PLATO’S BORROWING AND EXTENSION OF HOMERIC JUSTICE

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Abstract

One of the topics of the Republic is to determine the role of the poet within the ideal city. While the poets, including Homer, are categorically expelled from the ideal city in Book X, numerous Homeric and poetic influences, references, and illusions can be seen throughout the Republic. Starting with the first word κατέβην and ending with the Myth of Er. I determine the nature of justice in the Homeric worldview to be ‘doing that to which you are allotted’, which is the same as justice is initially presented in Book IV of the Republic. I argue further, that there is not a shift in the moral tone of the Odyssey from the Iliad, and that by investigating the actions of the two protagonists of these epics a unity between them may be drawn. Due to the numerous other poetic influences on the Republic, and that the Homeric epics can be read as containing the same notion of justice, I conclude that Plato’s presentation of justice initially in Book IV is essentially a borrowed concept from Homer. In the successive books of V-IX, Plato builds a philosophical foundation on which to show the superiority of justice to injustice. In the course of these arguments, justice itself is deepened and made into a more robust notion that was initially presented in Book IV. I argue, at the end of the Republic, the nature of justice appears to be different, while actually being a deepened, clarified, and more robust concept than its initial presentation.

Advisors: Dr. Dimitrios Yatromanolakis and Dr. Richard Bett
Preface

I came to this topic through a general curiosity regarding the ancient Greek concepts of justice. Initially, I wanted to produce a broadly schematic layout of the major theories of justice from the Archaic to the Hellenistic age. This monumental undertaking had to be reined in by my advisors over and over again as I attempted to investigate topics that would have been more appropriate for a PhD dissertation or a lifetime of work, rather than a Master’s thesis. I have to thank my advisors, Dimitrios Yatromanolakis and Richard Bett, for what seems like constantly curbing the manic impulses of my mind for this project.

In large part, I began studying philosophy in order to understand Plato, the first philosopher that I was introduced to in the 5th grade by my grandfather. From then on, I was hooked. I was forced to bide my time, however, until I could take philosophy courses in college, which I jumped into with relish. This thesis, in some ways, reflects the culmination of my initial fascination with Plato all those years ago.

This work is dedicated to my parents, Craig and Sue, without whom I would not be where I am today. I am eternally grateful for their guidance and wisdom throughout the years, and look forward to hearing it for many more years to come.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.  Note to the Reader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Doing what is appropriate: <em>dike</em> in Homeric Epic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Potential Hermeneutic Barriers to the Interpretation of the Problem</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A Unity between the <em>Iliad</em> and the <em>Odyssey</em></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Homeric <em>dike</em> as doing that which is Appropriate</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Justice in the <em>Republic</em>: The Borrowing and Extension of Homer</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Gauntlet</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The City-Soul analogy’s Initial Presentation</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. First Critique of Poetry</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Justice in Book IV: Homeric in Nature</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Books VIII and IX: The Psychological Books</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Book X</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Extending Homer</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.  Conclusion</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Works Cited</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CV</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Note to the Reader:**

All translations of the *Iliad* will be from the 1924 Murray edition unless otherwise noted.

All translations of the *Odyssey* will be from the 1919 Murray edition unless otherwise noted.

All translations of the *Republic* will be from the 1969 Shorey edition unless otherwise noted.
Introduction: Avoiding the Modern Semantic Baggage of ‘Justice’

The first century BCE historian Diodorus wrote: “Who could speak highly enough of training in the art of writing? By this means alone the dead speak to the living, and through the written word those who are widely separated in space communicate with those remote from them as if they were neighbors” (Bibliotheca Historica 12.13.2).1 This quote coyly leaps over any and all of the many obvious obstacles and potentially bewildering barriers that block the path toward understanding an author’s intentions with its copious potholes. The spirit of the quote, however, is to say that the author’s intentions may in fact be gleaned from a text regardless of the wide separation in space and time, is a sentiment that has inspired this current undertaking. It is this ability of the written word, to place the reader in the presence of the author and to attempt to commune with him or her, which has made this hermeneutic undertaking possible.

The rediscovery of writing after its loss following the collapse of the Mycenaean culture2 and its development into an influential medium of communication from the end of the 8th century to the 5th century3 BCE is centrally important to a foundational understanding of this work. This quarter-millennium period of rapid change from the rediscovery of the written word to the Classical Age of Athens parallels the philosophical development of the ancient Greek world. The focus of this work will be the reception of the extant Archaic epic poet Homer by Plato in the fourth century. More specifically, I will consider how Plato understood the vital role of the poet in society and how his exclusion of the poets from his ideal city is not total, since Plato extends the Homeric

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1 Translated by Barron in Easterling and Knox (1985; 90).
2 Sometime between c. 1200-1100 BCE.
3 See Easterling and Knox (1985) for a thorough history of Classical literature.
notion of justice as a mechanism by means of which every class within the ideal city may utilize this virtue effectively in their daily lives. The delicate interplay between the Archaic and Classical ages as it appears in the context of this thesis is not only fascinating but also vitally important to a proper understanding of the development of ancient Greek thought.

Since *dike* in Greek is typically translated into English as ‘justice’, the word immediately provokes images from modern English-speaking cultures in the mind’s eye of the reader. The word justice in English, consequently, has many connotations, which must be shed off before approaching this Greek concept. Just as one would change one’s attire to suit the environment, so one must change one’s mental costume in order to suit a change in cultural environment. It is imperative that these immediate, subtle, and typically sub-conscious associations of justice are brought to the forefront of the reader’s mind so that they may be deliberately laid aside. The temporal barrier alone, with all of its obfuscating qualities, separating the ancient Greeks from us would warrant such a cautious approach to the topic. This is not the only difference, though, that must be addressed so that the reader may be aware of the topic outlined above.

As regards nearly every aspect of culture there are significant and divisive disparities between the ancient Greeks’ and our own. One must struggle constantly to

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4 This Homeric notion of justice is presented in the first half of Book IV. I argue, ultimately, that by Book X Plato extends his initial notion of justice into something more robust than it was by Book IV. Even with this redefinition, Justice as it is presented in Book IV is vitally important to the project of the *Republic*.

5 As an influential scholar aptly puts it in a discussion of early Greek poetry: “Such writer as Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euripides… were not for the most past introducing radically new techniques or attitudes, but rather exploiting, systematizing, and exaggerating possibilities that they found already well developed by their predecessors” (Griffith 1990; 187).

6 This hermeneutic problem applies to all readers of the text regardless of language as it is very difficult to access Plato in the way an ancient audience would have, and furthermore to glean from the text the exact intention of Homer and Plato’s use of *dike*. 
keep these disparities in the forefront of one’s thought in order to properly begin addressing and understanding the complexities that existed within this culture that has drawn so much attention from both the popular and scholarly communities.

Homer was not a philosopher; this statement may seem obvious but is the root of various issues within some scholarship. As such, there will be inconsistencies within the texts if rigorous philosophical methods are used. Nevertheless, these inconsistencies do not damage the worth of the text because Homer was not attempting to create valid philosophical arguments. He presented a worldview that was not philosophical. Instead of pressing Homer on the inconsistencies within the text and being confused by them, the scholar would do better to seek out general patterns that are woven throughout the Homeric worldview. These general patterns then lead the scholar to a better understanding of Homer and the world he lived in.
Doing what is appropriate: dike in Homeric Epic

The ability of dike to permeate every aspect of life in the classical Greek tradition is apparent through the breadth of works in which it appears and plays a vital function. Such areas as: epic, lyric poetry, philosophy, politics, history, tragedy, and comedy, all touch on this concept in their own unique and meaningful way. Because of the significance of dike, several influential modern works have been written on the concept, its historical development, and a wide-ranging interpretation of it (Lloyd-Jones 1971 and Havelock 1978 to name a couple). The scope of my thesis is smaller than those large-scale discussions of dike. As such, I will primarily investigate the concept as it appears in Homer and Plato. More specifically, the present thesis will be a discussion of how Plato’s use of dike in the Republic can be interpreted simultaneously as a reaction against and a borrowing of the dike displayed in the extant epics of Homer. Further, the scope of this thesis includes the extent to which Plato’s famous condemnation of poetry is significant regarding his understanding and utilization of dike in the Republic. This work will demonstrate that Plato simultaneously borrows the Homeric notion of justice as Socrates defines it in the first half of Book IV of the Republic and extends this notion of justice to its most robust formulation at the end of Book IX. This leads to a kind of ‘paradigm shift’ in the centuries after Plato. Further, it is this presentation of dike in the later books of the Republic that presents dike in a more robust philosophical light with

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7 My discussion of Plato’s work will be limited to the Republic. The Republic, though, is not the only text with which justice may be approached as it appears in Plato; in fact there are 6 other dialogues that discuss the topic. The primary reason for the focused scope of this M.A. thesis is due to both time and length constraints applied to this research project.

8 In Book IV Plato defines justice as “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (Republic 434a), and in relation to the different classes: “the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing what is appropriate, each minding its own business in a city” (Republic 434c).

9 I borrow this term from Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 work The Structure of Scientific Revolution in order to illustrate the magnitude of the change in the philosophic discourse that Plato introduces.
substantial arguments made on its behalf, being built up from the foundations of a philosophical system, for the first time in the European philosophical tradition and fundamentally altered the way that justice was characterized and conceptualized for millennia. This will give some context and justification to the influential assertion that “the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1979; 39).

While this M.A. thesis only discusses Homer and Plato in depth, this does not mean that these two authors are the only influential thinkers in the Greek tradition that discuss *dike*. Other authors from the Greek world have been excluded from the scope of this text because Plato has a special, if highly complicated, approach to Homer that appears again and again throughout the *Republic*. I have decided to investigate this special treatment of Homer by Plato in the *Republic* and determine if Plato’s love of Homer manifests itself through some special treatment, or by finding a way to include some aspects of Homeric thought into his ideal city. This is not to say that the material from other authors or their influence should be doubted or disregarded; on the contrary, there are many fascinating and deeply sophisticated uses of *dike* other than in the works that will be discussed here which the reader would be well advised to delve into due to their influence in the Greek tradition (e.g. Hesiod\(^\text{10}\), Solon\(^\text{11}\), Aeschylus\(^\text{12}\), and Sophocles\(^\text{13}\)). However, their work will be excluded from this thesis primarily as it is beyond the scope of the research question at hand.

\(^{10}\) See Beall (2006).
\(^{11}\) See Henderson (2006).
\(^{12}\) See Dolgert (2012).
\(^{13}\) See Ahrensdorf (2011).
Potential Hermeneutic Barriers to the Interpretation of the Problem

Before the text of Homer may be discussed, there is one important issue that needs to be addressed so that its full force may be recognized in the discussion of Homer. That issue is the role that the early Greek epics would have played within archaic Greek society. As regards the wider literary tradition, Homer seems to fit very well into the broadly understood category of “national epics” in preliterate societies—to use terminology applied to literate societies (Havelock 1978; 25). To this extent they functioned as a cultural history, that is, a storage-container for many aspects of the society’s secular knowledge, in addition to theology. This means that these epics were used to keep a record of those societies’ historical achievements: cultural, militaristic, artistic, etc.—almost all aspects of the culture were embedded in these epics. This cultural record is authenticated by the gods of the society through the role that they play within the epics (Havelock 1978; 25). Since the gods of this society both were the progenitors of the Homeric heroes and stand in as the creators of history, they are understood as a unifier of culture. In other words, the gods in question act as the justification for both the authenticity and truth of the epics. These oral histories are the culmination of a group’s achievement as symbolized “in the form of victories over other groups, feats of prowess or daring and the like” (Havelock 1978; 25), which connect the society with their gods and their ancestors. In addition to the Epic’s role in society, the manner of the presentation and memorization of the epics—if we understand them as

14 For this question I found the Cambridge Companion to Homer (2004) to be very helpful, especially the chapters by: Scodel “The story-teller and his audience”, Foley “Epic as genre”, Dowden “The epic tradition in Greece”, Osborne “Homer’s Society”, and Hunter “The Homeric Question”.
oral—is a point of especial interest. The use of meter in Homeric epic creates a sort of music in the ear of the listener and the head of the speaker such that

[It] makes some demand on the memory, but the act of recall is relatively easy because rhythms are repetitive; that is their essence; they can provide a spell, a standardized incantation to which the words of a required statement can be fitted so that as pronounced they reproduce that rhythm. Once so placed, they remain relatively immune to the arbitrary change or imperfect recollection, for their order cannot be shifted. (Havelock 1978; 26)

In this way, meter is a tool that allows for a greater sum of information to be stored and accessed in a ritualized manner than is possible without it. This frames the presentation and reception of the information in a way which provides some noteworthy insight into how people would have interacted with these narratives.

Yet, what does it mean for the epics to be oral? An important anthropological distinction needs to be drawn between oral composition, oral transmission, and oral presentation (Yatromanolakis 2007). It seems reasonable to suppose that the epics were presented to audiences orally. The evidence for this is apparent and there are several defensible reasons for the claim that the Homeric epics were performed orally. Most of the arguments revolve around the grammar of Homeric Greek, the word choices, the use of formulaic language, and the reiteration of the exact text by messengers throughout the epic, which would make a ritualized memorization of the text easier for the bard (Lord Bates 1960). These appear to be the best available explanations to the question regarding the oral performance of early Greek epic. Furthermore, the possibility of oral transmission seems plausible, if not always provable. Modern Middle Eastern countries give us some excellent examples of how massive amounts of a text can be memorized. In more conservative parts of the Islamic world, children are taught to memorize the entirety
of the Qur’an—a work of no small size\textsuperscript{15} (Boyle 2004). The reason for this modern example in the present work is that there might be fundamentally different ways in which oral cultures interacted with their narratives\textsuperscript{16} than literate societies do with their literature. As such, if we attempt to understand how Homer was transmitted in early Greek society, it is of outstanding importance for modern scholars to be familiarized with the manner in which oral societies functioned through either the active participation in fieldwork of traditional societies or through a deep and wide ranging investigation into the fieldwork of anthropologists (Yatromanolakis 2003). This will give us a better understanding of the plausibility of the oral transmission of Homeric epics. Oral composition of the Homeric epics is the last of the possible meanings of ‘oral’ and it is the least provable and plausible of the different types.\textsuperscript{17} This is a complex issue and will not be addressed at much length here because, at present, there is no way of definitively defending the assertion that the epics were composed orally. Yet, it is at least important to note the possibility of oral composition.\textsuperscript{18} One aim, here, is to understand dike as Homer and his initial audiences would have understood it. For this reason, it is vital that we understand the intention as well as the intellectual arguments, whether stated explicitly or not, which can be pieced together from the epics. Only after this may one put Plato’s reception of them into a proper context.

\textsuperscript{15} The Qur’an is divided into 114 chapters and is roughly equivalent to the New Testament in size. For reference to the Qur’an, I suggest M.A.S. Abdel Haleem’s translation (2004).

\textsuperscript{16} Since literature, strictly defined as such, cannot be attributed to an oral society.

\textsuperscript{17} For the concept of orality I find Lord Bates’ work The Singer of Tales (1960), Ruth Finnegan’s works Oral Poetry (1977), and Literacy and Orality (1988), and Walter Ong’s work Orality and Literacy (1982) to be the most helpful.

\textsuperscript{18} Even if oral composition is not very plausible, it cannot be ruled out, and any serious consideration of the epics must keep this possibility in mind during its argumentation so as to not diminish the possibility space of the issue being addressed.
Two of the more hotly debated topics in Homeric scholarship, as to whether Homer is one person or more and when precisely the Homeric epics were first composed, have little relevance for the current work. Any comparisons between the texts of the Iliad and the Odyssey will not be tied up intimately in Homer necessarily being one person. For example, my assertion that the moral climates of the Odyssey and the Iliad are essentially the same is founded and dependent on an analysis between the two texts themselves. This claim in no way requires them to have been composed by the same author. Further, because Plato understood the author(s) of the Iliad and the Odyssey to be one person it will be helpful, for the present work, to understand Homer through the same lens as Plato. One major goal of this M.A. thesis is to properly understand the reception of Homer by Plato. For this reason it will be useful to refer to Homer as a single individual; nevertheless, this does not require that the assumed identity of Homer, as one person, is inseparably tied up in the arguments that will be made. In addition, regarding the debate surrounding the dating of the Homeric epics, it bears little on the discussion here because they were written well before Plato, and this clear temporal distinction between the Archaic and the Classical period is all that is needed for the validity of the arguments made in the present thesis.

Where to begin then, if not at the beginning of the Greek tradition; as is often the case with all things Greek, the beginning is Homer. It is with him that we catch our first glimpse of dike. In Homer, dike is not an abstract principle, such as a modern audience would understand justice. Rather it acts as a principle that regulates actions between

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19 For the issue of the Homeric Question, both West (1999) and West (2011) are extremely insightful.
20 For a historical introduction to the Homeric Epics I find Clarke (1981) and Graziosi (2002) for the early reception of Homer to be helpful.
21 This clear temporal distinction spans nearly a quarter-millennium from possibly the end of the 8th century to the early 4th century.
people—and only actions. It can, therefore, be described as an act-centered conception. The extent to which the gods are concerned with mortals is concentrated on their actions; they punish and reward actions based on how that particular action aides or hinders the societal fabric of the divine and mortal communities.

In this chapter, I suggest that *dike* as it is presented in the Homeric epics closely resembles the virtue of justice as Plato presents it in book IV of the *Republic*: “having and doing one’s own and what belongs to one’s self would be agreed to be justice” and “the moneymaking classes, auxiliary, and guardian classes doing what’s appropriate, each of them minding its own business would be justice” (*Republic* 434a and 434c, respectively). This will suggest a borrowing of Homeric justice for use in Plato’s ideal city. This point of view will be argued for in opposition to a recent assertion by William Allan that *dike* in the Homeric epics is best understood as an ordering of the *cosmos* (Allan 2006). I argue that if a reader understands *dike* as a divine ordering of the *cosmos*, this would only provide the reader with a limited understanding of *dike* and its function in the epics. There is a richer reading of the text than is possible if *dike* is Zeus’ ability to prevent the activation of tensions amongst the divine community. Homeric *dike* may be understood as an ordering of the *cosmos* because it is irrevocably bound to Zeus and his ability to generally appease the other gods. I do not mean that *dike* is the happiness of all the gods, because such a statement would be unreasonable. In Allan’s understanding of *dike*, rather, it is Zeus’ ability to prevent the activation of tensions and quarrels amongst the gods. I argue that Allan’s cosmic order, while potentially being just, is not ‘justice’ itself. Rather, ‘justice’ itself in the Homeric epics is each person doing what is

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22 By this, I claim that Homeric *dike* does not include intention in its ethical arithmetic.
appropriate and has been allotted for them to do. Allan, then, describes things within the Homeric epics that are just but fails to see ‘justice’ itself in the Homeric epics in his attempt to draw a unity between the extant early Greek epics. I will, therefore, proceed by arguing the merits of my conception of *dike* and then turn back and address the perceived flaws in Allan’s conception.

**A Unity between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey***

Divine conflict is a constant theme in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. In the *Iliad* this can be seen in several different scenes. The first of these scenes which I will discuss is in book four (*Iliad* 4.29) as Zeus incites Hera to a fight about the duel between Menelaus and Paris. The second instance is in book sixteen (*Iliad* 16.443) as Hera scolds Zeus for considering saving Sarpedon. The third instance is in book twenty-two (*Iliad* 22.181) as Athena warns Zeus not to let Hector escape the wrath of Achilles. In all of these three instances the same phrase is used: ἕρδ᾽ ἀτὰρ οὗ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι “do it but be sure that the other gods will not approve.” In all of these instances Zeus is contemplating changing something that has long been fated to occur, and in each of these cases the response is exactly the same. Even though it is possible to change the fate of a mortal, the cost of such an action far outweighs the benefit it may bring. Zeus is not bound to different rules than the other gods, and the fates of mortals are simply untouchable—even if every god wishes to intervene for their favorite hero. From a philosophical perspective, this is extremely confusing since there are contradictory views on how fate functions and what the gods may or may not do in relation to it. In one view, Zeus has the raw physical power necessary to enact the change

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23 It would cause all the other Olympians to disapprove and potentially begin a revolt.
he wishes; the other view states that a mortal’s fate is unchangeable. These views are in opposition and cannot both be correct. It appears, however, that the issue is within the text itself and if examined leads to a confused understanding of the relationship between the gods and fate.

Strangely enough in the epics, it does not appear that Zeus lacks the ability, or more precisely the raw power, to change the fate of a mortal\textsuperscript{24}. Instead, it appears that Zeus understands and respects the role of the Fates and the necessity not to tamper with the lot of any mortal as this would trigger tensions amongst the divine community. This may seem bizarre at first coming from Zeus, the same god who constantly brags about how much greater his power is than all the other gods (Iliad 8.18-8.27). Zeus is ultimately unwilling to save Sarpedon and Hector because both have been πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴση (Iliad 16.441, 22.179) “long doomed by fate”. These heroes being long doomed by fate demonstrate a power that is higher than the will of Zeus or the other gods. While Zeus may possess the raw power to change the fate of a mortal, fate, is deemed higher than the will of the gods.

Further, in the Odyssey, Zeus’ ability to prevent tensions amongst the divine community from growing and potentially threatening the divine order of the cosmos is shown by Zeus giving his approval to Athena so that she might help Odysseus on his homeward voyage. Odysseus is fated to return to Ithaca and preventing this homeward voyage eternally would be a disruption of the cosmic order. Athena tells Odysseus that she was unwilling to openly disregard the will of her uncle but once Poseidon was absent

\textsuperscript{24} It would seem quite the contrary. Zeus is in fact capable of changing the fate of a mortal; his contemplation of this action implicitly shows the reader that this action is within the realm of possibility for Zeus, even if it is forbidden.
from Olympus she could go to Zeus, lobby her complaint, and receive his support (Odyssey 13.341-342). After Zeus’ support is given to Athena, there is nothing in Poseidon’s power to do. Essentially, Poseidon cannot win a contest of power against his elder brother. In this scene from the Odyssey, Zeus acts as the divine arbiter of the dispute between Athena and Poseidon, allowing the cosmic order to be maintained. Further, his arbitration avoids a potential conflict between the two deities that might polarize the community which would threaten the divine order of the cosmos. In this way, there is a link between the justice of the Iliad and the Odyssey; it is the constant maintenance of the cosmic order by heroes doing that to which they are allotted with the help of the gods.

This statement itself, drawing a unity in the conception of justice as it is portrayed in the Iliad and the Odyssey is seen by some scholars as an unpersuasive move (Kullman 1985). The central thesis of such a counter argument is that there is an “incompatibility of the religious conceptions of the two epics” (Kullman 1985; 14). This position is even held by such noted scholars as Hugh Lloyd-Jones; even after he undermined the developmental model of moral justice in early Greek epic, Jones believed that there was a difference in the moral climate of the two epics (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 28, 30). As I will demonstrate, though, Lloyd-Jones and other prominent scholars were incorrect in asserting that the moral climate of the Odyssey is different from that of the Iliad.

After investigating two primary examples, one from the Iliad and one from the Odyssey, a clearer unity between the two epics may be seen. The two examples are the actions of Achilles and the actions of Odysseus throughout their respective epics.
The case of Achilles here is not only an extraordinarily interesting one, but an illuminating one because it helps explain how Homeric *dike* not only affects but is also contingent on certain actions taking place in the mortal realm. The *Iliad*, famously, begins by telling the muse to sing the μῆνιν or ‘rage’ of Achilles. Nevertheless, this rage is not uselessly destructive or horribly negative on the grand scale, for Achilles’ μῆνις is furthering the will of Zeus (*Iliad* 1.5). As a result, his wrath has a purpose; which is to speed up the fated fall of Troy, and consequently, maintaining the cosmic order by doing that which is allotted to him. There are some scholars who propose that Achilles’ actions are just, regardless of any “indiscriminate destruction because that sanction preserves an order which is far preferable to chaos” (Muellner 1996; 7-8). In this way, order, however harsh, is far preferable to chaos which is deemed to be unlivable. Even if one is to accept this argument, though, there must be a lingering shadow of a doubt about why so many innocent people, who have no direct stake in the feud between Agamemnon and Achilles, must not only suffer from the feud but also be killed on account of it. This construction of the argument, that the order is preferable to chaos due to the unlivability of chaos seems to oversimplify the text. This description of justice appears to ‘write a blank check’ to whatever action that needs to be described as just. With such a definition every action in the *Iliad* may be seen as just because it plays a role in the preservation of the divine cosmic order, however terrible the consequences. If every action may be seen to be just, then there is no useful way of distinguishing the value of any given action. Without the ability to evaluate actions, justice loses much of its traction. I would not contend that Homer espouses the notion that all actions are just. Furthermore, justice in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is not a static concept; by this I mean that Homer does not create a world in
which the characters may not take action and have the walls of Troy fall or Odysseus return home. Action must be taken by the agents within the system so that the fated outcomes may occur. Chaos ought to be seen as the most extreme consequence of divine or human will not doing the task to which they are allotted by fate. Not every action has the potential to create chaos, though. Chaos is an extreme; the imposition of Zeus’ will to prevent this chaos from damaging the cosmic order is a mollification, an easing, a moderation of that potential chaos. Zeus, in his role as arbiter, is constantly reining in the excesses of the other gods and mortals, whether it is Poseidon’s rage with Odysseus or Achilles’ rage with Agamemnon.

As the *Iliad* progresses, Achilles develops morally as a hero (Lutz 2005-2006). The final development is his understanding and acceptance of the injustices that he has caused throughout the epic. Yet, the picture of Achilles that is painted in the first book is very different from that in the last book. In the first book, Achilles appears to understand justice, not as doing that, to which he is allotted, but rather a societal recognition of excellence and the doling out of goods based primarily on successes in war. If Achilles can be said to understand justice in this way in the beginning of the *Iliad*, then naturally it follows that Achilles’ choice to leave the war in Book I is due to the breaking of what is a just principle in his mind. Even if Achilles is not aware of justice as doing that which is allotted to him, but rather as a societal or political recognition of excellence in war, this does not exclude justice functioning this way. Achilles’ attitude betokens only his ignorance, at least in book one, of the true nature of justice in the *Iliad*. There is evidence

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25 This is primarily a social or political understanding of justice as it relates to the regulation of interpersonal relationships. A man may only be just in so far as his actions are just, and those actions require the presence of a social fabric. Without some sort of social fabric, in Homer, it would be impossible to comprehend what a just man would be like.
to support the claim that Achilles clashes in many ways with societal norms in the *Iliad*. At the outset of the *Iliad*, Homer acknowledges that Achilles’ wrath plays a significant role in the progression of the epic on a grander scale than the simple dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon (*Iliad* 1.5). In other words, there is more at stake for the Achaeans than whether Achilles receives proper compensation or not; the fate of Troy, whether it will fall or stand, is fundamentally attached to Achilles’ choice to fight or not.

During the course of the *Iliad* Achilles goes through a period of rejecting the heroic code, at first, based on the injustices that he has endured, and the unresponsiveness of the rest of the Argives to let “the best of the Achaeans” suffer this injustice (*Iliad* 9.323-344). This phase of Achilles’ development has been seen by some scholars as being itself an injustice (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 26). In Lloyd-Jones’ conception, Achilles is committing an injustice by withdrawing and allowing his fellow countrymen to die. This injustice committed by Achilles is only heightened by Achilles’ abject refusal, as told to Odysseus, to accept Agamemnon’s seemingly spectacular offerings of compensation (*Iliad* 9.312). Achilles choice in Book I, Book IX, and Book XVI to withdraw, and stay withdrawn, from the fighting is unjust. While his absence could be seen as the necessary catalyst for the death of Patroclus as it is fated, and may be construed as helping aid the fulfillment of the divine order on a larger scale. It does not, however, aid in the fall of Troy. In the *Iliad*, moving the plot toward the eventual fall of Troy, even though its fall is not depicted in the *Iliad*, is the issue with which all the actions of the epic are concerned. It is against this fated end which everything in the epic ought to be weighed; does it help fulfill this end, and thereby aid in the maintenance of the cosmic order, or not? If so, the action is just, if not then the action is not.
Further, his subsequent promise to Telemonian Ajax, to return to the fighting only if the Trojans begin to burn the ships (Iliad 9.676), is a further injustice because it is an immutably strong stance on the matter. A more flexible stance here may be seen as just because it would show his comprehension and periodic reevaluation of the evolving nature of the conflict. At the very least, such a periodic reevaluation would reflect an acknowledgement of the losses being suffered by his comrades as a result of his absence. Such an immutably strong stance cannot help either party involved, and in fact, is a severe detriment to one of the parties and the maintenance of the cosmic order. For this reason, Achilles’ immutably strong stance in Book IX is unjust.

One view of the matter is that these injustices committed by Achilles are the necessary catalysts, which allow Patroclus to ask Achilles to lead the Myrmidons into combat in order to save the ships from being burnt. Ultimately, this act by Patroclus leads Hector to overcome him and is the provocation that returns Achilles to the fighting; thus, the plot of the epic is propelled forward by the slow buildup of injustices that Achilles creates and suffers. The result is that Achilles’ injustices cause the cosmic order to function as it ought to. Achilles’ choice to refuse fighting is not the proximate cause of Patroclus’ death, nor would have Achilles’ presence in the battle guaranteed Patroclus’ safety. If Achilles had ordered Patroclus to pursue a line of action, and that direct line of action caused his death, then Achilles very well might have been the proximate cause of his death. Achilles gave an express order to Patroclus to not pursue the Trojans past the ships (Iliad 16.80-100). Yet it was this hubris that drove Patroclus to his fated death. There is no guarantee, then, that Achilles was directly involved with the actions that led up to Patroclus’ death. Since Achilles actions were not involved in Patroclus death,

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Achilles’ injustices cannot be seen to be speeding up the fated fall of Troy or maintaining the cosmic order. The unfortunate consequence, therefore, is that Achilles’ actions up to Book XVIII may be characterized as unjust. Even this, what could have been seen as potential threat to a coherent notion of *dike* in the Homeric epics, in the proper light may be an explanatory tool.

Not only does the death of Patroclus propel Achilles to action, but it also allows the plot of the epic to move forward. The death of Patroclus forces Achilles to take another step forward in his moral development as the protagonist of the epic. At this point, it is possible to understand Achilles’ actions as being driven by a concept of justice which “means, more than anything else, helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies (*Iliad* 16.31)” (Lutz 2005-2006; 118). It is at this point in the epic that Achilles shifts his wrath from avenging a perceived injustice by Agamemnon, to avenging the death of his friend. His goal is to thereby help restore Patroclus’ honor through the death of Hector. What is important is that the object of his wrath has shifted from some personal injustice to avenging the injustice done to a friend. Undoubtedly, this is a step in the right direction. This shift in the object of Achilles’ wrath is a telling sign of some moral development because, for the first time in the epic, Achilles is willing to put aside his own personal interests, in the sense that those interests pertain specifically to his *timê*, and pursue a line of action which is for the better of his countrymen. Additionally this is a cause taken up for a friend. Any distinction drawn between his two motives here is of little import. After all, even if Achilles does return to the fighting not to help his countrymen, but to avenge Patroclus, he is putting the interests of another in front of his own and should be understood as living a new theory of justice—which is to help friends
and hurt enemies. This is a step forward for his moral development through the epic, yet at this point Achilles is still not conforming to the nature of justice within the *Iliad*. His moral development is complete only when he comes to this realization. In this phase of the epic, Achilles is neither aware of how his actions are necessary for the fall of Troy, nor is he aware of justice as doing that, which is allotted to him. It is true, though, that at this point he is aware that his choice will lead to his own death as he will have chosen between the two possible scenarios laid out for him by his mother (*Iliad* 9.410-416). But he is neither aware of how he will win eternal glory through a short death, nor how necessary he is for the Fall of Troy.

It is not until the last book of the *Iliad* that he finally accepts the death of Patroclus, and more importantly realizes that his actions cannot do anything to return Patroclus from Hades. This process of grief, which Achilles goes through, allows his wrath to subside. It is this calming of Achilles wrath that allows him to, for lack of better words, ‘see the bigger picture’ and accept the divine order of things, which he had wanted to control until now. It is only here in Book XXIV that Achilles becomes aware of what justice is and how his actions help to maintain the cosmic order. All of this takes place after Priam’s speech to Achilles in book twenty-four (*Iliad* 24.544). This scene is transformative for Achilles because, during the dialogue, Achilles develops in two ways. First, he becomes truly human and integrates himself wholly into society by realizing the rights of others, and thereby limiting his own claims so that he can rejoin the community (Lutz 2005-2006; 124). This allows Achilles to participate in the community in a more harmonious manner. Second, it is through a fear of Zeus that Achilles gives back the

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26 He is only aware of a vague outline of his fate.
body of Hector (Iliad 24.138-139) and this exemplifies the role of Zeus in the epic as arbiter.

What is left to be seen is how the Odyssey portrays the same sort of Justice as the Iliad. The Odyssey traditionally has been, and is still, commonly approached by the mistaken view that the Odyssey creates a divine world that is substantially different from that of the Iliad (Burkert 1997; 259). Such a view is even held by Hugh Lloyd-Jones as he states “that [the Odyssey’s] theology is in some important ways different from that of the Iliad” (Lloyd-Jones 1971; 28). This reading interprets a change in the moral tone of the Odyssey. I believe that this view promotes a change in the moral tone of the Odyssey because the Odyssey more explicitly deals with morality, and is therefore easier to interpret. A better view may be that in the Odyssey there is simply less grunt-work to be done—less searching to find how dike functions. The ethical discussions in the Odyssey are rather more straightforward than in the Iliad, but this doesn’t mean that there is a shift. Homer’s implied attitude toward justice is more easily discerned in the Odyssey. However, I will forward, hopefully convicingly, that the moral climate and justice are the same in both epics.

As concerns the argument that the moral climate of the Iliad and Odyssey are the same, the best place to begin is the opening words of the epic by Zeus. In this speech Zeus brings up the death of Aegisthus by the hands of Orestes (Odyssey 1.32-43). Zeus uses this example to condemn mankind’s inability to accept their own role in the responsibility for their destruction (Odyssey 1.32-35). As such, Zeus is trying to illustrate a point here, not make a definitive shift in the morality of the Odyssey. As Allan points out “scholars and translators often fail to give the καὶ in line 33 its full force, since it
implies ‘they suffer because of their own wickedness in addition to the trouble sent by us’” (Allan 2006;16 n. 73). Tsagarakis had already come to the same conclusion a few years earlier in stating “the καὶ makes all the difference here” (Tsagarakis 2000; 47 n. 163). This opening speech is often cited as an outright change in the tone of the Odyssey (Kearns 2004). However, I would argue quite the opposite.

Firstly, this complaint by Zeus at the opening of the Odyssey is quite simply just that—a complaint. It should not be understood as more. It does not represent a wholesale change in the approach that the gods will take concerning the actions of mankind from the Iliad. In this case, it is wrong to put the emphasis on the role that humans play in their own destruction because the story that is about to be told—the Odyssey—clearly makes the reader aware of the role of the gods as a large source of human suffering (Allan 2006; 17). This much ought to be evident as Poseidon is the reason for Odysseus’ delay on his homeward voyage. Now, an argument could be forwarded that fundamentally understands a reading of the Odyssey as a major discussion of the role that men play in their own destruction. However, such a reading does come to “a deep seated disjuncture: one of the Odyssey’s best known incidents does not conform to its dominant ethical categories, as exemplified by the fate of the suitors and the paradeigma of Aigisthus. This is surprising at least and calls for an explanation” (Allan 2006; 18).

What is in tension with the opening speech of Zeus is the wrath of Poseidon, which is driven by personal and familial ties, and is primarily motivated by revenge and not an abstract principle of right and wrong (Allan 2006;19). This would be in tension with the reading of Zeus’ opening speech, if we frame the actions of the Odyssey in a new moral light. This reading of the opening speech wants to assert that the tone of the
Odyssey is different. Further, that all of the subsequent action in the epic conforms to this new, truly ethical—as a modern reader would understand it—standard. Simply put, Poseidon does not conform to this new standard, nor are his actions used as a sort of moral exemplar of how one ought not to act. For this reason, based on Zeus’ opening speech and Poseidon’s wrath there is good motive to cast doubt on claims about the change in the moral tone of the Odyssey.

Concerning the divine community, another similarity may be drawn between the Odyssey and the Iliad. It is the unwillingness of gods of a lesser rank to disregard the clout of a god who has higher authority whether this takes the form of a generational gap or of a younger sibling or the submissiveness of a wife. In the Iliad there are several cases of this. The most prominent case in the Odyssey is a similar disagreement between Athena and Poseidon; in fact, this is the driving force of the first half of the epic until Odysseus finally lands on Ithaca’s shore. In this case, it is not until Poseidon leaves Olympus, as Athena tells Odysseus, that she may discuss the matter of Odysseus’ return home with the other gods (Odyssey 13.341-342). This is due to her trepidation; she is afraid of openly disagreeing with a god who is mightier. However, after she receives the approval of Zeus to help Odysseus return home (Odyssey 5.28-43) she accepts Odysseus’ prayer to land on the shore of the Phaeacian land. In this way, the divine community in the Odyssey still acts very similarly to how they did in the Iliad. They still follow the same rules and customs and still resolve their conflicts in the same way by having Zeus arbitrate the issue. Therefore, it is very difficult to believe that there is any radical shift in the actions or nature of the gods in the Odyssey from the gods in the Iliad. In the same vein as the Iliad, the example of Poseidon’s wrath in the Odyssey is not of a different
nature; but rather it is more of the same. His wrath towards Odysseus is driven by his desire to seek personal vengeance and avenge the loss of his son—Polyphemos. Such a motivation is nothing new to any reader of the *Iliad* and is well reflected in Achilles actions to revenge Patroclus.

Further, if the change in the moral tone were to be a correct reading, then Poseidon’s destruction of the Phaeacians is more disturbing than first thought. This is because of how dear to Poseidon the Phaeacians were, since their king and queen are both descendants from Poseidon himself (*Odyssey* 7.56-66). The example of the Phaeacians, their fate and their willingness to aide Odysseus, is a wonderful example of the same conception of *dike* as is in the *Iliad*—doing that which is allotted. The allotted action is the destruction of the Phaeacians, and Poseidon fills the role of the destroyer. Poseidon is clearly angered by the actions of the Phaeacians, who up until this time were precious to him. Because of the choice that the Phaeacians made, he seeks to destroy them. This action is fated, and Zeus gives Poseidon permission to destroy the Phaeacians. Thus, the Phaeacians willingness to aide Odysseus forwards the maintenance of the cosmic order by fulfilling the prophesy. This is how one ought to understand the role of Poseidon’s wrath towards the Phaeacians; they were fated to be destroyed for helping a stranger and Poseidon fulfilled that role (*Odyssey* 5.564-572). Zeus, as the guarantor of the cosmic order, gives his consent. Thus, these actions allow fate to proceed and be fulfilled. The fulfillment of this prophesy and the maintenance of the cosmic order may be seen as an example of justice in the *Odyssey*. While it is disturbing, to the moral sentiments of a modern audience this does not mean it is inconsistent; quite the contrary, it is the same sort of justice that it omnipresent in the *Iliad*.
There is yet another issue with a reading such as Kullman’s, who states that there is an “incompatibility of the religious conceptions of the two epics” (Kullman 1985; 14). The actions of Odysseus and his men fit well into the moral categories of the *Iliad*. The episode to which I refer is the eating of Helios’ sacred cattle and the ignoring of Teiresias’ warning that the cattle of Helios should not be eaten (*Odyssey* 11.105-11.116). As a result of their actions, Helios is allowed to take revenge on them because they have transgressed him. However, in order for him to do so he had to first threaten the cosmic order (*Odyssey* 12.382-383). Zeus cannot allow this potential threat to come to fruition and consequently gives Helios permission (*Odyssey* 12.385-388).

Further, Odysseus’ choice to go visit the Cyclops is disastrous for his men. Not only was he at fault for going into the cave, but also, upon his escape, he boasts to the Cyclops and let’s slip his name. As a result, the Cyclops prayed to Poseidon and asked for revenge against Odysseus specifically. This childish act endangers all of Odysseus’ companions and himself, solely to appease his ego. This act of hubris is clearly not just, but neither is it unjust; in proper context it should be viewed as being hubristic and unintelligent. These actions do not seem to fit well with what some would like to deem a new moral tone of the *Odyssey*. Similar actions can be seen throughout the *Iliad*, one example is Achilles attempting to fight with the river god Xanthus (Iliad 21.233-283). The similarity between these two scenes is that both of the heroes seemingly could not control themselves and their natures took over, so much so that the results of their actions bring them to the brink of death.

27 Also known as Scamander.
Odysseus’ indiscriminate and potentially excessive revenge, which he exacts on the suitors, provides further evidence to support my thesis—that justice functions in the Homeric epics as one doing that which is allotted—under proper examination. In the scene described in Book XXII, Odysseus’ wrath appears to be bordering on bloodlust and extending into the realm of injustice. There are two suitors who are considered to be good men—Amphinomus and Leiodes—and both are killed in addition to the other suitors (Odyssey 22.153-6 and 22.326-9 respectively). They appear to have done no wrong, and Odysseus even kills Leiodes while he is in the middle of supplicating to Odysseus. Potentially, this is a grave offence against Zeus, the protector of suppliants. Further, Amphinomus treats Odysseus respectfully when he appears as a beggar; gives him bread and treats him kindly and Odysseus praises him for being a good man (Odyssey 18.120-153). Yet he is killed by a spear thrust from Telemachus. This is all potentially disruptive unless their deaths are put into a larger context. Both men were fated to die as shown when “Athena drew close to the side of Odysseus, son of Laertes, and roused him to go among the wooers and gather bits of bread, and learn which of them were righteous and which lawless. Yet even so she was not minded to save one of them from ruin.” (Odyssey 17.360-364). Since all of the suitors were doomed to die, Odysseus’ killing of the supplicating Leiodes can be seen as just. It must be seen as just and overriding the neglect of the suppliants rights and the potential wrath of Zeus because by killing Leiodes Odysseus is maintaining the cosmic order by doing that which is allotted to him. The same holds true for the death of Amphinomus. Odysseus does go too far and borders on disrupting the cosmic order and acting unjustly in Book XXIV; and it takes a warning from Athena and a lightning bolt from Zeus to prevent him from going to war against the
suitors’ kinsmen (*Odyssey* 24.528-536, 24.537-544). Odysseus was about to take his wrath too far and potentially disrupt the cosmic order by taking action that had not been fated. Zeus as the arbiter had to prevent this and made a settlement between Odysseus and the kinsmen (*Odyssey* 24.472-486). Despite this, such a brutal act can be seen as portraying the same use of justice and morality as the *Iliad*. Interestingly, in a related article Clarke goes so far as to say that “the punishment of the suitors is more than an example of reciprocal vengeance: it is an enactment of absolute and timeless justice” (Clarke 2004; 88). It would seem that, if we understand the basic moral tone of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to be the same, one then comes to a much better reading of the texts. In other words, the epics present themselves in a coherent and internally consistent manner if this approach to *dike* is used.

**Homeric *dike* as doing that which is Appropriate**

By examining episodes from both epics and the actions of the protagonists of each epic, justice may more easily be seen just as Plato presented it in Book IV of the *Republic*: “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself” (*Republic* 434a), and “doing what is appropriate, each minding its own business” (*Republic* 434c). Further, the ultimate arbiter and guarantor of this justice is Zeus. His will, though, is not justice as was demonstrated by several instances within the *Iliad* where Zeus is contemplating pursuing an action that was not fated and he does not pursue that action. There is a will that is higher than Zeus’. Zeus’ task is to maintain the order of the *cosmos*; that ordering of the cosmos is not itself justice though. Nor is the will that is higher than Zeus’ justice either. Justice in the Homeric epics is each person doing that which is allotted to them in order to allow the cosmic order to be maintained. For Zeus, justice
manifests itself in his warnings to Odysseus and Achilles in Book XXIV of their respective epics and his arbitration of divine conflicts. For Achilles, it is returning to fighting so that the fated fall of Troy may occur. For Odysseus, it is returning home and killing the suitors. Injustice manifests itself in the epics through an attempt to delay, inhibit, or prevent that which was fated to occur. By reading *dike* in the Homeric epics this way, a coherent unity can be found that clarifies issues of justice that appear in other interpretations of Homeric *dike*. I believe ultimately, that for the clarity and simplicity which this interpretation provides, Homeric *dike* ought to be read as Plato presents justice in Book IV.
Justice in the Republic: The Borrowing and Extension of Homer

The time between Homer\(^{28}\), and Plato\(^{29}\)—roughly 250 years—sees the engagement of *dike* in the literary record by several notable authors (e.g. Hesiod\(^{30}\), Solon\(^{31}\), Aeschylus\(^{32}\), and Sophocles\(^{33}\)) in deep and engaging ways. In the philosophical dialogue *dike* has a place of lesser significance, although justice is examined in Anaximander\(^{34}\), Heraclitus\(^{35}\), and Parmenides\(^{36}\) to varying degrees. In these authors, however, *dike* is not engaged with as deeply as in Plato. This is not to say that the material from other authors or their influence should be doubted or disregarded—quite the contrary. With this in mind, it must also be noted that Plato’s *Republic* acts as a sort of ‘paradigm shift’ in the Greek tradition—with regard to the centrality of *dike*. As such, the *Republic* is one of the first works to which scholars flock when attempting to engage with *dike* in the Greek tradition. This is not only the case for Plato’s own understanding of *dike*, but also for his engagement with traditional notions of justice. Moreover, “the *Republic* has generally been regarded as the high-water mark of Plato’s philosophical career” and can be seen as the “culmination of [his] philosophical reflections” (White 1976, 89).

\(^{28}\) Approximately the late 8th century or possibly the early 7th century. For a thorough commentary see Easterling and Knox (1985).

\(^{29}\) Plato’s life span was approximately 428/7-347 BCE; another interpretation by Nail has his life span at 424/3-347BCE.

\(^{30}\) See Beall (2006).


\(^{32}\) See Dolgert (2012).

\(^{33}\) See Ahrensdorf (2011).

\(^{34}\) See Engmann (1991).

\(^{35}\) See Bambach (2006).

\(^{36}\) See Fischerova (2006).
Socrates’ interest in Homer during the course of the Republic demonstrates a special, if not highly complicated, approach to Homeric poetry. He creates a scathing critique of poetry that appears to categorically deny Homer’s entrance to Plato’s ideal city which is well summed up with Socrates’ words: “though a certain love and reverence for Homer that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking… yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth” (Republic 595b-c). This attitude which Socrates portrays, in addition to the increasingly severe critiques of the poets from the ideal city in Books II, III, and X might, at first, lead one to assume that the Republic would be devoid of poetic, especially Homeric, influence. This rejection of the poets would amount to a rejection of the foundation of Hellenic culture—Homer.

Despite this, numerous scholars have found Homeric themes throughout the Republic. The first of which is the opening word: κατέβην. This word, katabasis, has mythological undertones as it is the word used for a trip to the underworld (O’Conner 2013; 59). Alone, this word isn’t easily tied to the Odyssey; however, when in conjunction with the Myth of Er, which has been read as a retelling of Book XI in the Odyssey (Klonoski 1993, and Bloom1991; 427), a Homeric influence on Plato’s Republic can be drawn. This is not the only Homeric or Poetic influence that can be seen in the Republic. The Republic, in its entirety, is a kind of “large tale, dramatic, myth-

37 Socrates’ specific interests with Homer are the values he believes Homer to be teaching the youth of Athens, Homer’s reliance on mimesis, and the implications of the mimetic action on one’s ability to access reality.
39 As O’Connor points out, katabasis is the same word that Odysseus uses to recount his trip to the Underworld for Penelope (Odyssey 23.252).
laden, poetic” (Klonoski 1993; 256). These aspects of the Republic stand in stark contrast
to the rejection of poetry from the city.

Despite the eventual expulsion of the poets from the ideal city, Plato is constantly
engaging with Homer. One of the most salient features of the Republic is that Socrates is
extremely hesitant and uneasy to dismiss the poets from the city because of his love for
Homer (Republic 595b, 383a, 391a, 468d, 605c-d). Furthermore, with Homer referred to
as the educator of the Greeks (Republic 606e), would it be at all possible for Plato to
salvage some aspects of Homer, in order to use them in his own ideal city? Since Plato
was influenced by Homer, and parallels between aspects of the Republic and the Homeric
epics can be drawn, in what ways does Homer exert his influence on Plato? Put another
way, what, if any, Homeric themes can be identified in the Republic? In this chapter I
argue for two fundamental points. First, that Plato borrows the nature of justice which is
presented in the Homeric\footnote{While in the Republic Plato makes reference to, quotes, or reworks a motif, idea or character of Hesiod
18 times, that number skyrockets up to 86 total references to Homer (Yamagata 2010; 70). While this does
not explicitly tell us much as it is a cursory look at the works, it does at least demonstrate the extent to
which Plato felt he needed to address or make an especial critique of Homer.} epics, using it as a sort of ‘place-holder’ in Book IV, because
the eventual picture of justice would not make sense without the long argument that he
makes in the metaphysical Books of V-VII, and the psychological Books of VIII and IX.
Second, that justice is indeed presented in two similar ways, with some important
differences, once in Book IV and the other in Book IX. The former may be understood as
a ‘place-holder’ that functions reasonably well within the platonic framework, while the
latter makes use of much more sophisticated and nuanced arguments that require the
construction of a larger philosophical framework in order to sustain the argument and
bring the dialogue to its eventual conclusion. The view that there are two separate yet
linked arguments for justice is supported by Plato himself as in the beginning of Book VIII. The reader is told that the conclusion in Book IV\textsuperscript{41} was premature (Republic 543c-544b). Therefore, the presentation in Book IV is not complete and needs material between Books V-IX to finish the argument.

Socrates states in the third book of the Republic that before the poets may be accused of lying, the nature of justice must be understood (Republic 392c); “This suggests that in order to understand what is at stake with poetry, one must come to understand in some way the nature of justice” (Mei 2007; 755). Socrates’ statement demonstrates that there is an implicit link between the poets and justice in Plato’s thought. I posit that Plato’s condemnation of poetry is not complete because of Plato’s borrowing of a traditional notion of justice\textsuperscript{42}. I claim that Plato manipulates what is initially a social and political construct, an act-centered theory of justice, and extends it to the soul, making it an agent-centered theory of justice (Dahl 1991). That is to say, justice in Plato’s ideal city functions both interpersonally, as it helps regulate the actions of people and groups amongst each other and themselves, and intrapersonally, because any given action has ramifications to the health of the soul and one’s place in the afterlife/rebirth cycle.

For this reason, it is important to understand the extent to which Plato’s condemnation of poetry is influenced by his unease with the moral teachings of Homer. It is also important, how much, or to what degree, Plato separates from the epic past, and if

\textsuperscript{41} The conclusion of Book IV was that the best city and the best individual had been found.
\textsuperscript{42} Mimesis as it is presented to the reader in book III (Republic 393c) has a narrower scope and in book X it has a broader scope. This broader scope of mimesis in book X allows the critique to become a epistemological critique of the poets (Republic 598-599).
such a break is as radical as some scholars have speculated\textsuperscript{43}. I believe, that instead of such a radical shift in thought as is typically categorized, Plato’s theory of justice in the *Republic* represents an “exploitation and exaggeration of possibilities embedded in the works of predecessors” (Haubold 2010; 29). In this case, the predecessor is Homer\textsuperscript{44}.

Several of Plato’s works may be understood as addressing *dike* in one manner or another, even if the discussion of *dike* is not the main thesis of those works\textsuperscript{45}. These works are: the *Republic, Laws, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Gorgias*, and *Politicus*\textsuperscript{46}. However, traditionally the subheading of Plato’s *Republic*, and its primary thesis, is understood to be ‘on Justice’\textsuperscript{47}. For this reason, amongst others, it is with this dialogue that people typically begin in order to get some grasp of Plato’s views on justice\textsuperscript{48}.

One breakdown of the *Republic* which is appealing, if only for the clear divisions that it makes, states that the dialogue could easily be broken down into two distinct parts. The first book serves as an introduction of sorts, and appears to be akin to the aporetic early dialogues of Plato\textsuperscript{49}. However, this defense of justice in Book I only seems convincing, and is not really convincing, which is why the rest of the *Republic* is needed—to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus.

\textsuperscript{43} The trend in current scholarship seems to have a “distaste for grand narratives of intellectual and cultural change (Hesiod to Plato, Poetry to Philosophy, myth to reason)” (Haubold 2010, 29).

\textsuperscript{44} I do not mean to say that justice isn’t discussed in the philosophical tradition before Plato, because it is brought up in Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. Rather, I mean to say that these thoughts are not developed very far. Furthermore, I focus here on the reception of Homer by Plato, while acknowledging that there are many other authors that try to understand *dike*. Those authors most notably in the philosophical, dramatic, and lyrical traditions and their interpretations of *dike* will be the focus of future studies, since I am constrained by time in the present work.

\textsuperscript{45} Of the twenty-eight genuine dialogues typically ascribed to Plato, not including the doubtful or spurious works, seven of them touch on *dike*.

\textsuperscript{46} See Kosman (2007).

\textsuperscript{47} See Tarrant (2000).
The rest of the *Republic*, Books II-X, is clearly understood as Plato’s (through the mouth of Socrates) full-throated and exhaustive defense of justice, not just as a social principle, as Homer envisioned justice, but also as a personal virtue of the soul. One important aspect of the first book is its depiction of popular morality to Plato’s contemporaries and this depiction of popular morality is significant to Plato’s condemnation of poetry in Books II, III, and X. The first condemnation hinges on the poets’ ability to be a positive moral agent in society⁵⁰, while the second condemnation is an absolute critique of poetry for philosophical reasons as the poets cannot help people access and have knowledge of the Forms. These books will be addressed in due course; however, what may be even more enlightening than Plato’s discussion of his own views is his depiction of popular morality in the first book through Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. Socrates seeks out the philosophical flaws that are inherent in popular morality and makes them apparent. At the close of the first book it is clear that Plato wants to insert philosophy into the moral void which he perceives has been created by the false ideals of popular morality and the agnosticism of the sophists. In simpler terms, one goal in the *Republic* is to create a comprehensive, philosophically based, moral system which is intended to function as a replacement of the moral systems that exist in 4th century Athens. First, the opposing views in Book I must be laid out, so as to fully understand why this book is included in the *Republic* and how Plato is able to move beyond them.

⁵⁰ This claim will be explained later in the essay; however, it would be a large digression at this point and so is avoided.
Book I: Popular Morality in Plato’s Eyes

The Republic opens with Socrates describing his return from Piraeus with Glaucon. The dialogue moves toward Socrates and Cephalus discussing many things, moving from topic to topic and making Cephalus appear to be the expositor of the traditional views concerning many subjects (Stauffer 2001; 26-27). The topic which Socrates eventually steers Cephalus toward is justice. The root of Cephalus’ argument states that justice is speaking the truth and giving back what one takes (Republic 331d). Socrates questions such a view through an example that returning a weapon to a madman, which was taken when he was sane, is not just (Republic 331c). Cephalus declares, then, that he must go attend to sacrifices and cannot bother to think about these things. Therefore, he hands the argument over to his son Polemarchus (Republic 331d).

After Cephalus’ departure, Polemarchus forwards another version of justice; this time it is a quote from Simonides “it is just to give to each what is owed” (Republic 331e). This conception of justice, with some gentle prodding from Socrates, allows for a circumnavigation of the criticism Socrates brought to the first definition of justice. For surely, even if one friend owed the weapon to the other he would not return it under any circumstances as long as he is not compos mentis. Socrates then asks Polemarchus to rework what he believes Simonides to have meant. Polemarchus responds by stating that Simonides meant to say “he supposes that friends owe it to friends to do some good and nothing bad” (Republic 332a). The underlying principle is that “justice is giving benefits and harms to friends and enemies” (Republic 332d). Socrates leads Polemarchus toward a fallacy in this definition by asking in what scenario a just man could be of the greatest use. Polemarchus responds; “in my opinion it is in making war and being an ally in
battle” (*Republic* 332e). Socrates then asks if a just man is no longer useful in times of peace, since a doctor is not needed when one is healthy. Polemarchus responds that this is not what he intended to mean and that there are a number of uses for justice in times of peace (*Republic* 333a-b).

The end result of this line of argument (*Republic* 333a-334a) is that Polemarchus is led to state justice “to be a certain art of stealing, for the benefit, to be sure, of friends and the harm of enemies” (*Republic* 334b). Socrates’ response can be broken down into three constituent parts. They are:

1) In what manner is it useful for helping friends and hurting enemies (*Republic* 332d-334b)? Specifically, justice is the art of giving the best help to friends and doing the worst harm to enemies in particular situations (*Republic* 333c-333e). If this view of justice is to be assumed, then justice is turned into something rather toothless (*Republic* 333e). Therefore, it would seem best if, in Polemarchus’ construction of justice, it was some sort of marriage between art and intention.

2) What defines a friend (*Republic* 334c-335b)? Since it is possible that we make mistakes in judging the character of our friends, it makes sense that in some cases the just man will be helping those who are bad and hurting those who are good—which is naturally the opposite of the intended goal. Here, Polemarchus sets about readjusting the scope of his definition of justice. The reformulation is “the man who seems to be, and is, good, is a friend, he said, and the man who seems good and is not, seems to be, but is not a friend. And we’ll take the same position about the enemy.” (*Republic* 334e).
3) Does it really belong to the just man to harm someone else \((\textit{Republic} 335b-335e)\)? Polemarchus agrees that he wants to be able to say that a just man can harm unjust men—this is obvious since it is the second part of his definition. Socrates leads Polemarchus to state that if horses and dogs are harmed, then they become worse in respect to the virtue of horses and dogs \((\textit{Republic} 335b)\). The next step is that humans who are harmed become worse in respect to the virtue of humans \((\textit{Republic} 335c)\). The virtue of humans, Socrates states and Polemarchus agrees, is justice. Polemarchus agrees, and Socrates asks if it is possible to make someone unmusical by means of music—Polemarchus agrees that it is not \((\textit{Republic} 335c)\). The next analogy that Socrates wishes to make is that justice and musicality are of sufficient likeness that they operate the same way on the human mind. Therefore, the end result of this argument is that it is impossible to make men unjust by acting justly \((\textit{Republic} 335e)\). It is not the work of the just man to harm anyone, therefore, because acting justly cannot bring about its opposite.

The last notion of justice that is addressed in Book I is Thrasyphon’s. The claim Thrasyphon makes about justice is that, it is “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” \((\textit{Republic} 338c)\). Justice is whatever the ruling class of a city says it is, and they always have created laws that are in their interest. Socrates points to a contradiction in Thrasyphon’s position here by demonstrating that sometimes rulers make the wrong decision and command people to do things that are actually to their disadvantage \((\textit{Republic} 339e)\).

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51 This argument assumes much of Platonic psychology. For this topic I find \textit{Essays on Plato’s Psychology} (2001) to be the most helpful.

52 However, this movement of arguing by analogy may not be entirely persuasive. For it assumes that animals and humans will act in the same way to harm. Plato, in Book IV of the \textit{Republic}, postulates the tripartite view of the soul. That is to say, human souls are different than animal souls, and there may be a serious claim to be made that no appeal to the likeness of animals and humans can persuasively be made to convince that humans necessarily react in the same way as horses and dogs do to being harmed.
Thrasyzmachus’ response chooses to redefine who the ‘stronger’ are by his definition. His amendment is that the “the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself. And this must be done by the man who is ruled” (*Republic* 340e-341a). Thrasyzmachus narrows his definition of what a ruler is to the point that he creates a rather useless definition.

Despite this, Socrates is able to convince Thrasyzmachus to admit that the crafts possess an art that is naturally directed toward its object. Thrasyzmachus agrees to Socrates’ assertion that no art requires another art to preside over, rather each art “being correct, is unblemished and pure so long as it is precisely and entirely what it is” (*Republic* 342b). This critique of Thrasyzmachus which Socrates may now use focuses on Thrasyzmachus’ analogy between art and rule. Thus, he says: “Therefore Thrasyzmachus, I said, there isn’t ever anyone who holds any position of rule, insofar as he is ruler, who considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of what is ruled and of which he himself is the craftsman” (*Republic* 342e). Making the role of the ruler to necessarily consider everyone else’s needs except his own reflects the sort of moral behavior that Socrates and Plato aim for and desire from rulers and Thrasyzmachus necessarily wants to avoid.

Thrasyzmachus attacks justice in the following sections (*Republic* 343a2-347e4). The nature and intensity of this attack on justice changes the tone of the whole dialogue, because Thrasyzmachus explicitly states justice to be a harm to the just man while injustice is a good (*Republic* 343c). Moreover, he claims that perfect injustice will make

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53 Including both aspects, that an art is a form of ruling over the aspects of the art, and that ruling is like the arts because it is a type of knowledge (*Republic* 340e4-6).
the man who commits it “most happy” (Republic 334a3-5). To this especially hard
critique of justice Socrates spends the rest of Book I giving a lengthy three part response
(Republic 347e4-354a11). The three points of Socrates’ argument are thus: 1) that the just
man is wise and good while the unjust man is ignorant and bad, 2) that justice is stronger
than injustice, 3) that the just are happier and live better than the unjust, therefore, justice
is more profitable than being unjust.

The first book ends with the idea that it will not be possible to get a firm grasp of
what is right and wrong with the popular notions, and to what degree they ought to be
dismissed, until a much deeper and lengthier investigation is undertaken. The first Book
is an essential part of the whole dialogue. Within it, Plato is able to dismiss two popular
notions of justice and engage with the central issue that will take the rest of the Republic
to solve.

The Gauntlet

As one might expect, right at the beginning of the second book the parameters for
the rest of the dialogue are created. Glaucon states “Socrates, do you want to seem to
have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us” (Republic 357b) referring to the arguments
made in Book I. Any sort of conclusions that may be drawn from the end of the first book
must be immediately questioned54 as Glaucon and Adeimantus desire what they believe a
truly convincing concept of justice would be like to them, and Socrates has not presented
a convincing argument. Socrates’ task, set out for him by Glaucon and Adeimantus, is to
show that justice itself is the most desirable thing and the most just man, even if he is

54 Socrates himself does this at the end of Book I (Republic 354b-c).
perceived to be the most unjust man, has by far a better life than the most unjust man—quite the heavy burden (*Republic* 361a-367e). The challenge begins with Glaucon who asks Socrates to show that someone *seeming* just is not more desirable than being just. He does this by constructing a scenario wherein Glaucon claims that perfect injustice is the ability to seem perfectly just while committing the worst crimes:

For the height of injustice is to seem just without being so. To the perfectly unjust man, then, we must assign perfect injustice and withhold nothing of it, but we must allow him, while committing the greatest wrongs, to have secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice (*Republic* 361a).

He juxtaposes this perfectly unjust man with his opposite; a perfectly just man who seems to be the most unjust man:

our theory must set the just man at his side—a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good. Then we must deprive him of the seeming. For if he is going to be thought just he will have honors and gifts because of that esteem. We cannot be sure in that case whether he is just for justice' sake or for the sake of the gifts and the honors. So we must strip him bare of everything but justice and make his state the opposite of his imagined counterpart (*Republic* 361b-c).

Adeimantus is not satisfied with Socrates simply proving that even in this case the just man has a better life. He requires that Socrates also demonstrate what each does to the man who possesses it:

Do not then, I repeat, merely prove to us in argument the superiority of justice to injustice, but show us what it is that each inherently does to its possessor—whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men—whereby the one is good and the other evil (*Republic* 367e).

Once, Socrates has adequately showed the superiority of justice even in the worst of situations and has demonstrated what justice does to the one who possesses it, only then may the dialogue come to a successful conclusion. Book IV does not fulfill all of these requirements, leading to the lengthier arguments made in Books V-IX. Later in the
chapter I examine the definitions of justice put forward in Book IV and Book IX, attempt to understand why they are presented differently, and to what degree they answer the challenge set forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus.

**The City-Soul analogy’s Initial Presentation**

Directly after the challenge, a curious analogy is drawn between the structure of the individual soul and the city—commonly called the City-Soul analogy. Due to its proximity to the challenge, Plato must believe that this analogy is a requisite starting point for the arguments that he will make (*Republic* 368e-369a).

“but what analogy to do you detect in the inquiry about justice?” “I will tell you,” I said: “there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city.” “Assuredly,” said he. “Is not the city larger than the man?” “It is larger,” he said. “Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend (*Republic* 368e).”

It happens so quickly that at first glance it appears very easy to overlook, but on closer inspection it is the lynch-pin of the argument. The analogy is extraordinarily peculiar because it is an enormous foundation stone for the construction of Plato’s arguments, yet its validity is not put under any scrutiny at this point. Instead of arguing for the similarity between the make-up of the city and the soul, Socrates begins to create an outline for the ideal city. The City-Soul analogy as it is brought up in Book II only agrees that justice applies to both the city and the soul and goes no farther. We will have to wait until Book IV in order to get a detailed argument for the structural similarities between the city and the soul. This longer, more detailed, argument is needed to take the Homeric notion of justice, which is an act-centered theory of justice, and develop it into an agent-centered

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55 For a discussion of the complex issue that is the City-Soul analogy I find Evrigenis (2002), Blossner (2007), Ferrari (2009) to be helpful. I will raise the issue here and then move on as it relates to my topic but it cannot be discussed in great depth as it is outside the scope of the research question.
theory of justice. Without a successful argument for the sufficient likeness of the parts of the city and the soul, Plato cannot extend justice to the individual level. This in turn is necessary for Plato to fully answer the challenge that Glaucon and Adeimantus put before him.

First Critique of Poetry

The first critique of poetry is born out of a concern for the education of the young men who will become the guardians of the ideal city. This first critique also deals with the notion of mimesis but in a far less expansive way as Socrates limits the poets’ mimetic action to imitating a character’s speech, looks, and creating a monologue for a character (Republic 393b-d). Socrates even gives an example of what a section of Homer may look like without any mimesis (393d-394a). The critique is not confined to Homer but deals with all types of poetry that are potentially harmful to the young guardians.

What Socrates finds dangerous about poetry is that it not only promotes false virtues, but also makes these false virtues appear to be proper examples of moral behavior. These poetic texts are understood to be broadly political with the minds of the young guardians at stake (Griswold 2012). This critique, although, focuses on the moral development of children and Socrates expresses his disapproval poignantly:

“Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up?” “By no manner of means will we allow it.” “We must begin, then, it seems, by a censorship over our storymakers, and what they do well we must pass and what not, reject. And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands. But most of the stories they now tell we must reject” (Republic 377b-c).
This critique, allows for Homer to be taught as long as his material is appropriate. However, Plato spends the rest of Book II and a large section of Book III examining ways in which Homer does not teach correct morals (Republic 379c-d, 383a-b, 386b-387b, 388a, 388b-d, 389e, 390a-d, 390e, 391a-c, 391e-392a) and debating whether to allow Homer into the city. In Book III Socrates expands the critique significantly where the ethical and psychological effects of poetry are first considered. The poets must not depict good men being frustrated with their own hardships (Republic 387e-388a). The poets also should withhold presentations of gods and heroes as being overwhelmed by the extremes of emotions; the strong soul isn’t overwhelmed by emotion and doesn’t suffer from a disharmony of the soul (Griswold 2012). Mimesis makes its entrance into the dialogue in Book III. A poet is acting mimetic when speaking as one of the characters in the poem with the goal of trying to make the audience believe that the character is speaking.

At the end of the critique there is a noticeable bend toward attacking mimesis which will serve as the foundation of the later critique. It is interesting to note that the part of Plato’s critique of poetry concerning morals does not become categorical. Rather, that aspect of the critique can be evaded by a poet if they promote proper virtues for the young guardians. In other words, Plato finds faults with certain aspects of the ethics within the Homeric worldview. Plato does not force himself, though, to move entirely beyond all aspects of the Homeric worldview. This leaves the door open for Plato to borrow and expand upon aspects of this worldview which Plato believes to be useful. In the next section, I will demonstrate that one aspect of this Homeric worldview Plato borrows is the Homeric conception of justice.
Justice in Book IV: Homeric in Nature

As I have said already, at the beginning of Book VIII we found out that the claim at the end of Book IV was premature (Republic 543c-544b). We know then that Book IV does not tell the whole story and the argument for justice is deepened by the material in Books V-IX. Interestingly, nowhere in the Republic does Socrates engage with a definition of justice that is seriously considered Homeric. Homer is discussed often in the text but an extensive discussion of his view on justice is nonexistent. In this section I examine the nature of this first presentation of justice and demonstrate that it is fundamentally Homeric in nature. This borrowed Homeric justice is then expanded and built upon for the complete version of justice in Book IX. As I have argued in the first chapter of this thesis, justice in the Homeric epics can be defined using the definitions of justice presented in the first half of Book IV. This, in conjunction with the numerous other influences that the Homeric epics can be seen to have on the Republic leads me to believe that Plato borrowed the notion of justice in the Homeric worldview.

I intend to use this understanding of justice to solve a controversy started by Sachs (1963): that while Glaucon and Adeimantus at the outset of Book II ask for a defense of justice as it is ordinarily understood, Socrates’ presentation of justice of the individual at the end of Book IV appears to have little to do with justice as it is ordinarily understood. My solution is that justice in the city is a formulation of Homeric justice, and that Socrates uses the City-Soul analogy to extend an ordinary conception of justice to the

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56 The claim is that the best person and city had been found.
57 In Book I, Socrates in passing attributes the view of helping friends and hurting enemies to Homer and Simonides, but doesn’t engage with Homer in a meaningful way here. Homer is mentioned more in passing than anything else. Also, this is brought up in Book I in which there are many views presented and quickly cast away. This leads the reader to question the intensity of the views presented in Book I.
58 See footnote 40.
individual at the end of Book IV. From Books V-IX Socrates deepens this understanding of justice so that it appears to be something more nuanced at the end of the Republic than it was in the beginning. Plato takes an ordinary social conception of justice and develops it into a personal virtue. The fully formed notion of justice that is presented in Book IX would be too overwhelming for the reader to just drop-in as Socrates is defining the virtues rather quickly and succinctly. Socrates needs to ease the reader into his complete understanding of justice which cannot be accomplished through Book IV alone.

In Book IV Socrates quickly, and surprisingly easily, defines the four virtues within the city. For an account of how the virtues function within the city see: for wisdom (428b–429a), for courage (429a–430c), for moderation (430e–432b), and for justice (432b–434d). Peculiarly though, directly after stating how difficult it will be to find justice, Socrates believes that he has found it, and furthermore, that they have been saying and hearing it all along (Republic 432e). If justice can be found so easily, then why doesn’t Socrates proceed to address the superiority of justice in a complete way, or what benefits justice brings the just man, or how it is greater than injustice? This would appear to be the next logical step toward moving the dialogue forward\(^59\). This almost appears to be the case, since he attempts to do this at the end of Book IV and the beginning of Book V but soon digresses into the lifestyle of the guardians. The Republic does not go in this direction and chooses, rather, to present justice in phases, connecting each of them with a series of arguments that strengthens the overall position of justice.

As it is first postulated in the city, Justice is “[doing] one's own business and not to be a busybody” (Republic 433a). Here, Plato describes justice as a harmony in society;

\(^{59}\) He hints at this in 445a-b.
each citizen doing a task which they are naturally inclined to perform. Another way that Socrates phrases it is as “The proper functioning of the money-making class, the helpers and the guardians, each doing its own work in the state, being the reverse of that just described, would be justice and would render the city just” (Republic 434c). Plato gives a definition of the just man as one who “from this point of view too, then, the having and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice” (Republic 433e-434a). Closely following this agreement, Socrates believes that he has made a successful argument for the origin of justice in the city. Socrates states:

And is not the cause of this to be found in the fact that each of the principles within him does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled? Yes, that and nothing else. Do you still, then, look for justice to be anything else than this potency which provides men and cities of this sort? No, by heaven, he said, I do not (Republic 434b).

Justice as it is defined here seems strikingly similar to Socrates’ earlier definition of moderation (Republic 430d-432b) (Weiss 2012, 181).

Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of soberness, but it extends literally through the entire gamut throughout, bringing about the unison in the same chant of the strongest, the weakest and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please, in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion. So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity to be soberness, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual. (Republic 431e-432b)

The key to moderation is that the lesser, the middle, and the higher all are in agreement about which should rule. There are several close similarities between moderation and justice; the majority of which are that Socrates defines justice as he has defined moderation at the start by having the superior master the inferior (Republic 430-431), that he “[uses] nearly identical language and nearly identical metaphors for both—musical
metaphors such as *sumphonia* and *harmonia* and the high, low, and middle, placement on the musical scale, as well as the metaphor of friendship” (Weiss 2012, 181), and that both virtues extend throughout the whole soul (Weiss 2012, 181). At best, these similarities simply blur the line between the virtues because they share many common features, and at worst Socrates defines justice as moderation.

This overlap between the two virtues doesn’t quite seem to add up. Clearly, if the two virtues are one in the same, and Plato had intended this, then it would make much more sense to have defined them as one virtue. Further, it does not help him answer the challenge set before him in Book II. Since one of the goals of the Republic is to define justice correctly, then the complete, fully formed, and most robust definition of justice may not be as easily obtained as simply as wisdom, courage, or moderation.

Weiss argues that because of all their similarities, justice and moderation are in fact the same virtue. This answer does not seem very plausible if only because this argument does not make more sense of the dialogue—in fact it makes it more opaque. There are other reasons as well; Weiss’ reading doesn’t help Socrates achieve anything, nor does it seem to make much sense to define two virtues in the same way. Put simply, it strikes the mind as unattractive. It is more plausible that the argument for justice is muddled, short, and incomplete in Book IV. If the initial presentation of justice is incomplete this could account for potential misreadings and overlaps between the virtues. With this reading, the incomplete argument appears to make the virtues more similar than they in fact are, while preserving the independence of the four virtues, and allowing for an expansion of thought through the remaining Books. In order to make a clear
distinction between moderation and justice, Socrates needs to use various parts of the arguments in Books V-IX.

At the initial presentation of the City-Soul analogy, the analogy of keen sightedness is used to describe Socrates and his interlocutors’ pursuit (Republic 368c-e). At this point the City-Soul analogy is used to then examine the virtues in the city and extend those virtues to the soul. As Socrates states, once the other virtues are defined they must act like hunters closing in on a prey so that it doesn’t escape them (Republic 432b-c). He goes further; “And truly, said I, it appears to be an inaccessible place, lying in deep shadows. It certainly is a dark covert” (Republic 432c).

Directly after Socrates defines justice and injustice in the city, he turns to reinvestigate the City-Soul analogy (Republic 434d-e). The just man will not be different from the city with respect to justice (Republic 435b). The city is just when each of the three classes minds its own business and is wise, courageous, and moderate (Republic 435b). Socrates then wants to claim that justice in the single man is just in the same way and for the same reasons as the city (Republic 435b-c). The issue at hand, then, is whether the soul has the same number of parts, in recognizably the same relations to one another, as in the city. The solution to this problem is that there are three parts of the soul because there are three different types of desires that come into conflict with one another. There are desires that are independent of one’s understanding of the good—this is appetite. There are desires that a person understands to be required by one’s conception of the good—this is reason. These two types of desires are argued for by showing the strife between the two sorts of desires (Republic 437b-439e). There are also desires that involve some understanding of what good is but not an understanding of something that
is on the whole good—this is spirit. It occupies a middle ground between the two other desires (Republic 439e-441b). After separating out the different types of desires that exist within an individual and that they correspond to aspects of the city, Socrates is able to claim that the city and the soul are of sufficient likeness that justice in the city will correspond to justice in the individual: “the same kinds equal in number are to be found in the state and in the soul of each one of us” (Republic 441c).

After this Socrates is able to explain that a just man sets his soul in order and harmonizes the three parts of the soul (Republic 443c-e). Injustice, then, is a sort of faction between the three parts (Republic 444b). From here Socrates states that healthy things produce health and sick things produce sickness (Republic 444c). Socrates uses this to reword his definition of justice as being the health of the soul and injustice being the sickness of the soul:

But to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature. Yes, that is so. And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? Exactly so, he said. Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness (Republic 444d-e).

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60 I found Terrence Irwin’s Plato’s Moral Theory and John Cooper’s “Plato’s Theory of Motivation” helpful in understanding the three parts of the soul.

61 An interesting probe into the analogy has been read by some scholars as a move to hide a fundamental distinction between the City and Soul. Specifically, that the city can be seen and observed, while the soul cannot be seen and its attributes can only at best be inferred by observation (Blossner 2007; 346). What was at first a hypothetical assertion in 368c-369a becomes an assured fact by 434e-435a (Blossner 2007; 347-348). In 435b–c, however Socrates raises two points of interest, that justice is in both city and soul, and that justice in the city is a result of how the city’s parts functioned.
As I argued in the first chapter, the Homeric worldview’s conception of justice is act-centered. Heroes and gods act justly when they are doing the tasks to which they are allotted, and the first wording of justice in Book IV for Plato is the same “the having and doing of one's own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice” (*Republic* 433e-434a). This may be taken even as far as to see a link in the sense in which these tasks are ‘allotted’ in the Homeric epics and the *Republic*. In the Homeric epics, ‘doing what is allotted’ means one doing the tasks that will help maintain the order, balance, harmony of the *cosmos*. In the *Republic*, ‘doing what is allotted’ means doing one’s task so that the entire city might be properly harmonious. This notion, that doing these tasks so that a harmony can be achieved or maintained, runs through both of the conceptions of justice. While the contexts are different, there is a similar current that runs through both.

The Homeric notion of justice is rawly borrowed only as far as Plato uses it in the first half of Book IV. Its focus is on intercommunal relationships and the acts that the heroes and gods perform. Plato uses the City-Soul analogy to take this conventional form of justice and extends it to the soul by showing that the soul has the same number of parts, in the same relation to one another, as in the city. The claim that the notion of justice that Socrates argues for is conventional is supported by his ‘discovery’ of it (*Republic* 432d-e) since it appears that there was not much need to go far searching for it:

All the time, bless your heart, the thing apparently was tumbling about our feet from the start and yet we couldn't see it, but were most ludicrous, like people who sometimes hunt for what they hold in their hands. So we did not turn our eyes upon it, but looked off into the distance, which perhaps was the reason it escaped us. What do you mean? he said. This, I replied, that it seems to me that though we were speaking of it and hearing about it all the time we did not understand ourselves or realize that we were speaking of it in a sense (*Republic* 432d-e)
In Book IV, at first Plato can be seen to use the Homeric notion of justice, and eventually with the help of the City-Soul analogy extend it to the soul. By using the City-Soul analogy, Socrates is able to take an act-centered theory of justice ‘doing what is allotted’ and extend it to the agent as ‘the health of the soul’. The analogy acts as the bridge that connects the Homeric worldview’s notion of justice to the Platonic version of justice which is developed from Book V on. In Book IV, Socrates has given only an incomplete reply to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus. In order to complete the challenge in Book II a persuasive account of the personal virtue of justice needs to be forwarded as well as a persuasive argument why a person is always happier being just rather than unjust. In Book IV Socrates describes justice, but the arguments for the superiority of justice begin in Book V and culminate in Book IX. The arguments in the successive books build upon the groundwork that was done in Book IV and the representation of justice at the end of Book IX shows a richer, more complex and fully formed notion of justice that fulfils the nature of the challenge in Book II.

**Books V-VII: The Metaphysical Books**

At the end of Book IV the number of possible regimes in the city and the soul is mentioned (Republic 445c-e) and it would appear that the next logical step in Book V would be to elaborate on them as this would be the quickest way to address Glaucon and Adeimantus’ challenge. This appears to be the direction of the dialogue until Polemarchus and Adeimantus state that Socrates is “trying to cheat us out of a whole division, and that not the least, of the argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it” (Republic 449c). Those things are what will be held in common, namely women and children (Republic 449c). At first glance this appears to be quite a diversion, since a
discussion of these things cannot help forward the arguments for justice. This discussion eats up a substantial portion of the fifth Book leading eventually to a point that begins to have significance for this thesis.

This specific line of questioning stems from a worry posed to Socrates regarding the feasibility of the ideal city on earth; “But I fear, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this fashion, you will never get to speak of the matter you put aside in order to say all this, namely, the possibility of such a polity coming into existence, and the way in which it could be brought to pass.” (Republic 471c). Socrates’ response is that the only way such a regime could come into existence would be if philosophers ruled (Republic 473c-e). Socrates is then pushed to define what a philosopher is. Socrates first clarifies what one means when one claims one is a desirer of something; “When we say a man is [a desirer of]62 something, shall we say that he has an appetite for the whole class or that he desires only a part and a part not?” (Republic 475b). With this definition a philosopher is a desirer of all of wisdom and not just a part of it (Republic 475b). Philosophers are distinguished from lovers of sights and sounds by the depth of interaction that each has with sights and sounds; philosophers interacting with the Forms of what the sights and sounds participate in.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I said, delight in beautiful tones and colors and shapes and in everything that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful in itself. Why, yes, he said, that is so. And on the other hand, will not those be few who would be able to approach beauty itself and contemplate it in and by itself? (Republic 476b).

62 Here I changed Shorey’s translation. The original Greek is: ἂρα δὲ ὃν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγομεν, παντὸς τοὐχείδος τοῦτον φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δὲ οὐ. I believe that by using ‘a desirer of’ makes better sense in English than Shorey’s “keen about”.
Further, the lover of sights and sounds is dreaming while the lover of wisdom is actually awake; since the man who believes that there is something fair itself and can distinguish it from what things participate in it, and believes that the participant is not the thing itself is actually awake and not dreaming (Republic 476b-d).

This leads to a clarification of the differences between knowledge, opinion, and ignorance which is a crucial step toward the Theory of Ideas which is posited in Book VII (Republic 476c-478e). Knowledge and ignorance are opposites of one another and opinion lies in between them. In this definition, knowledge depends entirely on what is true, for something to be known that thing must exist (Republic 476e-477a). If one knows something, in the Platonic sense, then that person cannot be wrong. What is most important—for the purpose of this thesis—is that only philosophers have knowledge. Forms are the only things that fully measure up to the standards of what truly is. Knowledge is directed toward interaction with the Forms. Book V ends by distinguishing between lovers of opinion and philosophers who love things that really are:

Shall we then offend their ears if we call them doxophilists rather than philosophers and will they be very angry if we so speak? Not if they heed my counsel, he said, for to be angry with truth is not lawful. Then to those who in each and every kind welcome the true being, lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion is the name we must give. By all means (Republic 480a).

Book V serves to clarify the definition of knowledge and Plato’s definition of a philosopher, both of which provide solid ground for Socrates to build toward his arguments in favor of the superiority of justice over injustice.

Book VI opens by using this definition of the philosopher as justification for philosophers being guardians (Republic 484b-485a). Further, because of their grasp of
Forms, they have an ability which no one else has, and moreover, because they are the ones who have real knowledge there is no need of any other rulers of cities (*Republic* 484a). This must be the case because one cannot rule well without knowledge. Later in Book VI Socrates discusses the quality of souls and how ones that have the potential for the best nature can turn exceptionally worse than souls that do not have the potential for the best nature (*Republic* 491d-e). This makes the most just man and the most unjust man more similar than previously thought, as the quality of souls is judged in a way that may be characterized as Homeric. Achilles is judged to be the best of the Achaeans because he is the best fighter, and engrained into this view is the notion that one who has the ability to do more, based on a Hero’s raw attributes, is greater. This appears to be the same way that Socrates is looking at the nature of souls in Book VI. This is the reason that men who have the ability to be philosophers do not always become so; family, friends and the entrapments of the non-philosophical life lead them to abandon what is deemed to be the best pursuit (*Republic* 494b-495c). Although there is no city on earth that is structured such that the philosopher will rule, if it ever came to fruition, then it would clearly be the best regime (*Republic* 497b-c). The ability of the philosopher’s soul to degenerate and not strive for its potential is necessary for the story Socrates tells in Books VIII-IX as the descent from the aristocratic city and man to the tyrannical city and man is chronicled. It also foreshadows the definition of injustice in Book X; namely that injustice is the sickness of the soul (*Republic* 609b-c).

Plato’s much discussed theory of Ideas63 serves many purposes. The focus here will be on how the Theory of Ideas and the rest of Book VII affect the ultimate goal of

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63 Or Forms.
the Republic. The general layout of the Allegory of the Cave⁶⁴ is that there are prisoners who are chained facing a wall in a cave. They rely exclusively on shadows cast by statues and other objects which are artificial images of real things in the world outside of the cave for their understanding. At some point, there is a philosopher who is released from his chains and is led up to the outside world. How the philosopher was released from his bonds is not explained. Presuming that the cave represents a non-ideal city, the fact that this is not explained makes a lot of sense. In this city, there is no mechanism for a philosopher to emerge (Republic 519a-b). He absorbs knowledge of the Forms and then descends back into the cave. The philosopher’s ascent from the cave and the realm of sensible objects toward the realm of intelligible Forms demonstrates the intellectual progress that occurs with philosophical inquiry. Upon his descent back into the cave, the philosopher no longer plays the guessing games of the prisoners and is ridiculed by them; who would kill them if they could (Republic 516e-517a). Properly understood, the cave is meant to be an allegory of our educational state (Republic 514a; Sedley 2013; 262).

Later in Book VII there is a lengthy discussion on philosophers. In it, Plato attempts to demonstrate that philosophers will make the best rulers. Dialectic both plays an important role in the selection of the guardians (Republic 537c) and, as it is practiced in current society, is extremely dangerous (Republic 537e). Dialectic attempts to understand the being of things (Republic 533b). In order for Plato to describe someone as dialectical, that person must be able to distinguish, in an account, the Form of the Good from everything else and be able to survive all attacks (Republic 534b-c).

⁶⁴ For a full discussion of the Allegory of the Cave see Wilberding (2004).
The nature of dialectic is so dangerous though, that Plato believes it should be restricted to those who are properly trained, have the right type of soul, and are of a certain age\textsuperscript{65} (Republic 539a-c). The proper type of soul is a guardian. The one who is to be taught dialectic must be of a certain age because young people will misuse the tool and refute beliefs until they disbelieve what they previously had believed (Republic 539b), while an older person is more likely to imitate looking for the truth (Republic 539c). The proper training of one who is to be taught dialectic is outlined through Book VII but it bears no relevance on the current thesis. This book solidifies specifically the Theory of Ideas, provides an argument that gives credence to the claims made in Books V and VI that the philosopher is the one who has knowledge and that because of this the philosopher has an obligation to educate and rule. Through the middle Books of the Republic, the philosopher is shown to be the best ruler based on their knowledge of Forms and their nature, and justice is made reliant on knowledge of its Form. The superiority of the philosopher in Books V-VII sets the stage for the argument described as “the greatest and most decisive overthrow” (Republic 583b) of injustice)—the argument about pleasure in Book IX.

Books VIII and IX: The Psychological Books

The special place that reason ought to have in the soul and that the philosopher ought to have in the city sets up the arguments made in Books VIII, which describe the ‘devolution’ from the aristocratic city and man to the tyrannical city and man. Book VIII

\textsuperscript{65} That age is 30 years old.
is largely concerned with the processes by which a person or city may devolve from one regime to another lower one. For a description of the regimes discussed in Book VIII see: for the timocratic city, or son, and how it would come about from an aristocratic city, or father, and its descent (Republic 545c-550c), for the oligarchic city, or son, and how it would come about from a timocratic city, or father, and its descent (Republic 550c-557a), for the democratic city, or son, and how it would come about from an oligarchic city, or father, and its descent (Republic 557a-564a), for the tyrannical city, or son, and how it would come about from a democratic city, or father, and a description of it (Republic 564a-569c). While Book VIII is fascinating, the trajectory of the book is rather straightforward and its contents have few implications on the arguments of this thesis and will be largely unmentioned except with reference to specific instances that play into other aspects of the Republic.

In Book IX, Socrates gains traction in his argument against the tyrant and for the superiority of justice. It must be remembered how ambitious a task Socrates was asked to accomplish. He has to show that justice is a greater good than injustice, even if the normal consequences of justice are flip-flopped with injustice. The most just man must appear as the most unjust man and vice versa. The fulfillment of this challenge comes in Book IX as Socrates describes and examines the life of the most unjust person, the tyrant. In the process more is drawn out of the definition of justice than in Book IV, making justice appear richer than originally presented.

The tyrant is allowed to let his erotic desires reach their maximum, leading them to become impossible to satisfy and making the tyrant constantly frustrated (Republic 579d-e). Additionally, the tyrant must eventually fear reprisals for his wrongs and this
leads to continuous mistrust of everyone around him (Republic 576a, 579a-c). The tyrant is unable to properly rule himself as the different parts of his soul are not kept in their proper place and he is in constant internal strife (Republic 573d). Clearly the tyrannical life, as it is portrayed, is not a model life that someone would wish to lead and looks quite differently than it is so favorably portrayed as in Book II. Plato’s depiction of the tyrant’s life is built upon the picture that Glaucon and Adeimantus painted to make the tyrant’s life appear attractive. The discussion in Book IX expands on what was inherent in the conception of the most unjust man (Kraut 1992; 326). Furthermore, Socrates demonstrates that the tyrannical man is by necessity impoverished, insatiable, and the most wretched man of all (Republic 577e-578b). The most unjust life at this point has a difficult time appearing more enjoyable than the most just life and the situation becomes more complicated. The situation for the most just man becomes more appealing than the situation for the most unjust man, because of his possession of knowledge of the Forms.

At this point Socrates has already claimed that only the philosopher has real knowledge, and in Book IX Socrates claims that the philosopher is the only proper judge of the quality of different pleasures. There are two different arguments that Socrates forwards concerning pleasure. They are exceptionally difficult arguments to fully grasp because Plato never explicitly clarifies what is meant by pleasure. The first of the two arguments occurs in four steps: 1) just as each part of the soul has its own desires and pleasures, people have specific desires and pleasures depending on what part of the soul rules them66. 2) Each class of people claims that their pleasure is best. 3) Whoever has the better experience, argument, and reasons is correct. 4) The philosopher has the best

66 The pleasure of philosophers is learning, for auxiliaries it is being honored, for the money-making class it is making money.
pleasure because he is the only one who has participated in all the different forms of pleasure and therefore is the best judge of which pleasure is greatest.

This argument however does not explain why the distinction between the different types pleasure is made. For this reason Socrates puts forward another argument which is described as “the greatest and most decisive overthrow” (*Republic* 583b) of injustice. This occurs in three phases: 1) pleasure and pain are not contradictories but rather opposites, and there is a middle ground in between that is neither pleasure nor pain. In this way, removing pain can seem pleasurable and removing pleasure can seem painful, but this is only a deceptive appearance. 2) Most bodily pleasures remove a pain and are not real pleasures. 3) The philosopher’s pleasure does not remove a pain and are real pleasures.

The philosopher at this point has been demonstrated to lead a more pleasurable life than the tyrant. The depiction of the tyrant shows that Plato’s argument does not rest only on the metaphysics of Books V-VII or the political theory of Books II-IV but rather builds on itself gradually making what was a social and act-centered theory of justice and extending it to the soul and then deepening this concept. While the theoretical arguments in favor of the just life come to a conclusion in Book IX, Socrates still believes that he needs to attack the poets and repel them from his city. At this point justice has been argued for, but Book X still makes the conception of justice more robust.

**Book X**

Before Plato could deny the poets access into the ideal city on epistemological grounds, Plato also needed his theory of Ideas in order to demonstrate the dangers of the
poets’ *mimetic* actions. In Plato’s system the material world is composed of the imitation, to varying degrees, of Ideas. This participation is only to an imperfect level, however, as a perfect participation would be the actual Idea. The critique of the poets centers on *mimesis* which is usefully defined as the “doing or making something that is like, and is intended to be like (i.e. imitating), something else in one aspect or another” (Marušič 2011; 222). The English verbs that are most alike *mimesis*, context dependent, are ‘imitate’ and ‘represent’ (Marušič 2011; 222). In Book X the poets are likened to the painters as Socrates claims:

For it is necessary that the good poet, if he is going to make fair poems about the things his poetry concerns, be in possession of knowledge when he makes his poems or not be able to make them. Hence, we must consider whether those who tell us this have encountered these imitations and been deceived; and, whether, therefore, seeing their works, they do not recognize that these works are third from what *is* and are easy to make for the man who doesn’t know the truth—for such a man makes what look like beings but are not (*Republic* 598e-599a).

In this part of book X, it is not yet clear in what manner poetry is characterized as *mimesis* nor what specifically about it is unreliable. For a clarification of this, Socrates compares the poets and the painters as Socrates argues:

Now consider this very point. Toward which is painting directed in each case—toward imitation of the being as it is or toward its looks as it looks? Is it an imitation of looks or of truth? Of looks he said. Therefore imitation is surely far from truth (*Republic* 598b)

Socrates goes on to say that while a painter “lays hold of a certain small part of each thing” (*Republic* 598b); he does not understand the arts of anything that he paints (*Republic* 598c). Therefore he could paint a carpenter, but this does not mean that the painter could make a hand-carved bed due to his lack of knowledge. Socrates argues that in just this same way, even though the poets describe things, in no way does this
demonstrate that they have true knowledge of a topic. The ultimate critique of the poets in Book X is to demonstrate that, just as it is naïve to believe that Homer’s narrations of the battle scenes are sufficient instruction in the art of war, it is also naïve to believe that the Homer’s narrations on ethical matters is sufficient (Ferrari 1989; 130, and Marušič 2011; 239-240). The result is that the poets present us with a view of reality that is twice removed from the forms. They imitate or depict things in the material world which are only imperfect participants of Forms, trying to find truth in the poets is moving in the wrong direction. The poets can never bring us closer to the Forms, since we already exist one degree closer than what the poems depict. Therefore, reading the poets is useless from an educational standpoint and can only do us harm.

Socrates changes the topic to the immortality of the soul (Republic 608c), after this wholesale dismantling of poetry. His interlocutors are astounded that the soul is immortal and can never be destroyed (Republic 608d). The general principle that Socrates lays down is “that which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good” (Republic 608e). They then seek the badness of the soul:

Well, then, said I, has not the soul something that makes it evil? Indeed it has, he said, all the things that we were just now enumerating, injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and ignorance. Does any one of these things dissolve and destroy it? And reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it no longer is a body at all, in like manner in all the examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity. Is not that so? Yes. (Republic 609b-d).
Socrates defines injustice as the vice of the soul, but this vice cannot destroy a soul because this would be a relief from evils, rather the effect of this vice is sleeplessness (Republic 610d-e). Soon afterward, Socrates demonstrates that if a man is truly just, then the gifts he receives from being just are better than the gifts received from seeming just (Republic 612b-d). Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul creates the Myth of Er; which acts as a cautionary tale for people to ensure that they know the dangers of the unjust life since the soul is immortal.

**Extending Homer**

As I already stated, the conclusion drawn at the end of Book IV was premature, and is strengthened by the arguments made between Books V-IX. What is left to answer is how the argument for justice is strengthened, made deeper, and more robust between Books V-IX. Justice as it is presented in the first half of Book IV is Homeric and act-centered in nature. By way of the City-Soul analogy, justice is reworded as the health of the soul by the end of Book IV and becomes something more than it was in Homer because it extends and exists beyond the social level. Yet, at this point justice is still argued for incompletely: Book IV hasn’t defined knowledge or discussed what the Good is—both key components to filling in Plato’s conception of justice, nor do we have a full account of virtue which is incomplete without Books V-VII, nor in Book IV is there reason to believe that there will be a reexamination of the psychological premises of Book II in the later Books VIII-IX which will turn the tables on the unjust man.

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67 As it is presented in the Republic, the Good is difficult to understand (506e) and hides behind the images of the Sun, Cave, and Line. There is an assumption, though, that goodness is unity (Brown 2011).
Briefly, a schematic picture of the *Republic*, for the purposes of this thesis, might look something like this: Book I is an introduction, Books II-IV discuss political theory, Books V-VII discuss metaphysics, Books VIII and IX discuss psychology, and Book X discuss the poets and the immortality of the soul. Although Books V-IX are necessary to complete the argument for justice, this does not mean that at the end of Book IV the reader has no reason to believe justice is superior to injustice. Rather, the conclusion reached in Book IV acts as a ‘place-holder’ so that the varying gaps can be filled in.

In the middle books, the nature of knowledge and the Forms is illuminated. Further, it is made clear that the philosopher is the only person who is able to know anything or interact directly with the Forms. Because Forms are the greatest good (Kraut 1992; 319), people must incorporate this new good into their lives by imitating them. Possession of the forms is necessary for true happiness and this is only possible through the use of reason. The philosopher is the only person who can achieve this and become truly just. Plato’s notion of justice is then deepened because it extends all the virtues. Only through knowledge of the Form of the virtue and imitating it can a person fully develop that virtue. Instead of justice only being the harmony of the classes of the city or the parts of the soul. It also contains an external reality that ought to be imitated. This imitation of the virtue will bring about the harmony of the different parts of the soul and classes of the city.

Plato’s description of the tyrant clearly shows that justice buttressed by the political theory of the early books and the metaphysics of the middle books is also

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68 Cooper (1977) highlights the limits of the arguments made in Book II-IV, supporting the view that they are strengthened by Books V-IX.
heavily dependent on his portrayal of psychology. The tyrant ends up suffering unseen psychological pain as a result of his imbalance. The position of the tyrant is worse than the perfectly just man because the perfectly just man has access to the Forms which is the greatest good there is. The tyrant cannot access the greatest good and loses the contest for pleasure, turning the tables on the presentation of injustice in Book II. The just man’s situation inherently outweighs anything else because of the raw value of the Forms. Again, this bolsters justice to have more in its favor and presents a deeper picture of the nature of justice.

Dahl claims at the end of his article on Plato’s defense of justice that “Plato cannot rightfully be praised for having a theory that avoids all of the problems that come with act-centered theories. If his agent-centered theory isn’t equivalent to a corresponding act-centered theory, it at least has an act-centered theory embedded in it” (Dahl 1991; 831). Dahl concluded that within Plato’s theory of justice in the Republic there must be an act-centered theory. I argue that the act-centered theory that is embedded in Plato is the Homeric worldview’s conception of justice. By borrowing the Homeric Worldview’s conception of justice, Socrates can define justice in a conventional way that people will recognize, while developing this act-centered theory into an agent-centered theory as best he can. For this reason, while the picture of justice does not change through the Republic, it is illuminated, clarified, and deepened between Books V-IX.
Conclusion

In this thesis I have argued that the Homeric conception of justice is the same formulation of justice that is presented in the first half of Book IV. That there is not a shift in the moral tone of the Odyssey from the Iliad, and that by investigating the actions of the two protagonists of these epics a unity between them may be drawn. In the Republic, the way that Plato presents justice in Book IV and in Book IX is very similar; the main difference being the arguments that the conception of justice rely upon. In Book IX Plato shows an extension of the Homeric conception that is more developed and robust. However, I posit that the Homeric conception of justice in Book IV acts as a ‘place-holder’ until Plato is able to fully argue for justice in the manner he wants. This argument takes up the bulk of Books V-IX. Using Homer’s notion of justice as a ‘place-holder’ can be seen as a useful reading because the presentation in Book IX would have been so overwhelming that it could not properly be understood until a lengthy philosophical argument is made for it. This ‘place-holder’ allows Plato to spend the length of time necessary to lay the ground work for his real definition of justice in the Republic. If Plato had placed his definition of justice, from Book IX, in Book IV, it would be too complex and would seem to come out of thin air. Plato slowly introduced the audience of the Republic to his arguments. Only after Books V-IX is it possible for Plato to define justice in the way that he fully intends to.


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