe regional strife in Uzbekistan. Thus, Bailey Carlisle distinguishes the “clan/regional” power struggle between Khodzhaev and Ikramov as “monumental”, providing “us with the single most important model for comprehending factional politics”.201 The struggle over the Land/Water reform of 1925-1926, in which Khodzhaev championed a go-slow approach and Ikramov more radical and fast-paced reform, is one of the examples cited.202 The extent to which this conflict was regional in nature as opposed to personal or institutional is impossible to gauge with precision.

What is clear is that earlier analysts in the “pre-regionalism era” did not identify a regional dimension of this conflict, at least not the same one as Bailey Carlisle. Roger Kangas thorough biographical work on Khodzhaev identifies the bones of contention between him and Ikramov to have concerned mainly Khodzhaev’s nationalist beliefs, his support of the Jadids, opposition to the Bolshevik’s cotton monocrop policy, and various

202 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
disputes surrounding economic and social reforms. If Khodzhaev had a power base in Uzbekistan, it was “among the intelligentsia”, he notes. Likewise, Ishanov’s biography of Khodzhaev relates his dispute with Khodzhaev solely to their different opinions on cotton production. Another analyst emphasizes that this was a “personal rivalry”. The only regional dimension to this conflict noted by Kangas is the reverse of Carlisle’s. Thus Kangas remarks, “Presumed to be a member of the Samarkand group that opposed the Tashkent organization of Khodzhaev before the 1920 revolution, Ikramov was also a devoted communist.” In this assessment, Khodzhaev is presumed to have belonged to the Tashkent group, Ikramov to Samarkand, and not vice versa as has been conveyed by Bailey Carlisle.

Stalin’s interpretation, in turn, was not one of conflict between them but that Ikramov had conspired with Khodzhaev. Thus, in a telegram from Stalin and Molotov of Uzbekistan dated September 10, 1937, the Central Committee of Uzbekistan was

204 Ibid., p. 324.

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informed that “in relation to the arrests of Bukharin, F. Khodzhaev, Razumov, Ryzykulov [and others]…Ikramov was not only associated with these group of nationalists but also patronized them”. 208

Whichever is correct, if any, the functions of the state and party often impinged on one another, which inevitably generated frequent clashes of authority between Khodzhaev and Ikramov. This tactic of *divida et impera* served Stalin’s purposes as he gradually sought to remove those perceived as disloyal and strengthen the communist party in the process. Parallels could surely be drawn to Stalin’s targeting of Zhdanov and the purge of the Leningrad-faction in the late 1940s. 209 Bukhara had been the most autonomy-minded of Uzbekistan’s parts, the most restive ever since the Tsarist era, and the site of the most severe internal power struggles. Transferring power from Bukhara to the more loyal part, Tashkent, was a means to strengthen Soviet control and halt the growth of autonomist sentiments. Ferghana initially lost out among the three because it was perceived as a source of opposition and Ferghana was marginalized in Kyrgyzstan.

208 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 2, d. 149, "Pis’mo Stalina I.V. i Molotov V.M. Plenumu Ts.K Kompartii Uzbekistan,” September 10, 1937.
for the same reason. Tajik Ferghana, by contrast, thrived because it was Uzbek and designated to control the new Tajik republic detached from Uzbekistan in 1930.

A second reason for this power transfer was the shifting importance of Tashkent and Ferghana Valley in the late 1920s and the 1930s. The upgrading of Tashkent in 1925 to a “first rank” city along with Kharkov (Ukraine), the subsequent transfer of the capital to Tashkent, and its history as the capital of Central Asia since the mid-19th century ensured a prominent role for the elite associated with the capital region. Between the years 1926 to 1939 Tashkent’s city population nearly doubled, from 314,000 to 556,000, thereby outstripping Samarkand’s more modest population increase from 105,000 to 136,000 during the same years.

Ferghana’s ranking was similarly raised. By the mid-1930s Uzbekistan’s economy had overwhelmingly been oriented to that of a “cotton republic”, the production of which centered on the Ferghana Valley. Cotton thrust Ferghana Valley up in the hierarchy of administrative importance since the two foremost cotton-producing oblasts,

213 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 737, l. 65, “Ikramov k Stalinu,” June 12, 1935; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65, l. 14, “Ikramov k Stalinu,” June 4, 1936.
Ferghana and Andijan, were located in the Valley. While the historical heart of Central Asia and of immense cultural significance, the areas associated with Bukhara and Samarkand could not boast equal administrative and economic importance. The transfer of political power from Bukhara and Samarkand towards Tashkent and Ferghana accorded with this changing economic and administrative significance; the latter two regions would also become the main cadre pools for the rest of the Soviet period. Such differential treatment of regions and cities as cadre pools was not unique to Uzbekistan, it should be said, but the rule in the Soviet system.\textsuperscript{214}

Bukhara had been downgraded and Tashkent upgraded but the leaderships of both areas were eventually truncated. On March 15, 1938, both Khodzhaev and Ikramov faced the death penalty together with several others accused of “nationalistic” and anti-Soviet activities e.g. Khodzhanov, Atabaev, and Karimov.\textsuperscript{215} They were succeeded by a set of new leaders who also took charge of the execution squad, including Usman

\textsuperscript{214} As noted by Geoffrey Hosking: “Every town had its place on the rungs…in accordance with its administrative significance and the status of the enterprises located on its territory. For the Soviet Union as a whole, Moscow stood at its apex, Leningrad a rung below, then the capitals of the union republics ranked according to their importance, then oblast’ centres and other towns which contained enterprises of 'all-union significance', then towns whose enterprises were merely of 'republican' significance, and finally those where no enterprise was of more than oblast' significance.” See Geoffrey Hosking, “Patronage and the Russian State,” \textit{The Slavonic and East European Review}, Vol. 78, No. 2 (April, 2000), pp. 314-315.

\textsuperscript{215} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, l. 19, Dokument No. 1167/sh, “Shifrtelegramma I.V. Stalina v Ts.K.(b) Uzbekistana o Zamenakh v Sostave Rukovodyashchikh Kadrov,” August 2, 1937.
Yusupov (Ikramov’s successor), Sultan Segisbaev (Chairman of SNK), B.B. Shejdin who survived the first round of purges, D.Z. Aprezyan (the new narkom), and A. Abdurakhmanov (Segisbaev’s successor).^216

**Conclusion**

The “artificial” creation of Uzbekistan in 1924 portended strong local loyalties in the new state, but delimitation also acted as a centripetal force by solidifying the indigenous elite whether as a marriage of convenience or not. National loyalties gradually transcended pre-national ones, even if not supplanting them completely. Analysts have claimed that clan and tribal consciousness in Central Asia not only survived the Soviet period but was reinforced by it, because “development of tribalism was a natural, spontaneous form of resistance to the assimilationist policies that Moscow pursued in an effort to divide national communities”.^217 The argument in intuitive since this resistance, though at another level, is partly what occurred in the Soviet Union as a whole in the 1970s and 1980s: rather than drawing the nations together, increased inter-homeland

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migration and interaction in general among USSR’s nations “served as catalysts activating national territoriality.”

It is conceivable that a similar logic applied to the delimitation in the 1920s, i.e., that sub-national loyalties were activated in response to the imposition of nations.

However, my findings suggest the contrary. The Bolshevik revolution created fresh opportunities for a national elite with vested interests in the new republic. Thus, a new class of beneficiaries was created which, to quote Fainsod, “began to separate themselves from their neighbors and align their futures with the communist cause.”

Such “national” solidarities had their foundation in the social organization of pre-Soviet Central Asia and the distinction between settled and nomadic society, where in the former the importance of kinship was much weaker. On the Bolsheviks’ part, this was expressed in the adoption of a “tribal policy” for Turkmenistan but not for Uzbekistan. Delimitation ensured the indigenes participation in their own affairs, better career prospects, and an ebbing influence of the non-Central Asian prefects. While such interests wedded to the nation mitigated conflicts among the indigenous elite, it did not reduce them completely, as testified to by the disputes among the Bukharans.

Zemlyachestvo, mestnichestvo, nepotism, and favoritism of former colleagues were pinpointed elsewhere in the Soviet system at the time but archival records contain surprisingly scant evidence of this in Uzbekistan. That zemlyachestvo was the “dominant principle of recruitment” as has been argued is doubtful since few of the Sredazbyuro documents discussed the matter. What were discussed, at least as regards Uzbekistan, concerned merits, party history, intellectual abilities, reliability, prior government work, and loyalty to Moscow.

Soviet nationality policies may have leapfrogged a new nationally oriented elite but the Soviet hierarchy of regions in parallel spurred an artificial form of regionalism. That particular regions dominated early Soviet Uzbekistan and others lost out was to be expected given the events preceding and coinciding with the Bolshevik takeover. The Kokand autonomy and its elite was destroyed, Bukhara was bought off, and the historical power center Khwarazm was too backward to be a contestant for political power. Thus political power was initially dispersed among figures from Tashkent, Bukhara, and to a lesser extent Ferghana – the economically, demographically, and politically most important component parts of the republic.

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During the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, Stalin pulled the carpet from underneath officials associated with Bukhara and strengthened Tashkent and later Ferghana. It was Stalin who sowed the seeds of dissension amongst the native elite, which certainly contributed to the deep-seated animosity between Khodzhaev and Ikramov. He duped Khodzhaev and undermined him when the USSR was in firmer control. A similar tactic of “empowerment-destruction” guided the creation and abolishment of the *Sredazbyuro*. If the imposition of the Uzbek nation and regionalization of politics were the foremost external forces shaping politics in early Soviet Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan’s settled society was the primary internal force. This social basis enabled elite loyalties to the Uzbek nation but it was fettered by Stalin’s regionalization of political power.
3. Sidelining Moscow’s Sentinel: Uzbekistan after Stalin’s Great Purges, 1937-1953

Introduction

From the formation of the Central Asian republics in 1924 down to the great purges of 1937-38, Moscow gradually centralized authority over the region. Little if any independent authority remained in the hands of the native leadership by the end of that cataclysmic period. The first generation of Uzbek leaders was brutally executed and the baton was passed over to a group of successors. These, too, had their origins in Tashkent and Ferghana which was surprising since had they been “clans”, they would presumably have been thoroughly destroyed. Instead, these two regions emerged with renewed prestige in a similarly ordered system. Though from the same regions, the post-purge Uzbek leaders differed from their predecessors in one important respect: From the early 1940s and on the First Secretary of Uzbekistan was given unprecedented discretion in the
selection of subordinates, though not in contesting central directives.\textsuperscript{1} Still, the Party Control Commission’s documentation does not attest to that “localism” or regionalism were major concerns, even if such violations were identified elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Other violations were pinpointed, e.g., monopolization of decision-making by the secretarial group in the Central Committee Bureau, but this was the rule in the Soviet system at the time.

No different from other Soviet leaders, First Secretary Usman Yusupov and his successor Amin Niyazov did engage in favoritism but the individuals experiencing upward mobility under them were associates they had met in course of their careers. The Party Control Commission did acknowledge severe conflicts in Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau but these related solely to the incessant feuding between the indigenous elite, on the one hand, and the centrally appointed and locally recruited non-Central Asians, on the other. Nationality, not region of origin, was the source of frictions.

Tajikistan, in contrast, was the site of some of the most pronounced practices of region-based recruiting in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Similar to Yusupov, Tajikistan’s First Secretary Gafurov had been granted wide autonomy and misused his seigniorial

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} The system remained organized according to the vertical “branch” principle also in the post-purge period and the republic-level and lower organs of government were strictly controlled from the center. See Z. Mieczkowski, “The Economic Regionalization of the Soviet Union in the Lenin and Stalin Period,” \textit{Canadian Slavonic Papers}, Vol. 8 (1966), pp. 117-122.}
prerogatives by favoring figures from his native Leninabad. However, even if the extent of “localism” in these two cases differ, the logic behind appointments was similar. Gafurov, not unlike Yusupov, promoted associates of his. The only difference was that elite mobility between oblasts was less pronounced in Tajikistan, generating a phenomenon which approximated “clans”. The wide discrepancy between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, both settled and culturally similar societies, indicates that Soviet policy and patterns of elite mobility were behind the varying expressions of “localism” in these two cases.

The topics introduced above will form the main subjects of this chapter. I shall begin, however, with a brief review of the party hierarchy and the distribution of power between the secretaries as it had crystallized by the 1940s as well as touch upon the formal workings of the USSR’s appointment system, the nomenklatura.

The Party Hierarchy and the Nomenklatura

The Party Hierarchy

The structure of the party hierarchy in the republics had assumed a stable and institutionalized form by the 1940s and remained essentially the same thereafter. In Uzbekistan and the other Soviet republics, the Bureau of the Central Committee stood at the apex and served as the highest decision-making body. The Bureau had both functional and symbolic roles. Its functional role was to serve as the center’s agent, implement its
decisions, and mediate between central planners and the social, economic, and political requisites of the republic. Its symbolic role and legitimizing function prescribed representation of both Uzbekistan’s nationalities as well as European non-Central Asians, principally Russians and Ukrainians.² Full and automatic membership in the Bureau was conferred upon the entire Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his deputy, the Commander of the Turkestan Military District, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.³

The party-administrative organs below the Bureau included, in descending order of authority: the Central Committee Secretariat and its hierarchically ordered line organizations; the obkoms including, in Uzbekistan, Tashkent’s gorkom; other gorkoms; and the rural and urban raykoms. At the bottom of the pyramid stood primary party organizations. The Central Committee departments included staff offices of the Secretariat for political, economic, and socio-cultural checking and control of central plans and directives. Each level within the party hierarchy also comprised sub-departments of functional responsibilities.⁴

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³ Ibid.
The First Secretary was tasked with overall leadership, coordination, and supervision of the Uzbek party apparatus. These powers were not only symbolic but possessed the aura of a chief of state. Presiding over the Uzbek Bureau, the First Secretary served as the republic’s chief policy implementer, acting within the constraints set by central directives. Unlike the centrally appointed Second Secretaries who maintained a low but powerful profile in terms of control, First Secretaries participated to some degree in policy debates on economic and other subjects. On party-organizational matters, however, the powers formally rested with a non-Central Asian central appointee, the Second Secretary, who controlled the nomenklatura. Overall, the dominance of non-Central Asians on questions relating to political-organizational matters, was one of the most prominent “ethno-political biases” in recruitment to the Uzbek state and party apparatuses, which was a calculated measure of control. Beyond controlling appointments and dismissals, the Second Secretary was empowered to serve as a “mediator” between the non-Central Asian and Central Asians. In carrying out these

functions, he was also obligated to keep tabs on the republican leadership and report them to central authorities.\footnote{John Miller, "Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of the CPSU First and Secretaries in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR," \textit{Soviet Studies}, Vol. 29 (January, 1977), pp. 6-10.} Usurping practically all authority of the other state organs at each level of government, the powers wielded by the First Secretary and the Second Secretary were substantial, though a Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or oblispolkom at the oblast level) could wield significant informal authority.\footnote{Merle Fainsod, \textit{Smolensk Under Soviet Rule} (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1958), pp. 62-67.}

The division of labor between the First and Second Secretaries outlined above was mirrored at lower levels of government (oblast, rayon): the non-Central Asian Second Secretary acted as Moscow’s watchdog and formally kept control over the \textit{nomenklatura}.

\textit{The Nomenklatura: A Skein, Not a Hierarchy}

The appointment powers of the different levels of the party organs outlined above were defined in the \textit{nomenklatura} system. One of the basic elements of the Soviet socio-political order, the \textit{nomenklatura} regulated the appointments of hundreds of thousands of officials in the Soviet polity, some of them nominally elective, from the central government down to the village soviets. The \textit{nomenklatura} lists were controlled by the Communist Party, directed from the center and at successively lower levels of the
Communist Party apparatus. Although the system was modified over the Soviet period, the fundamentals remained the same. The nomenklatura contained two lists regulating the appointment and transfer of senior officials. The first included posts which could only change hands by a decision of the Central Committee and its bodies -- the Secretariat, the Orgburo, or the Politburo. The second list comprised posts needing approval of one of the Central Committee members. Republican and provincial party organs were instructed to compile their own nomenklatura lists modelled on those of the central government in Moscow. The hierarchy of authority was similar. Positions on the two nomenklatura lists could only change through authorization of the Central Committee and its bodies at each level of government (central, republican, obkom), though this did not encompass the most senior posts. The appointment of Central Committee members and candidates and other “leading” party functionaries at the republican, obkom, and rayon levels was the prerogative of the Central Committee at the level above. Likewise, the job categories placed on the nomenklatura list on each level were decided by the level above, which


empowered that particular party organ to decide the influence of the party organ at the level below.\textsuperscript{13}

The crux of the matter was two: First, the \textit{nomenklatura} lists contained several instances of overlapping authority between bodies. For example, senior officials at the republican level were on the \textit{nomenklatura} of both the Central Committee in Moscow and the Central Committee in the republic. Likewise, senior officials at the obkom level were on the \textit{nomenklatura} of the republic’s Central Committee as well as on the obkom Central Committee \textit{nomenklatura}. Thus, the \textit{nomenklatura} system set the main parameters in which appointments were regulated but the overlapping authority between bodies entailed that the prerogatives were fuzzy. For example, the oblast and rayon NKVD offices in the 1930s were on the obkom \textit{nomenklatura} and the obkom leadership was thus formally authorized to staff them. In practice, however, it was the NKVD itself which proposed appointments or removals and the obkom which accepted them.\textsuperscript{14} It became unclear what bodies that initiated or merely ratified decisions since the system was a skein and not a strict hierarchy.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 533.
Second, these overlapping authorities combined with inadequate administrative resources at all levels to monitor and control adherence to nomenklatura rules led to ubiquitous informal politicking over cadre appointments. This occurred both laterally between organs at the same level of government (e.g. the Central Committee Secretariat, the Central Committee Bureau, and the Orgburo) as well as vertically between levels of the party organs. In the case of the latter, each level of the party apparatus sought to shield itself from the influence of the one above by exploiting these loopholes and dual sources of authority in the system. Thus, First Secretaries of raykoms, obkoms, or republics and the Bureaus at each level could use their authority over cadre appointments to designate their personnel: they made recommendations, smoothed the way for particular candidates by advancing their merits, and sometimes appointed personnel without approval from the level above to create a fait accompli. At times, the party organ at the level above struck back, recognizing the importance of controlling appointments below to “prevent local cliques from consolidating”.

As the previous chapter hinted to, control over the nomenklatura was not an insignificant power but probably the most potent and instrumental source of authority. The heart of political power in the Soviet system was to maintain a following of loyal

16 For a more thorough elaboration, see Ibid., pp. 86-87.
17 Thus, Fainsod noted: “Second only to matters of internal party administration in importance were the recurring problems of agricultural production…” Ibid., p. 79.
supporters. The key to maintaining loyal supporters was to control the *nomenklatura*. It is not surprising therefore that the First Secretary attempted to usurp some of the Second Secretary’s powers, lest he would lose control over the placement of loyal supporters and thus compromise his ability to govern effectively. The post-purge Stalin period furnishes us, perhaps, with the most clear-cut evidence on how the formal distribution of power between Uzbekistan’s secretaries was upset by informal politics.

**Yusupov’s Uzbekistan**

*The Post-Purge Leadership Constellation: Tashkent and Ferghana Unscathed*

Having decimated the first generation of Uzbek politicians, Stalin installed a new Uzbek leadership in 1937 who looked squarely to him.¹⁸ Yusupov, a native of Ferghana, succeeded Ikramov in 1938 and was thrust into the forefront as First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party at the age of 38. Though a native of Ferghana Valley, Yusupov had previously served as Secretary of the Tashkent okrug and head of the Tashkent Writers’ Union and was named secretary of the Central Committee in 1929 and

¹⁸ For an example of the new leadership’s adulation of Stalin, see: RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.1371, l.18-19, Document No. 14, “Privetstvennyaya Telegramma Usmana Yusupova iz Tashkenta,” December 22, 1947; and RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.1349, l.114-115, Document No. 82, “Privetstvie Ts. K. KP(b) Uzbekistana, SNK i Presiduma VS,” June 30, 1945.
Commissar of Food Industries in 1937.\textsuperscript{19} If Ikramov was a Tashkent native who had built his career in Ferghana, Yusupov was the exact reverse—a native of Ferghana who plunged into politics in Tashkent. He owed his position to the patronage of Russia’s new prefect, Andreev, appointed to Tashkent in September 1937 who familiarized Yusupov to Stalin. Yusupov was portrayed as a figure detached from the Uzbek nationalist intelligentsia who had “always opposed Ikramov and Khodzhaev”, which clearly worked to his advantage.\textsuperscript{20} Declaring that he “was not opposed to the candidacy of Yusupov”, Stalin instructed Andreev “to act at your own discretion and according to the situation,” suggesting a degree of influence on the process of selecting a First Secretary to the Second Secretary. However, this correspondence contains no deliberations that his region of origin was of importance.\textsuperscript{21} Yusupov’s main quality was that he was anti-Ikramov and perceived as loyal. Evidence of this could be traced back to 1930 when, shortly after Ikramov’s rise, Yusupov was demoted and penned several denunciatory letters on Ikramov directly addressed to Stalin.\textsuperscript{22}

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\textsuperscript{20} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, l. 95, “Andreev k Stalinu,” September 25, 1937.

\textsuperscript{21} RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, l. 94, “Stalin k Andreevu,” September 25, 1937.

\textsuperscript{22} RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 154, l. 79–92, “Yusupov k Stalinu,” January 25, 1931.
A Tashkent native, Abdudzhabar Abdurarakhmanov was in 1937 chosen Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (later in 1946 renamed the Council of Ministers). Abdurarakhmanov, like much of the rest of the Soviet leadership, rose through the province and district apparatuses, having served prior to this appointment as the secretary of the Margilan, Ferghana, Kokand gorkoms, the Yangiyul raykom (Tashkent), and the Bukhara obkom – i.e. in all the three main power centers of the republic.\(^{23}\) In between Khodzhaev and Abdurarakhmanov two figures, Abdulla Karimov and Sultan Segizbaev, served but they only lasted for a few months each.\(^{24}\) Being only one of a few in the Uzbek ruling elite who survived Stalin’s purges, the Ferghana native Yuldash Akhunbabaev remained as the servile head of the “legislative” branch but now Chairman of the recently established Supreme Soviet.

Stalin’s bloodshed cut a deep gouge in Uzbekistan’s elite. Even so, the supremacy of figures hailing from Tashkent and Ferghana continued after the great purges of 1937-1938. Only N. Ismailov from Samarkand came from elsewhere in the Central Committee Bureaus of 1940 and 1949 (see Table 3 and 4 in Appendix). In other


\(^{24}\) While Karimov’s fall from grace was a consequence of his “nationalist” inclinations, what led Stalin to dismiss Segizbaev shortly thereafter is not known, but it followed intense correspondence between Stalin and Yusupov on the matter. RGASPI, f.558, op.11, d.58, l.39-40, Document No. 19, “Shifrotelegramma Stalina I-V. Yusupovu,” June 10, 1938.
words, even if an almost entirely new leadership was installed in power they reflected largely the same geographical origins as their disgraced predecessors. This attests to the robustness of the cadre hierarchy and that this “regionalism” was something which had intruded from without. Moscow also visibly reinforced its control by almost doubling the presence of non-Central Asians on the Uzbek Central Committee Bureau from five in 1937 to nine in 1940 (see Table 2 and 3 in Appendix).25 Korenizatsiia had slowed down from the early 1930s, which in part was manifested in the Russification of the Uzbek Bureau after the great purges, but this did not imply that the powers of the native leadership were more curtailed as Uzbekistan entered the 1940s. Quite the contrary, as Moscow stood passive to an increasingly reassertive Uzbek leadership.

25 The power ministries and procurator’s office were also dominated by non-Central Asians, including the Georgian Minister of Interior, Kobulov, whose appointment followed a purge of the Uzbek NKVD cadre department, and the Russian Prosecutor General Alexander Beljaev from Novgorod. Incidentally, Kobulov had been accused of nepotism and failure to fulfill his duty as head of intelligence in Germany. However, instead of dismissing him Beria “gave him a raise” and appointed him Commissar of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan. See Ts. K. KPSS, No. 1686/ce “Vypiska iz Protokola No. 70 Zasedaniya Preziduma Ts.K. ot 1 Iyulya 1954 g.” June 16, 1954. On the purge of NKVD see: RGANI, f.6, op.13, d.39a, l.4-199, “Zapiska Komissii Prezidiuma Ts.K. KPSS v Prezidium Ts.K. o Rezul’tatakh Raboty po Rassledovaniyu Prichin Repressij i Obstoyatel’stv Politicheskikh Protsessov 30-kh Godov,” February 18, 1963. See also RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 37, l. 72, Document No. 232, “Postanovlenie Politbyuro Ts.K. VKP(b) vopros Yusupova i Kobulova o Sozdaniiz Respublikanskoy Trojki v Uzbekistane,” March 14, 1943.

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Although Stalin’s Russification and centralization of policy in the post-purge period initially stifled local political influence, Yusupov’s clout was growing steadily during the 1940s and his policy initiatives often trumped those of powerful figures in the center. For example, when in the 1940s Yusupov and Kobulov reported increasing theft and embezzlement in the trading network of food, textile, and manufactured goods, proposing the establishment of a troika composed of themselves as well the Prosecutor Beljaev, this was rejected by the Central Committee secretaries Molotov and Mikoyan who wanted this to fall under the all-Union Prosecutor General. But Stalin sided with the locals, noting “I am against the proposal of Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan. I favor the proposal of Yusupov and Kobulov. Insist on that proposal”.26 A second example of Yusupov’s increasing authority was his lead role in the construction of the Great Ferghana Canal, a massive project begun in 1939 stretching 250 kilometers and employing 500,000 workers. Whereas Molotov in his speech to the 18th party congress the same year used the rostrum to criticize the “gigantomania” of present construction efforts and irrigation projects in the USSR as a whole were being scaled down, Yusupov confidently ignored this opposition with Stalin’s backing. Not only Molotov but the

26 AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 211-12, Document No.231, “Zapiska V.M. Molotova i A.I. Mikoyana I.V. Stalinu o Sozdaniii Troiki v Uzbekistane;” March 12, 1943.
Uzbek Second Secretary Alexander Kudriavtchev along with the other non-Central Asian members of the Uzbek Central Committee opposed the project.\textsuperscript{27} Evidently, Stalin ceded policy initiative and political power to Yusupov and did so in part, as during the 1920s and 1930s, to maintain parity between the Central Asian and non-Central Asian secretaries.

The canal controversy and Yusupov’s transgressions of authority frayed relations between the indigenous and non-Central Asian centrally appointed members and candidates of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, the deputy Chairman of the Party Control Commission, Nikolaj Lomakin, reported in 1941 that he had “a more or less clear picture” of the situation in the Bureau. “Yusupov”, he noted, “distrusts Second Secretary Kudriavtchev and vice versa”. There is an “unhealthy climate in the Bureau” he continued, mainly fought out “between Russians and Uzbeks”. Accusing Yusupov and Abdurakhmanov for ‘anti-party’ activity and for having “adopted or strived for adopting the role of Second Secretary”, Kudriavtchev lamented that they had precluded “an active role for himself”.\textsuperscript{29} Comrade Zykov (in charge of the all-Union Central Committee’s

\textsuperscript{27} RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 662, l. 197–199, “Yusupov to Shkiritov,” March 17, 1940; RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 662, l. 235, “Protokol zasedaniia Biuro TsK UzSSR,” August 20, 1940.

\textsuperscript{28} RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, d. 662, l. 235, ”Protokol zasedaniia Biuro TsK UzSSR,” August 20, 1940; RGANI f. 6, op. 6, d. 667, l. 41–52, ”Lomakin to Andreev,” August 7, 1941.

\textsuperscript{29} RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 667, Letter from N. Lomakin, “Upolnomochennyj KPK pri Ts.K. VKP(b) po Uzbekskoj SSR, 1941” to A. Andreev (“Informatsionnaya Zapiska”) in “Spravki rabotnikov komissiispravki rabotnikov komissii
cadre policy) corroborated this, writing to Malenkov (Secretary of the all-Union Central Committee) that: “On the question of cadres, the opinion of Kudriavtchev is not listened to.” Refractory to instruction, Yusupov “went ahead and appointed the Chairman of the Workers Reserves, comrade Vostokov, the First Secretary of Lenin raykom, Kotov, and comrade Makumbaeva (an NKVD official in Bukhara), against Kudriavtchev’s objections”.

Appended to Lomakin’s report was a long list of Kudriavtchev’s other accusations against the Uzbek leadership, out of which embezzlement, theft, and concentration of powers were among the more grave. Noteworthy is that this litany of errors contained no allegations of favoritism or nepotism. Lomakin, on the other hand, did note “one major shortcoming in Yusupov’s work and that is his cadre policy”. However, by this was not meant nepotism or localism but the preferential treatment of Uzbeks in army conscription. Underscoring that the main acrimony was between Russians and Uzbeks, Lomakin even went as far as saying that these belligerent groups

partijnogo kontrolya pri Ts.K. VKP (b) po dokladnym zapiskam upolnomochennogo KPK po Uzbekskoj SSR, informatsii i telegrammy upolnomochennogo, postanovleniya Byuro Ts.K. KP(b) Uzbekistan i drugie materialy o narusheniyakh ustava VKP (b)...” 1941-1943.

30 RGANI, f. 6, op.6, no. 664, “Sekretaryu Ts.K. VKP/b/ tov. Malenkovu G.M.” Telegram authored by Zykov, Organisator Upravleniya Kadrov Ts.K. VKP/b/, November 11, 1940, in “Dokladnye zapiski upolnomochennogo KPK pri Ts.K. VKP(b) po Uzbekskoj SSR...” 1939-1942.
were conspiring against one another.\textsuperscript{31} That Yusupov was safely under Stalin’s thumb cannot be doubted but he apparently exercised significant powers locally, even sidelining Moscow’s proconsul.

\textit{Yusupov’s “Family Circle”: The Marginal Importance of Region}

These powers extended also to the delicate sphere of cadre appointment. When exercising these powers, “Yusupov was as a man,” B. Reskov and G. Sedov contend, “who rarely listened to recommendations…when it came to selecting a person for a position”. Rather, Yusupov surrounded himself with those outstanding figures “he had met and encountered in his work life.”\textsuperscript{32} One such “supporter” is described in greater detail, R.M. Ghulov, the example of which Reskov and Sedov view as emblematic of Yusupov’s governing style. Deaf but ambitious, Ghulov began as a mechanic in Tashkent but was assigned to Tajikistan and rose to the position of deputy Commissar for Food Industry, and then deputy First Secretary of the Communist Party. He encountered Yusupov in the early 1940s during the construction of the Great Ferghana Canal and

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\textbf{\textsuperscript{31} RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 667, Letter from N. Lomakin, “Upolnomochennyj KPK pri Ts.K. VKP(b) po Uzbekskoj SSR, 1941” to A. Andreev (“Informatsionnaya Zapiska”) in “Spravki rabotnikov komissii partijnogo kontrolya pri Ts.K. VKP (b) po dokładnym zapiskam upolnomochennogo KPK po Uzbekskoj SSR, informatsii i telegrammy upolnomochennogo, postanovleniya Byuro Ts.K. KP(b) Uzbekistan i drugie materialy o narusheniyakh ustava VKP (b)…” 1941-1943.}
\textsuperscript{32} B. Reskov and G. Sedob, \textit{Usman Yusupov} (Toshkent: BAE, 1976), Chapter 6 “Budem Vmeste Rabotat’”.
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Yusupov was reportedly so impressed with Ghulov’s labor that he instructed Second Secretary Kudriavtchev to appoint him first deputy of the State Control Commission. “Yusupov knew one criterion,” Reskov and Sedov write “Intelligence, education, independence, organizational skills, determination, and courage […] not national origin.” Another appointee, the head of the Great Ferghana Canal project, a Bukhara native, was illiterate, but had reportedly the qualities Yusupov sought. Yusupov’s men may have been lacking in savoir faire but they were apparently both loyal and in possession of the requisite talents.

Even adherents of the regional approach of Uzbekistan’s politics testify to the marginal relevance of region and nationality in Yusupov’s calculus. For example, Donald Carlisle identified Abdulla Mavlyanov and Mirza-Akhmedov, both Kazakhs and natives of southern Kazakhstan, to have been the two key figures in Yusupov’s “family circle”. Born in the Kazakh village Sarar, Mavlyanov was active in Tashkent Unions during the 1930s, at the time of which he encountered Yusupov. They would also rise together. Having served as secretary of the October raykom in Tashkent, then secretary in Ferghana and Bukhara, Mavlyanov was elevated to Central Committee secretary in 1941,

33 Ibid.
and from 1942 and 1946 he occupied the prestigious position of First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom.\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, Mirza-Akhmedov was a native of Turkestan City, located near the more well-known Kazakh city of Shimkent, but like Yusupov and Mavlyanov he spent almost his entire career in Tashkent.\textsuperscript{36} The common denominator of Yusupov, Mavlyanov, and Mirza-Akhmedov was that their careers were confined almost exclusively to Tashkent; all had served in the Tashkent obkom or gorkom at various points, but it bears noting that none of them came from this area.

Conversely, the two eminent Tashkent natives during Yusupov’s reign in the 1940s – Sabir Kamalov and Arif Alimov – served predominantly outside of Tashkent. During the 1930s Kamalov was stationed in Bukhara, then First Secretary of the Karakalpak obkom 1933-36, first Secretary of the Margilan raykom in Ferghana 1937-38, Second Secretary of the Ferghana obkom 1938-1939, deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers 1940-41, only to end up as First Secretary of the Karakalpak obkom 1941-


\textsuperscript{36} After entering the party in 1931, Mirza-Akhmedov served as First Secretary of a Tashkent rajkom from 1934-1937, head of the Tashkent Film Studio for two years, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tashkent gorkom responsible for cadre issues, and then promoted to chief of cadre policy on the republic-level in 1943 – a position he controlled until 1949 when named First Secretary of the Andijan obkom. “M. Mirza-Akhmedov” in \textit{Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi}, Vol. 7 (Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1976), p. 262.
1946, and First Secretary of the Ferghana obkom in 1949. At the age of 38 in 1950, Arif Alimov had served as First Secretary of Tashkent gorkom, Kokand gorkom and Namangan obkom in Ferghana, commissar of state security in Karakalpakstan, Second Secretary of Andijan obkom, and First Secretary of the Namangan and Samarkand obkoms. Down to 1950, the Tashkent-based phase of his career had lasted only two years even if he had traversed all oblasts of the republic but three.

The pattern during the Yusupov years was that elite careers were primarily pursued outside of native oblasts – “Ferghanites” served primarily in Tashkent and vice versa while several others crisscrossed the republic in a breath-taking pace. This all but made impossible the formation of regional cliques on the basis of place of birth. A Tashkent-clique may be said to have formed during Yusupov, based in part on figures from this region (e.g. Kamalov and Alimov) and those who had predominantly served there (Yusupov, Mavlyanov, and Mirza-Akhmedov) but the rapport established between these individuals was not based on region of origin since they hailed from diverse places.

The Party Control Commission’s files on party violations in the early 1940s further

testifies to the diversity of origins among members of “protection pacts”.\textsuperscript{39} For example, Ferghana’s Party Control Commission head Abdurakhmanov was identified to have “secret ties” with the former Secretary of the Uzbekistan Central Committee on propaganda, Suleiman Azimov, and the former secretary of Tashkent obkom, M. Yuldashev.\textsuperscript{40} However, Abdurakhmanov was a native of Tashkent, Yuldashev form Kokand Ferghana oblast,\textsuperscript{41} and Azimov from Samarkand.\textsuperscript{42}

That Central Asian leaders exerted influence through mutual protection pacts is evident. But whatever the extent of such pacts and their occasional concentration to geographical regions, they were scarcely unique to Central Asia. In 1937, for example, A.A. Kulyakin alerted Stalin to the formation of a regional patronage group in Ukraine, where the First Secretary of Dnepropretovs sk obkom M.M. Khataevich had contrived a

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\textsuperscript{39} RGANI, f. 6., op. 6, No. 667 “Spravki rabotnikov komissii partijnogo kontrolya pri Ts.K. VKP (b) po dokladnym zapiskam upolnomochennogo KPK po Uzbekskoj SSR, informatsii i telegrammy upolnomochennogo, postanovleniya Byuro Ts.K. KP(b) Uzbekistan i drugie materialy o narusheniyakh ustava VKP (b)...” 1941-1943.
\textsuperscript{40} RGANI, f. 6., op. 6, No. 667, Letter from Sec. of Ts.K. KP/b/Uz Lomakin to Chm. of KPK A.A. Andreev, January 23, 1942.
\textsuperscript{42} Beyond engaging in these illicit ties, Abdurakhmanov had also used public funds for house construction and had a reputation considered “strongly disfavorable”. See RGANI, f. 6., op. 6, No. 667, Letter from Sec. of Ts.K. KP/b/Uz Lomakin to Chm. Of KPK A.A. Andreev, January 23, 1942.
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“loyal following of former co-workers and friends” at different levels of responsibility – all of whom shared the background of having been associated with Khataevich in party organizations and factories in the past.\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, Ukraine and the Black Sea area was the region most associated with nepotism -- not Central Asia. Declaring a “war on bureaucracy and nepotism” in 1937, Stalin averred that in “a number of regions of the Soviet Union, notably Ukraine and the Black Sea area, party executives were being ‘chosen’ by a small group of insiders instead of being elected.”\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{Party Violations in Yusupov’s Uzbekistan}

In-depth investigations by the Party Control Commission in Tashkent, Samarkand, and Bukhara oblast in the early 1940s posit that the main predicaments here were others than violation of cadre policy, though of no lesser importance. The Party Control Commission highlighted four main areas of wrong-doings in Tashkent. First, Tashkent officials had splurged 50,000 rubles on a banquet, which together with other banquets and concerts for heads of enterprises, secretaries of the party bureau, komsomol secretaries, and raykom secretaries had “created conditions for semejstvennosti [nepotism]”. Although Tashkent was spotlighted in particular, such spendthrift was

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\textsuperscript{43} RGASPI, f.558, op.2, d.148, "Pis’mo Kulyakina A.A. v Osobyj Sektor Ts.K. VKP (b),” June 16, 1937.

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pinpointed also in other oblasts of the republic, not seldom involving the throwing of lavish parties, the “drinking of wine and vodka”, and other disorderly conduct. A second target of criticism was the “low number of figures with worker backgrounds” among Tashkent officials (and also other oblasts of the republic) and the “liberal relations to judicial practice” among judges. Thirdly, and perhaps most serious, were allegations against Tashkent obkom and gorkom officials for their “violation of intra-party democracy”, “the question of collective leadership in the party apparatus”, and the “failure to hold party plenums as envisaged.” Such missteps were asserted to have been particularly pronounced in in Oktyabrskom, Stalinskom, and Kalininskom rayons. Not a single session of the Bureau of Tashkent gorkom between March and August, for example, was held with the attendance of all members and only four out of the nine voting members were present during the seven sessions held during these dates.

45 RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, No. 664, “Dokladnaya zapiska – O faktakh razbazarivaniya gosudarstvennykh sredstv Tashkentskim obkomom KP/b/Uz na ustrojstvo banketov,” October 21, 1939, in “Dokladnye zapiski upolnomochennogo KPK pri Ts.K. VKP(b) po Uzbekskoj SSR…” 1939-1942. In defense, First Secretary Yusupov claimed this had been unsanctioned by the SNK and the CC. See, RGANI, f. 6, op.6, No. 664, in “Dokladnaya zapiska…” January 8, 1940.

46 RGANI, f. 6, op.6, No. 664, in “O faktakh narusheniya…” July 7, 1940, and “Dokladnye zapiski…” August 27, 1940.
This quadrumvirate of officials effectively monopolized decision-making to the others’ dismay.

Samarkand oblast received its share of criticism, which focused on four general concerns: failure to absorb local nationalities in industrial work, insufficient party work in primary party organization, low response rates to complaints against the party, and a “feudal attitude” towards spouses and women in general. It is further mentioned how leading officials “violates the Bolshevist principle of development of cadres.” But this condemnation did not concern promotions based on kinship, nepotism, or promotion of *rostvenniki* but the “high turnover of cadres” whereby in the first 8 months of 1940, as much as 35.3 percent of the 1497 *nomenklatura* employees in the obkom changed positions for various reasons. This was conceived to be an “unserious relationship to cadre development” with “cadre shifting from place to place”. The failure to include local

47 RGANI, f. 6, op.6, No. 664, in “O Narusheniyakh ustava VKP/b/ o Sozyve..” to Yusupov and Andreev AA from V. Filimonov, October 10, 1940. The absence of most members but the core secretarial group in regular Bureau sessions, it should be said, was scarcely unique to Uzbekistan but appears to have been the rule in the Soviet system. As Fainsod noted in relation to the Smolensk obkom, “…those in regular attendance with voting power consisted chiefly of the secretarial group.” Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1958), p. 68.
nationalities in the *nomenklatura* was also identified to be a problem, with only 634 of the 1497 being Uzbeks, and the share of women negligible.\(^{48}\)

Finally, in an evaluation of Bukhara oblast authored by the First Secretary of its obkom, T. Dzhuraev, the vast majority of party exclusions concerned misuse of state property or poor performance. Out of 50 exclusions from 1930 to 1952, 21 concerned embezzlement of state or kolkhoz funds, 10 related to “violations of socialist instructions”, 6 to “hooliganism”, and 2 for violations of “party discipline”.\(^{49}\) Another 26-page long evaluation on performance and party violations in Karakalpakstan notes significant problems in virtually all spheres of political life, mostly in respect to plan fulfillment, but does not mention poor staffing of cadres.\(^{50}\) Instances of patronage (*protektsiya*) and embezzlement were observed in Namangan and Tashkent oblasts where in the former one Ubajdullah Khaipakhunov had protected “an associate” and in the latter

\(^{48}\) RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, No. 664, “Dokladnaya zapiska: o rabote Samarkandkogo obkoma KP/b/Uz” from V. Filimonov to U. Yusupov and A.A. Andreev, October 24, 1940.

\(^{49}\) RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, No. 1047, “Informatsiya o rabote partijnoj komissii pri Bukharskom obkome Kompartii Uzbekistana za vtoroe polugodie 1953 goda”.

\(^{50}\) RGANI, f. 6., op. 6, No. 667, “O faktakh samouspokoeinija…” April 15, 1942. On failure to fulfill cotton plans, see RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, No. 667, Postanovleniya SNK UzSSR “O merakh po sokhraneniyu khlopkia volokna i khlopkia-syrtsa urokhaya 1941-1942” authored by Yusupov November 23, 1942.
Kolkhoz funds had been plundered in Parkent rayon, but attention to cadre policy, nepotism, and favoritism was on the whole marginal.\textsuperscript{51}

Even taking into consideration the possibility that such violations may simply have eluded the Party Control Commission it is important to recognize that nepotism and localism were problems encompassing all of Soviet society to varying degrees. An article published shortly after Stalin’s death on August 4, 1953, in \textit{Pravda} set the tone. Cadre selection in the USSR takes place on three criteria it proclaimed: First, on the basis of “political trust” and reliability; Second, on the basis of concrete work and merit; And third, more negatively, on the basis of “personal loyalty, friendship connections, and localism (zemlyachestvo or rodstva).”\textsuperscript{52}

In the sphere of nepotism, Soviet newspapers were filled daily with new revelations that were meant perhaps not so much to shock as amuse readers. In one of the more egregious cases, Ivan Voronkov, a director of the automobile factory restaurant \textit{Avtozavodsk} in the Russian town of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) was accused of putting 70 relatives on the pay roll – cousins, nieces, aunts, and uncles – not to mention his brothers Nikolai and Georgy Voronkov and Alexandra Grigoriyevna, his wife. Voronkov may

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\textsuperscript{51} RGANI, f. 6., op. 6, No. 667, “Zapiska o Sistematicheskom narushenii so storrony Byuro TsK KP/b Uzbekistan i nekotoryh obkomov i rajkomov partii…o rassmotrenii apellyatsii”. October 28, 1942.  
have upped the ante on nepotism even by Soviet standards but the shadow cast by the
Voronkov family tree on this diner was scarcely an isolated incident.\textsuperscript{53}

Six months later \textit{Izvestija} exposed analogous family trees running the Kiev
Medical Institute: The Barchenko family, the Baranniks, the Benyumovs, the Bogdano-
wiches, the Brauns, the Vinokurs, the Aizenbergs, the Gorodinskys, the Dukhins, the
Zlatmans, the Zantbarts, and so on. “If you drew all the family trees present in the
institute’s nepotism”, \textit{Izvestija} cynically concluded, “you would have a whole grove.”
Perhaps more conspicuously, the 13 wives of department heads and administrators in the
Tomsk Medical Institute were disclosed to have formed an informal “lobbying council”
to which the institute’s formal male council “dared not talk back”.\textsuperscript{54} Perhaps there were
“Ikramovs”, “Mukhitdinovs”, and “Khodzhaevs” running the medical institutes of
Tashkent and Samarkand, although this did not make it into either \textit{Izvestija} or
confidential reports, but even if this was the case it would not have deviated much from
nepotism and family rule elsewhere in the USSR.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Izvestia}, March 23, 1952, p. 2.
Niyazov’s Uzbekistan

Regionalism Reversed

In 1950 First Secretary Yusupov was replaced with another Ferghana native, Amin Niyazov, who inhabited this office until 1955. Next to Supreme Soviet head Yuldash Akhunbabaev, Niyazov belonged to that small clique of individuals whose careers had commenced prior to the purges and prospered afterwards. His formative career experiences were unlike Yusupov primarily in his native Ferghana. Designated Minister of Finance in 1940, Niyazov held this post until 1946 when named deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1947 he climbed an additional rung on the career ladder being elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and admitted member of the Central Committee Bureau. He would serve as First Secretary from 1950 until his dismissal in 1955.55

Similar to the key officials during Yusupov, Niyazov’s “ruling coalition” was primarily based on figures who had not pursued their careers in their native regions. For example, Malik Abdurazakov (from Namangan) was appointed First Secretary of the Tashkent gorkom in 1952 and elected member of the Central Committee in 1956 after a


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brief sojourn in the all-Union Council of Nationalities.\textsuperscript{56} Nurutdin Mukhitdinov, conversely, like many other Tashkent natives grounded his career in Ferghana Valley. Born in 1917 and having joined the party in 1942, he was appointed secretary for propaganda in the Namangan obkom in 1948, and then First Secretary of Namangan obkom in 1948-50. Thereafter he headed Tashkent oblast for two years till his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1951. In parallel to this he served in the Central Committee Bureau 1952 to 1956 during the time of which he was chosen First Secretary of Uzbekistan in 1955.\textsuperscript{57}

That most leading Tashkent officials had served the greater part of their career not in their province but in Ferghana and \textit{vice versa} created bonds of loyalties at workplaces, but not necessarily in their native regions. Thus, the Second Secretary of the Andijan obkom in 1946, the Tashkent native Arif Alimov, encountered another Tashkent-native Abdurazak Mavlyanov when he served as First Secretary of Andijan obkom in 1946 and Mavlyanov and Alimov would rise together: Mavlyanov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1950 when Alimov was designated Minister of


Agriculture. Abdurakhmanov, the Tashkent native, served as head of the Yangijul raykom in Tashkent when Yusupov from Ferghana was First Secretary of Tashkent oblast. They rose and fell together in 1937 and 1950 respectively.\textsuperscript{59}

Parallels could surely be drawn to the Tsarist period and Stéphane A. Dudoignon’s pioneering study of non-place based loyalties among Bukhara’s Ulama. Here, the high presence of Ulama from Khatlon in Bukhara and vice versa was not a function of the rule of “clans” but derived from ties the Ulama formed when rotating in predominantly these provinces. Clientilism, corruption, and favoritism was pervasive, here as elsewhere, but it derived primarily from other forms of loyalties than kinship. The system was built “on exchange of favors” and “generosity” but did not relate principally to clan. Thus, factions such as the Kulabi or Temane have been “erroneously caricatures as a coalition of purely regional interests” instead of the “fluid landscape” of loyalties which it was.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} Refer to their biographies cited earlier.
Maimed though not entirely defeated, Niyazov’s predecessor Yusupov returned to Tashkent in 1953 to chair the Council of Ministers but was soon undermined and demoted to director of a Sovkhoz. Yusupov was the first casualty of Khrushchev’s rise to power and he was replaced with Nurutdin Mukhitdinov who, using this office as springboard, two years later would be appointed First Secretary. At the plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party in 1954, Arif Alimov, Secretary of the Tashkent Obkom, accused Yusupov of “nepotism and corruption” and Malik Abdurazakov, the Tashkent gorkom Secretary, lambasted Yusupov’s construction of 2 million rubles personal mansions in Tashkent and Yangi-yol.61 True or untrue, such allegations were the modus operandi in the Soviet system and frequently concerned flamboyant lifestyles, house construction, and promotion of friends and relatives. *Izvestiya*’s “A Forest Tale” published in 1959, implicating Russian senior party officials with building dachas for 43 ministers, was but one example of similar charges of favoritism and housing construction elsewhere in the Soviet Union.62 If wealth in the U.S. more commonly has been a road to political office than political office has been a road to wealth,63 the reverse undoubtedly held true in the USSR. Doubtlessly, Soviet leaders

exploited the perquisites of public office to acquire apartments and other attractive goods for family and friends. It is doubtful, however, whether all such accusations should be taken at face value. That virtually every new leader chastised his predecessor for “nepotism”, housing violations, or related accusations made such accusations rather script-like. Besides, the figure who did not have an entourage of protégés would likely never had made it to the higher echelons of power in the first place.

*Party Violations in Niyazov’s Uzbekistan*

A more reliable indicator of localism than the opinions of a successor is the confidential reports of the Party Control Commission. Firstly, it is suggestive that the one Party Control Commission file relating specifically to *mestnichestvo* in the Soviet Union covers only cases in Rostov, Gorkov, and Karelo-Finn oblasts, the Ministry of Building Material, the Leninabad and Tatar obkoms, and others. Uzbekistan is not mentioned among them, even if this file is enlightening to these practices elsewhere. For example, in Russia’s Shelkov Cotton Kombinat the former Director, Comrade Bolshakov, had filled this enterprise with relatives, including among them his wife’s brother Shibaev.

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64 RGANI, f.6, op.6, no. 1652, “Spravki rabotnikov KPK pri TsK KPSS po proverke zayavlennij o narushenii gosudarstvennoj distsipliny, pripiskakh, ochkovtiral'tstve i mestnichestvo,” October 1952-May 1955.

65 RGANI, f.6, op.6, no. 1652, “Zamестителю председателя КPK при CтK ВКП/б т. Ягодкину И.Т.” 1951.
Likewise, in Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast, the chairman of the Pobeda enterprise, Mirzaidov, had embezzled factory funds and engaged in favoritism. That no case in this file concerns Uzbekistan may have several explanation and does not necessarily imply that such practices were not part of Uzbek politics, which they in all certainty were to some degree. But it points to that localism as well as the related practice of nepotism was not more extensive than elsewhere in the USSR, including the European parts of the empire.

Secondly, the violations that did occur in Uzbekistan appear to have been principally of other types. The Party Control Commission’s examination of Uzbek obkoms and gorkoms in the first half of 1953 reveals that of 101 party exclusions considered by the Uzbek Central Committee from 1923 to 1951, 23 concerned embezzlement or theft of state property, 15 various forms of misdemeanors in cooperatives, 5 for withholding compromising material on oneself or relatives, and 27 for drinking, hooliganism, or moral problems. Typical deficiencies among the rest of these neatly arranged violations pertained to desertion, feudal relationship to wives, “sloppiness” in work, and anti-Soviet activity. Specific examples referred to include a prosecutor in Tyurya-Kurgansk rayon who illegally had made a mint totaling 9200 rubles; tens of thousands of rubles had been embezzled from the Naryn Sovkhoz by a  

66 RGANI, f.6, op.6, no. 1652, “Predsedatelyu KPK pri TsK KPSS t. Shkiryatovu M.F.” 1953.
judge in Kurgansk rayon; and the Chairman of the Kirov Kolkhoz had amassed a small fortune amounting to more than 300,000 rubles.\(^{67}\) A similar story could be told for spotted party violations in the second half of 1953.\(^{68}\) Of all eight examples of transgressions canvassed (K. Turgunbaev, M. Sanaev, Kh. Niyazov, Kh. Shermatov, M. Khodzhaev, K. Dzhanamurdov, M. Tasheva) none concerned localism, promotion of relatives, or favoritism.\(^{69}\) Furthermore, Uzbekistan during the Stalin years was accused of “wrecking” and “sabotage of the cotton industry” but such criticism was rarely linked to favoritism in cadre placement.\(^{70}\)

Thirdly, Central Committee plenum reports rarely referred to localism in Uzbekistan, even if they were part of similar reports elsewhere. A reading of public reports from the Uzbek Central Committee Party plenums in the late 1940s and early 1950s confirm that the party violations referred to in secret correspondence square overall

\(^{67}\) RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 1070, “O rabote partijnoj komissii pri Ts.K. Kompartii Uzbekistan za pervoe polugodie 1953 g.” in “Informatsiya o rabote partijnoj komissii pri Ts.K Kompartii Uzbekistana za 1953, 1955”.

\(^{68}\) RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 1070 “Informatsiya o rabote partijnoj komissii pri Ts.K Kompartii Uzbekistana za 1953, 1955”.

\(^{69}\) RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 1070, “O rabote partijnoj komissii pri Ts.K. Kompartii Uzbekistana za vtoroe polugodie 1953 g.”

\(^{70}\) RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 57, l. 117-118, No. 2133/Sh, “Shifrtelegramma A.A. Andreeva I.V. Stalinu o repressiyakh v Tadzhikistane;” October 2, 1937.
with public reports on “the struggle against feudalist-landowner survivals”,
“failure to meet cotton targets,”
“district and province officials who…have even themselves stolen collective farm property”,
“a trend toward private property acquisition, petty bourgeois corruption and nationalist and religious sentiment,”
“instances of a feudal-beg attitude to women”. Contemporaneous plenum reports from the Kyrgyz and Tajik Central Committees contain nearly the same content of party violations but here, in difference to Uzbekistan, the maladies of nepotism and related practices are emphasized. Thus, a Kyrgyz Central Committee plenum report remarks how “The struggle against the incorrect practice of selecting cadres for family reasons is being waged… Officials who have failed in their work are frequently transferred from one post to another”.
Likewise, a Tajik Central Committee Plenum report intimates that “[Second Secretary of Tajikistan] Perminov…was waging a principled struggle against existing shortcomings and had spoken out firmly against selecting personnel on the basis of friendship.”

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74 Ibid., p. 2.
75 Ibid., p. 2.
These differences are likely not coincidental since nepotism, *zemlyachestvo* or *mestnichestvo*, were precisely the ills emphasized in Tajik confidential party documents. Available data suggest that there was a qualitative difference between politics as conducted in at least these two republics, even if public bombast and blunder of “promotion of friends and relatives” was a means to denigrate one’s predecessor in most Soviet republics. The hegemony of the Leninabad faction in Tajikistan serves as a useful contrast to the comparatively less territorialized factions in Uzbekistan.

**Leninabad Hegemony in Tajikistan**

The previous chapter noted how Tajikistan’s Leninabad oblast emerged as the foremost source of political power following its detachment from Uzbekistan in 1930. This hegemony was tangible. While comprising less than a fifth of Tajikistan’s territory and less than a third of its population (in 1976), the population of neighboring Stalinabad oblast almost doubled from 1946 to 1991 (Gafurov, T.U. Uldzhabaev, D.R. Rasulov, R.N. Nabiev, K.M. Makhkamov).

that of Leninabad. Likewise, all Chairmen of the Council of Ministers during this half-century long period were born in Leninabad oblast (D.R. Rasulov, T.U. Uldzhabaev, A.K. Kakharov, R.N. Nabiev, K.M. Makhmanov, I.I. Khaeev, and K.M. Makhkamov) with the partial exception of N. Dodkhudoev (1956-61), hailing from Derzud in Gorno-Badakshan oblast. None of these figures – heads of party and state – ever served outside of Leninabad or the capital oblast Stalinabad, except Uldzhabaev who was “exiled” to Khatlon oblast after he had fallen out of favor with the party in 1961. Whereas heads of party and state came from disparate origins in Uzbekistan and a majority, as a rule, had served in several oblasts during their careers, in Tajikistan political power was concentrated to a single region.

Besides the low level of inter-oblast mobility within Tajikistan, it was on the lowest rung of Soviet republics in enlistments for positions in the center in Moscow. In fact, of the Soviet Union’s 129 oblasts in the post-Khrushchev period, Leninabad oblast occupied the 128th place when measuring the degree of upward mobility from oblast to union-level positions. Only the Ukrainian Sum’ska oblast was a more unfavorable spot

79 Ibid., p. 285.
for the career-oriented official seeking promotion to Moscow. In other words not only was lateral mobility within Tajikistan impeded but vertical mobility was severely circumscribed.

The tight-knit group of leading Tajik officials which formed in this soil was quite distinct from their Uzbek counterparts. One document dating to 1952 noted serious deviations from the party line by the Tajik Central Committee Bureau, and especially its stubbornly disobedient First Secretary Gafurov, including but not limited to anti-government activities, fraud in the cotton industry, and localism. “Gafurov and Rasulov”, it grumbled, “demonstrates a tendency of mestnichestvo and zemlyachestvo…[with] all attention directed to Leninabad oblast where they were born and where they have all of their relationships”. Nepotism was rife among this clique of Leninabadis. One case among many others cited referred to the former Secretary of Stalinabad gorkom Shomukhamedov who had smoothed the way for his 75-year old uncle and other relatives. Heads of kolkhozes, meanwhile, had reportedly been filled with “close friends” of Rasulov and Gafurov and ministers and others were appointed on the

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82 RGASPI, f. 558, op.11. d. 903. l.86-99,”O Ser’eznykh Izvrashcheniyakh Linii Partii v rabote rukovodstva Ts.K. KP (b) Tadzhikistana, osobenno ego sekretarya Gafurova. V.” June 1, 1952.
basis of their origin (*rod*). Not limited to this, Russian raykom secretaries had been replaced with *rodstvenniki* of Gafurov and Rasulov.⁸³

In parallel, peripheral regions of the republic had overall suffered from chronic neglect, especially Garm and Gorno-Badakshan where no measures had been taken to “lift them from their low level of cultural and scientific development.” “Gafurov and Rasulov detest the mountain regions and their cadres” the document lamented, and they even went as far as liquidating the Garm oblast because of their dislike of the erstwhile secretary of the Central Committee, Isaev, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, S.S. Shogodaev. Funds earmarked to these regions had been programmed by Gafurov and Rasulov to Stalinabad and Leninabad instead, and attempts to raise this issue in Moscow had prompted the firing and exclusion of several raykom and ispolkom secretaries.⁸⁴ By 1956 all other oblasts in the republic had been abolished apart from Leninabad,⁸⁵ which served to reinforce this hegemony. Uzbek officials, too, readjusted rayons and oblasts to shore up their power bases (e.g. in the creation of *Jizak* oblast under

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⁸⁵ With the partial exception of the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakshan whose status only could be changed by Moscow.
Rashidov and its abolishment by First Secretary Nishanov in the late 1980s) but they were not as bold to liquidate all other oblasts.

While politics in Uzbekistan never approached the magnitude of nepotism and “localism” in Tajikistan, it is conceivable that bonds of loyalties were little different in Tajikistan than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Earlier career ties as a source of cementing may have been as present here as in other Soviet republics. However, the concentration of a cadre pool to one single region created effects which were quite distinct from when power is dispersed between figures from a diverse set of regions and where officials inter-mingle. It amounted to a geographical territorialization of power, akin to the sway held of a geographically defined ethnic group over another.\(^6\) Being among the smallest of the Soviet republics, Tajikistan’s size impacted this concentration of power to one region as well since the cadre pool was much more circumscribed.

The differences which can be observed in these two cases cast doubts on the thesis that localism and nepotism in Central Asia were culturally determined. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were settled societies, had undergone similar transformations of identities in the pre-Soviet era, and were part of the non-tribally organized Central

Asia. Variations in Soviet cadre policy and the disparate sizes of these two republics nonetheless produced dissimilar outcomes: In Uzbekistan, localism was weak and nepotism certainly not more extensive than the Soviet average; In Tajikistan, localism was much more pronounced and nepotism fed into this since officials typically served in their home regions.

**Conclusion**

The previous chapter found some evidence indicating that career-based loyalties were present in early Soviet Uzbekistan, that national loyalties often trumped sub-national ones, and that indigenous localism and “regionalism” were of marginal concern. The post-purge period, 1937-1953, lends further support to these observations. If regionalism was of indigenous origin, then why did the predominance of figures from Tashkent and Ferghana continue even after the first generation of leaders had been almost completely purged and a new leadership installed? The only conceivable explanation is that the Tashkent-Ferghana linkup was in part centrally determined and in part a function of the extensive career ties formed in this soil. Yusupov, the First Secretary 1937-1950, exercised some authority on cadre selection and even took over this prerogative from the Second Secretary but his cadres were drawn narrowly from Tashkent and Ferghana. While a native of Ferghana, Yusupov had spent most of his career in Tashkent, which to some degree explains the high presence of former Tashkent colleagues in his Central
Committee and government. This imposed regionalization supports the “regionalism” hypothesis in this respect, yet this does not necessarily entail that particularly strong regional identities defined Uzbekistan.

Similar to the pre-purge period, the main antagonisms in the Central Committee were not among the indigenous elite but rather between Uzbeks and non-Central Asians. The Second Secretary was supposed to mediate these disputes but appears to have taken an active part in them himself. Informal politics overrode the formal distribution of powers between the First and Second Secretary, with the tacit approval of Stalin. The Second Secretary fulfilled his duty of reporting party-organization problem to the center, alleging that Yusupov had violated “cadre policy”. Yet this harsh criticism did not concern “localism” or nepotism but that he had given Uzbeks preferential treatment over Russians. In any case, it fell on deaf ears in Moscow. “National” loyalties among the Uzbek members clearly took precedence to particularistic ones, at least when facing the Russian and Slavic central appointees.

Nor do other forms of party violations detected by the Party Control Commission instill much confidence in the hypothesis of “localism”, even if it is noted to have been present elsewhere in the USSR in the same reports. Tajikistan is perhaps the most clear-cut example of such “localism” where Gafurov and Rasulov favored cadres from their native Leninabad and neglected the other parts of the republic in the distribution of resources. This also accords with the publicly available Central Committee Plenum reports, in which these phenomena are observed and criticized. In contrast to
their Tajik counterparts, however, the Uzbek leading officials were highly mobile. The rule during Yusupov was that Central Committee members had done tours in several oblasts of the republic, except often for their native ones. This mobility implied that loyalties were formed among figures of disparate backgrounds whose careers happened to intersect in the oblasts.

Taken together, the archival evidence and biographical data presented do not support the contention that tightly-organized regional groups ruled Uzbekistan or that this was the primary faultline of conflict. Neither does nepotism appear to have been particularly severe in Uzbekistan. Cases of bribery, embezzlement, high turnover of cadres, and “failures of collective leadership” were identified in Uzbekistan but the marginal attention devoted to nepotism and localism, both in Soviet media and Party Control Commission documents, suggests that it was surely not worse than elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Loyalties were formed primarily on the basis of career ties, which is exemplified by Yusupov’s varied clientele. That the distinct trajectories of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be traced to culture is improbable since both societies historically were settled, in difference to the nomadic Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. A more plausible explanation is the particular elite-mobility patterns of elites in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose origins trace to Soviet policies rather than to pre-Soviet history.

**Introduction**

With the partial exception of cadre policy, the post-purge Stalin period had been defined by a continuation of centralized government. Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, reversed this pattern. Khrushchev centralized authority over cadre policy in an attempt to uproot the nepotism and *zemlyachestvo* that had plagued the USSR in the final years of Stalin’s rule. But in parallel he decentralized decision-making by carving up the USSR into regional economic councils (*Sovnarkhozy*) and relaxed the “branch” principle of centralized decision-making which had been in effect since the early 1920s.¹

These center-periphery power readjustments were paralleled with a rapid turnover of personnel and in the other Central Asian republics “nativization”. In

Uzbekistan from 1953 to 1964 three new First Secretaries were appointed, equaling the number of First Secretaries named during the 34 years of Brezhnev and the post-purge Stalin period together. Uzbekistan was alone of the Central Asian republics entrusted with a native First Secretary already from 1929 and thenceforth. By the early 1960s, however, native secretaries had been appointed in all Central Asian republics: Rashidov in Uzbekistan, Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan, D.N. Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan, and Rasulov in Tajikistan.

These new leaders were subjected to a forceful union-wide crack down on zemlyachestvo, affecting Tajikistan in particular. However, Uzbekistan did not become a part of this campaign. If anything, the charges levied against Uzbekistan in Khrushchev’s party housekeeping effort were related to “nationalistic” deviations and not sub-national loyalties. As in the 1940s, the Uzbek leadership again stood accused of ganging up on their Russian counterparts in the Central Committee. It was also chastised for “nationalism”, disregard of central priorities, and foot-dragging on the implementation of cotton mechanization. What did change was the reintroduction of Samarkand into

2 The Tadzhik, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen Soviet republics saw an interchange of non-Central Asians and natives as First Secretaries from their creation up to 1960 or were tended to exclusively by non-Central Asians, in the case of Kazakhstan.
political power. Like a river that goes underground and later resurfaces, Samarkand resurrected with Rashidov’s appointment in 1959 after 25 years in the political periphery.

**Uzbekistan Under Khrushchev**

*Attacking Stalin’s Legacy of Nepotism*

At the 19th Party Congress in 1952, Khrushchev (then a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee) resolutely attacked the selection of party cadres, nepotism and favoritism in the USSR. “It was a serious affair,” Khrushchev declared, “when friendship, family relationships, and local ties were put before professional and political considerations.”¹ Georgii Malenkov’s speech at the 19th Party Congress, half a year before Stalin’s death, echoed these concerns. Devoting a not insignificant part of his speech to “nepotism and indiscipline”, Malenkov lamented that, “one of the party’s main shortcomings was the fact that cadres were selected not politically but on the basis of family and friendship.”²

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Examples of this assertion could be drawn from all corners of the USSR only during this decade, ranging from the domineering family of the Dagestan Tobacco Factory in the Caucasus,\(^5\) favoritism in Turkmenistan’s Ashkhabad television studio,\(^6\) nepotism in the Sverdlovsk Philharmonic Society of Russia,\(^7\) the corrupt family-rule in Siberia’s Omsk province,\(^8\) the “family ties and ties of friendship” in the Soviet Scientific Research Institute of Hydro Technology and Soil Amelioration in Moscow,\(^9\) Moldavia’s Minister of Light Industry who promoted his “relatives and acquaintances”,\(^10\) the “family influence” and “party connections” pervading the Bolshoi Theater,\(^11\) Moscow’s V. M. Molotov Library Institute, where as many as twenty members of the staff were related to each other,\(^12\) the Kiev Glass Factory whose Director Ya. D. Meilman had “filled all executive positions with his own people,”\(^13\) and last but not least the “nepotism” of Uzbekistan’s Chirchik gorkom.\(^14\)

\(^6\) V. Kornilov, “Pochemu Ashkabadskaia studiia vypuskaet plokhie kinozhurnalny,” *Pravda*, November 12, 1951, p. 2.
\(^7\) A. Nekrasov, “Fakty okazalis’ neozhidannymi…” *Pravda*, May 10, 1951, p. 2.
\(^8\) *Pravda*, October 15, 1953, pp. 5-6.
\(^10\) *Pravda*, April 24, 1959, p. 2.
\(^12\) V. Yeliseyeva, “In an atmosphere of nepotism,” *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, February 21, 1953, p. 2.
\(^13\) *Pravda Ukrayini*, January 23, 1953, p. 3.
\(^14\) *Pravda*, November 26, 1953, p. 2.
Not satisfied with only trimming the local excesses, Khrushchev put the Uzbek *nomenklatura* and those of other republics firmly under his thumb. Thus, in 1954 Moscow declared its intent to achieve more “effective cadre staffing” in Uzbekistan, resulting in the exclusion of 19 civil servants from the *nomenklatura* of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee, the transferring of 18 civil servants, and the exclusion of 156 from the party and removal from office. This encompassed the head of the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation, chairmen of factories, the chief engineer of Tashselmash, prosecutors, the deputy minister of Goskontrol, deputy minister of Justice, and others. Local input on this overhaul was insignificant and the Uzbek leadership retained only the shadow of what their former prerogatives had been. Hence a letter from the Uzbek Second Secretary, Melnikov, to Khrushchev declared that “The Central Committee of Uzbekistan agrees with [this reorganization] and encourages the center to send a new list of *nomenklatura.*” Ordinarily all of the positions cited above were the prerogative of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee to staff but the overlapping authorities of the *nomenklatura* system enabled the CPSU Central Committee to override it.

Having consolidated his powers in Moscow, Khrushchev in 1955 nominated Nuritdin Mukhitdinov new First Secretary of Uzbekistan, replacing Niyazov.\textsuperscript{16} Like many of his contemporaries, Mukhitdinov had built his career in Tashkent and Ferghana.\textsuperscript{17} Niyazov was sharply rebuked at the republican plenum in 1956: He had failed to direct the Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat successfully, left cotton quotas unfulfilled, neglected large areas of the republic, illegally constructed 100 houses in Tashkent for officials, and resorted to the “questionnaire” method in selecting officials. “Even Ministers and their deputies not to speak of other personnel,” the plenum report noted, “were sometimes approved without discussion by [the Uzbek] Central Committee Bureau.” As could be expected, Rakhimbabayeva and Alimov, who also were new secretaries in the revamped Central Committee, were less self-contained in their criticisms than the others.\textsuperscript{18}

All-Union evaluations of Uzbek cadre policy dating back to the same period, however, did not indicate that cadre policy was a particular area of concern. The deputy


\textsuperscript{17} He served as First Secretary of the Namangan obkom from 1948 to 1950, First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom 1950-51, and thereafter member of the Central Committee from 1952 to 1956. See \textit{Ibid}.

director of cadre development in the USSR Central Committee, Alekseev, pinpointed Armenia, Georgia, and Tuva, Vologod, Kaluzh, Smolensk, and Yaroslavl oblasts as areas where cadre policy was unsatisfactory but did not mention the Central Asian republics. Uzbekistan was faulted for its failure to include local nationalities and minorities, especially Karakalpaks, in party organizations, a problem which also was present in Dagestan and the Karelo-Finn party organization, but Alekseev did not relate this to violations of “collective leadership” and other misconducts identified by Niyazov’s successors.\textsuperscript{19} The only “serious violations” of factionalism in Uzbekistan detected by Moscow’s sentinels were confined to Tashkent and Surkhandarya oblasts, where a number of Komsomolists and communists had been arrested and excluded for “groupism in criminal activities”.\textsuperscript{20} This stood in contrast to the faculty at Moscow State University where the “cadre [was] recruited on the basis of earlier connections and birth ties (\textit{rodstvennykh otnoshenij})”\textsuperscript{21} and the Soviet Minister Beshchev and his deputy Kuznetsov

\textsuperscript{19} RGANI, f.5, op.29, no. 33, “TsK KPSS” letter from Alekseev, deputy director of cadre, TsK KPSS, December 20, 1954.
\textsuperscript{20} RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasnotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov” April 1957 in “Material k otchetu KPK pri TsK KPSS po Uzbekistan 1957 i 10 mes 58g.”
\textsuperscript{21} RGANI, f.5, op.29, no. 33, TsK KPSS “O nedostatkakh v podbore kadrov v Moskovskom gosudarstvennom universitete im. M.V. Lomonosova”, August 28, 1954.
who promoted figures on the basis of “prior connections” in Lvov, Northern Caucasus, and elsewhere. 

The predominance of figures from Tashkent and Ferghana in the Uzbek Central Committee Bureau continued well into the mid-1950s (see appendix on composition of Central Committee Bureau) even if these, with few exceptions, had crisscrossed a number of oblasts. Among the most prominent members admitted were Arif Alimov and Mukhitdin Nurutdinov (not to be confused with First Secretary Nurutdin Mukhitdinov). Alimov was a protégé of Mukhitdinov who had previously been his superior in the Namangan obkom. Nurutdinov, in turn, belonged to that nonconformist group of Uzbek politicians who had served uniformly in one oblast, Tashkent. Ferghana Valley and Tashkent officials also made their presence felt beyond the Central Committee Bureau, including in positions traditionally spoken for by non-Central Asians.

23 From 1952 to 1955 Alimov headed the Tashkent obkom and became a member and candidate of the Central Committee Bureau in 1954 and Secretary of the Central Committee in 1956.
24 At the age of 27, in 1938, Nurutdinov was named First Secretary of the Tashkent komsomol gorkom and First Secretary of the Tashkent komsomol obkom a year later. After service in the Army he was appointed secretary of the Tashkent obkom and then First Secretary of the same oblast in 1948. See, “M. Nurutdinov,” Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, Vol. 8 (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1976), p. 91.
25 For example, the new deputy Chairman of the Uzbek KGB on cadre issues, Turgun Ashuraliev, appointed in 1957 was a native of Andijan. His predecessor Tadziddin Dzhalilov, another Andijan native
Mukhitdinov’s time in office would be short since in December 1957 he was transferred to Moscow. However, his standing with Khrushchev ensured that he was not subject to the typical defamation but was quietly replaced with Tashkent’s Sabir Kamalov. Like several of his predecessors, Kamalov rose through the provincial apparatuses of Ferghana and Tashkent. This earned him a spot on the Central Committee in 1950, which he held until 1955 when named chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Secretary two years later. The new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mirza-Akhmedov, had served as secretary of the Tashkent gorkom in 1940 and then First Secretary of Andijan obkom from 1949 to 1956. In the intervening period he also was a member of the Central Committee.

Evidence is inconclusive but it is probable that Mirza-Akhmedov transgressed his authority as head of government by expanding the Council of Ministers’ Presidium beyond the lawful limits. According to the joint Party-Government decree of March 7, was concurrently designated Minister of Interior and Alim Karimov from Namangan was named head of mechanization of agriculture in the Central Committee in July 1957, to mention but a few. See “Tadziddin Dzhalilov,” at centrasia.ru <http://www.centrasia.ru/person.php> (2013-11-05).

26 From 1937 to 1950 he was First Secretary of the Margelan raikom (Ferghana), second secretary of the Ferghana obkom, secretary in a Tashkent raikom, and First Secretary of the Ferghana and Karakalpak obkoms. “Sabir Kamalov,” at Alexander Yakovlev Archives <http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/almanah/almanah-dict-bio/1003642/9> (2013-11-05).

1953, following Stalin's death, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was to consist of only one vice chairman. However, Mirza-Akhmedov’s Presidium was composed in 1959 of all vice chairmen, including the vice chairman of Gosplan, as well as the Ministers of Agriculture and Finance. It is conceivable that Mirza-Akhmedov put these officials on this prestigious organ to reinforce his power base, assure their loyalties, and create a set of loyal clients. On the other hand, it is unclear whether he could have acted in such outright defiance of this important Party-Government decree unless, of course, it served the central government’s interests.28

Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization in Moscow touched on cadre appointments also in Uzbekistan, though arguably less than elsewhere. Kamalov was a Stalinist era politician catapulted to power after Stalin’s purges, yet he was still entrusted to lead Uzbekistan under Khrushchev. Several changes were also made in the Central Committee, in which a slew of First Secretaries of provinces were elected: Alimov, Gulyamov, Kambarov, and Nurutdinov – First Secretaries of the Samarkand oblast, Tashkent city, Ferghana oblast, and Tashkent oblast respectively. This reshuffle indicated the preferential status of these three areas as sources of cadre. It also reflected the changing dynamics of Soviet upward mobility, whereby the path to the national level

came almost exclusively through the obkoms and oblispolkoms. In March 1959, however, Kamalov was unexpectedly dismissed in part due to “serious problems” in cadre development in Uzbekistan, including insufficient education of party officials, poor job matching, few women in party organizations, and leaking of secret documents.

Like his predecessor, Kamalov lasted only two years as First Secretary of the republic and his removal coincided with the firing of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Manzur Mirza-Akhmedov. Noteworthy is that the downfall of these two officials were proclaimed together with the sacking of two Moscow secretaries – Ivan V. Kapitonov (First Secretary of Moscow obkom) and Nikolai F. Iganotov (head of a raykom in Moscow oblast). Demoted on similar charges, Kamalov had allegedly put his “toadies” in key positions, Mirza-Akhmedov had “behaved like a little dictator”, while the Moscow leaders had speculated in dachas and patronized each other. Malik Abdurazakov who earlier had chastised Yusupov in the earlier 1950s for corruption and greed now attacked Kamalov in a tirade which mimicked that against Yusupov verbatim.

In a retribution of his missteps at the party plenum, he highlighted the “flamboyant lifestyle of Kamilov’s wife”, the “spending of huge amounts of money on the renovation of Kamalov’s summer house and apartment which Mirza-Akhmedov authorized”. It is further noted how “Kamalov was trying to factionalize the bureau of the Central Committee and pit Russian and Uzbek members against each other.” And how he “grossly violated cadre selection” often “resolving these “on a friendly basis”.

Whatever the truth behind each of these allegations, they were not unique to Uzbekistan – indeed, they almost corresponded too closely with the forms of violations identified elsewhere. For example, in 1961 the First Secretary of a Krasnoyarsk oblast raykom was apprehended for “stealing of funds”, “construction of a house for state funds for personal use”, and for “running the raykom as a dictator, striving for concentration of power”. Likewise, the Estonian Chairman of the Council of Minister and later Foreign Minister, A.A. Myuris, stood accused of withdrawing double salaries, of having two apartments in Tallinn, and “violations of housing regulations” in general. In retrospect,
when comparing the public allegations against officials in the Soviet Union, it appears that many of these were carefully scripted, often resembling one another, and conforming to the rave of day.

A further observation is the discrepancy between the Party Control Commission’s reports and those of the Soviet media. In the former, officials typically stood accused of one charge or a group of charges related to that particular charge (e.g. embezzlement). Media, however, often leveraged an entire battery of unrelated charges e.g. corruption, local favoritism, harems, flamboyant lifestyles etc., and bundled them into a neat package designed to discredit the individual in question. Perhaps this made for entertaining reading but this sensationalism should not be taken at face value. The confidential reports of the Party Control Commission are likely a better barometer on party violations than central media.

The high turnover of First Secretaries during Khrushchev’s reign renders it difficult to determine who patronized whom and the influence of various forms of loyalties. The two-year stints of Mukhitdinov and Kamalov as First Secretaries of the republic likely precluded them from consolidating “coalitions of protégés” in this short span of time. Such consolidations were typically lengthy processes. In any event, it is unlikely that strong regional elite identities and loyalties resulted from this since the elite were transferred between oblasts in a breath-taking pace. It is hard to envisage how they could advance in their careers relying solely on figures from their native regions. They
must have been built new loyalties and incorporated new clients as they hopped from oblast to oblast.

*Samarkand Plunges Back into Power*

The hierarchy of cadre pools was by the mid-1950s shifting back towards Samarkand/Bukhara after more than 20 years in the political periphery. With the stroke of a pen, Samarkand in 1957 was suddenly portrayed in Moscow’s Central Committee as “second in importance of the oblasts of the republic” after Tashkent. This accorded with the share of party members in these three oblasts, in which the 53000 members in Tashkent oblast dwarfed Samarkand’s 21000 but this was still more than Ferghana’s 19000. This opening of the Tashkent/Ferghana barrier was manifested in a re-introduction of officials from Samarkand, of whom the most prominent was Sharaf Rashidov. Hailing from Jizak/Samarkand, Rashidov was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee in 1950 and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet the same year. Like Mukhitdinov, also born in 1917, Rashidov’s party credentials were less impressive than those of the more mature remaining Stalinists e.g. Sabir Kamalov, Sirodzh Nurutdinov

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35 RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov”. See “Spravka o resultatakh komandirovki v Uzbekskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda”.

and M. Mirza-Akhmedov, but his literary background lent the Central Committee a
degree of sophistication.  

Rashidov enjoyed strong support in the center, which in part owed to that
Rashidov had travelled with Khrushchev to India and was known in Moscow as a
capable, loyal, and erudite man. In early February 1959 Rashidov departed for Moscow
to attend the opening of an exhibition on literature and arts of Uzbekistan, the visit of
which included meetings with Khrushchev, the British Prime Minister Harold
MacMillan, and the deputy head of government Anastas Mikoyan. Rashidov undoubtedly
made an impression on the General Secretary since a month afterward he was elected
Uzbekistan’s First Secretary.

S. Rizaev’s book on Rashidov provides a transcript of the historic 3-day meeting
in March, 1959, which brought him to power. The support for Rashidov was nearly
unanimous even if the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, M.
Mukhamedjanov, spoke in favor of the second contestant, Arif Alimov. Several of the
Central Committee members motivated their choice by referring to their earlier career-
based encounters with Rashidov. Thus, Rasul Gulyamov declared: “I know Sharaf
Rashidovich very well…he was secretary of party-organizational matters in Samarkand

obkom when I was in the personnel department. We know each other and we became friends. He is a good friend, a humble worker, and enjoys great respect…” Likewise, the first Secretary of the Ferghana obkom supported Rashidov since he had known “Rashidov since 1944 through his work in the Samarkand obkom [and when] he came to Ferghanavodstroy [which he headed]”. Career-based loyalties evidently mattered in Rashidov’s appointment.

On March 14, Rashidov was elected First Secretary and a number of changes in the top leadership ensued. Most prominently, Arif Alimov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, replacing Manzur Mirza-Akhmedov, and Yadgar Nasriddinova was named Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, taking over this office from Rashidov. Before becoming head of the Council of Ministers, Arif Alimov had assignments in all of the republic but was particularly rooted in Andijan, Namangan, Tashkent, and Samarkand where he had served as First Secretary of obkoms or gorkoms for twenty years. Conversely, a native of Kokand (Ferghana), Nasriddinova’s career was more concentrated to the Tashkent region. The Central Committee Bureau was also

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38 S. Rizaev, Sharaf Rashidov: Shnriki k Portretu (Tashkent: Ezuvchi, 1992)
41 She was appointed First Secretary of Tashkent Obkom in 1946, served on the Central Committee for much of the 1940s, then First Secretary of Kirov raikom in Tashkent only to be promoted to the republican-
overhauled. Only A. Alimov, Z. Rakhimbabeva, K. Murtazaev and S. Rashidov remained on the new 1959 Bureau compared with its 1956 predecessor. Coming straight from Russia’s Ivanovo obkom, F.E. Titov was appointed Second Secretary six months after Rashidov’s rise to power and a number of other new faces appeared on the revamped bureau. The number of central Russian/Slavic appointees doubled between 1956 and 1959 – from 3 to 6, indicating a similar recentralization of authority as had occurred in the immediate aftermath of Stalin’s great purges (see Table 6 and 7 in the Appendix). The difference now being that the dormant Samarkand plunged back into politics as part of this Russification after having been dislodged under Stalin.

Crackdown on Zemlyachestvo and Party Problems in Central Asia and Elsewhere

This crystallization of central control emerged in conjunction with a nation-wide media campaign on the ills of zemlyachestvo in the early 1960s. The catalyst was the purge of the Tajik leadership, including First Secretary Uldzhabaev, Second Secretary Pyotr Obnosov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers N. Dodkhodoyev, secretaries of oblasts and several others, following startling revelations of “secret harems, nepotism,

blackmail, and falsification of cotton production”.

“Soviet Purge Strikes Hard in Asia Area,” Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 1961, p.7. Another reason for the dismissal of these officials was the “misrepresentation of reports in plan implementation”. See Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 157-158.


Ibid.

44 “Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda, July 23, 1961, p. 1; See also “Russia sets up new curb”, The Sun, July 24, 1961, p. 5.
party and the state, but also the armed forces and even the KGB, and refer detected violations to the prosecutor’s office. A former KGB chief, Alexander Shelepina, was entrusted as head of the agency in Moscow and his counterpart in Uzbekistan was Ferghana’s Mirza-Akhmad Musakhanov, who was appointed head shortly after his nomination to the Bureau of the Uzbek Central Committee in 1961.\footnote{Fedor Razzakov, 	extit{Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka} (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 10.}

The crack-down eventually encompassed the whole of the USSR. In Kyrgyzstan First Secretary Razzakov was reprimanded for having reinstated a “punished” first secretary of the Tyan-Shan Province Party Committee as Minister of Internal Affairs;\footnote{“Doklad Pervogo Sekretarya TsK Kompartii Kirgizii t. I.R. Razzakov,” 	extit{Pravda}, January 14, 1961, p. 5-6.} The head of the Belarus Institute of Railroad Engineering had reportedly engaged in widespread nepotism;\footnote{“Semejnyj Institut,” 	extit{Pravda}, August 14, 1961, p. 2.} In the Abkhaz and Adzhar Autonomous republics of Georgia “personal loyalty, personal friendship, and nepotism” guided the placement of cadre;\footnote{“Povyshat’ trebovatel’nost’ k rukovodyashchim kadram,” 	extit{Pravda}, July 7, 1962, p. 2.} and self-introspection, F.S. Goryachev, the First Secretary of Novosibirsk oblast proposed during the campaign a statute to prevent the “selection of cadres on the basis of

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friendship, kinship or personal loyalties”⁵¹ and his counterpart in Azerbaijan bluntly declared that “mutual support, kinship and devotion” had received “a new content”.⁵² Likewise the First Secretary of Kazakhstan, D. Kunaev, remarked how the First Secretary of Kyzyl-Orda oblast had organized card games with several secretaries of district Party committees, chairmen of district executive committees and collective farm managers, leading to “cronyism, nepotism and corruption”.⁵³

Criticism of Uzbekistan, by contrast, related largely to the flamboyant lifestyles of officials in Samarkand oblast and the nationalistic inclination of the Uzbek elite. One report in Izvestija from June 11, 1961, for example, implicated the Chairman of Samarkand ispolkom and the Directors of the Clothing, Textile, and Household Articles Trade Trusts with building expensive villas for public funds, which only were dwarfed by the palatial houses of the former Director of the Samarkand ispolkom and the First Secretaries of Samarkand and Bukhara.⁵⁴ Another article in Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost accused senior officials in Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Lithuania for localism. However, the meaning ascribed to the concept of “localism” was not the promotion of figures on the basis of region of origin but the favoring of republic interests over central

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⁵¹ Pravda, October 31, 1962, pp. 6-7.
⁵⁴ Izvestia, June 11, 1961, p. 4.
ones, which more accurately could be described as “nationalism”. Thus, Uzbeks were charged with failure “to fulfill the plans and assignments for the delivery of excavators and cable products to the economic regions of other Union republics,” the accusations of which were similar to those levied against their counterparts in Armenia and Lithuania.  

A similar conclusion could be drawn from the Party Control Commission’s comprehensive evaluation of the Uzbek party and state apparatus in 1962. Several instances of “violation of Soviet law” on personnel matters were noted, resulting in a number of party exclusions of heads of enterprises, kolkhozes, primary party organizations, gorraykoms, and also obkoms officials. For example, N.G. Potanenko of Samarkand oblast was ostracized “for harshness towards subordinates, K.B. Kadyrov for “insufficient” work, and S. Dzhabbarov in Andijan for “corruption”.  

In an act of samo-kritika (self-criticism), Sharaf Rashidov was the first to candidly expose to the Politburo all the faults of the administration he controlled, admitting these violations in toto while adding that several oblasts had failed to put able-bodied men to work. This problem was particularly acute in Samarkand oblast, where 216 such cases of party members and

56 RGANI, f.6, op. 6, no. 1793, Zapiska Instruktora KPK t. Fedorenko D.D "O faktakh neobosnovannogo uvol’neniya s raboty kommunistov, privlekaemykh k partotvetstvennosti po Uzbekskoj partorganizatsii", February 7, 1962.
candidates could be identified, 125 in Ferghana, 124 in Karakalpakstan, and 180 in Tashkent.\textsuperscript{57} The center’s envoy Fedorenko shared this assessment adding 20 more such figures lacking gainful employment in Tashkent gorraykom. The trouble spots, in his mind, were mainly concentrated to “kolkhozes, enterprises, local party organs, and primary party organizations”,\textsuperscript{58} reflecting similar observations for those of the USSR as a whole.\textsuperscript{59}

It should be recognized that many violations in the oblasts may simply have eluded the Party Control Commission. One would expect nothing less since in seven out of Uzbekistan’s 10 obkoms, the Party Control Commission comprised only one employee – the Chairman himself – and only in Andijan, Bukhara, and Karakalpakstan was the Chairman aided by instructors or administrative personnel. It is inconceivable that a single envoy would be able to discover and report all forms of party violations occurring in one oblast, especially in the larger ones -- Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand. Members of the Uzbek Party Control Commission (Chairman Dzhuraev, three Central Asians, two non-Central Asians, and 2 instructors) were also assailed by the center for

\textsuperscript{57} RGANI, f.6, op. 6, no. 1793, “Postanovlenie: Sekretariyata TsK Kompartii Uzbekistana – Zapiska Instruktora KPK pri TsK KPSS t.Fedorenko”, February 24, 1962.
\textsuperscript{58} RGANI, f.6, op. 6, no. 1793, “O neobosnovannykh…” Assessment by Fedorenko, Instruktor KPK pri TsK KPSS.
inconsistent field work, insufficient preparation of material, and a generally poor work on appeals. For instance, requests from Moscow to look into appeals of specific persons were not acted upon. Other directives, e.g. the directive on “disorder” in Samarkand Tuberculosis hospital, went unheard.\textsuperscript{60} The absence of “localism” and nepotism in the Party Control Commission’s documents may simply have been due to understaffing or insufficient work.

However, in several other parts of the USSR the Party Control Commission did probe and report these phenomena and the staff of these areas were not larger than in Uzbekistan. For example, in Azerbaijan’s Akhsuin rayon the rayispolkom chairman, Sh. Nazarov, and third secretary of the raykom, S.V. Ismailov, were charged with promoting their distant relatives (\textit{dal’ nukh rodstvennikov}) to power, including Nazarov’s uncle’s brother who was a kolkhoz chairman, a father-in-law to Ismailov who had been appointed chairman of a selsoveta, and dozen others who had acquired cars and houses on the basis of “connections” and blood ties. Similar accusations of “poor work with cadres” were levied against G.G. Aliyev, Secretary of Derbent gorkom in Dagestan\textsuperscript{61} and staffing on

\textsuperscript{60} RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravka o resultatakh komandirovki v Uzbetskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda” in “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov” 1957.

\textsuperscript{61} RGANI, f. 6, op. 6, no. 1806, “Zapiski i spravki rabotnikov KPK pri Ts.K. KPSS po proverke zayavlenij o narushenii partijnykh printsipov podbora i rasstanovki kadrov” January 1962-October-1962.
the “principle of zemlyachestvo in Ukraine’s Donetsk gorkom. In a file relating specifically to the issue of mestnichestvo, only cases in Chelyabinsk oblast, the Ministry of Defense, Krasnodarsk, Novosibirsk, Moscow oblasts and Azerbaijan were noted.

Stated differently, media reports as well as the Party Control Commission’s secret reports canvassed several party problems in Uzbekistan in the early 1960s. Most of these concerned embezzlement, affluent lifestyles, and “hidden unemployment”. Localism and nepotism were identified as major questions in several Russian oblasts, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and elsewhere but not to the same degree in Uzbekistan. The geographical concentration of localism and nepotism identified overlapped to some degree in confidential as well as journalistic reports, with the situation being particularly acute in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.

If nepotism had been extensive and if clan-ties and solidarities specific to Islamic society had been manifestly present in Uzbekistan they are unlikely to have escaped Khrushchev’s radar. Much more than any other Soviet leader, Khrushchev considered the family the most important place for shaping the communist citizen. The family was the channel through which churches and mosques disseminate influence to the

63 Ibid.
young and his repression of religion, which has by some been considered worse than that of Stalin, derived from this belief. Mothers were potentially harmful too if they did not indoctrinate their children with Marxist-Leninist ideology. To prevent the family from being a “transmission belt” for dissenting views and religion, Khrushchev used direct force against the family to change its values. With this background, it is conceivable that Khrushchev would have recognized and targeted clannism in Uzbekistan’s government had it been a significant problem.

The degree of inter-oblast mobility in Uzbekistan in part explains why mestnichestvo was a lesser concern contemporaneously in Uzbekistan than in other parts of the USSR. The Uzbek obkom First Secretaries under Khrushchev were scarcely “rooted”. For example, of the five obkom First Secretaries who served in Andijan, Bukhara, Khorezm, Namangan, and Surkhandarya for the majority of the Khrushchev era, all had served in at least four oblasts in the course of their careers, none of them were natives of the oblasts in question in which they served, only one “rose” in the same oblast in which he was appointed First Secretary, and no one stayed in the oblast after termination of duty. Moreover, all of them served across the historic “divide” between the former khanate of Bukhara and Kokand during their careers and two of them also

served in the remote Karakalpakstan, previously belonging to the Khivan khanate.\textsuperscript{65} Inter-oblast mobility served to uproot local networks and nepotism was conceivably less extensive when officials served far away from their home village or city.

In this context of non-place based loyalties, many officials were both promoted and dismissed by their \textit{rodstvenniki}. The chequered career of Ferghana’s Mirza-Ali Mukhamedzhanov is a case in point. From 1947 to 1950 he served as Minister of Sovkhozes. With Yusupov’s fall in 1950 he was demoted to academia only to rise again in 1953 as Minister of Agriculture. Two years later, in 1955, when Nurutdin Mukhitdinov was appointed First Secretary he was again demoted to his previous position in academia. When Kamalov came to power in 1957 he was reinstated Minister of Agriculture only to be demoted again in 1959 when Rashidov replaced Kamalov.\textsuperscript{66} In other words, the individual in question was promoted and dismissed by “Ferghanaites”, appointed and removed by Tashkentis, and demoted by Rashidov from Samarkand. Place of birth was of marginal importance in Mukhamedzhanov’s roller coaster ride. What mattered was whether his patron was an enemy of the replacing First Secretaries, which they often were.

\textsuperscript{65} See Appendix B, Table 2. The obkom First Secretaries referred to are R.K. Kurbanov, A. Rizaev, F. Shamsutdinov, A. Tairov, and A. Khakimov.

The only archival evidence of factionalism in Uzbekistan in the 1960s detected by this author concerns a group of engineers in GSKB, the state cotton producer, with “groupist” (gruppirovki) tendencies.\textsuperscript{67} Headed by comrades Prikhodko, A.N., Nekhoroshevym, and Iomdinym N.G. and others, this faction had for several years waged a struggle against leadership, failed to implement Central Committee decisions, been unreceptive to the cadre suggestions of the Goskomitet and Sovnarkhoz directorship, and refused to adopt new machinery and technology. Several predicaments in the cotton sector in the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, including in the crown jewel Tashsel’mash, were traced to this factionalism but the bone of contention was the type of machinery to use. None of the accusations concerned favoritism or even corruption, even if Iomdinym’s spending habits are touched upon in the Party Control Commission’s report and the group’s behavior was considered generally “offensive” and “threatening”.\textsuperscript{68}


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. See also reply from N.G. Iomdin “Zayavleniye…” August 19, 1962 and “Zhaloba…” in “Reshenie komiteta partijnogo kontrolya pri TsK KPSS, zapiska rabotnika KPK i materialy proverki o nedostatkakh v rabote po sozdaniyu Khlopko-uborochnykh gMashin v Uzbekskoj SSR” January 1962-October 1962.
Such “groupism” flew from de-Stalinization and the opening up of the political system. Thinly veiled dissent, foot-dragging on policy implementation, and factional cleavages became increasingly commonplace. Broadly speaking, the cementing factor of such groups related to common outlooks on specific policies and were “loose informal clusterings that articulated distinctive interests.” Khrushchev’s many reforms, e.g. the division of the party into agricultural and industrial units, inevitably generated “winners” and “losers” who collaborated to further their interests. Khrushchev’s cadre centralization was in part a countermeasure to the resistance encountered from his reforms yet leaders at each level fought back. The career-based loyalties of Soviet politics were given added impetus since the interests of figures in the same organ or workplace tended to converge.

**Conclusion**

Party violations in Uzbekistan throughout the Khrushchev era were undoubtedly extensive, as elsewhere in the USSR, but as before they were more related to theft and

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general corruption than nepotism and locally based loyalties. Party violations were scarcely censored in Khrushchev’s USSR, especially following the crackdown on zemlyachestvo in the early 1960s. If localism and nepotism had been major problems in Uzbekistan, then Uzbek officials would have been exposed to comparable criticisms as their Tajik, Azeri, and Russian counterparts. However, neither confidential nor public reports attest to the presence of significant localism. Rather, the party problems identified in Uzbekistan (corruption, renovations of personal property, failure to meet plans, and concentration of powers etc.) were observable throughout the USSR.

The rapid pace by which the Uzbek elite were transferred from oblast to oblast explains, in part, the lesser presence of zemlyachestvo. With the partial exception of Nurutdinov, all other heads of party and state had crisscrossed most corners of the republic prior to reaching their offices. That Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were much more “rooted” than elsewhere in the Soviet Union and that this served to reinforce regionalism is not upheld by actual career trajectories. What regional faction could Kamalov, for instance, conceivably belong to after his long career encompassing Tashkent, Bukhara, Karakalpakstan, and Ferghana? Or Arif Alimov whose career spanned Tashkent, Kokand, Namangan, Karakalpakstan, Andijan, Samarkand and other places? Or the five obkom First Secretaries discussed who all had traversed on average half of the republic’s oblasts? This question is particularly warranted since most, as a rule, tended not to serve in their native regions for prolonged periods of time. Conversely, that the leading Tajik officials were chastised for zemlyachestvo is not surprising since
they rarely moved beyond the borders of their native Leninabad and the capital area. The official upgrading of Samarkand in party documents and the appointment of Sharaf Rashidov lends further support to the thesis that “regionalism” and its corollary, the geographical origin of cadre, was externally imposed.
5. Brezhnev’s Era of “Regionalism”, 1964-1982:

Rashidov’s National Orientation

Introduction

The transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev spelled the end to Khrushchev’s reorganizations, enabling the new leaderships installed throughout the Soviet Union to consolidate their powers. Venting his frustration on Khrushchev’s reforms, Rashidov at the Plenum of the Central Committee in 1964 declared how the republic was “tired of reorganization” in such spheres as production management organs and the dizzying administrative reforms in the rayons.\(^1\) A new “stable cadre” policy of long stints for secretaries at all levels ensued as part of Brezhnev’s going concern. Brezhnev also ushered the USSR into a period of decentralization in the area of cadre policy, which had

\(^{1}\) AP RF, f.3, op. 67, d. 223, “Rabochnaya protokol’naya zapis’ V.N. Malina zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,” October 13-14, 1964.
been highly centralized under Khrushchev. The empowering of the local political elite in the republics in part offset the formal workings of the nomenklatura system. Empowered to recruit their protégés in the provinces with much less interference than earlier, republic-level political elites formed impervious cliques that were increasingly defined by “regionalism”. Modern analysts of clans and regions in Central Asia have identified this trend towards heightened regionally-based promotions under Brezhnev as a uniquely Central Asian development. Yet the same trend was observed throughout the Soviet Union.

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As Robert Kaiser notes in respect to the USSR in its entirety: “However, while de jure economic decentralization was more limited during the Brezhnev era than it had been under the sovnarkhozy system, decision-making authority devolved de facto to enterprise managers and local political elites. In turn, these local elites were increasingly comprised of socially mobilized indigenes, chosen not according to the dictates of a centrally orchestrated nomenklatura system but rather through a selective procedure increasingly dominated by ‘regionalism’.”

Thus, the thesis advanced in these writings was that regionally defined sub-national and national elites had penetrated the USSR in the tranquility of the Brezhnev period and that the central nomenklatura system increasingly was being bypassed. The center was relegated to a background role, ratifying appointments but delegating authority over the process to the republics. Hegemonic regions formed at the national level as upwardly mobile actors entered into networks that controlled local or regional jobs. These actors advanced because they were patronized by influential officials. Even if key offices at the republic level were listed on the central nomenklatura, “the process

through which candidates appear[ed] on the appointment lists [was] endemic to the
regions in which [the patrons] had carved out their initial careers.”

For example, in Kabardino-Balkariia of the North Caucasus, the First Secretary
T.K. Mal’bakhov brought in clients from Tersk and packed the obkom Bureau and other
strategic positions with former acquaintances from this district. That this happened to be
Mal’bakhov’s native oblast generated a semblance of a “clan” centered on this territory
but this was an epiphenomenon of the process of regionalization discernible in the USSR
as a whole.

Rashidov’s powers mirrored the developments in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union: he
was almost defenseless against central directives but was afforded some elbow room in
choosing his personnel. Cadre appointment was formally in the hands of the Uzbek
Second Secretary, decided collegially at the plenums and in the Bureau of the Central
Committee, but Rashidov’s willfulness often encroached on these powers. His political
valence as member of the bureau and ties to Brezhnev checked the Second Secretary’s
control function, at least up until the late 1970s. Uzbekistan’s Central Committee
exploited this and recentralized cadre policy to Tashkent from the oblasts. Early in the

5 Michael Urban and Russell Read, “Regionalism in a Systems Perspective: Explaining Elite Circulation in
6 Yoram Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks under
Brezhnev,” Slavic Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Fall, 2010), pp. 681-682.
Brezhnev era a new formal rule was enacted, requiring every change in nomenklatura positions at the oblast level to have the Uzbek Central Committee’s approval. Rashidov entirely usurped the autonomy of cadre appointment that rested with the obkoms, even if they still were entitled to initiate appointments and removals.

This concentration of powers to Tashkent was a manifestation of the increasingly autocratic methods of leadership in the party, state, and economic organs under Brezhnev. Such autocratic tendencies have clearly a negative connotation but they must be viewed in context of the Soviet system. In contrast to Western liberal democracies, there were no rules in the Soviet system mandating an automatic replacement of personnel during leadership turnovers. Upon gaining office, American Presidents or British Prime Ministers could act immediately and install their protégés committed to their policy programs into power. Not so for the Soviet First Secretary or General Secretary. They had to incrementally force out their enemies and substitute them with their clienteles. Rashidov’s autocratic leanings and centralization of the

nomenklatura was to be expected since few Soviet leaders passed on such opportunities if they opened.

The paradox of Rashidov’s leadership is that the imposed “regionalism” in place since the late 1920s partly dissolved under his reign when it flourished elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Not unlike other Soviet leaders, Rashidov gravitated towards individuals whose loyalty could be assured. However, because Rashidov had not presided over an obkom and because he spent most of his career in the metropol of Tashkent, the origins of his close associates were diverse. The sources of Rashidov’s elite diversity were not different from that of other Soviet leaders only that he followed a different career path.

Rashidov’s Uzbekistan

Sharaf Rashidov: A Biographical Sketch

Born to poor parents on the eve of the Revolution in 1917, Rashidov occupied prominent state and party posts in Soviet Uzbekistan for 45 years and for almost 25 years he headed the republic. Rashidov’s father, Rashid Rashidov, was like many others of his generation a beneficiary of the revolution. As a newly minted policeman he guaranteed the Rashidov family a life beyond subsistence-level farming. However, after the death of Rashidov’s mother in the late 1920s his uncle Hamid Azimov took custody of the young
prodigy. Like his patron Yusupov, Rashidov came from a literary background and he owed this predilection to his uncle Hamid who wrote poems and novels and taught at the Samarkand pedagogical academy. Following closely in his uncle’s footsteps, Rashidov enrolled at the Jizak pedagogical academy after graduation in 1931 and was considered a man of extraordinary talent. Thus, he was elected Chairman of the Academy’s Trade Union Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

Stalin’s great purges in 1937-38 paved the way for Rashidov’s path to power. Being 20 years of age at that point, Rashidov’s career commenced at the precise time when Stalin throughout the Soviet Union staffed positions with the younger more party-minded elite. He shared this fate with Leonid Brezhnev who was designated head of a department of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee in 1938; Yuri Andropov was appointed secretary of the Yaroslavl komsomol a year earlier; and Alexei Kosygin was named head of a department in the Leningrad obkom in 1938. In 1937 Rashidov was selected executive secretary of the Samarkand-based newspaper \textit{Lenin Yuli} (The Lenin Path).\textsuperscript{12}

Rashidov was a dedicated communist and espoused the Soviet system because he as well as his family benefited from it. But events at the time would also instill in him

\textsuperscript{11} Fedor Razzakov, \textit{Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka} (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 2.  
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}
a pride in Uzbek culture and history. As a journalist for *Lenin Yuli* he covered the opening of Amir Timur’s tomb in 1939 and Uzbek history textbooks in that decade even depicted Timur as a hero. Timur had rescued Russia from the yoke, it was said, and Rashidov’s writings reciprocated by portraying the USSR as Central Asia’s savior.\(^\text{13}\) Such developments together with Stalin’s reconciliation with Islam in the post-war period increasingly connected Rashidov with Central Asia’s historical heritage. These three influences: Soviet patriotism, pride in Uzbekistan’s past, and a conciliatory attitude towards Islam conditioned Rashidov’s future statesmanship.\(^\text{14}\)

Rashidov entered the party in 1939 but accomplished his major career leaps only in the post-World War II period. Prior to his appointment as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1950, Rashidov served in a school in Namangan (1942-1943), editor of the Samarkand newspaper *Lenin Yuli* (*The Lenin Path*) (1943-44), in a factory in Bekabad outside of Tashkent in 1944, Secretary of party-organizational control in the Samarkand obkom (1944-1947), editor of *Kizil Ozbekistan* (*Red Uzbekistan*) in Tashkent (1947-49), and Chairman of the Uzbek Writers’ Union (1949-50).\(^\text{15}\) Rashidov’s outgoing character

\(^{13}\) See, e.g., *Leninizm: Znamia Osvobozhdeniia i Progressa Narodov* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1972); *Ideologicheskaia Rabota: Moshchnyi Faktor Bor’by za Kommunizm* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoii Literatury, 1974); and *Pobediteli* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1951).
and interpersonal skills facilitated strong loyalties with a number of prominent figures during these years, including the General Secretary of the USSR Union of Writers, Alexander Fadeev, and others in the Moscow intelligentsia. It was Fadeev’s support who secured Rashidov’s chairmanship of the Uzbek Writers’ Union and he owed his election to the Supreme Soviet to First Secretary Yusupov’s patronage.

Rashidov presided over the Supreme Soviet for nine years, which was the springboard to the position of First Secretary. He was appointed candidate member of the (all-Union) CPSU Central Committee at the 20th Party Congress and became a full member after the 22nd Congress, holding this office through the 26th Party Congress and until his death in 1983. The most senior post that Rashidov occupied was that of candidate member of the USSR’s Politburo, which he was elected to in 1961.16

Often described as a cautious man with broad visions and an innate sense of tact, Rashidov did not only survive the feuds of Soviet politics but climbed the career ladder. Anyone who could navigate through Stalin’s purges, the personnel turnover after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev transition unscathed and then stay in power for an additional 19 years must have possessed extraordinary tactical skills. Most of Rashidov’s peers fell by the wayside at either of these points but Rashidov steadily rose in the hierarchy. Unlike Khrushchev who made foes everywhere,


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Rashidov understood that his powers were limited and contingent on sustaining support from others.

His steadfast promotion of Uzbek identity could scarcely have passed without such support from the highest levels. Cultural institutions operating in the vernacular languages flourished under Rashidov and these gradually took on nationalistic overtones. Brezhnev’s *laissez faire* opened the doors to explore literary and historical themes which had been banned under Khrushchev. Medieval heroes such as Amir Timur and Babur resurfaced together with the writings of Uzbekistan’s first set of leaders, Akmal Ikramov and Faizullah Khodzhaev.\(^{17}\) In 1963 Rashidov even inaugurated a planetarium in Tashkent inspired by the Timurid ruler and renowned scientist Ulug-bek. That the mahalla as a traditional institution was resuscitated from the day Rashidov took office in 1959 further indicated the restoration of Islam in Uzbek society.\(^{18}\) Islamic pre-Soviet

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\(^{17}\) See, e.g., *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (February, 1973), pp. 3-20.

traditions were no longer considered ills to be eradicated in the construction of Soviet society but as assets in building “new contemporary traditions.”

*Rashidov’s Unrelated Relatives: The Tashkent Party Conference*

Rashidov has gone down in history as one of the most nepotistic of Soviet politicians who overwhelmingly favored relatives and figures from his native Jizak/Samarkand. This is a misinterpretation of history since many of those branded as his relatives were not his relatives and the Samarkand natives that experienced upward mobility during his reign were, with few exceptions, associates from his time in the Samarkand obkom. Tashkent’s obkom party conference of December 1964 affords us with a rare glimpse into the reality of Uzbekistan’s elite politics.

Khrushchev’s removal triggered a “domino effect” in the republics: Kazakhstan’s First Secretary Ismail Yusupov was replaced with Dinmuhamed Kunaev a month after the General Secretary’s fall from grace and Uzbekistan was not unaffected since Rashidov owed his rise to Khrushchev’s patronage. Rashidov’s opponents seized the opportunity and hatched a scheme to eliminate him. Taking place shortly after Khrushchev’s ouster in October the same year and Brezhnev’s visit to Uzbekistan in

November, the conference revealed serious rifts within the Uzbek elite. Particularly venomous in his criticism of Rashidov was Vali Usmanov, the deputy head of the Organizational-Party Department of the Tashkent obkom.\(^\text{20}\)

In a speech lasting about 25 minutes, he assailed Rashidov’s cult-like devotion of Khrushchev and directed the audience’s attention to such provocative statements by Rashidov as that “there would be no life on Soviet soil without Khrushchev” and that Uzbekistan “owed its prosperity to Khrushchev”. Not limited to this, Rashidov had placed supporters in government on the basis of kinship (rodstva) and localism (zemlyachestvo). Three examples were cited: Sarvar Azimov, then deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; N.D. Khudaiberdyev, then Secretary of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee; and his brother Sahib Rashidov, head of the Party-State Control Commission under the Central Committee and Council of Ministers -- all of whom came from Rashidov’s native Jizak. “Friendship” had also guided several other of Rashidov’s appointments e.g. the Kashkadarya-born First Secretary of the Tashkent gorkom, Kayum Murtazaev.\(^\text{21}\)

This long tirade did not go unopposed. A member of Uzbekistan’s Supreme Soviet, Akhmad Kadyrov, took the floor, declaring: “I have been a member of the

\(^{\text{20}}\) Fedor Razzakov, Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 16.

\(^{\text{21}}\) Ibid.
Supreme Soviet’s Presidium for 10 years working with Rashidov and know him well. Many of you, almost everyone, will agree with me that Rashidov is a modest, sympathetic…and honest man”. The head of “Glavgolodnostepstroya” mounted a similar defense. Having headed the agency for five years, Ashot Sarkisov reminded the audience that Rashidov on several occasions had forthrightly objected to Khrushchev’s unrealistic demands in rice sowing and other spheres. He then proceeded to declare how “he had known Rashidov since 1944 when he, wounded, had returned from the war front to ‘Farkhadstroy’ [in Bekabad, Tashkent] and with 10000 kolkhozniky built Farkhad GES [Hydro-Electric Station]. I know him as a humble, principled, extremely simple, and honest man.” Not mincing his words, Sarkisov branded Usmanov’s charges “filth”.

The Tashkent obkom First Secretary, Malik Abdurazakov, seconded these points. Dismissing Usmanov’s speech as demagogic, M. Abdurazakov assured that Sarvar Azimov’s approval to deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1959 came not at Rashidov’s initiative but that of Arif Alimov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers [from Tashkent]”. Rasul Gulyamov, a former head of the Tashkent gorkom and native of Tashkent, murmured in the audience that: “he [had] put forward the nomination and Alimov supported it”. Turning to the appointment of Khudaiberdyev, Abdurazakov

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
certified that “Rashidov had no relationship to him [Khudaiberdyev]. I have known Khudaiberdyev for many years. He was secretary of the obkom and secretary of the Central Committee and is a respectable person.” That Murtazayev was “full of flaws” and a “sycophant” was considered similarly unfounded.24

Politely waiting until all had spoken, Rashidov finally intervened in this crossfire. He assured that Azimov and Khudaiberdiyev had been “approved by the CPSU Central Committee on the recommendation of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee, not [him]”. He knew them “only from Tashkent when Comrade Khudaiberdyev had worked as a deputy to Comrade Mukhitdinov, then head of the agricultural department of the Central Committee.” In Rashidov’s version of events, they “decided on his appointment collectively”. And, he continued, “about my brother [Sahib Rashidov] he served for five years in the Soviet army and worked for seventeen years in the rayon [presumably in Jizak]. He was promoted to deputy prosecutor of the republic before I came to the Central Committee. That is it.”25

What can be derived from this exchange in Tashkent’s halls of power? First, the three prominent figures from Jizak – Azimov, Khudaiberdiyev, and Sahib Rashidov –

25 Fedor Razzakov, Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 16.
have all been noted in the literature as “relatives” of Rashidov. While this is true in the case of his brother Sahib, Sharaf Rashidov claims to have barely known the other two, much less them being his relatives. Demian Vaisman, Kathleen Bailey Carlisle, and others have translated *rostvenniki* into “relatives”. But *rostvenniki* has a dual meaning, implying both relatives and people from the same place. In this case, it clearly denoted individuals from Rashidov’s native Jizak and not relatives. This is important since these three individuals belong to the few examples of real persons assumed to have formed part of Rashidov’s “clan”.

Second, this in-fighting shows that place of origin was of negligible importance in determining loyalties. Rashidov from Samarkand was supported by Kashkadarya’s Murtazaev and Abdurazakov from Namangan as well as Gulyamov, Sarkisov, and Alimov from Tashkent. The ties between these individuals resulted from intersecting careers: Rashidov was acquainted with Azimov and Khudaiberdyev from Tashkent; Sarkisov encountered Rashidov in 1944 at “Farkhadstroy”, located on the outskirts of


Tashkent; and Akhmad Kadyrov knew Rashidov from their work in the Supreme Soviet. In other words what this faction amounted to was a “family group” bound by prior work connections and mutual support. It is possible that the appointments of Azimov and Khudaiberdyev came at Rashidov’s initiative and that Gulyamov and Abdurazakov were being disingenuous and protected him. Even so, such mutual solidarity would still conform to the definition of “family group”.

*The Primacy of Career-Based Loyalties*

The snapshot above provides clues to the nature of loyalties in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan. His elite were composed of individuals that he had encountered in the course of his career. Other individuals could be cited, many of whom shared Rashidov’s intellectual leaning. Thus, Egemkul Tasanbaev, Minister of Sovkhozes 1971-1975, had a long history in journalism as editor of “Our Bolshevik Kolkhoz”.  

28 Mansur Mirza Akhmedov, the Minister of Housing from 1961 to 1966 and subsequent deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers also had a background in culture as director of the Tashkent Institute of Cinematics.  

29 Both Tasanbaev and Mirza Akhmedov were born in southern Kazakhstan but they served in Uzbekistan for most of their careers. Another example of

28 Tasanbaev’s biography on file with author.  
the intellectuals who experienced upward mobility under Rashidov is Ubaidulla Abdurazakov. A graduate of Tashkent Pedagogical Institute and a teacher by profession, Abdurazakov was in 1971 appointed Managing Director of the Council of Ministers and then editor of the journal *Mekhnat*. Twenty years later he chaired Uzbekistan’s Writers Union, the prestigious position of which Rashidov, First Secretary Yusupov, and Foreign Minister Sarvar Azimov all had held. These well-bred individuals came from diverse places but their literary backgrounds resonated with Rashidov.

The Samarkand clique was predominantly composed of figures Rashidov had encountered during his time in its obkom. For example, the Minister of Internal Affairs Khaidar Yakhyaev served as department head in the obkom in 1944 when Rashidov held the cadre portfolio. Likewise, the KGB head Leon Melkumov was stationed there as secretary of Komsomol together with Rashidov but when Yusupov was dismissed in 1950 he was dispatched to Moscow. A year after Rashidov came to office in 1959,

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Melkumov returned to Uzbekistan and was instated KGB officer in Samarkand oblast.\textsuperscript{32} Bektash Rakhimov, First Secretary of Samarkand oblast in the 1970s, had been a co-worker with Rashidov in the obkom 30 years earlier.\textsuperscript{33} And N. Makhmudov from Kokand in Ferghana Valley, one of Rashidov’s closest confidantes, was yet another acquaintance from this time. Also a writer, Makhmudov penned articles for *Shavot Khakikati* in the 1930s and was First Secretary of Samarkand in the decade thereafter (1943-48).\textsuperscript{34} In 1963 with Rashidov’s patronage he assumed the post of First Secretary of Syr Darya obkom which he held until 1969 when he was put in charge of the People’s Control Commission (*Komiteta Narodnogo Kontrolya*).\textsuperscript{35}

Such concentration of former co-workers from native or non-native regions was the rule in the Soviet system. Uzbek party functionaries reportedly joked that Russia’s history was divided into three periods: “the pre-Petrine, Petrine, and Dnepropretovsk”.\textsuperscript{36} That Brezhnev had smoothed the way for such individuals from Dnepropretovsk as

\textsuperscript{32} Leon Melkumov was deputy chairman of the Uzbek KGB from 1970 to 1978 and then Chairman of the same organization until Rashidov’s dismissal in 1983. See “Leon Melkumov,” in *Uzbek Sovet Entsiiklopediyasi*, Vol. 7 (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1976), p. 134.


\textsuperscript{35} In the mid-1950s Makhmudov was appointed Chairman of the Bukhara ispolkom (1954-56) and then First Secretary of Karakalpak SSR (1956-63). *Ibid.*

\textsuperscript{36} Fedor Razzakov, *Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka* (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 20.
Shukanov (his assistant), Novikov (the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers), Pavlov (director in the CPSU Central Committee), Shelokov (Minister of Internal Affairs) and several others did not pass unnoticed in Tashkent. 37 Brezhnev’s “cadre pool” of ca. 130 oblasts, of course, also made this favoritism even more blatant compared to Uzbekistan’s eight oblasts from which the leadership could pick its staff.

One of a few from Samarkand who did not share this background in the Samarkand obkom was the President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Ibrahim Muminov. That he was remunerated with a monthly salary of 9000 rubles shortly after Rashidov came to office, above the pay grade of a Minister in the Central Government (7000 rubles) and almost three times that of the Chairman of the Tashkent city soviet (3500 rubles), shows that he was held in high esteem. 38 Yet Muminov rose to prominence long before Rashidov and it was he who sustained Rashidov and not *vice versa*, at least initially. Their common denominator was clearly professional bonds, not region of origin.

The share of Samarkand-associated figures under Rashidov was unprecedented, which owed to that the region had been in the freeze box since Stalin, Rashidov spent his

formative years in its obkom, and Yusupov initially had patronized several of the rising stars from Samarkand – Rashidov, Muminov, Azimov, Khudaiberdyev, and others. Yet an equally voluminous number in Rashidov’s elite were drawn from Tashkent and Ferghana,\(^{39}\) of which the composition of the Central Committee was a miniature expression. According to the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopedia*, of the 16 members and candidates admitted to the 1976 Bureau, five were Russian non-natives, three hailed from Tashkent, two from Uzbekistan’s Karakalpak ASSR, two from Ferghana, one from Jizak other than Rashidov himself, one from Khorezm, and one from Osh oblast in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley (see Table 8 in the Appendix).

In sum, what united Rashidov’s coalition was that the figures he patronized were his associates. He had encountered them in different phases of his work life in Tashkent, Samarkand, and elsewhere, many of whom shared his intellectual abilities. The result was a non-territorialized coalition of protégés whose cement of loyalties did not deviate much from Soviet norms. That Rashidov one-sidedly established rapport with figures from his native Samarkand is not upheld by biographical data on the key office holders. The

\(^{39}\) Suffice to say, they included S. Mamarasulov, the long-standing Minister of Irrigation and Water; the Minister of Cotton Production, Ibragimov; Eiyadullaev, the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and then Chairman of Gosplan; and A. Khodzhaev, a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. See “Salidzhan Mamarasulov,” in *Sovetskij Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar’* Vol. 2 (Moskva: Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1983), p. 643; “A.A. Khodzhaev,” in *Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi*, Vol. 12, (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi, 1979), p. 413.
formative influence behind his coalition was similar as for other Brezhnev era factions in other parts of the USSR, only that in some places the career trajectory of the patron in question resulted in more pronounced territorial factions.⁴⁰

The proposition of the “solidarity networks” hypothesis, i.e., that power holders rose to the top with the assistance of figures from their native regions, does not hold. Rashidov was patronized by Yusupov from Ferghana and Rashidov reciprocated by favoring figures that had been loyal to Yusupov, e.g., Muminov. Conversely, some of Yusupov’s critics, e.g., Namangan’s Malik Abdurazakov, prospered under Rashidov since he had been a critic of Rashidov’s predecessor Kamalov. The individuals loyal to Rashidov were tied in webs of relationships to each other, and the bonds between them related principally to professional ties and their joint opposition to Rashidov’s enemies. The Uzbek factions clashed on the terrain of non-territorial patron-client relations and not region.

Rashidov’s Putinesque Governor Policy

Just as contemporary analysts have misinterpreted the nature of loyalties in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan, so they have mischaracterized his policy aimed at uprooting

regionally articulated patronage networks. Rashidov centralized powers from the oblasts to Tashkent and did so in part to prevent local cliques from consolidating. The issue was a delicate one since obkom First Secretaries who served in their native provinces for long periods of time tended to be more rooted, susceptible to nepotism and *zemlyachestvo*, and thus able to consolidate their own “cliques”. Conversely, non-natives transferred between oblasts had to start afresh and had greater difficulty building their own power bases. Rashidov adhered to Brezhnev’s “stable cadre” policy, which entailed long stints of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries and at times life tenures, but supplemented this with a policy aimed at uprooting them.

Thus, the vast majority of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov were parachuted into these positions from elsewhere and did not rise through the oblasts in question. Of the 32 obkom First Secretaries for whom complete data are available under Rashidov, only 10% percent had served in the oblast of appointment immediately prior to being named First Secretary, only 4% remained in the province after terminating service, and around 45% came from a position in the republic-level government. Notably, more than 76% of these obkom First Secretaries had served in more than three oblasts during their careers and only 21% were natives of the oblast in which they served (data calculated from Table 1, Appendix A) These numbers are low when compared to other Soviet republics, in which around half tended to be natives of the oblasts in which they
served and a majority came straight from a previous position in the same oblast. Finally, 72% of the obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov served in both parts of Uzbekistan’s “historical divide”, the former Khanate of Kokand and Emirate of Bukhara.

Why did Rashidov engage in this dizzying transfer of officials from their home turfs? In all likelihood for the same reasons that have guided similar policies elsewhere, i.e., to prevent localism and preempt the consolidation of regional power bases. This held as true for provincial appointments in pre-1965 China as for Putin’s Russia. The establishment of Putin's Federal Districts was accompanied by a trend whereby “regional and national actors were rotated through the levels of the new presidential bureaucracy en

41 For example, of Rostov’s eight obkom First Secretaries, 1950-1980, three were natives and the equivalent figures for Volgograd, Odessa, Kharkov, and Dnepropetrovsk were 2/5 (40%), 1/8 (12.5%), 6/7 (86%), and 6/8 (75%) respectively. That is an average of 50% natives. See Joel Moses, “Regionalism in Soviet Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 37 (April, 1985), pp. 194-195. Likewise, in recruitment to Belarus’ seven oblasts from 1966 to 1986, 62.8 percent of the “top jobs” were filled by someone whose immediately previous position was in the same region. See Michael E. Urban and Russell B. Reed, “Regionalism in a Systems Perspective: Explaining Elite Circulation in a Soviet Republic,” Slavic Review, Vol. 48, No.3 (Fall, 1989), p. 424. Furthermore, James H. Oliver’s assessment of “inside” or “outside” recruitment of city and oblast secretaries in Moscow, Leningrad, Donetsk-Makeevka, Gorky, Kiev, Kharkov, Baku, Tashkent, Dnepropetrovsk, Kuibyshev, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk between the years 1965 and 1970 shows that 74% were recruited from “inside” the oblast on average and 26% from the outside. James H. Oliver, “Turnover and Family Circles in Soviet Administration,” Slavic Review Vol. 32 (September, 1973), p. 542.

route to a new post or in compensation for loss of their old post.”\textsuperscript{43} Such rotation was a means to inculcate loyalties to the nation rather than the localities in which they had served or were about to serve. Rashidov acted no differently: governors moved “upstream”, “downstream”, and sideways which enabled stronger central controls. Careful not to be devoured by the figures he empowered, Rashidov’s gubernatorial policy was a conscious policy of nation-building and approximates Putin’s drive to reverse Yeltsin’s loss of regional control in Russia. It was a way to curb regionalism in a system where the party hierarchy, career trajectories, and its associated regionalism virtually ensured regionalism.

The high mobility of regional secretaries had important ramifications for patronage politics; factions become more geographically dispersed and less territorialized as the heads of oblasts built loyalties across the region.\textsuperscript{44} Brezhnev’s “stable cadre policy was “stable” among Uzbek obkom First Secretaries in the sense that they served longer than under Khrushchev, but this did not entail that they were “rooted” in their home region or only one oblasts. New loyalties were formed in their non-native territories and when they climbed to the republic-level they patronized their former colleagues. Yet

\textsuperscript{44} John B. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 50.
because the majority had served in three oblasts or more and a majority had been stationed in both Bukhara/Samarkand and Tashkent/Ferghana, such cliques became essentially non-territorial. This “unrooted” cadre policy impeded the consolidation of identity-bound territorial factions and required concentration of powers from the oblast to the center to effect it. Alongside elite diversity and promotion of Uzbek national culture, it formed part of Rashidov’s national orientation.

This assessment stands in sharp contrast to the prevailing view in the literature. Luong, for example, points to “the widespread practice, both before and after Rashidov’s reign, for obkom First Secretaries to be promoted from within the region in which they serve [and where] officials spent their entire careers serving within the same region”. In support, Luong has compiled a list of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries and the extent to which they had held “a previous position in the same oblast”. However, the category used, i.e., “previous position in the same oblast”, obscures more than it tells about rootedness since Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were transferred between oblasts in rapid pace and often returned to oblasts in which they had previously served. Literally, then, they had often held a previous position in the same oblast but this is misleading since the accuracy of this rests on the fact that they were highly mobile and not “rooted”. The

category that most scholars studying “regionalism” elsewhere in the USSR have used to
determine “rootedness” is “position in oblast immediately prior to appointment” or
“promoted from within oblast”. This category is no less relevant when measuring the
degree of “rootedness” in Uzbekistan.

Luong’s proposition that long tenure in oblasts served to reinforce regional and
local leaders’ political affiliation with their specific regions is sound. It may hold for
some of the other Soviet republics, especially Tajikistan. If Luong is correct, however,
the opposite would be true in Uzbekistan. That is, because they were not “rooted”
regional political identities among the elite are unlikely to have crystallized to the same
extent as elsewhere.

The Twilight of Rashidov’s Rule

The \textit{laissez faire} that enabled Rashidov’s relative autonomy was increasingly
being suffocated in the late Brezhnev era when the central government took a firmer
stand against the spread of Islamic practices, nationalism, and corruption. Rashidov’s
hold on power was also crumbling, the signs of which were evident already by the late
1970s. The turning point was the replacement in 1978 of Khiva’s Matchanov as head of

the legislature with I. B. Usmankhodzhaev, a native of Ferghana, former First Secretary of Andijan obkom and Namangan oblispolkom, and staff member of the CPSU Central Committee. Usmankhodzhaev was no less immune to the promotion of associates than other Soviet politicians. Having reached the Supreme Soviet chairmanship, Usmankhodzhaev promoted his old acquaintance from Namangan oblast, the head of the Ministry of Interior of Namangan, Kudrat Ergashev to Minister of Interior. He replaced the Rashidov protégé from Samarkand, Yakhyaev, who was demoted to deputy of the People’s Control Commission. The Uzbek KGB head Nordman was similarly ousted along with many others.

That this was the twilight of Rashidov’s rule can be shown by looking at appointments and dismissals during 1977-1978 and how the new appointees fared after Rashidov’s demise. Beyond Usmankhodzhaev, two figures stand out: Timur Alimov and Ismail Jurabekov. Alimov was elected to the Supreme Soviet Presidium on the very eve of Usmankhodzhaev’s appointment in December 1978. He would become the


republic’s second or third most powerful person in the Gorbachev era and the same held true in the post-independence era. Another power broker of almost identical potency was Ismail Jurabekov who in 1977 replaced Rashidov’s longstanding protégé Salidzhan Mamarasulov as Minister of Reclamation of Water Resources.\textsuperscript{51} Most noteworthy, Alimov, Jurabekov, and Usmankhodzhaev were among the selected few who survived the shake-ups of Rashidov era politicians during 1982-1985. Usmankhodzhaev would also turn out to be Rashidov’s fiercest critic after his death in 1983, and the one who most vigorously planted the accusation of “kinship-based” promotion in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan in Soviet media. The post-Brezhnev leadership’s continued trust in these individuals suggests that they were a local cabal of officials in the hands of some influential forces in Moscow, in all likelihood Yuri Andropov, the then-KGB chairman and future General Secretary of the CPSU.

\textit{Zemlyachestvo in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan: The Party Control Commission’s Scoresheet in 1982}

Brezhnev’s earlier “kid-glove treatment” of Uzbekistan scaled down with this tightening of central controls.\textsuperscript{52} The Party Control Commission’s “scoresheets” for 1982,

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\textsuperscript{52} On Rashidov’s “kid-glove” treatment, see Yegor Ligachev, \textit{Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), p. 211.
evaluating party violations in Rashidov’s final year in power, is thus of great value since it arguably portrayed a more nuanced picture of Uzbekistan than those of the central media at the height of the Brezhnev era. Yet these assessments give no indication to that *zemlyachestvo* or nepotism were worse in Uzbekistan than elsewhere even if “speculation” and “plan discipline” were targets of criticism.

That the Soviet leadership in several parts of the USSR was teetering on the tightrope between unearthing widespread corruption and praise for disclosing it was, however, manifestly evident. Thus, in a volume on Party Control, the Chairman of the Party Control Commission, N.S. Guslov, stated that “excellent results” had been achieved by the control agency in the communist parties of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Latvia, Moscow obkom and gorkom, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Ivanov, and Dnepropetrovsk. Improving its framework of controls, the Central Committee of Kyrgyzstan was considered to have been particularly “disciplined” in its work. The case of T.Iyazaliev, a former first deputy chairman of the Kyrgyz republican society ‘Znanie’, who had been excluded for “serious shortcomings” in his work was cited as evidence of the improved discipline in the Kyrgyz party organization.\(^5^3\) Likewise, Kazakhstan’s Alma-ata obkom together with the control commission was praised for its

exemplary work in protecting “socialist property”. Criticism in the Chairman’s report was directed almost uniformly to Russian oblasts. For example, the leadership of Volgograd was accused of engaging in razbazariveniya of state property and in Orenburg “several measures had not been adopted” to correct the recommendations of the Party Control Commission. Since half of the control commissions in each republic and oblasts were comprised of indigenous elites and half representatives of the center, these assessments could be interpreted as conditional praise in those republics and oblasts which would later be subject to some of the most vicious criticism for laxity in party control. That Uzbekistan was never mentioned in the Chairman’s assessment, neither as a “negative” or “positive” example, indicates either that: a) the party control work there was neither worse nor better than anywhere else, or b) that the subject of Uzbekistan was taboo.

An indication to that it was a) rather than b) is in that Uzbekistan, along with Ukraine, Armenia, several Russian oblast, and other republics were given their own “republic chapters” in this volume in contrast to the troublesome Tajikistan, which was

54 Ibid., p. 33.
55 Ibid., p. 33.
56 See, for example: RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov” April 1957 in “Material k otchetu KPK pri TsK KPSS po Uzbekistan 1957 i 10 mes 58g.”

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entirely excluded. In the Uzbekistan chapter, U.A. Atakulov, Chairman of the Uzbek Party Control Commission, acknowledged several violations of Soviet discipline: “hooliganism”, complacency (samodovolstvo), conceit (zaznajstvo), “deep violation of plan discipline”, and “speculation” (spekulatsiya). Pharmacists A. Kazymov, for instance, ran a “speculative machinery” together with the head of Uzbek pharmacies, I. Dzhuraev, while the Chairman of Papskogo Rajtrebsoyuza in Namangan had deeply violated financial discipline. But overall the majority of cadres were conceived to be “industrious, active, and result driven” and no attention was paid to either mestnichestvo, nepotism, or related concepts. If nepotism and localism had been particularly serious problems Atakulov likely would have said it since these were surely not regarded as worse than violation of plan discipline in Soviet discourse at the time.

That these ills were identified elsewhere in the USSR in the same volume testify to that these subjects were not taboo. For example, the Chairman of the Party Control Commission in Moscow gorkom, K.S. Buchin, the Party Buro Secretary V.P. Surin in Kaluzhskoj oblast, and the head of a local hospital had for several years used connections and relatives (rodstvennye svyaz) to acquire a large sum of money from the

58 Ibid.
Ordozhonikidze kolkhoz in the same oblast. Likewise, the Chairman of Armenia’s Party Control Commission, S.M. Khachatryan, chastised the former Chairman of the Ispolkom in Nemberjanskogo rayon, S.S. Antonyanom, for having acquired “two apartments for his sons”, constructed a “two-story dacha for state funds”, and engaged “in other illicit affairs with his rodstvenniki”, the success of which was contingent on his “cooperation” with the former First Secretary of the rayon, G.S. Nakhshkuryan, whom he was connected with from “prior work”. Public reports of the Party Control Committee published in Pravda, from 1982 to mid-June 1983, similarly pinpointed nepotism and localism in all corners of the USSR: the director of an Azeri natural gas institute was charged with selecting personnel on the basis of personal devotion, regionalism, family ties and subservience; in Chelyabinsk, report padding, deception, extortion and nepotism had been ubiquitous; and in the city of Volgodonsk “gross violations” of cadre discipline had been disclosed among other cases.

Needless to say, the Party Control Commission’s reports should not be taken as definitive. But they serve as a reminder that nepotism and localism were not concepts primarily associated with Central Asia or Rashidov by the time of Brezhnev’s death in November 1982. They were perceived as encompassing all of Soviet society and they had been declared by authorities to be ills since at least the 1920s and 1930s. If anything, Uzbekistan was less frequently linked with these predicaments. This is not only evident from the material cited above and media reports but also party resolutions, whose contents correspond to the party control agency’s. For example, an all–Union Resolution on party violations in Samarkand oblast identified problems in plan fulfillment, low quality of goods, and unkempt equipment but nothing beyond this. However, as the next chapter will explore, 1983 would be a turning point in the perception of localism and nepotism and their presumed geographical concentration within the USSR. From that moment on they were to become inextricably intertwined with Central Asia as a whole and Uzbekistan in particular.

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Conclusion

What distinguished the height of Rashidov’s reign in the 1970s was not the concentration of officials from Samarkand/Jizak but the varied origins of his closest allies, most of whom he had encountered during his professional career. This was made manifestly evident at the 1964 Tashkent obkom Party Congress. Almost everyone that came to Rashidov’s defense in this heated exchange testified to their professional encounters with him. By all intents and purposes, Rashidov’s promotions and appointments did not differ much from the coalitions of protégés elsewhere in the Soviet Union. His lack of a substantial background in the obkoms entailed that his principal clientele was drawn from the central apparatus, the cultural elite, and from his brief stint in Samarkand. That this “de-regionalization” was most pronounced in the period when powers over cadre appointment were extensively de-centralized further strengthens the hypothesis that Uzbekistan’s “regionalism” was of external rather than internal origin.

Rashidov’s promotion of Uzbek culture and identity was intertwined with the diversity of his elite. The introduction of Karakalpaks on the Central Committee Bureau was a conscious attempt at nation-building just as his rediscovery of Amir Timur and national symbols served a similar purpose. Further, reshuffling of obkom first Secretaries and routing them via the national level generated national loyalties as opposed to particularistic ones. This necessitated concentration of powers to Tashkent from the oblasts since left unattended the Soviet system gravitated towards immobility and the
formation of local cliques in the provinces; most officials were reluctant to be disconnected from their “family groups” unless they were compelled to. These separate areas formed part of a whole in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan which in a nutshell can be expressed as a national orientation. Contemporaneous analysts took note of this. Even critics of the notion of strong national identities in Central Asia conceded that Uzbekistan was an exception to this rule. It is not for nothing that Alexander Bennigsen considered Uzbekistan the only Soviet Muslim republic becoming “a real nation” when discussing the strength of sub-national, national, and supra-national identities in a 1979 article. 66

Evidence will remain inclusive until declassified material from this period is made available, but a fair appraisal of Uzbekistan under Brezhnev on the basis of existing evidence is that nepotism and locally based loyalties at maximum approximated the average Soviet republic or oblast. The Party Control Commission’s evaluations, at least, do not indicate that zemlyachestvo was a problem in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan even if it was pinpointed in Armenia, Moscow, and elsewhere. Other violations were identified e.g. violation of plan discipline, “speculation”, and “conceit” but these did not extend to violation of nomenklatura rules. The official Soviet perception at the time was that nepotism and localism were not major problems in Uzbekistan. In the post-Brezhnev

period, however, the presence of *zemlyachestvo* in Uzbekistan was grossly exaggerated by Rashidov’s successors; Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev and others in the Soviet politburo; Moscow’s anti-corruption investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov; Soviet and Western media; and perhaps most consequentially, by scholars.
6. Rashidov Reevaluated: Uzbekistan’s “Cotton Affair”,
1982-1986

Introduction

Whether Uzbekistan was an “untouchable” or not under Brezhnev’s reign, his successors ruling the Soviet Union from late 1982 to 1991 – Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev – were less apologetic. From 1982 to 1986, Moscow and the central media singled out Uzbekistan as the most corrupt and nepotistic of the Soviet republics and the Uzbek leadership was purged at all levels. The catalyst was the “cotton affair” which unfolded in 1983; later, in the 1980s, it would even implicate members and candidates of the Soviet Politburo. This was a remarkable turnaround since publications of the Party Control Commission just prior to the break of the “cotton affair”, as detailed in the previous chapter, did not conceive of Uzbekistan as more corrupt or prone to party violations than any other Soviet republic. Favoritism on the basis of place of birth was identified elsewhere but not in Uzbekistan.

That Rashidov’s successor, I. Usmankhodzhaev, accused his predecessor for wrong-doings in virtually all spheres of authority, including promotion on the basis of
kinship, was not surprising. This was the rule rather than the exception among Soviet successors. A battery of allegations were unleashed against him out of which padding of cotton reports probably was the real transgression from which a series of other violations were spun, whether truths, half-truths, or false. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair”, however, was only the prelude to another affair which justifiably could be designated Moscow’s “cotton affair”. Unfolding in secrecy in 1989, the Politburo concluded that many of the claims held against Uzbek officials had been fabricated. The contents of these documents, detailed in Chapter 7, were never publicized and the wrong-doings in the Uzbek investigations that were exposed in media solely concerned the false allegations against officials in the CPSU Central Committee. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair” is the focus of the present chapter; Moscow’s “cotton affair” is the subject of the subsequent final chapter of this dissertation.

The Ubiquitous Nepotism in the Soviet Union as a Whole

Only a few minutes remained at the 19th Party Congress in early July, 1988, when an evidently frustrated Moscow representative rose to the podium. Yu.F. Surkov, a worker at the Moscow Special Alloy Plant, was reportedly unprepared but blunt: “I cannot sit here idly and watch as speakers literally squander our time. The reports by the First Secretaries are marked by a stereotyped approach.” Striking at the core of party problems, Surkov addressed the delicate issue of nepotism in party ranks: “I am amazed
by the robotization of the work of the party apparatus. Why is this happening?” he rhetorically asked, “Because one official can decide the fate of all others. Favoritism exists in our ranks when family ties determine who gets the top and middle-level jobs. This can be felt in all areas…and we are doing a poor job in the Party as regards the upbringing of leaders.”

The problem Surkov addressed was, of course, neither novel nor unknown. Earlier Soviet leaders, starting with Lenin, had smoothed the way for family members, relatives, and trusted colleagues. Positions that involved travelling in the West were particularly attractive since these allowed the sons, daughters, and other kin of senior Soviet officials to find respite to the dust of everyday Soviet life. Thus, Anastas Mikoyan’s son was named editor of the Institute of International Relations and World Affairs’ Latin American Review; Galina Brezhnev and Igor Andropov, the daughter and son of the General Secretaries, held positions in the Institute for the Study of the United States; and Yuri Brezhnev, another less than indigent child of Brezhnev, was Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade. The opaque webs of hegemonic families ruling local

factories, schools, and other institutions during the first 60 years of Soviet rule held true also during the 1980s. Only to take one example of at least a hundred similar ones, the head of the Vladivostok Medical Institute, B. Strelnikov, selected his “protégés on the basis of how much they or their parents could do for him”. Newspaper readers were not unlikely to encounter several intricate stories of nepotism and family rule in a single edition. The only difference now was that it began to encompass secretaries at all levels, Politburo members, and other ranking members of the *nomenklatura*. The senior Soviet leadership was exceptional only in that they rarely were caught until the advent of *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

**The Cotton Affair**

*The Cotton Affair Unfolds*

Addressing the Paakhthabad electors of Moskovskiy rayon in January 1980, Sharaf Rashidov touted Uzbekistan’s rapid economic development. “Even under last year’s extremely difficult conditions,” he said “the Republic's cotton farmers fulfilled with honor their patriotic duty to the homeland. A record harvest was gathered in: 5,763,000 tons of cotton…and 62% of the harvest was gathered in by machines… The

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Party teaches us not to tolerate sham efficiency and sensation-seeking.”

A Candidate member of the Politburo, Rashidov was decorated with his tenth Order of Lenin two months later.\(^6\)

This glory came to naught in late 1982 with the death of his patron Leonid Brezhnev. How Brezhnev’s clients – Kazakhstan’s Kunaev, Ukraine’s Shcherbitsky, Uzbekistan’s Rashidov, Azerbaijan’s Aliyev, and Grishin of Moscow – were to be dealt with was at first unclear since they belonged to what Gorbachev later designated a “zone closed for criticism”.\(^7\) This taboo ended with the election of the former KGB head Yuri Andropov to General Secretary on November 12, 1982. Determined to reverse Brezhnev’s decentralization of authority, Andropov launched a nation-wide anti-corruption campaign, examining in particular corruption charges held against Central Asian officials. What began as a KGB routine investigation against an official in Bukhara ispolkom, Muzaffarov, soon implicated not only grand embezzlement by Uzbek cotton

\(^5\) “Rashidov's Speech in Moskovskiy Rayon Constituency,” The Elections to The Republican Supreme Soviets, SU/6334/C1/1, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 1, 1980.


\(^7\) Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 203
procurement agencies, the top Party officials in Uzbekistan, and hundreds of lower level secretaries, but also key figures in Moscow.  

In April 1983, four months after, Yegor Ligachev was appointed head of the Party Organization Department of the Central Committee. The “problem of Uzbekistan”, he solemnly recalled, was brought to his attention on the very day he assumed office since “thousands of letters were coming in from ordinary Uzbeks complaining about lawlessness and arbitrary and unfair actions”. Rashidov was summoned to Ligachev’s office in the Fall of 1983 and confronted with the pile of letters on his desk. Two separate investigations were begun. One was headed by K.N. Mogilnichenko, the deputy director of Ligachev’s Party Organization Department, working under the authority of the Central Committee. A parallel enquiry was conducted by the KGB and, later, the Prosecutor’s office of the USSR headed by the two chief investigators, Gdlyan and Ivanov. “Heinous violations” were unearthed by the Mogilnichenko investigation and

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8 RGANI, f.89, op. 24, no. 24, “Pis’mo narodnykh deputatov t.t. Kalmykova, Kerimova, Kudryavsteva, Semenko, Sukhareva, Yakovleva A.M., Bakatina, Guseva, Kvartsova, Kryuchkova, Yakovelva V.F., v Presidium Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR s pros’boj o provedenii proverki zhalob na narusheniya zakonnosti pri rassledovanii уголовных дел в Узбекской ССР бригадой следователей, возглавляемой старшим следователем по особо важным делам при генеральном прокуроре СССР Гдлыаном Т.Кх.” To members and candidates of Politburo of the TsK KPSS. 19.y.1989.


10 Ibid., p. 215.

11 Ibid., p. 221.
Ligachev himself was sent to Uzbekistan in 1984 to chair Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Plenum, now working with Rashidov’s successor I. Usmankhodhaev. These violations would subsequently be dwarfed by the haul of evidence Gdlyan and Ivanov returned to Moscow with.

In the course of 1983 it transpired that significant chunks of Uzbekistan’s production had been falsified, that the republic had been paid for cotton never produced, and that as much as three billion rubles had been embezzled by Uzbek officials between 1978 and 1983 alone. Around half of the total was believed to have accrued the secretaries at the provincial and republican level, with the remainder spread on both lower and higher levels. The “cotton scandal” was portrayed as the tip of the iceberg of a massive corruption scheme involving especially Uzbekistan but also other Soviet republics. In what was officially declared to be a heart attack, Rashidov died in late 1983.

“What we are talking about,” Gdlyan asserted, “is a well-planned system of organized crime, in which every stolen ruble is earmarked for some future use [where] present-day emirs are systematically feeding (kormlenie) on the ‘golden calf’”. Heaped

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12 Ibid., p. 217 and 220.
with treasure beyond imagination, First Secretaries of local Party committees had forced collective farm chairmen to “pad reports and accept bribes” and the First Secretaries, in turn, had been bribed by provincial level officials whose activities were sanctioned and profited from by the republican leadership. Avduvakhid Karimov, for example, First Secretary of the Party in Bukhara oblast from 1977 to 1984, was legally convicted not only of receiving but of offering bribes “higher up”. That is, to the First Secretary of the Republic, Sharaf Rashidov, and Rashidov himself had bribed the central level leadership in Moscow,\textsuperscript{15} including the former Minister of Cotton Ginning, V. Usmanov.\textsuperscript{16} This vertical “feeding” did not only extend to the cotton and agricultural sphere but to manufacturing. Muzaffarov, for instance, the head of the Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, was charged with “protecting” staff of the Bukhara city organization for trade in manufactured goods, which was selling commodities on the market at inflated prices, the director of which reportedly beat subordinates who had dared to object when confiscating a store's daily receipts.\textsuperscript{17}

Those unwilling to take part in such schemes faced consequences. Some collective farm chairmen who refused to pad reports were coldly murdered, \textit{Pravda}

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{17} G. Ovcharenko, “Kobry nad Zolotom,” \textit{Pravda}, January 23, 1988, p. 3.
reported, even if recalcitrant First Secretaries at the provincial level were generally treated more leniently. Thus, the cautious Kayum Murtazaev, First Secretary of Bukhara obkom 1965-1977, was merely replaced with A. Karimov. Akhmadzan Adylov, the head of the Paisk industrial complex, received particular publicity and turned into a symbol of corruption, dictatorship, and medieval legacies. Residing in a multi-million ruble mansion equipped with a private zoo, Adylov had according to Soviet press turned a rural settlement into a private empire with roughly 30,000 subjects, a large underground dungeon, and a private security force.18 "In school we learned about the Middle Ages in Central Asia," a veteran Uzbek farmer, Rustam Sadkhamedev, quipped “and these men, like Adylov, are just the descendants of the old evil lords. They wanted to live like Tamerlane the Great."19

Like condemnations streamed in from Soviet officials. Commenting on Ligachev’s report on Uzbekistan in the Politburo in 1984, A. Chernaev penciled in his diary “The horror, the complete decomposition…the fiber yield decreased annually even though the crop was growing, robbing the state on hundreds of thousands of rubles…In Tashkent was constructed palaces and magnificent squares…and all the party secretaries

in Samarkand had acquired mansions and villas and some five cars... in all the oblast committees sat rodstvenniki... but it’s unclear why it’s decided to expose the whole system”.20 Even though Chernaev questioned the scorched earth tactic used, he too leapt to the conclusion that the rapacity knew no bounds.

Whatever was uncovered after Uzbekistan reared his head, cotton corruption must be viewed in context of the Soviet system and with the Stalin period as backdrop. The coercive institutional environment that Soviet politicians had been raised in under Stalin coupled with unrealistic goals of central planning made false and padded reports the norm. Stalin’s dizzying demands of a 20 percent industrial growth per annum, the “hopeless” bureaucrats who failed reached them, and the petrified local commissars who were compelled to report successes, all fuelled a fear-saturated economic system whose foundation was based on what superiors wanted to hear. In other words, the coercive institutional environment that Stalin nurtured institutionalized corruption.21 Uzbekistan’s excessive specialization in one single good, cotton, also made it more easily detectable

and blatant compared to other republics whose economies were more diverse and complex.\textsuperscript{22}

Rashidov’s challenge was not only to meet the cotton plans set in the center but also to satisfy the wants of the Uzbek population and his clients. This was easier said than done when procurement prices for cotton, i.e., the prices at which Moscow purchased cotton from Uzbekistan, were increasing at a disappointing rate. In relative terms cotton procurement prices increased less during Brezhnev’s 18 years as General Secretary than they did under Khrushchev. By forcing cotton farmers to operate in the red, the central leadership could keep pressure on them to increase harvests.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, at the 1964 March Plenum Brezhnev declared an increase for many farm products in Uzbekistan, but not for cotton.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time, ever since 1935 an over-plan premium (\textit{premii-nadbavok}) had been in effect to motivate farmers to increase production.\textsuperscript{25} These pecuniary incentives

\textsuperscript{22} Though country-wide industrialization had taken off during the Stalin period, agriculture was still the mainstay of Uzbekistan’s economy. In the late 1950s, around 40\% of the work force was employed in kolkhozes and sovkhozes as compared to 25\% in industry. See RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov”, “Spravka o resultatak komandirovki v Uzbekskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda”.


\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 110.

were retained under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. The result was that Uzbekistan was amply compensated for over-plan production, which benefited the Uzbek people and elite, but the demands for continually increasing cotton yields were also raised with this higher level of performance.

A reticent attitude towards the center’s ever increasing cotton targets would have resulted in strengthened controls by the Russian central appointees. This, in turn, would have unnerved the indigenous elite since their work would be put under closer supervision. In other words, Rashidov would have been squeezed from both ends, i.e., the Moscow and the Uzbek elite.

But words had to be translated into deeds. Fulfilling these ambitious targets was a delicate problem since First Secretaries were held as “personally responsible” and failure was political suicide. The price for failure was, to quote Fainsod, “disgrace, demotion, or even worse”.26 This was made abundantly clear to the Azeri leadership whose inability to raise cotton yields and “anti-cotton” activities led to the sacking in 1969 and 1970 of the First Secretary, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Agriculture and others.27

27 In a rare instance of criticism of the Uzbek leadership, Brezhnev hinted to that they were next in line unless they delivered on what the Azeris had failed to do: “A while back [October, 1968] sharp criticism
On Moscow’s part, in contrast, deeds were rarely translated into words. Neither Brezhnev nor Khrushchev, let alone Stalin, went into great detail how ambitious plan targets were to be met. Thus, Brezhnev acknowledged that there were no “prepared recipes” or “universal advice” in raising cotton production by the one million tons specified in the 9th and 10th plans. These plan targets rarely erred on the low side. Under Khrushchev it was not uncommon to find plans in classified briefings demanding a 25 or 30 percent raise in cotton output annually, yet without specifying the specific technological changes or manpower increases that would allow this upward adjustment. That the tempo was extraordinarily high is testified to by the realization of this when the was levelled for the misuse of irrigated lands against the Central Committee of the Azerbaidzhan Party. The leaders of other republics and oblasts were not named at the time. We thought that they themselves would understand this and draw the necessary practical conclusions. The facts show that not all comrades have correctly understood this criticism. Today, in many kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSRs…there is not a real struggle for the achievement of higher yields from irrigated land.” See Gregory Gleason, Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton Production Complex, PhD Dissertation, University of California, 1984, p. 93 and pp. 114-115.

28 Ibid., p. 109.

29 For example, in a Central Committee document from 1957 it is remarked how Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest of “3 million tons would soon rise to 4 million tons”. See RGANI, f.6, op. 6, doc. 1106, “Spravki rabotnikov pri TsK KPSS o rabote partkomissii pri TsK KP Uzbekistana o rasmotrenii personal’nykh del kommunistov”. See “Spravka o rezultatakh komandirovki v Uzbekskaya SSR Mart 1957 goda”.

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26th CPSU Congress in March 1981 adopted “stable” cotton targets, reducing the ill-apportioned burden of the foregoing.  

The padding of cotton reports was merely a facet of the frantic search for solutions to the unrealistic and often contradictory central directives which had characterized the USSR’s since its creation. Falsification of cotton production gave the elite breathing room in face of the center’s relentless pressure. In many ways, the Cotton Production Complex served as a first line of defense for the republic’s autonomy. In the eyes of the Uzbeks, the falsified part of production only reclaimed what was perceived as theirs had cotton procurement prices evolved with the indices in other sectors.

Usmankhodzhaev and Rashidov’s “Local Favoritism”

Rashidov’s demise catapulted a new triumvirate of leaders to power: I. Usmankhodzhaev, A. U. Salimov, and G.Kh Kadyrov – heads of party, legislature, and state respectively. Usmankhodzhaev’s appointment was preceded by intense politicking among the Politburo members in Moscow. Formally, the main figures responsible for vetting, selection, and appointment of First Secretaries in the Union republics in 1982-83 were the director of the CPSU Secretariat’s Party Organization Department (Ligachev),

the General Secretary and Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (Andropov and Chernenko), while final decisions were to be taken collegially in the Politburo. This formal process was partially altered by Gorbachev. “Gorbachev could not have decisive influence on nominations to party positions,” Ligachev recalls, “but I often found Gorbachev in Chernenko’s office, and he took active part in the review of candidates.” That the choice fell upon Usmankhodzhaev is attributed principally to Second Secretary Chernenko, Gorbachev, and other supportive members of the Politburo and Secretariat.

Seeking to enlist the hand of the center in his vendetta with the Rashidov leadership, First Secretary Usmankhodzhaev at the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek Central Committee in 1984 singled out Kashkadarya, Jizak, and Bukhara oblasts as particularly prone to violations of cadre selection and promotions on the basis of “kinship, local favoritism, or personal devotion”. Kashkadarya’s former oblispolkom chairman, B. Elbayev had built luxurious housing for his children and the erstwhile party raykom First Secretaries N. Khikmatov, T. Tillayev, D. Khushnazarov, A. Umirov, Kh. Kalilov had engaged in “deception and falsification”; Jizak’s former gorkom secretary U. Turakulov had patronized workers who had broken the law; and in Bukhara the then-obkom First

31 In 1966 the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was renamed General Secretary, returning to the tile in use during Stalin.
Secretary, A. Karimov, had promoted several figures on the basis of “friendship or local favoritism”, including the oblast state prosecutor and the chiefs of the Internal Affairs Administration. An article in Izvestija buttressed these claims, identifying Rashidov’s region of origin, Jizak, as the most troublesome of Uzbekistan’s oblasts. “It was here” the journalist G. Dimov lamented, “that the ugliest sprouts of nepotism shot up…what more could one expect, when half the members of the province Party committee's bureau were related.” Embezzlement had been a direct function of the lack of supervision, local favoritism, and mutual protection, which had been especially palpable in the Zagotkhlopkoprom (the Cotton Procurement Industrial Association).

Yegor Ligachev’s report to the Uzbek Central Committee’s 16th Plenum was less damning, noting how there had been many achievements in the socio-political development of Bukhara oblast but that it had erred in the “resolution of cadre issues”: political, professional, and moral qualities had been replaced with “selection on the basis of kinship, common origins, or personal loyalty.” As regards Samarkand oblast, however, Ligachev’s attention was directed other issues: to raise “production capacities,” strengthen “labor resources”, “output quality” etc., with no shortcomings detected in the

34 Izvestija, December 30, 1986.
sphere of cadre policy. Still, a month later the Uzbek party congress accused a son of Samarkand oblast – the Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs, Kh. Yakhyayev -- for gross misconduct. Citing documents of an unknown origin, the Secretary of the Uzbek People’s Control Committee, G. Shamshiyev, alleged that Yakhyayev had engaged in systematic abuse of official position, toadyism, amoral way of living, among other reprobate behavior.

Rashidov’s demise became the inception of a deep purge of the Uzbek state and party apparatus. In 1984 and 1985 alone, 1813 officials in the nomenklatura, or 45.7 percent of the total, were excluded. As many as 52 out of 65 secretaries of obkoms were ejected, of whom 11 were First Secretaries, and 400 new secretaries (equivalent to 70 percent of the total) at the raykom and gorkom levels were elected of whom 149 were First Secretaries. Forty six chairmen of oblispolkoms and deputies were changed, 29 figures on the Central Committee were replaced, 232 deputies in the Supreme and local soviets were demoted, and 6663 party members were expelled from the communist party. Having a taste for statistics, First Secretary I. Usmankhodzhaev proudly touted

36 Pravda Vostoka, July 18, 1984, p. 3.
this purge at the October Plenum of the Party Congress in 1984, citing these numbers and others, acknowledging meanwhile that several difficulties remained “after years of deficient leadership” that “cheated the party and the state.” Eventually, the fallout of this scandal would radiate even to Brezhnev’s son-in-law Yuri Churbanov, deputy Minister of Interior, who was convicted along with other Moscow officials in the central party apparatus. The long-standing First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom, Musakhanov, was similarly dismissed and reprimanded on the eve of the 1986 Communist Party Congress.

Usmankhodzhaev presided over an almost completely revamped Bureau of the Central Committee. Only Salimov and Usmankhodzhaev remained from the 1981 Bureau whose Brezhnev era native and non-native members had been thoroughly purged. Determined to reverse the corrupt and negative tendencies in Soviet society, Alexander Yakovlev in 1985 penned a letter to Gorbachev on the imperative of further economic and political centralization. This thinking extended to cadre policy which was put under much stricter surveillance. Thus, a party document from 1986 notes “how the work of

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party…organs of Uzbekistan continues [but that they are now placed] under the control of the otdel of the Central Committee of the Communist Party [KPSS]” in Moscow “to strengthen discipline”. As during the post-purge Stalin and Khrushchev eras, the Central Committee Bureau was “Russified” where the number of non-native central appointees jumped from five in 1981 to eight in 1986. Gorbachev refrained from taking such drastic steps as in Kazakhstan, however, where in 1986 he dismissed the long standing Kazakh First Secretary Kunaev and replaced him with an ethnic Russian, Gennady Kolbin. Uzbeks preserved the leading posts in the Uzbekistan and at the rayon level, 86 percent of First Secretaries were in 1987-1989 “Muslim”, indicating that Uzbeks remained preponderant at lower levels as well.

Usmankhodzhaev, in an attack on Rashidov’s leadership, noted in a letter to the all-Union Central Committee on April 30, 1986, how he “seriously…violated the work with cadres,” how “cadres were promoted on the basis of birth place (rodstva and zemlyachestvo), personal loyalty, and workplace”. Many positions in the party, soviet, and governmental organs were filled with his close rodstveniki who “benefited from

appointments”. Not limited to these, Rashidov had bestowed the Hero of Socialist Labor Order on “his uncle Nasirov” and awarded doctorates to his brother N. Rashidov and daughter S. Rashidova. As many as eight Jizak natives were allegedly employed in Uzbekistan’s Central Committee and three with kinship relations to Rashidov could be pinpointed in the Jizak obkom. Throughout the Rashidov-period and especially during the 1970s, Rashidov had created a spirit of “parading nationalism” whereby anti-Soviet and anti-governmental figures such as the First Secretary of Kashkadarya oblast, Gaipov, his counterpart in Bukhara, Karimov, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the head of Paisk agro-industrial complex Adylov, and the former Secretary of the Central Committee Umarov had escaped unpunished. Last but not least, widespread corruption had resulted in the “embezzlement of billions of rubles” Usmankhodzhaev concluded.

The CPSU Central Committee’s response on Usmankhodzhaev’s tirade in 1986 was less damning, though still acknowledging Rashidov’s deficiencies. The Central Committee affirmed flaws in the “placement and training of cadres” and that serious violations on party norms occurred, including “widespread corruption” and “bribery”,

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
resulting in the misappropriation of more than 3 billion rubles between 1970 and 1983. What is more, the Central Committee remarked that practically all of the senior leadership of the Procurator’s Office, MVD, Supreme Court, and Ministry of Justice had been replaced, in addition to the dismissals cited in Usmankhodzhaev’s telegram. While addressing many of Usmankhodzhaev’s points, noteworthy is that no reference is made to Rashidov’s “favoritism”, kinship connections, or any other of the allegations made by the Uzbek First Secretary, which may possibly denote that these were the opinions of a “successor” rather than established facts.

Rashidov’s kin-based promotions were neither a subject in an article on Uzbek party violations in Pravda Vostoka. Not being apologetic, the article still chastised several Uzbek officials whose offices had been sources of personal enrichment. All of those standing “puzzled” to the allegations, the newspaper charged, were in fact guilty: N. G. Kurbanov, the Minister of Rural Construction, had been preoccupied with providing for his family and mistress; Kh.R Rakhimov, previous Director of the Agency of Foreign Tourism, had smoothed the way for his son’s acceptance to Tashkent University’s Oriental Studies division, which had “allowed his son to travel abroad”; U.A. Aripov, the former Rector of Tashkent’s Medical Institute, had endowed his five

daughters with higher education in the university he was heading; and the then-head of Uzbekistan Writers' Union, S. A. Azimov, was charged with reissuing works published years ago (an “operation” valued at 15,000 rubles) and of using public funds to pay for 800 plates of kebab at his son’s wedding.48

“Tribalizing” Central Asia

Perhaps alluding to more serious troubles, President Gorbachev at the CPSU Party Congress in 1986 identified the Uzbek republic as the place where “negative processes have been manifest in their most acute form”. A Party Control Commission publication from a year later, analyzing the Samarkand party organization, similarly noted how “negative processes crystallized in Uzbekistan”, where the leadership “organized banquets”, and even several Party Control Commission central appointees had been “drawn into disloyalty and localism (mestnichestvo)” (even if “localism” in this context almost certainly meant the favoring of Uzbek interests over central ones and not “localism” as preference for certain Uzbek regions).49

Corruption was not limited to cotton embezzlement. When Boris Yeltsin, then Central Committee Secretary in charge of construction, visited Tashkent in 1985 he

48 Pravda Vostoka, November 22, 1986.
scourged the leadership for “constructing prestige objects” of culture, sports, political education, and science while neglecting the “social development of the city”.\textsuperscript{50} Krasnaia Zvezda, meanwhile, identified all of the Soviet officials protecting their sons from being sent to Afghanistan as Uzbeks.\textsuperscript{51} Chernaev was even brusquer, depicting the Central Asian leaders as “illiterates” and “criminals” who needed to be replaced with new, young cadre. The Turkmen leader Gapurov was derided as particularly “pathetic”, having been unable to eradicate polygamy, “religious relics”, the “thousands of illegal mullahs” while standing passive to the 85 percent of able-bodied women who “do nothing”, as it was 100 years ago.\textsuperscript{52} In a report on the agricultural situation in 1988, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan were distinguished as in a particular “unfavorable state of affairs”, where as much as 55 percent of enterprises violated the requirements of regulatory documents.\textsuperscript{53}

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Kazakhstan also received its share of criticism. For example, the head of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences stood accused of alcoholism, improper conduct, and the selection of personnel on the basis of favoritism, nepotism and preference by geographic origin.\textsuperscript{54} Nearly identical accusations were levied in 1987 against the former First Secretary, D.A. Kunaev, whose work violated the principle of collective leadership and encouraged nepotism and toadying.\textsuperscript{55} The Kazakh Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, K. N. Naribayev, was similarly alleged to have a predilection for “hometown friends” patronizing each other.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, a Coordinating Council for Combating Crime, Alcoholism, and Unearned Income was established, whose raison d’être was to wage an uncompromising struggle against favoritism, nepotism, and “preference for people of similar geographic origin”.\textsuperscript{57} At a Politburo meeting on June 11, 1987, addressing the problem of favoritism in the USSR, Kazakhstan was also the sole focus of deliberations. The proceedings noted that: “favoritism and the selection of personnel on the basis of kinship, tribe, hometown or friendship [in Kazakhstan] must be eradicated”.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} Pravda, February 14, 1987, p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{55} Pravda, July 16, 1987, pp. 1-2.  
\textsuperscript{56} Kazakhstanskaya pravda, February 19, 1987.  
\textsuperscript{57} Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, December 28, 1987.  
\textsuperscript{58} Pravda, June 12, 1987, p. 1.
Testimony from Gorbachev’s memoirs even attributes Kazakhstan’s Alma-Ata riots in December 1986 not to nationality conflicts but to the “the advantages extracted by the relatives, close and distant, of the top man Kunaev” and his “Dzhuz clan”, which made people “upset and dissatisfied”.\(^{59}\) This was in spite of that the riots started a day after Kunaev was dismissed and the Russian Gennady Kolbin was installed in his place. Of course, no parallels were drawn to that Gorbachev himself immediately when coming to power in 1985 elevated his protégé Murakhovskii, the former Party Secretary of Gorbachev’s native Stavropol, to Chairman of Gosagroprom\(^{60}\) and that the new chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1985, Nikolai Ryzhkov, smoothed the way for three of his clients from the Tyumen’ region – Evgenii Varnachev, Iurii Batalin, and Sergei Bashilov.\(^{61}\) Likewise, in Ulyanovsk oblast’s Staraya Kulatka district, media uncovered “report-padding”, “suppressions of criticism,” and “toadying and nepotism”.\(^{62}\) However, neither there nor in most other areas of USSR, was this described as having a social basis in tribe, clan, or home-town. Whereas favoritism in Kazakhstan concerned century-old


\(^{61}\) Varnashev was promoted Minister of Construction and Building Materials, Batalin deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Bashilov Minister of Construction and of Heavy Industry Enterprises. See *Ibid.*, p. 348.

tribal solidarities, analogous practices in Moscow were merely considered the mores of “normal” Soviet politics.⁶³

Reasons for Skepticism

There are at least three factors which cast doubt on the accuracy of the judgments above. First, the authority responsible for party organization, Yegor Ligachev, reported many figures which were inconsistent with other party documents, including those authored by Gorbachev. For example, Ligachev’s memoir avowed that “in the three years from 1980 to 1983, the Central Committee received tens of thousands of letters from that republic [Uzbekistan]”.⁶⁴ A confidential document authored by Gorbachev in 1989 to members of the Politburo, by contrast, noted that “From 1978 to 1983 the Central Committee had received on average 736 letters per year from Uzbekistan”, i.e., a total of

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⁶³ Beyond terminology, whether Gorbachev and the Politburo in Moscow had more than a superficial understanding of the potential role of tribe and kinship in Kazakh politics is questionable. That Gorbachev sketchily speaks about the “dominance [in Kazakhstan’s politics] of of one of the local communities, the ‘Dzhus clan’” is suggestive. Dzhus is the Kazakh word for the English “tribe”, and would thus translate as dominance of the “tribe clan”. Kazakhstan’s territory is divided into three dzhuses: Uli dzhus (great horde), Orta dzhus (middle horde), and Kishi dzhus (small horde). Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 330.

3680 letters over five years. Either Ligachev was prone to exaggeration or Gorbachev’s numbers were inaccurate, but one of them was evidently wrong. Substantial variations on the declared amount of cotton embezzled could also be discerned, ranging from a total of $3 billion for the five years 1978-1983 (reported in Central Committee documents) to $3 billion for the thirteen years between 1970 and 1983 (also reported in Central Committee documents). Whichever was correct, if any, Uzbek cotton was worth $35 billion on the international market in 1975 alone, equivalent to 26 billion rubles (with the 1975 exchange rate of 0.75 rubles per U.S. dollar), which makes even the “high estimate” a theft of roughly 2 or 3 percent of the total harvest when calculated over five years. Other observers have claimed that the amount of cotton embezzled approximated almost 20 percent, at least in the year immediately prior to Rashidov’s demise. That the tumultuous nature of the circumstances caused these discrepancies is likely and should be duly acknowledged. On the other hand, perhaps this is the very reason why any figure cited during this period warrants a degree of skepticism.

67 See e.g. Fedor Razzakov, Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009).
Second, that Andropov and Chernenko were to crack down on Central Asia and the Caucasus was to some degree to be expected. In an insightful quantitative study of the attention given by the Politburo members and candidates from 1972-79 to the 15 union republics in public speeches, Philip D. Stewart et al. uncover how Andropov and Chernenko were the two Politburo members of the 19 members and candidates whose priorities most clearly lay elsewhere. They lobbied primarily for the interests of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and Estonia and were set firmly against the faction composed of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Masherov and others “defending” Central Asia.68 That “their” republics were footing the bill of the net-recipients in Central Asia and Caucasus almost certainly touched a sensitive nerve. In other words, the objectivity of both the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev leadership could be questioned. They clearly had their pet republics in the Eastern and Western parts of the empire respectively. Andropov and Gorbachev’s criticism towards the Western parts was as muted as Brezhnev’s for the Eastern parts.

Third, Ligachev claims that the party, soviet, management and law enforcement personnel were chosen “largely on the basis of personal loyalty to Rashidov”. Thus, it is said that “no fewer than 14 of his relatives worked in the republican Central Committee

apparatus.” Recall that I. Usmankhodzhaev made a similar remark, declaring that eight in the Central Committee hailed from Jizak and three in the Jizak obkom had kinship relations with Rashidov. Izvestija likewise claimed that half of the Jizak obkom’s bureau were related to each other. Noteworthy is, however, that not a single example ever is given on who these persons were. As sparing in their exhaustiveness as they were in their sources, none of these accounts ever gives any information about what particular data point they are referring to; Rashidov ruled Uzbekistan for 23 years but the data are static pictures of unspecified dates. That the Central Committee of Uzbekistan was made up of sixteen departments in 1962 and 180 members and several dozen more candidates also make eight Jizak natives roughly proportional to its weight in national affairs.70 A similar ambiguity defines the scholarly literature. For example, James Critchlow remarks that Jizak-natives “seemed to do well in their careers”, yet without providing any source or specific persons.71 Demian Vaisman makes equally strong claims about Rashidov’s “clan” of relatives in power, acknowledging still that exactly who they were is hard to pin down since Rashidov did not “advertise” his family connections.72

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70 In 1962, Uzbekistan’s Central Committee was made up of 180 members, see Pravda Vostoka, September 28, 1962, p. 1.
Moreover, if nepotism was as pronounced during Rashidov as has been claimed, why did confidential documents, media reports, and scholars all fail to provide a specific documented example? *Izvestija*, for instance, supplied a wealth of examples in minutiae about fairly benign violations in Uzbekistan but did not identify a single person in the nepotistic Jizak obkom bureau. Why did Usmankhodzhaev name Rashidov’s uncle Nazirov, who was awarded the Order of Lenin, and his daughter’s and brother’s unwarranted doctorates, but leave the Jizak natives in the Central Committee or his relatives in the Jizak obkom unnamed? That neither Usmankhodzhaev nor anyone else were able to come up with a real person, even while being sharp-eyed on such figures in other spheres, points to that these claims were either spurious or exaggerated. Had he, media, or scholars known any such examples they would almost certainly have mentioned them. Perhaps this is also why the Central Committee in Moscow left this particular concern aside when responding to Usmankhodzhaev’s litany of accusations.

Conceivably, Rashidov’s ostensibly kinship-based promotions were derived from the corruption and padding of cotton reports during his reign. Like other Soviet and Uzbek leaders before him accusations came as part of a “package” since few leaders could be or were dismissed solely on one charge. The re-labelling of career associates as *rodstvenniki*, a common practice in the Soviet central media, probably held true also in
this case.\textsuperscript{73} Such “bundling” of \textit{kompromat} aimed at disreputing Rashidov, and was no different than any of those levied against the several dozen of other Soviet politicians cited in this dissertation who had fallen from grace. What is puzzling is that few, if any, of the scholars writing on “clans” in Soviet Uzbekistan have seriously acknowledged either the possible fabrication of such accusations or the “rebranding” of former colleagues as \textit{rodstvenniki}. Many appear to have taken the claims in public sources at face value, as will be returned to in the next chapter.

\section*{Conclusion}

If there is any period in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history for which material relating to “clans” or strong regional identities could be found, it is this one. Usmankhodzhaev’s letter to the Central Committee, journalistic articles, and plenum reports all testify to that

\textsuperscript{73} General favoritism of old co-workers, which was ubiquitous in the Soviet Union, was often rebranded as \textit{kompromat} in the guise of “nepotism” as pointed out by the Party Control Commission. In one such case among many others, the head of Glavstrojlegproma, K.K. Valitshin, in Shelkovskogo Gorkom stood accused of numerous violations, including support from his \textit{rodstvenniki}, Konstantinov, Instructor in the Central Committee. While the Party Control Commission acknowledged many of the accusations against him to be correct it explicitly noted that the accusation of \textit{rodstvenniki} was wrong since Konstantinov, in fact, was not his \textit{rodstvenniki} but connected to him from previous work in the Ministry of Building Materials dating back to 1939-1940. See RGANI, f.6, op.6, no. 1652. “Zamestitelyu predsedatelya KPK pri TsK VKP(b) t. Yagodkinu I.A.” 1952.
kinship was of some importance in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan. On the other hand, Surkov’s declaration at the 19th Party Congress, that “family ties determine who gets the top and middle level jobs” in the entire Soviet party apparatus, attests to that blood-ties and nepotism were not only associated with Central Asia. Assuming that the charges against Rashidov are correct, it is not entirely clear why Uzbekistan’s patronage should be conceived as distinct from the rest of the USSR.

Either way, Usmankhodzhaev’s allegations can scarcely be taken at face value since he had a vested interest in sullying the reputation of his predecessor. Events that unfolded later would also put a big question mark regarding this entire episode. Just to take one example out of many, the Minister of Interior, Kh. Yakhyaev was accused by the Uzbek Party Congress in 1984 for “toadyism” among many other allegations. In 1989, however, as will be detailed in the next chapter, it was revealed that the accusations against not only him but dozens of others were fabricated. This poses the question of what, if any, of the accusations revealed in course of the “cotton scandal” that are to be believed, including those levied against Rashidov.

Rashidov’s falsification of cotton reports is likely what unleashed all other claims on his persona and policies. It is conceivable that Rashidov’s clients, most of whom he had encountered during his career, were relabeled *rostvenniki* by Usmankhodzhaev in a similar vein as was documented by the Party Control Commission in other republics. That is likely why the CPSU Central Committee in confidential reports focused more on the cotton question than any of the other claims that surfaced in media
and public sources. The most “objective” source among the party organs is undoubtedly the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo reports. This was most clearly revealed as they in 1989 began examining Moscow’s own transgressions in Uzbekistan.
Introduction

In 1989 two sets of confidential documents landed on the Politburo’s table. Both revealed that many of the claims surrounding the cotton scandal were erroneous. A large number of imprisoned or disgraced Uzbek officials had been innocent and evidence against them had been fabricated. Not limited to this, the investigators in Uzbekistan had purposefully misused media in discrediting Uzbek officials. The unprecedented media freedom during glasnost allowed journalists to widely disseminate accusations whose accuracy mattered less than the imperative of regularly serving stunning revelations. Such mythmaking ensued when central media in 1988 began speaking about “clans” in Uzbekistan. Shortly thereafter, in 1989, scholars embraced this concept as an accurate portrayal of Uzbek realities without questioning who launched it and the circumstances under which it arose.

Further, just as Gorbachev misread the strength of nationalism in the Soviet Union so he misread the nature of Uzbekistan’s patronage networks. In what amounts to
an act of desperation, the central government began transferring Uzbek officials across the republic in a dizzying pace while leaving a handful of powerful figures in place. The one’s who were left en poste took advantage of their deep-seated networks in their native Tashkent and Samarkand to amass regionally defined power bases unmatched among the Uzbek elite. Islam Karimov inherited these power brokers after independence in 1991 and it took more than a decade of maneuvering to eliminate them. In parallel to this struggle, Karimov has effectively barred former governors (hokimlar) from national offices to prevent them from bringing in regionally rooted clients into national government. Striking at the core of Soviet place-based networks, Karimov aimed to suffocate the centrifugal forces of regionalism through a reversal of the Soviet era career pattern. The fight against patronage networks has nonetheless proven to be a prolonged struggle, as Gorbachev too was made aware of in the midst of perestroika.

**Gorbachev’s Misreading of the Situation**

The purge of Uzbek officials in the early and mid-1980s proved ineffective. A document dated August 1987 of the CPSU Politburo reveals that corruption and favoritism were present even when the Uzbek political system was under tight controls. Apart from pointing out insufficiencies in cotton cultivation in practically all oblasts of the republic, the Central Committee averred that plenty in these harvests had been embezzled and that several officials had “been drawn into friendship ties with a number of others”. Thus, the Central Committee called upon First Secretary Usmankhodzhaev
and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kadyrov, to “strengthen work with cadres”, to listen to the opinion of agricultural specialists, and to take other measures to resolve problems in the cotton sector.\(^1\)

It might be argued that this description of the Politburo came too soon after the purge to judge its effectiveness. Still, instead of predicating the policy on reversing the primary source of region-based power and nepotism – the promotion of former First Secretaries upwards in the system, from a rayon to the oblast containing the rayon, and from oblast to the containing republic – it was continued. For example, Usmankhodzhaev, the First Secretary 1983-88, had a long history in the provinces of the Ferghana Valley as had the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Soviet 1989-1990, Mirzaolim Ibragimov.\(^2\) True to form, old colleagues and figures from Namangan and Andijan made notable career leaps under Usmankhodzhaev.\(^3\) Clearly, Moscow could

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\(^1\) RGANI, f.89, op.36, doc. 13 “O Ser’eznykh nedostatkakh v razvitii khlopkovostva v Uzbekskoj SSR” Vypiska iz protokola No.78 zasedaniya Politburo TsK KPSS, August 3, 1987.

\(^2\) Usmankhodzhaev had served as First Secretary of the Andijan obkom, Chairman of the Namangan obispolkom, and head of the Ferghana gorsoviet; Ibragimov was previously First Secretary of the Ferghana obkom. Other examples of leading figures whose paths came via provincial service are Gairat Kadyrov, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers 1984-1989, who had risen through the Chirchik gorkom and his successor, Mirakhat Mirkasymov, who had served as First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom, prior to which he had been First Secretary of the Khorezm obkom. Makhmud Aripdzhanov, First Secretary of the Andijan obkom 1985-1990, rose through the Almalyk gorkom.

\(^3\) For example, Usmankhodzhaev’s deputy chairman of the Namangan obispolkom in 1974, Shavkat Yuldoshev, was named First Secretary of the Namangan gorkom in 1984 and First Secretary of the
have targeted the problem of region-based promotions had it closed off the republic-level offices from figures rooted in the oblasts, but it did not. Instead, Moscow’s pursued the alternative strategy of transferring officials “laterally” across the republic from oblast to oblast.\(^4\) The intention was to root out the “wide-spread corruption”, “exploitation”, create stability in the republic, to instill a sense of “collegiality and criticism”, and return to “Leninist norms of party life”.\(^5\) Whatever the success on each of these parameters, the uprooting had unintended consequences. Patronage networks expanded as the transferred officials moved laterally across the republic from oblast to oblast.

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\(^4\) For example, Abdukhalyk Aidarkulov, a native of Tashkent oblast, serving there as First Secretary of a Tashkent gorkom, was during Gorbachev appointed First Secretary of the Navoi obkom and then First Secretary of Syr Darya oblast. Anvar Ikramov, in turn, served as First Secretary of a Tashkent oblast raikom during Rashidov (1971-1980), only to be reappointed in 1988 as First Secretary of the Samarkand obkom; Salidzhan Mamarasulov, hailing from Andijan, served as First Secretary of the Andijan obkom during Rashidov (1978-1985), but was dispatched to Surkhandarya (1985-1989) in the Gorbachev period; And Tashkent-born Mirakhat Mirkasymov was transferred to Khorezm Oblast where he served as First Secretary from 1986 to 1988, at the time of which he was chosen First Secretary of Tashkent Oblast. See "Anvar Ikramov," in Uzbek Sovet Entsiklopediya, Vol. 4, (Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademi, 1973), p. 578-579; “Salidzhan Mamarasulov,” in Sovetskij Entsiklopediaeskij Slovar’ Vol. 2 (Moskva: Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1983); ad “M. Mirkasymov,” at centrasia.ru <http://www.centrasia.ru/person2.php?is=103880589> (2012-12-16).

personnel built loyalties in new areas. In principle, this was not much different than the “rotation policy” pursued by Rashidov. Yet Rashidov was hesitant in leaving obkom First Secretaries and other officials on their home turfs (see Table 1, Appendix A).

Gorbachev was less cautious in his crusading spirit. Thus, the few power brokers who were not subject to the “inter-oblast” transfers emerged emboldened and unchallenged, which concentrated powers in increasingly few hands. Three pair of hands to be more precise, belonging to Timur Alimov, Ismail Jurabekov, and Shukrullah Mirzaidov. Only two weeks after Mikhail Gorbachev’s appointment on March 11, 1985, as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Timur Alimov was made a full member of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee, serving in parallel to his position as First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom. On August 29 the same year Gorbachev and the Politburo appointed Jurabekov deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Tashkent native Alimov served for a decade in Tashkent structures untouched, first as Chairman of the Tashkent oblispolkom from 1978 to 1985 and then First Secretary of the Tashkent obkom, 1985 to 1988. Next to his position in the Council of Ministers, Jurabekov was in 1985 named Chairman of Gosagroprom and could through this position control much of the republic’s cotton production and rural countryside, including in his native Samarkand.


Another powerful figure whose network was left intact, Shukrulla Mirzaidov, was to be swiftly neutralized by Karimov after independence but played a profound role in shaping the events of the Gorbachev era. Having served uninterrupted as Chairman or deputy Chairman in Tashkent-based institutions since 1963 – in the oblplan, oblispolkom, gorplan, and gorlispolkom – Mirzaidov had amassed a regional power base unmatched amongst the Uzbek elite. Even so, Gorbachev named him Chairman of Tashkent’s oblispolkom in 1985 and in 1989 Chairman of Gosplan. These three – Alimov, Jurabekov, and Mirzaidov – were also to become the principal power brokers behind Karimov’s rise to power in 1989. While Gorbachev’s unfaltering glasnost and perestroika aimed to spread powers in society and state, the unintended effect in Uzbekistan was a concentration of power. These kingmakers were products not of Brezhnev and the Rashidov era but Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev.

If the “inter-oblast” transfers had met with only partial success and even proved harmful for future democratization, Andropov’s and Gorbachev’s reluctance to affect a generation change was another missed opportunity. Instead, the officials promoted

8 This is not to say that these figures did not have allies beyond their home turfs. For example, Mirzaidov maintained close ties with Abdurauf Gafurov, a member of the Namangan obkom Bureau in 1985 and one of Ferghana Valley’s “underground millionaires”. See Martha Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), Chapter 9, heading “Abdurauf Gafurov”.

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typically belonged to the older generation of stale politicians.\(^9\) Beyond high age, what they also shared was that they were part of that segment of the elite which had sunk into oblivion during Rashidov. Nishanov, for example, had been in the deep-freeze for 25 years biding his time in the Soviet Embassies in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Jordan before being appointed Foreign Minister in Uzbekistan in 1985 and then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet a year later. Former First Secretary Nurutdin Mukhitdinov, who after his fall from power in 1961 had been posted to diplomatic work in Syria, was reinstalled and ended his career as deputy Chairman of the Trade and Industry Chamber in 1987 at the age of 70.\(^10\) Rasul Gulyamov, who initially supported Rashidov but then turned into his critic when he was removed from the Bureau in the 1960s, resurfaced under Gorbachev as head of the so-called “Namangan clan”. Uzbekistan was ripe for a generation change but Moscow did not take advantage of it; Gorbachev’s “new thinking” suffered from the lack of “new thinkers”.

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What has been said above may be interpreted as a one-sided failure on Moscow’s part. But this is not the whole story since the Uzbek elite had proven stubbornly resistant to change. Much more than elsewhere in Central Asia they had become masters of keeping Russia out of its hair even when tightly manacled. This resilience took several expressions. First, many of Moscow’s dismissals in Uzbekistan were often rapidly reinstated locally in other positions. This “revolving door” subverted Moscow’s cadre policy at every step, and was especially pronounced at the oblast and rayon level. For example, the head of Surkhandarya’s Administrative Department, having been fired for forging documents for his daughter, resurfaced not shortly thereafter as the Department Head of the Oblast Trade Union organization.\textsuperscript{11} Moscow recognized its failure of eliciting obedience at the 1986 Party Congress and issued a decree in 1987 warning party organs not to reinstate figures who had been expelled from the party on “bribery, embezzlement, and padding of reports”.\textsuperscript{12} Yet Moscow was utterly lacking the resources demanded to control adherence to this decree. It also faced a dwindling reserve of qualified personnel after the purge, forcing Moscow’s cadre bureau to turn a blind eye towards some reinstatements. Second, the Uzbek elite turned increasingly vocal in its

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}
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criticism of Moscow’s new “unstable” cadre policy. One obkom First Secretary at the Uzbek Party Congress of March 28, 1987, lambasted the purge, saying that work with cadres was “impossible” without “stability.” Like elsewhere in the Soviet Union, patronage networks were amorphous hydras. As one head was cut off, two new grew back in its place.

Usmankhodzhaev’s Credibility Questioned

Next to this resourceful meddling in cadre policy, new corruption allegations soon spurted out. In 1988 Rashidov’s successor, Usmankhodzhaev, was arrested along with dozens of other officials accused of accepting “large sums of money from their subordinates and other officials for patronage”. According to the Procurator General, Usmankhodzhaev at two instances embezzled 65000 rubles, and in a subsequent telegram it is established that he bribed Central Committee member Roshanov with 25000 rubles. A campaign in mass media further alleged that Usmankhodzhaev had bribed Ligachev with 30000 rubles. Corruption – whether true or untrue – had persisted to Gorbachev’s dismay.

Usmankhodzhaev’s successor was Rafik Nishanov whose Janus-face undoubtedly pointed more towards Gorbachev than his own republic. Heeding Gorbachev’s brisk instructions, Nishanov effected a further unpopular shake up in the Uzbek state apparatus. On July 28, 1988, 13 ministries were abolished by decree and several oblasts and rayons were declared subject to immediate amalgamation. The office holders in the defunct ministries were to be “transferred to production”, in effect losing the privileges they had held in the party nomenklatura. This far-reaching measure affected thousands of Uzbek officials in prominent positions. For example, on August 18, 1988, 20000 specialists were “released to production” following the elimination of rayons. In early September, 1988, the Navoi and Samarkand oblasts were merged into one “Samarkand oblast” and Syr Darya oblast usurped Jizak oblast. This reorganization followed complaints in Moscow a year earlier that “hundreds of thousands” were employed in Uzbekistan’s 55 ministries and that several oblasts were too small for justifying their existence. Jizak, for example, with a population of 800,000 was singled

16 As Gorbachev reminisced in his memoirs, “I liked Rafik Nishanovich. His unchanging posture, humour and a certain philosophical distance from the petty vagaries of life – in other words everything that was usually associated with the ‘wisdom of the east’ – appealed to me.” Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 304.
18 “Rural Rayons to be Abolished in Uzbekistan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 8, 1988.
out as particularly unwarranted. While the abolishment of Jizak has been viewed as a posthumous attack on Rashidov, it is important to recognize that this formed part of Moscow’s campaign to combine oblasts in the entire union. Jizak was an obvious victim due to its size but one cannot rule out that other motives guided this decision.

The dismissal of Usmankhodzhaev in 1988 was a catalyst to yet another affair which raised questions not only of Usmankhodzhaev’s credibility but also Gdlyan and Ivanov’s corruption investigation in Uzbekistan during the 1980s. In May 1989, Gdlyan and Ivanov began attacking the Politburo members Ligachev, Romanov, Solomentsev, and others for ties to the “Uzbek mafia”. Gdlyan was in the Yeltsin camp and a fierce opponent of Ligachev and other conservative members of the Politburo. Some of the testimony for the accusations levied against Ligachev and others were gathered from Usmankhodzhaev. “Gdlyan,” Ligachev lamented “convinced Usmankhodzhaev to fabricate testimony against me”. After his arrest on October 19, 1988, Usmankhodzhaev petitioned the Prosecutor General asking that his case be handled “only by Gdlyan, Ivanov, and their direct superior Karakozov”, whom he “trusted absolutely.”

21 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 242.
24 Ibid., p. 243.
A personal letter from Usmankhodzhaev to Ligachev, dated January 23, 1990, and republished in Ligachev’s memoirs, furnishes additional evidence to that Usmankhodzhaev was firmly under Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s thumbs. “I was a victim of the political intriguers Gdlyan and Ivanov,” Usmankhodzhaev regretted, “who tried to fabricate accusations that a number of Party and soviet figures committed crimes…While I was under pressure from the investigators and started down the path of deception, I implicated innocent people, including you, Yegor Kuzmich.”

Similar recantations were recorded by the Prosecutor on April 8, 1989. Prepared to cut off his nose to spite his face, Usmankhodzhaev stated during interrogations that he had implicated honest people at the demand of Gdlyan and Ivanov. “The innocent people they investigated,” Ligachev attested, “had been subjected to mental and physical harassment, the terms of detention were violated, and threats of reprisals against relatives were used to elicit the testimony they needed.”

The astute observer may question Ligachev’s testimony. After all, he was as implicated in the palace intrigues of the Kremlin as any other. While such objections are not unfounded, other independently collected archival evidence vindicates his case: The

27 Ibid., p. 221.
Prosecutor’s office, Gorbachev, and a commission of legislators unearthed equally appalling violations in the work of the anti-corruption investigators. A not insignificant number of Uzbek officials had been indicted on trumped up charges, the material of which Gdlyan and Ivanov made it a matter of principle to feed to the Soviet news media. Uzbekistan was publicly condemned but eventually silently rehabilitated in the Politburo.

_Uzbekistan’s Silent Rehabilitation_

Having humbled Uzbekistan to the status of a mafia republic, the spotlight on Soviet corruption unexpectedly turned on Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves. That their corruption investigations had overstepped the bounds of its original purpose and begun to target the top Soviet leadership, including Yegor Ligachev, was likely a trigger for this seemingly preemptive action. Whatever the reason, beginning in May 1989 their rummaging in Uzbekistan was sharply criticized in confidential deliberations. This eventful month climaxed with a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet’s Presidium held on May 13. In a terse summary it was reported that Gdlyan and Ivanov had “used provocative methods”, “violated law” in their investigations of some “of the leading officials of the USSR”, and a commission was to be established to appraise Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s work.28

One Politburo document authored by Gorbachev summarizes the many letters on violations by judicial organs (procurators, judges, courts etc.) in Uzbekistan, especially following the onset of Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigatory work.\textsuperscript{29} The majority had been sent by either convicted prisoners or their relatives, practically all of whom testified to unfair trials, false accusations, forced confessions, and/or the stereotyped picture portrayed in media.\textsuperscript{30} Although some of these letters were streaming in from other parts of the USSR, the main source was Uzbekistan. It was also declared that the USSR Prosecutor General underwrote several of the complaints contained in them. From Moscow’s perspective, the problem was not confined to the unlawful pursuit of several innocent communist and high level officials, which “had no parallels” in the rest of the USSR, but it had affected public opinion negatively, smeared judges, and created a perception that these methods were a facet of perestroika.\textsuperscript{31}

For example, two letter writers included in Gorbachev’s appraisal, V.Z. Zhevagin and U.S. Sizov of the USSR Supreme Court, referred to the former Uzbek deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davydov, and another senior official in Yangiyul

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\textsuperscript{29} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh s zhalobami na narushenie zakonnosti pri vedenii sledstviya po ugolovnym delam v Uzbekskoj SSR”. From Mikhail Gorbachev to members and candidates of the Politburo, Secretaries of the Central Committee, V.M. Chernikov, and Prosecutor A. Ya. Sukharev. May 4, 1989.
\textsuperscript{30} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh...”, p. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{31} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh...”, p. 2-3.
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raykom (Tashkent), Khadkhimuradov, who both had committed suicide while under investigation. According to these letters, the judge handling their case had groundlessly been accused by Gdlyan and Ivanov for ties to the mafia, and Davydov as well as Khadkhimuradov were claimed to be innocent. This letter, received on February 20, 1989, was only one in a pile of similar letters.32

Another letter cited by Gorbachev authored by one S.K. Ishanov, received on March 3, 1989, blamed Gdlyan and Ivanov for “unlawfulness”, that they had lapsed into “uncontrollable behavior”, and “terrorized the people of Uzbekistan”. This “moral trauma” was declared to have affected thousands of members of the Communist Party, their families, and relatives. Referring to one out of many equivalent instances of misconduct, he noted how T.Kh. Kakhramanov, another deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, had been terrorized by the investigators on trumped up charges and falsified documentation. Other letters of forced confessions were received from the First Secretary of Karshi gorkom, A. Iliadi, an accountant at a Kolkhoz (M.M. Khvan), and the wife of the former First Secretary of Kyzyl-tep raykom, N.Khikmotov. The latter had been sentenced in 1986 for grand scale peculation but after a complaint and appeal

32 RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh…”, p. 3-5.
the Navoi oblast judge dismissed the case due to an insufficient preliminary investigation.\textsuperscript{33}

Uzbekistan’s former Second Secretary T.N. Osetrov submitted an equally long complaint about Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigation, categorically denying the charges against him and the unlawful arrest of his wife and daughter. To make matters worse, his reputation had been sullied in media whereby \textit{Selskaya Molodezh} had charged him with “being bought all the time when serving in the Central Committee; \textit{Literaturnaya Gazeta} (March 9, 1988) had accused him of belonging to Uzbekistan’s “mafia”; \textit{Pravda Vostoka} (May 1988) profiled him as “directing a criminal cadre”; and Gdlyan’s book \textit{Detektiva i Politika} (APN, 1989), co-authored with journalist E. Dodoyev, portrayed him as a “criminal” and “bribe-taker”. A response from the Ideology and Judicial Section of the all-Union Central Committee dated January 16, 1989, vindicated Osetrov’s claims.

Having raked through the evidence, the USSR General Prosecutor A. Sakharov concluded that he “did not agree with the [Uzbek] prosecutor [in Osetrov’s case], “that the prosecutor’s office had made no attempt to acquire accurate information”, and that “the handling of Osetrov violated the presumption of innocence”.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh…”, p. 5-8.
\textsuperscript{34} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh…”, p. 19-20.
Osetrov was not alone of having been desecrated in the media. Another letter authored in defense of A.G. Statenin, a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, remarked how as soon as the second day after Statenin’s arrest the media portrayed him as a criminal and plunderer. Statenin was sentenced to 8 years but was later acquitted due to insufficient evidence.\textsuperscript{35} Usmankhodzhaev, who had been feeding Gdlyan and Ivanov with false indictments throughout the 1980s, was subjected to an equally vicious media campaign after his arrest.\textsuperscript{36} Ligachev perhaps put Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s public relations campaign most succinctly: “…in addition to the group’s purely professional efforts, a new ‘quality’ of perestroika soon appeared in the investigators. They had a real knack for working with the press and TV, publicizing sensational materials before trials, sometimes signing their own names to articles…Gdlyan and Ivanov, who actively sought out contact with the press emerged as winners”.\textsuperscript{37}

Investigative journalist Olga Chaikovskaya’s article “the Myth”, published in \textit{Literaturnaya Gazeta}, lent further support to Gorbachev’s case.\textsuperscript{38} In her account, Gdlyan and Ivanov among other violations had attempted to extract a false confession from a

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\textsuperscript{35} RGANI, f.89, op.24, No. 21, TsK KPSS “O pismakh…”, p. 23.
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director of a state farm that he had bribed the Secretary of the Karakalpak obkom.\textsuperscript{39} Others had been subjected to torture or died in detention. Secretary Gaipov was found dead with 17 knife wounds in a room adjacent to Gdlyan’s office; the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Davyдов, referred to above, shot himself; and Col. Khadzhimurat left a suicide note saying that he could no longer endure the ordeal.\textsuperscript{40} Although comparable revelations were contained in then confidential documents, Chaikovskaya had evidently crossed a red-line since her sequel to this article was published in \textit{Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR} (Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), a publication of much more limited circulation.\textsuperscript{41} Apparently, the Soviet public was “ready” to learn about the spurious claims against Politburo members but the wrong-doings in Uzbekistan were a more bitter pill to swallow.

A second confidential document, authored by 11 non-Central Asian all-Union Supreme Soviet deputies and addressed to members of the Politburo, raised further questions on the investigations.\textsuperscript{42} Evaluating the work of the commission composed of

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\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR}, No. 8 1990.  
\textsuperscript{42} RGANI, f.89, op. 24, no. 24, “Pis’mo narodnykh deputatov t.t. Kalmykova, Kerimova, Kudryavsteva, Semenko, Sukhareva, Yakovleva A.M., Bakatina, Guseva, Kvarstova, Kryuchkova, Yakovleva V.F., v Presidium Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR s pros’boj o provedenii proverki zhalob na narusheniya zakonnosti pri rassledovanii ugolovnyka del v Uzbekskoj SSR brigadoj sledovatelej, vozglavlyaenoj, starshim
the USSR Prosecutor, KGB, and the Supreme Court, the assessment deduced that Gdlyan, Ivanov, and their “circle” had severely violated Soviet law, used “provocative methods”, and been corrupted by wide-spread bribe taking. Not only letters streaming into the Central Committee testified to this but also the General Prosecutor O.M. Litvok and co-workers of Gdlyan.43 Particularly “illegal” was the treatment of the former chairman of Bukhara oblpotrebovyuza, G. Mirzaev, who had been living under “terrible conditions” for the past five years. The “investigation” of his behavior had been completed already in mid-1986 but he had by 1989 still not been directed to a court. Other forms of mistreatment included the arbitrary arrests of relatives, which had been “painful psychologically” for all involved. For example, sixteen of the relatives of the former First Secretary of Bukhara obkom, Karimov, had been incarcerated and put in confinement for terms ranging from 5-8 months. Thus, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court reported that the investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov “had violated constitutional norms on judicial independence” and unacceptably interfered in the trials of the accused. Many had reportedly bribed Gdlyan and his group to be excluded from punishment or have their sentences reduced. “This material testifies to,” it is noted “that

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sledovatelem po osobno vaznym delam pri general’nom prokurore SSSR Gdlyanom T.Kh.” To members and candidates of the Politburo TsK KPSS, Secretaries of the TsK KPSS, and comrades Kryuchkov and Pugo. May 19, 1989.

43 RGANI, f.89, op. 24, no. 24, “Pis’mo narodnykh deputatov…”, p. 1-2.
persons under investigation, to avoid extraordinary measures of punishment and a minimal sentence, confessed to the charges and then used connections ‘higher up’, namely to the leading officials of the republic and country”, to be cleared of accusations. Several others condemned in the course of the cotton affair had been indicted on thin or inexistent evidence, including but not limited to G. Mirzabaev, T.M. Umarov, R. Baltaev, T.N. Osetrov, G.M. Orlov, K. Kamalov and others. For these reasons, the evaluation called on the USSR Prosecutor to reassess the cotton affair, reopen the cases on corruption, crime and bribery in the republic, and conduct a “careful” investigation of the “criminal groups” working under Gdlyan in central, party, and state organs. Beyond this, it ordered the falsely accused Uzbeks Kakhmatov, the former Interior Minister Yakhyayev, and an Estonian scientist, Khinta, to be promptly rehabilitated. The systematic abuse of official position, toadyism, amoral way of living, among other violations, that Izvestija and Usmankhodzhaev had charged Yakhyayev with, were all of a sudden said to be fabricated.

44 RGANI, f.89, op. 24, no. 24, “Pis’mo narodnykh deputatov…”, p. 3-7.
45 RGANI, f.89, op. 24, no. 24, “Pis’mo narodnykh deputatov…”, p. 8-10.
The attacks on Gdlyan and Ivanov may have bloodied their noses but they only reinforced their popularity with the Russian public. In May 1989 they were elected to the Supreme Soviet, using attacks on the top party leadership in part, it seems, as a strategy to gain votes. Remarkably, in April 1990, a parliamentary resolution adopted with 275 votes in favor and 84 against, effectively dropped the investigation of Gdlyan and Ivanov and their parliamentary immunity from prosecution was also retained. The resolution warned, however, that if “they continue activity leading to the destabilization of the situation in the country, the Supreme Soviet will move to lift parliamentary immunity from them”. Subsequently, Gdlyan and Ivanov were fired from the prosecutor’s office and reprimanded for having brought false accusations against Politburo member Yegor Ligachev. That Gorbachev had “turned a blind eye towards the mafia” was also by a legislative committee considered groundless.46

While acknowledging that transgressions had been made by Gdlyan and Ivanov in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, the contents of these classified documents were not publicized. Uzbekistan and the large number of innocent Uzbeks were never rehabilitated in Soviet and Western media. A general silence on the matter prevailed, no thorough

independent investigation on what was true and not true in Uzbekistan was made, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 rendered any such investigation impossible. The sentencing of Rashidov’s head of government, N. Khudaiberdyev, to nine years in labor camp in September 1989 only added fuel to the general sentiment that whatever the flaws of Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigation the “Uzbeks were still guilty”.  

Media attention in the West and the USSR for the remainder of 1989 and 1990 focused almost uniformly on the Churbanov and Ligachev cases, the Estonian scientist, and the internal power struggles in the Kremlin, which Gdlyan and Ivanov had become a part of. Indicatively, at the Central Committee Plenum of September 1989, Prosecutor General Alexander Sukharev provided a long official report with several substantive examples and facts about Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s abuses, including those against Ligachev and Smirnov (the head of the CC party organization department). But except for Usmankhodzhaev’s false testimony against Ligachev not a single word uttered in this two-page rant of 6500 words from the plenum concerned the rehabilitation of the Uzbeks who were the primary targets of this campaign, and on whom also internal Politburo

discussions focused overwhelmingly. Indeed, the misdeeds in Uzbekistan were at the center of Politburo and Supreme Soviet concerns, if only because these cases were of excellent help when discrediting the allegations levied at Politburo members in the center.

Even Ligachev noted this paradox: “The matter concerned only me,” he altruistically remarked, “[and] meanwhile the smear campaign against honest people -- was going on throughout the city and countryside.”50 “The creation of the “myth of [the heroic investigators] drowned out the reports and complaints about the investigators’ unlawful methods, which only a few newspapers picked up,“ Ligachev continued, “Cheers drowned out the moans of the tortured in the investigators’ offices of Uzbekistan. The press even attacked the special commission created by the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to investigate complaints from Uzbekistan”.51 No attempt was made in central media to enlighten the public on the mistreatment of Uzbeks, which in Ligachev’s words impeded an objective “calm” evaluation.52 That society as a whole had become completely subservient and dependent upon the state over seven centuries of Soviet rule did not help. Whatever populistic ideas that were propounded in state media

51 Ibid., p. 223.
52 Ibid., p. 223.
after the new freedoms of *glasnost* were, some have argued, uncritically believed.  

Once these errors were detected it was difficult to reverse public opinion and Uzbekistan, in many ways, thus became the first major casualty of this liberalism.

Although the center shirked on publicizing alternative findings of the cotton scandal, then-First Secretary Islam Karimov sought restitution. “Having ensured the country’s cotton independence,” Karimov stated at the 28th CPSU Congress in 1990, “the republic became a laboratory of ‘cotton scandals’, repression, and mass lawlessness degrading to people’s national dignity.” In February 1991, Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court examined 241 cases related to the “cotton affair” and acquitted all of them; 1600 of the 2600 implicated in the scandal were subsequently rehabilitated and cleared of all accusations while 1.5 million rubles were dispensed in compensations.

After independence the Uzbek leadership assigned the blame for the “cotton scandal” not on

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54 The hostile context at the time certainly did not help. Being among the USSR’s highest net recipients, Uzbeks and Central Asians were generally castigated as “freeloaders”. The growing number of Central Asians migrants to Russia in the 1980s to some degree also inflamed the situation as the Central Asian and Russian populations came in unprecedented contact with each other. The racial stereotype of Soviet “blacks” (*chernye*) arriving from Central Asia and the Caucasus was widespread in Moscow and Leningrad, even though numerous migrants, of course, also had positive experiences of moving to these metropoles. See Jeff Sahadeo, “Soviet ‘Blacks’ and Place Making in Leningrad and Moscow,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Summer, 2012), pp. 331-358.

55 *Pravda*, July 6 1990, p.3.

Rashidov but the communist party which had given incentives for massive corruption.\textsuperscript{57} Aside from this redress, Rashidov was portrayed as a hero who had outsmarted the Russians, defended the interests of Uzbekistan, and stood up to the welter of pressures emanating from the center. His rehabilitation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan should be seen in light of this. The restoration of Rashidov’s name was cautiously expressed already at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Uzbek Communist Party Congress in 1990 which discussed Rashidov’s accomplishments and urged that his legacy should be judged from “from the period in which he lived and worked”.\textsuperscript{58} After independence, President Karimov took this rehabilitation a step further, calling Rashidov in one of his works from 1993 “a true son of the land and people (\textit{rodiny i naroda})”.\textsuperscript{59}

Karimov’s rehabilitation of Rashidov and the victims of the cotton scandal has been widely portrayed as merely an instrument to consolidate his own rule. That Karimov employed this segment of history for his own purposes is probable, which is why he labelled the transgressions of the cotton affair as degrading to people’s \textit{national dignity} (see citation above). It was a means to generate a degree of centripetal force and nationalism at the time of independence and a response to the denunciations of the entire Uzbek people as “parasites”. Even so, the rehabilitations themselves were practically

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\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Islam Karimov, \textit{Izvestija}, January 29, 1991, p. 3.
ignored by scholars and journalists. Karimov’s intentions were the sole focus, not whether the rehabilitations were warranted as a readjustment of past errors. With the exception of an obscure book published in Tashkent, few probed the substance behind the accusations that had been hurled at Uzbekistan.60

“Clans” and Mythmaking

The mythmaking of “clans” that ensued was a function of this neglect. In early 1988, Pravda’s Uzbekistan correspondent, G. Ovcharenko wrote a damning article on “bandits”, “mafia”, “criminals”, “organized crime”, and “modern day Emirs” in Uzbekistan.61 Later the same year such denunciations took on a new dimension when a series of articles appeared in Soviet and Western media on the theme of “clans” in Uzbekistan. Prior to this the “clan” concept had rarely, if ever, been employed for Uzbekistan’s elite politics. Thus, Ovcharenko did not mention anything of the sort in the article cited above even if most other conceivable negative epithets were used. That this concept emerged in 1988 is evident when doing a simultaneous search in the FBIS, Pravda, EastView, and Proquest databases. In each of these, which contains practically all major Soviet and U.S. newspapers and issues in the 20th century and are independent

60 V. Iliuskhin, Oborotni: Kak Bylo Nadumano “Uzbekskoe” Delo (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1993).
from each other, the same search of “Clan” and “Uzbekistan” returns results only from 1988 and on. From March to August articles on this topic appeared in Trud, Literaturnaya Gazeta, and Komsomolskaya Pravda. Later, within the scope of a few months in the fall of 1988, this concept was introduced in a New York Times article describing the existence of “criminal clans” in Uzbekistan. On August 30, Pravda’s G. Ovcharenko, the author of the “Cobra” article, portrayed Yuri Churbanov and Sharaf Rashidov as heading a “crime clan” (prestupleniya klan). Likewise, Steve Goldstein wrote in the Philadelphia Inquirer three months thereafter how: “Clans…relatives and friends all help one another to succeed”. These reports precipitated a flood of news articles thereafter describing the same phenomena in Uzbekistan.

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64 Untitled article by G. Ovcharenko and A. Chernenko in Pravda, August 30 1988, p. 6. See under “Retrospektiva”.
Demian Vaisman was correct in his observation in 1995 that publications on “clans have only recently become more frequent”. It was not until 1989 that Western scholars began referring to “clans”. Thus, Boris Rumer wrote in a book published in May 1989 that the Soviet Union had reinforced the “clan” and made it stronger. Likewise it was argued in 1991 that “clan and tribal allegiances” were still strong in Uzbekistan. In 1994, Olivier Roy introduced a related term, describing Uzbek political factions as *groupe de solidarité* (solidarity groups) which functioned as a “new ‘clan’”. The concept gained increasing currency thereafter, in media as well as scholarship. While some were cautious, others took the claims contained in *Pravda’s* reports at face value. In other words, it was scholars who responded to this public/journalistic engagement about “clans” with the liveliest enthusiasm and not *vice versa*.

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71 For example, Gregory Gleason, citing Ovcharenko’s “Cobra” article, writes that: “With public revelations during the past four years regarding the 'Cotton Affair' in Soviet Central Asia, a great deal of new information has become available about the extent of political corruption and organised crime in the USSR”. See Gregory Gleason, “Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia,” *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1991), p. 627.
Critics will almost certainly object that I could impossibly safeguard against the use of these concepts in the thousands of local newspapers and obscure journals across the world. Such a reasoning would reveal more about the fears of the critic in question than the validity of this hypothesis. If earlier scholarship that pre-dates the articles of Soviet journalists hypothetically exists it would, presumably, have been cited in the literature. Yet the literature does not contain any references to works observing “regionalism” in Uzbekistan prior to Carlisle’s 1986 article and “clans” before Rumer’s 1989 book.

Some of these early analysts, including Critchlow, readily acknowledged that the data on “clans” and sub-national networks derived from Soviet central media and often added caveats on the use of this material. Thus, in an early influential article on Uzbek “clans” and subnational networks, James Critchlow noted: “Soviet media tend to be reticent about the specifics of vestigial and tribal or clan consciousness.”72 This was understandable since the clans pioneered by journalists were often not “real” clans but metaphors. For example, one Uzbek “clan member” identified by Pravda, Yuri Churbanov, was born and raised in Russia, i.e., half a continent away from the kinship network of which he ostensibly was a part. Another odd klan constellation consisted of

Brezhnev, Medunov, Rashidov, and Kunaev – the first two born in Russia and the two latter in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  

In the same vein, Chernenko’s biographer in 1989 noted that Brezhnev’s Moldavian and Dnepropetovsk “mafias” were animated by “principles of mafia psychology and tribal solidarity.” In many ways, klan functioned as a negative word for all sorts of phenomena Moscow did not like and was used as propaganda against its perceived enemies. The notion of klan was a synonym to the Soviet concept of “family group” only expressed in stronger terms. Perhaps sensing this connection, many scholars used the concept of “clans” in inverted commas at first but during the 1990s these gradually disappeared and what was once fictive groups, turned into real political factions.

When following the labyrinthine citations of “secondary” sources in this field one almost inevitably hits a dead end, when no source is quoted, and where the original

73 “Vozvrashchenie k ‘Vozvrashcheniyu,’” Pravda, June 24, 1989, p. 3.
claim often has been distorted along the way. For example, the source cited for Luong’s contention of overt regional favoritism occurring under Rashidov’s auspices is an early article by James Critchlow from 1991.\textsuperscript{76} Yet Critchlow made no such specific claim about Rashidov in the article and pages referred to (p. 137, 140) but he did suggest that “localism” and “subnational networks” were present in Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{77} Critchlow, in turn, did not provide any source for his claim but referred to “denunciations by Moscow spokesmen”.\textsuperscript{78} In other words, Luong’s proposition about Rashidov traces to Soviet central media even if she, presumably, was unaware of this connection.

Misinterpretations of the already biased claims of Usmankhodzhaev and the post-Rashidov leadership can also be detected. One example is an oft-quoted Uzbek Communist Party Plenum report in \textit{Pravda Vostoka} from June 26, 1984. The report accuses the First Secretary of Bukhara obkom A. Karimov for having “promoted cadres…on the grounds of friendship or local favoritism”.\textsuperscript{79} When the same source is quoted in the scholarly literature, it is reported that Karimov was criticized for “deciding

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\textbf{\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid.}} \\
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personnel questions on the principle of common place of origin, kinship, and personal
loyalty”. Mark well the difference since it strikes at the core of the distinction between
“normal” Soviet patronage policy, in which friendship and local favoritism were
common, and “clan” politics in which common place of origin and kinship are the
defining factors.

With time the regionalism hypothesis also came to encompass the citizenry at
large and not only the elite. The argument was that a national identity had not yet
consolidated in Uzbekistan and that region of origin was the primary identity among the
populace. One may question whether this was more an assumption than a finding.
Michael Kennedy’s extensive survey research on the strength of regional versus national
identities in Ukraine, Estonia, and Uzbekistan conducted in 1997 produced the direct
opposite result. He found that regional identities were critical variables in Ukraine and
Estonia but less so in Uzbekistan. With the partial exception of the Karakalpaks, who are
distinct since they have formed a nominally autonomous oblast since the early Soviet
period, “Uzbeks and Tajiks…were quite unlikely to highlight regional issues”. Whereas
citizens of Ukraine’s Lviv, Donetsk, and Kiev held grievances against other regions and

each other, Kennedy’s research team was “frankly surprised…that regional identity was not particularly important” among the citizenry of Uzbekistan. This survey suggests that direct contact with the Uzbek people may generate alternative findings.

That the clan/region hypothesis emerged in conjunction with the cotton scandal and Moscow’s drive to portray Uzbekistan as ruled by “mafias” and “clans” is evident though rarely, if ever, acknowledged by advocates of this hypothesis. There has been little, if any, reflection on the circumstances under which this theory arose, nor has there been much problematization of the absence of primary sources in existing scholarship. In the course of the post-independence period, the clan/region hypothesis was gradually amplified; each successive publication made more far-reaching claims about the relevance of this theory than the preceding one yet without basing them on new evidence. But if the initial premises are wrong, then the conclusions are bound to be wrong. And if the premises derive from Soviet propaganda, it is worthwhile to remain open to alternative hypotheses.

Gorbachev’s legacy defined Karimov’s challenges after independence. It is true that Karimov after 1991 was constrained by powerbrokers and that these in part had regional bases. Rising under Gorbachev’s patronage, Timur Alimov, Shukrullo Mirzaidov, and Ismail Jurabekov exerted considerable influence long after Gorbachev threw in the towel. While Mirzaidov was neutralized shortly after independence, Alimov and Jurabekov tied President Karimov’s hands in many areas up to the mid-2000s, not least in democratic and economic reform. The powers of these figures were not subtle: Alimov and Mirzaidov controlled vast networks of clients in the Tashkent region where they had served uninterrupted for 20 years, and governors from oblasts down to the village level in agricultural areas were firmly under Jurabekov’s thumb.  

For nearly 20 years Ismail Jurabekov presided over this sphere, serving as Chairman of Gosagroprom from 1985-1990, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers during the same period, first deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture 1994-1998, and then State Advisor to the President on Agriculture from 2000 to March 2004. That Uzbekistan’s state apparatus was dominated by figures from Tashkent and

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Samarkand up to the early 2000s traces to this perestroika era legacy. Not unlike the “compromise solution” in the Politburo that brought Brezhnev to power and then curtailed his room for maneuver, Karimov’s powers were circumscribed by those that had placed him in power.\textsuperscript{84}

These power-brokers and others looked with wariness toward reform and privatization because this would cut directly into their profits. Thus, ADB concludes: “As Uzbekistan has a centralized distribution system of resources, some government officials have their prestige and power base directly linked to their control of the resource distribution system. These officials and their corresponding institutions do not support reform because then there would be private suppliers and competition, while at present they enjoy a virtual monopoly.”\textsuperscript{85}

Karimov subtly hinted to the powers wielded by these individuals in his book \textit{On the Threshold of Independence}, in which he speaks about the power of “clans”. This book was influential since the “second wave” of scholarly writing on clans around the turn of the millennium emerged shortly after its publication in 1997. But if Karimov speaks about “clans” is not this evidence of “clans”? Clearly, few voices in this debate

\textsuperscript{84} On Brezhnev see: Fedor Razzakov, \textit{Korruptsiya v Politburo: Delo Krasnogo Uzbeka} (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), Chapter 16.

\textsuperscript{85} ADB, Uzbekistan: Implementation and Monitoring of Policy Reforms in the Agriculture Sector, December 2008, p. 121
should be regarded as more authoritative than Karimov’s -- he has been at the center of Uzbekistan’s politicking longer than Rashidov himself. At the same time, it is worth asking whether Karimov’s reference to “clans” was his own terminology or if he was trying to speak in terms intelligible to Westerners. Karimov’s point was conceivably to highlight the constraints he was facing, that authoritarian rule was a precondition for surmounting them, and that Western diplomats should recognize this.

If Karimov’s policies are a guide, his approach was to attack the region-based power-brokers and regionalism inherited from the Gorbachev era by striking the problem at its core. No longer a prisoner of Soviet politics, Karimov silently mounted a campaign to suffocate regionalism through a reversal of the Soviet era career pattern. Though no purely organizational measure could fragment the Soviet system alone, he nonetheless sought to demolish regionally defined patronage networks by barring former governors of provinces from the national stage. Among the hokimlar (governors) serving from 1991 down to today, only one has ever played a major role in national affairs after serving as hokim and that is the current Prime Minister, Shavkat Mirziyaev, hokim of Samarkand from 2001-2003 (see Table 9, Appendix C). The reverse direction is more frequent: a few hokimlar previously served as ministers prior to their appointments as heads of provinces. There is a degree of interaction between cabinet and provincial structures but this mostly takes place on deputy levels or in a flow “downstream” from the national to the regional
level. The national political structures are designed to prevent regionalism and the politicking associated with it from infiltrating national structures.

If indigenous “clans”, not the Soviet era vertical career pattern and its associated patronage, was the source of regionalism then why would Karimov attack the problem from this end? This disassociation between the republic- and the regional level would presumably be an ineffective measure against identity-bound clans since these “exist” regardless of paths to power and their associated patronage. And still one of the first measures Karimov took was to attack this source of Soviet regionalism, which existed in the entire Soviet Union.

A precondition for this policy was to rein in the powers of regional governors and assure that Tashkent had a hand in everything. Thus, in January 1992 a State Control Committee was established under the Presidential apparatus, placing the supervision over the implication of laws and decrees under central rather than regional control. Satellite offices were subsequently established in each viloyat, the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, and the capital city Tashkent to evaluate and assess the performance of regional administrations. Among other new means of control, the President and central

[86] E.g. the first deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in 2008, Gairat Kodyrov, was transferred to the equivalent position in Samarkand oblast, among many similar examples. See Presidential Decree 335, June 11, 2008.
authorities made it a matter of priority to build links with the local level and thereby circumvent the regional *hokimyats*. For example, a resolution adopted in 1997 urged the shifting of “industrial control” to the cities and rayons rather than the provinces.\(^7\) Likewise, in 1999 the Cabinet Resolution “On measures to strengthen control over budgetary discipline” curtailed spending in the regions and imposed a stricter control over regional and local budgets.\(^8\) The most important precondition, however, was to have regional governors appointed rather than elected and constantly keep them on their heels. This was a long step back from democratization of the political system but the policy was understandable. Karimov feared that the election of governors would not only empower them but stir up something approximating “states within a state”, analogous to what happened in Yeltsin’s Russia.\(^9\)

The risk of this happening in Uzbekistan was particularly pronounced due to the prevailing poverty. It is to governors and mayors that local businesses, families, and individual inhabitants turn for preferential treatment and support. Conversely, governors and mayors pressure local state-owned firms to partially finance the low salaries of their


civil servants. The result is a web of mutual dependence, patronage, and *de facto* control by governors over segments of the economy.\(^9^0\) Empowering the provincial governors would not only have revealed Karimov’s feebleness to this politicking but governors would have aspired for key national offices, including the presidency. Regionalism would have been reinforced and threatened not only Karimov’s powers but also state stability as happened in Kyrgyzstan. It should not come as a surprise that Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who deposed ruling President Askar Akayev in the 2005 Tulip Revolution, came from long service in the Jalalabad oblast since independence, as head of it from 1995 and on, and then filling the equivalent position in Chui oblast prior to becoming Prime Minister in 2000.

Though Karimov inherited a dominance of figures from Tashkent and Samarkand, owing to the sway of Alimov and Jurabekov, such “regionalism” withered with their demise in the early 2000s and final removal in 2004. Between 2002 and 2006, the predominance of these two regions in government became increasingly diluted.\(^9^1\)

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\(^9^1\) For example, the new Minister of Public Education, Turabzhon Dzhuraev, appointed in 2005 hails from Surkhandarya; Shavkat Mirziyayev, born in Jizak, replaced the Tashkent native Utkir Sultanov as Prime Minister in 2003; the new Minister of Emergency Situations, Bakhtier Subanov, appointed in 2003 came from Namangan and his predecessor Botir Parpiev, appointed in 2002, is a native of Termez in Surkhandarya; Vladimir Norov, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2006 was born in Bukhara and Fozilzhon Otakhonov, appointed Minister of Justice in 2006, hailed from Ferghana, to mention but a few.
Thus the cabinet of February 2005 was composed of ministers whose origins were all over the country: Syr Darya, Tashkent, Surkhandarya, Jizak, Namangan, Ferghana, Samarkand, and elsewhere. Only one, significantly, was born in Karimov’s native Samarkand. This was a vital first step in consolidating the Uzbek nation-state and preventing its capture by regional interests.

The removal of Alimov and Jurabekov had not only a salutary effect in placating regionalism but also, to a lesser extent, sped up reforms. For example, the Welfare Improvement Strategy Paper of the GOU adopted in 2005 acknowledges that reforms in the agricultural sector were slow prior to 2003.\textsuperscript{92} From that point on, however, reforms took off which is why the ADB concludes that: “there has been genuine, if uneven, progress in the past 3-4 years [up to 2008] in formulating and implementing agricultural policy reforms and institutional change”.\textsuperscript{93}

Though still utterly incomplete in the sphere of political and economic reform, Karimov’s pre-emptive action against regionalism has been successful. This policy prevented, though never insured, that new strong regionally rooted power brokers would

\textsuperscript{93} ADB, Uzbekistan: Implementation and Monitoring of Policy Reforms in the Agriculture Sector, December 2008.
emerge after Alimov and Jurabekov. It is true that Jurabekov was succeeded by a new
group of younger men, among the most prominent of whom were Gafur Rakhimov and
Abduarif Sodyq. But they differed from Jurabekov in one critical respect. “Neither is
perceived,” Frederick Starr states, “as having a strong regional base within the country
and both for the time being have been content to distance themselves from matters of
government.”94 Had Karimov preserved the Soviet tradition, a new set of regional power
brokers would merely have replaced Alimov and Jurabekov, exercising equal control
over territory as well as regional sectors of the economy.

The Soviet legacy Karimov inherited goes some way towards explaining his
gradualism, caution, and centralization of powers. But this is not the whole story since
Karimov looked to the past for working models of governance. Rashidov’s footprint in
post-independence Uzbekistan is larger than Karimov’s rehabilitation of the disgraced
First Secretary.

First, Karimov’s centralization of powers from the oblasts to Tashkent and the
routing of governors “downstream” from the capital to the oblasts have perhaps been
inspired by Rashidov’s center-region equation. Rashidov could never be as bold as to bar
obkom First Secretaries completely from national offices, but the end of Soviet rule
opened such opportunities for Karimov. No different from the Rashidov era, Karimov

reined in the powers of governors, curtailed most intermediary powers between the national and local levels, and centralized power to effect it.

Second, Karimov has worked to absorb all corners of the republic into government. The Prosecutor General is from Ferghana, the intelligence head is a native of Surkhandarya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs hails from Tashkent, and the Chairman of the Senate comes from Khorezm. This is a conscious effort of nation-building and exhibits a similar spirit as Rashidov’s policy in this realm.

Third, the two longest serving First Secretaries during the Soviet era, Rashidov and Yusupov, paired concentration of powers with the promotion of national symbols and Uzbek national identity. Amir Timur’s place in Uzbek society today owes to Yusupov’s and Rashidov’s advancement of the same. Karimov’s predecessors had to pursue this gradually within the parameters of the permissible but such constraints did not act upon Karimov. Absent democratic processes, Karimov reached out to the population directly and employed national symbols and nationalism for these purposes. If Rashidov and Yusupov were “worshipped by the entire people” as has been claimed, is it any wonder that Karimov after independence followed in their footsteps? Karimov turned to the model of government that had worked best historically and adapted it to the new circumstances after independence.

Fourth, the deft Soviet politician concentrated powers in his hands to the extent that he could and exercised them in the first instance since this was a sine qua non to preserve power and to govern effectively. Such autocratic tendencies enabled Rashidov
and Yusupov to stay in power and pursue Uzbek interests, whether Yusupov’s Great Ferghana canal or Rashidov’s push for investments into industry. Then as now, Karimov has viewed concentration of powers as a precondition for nation-building, even if his gradualism at times has appeared extremely unhurried.

**Conclusion**

The corruption that was unearthed in Uzbekistan in course of the cotton affair was in all likelihood, as portrayed by Moscow, the top of an iceberg of a much deeper problem encompassing the whole of Uzbek and Soviet society at large. Likewise, Davydov, Khadkimuradov, Khikmotov, Osetrov, Gaipov, Mirzaev, Kamalov, and all the others falsely accused in course of the investigation were presumably the top of the iceberg of the 2600 officials who were excluded from the party, removed, or arrested on fabricated evidence. Uzbekistan’s “cotton affair” and Moscow’s “cotton affair” were manifestations of two of the darker sides of the Soviet polity. Corruption was endemic throughout the Soviet Union, as detailed in each of the chapters of this dissertation, and the “food chain” of Soviet politics entailed that enemies or the friends of one’s enemies were ruthlessly destroyed. Frictions and contradictions of the Soviet system snowballed over a century were unleashed with the “cotton affair”. Had this brewing central-regional conflict erupted on someone else’s watch but Andropov’s, who together with the Armenian Gdlyan held a general antipathy against the Eastern Muslim republics, the
corruption allegations facing Uzbekistan might well have been hurled at some other non-Muslim republic.

It was in this soil that the theory of “clans” and “regionalism” emerged in the 1980s. The scholarly literature on “clans” and regionalism is so entangled with the turmoil of the 1980s and its mass of falsified information and propaganda that it is difficult to separate myths from reality in it. Perhaps the greatest paradox is that this theory of “clans” gained traction among Western analysts in the specific year of 1989. This was at the exact same moment that Gorbachev and parliamentary deputies began questioning much of the evidence that was the embryo of the hypothesis. It was also at a time when glasnost and the opening of the regime seemed to allow more rigorous research by outside scholars than ever before.

Gorbachev’s anti-corruption policy was in part a blind reaction to an intractable problem and it was to be expected that corruption and the selection of personnel on the basis of friendship persisted. The flaw was that it worked at cross purposes with Gorbachev’s democratization drive. While he may have crushed the power bases of several provincial secretaries by transferring them across the republic, he left a few *en poste*, enabling them to maintain their networks intact and thereby concentrating powers in the hands of these individuals. The Soviet Union was disintegrating, the Central Asian republics were nationalizing, but instead of acknowledging how Soviet policies inadvertently had produced this potentially explosive situation, Gorbachev blamed “clans” and the lax policies of the Brezhnev era. This misreading, in part, precipitated a
mythmaking. Soviet authorities were in part responsible for this but Soviet media, using the newfound freedoms of Perestroika, did more than any other in spreading the myth that the Central Asian republics were ruled by “clans” and “mafias”. Moscow’s misreading and mythmaking were eventually adopted uncritically by Western scholars who, while addressing Moscow’s misreading of nationality conflicts, further sustained the myth that indigenous “clans” defined politics in Central Asia. Inadvertently, these analysts have to varying degrees become spokesmen of the political agenda propounded by the anti-corruption investigation and its falsified evidence.

Karimov’s policies in the post-Soviet period, however, have been guided less by myths than finding solutions to practical problems. Among these were how to defeat the powerbrokers rooted in Tashkent and Samarkand whose interests lay with preserving the essentials of the Soviet system. Only by 2003-2004 had the most influential of these been defeated. Their demise precipitated a new government of much more mixed origins than Alimov’s and Jurabekov’s protégés from Tashkent and Samarkand. This only proved what Karimov silently had been engaged in since the early 1990s, which was to prevent officials rooted in the provinces (especially governors) from entering the national stage since this would generate regional factions which, potentially, could rip Uzbekistan apart.
8. Myth and Reality: A Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from this survey of politics and patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan. To start with, it is clear that contemporary scholarly assessments and archival evidence are discordant. This suggests either that scholars are wrong or that Soviet perceptions of localism and “clans” in Uzbekistan were erroneous and that the former have uncovered a reality that eluded Soviet control organs. On the basis of available evidence, the conclusion points to the first. There are good reasons to believe that the notion of regional elite “clans” and particularly strong regional elite identities is a myth. Like most myths, this finding is not based on primary sources but the accumulation and gradual amplification of initially unsupported claims. Most roads in this literature lead back to Carlisle’s pioneering article or the early writings on “clans” around 1991-1992 through a maze of citations of other secondary sources. A research field in which primary sources remain unexplored could progress in few other ways.

The arguments of Carlisle, Critchlow, and other path-breaking authors were to be expected. They wrote at a time when the Soviet archives had not yet opened and when scholars were confined to the sources of Soviet central media, other publicly available publications, testimony of émigrés, and limited field research in the era of glasnost. That the theses of scholars were drawn from the trends reported was not surprising.
“Regionalism” and subsequently “clans” flew from the Soviet portrayal of events in Soviet Uzbekistan. That is why earlier scholars of Soviet Uzbekistan did not recognize this *ex post facto* assessment, but it struck a responsive chord among post-Soviet scholars. When archives opened after the collapse of the USSR, scholars on “clans” or regionalism in Soviet Uzbekistan did not take advantage of them but instead tended to rely on the earlier post-1985/pre-1992 writings. Along the way, the initial claims of the pioneering writers have been distorted and their caveats have vanished.

That few, if any, of the major works on clans and regions have related regionalism in Uzbekistan to the trend of regionalism and territorialized factions elsewhere in the Soviet Union is noteworthy. If the thesis of indigenous “clans” and strong regional identities rooted in Central Asia’s past hypothetically is correct, then this must somehow be separated from the regional factions elsewhere in the USSR. A link must be established between region and individuals and that several identifiable characteristics were unique to Central Asia, e.g., the existence of a core “kin group” in clans, marriage as a method of strengthening clan power, and that region of origin was an important criterion in appointments. Such data cannot be obtained from circumstantial evidence of “rooted” First Secretaries or biographical source material but need written correspondence, assessments of party violations, or testimony of participants. This problem has not been attacked because there are few ways of resolving it absent the documentation of the USSR’s party control organs. Shielded off from the rest of Soviet
scholars, Central Asia analysts have instead claimed a unique Central Asian “regionalism” derived from its culture.

The ultimate source of this myth of strong regionalism and clans traces to the “cotton affair”. A retrospective reading of the literature confirms that it evolved with it. The concept of regionalism was adopted shortly after the Uzbek Party Congress in 1984 and the notion of “clans” was incorporated from 1989 and on after similar observations had been made among Soviet journalists starting in mid-1988. That the stimulus of this field was Soviet propaganda would have been a problem in any event. Yet that it traces to the “cotton affair” further compounds it since many of the claims were fabricated as the Politburo’s self-introspection revealed in 1989. Usmankhodzhaev had implicated “honest people”, engaged in defamation of the Rashidov leadership on the orders of the anti-corruption investigators, and exploited media for these purposes. True to form, much of what surfaced in the media during these years came from these false accusations. “Moscow’s denunciations” cited by scholars as evidence of “clans” around 1991 came straight from this campaign. Eventually, this blossomed into the field of Uzbek “clans” and regionalism.

If there is a silver thread that runs through the archival material, media, and party plenum reports down to the “cotton affair” it is the near absence of *zemlyachestvo* or *mestnichestvo* as sources of concern in Uzbekistan. The Bolsheviks did not formulate a “tribal policy” or anything similar based on region for early Soviet Uzbekistan and factionalism among the elite in the post-purge Stalin period related primarily to conflicts
between Uzbeks and Russians. In the Khrushchev period the Party Control Commission identified a number of other problems but neither in Soviet central media nor in confidential correspondence were the Uzbek elite exposed to similar criticism of *zemlyachestvo* as their Tajik counterparts.

A rare exception to this rule is the campaign mounted against Rashidov at the 1964 Tashkent obkom Party Congress when he stood accused of favoritism. However, none of the figures involved were “relatives” of Rashidov as has been claimed in the literature. Rashidov was only superficially acquainted with Azimov and Khudaiberdyev and his brother Sahib had been chosen deputy Prosecutor General before Rashidov had been nominated to the Central Committee empowered, formally at least, to shape this process. The 1982 “scoresheet” of the Party Control Commission did not pinpoint localism as a problem in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan even if it was observed elsewhere in the USSR. Nor did the Party Control Commission’s specific file on *mestnichestvo* in the Soviet Union mention Uzbekistan even if such practices were exposed in Chelyabinsk, Moscow, Krasnodarsk, Azerbaijan and other places.

Another method to reach this conclusion is simply to read the literature on “clans” and regions. If “localism” was a constant concern in Uzbekistan throughout the Soviet period and was “regularly condemned” as has been argued by Luong and
Critchlow among others,\(^1\) then why are they not citing any media or plenum reports that would vindicate these claims? Or have scholars making this observation refrained from citing such material even if it would strengthen their hypotheses? The reality is that it was not a major concern, neither publicly nor confidentially.

If the thesis of “clans” and strong regionalism in Uzbekistan is a myth what, then, was the reality in summarized form? Taken as a whole, the forms of party violations canvassed by the Party Control Commission in Uzbekistan over this long stretch of time were scarcely unique: Foot-dragging on policy implementation, nepotism at lower levels, embezzlement, theft, concentration of powers, misuse of state funds, low number of figures with worker backgrounds in governing positions, failure of plan fulfilment, wrecking and sabotage under Stalin, a permissive approach to national/religious sentiment, failure to include local nationalities, “groupism”, corruption, violation of plan discipline, speculation, flamboyant lifestyles, and embezzlement. All of these were to varying extents observable in the Western parts of the empire as well, as Fainsod’s study of the Smolensk archive elaborates in greater detail. Tendencies of “groupism” in the Khrushchev era also entered at a point in time when “interest groups” were pinpointed

throughout the USSR. The only “special concerns” in Central Asia appear to have been a “feudal attitude towards women” and perhaps the “high turnover of cadres”. Stated succinctly, party violations and patronage did not deviate much from that observed in the other corners of the empire.

Moscow imposed a common mold across the USSR, but what made Uzbekistan distinct was the high elite mobility laterally and vertically which eroded the terrorialization of patronage networks seen elsewhere. Though my data were limited to the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, obkom First Secretaries had generally served in three or more oblasts during their careers, only a small minority were natives of the oblasts in question, the vast majority came from another oblast immediately prior to appointment, and only a few percent remained in the oblast after their stint. That a majority served across Uzbekistan’s “historical divide” of Samarkand/Bukhara and Tashkent/Ferghana Valley cemented relations between these two territories which, perhaps, was a conscious policy. Noteworthy is that this was particularly pronounced under Rashidov who also was empowered to shape this policy. A similarly high elite mobility was seen among those inhabiting leading republic-level offices. This is intuitive since practically all but Rashidov had previously served as obkom First Secretaries. With the exception of Nurutdinov whose career was confined to Tashkent, practically all other prominent officials had served in several oblasts and often outside of their home provinces. This high elite mobility, laterally and vertically, partly explains why
zemlyachestvo was a lesser concern in Uzbekistan than in many other Soviet republics, at least on higher levels in the state and party hierarchy.

Inevitably, this mobile elite formed new loyalties in diverse places. That “protection pacts” tended to be composed of individuals of diverse origins suggest the relevance of career-based ties. Ranging from the pacts of the 1930s, the Yusupov-Mavlyanov-Mirza Akhmedov pact in the 1940s, to the Rashidov pact in the 1970s, the common denominator among them was the disparate origins of their members. Baltabaev and Tyuerabekov, hailing from Ferghana Valley and Khodjent (Tajikistan), were figures that Ikramov had encountered in Tashkent. Yusupov’s main allies were natives of southern Kazakhstan but they had all served together in the Tashkent obkom or gorkom. Likewise, because Rashidov was not “rooted” in a particular oblast and had not served as obkom First Secretary, his closest allies came from all over the republic. That the Ferghana Party Control Commission in early Soviet Uzbekistan identified a mutual protection pact composed of three individuals from Tashkent, Ferghana, and Samarkand further attests to the marginal relevance of place of origin.

What could have bound all these officials to one another but loyalties and common perspectives and interests formed in the course of their careers? The individuals that came to Rashidov’s defense in 1964 came from Namangan, Kashkadarya, and several from Tashkent and all referred to career-based encounters with the First Secretary. Similar reflections among the Bureau members who elected Rashidov in 1959 suggest that the 1964 conference was not an isolated case.
Other factors beyond high elite mobility accounted for the heterogenous protection pacts. First, the size of the republic and the comparatively large number of oblasts entailed that officials seldom served only in one region, in contrast to Tajikistan. This is conceivably why regionalism tended to be most visible in the smaller republics e.g. Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The principle behind loyalties may not necessarily have been different than in Uzbekistan only that the concentration of power to a single region generated hegemonies which were more palpable. That Karimov moved quickly upon independence to close the lid between oblasts and the republican-level attests to a felt need that regionalism was a function of the Soviet career pattern rather than indigenous “clans”.

Second, the settled lifestyle of Uzbekistan’s territories favored elite ties which were not place-based. Catapulted into leadership positions after the delimitation, the new national elite had vested interests in the preservation of the new republic and were not bound by similar tribal solidarities as defined their Turkmen counterparts. Their loyalties were not primarily in their home regions but with the Communist Party and Stalin’s national idea, if not for any other reason than for the privileges bestowed upon them. On repeated occasions Stalin sided with the indigenes, empowered them at the expense of the Second Secretaries, and shrewdly exploited the tactic of de-Russification. Roger Kangas thorough-going account on this formative period shows that the Uzbek elite rallied around the new concept of the Uzbek nation. The centrifugal forces of particularistic solidarities were less visible in Uzbekistan. A “tribal policy” was not implemented in
Uzbekistan because the social structures of the settled and nomadic areas were very
different and because the Bolsheviks’ shared preconceptions about this important
distinction. Evidence that *zemlyachestvo* was a “dominant principle in recruitment”, as
has been argued, is equally sparse.

Third, national solidarities among Uzbekistan’s elite were triggered by the
center’s omnipresence. Uzbeks in the Central Committee Bureau cooperated and
colluded against their Russian/Ukrainian counterparts with Stalin’s tacit approval; the
center’s tightening of cadre policy and control over Uzbekistan’s *nomenklatura* was
sometimes subverted, as evident in the Gorbachev era; and Rashidov deftly killed
Khrushchev’s proposal to eliminate the Tashkent gorkom. What defined Rashidov’s rule
was a national orientation and an attempt to break Soviet regionalism to the extent that
circumstances allowed: he assured an interchange of personnel between the republic-level
and the oblasts, uprooted obkom First Secretaries, concentrated power to the capital from
the oblasts to achieve this, incorporated the marginalized areas of Uzbekistan into
government, and promoted Uzbek national culture. It should not come as a surprise that
contemporaneous scholars in the late 1970s considered Uzbekistan the most consolidated
and nationalistic of the Central Asian republics. Importantly, however, this rarely
aroused hatred towards Russians as in the Baltics. In spite of the degrading treatment
during the cotton scandal, 95% of Uzbeks in March 1991 still voted in favor of
preserving the Soviet Union.
Luong’s “regionalism” hypothesis is correct in that Soviet rule empowered certain oblasts. This fettered Uzbekistan’s politics and confined it to two or three predominant regions. This held particularly true in the Stalin period when regions were judged according to their perceived loyalties. The Kokand elite was destroyed early on and the Bukharans were bought off, which initially ensured the latter a prominent role in the new republic next to Tashkent. The domination of Tashkent and Ferghana in the post-purge period owed in part to that the Bukharans were undermined, the status of Ferghana was raised with the expanding cotton production centered on Ferghana Valley, and Yusupov enjoyed Stalin’s trust. The robustness of this cadre hierarchy was clearly evident when Stalin executed the first generation of leaders from Tashkent and Ferghana and a new set of leaders from the same origins were installed in their place. This Tashkent-Ferghana linkup lasted until the late 1950s when Samarkand was upgraded to “second in importance” among Uzbekistan’s eight oblasts. True to form, Samarkand crept back with Rashidov’s rise to power. Noteworthy is that when cadre policy was most decentralized under Brezhnev, the hegemony of figures from Tashkent and Ferghana in Uzbekistan’s Central Committee Bureau fragmented. Members and candidates admitted to Rashidov’s Bureau at the zenith of his powers in 1976 had the most disparate origins in Soviet Uzbekistan’s history. The “regionalism” that did exist in Uzbekistan had external origins, was not indigenous to Uzbek society, and this was most persuasively demonstrated at times of such intermittent liberties.
On the other hand, this imposed regionalism never translated into “strong regional elite identities” for the sole reason that this, as Luong correctly argues, necessitates “rooted” Uzbek officials. Yet the Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were rarely rooted. Luong’s use of the category “previous position in the same oblast” obscures this fact since Uzbek obkom First Secretaries were transferred back to oblasts in which they had previously served. It was the “unrootedness” of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries which led many to have held a “previous position in the same oblast”. That this misleading category has been used and not the one ordinarily used by scholars of Soviet regionalism, i.e., “position in oblast immediately prior to appointment”, is perhaps an indicator to the troubles scholars have had in pinning down evidence for Uzbek “regionalism”.

Olivier Roy’s thesis of “solidarity networks” may be relevant if conceived on a non-regional basis but this is not what he argued. He argued that these “always were regional”, a function not of Soviet policy but Central Asian culture and that this gave solidarity groups a “territorial basis” that their Russian counterparts were lacking. Like other analysts he appears to have neglected the development towards regionalism elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Territorial factions bound by bonds of solidarity defined the entire Soviet polity from the Politburo and down under Khrushchev and Brezhnev and to a lesser extent before and after. What Roy and others derived from Central Asian culture had Soviet origins. If they had recognized the identical phenomenon of regionalism elsewhere they would presumably have explained how the Central Asian regionalism differed from it.
In the final analysis, evidence is thin that Uzbekistan’s factionalism added up to “clans” or strong regionalism. The limited evidence that can be mustered in favor of the “clan” hypothesis is the bombast and bluster of Usmankhodzhaev and central media. Yet such data should be approached with skepticism for the same reasons that the alleged presence of “harems” among the Tajik elite should be. The discrediting of predecessors often involved a battery of accusations and it is the task of the analyst to single out which ones that have a basis in reality. Yet analysts took most, if not all, of the Soviet denunciations of Rashidov at face value. With the passage of time, the original Soviet sources of such information were “cleansed” in the scholarly literature and myths became reality.

Having said that, the conclusions reached in this dissertation must still be treated as provisional. If or when the still classified archives of the Brezhnev era are made available, evidence may surface that challenges the hypotheses advanced herein just as those about the other Soviet republics may need to be revised. It cannot be ruled out completely that kinship was of particular importance in the politics of Soviet Uzbekistan, even if most indicators and existing evidence do not point in this direction. To confirm this hypothesis analysts must find clear-cut evidence that kinship-related bonds were a particular concern in Soviet Uzbekistan. The Party Control Commission’s records among other resources were examined by this author but other agencies may have documented it.

This dissertation has established that the reigning theory is questionable and that evidence supports the alternative theory of politics in Uzbekistan as “normal” Soviet
patronage. Archival evidence, journalistic material, and plenum reports attest to that patronage in Soviet Uzbekistan approximated that conducted in the non-Muslim areas of the USSR, deviated only in marginal respects from it, and that existing assumptions are based more on myths than reality. I see few reasons why the heterogenous groups that formed among the Uzbek elite at the obkom- and republic-level in Soviet Uzbekistan should be considered distinct from the Soviet “family groups” elsewhere. The “cotton affair” was a product of the Soviet system and the “family groups” and conflicting interests which composed it. Determined to assert Central Asia’s uniqueness, many post-Soviet Central Asia analysts instead took Moscow’s claims at face value, ignored the contradictory evidence that Moscow itself provided later on, and built a theory that with few exceptions are based on citations of each other.

The Implications

Extant scholarship in political science has treated the Soviet legacy of regionalism as essentially similar across the Central Asian republics. Several hypotheses have been derived from this observation: Kathleen Collins, for instance, argues that the absence or presence of pacts between regional “clans” determined the different trajectories of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan after independence. In this interpretation, the absence of a pact in Tajikistan accounted for the civil war which ripped it apart in the 1990s and the presence of pacts in the other two republics ensured
stability.² Luong, in turn, makes a similar argument about the similarities of regionalism in Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and how different perceptions of the shifting relative power between “the center” and “regional leaders” after independence accounted for the absence or presence of pluralism.³ Key to both of these accounts is that a Soviet legacy of strong regionalism and regional identities defined the republics in question.

The findings of this dissertation challenge this core assumption, at least as regards Uzbekistan. The differences in the extent of localism and regionalism between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were profound. Whether speaking of the extent of elite mobility, *zemlyachestvo*, and cohesiveness of regional elite groups, which all are related, they differ widely on each of these parameters. In Uzbekistan lateral and vertical elite mobility was very high, *zemlyachestvo* was of marginal concern, and mutual protection pacts tended to be composed of figures from diverse origins. In Tajikistan, in contrast, the Leninabad elite rarely went beyond their home province, *zemlyachestvo* was a concern throughout the Soviet period, and the clique that formed in this province was hegemonic for 50 years up until 1991.

While several factors and circumstances inevitably were at work in causing Tajikistan’s civil war, this concentration of power to one region certainly did not help as the subdued non-Leninabad elite reasserted themselves with a vengeance after independence. While the Leninabad and Kulyab elite groups initially stood on the same side in fighting the opposition, they splintered from 1993 and on as the subdued Kulyab elite outmaneuvered the Leninabadis. That a similar region-based conflict did not evolve in Uzbekistan was to some degree to be expected since the elite had intermingled for almost 70 years and often traversed half of the republic’s oblasts in the course of their careers. The factions in Uzbekistan were not territorialized and the individuals comprising them were tied to each other in webs of relationships.

A civil war erupting on that basis is less likely since the factors of identity or territory were not in play. The primary interest of the power brokers Uzbekistan inherited from the Soviet era was to retain the privileges of the Soviet period. President Karimov heeded these concerns. There existed no omnipotent regional elite defined by identity and territory that had completely sidelined other regional elites as in Tajikistan. Karimov also proved himself adept in suppressing dissent, which was not all surprising since the heterogenous opposition in Tajikistan was a trigger of the civil war as they sought to


4 For a brief account of the Tajik civil war and its multiple causes, see Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan’s Civil War,” Current History (October, 1997).
displace the old Soviet elite. What was at stake for the non-Leninabadi elite in Tajikistan was whether they were to continue to be excluded from the privileges of office and power as the Soviet empire crumbled. The ruling Uzbek elite were content with the status quo as long as Karimov did not embark on economic or political reform.

In other words, the degree of territorialization of elite factions explains, in part, the different trajectories of these republics. It helped maintain stability in Uzbekistan and a bloodless transition but at the cost of a perpetuation of the Soviet system. In Tajikistan it sustained and partially caused the civil war and, later, would lead to a preservation of some of the essentials of the Soviet system here as well as the neo-Soviet Kulyab elite retain power down to today.
9. Bibliography

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Other archival sources used:

Alexander Yakovlev Archives;

Library of Congress Archival Section;

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10. Appendix

A) Obkom First Secretaries

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Years Served</th>
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<td>Andijan</td>
<td>M.Z. Mirza-Akhmedov</td>
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<td>1st Dep. Chm Pres. CM</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
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<td>A.R. Khodzhaev (Ind.)</td>
<td>1963-1964</td>
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<td>Ashur Khaidarov (Agr.)</td>
<td>1963-1964</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
<td>No (Andijan, Tashkent)</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>I.B. Usmankhodzhaev</td>
<td>1974-78</td>
<td>Chm. Namangan oblispolkom</td>
<td>Chm. Pres. SS</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>Yes (Ferghana, Syr Darya, Namangan, Andijan, Tashkent)</td>
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<td>S.M. Mamarasulov</td>
<td>1978-</td>
<td>Dep. Chm. CM Uz</td>
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<td>Akhmadali Rizaev</td>
<td>1956-62</td>
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<td>1st Secr. Kokand gorkom</td>
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<td>N.M. Matchanov</td>
<td>1962-65</td>
<td>Dep. Min. of Agriculture</td>
<td>Sec CC CPUz (Agr)</td>
<td>Khiva</td>
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<td>Kaim Murtazaev</td>
<td>1965-77</td>
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<td>Jizak</td>
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<td>T.B. Baimirov</td>
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<td>S.R. Rasulov</td>
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<td>Kashkadarya</td>
<td>R.K. Kurbanov</td>
<td>1952-55</td>
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<td>S.N. Nurutdinov</td>
<td>1954-55</td>
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<td>Asadilla Khodzhaev</td>
<td>1968-73</td>
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<td>M.I. Ibragimov</td>
<td>1973-76</td>
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<td>M.K. Kamalov</td>
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**Khorezm**

- M. Rakhmanov 1951-1960 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

**Namangan**

- S.N. Nurutdinov 1954-55 Head of Dept. CC Uz 1st Secr. Tashkent gorkom Tashkent No (Tashkent, Namangan)
- Asadilla Khodzhaev 1968-73 1st Secr. Samarkand oblast gorkom Tashkent Yes (Tashkent, Samarkand, Namangan)
- M.K. Kamalov 1973-76 Minister of Cotton Ginning Fergana Yes (Fergana, Namangan, Tashkent)
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<td>Nor Yakubov</td>
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<td>Arif Alimov</td>
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<td>Arzi Makhmudov</td>
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<td>N.D. Khudaiberdyev</td>
<td>1961-63</td>
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<td>E.T. Tasanbaev</td>
<td>1969-71</td>
<td>Chm. Syr Darya oblispolkom</td>
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<td>N.D. Khudaiberdyev</td>
<td>1971 (one month)</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td>Jizak</td>
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<td>V.A. Khaidurov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arif Alimov</td>
<td>1952-56</td>
<td>1st Secr. Bukhara obkom</td>
<td>Sec CC CPUz (Agr)</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

329
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.N. Nurutdinov</td>
<td>1956-59</td>
<td>1st Secr. Tashkent gorkom</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>No (Tashkent, Namangan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Gulamov</td>
<td>1959-61</td>
<td>Member of Bureau, CC Uz</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>No (Tashkent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Abdurazakov</td>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>Secr. CC Uz</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Yes (Namangan, Tashkent, Kashkadarya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in 1963-64 Agr.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.V. Kaimakov</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.M. Musakhanov</td>
<td>1970-</td>
<td>1st Dep. Chm CM Uz</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>No (Tashkent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Abdurazakov</td>
<td>1952-55</td>
<td>1st Secr. Komsomol</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Yes (Namangan, Tashkent, Kashkadarya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N. Nurutdinov</td>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>1st Secr. Namangan obkom</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>No (Tashkent, Namangan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Gulamov</td>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>Chm. Tashkent ispolkom</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Kh. Khodzhaev</td>
<td>1957-60</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Minister of Cotton Ginning</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaium Murtazaev</td>
<td>1960-65</td>
<td>Secr. Komsomol</td>
<td>Kashkadarya</td>
<td>Yes (Ferghana, Bukhara, Tashkent)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.R. Rasulov</td>
<td>1965-73</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A. Khodzhaev</td>
<td>1973-78</td>
<td>1st Secr. Namangan oblast</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Yes (Tashkent, Samarkand, Namangan)</td>
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</table>
### B) Central Committee (b) Members and Candidates, 1937-1976

#### Table 2: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), June 1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yu. Akhunbabaev</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Baltabaev</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. S. Zagvozdin</td>
<td>Non-native (Tobol guberniya, Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ikramov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Iskhakov</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Karimov</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. I. Manzhara</td>
<td>Non-native (Kherson oblast, Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Tyuryabekov</td>
<td>Khodjent (Tajikistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A. Tsekher</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Sharipov</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Shirmukhamedov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
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#### Table 3: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), March 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. Yusupov</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. V. Kudriavtch</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. P. Mun’ko</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ya. Artykbaev</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Azimov</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Abdurakhmanov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu. Akhunbabaev</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh. Turdyev</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. N. Sadzhaya</td>
<td>Non-native (Georgia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. R. Apanasenko</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. A. Kabanov</td>
<td>Non-native (St. Petersburg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. T. Aleksandrovskii (c)</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. P. Fedotov (c)</td>
<td>332</td>
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Table 4: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Abdurakhmanov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.A. Bylbas</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. G. Vakhabov</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. A. Kabanov</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. A. Lomakin</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.I. Niyazov</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Nurudinov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.E. Petrov</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
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<tr>
<td>U. Yusupov</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu. Babadzhanov (c)</td>
<td>Khorezm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.I. Baskakov (c)</td>
<td>Non-native (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. R. Rakhimov (c)</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
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Table 5: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V.A. Bylbas</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.K. Kamalov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A. Luchinskii</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. E. Melnikov</td>
<td>Non-native (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Mukhitdinov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh. Mukhitdinova</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Rashidov</td>
<td>Samarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Yusupov</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Alimov (c)</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.P. Byzov (c)</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Murtazaev (c)</td>
<td>Kashkadarya</td>
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</table>
Table 6: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Abdurazakov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Alimov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.P. Byzov</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.K. Kamalov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A. Luchinskii</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E. Melnikov</td>
<td>Non-native (Moscow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Mirza-Akhmedov</td>
<td>Kazakhstan (Turkistan Sh.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Murtazaev</td>
<td>Kashkadarya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Mukhitdinov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z. Rakhimbabaeva</td>
<td>Andijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. Rashidov</td>
<td>Samarkand/Jizak</td>
</tr>
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Table 7: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sh. R. Rashidov</td>
<td>Samarkand/Jizak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. E. Titov</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. A. Abdurazakov</td>
<td>Namangan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. A. Gabril’yants</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z.R. Rakhimbabayeva</td>
<td>Andijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ya.S. Nasriddinova</td>
<td>Ferghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A. Alimov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. G. Gulamov</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. F. Naimushin</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.I. Fedyuninskii</td>
<td>Non-native (Sverdlovsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. N. Rudin</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.M. Murtazaev (c)</td>
<td>Kashkadarya</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. P. Burmistrov (c)</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
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Table 8: Composition of Uzbekistan’s Central Committee (b), 1976

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.G. Anisimkin</td>
<td>Non-native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E. Belonozhko</td>
<td>Non-native (Chernigod oblast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.G. Lomonosov</td>
<td>Non-native (Khabarovsk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.N. Osetrov</td>
<td>Non-native (Belgorod oblast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.B. Nordman</td>
<td>Non-native (Tomel oblast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.M. Orlov</td>
<td>Osh, Ferghana (Kyrgyz Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.M. Matchanov</td>
<td>Khorezm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.M. Musakhanov</td>
<td>Fergana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Rashidov</td>
<td>Samarkand/Jizak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.U. Salimov</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A. Khodzhaev</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D. Khudaiberdiev</td>
<td>Samarkand/Jizak</td>
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<tr>
<td>K. Kamalov</td>
<td>Karakalpakstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.U. Sultanova</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. Makhmudov</td>
<td>Fergana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu. Kurbanov</td>
<td>Karakalpakstan</td>
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Source on Composition


Sources on Birth Place


Table 9: Governors in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan, 1991-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years served</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andijan</td>
<td>Kayum K. Khalmirzaev</td>
<td>1993-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kobildzhon Obidov</td>
<td>1993-96, 2000-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saidullo Begaliev</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Akhmadzhon Usmanov</td>
<td>2006-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukhara</td>
<td>Damir S. Yadgarov</td>
<td>1993-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samoiddin Khusenov</td>
<td>1996-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mukhiddin Esanov</td>
<td>2011-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzhizzak</td>
<td>Erkin Tursunov</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alisher Tashkenbaev</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shavkat Mirziyaev</td>
<td>1996-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ubaydullo Yamonkulov</td>
<td>2001-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musa Anarbaev</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makhmudzhon Khalbutaev</td>
<td>2009 (6mths)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saifitdin Ismailov</td>
<td>2009-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferghana</td>
<td>Mirzadzhon Y Islamov</td>
<td>1993-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numonzhon Muminov</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alisher Otabaev</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shermat Nurmatov</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abdukhashim Abdullaev</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mamatisak Gafurov</td>
<td>2008-2010?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Khamid Nematov</td>
<td>2010-2011?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shukhrat Ganiev</td>
<td>2011-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashkadaria</td>
<td>Temir P. Khidirov</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azat Fermanov</td>
<td>1995-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bakhtiyar Khamidov</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nuriddin Zainiev</td>
<td>2002-2011</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Turabzhon Dzhuraev</td>
<td>2011-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>Time Periods</td>
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<tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tashkent (City)</td>
<td>Rustam Shaabdurakhmanov</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syr Darya</td>
<td>Batyr M. Makhmudov</td>
<td>1993-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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11. Curriculum Vitae

Nicklas Norling is Research Fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Prior to enrolling in the doctor of philosophy program at Johns Hopkins University, Mr. Norling served as Project Director at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm, Sweden. He holds MA and BA degrees in Political Science from Stockholm University and has published approximately 40 articles in journals such as Asian Survey and Central Asian Survey. In addition to these, Mr. Norling authored the official report from the First Kabul Conference on Trade and Development in Greater Central Asia in 2006, and co-authored the first evaluation of Finland’s development assistance to Central Asia and the South Caucasus in 2009. A former Managing Editor of the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, his research interests include domestic politics in the Central Asian states, the regional politics of energy and trade, the international relations of Central Asia, Soviet history, and politics in South Asia and the Middle East. Mr. Norling is fluent in English and Swedish, has an advanced command of Russian, and a basic comprehension of Uzbek and Persian.