THE SOURCES OF JAPANESE CONDUCT:
ASYMMETRIC SECURITY DEPENDENCE, ROLE CONCEPTIONS
AND THE REACTIVE BEHAVIOR IN RESPONSE TO U.S. DEMANDS

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ABSTRACT

Despite her enormous economic size and large population, Japan was reluctant to participate in the management of global affairs during the Cold War, but once the United States made her request clear, Japan tended to be flexible in accommodating U.S. demands. In 1988, Kent E. Calder presented the reactive state thesis (RST), calling this peculiar aspect of Japanese policy behavior reactive. According to Calder, Japanese foreign policy behavior remains to be reactive and its main explanatory variable is the fragmented governmental structure.

The main arguments of this dissertation are (1) that the Japanese reactive behavior in the area of security policy indeed changed little, but (2) that the main explanatory variable is external rather than domestic. As an alternative causal variable, this thesis indicates the asymmetric security dependence on the United States.

We reached these arguments through operationalization and comparison. In order to test the validity of the RST, we operationalized the concept of reactivity and applied it to the Japanese responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War. The result showed no significant behavioral variation between the cases.

In order to test the causal argument of the RST, we selected South Korea, where, unlike Japan, the executive power is highly concentrated, and compared the two countries’ responses to the two wars. The reactive behavior was uniformly observed across the cases despite the cross-national difference in domestic environments.

The suggested causal chain for the reactive behavior is that the security dependence limits the capacity of the reactive state, and suppresses the proactivity towards external challenges. At the same time, it influences the role conceptions of core decision-makers,
creating a shared feeling that once the United States demands assistance, it is inevitable to provide it.

In addition to the continuity, we also noted the variations across the cases. We found two types of variations: the variation in the extent that the reactive states tried to discount U.S. demands under the limit of the reactivity and the variation in the size of the actually delivered assistance. As the causal variables for the first type, we suggested the degree of fragmentation and the existence of a veto player within the decision unit, and for the second type, we suggested the U.S. preconception on the providing capacity of a reactive state as an explanatory variable.

*Readers:*

- Kent E. Calder, Professor, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
- Charles F. Doran, Professor, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
- Karl D. Jackson, Professor, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
- Francis Fukuyama, Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University
- Eunjung Lim, Visiting Assistant Professor, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>September 11th</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTPN</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADU</td>
<td>Authoritative Decision Unit</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ATSM</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Special Measures</td>
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<td>BAI</td>
<td>Board of Audit and Inspection, ROK</td>
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<td>CADI</td>
<td>Citizens’ Action against Deployment to Iraq</td>
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<td>CIRO</td>
<td>Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, Japan</td>
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<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>DJP</td>
<td>Democratic Justice Party, ROK</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party, ROK</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defense Security Command, ROK</td>
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<td>DU</td>
<td>Decision Unit</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EPB</td>
<td>Economic Planning Board</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FOTA</td>
<td>Future of the Alliance</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand National Party, ROK</td>
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<td>GPR</td>
<td>Global Posture Review</td>
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<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JAL</td>
<td>Japan Airlines</td>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japanese Communist Party</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JOCV</td>
<td>Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers</td>
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<td>KAL</td>
<td>Korean Airlines</td>
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<td>KCIA</td>
<td>Korean Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Millennium Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Japan</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan</td>
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<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline, Japan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service, ROK</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPA</td>
<td>National Security Planning Agency, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OpCon</td>
<td>Wartime Operational Control</td>
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<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARC</td>
<td>Policy Affairs Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace-Keeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>Party for Peace and Democracy, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>RST</td>
<td>Reactive State Thesis</td>
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<td>SCM</td>
<td>Security Consultative Meeting</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Forces</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SII</td>
<td>Structural Impediment Initiative</td>
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<td>SMPD</td>
<td>Single-member Plurality District</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDU</td>
<td>Ultimate Decision Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPC</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPCC</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces in Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

If a cuckoo doesn’t sing, then, wait until it sings.

Tokugawa Ieyasu

It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.

Charles Darwin

Japanese foreign policy behavior is problematic and peculiar. Japan’s size as a country is big, but her behavior is small. That is, in terms of her economic and demographic size, Japan should act like a major power, but, in reality, Japan acts like what Kent E. Calder called a reactive state such as Austria, Norway, Taiwan, and South Korea—those small countries that have been good at adapting to changing international environment. I would call this mismatch between size and behavior as ‘Japanese peculiarity’: Japanese foreign policy behavior is reactive, when, considering her size, the behavior should not be reactive. Actually, Calder (1988) first developed and presented the concept of reactivity to describe the Japanese behavioral peculiarity in the issue area of foreign economic policy. Then, can we apply the concept to describe the behavior observed in issue areas other than foreign economic policy? If applicable, then, can we still describe Japanese foreign policy behavior in that area as reactive? In other words, is the Japanese peculiarity observed, say, in the security area?; If observable, is it changing or not?; and what are the independent variables that can explain the Japanese peculiarity?
These are the main questions that I want to answer through this dissertation.

1.1 Three Arguments

The first argument of this dissertation is that we can indeed apply the concept of reactivity to describe the behavioral feature observed in non-economic issue areas such as security or military policy, although that application needed meticulous reformulation and further operationalization of the concept of reactivity to clarify and narrow down its meaning. The second argument is that the behavioral feature of the peculiarity has changed little despite some noticeable changes in the substance of Japanese foreign policy. The third argument is that bilateral asymmetric security dependence on the United States is the central explanatory variable for the behavioral peculiarity, that is, the Japanese reactivity in foreign policy responses to U.S. demands.

More specific explanation for the third argument: during peacetime, asymmetric security dependence on the United States creates conditions that suppress the expression of proactive behavior, making Japanese foreign policy response passive, particularly when the core U.S. security interests are at stake. For example, the security dependence limits the level of attention that the Japanese government might pay to the Middle East by curbing the national capacities to influence events that occur in regions far away from home or by distorting the military structure of the ally. At the same time, the security dependence on the United States acts on the role conceptions held by core policymakers in Tokyo through such intervening variables as socialization, competition, and dense transnational networks with the United States, and produce and reproduce a strong shared
feeling among the core policymakers that it is inevitable to provide assistance for the United States, once the United States demands it. Once an external crisis occurs, or Washington does explicitly submit a list of requests, then, the latent role conceptions come up to the surface, making Japanese foreign policy response to U.S. demands flexible.

1.2 Three Caveats

Concentration on the Reactive Behavior

There are three caveats to the three main arguments. First, this dissertation does not argue that the reactive behavior covers all aspects of Japanese foreign policy. Particularly, we distinguish between behavioral and substantive aspects of Japanese foreign policy to concentrate more on the reactive behavior. Although we highlight the continuity in the Japanese peculiarity based on the observations of the reactive behavior, we do not want to disregard the empirical variations observed in the substance of Japanese foreign policy. In fact, the observations in this dissertation indeed found some variations in the substance: the amount of total assistance and the size of personnel (or military) assistance provided for the United States varied across our cases. In order to explain these variations, this dissertation suggests U.S. prior conceptions on the providing capacity of the allies as the main explanatory variable.

We could observe some variations on the behavioral side, too. Within the limit of the reactive behavior, negotiators of the responding countries tried to maximize their national interests by searching for the bottom-line of U.S. demands and discounting the demands
as much as possible. We could observe a variation in the strength of this maximizing behavior across the cases. In order to explain this behavioral variation, this dissertation introduces the concept of what Margaret G. Hermann called the authoritative decision unit (ADU) or those who make the final decision in the core decision-making process regarding a specific decision, and suggests the fragmentation within the ADU as an explanatory variable for the variation in maximizing behavior. In other words, the more fragmented the core decision-making process is, the less likely it is that we observe the expression of maximizing behavior in the responses of an ally.

In addition, our observations also showed that a flexible response did not necessarily mean 100% accommodation of foreign demands. Sometimes, the responding governments refused to accept part of the demands, albeit maintaining the overall flexibility. How could this partial inflexibility or rejection of some U.S. demands be possible? This dissertation used the concept of a veto player within the core decision-making process to explain the partial inflexibility.

In a nutshell, the essence of the first caveat is that this dissertation separates the reactive behavior from other aspects of Japanese foreign policy by meticulously operationalizing the concept of reactivity in order to narrow down and focus more sharply on the reactive behavior as the main dependent variable of this research.

I argue that this separation is justified and also required to make progress on the debate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy in the field of Japan studies. The current debate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy tends to mix up the behavioral and substantive aspects of the Japanese foreign policy, making it hard for the debate to move forward. However, this dissertation argues that we do need to make efforts to
conceptually distinguish between the behavior and the substance of a policy, and that we can find continuity in the behavioral aspect of a state’s response to foreign pressures even when there is an appreciable change in the substance of the policy response. For example, the size of the personnel assistance that the Japanese government provides in response to U.S. demands may vary over time, and yet, the behavioral observation that the Japanese government changes its decision after a U.S. request is explicitly delivered to the Japanese side can continue irrespective of the variation in the substance of the policy response.

Furthermore, this dissertation found that the current debate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy failed to distinguish between the behavioral features observed on different levels of analysis. Therefore, this dissertation argues that, distinction should be made between the overall feature and the partial characterization of policy behavior. For example, even if an administration in Tokyo refuses to accept part of U.S. demands, that partial refusal alone does not necessarily make the nature of Japanese foreign policy behavior as a whole inflexible.

In short, in order to overcome the problems of the current debate and make progress on the debate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy, this dissertation adopted an analytical approach, and pointedly aimed at the reactive character of Japanese foreign policy as a dependent variable, which will be the main concern of this research, distinct from the substantive aspect and other behavioral aspects of Japanese foreign policy that are relatively less relevant to the main concern.
Bringing the External Variables Back In

The second caveat is that we do not want to underestimate the importance of domestic variables in explaining Japanese foreign policy. This dissertation does not argue that external variables are the only possible variables that can explain Japanese foreign policy, nor claim that external variables can explain every aspect of Japanese foreign policy. Although this dissertation indicates an external variable—asymmetric security dependence on the United States—as the central variable to explain the reactive aspect of Japanese foreign policy behavior, it is worth noting that even in the causational scheme of this dissertation, the external variable alone does not explain the reactive behavior because an external variable cannot directly act on the behavior of domestic agents. For example, the bilateral asymmetry in the security relations between the United States and Japan has to act on the domestic role conceptions through intervening variables such as socialization and competition to influence the behavior of domestic policymakers. These factors—role conceptions, socialization, and competition—are all domestic. In addition, there clearly is a behavioral aspect of Japanese foreign policy that is not covered by the description of the reactive behavior. We used the concept of the ADU and the dynamics inside it to explain the aspect that is not subsumed under the rubric of the reactive behavior, and it should be noted that the ADU and its inner dynamics are also domestic factors.

Again, the argument of this dissertation is not that we have to recognize an exclusive primacy of external variables in explaining all aspects of Japanese foreign policy, but that we need to go over the domestic orientation currently prevalent within the field of Japan studies and endeavor to give a proper and due weight to the relative importance of
external factors in explaining Japanese foreign policy by rediscovering and re-highlighting the significance of external factors as an explanatory variable, which have been eclipsed for many years due to the over-emphasis on domestic factors in the field of Japan studies. Finding the main source of the Japanese reactive behavior in her security dependence on the United States will arguably be one such endeavor. This dissertation expects to stimulate an intellectual debate on the causal variables of Japanese foreign policy in the fields of Japan studies as well as security studies and comparative foreign policy analysis (FPA).

Limited Generalizability

The final caveat is that in this dissertation, we do not argue that we have reached a general theory of reactivity in explaining the responses of U.S.-allied nations to U.S. demands. We will elaborate further on the reason for the case selection of this research in a section of this chapter that deals with that topic, but we have to admit that this research deals with only four cases: the Kaifu Administration’s response to the Gulf War (K₁), the Koizumi Administration’s response to the Iraq War (K₂), the Roh Tae-woo Administration’s response to the Gulf War (R₁), and the Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s response to the Iraq War (R₂). Obviously, we will need much more number of cases to reach a significant level of generality in our research outcomes. Moreover, all our cases are dealing with the responses in a security issue area with a crisis situation as its background, then, the applicability of the theoretical conclusions reached in this research might be limited to areas related to security issues, where use of force is a central subject for discussion.
Despite these limits in generalizability and applicability, one argument of this dissertation is that, as a result of this research, we made a small but significant step forward towards higher generality and wider applicability. As mentioned above, the concept of reactivity was originally developed in the issue area of foreign economic policy. This research is a theoretical attempt to apply the concept to an issue area and a situation different from where the concept was first born through certain reformulation and operationalization of the concept. Moreover, although the number of cases in this research is clearly limited, this research attempts to compare Japanese cases with non-Japanese benchmarks with a view to creating a test environment fit for controlled comparison. Considering the fact that there has been a strong tendency in the field of Japan studies to focus exclusively on Japanese cases to explain Japanese features, I expect that a comparative qualitative approach adopted in this dissertation will be able to make a contribution to the field of Japan studies and that accumulation of such attempts will in the end raise the level of generality and expand the applicability of those theories developed in the field of Japan studies.

1.3 A Brief History of the Japanese Peculiarity

In fact, the Japanese peculiarity has a long history. As early as the late 1960s, the size of the Japanese economy caught up to those of other advanced industrialized economies. In 1978, Japan emerged as the world’s second largest economy. Despite these remarkable economic achievements, Japan’s role in the security and military parts of the global management was limited. Notice that during the Cold War era, Japan never
participated in a war or any type of international military conflicts although Japan was physically able to do so if she had so wished at least from the moment when Japan caught up to the level of industrialization in other major economies.

During the Cold War years, the Japanese peculiarity was understood in terms of the U.S. grand strategy to conduct the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The original intention of the United States immediately after the Pacific War was to disarm Japan once and for all. However, the onset of the rivalry with the Communist Camp reversed the U.S. course. Finally, in the San Francisco Treaty system or the post-war security architecture of East Asia, Japan was positioned as a non-military junior partner of the United States. The United States limited Japan’s military capability and functions: Japan does not maintain a serious war potential; instead, the United States protects Japan; in return, Japan provides military bases for the U.S. forces; and, in case of a war, Japan would supply rear service for the U.S. military.

Strangely, however, the Japanese peculiarity continued even after the end of the Cold War. If the source of the Japanese peculiarity had been the U.S. Cold War strategy, which was created to meet the international needs to conduct the Cold War, then, the Japanese behavior should have returned to normalcy, as soon as the brake or the Cold War structure of the international system disappeared. And yet, Japan continued to be reluctant to be involved in the management of the world order. The reluctance was most conspicuously felt in the Japanese response to the Gulf War of 1991.

To be sure, the continuation of the Japanese peculiarity into the post-Cold War era was not just a linear extension of the peculiarity observed during the Cold War period. Substantively, Japanese participation in global conflict management increased gradually
but steadily throughout the 1990s and the 2000s and culminated in the historic dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq in 2004. Moreover, in some isolated cases such as Japan’s responses to the events in Southeast Asia, Japanese foreign policy showed behavioral patterns that had rarely been observed during the Cold War period. Nevertheless, some experts still believed that there was no fundamental change in the central behavioral patterns of Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, other commentators began to argue that Japan had now graduated from the Cold War mentality, and was ready to go back to normalcy.

1.4 Debate: Japanese Foreign Policy, Changing or Not?; and What is the Cause?

Naturally, a debate began. One group of scholars and experts argued that the behavioral essence of Japanese foreign policy has changed little despite the gradual change in the substance of the policy. On the other hand, the other group of scholars began to claim that Japanese foreign policy is changing. The debate is continuing even today. However, there is one similarity between the two groups of scholars within the debate: both groups tend to emphasize the influence of domestic factors as the main source(s) of Japanese diplomatic behavior. Most of the scholars, whether they argue for or against the existence of change in Japanese foreign policy, indicate domestic factors as the main cause(s) of the change or lack thereof in Japanese foreign policy.

In fact, this domestically oriented tendency is not so surprising. For those who emphasize the continuity of Japanese foreign policy, paying attention to domestic factors is a must because Japanese foreign policy seems to have changed little despite a great change in an international variable, that is, the collapse of the Cold War international
structure. Then, it is natural for them to think that the cause(s) of the continuity should be found in domestic factors. For those who emphasize the change in Japanese foreign policy, the collapse of the Cold War structure obviously should be an important factor indeed. However, they also want to pay attention to domestic factors as the source(s) of Japanese behavior because for the past quarter century, there had been many critical changes in Japanese domestic factors: political institutions, bureaucratic and party structure, demography, memory of the Pacific War and the Defeat, economic growth rates, et cetera all changed remarkably. Then, it is by no means strange for them to try to find the source(s) of the change in the great changes in domestic factors.

1.5 Problems of the Current Debate and the Direction of This Research

One of the central goals of this dissertation is to contribute to the progress of this debate on Japanese foreign policy. The current debate and discussions on Japanese foreign policy has three problems. First of all, there is no agreed common conceptual tool to measure the change in Japanese foreign policy. Each scholar argues for or against the continuity of Japanese foreign policy, but rarely provides a specific operational definition of a conceptual tool with which to measure the degree of change or distinguish between change and continuity.

Second, in the current debate, the discussions on substance and behavior of Japanese foreign policy are confusingly mixed up. Those who argue for the change in Japanese foreign policy tend to emphasize the substantive change or policy accomplishments in Japanese foreign policy. For example, in the 1970s, it was absolutely unthinkable to send
SDF troops overseas, but now, based on the PKO Law, the Japanese SDF troops are participating in the peacekeeping operations of the UN. This is evidence for change, they would argue. On the other hand, those who argue for the continuity tend to accentuate the behavioral aspect of the policy. For instance, some argue that whatever the substance of the policy is, the Japanese government tends to succumb to foreign pressure and change the original decision, especially when the pressure is coming from the United States. Therefore, when measured by its behavior, they would argue, Japanese foreign policy has changed little.

Finally, we need to rethink over the domestically oriented tendency within the current debate on Japanese foreign policy. Their emphasis on and attention to Japanese cases and Japanese domestic factors to explain the change or continuity of Japanese foreign policy indeed have a reason for themselves as we just explained above. However, focusing too much on Japanese cases and Japanese domestic factors only will not be so instrumental to raise the generalizability and the applicability of the research outcomes. And also, with domestically oriented research designs based primarily on Japanese cases, it will be hard to highlight the truly Japanese characteristics distinct from the characteristics of other Asian countries, and it will also be difficult to assess the relative explanatory power of the domestic factors.

In order to solve these three problems, we need to make efforts in three directions. First, we need to make more efforts to operationalize the concepts that are being used in the field more clearly so that we can agree upon a common concept to measure the change or continuity of Japanese foreign policy. Second, in order to make a breakthrough to the stalemate between substance and behavior, we need to make more efforts to
conceptually distinguish between substance and behavior of Japanese foreign policy when describing and assessing it. Finally, if we truly want to strengthen those arguments based on domestic factors, then, we need to compare Japanese cases with non-Japanese cases that have different domestic environment. If the comparison shows that those two types of cases produce different outcomes, then, it will strengthen those theories that explain Japanese foreign policy with domestic factors.

1.6 The Theory and the Cases

This dissertation is a result of the efforts made in the three directions that we just mentioned. First of all, we chose an existing theory that describes and explains the aspect of Japanese foreign policy that is of main concern for us, and operationalized the central concepts of the theory to test the continuity in that aspect of the Japanese foreign policy. Second, when operationalizing, we tried to separate the behavioral aspect of Japanese foreign policy from its substantive aspect and separately observed and measured the variations in both aspects. Third, when measuring, we did not just measure the ‘Japanese’ change. We chose a country whose domestic environment is different from Japan’s as a benchmark, and measured the variations in its policy behavior and substance, and compared its measurements with those of Japan.

Selection of the Theoretical Anchor

The theory we chose is the reactive state thesis (RST) that Kent E. Calder put forth in 1988 (Calder 1988). We chose the RST as a theoretical anchor of this dissertation,
because the RST was one of the first attempts to conceptualize the peculiarity of Japanese foreign policy in a theoretical and comparable way and also because the RST is relatively concentrating on the behavioral aspect of Japanese foreign policy. According to the RST, the peculiar aspect of Japanese foreign policy is found in the behavioral observation that Japan is different in the way they conduct their foreign policy from other major powers of similar size. Notice that, at the time of this writing, the size of the Japanese economy is still almost the same as the size of the British and French economies combined, although the performance of the Japanese economy has been listless for the past quarter century.¹ Despite her big size, Japan has behaved differently in comparison with other major powers of the international system such as the United Kingdom and France.

In 1988, Calder theoretically tackled this puzzle, and defined the key behavioral feature of Japanese foreign economic policy as “reactive”: the Japanese state does not undertake initiatives, and rather, wait for other countries to move first; when the time is ripe, however, they flexibly adapt to foreign demands. Calder presented this behavioral observation in a comparative manner because he found that the behavioral characteristics of the Japanese foreign policy were distant from other major powers; rather, closer to what he called the reactive states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Norway and Austria (Calder 1988, 519).

Calder found the causes of the Japanese behavioral peculiarity primarily in the domestic constraints: particularly, the fragmented character of the Japanese state authority and the party structure slows down the policy process, and makes the Japanese

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¹According to IMF statistics, as of 2013, the GDP (current prices) of Japan is US$ 4,902 billion while those of the United Kingdom and France are US$ 2,536 billion and US$ 2,737 billion, respectively. The combined size of the U.K. and French economies as of 2013 is therefore US$ 5,273 billion. See Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014. These statistics were retrieved on 26 April 2014.
government passive. Interestingly, Calder argued that the very causes for the initial passive behavior of the Japanese foreign policy are making the Japanese policy response flexible subsequently. In each issue area, the fragments of the Japanese government and the political parties are transnationally connected to and penetrated by foreign interests. This transnational link in each issue area is the main force that induces the flexibility of the Japanese foreign policy responses, and this link is possible because the Japanese government and political parties are fragmented.

In short, the RST defined the concept of reactivity and put Japan in the category of the reactive state, and at the same time argued that the main causal variable of the reactive behavior lies in the domestic constraints of the reactive state. In this dissertation, we will try to test the validity and the reliability of the RST. That is, we will test whether the concept of reactivity is correctly describing the foreign policy behavior of what it calls the reactive states including Japan (validity test) and whether the RST is proved in a multiple number of cross-national cases (reliability test). Also, in this dissertation, we will test the causal effect of the domestic constraints on the reactive behavior.

Selection of the Cases

For these purposes, we need empirical test cases. This dissertation chose the Japanese responses to the Gulf War as the first case. The Gulf War and the Japanese responses to it provide a good testing ground for our questions. As mentioned above, we would like to know whether the Japanese peculiarity is observed in the area of security policy. If observable, then, we would like to see whether it is changing, and find the causal variables that can explain the Japanese peculiarity.
The Japanese responses to the Gulf War provides a good testing ground for the applicability of the RST to other issue areas because the Gulf War was the first serious challenge to the Japanese peculiarity in the area of security policy. The Iraqi invasion into Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the U.S.-led coalition’s responses to the invasion, which eventually led to the Gulf War in the next year, posed the first serious global security crisis to the international community in the beginning of the post-Cold War period. It was a formidable challenge for Japan as well. First, the crisis took place in a region critical for the energy supply for Japan. At the time, more than 70% of Japanese imported oil came from the Middle East, and at the time of the Gulf Crisis, Japan had a large refinery facilities being developed near the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Second, since it was a security crisis on a global dimension, as an important member of the international community, Japan was expected to have a due incentive for participating actively in the responses of the international community to the crisis and the creation of a new world order. Finally, the single most important security partner of Japan was leading the international coalition against the invasion and explicitly asked Japan to express support and provide assistance for the coalition.

As a result of the Gulf Crisis/War, Japan had to directly face serious and difficult security questions: how Japan should frame the Gulf Crisis/War?; what should be the position of Japan in response to the Gulf Crisis/War?; how Japan should respond to U.S. demands regarding the Gulf Crisis/War; and more specifically how much of the U.S. demands Japan should accommodate? The essence of these questions actually boiled down to one question: whether Japan should maintain her foreign policy response patterns that had been established during the Cold War era. Namely, it was a challenge
against the Japanese peculiarity.

Interestingly, Japan faced basically the same questions some twelve years later. A similar crisis occurred in the same part of the world. This time, too, the United States went to war with Iraq, and to this end, the United States organized an international coalition and for this coalition, asked for support and assistance from her allies. Again, Japan had to define her role in the coalition for herself and decide on how to respond to the U.S. demands. Japanese answers to these questions will constitute our second case.

The comparison of the two cases is expected to provide a good testing ground to test the continuity in the Japanese peculiarity or the Japanese reactive behavior in the area of security policy because Japan had to respond to similar challenges in similar circumstances with twelve years’ interval. Moreover, the comparison is expected to provide a good quasi-experimental environment to test the causal effect of domestic constraints on the behavior and substance of Japanese foreign policy because, between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, the Japanese political system experienced great changes in electoral law, executive structure, and the procedures for intra-party competition. The central effect of all these institutional reforms was the strengthened power of the prime minister. Notice that the fragmented character of the executive and party structure or the lack of a strong chief executive was the main causal variable of the RST to explain the reactivity. If the prediction of the RST is true, then, all these institutional changes are expected to weaken the domestic constraints that produce the reactive behavior and thereby weaken the reactive behavior itself. If observations show that the domestic institutional reforms did not create a meaningful change in the behavior and substance of the Japanese responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War, then, the
explanatory power of the domestic constraints will be weakened. In addition to the inter-temporal comparison between Japanese cases, we will also conduct cross-national comparisons. Specifically, we choose South Korea as our benchmark and compare the Japanese responses with the South Korean ones. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the choice is justified by the similarities between Japan and South Korea. South Korea has many socio-political and cultural features in common with Japan, but most importantly, as a military ally of the United States, South Korea faced the same questions as Japan did when the Gulf and the Iraqi Crises occurred. Moreover, remember that the original RST presented not only Japan but also South Korea as an example of the reactive state. Then, we can expect that Japan and South Korea will show similar reactive patterns in responding to the crises and the U.S. demands. In other words, the reactive state model should be able to describe not only Japanese but also South Korean responses correctly. If there is a significant variation in the responses of the two countries that the reactive state model does not cover, then we can raise a question about the describing capacity of the reactive state model.

The second reason is that the comparison of Japan and South Korea will give us an opportunity to test the causal argument of the RST. The RST indicated the domestic constraints, particularly, fragmented political structure and the lack of a strong chief executive as the main causal variable for the reactive behavior. However, in South Korea, these main explanatory variables are missing. Based on these missing variables, we can expect that South Korea will not show the reactive behavior in response to U.S. demands. If we can observe reactive patterns in the responses of both Japan and South Korea, then we can raise a serious suspicion about the causal argument of the RST.
1.7 Values Added: Operationalization and Explanation

Operationalization of the Concepts

The first task that should be done to test the selected theory with the selected cases is to carve out the dependent variable and transform it into a measurable object. To this end, operationalization was essential. According to the RST, the concept of reactivity is broken down into the aspects of passivity and flexibility. We found two observable implications that constitute the essence of the concept of passivity. First, the reactive state waits for external initiatives without first taking an initiative. If this interpretation is applied to our cases, then Japan or South Korea fails to pass the test of passivity if they take an independent action in response to the crisis in the Middle East before American requests materialize. Secondly, a passive policymaker does not propose a counter-proposal that exceeds the original foreign demand, and is not willing to change the framework that creates the foreign demands itself. For example, if Japan or South Korea provides more financial assistance than is required by the United States or fundamentally changes the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, then, we can no longer characterize their foreign policy response as passive.

From the essence of the concept of flexibility, we extracted two observable implications. First, the reactive state accommodates foreign demands. Then, at what level of accommodation, we can call the response flexible? A 100% accommodation of foreign demands will naturally be called flexible. A zero-percent accommodation will be judged to be inflexible. Then, what about 5% or 90% accommodation? In order to empirically
distinguish between flexibility and inflexibility, we drew the demarcation at the 50% line on the scale of accommodation although it is an arbitrary decision. For example, therefore, if the only U.S. request is the financial assistance of US$ 1 billion, and if Japan does not provide more than US$ 500 million for the United States, Japan will fail to pass the test of flexibility. The second observable implication is that the promised assistance should be delivered on time. Then, what is the definition of the “delivery on time”? We defined that an implementation of the promised assistance is flexible when the delivery of the assistance is made within a usually required amount of time. For example, let us suppose that it usually takes two months for a South Korean administration to place an army division in an Iraqi city. If a South Korean administration needed more than two months to actually deliver an army division to Iraq, then the South Korean response fails to pass the test of flexibility.

Some commentators may criticize that the sort of operationalization as explicated above fails to discern behavior from substance because the second observable implication of the concept of passivity and the first observable implication of the concept of flexibility seem to involve the substance of foreign policy responses. However, it is worth noting that our operational definition of the concept of reactivity does not presuppose a specific level of the policy substance to distinguish between reactivity and non-reactivity. The way we define the concepts of passivity and flexibility has nothing to do with the specific level or size of the provided assistance. For example, we do not define the concept of passivity in such a way that we claim that we cannot regard the Japanese military policy as passive if some SDF troops are dispatched overseas. According to our definition, whatever the substance of U.S. demands is, we will call a response passive if
the response comes after a foreign initiative and does not exceed the foreign demand. Such is the same with the way we define the concept of flexibility. If the degree of accommodation of a state falls between the 50% and the 100% marks on the scale of accommodation, then we will judge that the response passed the test of flexibility. Notice that here we did not specify the substantive baseline of the scale of accommodation. Whatever the substance of U.S. demands is, if a state accommodates 50% to 100% of the foreign demand, then we will regard the response as flexible assuming that the delivery was made on time. In this sense, we argue that our operational definition of the concept of reactivity discerned the behavioral aspect from the substantive aspect of the policy responses.

**Explanation of the Uniformity**

As a result of applying the aforementioned four criteria to our cases, this dissertation reached a conclusion that the four cases that we dealt with all passed the test of reactivity. In all the four cases, the governments showed reactive behavior in response to U.S. demands. We could not find a significant behavioral difference between Japanese responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War. That is, we found continuity in their foreign policy behavior. Likewise, we could not find a significant variation across the Japanese and South Korean responses. That is, despite the lack of the domestic constraints that the RST indicated as the main explanatory variable for the reactive behavior, we could not find a significant cross-national variation in the dependent variable.

In order to explain the uniformity in the reactive behavior observed in the four cases, we compared the explanatory power of possible candidate independent variables, and
reached a conclusion that an external variable, that is, asymmetric bilateral security dependence on the United States is the main explanatory variable. And, as intervening variables that connect the main independent variable and the reactive behavior, we suggested socialization of the core decision-makers, competition among the domestic agents, and the dense and tight transnational networks between the policymakers of the reactive states and the United States.

**Explanation of the Variations**

Aside from the uniformly observed reactive behavior, we also tried to observe whether there were any variations in other aspects of the foreign policy of the reactive states. Particularly, we noted the fact that under the externally imposed restriction of the reactivity, the four administrations in our cases tried to maximize their national interests by discounting U.S. demands or refusing to accept part of the U.S. demands.

In fact, we found a variation in this national-interest maximizing behavior across the cases. In the Kaifu Administration, however, the discounting behavior was found to be weaker than in the other three administrations. For example, the Kaifu Administration never discounted the U.S. demand for financial assistance. In order to explain this outlier, we introduced the concept of the fragmentation within the decision unit as an explanatory variable.

It is worth noting that this concept is different from the fragmented character of the governmental structure that the RST indicated as the main explanatory variable. The RST presented the fragmented character as an explanatory variable for the reactive behavior, but we suggested the fragmentation within the decision unit as an explanatory variable.
for the maximizing behavior observed within the limit of the reactive behavior. Also, the governmental structure as presented by the RST is institutional, therefore, rather constant and enduring. On the other hand, the size and scope of the decision unit can vary frequently depending on the nature of the occasion for a decision.

A variation was also found in the extent of refusing to accept part of foreign demands. In the administrations headed by Prime Ministers Kaifu and Koizumi, and President Roh Tae-woo, some items on the U.S. list of requests were rejected completely. For example, the Kaifu and Koizumi Administrations refused to send SDF troops to an area technically defined as a war zone. However, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration never completely rejected any item on the U.S. list of requests although some demands were met at a discount.

In order to explain this outlier, we suggested the existence of a veto player within the decision unit as an explanatory variable. In the core decision-making process of the three administrations except for the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, there was a veto player within the decision unit, who was willing and able to veto part of the U.S. demands. However, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration had no such veto player because Roh Moo-hyun as an individual leader was the decision unit or the only core decision-maker. In consequence, the lack of veto players made the Roh Moo-hyun Administration accommodate all items on the U.S. list of requests more or less.

We also noted the effect of discounting by the reactive states on the substance of policy responses. In fact, we could observe substantive variations in the total assistance (the amount of financial assistance plus the cost of sending and stationing personnel assistance) and the relative size of personnel (or military) assistance for the U.S.-led
coalitions. In terms of the size of the total assistance, the Japanese provided more for the Gulf War than for the Iraq War while the South Koreans provided more for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War. That is, we could observe an X-shaped variation in the total assistance provided by the four administrations. In terms of the relative size of the personnel (or military) assistance, South Korea consistently provided more than Japan did (a skew to the Korean side across the four cases). At the same time, we could observe that more personnel (or military) assistance was provided for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War (a skew to the Iraq War side across the four cases).

In order to compare the explanatory power of the domestic and external variables on these variations, we introduced the framework of demand and discount. That is, we compared the pattern of variations observed in the original U.S. demands before discounting with the pattern of variations observed in the size of the realized assistance after discounting. The expectation was that if domestic variables are more important than external variables in explaining the substantive variations in the assistance provided for the United States, then, the pattern of variations before discounting will be fundamentally different from the pattern of variations after discounting on the assumption that the causal effect of domestic variables will be expressed through the process of discounting. As a result of this comparison between the patterns of variations before and after the discounting, we found that we could observe the X-shaped variation and the militaristic skews in the original U.S. demands. The discounting by the reactive states indeed made some changes to the variations, but did not change the central pattern of variations in the substance of the responses. This finding suggests that, although the discounting process and the influence of the domestic variables expressed through it play a role in
determining the substantive level of the assistance provided for the United States, the influence of the original U.S. demands was stronger in determining the size of the total assistance and the personnel (or military) assistance. In order to explain this observation, we suggested the U.S. prior conceptions on the providing capacity of the reactive state as an explanatory variable.

1.8 Organization of the Chapters

In the next chapter, we will review the debate on the RST by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the RST and its critics, and assessing the contributions that each theory made to the understanding of Japanese foreign policy. We will also discuss the lessons we learned from the review with a view to clarifying common problems held by the RST and its critics.

The goal of Chapter 3 is to establish a framework of measurement. In order to test the validity of each argument within the RST debate, we need criteria. Therefore, we will try to set up the criteria that are required to test the RST in this chapter. In so doing, we will try to reorganize the definition of the reactivity and present it in a testable form in order to overcome the common problems of the existing theories mentioned in Chapter 2.

In Chapters 4 and 5, we will describe our cases. When describing, the test criteria that we established in Chapter 3 will work as our descriptive anchors. That is, the test criteria will be used as standardized questions that we raise uniformly across the cases. The descriptions will be given in the five stages of the foreign policy-making: assessment of the environment, goal-setting, assessment of policy alternatives, determination of the
action to be taken, and implementation. Also, the descriptions will pay attention to the international backgrounds and the domestic situations surrounding the leaders in each case, and the major issues that they dealt with at the time in addition to the issue of how to respond to U.S.-led wars. This description of issues and situations will be useful for simulating the real problems that the policymakers in each case faced as realistically as possible. Furthermore, in these chapters, we will try to describe not just the static outcomes of the policy process in response to U.S. demands, but also the dynamic process of discussing, debating, and discounting inside the decision-making apparatus. For this purpose, the pros and cons advocated in the decision-making process on their way to the final decision will also be described.

In Chapters 6 and 7, we will test the validity of the RST and its critics. In other words, we will test whether the predictions derived from the RST and its critics are consistent with the empirical measures obtained from our descriptions. In Chapter 6, we will try to find the answers to the four standardized questions that we established in Chapter 3 by explicitly raising those questions uniformly across our cases and see whether the reactive state as a model still fits the reality, or whether the RST is still useful for describing the reality of Japanese foreign policy behavior. In the meantime, we will also compare the observed responses of the reactive states such as Japan and South Korea with the responses of such non-reactive states as France and the United Kingdom in order to better highlight the peculiarity of the reactive behavior vis-à-vis the behavior of non-reactive states. In the first section of Chapter 7, we will test the competing theories presented by the critics of the RST by checking whether the observable implications that we extracted from each critique in Chapter 3 are really observed in the cases. In the
second section, we will describe the behavioral and substantive variations that we found in the process of testing the counter-arguments against the RST.

In Chapter 8, we will compare the explanatory power of each candidate causal variable by testing whether there is a correlation between the variation in the reactive behavior and the variation in the values on the selected candidate explanatory variable. Once the correlation is confirmed, then, we will try to find the intervening variables that connect the independent and dependent variables.

Likewise, in Chapter 9, we will try to explain the variations that we found in Chapter 7. Our foremost method of explanation will be again to look for the correlation between a candidate variable and the dependent variable. If the correlation is confirmed, then, we will try to depict the causal chains among the variables.

In the final chapter, we will summarize the empirical findings and the descriptive, explanatory and theoretical contributions of this research, and suggest the implications of the findings. Finally, at the end, we will present possible directions for further research.
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES

Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend.

Mao Zedong

They don't see each other. They only see what they want to see.

Cole Sear, a character in M. Night Shyamalan’s *The Sixth Sense*

One crucial problem of description in social science is that in reality there are too many events to be described. In order not to be overwhelmed by the cacophony of observations, we need to have a descriptive focus. The best way to find this focus is to choose a theory or a hypothesis. In order to find the descriptive focus for this research, we will first critically review the reactive state thesis (RST) and the debate centering on it. The bone of contention in the debate will be whether the reactive character still constitutes the key feature of the Japanese foreign policy behavior.

In the debate on the RST, a group of scholars argue against the RST, claiming that Japanese foreign policy is no longer reactive. On the other hand, the other group of scholars agrees with the RST’s behavioral description, but differs on the source of the reactive behavior. We need to see which argument—the RST or its critics—is closer to the reality.

For this purpose, we first need to conduct a critical review of the debate to assess the merits and demerits of each argument and the theoretical contributions that each argument made to the debate. Then, based on this assessment, we will try to abstract
some common problems shared by the RST and its critics, and find suggestions for overcoming them.

**2.1 Political Context of the Reactive State**

Before we begin the critical review of the debate on the RST, we first have to clarify the heuristic value of the concept of the reactive state. Reactivity may be regarded as useless, as a conceptual tool of exploring social reality, because, in a sense, not only Japan and South Korea but also every state in the international system is one way or another ‘reactive’: all countries have to react to what happens outside their territories or what is beyond their control. To this rule, even the most powerful player in international politics is not an exception. The Reagan administration had to react, although reluctantly, when in 1983 two suicidal truck bombs attacked U.S. military barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American servicemen, by withdrawing from Lebanon. Also, the 9/11 attacks and the American reactions to them are none other than a good example of the United States having to react inevitably. If each and every state is more or less reactive, then we will not be able to discern a reactive state from a non-reactive state.

In this dissertation, however, the word, “reactive” does not just mean a policy reaction to whatever stimulant from the outside. It has as its background the problem of how to handle a demand made by a foreign country. For example, the United States as a leader of the international community wants other members of the community to participate in the global governance. Such governance includes maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East, stemming nuclear proliferation, fighting global terrorism,
and responding to climate change, et cetera. For the collective task of the management of global affairs, the United States submits a list of requests to other countries. The demand is more strongly made when the United States regards a country as a close ally located in a strategically important position and large enough to share the burdens.

One good example is Japan. Former U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard P. Lawless once argued that “Japan must start doing things for itself that it has historically expected the U.S. to do on its behalf,” after calling Japan’s defense planning “episodic rather than systemic … reactive rather than proactive” (Frederick 2005, 21-2; underline by author). Thus, “reactive” in this context was an adjective used to describe a U.S.-allied nation that is not forthcoming in response to U.S. demands: be it higher value of the currency, more ODA, or more assistance for the U.S. war on terror. The word can be used to describe any U.S.-allied nation that faces U.S. demands, but is reluctant to meet them. In this context, then, the adjective “reactive” cannot be reserved only to describe Japanese foreign policy behavior. Any country that faces foreign demands, and is reluctant to provide what has been demanded can be described as reactive.

However, it was Japan that became the first serious target of the debate on the reactive state. It is probably because Japan was one of the fastest among the countries that recovered from the ashes of World War II, and also because Japanese economic growth since the 1960s was believed to be based on an aggressive export-oriented strategy preying on U.S. markets. Moreover, in the eyes of Washington, Japan seemed to be free-riding under U.S. security umbrella although she became rich enough to pay the whole fare.

However, if the word “reactive” had been used only in this kind of political context,
then, it might have been inappropriate to use the word as a concept for serious scientific research. Besides its political usage, the concept of reactivity as we examine in this dissertation has a systematic foundation.

2.2 Review of the Debate

The Reactive State Thesis

In a 1988 article for *World Politics*, a Japan expert attempted to grasp the uniqueness of Japanese foreign policy behavior in a systematic way. There had already been many popular and political critiques against the reluctant behavior of the Japanese state, but this article was one of the first attempts to raise popular complaints about Japanese foreign policy to a theoretical level. The article created a behavioral four-way typology of states, and defined a behavioral puzzle by finding Japan in the group of the reactive states, where, according to the article, Japan should not belong. By defining the uniqueness of Japanese foreign policy behavior in general and comparable terms, the article opened the way for the possibility of comparing Japanese behavior with that of another reactive state, say, South Korea, and thereby increasing our general knowledge about the reactive state or the allies of the United States in general.

Three arguments epitomize this article. First, Japanese foreign policy is passive: Japan “fails to undertake independent initiatives when it has the power and incentives to do so” (Calder 1988, 519). This statement about the character of the Japanese state is

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2 According to the definition of this dissertation, the reactivity is composed of the passivity and the flexibility; the passivity is a sub-category of the reactivity. Therefore, conceptually, passivity is discernible from reactivity. However, even Calder himself, at times, uses the “passivity” and the “reactivity” interchangeably. For example, he says, “Why is the Japanese state *reactive* but nevertheless intermittently...
amazing, according to the author, because, considering the level of economic development, the demographic size, and its standing in the global financial market, Japanese foreign policy should not be passive, but closer to the policies of, say, France or the United Kingdom.

Figure 2-1 Two-dimensional Typology of States based on Passivity and Flexibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passivity</th>
<th>Flexibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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Second, although passive, Japanese foreign policy is flexible when enough pressures are exercised from the outside: Japan does “respond to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely” (Calder 1988, 519). This feature is also peculiar because many states whose foreign policies are passive often do not respond to external pressures at all because their internal institutions are too petrified to adequately respond. For example, some failed countries in Africa are not just passive but also inflexible and rigid; they are internally too fragmented by civil wars and internal

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flexible in the face of foreign pressure? (Calder 1988, 533; italicized by author). In the context of this sentence, the word, “reactive” can be replaced by the word, “passive.” Despite Calder (1988)’s interchangeable usage of the words, “passive” and “reactive,” in this dissertation, we will keep using the word, “passive” as a sub-category of the word, “reactive.” Therefore, a policy is reactive only when it is passive and flexible.
strife to react to changing external environments. On the other hand, some other states, including Japan, do adjust to the environment. Calder (1988, 519) names this type of state whose foreign policies are passive but flexible a “reactive state,” and puts Japan in this category together with such small but successful countries as Austria, Norway, South Korea, and Taiwan as we can see in Figure 2-1.³

The third argument is about the source of the reactive behavior. Calder (1988, 528) argues that the main behavioral source of the Japanese reactive state is found in domestic constraints. In producing this argument, at first, he takes a deductive and indirect approach. Explanations of foreign policy behavior can be found in one of three areas: state strategy, international environment, and domestic structure of the state (Calder 1988, 526). The postwar state strategy of Japan can be summarized as the Yoshida Doctrine: keep a low profile in the international arena and focus on economic growth to catch up with the developed countries. The international environment given to Japan after 1945 was the Cold War and the U.S.-centric international system, which did not allow Japan much room to maneuver. By the 1980s, however, the Japanese state strategy was completed: in economic terms, Japan had caught up with most advanced Western countries; the Cold War was winding down; and the U.S.-centric system was being replaced with a more equal balance of power among the western-bloc countries. Yet, the Japanese domestic structure, Calder (1988, 528) argues, was basically unchanged. Therefore, the argument goes, the domestic structure should be the strongest source of the ‘still unchanged’ reactive behavior.

More specifically, Calder describes what he meant by the domestic structure as a

³Calder (1988) does not graphically provide Figure 2-1 in his article. Figure 2-1 was created by the author of this dissertation based on the definition of the four-fold typology given by Calder (1988, 519).
source of the passivity and the flexibility, respectively. For the passive behavior of the Japanese foreign policy, the fragmented character of the state authority, or the absence of strong executives are presented as the specific source.

To be sure, Japan has powerful national ministries such as MITI and the Ministry of Finance, which lend an aspect of decisiveness to policy on narrow technical issues within their clear individual areas of technical expertise and established professional concern (nawabari) . . . But on broad, complex questions of global economic management, or on issues created by emerging technology or economic transformation where bureaucratic responsibilities have yet to be defined, ministerial jurisdiction is often unclear, and internal conflict over how to proceed is often strong. In such cases . . . Japanese policies can hardly avoid being [passive] (Calder 1988, 529).

Simply put, when a new and critical issue arises, the Japanese state hesitates, and becomes indecisive because, in the Japanese domestic political structure, the authority to decide is fragmented, and there is no top authority to resolve the bureaucratic conflicts over how to deal with the new issues.

In addition to the fragmentation of the state authority, Calder also suggests the oversensitivity of the Japanese state to the interest-group pressure and the fragmented party structure as another cause of the passive behavior. Japanese interest-group politics is driven by such parochial interests as “agricultural federations and small-business dominated regional chambers of commerce” (Calder 1988, 530), while internationalist forces such as defense lobby and multinational enterprises with global interests have been relatively weak in Japanese politics. Moreover, in the Japanese electoral system of medium-size districts, where candidates from the same party often have to compete with each other, the expression of ideological clarity was suppressed while the appeal to the parochial interests was promoted. This state of affairs is reflected in the higher echelons
of the ruling party, too. “Dietmen—that most likely to advance to the higher ranks of a seniority-oriented conservative political world—devote themselves to service to their constituents, especially in the agricultural and construction areas” (Calder 1988, 531). As a result, this peculiar combination of the prevalence of domestically-oriented interest groups, the system of the medium-size electoral districts, and the faction-based, fragmented party structure all combined to “inhibit the LDP from undertaking decisive, independent foreign policy initiatives” (Calder 1988, 531).

Then, what is the source of the flexible character of the Japanese state? Again, Calder finds the major source of the flexibility in the fragmented character of the Japanese domestic structure: “the existence of crosscutting communities of interest between Japanese and foreign interest groups” (Calder 1988, 534). In other words, the Japanese political system, particularly, the interest-group politics is fragmented, and therefore, receptive to the penetrations by foreign forces. So, when a negotiation arises between Japan and a foreign country, “cross-national interest-group coalitions” between the two countries will have “the leverage within Japan to induce some flexibility in the Japanese government” (Calder 1988, 534).

Interestingly, Calder indicates an additional source of flexibility, which is also a domestic factor: the unusual structure of the Japanese media. Actually, he emphasizes the dual character of the Japanese media: “they encourage some policy flexibility while also inhibiting proactive Japanese initiatives” (Calder 1988, 534). The Japanese media market is highly monopolized by several large media conglomerates such as the Asahi and the Yomiuri groups. Given the “homogeneous and relatively conformist” cultural backgrounds of the Japanese society, these media groups can exert great political
influence over the public and swiftly “sway grassroots opinion” in one direction (Calder 1988, 535). Under these circumstances, politicians have to watch closely how a foreign initiative is received by the media before they come up with their own initiatives because, if their initiative ends up on the other side of public opinion, which will soon be organized and expressed by the large media, it is politically too risky. These conditions of the media market in Japan promote cautiousness, and restrain assertiveness among politicians. However, the same condition sometimes can make the policy process more flexible. Once public opinion begins to materialize and lean toward one direction, especially after a foreign country exercises strong pressure on the Japanese government and society, the highly integrated and monopolized media industry can facilitate policy change. Once “a consensus on the need for change is reached,” the change is inexorable and very fast (Calder 1988, 535).

The policy implication of Calder’s argument was clear and straightforward: the Japanese state is passive, and hesitant to accommodate foreign demands, but, due to its unique domestic structure, when a proper amount of pressure is exercised from the outside, the Japanese state can be flexible enough to accommodate the foreign demands. Years later, Calder’s argument was echoed by other Japan experts (Blaker 1993; Pharr 1993). And his ideas provided a theoretical background for the so-called revisionist school of the Clinton administration, which advocated putting overwhelming pressure on Japan in trade negotiations, based on a so-called “results-oriented” approach (Schoppa 1997, 1-3). Necessity of overwhelming pressure could be justified by the RST, because, if Japan is a reactive state, that is, passive but flexible, and unable to change due to domestic constraints, then, only overwhelming pressure from the outside can change
Japan’s course in the ‘right’ direction.4

Proactive Japan

The RST provoked a number of counter-arguments, and one of his critics came from the heart of the Japanese state: Kasumigaseki, Tokyo, where powerful ministries of the Japanese central government including the Foreign Ministry clustered. Kohno Masaharu, former Japanese Ambassador to Russia and former Deputy Minister of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), wrote a working paper criticizing the RST when he was serving as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution in 1999.

His main argument is straightforward: Japanese diplomacy is no longer reactive; it is proactive (Kohno 1999, 4). In order to refute Calder’s argument, Kohno presents two major cases in which Japan played a proactive role: the Cambodian peace process and the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The former case is particularly conspicuous because in that case, “Japan defied the United States and led the P-5 (the five permanent members of the UNSC), and in the end, its vision of the peace process largely prevailed” (Green 2003, 176).

To be more specific, the United States had traditionally believed that the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh was a “puppet” government controlled by Hanoi. But Tokyo was

4Calder (1988) does not generally argue for this policy implication in every industrial sector of the Japanese economy. Rather, Calder (1988, 538-9) worries about the possibility of “foreign pressures stimulating Japanese nationalism,” and emphasizes the importance of “focused and qualified foreign demands on Japan to avoid inflaming Japanese nationalism.” However, Calder (532; 537) also acknowledges the necessity of foreign pressure in some sectors. He stresses that in some specific sectors, the Japanese “concessions . . . have always been in response to foreign pressure” (532). In Japanese agriculture, Calder argues that “foreign pressures should demand [long-run structural changes]” (537). Moreover, he predicts that “the importance of foreign pressure in Japanese foreign economic policy formation will further intensify” in consideration of “the massive imbalances of the international trade and monetary system in the late 1980s combined with Japan’s character as a reactive state” (537; italicized by author).
keenly aware of the reality that Hun Sen was already controlling almost 80 percent of the territory. Japan moved ahead despite U.S. reservations, and finally made a 50-50 arrangement in which Hun Sen and Sihanouk shared power and the Khmer Rouge was marginalized. Later, “the United States would also abandon its one-sided support for anti-Hun Sen forces” (Green 2003, 174).

Without doubt, the Cambodian peace process is a case in which the independent diplomacy of Japan was successful. And to the extent that Japan is capable of independent diplomatic initiatives and leading other countries in the direction she deems desirable, the RST should be weakened because failing to seize the initiative on an independent basis, namely, being passive is one of the two conceptual pillars of the reactive state, and also because in this case Japan did not merely accommodate U.S. demands, rather persuaded the United States with her own independent alternative.

However, the countervailing force of Kohno’s argument is limited. First, “Cambodia was not a critical area for U.S. foreign policy, which meant that Japan had freedom to maneuver without angering key actors in the United States” (Green 2003, 174). Second, notice that the Cambodian peace process was roughly contemporaneous with the Gulf War, which absorbed a large part of global attention (Green 2003, 175). In other words, U.S. inattention and a bigger event in another part of the world gave Japanese diplomacy independent breathing space. If Japanese foreign policy is still unable to be proactive in areas where U.S. interests are critical, and in cases that attract global attention, then the RST may still be valid to that extent.

Moreover, Kohno’s argument seems to lack a coherent theoretical framework although he presents vivid examples of independent policy initiatives. In his working
paper, being “proactive” is simply equated with being good, and being “reactive” appears to be regarded as being bad. But he does not provide conceptual criteria by which to distinguish between “proactive” and “reactive.” As a result, proactive foreign policy in Kohno’s usage of the word sounds simply like serious efforts to maximize national interests. According to Kohno’s argument, Japanese foreign policy is proactive in multilateral diplomacy, simply because Japan is participating in and hosting many international conferences. He even claims that Japan’s response to the Gulf War was “a typical example of the Japanese proactive diplomacy” (Kohno 1999, 10), because Japan was assiduously trying to respond to U.S. demands. But, in fact, in the memories of many Japanese government officials, Japanese response to the Gulf War was a typical case of policy inaction or even a “defeat” (Ozawa 1994, 36; Tanaka 2006; Suzuki 2006). This problem is critical especially for our discussion here, because without a proper theoretical framework, it will be difficult to extract observable implications from the argument.

As for the source of Japanese policy behavior, Kohno presents many factors, but they can be summarized into two main ones: one is the strengthened power of the political world (*seikai*), and the other is the proactive role played by the bureaucracy. More specifically, the collapse of the ’55 system brought about a realignment of Japanese political terrain, which in turn made possible the more conspicuous role of the prime minister and the debut of new types of politicians. The strengthened power of the prime minister and the rise of the new generation of politicians make the political debates more policy-oriented. Their active participation in the policy process is making Japanese foreign policy more proactive (Kohno 1999, 7). The second is the proactive role of bureaucracy: Kohno argues that MOFA, the institution to which Kohno himself belongs,
can be proactive, sometimes more proactive than politicians (Kohno 1999, 7-8).

But it should be noted that from a theoretical point of view, the strengthened power of politicians may not necessarily turn out more proactive policy stances. In fact, it may produce the opposite outcome. As Calder (1988, 530-1) points out, politicians are generally responsive and sensitive to the constituency in their electoral districts and parochial interest groups. Furthermore, the Japanese electoral reform in 1994 scaled down the size of each electoral district, which may have the effect of making politicians more sensitive to parochial interests (Lancaster 1986; Carey and Shugart 1995, 430-2). When politicians are on a tight leash of local interests, it may be hard to expect them to be proactive in foreign policy.

Kohno’s emphasis on the role of bureaucracy is likewise questionable. He claims that “proactive diplomacy is … the brainchild of MOFA” and that “it is usually MOFA that dares to introduce new thoughts that contradict existing policy” (Kohno 1999, 8). However, bureaucrats usually have a “powerful tendency to continue doing today whatever they did yesterday” (Downs 1967, 195). In some cases, to be sure, particular bureaucrats or some specific institutions of the bureaucracy may become innovative and change-oriented, especially when “bureaucrats are so politicized at the executive level that politicians and bureaucrats are indistinguishable” (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1987, 284-302). However, our subject here is not the passivity or proactivity of a specific ministry. And Japanese foreign policy is not necessarily what MOFA dictates. However proactive MOFA might be, it is still only one of the many players in the vast “bargaining game” that determines the final policy outcome of the Japanese government (Allison 1971, 144-7). The bureaucratic constraints emphasized by the RST do not mean the
passivity of a particular bureaucratic agency much less a particular bureaucrat. The problem is more of a systemic one. It is a lack of a system that ensures smooth inter-agency cooperation and effective coordination by the top, especially the lack of institutional capacities supporting the decision-making role of the *kantei*, the prime minister’s office (Calder 1997, 12-5).

Some bureaucrats or part of the bureaucracy can be change-oriented. But, we need to keep in mind that bureaucratic agencies as a whole are always in ongoing competition with one another. Therefore, it is hard to extract a consistent direction out of the competition. To provide the direction of change to the bureaucratic system as a whole, therefore, is a role that political leaders have to play (Beetham 1996, 47). And this central leadership role is what the reactive state thesis claims the Japanese state lacks. Kohno reduces the behavioral pattern at the government level to that at the ministerial level, and seems to simply assume a broad consensus among governmental agencies on the desirability of proactive diplomacy espoused by MOFA. But, proactivity of one ministry does not replace passivity of the government as a whole, and the consensus among agencies should be proved rather than merely postulated.

Although Kohno’s arguments are limited in refuting the RST, his argument made a significant contribution to the debate. First of all, he found out cases in which Japan could undertake an independent initiative. Based on this initiative, Japan actively tried to persuade other countries. In fact, this is a direct challenge against the RST, because Calder (1988) argued that the reactive state does not know how to undertake an independent initiative and that Japan is such a state.

Second, from Kohno’s counter-argument against the RST, we can get the idea that
proactivity or passivity in policy behavior can exist on many different levels of analysis.
The Cambodian peace process itself was not begun by Japan. The macro-arrangement of the peace process itself was given from the outside. Japan was passive on this level. In response to this environment, however, Japan tried to be proactive in the negotiation over the detailed political arrangement of the new regime in Phnom Penh. On this level, Japan was not passive. Even when a country that is categorized as a reactive state is indeed found to be passive on the macro-level, that is, the level that deals with the overall security structure of the region or the basic political and economic arrangement of the bilateral relationship with other countries, the country can still be proactive on a lower level of analysis that determines a very detailed and idiosyncratic outcome of a negotiation.

Lastly, Kohno directly dealt with the possibility of change in the reactive state. Kohno does not claim that Japan had never been a reactive state. His argument is that the Japanese state has changed due to such changes as the administrative reforms in the 1990s, the rise of a new type of politicians, and the role of change-oriented bureaucrats. Other observers do not seriously deal with the source of the change in the reactive state. Rather, they tend to emphasize how firm the domestic foundation of the reactive state is. But, those who are stuffing the apparatus of the reactive state will go sometime in the future, and as the reactive state democratizes, a new mandate by the people will from time to time impose the advent of new politicians with new ideas through a critical election.

Passive Leadership
Another line of criticism comes from a new generation of Japan scholars who mainly focused on the Japanese diplomatic practices of the 1990s. Unlike Kohno, their arguments are more nuanced. They argue that Japanese foreign policy is *not always* reactive\(^5\). Some reactive aspects are still observed in some areas of Japanese foreign policy, particularly in her relations with the United States, while, in some other areas, Japanese foreign policy is shifting to more activism. They are also different from Kohno because they provide an alternative conceptual framework.

After reviewing six books assessing Japan’s international relations in the 1990s, David Potter and Sudo Sueo concludes that “Japan's new policy initiatives toward East Asia are not reactive, nor are they exceptions in a broader framework of merely reactive foreign policy” (Potter and Sudo 2003, 318).\(^6\) Their argument begins with what they call “new approaches to Japanese foreign policy.” The gist of these new approaches, they argue, is to discern leadership from proactive initiatives.

Leadership, in the traditional (or American) notion of the word, has to be proactive, and it requires rule-making or agenda-setting capability. But leadership does not necessarily need to be proactive according to Potter and Sudo’s argument. Leadership is one thing and activism is another (Potter and Sudo 2003, 319). It does not necessarily require rule-making power. Japanese foreign policy appears to be passive when it is compared to the traditional type of leadership. However, one can exercise “consensual

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\(^5\)This argument is presented as a criticism against the RST. But, it is questionable whether Calder (1988) had ever claimed that Japanese foreign policy is *always* reactive. A proposition in social science is probabilistic in its meaning. That is, a proposition indicates a tendency in social behavior. For example, the statement that A is the case in a set X of cases does not necessarily mean that A is the case for all possible particular cases of the set X.

\(^6\)Six books reviewed are Blechinger and Legewie 2000; Green 2003; Hook et al. 2000; Inoguchi and Jain 2000; Maswood 2001; and Miyashita and Sato 2001.
leadership” by encouraging consensus-building within the given community as Japan had done in the establishment of the ARF and the APEC (Potter and Sudo 2003, 320). Consensus-building is also exactly what Japan had done in the Cambodian peace process: the Japanese had carefully calculated the positions of the interested parties, particularly that of the United States before they made a decision on how to approach the peace process. Even after the decision was made, Japanese policymakers tried to strike a balance among parties to the peace process. To this end, Japan even had to temporarily keep a distance from her sole alliance partner.

Here, it is worth noting that unlike the traditional sense of leadership, Japanese leadership might be invisible because Japan has tended to avoid setting down in the first phase of the process any ideological principles or tenets such as democracy or universal human rights. Rather, Japanese leadership was exercised “indirectly” and “from behind the scenes” (Potter and Sudo 2003, 323). We can name the type of leadership that Potter and Sudo (2003) describes as passive leadership.  

Passive leadership may not look as dramatic as the American type of leadership because by definition, passive leadership has to keep a low profile. But in terms of achieving policy goals, it may be “more effective than is understood if one imposes a hegemonic leadership frame for judgment” (Potter and Sudo 2003, 321). And if Japan found a role to play in the “paradigm of the leader as conciliator, broker, and behind-the-scenes mediator,” Japan may have “outgrown the Yoshida Doctrine and the reactive

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7Potter and Sudo (2003) do not coin the term “passive leadership.” However, one of their main arguments is that it is possible to discern leadership from proactive initiatives. That is, leadership is possible without proactivity. Then, we can call this type of leadership as “passive leadership.”
foreign policy” (Potter and Sudo 2003, 320).⁸

By replacing the reactive-versus-proactive dichotomy with a new concept of leadership, this group of scholars succeeded in taking a snapshot of the changing Japanese foreign policy behavior after the Cold War. According to this picture, Japan already exercises leadership in such areas as Southeast Asia and multilateralism. And this new type of leadership was made possible by various changes in the international environment and the Japanese domestic structure: strengthened role of multilateralism in the post-Cold War era, weakened Asian antipathy toward the Japanese past, electoral and administrative reforms of the 1990s, and the ensuing relative decline of the power of bureaucracy in the Japanese policymaking process (Potter and Sudo 2003, 324-8; Green 2003, 35-75; 167-227).

Nevertheless, they also suffer from the central problem that Kohno faced. The limit of the proactive Japanese foreign policy is still set by Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. Japanese foreign policy may be able to be proactive in multilateral diplomacy, foreign aid, and Southeast Asia, where usually U.S. interests are not critical or where U.S. and Japanese interests traditionally converge. But, neither the Japanese diplomacy in the United Nations nor Japan’s relations with ASEAN countries can replace her bilateral relations with the United States (Grant 1997, 108; Maswood 2001, 129; 134). Moreover, as Michael Green, former Asian Director of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) aptly points out, even in areas where Japan can be proactive, “the bottom

⁸In similar but a little different vein, Maswood (2001, 134) depicts the characteristic of the Japanese foreign policy as “active but constrained,” because the Japanese have shown in Southeast Asia more proactive attitudes in dealing with many regional affairs whereas their activism was constrained when confronted with the U.S. interests in the region. But, he also advocates the model of “consensual leadership” as a new conceptual tool to describe the Japanese foreign policy behavior (Maswood 2001, 22). And what he names the “consensual leadership” is conceptually similar to the “passive leadership.”
line for Japan has been that [Japanese] diplomacy has been most effective when Tokyo and Washington are cooperating, and least effective when these two allies are in open competition” (Green 2003, 225).

True, Japan's new policy initiatives in some isolated issue areas are not reactive as Potter and Sudo argued, primarily with respect to Japan’s East Asia policy and multilateral diplomacy. But their argument went further. They argued that Japanese proactive policy initiatives in East Asia are “not exceptions in a broader framework of merely reactive foreign policy.” Nevertheless, they do not explain in detail whether and how Japanese foreign policy can be depicted as “non-reactive” in areas other than East Asia or multilateral diplomacy. To be sure, there are cases out there in which Japanese foreign policy was proactive. But the crucial problem of Potter and Sudo and the authors of the books they reviewed is that they tend to look into cases where the probability that Japan can be proactive is systematically higher.

Despite this problem, Potter and Sudo made one significant contribution to the debate on the RST: they separated policy process from policy output. Even when the policy behavior of a state is passive in the process of international policymaking or bilateral negotiations, that state can still affect policy outcome in a positive manner by promoting consensus building behind the scenes. And, as long as the state can move the direction of the policy output in the direction it wants, the behavioral feature of the state in the policy process may not be a serious problem. It can be passive, but also successful in attaining a given policy goal.

*Passive but Rational*
As we have seen in the arguments of Kohno as well as Potter & Sudo, there tends to be a bias in case selection in critiques against the RST. This bias is the very problem that Miyashita (1999; 2001) is undertaking to address. According to Miyashita, both advocates and opponents of the RST have tended to select cases that are inclined to prove their own points. Those who want to emphasize the role of U.S. pressure on Japanese foreign policy tend to single out cases in which U.S. and Japanese interests converge. As their interests were similar from the start, naturally the policy outcome on the Japanese side would be close to what the United States had originally demanded, hence, success of the U.S. pressure. On the other hand, those who want to emphasize the independent aspect of Japanese diplomacy tend to choose cases found on the periphery of U.S. interests. In these cases, Japan can play an active role, while the United States is preoccupied with what she judges to be more important issues in core foreign policy areas. To be free from this bias, Miyashita suggests, we must directly “examine the instances where American and Japanese preferences conflict,” because, “only in such cases Japan feels ‘pressure’; therefore, it is here that we can best evaluate the true effects of gaiatsu (external pressure)” (Miyashita 2001, 37).

The cases Miyashita selected to avoid this bias are Japan’s foreign aid to China and Russia because in these cases, he believes, the original interests of Japan and the United States sharply diverged. When Beijing brutally cracked down on the student demonstrators gathered at the Tiananmen Square in 1989, major powers in Europe and North America imposed economic sanctions on China to punish Beijing. Japan was under great pressure to join the Western efforts. Participation of the largest donor of aid to China (accounting for more than 50 percent of all the annual bilateral ODA that China
received at the time) in the sanctions was indeed essential. But Japan was reluctant. First, Japan had much larger economic stakes in China than did the other advanced industrial nations. Second, Japan’s geographic proximity to China meant that Japan also had strong security interests in maintaining an internally stable and externally moderate China. Eventually, however, Japan caved in to the pressure from her Western friends and suspended her economic assistance to China. The resumption of Japan’s aid to China had to wait until the United States and other G7 members began to relax their sanctions.

The aid to Russia represents another case of gaiatsu—making demands on Japan to act against her own interests. After the aborted coup attempt to oust Mikhail S. Gorbachev in August 1991, the United States began to realize that the cost of not supporting the liberal regime in Moscow could be quite high. Then, in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The first Bush administration, then, began to play an active role in organizing Western efforts to assist Russia. Japan was again pressured to join these efforts. However, large-scale assistance to Russia was against Japan’s traditional linkage strategy toward Russia, or seikei fukabun (non-separation of politics and economics). The biggest issue for Japan in her relations with Russia has been and remains the return of the “Northern Territories” (the four islands north of Hokkaido), which had been occupied by Stalin in the last few days of World War II (Green 2003, 147-51; Hook et al. 2001, 98-9). Japan’s position was that no full-scale assistance would be forthcoming until these territories return to Japan. However, after U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker announced U.S. support for a plan to establish a multi-billion-dollar fund to stabilize the Russian Ruble in February 1992, Tokyo changed its position: Japan would not oppose

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9The Russians call them the “Southern Kurils.”
financial aid to Russia if it were channeled through multilateral institutions. But it was obvious that if Japan provided Russia with substantial financial assistance, albeit under the multilateral flag, the prospect for a territorial settlement would grow dimmer.

In the two cases described above, the original Japanese position was different from that of the United States and other Western countries. After gaiatsu, however, Japan changed her stance, although crucial Japanese economic and territorial interests were at stake. Japan failed to take and maintain an independent policy position in the face of initiatives from Washington, and rather, flexibly changed her position in response to external pressures. Therefore, Miyashita concludes that Japan is indeed reactive as Calder argues.

However, Miyashita disagrees with Calder on the source of the reactive behavior. Unlike Calder, who attributes Japan’s reactive behavior largely to domestic constraints, Miyashita contends that Japan’s reactive behavior is a result of an act of will. In the two cases examined above, for instance, the Japanese concern over a deterioration of bilateral relations with the United States or Japan’s ‘awakening’ to her own true interests altered the cost-benefit analysis on Japan’s policy options and eventually forced Tokyo to modify its initial positions. Unlike Kohno, being reactive in foreign policy is not a problem at all for Miyashita as long as it serves Japan’s interests. And Miyashita argues that the reactive policy can result from rational choice, because by adopting the reactive policy, Japan could promote her larger national interests as defined in the relations with the United States.

The first contribution of Miyashita is that he deals with the problem of falsifiability, though indirectly. A serious attempt to falsify the RST, according to Miyashita’s argument,
requires the selection of cases in which the national interests of the United States are opposed to those of the reactive state. Next, the selected cases have to attract close attention of U.S. policymakers. If a country seizes an independent initiative (non-passive) or refuses to accommodate U.S. demands (non-flexible) in such cases, then we can clearly refute the proposition that the country is a reactive state. Indeed, Miyashita selects cases as required by his own criteria. Unlike Kohno and Potter & Sudo, Miyashita tackles the heart of the matter, where the core national interest of the United States is at stake, and in conclusion, agrees with Calder on the reactive behavior of the Japanese state.

Miyashita’s second contribution is a new and different viewpoint with which to assess the foreign policy of the reactive states. By stripping off the negative connotation that overshadowed the reactivity, he neutralized the concept of reactivity. His argument is that behaviorally, Japanese foreign policy is indeed reactive, particularly in its relations with the United States, but that the reactive behavior is a result of a decision consciously reached through rational calculation of the national interest. In Miyashita’s theorizing, therefore, the independent aspect of Japanese foreign policy is still alive, because he regards the reactive behavior as a result of rational calculation, which particularly takes U.S. demands into consideration. In other words, the bilateral relationship with the United States was so crucial in the minds of Japanese policymakers that it overwhelmed other issues: security, economic, and even territorial interests in relations with non-U.S. countries.

However, his argument raises two further questions. First of all, his concept of rationality is somewhat unclear. What does “rational” exactly mean in this context? According to German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, there are two types of rationality:
one is instrumental, and the other, communicative. The concept of instrumental reason refers to “the capacity to maximize efficiency” in achieving a given goal (Dews 1998). In other words, the instrumental rationality is realized when least resources are invested to attain the given objective. This type of rationality can be relatively easily calculated just as we calculate an equation: add up all positive terms and all negative terms respectively, and subtract the sum of the negative terms from the sum of the positive terms, and the solution to this equation will give us a policy direction. If a new term is put into the equation, we can simply repeat the process to get a new solution. However, realizing the communicative rationality is not so straightforward. For the communicative rationality to be realized, “speakers [have to] coordinate their action and pursuit of individual goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable and merit-worthy,” that is to say, the actors in the communication have to “freely agree that their goal is reasonable and that it merits cooperative behavior” (Bohman and Rehg 2009).

Table 2-1 Calculation of the Policy Direction and Transmission Path of Gaiatsu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculation Before Gaiatsu</th>
<th>Transmission of Gaiatsu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(-) = R - T, (R &lt; T)</td>
<td>(+) = R - T + US, (T&lt;US + R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+) = R - T, (R &gt; T); R = R(US)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Signs and Terms*

(-): Not to provide aid to Russia; (+): Provide aid to Russia

R: Japan’s expected interest when she provides aid to Russia

T: Japan’s territorial interest, which will be eroded when she provides aid to Russia

US: Japan’s interest in her relations with the United States, which will be adversely affected when Japan decides not to provide aid to Russia

R’: Japan’s expected interest, redefined after consulting with the United States.

R = R(US): Japan’s expected interest is a function of Japan’s interest defined in her relations with the United States.

When Miyashita claims that Japan’s change of heart is rational, it seems that he sees
the choice as based on communicative rationality. Indeed, for Japan to be proactive in its choice to be reactive, Japanese policymakers have to ‘freely agree that the goal of the American foreign policy is reasonable, and that it merits Japanese cooperation.’ In order to see which type of rationality really prevails in the process of changing the position, let us take a look into the transmission path of gaiatsu. If gaiatsu affects the calculation of Japanese policymakers, we can conceive of two transmission paths: one is exogenous and the other, endogenous. According to the first interpretation, Japan changed her policy, simply because the single most important ally wanted the change, and put enormous pressure on Japan. According to the second interpretation, however, Japan truly though belatedly understood the importance of the policy change for Japan after communicating with Washington, and changed her position. Assuming that there was a policy equation in the rational calculation of the Japanese policymakers in the case of aid to Russia, we can illustrate these two transmission paths in equational forms. See Table 2-1.

In both paths, Japan’s policy change can be said to have been rational in the sense that policymakers were calculating to maximize Japan’s national interest. In the first path, however, U.S. pressure represented by the US term changed the sign of the overall equation, which can be found on the left-hand side of this policy equation. On the other hand, in the second path, there is no US term. The US term is nested in the function of Japan’s expected interest (R). The sign changes in this equation, too, but the change is endogenously processed through the function \( R = R(US) \) rather than by putting a new large term into the equation, that is, by sheer U.S. pressure.

When Miyashita concludes that he has to agree with Calder on the reactive behavior of the Japanese state, his understanding of the Japanese foreign policymaking process
appears to be closer to the first interpretation because Japan was pressured to do what Japan otherwise would not have done. However, when he highlights the independent nature of the Japanese foreign policy process, Miyashita seems to be emphasizing the second path, particularly the role of the function $R$.

The type of rationality represented in the first path is close to the instrumental rationality: when a new term comes into the equation, policymakers simply recalculate the equation to maximize the national interest. But, the type of rationality required by the second path is similar to the communicative rationality, because through the communication with the United States, Japan has now reached a new understanding of her own national interest. Miyashita argues that Japan can be proactive even when she changes her position due to the foreign pressure from the United States because the choice to change the position was rationally made. For Japan to be proactive in this sense, however, the rationality based on which Japanese policymakers changed their position should be closer to the communicative rationality. If the instrumental rationality prevailed in the rational choice by Tokyo, then the independent nature that Miyashita argues remains in Japanese foreign policy might be seriously questioned. We will be able to see in the descriptive part of this dissertation, that is, Chapters 4 and 5, which type of rationality really prevailed in the decision-making process of the reactive state.

The other problem of Miyashita’s argument is that there are in fact cases where even U.S. pressure fails to move Japan in the direction that Washington wants. For a state to be reactive, according to the RST, it should be not only passive in taking initiatives but also flexible in changing positions. But, sometimes, Japan adamantly refused to accommodate U.S. demands, even if the United States put huge pressure. For example, during the
Clinton Administration’s trade talks with Japan, the United States failed to persuade Japan to accept the so-called “results-oriented” approach, which meant that the Japanese government should commit to specific “market share targets” earmarked for foreign producers (Schoppa 1997, 3).

If a reactive state is supposed to change its position when faced with sufficient foreign pressure or the threat thereof, why in some cases do they not change the position despite huge pressure? Based on the first path described above, the status quo-maintenance effect of the other terms in the equation was simply greater than the change effect of the US term. Namely, the pressure initially deemed sufficient turned out to be not sufficient for changing the position. According to the second path, however, the foreign pressure failed to change the reactive state’s understanding of the situation through communication. Namely, the persuasion was not effective. However, if Calder’s explanation on the cause of the reactive behavior is right, the policy process within the reactive state was simply too paralyzed to be able to decide anything on the given issue. Which is the more correct explanation of the failure to react? We will try to find answers to this question in later chapters.

Limit of Gaiatsu

In the previous section, we dealt with the transmission path of foreign pressure. And that is exactly where Leonard J. Schoppa’s research on bargaining strategy with Japan begins. From the start, his focus is a little different from other studies, which are relatively focused on whether Japan is really reactive. He does not attempt to prove or disprove Japan’s reactive behavior. He admits up front that “gaiatsu does indeed have the
power to influence Japanese policy outcomes” (Schoppa 1997, 6). His research interest is rather focused on “when and how this external pressure works.” In a nutshell, his argument is that external pressure works best “when the Japanese domestic political arena offers opportunities” for its successful working.

Schoppa arrives at this conclusion through a case study on the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) talks, which started during the first Bush administration. The SII talks were peculiar in comparison with prior U.S. approaches to trade negotiations with Japan. Facing the problem of a huge bilateral trade deficit with Japan, President George H. W. Bush and his economic advisors chose policy areas which had traditionally been regarded as “domestic” issues, and pressured Japan to comply with U.S. demands to implement necessary reforms in these areas. The policy areas included macroeconomic policy (more investment), distribution system (loosening the Large Store Law), land policy (more comprehensive planning), exclusionary business practice (enforcing Anti-Monopoly Law), and uncompetitive relations within keiretsu.

Schoppa argues that the SII talks provided a perfect condition for the “most similar” design of comparative research: first, the U.S. pressures in each of the five areas could be assumed to be uniform. Second, international and institutional factors were relatively constant during the short period of the negotiation. Despite these uniform conditions, there was a tangible variation in the outcomes of the negotiations across policy areas. In the former three areas—macroeconomic policy, distribution system, and land policy—the outcomes were closer to what the United States had originally demanded. However, in the latter two—exclusionary business practice and uncompetitive relations within keiretsu—there was little change in the positions of Tokyo. Therefore, Schoppa argues,
this case would provide a perfect proving ground for assessing the effect of external pressure on policy changes of the Japanese government.

Schoppa’s contribution to the debate over the RST is significant although his research was not actually intended to address the reactive behavior of the Japanese state. His main suggestion is that we have to take account of the strength of the domestic resistance against foreign pressure when we want to predict the outcome of the negotiation with the reactive state. And the strength of the domestic resistance will vary depending on the issue area. By highlighting the role of domestic players and their interaction with foreign pressure, he could provide a more sophisticated and nuanced model to explain when and how external pressure works. And one advantage of a nuanced model is that it helps us avoid simple either-or questions. For example, if the RST is mechanically applied, then it may be interpreted that the instrumental transmission path prevails in Tokyo’s policymaking process. Then, what needs to be done on the part of Washington is to simply increase the size of the US term in the right hand side of the policy equation in order to change its sign, namely, put more pressure. And in fact this is what the trade advisors of the first Bush Administration had to say:

Japanese government officials have a keen sense of where their national interest lies, and when faced with credible threats of retaliation that adversely affect that interest, they usually choose to accommodate requests from the United States (The 1989 report of the U.S. President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), requoted from Schoppa (1997, 3)).

Schoppa’s findings provide a useful insight against this type of approach: even if Japan is reactive, there is a limit to the reactivity of Japanese foreign policy; hence, a limit to the power of U.S. pressure on Japan. If the pressuring strategy is pushed forward
when the domestic conditions within Japan are not right, then the external pressure “required to bring about a concession may be so great as to threaten the entire bilateral relationship” (Schoppa 1997, 4).

Nevertheless, one possible loophole in Schoppa’s method should be pointed out. Schoppa argues that the amount of U.S. pressure was uniform across the five policy areas, which, according to him, is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. negotiation team refused to prioritize U.S. demands and decided to “emphasize all of their demands equally” in the beginning stage of the talks (Schoppa 1997, 80). However, this decision in fact reflected the need to avoid turf battles among U.S. government agencies whose representatives participated in the negotiation team rather than the U.S. government’s intention to give equal weight to all U.S. demands. If there was a variation in the degree to which issues were pushed from the U.S. side, as Naka Norio argues against Schoppa, then, probably part of the variation in the negotiated outcomes across the five policy areas is attributable to the U.S. side rather than to the domestic factors in Japan (requoted from Schoppa 1997, 321). Schoppa himself acknowledges the possibility that, as the SII talks proceeded, “U.S. attention eventually came to be focused on a subset of the original demands.” But he responds that this change in attention was “shaped by the Japanese media and American negotiators’ sense of where they could win concessions and so cannot be treated as an ‘independent’ explanation of the negotiating outcome” (Schoppa 1997, 321). Aside from the theoretical problem of whether it can be an independent explanation, once there was a variation in U.S. pressure across policy areas, then the basis of Schoppa’s “most similar” design would be weakened.

The other insight that we can get from Schoppa’s work in the context of the debate
on the RST is that the evaluation on flexibility, one of the two constitutive concepts of the reactive state is always relative. For example, when Japan negotiates with the United States over the SII talks, there are many policy areas in the SII talks. In one area, Japan can be flexible while in another, inflexible. Moreover, aside from the SII talks, there can be many other important ongoing negotiations between the two countries. Then, even if Tokyo accommodates all demands by Washington in the SII talks, Tokyo can still refuse to accept U.S. demands in other issue areas. In other words, the flexibility in foreign policy response is always relatively measured depending on which issue area or how many issue areas are observed at the moment. In this research, we will focus on the Japanese and South Korean responses to the U.S.-led wars in Iraq. However, Tokyo and Seoul must be in negotiations with Washington in issue areas other than the wars. Therefore, we have to remember that the observations we get from this research do not finally determine the overall foreign policy characteristics of the Japanese and South Korean states although their decisions on how to respond to the U.S.-led wars in Iraq were crucial in their foreign policy. Generalization of that sort will have to await more case studies.

*Passive Only to the United States*

The last counter-argument to be covered is that of Park Cheol-hee, a Seoul National University professor. In his working paper, he attempts a critical examination of the RST (Park 2005). His approach is basically similar to that of Schoppa. He argues for the need to establish a more sophisticated model of the Japanese foreign policy behavior: the *strength of the domestic response* should be explicitly incorporated into this model, when
one assesses the reactivity of the Japanese foreign policy behavior. However, he adds one more dimension to the model: the direction of the gaiatsu, namely, from which country the external pressure is coming should also be considered.

Park argues that despite the passive image of Japan prevalent in the minds of pundits and professors in the United States, the Japanese foreign policy behavior shown to the Asians, particularly those in China and Korea is quite different. For instance, despite repeated top-level demands upon Japan to be clearer on issues such as history, textbooks, and comfort women during the Pacific War, Japanese response was less than positive and forthcoming. Moreover, with regard to the Yasukuni issue—whether the prime minister of Japan has to pay tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the Japanese war dead including class A war criminals are enshrined—the response of the Japanese government is sometimes very negative even to the demands from within domestic circles. For example, Watanabe Tsuneo, president of the Yomiuri Shimbun, the newspaper with the world’s largest circulation, and long eminence grise of Japanese politics, once complained in public that Prime Minister Koizumi did not listen to him, when he conveyed his opposition to Mr. Koizumi’s tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine (Watanabe 2006; Onishi 2006). Therefore, Park argues that the RST is merely U.S. centric and does not correctly describe the overall foreign policymaking pattern of Japan. Japanese foreign policy may be reactive, but only in relations with the United States. Therefore, characterizing Japanese foreign policy as reactive is only a partial description and based on a U.S.-centric notion of Japanese foreign policy.

Park’s criticism is significant because what his paper suggests is that there is a limit to the generalizability of the RST. Notice that Calder’s 1988 article did not present the
RST as a particularistic model only to explain Japanese foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis the United States. On the contrary, he first established a typology of the general state behavior, and then, raised a question by placing Japan in the category of the reactive state to which many other countries belong at the same time.

Furthermore, Park’s criticism is significant because, if Park’s description is right, then it raises the question of why Japan and South Korea are passive only to the United States. Park’s description already provides part of the answer. If Japan’s foreign policy response varies with its counterparts, then Calder’s argument on the cause of the reactive behavior may also be challenged. If the cause of the reactive behavior basically lies in domestic constraints, then the Japanese foreign policy behavior should be uniformly reactive regardless of the counterpart. If the behavior changes from counterpart A to counterpart B, then, it can be inferred that external factors play a separate, independent, and perhaps more important role in determining the foreign policy response of the Japanese state than the domestic factors.

2.3 A Bird’s Eye View of the Debate

The five counter-arguments against the RST that we reviewed in the previous section were selected for a reason. Each argument was selected to represent typical critiques against the RST, and as a whole, they are expected to provide a bird’s eye view of the field of the debate by each representing a possible critique against the RST.

Calder’s original argument in 1988 begins with two main behavioral puzzles: one is the fact that Japan belongs to the category of the reactive state when, considering the size
of the population and economy, Japan was not supposed to belong there. The other puzzle is that within the same Japanese foreign policy behavior, the passivity and the flexibility coexist: Japan does not undertake initiatives, but when pressured, Japan is flexible enough to respond to external demands eventually.

The first puzzle raises a question about the source of the Japanese foreign policy behavior: what distinguishes Japan from other countries? More specifically, why is the Japanese foreign policy behavior more reactive than that of such non-reactive states as the United Kingdom and France when the size of the Japanese population and economy is larger than or as large as theirs? At the same time, the flip side of this question is why the Japanese behavior is similar to that of the reactive states such as South Korea and Taiwan when the size of the Japanese population and economy is much larger than that of the usual reactive states.

The second puzzle raises a question about the relationship between the process and output of the Japanese foreign policy: why passive behavior eventually produces flexible policy output? What variable explains the seemingly contradictory connection between the initial passivity and the eventual flexibility in the Japanese foreign policy?

**Disagreement Group**

Kohno’s answer to these puzzles is straightforward: Japan is no longer reactive. Kohno disagrees with Calder even on the very observation that Japan is reactive. To prove his point, Kohno looks to the cases in which Japan undertakes initiatives. Potter & Sudo like Kohno raise an objection to the behavioral observation of the RST, but the manner is different from that of Kohno. The behavior may seem passive, but it can still
produce positive results through a different type of leadership. Both Kohno and Potter & Sudo disagree with Calder’s observation that Japan is reactive, and both of them emphasize the process side of the policymaking or the passive side of the reactivity to criticize Calder’s argument: For Kohno, Japanese foreign policy is not reactive because, in the process of conducting foreign policy, the Japanese government can take initiatives, whereas Potter & Sudo argue that, although the Japanese foreign policy may seem passive, it has already transcended the proactive-reactive dichotomy because, in the process of reaching a common decision in multilateral diplomacy or in the regional politics of Southeast Asia, the Japanese government exerts a type of leadership defined in different terms than the American type of leadership. We can name these two counter-arguments the ‘disagreement’ group because they disagree with the RST on its very basis.

Table 2 -2 Summary of Each Argument in the Debate on the RST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Debaters</th>
<th>Insights</th>
<th>Cause(s) of the Behavior</th>
<th>Emphases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calder</td>
<td>Reactive=Passive+Flexible</td>
<td>Domestic Constraints</td>
<td>Strange Behavior considering Japan’s size; Coexistence of Passivity and Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohno</td>
<td>Not Reactive, but Proactive</td>
<td>New Politicians, Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Cases where Japan Took Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potter &amp; Sudo</td>
<td>Not Reactive, New Leadership</td>
<td>New Environment &amp; Domestic Reforms</td>
<td>A Different Type of Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyashita</td>
<td>Reactive, but Rational</td>
<td>Conscious Choice after Calculation</td>
<td>Decision Process inside the Policymaking Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoppa</td>
<td>Reactive, but there is a limit.</td>
<td>Domestic Conditions for Each Issue Area</td>
<td>Degree of the Domestic Resistance including the Social Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park</td>
<td>Reactive, but only to the U.S.</td>
<td>Restrictions Imposed by the U.S.</td>
<td>External Variables, especially, the U.S. pressure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Partial Agreement Group

On the other hand, the other three critiques (Miyashita; Schoppa; and Park) can be
named the ‘partial agreement’ group: they agree with Calder on the behavioral observation, but the basis of the agreement diverges. Miyashita finds the source of the reactivity in the independent and rational calculation of the decision-maker(s). To prove Miyashita’s point, then, we have to pay attention to the decision process inside the policymaking apparatus. Schoppa is interested in measuring and predicting the degree of reactivity in a given issue area, therefore, the decisive factor for Schoppa is the strength of the domestic resistance against foreign pressure in the issue area. In determining the degree of the resistance, the socio-political factors in each issue area become relevant. Park, too, agrees with Calder on the reactivity of Japan, but argues that the reactivity defined by the RST is limited because that observation holds true only in the bilateral relations with the United States. All three arguments agree with the RST that Japanese foreign policy is reactive, but the source of the behavior they emphasize varies. Miyashita emphasizes the state or the governmental process; Schoppa stresses social factors including interest-group politics or the interaction between the state and the society; and Park accentuates the external variables, particularly, the U.S. factor. The insight and emphasis that each debater provides is summarized in Table 2-2.

2.4 Lessons Learned: Unclear Definitions and Too Many Causes

_Lack of a Common Concept_

One lesson we learn from the review of the prior studies is that they lack an agreed conceptual tool. They argue and counter-argue, but they do not share the definition of the reactivity. This lack of a common conceptual framework makes it difficult for the debate
to make progress. Remember that Calder (1988)’s definition of the reactive state contains two aspects at the same time: passivity and flexibility. The passive character is mainly found in the process of the policymaking. Japan is passive because Japan fails to undertake an initiative when she has the capability and chance to do so. On the other hand, the flexibility is measured on the output side of the policy process: the Japanese change their decision as a result of foreign pressure. And here, this changed decision is the output of the policy process. Thus, passivity is mostly a process trait while the flexibility is observed primarily in policy output. Then, even if a state is proactive in the policy process because the state takes a policy initiative preemptively, still the state can be flexible, that is, change its stance after foreign pressure. In other words, passivity and flexibility are conceptually discernible.

Both Passivity and Flexibility Should be Included. The review of the prior studies shows that the debaters participating in the reactive state debate highlight different aspects of the definition of the reactive state. The ‘disagreement’ group emphasizes the process side or the passive aspect. For the ‘disagreement’ group, the essence of the reactive state lies in the absence of proactivity or an independent initiative. To be proactive, therefore, the state needs to know how to take an initiative earlier than other countries. For example, Kohno tries to prove that Japan is not a reactive state by showing how proactive Japan could be in trying to persuade other powers and presenting creative ideas. For this purpose, he looked for cases in which Japan took independent initiatives such as the Cambodian peace process. Unlike Kohno, Potter & Sudo avoid the collision with the RST, and tries to replace the concept of the reactivity with a new type of leadership. They claim that, although Japan seems to be passive, Japan is actually
influencing the policy output by practically promoting consensus-building behind the scenes, namely, exercising a different type of leadership. Even if Japan seems to be passive, according to Potter & Sudo, it would not be a serious problem as long as Japan can affect the policy outcome through a different process.

On the other hand, the ‘partial agreement’ group emphasizes the output side or the flexible aspect of the reactive state. For this group of debaters, the evidence of the reactive behavior lies in the fact that the policy was changed after foreign pressure. When Miyashita, Schoppa, and Park all agree with Calder that Japan is reactive, their agreement comes from their observation that the Japanese government changed its position after U.S. pressure. If the ‘disagreement’ group and the ‘partial agreement’ group are observing the different aspects of the same concept just as two blind men touching different parts of an elephant argue with each other about the correct shape of an elephant, then, this debate will not end. No accumulation of evidence will prove or disprove the RST. Therefore, our task is to establish a common conceptual framework that includes both the passive and flexible aspects of the reactive state, so that we can capture the multiple aspects of the reactive state at the same time.

An Operational Definition Required

The second lesson is that we need to operationalize the definition of reactivity further. Actually, this lesson is tightly related to the first lesson. Part of the reason for the lack of a common concept of reactivity stems from the fact that all debaters do not share a clear and comprehensive operational definition of the reactivity. Without an operational definition of a concept, however, the concept is immeasurable. And if a concept is
immeasurable, we cannot know for sure which observed event would be the evidence to refute the proposed theory that includes the concept.

As Karl Popper pointed out, “a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event” (Thornton 2009). Therefore, if we want to scientifically prove or refute the proposition that Japanese foreign policy is reactive, then, we first have to specify the conditions of a conceivable event, finding of which will let us refute the proposition. To this end, we have to make the concept of the reactivity measurable just as we need to make the concept of water temperature measurable to know for sure whether a glass of water is boiling. This treatment of making a concept measurable is called operationalization. Not until we operationalize a concept, can we distinguish between the presence and absence of the target event in the cases clearly. In other words, if the concept of reactivity is left un-operational, we can never be sure whether we found the evidence of the reactive policy in the cases we observed.

Proactivity without an Initiative. To be sure, both the ‘disagreement’ and ‘partial agreement’ groups have operationalized the definition of the reactive state to a certain degree, although partially, but their definitions need to get more sophisticated and multi-faceted.¹⁰ For example, for Kohno, the key to the reactive state is the absence of an

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¹⁰Here is a quick example of the more sophisticated operational definition. If we want to refute the observation that the water in a teapot is boiling, then we need to operationalize the concept of water temperature or boiling. One simple way to do this is to see the bubbles in the teapot. Therefore, if we see bubbles rising out of the water in the teapot, we can see that the water temperature is at 100 degrees Celsius, and thus the water is boiling. On the other hand, if we see no such sign, then we can refute the observation. However, finding the bubbles in the water may be a less correct way of measuring the water temperature. Depending on the degree of air pressure, we may observe some bubbles in the water even if the water is not boiling. The bubbles may have been created by some chemicals added to the water. Then, in order to get a more correct method of measurement, we need to find a more sophisticated way of operationalizing the concept of water temperature. One way to do this is to introduce a Celsius scale and purchase a thermometer. By putting the thermometer in the water, we can easily measure the water temperature, and make sure about whether the water is boiling. Our job here is in a sense to get a thermometer for the reactive behavior.
initiative. Kohno sees the essence of the reactivity in the failure to undertake an initiative, and tries to find cases in which Japan takes initiatives in order to refute the reactive state thesis. However, we can conceive of a case in which a state’s policy can still be proactive without taking an initiative. For example, just like Japan, the United Kingdom or France also has to react to events happening outside their borders. That is to say, they, too, have to follow rather than lead international events. But their policy can be seen proactive if they provide an alternative, which is quantitatively or qualitatively creative, and surpasses the outside expectation, even if they reacted to the environmental change. To graphically see the possibility of a case of ‘proactivity without an initiative,’ let us take a look at Figure 2-2.

**Figure 2 -2 an Imagined Scale of Foreign Demand and Accommodation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Demands</th>
<th>D1</th>
<th>D2</th>
<th>D3</th>
<th>D4</th>
<th>D5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision Before Pressure</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td>A1, A2</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision After Pressure</td>
<td>B4 (=51)</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measures in SUS

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

*Notations*

D1: the amount of foreign demands in an imagined Case1
A1: the amount of Japanese provision in an imagined Case1
D2: the amount of foreign demands in an imagined Case2
A2: the amount of provision proposed by Japan before pressure in an imagined Case2
B2: the amount of provision actualized by Japan after pressure in an imagined Case2
D3: the amount of foreign demands in an imagined Case3
A3: the amount of provision proposed by Japan before pressure in an imagined Case3
B3: the amount of provision actualized by Japan after pressure in an imagined Case3

First of all, let us suppose that there is an absolute scale of provision for foreign countries by Japan measured in terms of U.S. dollars, and that we can simultaneously
indicate the level of foreign demands and the Japanese accommodations on this scale.\textsuperscript{11}

In an imagined Case\textsubscript{1}, Japan did not take an initiative, and waited for the foreign country to submit a request to Japan. And then, the foreign country finally asked for $20 (D\textsubscript{1}). In response, Japan provided $40 (A\textsubscript{1}). The Japanese provision exceeded the foreign expectation (D\textsubscript{1} < A\textsubscript{1}). In this case, we cannot safely claim that the Japanese response was passive, although the response came after the foreign pressure, because the Japanese provision surpassed the foreign demand, and set a new standard for the bilateral negotiation. Kohno’s definition of the reactivity cannot cover this type of non-reactivity as long as it concentrates only on the temporal sequence of initiatives and responses.

\textit{The Threshold between Flexibility and Inflexibility.} Like the ‘disagreement’ group, the ‘partial agreement’ group has its own operationalization. They find the heart of the reactivity in the change of the decision after foreign pressure. In other words, when Japan accommodates foreign demands after foreign pressure, the Japanese policy is judged to be reactive. For example, Miyashita claims that Japanese foreign policy is reactive because the Japanese government accommodated U.S. demands after getting pressure from Washington. However, what if the changed policy still does not meet the original demands? In Miyashita’s definition, changing the policy after foreign pressure is an indication of the reactivity, that is, flexibility. However, this definition of the reactivity disregards the fact that ‘accommodation’ is always a relative concept defined in terms of demands. That is to say, the amount of accommodation should always be assessed in terms of the original foreign demands. If the amount of the original foreign demands is

\textsuperscript{11}In reality, it will be not easy to establish such an absolute scale, first because, in many times, negotiating parties intentionally keep their positions blurred for tactical purposes, and second because a negotiation usually deals with many issues at the same time, which cannot easily be fused into one indicator. At the end of any negotiation, however, all issues and contentions have to be unified into one indicator to be evaluated and judged by the final decision-maker on each side.
not taken into consideration, then, we cannot discern mere ‘reactive’ behavior from ‘more reactive’ one. Again, let us take a look at Figure 2-2 to understand the relative nature of the accommodation.

In Figure 2-2, \( A_2 \) represents the amount of proposed provision in response to foreign demands in an imagined Case2. \( B_2 \) denotes the amount of actual provision delivered by Japan after foreign pressure. In this case, \( A_2 \) is $40, and \( B_2 \), $60. Therefore, Japan in this case flexibly changed her position after foreign pressure in the direction that the foreign country wanted. Then, according to Miyashita’s definition, we can judge that the Japanese policy in this case was flexible. Let us take another similar case. In Case3, \( A_3 \) is $80, and \( B_3 \), $100. In this case, too, the response can be judged to be flexible, according to Miyashita’s definition, because the government changed its position after foreign pressure in the direction that the foreign country wanted.

So far, we have not considered the demand side of the negotiation. Now, let us take the amount of foreign demands into consideration explicitly. In Case2, let us suppose that the foreign country demanded $60 (\( D_2 = B_2 \)). Then, the extent to which the foreign demand was accommodated is 100%. On the other hand, let us assume that the foreign demand (\( D_3 \)) was $140 in Case3. Then, the actualized provision after foreign pressure (\( B_3 \)) did not meet the foreign demand (\( D_3 > B_3 \)). The accommodation ratio is only 71\% \( \frac{\left( \frac{B_3}{D_3} \right)\times100}{1} \). The Japanese policy responses in both cases have to be called flexible, and thus, reactive according to the definition of the ‘partial agreement’ group because in both Case2 and Case3, the government changed its position after foreign pressure. But, there is a clear difference in the degree of flexibility between Case2 and Case3: the accommodation ratio is 100% in Case2, and 71% in Case3 when assessed
against the foreign demands. The definition of the reactivity of the ‘partial agreement’
group does not handle this issue explicitly.

Moreover, even if we take account of the amount of the original foreign demands,
and the ratio of actual accommodation to it, there remain two more questions to be asked.
First, if there is a variation in the degree of flexibility from case to case, then, at which
degree of accommodation, can we call the policy response sufficiently flexible? Does it
always have to be 100% to be judged to be flexible, hence, reactive? Or, just a minor
change after foreign pressure is sufficient to be called flexible. Where is the demarcation
between flexibility and non-flexibility? For example, let us imagine Case 4, in which D4 is
$100, while A4 is zero, and B4 is $1. In other words, if the accommodation ratio is only
1%, do we still have to categorize the case as flexible only because the responding
government moved a tiny bit in response to foreign pressure?

*The Speed of Policy Implementation.* The other question is about the timing of the
implementation of the promised provision. In the actual world of policy, the
implementation is as important as the decision. For example, in Case 2 above, the
accommodation ratio is 100% because D2 equals B2. However, for this policy response to
be flexible, when does the responding government have to deliver the promised amount
of provision? If it is extremely slow, or *too late*, can we still categorize the policy
response in the case as flexible?

The critical examination of the review of the prior studies directs us to the need for
further sophistication of the definition of the reactive state. Particularly, we could learn
that the definition of the reactive state has to cover such cases in which the response
exceeds the foreign expectation, because in such cases, the response can be categorized
as proactive even if it came later than the foreign initiative. Also, we could see that our new definition of the reactivity will have to deal with the issue of demarcation between flexible and non-flexible, and the issue of the timing of the implementation more explicitly. The existing arguments on the reactive state do not deal with these issues head-on. Therefore, our theoretical task in this research will be to reorganize and further operationalize the concept of the reactivity so that we can clarify the applicability of the concept.

Too Many Causes

The third lesson is that there are too many causes to explain Japanese foreign policy behavior. Then, the next question is what the main force that propels that behavior is. Grappling with many causal variables simultaneously is the fate of a social scientist. But, we still have to try to overcome that fate by picking out the most important one among the many causes. If Japanese foreign policy behavior is so unique, then what is the main explanatory variable for that uniqueness?

For example, the ‘disagreement’ group of scholars argues that Japanese foreign policy was reactive, but that it is now changing in the direction of less reactive and more proactive behavior. Then, what are the variables that they argue explain this change? Kohno and Potter & Sudo specify all sorts of variables: from the end of the Cold War, the Japanese electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s, collapse of the LDP-centered party politics, to the generational change in the Japanese public and its political elite. Putting more factors into a model will enhance the explanatory power of the model, so, a social scientist might be tempted to list all possible explanatory variables, giving an equal
weight to each one. However, this is the very reason why we need to try to discern a more important factor from other background variables. If everything is explaining everything, it is actually explaining nothing, because, logically speaking, it is a tautology. If the ‘disagreement’ group wanted to explain the change of the Japanese foreign policy behavior, they first had to specify which variable was the most important factor in explaining the previously reactive behavior, and which new variable can now explain what they argue is proactive behavior. However, they are silent about which of the many variables that they specified is the most important factor that explains the peculiarity of Japanese foreign policy behavior.

On this score, those who argue that Japanese foreign policy is indeed reactive are better because they at least pinpoint what they believe is the most important factor. For example, Calder points to the domestic constraints, especially, the lack of an effective executive, and the fragmentation of the authority in the ruling party and the cabinet. On the other hand, Miyashita emphasizes the rationality of decision-makers as a unitary group. Schoppa highlights the strength of the resistance in each issue area of negotiation while Park looks into the external influence from the United States. Then, the natural question is: which of these variables is the most important factor? Our final task will be to answer this question. In order to answer this question, we have to compare the explanatory power of each variable.

In the next chapter, in order to deal with the lack of a common concept and the necessity of a more operationalized definition of reactivity, we will reformulate and refine the definition of reactivity, and extract test criteria that we will apply across our cases in Chapter 6. The comparison of the explanatory power of each candidate causal
variable will be conducted in Chapter 8, where we will try to find the strongest propelling force behind the reactive behavior.
CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK OF MEASUREMENT

Tzu-lu said, "The prince of Wei has been waiting for you, in order that you administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?" The Master replied, "What is necessary is to rectify names."

*The Analects of Confucius*

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

In order to test a theory, we first have to set down the building concepts of the theory. One of the aims of this dissertation is to test the RST to see if the RST is still able to capture the key features of Japanese foreign policy behavior. In other words, we are interested in whether we can use the RST as a ruler to take a measurement of the reality of Japanese foreign policy behavior. The ruler for a social scientific construct such as reactivity is language. Therefore, we have to hone the language of the definition of our concept if we want to take a more correct and detailed measurement of the reality.

In order to hone the language of the definition of reactivity, we will reformulate and refine the RST. In so doing, we will take account of the common problems of the RST and its critics that we found in the previous chapter: the lack of a common concept and the necessity of a more operationalized definition. Specifically, we will make sure that both the passive and flexible sides of the reactive state are included in the definition, and find a way to cover such cases in which a policy can be proactive without undertaking an
initiative. We will also try to find a way to draw a line between flexibility and non-flexibility, and to take the amount of time needed for implementation of a policy into the definition of flexibility. For the test of the critiques against the RST, we will extract and compile observable implications from each argument so that we can test if our cases match the observable implications derived from the arguments.

These test criteria—the new definition of reactivity and the observable implications extracted from each argument—will be also used as standards for data requirement in Chapters 4 and 5—the descriptive part of this dissertation, and we will apply those test criteria to our cases in Chapters 6 and 7 to test the validity of each theory as a conceptual tool.

3.1 Falsifiability and Operationalization of the Concept of Reactivity

Only those theories that are subject to the challenges of falsification can be called scientific. That is to say, to secure the falsifiability of a theory is to make it scientific. And, to know whether a theory is falsifiable is to know what event will let us refute the theory. Therefore, if one intends to secure the possibility of refuting or falsifying the RST, and thereby consolidate its scientific bases, then, they first have to clarify the conditions of a conceivable event, finding of which will let us refute the statement that Japan is a reactive state, and specify logical rules by which to organize the conditions. Then, what are the conditions of a conceivable event that can refute the RST? To answer this question, we will specify and reformulate the building blocks of the concept of reactivity for the purpose of making it operational. Once we are done with the reformulation, we need to
establish logical rules by which to falsify the RST.

Who Acts First?

The two building concepts of the reactive state are passivity and flexibility. First, let us operationalize the concept of passivity. Let us take a look at the dictionary definition of the word, “passive,” first. The Cambridge Dictionary defines passivity as “not acting to influence or change a situation; allowing other people to be in control.” Here, the key words are “allow others.” A passive actor allows other actors to move first and be in control. Notice that the RST has as its background a bilateral negotiation with a foreign country. Then, in this context, the temporal sequence of policy initiatives taken by each negotiator is the key to determining the passivity: in order to be not passive, you have to act to influence the situation and allow yourself to be in control before your counterpart influences or controls the situation.

Therefore, we can state that a state or an administration is passive when a foreign country undertakes an initiative first, and then the state or the administration examines how to respond to the foreign initiative as the negotiation over a specific policy area begins. Therefore, everyday expressions such as a “proactive response” or an “aggressive reaction” are not possible at least in our scheme because, by our definition, we cannot describe a state as proactive if the chosen policy came as a response after a foreign country had provided a policy initiative or a demand. On the other hand, we cannot describe it as passive if a state takes a policy initiative earlier than the counterpart does. For example, if, as soon as the Gulf War broke out, the Japanese government had created its own list of possible assistance for the war and led the negotiation with the United
States even before U.S. demands materialized, then it would have been difficult to call Japan passive. The timing of a policy initiative is thus essential in determining whether it is passive. Therefore, the first condition for passivity is that a foreign initiative or demand comes first, and then a foreign policy response to it is deliberated.

More Than Demanded?

The other condition for testing passivity is whether a policy response exceeds the original foreign demand. For a reactive state, foreign demands would work as parameters of policy deliberation. That is, the policy of a reactive state would be made in terms of how much of the demand will be accommodated. Therefore, a state or the policy adopted by the state is not passive if the response exceeds the externally-imposed parameters, even when the policy came as a response to a foreign initiative.

We can state that a response exceeds parameters when any of the following three conditions is met. First, a response can exceed the original demand quantitatively. For example, if South Korea promised 100 million dollars as financial assistance for the Iraq War, when the United States had originally requested only 90 million dollars, then, we can state that the South Korean response exceeded the foreign demand. Second, a response can exceed the original demand qualitatively. For example, if Japan proposed to provide personnel and submarine assistance for a U.S.-led war, when the United States had only asked for financial assistance, then we can judge that the Japanese response exceeded the U.S. demand, because the Japanese administration could provide a qualitatively different and creative alternative. Lastly, a response would exceed the original demand, if the responding country were capable of changing the course of action
of the demanding country. For example, if Japan can stop the United States from unilaterally going to war with Iraq, and persuade the United States to win prior approval of the UNSC for the war, then we cannot categorize the Japanese response as passive, even if the response came later than the demand. This is because, if the responding country can change the course of action of the demanding country, then, it means that the responding country can change the parameters defined by the demanding country.

How Much of the Demand Was Accommodated?

The other building block of the reactive state is flexibility. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, “flexible” means being “able to change or be changed easily according to the situation.” The meaning of flexibility in the RST is similar to this dictionary definition of flexibility. It means that a state can rapidly enough change domestic law, institutions, and political arrangement to accommodate foreign demands. However, it will be extremely difficult to directly measure the changes in the domestic regime as a whole. Moreover, what interests us here is the flexibility that the negotiators of U.S.-allied nations show in an international negotiation. What we can empirically observe is actually how much South Korean or Japanese negotiators yield or claim on the negotiating table with their counterparts. Then, we can assume that how much of the foreign demand they can accommodate on the negotiating table will reflect how much they could change the domestic arrangement. Therefore, in order to measure flexibility, we can use the degree to which a state accommodates foreign demands. The degree of accommodation will be used as a substitute variable for the size of the changes in the domestic arrangement as a whole.
Then, at what degree of accommodation can we judge that a state is flexible or inflexible? Where do we have to place the critical value at which ice becomes water? Before tackling the issue of the critical value, however, we need to assume a scale by which to measure the variable. That is, if we wish to draw a line between flexibility and inflexibility, we will first have to assume a scale of flexibility or a scale of accommodation. Then, on one end of this scale will be located no-accommodation. In other words, the responding country accepts zero percent of foreign demands. For no-accommodation, there can be two reasons. The first is intentional rejection. For example, when Japan intentionally rejected the U.S. proposal for a results-oriented approach in the U.S.-Japan trade talks during the Clinton administration, we could judge that Japan was by no means flexible at least in that policy area. The second is no-decision. Sometimes, the responding country cannot make any decision. In response to external demands, some countries are so paralyzed that they do not reach any decision at all. No decision can also be regarded as a case of no flexibility, and be placed on one end of the scale of accommodation.

On the other end of the scale will come 100% flexibility, that is, 100% accommodation. For example, if South Korea decides to send 5,000 soldiers to Iraq when the United States asked the ROK government to send 5,000 soldiers, then the South Korean response could be judged to be 100% flexible in that occasion for decision when measured by the degree of accommodation.

In summary, that a state could accept whole foreign demands can be interpreted to mean, first, that the state could reach a domestic decision in that issue area in order to
positively respond to external demands, and second, that the state is, at least in regards to the given policy area, fully flexible. On the other hand, the zero percent acceptance rate of foreign demands could mean either a lack of the capability to reach a necessary domestic decision or a lack of such intention. Either way, we can judge that the state is, with respect to the said policy area, not flexible at all.

Then, what if a state’s response falls between these two extreme ends? For instance, what if a state met only 30% of foreign demands? What if the percentage of accommodation is 70%? If we have to draw a line, where do we have to draw the line between flexibility and inflexibility? Precisely speaking, except for the case of zero flexibility, we must say, all the other cases exhibit a certain degree of flexibility, more or less. However, if we put together all cases that are not zero-percent flexible into the category of flexibility, then the idea of flexibility as a conceptual tool will be less than useful because it cannot discern more flexibility from less flexibility. And, it will also go against the common usage of the word, “flexibility.” Usually, for example, one-percent accommodation rate will not be regarded as a flexible response. Therefore, for the technical purpose of discerning more flexibility from less flexibility and in order to bring the meaning of the concept closer to its everyday usage, this research will present the 50th

12“Accepting whole foreign demands” does not necessarily mean to provide exactly the same thing in kind as demanded by the United States. An ally of the United States accepting U.S. demands may provide ‘alternate but comparable’ assistance for the United States. For example, when requested to provide tanks, South Korea can provide armored vehicles that can play similar functions in the given tactical environment of the Middle East. If U.S. demands are met with alternate but comparable provision by allies, we will take it as “accepting the whole demands,” although the assistance actually provided was not exactly the same as had been requested by the United States. Here, it is worth noting that, from a conceptual point of view, this is where proactivity (or non-passivity) and flexibility may overlap. Some alternate but comparable assistance can also be regarded as independent and proactive, if its provision creatively exceeded the original demand. For example, providing armored vehicles when tanks were requested may be taken as an example of flexible behavior. But if attack helicopters that can destroy enemy tanks were provided when tanks were requested for the purpose of countering the enemy tanks, we may also regard the provision as an example of independent and proactive behavior, because the provision obviously exceeded the original demand.
percentile or the median on the scale as the demarcation.

Here, it should be pointed out that this demarcation is purely arbitrary. Generally, the critical value in natural science is not necessarily arbitrary. Often, the critical value is qualitatively discernible. For example, ice becomes water at zero degrees Celsius. At this point, a qualitative transformation occurs in the molecular structure of H₂O. Therefore, the zero degrees Celsius will be the critical value between ice and water. The critical value can also be presented as chronological or quantitative concepts. For example, when we defined passivity in the previous section, we used the timing of foreign initiatives as the demarcation between passivity and non-passivity. If the responding country acts earlier than a foreign initiative is given, then, the responding country cannot pass the first test for passivity. For the second test for passivity, the original demands from the demanding country were the criterion. If the response from the responding country exceeds the original demands, then the responding country fails to pass the second test for passivity.

On the contrary, the middle point on the scale of accommodation is neither a critical value where a qualitative change occurs, nor a demarcation where we have a clear chronological or quantitative criterion. The degree of flexibility at the 49th percentile of the scale is only less flexible than the degree of flexibility measured at the 51st percentile of the scale by 2 percentage points (pp). Therefore, we need to remember that we drew this line at the median of the flexibility (or accommodation) scale, for a practical purpose of comparing the flexibility of each policy case. Other studies can also safely draw a demarcation line at the 60th percentile or the 40th percentile of the scale according to their purposes. Here, the most important is the fact that we can compare the degrees of
accommodation among our cases. As long as we can judge that the response in one case was more or less flexible than in another, then we can compare and evaluate the flexibility of the responses in our cases.

*How Fast Was It Delivered?*

We can also present delivery time as the second condition for testing flexibility. The amount of time taken for delivering demanded assistance is as much important as how much assistance is delivered, because we are dealing with the real world where time matters. For example, even if the South Korean government decided to dispatch as many troops as requested by the United States in response to U.S. demands, the assistance will be useless if the troops arrive at Iraq, say, 5 years after the war was over. This is quite an extreme example, but the point is that a policy response is not flexible, if the actual implementation of the policy response takes too much time. Therefore, whether a state can deliver a policy at a suitable moment will be the other condition for testing flexibility.

Then, the same question of demarcation is raised as to the delivery time. Exactly when is the suitable moment? Where do we have to draw the demarcation line between fast and slow delivery of the promised assistance? To this question, this research presents a “usually required amount of time for accomplishing the mission of delivery” as a solution. For example, suppose that you as a government official in charge of delivering the assistance for the United States have to place a division of 3,000 soldiers and officers in a northern Iraqi city because your government promised to do so to the U.S. government. Then, from a technical point of view, you can put together a “To-Do” list for this mission. First of all, administratively, you will have to create a new division for this
purpose, or select an existing one to be dispatched to the Middle East. Second, you will have to gather and regiment soldiers and officers for this division and train them. You can provide them with basic language skills, and practical knowledge required for the tactical requirement of desert and for the communication with the Muslim community, and so on. And then, you will have to ship them out to the field. You can calculate the amount of time required for a naval ship to reach the Middle East. If you go through this kind of process, you can calculate, albeit approximately, the usually required amount of time for accomplishing this delivery mission. In this particular case, we can safely assume that within two to three months, a government can accomplish the mission of placing a division of 3,000 officers and soldiers in an Iraqi city. Then, the usually required amount of time for accomplishing the mission will be three months at the maximum. If the mission takes longer than three months, then, we can presume that a variable that is inherently not military or technical is working to delay the accomplishment of the mission. In Chapters 4 through 6, where we describe and compare the responses of Tokyo and Seoul, we will pay attention to this “usually required amount of time” for delivering the promised assistance.

Logical Rules for Judgment

Based on the abovementioned four test criteria, we will judge whether policy responses observed in our cases were reactive. Additionally, however, we need some logical rules for the judgment. The first rule is that the two building blocks of the reactive state have to be satisfied simultaneously. Namely, the reactive state should be passive and flexible. Conversely, therefore, if a particular response is either not passive or not flexible,
that is, if either of the two conditions is not met, then, the policy response fails to pass the test of reactivity, thus, is not reactive. This rule is required to reflect the lesson we learned from the review of prior studies: we have to cover both passive and flexible aspects of the reactive state.

The same logical rule that was applied to the two building blocks of the concept of reactivity is likewise applied as well to the conditions for passivity and flexibility, respectively. The passivity can be assessed by two conditions—whether the reaction came after a foreign initiative and whether the reaction failed to exceed the original foreign demands. These two conditions have to be met simultaneously: the reactive state’s policy response has to come after a foreign initiative, and the substance of the policy response should not exceed the foreign demands. Therefore, if a response exceeds demands, then, even though the response chronologically came after the demands, we can judge the foreign policy response to be not passive.

The flexibility in our scheme also has two conditions: the degree of accommodation and the amount of time taken for delivery. By our criteria, the responding country has to provide at least more than half of the demanded assistance to be judged to be flexible. Also, the responding country has to deliver the promised assistance within a usually required amount of time for accomplishing the delivery mission. These two conditions also have to be met simultaneously. That is, even if the accommodation ratio is 100%, we cannot regard a foreign policy response as flexible if the delivery takes longer than a “usually required amount of time” for the delivery.

An Application: the Futenma Case
In order to better understand the application of these test criteria, let us take the Hatoyama administration’s policy response about the MCAS (Marine Corps Air Station) Futenma issue as an example. The relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa is a thorny issue between Japan and the United States. In 2006, both sides had agreed to relocate the base to another place in Okinawa. But, then Prime Minister Hatoyama, riding over a wave of change following the DPJ’s landslide victory in the general election of 2009, wanted to re-examine Japan’s traditional America-centric policy including the issue of the relocation of the MCAS Futenma. He wanted to move the base out of Okinawa.

Eventually, however, in terms of a policy output, the Hatoyama administration accommodated the original U.S. demand. In the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee announced on 28 May 2010, which was agreed upon by foreign and defense ministers of both countries, the United States and Japan confirmed their “intention to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010).13 This statement was actually a reconfirmation of the original U.S.-Japan agreement made in May 2006. Japan was again proved to be flexible, because she eventually accommodated what the United States demanded: “Stick to the previous agreement!”

But, notice that it was the Hatoyama administration that first demanded a ‘renegotiation’ of the previous agreement, which had been concluded between the previous Japanese administration and the U. S. government. The Japanese government expressed its intention to change the status-quo spontaneously. In terms of the process,

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13 The document posted on the MOFA website shows the names of all four foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States as if they were all in the same place to sign the document. But, actually, they did not gather at one place to sign the document. However, the document does reflect the agreement between the governments of Japan and the United States.
Japan was not passive because Hatoyama’s initiative came first, and then the United States had to react to it (breach of the first condition for passivity). Moreover, Japan suggested an independent alternative—relocating the facility out of Okinawa, which was qualitatively different from the previous agreement (breach of the second condition for passivity). In terms of the output, however, Hatoyama’s initiative failed to overcome the U.S. and domestic resistance against the renegotiation, and eventually accommodated the U.S. demand (passage of the test for flexibility).

The effect of the failure was miserable. Hatoyama did not just stop at taking back his proposal. He had to sacrifice his own office. Still, the Japanese foreign policy in the process cannot be judged to be reactive, according to our criteria, because it failed to pass the test for passivity. The Hatoyama administration spontaneously produced its own independent demand, although the Japanese eventually accommodated the U.S. demand. Then, at least in this case, Japan was not a reactive state, because, in order to be categorized as reactive in our scheme, the state has to meet the conditions for passivity and flexibility simultaneously. In other words, the Japanese foreign policy in this case lacked one of the two building blocks of the reactive state.

3.2 Central Descriptive Foci: SEAD (Sequence, Excess, Accommodation, and Delivery)

One of the reasons why we wanted to review the debate on the RST was to find descriptive foci or standardized research questions to be applied to our cases that will be described in the next two chapters. This task of establishing descriptive foci is important
first because, in order to make a fair assessment of Japanese and South Korean foreign policy responses observed in our cases, we need to make sure that same questions are raised across our cases, and second because the other goal of ours is to compare the cases cross-nationally and inter-temporally with a view to finding the most important causal variable(s). Then, to this end, we need to make sure that observations gathered from our cases are comparable. Describing the cases based on uniform descriptive foci or raising constant research questions across the cases is the way to secure the comparability of observations.

We accomplished this task. Through the review of the RST and its critiques, we could identify some common problems latent in the debate on the RST, and re-operationalize and reformulate the basic concepts of the reactive state so as to be used as the test criteria of our research. As a result of this reformulation, we could find four main descriptive foci as follows.

(1) *Sequence of actions*. We need to identify the timing of actions made by the United States on one hand, and Japan and South Korea on the other to see if an action was passive. The key is to know when the United States submitted requests regarding the wars in the Middle East, and when Japan and South Korea reacted to the unfolding external developments.

(2) *The contents of the original demand by the United States and the substance of the South Korean and Japanese responses eventually delivered*. What was it that the United States demanded at the first stage of the wars? Did the South Korean and Japanese responses eventually exceed it? Or, did they come up with a
fundamentally new policy alternative to the U.S. demands?

(3) The degree of accommodation by South Korea and Japan. How much of the U.S. demands did South Korea and Japan accommodate? In order to answer this question, we have to compare the amount of the actually delivered assistance with the amount of the original U.S. demands. The more South Korea and Japan accommodated the U.S. demands, the more flexible they can be judged to be. Of course, U.S. demands are not constant. They continue to change in the negotiation process. Moreover, sometimes, negotiators on the American side themselves do not know what they really want. Inside the foreign policy apparatus of the United States, there can be many contending arguments and suggestions about how much to demand from Japan and South Korea. But, what is important here is what Seoul and Tokyo interpreted as the final U.S. demands because, if the Japanese and South Korean governments had been reactive, then, what the Japanese and South Korean policymakers thought the United States was asking for must have been the starting-line of the policy discussions in Tokyo and Seoul.

(4) The amount of time taken to deliver what Seoul and Tokyo promised. How much time had to pass in order to deliver what South Korea and Japan promised to provide for the wars? And how long was the usually required amount of time for delivering the promised assistance? If we look at the size and nature of the promised assistance, we will be able to approximately calculate the usually required amount of time. Then, we can compare the actual delivery time with the usually required amount of time for the delivery to see if the delivery was flexible. Finding the usually required amount of time for the delivery may seem difficult. However,
in the negotiation between the demanding and responding countries, usually there must be an explicit or implicit agreement on approximately when the assistance should arrive. Once we can measure the actual delivery time taken to provide the assistance in each of our cases, and compare it to the usually required amount of time, then, we will be able to tell in which case the delivery was the fastest (or the slowest).

3.3 Observable Implications of the Competing Theories in the RST Debate

The four descriptive foci will also be used as the criteria to test the validity of the RST when we compare our cases cross-nationally and inter-temporally. If the RST passes the test, then, we can judge that the RST is still useful in describing the main behavioral features of the reactive state in Japan and South Korea, and naturally, the arguments of the critiques against the RST will be weakened.

However, there also is a way to directly test the critiques against the RST. We can extract some observable implications from a theory and see if those observable implications are really observed in the cases. Searching for observable implications of a theory to test the validity of the theory is actually used in many fields of science. For example, dinosaurs disappeared from the earth some 66 million years ago, and the extinction happened only once. So, there is no way to compare this extinction with another extinction of dinosaurs. Still, we can test the theories explaining the dinosaur extinction by extracting observable implications or presumed evidence from each theory and by observing the cases to see if the implications or the expected evidence are really
found.

If, for instance, an asteroid impact was the main cause, some metal that is rare on Earth’s surface, but is more common on asteroids should be found in the sedimentary rocks associated with the time of the dinosaur extinction. On the other hand, if the competition from mammal species was the main cause, then, the dinosaur extinction must have proceeded gradually. If the observation of the geological evidence shows that the dinosaur extinction was more sudden than gradual, then, we will be able to refute the mammal competition hypothesis.

We can apply the same method to test the competing theories in the RST debate. For this purpose, we will extract observable implications from the competing theories, and see if the implications are really observed in the description of our cases.

**Observable Implications of Kohno’s Argument**

Although Kohno’s conceptual framework is unclear, we can still extract some observable implications from his argument. Kohno’s argument can be summarized as the following: Japanese government proactively responds to external challenges, and this proactive behavior was made possible by some institutional reforms that created or strengthened the central leadership, a new type of politicians, and the proactive bureaucracy.

Depending on the definition of his proactivity, we can extract two different observable implications. First, we can define Kohno’s proactivity in terms of active participation in the process set off by external forces. Then, it can be predicted that South Korea and Japan would try to proactively participate in the U.S.-led wars. When faced
with U.S. demands, there will be no reluctance on the part of South Korea or Japan. They will actively attempt to grasp the situation, accommodate U.S. demands, and, if necessary, will try to persuade the United States into the direction that they deem necessary and proper.

The other definition of Kohno’s proactivity may be found in attempts to maximize the national interest under given limits. Even when policymakers in Seoul and Tokyo realize that they cannot help but politically support and provide a certain amount of assistance to the United States, they can still try to maximize their national interest at the working level by providing as least assistance as possible without damaging the relationship with the United States.

Observable Implications of Potter & Sudo’s Argument

Potter & Sudo’s argument basically goes beyond the reactive-proactive debate by creating a new concept of leadership. Thus, it is ambiguous what type of observable implications we can extract from the “passive leadership.” But, at least, if their argument were to be found to be true in our cases, we should be able to observe many consensus building efforts behind the scenes in our description of the cases, because, according to Potter & Sudo, consensus building efforts behind the scenes are the hallmark of passive leaders. The United States would set the rules and agenda in going to war with Iraq, for example, but there must remain some room for other countries to maneuver because it is still possible that disagreements arise among major players on many issues when they discuss whether and how to conduct a war with Iraq. If South Korea or Japan is found to be instrumental in settling these disagreements, then it will be evidence that they can play
a leadership role although their foreign policy behavior seems passive.

**Observable Implications of Miyashita’s Argument**

The critical review of Miyashita’s counter-argument against the RST could provide us with some hypotheses. According to Miyashita, South Korean and Japanese policymakers are expected to change their positions if their initial positions were different from those of the United States. They will change their positions because they have rationally calculated, after communicating with their U.S. counterparts, what their reasonable interests are. And if they fail to move swiftly enough to respond to U.S. demands, that must be because their U.S. counterparts failed to persuade them, not because the pressure was not enough.

**Observable Implications of Schoppa’s Argument**

Schoppa’s theory compares the Japanese domestic resistance across a multiple number of issue areas, and concludes that the success of gaiatsu depends on the power of the domestic resistance in each issue area. On the other hand, the main subject of our research deals with only one issue area—how to respond to U.S. demands for wars in the Middle East. And yet, we can divide the one issue area into many sub-categories. For example, we can break down the response from Japan and South Korea into several sub-categories such as an expression of political support, provision of monetary assistance, and dispatch of military forces. And then, we can see how the domestic resistance is related to each sub-category. That is to say, the accommodation ratio of U.S. demands is expected to vary among issue areas. This will be an observable implication we can extract
Another insight from Schoppa’s theory is that politics within the domestic arena will affect the negotiation over what to provide for the United States. For example, the pressure from domestic interest groups is expected to play an important role in deciding the strength of the domestic resistance against foreign pressure. In our cases, the fate of the U.S.-led Wars in the Gulf region will have a great impact on energy supply for Japan and South Korea. Moreover, the decision to send troops abroad would entail a large sum of defense expenditures. Then, we can expect that energy and defense industries of South Korea and Japan would try to influence how to respond to U.S. demands.

In addition, it is worth noting that the wars in Middle East must have created a quasi-crisis situation for Seoul and Tokyo, first, because the wars are occurring in the origin of their energy lifeline, thus threatening a high priority goal of the state, that is, smooth provision of energy. It must have been a crisis for South Korean and Japanese policymakers also because the U.S. demands forced them to seriously deliberate over the option of use of force or the possibility of having to send their sons in harm’s way within a restricted amount of time. When such a situation arises, “bureaucratic procedures are short-circuited,” and “the highest level of government officials will make the decisions” (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 512-13). Naturally, then, the political struggle among the top decision-makers over how to respond to U.S. demands will come to the fore and have a crucial impact on the substance of the final decision.

From these insights we can extract two observable implications: first, those groups representing energy and defense industries are expected to play a role in the decision-making over how to respond to the wars in Iraq, and second, we can expect the politics
among top decision-makers has a significant impact on the final outcome of the decision-making process.

Observable Implication of Park’s Argument

One observable implication of Park’s argument is that the nature of the reactive states’ response to countries other than the United States will be different from the nature of their response to the United States. They will be passive vis-à-vis the United States, but in relations with other countries, they are expected to be not so passive. To test the prediction by Park’s argument, we need to have new cases where the main concern of South Korean and Japanese policymakers is how to respond to foreign but non-U.S. demands. Unfortunately, however, the main subject matter of our cases here is the relationship of South Korea and Japan with the United States. Therefore, it will be hard to organize description around the observable implication of Park’s argument. But we can still partially go around this limit by observing the South Korean and Japanese response to the demands from other countries, say, the United Kingdom during the wars. If an essential difference in the reactive states’ responses to U.S. and non-U.S. countries can be found, then, Park’s argument will be strengthened.

Now that we are equipped with descriptive foci and test criteria, we will turn to the next chapters where we will describe the responses of Tokyo and Seoul. In the next two describing chapters, when we organize our descriptions, we will keep in mind the four main descriptive foci and the observable implications extracted from the counter-arguments within the RST debate. And in Chapters 6 and 7, we will test whether the RST and its critics met the test criteria that we established in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTION: THE RESPONSES TO THE GULF WAR

Providing just mouth and money without blood and sweat is too awful.

Kaifu Toshiki

Our country is studying an appropriate amount of assistance. Not all of our assistance will be in hard currency.

Roh Tae-woo

In this chapter, we will describe how the administrations in Tokyo and Seoul responded to U.S. demands, when the Gulf Crisis/War occurred. The description will be given in roughly five stages of the foreign policy-making: assessment of the international and domestic political environment; goal setting; determination of policy options; decision-making action; and implementation of the chosen policy option. That is to say, we will describe the external and domestic environments surrounding the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul, their goals when the crisis/war broke out, options given to them, the consideration they gave to the options, the process in which they chose the option, and the implementation process of the chosen option. The description will be given basically in a chronological order.

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14In the field of foreign policy analysis, the foreign policy-making is conducted in five stages: assessment of the environment, goal setting, determination of options, choice of an option, and implementation of the chosen option. However, we need to keep in mind that analyzing the policymaking process into five stages is for an analytical purpose. It does not necessarily mean that one stage does not start until the previous stage is officially terminated. In the real policymaking process, the stages overlap each other. The process can go through different stages at the same time, or sometimes, according to the results of one stage, the outcome of the previous stage can be nullified and repeated from scratch. For a simple example, the chosen option can turn out to be not executable in the implementation stage. Then, the policymakers have to go back and search for other options.
After describing the cases in this chapter and the next, in Chapter 6, we will test whether the answers to the four standardized questions we established in the previous chapter fall within the predicted range, and in Chapter 7, we will test whether we could find in the cases the observable implications of the critiques on the RST. And then, in Chapter 8, we will try to find the most relevant variables to explain the test results of Chapter 6, and in Chapter 9, the same task will be done with regard to the test results of Chapter 7. In other words, in Chapters 4 and 5, we are laying the descriptive foundations for the comparative and explanatory tests that will come in Chapters 6 through 9.

One caveat before we begin the description: the descriptions that will come in these two chapters may look complicated because they are basically narrated in a chronological order. However, we need to keep in mind the four main questions we selected in the previous chapter as our descriptive anchors: when Japan and South Korea produced their reactions to the wars in the Middle East; whether their responses exceeded U.S. demands; how much of the U.S. demand was accommodated by Tokyo and Seoul; and how fast Japanese and South Korean assistance were delivered. These four questions will provide a clearer viewpoint throughout Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 6, we will more explicitly compare the answers to these four questions. Also, in reading the coming two chapters, we need to focus on the dynamic interaction among variables: domestic political processes, institutions, political interests of politicians, demands and discounts of negotiators on both sides of the Pacific.

4.1 Background
Outline of the Gulf Crisis/War

Technically speaking, the so-called Gulf War or “the Gulf Conflict” as some experts call it (Freedman and Karsh 1993), can be divided into two periods: one covers the period between the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait and the eve of the actual beginning of combat activities on the field, and the other between the onset of the attack and President Bush’s declaration of ceasefire.\footnote{The title of the book authored by Freedman and Karsh is The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. In this book, the title of the first part is “Origins of the Crisis,” while the title of the part five is “War.” And part two through part four deal with diplomatic struggles of the United States, Iraq, and other countries in the lead-up to the war. Therefore, the Gulf Conflict as used by Freedman and Karsh (1993) includes both the “Crisis” and the “War.”} In this dissertation, the Gulf Crisis covers the first period, and the Gulf War, the second period.

The Gulf Crisis began on 2 August 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. In response, the United Nations (UN) immediately condemned the invasion and requested unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces and restoration of the status quo ante (S/RES/660(1990)). However, Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq refused to cave in. The United States organized the Multi-National Forces (MNF) under the auspices of the UN, and began to build up massive forces along the Kuwaiti borders to show that her threat of use of force is not just a bluff. Diplomatic efforts were made to avoid the upcoming war, but Iraq did not back down. On November 29, finally, the UNSC authorized use of “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security in the Gulf area on the condition that Iraq should on or before 15 January 1991 fully implement the previous UNSC resolutions concerning the Gulf Crisis (S/RES/678(1990)). If Iraq does not implement, then, the war was inevitable.

At last, the MNF led by the United States began air strikes against the targets inside
Iraq starting 16 January 1991 Washington time. This was the beginning of the Gulf War. Then, the ground war began on February 24, 39 days after the air campaign started (NSPA 1991, 376). In response, the Iraqi forces set Kuwaiti oil fields on fire and launched Scud missiles toward Saudi Arabia. But the Iraqi resistance did not last long. On February 26, only two days after the ground war began, Saddam Hussein announced unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The next day, President Bush decided to end the war at midnight Washington time. The land war lasted for only 100 hours.¹⁶

**Implications of the Gulf War**

The Gulf War was a surprise for both the United States and other countries. It was a shock not just because they failed to predict its breakout, but also because the implications of the war ran counter to the overall intellectual atmosphere of the time. Before the summer of 1990, a great change was occurring in international politics: the Cold War was winding down. Previously in 1989, during a visit to Finland, Mr. Gorbachev declared that “the Soviet Union had no moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors” and that “each country was responsible for its own destiny” (Spanier 1992, 353-4). In November 1989, the Berlin Wall—the symbol of the Cold War in Europe—fell. In February 1990, Mr. Gorbachev, “in a revolutionary statement to a plenum of the Communist party, renounced the constitutionally guaranteed Communist monopoly of power.” In the following months, free elections in Eastern Europe including those in East Germany produced non-communist governments. East and West Germany began negotiating unification, and in July 1990, they created a

¹⁶For a chronology of the Gulf Crisis/War, see Appendix 1-A, and for chronologies of Japanese and South Korean responses to it, see Appendices 1-B and 1-C, respectively.
financial and economic union paving the way for full unification coming up in October (Spanier 1992, 416-7).

*Global Euphoria and Assertive Japan.* The end of the long Cold War thus created euphoria and high expectations for so-called peace dividends. On the economic side of the global affairs, moreover, the rise of Germany and Japan was prominent, and the relative decline in U.S. power seemed obvious (Spanier 1992, 385). The end of the Cold War was interpreted as an end of the age of obsession with security and military might and the beginning of a new age of global interdependence and the primacy of economic power.

With this historical mood as a backdrop, then, it is no wonder that the Japanese wanted to assert their newly acquired power. It was in January 1989 that Ishihara Shintaro, then Transportation Minister, and Sony chairman Morita Akio co-published *The Japan That Can Say No*, criticizing Japan’s yes-man mentality vis-à-vis the United States, and advocating more independent stance of Japan (Ishihara and Morita 1989). The next year, right before the breakout of the Gulf War, then Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki proclaimed in an American magazine, so-called “motivated” diplomacy as Japan’s formula to deal with the emerging post-Cold War order. Based on the premise that “dialogue and cooperation now replacing missiles and tanks as the tools for achieving order, and the role of military might in the balance of power is diminishing and the importance of dialogue and cooperation is growing,” the prime minister regarded the new situation as “Japan’s ‘chance and duty’ to ‘marshal her economic and technological strength, along with her store of experience and her conceptual ability in facing the challenges of the new order’” (Blaker 1993, 17).
The Gulf War smashed this intellectual euphoria and the burgeoning assertiveness in Japan all at once. Although the superpower rivalry on the global level ceased to exist, wars could still occur on the regional level. And when a war occurs in a region as important and sensitive as the Middle East, the war might in turn threaten the security balance on the global level. To repel the aggressor and restore peace and order required more than just economic power. As it turned out, serious security considerations and military strength still mattered (Spanier 1992, 385-6).

Stricter Burden-Sharing Required. Of course, the United States as the sole superpower with no serious contender at least in terms of military power could probably beat back Iraqi forces single-handedly. However, the fiasco in Vietnam, the twin deficits of the Reagan era, and the rise of new economic powers like Germany and Japan, which undermined the economic hegemony of the United States, made the American public rethink the role of the United States in maintaining the international peace and order. The rethinking was warranted especially because the Soviet Union, whose power was so formidable that it was obvious that only the United States could stand up against it, was on the verge of falling apart.

Atmosphere on Both Sides of the Pacific

It is noteworthy that the Gulf War occurred in this atmosphere of rethinking about the American role in the global governance. The Gulf War reminded those who had emphasized the primacy of economic power of the fact that it would be difficult to maintain and promote peace and order without the American military prowess. On the other hand, the United States, unlike the past, wanted her allies and friends to more
actively participate in sharing the burden. The bar abruptly got much higher for the allies of the United States. Washington was asking her allies that had previously been primarily focusing on the affairs of their own region to go beyond their borders and regional boundaries, and pay heed to security and stability on the global dimension.

However, on the other side of the Pacific, the preparations for more responsibility were not in place. In fact, the change of the direction in Japanese diplomacy had already geared up in the late 1970s, when Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi used the word “alliance” to describe the Japan-U.S. relations in a summit with President Carter in May 1979. Two years later, the word was put down in a joint statement published after the summit between Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and President Ronald Reagan. It was the first time since the end of World War II that the United States and Japan used the word, “alliance” to describe their bilateral relationship in a diplomatic document (Iokibe et al. 2006, 198). “Alliance” reminded the Japanese and their neighbors of an enlarged military role of Japan, and implicitly meant a shift away from the UN-centric diplomacy that had been a pillar of the Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Occupation. Nakasone, who succeeded Suzuki as prime minister, more explicitly pushed forward with the new direction of foreign policy by strengthening ties with South Korea and trying to increase the defense budget, which was capped at 1% of the GDP (Iokibe et al. 2006, 206). Fast economic growth of the 1980s boosted this mood. In 1989, Japan surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest ODA donor (Iokibe et al. 2006, 242). It was felt that now was the time for Japan to return to the political center stage of the world.

In terms of the foreign policy in practice and the institutions that concretely support the policy, however, nothing much was there to realize the ambition: the Japanese minds
were still mainly focused on the economic-centrism; the efforts to enhance Japan’s position in the political and security side of the international relations had yet to produce tangible fruits; no legal basis for enabling foreign operations of the SDF was there; and, with the Cold War winding down, even the purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance was becoming blurred. Moreover, the domestic political foundation for developing and implementing the ‘new direction’ was precarious when the Gulf Crisis broke out. At the time, the prime minister of Japan was Kaifu Toshiki, but he was regarded more as an employed manager than as an owner of the cabinet. Let us take a look at the political arrangement within the LDP in 1990:

In 1990 when the Gulf Crisis broke out, the influence of the LDP’s largest faction, the Takeshita faction was absolute. Kaifu was appointed to the premiership as an emergency measure by former Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru because all the major politicians of the LDP were involved in the Recruit Scandal. Kaifu belonged to a small faction named the “Kawamoto faction,” but, he was not even the leader of that faction; he was around number three. Ozawa Ichiro, who belonged to the Takeshita faction, occupied the position of the secretary-general of the LDP, and exercised the stronger influence than the prime minister, creating a double structure of political power (Shinoda 2006, 169; translation by author).

Then, we can grasp the atmosphere on both sides of the Pacific immediately before the Gulf Crisis/War: a rising expectation for sharing the responsibility on one side and insufficient preparations and arrangements for taking charge on the other. The stage was set for a disaster.

4.2 Japanese Response

*Initial Calm*
When the news of the Iraqi invasion came in, it created no crisis for Tokyo. Kaifu Toshiki, then Prime Minister of Japan was at the time scheduled to go to Karuizawa where he was supposed to deliver a speech before the members of the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren), who were participating in the Nikkeiren summer camp there (Kaifu 2003, 80). Despite the news, he was reluctant to cancel the speech at first. So, he went down there after listening to a quick intelligence briefing on the situation in the Gulf area. The summer camp began as scheduled, but the rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East did not allow Kaifu to stay there. He had to hurriedly speed back to Tokyo. The unfolding events in the Gulf urgently required the prime minister in place. On his way back to Tokyo, Kaifu testifies, the first thing on his mind was the energy issue. In his interview reminiscing about the Gulf War, we can take a look at what Mr. Kaifu thought in the first moments of the Gulf Crisis:

Kaifu: At the time (when the Gulf Crisis occurred), the thing that Japan had to immediately grapple with was, because it was a big problem if the oil was cut off, what we should do (about oil if the oil supply was suspended due to the crisis).
Interviewer: That’s right. It must have been because everybody was reminded of the oil shock (of the 1970s).
Kaifu: That’s right. That’s right (Kaifu 2003, 80; translation by author).

Thus, the first thing he did when he arrived back to Tokyo was to confer with his energy advisers. Tokyo’s initial response was to figure out the expected domestic economic impact of possible oil cutoffs. The numbers seemed reassuring, however. Although Japan depended on the Middle East for more than 70% of her oil supply, Japan was “only marginally dependent on Iraq (5.8%) and Kuwait (5.9%)” (Blaker 1993, 18).
At first, the problem seemed manageable.\textsuperscript{17}

With the energy issue handled, the Japanese government began to discuss economic sanctions on Iraq. In this discussion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) advocated solidarity with the United States, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) expressed cautious concerns about the possible impact of the economic sanctions on Iraq’s unpaid debt to Japan. This discussion was terminated on August 5, when the Japanese government hurriedly announced a four-point sanctions package against Iraq. The package included oil import embargo, export embargo, suspension of economic aid, and a freeze on Iraqi investment and loans.\textsuperscript{18} The decision was made fast. It took only six hours for the Cabinet to approve the package. Behind the abrupt termination of the debate between powerful ministries, it seems, was intervention from the Kantei, the Office of the Prime Minister. And Kantei’s action seems to have primarily stemmed from prodding by Washington. President Bush had called Kaifu in the morning on August 4, urging the prime minister to take proactive actions. In the evening, moreover, the European Community (EC) announced its economic sanctions on Iraq. Tokyo could not just wait

\textsuperscript{17}Inoguchi (1991) would disagree on this overall description of the first impression of the Gulf Crisis felt by the Japanese. He describes it as a “bolt from out of the blue” (257) to emphasize that the Gulf Crisis was an unexpected event for the Japanese. True, it was an unexpected event. Moreover, had the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait escalated into an invasion of Saudi Arabia, then, it could have become a serious energy crisis for Japan because at the time approximately 20\% of the total crude oil imports of Japan came from Saudi Arabia, and a large part of the Saudi oil was coming from the Japanese-owned Khafji oil field, which was located on the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (For the amount of Japan’s oil imports originating from Saudi Arabia, see IEA (2013), “OECD imports”, IEA Oil Information Statistics (database) available at OECD iLibrary). Actually, on 29 January 1991, the Iraqi forces invaded the Khafji oil field although the Multi-National Forces repelled them within only two days. Nevertheless, whether the Gulf Crisis was taken as a serious ‘security’ crisis for the Japanese in the initial stage of the Crisis, especially after the initial examination of the effects on the oil imports was over, is another question.

\textsuperscript{18}It seems that the MITI grudgingly agreed on this sanctions package. Two days after the four economic sanctions on Iraq were announced, then MITI Minister, Muto Kabun remarked that MITI was deliberating on mollifying the sanctions, considering the possible economic impact from the trade embargo. However, MITI’s deliberation went nowhere.
for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to impose trade embargo on Iraq, which would come on August 6. “Prompted by other Western countries’ actions and Bush’s personal urging, Kaifu rushed through the four-point package, which was announced in the evening of August 5” (Blaker 1993, 19).

_Ignorance of What the Americans Want_

Up to this point, there was not much hesitation much less frustration. On the very day of the invasion, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Misoji, the spokesman of the Kaifu Cabinet, condemned the Iraqi attack and requested an immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi forces (NSPA 1991, 190). Three days later, the Japanese announced their bilateral economic sanctions on Iraq even before the UNSC adopted measures for trade embargo. But the four measures against Iraq announced on August 5 were all about what not to do: suspension of import from and export to Iraq, on one hand, and freezing of economic aid and financial operations related to Iraq on the other. Now that what not to do was in place, it was time to decide what to do concretely to help the international efforts to repel the Iraqi invasion. From this moment, however, the task began to become puzzling.

It was puzzling for two reasons. First, “what Japan was being requested to do was extraordinarily vague” (Blaker 1993, 21). Every official in the Japanese government from the prime minister down to the working level felt that they had to do something, but they did not know what to do because their friends in Washington did not give them a ‘specific answer’ about what to do. Washington was too busy to come up with a solution for Tokyo. The to-do list seemed endless for Washington. Saddam Hussein just invaded Kuwait. Now policymakers in Washington had to figure out for themselves what to do in what
process and sequence. First, on August 5, President Bush had to show the political will of
the United States by declaring that “the invasion will not stand.” Then, in response to a
Saudi request made two days later, the United States began to deploy forces to Saudi
Arabia.\footnote{The Bush Administration proceeded with the largest U.S. troop buildup since the Vietnam War. In August it sent over a force of 100,000 troops, which was then increased to 250,000, to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia. The Bush Administration decided to double that force in November to face the approximately equal number of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq and 3,500 Iraqi tanks” (Spanier 1992, 389).} In addition, General Schwarzkopf, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, asked his military planners to begin work on ground offensive against Iraq. Washington had diplomatic efforts on the go as well. From the very first day, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker contacted their counterparts in Britain, the Soviet Union, and many other countries, trying to set up a political coalition against Iraq (Baker 1995, 277-99; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 110-27). Everything was rapidly moving, and everybody was running fast. With all factors and parameters constantly changing, it was hard for Washington to find out specifically what assistance to ask for from the allies in what amount. Karl D. Jackson, who was Senior Director for Asian Affairs of the U.S. NSC at the time, describes the situation as below:

My Japanese friends approached me and asked how much money would be required. I didn’t know, and we didn’t have any specific numbers at the time. You know, they just invaded. No one knew how things would unfold. To find specific numbers, I used to ask my DoD colleagues. But the numbers kept changing, and all the numbers were based on guesswork. I had to improvise some numbers myself to give answers to my Japanese friends (Jackson 2010).

The numbers that Karl D. Jackson provided seem to have failed to clear the thick haze that covered the eyes of Tokyo. Tokyo kept complaining about the ambiguity of U.S. demands. As for the total war cost, for example, Prime Minister Kaifu complained that
“the U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Embassy in Tokyo all provided different numbers” (Kaifu 2003, 85). If the total war cost were not fixed, the Japanese thought, then, it would be difficult to determine how much of the total cost Japan should cover. That is to say, the Japanese thought of their contribution to the war in terms of a share of the total war cost. Therefore, others have to determine first so that the Japanese can determine.

Finally, Tokyo had to determine the amount of financial assistance based on their independent guesswork. Matsuura Koichiro, who was Director-General of the North American Bureau of the MOFA at the time, shares with us a fragment of the Japanese process of determining the right amount of monetary assistance for the United States:

In the month of August when we were still in discussion with Washington about what to provide in what amount, Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama asked me, “How much money will satisfy America?” Because Americans didn’t give us specific numbers, I had to calculate the number on my own, and estimated that US$ 2 billion will be needed. Everybody was dumbfounded at the number. I knew US$ 2 billion were a large amount of money from my experiences as head of the International Economy Bureau. But the question was not how much we can pay, but how much will satisfy America (Matsuura 2001, 24; translation by author; and underlined and italicized by author).

Okamoto Yukio, then Director of the North American Division I of the MOFA also expressed complaints about his American friends: “However many times we asked about the war cost, they kept saying they could not calculate. As a result, requesting specific amount of money to the MOF was delayed. Finally, we couldn’t help but depend on our good sense to come up with a number, that is, US$ 1 billion” (Okamoto 2001, 14; translation by author). From the testimonies of Japanese policymakers, we can see that in

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20 After internal deliberation in the MOFA and discussion with the MOF, they eventually fixed the amount of the initial monetary assistance to be offered to the Americans at US$ 1 billion.
the initial stage of responding to the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese waited for the Americans to provide a specific answer to the question of how much assistance to provide, and when the answer did not come, the Japanese had to create their own.

*Dilemma: Limited Options*

The second reason why the task of determining what to do was puzzling was because the options given to the Japanese policymakers were extremely limited. Although many things were uncertain in the first few months after the invasion, there was one thing that the Japanese knew for sure: no military assistance and no SDF troops can be provided for the war. According to Jackson (2010), in one of the early calls made to Kaifu immediately after the Iraqi invasion, President Bush asked for some minesweepers for the purpose of logistical support. When Bush mentioned “minesweepers,” however, there was “stern silence” at the other end of the telephone line. After a pause, Kaifu mentioned the constitutional constraint as an unavoidable obstacle to sending MSDF minesweepers. In fact, the United States really needed more minesweepers at the time, because usually the U.S. military did not maintain sufficient minesweeping capabilities in peacetime.21 Nevertheless, the answer from Kaifu was a flat no. When even the request of

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21 According to Mifune (2012), the minesweeping function of the U.S. military at the time of the Gulf Conflict was generally provided by aircrafts. In comparison with the U.S. minesweeping aircrafts, Mifune testifies, Japanese minesweepers at the time were more accurate and efficient because the MSDF minesweepers could compartmentalize an area of the sea into multiple grids and exhaustively eliminate the sea mines in the area grid by grid. On average, fifty MSDF crewmen manned an MSDF minesweeper. However, the main function of the minesweeper was not to attack, but to eliminate sea mines. To the exclusion of the minesweeping function, the only firearm equipped on an MSDF minesweeper was machine guns on the deck. But the main function of those machine guns was to eliminate those few sea mines that survived the initial minesweeping operation. The Japanese government refused to provide minesweepers during the Gulf War, but did dispatch four minesweepers to the Gulf area after the war was over. MSDF Captain Mifune was a young operation officer in the Minesweeping Division 18 of the MSDF from February 1989 to June 1990. This Division 18 is the very division that participated in the minesweeping operations in the Gulf area in 1991.
minesweepers was rebuffed, the Japanese response to the request of troops was easily predictable.

The military option was not on the Japanese table from the start not just because Prime Minister Kaifu was a “pacifist and personally reluctant for a military measure” (Jackson 2010), but also because it was unimaginable for the Japanese public. A Kyodo News Service poll announced at the end of August 1990 found that “over 83% of the Japanese opposed sending the SDF to the Gulf region” (Purrington and A.K. 1991, 309). In addition, sending SDF troops to the Gulf region required the revision of the SDF Law, because at the time the SDF Law specifically stipulated that the prime minister can mobilize and move the SDF only when Japan was under an armed attack (Kenmochi, Miyajima and Yamakawa 1991, 263-4).²²

With the military option excluded, then, it appeared that the only way out was to provide money. But, among many Japanese officials as well as the public, there was an implicit but strong feeling that giving only money without providing something else would not be sufficient, and would not be appreciated by other countries including the United States. “Japan, it was agreed, ‘must do something more,’ but the actions to be taken were not clear” (Blaker 1993, 21; Kaifu 2003, 83). Kitaoka Shinichi, a long advocate of more proactive Japanese foreign policy, claims that this dilemma that Japan faced at the time created a kind of “suspension of thinking” (shikoteishi):

²²Article 3 of the SDF Law at the time limited the main task of the SDF to “defending our country in response to direct or indirect invasion,” and Article 76 stipulated that “the prime minister, when there is an armed attack from the outside (including when there is a concern that an external armed attack is expected), and when the prime minister recognizes such need in order to defend our country, can order the whole or part of the SDF into action after obtaining an approval from the Diet” (translation by author).
When the Gulf Crisis occurred, the Japanese used to say, “It is embarrassing to do nothing. Giving only money is likewise embarrassing. Then, what do we have to do?” It was like their thinking came to a full stop here, and didn’t move forward a bit. I still vividly remember, because I personally experienced similar cases a couple of times in some talk shows and private conversations. One person says, “We have to do something a little bit more.” I reply, “Absolutely. There is no other way but to dispatch SDF troops for a non-combative purpose.” Then, the person says, “That will be a little troublesome. But, we have to do something else anyway.” And then I ask again, “What can we do?” However, I don’t get an answer. It was very symbolic. Everybody says we have to do something. When it comes down to what to do specifically, however, the thinking just stops. That was the atmosphere of the time (Kitaoka, Yamazaki, and Watanabe 2001, 29; translation by author).

Looking at the pictures described by Matsuura, Okamoto, and Kitaoka, therefore, we can say that ignorance and dilemma epitomized the Japanese psyche in the first few weeks of the Gulf Crisis. They were ignorant of what the Americans want; they faced the dilemma because their feasible options were limited. Ignorance and dilemma led to the cancellation of Prime Minister Kaifu’s scheduled visit to the Middle East.

Before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kaifu was planning to go on a good will tour of the Mid-eastern countries from August 15 to 27. Had it been implemented as scheduled, actually, it could have been a good chance to listen to the Arabs’ frank opinions about the Gulf Crisis at the highest level. Also, Japan could have demonstrated her global leadership and asserted her political will to assist in the international efforts to drive off the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait (Blaker 1993, 19; Ito 1991, 275). As a matter of fact, Kaifu personally preferred to go as planned. But, the MOFA advised him not to go, because they needed the prime minister to stay in Tokyo, following up on the developments of the Gulf Crisis and deciding what actions to take at every juncture (Kaifu 2003, 81). More importantly, Japan at the moment was not ready to dole out gifts to the ‘frontline’ states (Purrington and A. K. 1991, 308; Armacost 1996, 102). Instead of Kaifu, finally, Foreign
Minister Nakayama Taro went with his Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the Middle Eastern Bureau of the MOFA, both of whom should have worked as a linchpin of the response to the Gulf Crisis in Tokyo (Matsuura 2001, 25). Tokyo had to wait for them to come back with new information gathered from the field.

**The Advent of the Real Crisis**

Washington did not wait, however. On 15 August 1990, U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Michael H. Armacost communicated U.S. demands to Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama. The general outline of the U.S. desires was already known because President Bush had talked to Kaifu by phone two days earlier. In addition, since August 2, many American officials on various levels had been contacting their counterparts, trying to let the Japanese know what they understood the United States needed. But, Ambassador Armacost’s request on August 15 was crucial because it was based on an instruction from Washington. It was official and authoritative requests from the United States. Let us see what the United States requested through a testimony of Ambassador Armacost:

Washington requested financial support for the coalition; economic assistance for Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; additional host nation support; and Japanese personnel contributions to back up the coalition. I mentioned a variety of possible responses to this last request: medical volunteers, logistic support in transporting personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia, Japanese help in managing the anticipated exodus of a large number of refugees from Kuwait, and participation in a multi-national naval force through the dispatch of minesweepers to help clear the Gulf and transport vessels to carry equipment from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. What Washington initially seemed to want most was the deployment of a Japanese ship manned by Japanese personnel and bearing a Japanese flag as a symbol of Tokyo’s involvement in a common effort (Armacost 1996, 102; italicized by author).

In response to the U.S. demands, the initial response of Tokyo was mixed. Again, let
Kuriyama hinted at Japan’s readiness to offer support that went beyond financial subventions. But he emphatically noted the political and constitutional difficulties that would attend any involvement of the Japanese SDF in an area of strife and clearly signaled that there was no likelihood that Japan would dispatch minesweepers (Armacost 1996, 102).

Only with the communication of the official request from Washington did the Gulf situation effectively transform into a real Gulf Crisis. Up until August 15, the office in charge of the matter was the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau of the MOFA. But the very next day, the Gulf War Task Force was set up headed by Watanabe Koji, then Deputy Foreign Minister. The Task Force included Director-Generals of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau (because it happened in the Middle East), the United Nations Bureau (because legally speaking, it was the UN versus Iraq), the North American Affairs Bureau (to deal with how to assist the United States), and the Consular Affairs Bureau (because there were Japanese hostages in Iraq). Here, it is noteworthy that the MOFA spearheaded the response to the Gulf Crisis, and the JDA (Japan Defense Agency)’s involvement in the decision-making regarding the Gulf Crisis was “scrupulously” excluded (Blaker 1993, 23).

**Failure to Placate Washington**

The task of the Task Force was to come up with a comprehensive assistance package for the Americans. However, the task was tricky. Japan had to provide more than just monetary assistance while not sending SDF troops. The Watanabe team’s answer came out two weeks later. The package announced on August 29 was composed of “four main
pillars" (shihonbashira): medical cooperation, transportation support, equipment provision, and monetary assistance (Okamoto 2001, 14). Specifically, the government pledged to (1) send a 100-strong medical team primarily composed of volunteering doctors and nurses, (2) charter two planes and two ships to provide supplies for the MNF, 3) provide equipment for the MNF such as anti-heat gears, four-wheel drive vehicles, and other supplies, and 4) provide loans and grants to the United States and the frontline states such as Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey (Purrington and A. K. 1991, 309; Blaker 1993, 21-2; NSPA 1991, 191).

The assessment from Washington was negative, however. U.S. officials privately did not hide their disappointment (Purrington and A. K., 1991, 309). First of all, what the United States wanted the most was, as mentioned above, symbolic: Hinomaru on the ground or on the sea. But, the personnel assistance was missing in the package to the only exception of the small medical team. Second, the amount of financial assistance was disappointing to Washington. Actually, on the day of the announcement of the package, the specific number of the loans and grants was missing because the MOF failed to deliver the number to the MOFA by the day. The next day, the MOF independently announced that the total value of the aid package including “in kind” contributions would be US$ 1 billion. And on August 31, the MOF “responded to MOFA plans to further increase Japan’s financial contributions by publicly announcing that the US$ 1 billion package was the most Japan could do in FY 1990” (Purrington and A. K., 1991, 309). Although the Americans failed to provide an exact estimation of the war cost, the US$ 1 billion package was wide of the mark, because by the time the Japanese aid package was announced, the expected war cost was snowballing as the war plans materialized. As
Blake (1993, 22) describes, “[T]he earliest U.S. cost estimates quickly escalated far beyond Japan’s calculations.”

Washington expressed dissatisfaction by sending U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nick Brady to Tokyo. He arrived at Tokyo on September 7, and held meetings with Prime Minister Kaifu, Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, and Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro, urging them to increase Japan’s contributions (Purrington and A. K., 1991, 310). Adding to Tokyo’s troubles, on September 12, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment to the defense authorization bill, calling for the annual withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Japan beginning in five years, if the Japanese government did not agree to pay the full cost of deploying U.S. troops in Japan. Actually, this amendment was a kind of low blow for Tokyo, because, as Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto announced on the next day, “sharing the upkeep cost of the U.S. Forces in Japan is one thing, and the assistance for the Gulf Crisis is totally another” (NSPA 1991, 192).

Finally, in an emergency Cabinet meeting held on September 14, the Japanese government decided to provide additional US$ 3 billion, one third of which was for the MNF with the remaining US$ 2 billion going to Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan. Therefore, only half a month after the first aid package of US$ 1 billion was announced, the amount of the total aid quadrupled to US$ 4 billion at the behest of the United States.

To make matters worse, the other three pillars of the shihonbashira did not go as announced. First of all, the Japanese government could not put together the medical team, because there were not as many volunteers as needed. The government hurriedly set up an advance team of 17 people and sent it to the Gulf on September 18. But the report from the advance team was gloomy. There was no serious demand for the Japanese
medical team on the field. Moreover, it was awkward to operate a medical team without additional units to protect it. Eventually, the ambitious idea of sending personnel assistance in the form of a medical team simply fizzled out. No Japanese medical team of 100 volunteers went to the Gulf (Matsuura 1991, 26). On November 2, the Japanese government announced that in place of the 100-strong medical team, two doctors would be sent to Saudi Arabia (NSPA 1991, 194).

The transportation support also hit a snag. In the August 29 package, the Japanese government promised to provide two airplanes for transportation. With the option of sending ASDF (Air Self-Defense Force) units dropped, however, the Japanese had to charter the planes from a private airline company. At first, it seemed easy because at the time the Japan Airlines (JAL) had already been operating some flights to the Gulf. But, in a negotiation with the government, JAL insisted that the flight should take off from Narita. It meant that the airplanes had to stop three times to upload U.S. supplies en route. Then, the transportation flight from Narita to Riyadh would take a week, which was too long to be accepted by the U.S. military. Eventually, the Japanese government had to charter planes from American companies (Okamoto 2001, 17). The August 29 package also promised to provide ships for transportation. The chartered ships with food and other supplies were supposed to set sail on September 5, but did not actually leave until September 25 because the labor union “refused to load the vessels, and the crew refused to depart” (Blaker 1993, 22).

Once the government managed to find a way to go over such logistical barricades, a legal problem was raised. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), which was officially responsible for interpreting the Japanese Constitution, raised an objection to the
government-chartered ships transporting weapons and ammunitions for the MNF. The objection was based on the so-called theory of identification with use of force, which in turn originated from the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution:

§ (1) . . . the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. §(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. . . (underline by author)

MOFA claimed that the U.S-led MNF was part of the coercive measures endorsed by the UN, therefore, did not belong to the “means of settling international disputes.” On the other hand, the CLB was of an opinion that, even if assisting the MNF is not prohibited by the first paragraph of the Article 9, still, combined interpretation of the first and the second paragraphs dictates that the use of force for the purpose other than self-defense is not permitted by any means. Then, whether it is endorsed by the UN or not, any activity by the state that can be identified with use of force for the purpose other than self-defense, is not allowed. According to the CLB’s interpretation, transporting weapons and ammunitions for the MNF could be identified with use of force, while the MOFA claimed that transportation itself was not use of force. The MOFA and the CLB were in a bitter tug-of-war over the interpretation of Article 9. But, to the end, the Kantei did not intervene. Finally, the MOFA failed to persuade the CLB: weapons and ammunitions were excluded from the cargo (Okamoto 2001, 17-8).

The SDF in Disguise

In addition to the four main pillars, another attempt to break through the dilemma

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was being tried simultaneously. When the Kaifu Administration announced a
supplemental aid package valued at $3 billion on September 14, the announcement also
included a plan to seek legislation to create the United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps
(UNPCC: Kokuren Heiwa Kyoryokutai), a civilian agency that would enable Japan to
perform support functions for UN peacekeeping forces. About two weeks later, the
government announced the initial draft of the UN Peace Cooperation (UNPC) Law
(Kokuren Heiwa Kyoryoku Hoan). After another ten days passed, on October 7, specific
guidelines to implement the proposed UNPC Law were determined. And, on October 18,
Foreign Minister Nakayama officially proposed the legislative bill before the Special
Committee on the UN Peace Cooperation of the Lower House of the Diet (Kenmochi,
Miyajima, and Yamakawa 1991, 248). From the announcement of the plan to the proposal
of the specific bill in the Diet, it took 34 days. Up to this point, the Japanese government
moved swiftly.

In fact, the argument that Japan had to provide personnel assistance, that is, send
SDF troops to the Gulf was raised on the Japanese side from the moment that the
Japanese realized the need to play a more visible role in the Gulf Crisis. On August 24,
Foreign Minister Nakayama remarked that “it seemed it was time to lay the foundation
for dispatching the SDF overseas.” On September 4, JDA Director-General Ishikawa
mentioned “the need to examine the option of sending the SDF overseas as a way to
contribute to the world peace.” On September 21, a MOFA spokesman revealed that “the
government is considering the idea of sending lightly-armed SDF troops to the Gulf
region” (NSPA 1991, 191-2).

However, sending active-duty members of the SDF required going through the
cumbersome process of revising the SDF Law in the Diet, which seemed almost impossible considering the expected resistance from the public opinion and the opposition parties. According to an Asahi poll announced on November 6, 78% of the respondents opposed sending SDF troops overseas while 58% objected to the proposed UNPC bill (NSPA 1991, 194). According to the poll results, the idea of sending the SDF overseas was an outright nonstarter, although the public opposition to the creation of the UNPCC was a little less strong. In addition, the idea of revising the SDF Law was reportedly opposed by Prime Minister Kaifu and the MOFA out of a concern that “such a move would trigger adverse reactions in neighboring Asian countries while providing new and unwelcome authority and prestige to the JDA and SDF” (Armacost 1996, 115).

Most importantly, we need to note that the Upper House of the Diet at the time was under control of the opposition parties because the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was defeated by a landslide in the Upper House election of 1989. As a result, the LDP came to control only 109 seats out of the 252 total. For the first time since 1955, the year in which the LDP was created, the LDP lost the control of the Upper House, whose consent was practically essential for translating any legislative bill into the nation’s law. In order to ram any legislative amendment through the Diet, now they needed the Komeito or any combination of opposition parties that can provide at least 18 votes in the Upper House. Therefore, had the Kaifu Administration tried to amend the SDF Law, it must have been an uphill battle.

23Constitutionally, the Lower House of the Japanese Diet can override the decision of the Upper House with a two-thirds majority. See Article 59 of the Japanese Constitution. But, for the ruling party or the ruling coalition to control more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House is a rare and exceptional case. Therefore, when the majority of the Upper House seats are in the hands of the opposition parties, and the ruling party (or coalition) lacks the two-thirds majority of the Lower House, the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet are practically equal in their power to make a law of the nation.
In order to go around the resistance, then, the Kaifu Cabinet came up with the idea of legislating a new law and thereby establishing a new organization, rather than amending the existing SDF Law (Purrington and A. K. 1991, 312). The essence of the new law was three-fold: (1) the law will set up the UNPC Headquarters in the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister will head the Headquarters (Civilian Control); (2) the UNPCC will be put under the Headquarters, and be stuffed with volunteers and non-SDF civil servants or SDF officers loaned from the SDF (SDF Undercover); and (3) the members of the UNPCC will be allowed to carry and use small weapons for the purpose of self-defense under strict restrictions (Weapons through Backdoor).24

In the debate over the UNPCC, the bone of contention was neither the historical significance of the Gulf Crisis, nor the strategic necessity of the dispatch to the Middle East, but the legality and constitutionality of the submitted bill, that is, the legal status of the SDF officers loaned from the SDF to the UNPCC and the lawfulness of using small weapons (Ito 1991, 277). Initially, the legal status of the members of the UNPCC became an issue. The original idea was that SDF officers would be excluded from the UNPCC, and that the UNPCC would be composed of only volunteers and non-SDF civil servants. This original plan was strongly opposed by some LDP members, the JDA, and even some MOFA officials because they believed that the essential functions expected to be played by the UNPCC could not be conducted without the SDF. Then, the idea of SDF officers retiring and then being transferred to the UNPCC was suggested, but criticisms continued. Finally, it was determined that the SDF officers would be commissioned to the UNPCC, while maintaining their legal status as SDF officers. So, in the final version of the draft

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24The text of the draft of the UNPC Law submitted to the Diet in October 1990 is available at Kenmochi, Miyajima, and Yamakawa (1991), 250-60.
legislation submitted to the Diet, SDF officers could participate in the UNPCC as SDF officers, and could use small weapons as they deem necessary to defend themselves.

It is no wonder that opposition parties exploded and bombarded Kaifu and Nakayama with questions. They could not accept any element of the SDF in the UNPCC. Against the fierce criticisms from the opposition parties, the government did not stand up squarely. Testimonies by Kaifu and other officials within the Diet’s Special UNPC Committee often waffled or even conflicted on the exact duties of the UNPCC. Especially, they failed to clearly define the scope of the “small weapons” and under which circumstances the members of the UNPCC could use them. After some waffle and equivocation, Kaifu finally testified that the constitution bars “the armed participation of the SDF in a UN force,” which was in fact the inner essence of the idea of the submitted UNPC bill (Purrington and A. K., 313). After the fierce legal battles, the opposition parties controlling the Upper House of the Diet agreed to support the bill on the condition that the SDF elements should be excluded from it. However, that agreement could not silence the voices arguing for the inclusion of the SDF on the other side. By early November, it began to appear impossible for the government to garner the required support from the Diet. Finally, the Japanese government on November 9 agreed with the opposition parties to scrap the bill without taking a vote.\textsuperscript{25} It was a humiliation for the

\textsuperscript{25}This failure left important lessons for the LDP as well as part of the opposition parties. On the same day when the UNPC Bill was scrapped, Ozawa Ichiro, then Secretary-General of the LDP reached a written agreement with the Komeito and the Democratic Socialists on the following three points: (1) they will abide by the peace principle of the Constitution and the pacifism based on the United Nations; (2) contributions to the UN have to include not only money and materials but also personnel elements; and (3) for this purpose, they have to create an organization separate from the SDF, which can help the peace-keeping operations of the UN (Shinoda 2006, 69; translation by author). In other words, they agreed that they would not amend the Constitution and the UN-centrism, so the assistance should be provided in the name of the UN; that something more than money, that is, personnel assistance is required to be provided to help the UN; and that they have to create an organization legally separate from the SDF as an organizational basis of the personnel assistance. These agreements would work as the foundations for the
Kaifu Administration.$^{26}$

*Endgame*

While the attempt to provide personnel assistance was going under, the Japanese government was trying to deliver on time what it promised. In addition to the 800 four-wheel drive vehicles that Japan delivered in September, on October 19, the MOFA announced a plan to provide 75 water-supply vehicles, 50 refrigerator cars, the materials for prefabricated housings, TV sets, and video players. On December 23, the Japanese government loaned US$ 300 million to Egypt as promised. The next day, as part of the financial assistance for the MNF, the Japanese government deposited US$ 1 billion to the Gulf Peace Fund (GPF), which was established under the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (NSPA 1991, 194-5).

However, as the United States exhausted the means to settle the conflict peacefully, the prospect for a war was looming larger. By the time when, on 12 January 1991, U.S. Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq, 680,000 MNF troops, including 415,000 U.S. troops, massed in the Gulf area. As the possibility of a war was getting higher, the expected budget for the war increased. Ambassador Armacost in Tokyo began to “urge the Japanese government to prepare for new and substantial requests for additional financial support.” He did not have a “precise idea what PKO Law, which would be successfully created in 1992.

$^{26}$This was a double humiliation. It was obviously a humiliation vis-à-vis the United States and other foreign countries, but also Kaifu lost face in front of his fellow LDP lawmakers and the opposition parties because it clearly showed that Kaifu albeit being the prime minister did not have a final authority over an important policy issue. One day before the withdrawal of the UNPC Bill, Kaifu reportedly said to one of his close aides, “So, I’ve told you so many times. If they had done as I had said . . . Things would have not ended up like this” (Shinoda 2006, 69; translation by author).
Washington’s expectations of Japan might be.” But he wanted to make sure that “Tokyo did not shoot too low again.” He also urged prompt and forthcoming Japanese initiatives in tackling the refugee problems. When trying to persuade his Japanese friends, Ambassador Armacost emphasized that the Japanese had to “announce their decision expeditiously without awaiting pressure” (Armacost 1996, 119). To communicate U.S. requests and obtain a better understanding of the political and budgetary realities of Japan, Ambassador Armacost met Finance Minister Hashimoto several times at the Ambassador’s residence in December 1990 and early January 1991.

In response to the new U.S. demands, Prime Minister Kaifu announced on January 17, right after the MNF offensive began, the Japanese government’s intention to provide additional financial assistance and to consider supplying SDF aircrafts for evacuating refugees from the war zone. As for the amount of the additional financial assistance, Hashimoto and Brady in a one-on-one meeting held in New York on 23 January 1991 cut a final deal. Brady asked Hashimoto to shoulder 20% of the expected total war cost of US$ 45 billion, which amounted to US$ 9 billion. This was in addition to the US$ 4 billion that Japan had already promised. Although the figure was “considerably higher than the Japanese anticipated and greater than Secretary Brady realistically expected Tokyo to provide,” Hashimoto’s answer was positive (Armacost 1996, 121). On January 24, the Japanese government held a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, and decided to provide additional US$ 9 billion and to dispatch SDF aircrafts for transporting refugees (NSPA 1991, 197).

Although the subsequent Diet process attached some minor strings to this US$ 9 billion package, and the proposal to utilize SDF aircrafts to transport refugees was
ultimately abandoned due to criticisms from the opposition parties, the United States appreciated Tokyo’s generosity and the timeliness of her decision on aid, which, according to Ambassador Armacost’s testimony, “helped dissipate criticisms on Japan within the Bush Administration, the American press, and the U.S. Congress” (Armacost 1996, 121-2). Tokyo’s contributions were indeed respectable. In order to procure the needed amount of money, the MOF had to impose more taxes on cigarettes, gasoline, and corporations.

The war was now over. And yet, there was one additional item of assistance coming from Tokyo. In April 1991, in response to a Saudi request, Tokyo dispatched four minesweepers to the Gulf to help demining efforts there (NSPA 1991, 199). An irony in this dispatch is that the Japanese could send the minesweepers without either a UNPCC or a revision of the SDF Law. The dispatch could be justified because there was the actual need to clear the sea lane to secure the safety of Japanese oil tankers and crew members, and because “the military risks had dramatically declined with the end of the war.” And, also, “a recent decision by the German government to send minesweepers to the Gulf” could be used by Tokyo as a precedent (Armacost 1996, 124). Most importantly, now that combat activities were over, there was no use of force with which the dispatch of the minesweepers could be identified.

4.3 South Korean Response

Nordpolitik and the Grand Merger

For the Kaifu administration, how to deal with the Gulf Crisis/War was the most
formidable diplomatic challenge (Kaifu 2003, 80), although the Japanese regarded it more as an energy crisis than as a security crisis in the initial phase of the response. For the Roh Tae-woo Administration, however, the Gulf is not remembered as such a serious question. For example, in President Roh Tae-woo’s memoirs, which amount to hundreds of pages, surprisingly, no reference is made to the Gulf Crisis/War. It is not just Mr. Roh’s memoirs: not a single paragraph in other books chronicling the diplomatic history of the Roh Tae-woo Administration mentions the Gulf War (Kim 2002, 173-220; Lee 2009, 196-241; Kim 2006, 429-500; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1999, 103-108; 139-154).

When President Roh Tae-woo was in office, in fact, the most important diplomatic task of the Republic of Korea was the *Nordpolitik* (Northern Policy), or rapprochement with traditional allies of North Korea including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The purpose of the Northern Policy was to siege and pressure North Korea by normalizing relations with Eastern-bloc countries so that North Korea would voluntarily come to the negotiating table with South Korea. As represented by the electoral catchphrase of Roh Tae-woo during his presidential campaign in 1987, President Roh’s strategy was to “go to Pyongyang via Beijing and Moscow” (Kim 2006, 467-9; Lilley et al. 2010, 97). By the time the Gulf Crisis occurred in August 1990, the Northern Policy had begun to produce tangible fruits. In June 1990, President Roh held a historic meeting with then Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev in San Francisco (Choe 1990). In early September, North Korea’s delegation headed by the premier of the DPRK or the

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27The memoirs mentioned here are not published as a single book. *Uelgan Chosun* (The Monthly Chosun) serialized them for a span of several months in 1999. Mr. Cho Gab-je, who is a former editor-in-chief of the magazine reedited and reposted those serial articles on his personal website. The author printed the memoirs from Mr. Cho’s website ([http://www.chogajbe.com](http://www.chogajbe.com)).
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, came to Seoul and held Inter-Korean High-Level Talks (Song 1990).

For the Northern Policy to be successful, one crucial requirement was smooth coordination with Washington. Although Seoul managed to lay siege to Pyongyang, the Northern Policy would be less than effective if Washington were to establish a separate and independent pipeline with the North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung. Seoul had to discourage Washington’s possible direct contact with Pyongyang, and hoped that the United States would acknowledge the primacy of inter-Korean dialogue in dealing with the affairs of the Korean Peninsula. To enlist the U.S. support for a top-priority policy, cooperation with the United States in other ‘less important’ issue areas was unavoidable. Assistance for the Gulf Conflict was one such issue area. The Roh Tae-woo Administration could not let the Gulf stand in the way to Pyongyang.

Fortunately for the Roh Tae-woo Administration, a favorable domestic political arrangement had already been established by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait: the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was occupying more than two-thirds of the seats in the unicameral National Assembly. Since President Roh’s Democratic Justice Party (DJP) lost the majority as a result of the general election held in spring 1988, he had not been able to control the legislative process until January 1990, when three conservative parties including the DJP decided to merge into a new party, the DLP (Kim 2006, 454-6). Had it not been for this conservative grand merger, it might have been extremely difficult for President Roh Tae-woo to dispatch any unit of the South Korean Armed Forces to the Gulf, because, according to the South Korean Constitution promulgated in 1987, to dispatch any element of the South Korean Armed Forces abroad required prior approval.
by the majority of the National Assembly. Now with more than two-thirds of the lawmakers in his party, President Roh could expect to get the approval relatively easily.

*A Fire on the Other Side of a River*

South Korea’s initial response to the Gulf Crisis was not much different from that of Japan. For the South Koreans, too, it was a typical case of an energy crisis. South Korean newspapers published on the next day of the invasion are full of concerns about oil prices. A major economic daily reported that, “[a]s an immediate effect [of the invasion] . . . oil prices jumped as much as 15 percent [sic] overnight,” and that, “All this cause[d] immense anxieties to [the Republic of Korea], which depends on imported oil for its entire oil supply” (*Maeil Kyongje* [Seoul], 3 August 1990). However, like the Japanese, the South Koreans were also relieved after calculating their actual dependence on the oil imported from Iraq and Kuwait. The combined daily oil imports from the two countries were 109,000 barrels a day, which occupied only 11.8% of the total daily imports. As a result, they reached a conclusion that, even when all oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait were cut off, South Korea could still get by for 348 days with their oil reserve of 38 million barrels. Although President Roh Tae-woo emphasized in an interview that “[t]he war clouds hanging over the Persian Gulf are not a fire on the other side of a river,” many South Koreans did not accept the Gulf Crisis as a direct threat to their security, because the crisis occurred in a region far away from the Korean Peninsula (Song 1990).

In addition to the possible effects of oil cutoffs and the location of the crisis, there were other factors affecting the public opinion on South Korea’s response to the Gulf Crisis. First of all, many South Koreans believed that they already had their hands full
“due to the hefty burden of [their] own defense” against North Korea (Yonhap [Seoul], 24 September 1990). Second, the economy was not going very well. Since the end of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, South Korean exports had begun to be sluggish. As a result, the current account of the balance of payments in 1990 was in deficit by US$ 2 billion. Moreover, in the summer of 1990, right before the breakout of the Iraqi invasion, a raging flood devastated the whole country. The amount of money required for the flood damage relief was estimated to be more than US$ 600 million (Seoul Sinmun [Seoul], 25 September 1990). Last but maybe at least as much important as other factors, anti-American sentiment was quite strong particularly among young South Koreans. According to a survey conducted in early July 1990 with 500 college students, 74.8% of the respondents said that the United States is “interfering in internal affairs” of South Korea; and 84.2% said that the United States is “a barrier to the inter-Korean reunification.” This strong anti-American sentiment largely stemmed from South Koreans’ perception that the United States was in one way or another involved in the Kwangju crackdown, which took place in May 1980, when, in a South Korean city named Kwangju, the South Korean military brutally cracked down on large-scale street demonstrations that called for democratization. According to the same poll, 75.6% responded that the United States “interfered” in the crackdown, 44.8% said that the United States “gave tacit permission,” and 15.6% answered that the United States “helped” (Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 17 September 1990; Hangyore Sinmun [Seoul], 5 August 1990).

Besides the unfavorable public opinion, the opposition parties were not very cooperative. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, in fact, the National Assembly had been
paralyzed, because in July 1990, all 69 legislators of the main opposition Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) and eight of the splinter Democratic Party had tendered their resignations in protest against the ruling DLP’s blitzkrieg passage of a total of 26 legislative bills through the plenary session (Korea Times [Seoul], 12 September 1990). The relations between the ruling and opposition parties fell to a low. With the unfavorable public opinion and the crippled legislative branch as a background, it was no wonder that an opposition party urged prudence and cautiousness on the government in responding to U.S. demands (Yonhap [Seoul], 1 September 1990).

Prudent and Cautious

Indeed, the South Korean government took a prudent and cautious step. On the very day that the Iraqi invasion took place, then U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, Donald Gregg asked then Foreign Minister Choi Ho-jung to condemn the invasion and impose sanctions on Iraq. As requested, Seoul immediately issued a statement expressing deep ‘concerns,’ hoping for a ‘peaceful’ resolution, and asking Iraq to withdraw ‘as early as possible’ (NSPA 1991, 381). The “condemnation and sanctions” were not there. Not until 9 August 1990 did the ROK government impose sanctions on Iraq. The substance of the sanctions was basically the same as the ones imposed by the Japanese government four days earlier.

The next step was to decide on what to do to help the MNF and the frontline states. Unlike Japan, who decided to announce her assistance package just two weeks after the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo communicated the official list of requested items on August 15,

28 If not otherwise indicated, the narrative and chronology of the South Korean responses to the Gulf Crisis/War in this chapter will be based on NSPA (1991).
Seoul waited out until late September.

It was not that Seoul was in a vacuum of U.S. pressure. The pressure was already on and intense. On August 17, Under Secretary of State Bob Kimmitt invited ROK Ambassador Park Dong-jin and asked for transportation support and financial assistance. Four days later, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon sounded out Ambassador Park on his views about additional assistance of aircrafts and vessels for the MNF. In Seoul, the South Korean press began to report that “U.S. President Bush asked the ROK to share the upkeep cost of the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf.” However, the South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman flatly denied the report, saying, “as of now, the U.S. Government has not officially informed us of this plan concerning sharing the military expenses and giving military assistance” (Donga Ilbo [Seoul], 31 August 1990). By then, almost a month had already passed after the Gulf Crisis occurred, and U.S. Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State had delivered the U.S. requests, but the South Korean government was not announcing its aid package.

On September 6, more than a month after the Iraqi invasion broke out, finally, President Bush’s personal letter to President Roh Tae-woo arrived. The letter outlined the expected monthly war cost and expressed hope for large-scale assistance from the Republic of Korea. On the same day in Washington, DoD delivered a request of US$ 450 million for sharing the Gulf War cost to the Office of the Military Attaché of the Korean Embassy: US$ 50 million in cash and US$ 100 million in kind by the end of 1990; US$ 5 million per month in cash and US$ 30 million per month in kind from 1991. DoD explained that the numbers were based on South Korea’s oil imports from the Middle East, the size of ROK’s construction projects in the Gulf region, and the domestic
economic situation of South Korea. The next day, U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady arrived at Seoul, and had a meeting with President Roh. He provided an exact number of financial assistance that the United States expected from South Korea. It was US$ 350 million in total: US$ 150 million for military operations in the Gulf and US$ 200 million for the frontline states.  

From Brady’s visit to Seoul, it took two and a half weeks for the South Korean government to finally announce its aid package. In the meantime, however, the U.S. pressure continued. On September 13, Charles Kartman, an advisor for U.S. Under Secretary of State, mentioned that as an ally of the United States, South Korea needed to provide assistance at the ‘right’ timing. On September 15, Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the U.S. NSC and Desaix Anderson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs visited South Korea and had a meeting with ROK Defense Minister Lee and Foreign Minister Choi respectively, and asked the South Korean government to swiftly decide on the amount and the means of the assistance, and to show a visible role as early as possible, saying that the timing is more important than the amount with respect to the assistance. On September 21, Ambassador Gregg made a demand on ROK for financial assistance as well as dispatch of military medical units and transportation equipment. Literally, Washington was bombarding Seoul.

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29 Whether the U.S. request was US$ 450 million or US$ 350 million is a little unclear. According to NSPA (1991), both requests were indeed made. However, which one reflects the true desire of the United States at the time? According to the South Korean press, the U.S. request was US$ 450 million. Moreover, then Korean Ambassador to the United States, Park Dong-jin also agreed that the requested amount was US$ 450 million (Yonhap [Seoul], 18 September 1990). It is probable that there might have been some difference in the base period based on which DoD and the U.S. Treasury calculated the amount. However, it is more plausible that the amount of the U.S. request was US$ 350 million first because Brady delivered the number to President Roh Tae-woo in person, second because Lee Sang-ok, who succeeded Choi Ho-jung in December 1990 to become the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea reveals in his memoirs that the U.S. initial request was US$ 350 million (Lee 2002, 305), and last, because President Roh himself in an interview with a South Korean newspaper acknowledged that the requested amount was US$ 350 million (Song 1990).
with requests.

A Little Short of the Original Demand

Finally, on September 24, the South Korean government announced its aid package of US$ 220 million and the plan to dispatch medical units to the Gulf and to provide transportation support for the MNF. The total amount of US$ 220 million will be broken down into two parts: US$120 million for the MNF and US$ 100 million for the frontline states. Vice Foreign Minister Yoo Jong-ha, who called a press conference to announce this package, explained to the press that US$ 50 million would be given in cash for the upkeep of the MNF in the Gulf region, and that the South Korean government would spend US$ 70 million to purchase non-lethal materials and services such as uniforms, gas masks, tents and to rent transportation equipment. The US$ 100 million for the frontline states would be broken down to US$ 40 million of long-term loans with low interest rates to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, US$ 10 million worth of grain (30,000 tons of rice), and US$ 50 million to the International Migration Organization for the support of war refugees and purchasing consumer goods for them (Yonhap [Seoul], 24 September 1990).\(^\text{30}\)

The package also included transportation and medical support just as the Japanese package did. The substance of the transportation support was actually a mere aircraft chartered from Korean Airines. The medical support was a small military unit of 154

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\(^{30}\)According to Lee (2002, 305-6), the amount of US$ 220 million is broken down somewhat differently: US$ 105 million for the MNF, and US$ 115 million for the frontline states. For the MNF, US$ 50 million will be provided in cash, and US$ 55 million will be in the form of transportation support. For the frontline states, US$ 60 million will be in loan, US$ 42 million in in-kind support, US$ 10 million in rice, and US$ 3 million in other types of support.
medics (Lee 2002, 312). However, it is worth noting that unlike the Japanese case, the Korean transportation support was provided right away. Actually, the Korean transportation support was provided earlier than any other U.S.-allied nation did (Choi 2004, 123). The medical support required prior approval of the National Assembly because it was a unit of the South Korean military. After securing the legislative approval, the unit arrived at Saudi Arabia on 24 January 1991 (Lee 2002, 312).

The basis of this aid package had already been deliberated and determined earlier. On September 18, a principals’ meeting was called to deal with the issue of how much to provide for the Gulf War. The participants included Deputy Prime Minister Lee Seung-yoon, National Security Planning Director Suh Dong-gwon, Foreign Minister Choi Ho-jung, Chief Presidential Secretary Roh Jae-bong, and Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs Kim Jong-in. In this meeting, it was agreed that the South Korean government could not provide the whole amount requested by the United States in light of South Korea’s economic difficulties and the flood damage. Instead, they decided to set aside nearly KRW 100 billion (US$ 150 million) in that year’s supplementary budget to share the cost of the military buildup in the Gulf (Yonhap [Seoul], 18 September 1990).

*Because the Americans Ask*

When making this decision, the most important factor that affected the decision must have been the fact that the United States, the single most important ally of the Republic of Korea demanded the assistance. To be sure, President Roh and his cabinet members mentioned the possibility of global energy crisis or the necessity to abide by the international norm represented by UNSC resolutions (Song 1990; Choi 2004, 122; Lee
But, obviously, the crucial factor was consideration of the U.S.-Korea bilateral relationship. Global energy crisis or the breach of peace and stability in the Middle East would surely have serious negative effects on the economy of South Korea, but the South Koreans could expect that even without South Korea’s participation, major powers of the existing international system would do their best to prevent such crisis from happening. Moreover, South Korea at the time was not even a member of the United Nations. Had it not been for the U.S. request, therefore, it would have been unthinkable for the South Korean government to spontaneously provide such large assistance for the Gulf War.

In addition, at the time, South Korea’s foreign relations were in need of U.S. cooperation. As had been pointed out previously, in order to effectively siege North Korea, South Korea asked the United States to recognize the primacy of inter-Korean dialogue over U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Further, South Korea needed U.S. support to accomplish the immediate goals of the Northern Policy. The immediate goals of the Northern Policy at the time were to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China on one hand, and to join the United Nations on the other. On 30 September 1990, a historic meeting between South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Ho-jung and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze was scheduled to be held in New York. This was going to be the first time the foreign ministers of the two countries would meet (Song 1990). The diplomatic negotiations to join the United Nations and the preparations to normalize relations with China were underway, too (Lee 2002, 117-

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31 In this meeting, they signed a communiqué normalizing their diplomatic relations immediately (Choi 2004, 131-8).
All these goals could not be achieved if without the support and cooperation of the United States.

More fundamentally, South Korea was dependent upon the United States for her security. If the United States were to take out part of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and redeploy them to the Gulf region to respond to the unfolding situation there, it would be a devastating blow to any administration in Seoul, because that action itself, aside from its real effect on the security of the Korean Peninsula, would affect the psychology of the South Korean electorate by making them feel more insecure. The U.S. side was familiar with this psychology. For example, one day after the Iraqi invasion, Douglas H. Paal, then Asian Director at the U.S. NSC, asked Yu Myung-hwan, Political Counselor at the Korean Embassy in Washington for South Korea’s participation in the economic sanctions on Iraq, alluding to the possibility that “insufficient sanctions against Iraq might tempt Kim Il-sung to invade southward.” Two weeks after the invasion, Robert W. RisCassi, Commander of the USFK reassured ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang-hoon that “USFK units would not be sent to the Gulf.” Later on, three days after the Operation Desert Storm began, General RisCassi, in a courtesy call to President Roh, reaffirmed the U.S. security commitment for South Korea. Uppermost in the minds of the South Korean policymakers was their own defense against North Korea, and the Americans knew that.

**Efforts to Bargain with the Americans**

In consideration of their own foreign policy agenda and South Korea’s security

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32In October 1990, the PRC and the ROK agreed to establish an office of trade representatives in Beijing and Seoul.
dependence, the policymakers of the South Korean government felt that they had no alternative but to provide assistance for the United States. The question was not whether to provide the assistance but how much assistance to provide. However, in deciding on the kind and the amount of the assistance, the South Korean government had to consider the domestic resistance. We can read this consideration in President Roh’s remarks:

Taking the size of the Korean economy into consideration, the United States asks our country to donate about $150 million for military expenses and another $200 million as assistance to the neighboring Gulf countries. Based on this, our country is studying an appropriate amount of assistance. Not all of our assistance will be in hard currency . . . (Song 1990; underline by author)

On September 24, when announcing the aid package, Vice Foreign Minister Yu also emphasized this point that not all assistance are in the form of cash. In addition, Mr. Yu stressed that “Korea has not been asked to send (combat) troops to the Gulf and thus has no plan to dispatch any” (Yonhap [Seoul], 24 September 1990).

Then, the testimonies and remarks of major policymakers of the Roh Tae-woo Administration lead us to the observation that by the time the principals’ meeting was held in September 18, the South Korean government reached four main conclusions about how to respond to the U.S. demands: (1) the South Korean government does provide assistance; (2) no combat troops from the South Korean Armed Forces will be included in the assistance; (3) the U.S. demand should be discounted: not the total amount as demanded by Washington will be given; and (4) Not all the assistance will be in cash; some will be provided in the form of materials and services.

Given these four premises, the amount decided by the principals’ meeting on September 18 was US$ 150 million. Now the task was to bargain with the Americans. It
was obvious that the final amount should fall between US$ 150 million and US$ 350 million. But determining exactly where to draw the line was by no means an easy issue. One U.S. official, who negotiated with the South Korean Embassy in Washington on the details of the assistance, recalls the difficulty of dealing with the South Koreans:

They (South Korean diplomats of the Korean Embassy in D.C.) frequently came to me, trying to find out our bottom line. Whenever I sat down with them to talk about the assistance, it was hard. They were tough, and tried to drive down the amount on the margin as much as they could (Paal 2010).

Through the negotiation between September 18 and 24, however, the U.S. and Korean sides could reach an agreement that the final amount should be increased by US$ 70 million to US$ 220 million although this number was smaller than the original U.S. demand by US$ 130 million. As a result, when announcing the aid package on September 24, Vice Foreign Minister Yu could proudly say that “the United States had asked for US$ 350 million, but agreed to a package of US$ 220 million last weekend, after taking account of Korea’s burden-sharing for U.S. forces stationed in [Korea] and its economic difficulties” (Yonhap [Seoul], 24 September 1990).

However, it does not seem that the U.S. side was completely satisfied with the amount. For instance, then U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, in the U.S.-Korea Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in New York on September 26, asked for additional financial assistance, quoting the possibility of the U.S. Congress making it a political issue as a reason. However, the South Korean government did not budge. Foreign Minister Choi explained that the number (US$ 220 million) was the maximum the ROK could pay, considering the security and economic situation of the ROK.
The domestic response to the announced aid package was complicated. Initially, the main opposition PPD gave tacit approval to the financial assistance of US$ 220 million, but objected to the dispatch of military medical units (Yonhap [Seoul], 31 January 1991). The public opinion was more unfavorable. For example, an editorial published by a South Korean newspaper on the day after the announcement of the aid package criticized the aid amount decided on by the government, and hoped that the government would keep its promise not to provide additional assistance for the United States in the future:

Considering the recent disasters and worsening economic situation, we feel the scale of support the government has decided to offer is excessive. . . . Even if the U.S. request is regarded as an appeal from an ally, we think the amount still is too much. The amount is exorbitant, not only because of our economic situation, but also because of the financial situation of a divided nation which already is under the pressure of an enormous defense burden. . . . Of course, this seems to be a result of a positive consideration not to damage our friendly relations with the United States and of an expected early settlement of the Gulf situation. . . . Considering public opinion at home, the government apparently has said “the amount of support was decided with comprehensive foresight over the prospects for the Middle East situation and, thus, we would assume no larger share of the expenses.” The government should, of course, keep its pledge to the people that it would assume no additional share, . . . The United States as well should be deeply aware that our share of the Gulf expenses, which exceeds what Canada or Australia would offer, is based on the spirit of ROK-U.S. friendship and reciprocity (Seoul Sinmun [Seoul], 25 September 1990; italicized by author).

Domestic Maelstrom over Combat Troops

The South Korean government could not keep this promise. As the possibility of

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33 Later, the leader of the PPD, Kim Dae-jung changes his position after a meeting with President Roh Tae-woo on 19 January 1991, and supports the idea of sending the medical unit on the condition that no combat troops go to the Gulf. As a result, the government’s motion to dispatch a military medical unit to the Gulf passed the National Assembly with 223 for, 9 against, and 1 abstaining out of attending 233 assemblymen (Lee 2002, 312).
peaceful settlement of the conflict grows dim, the war clouds over the Gulf region
loomed larger. Naturally, the expected war cost increased. Washington wanted to make
sure that American friends and allies knew that they would have to pay the additional
bills if the situation in the Gulf were to become more serious. On 20 December 1990, U.S.
Under Secretary of State Kimmitt conveyed to Kim Jong-hwi, Presidential Special Envoy
of ROK, who was visiting the United States, the complaints from the U.S. Congress on
the financial burden-sharing, and expressed a hope that ROK would actively cooperate if
a request for additional financial assistance was made by the United States the next
month.

South Koreans themselves felt the U.S.-led war coming up on the horizon. Therefore,
whether to provide additional assistance and whether the additional assistance should
include combat troops became a hot issue for the South Korean media. President Roh
responded to the media’s keen interest by saying in the new year’s press conference held
on January 8, that, although the military medical units would be dispatched to the Gulf,
the ROK government was not considering the dispatch of combat units to the Gulf region,
and that there was no request thereof (Lee 2002, 311).

On the same day in Washington, however, Charles Kartman, in a meeting with the
Korean ambassador, disclosed that the United States would make a request for additional
financial assistance. He also mentioned that participation is symbolically more important
than the amount; therefore, a spontaneous action from the ROK would have a politically
stronger effect. Three days later, Karl D. Jackson, in a meeting with Lee Seung-gon,
Political Minister of the ROK Embassy in Washington, recommended that ROK provide
a symbolic number of troops for the MNF after indicating that there would be another
demand for extra money.

On the same day when Karl D. Jackson met Lee Seung-gon, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-gu hinted at the possibility of sending combat troops to Saudi Arabia. Defense Minister Lee’s remarks brought about a political maelstrom in Seoul. Assemblyman Chang Suk-hwa, spokesman for the Democratic Party said, “Sending combat troops can never be tolerated for any reason,” and Assemblyman Chong Mun-hwa, spokesman for the People’s Party, said, “It also runs counter to President Roh Tae-woo’s promise made during his new year’s press conference not to dispatch combat troops” (Yonhap [Seoul], 12 January 1991). Finally, the top South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae-jung denounced the dispatch of Korean troops to the Gulf in a speech to foreign correspondents and diplomats:

Even if we support all the resolutions of the United Nations, we oppose dispatch of Korean troops to the Middle East, because the Korean Peninsula is the only area where Cold War confrontation has not ended and the Middle East is too far from Korea. I think we should consider any form of cooperation with the United States or the United Nations unless its requests are on the dispatch of Korean combat troops to the Persian Gulf (Yonhap [Seoul], 14 January 1991).

The ruling DLP’s position on this issue was officially for the dispatch of the combat troops, but, here as well, cracks were developing. The second largest faction of the DLP headed by Party Executive Chairman Kim Young-sam supported the medical team, but, not the combat troops. The public opinion was strongly negative. In an opinion poll conducted on January 11 with 1,000 adult men and women across South Korea, 54.2% of the respondents opposed the deployment of troops to the Gulf, while only 24.2% supported.
With the domestic cracks came a political spinning game. Somebody inside the decision-making apparatus leaked to the press that the United States “requested the [ROK] government to send military troops [to the Gulf region] for the implementation of the UN resolution” (Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 16 January 1991). The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul denied that there was any such request, saying that the report by Chosun Ilbo was “a total fiction” (Yonhap [Seoul] 16 January 1991). The U.S. denial was not entirely false because, although Karl D. Jackson recommended South Korea to provide a small symbolic number of forces, an official request for additional assistance had never been made up to that point. In fact, that official request would never come from Washington.

Additional Assistance without Combat Troops

As Seoul falls into a vortex of pros and cons over the dispatch of combat troops, Operation Desert Storm began on January 16, and the U.S. demands, albeit unofficial, continued. On January 22, Kartman again mentioned that the ROK’s spontaneous provision of financial assistance would have a great effect. On the same day, Doug Paal mentioned the need to send troops to the Gulf in a meeting with Political Counselor Yu Myung-hwan. The next day, the chief of the Korea Desk at DoD raised the need for the ROK Air Force to provide C-130 transport aircrafts for the Gulf War. On the same day, Stanley Roth, staff director of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked in a meeting with Political Counselor Lim Sung-jun that sending a combat unit of a symbolic size to the Gulf would be helpful since American complaints about under-assistance from the allies of the United States might
spread to South Korea. On 28 January 1991, General RisCassi visited ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), and provided his advice on the amount and delivery method of the assistance for the MNF. He even specifically mentioned that the additional monetary assistance should exceed the initial provision of US$ 220 million.

Faced with double pressures from domestic and foreign sources, the South Korean government had to find a compromise. Finally, on January 29, President Roh called a meeting of relevant Cabinet members and decided to provide additional assistance of US$ 280 million, US$ 170 million of which will be in materials that the South Korean military had already kept in its stock, and the remainder will be in cash and transportation support. The meeting also decided to provide personnel assistance in the form of a ROK Air Force unit of five C-130 transport aircrafts. Unlike the initial assistance, the additional assistance would not include the assistance for the frontline states (Lee 2002, 313; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991, 342-3).34

In making this decision, what factors did the South Korean government consider? First of all, the option to send combat troops was taken off the table. Although some Cabinet members floated the idea, the response from the National Assembly and the public opinion was cold. Even a major faction within the ruling party was opposed to that idea.

Second, providing additional assistance was a must. By the time the Operation Desert Storm began, many countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Germany, and Japan expressed their intention to provide additional assistance for the MNF (NSPA 1991, 14). And the United States was publicly saying that the

34However, US$ 30 million of the additional assistance would go to the United Kingdom. This was a response to a U.K. request for assistance (Lee 2002, 314-5).
relations with U.S.-allied nations after the Gulf War would be reevaluated in terms of the military and financial contributions they made to the conduct of the Gulf War (Lee 2002, 312).

The third factor was the spontaneity. On the day the Gulf War began, President Roh presided over an NSC meeting at 14:00. In this meeting, Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok recommended to President Roh that the government examine the proper amount of the additional assistance when the United States delivered the request thereof. However, the official request never came, and did not even seem to come. The U.S. side actually through many routes delivered the suggestion that Seoul should voluntarily provide the assistance without waiting for U.S. demands. The same opinion was raised in the South Korean inter-ministerial consultation before the January 29 decision. Moreover, the policymakers in the South Korean government calculated that if provided before the United States submitted a specific number, they might be able to cut down on the burden they had to shoulder (Lee 2002, 313).

The fourth factor was the lessons they learned from the failure of Japan. The South Koreans thought that the Japanese assistance was not as highly appreciated as it deserved, because the Japanese decision and delivery of the initial assistance were not so timely and because the Japanese assistance lacked the personnel part. Therefore, the lessons were that the decision on the assistance should be timely and that the personnel assistance should be included, albeit symbolically, in the aid package. This is part of the reason why the South Korean government included the C-130 Air Force unit into the aid package (Lee 2002, 309; 318).

Based on these considerations, the South Korean government decided to provide the
additional financial assistance and air transportation support without combat troops, despite the lack of an official U.S. request. Then, the final question is why US$ 280 million? Before we answer this question, we need to clarify the exact amount of the additional assistance for the United States: it was US$ 250 million because, of the total of US$ 280 million, US$ 30 million was for the U.K. Then, why does the number have to be US$ 250 million?

We do not have clear evidence. But, the circumstances suggest that Seoul carefully and faithfully followed the signals from the American side. Obviously, the Americans did not provide the specific number, probably because they were simply too busy conducting the war or because they were worried about a possible backlash from the South Korean domestic politics. The records show, however, that there was intimation from the U.S. side about the amount: General RisCassi mentioned that the additional financial assistance should at least exceed the first one. The South Koreans provided exactly as had been advised by the Americans: they provided slightly more than the amount of the initial assistance: US$ 250 million, which was only US$ 30 million more than the first financial assistance. The pressure from the domestic politics was working as an upper limit, and the intimation from General RisCassi provided a kind of bottom line. The final decision fell between the two parameters.

The Americans’ advice included the timing of the assistance, and the South Koreans carefully read and followed the advice. The advice of the American friends let Seoul calculate that they could give away the assistance at a reasonable price before their American counterparts quote a specific price. In other words, through the conversations with their American counterparts, the South Koreans reached a conclusion that a
preemptive provision of assistance might help discount the amount of money they had to provide, and they did provide the second financial assistance without an official request from Washington.

They also believed that they could complement the financial assistance with some personnel assistance (Lee 2002, 318). So, Seoul determined to complement the financial assistance with some personnel elements, that is, the C-130 transportation support. This was also what the Americans had advised.

On 30 January 1991 when the South Korean decision to provide the additional assistance was announced, the United States welcomed it. But, from the next day, Americans began to vent their complaints. On January 30, Karl D. Jackson remarked that although appreciable, the expectation of American public opinion was much higher than the amount announced by ROK. On the same day, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon suggested to Ambassador Park that the ROK provide additional US$ 1 billion considering their special bilateral relationship. The next day, Henry S. Rowen, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, expressed a hope to Ambassador Park that the ROK would provide about 5% of the Japanese additional financial assistance (US$ 9 billion), which amounted to US$ 450 million. The complaints continued. Bob Kimmitt and Robert Zoellick respectively indicated the need for South Korea to raise the amount of the assistance, quoting as a reason possible criticisms from Congress. Nevertheless, the South Korean government did not change the number.

_Delivery on Time_

Although the South Koreans refused the U.S. request to increase the assistance, they
delivered on time what they had promised. On 11 October 1990, about half a month after the announcement of the initial aid package, representatives from the U.S. and the ROK held a meeting in Washington to discuss the details of the transportation support and the dispatch of the medical units that ROK promised. In this meeting, the U.S. side appreciated the fact that South Korea was the first country to provide transportation support, and asked South Korea to directly approach the recipient states to work out the details of the assistance. As requested by the United States, from October 31 to November 7, a ROK delegation headed by Vice Foreign Minister Yu visited Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey to discuss the details of the announced assistance for the frontline states. As a result of this trip, ROK came to provide US$ 30 million to Egypt, US$ 15 million to Jordan, US$ 10 million to Syria, and US$ 20 million to Turkey. Next year, on January 21, the South Korean National Assembly passed the “Motion for Dispatching a Military Medical Team to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Three days later, the Korean medical team of 154 soldiers arrived at Dammam, Saudi Arabia as planned. Dispatching the C-130 transportation unit also proceeded without a hitch. On 7 February 1991, the National Assembly approved the government’s decision to send five C-130 aircrafts and 150 pilots and the accompanying ground crew with a vote of 191 out of 198 attending. Half a month later, a ROK Air Force transportation contingent would depart for the Gulf.

Recognizing the contributions from the Republic of Korea, DoD declared on February 16 that South Korea became the 33rd participant in the MNF. On February 28, Richard Solomon expressed gratitude for ROK’s active assistance for the United States, and mentioned that the assistance would have a positive effect on South Korea’s security...
by sending a warning signal to North Korea. Finally, in March, after the end of the Gulf War, President Bush, in a reply to President Roh’s congratulatory message, praised the ROK’s efforts for the Gulf War, and asked for South Korea’s cooperation on the reconstruction of the Middle East.
CHAPTER 5. DESCRIPTION: THE RESPONSES TO THE IRAQ WAR

I have no intention of kowtowing to the United States.

Roh Moo-hyun

At any rate, the question of what Japan can do is a matter for Japan to decide

Koizumi Junichiro

In this chapter, as we did in the previous one, we will describe how the administrations in Seoul and Tokyo responded to U.S. demands in the lead-up to and during the Iraq War. The Iraq War or the Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted for 7 years from 2003 to 2010, but the main period covered in this chapter will be the first term of President George W. Bush during which the United States prepared for and started the Iraq War and demanded assistance from her allies as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated.35 The descriptive foci will be basically the same as in the previous chapter. Before describing the responses, we will briefly examine the outline and implications of the Iraq War, and the domestic problems that the policymakers in Seoul and Tokyo were facing when they received the request of assistance from Washington.

5.1 Background

Outline of the Iraq War

35 For a chronology of the Iraq War, see Appendix 2-A, and for chronologies of Japanese and South Korean responses to it, see Appendices 2-B and 2-C.
The Gulf Crisis began when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. However, the crisis leading up to the American invasion into Iraq in March 2003 virtually began when a group of terrorists attacked multiple places on the U.S. mainland on 11 September 2001. Immediately after the so-called 9/11 attacks, some senior officials in the Bush Administration began to suspect that Saddam Hussein might be involved in the 9/11 attacks, and a couple of months later, President Bush ordered his Secretary of Defense to prepare the plans for invading Iraq (Woodward 2004, 2; 26). With 9/11, U.S. security policy shifted from defense and deterrence to offense and preemption.

The counteroffensive first started in Afghanistan: the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. Soon, another counterattack began the next year. In his state of the union address, President Bush termed Iraq, together with Iran and North Korea an “axis of evil.” Throughout the year 2002, the drumbeat of war intensified, and culminated in November 2002 when the U.S. Congress authorized an attack on Iraq, and when the UNSC passed the Resolution 1441. The next year, President Bush reaffirmed his determination by announcing that he was ready to attack Iraq even without a UN mandate in his state of the union speech. After giving up on a new UNSC resolution endorsing the upcoming invasion into Iraq in February 2003, finally the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” declared a war against Iraq in March 2003.36

Unlike the Gulf War, which was almost unanimously supported by the international society, the Iraq War failed to enlist the general international support because other major powers of the international politics disagreed with the United States about the reasons that allegedly justified the war. After occupying the whole Iraq, the United States had to

36 As of March 2003, the membership of the Coalition of the Willing was 46 including the United States, Great Britain, and Australia. But except for these three, other member were relatively small countries. Even such countries as Marshall Islands, Palau and Solomon Islands were included in the Coalition.
face even harsher criticisms at home and abroad because Saddam’s alleged WMD programs—the most crucial reason why they had to go to war with Iraq—were never found. David Kay, the lead investigator searching for WMD in Iraq testified before a U.S. Senate committee that the prewar intelligence was “almost all wrong” about Saddam Hussein’s arsenal. Even worse, contrary to the prewar expectations, the fight continued after President Bush declared that major combat operations were over on 1 May 2003. In order to incite instability and fear, terrorists and insurgents in Iraq bombed major buildings, and kidnapped and assassinated major figures of the Iraqi interim government and foreigners residing in Iraq. In August 2003, a suicide bombing destroyed UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24 people including the UN top envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. In November, a suicide bombing in Nasiriyah, southern Iraq killed at least 26 people including 16 Italian soldiers. In March 2004, an Iraqi mob killed and mutilated four American contractors and dragged them through the streets of an Iraqi city named Fallujah.

As the fight continued, the number of casualties and the cost of the war snowballed. On 7 September 2004 when approximately one and a half years passed since the start of the Iraq War, the American death toll in Iraq reached 1,000. As of late 2010, the number rose to 4,400. The financial cost of the Iraq War is estimated to be US$ 852 billion through FY2011 according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) (Cordesman 2010, 6). Even the most powerful country in the world could not persist. On 27 February 2009, newly elected President Obama announced the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of August 2010. And then, in August 2010, President Obama declared the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The remaining troops, too, left Iraq
by the end of 2011.

*Implications of the Iraq War*

The Gulf Crisis/War was a shock to the world, but in the aftermath, the United States emerged as the sole and undisputed superpower. Even the Soviet Union, who had extensive and deep interests in Iraq and the Middle East could not help but follow the American initiatives against Iraq. On the other hand, the Iraq War caused a crisis of trust for the United States. Although the United States confidently went ahead with the war despite reservations from her allies and friends, many of U.S. arguments for the war turned out to be not true. Credibility of the United States plummeted as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated. Moreover, the mounting cost of the war seriously damaged American economic power. Remember that the financial cost of the Gulf War was minimal for the United States because the successful burden-sharing diplomacy of the first Bush Administration raised more than enough funds from other countries. Politically as well as fiscally, therefore, the Iraq War and its aftermath signaled the decline of U.S. hard and soft power and the transition of the international system to a multi-polar arrangement.

The Iraq War brought about a crisis for the allies of the United States, too. The U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq and the ensuing U.S. demands for assistance left her allies in a dire predicament because majority of their domestic public opinion regarded the Iraq War as unjust and unwarranted. Some politicians, who went ahead and supported the United States despite domestic resistance such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, eventually had to retire from politics. Other leaders like Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic
of Korea and Koizumi Junichiro of Japan had to risk their political lives in deciding to provide assistance for the United States.

5.2 South Korean Response

Foes on All Sides

Anti-Americanism. President Roh Moo-hyun rode the wave of anti-American sentiments to become the President of the Republic of Korea. But, as soon as he got elected, President Roh had to find a way to calm down the anti-American fervor of his own support base. To be sure, anti-American sentiments or anti-Americanism in South Korea was nothing new (Lee 2003, 186-7). Since the 1970s and the 1980s when the military dictators in South Korea began to override the democratic procedures and norms, South Koreans began to suspect that it was the U.S. government that was pulling the strings behind the military dictators, or that the United States was at least acquiescing. Since the 1990s, moreover, the social problems caused by U.S. military bases in South Korea such as crimes committed by American soldiers and environmental pollution caused by the U.S bases became the source of complaints by South Koreans. As South Korea succeeded in economic and democratic catch-up, the enhanced national pride of the South Koreans led to the demands for more equal partnership with and fairer treatment from the United States. The tragic killing of the two teenage girls by a U.S. military vehicle and the following acquittal of the driver and the commander in 2002 was a mere flashpoint. The incident set fire to the existing dry field of anti-American sentiments among the South Koreans. The fire quickly spread, and in combination with
the South Koreans’ desire for a change, drove Roh Moo-hyun, who previously not many people had expected would become the president, to the top post.

Driven by the Crisis. However, even before he officially occupied the Blue House, the presidential office of the Republic of Korea, President Roh could see that he had to mend fences with Washington. First of all, a nuclear crisis was on the horizon. Since October 2002 when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly confronted in Pyongyang his North Korean counterpart with suspicion on Pyongyang’s secretive uranium enrichment program, and when Pyongyang allegedly admitted it, Washington and Pyongyang were on a collision course. As Washington suspended the provision of heavy fuel oil, which was to be provided for North Korea according to the Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and began to prepare the reactivation of the Youngbyon nuclear facilities, which had been frozen for about a decade. Later, in January 2003, Pyongyang declared its withdrawal from the NPT, or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In response, the United States placed “twenty-four B-1 and B-52 bombers—nuclear-capable bombers—to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam” (Funabashi 2007, 213). As President Bush called North Korea “an oppressive regime [whose] people live in fear and starvation” in his 2003 state of the union address, North Korea fired missiles into the East Sea on the day before President Roh’s inauguration in order to demonstrate her determination and firepower. In response to a series of North Korean threats, Washington did not forget to emphasize that all options are on the table.

At the time, rumors in Seoul had it that the United States would attack North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s provocation. Looking back, the rumors seem a little baseless.
The U.S. military at the time was absorbed in the planning and preparing for the upcoming war with Iraq, and must have not had enough time and resources to plan a serious military strike against North Korea, which might escalate into an all-out war.\textsuperscript{37} In Seoul, especially to President-elect Roh, however, the rumors sounded fairly persuasive. If Washington could go to war with Iraq due to the possibility of Saddam’s developing WMD, then it was perfectly plausible that the United States could bombard Kim Jong-il and his regime, which allegedly admitted that they did not stop developing the lethal weapons. Therefore, being apprehensive about the possibility of a U.S. attack on the North, President-elect Roh tried to make sure that the United States would not attack North Korea whenever he met senior officials from Washington.

After securing the commitment from Washington that the United States would not preemptively attack North Korea without consulting Seoul, the next step for Seoul was to mediate a meeting between Pyongyang and Washington. In order to defuse the tension on the Korean Peninsula, serious dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington was essential. And yet, President Bush insisted upon a multilateral framework in which parties other than the DPRK and the United States also participate while Pyongyang demanded a direct one-on-one meeting with the Americans, in which North Korea can get an American assurance that the United States would not attack the North. Eventually, Seoul’s efforts to mediate a meeting bore fruits when in August 2003, the first round of the Six-Party Talks, where the United States and North Korea along with South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia got together to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, was held in Beijing.

\textsuperscript{37}Funabashi (2007, 229) agrees that no one in Washington at the time “was serious about the military option (against North Korea).”
The nuclear crisis caused collateral damage on the economic front. As the war clouds loomed over the Korean Peninsula, the stock prices on the South Korean stock exchanges began to destabilize. Furthermore, American rating agencies began to reevaluate the national credit-rating of South Korea. For example, on 11 February 2003, Moody’s Investors Service announced that it would lower the national credit-rating of South Korea by two notches. “At the end of the first quarter of 2003, U.S. investment in South Korea had declined by 70% since the previous year” (Funabashi 2007, 224). In response, President Roh had to dispatch in March and April 2003 his top advisors on foreign, defense, and economic policies to New York to defuse concerns among foreign investors about South Korea’s security and financial stability.

*Relocation and Reduction of the USFK.* In addition to the security and economic crises, the Roh Administration had to conduct a tough negotiation with the United States over the relocation and reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea (USFK). In fact, foreign forces in Korea are a problem that has long history. Foreign troops have occupied part of Seoul since 1882 when Qing Dynasty seized the area of Yongsan (Dragon Mountain) lying between the Han River and the Korean royal court, where currently a U.S. military compound is located (Calder 2007, 4). However, foreign military bases dispersed in and around a densely populated city created many conflicts with South Korean citizens. As South Korea democratized, the coercive mechanism or what Kent E. Calder called “fiat politics” that suppressed the South Korean popular discontents with U.S. bases began to deconstruct (Calder 2007, 148-52). As a result, the Roh Tae-woo Administration began a negotiation with the United States over the relocation of U.S. bases, and the two sides reached an agreement in 1990. But the implementation of the agreement halted in June...
1993 due to the disagreement over how to divide the cost of the relocation (Ministry of National Defense 2005, 93). For South Koreans, therefore, the relocation was long overdue.

For the Americans, too, the issue needed to be resolved. At the time, the U.S. government was in the process of reexamining the posture of U.S. military bases worldwide in the name of the Global Posture Review (GPR) for the purpose of streamlining and reorganizing the U.S. bases to the needs of the post-Cold War era. In the eyes of the advocates of the GPR in the Pentagon, the U.S. bases located near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) needed to be reorganized into a smaller number of bases south of the Han River. So, as early as in January 2003, when President-elect Roh’s delegation went to Washington to deliver Roh’s message, then Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld “mentioned an adjustment to the size and location of American troops in South Korea” (Funabashi 2007, 212). As the needs of the two sides met, therefore, South Korea and the United States began a negotiation called the FOTA (Future of the Alliance) meeting from 8 April 2003 in Seoul to reorganize the U.S. bases and redefine the roles of the USFK.

However, many South Koreans including some conservative intellectuals took this negotiation as an expression of U.S. anger and discontent with the Roh Administration’s anti-American rhetoric, and believed that as a result of the negotiation, South Korea’s security would be threatened because U.S. troops that had been playing the role of ‘tripwire’ near the DMZ would leave the area, and also because part of the USFK might leave South Korea to be stationed in other parts of the world weakening the U.S. deterrence and commitment against possible attacks from the North.
Domestically under Attack. On the domestic front, too, President Roh faced many serious problems. First of all, although he and his party won the presidential election, the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) was still occupying the majority of the National Assembly, and they were not willing to accept the legitimacy of the previous election, which they lost. On 5 June 2003, Choi Byong-yol, a newly elected head of the GNP hinted at the necessity of a confidence vote on President Roh, which was in fact unconstitutional under the presidency with a fixed term. About two months later, Choi mentioned the possibility of the popular movement to oust President Roh, asking Roh to come clean on the alleged corruption charges. In the middle of October 2003, Choi finally threatened to bring to a vote the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun.

The existence of a formidable opposition party was threatening, but the more serious problem existed inside President Roh’s own party. The mainstream of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) was the faction loyal to former President Kim Dae-jung, which was based on the Cholla province. Roh Moo-hyun, who was from the Kyoungsang province and the left wing of the MDP, was like an isolated underdog within the MDP. The MDP mainstream faction, therefore, had been opposed even to the nomination of Roh Moo-hyun as the party’s presidential candidate. No wonder an intra-party strife followed the successful presidential election. The factional strife culminated in March 2003 when President Roh approved of establishing an independent council’s office demanded by the opposition party to investigate the so-called “Secretive Money Transfer to North Korea” scandal. The charge was that the Kim Dae-jung Administration illegally transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea in return for the North’s agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit. As a result of the investigation, a
former intelligence chief and a former presidential chief of staff in the previous administration got arrested and indicted, and the chairman of one of the largest business conglomerates in South Korea killed himself.

At last, the conflict between Roh’ faction and the MDP old guard passed the point of no return. Eventually, in September 2003, a major faction of the MDP loyal to President Roh broke away and formed a new party called the Uri Party (“Uri” means “our” in Korean language.). Ten days later, President Roh himself left the MDP. As a result of this breakaway, now, more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly fell into the hands of the opposition parties. By the Korean Constitution, the opposition parties could now override any veto by President Roh, and could even impeach the president if they so wished.

All these constitutional possibilities realized pretty soon. In November 2003, the opposition parties tried to establish another independent counsel’s office to investigate corruption charges against President Roh’s entourage. Roh’s veto was simply overridden. More shockingly, on 12 March 2004, the MDP and the GNP together voted to impeach President Roh for a minor breach of the electoral law. By the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, all presidential power of Roh Moo-hyun was suspended from that moment until the Constitutional Court reinstated him on 14 May 2004 after President Roh’s party won a landslide victory in the general election held on April 15.

From his inauguration in February 2003 through the general election in April 2004, therefore, President Roh and his government were surrounded by foes on all sides. Domestically, his own party was breaking down and turning against him with a vengeance. The main opposition party was reluctant to accept him as “their” president.
From beyond the border, a nuclear crisis was looming large. The United States wanted to relocate and reduce the USFK. On both of these issues, consultation and cooperation with Washington were essential. However, President Roh’s own support groups wanted to see their reform agenda be swiftly fulfilled by President Roh. Politically, President Roh Moo-hyun was under siege from all sides.

*Swift Response to the War on Terror*

The initial response of the South Korean government to the American War on Terror was quite positive. Just two months after the U.S. invasion into Afghanistan in October 2001, the South Korean National Assembly passed the motion to dispatch troops to assist the American war efforts there. Within three weeks from this passage, South Korea dispatched a naval transport unit with 171 crew members, and four C-130 transport aircrafts to help U.S. military transportation. The next February, a 100-strong Korean military medical team arrived at Kyrgyzstan to assist the U.S. military. The medical team moved to a U.S. air base in Bagram, Afghanistan in February 2003, and stayed there until December 2007.\(^{38}\) No serious domestic resistance against the assistance was observed.

The response to the Iraq War was different, however. According to the Korean MND homepage, it was on 20 November 2002 that the U.S. government first sounded out the South Korean government on Korea’s willingness to provide assistance for the Iraqi Crisis. About a month later, on December 23, just four days after the South Korean presidential election, the South Korean government basically expressed its willingness. However, it was obvious that an outgoing government could not decide on such a serious

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\(^{38}\)The whole history of South Korea’s foreign dispatch of troops since 1991 is available at the Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) homepage (www.mnd.go.kr).
Phase I: Provision of Non-Combat Troops

For President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, the most urgent question was whether the United States would precipitate a war in the Korean Peninsula by preemptively attacking the North. He did not hide his misgivings. Speaking on a South Korean TV show on 18 January 2003, Roh Moo-hyun said, “U.S. hardliners, people in very responsible positions in the U.S. administration, were talking about the possibility of attacking North Korea and the possibility of war” (The Independent [London], 20 January 2003, 8). The very next day, a White House spokeswoman denied Roh’s remarks by saying that President Bush “has made it clear that the U.S. has no intention of invading North Korea” (Courier Mail [Queensland, Australia], 20 January 2003, 16). However, the denial failed to allay President Roh’s apprehensions. One month later, President-elect Roh told members of the Korean Chamber of Commerce that he was “willing to differ with the U.S. if that helps prevent war” (The Advertiser [Adelaide, Australia], 20 February 2003, 4). It is worth noting that President Roh withheld his support for the Iraq War as he expressed his concerns about the American intention toward the DPRK. It took Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s visit to Seoul to finally reassure Roh about Washington’s true intent. In his meeting with President Roh on February 25, Secretary Powell was reported as saying that “Washington intends to seek Seoul’s approval, if the situation comes down to an attack on the North” (Korea Times [Seoul], 13 March 2003).

Two weeks later, the Blue House publicly announced that “the United States demands our government’s support for the [Iraq] War, which includes assistance of
medical troops and help in dealing with refugees” (Korea Herald [Seoul], 11 March 2003). On the same day, an anonymous South Korean official acknowledged that the Roh Administration was planning to accept the request. Three days later on March 13, President Bush called President Roh to thank for South Korea’s support for the upcoming war with Iraq. On the same day, the U.S. government submitted a list of requests to the ROK government. One week later, on the day that the United States invaded Iraq, the Roh Administration announced that South Korea would send a battalion of 500 to 600 military engineers and about 150 medical staff to Iraq in 7 to 11 weeks. In addition to the personnel assistance, Seoul also promised to provide US$ 5 to 10 million in humanitarian assistance.39

Although ranking members of both ruling and opposition parties welcomed President Roh’s decision, his decision also sparked off a heated debate particularly within the ruling MDP. On March 21, the South Korean Cabinet filed a motion to dispatch the construction and medical units to Iraq for approval by the National Assembly. Yet, the vote was postponed as major civic activists waged anti-war rallies and sit-in protests. The public opinion was almost evenly divided. According to various opinion polls conducted in March 2003, a little more than 50% supported and a little less than 50% opposed the government’s decision to dispatch troops although three-quarters of the South Koreans opposed the U.S.-led war (Lee 2006, 486-7). The vote was again delayed on March 29 when the Speaker of the National Assembly accepted a demand by 71 reformist lawmakers to hold a conference meeting of all 272 assemblymen to discuss the government’s decision. After the conference meeting produced no specific results, leaders

39The financial assistance for the United States during the Phase I was later increased to US$ 60 million.
of the ruling and opposition parties again agreed to delay the vote until after President Roh’s address to the National Assembly scheduled on April 2. Legislative leaders in Yeouido, home of the National Assembly, did not want to take the responsibility for the controversial dispatch, and simply passed the buck to the President. Finally, President Roh directly urged the National Assembly to vote for the dispatch motion arguing that a strong U.S.-ROK alliance was essential for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. On the same day, the National Assembly passed the motion to dispatch the engineering and medical units to Iraq by a 179-68 vote.

**Phase II: Whether to Send Additional Troops**

Unfortunately, however, the war continued. The Iraqis as well as U.S. soldiers in Iraq could not just live happily ever after with President Bush’s declaration of an end to major combat operations on 1 May 2003. The post-combat situation in Iraq became more and more combative. On July 17, U.S. KIAs in Iraq reached 147, the same number of soldiers who died from hostile fire in the Gulf War. On September 7, President Bush had to announce that US$ 87 billion was needed to cover additional military and reconstruction costs in Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq deteriorated, Washington submitted another request for assistance to Seoul. This time the demand included a request for combat troops. On 4 September 2003, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Richard P. Lawless, who was in Seoul to participate in the fourth round of the ROK-U.S. FOTA meeting, delivered the request (*Yonhap* [Seoul], 13 September 2003; Lee 2006, 488). The request was delivered to the opposition party as well. On September 15, U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz had a meeting with the GNP leader Choi Byong-yol and asked to send combat troops to help keep order in postwar Iraq (Yonhap [Seoul], 16 September 2003). According to a source in the South Korean government, “Washington did not specify the exact number of troops it requested, but the U.S. government cited a unit from Poland as an example” (Yonhap [Seoul], 16 September 2003). “The Polish Division was a multilateral force composed of 2,500 to 3,000 Polish Army soldiers and 5,000 to 8,000 troops from 18 other countries under the command of a Polish two-star general” (Funabashi 2007, 236). In addition, Washington wanted the South Korean troops to be able to operate independently without additional protection from U.S. forces in Iraq.⁴⁰

The immediate response from the Blue House was negative. An official who was at the time seconded to the Korean NSC from a ministry in the cabinet recalls the initial response of the political appointees at the NSC to the U.S. request for additional troops as follows:

In response to the U.S. demand, somebody had to write up a policy memorandum on how to respond to the request. I volunteered because I thought it would be a good challenge for me. My conclusion was that we had to respond positively. When I circulated my draft, however, the responses were blunt and curt. They were not explicit, but they were basically saying, ‘So what? Are you saying we have to help the Americans in Iraq?’⁴¹

When the United States first demanded assistance from the Roh Administration before the Iraq War began, the negative response from inside the Roh Moo-hyun camp

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⁴⁰According to Funabashi (2007, 235), by early October 2003, Turkey was expected to contribute about 10,000 troops, so, at the time, the U.S. expectation for South Korea was something between 3,000 and 5,000 troops. But, as the Turkish plan was cancelled due to strong domestic opposition, the U.S. expectation on South Korea rose higher.

⁴¹The interview was conducted in the summer of 2005. In order to protect the interviewee, the author will not reveal his name and pay grade, much less the ministry the interviewee belongs to.
was not so strong, although there had been some protests particularly from the civil society. Most importantly, there was not a serious conflict within the entourage of President Roh over whether to dispatch the troops. First of all, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula was so urgent that Roh’s transition team did not have much time to bicker. To avoid the nuclear crisis, the change of U.S. attitudes toward North Korea seemed essential, and to this end, cooperation with the United States on other issues appeared unavoidable. Second, “the anti-American elements within the Roh Administration had not yet consolidated” (Yoon 2009). Third, in early 2003, no one had ever predicted that the United States would have such a hard fight in Iraq. Lastly, it was only non-combat troops that the United States asked for at the time.

By September 2003, however, the situation dramatically changed. As the first meeting of the Six-Party Talks was held in August, the nuclear crisis passed its peak although it was still a serious matter. Second, by this time, anti-American elements of Roh Moo-hyun’s presidential campaign settled down in important governmental posts such as the Office of the Presidential Senior Secretary for Political Affairs in the Blue House, the Secretariat of the Korean NSC, and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and began to voice their opinions. Third, it was combat troops that Washington demanded this time. Moreover, under the worsening situation in Iraq, some of the dispatched combatants could really be killed or wounded.

With this changed situation as a backdrop, the U.S. demand for additional troops created a chasm between pro-independence and pro-assistance groups within the Roh Administration.\footnote{This dissertation intentionally chooses not to use the designation, “pro-American” in describing the group that advocated the provision of the additional troops as demanded by Washington because major figures} Many of Roh’s political allies thought that the U.S. demand was too
much. On 16 September 2003, Yoo In-tae, President Roh’s Senior Secretary for Political Affairs, told a South Korean newspaper that, in his personal opinion, South Korea did not need to comply with a U.S. request for the dispatch of combat troops. A close friend of Roh Moo-hyun, who was notorious for straight talking, Yoo did not hide his opinion: “There are many other rich countries, and I cannot understand why the U.S. has asked a divided nation like us to send combat forces. [Sending forces to Iraq] does not serve the national interest” (Yonhap [Seoul], 17 September 2003). It is notable that about half a year ago, however, as a member of the inner-circle that decided to send non-combat troops to Iraq, Mr. Yoo himself had advocated the troop dispatch. He even went out to meet representatives of ten major civic groups in order to persuade them to cease protesting against the assistance for the United States. On the same day that Yoo In-tae made clear his opposition to the dispatch of combat troops, Chang Young-dal, Chairman of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly also revealed his opposition, saying, “Sending combat troops could further increase the hostility of the Iraqi people (toward our country). Even if the United States were to gain UN’s support, it seems inappropriate to send the combat forces” (Korea Herald [Seoul], 18 September 2003).

On the other hand, those who advocated sending combat forces to Iraq, particularly those in the Ministry of National Defense (MND), began to float their opinions to the media. On 17 September 2003, a senior South Korean government official said on the condition of anonymity that South Korea was willing to send more than 10,000 troops in

called “pro-American” in this debate such as then-Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan were not unconditionally supportive of U.S. demands although they advocated closer coordination with Washington. This dissertation intentionally chooses to use “pro-assistance” rather than “pro-American” to describe the main feature of this group of people within the Roh Administration more correctly.
response to the U.S. request (*Korea Times* [Seoul], 17 September 2003). About ten days later, an MND internal review on the matter suggested sending 5,000 soldiers to Iraq.

There was a kind of compromise proposal, too. On September 19, Chung Sye-kyun, the chief policymaker of the faction loyal to President Roh mentioned the possibility of sending combat troops to Iraq on the condition that the UN issued a resolution asking South Korea to send troops to form a peacekeeping force in Iraq. He also suggested “find[ing] ways of sending the least number of combat troops possible . . . if [South Korea had to] decide to send them anyway” (*Yonhap* [Seoul], 19 September 2003).

President Roh could not make a decision, however. He acknowledged that “the people are divided on the issue [of dispatching troops to Iraq], and so are those close to me” (*Yonhap* [Seoul], 17 September 2003), and suggested that the “public opinion will be the final point of reference” (*Korea Herald* [Seoul], 18 September 2003). However, the public opinion, too, was sharply divided. According to the results of two public opinion polls, at the time, around 57% of the respondents were opposed to sending more troops to Iraq. But the opposition was conditional. In another poll result, 58.6% of the respondents said that they would agree if troops went under a UN mandate (*New York Times*, 8 October 2003, 3).

When pressed for a decision, often, a convenient way out is to let officials study more on the issue. On September 23, an inter-ministerial investigative team headed by an MND official went to Iraq. The team was supposed to come back on October 3. President Roh emphasized that the final decision would be made after closely checking the team’s report. The team came back with a report that the situation in Mosul, the city that the Korean MND was considering at the time to be the place for stationing the dispatched
Korean forces, was stabilizing and the terrorist threats there were decreasing.

However, the decision was again delayed. At the time, President Roh was literally in a political impasse. On October 13, he proposed a national referendum on his leadership to make a breakthrough in the domestic political deadlock. But the next day, the majority party leader Choi Byong-yol rebuffed the offer, insisting that a thorough probe into the allegations of corruption should precede any confidence vote, and threatened to start a procedure for an impeachment depending on the outcome of the probe. Although a summit with President Bush was coming up on October 20, the prospects for a decision on the troop dispatch grew dim. On October 15, Ban Ki-moon, then foreign policy advisor for President Roh announced that President Roh would make no commitment to send troops to Iraq when he meets U.S. President George W. Bush in Bangkok on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. Unexpectedly, however, an emergency meeting of the NSC was called on October 17. In the meeting, the pro-assistance and the pro-independence groups clashed. Funabashi Yoichi, who closely watched the South Korean decision-making process on the troop dispatch, described the opinions of the two groups as follows:

Yoon [Young-kwan, who represented the pro-assistance group] offered President Roh the following advice:
—It is important to cooperate with the U.S. government when it requires our help, although it might be politically difficult domestically. That will further strengthen U.S.-South Korean relations. That is in our national interest.
—At the time of the Korean War, we benefited greatly from foreign assistance, including that of the United States and some other Western countries. It is time for us to repay the favor.

. . . In contrast, a more cautious argument was advocated by Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun in the cabinet and by Yoo In-tae of the Blue House staff. They argued:
—Because the legitimacy of the Iraq War itself was highly questionable, it would be difficult to justify the dispatch of Korean troops to join in that war.
—Dispatching troops would make the president’s domestic political position very difficult (Funabashi 2007, 233).

Finally, on October 18, President Roh announced his decision to send additional troops to Iraq. He also pledged to provide US$ 200 million in addition to the already-promised US$ 60 million for the rehabilitation of Iraq over the 2004-7 period (Funabashi 2007, 234). The coup de grâce for Roh’s decision was the UNSC resolution 1511, which was unanimously arrived at on October 16. The resolution supported an international force to be formed in Iraq under U.S. authority. It seemed as if the struggle for President Roh’s heart ended in a victory for the pro-assistance group.

Phase III: How Many Combat Troops to Send

Nevertheless, that was not the end of the game. In the decision made on October 18, the number and function of the troops to be sent to Iraq were missing: how many soldiers to send, and how many combat elements to be included in the total. Moreover, if sent, where will the troops be stationed? What will be the task of the sent contingent? On these issues, the struggle between the pro-independence and the pro-assistance groups continued. The pro-assistance group represented by the MND and the MOFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) wanted to send a sufficient number of troops, which would be 5,000 to 10,000. A full division of 10,000 would be able to operate independently, protecting itself and implementing reconstruction projects on its own. A division of 5,000 would also be able to accomplish the mission, if they are heavily armed and well-trained special operations forces.

On the other hand, the pro-independence group still grumbled, refusing to accept
President Roh’s decision to send the additional troops. For example, three days after President Roh’s decision, Park Joo-hyun, the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Society Affairs revealed that there “existed a serious opposition” in the Blue House to the dispatch of the combat troops, and that “the president was aware of the atmosphere” (Korea Times [Seoul], 22 October 2003). She was suggesting that the majority of Roh’s entourage was uncomfortable with his decision to send more troops to Iraq.

In this bitter tug-of-war, on October 27, an anonymous NSC official floated the number 3,000 as the size of the troops to be sent to Iraq. This number would work as a kind of a guideline for the debate on the size of the troops until November 11, when President Roh convened a meeting of the NSC standing committee to review the report of the second survey mission to Iraq. In this meeting, the NSC decided that South Korea would send a 3,000-strong division, commanded by a major general. According to the decision, part of the 3,000 soldiers will be combat troops. However, the NSC meeting also decided that the role of the additional troops would be to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, not to maintain peace and order (Funabashi 2007, 237-8). In other words, the South Korean government will send combat troops, but they will not combat.

The number 3,000 was delivered to the U.S. side on November 17, when U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visited Seoul to participate in the annual U.S.-ROK SCM (Security Consultative Meeting). Rumsfeld appreciated South Korea’s decision to send the additional troops. But, behind the scenes, the U.S. side complained about the number,  

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43The official was later revealed to be Lee Jong-seok, then Deputy Secretary-General of the Korean NSC. At the time the rumors in Seoul had it that the number 3,000 reflected President Roh’s opinion. But a Blue House official testifies that the number “was Lee’s personal opinion,” and that “President Roh had not yet decided on the number of troops to be dispatched at that time.” However, Lee Soo-hyuk, who went to Washington on November 5 to discuss the details of the Korean troops to be dispatched to Iraq with Americans, testifies otherwise. He claims that by the time he went to Washington “the figure of 3,000 had already been confirmed within the government” (Funabashi 2007, 237; 520).
and yet South Korea decided to push ahead. On December 4, President Roh in a meeting with South Korean and Japanese lawmakers said, “The size of the troops to be sent to Iraq stops short of U.S. expectations, but I think the United States will understand and accept our position” (Yonhap [Seoul], 4 December 2003). At last, on December 17, the Roh Administration finalized the number of soldiers to be sent to Iraq at 3,000, and the Office of the President also added that the troops would not take part in combat operations.

Then, why does the number have to be 3,000? Officially, Washington has never given a specific number as a guideline, which the South Koreans were eager to get, probably because the Americans knew that, whatever number they provided, they would eventually get a smaller number than that, or because they wanted to keep the appearance of spontaneity in the assistance provided by the allies. Or, it may be because the U.S. side had already delivered its hope about the number through an unofficial transpacific pipeline between the Pentagon and the South Korean MND. According to Funabashi (2007, 236), “The United States had hoped that South Korea would dispatch a brigade of 5,000 to 7,000 troops, if not a full division of 10,000 to 15,000 troops.”

When President Roh met President Bush in Bangkok on October 20, Roh asked for Bush’s opinion on the desirable scale of the South Korean reinforcements, Bush simply replied, “The more you can dispatch, the more appreciative we will be.” So, it was the South Korean side that had to find the answer about how many. On November 5, when Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuk sat down with his U.S. counterparts in Washington to discuss the details of the Korean reinforcements, he “tried to find out the ‘bare minimum’ that would satisfy the United States, but he got nothing but obscure
answers” (Funabashi 2007, 236).

However, one approximate answer came from Richard P. Lawless, who said, “We would like you to be prepared to dispatch a division” (Funabashi 2007, 235). Until October 2003, Washington was implying to Seoul that the dispatch of something between 3,000 and 5,000 troops was expected. But, by early November, the Pentagon in cooperation with the MND had estimated that South Korea could “dispatch a brigade of 5,000 to 7,000 troops, if not a full division of 10,000 to 15,000 troops.”

According to Funabashi, “normally, a military division consists of 10,000 to 12,000 troops, but in South Korea it can range from 3,000 to 12,000 troops” (Funabashi 2007, 236). Then, 3,000 is the smallest number of soldiers that can constitute a division in the South Korean military organization system. Consequently, the South Koreans satisfied the demands, but at the bottom line. In addition, South Korea appointed a two-star general to be the commander of the 3,000-strong unit apparently in order to give the appearance of a regular division to the reinforcements. Normally, a one-star general should be the commander of a contingent of brigade size. We can presume that South Korea had to meet the U.S. demands, but wanted to provide the least number of soldiers as far as she can meet the very bottom line of Washington; hence, Seoul produced the number 3,000.

The same type of discounting behavior is also found in deciding on the function of the military contingent. Washington asked for combat forces, so Seoul included combatants in the contingent. However, the function of the military division was limited

44In response to the request of a division, Lee Soo-hyuk “proposed sending 500 to 1,000 troops, which a senior U.S. administration official later recalled that it was ‘such a small figure that we thought we had misheard Lee’” (Funabashi 2007, 235-6).
to help with the reconstruction efforts. Maintaining peace and order in Iraq was excluded from the job description of the South Korean reinforcements (Funabashi 2007, 237).

Late Delivery

Was the promised assistance delivered on time? The provision of non-combat troops in Phase I was implemented relatively smoothly although the legislative vote on the motion to dispatch the troops was delayed three times between March 20, when President Roh announced the decision to dispatch the troops, and April 2, when President Roh directly appealed to the legislative branch. Once the legislative process was completed, however, the delivery was quick and smooth. On April 17, about two weeks after the vote, a 20-member advance team left for the Gulf. About two weeks from then, the first contingent of the Seohee (engineers) and the Jema (medics) battalions left for Nasiriyah, Iraq. It took another two weeks to complete the placement of all the promised troops in Iraq. By 14 May 2003, therefore, all troops of the Seohee and the Jema battalions had departed for Iraq.

However, dispatching combat troops needed much more time. The Roh Administration made the basic decision to dispatch the Korean reinforcements to Iraq on 18 October 2003, about one and a half months after the U.S. side officially demanded the additional troops to Iraq. And then, it took additional two months to finalize and publicly announce the number of soldiers to be sent to Iraq. From then, it took another two months for the National Assembly to pass the motion for the troops dispatch to Iraq.

The implementation of the dispatch was also delayed. In early November 2003, when Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuk’s team negotiated with their American
counterparts over the timing of the dispatch of the additional troops, the United States asked South Korea to dispatch troops to Iraq “around February 2004, when the main U.S. force is due to be replaced.” However, South Korea proposed “April or May” (Yonhap [Seoul], 14 November 2003). The general election for the National Assembly was scheduled on 15 April 2004. The political advisors of President Roh did not want to let the dispatch of combat troops become an issue in the electoral campaign.

But, the dispatch could not be implemented even in April although the military division to be deployed to Iraq—the Zaytun division (“Zaytun” means olive in Arabic.) had already been created on 23 February 2004, only ten days after the approval by the legislature. In March, the two largest opposition parties joined forces to impeach President Roh, and the resulting political vacuum stopped all major policies from being implemented. President Roh returned on May 14, when the Constitutional Court reinstated him.

This time, however, President Roh’s own party became a hurdle. Many freshmen lawmakers of the Uri Party, which came to occupy the majority of the National Assembly as a result of the general election, doubted the propriety of the decision to send combat forces to Iraq. For example, on June 10, ninety lawmakers from ruling and opposition parties signed a petition for a bottom-up reexamination of the decision to send troops to Iraq. Finally, President Roh again had to personally urge the leaders of the Uri Party, arguing that the safety of the dispatched troops will be enhanced by changing the place for stationing the Korean troops to a safer place: from Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in Northeastern Iraq to Arbil, a Kurd-controlled city in Northern Iraq. The next day, the Uri Party decided to uphold the motion to dispatch Korean troops to Iraq, which had been
passed in the previous meeting of the National Assembly.

After gearing up for the dispatch again, at long last, the 3,000-strong Zaytun division departed for Arbil on September 3. The dispatch was all completed on September 22. Consequently, from the day when the Roh Administration decided to deploy additional troops to Iraq, it took more than 11 months to actually deliver the promise.

5.3 Japanese Response

*Lack of Intra-Party Support Base*

*Desire for Change.* Just like President Roh Moo-hyun, it was the desire for change of the Japanese that propelled Koizumi Junichiro to the premiership of the Japanese government. Despite the electoral reform of 1994, which was highly expected to change the logic of Japanese politics, the LDP came back to power in 1996, in a coalition with smaller parties. After the LDP’s return to power, no serious contender against the LDP was in sight. Factional politics also continued. When Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, the leader of the largest faction within the LDP suddenly passed away in 2000, faction leaders of the LDP agreed to install Mori Yoshiro in the Office of the Prime Minister through backroom politics. Yet, Mori’s approval ratings hovered around mere 10%. Apparently, the Japanese electorate refused Mori as the prime minister. Grudges and grievances against politics in general and the LDP in particular were simmering among the Japanese.

However, had it not been for the institutional reform in the LDP internal regulations on how to elect the party president, Koizumi might have lost the chance to become the
prime minister. Since the LDP was usually the largest party in the Diet, whoever was
elected the party president would virtually automatically become the prime minister of
Japan. To become the party president, the candidate had to win the party election for the
presidency. Under the past LDP regulations, it was basically the lawmakers of the both
Houses of the Diet that elected the party president, and the lawmakers were under the
control of the faction leaders. In the final analysis, therefore, it was the faction leaders
that decided who would become the next party president, and thereby the next prime
minister. However, in the LDP presidential election in April 2001, local branches of the
LDP were given substantial votes. The representatives of each local branch of the LDP
would cast three votes depending on the results of the local primaries that would be held
before the vote of Diet members in Tokyo.  

In fact, in the beginning of the race for the LDP presidency, there were not many
people who had expected Koizumi to win the party presidency against Hashimoto
Ryutaro, a former prime minister and the undisputed heir of the mainstream in the LDP.
Even before April 2001, Koizumi had already though unsuccessfully competed for the
presidency of the LDP twice against the leaders of the largest faction: September 1995
and July 1998. He failed because he was an outsider in the faction-driven Japanese

45 Before the reform, each prefectural branch was given one vote for the party presidential election. The
local branches had asked for a larger share of the votes to the party headquarters. Finally, a compromise
was made to give three votes for each local branch. Then, the LDP local branch in the Kanagawa prefecture
decided to hold a primary in advance of the main election to be held in Tokyo, and to give all the three
votes to the winner of this primary. This “Kanagawa” way quickly spread to other LDP local branches, and
created an electoral typhoon in April 2001 (Matsuda 2006, 266-7).

46 Technically speaking, Koizumi belonged to the Mori faction, but the size of the Mori faction was a little
less than 60% of the largest faction, the Hashimoto faction. In addition, of all the lawmakers of the LDP,
only about one-sixths belonged to the Mori faction. Moreover, Koizumi’s position in the LDP was like a
lonely wolf; the number of the lawmakers personally following Koizumi was almost none (Shinoda 2004,
11).
politics. On 24 April 2001, however, to the amazement of the LDP old guard and the
Japanese media, Koizumi defeated Hashimoto. Koizumi won 123 votes out of the 141
total or 87% of the votes from the prefectural party organizations. The final tally was 298
votes for Koizumi versus 155 for Hashimoto. The power of the factions could not turn the
strong wind of change blowing from the Japanese grassroots.

Therefore, when Koizumi Junichiro came to Kantei, or the Office of the Prime
Minister in April 2001, behind him was the desire for change of the Japanese. The
Japanese saw an opportunity to change the old ways of politics and governance in
Koizumi. The strong desire for change of the Japanese public could be confirmed in the
approval ratings of the Koizumi Administration. According to a Nikkei poll, the approval
rating of the Koizumi Cabinet was upwards of 80% in April 2001, the highest in the
The strong support was reaffirmed when the LDP won more than half of the contested
seats in the ordinary election for the House of Councilors in July 2001. As a result of this
election, the ruling coalition of the LDP and the New Komeito could keep the grip on the
majority of the Upper House of the Diet. Koizumi got off to a good start.

For Koizumi, the mandate of the Japanese electorate was to revive the economy and
retrench the state. To carry out this mandate, Koizumi waged three main battles:
privatization of the postal system, privatization of the Public Road Corporation, and
industry deregulation including finance, transportation, health, and agriculture (Kaihara
2007, 757). None of these issues was easy to handle, however. In each issue, inefficient
systems created during the high-speed economic growth era were producing wastes and
redundancies. And yet, those who benefited from the inefficient systems, or the
establishment of the Japanese politics—so-called iron triangle of zoku politicians, government bureaucrats, and the business world (seikai kankai zaikai)—would resist the reform. To overcome the resistance required a solid support base. But, that was one thing that such a maverick politician as Koizumi lacked. He had long been an outsider within the LDP. Many of his party colleagues and journalists regarded him as an eccentric.47

The Koizumi Theater. The strategy Koizumi employed to complement his insufficient intra-party support base was to create confrontation and to directly appeal to the media.48 He would preemptively raise issues that grab the public attention, and draw a line between those who agreed with him and those who disagreed, depicting the latter as so-called “resistance force” to be destroyed, and himself as a crusader marching for a “Reform without a Sanctuary” (seiikinaki kaikaku), and pressed choice upon those on the sidelines. Even his own party, if it stands in his way, could become the resistance force, and thus, should be destroyed as he remarked in 2001: “If my party tries to destroy my reforms . . . I won’t hesitate to destroy the party itself” (Encyclopedia of World Biography, 1 July 2005). By continually causing controversy or staging political shows, Koizumi called Japanese people’s attention to his agenda, and maintained his approval ratings. Therefore, although seemingly casual and off-the-cuff, each of his short remarks and

47Tanaka Makiko, a longtime Diet member, and the daughter of the former prime minister, late Tanaka Kakuei, once described the three presidential candidates of the LDP presidential election held in July 1998 as follows: bonjin (ordinary man), gunjin (soldier; military man), and henjin (eccentric man). Bonjin is late Obuchi Keizo (former prime minister) because he was at the time not widely known to the Japanese public. Gunjin is late Kajiyama Seiroku (former LDP secretary-general) because he was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy. And Henjin is Koizumi Junichiro because he took as his top agenda the privatization of the postal system, one of the support bases of the LDP, and thus because many LDP politicians regarded him as a heretic.

48The title of a Yomiuri book focusing on the Koizumi diplomacy is well summarizing this strategy. The title is Gaikowo Kenkani Shita Otoko (The man who took diplomacy as fighting) (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006)
passing comments was carefully selected and meticulously choreographed to attract the public attention (Matsuda 2006, 150-1). Japanese commentators and pundits used to call this attention-grabbing tactic as the “Koizumi Theater” (Koizumi gekijo).

*The United States as the Ruling Party.* However, the Koizumi Theater was not enough to solidify his support basis. Another powerhouse that Koizumi resorted to was the United States. In the beginning, it seems, Koizumi did not fully understand the significance of the relations with the United States. He could not even distinguish between “friendly relations between Japan and the United States” (*nichibeiyuko*) and “Japan-U.S. alliance” (*nichibeidomei*) (Yomiuri Shim bun, Political Division 2006, 112-3). However, he quickly caught up. He instinctively began to understand that precarious relations with the United States might adversely affect his own domestic footing. The fact that many of his entourage believed that “good relations with the United States, especially with the U.S. President on a personal level were essentially linked with the stability of the Koizumi Administration,” strengthened the pro-American inclination within the Koizumi government (Marukusu 2004, 47; Okamoto 2003, 8).

Therefore, emphasizing close personal relations between Koizumi and Bush was one of the top priorities of the Japanese diplomats. To reinforce the pro-American public image of the prime minister, the Japanese government sometimes even performed some public diplomacy stunts. For example, Koizumi’s summit with President Bush in Bush’s private ranch in Texas as well as Koizumi’s visit to the Graceland, a former home of an American rock star, Elvis Presley in the final year of Koizumi’s tenure, were all well-orchestrated acts to show off tight relations with Washington and Koizumi’s personal ties with the supreme leader of the United States.
To be sure, Koizumi’s approach to the United States was not without an inner critic. Tanaka Makiko, the first foreign minister of the Koizumi Cabinet, who had strongly backed Koizumi in the LDP presidential election with her own high popularity, wanted to put the U.S.-Japan relations on a more equal footing, based on which Tokyo can say to Washington what it has to say (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 116-7). However, as soon as he judged that Tanaka turned from an asset into a liability to the Cabinet, Koizumi quickly ditched Tanaka, and moved on, although, immediately after firing Tanaka, Koizumi’s approval ratings plummeted down to a 30% level.

In terms of strengthening his insufficient political foundations, Koizumi’s dealing with the United States seemed successful. Koizumi’s opponents within the LDP, particularly the leaders of the Hashimoto faction, could not find an excuse for politically attacking Koizumi for a failure to properly handle the relationship with the United States. Whenever President Bush had a meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, Bush did not forget to lavish praises and admirations on Koizumi. In this sense, the United States was certainly a political asset for Koizumi. One commentator even remarked that Koizumi’s ruling party (yoto) was not the LDP, but the United States.

Coalition with the New Komeito. Despite the populist media strategy and the domestic utilization of diplomacy, one more strategy was required to finally consolidate his platform for pushing forward with the “Reform without a Sanctuary.” To realize a reform, the idea should be translated into a legislative bill and pass through the Diet. To deliver what he promised, in other words, Koizumi had to secure the majority in the both Houses of the Diet. In the Lower House, the LDP could more or less secure the majority on its own. But the key was the House of Councilors, the Upper House of the Diet.
Although the LDP triumphed in the Upper House election in 2001, the LDP stopped short of independently occupying the majority of the House of Councilors. The LDP still needed more than 5% of the Upper House seats to constitute a stable majority within the Diet.

It was the New Komeito, a small party based on a religious organization called *Soka Gakkai* that could provide the votes that Koizumi eagerly needed. For this reason, the New Komeito, which holds less than 10% of the seats in the Diet, could inadvertently become what George Tsevelis called a veto player.\(^{49}\) No legislation whatsoever could pass through the Diet without the agreement of the New Komeito. No wonder, Koizumi took care to consider the positions of his coalition partner in the policy process.\(^{50}\)

*From Nemawashi to Top-down.* This specific combination of strategies created a distinctive policymaking pattern of the Koizumi Administration. In the past, the policy deliberation between the Cabinet and the Diet began with the subcommittees of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). After approved by the PARC, the draft legislation passed through the Executive Council (*Somukai*), then, the official position of the LDP was finally determined. With this determined party position, the LDP began negotiations with the opposition parties. In this whole policy process, the so-called *nemawashi* (prior consultation) with important members of the LDP, particularly the three main role players (*tosanyaku*)—Secretary-General, Chief of the PARC, and Chairman of the Executive Council—was essential (Thayer 1969, 210-12; 261; Abe, Shindo, and

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\(^{49}\)Veto players are individuals or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo. It follows that a change in the status quo requires a unanimous decision of all veto players (Tsebelis 2002, 19)

\(^{50}\)However, it does not necessarily mean that the New Komeito got their way on every issue. If the New Komeito sticks to its opinion when Koizumi is not willing to accommodate it, then the final option for the New Kometio was to break out of the coalition, which meant to give up all the perks of being in power.
However, in the Koizumi Administration, the direction of the policy process was turned upside down. Policies were made in what Shinoda Tomohito called “top-down” fashion (Shinoda 2004, 36-41). The decision was made at the top, and thrown down to the LDP. Particularly in the foreign policy area, important decisions were announced after Prime Minister Koizumi had a summit with President Bush. Then, Koizumi consulted with his coalition partners—the Komeito and the Conservative Party—to gain their approvals. And then, the draft of the policy was delivered to the LDP, but by this time, there was nothing much left for the LDP to add or subtract (Sinoda 2006, 178).

Having understood the domestic challenges that Prime Minister Koizumi faced, and the strategies he employed to overcome the challenges, now we can see why the Iraq War and the U.S. requests for assistance created a crisis for the Koizumi Administration. First of all, the Koizumi Administration could not help but be extremely sensitive to public opinion. The Koizumi Administration stood or fell on public support. If Koizumi were to lose public support, he did not have a fallback position within the LDP. With the majority of public opinion opposed to the Iraq War, then, it was highly risky for Koizumi to support and provide assistance for the unpopular U.S.-led war (Marukusu 2004, 60).

Second, Koizumi could lose the linchpin of the coalition. One of the mottoes of the New Komeito was peace and international cooperation. Naturally, leaders of the New Komeito felt uncomfortable when the United States announced that she was ready to go to war with Iraq with or without the endorsement of the UN, and demanded Japanese assistance for the war. However, the backing of the New Komeito was indispensable not only for supporting the United States, but also for maintaining the very base of Koizumi’s
coalitional government. Koizumi had to find a smart way to reconcile U.S. demands with the positions of the New Komeito (Marukusu 2004, 60-1).

Lastly, Koizumi could not just turn his back on the U.S. demands, first because, he knew that conflicts with Washington would return as a boomerang to his domestic political base. His political opponents would attack Koizumi, criticizing that Koizumi failed to properly handle the most important bilateral relationship of Japan. Troubles with foreigners, especially with the Americans, are something that anyone who wants to focus on domestic reforms has to avoid (Kaieda 2006). Moreover, as he instructed Ms. Tanaka—his first foreign minister—to remember, close cooperation with the United States was the backbone (kijiku) of Koizumi’s foreign as well as domestic policy (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 112).

All in all, the Koizumi Administration stood on three legs: public opinion, the United States, and the New Komeito. If the three legs conflict with one another, then, how can one possibly stand up and safely walk to the destination one desires? This is the reason why the Iraq War and the U.S. demands created a dilemma and a crisis for Prime Minister Koizumi.

In response to the crisis, Koizumi put himself on the center stage of the decision-making. For example, on 20 March 2003, about one hour after President Bush’s declaration of war against Iraq, Koizumi announced in a press conference that he “understands and supports the U.S. attack on Iraq” (Azad 2008; Yasuaki 2005, 843; Yakushiji 2003, 42). On the same day, Koizumi held a Cabinet meeting, and the Cabinet decided to set up an inter-ministerial Iraqi Task Force with Koizumi as its chief and all Cabinet ministers as members. In the first meeting of the Iraqi Task Force, it was decided
to continue the assistance activities for the United States that had been authorized under the ATSM (Anti-Terrorism Special Measures) Law, and to examine the ways to implement reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Iraq, which might require a new law. To conduct this examination, a team within the Cabinet Secretariat, which was in charge of the legal review on emergencies in areas surrounding Japan, took over the job of studying the possibility and necessity of a new law (Shinoda 2004, 102).

U.S.-Japan Alliance vs. International Cooperation

Quick and Prompt on the War on Terror. Just like South Korea, Japanese response to the U.S. war on terror was relatively rapid and prompt. In fact, when the United States was planning to invade Afghanistan, the Japanese found that Japan’s existing legal foundation for dispatching SDF troops overseas, that is, the PKO Law (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Ho) was not applicable to the Afghan War, because, for the Japanese international peace cooperation corps to participate, according to the Law, at least three conditions should be met: 1) agreement among the parties to stop the armed conflicts; 2) consent of all the parties to the armed conflicts for the UN PKO and Japan’s participation; and 3) strict impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to the armed conflicts. 51 None of these conditions existed in the Afghan War. Another existing legal foundation for dispatching SDF troops overseas, so-called “Law concerning the Emergency in Areas Surrounding Japan” (Shuhen Jitai Ho) was not applicable, either, because Afghanistan obviously did not belong to an “area surrounding Japan.” However, three weeks after the U.S. invasion into Afghanistan, the Japanese government set up a

51 See the homepage of the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Corps, the Cabinet Office (http://www.pko.go.jp).
new legal basis for assisting the Afghan War: the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures (ATSM) Law (*Tero Taisaku Tokuso Ho*). In November 2001, about ten days after the ATSM Law was enacted, the Japanese government dispatched MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to the U.S. military. No serious resistance against the ATSM Law and the dispatch of MSDF ships was observed in the Japanese government or in the Japanese society.

*A New UN Resolution Needed.* As the possibility of another war in the Middle East appeared on the horizon, however, voices asking for more prudent approach began to gain power. Some politicians began to quote the legal restriction as a limit to what Japan can do. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo said that “Japan’s cooperation with the U.S. is limited under current legislation, including the war-renouncing constitution, Japan-U.S. security treaty and the anti-terrorism law” (*Kyodo News Service* [Tokyo], 28 August 2002). Moreover, as former Prime Minister Miyazawa pointed out, the upcoming war with Iraq was different from the Afghan War: “In the case of attack on Afghanistan, the world joined forces for peace. In the case of an attack on Iraq, I wonder if it is only designed to topple President (Saddam) Hussein, or if there is really sound justification for the action” (*The Daily Yomiuri* [Tokyo], 29 August 2002). Questions were raised about the alleged linkage between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, too. For example, LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki Taku said, “For Japan to invoke the ATSM Law, either Osama Bin Laden . . . or his Al Qaeda network base must be confirmed to be in Iraq (*Kyodo News Service* [Tokyo], 28 August 2002).

However, the most important condition for Japanese assistance for the United States in case of a war with Iraq was international cooperation, meaning authorization by the
United Nations. For example, on 27 August 2002, in the first Japan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue meeting, Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi Yukio told his counterpart, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage that “international cooperation is necessary to deal with the Iraqi problem” (Yasuaki 2005, 849; The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 29 August 2002). In the next month, when Prime Minister Koizumi met President Bush on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly, Koizumi emphasized the need to “undertake further international coordination” in response to Bush’s request for support and assistance in case of a war with Iraq (Yasuaki 2005, 849; Shinoda 2004, 90; Marukusu 2004, 49-50).

Mounting Pressures from Washington. Then, what was the demand on the other side of the Pacific? According to various sources, it was in February 2002, only 3 weeks after the “Axis of Evil” address that President Bush revealed his intention of attacking Iraq to Koizumi. In a summit held in Tokyo, Bush told Koizumi that the United States “will definitely attack Iraq” (Shinoda 2004, 86; Azad 2008). However, this was an expression of mere basic principles on Iraq. The plan of attack on Iraq was not yet materialized. It was in August when U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage visited Tokyo to have a Strategic Dialogue meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi that the U.S. side made its demand more specific. In Tokyo, Armitage spoke with the three secretaries-general of the ruling coalition, and reportedly stated, “The U.S. will make a decision sooner or later. I hope Japan decides on measures through sufficient dialogue while keeping in mind the importance of Japan-U.S. alliance,” and “announced that the United States hoped that Tokyo would pledge assistance for the U.S. when an attack occurred” (Yasuaki 2005, 849).
Two months later, in October, the demands from Washington became more specific. In the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC) meeting held in Washington, Richard P. Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense met with Nagamine Yasumasa, Deputy Director-General of the MOFA North American Affairs Bureau and Iihara Kazuki, Deputy Director-General of the JDA Defense Policy Bureau. Reportedly, in this meeting, Mr. Lawless “called for ‘boots on the ground’ and requested the same amount of logistical support by SDF as provided in the Afghan War, meaning participation of ASDF and MSDF in transportation and fueling services, if Japan were to join the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ against Iraq” (Yasuaki 2005, 850).

Honne and Tatemae. In response to the mounting requests from Washington, Tokyo kept emphasizing the necessity of international cooperation, not declaring official support for the U.S.-led war with Iraq. But, the center of gravity was gradually shifting from “no assistance unless the UN approves” to “can assist if the UN approves.” On September 15, for example, referring to President Bush’s request for assistance for a possible war with Iraq, LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki said, “If there is a UN resolution, I think [Japan] will be able to take a considerable action” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 15 September 2002). Moreover, according to some observers, Prime Minister Koizumi had already made up his mind to support the U.S. attack on Iraq, when he had a meeting with Bush in New York in September. His close advisors also began to feel that it was impossible to change Bush’s mind (Marukusu 2004, 49-50).52

52On the question of when the Japanese government judged that the U.S. war with Iraq was inevitable, thus legal and practical preparations were needed, opinions vary. Marukusu (2004; 2006) believes that Prime Minister Koizumi’s summit with President Bush in September 2002 at the UN General Assembly was the finish blow. An official from JDA basically agrees with Marukusu. He opines that it was around the fall of 2002 that the decision was made within the Japanese government to support the U.S. war with Iraq (Kaieda 2006). Shinoda (2004, 88) thinks that as early as July 2002 or before, government officials, particularly
However, the Koizumi Administration could not simply declare their support for Washington, because they had to first consider a possible backlash from the public and the coalition partner. For example, according to a Mainichi poll, 84% of the respondents opposed an attack on Iraq (Azad 2008; Yasuaki 2005, 858). The New Komeito was feeling uncomfortable about SDF’s expanding roles abroad, too. In December 2002, when the Japanese government decided to send an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean to help the U.S. and U.K. operations there, Kanzaki Takenori, the leader of the New Komeito expressed his regrets to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, although he did not try to veto the decision (Marukusu 2004, 68). Therefore, Koizumi and his entourage could not help but continue to maintain ambiguous positions on the possible war with Iraq. For instance, in response to a question by SDP leader Doi Takako about how he views a potential war between the United States and Iraq, Koizumi dodged the question by saying, “I would like to refrain from commenting on what I think about a preemptive attack at this stage when it is not yet taken into action” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 6 November 2002).

The War is Inevitable. In November, the Republicans occupied both Houses of Congress as a result of the U.S. mid-term elections, and the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a last chance to comply with its disarmament obligations. A few weeks later, finally, Washington submitted a written request to Tokyo. According to a Yomiuri report, in the middle of November 2002, the U.S. government formally asked for Japan’s support and cooperation in case of a U.S. attack on Iraq. Reportedly, the written those from MOFA began to consider how to respond to the unavoidable U.S.-led war with Iraq. However, a MOFA official judges that it was around the winter of the 2002-2003 season that the Japanese government began to be convinced about the inevitability of the war with Iraq (Ichikawa 2006).
request was submitted to the MOFA through the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. The letter called on the Japanese government to 1) announce Japan’s support for U.S. military actions against Iraq; 2) study ways in which Japan could support U.S. military operations against Iraq; and 3) study Japan’s possible diplomatic role following an attack on Iraq, including assistance to rebuild Iraq. It was reported, however, that the letter did not either specify how Japan should utilize the SDF personnel, nor what equipment they should use, thereby leaving such specifics up to the Japanese government (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 22 November 2002).

As the recognition that the upcoming war with Iraq was unavoidable spread among key decision-makers of the Koizumi Administration, the Cabinet Secretariat began in secret the legal preparations because, as mentioned above, the existing laws could not provide the necessary legal foundations for dispatching SDF troops to Iraq (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 155). At the same time, the foreign policy entourage of Prime Minister Koizumi began to float the necessity of new legislation and the possible needlessness of a new UNSC resolution for attacking Iraq. On 6 December 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda said, “Assistance to (postwar) rehabilitation in Iraq is important. Our country will see many opportunities to cooperate. Legislation will need to be drafted for that purpose” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 6 December 2002). On December 20, however, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, in a press conference, commented that “a new (UN) resolution is not an indispensable condition for an attack on Iraq” (Marukusu 2004, 68).

Nevertheless, in general terms, the Japanese withheld an announcement of public support for the upcoming war with Iraq, and continued, at least in their public remarks, to
emphasize the necessity of a new UN resolution endorsing the attack on Iraq. Up to the last minute, therefore, “international cooperation” was an easy mantra for the Koizumi Administration. On December 9, MOFA Vice Minister Takeuchi, in a meeting with Armitage in Tokyo, said, “the international community has to continue to cooperate in ensuring implementation of the UN resolution. It is more important that the international community cooperates.” In January, when Koizumi had a telephone conversation with President Bush, Koizumi said, “It is duly important to maintain the international cooperation that [you have] constructed.” Finally, on 22 February 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Kawaguchi met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and pointed out that “a new UNSC resolution would be desirable before any further action is taken by the United States . . .” (Yasuaki 2005, 852-4).

*What Japan can and cannot do.* However, the appeal by the Japanese went nowhere. The hope for a new UN resolution was dissipating. Now, the more important task was to clarify the bottom line, that is, what Japan could and could not do to assist the United States. First, the Japanese would not participate in battles, but they might be able to help with postwar reconstruction. Already in December 2002, when Takeuchi had a meeting with Armitage, he drove home this point. Reportedly, he told Armitage that in the event of military strikes on Iraq, Japan would extend assistance only for postwar reconstruction and help with refugees in neighboring countries (*Japan Times* [Tokyo], 10 December 2002). This bottom line was accurately noted by Washington. In the list of members of the Coalition for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq announced by the U.S. Department of State on 18 March 2003, Japan was listed as a “post-conflict” member (Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 18 March 2003; *Windsor Star* [Ontario], 19 March 2003).
Washington also understood that, being restricted by the Constitution and the public opinion, the SDF would not be able to directly participate in combat activities. Second, unlike the Gulf War, Japan would not pay for the war cost. But, the cost of helping refugees and reconstructing Iraq might be covered. On 3 March 2003, in a Diet Budget Committee session, Koizumi said that Japan would not bear the costs of an anticipated U.S.-led war against Iraq. However, he also said that Japan was ready to foot the bill by giving aid to refugees and by assisting in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 3 March 2003).

*Going to Iraq for North Korea.* As the U.S. invasion into Iraq drew closer, the remarks and comments by Japanese officials about the necessity of a new UN resolution diminished, while the emphasis on the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in dealing with North Korean threats began to appear. In order to appease the strong public opposition to the Iraq War, the Koizumi Administration began to depend upon the North Korean nuclear threats as a reason. On February 14, in the pages of Yomiuri Shimbun, a MOFA official and a researcher from a government-affiliated research institution wrote op-ed columns highlighting the relationship between the strengthened Japan-U.S. alliance and the prevention of North Korean threats. On March 1, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo, for the first time as a member of the Koizumi inner circle, publicly said, “In order to deter North Korean nuclear weapons development, keeping step with the United States on the Iraq issue is required” (Marukusu 2004, 69-70).

At long last, the moment of truth came. The Japanese public’s opposition to the Iraq War was still quite strong. But, Tokyo could not continue to withhold its support for the war with Iraq. Before the final declaration, however, Koizumi had to finish his homework.
On March 11, in a meeting with leaders of the ruling coalition, Koizumi said, “According to the most recent information, there still remains the possibility that the UNSC may reach consensus. Since it might be possible to overcome the confrontation between the United States and France, we have to strive to the end.” Kanzaki, the leader of the New Komeito, also asked Koizumi to strive to the end. But, by this time, it was already clear that all these conversations were mere lip service (Marukusu 2004, 71).

On 16 March 2003, Koizumi publicly remarked that he felt an American-British attack on Iraq was valid with or without a new UNSC resolution (Azad 2008). Even the mantra of international cooperation was now jettisoned. Two days later, he convened an NSC meeting to discuss the Japanese government’s counter-measures to the upcoming war with Iraq (Mainichi Shimbun [Tokyo], 18 March 2003). In an interview after the meeting, Koizumi stated that “I understand that so far President Bush has made various efforts to obtain international cooperation on Iraq,” and that “I support America’s position because I think President Bush’s decision was inevitable after such efforts” (Shinoda 2004, 98; Marukusu 2004, 54).

Sandwiched between opposing requests from the domestic and the international levels, the Koizumi Administration continued a kind of double-talk. Without clarifying its position on the Iraq issue, the Koizumi government asked Washington to make more efforts to get the new UN resolution, while explaining to the Japanese public and the coalition partners that they were striving hard to reconcile the differing opinions among the permanent members of the UNSC. At the end of the day, however, Koizumi had to choose sides. He could not continue to have his cake and eat it forever. The final decision was to support the United States as had been expected.
This decision had a negative impact on the approval ratings of the Koizumi Administration. Koizumi’s approval rating indeed went down from 54% in December 2002 to 42% in March 2003 (Marukusu 2004, 72-3). The Japanese government explained to the public that the previous UN resolutions—UNSC resolutions 678, 687, and 1441—were enough to justify the attack on Iraq as if they had been making useless efforts to pass the new UN resolution only a few weeks previously. However, as long as the New Komeito did not walk away from the coalition government, Koizumi could maintain his power.

**New Legal Basis and the Dispatch of SDF to Iraq**

**The Time for Debt Collection.** There was no hope for Saddam Hussein. On 9 April 2003, Baghdad fell. The Iraq War was rapidly drawing to a close. Koizumi had promised to participate in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq and to provide financial assistance to help rehabilitate the country. Now, it was time for Koizumi to live up to his promises. The debt collector was Richard L. Armitage. On April 2, Armitage had an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, and expressed strong U.S. hopes to see Japan play roles in a wide range of fields for Iraqi rehabilitation, such as medical and educational activities as well as those activities for maintaining public peace and order (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 2 April 2003).

In response, the Japanese government announced an aid package for Iraq on April 21. According to the package, Japan would help preserve Iraq’s cultural assets in cooperation with UNESCO, and reopen her embassy in Iraq as soon as possible. The package also called for Japan to transport materials and goods for a humanitarian aid to war-affected
people in Iraq and the vicinity using SDF aircrafts. Most importantly, the package revealed that the government was prepared to draw up new legislation *if necessary* in an indication of the willingness to consider the dispatch of SDF troops and civilian personnel. But, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda in announcing the aid package, said, “The government has yet to make any decisions on new legislation” (*Kyodo News Service* [Tokyo], 21 April 2003).

The decision came one month later. On May 21, in an airplane en route to the United States, Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time mentioned the possible establishment of a new law that would enable the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq. A U.S.-Japan summit was held on May 23 at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. On the previous day, the UNSC had passed the Resolution 1483, asking UN member states to assist the Iraqis. In the meeting with Bush, Koizumi informed Bush that the Japanese government was examining the possibility of airlifting humanitarian materials to the countries surrounding Iraq by providing C-130 transport aircrafts, and as for the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq, he confirmed that Japan would provide “contributions suitable to Japan” based on Japanese national strength (Shinoda 2004, 105). However, Koizumi withheld a detailed plan of providing assistance for postwar Iraq. In the joint press conference after the meeting, Koizumi said, “With regard to the question of sending the SDF to Iraq . . . now that the UN resolution has passed (to lift the 13-year-old economic sanctions on Iraq), upon return to Japan, we shall study in detail what Japan can do. At any rate, the question of what Japan can do . . . is a matter for Japan to decide.” But, Bush wanted more specific promises. He said, in an apparent expression of a hope that Japan would send the SDF to help rebuild Iraq: “Japanese forces will provide logistical support
for humanitarian and reconstruction activities” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 24 May 2003).

As one aide of Koizumi remarked, now the Japanese “were not supposed to say, ‘We cannot send it’” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 5 June 2003). Technically, the war was now over, and the Japanese had already expressed their intention to assist in the postwar reconstruction. And most importantly, the U.S. president clearly and publicly requested the SDF dispatch to Iraq.

*High Speed Legislation.* Upon return to Tokyo, Koizumi sped up his work. On June 7, in a meeting with the three secretaries-general of the ruling coalition, he delivered his intention to submit the draft of the new law to the Diet. He also disclosed his plan to pass the draft legislation through the Cabinet by June 13, that is, six days later (Shinoda 2004, 105-6). Two days later, on June 9, the Cabinet Secretariat gave a briefing on the details of the draft legislation to the select members of the ruling coalition. According to the briefing, the SDF troops and the civilians to be dispatched to Iraq would embark on three main activities: 1) humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for the Iraqis; 2) medical, transportation, and logistical assistance for the American and British forces; and 3) assistance for the disposition of the WMD left over by the Saddam Hussein regime (Shinoda 2004, 106). The next day, on June 10, the Cabinet Secretariat also gave a separate briefing on the new legislation to the members of the Cabinet, Defense and Foreign Affairs committees of the LDP PARC. Some legislators raised such questions as “What is the distinction between combat and non-combat areas?” In the ensuing LDP Executive Council meeting, more questions and complaints were raised. One of the LDP legislators called the prime minister’s schedule to pass the draft through the Cabinet by
June 13 “unreasonable” (Shinoda 2004, 107).

The LDP continued to try to reach consensus on the draft bill on June 11 and 12, but failed. Criticisms from anti-Koizumi faction leaders stopped the LDP Executive Council from reaching a conclusion. With the next LDP presidential election coming up in September, they did not want to let Koizumi simply get away with the new law. In the debate over the new law, former LDP Secretary-General Nonaka claimed that “it is lack of common sense to submit draft legislation (without prior consultation with the governing party). The submission is based on the premise that Japan would one way or another dispatch the SDF to Iraq.” Former Director of JDA, Norota argued that “the disposition of WMD should not be included in the draft since no WMD has yet been found in Iraq.” By this time, the New Komeito and the Conservative Party had completed their internal process to endorse the draft legislation (Shinoda 2004, 108). Finally, on June 13, through the negotiation among the ranking members of the LDP, the “assistance for the disposition of WMD” was deleted from the draft despite objections from the Cabinet (Shinoda 2004, 108-9). At last, the Japanese government submitted the bill concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (SMHRAI Law: *Iraku Jindo Fukko Shien Tokuso Ho*) to the Diet.

According to the bill, the dispatched SDF personnel were allowed to carry out activities only in areas where no combat operations were or would be taking place. They were not allowed to provide any ammunition or weapons, nor to refuel or maintain aircraft for combat operations. The SDF personnel could use weapons only to protect themselves, colleagues, people involved in the work related to the reconstruction of Iraq, and others under their supervision (*Xinhua* [Beijing], 13 June 2003).
The draft bill passed the Lower House on July 4, and, after passing the Upper House, the SMHRAI Law was enacted on July 26. The opposition parties including the DPJ strongly objected to the law. But, as the ruling coalition enforced the passing of the new legislation, there was nothing they could do to stop the SMHRAI Law.

With the enactment of the SMHRAI Law, the legal preparations for the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq were all set. The decision to dispatch was made, thus the SDF troops would have to go to Iraq. But they were not supposed to engage in combats because that would be a breach of the Japanese Constitution. Although the troops were equipped with light firearms, those could only be used for the purpose of self-defense. The jobs of the troops are to provide humanitarian and reconstruction services to the Iraqi people and transportation services for the U.S. and the U.K. forces. Still, some crucial questions had not been answered, such as how many soldiers would go to which region of Iraq, and when.

*How Many, Where, and When.* The number was actually not so important. The main purpose of the SDF troops in Iraq was not military but symbolic. By maintaining their presence, those troops could speak volumes for Japan’s support for the Iraq War. From a pure military point of view, the U.S. armed forces in Iraq did not urgently need assistance from foreign countries with the possible exception of the support from the British forces (Tanaka 2006). So, when the U.S. side indirectly indicated “2,000 boots on the ground,” the number of SDF troops was easily fixed around 1,000 including ASDF and MSDF elements. The U.S. request was accommodated by one hundred percent.

Then, when would the Japanese government send the troops to Iraq, and in which

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53 The eventual number of SDF soldiers actually provided was a little less than 1,100 in total. But, this number fluctuates up and down as the SDF troops operating in Iraq are periodically replaced.
region of Iraq would the troops be stationed? The answer to these questions became more and more complicated as the security situation in Iraq worsened. In the beginning, the SDF considered Baghdad to be the place to be stationed in. But, due to the deteriorating security situation there, the SDF shelved the earlier plan of providing logistical support to American troops in Baghdad. Later, the place was changed to Samawah, a city in Southern Iraq, because the Japanese government judged that the city was safer than other places.

The final question was when to go to Iraq. The continuing terrorist attacks in Iraq and the domestic elections scheduled in September and November 2003 made Koizumi and his advisors extremely cautious, and thus delayed the dispatch. After the August 19 bomb attack on UN buildings in Iraq, a Japanese official indicated that the dispatch of the first SDF contingent to Iraq would be postponed until the next year at the earliest (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 20 August 2003). Two days later an anonymous Japanese official mentioned that Japan would not send troops to Iraq for “several months” irrespective of the security situation (Irish Times [Dublin, Ireland], 22 August 2003). The public opinion could not be worse. According to a Mainichi poll, only 19% of the Japanese supported the idea of dispatching SDF troops to Iraq (Straits Times [Singapore], 29 July 2003). With the LDP presidential election scheduled in September, it was too risky for Koizumi to push forward with the dispatch.

The momentum for restarting the dispatch project came from the outside after Koizumi won the LDP presidential election by a landslide on September 20. On 16 October 2003, the UNSC unanimously approved the U.S. and U.K.-proposed resolution (Resolution 1511) on Iraq's reconstruction, which supported the idea of an international
force formed under U.S. leadership. The next day, in a summit with Prime Minister Koizumi held in Tokyo, President Bush appreciated Japan’s role in fulfilling the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1511. Obviously, the appreciation was a kind of soft pressure on Japan to live up to her promise.

In response to the misgivings about the strength of the Japanese will to dispatch, the Koizumi Administration had to reassure Washington. At the end of October, despite a UN announcement about temporarily withdrawing international staff from Baghdad, the Japanese government said that its plan to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq was not changed (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 31 October 2003). In the general election on November 9, the LDP lost the majority, but thanks to the coalition with the New Komeito, managed to maintain a grip on power. Only three days after the election, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda said in a press conference that Japan was “sticking to the plan to carry out the dispatch by the end of this year” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 12 November 2003).

However, another blow held back the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq. On November 12, a suicide bombing in Nasiriyah, southern Iraq, killed at least 26 people including 16 Italian soldiers. Nasiriyah was not far from Samawah. The next day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda said, “We could [send] the SDF there if circumstances permit. But there is no such situation.” In response to a question of whether there is any change in the government’s plan to send SDF troops to Iraq by the end of the year, Koizumi said, “We will decide after closely watching the situation” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 13 November 2003). Originally, the basic plan for dispatching the SDF troops to Iraq was to be announced on November 14. But, the deteriorating situation in Iraq, and the surprising leap forward of the DPJ in the general election let the schedule be delayed (Shinoda 2004,
To make matters worse, on November 29, two Japanese diplomats were killed in Iraq. According to an opinion poll conducted at the end of November, only 10% of the Japanese supported sending Japanese troops to Iraq (The Age [Melbourne, Australia], 1 December 2003). However, the killing of the two diplomats produced unexpected results. The Koizumi Administration and the LDP reacted aggressively. On the very next day of the killing, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi said in a press conference, “We will not give in to terrorism, and Japan’s policy of being actively engaged in Iraq’s reconstruction is unshaken” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 30 November 2003). On the same day, Koizumi said, “There will be no change in Japan’s policy . . . Japan should not be intimidated by terrorism” (New York Times, 1 December 2003). In the LDP joint conference for foreign affairs and defense-related matters held on December 2, the opinion that Japan should not cave in to terrorist threats prevailed (Shinoda 2004, 118).

On December 4, a high-ranking government official said, not revealing his identity:

Prime Minister’s desire is to start the deployment as early as possible. We have seen the polls that indicate 70 to 80 percent of the public is opposed to the dispatch, but Prime Minister will be explaining his decision to the people, and he believes they will understand (Washington Post, 5 December 2003).

Finally, Koizumi decided to take a chance. He went ahead despite the negative public opinion. On December 8, the Cabinet Secretariat announced the basic plan for dispatching the SDF troops to Iraq. According to this plan, 600 GSDF troops would reconstruct social infrastructure such as medical, water supply, and schooling services around Samawah in southern Iraq. The ASDF would provide 8 aircrafts including C-130
cargo planes as ‘Assistance-for-Ensuring-the-Security’ activities for the sake of American and British forces. The period of the SDF dispatch to Iraq would be one year from 15 December 2003, but the start date of the dispatch was not specifically announced (Shinoda 2004, 119; New York Times, 10 December 2003).

The LDP approved the plan on the day the plan was announced. The New Komeito followed suit the next day. The Cabinet passed the basic plan on 9 December 2003. Then, the implementation of the dispatch ran at full speed. On December 26, a 40-strong advance unit of the ASDF left for Kuwait and Qatar. The 110-member main unit of the ASDF arrived at Kuwait on 23 January 2004 (Xinhua [Beijing], 23 January 2004). The GSDF advance unit of 30 members had already departed for Samawah on January 19. The main force of the GSDF contingent joined the advance team on February 8. Consequently, from the day when Koizumi announced his intention to legislate a new law enabling the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq, it took about 8 months to complete the dispatch.

**Financial Burden-sharing**

In addition to military assistance, Japan provided financial assistance, too. According to the original assistance plan of Prime Minister Koizumi drawn up in March 2003, Japan was not supposed to share the cost of war, but the cost of reconstruction. In Iraq, however, battles continued after the combat was over. The distinction between war and reconstruction became meaningless. The assumption in March was that the war would soon be over, and that Japan would probably focus on reconstruction in peaceful postwar Iraq. Contrary to the expectation, the security situation in Iraq worsened as time
went by. In consequence, President Bush, on 7 September 2003, requested additional US$ 87 billion from U.S. Congress. Facing the snowballing war cost, naturally, the United States tried to share the financial burden of the Iraq War with her allies.

Ten days after President Bush’s request to U.S. Congress, U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, Howard H. Baker Jr., paid a visit to Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, and discussed Japan’s possible financial contributions for Iraq’s rehabilitation (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 17 September 2003). To Japan, Baker’s visit was a pressure. At the time, President Bush was scheduled to have a summit with Koizumi in Tokyo on October 17, and an international conference for reconstruction aids for Iraq was supposed to be held in Madrid on October 24. Japan had to come up with something to meet Washington’s demands.

Contribution without Taxation. On October 10, the overall size of Japan’s financial aid for Iraq was leaked to the media. According to a government source, Japanese government was considering a plan to provide about US$ 5 billion to help reconstruct Iraq in the four years beginning FY2004. The amount accounted for about 10% of the total expected cost of reconstruction, set at US$ 55 billion for the period between 2004 and 2007 by the World Bank (Japan Times [Tokyo], 5 October 2003). On the same day, a MOFA spokesman said, “Koizumi will be making a promise to President Bush to provide money and personnel. Japan is aware of its obligation” (Washington Post, 11 October 2003). Eventually, on October 24, Japan pledged US$ 5 billion in reconstruction aids for Iraq in the Madrid Conference. US$ 1.5 billion of the total would be provided in FY2004 as grant aids. The remainder would be provided as long-term low-interest rate loans (Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 26 October 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 106).
Unlike the Gulf War. Why was the number set at US$ 5 billion, or about 10% of the total expected cost? According to a source, Tokyo once “indicated it would be prepared to shoulder 20% of the financial burden” as the Kaifu Administration did in case of the Gulf War (Australian, 25 March 2003). Tokyo’s indication seems to have been a response to a suggestion from Washington. If the 20%-standard had been accepted, then, the amount should have been US$ 11 billion. How could Tokyo discount the share of the total reconstruction cost?

It was, presumably, because there were some differences between the Japanese responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War. First, this time, Japan was providing personnel assistance. Then, the Japanese could argue that the amount of the financial aid should be less than the share that the Japanese government had taken in case of the Gulf War. The financial contribution that Japan provided for the Gulf War was US$ 13 billion, or about 20% of the total expected war cost. Then, now the ratio should be less than 20%. Second, Japan’s financial power was much weaker than during the Gulf War. Under the proposed fiscal 2003 budget draft, Japan’s dependence on government bonds for her general accounting budget was 44.6%, at least 30 percentage points higher than during the Gulf War (Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo], 10 March 2003). More importantly, according to the calculation of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF), US$ 5 billion was the maximum that the Japanese government could contribute without raising additional taxes from the Japanese taxpayers (Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo] 17 October 2003).

Moreover, we need to look at the relative rather than nominal amount of the Japanese contribution. The nominal comparison of US$ 5 billion vs. US$ 13 billion might lead some observers to assess that the Japanese contribution dramatically
diminished. From a cross-national perspective, however, the size of the Japanese financial aid for the Iraq War was considerable. In the Madrid Conference, the goal of the United States was to raise US$ 55 billion, but the actual size of the funds pledged by the participating countries was only US$ 33 billion. Then, as measured as a ratio of the total financial aids actually promised by the participants of the Madrid Conference, Japan pledged about 15% of the total. Moreover, of the US$ 33 billion, 55%, or US$ 18.4 billion came from the United States, the largest donor. Japan was the second. And the third largest donor was the EU, which contributed only US$ 812 million. In terms of the Japanese share of the actual total international contributions, therefore, Japan’s financial contribution was substantial.

In addition to the financial assistance, there was also debt reduction. As the reconstruction of Iraq was becoming a crucial issue for the stabilization of postwar Iraq, Washington thought that the reduction of the Iraqi debts was essential to invite new investments to Iraq. So, the United States began to ask the Paris Club, a group of creditor nations including Japan, to write off their credits to Iraq. At the time, Japan was the largest creditor country in terms of Iraq’s public debt.

Japan again reacted positively. Prime Minister Koizumi said, in a meeting with U.S. special envoy James A. Baker on 29 December 2003, that “Japan would be prepared to eliminate the ‘vast majority’ of its debt of US$ 4.1 billion owed it by Iraq, ‘if other Paris Club creditors are prepared to do so’ in the context of a Paris Club agreement.” Actually, the total amount of Japan’s outstanding loans to Iraq was more than US$ 4.1 billion; it was US$ 7 billion, if late payment charges were added (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 29

54 For the results of the Madrid Conference, see the Council on Foreign Relations homepage (http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-madrid-donor-conference/p7682#p1; accessed 23 April 2013).
December 2003). Eventually, at the Paris Club meeting held in November 2004, the creditor countries reached an agreement with the Iraqi side on the reduction of Iraq’s public debt (in three stages, for a total reduction of 80%). Given this decision, in November 2005, Japan and Iraq signed an agreement concerning an 80% debt cancellation, amounting to approximately US$ 6 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 107).

Debt reduction is not financial assistance in that it does not impose new financial obligations on the Japanese government. The debts can be simply crossed out from the Japanese ledger. Moreover, almost half of the debts were late payment charges. More importantly, Iraq was under reconstruction. At any rate, there were little prospects that the Iraqi government would redeem the debts in the near future. It must have been a better idea for Japan to write off the debts and find new business opportunities in reconstructing Iraq. Nevertheless, the debt reduction must have been an appreciable contribution to the Iraqi reconstruction in the eyes of the Americans particularly because Japan was the largest creditor to Iraq in terms of the public debts.

All in all, the total financial assistance of Japan for the Iraq War was US$ 5 billion. However, if we assess the financial assistance in terms of Japan’s share of the total funds actually raised, and if we appreciate the significance of the Japanese debt reduction for Iraq, we can conclude that the Japanese financial assistance for the Iraq War was not negligible.
CHAPTER 6. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE REACTIVE STATE THE SIS

Without comparisons to make, the mind doesn't know how to proceed.

Alexis de Tocqueville

Those who know only one country know no country.

Seymour Martin Lipset

We want to know whether the RST is still useful to understand the peculiarity of Japanese foreign policy behavior, and to find the most important causal variables that explain the peculiarity. In order to accomplish these goals, we will cross-nationally compare the Japanese cases with the cases from other countries, particularly, the South Korean cases, and also compare the Japanese cases inter-temporally to see if there were any changes in the key features of Japanese foreign policy behavior.

The RST as reformulated in Chapter 3 provides criteria for the comparison, and the descriptive work of the previous two chapters set the foundations for the comparison. Now that we have the criteria and the foundations, it is time to compare our cases and thereby assess the utility of the RST and its critics, and confirm the presence or absence of the change in Japanese foreign policy behavior. In doing these tasks, the four main descriptive foci that we established as a result of the reformulation of the RST in Chapter 3—sequence, excess, accommodation, and delivery—will be used as the standardized questions for comparison. Specifically, for each case, we will raise the same four
questions as below:

Q1. Did the response from Tokyo (or Seoul) precede the U.S. demands? More specifically, did Tokyo (or Seoul), after watching the military crisis in the Middle East rising on the horizon, spontaneously present their own policies to their U.S. counterparts?

Q2. Did the response from Tokyo (or Seoul) exceed the U.S. demands qualitatively or quantitatively? Or, could Tokyo (or Seoul) change the course of important U.S. actions relating to the wars in Iraq?

Q3. Did Tokyo (or Seoul) meet more than 50% of the U.S. demands?

Q4. Did Tokyo (or Seoul) deliver the promised assistance within the usually required amount of time?

According to the logical rule for applying the test criteria established in Chapter 3, the answers to both Q1 and Q2 should be no to pass the test of reactivity, whereas the answers to both Q3 and Q4 should be yes to pass the test of flexibility. When testing the cases, we will first test for the passivity of each case. In other words, we will try to find answers to Q1 and Q2. And then, in order to better highlight the passivity of our cases from a comparative perspective, we will compare the shared characteristics of our test cases with the characteristics observed in the responses of non-reactive states such as Britain and France to the same wars. Next, we will test the flexibility of each case by trying to answer Q3 and Q4 for each case.

6.1 Test for Passivity

Sequence: Who Moved First?

The answer to Q1 for the four cases is uniformly no. Basically, U.S. actions preceded the actions by Tokyo and Seoul. In other words, the Administrations of Kaifu Toshiki,
Roh Tae-woo, Roh Moo-hyun, and Koizumi Junichiro (K₁, R₁, R₂, and K₂) all waited for the United States to submit the request.

In K₁, the Kaifu Administration’s response always followed the U.S. actions. Remember that Prime Minister Kaifu, hearing the news of the breakout of a war in the Middle East, was even reluctant to cancel a speech at Karuizawa. When he was hurriedly back to Tokyo, the first thing he did was to gather advices and opinions of energy experts. And then, when the impact of the war on the energy supply to Japan proved to be manageable, the tension level dramatically went down. It only went back up when Washington seriously submitted a list of requests. Exactly the same pattern was observed in Seoul. To the South Koreans (R₁), initially, the Gulf Crisis was an energy crisis. And when they reached a conclusion that they could handle the impact of the crisis on their energy supply, then, their attention turned to what the Americans would want, not what they had to do to deal with the crisis. Likewise, uppermost in the minds of the policymakers of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R₂) was the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the possibility of a U.S. attack on the North. Even if a military crisis was looming large in the Middle East, they withheld the expression of their position for the war until they were reassured by a high-ranking U.S. official that the voice of Seoul would be heard if Washington made any decision on the military attack on the DPRK. The first thing that the Koizumi Administration (K₂) did in response to the coming war with Iraq was to draw a line between what they could do and what they could not. They made it clear up front that they would not participate in the battles, and that no

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55From here on, we will use abbreviated expressions for each case: K₁ represents the case of the Kaifu Administration; K₂, the Koizumi Administration; R₁, the Roh Tae-woo Administration; and R₂, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration.
provision of assistance would be made for the war. The assistance would be provided only after the war.

We can observe the sequence of the U.S. requests and the responses from Tokyo and Seoul from a comparative perspective. Let us take a look at Table 6-1, where we put together the timings of important U.S. requests on one hand, and the Japanese and South Korean responses in the lead-up to the Gulf War on the other. This table is based on the descriptions of the previous two chapters.

Table 6-1 Sequence of U.S. Actions and Tokyo & Seoul's Responses: the Gulf War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions &amp; Reactions</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First official request filed</td>
<td>15 Aug. 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First aid package fixed</td>
<td>14 Sep. 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final decision on personnel assistance</td>
<td>Nov. 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for additional assistance filed by the U.S.</td>
<td>Dec. 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First batch of personnel assistance completed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The amount of additional financial assistance finalized</td>
<td>24 Jan. 1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both Tokyo and Seoul, the first official request of assistance from Washington was filed around the middle of August 1990. Both Japan and South Korea publicized their aid packages between mid and late September 1990. As the possibility of a war with Saddam Hussein became higher, the United States submitted another request for assistance in December 1990. From both Tokyo and Seoul, the responses to this additional request came out in January 1991. A more detailed timeline for the U.S. requests and the Japanese and South Korean responses during the Gulf Crisis/War is
A similar pattern is observed in the Japanese and South Korean responses before and during the Iraq War. Let us take a look at Table 6-2, which puts together U.S. requests and the responses from Tokyo and Seoul before and during the Iraq War.

Table 6-2 Sequence of U.S. Actions and Tokyo & Seoul's Responses: the Iraq War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions &amp; Reactions</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. requests for assistance filed</td>
<td>Oct. &amp; Nov. 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the Iraq War announced</td>
<td>Mar. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative approval for the dispatch of medics and engineers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion of the dispatch of medics and engineers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to legislate a special law officially announced</td>
<td>7 Jun. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New special law authorizing the SDF dispatch enacted</td>
<td>26 July 2003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsening security in Iraq forces the U.S. to demand additional assistance from allies.</td>
<td>Aug.-Sep. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to dispatch (additional) troops to Iraq</td>
<td>26 July 2003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The size and the nature of the contingent to be sent to Iraq finalized.</td>
<td>Dec. 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatch of ground forces completed</td>
<td>24 Feb. 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The special law authorizing the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq was enacted on this day.

The United States delivered the request for assistance around October and November 2002. In both Seoul and Tokyo, the political support for the Iraq War was announced in March 2003. And then, in South Korea, the legal process for dispatching personnel assistance (military medics and engineers) was completed in April. The actual dispatch was completed by May 2003. On the other hand, officially, Tokyo did not move until June 2003 because the Koizumi Administration declared that the Japanese government would not provide assistance for the War due to its constitutional restriction.
After May 2003 in which President Bush announced the end of major combat situations in Iraq, the Japanese moved rapidly. By late July 2003, the legal preparations for the SDF dispatch to Iraq were completed. However, the Japanese still had to decide on the place for the dispatched SDF contingent to be stationed in, and also their size and function. In August and September 2003, the worsening security situation in Iraq forced Washington to submit another request for assistance to U.S.-allied nations. Seoul responded in October 2003 by making a decision to send additional troops to Iraq. Both South Korea and Japan decided on the size and nature of the contingents to be dispatched to Iraq in December 2003.

According to the observed pattern, Washington first produced demands and later, Seoul and Tokyo met the demands by supplying the demanded assistance. This is not just a coincidence. As a rule, Tokyo and Seoul intentionally waited for actions or requests from Washington before they came up with their own moves. Kaifu and the senior officials in his Administration (K1) waited for the United States to submit a specific number as a request of financial assistance to Tokyo. When the numbers the Japanese obtained all conflicted with one another, they got frustrated, and came up with their own improvised number. As soon as their calculated number was coldly rebuffed by those in Washington, however, those in Tokyo hurriedly revised and quadrupled the number within only two weeks. The Roh Tae-woo Administration (R1) also tried to find out the bottom line of what the Bush Administration wanted. Such was the same with the Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R2). When Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuk visited Washington in November 2003, one of his missions was to fathom out the bottom-line of Washington.
The response of the Koizumi Administration (K2) might be one possible exception to this pattern because senior officials of the Koizumi Administration emphasized many times in various occasions that there was no request from Washington for Japan to provide financial or personnel assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq. For example, immediately after the start of the Iraq War in March 2003, when news reports alleged that Ambassador Baker filed a request for Japan to send SDF units to postwar Iraq to help maintain order, Prime Minister Koizumi flatly denied the report by simply saying, “I haven’t heard of it” (Japan Times [Tokyo], 27 March 2003). Again, in June 2003, when he decided to set up a new law to enable the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq, Koizumi denied that the Japanese government received any request from Washington for the dispatch (Japan Times [Tokyo], 25 June 2003).

Tokyo kept emphasizing the appearance of independence and proactivity with a view to the repercussions at home and abroad, and that rhetoric was quite successful. The chroniclers of Koizumi diplomacy in Yomiuri Shimbun praise its independent characteristics. Whenever President Bush demanded some assistance, the mantra of Prime Minister Koizumi was independence: “We will judge independently, based on a comprehensive examination of the matter.” The Yomiuri reporters conclude that behind this adherence to independence lies Koizumi’s belief that Japan should not repeat the ad-hoc and piecemeal responses to the U.S. pressures that Japan showed during the Gulf Crisis/War (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 293).

From a pure timing point of view, moreover, there are some observations in which the Japanese offer of assistance indeed preceded the U.S. demands. For example, Koizumi declared his intention to legislate a new law on an airplane flying to the United
States to have a summit with President Bush in May 2003. Japan announced her financial aid package before Koizumi’s scheduled summit with Bush in October 2003. Both of these announcements were made before Koizumi met with Bush because Koizumi hated to be depicted as kowtowing to the U.S. requests.

Nevertheless, we can also observe that behind the “independent” decisions of Tokyo lay latent or explicit influences from Washington. For example, in October 2002, a U.S official mentioned the “boots on the ground,” and eventually, Tokyo delivered around 1,000 SDF soldiers. After President Bush’s request for additional US$ 87 billion to the U.S Congress in September 2003, the U.S Embassy in Tokyo began to silently discuss the matter of financial assistance with its Japanese counterparts, and Tokyo later responded with the aid package of US$ 5 billion, although Ambassador Baker denied that he filed any such official request with the MOFA. Besides, later on, in response to U.S. requests, Tokyo gave up most of its credits to Iraq.

Therefore, the correct picture of the matter is that important decisions on the part of Koizumi were made before he met President Bush in anticipation of Bush’s demands. Koizumi eagerly wanted to maintain the image of independence and proactivity vis-à-vis the United States, taking account of the domestic audiences, but it was not the case that Koizumi submitted Japan’s idea of assistance out of the blue. Tokyo was carefully reading Washington. Working-level officials from Tokyo and Washington were in consultation on a constant basis, so the Japanese were aware of what Washington wanted, and Washington understood and cared for the restraints that Tokyo faced.56

56There is ample evidence to show that Tokyo and Washington were in tight consultation with each other about how to respond to the Wars in the Middle East. Notably, in the consultation, the second Bush Administration took better care of the Japanese concerns and domestic restrictions in comparison with the first Bush Administration. For example, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, in a U.S.-Japan
Excess: Did the Response Exceed the Demands?

No. The answer to Q2 for each of our cases is also uniformly negative. First of all, quantitatively, the responses in K₁, R₁, K₂, and R₂ never exceeded the U.S. demands. Take a look at Table 6-3, which summarizes the differences between demanded and delivered assistance, that is, the discounted amount of the demanded assistance.

As you can see in Table 6-3, in no case did the actually delivered assistance quantitatively exceed the U.S. demands. For there to be excess in the actually delivered assistance, the discounted amount should be negative. In K₂, however, there was no extra although the Japanese satisfied most of the U.S. demand for personnel assistance. The Kaifu Administration (K₁) provided as much financial assistance as had been demanded by Washington although they failed to provide personnel assistance. The two Roh Administrations (R₁ & R₂) provided financial as well as personnel assistance. But, their assistance did not surpass the requested amount.

Second, no Administration in our cases exceeded the U.S. demands qualitatively. In all four cases, no serious example of a creative alternative is observed. Probably, the 100-

Strategic Dialogue held in Washington on February 9, said, “We don’t want to repeat the Gulf War. Japan doesn’t need to push too hard during the War. We are not going to ask for the burden-sharing of the war cost.” But, he also added, “But, for the reconstruction assistance, we hope for the dispatch of the SDF” (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 157; translation by author). The second Bush Administration’s attitudes toward Tokyo were exceptional and different from the previous U.S. administrations. President George W. Bush believed that “naked foreign pressures might be effective for a time, but, in the long run, they might stimulate the Japanese nationalism and anti-American feelings. From a longer term perspective, it is more effective to respect the independence of the allies” (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 146; translation by author). This Bush’s belief was part of the reason why President Bush did not make particular requests about thorny economic bilateral issues when he visited Tokyo for the first time in February 2002. At the time, Koizumi’s approval ratings were low due to the firing of the popular Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko. Bush took this domestic situation into consideration. His policy was, “Do not deal with particular economic issues on the political level” (Yomiuri Shimbun, Political Division 2006, 145; translation by author). Just as Koizumi considered Washington’s expectations in advance, Bush, too, took good care of Koizumi’s domestic concerns.
strong medical team suggested by the Kaifu Administration (K₁) might be an exception. Although Ambassador Armacost personally suggested the idea in advance, the Japanese believed that the team would make a creative breakthrough in the predicament facing Japan: something more than just money should be sent, but SDF troops could not go to the Gulf under the existing Japanese legal framework. Then, in place of the SDF, the medical team would be there as a visible symbol of the personnel assistance from Japan. However, according to the survey team dispatched by the Japanese government, there was no actual demand for such a medical team in the Gulf. More importantly, Japan failed to put together the medical team itself due to the lack of volunteers. Consequently, the idea of the medical team just fizzled out.

Third, no Administration in our cases was successful in changing the course of action of the United States. Nor did the Administrations in Tokyo or Seoul seriously try to mediate the positions of each party in the disputes between the United States and Iraq. In K₁, the Japanese failed to influence the situation in the Gulf or change the course of action of the United States. In the initial phase of the Gulf Crisis, Prime Minister Kaifu even cancelled a pre-scheduled trip to the Middle East when the trip could be used to the advantage of Japanese diplomacy. A serious mediating role played by Tokyo is also not observed in the collective decision-making of the international community. Japan as the largest non-Arab financial donor to the Gulf War could have been able to play a mediating role, especially when Yevgeny Primakov, a member of the Russian Presidential Council, arrived at Tokyo with a message from Saddam Hussein right after the Gulf War began. However, Tokyo quickly gave up on the idea of mediating as soon as President Bush said to Kaifu, “That’s their usual trick, Toshiki. Just leave it untouched” (Kaifu
For the two Roh Administrations (R₁ & R₂) in Seoul, influencing or changing the U.S. actions in the Middle East was none of their business. Their concern was consistently North Korea.

Table 6-3 Differences between Demanded and Delivered Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrations Tokyo &amp; Seoul</th>
<th>Personnel Assistance (Number of Soldiers)</th>
<th>Financial Assistance (US$, millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actually Delivered</td>
<td>Discounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaifu (K₁)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>A Symbolic Number of Personnel Assistance†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh (R₁)</td>
<td>314 (Medical &amp; Transportation)</td>
<td>A Symbolic Number of (Combat) Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi (K₂)</td>
<td>Around 1,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh (R₂)</td>
<td>Around 3,800</td>
<td>Around 3,000 troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the first financial assistance, the United States requested US$ 350 mn, and for the second financial assistance, US$ 450 mn. Therefore, the total requested amount is US$ 800 mn. Thus, US$ 300 million=US$ 800 million-US$ 500 million. It is true that once a U.S. official suggested US$ 1 bn for the second financial assistance, but we assume that the South Korean policymakers took US$ 450 mn as the U.S. bottom-line and decided on the amount of the second financial assistance on the grounds that the U.S. side is asking for US$ 450 mn.

§ It is unclear exactly how much financial assistance was demanded by Washington on the Koizumi Administration. According to a source, it is said that the Americans asked the Japanese to cover approximately 20% of the total reconstruction cost as they had asked in case of the Gulf Crisis/War (Australian, 25 March 2003). One-fifths of the total expected reconstruction cost amounts to US$ 11 billion. Then, the discounted amount is approximately US$ 6 billion because Tokyo eventually agreed to provide only US$ 5 billion. Tokyo cut out more than half of the U.S. demands. However, this discounting does not necessarily mean that Washington was disgruntled. It is worth noting that the amount of US$ 5 billion that Tokyo eventually provided covered around 15% of the total financial assistance actually raised in the Madrid Conference. In addition, the Japanese debt reduction of US$ 6 billion should also be appreciated although it did not create new financial obligations for the Japanese. At any rate, Japan was the largest creditor to Iraq in terms of the public credits at the time.

† includes minesweepers that President Bush asked for and that Prime Minister Kaifu refused to provide.

Again, one possible exception might be the Koizumi Administration (K₂). True, they continued to emphasize the importance of international cooperation. The Koizumi
Administration withheld the public announcement of support for the Iraq War until the last moment as if the Japanese support for the United States was not a foregone conclusion. As Koizumi’s foreign policy advisor, Okamoto Yukio, testifies, “Koizumi seems to have agonized over how to respond to the upcoming war, and have not stopped the efforts to establish the international cooperation up to the last minute (Shinoda 2004, 98; Okamoto 2003, 7). And, there are some scholars and officials who claim that the efforts indeed bore fruits. For instance, based on his interviews with a State Department official and a MOFA official, Shinoda (2004, 101) claims that it was because the Japanese government urged Washington to take the UN course that the United States chose to ask for new UNSC resolutions to endorse the attack on Iraq. Shinoda even claims that the British Foreign Office, which was initially negative to the idea of persuading Washington to go through the UN route to go to war with Iraq, changed its position due to the Japanese persuasion.

However, the evidence of the Japanese efforts and their results are not easily found on the American side. For example, Bob Woodward, whose book, *Plan of Attack*, meticulously describes U.S. preparations for the Iraq War, recounts five times the role played by Tony Blair in persuading President Bush to go the UN course (Woodward 2004, 162; 178; 183; 296; 319). Two of the five descriptions mention the roles played by the governments of Australia, Spain, and Italy in the persuasion (Woodward 2004, 183; 319). In the 446-page book, however, Prime Minister Koizumi appears onstage only once when President Bush projected the past successful recovery of Japan to the future of postwar Iraq (Woodward 2004, 419).

Moreover, whether the Japanese seriously pushed forward with the international
cooperation as a real attempt to change the American course of actions is dubious. It seems that the outward emphasis on the international cooperation was not so much out of their foreign policy choice but out of their domestic concerns. According to many knowledgeable observers of Japanese politics and diplomacy, Koizumi had already made up his mind way before the “last moment” (Marukusu 2004, 45; 49-50; Marukusu 2006; Kaieda 2006; Yasuaki 2005, 854). For example, from around the end of 2002, the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat began the legal studies on the new enabling legislation for the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq. By the time Prime Minister Koizumi decided to go ahead with the legislation, it needed only several weeks to complete all the process, because all the necessary advance legal preparations had already been set up there. Therefore, it is more plausible to infer that despite their predetermined preferences, the Koizumi Administration could not reveal them because they had to care about possible backlashes from their own governing party, their coalition partners and the public opinion. Or, Prime Minister Koizumi might have been simply waiting for the change of the French position. According to Yakushiji (2003, 44), the MOFA reported to Koizumi that the French would in the end support the new UNSC resolution. Then, Japan did not need to reveal her real preferences because Japan could simply jump on the bandwagon

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57 Marukusu (2004, 49) claims that the substantial decision to participate in the Iraq War had already been made by September 2002.

58 Or, it can also be equally plausible that the Koizumi Administration wanted to raise the price of their foreign policy choice so that their American friends would be anxious to get a yes from Tokyo, or in order to use the choice as a bargaining chip in other diplomatic games with Washington.

59 Yasuaki (2005, 854) agrees with Yakushiji (2003). According to Yasuaki (2005, 854), on 18 February 2003, “after a telephone conversation with French President Jacques Chirac, Koizumi chastised Nishida [Tsuneo, then-Director-General of the General Foreign Policy Bureau] and Ando [Hiroyasu, then-Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau], among others, claiming that ‘Chirac’s attitude is very firm. This situation is different from the account I heard from you. The MOFA had said that there was a possibility that France might change its position.’”
of attacking Iraq after the French changed their position.

If the answers to both Q₁ and Q₂ are no for all the four Administrations, then, all the four cases pass the test of passivity[ P[Q₁,Q₂(X)]=P; If Q₁,Q₂(X) = (no, no), then P(Y) = p(passive), where X={K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂}, and Y=Q₁,Q₂(X); the observations show that y=(no, no) for all X, therefore, P=p for all X]. All their actions did not precede the U.S. actions. Their assistance did not exceed the U.S. demands quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Their policy did not change the course of important U.S. actions. Each and every Administration in our cases waited for the United States to submit the request.

Once submitted, directly or indirectly, the U.S. list of requests worked as a kind of parameters of policy deliberation and choice for both Tokyo and Seoul. Whether to support the War, or for that matter, whether to provide assistance for the United States was less important an issue when the core decision-makers of the Administrations in Tokyo and Seoul debated how to respond. The more important question was always how much of the U.S. demands to accommodate.

To be sure, one might point out the fierce debate within the Roh Moo-hyun Administration over the Iraq War as a possible exception to the passive behavioral pattern described in the previous paragraphs. In R₂, indeed, those in the innermost circle of the foreign policy-making process conflicted with one another over how to respond to U.S. demands. The debate was so fierce that one key maker of President Roh’s foreign policy had to step down after the debate was over.

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60Here, the decision rule for each case is summarized as P[Q₁,Q₂(X)]=P. X is the set of all cases (K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂), and P is the set of all actions (passive or non-passive). Q₁(•) is defined as a function that takes the value yes or no, depending on the assessment of the observational focus in case x. P[Y]=P is defined as a binary decision function that takes the value, ‘passive (p)’ or “non-passive (~p)”, depending on the input y. Y is the set of all possible outputs of the function Y=Q₁,Q₂(X), which is (yes, yes), (yes, no), (no, yes), and (no, no). Here, only y=(no, no) corresponds to P=p. And our observations show that indeed y=(no, no) for all X, therefore, P=p for all X.
Nevertheless, notice that the key issue in the debate was again not whether to assist the U.S.-led war in Iraq, but whether to provide combat troops as required by Washington. And, even those who were publicly or in the internal discussion opposed to sending additional troops felt that in the end, it would be inevitable to send the troops to Iraq. As Yoo In-tae once said, “Everyone knew that South Korea had to dispatch more troops sooner or later.” Even Lee Jong-seok, Deputy Secretary-General of the Korean NSC “found it inevitable that South Korea would have to dispatch additional forces.” President Roh Moo-hyun “himself also was aware of the need to dispatch more troops” (Funabashi 2007, 233; 237). Therefore, the main point was not the Iraq War itself. The issue was how much of the whole U.S. demands including the request for combat troops should be accommodated.

6.2 Differences from Non-Reactive States

Some readers of this dissertation might raise an objection to the test results of the previous section. They may claim that the behavioral pattern of South Korea and Japan that we judged to be passive as a result of the test might be duplicated by other non-reactive countries. To see the differences between reactive and non-reactive states, let us briefly turn to the cases of non-reactive states.

The passive behavior that we could observe in the cases of Tokyo and Seoul markedly differs from the behavioral characteristics of non-reactive states. Non-reactive states such as Britain and France did not wait for U.S. actions to guide their own. They planned their moves based on their global strategic interests, and actively participated in
the collective decision-making process of the U.S.-led MNF or the deliberations in the United Nations. They did not take U.S. policy as a forgone conclusion. They tried to change the direction of collective decision-making to their advantage, and if necessary, were not even afraid of publicly disagreeing with Washington.

**Independent Actions with Strategic Purposes**

For example, let us take a look at the British case during the Gulf Crisis/War. On the day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was in the United States with President Bush, and it was Thatcher that demanded a principled and firm approach to the matter on President Bush. The next day, the British government and the military began their move. The British Cabinet’s Overseas and Defense Committee endorsed full economic sanctions against Iraq in the absence of Mrs. Thatcher. The next step was to strengthen the Royal Navy’s patrol in the Gulf region.

Just as Mr. Kaifu had to make a speech in Karuizawa, Mrs. Thatcher was supposed to make a speech in Aspen on August 5, and she delivered the speech as scheduled. But unlike Kaifu, for Thatcher, the crisis in the Gulf was not just an energy issue. It was first and foremost taken as a matter of principle:

> Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait defies every principle for which the United Nations stands. If we let it succeed, no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of the jungle would take over from the rule of law (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 111).

As Prime Minister Thatcher returns to London, the Cabinet agreed in principle to contribute some forces to the anti-Iraq coalition. The initial inclination inside the British government was to find a level of contribution that would achieve the maximum political
profile within the U.S.-led coalition with the minimum risk. Then, the question was the size of the military contingent. The Prime Minister was aware that to dispatch a small force would send a wrong political signal. If Britain was making a greater military input, then she could also expect to achieve a greater influence over the policy output. Finally, on September 11, the Overseas and Defense Committee made the decision to send an armored brigade (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 112-4).

In similar vein, what shaped the French position, when the Iraqi invasion occurred in August 1990, was her general attempt to develop special relations with the Arabs and her eagerness to demonstrate independence from the United States. On 9 August 1990, President Mitterrand declared that France would not be associated with the MNF proposed by Washington. France would, however, take her own steps. The main gesture was to send the aircraft carrier *Clemenceau*, although at the time all that *Clemenceau* was carrying was 42 helicopters. However, as the situation in the Gulf developed, it became evident to Mitterrand that the French forces would have to be more substantial, if they were to be taken seriously. On September 16, finally, it was announced that 4,200 French ground forces would go to the Gulf (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 115-7).

*Oppositions to U.S. Actions*

The behavioral characteristics of the French and the British responses to the Iraq War were also different from those of Japan and South Korea. Most conspicuously, the Chirac Administration publicly opposed the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, and even tried to dissuade other members of the UNSC from voting for the draft resolution proposed by the United States. However, it is noteworthy that the French did not oppose
the use of force against Iraq from the very start. Notice that the UNSC Resolution 1441, which warned Saddam Hussein of “serious consequences,” in case that Iraq refused to disarm and comply with the resolution, was approved by all members of the UNSC, including France. “Indeed, during the negotiations for the Resolution 1441 in the UN, France agreed that Mr. Hussein would probably fail to cooperate with UN inspectors. War was likely. So in December 2002, a senior French liaison officer visited General Tommy Frank’s headquarters in Tampa, Florida, to discuss fielding at least 15,000 soldiers as part of an allied force. As late as 7 January 2003, Mr. Chirac was telling his armed forces chiefs to be ready ‘for any eventuality’” (Financial Times [London], 27 May 2003, 15).

The French position began to change in the middle of January 2003, after the French Foreign Ministry reported to Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin that the U.S. Administration was absolutely intent on going to war with Iraq. President Chirac sent his special envoy, Mr. Gourdault-Montagne to Washington to inquire about the U.S. intention. The intention was clear: “The U.S. had decided that military action was necessary to resolve the Iraqi crisis and the only thing that would stop it was the fall, or departure of Saddam Hussein” (Financial Times [London], 27 May 2003, 15). About a week later, the French began their moves. In front of reporters, Mr. de Villepin announced the French opposition to the war with Iraq: “We will not associate ourselves with military intervention that is not supported by the international community. Military intervention would be the worst possible solution” (Financial Times [London], 27 May 2003, 15).

In late January 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain jointly proposed a draft resolution authorizing use of force against Iraq. From February, the race to secure the undecided votes within the UNSC began. Mr. de Villepin visited Cameroon,
Guinea, and Angola to persuade them to vote against the new resolution, and President Chirac even made phone calls to the heads of the undecided countries to ask them to oppose the U.S. proposal (Torikata 2004, 133). Finally, on March 10, President Chirac announced on television the French willingness to use a veto against the new resolution proposed by the U.S., the U.K., and Spain. On March 14, informal soundings made it clear that the U.S.-proposed resolution had no chance (Financial Times [London], 29 May 2003, 17).

The French opposition might look incomprehensible. If the French had found that the United States would go to war with Iraq with or without the UN approval, then they also would have recognized that their veto would be ineffective in terms of actually stopping Washington from starting the war. Moreover, the ineffective use of a veto might erode the international authority of the UN. For the French, however, what was paramount was the ‘balance between power politics and the international rule of law.’ Although they recognized the overwhelming power and the strong determination of the United States, the French found their national interest in the long-term maintenance of the UN’s authority over the international use of force. Even if they failed to protect and realize the procedural authority of the UN this time, still they could claim the credit for defending the authority of the UN the next time. For France, an emphasis on universalism and multilateralism as opposed to realpolitik and unilateralism was in their national interest, because it was better for the French to participate in decisions on important international matters within the UN, where they reserve veto powers, than to deal with the matters outside the UN framework, where their national power was relatively smaller than other leading members of the international community. In addition, the French could
judge that they could get away with the opposition to the U.S. position, because, with the Soviet Union gone, standing up against the United States would not cause any serious strategic crisis for the French; and moreover, “most of the trade disputes between the United States and Europe had already been being dealt with through the EU.” Then, it would be hardly possible for Washington to pinpoint France to retaliate in trade areas (Torikata 2004, 144-5).

**Efforts to Change the U.S. Actions**

As is well known, without doubt, the Blair Administration was the most credible partner of the Bush Administration in going to war with Iraq. Despite enormous domestic resistance against the War, a total of 46,150 British soldiers participated in the invasion into Iraq. The size of this British military contingent was the largest among the members of the Coalition of the Willing except for the U.S. forces. The U.K. stood by the United States politically as well as militarily. Whenever important matters were deliberated in the UN, the British were there to help with the Americans.

However, London did not just wait for Washington to go ahead. The British came up with their own alternatives and tried to persuade Washington to follow their advices. For example, in the summer of 2002, when the United States, tired of repeated Iraqi refusals to comply with the previous UN resolutions, was reported to begin to show a move to unilaterally attack Iraq, London strongly emphasized the necessity of going back to the UN framework, and finally in September, in a Camp David summit, obtained the U.S. commitment to making more efforts to disarm Iraq through the UN (Ogawa 2004, 160; Woodward 2004; *Financial Times* [London], 27 May 2003, 15). Again, in January 2003,
when Washington, angered by the untruthful contents of Saddam Hussein’s 12,000-page declaration, decided to attack Baghdad without an additional UN resolution, Prime Minister Blair visited Washington, and strongly appealed to President Bush to take the UN route again as a last resort before the war. In the end, again, Bush accepted Blair’s counsel (Financial Times [London], 29 May 2003, 17).

Passivity vs. Non-passivity

By comparison, the differences between reactive and non-reactive states, or the relative passivity of the governments in Seoul and Tokyo is unmistakable. London and Paris did not just wait for Washington’s actions. For the British and the French, at stake were neither mere oil prices nor bilateral relations with the United States. The point at issue was how to maintain their standing as pivotal states within the international community on a long-term basis. Therefore, sometimes, they proactively decided with or without a U.S. request to increase the number of the soldiers who would participate in the U.S.-led coalition forces in order to raise their stature within the coalition, and thereby strengthen their voices in the collective decision-making process. If necessary, they tried to change the U.S. course of actions just as Blair twice advised Bush to return to the UN framework. Or, in other times, when judged necessary, they publicly opposed the U.S. plan, and even tried to organize oppositions against the United States. Like Japan and South Korea, Britain and France, too, had to react to unexpected developments occurring outside their territories, and they, too, had to deal with strong domestic resistance against expected U.S. actions in the Middle East. But their reactions were based on their own strategic calculations that span the global range. They saw the situation from a larger
point of view, and they set the perimeters for themselves.

6.3 Test for Flexibility

*Accommodation: How Much Did They Contribute?*

Q₃ was “Did Tokyo (or Seoul) meet more than 50% of the U.S. demands?” In order to answer this question, we first have to know how much Tokyo and Seoul provided in response to U.S. demands, and then what percentage of the demands was met can be calculated. In order to see the amount of the assistance provided by Tokyo and Seoul, take a look at Table 6-4, which summarizes the absolute size of the assistance provided by each Administration.

As you can see in the table, the Kaifu Administration (K₁) provided almost no personnel assistance during the Gulf Crisis/War.⁶¹ On the other hand, their financial assistance was appreciable: US$ 13 billion in total. The Roh Tae-woo Administration (R₁) provided both personnel and financial assistance: around 314 troops (154 medics and five C-130 transportation aircrafts including 160 members of the crew and the supporting staff) and US$ 500 million in cash, goods, and services. The Koizumi Administration (K₂), too, provided both personnel and financial assistance. The personnel assistance was around 1,000 SDF soldiers in total.⁶² As for the financial assistance, the Koizumi

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⁶¹This number does not include the two doctors that Japan sent to Saudi Arabia and the minesweeper units dispatched to the Gulf after the War. The exclusion of the minesweepers is justified first because the decision was made after the situation in the Gulf was over and also because officially, it was the Saudis that requested the minesweepers. Most importantly, the official purpose of the dispatch was not for the War, but to help restore the navigational order in the Gulf.

⁶²This number includes those elements from ASDF and MSDF. The actual number of troops sent to Iraq from GSDF was around 500-600.
Administration provided loans and grants of US$ 5 billion. The Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R_2) also provided both personnel and financial assistance: a total of about 3,800 soldiers composed of combatants as well as medical, construction, and transportation units, plus US$ 260 million.

Table 6-4 Personnel and Financial Assistance by the Four Administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrations Tokyo &amp; Seoul</th>
<th>Personnel Assistance (Number of Soldiers)</th>
<th>Financial Assistance (US$, million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaifu (K_1)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh (R_1)</td>
<td>314 (Medical &amp; Transportation)</td>
<td>500 (including the cost for the personnel dispatch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi (K_2)</td>
<td>Around 1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh (R_2)</td>
<td>Around 3,800</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Table 6-4 may show us a misleading picture of the relative sizes of the observed responses. According to the table, at first sight, it may seem that it is the Kaifu or the Roh Moo-hyun Administration that provided the largest assistance to the United States, because in nominal terms of the financial assistance, it was the Kaifu Administration that provided the most, and if the criterion is the number of soldiers, the largest donor is the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. But, we need to remember that our focus here is not just the absolute size of the assistance. Rather, we should focus on the

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63 In this total, the debt write-off of US$ 6 billion is not included. US$ 6 billion is indeed a significant amount, but debt reduction does not create new financial obligations. Moreover, almost half of the debts written off were late payment charges. Most importantly, Iraq has just come out of a long tunnel of wars and international sanctions. The prospect of the Iraqi government redeeming all the debts was dim in the first place.
relative size or the ratio of the actual assistance to the original demands—how much of the U.S. demands had been met. In order to answer this question, we need to go back to Table 6-3.

According to Table 6-3, the largest donor in terms of the relative size of the assistance is the Koizumi Administration (K₂). The percentage of the accommodation in terms of the personnel assistance is almost 100%. The number of the ground forces provided by the Koizumi Administration was around 500-600, but, when the soldiers from the ASDF and the MSDF were included, the total number of the SDF troops provided was around 1,000, almost the same as had been demanded by the U.S. side. In the financial assistance, the Koizumi Administration discounted almost half of the U.S. demands. However, the original size of the U.S. financial demand was based on the simple calculation that Japan, like during the Gulf War, had to shoulder about 20% of the total expected cost. Although the financial assistance from the Koizumi Administration occupied only about 10% of the total expected cost, in terms of the total size of the actually raised funds, the Japanese financial assistance occupied almost 15%, meaning that the financial assistance from the Koizumi Administration met about 75% of the U.S. demands. Furthermore, Japan was the second largest donor at the Madrid Conference surpassed only by the United States. In addition, in terms of the size of the debt reduction for Iraq, again, Japan was the leader because Japan was the largest public creditor for Iraq. With all these contributions considered, we can judge that the Koizumi Administration’s personnel and financial assistance for the Iraq War was appreciable. And, this is probably the reason why we could not find the evidence of serious U.S. complaints about the size of the assistance from the Koizumi Administration.
Some observers may want to discount this positive assessment on the Koizumi Administration’s contribution because the Koizumi Administration made it clear up front that Japan would not provide assistance for the Iraq War. The assistance was provided only for the postwar reconstruction. But, it is worth noting that Washington was at the time not adamant about this blurred distinction between war and postwar. The United States did not strongly insist upon the necessity of the Japanese assistance during the ‘war,’ because the so-called war stage did not seem to last long. So, the United States could readily accept the Japanese condition. And then, as soon as the major battles had been declared over, the Japanese government began the official legal process for providing assistance for the Iraq War.

We can also judge that the Roh Tae-woo Administration (R₁), too, passes the test. In the first request of assistance from Washington, the amount of the demands was US$ 350 million, and the provided amount was US$ 220 million, which is approximately 63% of US$ 350 million. To assess the response to the second request is a little tricky. It is unclear exactly how much financial assistance was officially demanded from Washington. It varies from US$ 450 million to US$ 1 billion depending on the interlocutor on the U.S. side. The amount of the provided financial assistance was US$ 280 million. This amount already reaches 62% of the minimum level of assistance demanded by the United States,⁶⁴ and obviously surpasses the bottom-line that General RisCassi suggested.⁶⁵

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⁶⁴In the first and the second financial assistance for the Gulf Crisis/War from South Korea, the accommodation ratio is consistently around two-thirds of the demand. This may suggest that there was an informal standard of decision on the amount of the financial assistance for the MNF on the South Korean side although we could not obtain any document or any testimony that may support this presumption. Also, we can infer from this observation that the South Korean decision-makers in R₁ were basing their decision on the minimum demand from Washington, which was US$ 450 million for the second financial assistance. This presumption is likely to be correct because, when multiple requests are coming from different but equally authoritative sources in Washington, the decision-makers in Seoul may be tempted to choose the smallest tab as the official one as long as their intention is to provide as little assistance as politically
Moreover, we need to remember that, in addition to the financial assistance, South Korea provided personnel assistance. Particularly, the transportation support was provided the fastest among U.S.-allied nations. This non-financial assistance had a kind of compensating effect on the financial assistance. The South Korean policymakers including then-Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok had this effect in their minds when they made the decision on the personnel assistance.66

As for the personnel assistance, did it fully meet the U.S. demands for itself? Now we know from the declassified documents that the maximum demands from the United States included a little bit of combatants. It was not just Karl D. Jackson, but also Doug Paal, and even Stanley Roth on the Capitol Hill mentioned the necessity to South Korean diplomats. In response, Seoul did send troops but, not the combatants to the Gulf. At the time, however, Washington never made it official that the United States asked Seoul for combat troops. Also, Seoul, too, denied that Washington had ever asked for combat troops from South Korea. At one time, then-South Korean defense minister floated the idea of sending combat troops to the Gulf, but quickly rescinded it when the response from the domestic circles was not positive. Then, all in all, it will be reasonable to judge that both financial and personnel assistance from Seoul was substantial, namely, surpassed the 50% mark.

65 As we could see in Chapter 4, General RisCassi, then-Commander of the USFK suggested to the South Korean side that the amount of the second financial assistance for the Gulf War should be larger than the amount of the first financial assistance at the least.

66 Former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Lee Sang-ok acknowledges this consideration. He explains why South Korea provided medical and transportation assistance in addition to the financial assistance as follows: “In consideration of our budgetary capacity, there was a limit to the financial assistance. Therefore, we spontaneously considered (the possibility of) the personnel assistance, and decided to provide it” (Lee 2002, 318; translation by author).
The assessment on the response from the Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R2) is tricky because the substance of the U.S. demands is not specific enough. First of all, from the sources we could get access to, we could not specify the exact amount of the financial assistance demanded by Washington. Based on the available sources, the only thing we could find was that the amount of the financial assistance was not the point at issue between Seoul and Washington. The larger issue for both Washington and Seoul was obviously the personnel assistance. As for the preferable size of the personnel assistance, the U.S. side suggested a division that could independently operate and protect itself without additional U.S. protection. The answer from the Korean side was a division as well. Although it was the smallest possible unit that could be called a division, the division was operable independently, and equipped with its own firearms. Moreover, even from a pure numbering point of view, the U.S. demand for the personnel assistance from South Korea ranged between 5,000 and 7,000, and the realized number was approximately a little less than 4,000. Then, it would be reasonable to judge that South Korea met at least more than 50% of the U.S. demands, and thus passes the test.

The most controversial is the assessment on the Kaifu Administration (K1). As the Table 6-3 shows, the assistance from the Kaifu Administration fully met the U.S. demands in terms of the financial assistance. But, in terms of the personnel assistance, the supply was almost none. Then, how do we assess the overall assistance provided by Japan?

Let us suppose that you received a gift of two boxes. The two boxes are exactly the same in size. Your expectation was that one box would be filled with bread, and the other with fish. However, when you opened the boxes, you found that the bread box was
actually full of bread, but the fish box was empty. Then, what percentage of the expectation was met by the gift of the two boxes? If a unit of bread is perfectly fungible in its unit value with a unit of fish, then the answer would be simple. We can simply calculate the average, and then conclude that 50% of the expectation was realized. But, here, we are dealing with soldiers and money, not with bread and fish. It will be hard as well as controversial to translate the value of one soldier into monetary units.

The key to answer this question begins with the fact that, from the start, the two boxes were not the same in size. In other words, the U.S. expectation on the personnel assistance from Japan was not as high as on the financial assistance. As described in Chapter 4, the U.S. expectation on the Japanese personnel assistance for the Gulf War was a symbolic one: Just Hinomaru on the ground, or a symbolic number of troops that would show the world that the Japanese were working shoulder to shoulder with the MNF. It must have been a surprise to the Japanese as well as the Americans that the Japanese government at the time could not provide even this symbolic number of personnel assistance. As a result, some called it a “defeat”; others called it humiliation. However, we do not need to stretch this conclusion that the failure to provide the personnel assistance was a shock, to another inherently different conclusion that the personnel assistance constituted more than 50% of the expected assistance from Japan. It was a shock because the Japanese realized that they could not provide even such a small and symbolic size of personnel assistance abroad.

From the start, the U.S. officials did not expect much from Japan in terms of the personnel assistance. They thought that, if the Japanese could not provide the personnel assistance, then the Japanese could compensate by providing the financial assistance. Let
us take a look at the testimony by one of the most important participants of the U.S.-Japanese negotiation over the assistance for the Gulf Crisis/War:

If the Japanese were willing to provide such nonlethal support, all the better; if not, they might compensate by further sweetening their financial contribution or providing other forms of nonmilitary backup support (Armacost 1996, 103).

Indeed, when then-Japanese Finance Minister Hashimoto almost immediately said, “yes” in New York, to the request of then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady, which amounted to whopping US$ 9 billion, what the Japanese had in their minds must have been this “compensating by further sweetening their financial contribution.” The number “9 billion” was “considerably higher than the Japanese anticipated and greater than Secretary Brady realistically expected Tokyo to provide” (Armacost 1996, 121). But, there was no tedious and tiresome bargaining over the amount of the financial assistance.\(^67\) The response was quick and prompt.

The compensation strategy worked. Although the failure of the UNPC bill left a strong shockwave to many Japanese, and even forced some defense and security experts including Okamoto Yukio to do a lot of soul-searching on what had gone wrong, the reactions from Washington turned out to be positive:

Tokyo’s generosity, the timeliness of its decision on aid, and its steadfast political support helped dissipate criticism of Japan within the Administration, the press, and Congress (Armacost 1996, 122).

\(^{67}\)To be sure, on the working level, some trench warfare followed the agreement. “Two unresolved issues in particular provoked friction. One was the old question of whether Japan’s support would be allocated exclusively to the United States or shared with other members of the coalition. The other involved the exchange rate used to calculate the dollar value of Japan’s contribution” (Armacost 1996, 122).
Then, we can conclude that, even the Kaifu Administration (K₁) passes the test, because, although the failure to provide the personnel assistance was tragic and painful for many Japanese, we can still judge that the Japanese assistance for the Gulf Crisis/War surpassed the 50% level of the U.S. demands.

**Delivery Speed: How Fast Did They Deliver?**

Q₄ was “Did Tokyo (or Seoul) deliver the promised assistance within the usually required amount of time?” In order to answer this question, we will compare the cases, but before we compare, we first have to know when Washington’s official demands on Tokyo and Seoul were finalized and conveyed to the other side, and how long it took for Japan and South Korea to come up with and implement the assistance plan. In comparing the cases, we will divide our cases into two groups: the Gulf War group and the Iraq War group, and limit our cross-national comparison within the group. This division is warranted because the U.S. preparations and conduct of the Gulf War were implemented in a chronologically different time frame from those for the Iraq War, and therefore, the Japanese and South Korean responses to the Gulf War moved in a time frame that is different from that of the Iraq War.

**Speed of Decisions and Delivery responding to the Gulf War.** The speed is a relative concept. To judge whether something was fast or slow requires a point of reference for comparison. Here, for the purpose of judging the speed of the Japanese response and delivery, our reference is basically South Korea. We will compare the time taken to implement the Japanese and South Korean responses to see whether there was any
unusual delay. On the other hand, time as a basis of measuring the speed is an absolute concept. One month is one month for Tokyo as well for Seoul. Therefore, we will also see whether there was any unusual delay in terms of the physically required time to finish the delivery of the assistance.

Table 6-5: A Comparative Timeline of Japanese and S. Korean Responses to the Gulf War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>U.S. request for assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>U.S. request for assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30th</td>
<td>First aid package (US$ 1 bn) announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>President Bush’s official letter of request for assistance arrives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Revised package (US$ 4 bn) announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21st</td>
<td>US$ 1 bn deposited with GPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24th</td>
<td>First aid package (US$ 220 mn) announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>Guidelines for dispatching SDF drawn up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>U.S. &amp; ROK hammer out a plan to deliver the assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>UNPC bill scrapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>23rd</td>
<td>US$ 2 bn goes to the frontline states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24th</td>
<td>Another US$ 1 bn deposited with GPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>21st</td>
<td>Motion for dispatching a medic team passes the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24th</td>
<td>The medic team arrives at the Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29th</td>
<td>Second aid package (US$ 280 mn) announced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comparison in Table 6-5 shows that there seems to be no fundamental difference between the Kaifu and the Roh Tae-woo Administrations (K₁ ≅ R₁) in the length of the time taken to make decisions in response to U.S. demands, and to deliver the promises.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Despite many criticisms leveled against the Kaifu Administration, in this regard, their performance was
We could also judge that all their main responses were implemented within a usually required amount of time. Therefore, we could judge that both cases (K₁, R₁) pass the test.

The facts support our test results. As can be seen in Table 6-5, it is on 15 August 1990 that the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo, Michael H. Armacost submitted an official list of requests to the Japanese government. Two days later, U.S. Undersecretary of State, Bob Kimmitt, in Washington, submitted the same kind of official requests to the Korean Embassy in D.C. In response to the U.S. requests, Tokyo announced its own aid package on August 29, and on the next day, the plan to provide the financial assistance of US$ 1 billion was publicly announced. However, these announcements were not well received by Washington. After U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady’s visit to Tokyo, the Japanese raised the amount of the financial assistance to US$ 4 billion. On the Korean side, President Bush’s official letter of request for assistance was delivered to Seoul on September 6, and on the next day, Brady in Seoul fixed the preferred amount of financial assistance at US$ 350 million. In response, Seoul produced an aid package of US$ 220 million on September 24. Therefore, for both Tokyo and Seoul, it took about a month to determine their initial positions on the amount of the financial assistance.

Immediately after the announcements of the first package, both Japan and South Korea began the preparations for the delivery of the assistance. On September 21, the Japanese government contributed US$ 1 billion to the Gulf Peace Fund (GPF) as promised. Between October 2 and 8, Prime Minister Kaifu finally made the delayed tour actually not so bad. Japan’s traditional reluctance to participate in international security affairs is not conspicuous in case of the Gulf Crisis/War (Purrington and A. K. 1991, 307). However, Okamoto (2001, 14) disagrees. He claims that Japan, particularly the Japanese bureaucrats continued to stay one step behind. But, he does not specify his criterion against which he can claim that Japan was “one step behind.” Inoguchi (1991, 260) also disagrees. According to his evaluation, Japan’s “decision and implementation tended to be on the whole slow and spasmodic.”
of Mid-Eastern countries to take stock of the situation. On October 19, the Japanese government began to implement the plan to purchase water supply vehicles, refrigerators, building materials, TV sets and radios as assistance in kind for the MNF. On December 23, the Japanese government took measures to provide US$ 2 billion out of the additional US$ 3 billion to the frontline states. On the next day, Japan deposited the remaining US$ 1 billion with the GPF. Likewise, on October 11, working-level officials from the South Korean and the U.S. governments gathered in Washington to hammer out a detailed plan to deliver the assistance. In this meeting, the U.S. side asked the South Korean government to directly contact the frontline states and provide what they needed the most. Responding to the American advice, from October 31 to November 7, South Korean Vice Foreign Minister visited Mid-Eastern countries to listen to their opinions.

This similarity in speed repeated in case of the additional financial assistance. In December 1990, the Americans raised the necessity of additional financial assistance. On 17 January 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu mentioned his intention to provide additional financial assistance for the MNF. On January 21, when Brady asked Japan to pay an additional US$ 9 billion in New York, the answer from Tokyo was almost immediately yes. The South Korean response was quite fast, too. On January 29, Seoul announced the second aid package of US$ 280 million even without an official request from Washington.

Interestingly, this similarity is also found in the decisions related to personnel assistance. The first Japanese aid package announced on 14 September 1990 also included the plan to provide personnel assistance. Two weeks later, the initial draft for the UNPC bill was completed, and on October 7, the specific guidelines for dispatching SDF troops to the Gulf were drawn up. This swift response from the Japanese government,
however, went nowhere, because the Kaifu Administration failed to reach consensus with the opposition parties that had secured a constitutionally guaranteed veto power in the Upper House of the Diet. Eventually, the bill was scrapped on November 9. On the other hand, the South Korean provision of personnel assistance was actually a little slower. On 21 January 1991, the motion for dispatching a medical team to the Gulf passed the National Assembly, but only three days later, the team arrived at the Gulf region.

According to our comparison, then, the main Japanese reactions to the U.S. demands were almost as fast as those of their South Korean counterparts, and both the Japanese and South Korean reactions seem to have been implemented within a reasonable timeframe. This is in sharp contrast to the popular image of the Kaifu Administration, which was believed to be immobilistic. Sometimes, Japanese responses were even faster than those of their South Korean counterparts. True, the Japanese did fail to pass the UNPC bill through the Diet. And yet, we have to admit that their preparations and measures taken to pass the bill through the Diet were quite swift. The legislative result was negative, but the speed up to the gate of the Diet was positive.

*Speed of Decisions and Delivery responding to the Iraq War.* It is far more difficult to compare the responses of the Japanese and South Korean governments to the Iraq War (K₂, R₂). There is a reason for this. Unlike during the Gulf Crisis, in the lead-up to and during the Iraq War, the second Bush Administration was extremely cautious not to be shown as putting pressures on the allies of the United States to provide support and assistance. There was no official list of requests publicly announced. If any, requests and demands were expressed indirectly or conveyed unofficially. In public, the officials of the second Bush Administration kept emphasizing the spontaneity of the allies, and used to
express expectations that the allies would make the best choice considering their own national interests.

Perhaps the policymakers in Washington learned a lesson from the past experiences that whatever amount of assistance they ask publicly, what they eventually get would be smaller than that. Or, they were worried about the political impact of the publicized request. It may give an excuse for anti-American groups within the nations friendly to the United States to raise their voices. Domestically, too, it was not wise. If the actualized assistance is less than the official demands from Washington, U.S. officials will have to account for the difference to the American legislators and voters. Most importantly, the support and assistance that are not spontaneous were less effective in strengthening the political arguments of the U.S. government for the Iraq War in the international arena.

Moreover, spontaneity was emphasized on the other side of the Pacific, too. Especially, the Koizumi Administration consistently stressed that their decisions were independent and spontaneous. The Japanese officials continuously denied that the United States had ever demanded personnel or financial assistance from Japan. The choice was the Japanese to be made.

Due to these reasons, unlike during the Gulf Crisis, during the Iraq War, the timeline of both requests and responses is blurred and vague. It is uncertain exactly when a request was submitted by Washington and what was demanded. Also, it is unclear to which demand the allies responded. Given this situation, it is difficult to measure the time taken between the demand and the decision, and between the decision and the delivery. Therefore, we will first try to measure the time based on the announced actions as best as we can. But, also we cannot help but base our measurement on learned guesswork on
when the real decisions were made.

Let us take a look at Table 6-2. Just like the responses to the Gulf Crisis, in case of the Iraq War, the time taken to respond to U.S. demands are basically uniform between South Korea and Japan ($R_2 \cong K_2$). It is in November 2002 that the U.S. government began to seriously sound out Tokyo and Seoul for assistance for the upcoming war. That is exactly when the Bush Administration was irreversibly disappointed at the unfaithful declaration by Saddam Hussein. However, both Koizumi and Roh Moo-hyun withheld the announcement of support for the upcoming war with Iraq. Not until immediately before the start of the war on 20 March 2003 did they reveal their official support.

To be sure, there is a variation between the two cases. In April and May 2003, there were no actions on the part of $K_2$, while in June and July, $R_2$ showed no moves. To explain this variation, we need to note the fact that the Japanese support was limited to “post-conflict.” Early on, Tokyo told Washington that they would participate not in the war, but in the reconstruction after the war, and that they would share not the cost of the war, but the expenses for the rehabilitation. On the other hand, there was no such reservation on the Korean side. On the day when Roh Moo-hyun declared his support for the Iraq War, he also announced a plan to provide medics and engineers. The provision of medical and construction units was completed in May, about two months after the announcement.

On the Japanese side, however, a catch-up process started right after the major battles were over in May. Although there were still some dissenting views from within the LDP, the legal preparations for dispatching SDF troops to Iraq for the reconstruction purpose was all completed within only two months, a remarkable speed for the Japanese
Diet. Originally, the Japanese plan was to dispatch SDF troops immediately after the enactment of the special law authorizing the dispatch in July 2003. But, like in South Korea, the worsening security situation in Iraq halted the Japanese dispatch. The political schedule of Japan also delayed it. In September, there was to be an LDP presidential election. In early November, a general election was scheduled. However, right after the election, the Koizumi Administration quickly finalized specific plans for the dispatch in December, and in early February 2004, the dispatch of the GSDF to Iraq was finally completed.

In August and September 2003, the deteriorating security in Iraq finally forced the United States to ask her allies to provide additional assistance. In response, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, after fierce debates within its foreign policy inner circle, decided on October 17 to dispatch additional troops and provide additional US$ 200 million. The size and the nature of this contingent to be sent to Iraq—combative or non-combative—were finalized on December 17. In the middle of February 2004, the South Korean National Assembly approved this plan. However, the actual delivery of the military contingent had to wait for seven months. On 22 September 2004, the dispatch of the South Korean ground forces to Iraq was finally completed.

As a result of the comparison, we can see that there was no striking difference in speed between Seoul and Tokyo. Both countries officially announced their political support for the Iraq War in March 2003. South Korea was a little faster than Japan in providing medics and engineers, but Tokyo, too, caught up by swiftly completing all legal processes by July. Both countries’ speed of decision and delivery was affected by the

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69 For Seoul, it was an additional dispatch because the South Koreans had already sent medics and engineers in May, but for Tokyo, it was not, because Tokyo did not provide any troops before August 2003.
security situation in Iraq, and consequently slowed down. In response to the U.S. request for additional assistance, both Seoul and Tokyo finalized the size and nature of the military contingent to be sent to Iraq in December 2003.

The domestic politics of both Japan and South Korea were locked for a while in political struggles over how to respond to the U.S. demands. Particularly, after September 2003, when the United States asked South Korea to provide combatants as additional military assistance, the domestic political atmosphere of South Korea did an about-face. The U.S. request for combatants literally sparked a cutthroat struggle between pro-assistance and pro-independence groups within the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. However, it should be noted that this struggle did not radically halt the decision-making process. For President Roh, it took only about a month and a half to decide to dispatch the additional troops. It took additional two months for him to decide on the size and function of the contingent to be sent to Iraq. What really slowed down the whole dispatching process were the continuous terrorist attacks in Iraq and the misgivings about the possible impact of the dispatch on the domestic elections. But, it should be noted that these factors worked in both Japan and South Korea.

Indeed, Table 6-2 shows another variation ($R_2 \neq K_2$). For Japan, it took 7 months from the final decision to dispatch SDF troops (July 2003) to the completion of the dispatch (February 2004), while it took more than 11 months for South Korea to finish the dispatch of reinforcements to Iraq (September 2004) from the time of the decision (October 2003).

In fact, this four-and-a-half month gap might be narrower than observed because some Japanese decisions were presumably made way before the announcement. In other
words, the actual decisions of the Koizumi Administration might have been made much earlier than the timing of the publicized policy decisions may suggest. Outwardly, the Koizumi Administration equivocated and hesitated. But, it is highly likely that the Koizumi Administration or Prime Minister Koizumi himself had already made the decision to actively cooperate with the United States.70 For example, after coming back from the summit with Bush in May 2003, Koizumi officially revealed his plan to legislate a new law to enable the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq. From the revelation to the enactment, it took only 56 days. Considering the usually cumbersome process of the Japanese legislation, this movement was unusually rapid. Had the Koizumi Cabinet not fully prepared for the legislation in advance and pushed for the legislation vigorously, such speedy legislation would have been unthinkable.

Such advance preparations are also suspected in case of the actual dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq. The actual dispatch was delayed primarily by the unstable security situation in Iraq, and consideration of its impact on the domestic elections. However, immediately after the general election, the result of which allowed Koizumi to remain in power, the Koizumi Administration accelerated the dispatch process. And exactly three months later, the dispatch was completed, although, in the meantime, there had been no discernible improvement in the security situation in Iraq.

Nevertheless, if there indeed is a variation, then, we need to raise this question: “Does this variation fall within the range of the “usually required amount of time?” Here,

70Some observers raise the possibility that Prime Minister Koizumi had been misled by MOFA officials (Yasuaki 2005, 854). However, even if this report by Yasuaki is true, it is not evidence that Prime Minister Koizumi did not make up his mind until the last moment to support the Iraq War. On the contrary, it may show that Koizumi was thinking that at the end of the day, the French position would change to support the Iraq War. Even if Koizumi had already made up his mind to support the War, he does not need to risk being criticized domestically by revealing the intention, if the French are expected to change their position in the end.
we should emphasize that our aim is to find the systematic causal variable. Namely, we are interested in the kind of a variable that we can reliably expect to find in other comparable cases. It means that, if the difference was simply caused by a chance factor such as an earthquake or a tsunami, then we should regard it as a non-systematic noise, or something that cannot be reliably predicted.

If we can exclude noises, then, we can conclude that the cross-national variation of four and a half months described above is explainable within the framework of the “usually required amount of time” because the variables that caused the variation were a kind of force majeure. In March 2004, to the astonishment of the South Koreans as well as many foreign observers, the South Korean National Assembly impeached President Roh, and suspended all his power as President of the Republic of Korea until May, when the Constitutional Court reinstated him. Between March and May 2004, all important decisions of the government of the Republic of Korea were put on hold. Furthermore, when President Roh came back from limbo, waiting for him was a new meeting of the National Assembly packed with the so-called “Tandori” or the Roh Moo-hyun kids, many of whom were not very positive about the dispatch of the South Korean National Armed Forces to Iraq. The Roh Moo-hyun Administration, again, had to spend some time to persuade them to support the dispatch. This unexpected incident of impeachment and reinstatement, which could not be controlled by the foreign policy-makers of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration can explain the four-and-a-half month gap.

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71“Tan” is abbreviation of “Tanhaek” (impeachment). “Dori” is a suffix meaning a kid or a young boy. Therefore, “Tandori” literally means “a kid of the impeachment.” This newly coined word indicated those freshmen lawmakers who could enter the National Assembly thanks to an unexpected landslide of the Uri Party in the April 2004 general election, which was held right after the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun.
If we factor out these noises, then, we can confirm that there was no unusual delay in the responses of Seoul and Tokyo to U.S. demands. The overall speed of the response and delivery was normal, or in some cases, fast. Then, we can judge that both the Koizumi and the Roh Moo-hyun Administrations (K₂, R₂) pass the test.

Promised Assistance Delivered One Way or Another

We have conducted the test of flexibility for all the four cases by trying to answer Q₃ and Q₄. The test results show that the answers to both Q₃ and Q₄ are yes for all the four Administrations (K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂), then, we can judge that all the four cases pass the test of flexibility [F[Q₃,Q₄(X)]=F; If Q₃,Q₄(X) = (yes, yes), then F(Z)=f(flexible), where X=\{K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂\}, and Z=Q₃,Q₄(X); the observations show that z=yes, yes) for all X, therefore, F=f for all X].

In all four cases, the Administrations in Seoul and Tokyo provided more than 50% of the demanded assistance, and they delivered the promised assistance in time. There indeed were some variations in the time taken to finish the delivery, but they were attributable to noises or non-systematic variables.

The strength of the U.S. pressures as felt by the officials in Tokyo and Seoul was formidable. In order to meet the U.S. demands, for example, the Japanese government even had to raise more taxes (K₁). Such is the same with the Roh Tae-woo Administration (R₁). Despite trade deficits and flood damage, the promised financial assistance, which amounted to around US$ 500 million, was properly delivered. As for the personnel

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72 Here, the decision rule for each case is summarized as F[Q₃,Q₄(X)]=F; X is the set of all cases (K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂), and F is the set of all actions (flexible and non-flexible). Qₙ(*) is defined as a function that takes the value yes or no, depending on the assessment on the observational focus in the case x. F[Z]=F is defined as a binary decision function that takes the value, “flexible(f)” or “non-flexible(~f),” depending on the input z. Z is the set of all possible outputs of the function Z=Q₃,Q₄(X), which are (yes, yes), (yes, no), (no, yes), and (no, no). Here, only z=(yes, yes) corresponds to F=f. And our observations show that indeed z=(yes, yes) for all X, therefore, F=f for all X.
assistance, the Roh Tae-woo Administration promised medics and engineers, which were all dispatched on time. The Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R$_2$) promised to send medics, engineers, and combatants, and eventually, all of them were placed in Iraq as promised. The announced financial assistance of US$ 260 million was also properly delivered. The Koizumi Administration (K$_2$) promised to send SDF troops to Iraq help the Iraqi reconstruction, and made good on the promise. The Japanese government also implemented the financial assistance of US$ 5 billion, and the debt reduction of about US$ 6 billion as pledged.

One possible exception might be the promised and attempted provision of the personnel assistance in K$_1$. The Japanese announced that they would provide personnel assistance for the U.S.-led MNF, but failed, when the opposition parties in control of the Upper House of the Diet effectively torpedoed the UNPC bill in November 1990. This failure was a shock to many Japanese, and the impact is still reverberating in the minds of many Japanese officials and scholars. However, it is also true that the Japanese Administration at the time made serious efforts to pass the UNPC bill through the Diet. Of course, it might have been better for the United States, and for that matter, for Prime Minister Kaifu himself, had the government succeeded in persuading the opposition parties to vote for the proposed law. But, most importantly, we need to keep in mind that the personnel assistance was never the main part of the U.S. demands. And, it should also be noted that by the time the project for placing Japanese personnel in the Gulf reached the Diet, it had already overcome negative public opinion, and the opposition from within the Administration as well as the LDP. In addition, provision of other promised assistance such as four-wheel drive vehicles, tents, air conditioners, and most importantly, the
financial assistance of US$ 13 billion, was eventually all successful, despite many hurdles standing in the way. Therefore, we can confirm that, despite the failure to provide the promised personnel assistance, the Kaifu Administration’s response to U.S. demands, too, was indeed flexible in the sense that they satisfied more than 50% of the U.S. demands within a reasonable amount of time required for implementation.

6.4 Test for Reactivity

We are now ready to test the reactivity of our cases by combining the results of the previous two tests. A mathematical expression of the test criteria and the results are given below. Combination of the test results (1) and (2) shows that the foreign policy behavior observed in the four cases is all judged to be reactive.

- CRITERIA FOR PASSIVITY:
  - P[Q₁,Q₂(X)] = P;
  - If Q₁,Q₂(X) = (no, no), then P(Y) = p(passive),
  - Where X = {K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂}, and Y = Q₁,Q₂(X)

- TEST RESULT (1): after the tests, both Q₁(X) and Q₂(X) are found negative,
  - Therefore, the behavior is judged to be passive for all the cases

- CRITERIA FOR FLEXIBILITY:
  - F[Q₃,Q₄(X)] = F;
  - If Q₃,Q₄(X) = (yes, yes), then F(Z) = f(flexible),
  - Where X = {K₁, R₁, K₂, R₂}, and Z = Q₃,Q₄(X)

- TEST RESULT (2): after the tests, both Q₃(X) and Q₄(X) are found positive,
  - Therefore, the behavior is judged to be flexible for all the cases.
One implication of these test results is that we could find no significant variations cross-nationally as well as inter-temporally. By comparison, we could see that, cross-nationally, the Japanese foreign policy behavior was similar to that of South Korea, one of the exemplary cases of the reactive state model in the RST. In addition, we could also see that, despite all the changes at home and abroad in the 1990s, the reactive behavior of the Japanese foreign policy in response to U.S. demands fundamentally did not change since the end of the Cold War. The graphic expression of our finding is given in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1 Two-dimensional Typology of States Applied to Our Four Cases

(B) Passivity (A)

K1
R1 K2 R2

United Kingdom
France

(C) Flexibility

(D)

Before we look into Figure 6-1, recall Figure 2-1, which graphically described the two-way typology of states. Figure 2-1 was presented as a passivity-flexibility space. Calder (1988) categorized Japan into quadrant (A) of Figure 2-1 together with other presumed reactive states, and defined the placement of Japan in that space as a puzzle. Our aim in this chapter was to test whether our specific cases fall in quadrant (A) as had been predicted by Calder (1988). After the test, we could find that indeed the cases fell in
quadrant (A).

Despite the similarities among our four cases, however, the four cases as a group also show distinctively different features in comparison with other non-reactive states such as Britain and France. The common features of our four cases as opposed to the characteristics of non-reactive states are summarized in Table 6-6. This table shows the behavioral features of the foreign policy behavior of Japan and South Korea as distinct from that of non-reactive states.

Table 6-6 Comparison between Reactive and Non-reactive States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptive Foci</th>
<th>Reactive State (Intra-cases Commonalities)</th>
<th>Non-Reactive State (as opposed to reactive states)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sequence</td>
<td>Waits for U.S. actions; Reluctant to take initiative</td>
<td>Willing to take initiative; Can publicly disagree with U.S. if deemed necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess</td>
<td>Does not exceed the U.S. demands; Not active in participating in collective decision-making process</td>
<td>Thinks outside the U.S. parameters; Regards as more important their political standing in the international community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Thinks within the parameters set by Washington; Accepted more than 50% of U.S. demands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>Tries hard to deliver as promised albeit some delays and local failures</td>
<td>Delivers as promised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, we can reach a conclusion that, despite the counter-arguments of the critics, according to our criteria, the RST’s description of the Japanese peculiarity is still valid because it is describing what it purports to describe; the RST is reliable because its validity has been confirmed in a multiple number of cases; and therefore, the RST is still useful in describing the key feature of the Japanese foreign policy behavior, particularly, the behavior observed in their responses to the United States.
CHAPTER 7. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE CRITICS

Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve.

Karl Popper

Le bon Dieu est dans le détail (The good God is in the detail).

Gustave Flaubert

The RST is not the only model that purports to describe and explain the uniqueness of the Japanese foreign policy behavior; there are competing theories. In this chapter, we will assess those competing models presented by the critics of the RST in Chapter 2 by asking which model correctly describes what we actually observed in the cases.

The method to conduct this assessment is to look for the observable implications of each competing model as specified in Chapter 3. If we could find the observable implications of the model in the cases, then it means that the model is capable of describing a certain aspect of the cases correctly. However, if we fail to find the observable implications, then we can judge that the model would be less useful in describing the actual behavior of the Japanese state.

After the assessment, based on the assessment of the arguments of the critics, we will try to look more deeply into the cases and see whether there were any variations not covered by the RST or its critics behaviorally as well as substantially. To this end, we will relax the assumption of the comparative static analysis. The comparative analysis we
conducted in the previous chapter in assessing the behavioral characteristics of our cases was static in the sense that we assumed that those four cases—$K_1$, $R_1$, $K_2$, and $R_2$—were taking place at the same time in the same national environment. Notice that the four standardized questions—sequence, excess, accommodation, and speed—that we raised across the cases are applicable irrespective of the historical and national backgrounds of the cases. In other words, the four standardized questions are ahistorical and not nation-specific. Ahistorical and non-nation-specific questions are required to raise the level of generalizability of the research outcomes because we can raise the same questions to the test cases from another period of history with different national backgrounds. If tested positive, then we can raise the reliability of the theory, and expand its applicability into the polities from different continents and from different chapters of the history book.

However, as we had described in the descriptive part of this dissertation, the policymakers of the reactive states had their own political goals in addition to how to respond to U.S. demands, and had to accomplish these goals under different political, institutional, social-cultural, and international restrictions that varied over the time and across the border. We need to check if there were any variations that these varying restrictions might have created in the set of the cases. For this purpose, after finishing the validity test of the RST and its critics, we will try to see whether there was any national or inter-temporal or any other type of variations in our cases that are not covered by the RST and/or its critics.

The only exception is when we compared the speed of the decisions and deliveries of each case. In the previous chapter, when we compared the speed of the policymaking and its implementation, we divided the cases into two groups: the Gulf War group and the Iraq War group to control the effect of the chronological differences between the two Wars on the policy speed.
7.1 Test of the Competing Models

Kohno: Proactive Participation and Maximization of the National Interest

We could extract two observable implications from Kohno’s argument. First, Japan was expected to be proactive in participating in the war-fighting or the collective decision-making of the U.S.-led coalition. But, our descriptions clearly show that no Administration in our case was proactive in this sense. In K₁, Japan provided no personnel assistance. In R₁, South Korea provided only medical and engineering assistance. In K₂ and R₂, Tokyo and Seoul did dispatch military contingents. But, their function was limited to the assistance for the Iraqi reconstruction, and they intentionally selected a relatively safer place for stationing their soldiers. In addition, no Administration seems to have actively participated in the collective decision-making process about going to war with Iraq. They did not seriously try to influence the course of U.S. actions with respect to the Wars with Iraq.

The second observable implication was the behavior of maximizing the national interests within given parameters. We could observe in some cases this behavior. For the negotiators in Tokyo and Seoul, as a matter of fact, the support for the U.S. war in Iraq was a foregone conclusion. This was a given parameter. As a result, their decision was more about how much to provide in response to U.S. demands. Then, their task boils down to how to satisfy their American colleagues with the minimum cost within the given parameters.

In this regard, their behavior is different from that of Great Britain and France. The British and the French used to act faster than their U.S. counterparts or spontaneously
increased their military contribution for the political purpose of raising their stature within the coalition against Iraq. This type of non-passive behavior is missing in Seoul and Tokyo. However, we need to pay attention to the fact that Tokyo and Seoul, too, wanted to maximize the political effect of their assistance, and maintain the maximum possible level of policy independence vis-à-vis the United State within the given parameters.

For example, in R₁, one of the major goals of the South Korean foreign policy-makers was to secure the political support of the United States and, thereby maintain the maximum policy independence in pushing forward with the Northern Policy. In order not to be bothered about their main goal, the South Koreans had to respond positively to the U.S. requests in other issue areas, but they wanted to accomplish this task with the minimum cost. This is part of the reason why the South Korean foreign service officers in Washington frequently visited their counterparts and tried hard to find out the bottom-line of the U.S. demands. Here, the bottom-line was the minimum level of assistance that could satisfy the Americans. After the Americans revealed the preferred amount of financial assistance, the South Koreans wanted to discount the bill. In fact, what the South Koreans actually provided was about two-thirds of the requested amount of financial assistance.

Moreover, the policymakers of the Roh Tae-woo Administration sought to maximize the political impact of their assistance. The method was to make the decision for and the provision of the assistance faster than other U.S-allied nations: the South Korean transportation support for the MNF, for example, was delivered fastest among the allies of the United States. In addition, the decision on the second financial assistance was
made even without the official U.S. request for assistance being publicized.

Summing up, the Korean negotiators in R₁ tried to maximize their national interests within given parameters set down by the United States. On the one hand, they wanted to make sure that Americans appreciated their support and assistance, for the sake of their own agenda. At the same time, they also wanted to drive down the cost of supporting the United States. The fast decision on and delivery of the transportation support and the incessant attempts to discount the cost of the burden-sharing all seem to stem from this strategic calculation.

A similar pattern is observed in K₂. Here, the Japanese, too, took a strategic approach. True, the discounting observed in the U.S.-Japan negotiations over the amount of the assistance for the Iraq War was not as dramatic as the discounting efforts observed in R₁ except for the efforts to draw a demarcation line between war and postwar. However, we need to expand our perspective in order to better assess the response behavior in K₂. For example, in issue areas other than the Iraq War, the Japanese hardly backed down. Although not described in detail in the descriptive part of this dissertation, the Koizumi administration was rigid and adamant in negotiations with the United States over such issues as beef imports, Japanese oil development projects in Iran, the yen-dollar exchange rate, and most markedly, Japan-North Korea relations (Marukusu 2004, 59; Funabashi 2007, 74-9).

For example, in preparing for Prime Minister Koizumi’s historic visit to Pyongyang in 2002, Tokyo left Washington in the dark up to the last minute. Presumably, when the policymakers of the Koizumi Administration expressed support and provided assistance for the United States, they might have expected to gain leverage on other issues that they
deemed important because they could expect that the Americans would not be able to push hard in issue areas other than the Iraq War when they decided to provide a substantial amount of assistance for the United States.

Just like $R_1$ and $K_2$, the strategic behavior or maximizing-within-parameters strategy is also found in $R_2$. President Roh Moo-hyun tried to take advantage of the given situation for the sake of what he saw as more important and more urgent: the North Korean problem. Seoul wanted Washington to be more flexible in dealing with Pyongyang. To pressure Washington, Seoul tried to link the U.S. flexibility with their flexibility: South Korea’s support and assistance for the Iraq War. At the same time, the cost of this linkage strategy, that is, the cost of supporting the United States had to be minimized.

In response to the first U.S. demand for assistance, this strategy was relatively successful. In the initial phase of the Iraq War, the South Koreans tried to reconfirm the American cooperation in handling the North Korean nuclear crisis in return for the Korean support for the Iraq War. U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s visit in February 2003 reassured President Roh Moo-hyun about U.S. cooperation on the North Korean issue, and then, President Roh persuaded the National Assembly as well as the public opinion to provide the assistance for the United States.

However, implementing the linkage strategy in response to the second request was less smooth, first because, as the domestic struggle over how to respond to U.S. demands intensified, the latent conflict within the Roh Moo-hyun Administration rose to the surface, and, second because the internal conflict weakened the coherence and consistency of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. Despite some disturbances in the
process, however, in the end, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s linkage strategy was successful in terms of the result.

When dealing with U.S. demands, the negotiators of the reactive state have to be coherent and consistent in order to be successful in maximizing the national interest within the given parameters. That is the very reason why Koizumi always wanted to get necessary agreements from his domestic coalition partners in the initial phase of the foreign policy process. That is also the reason why, despite strong pressures and complaints from Washington, Roh Tae-woo’s diplomats refused to backtrack from the initial offer of the financial assistance.

At first sight, then, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s response to the second U.S. demand—the provision of combatants—seemed to lack this coherence and consistency. Then-South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan’s meeting with then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell held on 25 September 2003 in New York offers a glimpse of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s approach to the Iraq War and the North Korean problem. In this meeting, Yoon explained the position of the South Korean government as follows:

The South Korean government does not intend to link the dispatch of troops to Iraq with the matter of the USFK. The USFK issue should be dealt with on a separate track based on the consultation between our two governments. If the U.S. government takes a significantly forward-looking measure toward the North Korean nuclear problem so that the South Korean government can persuade the public opinion about this sensitive issue, it will be critically instrumental and helpful. It will be appreciated if the U.S. government considers the highest flexibility (Lee 2008, 316; translation by author).  

Lee (2008)’s description of then-Foreign Minister Yoon’s statement to Secretary Powell is a little bit different from Funabashi (2007, 231)’s description. But, the general outline of the statement is the same: it was based on the idea of exchanging more flexibility in U.S. North Korea policy with Seoul’s more active cooperation on the issue of Iraq.
Powell’s reaction was cold and blunt. He began by saying that he would be “frank,” and then he remarked:

The position of the South Korean government is not a (proper) attitude toward an ally. It is regretful that the ROK government links the dispatch with the North Korean issue. If the comprehensive approach toward the North Korean problem is the right choice, then you may push forward with that direction irrespective of the dispatch to Iraq. For now, it is not possible to solve such problems as economic assistance for the DPRK, North Korea’s diplomatic isolation, establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, etc. simultaneously (Lee 2008, 317; translation by author).  

In a nutshell, Chongwadae wanted to link the ROK’s flexibility on Iraq with the U.S. flexibility on North Korea. And yet, as can be seen in the description of the Yoon-Powell meeting above, initially, this attempt was not well received by Washington.

But, another problem came after the meeting. The key to the successful linkage diplomacy is to maintain the confidence in your own decision, or to set your own house in order. Recall the Roh Tae-woo Administration’s attitude on the amount of the financial assistance for the Gulf Crisis. Despite the strong complaints from Washington, Roh Tae-woo and his advisors did not change the original number. Members of the Roh Tae-woo Cabinet got together and endured the American complaints. On the contrary, President Roh Moo-hyun’s Chongwadae passed the buck to Yoon, saying that the nuance of the Foreign Minister’s delivery of the message was unnecessarily stronger than the original instruction (Lee 2008, 318-9). Furthermore, a detailed description of the conversation between Yoon and Powell was leaked by someone to The New York Times about twenty

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75Secretary Powell’s response to then-Foreign Minister Yoon’s statement is missing in Funabashi (2007).
days after the meeting. It was a cheap shot for Yoon. He was opposed to explicitly linking the two issues in the first place. He had to reluctantly read the instruction in front of Powell, whom he had already met a couple of weeks earlier in Washington D.C. because the top decision-makers in Seoul decided to link the two issues and because he was selected to be the speaker (Yoon 2009).

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration’s initial attitude towards the issue of additional troops to Iraq reminds us of the Kaifu Administration’s attitude when the initial assistance package of the Japanese government was rebuffed by Washington. The Japanese did not have confidence in the numbers that they improvised. And when they got a slap in the face, the Japanese began serious soul-searching, and quickly amplified the size of the assistance. Similar soul-searching is found in R2. After the Yoon-Powell meeting, the Blue House sent Ra Jong-yil, National Security Advisor for President Roh Moo-hyun to Washington to smoothen the relations with the United States. His job was to explain the circumstances surrounding the linkage proposition. Through Ra’s visit, President Roh also delivered his personal letter to President Bush. In this letter, he wrote that “Seoul, despite its difficult circumstances, is seriously considering the U.S. request that we send more troops to Iraq” (Funabashi 2007, 233-4).

The linkage strategy of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration was not so smooth. However, it does not necessarily mean that the linkage strategy was inherently wrong or a failure. There is another perspective from within the inner circle of Roh Moo-hyun’s foreign policy entourage. Park Sun-won, former Senior Foreign Policy and National Security Director of Roh Moo-hyun’s Presidential Office claims as follows:
The September Yoon-Powell meeting is described as a kind of diplomatic incident. . . . The Yoon-Powell meeting does not correspond to linkage, but to [consultation between allies]. . . . In a meeting between foreign ministers, either side can say that ‘because we have this difficulty, so we need your understanding and cooperation.’ If even such an expression is not allowed in response to the demand of additional troops, we would need to ask ourselves what the objective of diplomatic activities is (Park 2009, 216; translation by author).

Moreover, in order to do justice to a policy, we have to look at its result, rather than the noises out of the negotiation process. About a month after the Yoon-Powell meeting, on 20 October 2003, when Bush met President Roh Moo-hyun in the Bangkok APEC Summit, President Bush announced that “the United States would consider offering an assurance of security to North Korea.” Eventually, the United States showed flexibility on the North Korean issue as South Korea had asked. Although Powell showed displeasure at Yoon’s attempt to link Iraq with North Korea, later, after the meeting, Powell finally persuaded Bush to be more flexible on North Korea. As a senior White House official acknowledged later, “in the end, the South Korean troop dispatch and the U.S. response to North Korea became linked” (Funabashi 2007, 234). The Roh Moo-hyun Administration achieved the goal in the end.

On the other hand, in K₁, the maximizing behavior is not conspicuous. Of course, Japan, too, was given the opportunity to strategically maximize the national interest within the given parameters. For example, in response to the breakout of the Iraqi Invasion, the Kaifu Administration had to calculate on its own the proper amount of the financial assistance for the United States. The first solution was US$ 1 billion. But, when Washington showed negative reception to this number, they quickly quadrupled the number. There was no maximizing on the margin much less linkage and discounting. The same pattern is repeated in response to the second request. When Washington requested
US$ 9 billion, they quickly accepted the number without any discounting. Also, we could not find any evidence of a linkage strategy played by the Kaifu Administration in exchange for the large amount of additional financial assistance.

In sum, Kohno’s critique was partly true and partly not. The active participation predicted by Kohno was, at least in our cases, not observed. However, Kohno also suggested the possibility of the national-interest maximizing behavior on a certain lower level. Our observation shows that this prediction was realized in some cases. In K2 and R1, the policymakers tried to maximize the national interest by discounting the U.S. request, or by fast-tracking the decision and delivery process, or by linking the issue of the assistance for the United States, explicitly or implicitly, with other issues of their concern. In R2, the Koreans attempted at the same objective, but the process was less smooth although the linkage strategy was successful in the end. On the other hand, this maximizing behavior was not particularly observed in K1.

*Potter & Sudo: Passive Leadership (?)*

We could not observe the observable implications predicted by Potter and Sudo. No sign of passive leadership is found in our cases. According to Potter and Sudo, even if Japan or other reactive states seem to be passive in their conduct of foreign policy, we can still judge that those countries are exercising leadership as long as, behind the scenes, they are influencing the results or the process of the international collective decision-making in a significant way.

However, we could not find any sign of passive leadership in our cases. No Administrations in the four cases significantly influenced the American foreign and
military policy towards Iraq. For example, the two Korean Administrations never showed a deep interest in influencing the U.S. Iraq policy, nor did they ever try to change the U.S. course of actions against Saddam Hussein. Their consistent interest was North Korea and the bilateral relationship with the United States. The same can be said of the Japanese Administrations. Prime Minister Kaifu even cancelled a pre-scheduled trip to the Middle East, in which he could have played a considerable leadership role. When the Russian Federation asked Japan to be a mediator between Iraq and the United States, Prime Minister Kaifu simply ditched the idea of mediation after hearing a negative response from President Bush.

On the other hand, the Koizumi Administration was a little different. They did emphasize the importance of international cooperation. However, the evidence for the causal link between the Japanese emphasis on the international cooperation and the U.S. decision to try the UN course to get an authorization for the attack on Iraq is weak. In addition, it is doubtful whether the Japanese policymakers in the Koizumi Administration truly believed in the international cooperation as a policy objective rather than as rhetoric. When it became clear that the war with Iraq was imminent, the Japanese government abruptly changed its position and began to argue for the war with Iraq as if the new UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein had not been required from the very beginning. In terms of its outcome as well as its intention, therefore, the evidence of passive leadership in K2 is weak. In fact, the real meaning of the “international cooperation” for the Koizumi Administration turned out to be the “cooperation with the Americans.”

This result may not be so surprising. Iraq was different from Cambodia. Iraq was
one of the most important issues on the American foreign policy agenda at the time, and the Gulf and Iraq Wars are arguably the two most important conventional wars that the United States had to conduct for the past quarter century. In such important games, there was no room for a reactive state to exercise political leadership, whether passive or active.

*Miyashita: Reactive but Rational (?)*

Finding evidence to prove or disprove Miyashita’s argument is difficult because no politician would readily acknowledge that their decision was made by an external pressure. Even if external pressures played an important role in the actual decision-making process, policymakers would usually have a strong incentive to claim that they made a decision independently of irrelevant elements.

In fact, the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul were keenly aware of the criticism that they decided to support the United States due to the pressure from Washington, and thought about taking some cosmetic measures. For example, a declassified memorandum, which was drawn up by the Middle East Bureau of the South Korean MOFA in R1 provides a list of the reasons for and against the medical assistance for the MNF excerpted from the pages of South Korean newspapers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991, 313-9). According to the memorandum, the dissenting opinion number one was because the decision was enforced upon the ROK by Washington. And then, the author of the memorandum specifies as a policy suggestion how to respond to such criticisms.\(^76\)

\(^76\)The memorandum enumerates the reasons for sending the medical assistance to the Gulf: (1) that to provide the assistance for the MNF is to support the spirits of the UNSC resolution; (2) that, if South Korea helps the international society this time, she can expect the similar response from the international society when a situation arises in the Korean Peninsula; (3) that, if South Korea provides only economic assistance, then the international society might criticize South Korea, saying that she seeks only economic interests, and does not carry out the international duty to maintain peace and security; and (4) that, by providing the
K₂ and R₂, too, were not short of political rhetoric. As we had pointed out many times, Koizumi kept emphasizing the importance of the international cooperation. President Roh Moo-hyun, too, advertised his decision to send troops to Iraq as an unavoidable decision to protect the national interest. In a speech before the National Assembly in April 2003, he said, “I decided to dispatch troops, despite ongoing antiwar protests, because of the fate of our country and the people” (New York Times, 3 April 2003, 13). Therefore, we need to keep in mind that just reading the rhetoric of the policymakers would not be so helpful in assessing whether the decision was an outcome of rational discourse or a result of sheer enforcement. This is the reason why we need objective criteria, which can be separated from political rhetoric.

Recall the observable implications we had established as criteria for testing the competing theories in Chapter 3. According to Miyashita, in responding to the Gulf and Iraq Wars, and in deciding on the type and amount of the assistance for the United States, Seoul and Tokyo are expected to change their positions if their initial positions were different from those of the United States. In this change of positions or lack thereof, the key is the persuasion efforts to have a common goal. They will change their positions because the Americans were successful in persuading them to share the goal of the United States, not just because the Americans asked, if Miyashita’s argument is true. And if they fail to move swiftly enough to respond to U.S. demands, that must be because their U.S. counterparts failed to persuade them. These criteria are helpful because they provide a tool with which to assess the cases regardless of the political rhetoric. And we need to note that these criteria are based on the concept of the communicative rationality. That is,
the reactive state would change its policy because, through rational discourse, it was awakened to its true national interest by reaching an agreement on the merits of the collective goal.

The descriptions in Chapters 4 and 5 do not provide much evidence to support Miyashita’s argument. To be sure, we can observe some policy changes. In $K_1$ and $R_1$, the Japanese and the Koreans were initially obsessed with the possible impact of the Gulf Crisis on their energy supply. But, as soon as they found that the impact was not so great, their tension level went down. The tension level went up only when the U.S. demands began to materialize. Only then did Seoul and Tokyo begin a serious internal discussion on how to respond to the requests. However, was this change due to the rational discourse with Washington? Did they wake up to the cold reality of the international environment after talking to Washington? Through the descriptions of Chapters 4 and 5, we could see that, had it not been for the U.S. requests, Tokyo and Seoul would have not spontaneously sent such large amount of assistance to the Gulf. They provided assistance because the Americans asked. The American request was therefore crucial in explaining the policy changes on the other side of the Pacific.

Nevertheless, this policy change was not based on the communicative rationality as we had defined it. Washington did not need much persuasion although the evidence shows that the communications across the Pacific were thick and dense. And, Tokyo and Seoul did not need to be awakened to the cold reality of the international environment. The fact of the matter was that the mood for the assistance for the United States was prevalent even before the diplomatic negotiation began with Washington because they had already attached much importance to the bilateral relationship with the United States,
and because there was not much internal disagreement on this point—that they have to do something to help the Americans. Therefore, Washington just needed to pull the trigger. In other words, the Japanese and South Korean policymakers decided to help the MNF because the Americans asked, not because the Americans were particularly successful in persuading the Japanese and the South Koreans to believe in the common cause of the Gulf War.

For instance, when the initial assistance package was not well received by Washington in August 1990, the Japanese hurriedly quadrupled the package within only half a month. Was it because they realized their true national interest that they did not properly understand two weeks previously? The more probable reason is because, at the time, the Japanese policymakers did not have a clear and coherent idea about how much to provide for the United States. Therefore, they simply could not defend their position when their U.S. counterparts raised complaints.

On the other hand, in K2, the gap between Tokyo and Washington was not wide in the first place. In order to test Miyashita’s model, we need a case in which the interest of a reactive state initially diverges from that of the United States, but after negotiating with Washington, converges with it. However, our research backs the suspicion that the Koizumi Administration, in an early phase of the lead-up to the Iraq War, was supporting the U.S. plan, or at least acquiesced in it. True, the Japanese could not reveal their position up to the last minute mostly due to the domestic consideration. But, in consideration of Koizumi’s precarious domestic political foundations, which needed the United States as his ‘ruling party,’ and according to many testimonies, it must have been almost impossible for the Koizumi Administration not to support the Iraq War (Ichikawa
If the Japanese knew that the support and assistance for the Iraq War were inevitable, then, for the Americans, it was not necessary to let the Japanese be awakened to their real national interest. This is the reason why, in the dialogue between Tokyo and Washington in K2, it was hard to observe a process of serious persuasion about the cause and objectives of the Wars. Yes, Tokyo drew a line between war and postwar in the first place, and stood on the ‘postwar’ side, but the Americans did not try to change the Japanese position in earnest. Rather, Washington readily accepted this distinction. When the Iraq War began, the Koizumi Administration almost abruptly changed its position on the legality and necessity of going to war with Iraq without an additional UNSC resolution, but it was not a result of U.S. persuasion but a revelation of a hidden-but-expected position of the Japanese. Therefore, if we find no real change of positions and no evidence for a process of persuasion in K2, then, we can conclude that this case does not support Miyashita’s prediction.

In R2, we could observe a bitter struggle within the Roh Moo-hyun Administration over the issue of how to deal with the American request of additional troops. In the beginning, there was a strong opposition to the U.S. request. The public opinion was negative about assisting the United States in conducting an “unjust war.” President Roh’s close aides also did not hide their oppositions. In the end, however, President Roh Moo-hyun decided to send a military division to Iraq. What happened in the process:

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There may be three reasons for this acceptance: one is that the Americans knew from the experiences with the Japanese counterparts during the Gulf Crisis/War that Japan would not be able to send the SDF to a “war zone” in its strict sense of the word; two, the Americans expected that the war would soon be over, therefore, the distinction between war and postwar was pointless; and three, President George W. Bush chose to respect the independence and spontaneity of the allies. For the third reason, see footnote 2 in Chapter 6.
persuasion or enforcement?

President Roh Moo-hyun seems to have wanted to justify the decision as an inevitable choice to protect the national interest. We will not raise suspicion on his good intention for the national interest. But, his remarks before and after the decision, and some testimonies from his entourage all point to the possibility that his decision was based on instrumental rather than communicative rationality. Let us take a look at some of President Roh Moo-hyun’s remarks advocating the support for the United States. In the speech for the National Assembly mentioned above, he also remarked:

In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, it is important to maintain strong cooperation with the United State. . . . It would be imprudent to make a decision that threatens the survival of our people in the name of an equal relationship with the United States (New York Times, 3 April 2003, 13).

Immediately before making the decision to send additional troops to Iraq in October 2003, President Roh also specified the factors to be considered in making the decision. In a speech on the Armed Forces Day, he said:

The most important factor in reviewing the issue of troop dispatch will be whether we will have positive prospects and firm conviction on the peace and stability on the peninsula through the formation of a stable atmosphere for dialogue. . . . The government is doing everything to make the best decision that satisfies the people’s wishes. . . . The alliance has been the buttress that has solidified the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, and has been a pillar in maintaining world peace (Korea Times [Seoul], 2 October 2003).

According to these remarks, President Roh decided to send the troops because, in order to maintain peace and security in the Korean Peninsula, the bilateral relationship with the United States was essential. In other words, he did not agree on the justification
for the Iraq War, but had to send the troops anyway in order to accomplish other more important goals. We can find his dilemma in other sources, too. In his memoirs, President Roh revealed his thought on the Iraq War and the decision to send troops there:

The decision to send troops to Iraq was in retrospect, and will remain in the future a wrong choice for the records of history. But, as a person who assumes the presidency, it was an unavoidable and inevitable choice (Hankyore [Seoul], 2 September 2010, 5; translation and underline by author).

Moreover, according to Ms. Park Joo-hyun, one of the Senior Secretaries to President Roh Moo-hyun, President Roh was “pushed” to send the troops; it was not his true intention to send the troops to Iraq.

I was strongly opposed to the idea of sending (combat) troops to Iraq. At the time, the media were running high about this question, criticizing that even some within the Presidential Office were opposed to the sending. [President Roh Moo-hyun] even gave me a gift of encouragement to express his gratitude to me although I publicly objected to sending the troops. Because he was pushed by the situation to send the troops, he was grateful to me for publicly expressing the dissenting opinion (Hankyore [Seoul], 27 May 2009; translation and underline by author).

Notice that President Roh Moo-hyun’s remarks on and attitude toward the Iraq War are totally different even from those of Prime Minister Koizumi. Koizumi had never admitted in public that sending troops to Iraq was wrong. He also had never publicly acknowledged that, although the casus belli for the Iraq War was itself untrustworthy, Japan needed to send SDF troops to Iraq to achieve other more important goals.78 From

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78 Probably, the only exception is Koizumi’s remark made in a press conference held about one hour after President Bush’s declaration of war against Iraq. In that press conference, Koizumi stated that “the Japan-U.S. alliance is functioning effectively against the North Korean threats.” This is the first time Koizumi links Iraq and North Korea publicly (Marukusu 2004, 72).
President Roh’s remarks, we can see that he felt a psychological conflict over the issue of sending combatants to Iraq. It is certain that he anguished over which is the right course for his country. In the end, he made his decision based on his calculation of the national interest. But this decision process does not necessarily support Miyashita’s argument because, when one admits that they were “pushed” to make what they believed was a “wrong choice,” it would be hard to claim that the decision was independent and spontaneous.

All in all, we could not find in the four cases the very essence of Miyashita’s argument. According to our inference, the essence of Miyashita’s emphasis on the independence and autonomy of a decision is the communicative rationality. And one of the assumptions of the communicative rationality is the awareness of the interlocutors that they share a common goal. If Seoul and Tokyo made their decision based on the communicative rationality, then, as we had pointed out in Chapters 2 and 3, there must have been internal and external processes in which they came to share with Washington the understanding that the policy “goal was inherently reasonable and merit-worthy.” But, no such sign of the communicative rationality is observed. Internally, the discussion inside the Japanese and South Korean Administrations were absorbed in such questions as what to provide in what way, and how fast, etc. Likewise, in the negotiations with Washington, the Japanese and the South Koreans approached their American counterparts and asked such questions as how much is needed, and what the bottom-line is. Therefore, at least in our case studies, the test result for Miyashita’s model is negative.

*Schoppa: Where Is the Limit of Gaiatsu?*
One implication of the RST is that foreign pressure is a kind of a magic wand. Whenever the reactive state is intransigent, the Americans can simply put more pressure to let them line up. The magic wand is also found in a testimony of an American official. Ambassador Armacost claims that the key to changing the Japanese behavior was none other than foreign pressure.

What, one might ask, brought the Japanese around and prompted them to provide such substantial financial and political support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm despite their initial, deep-seated reservations? The simple answer, I believe, is foreign pressure, principally from the United States. This pressure was sharply focused, and it was sustained. It was broadly based, embracing key elements of both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. And it was fueled by strong emotional support from the American people. While the consequences of a lame response were difficult to calculate, Tokyo could not rule out profound changes in U.S. attitudes and policies toward Japan, including our future readiness to maintain the alliance (Armacost 1996, 125; underlined and italicized by author).

However, Schoppa’s question is that, sometimes, the reactive state does not change the course despite formidable pressure from Washington. Schoppa’s answer is, to put it simply, that the domestic conditions should be ripe for the foreign pressure to work. Then, he specifies the domestic conditions for the foreign pressure to work. However, these domestic conditions vary depending on the issue area. Then, the key to understanding when the foreign pressure works is to understand the domestic conditions in each issue area. From Schoppa’s model, then, we could extract an observable implication: the domestic condition for or domestic resistance to the foreign pressure varies depending on

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79It is interesting to compare the conditions within the pressuring country specified by Armacost (1996, 125) for making the foreign pressure work, with the domestic conditions suggested by Schoppa (1997, 6) for making the foreign pressure work within the reactive state. For the foreign pressure to be effective, probably it will be better for both conditions to be met. However, even if both conditions are met, they may not be sufficient. If there is a veto player holding a trump card that can overwhelm all other decision-makers in the process, then the veto player may forestall the decision-making process.
the issue area. Therefore, even when the overall feature of a state is reactive, the state still can say no in a particular issue area.

The test of Schoppa’s model shows that his prediction was basically correct. In the cases that we dealt with, there was indeed a limit to the American pressure. The policymakers of the reactive states could say no in some specific issue areas. In \( K_1 \), U.S. pressure did work to extract political and financial support from Tokyo. But, on the issue of the personnel assistance, the pressure did not work. The U.S. pressure failed to let the Kaifu Administration provide “boots on the ground.” In \( R_1 \), the South Koreans provided personnel as well as financial assistance although they did discount some of the original demands. However, despite the U.S. demands, the South Koreans did not provide combatants. Again, U.S. pressure failed to get all it wanted in a specific issue. In \( K_2 \), Japan did provide both types of assistance to Iraq, but, here too, there was a limit to \textit{gaiatsu}. Washington could not let Tokyo provide financial and personnel assistance during the ‘war’ phase. The Koizumi Administration made it clear up front that the assistance would be limited to the ‘postwar’ period. Also, another important point is that, in some issue areas other than the assistance for the Iraq War, the Koizumi Administration went its own way.

On the other hand, the limit of \textit{gaiatsu} is unclear in \( R_2 \). As for the issue of sending combatants, there was strong resistance. Despite this strong resistance, however, in \( R_2 \), the ROK did send a division of armed soldiers to Iraq although their job descriptions were, like their Japanese counterparts, limited to self-defense and reconstruction assistance. Although the Roh Moo-hyun Administration did discount the size and function of the military forces sent to Iraq, every item listed on the U.S. demands—
political support, financial assistance, and even combatants—was one way or another provided. In this sense, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration is an outlier.

_Park: External vs. Domestic Sources_

In order to assess Park Cheol-hee’s critique, we have to observe the response of the reactive states to the countries other than the United States. Indeed, we could find some positive responses. For example, when Great Britain asked South Korea to provide financial assistance for their conduct of the Gulf War, the response from Seoul was positive.\(^{80}\) However, this type of assistance was provided in the context of assisting the U.S. war efforts, because those recipients of the South Korean or the Japanese assistance all belonged to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. Therefore, it is hard to distinguish between the assistance for the United States and the assistance for other members of the U.S.-led coalition. The clearest way to test Park’s critique will be to observe Japan’s or South Korea’s response to, say, Chinese demands and compare those responses with their responses to U.S. demands, on the condition that the issue that they negotiated with China was essentially the same in nature as the issue that they dealt with in relations with the United States.

However, the descriptions of our four cases also give us a hint about assessing Park’s critique. As we had pointed out in, if Park (2005) is right, then, Calder (1988)’s

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\(^{80}\)When Sir John Weston, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Political Director of the British Foreign Office visited Seoul on 13 February 1991, he asked for financial assistance from Seoul. By that time, the U.K. had already provided 35,000 soldiers and 50 air fighters for the Gulf War. Mr. Weston especially emphasized the fact that 686 British soldiers sacrificed their lives during the Korean War. Specifically, he asked US$ 30 to 40 million as financial assistance from South Korea because according to the British calculation, their soldiers were covering approximately 8% of the total MNF troops. So, they asked around 8% of the South Korean financial assistance, which was US$ 500 million. In response, the Roh Tae-woo Administration earmarked US$ 30 million to be provided for Great Britain in the financial assistance (Lee 2002, 314-5).
argument that the reactive behavior stems from domestic sources will be weakened. Then, logically, the reverse is also true. That is to say, if the reactive behavior stems from external sources, particularly, the sources specific to the bilateral relationship with the United States, then, it is highly probable that the reactive state is not so reactive to countries other than the United States, because the source of the reactive behavior is found only in the bilateral relationship with the United States.\(^{81}\) In Chapter 8, when we probe more into the sources of the reactive behavior, we will cover this issue.

### 7.2 Variations under the Uniformity

The conclusion of Chapter 6 is that, in terms of the reactivity as defined in Chapter 3, there is basically no variation in our cases. The responses of the four Administrations that we observed were uniform—passive and flexible, according to our criteria. However, in testing the critiques on the RST, we could also observe some variations. In testing Kohno’s argument, we could see that in K\(_1\), the maximizing behavior is not conspicuous, and in testing Schoppa’s theory, we could also see that in R\(_2\), the limit of gaiatsu is unclear. In addition, the cross-national and inter-temporal comparison of the responses shows that, although in all the four cases the assistance exceeded the 50%-mark, the extent to which the delivered assistance surpassed the 50%-level varied, and that the

\(^{81}\)Using some logical expressions, we can simplify Park’s criticism against the reactive state thesis. For example, \([Ba=R \text{ AND } Bn=\neg R] \Rightarrow [Ba\leftarrow E]\), but \([Ba=R \text{ AND } Bn=R] \Rightarrow [Ba(=Bn)\leftarrow \neg E]\), where “Ba”: the reactive state’s behavior towards the U.S.; “Bn”: the reactive state’s behavior towards all non-U.S. countries; “\(\neg R\)”: meaning “found to be reactive”; “E”: the set of all possible explanatory variables found only in the reactive state’s bilateral relationship with the U.S.; “\(\neg E\)”: the set of all possible explanatory variables that do not belong to E. Therefore, reversely put, \([Ba\leftarrow E] \Rightarrow [Ba=R \text{ AND } Bn=\neg R]\) on the condition that \([Ba=R \text{ AND } Bn=\neg R] \Leftrightarrow [Ba\leftarrow E]\), and that E is the only source for Ba.
components of the assistance from each Administration, too, varies. Are these variations unpredictable exceptions? Or, do they follow a systematic pattern? Below, we will analyze and categorize the variations we observed in the process of testing the competing theories with a view to finding systematic explanations for the variations in Chapter 9.

**Outliers**

First of all, we could observe two outliers. By outlier, we mean such observation that the behavior of one case is different from that of all the others.\(^{82}\) One outlier is the deviation in the maximizing behavior, and the other is found in the limit of the U.S. pressure.

The first outlier is found in K\(_1\) because, as we saw when we assessed Kohno’s argument in the previous section, the maximizing behavior is not conspicuous in K\(_1\). On the other hand, in the other cases, we can observe the maximizing behavior. Take a look at Table 7-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>To the Gulf War</th>
<th>To the Iraq War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>K(_1): Kaifu (Outlier) (No Maximizing)</td>
<td>K(_2): Koizumi (Maximizing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>R(_1): Roh Tae-woo (Maximizing)</td>
<td>R(_2): Roh Moo-hyun (Maximizing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, the Japanese negotiators in K\(_1\) did not make serious efforts to drive

\(^{82}\) According to Barnett and Lewis (1994, 7), an outlier in a set of data is “an observation (or subset of observations) which appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data” (underline by author). Grubbs (1969, 1) defines an outlying observation, or “outlier,” as “one that appears to deviate markedly from other members of the sample in which it occurs” (underline by author). We can see that in detecting and defining an outlier, firstly, a subjective judgment is important.
down the cost of the assistance. When Washington demanded an increase of the financial assistance, they quickly quadrupled it. When Brady asked for US$ 9 billion, they also quickly accepted it with no discount. On the other hand, in R₁, the South Korean negotiators cut down on the U.S. demand by approximately one-third. In K₂, the Koizumi Administration discounted the initial U.S. demand for financial assistance by almost half. In R₂, the discounting behavior may not look so straightforward, but even in R₂, we can see the discounting. The size of the division that the Roh Moo-hyun Administration sent to Iraq was almost half the size demanded by the Americans, and the function of the division was also in fact limited to non-combat purposes although the division was heavily armed and independently operable.

In K₁, we could not observe other signs of the maximizing, either. For example, there was no fast-tracking in K₁. Unlike their South Korean counterparts, who saw a strategic advantage in delivering an item of assistance earlier than expected, the Japanese negotiators did not preemptively provide any item on the list of the assistance. In addition, no evidence of linkage is observed in K₁. In R₁ and R₂, the South Koreans wanted to see U.S. understandings and concessions on the North Korean issue in return for their flexibility. In K₂, the Koizumi Administration seems to have expected U.S. acquiescence in many issues of their concern in exchange for the Japanese support and assistance for the U.S. policy on Iraq.

The other outlier is R₂: only in R₂, we could observe no clear-cut limit of U.S. pressure. For example, in K₁, no amount of U.S. pressure could force Tokyo to provide personnel assistance. In R₁, Washington demanded a small number of combatants albeit unofficially, but, Seoul did not provide the combatants, and even denied that Washington
had ever asked for the combatants. The Koizumi Administration (K₂) announced up front that there would be no cost-sharing for the War much less participation of the SDF. They made it clear that Japan would become a “post-conflict” member of the Coalition of the Willing, and Washington accepted it.

Table 7-2 the Second Outlier: Success and Failure of U.S. Pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>To the Gulf War</th>
<th>To the Iraq War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>K₁: Kaifu (No Personnel Assistance)</td>
<td></td>
<td>K₂: Koizumi (No Participation in the ‘War’ Period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>R₁: Roh Tae-woo (No Combatants)</td>
<td></td>
<td>R₂: Roh Moo-hyun (Outlier) (No Dramatic Failure)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, no such limit of foreign pressure is observed in R₂. Although some of the U.S. demands had been discounted, all the U.S. demands were satisfied more or less. The Roh Moo-hyun Administration provided both financial and military assistance, and it was delivered even during the active war phase. When the Iraq War broke out, Seoul expressed political support, and provided financial as well as medical and engineering assistance. When Washington asked for additional troops, namely, combative forces, Seoul responded positively by providing a military division armed with independently operable weapons and ammunitions. The variation in terms of the success and failure of U.S. pressure is summarized in Table 7-2.

This observation becomes more interesting when we consider the ideological basis of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. President Roh rode the wave of anti-American sentiments to enter Chongwadae. Many of his entourage had the experience of participating in anti-American activities in the past. But, despite their backgrounds, as
policymakers who have to make serious decisions, they accommodated the U.S. demands. Unlike the other three cases, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, provided personnel assistance (unlike the Kaifu Administration) including combatants (unlike the Roh Tae-woo Administration), and assisted in conducting the Iraq War even during the ‘war’ period (unlike the Koizumi Administration). In this sense, R₂ is an outlier.

Table 7-3 Comparison of Total Assistance from Each Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Assistance</th>
<th>Gulf War</th>
<th>Compare</th>
<th>Iraq War</th>
<th>Gap</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>US$ 13 billion</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>US$ 5  billion</td>
<td>US$ 8 billion</td>
<td>-61.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance(A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Military Assistance(B)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>US$ 0.663 billion</td>
<td>US$ 0.663 billion</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assistance</td>
<td>US$ 13 billion</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>US$ 5.663 billion</td>
<td>US$ 7.337 billion</td>
<td>-56.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A+B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assistance</td>
<td>JPY 1.738 trillion</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>JPY 0.602 trillion</td>
<td>JPY 1.136 trillion</td>
<td>-65.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Local Currency*</td>
<td>JPY 1.738 trillion</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>JPY 0.602 trillion</td>
<td>JPY 1.136 trillion</td>
<td>-65.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>US$ 500 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>US$ 260 million</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance(C)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Military Assistance(D)</td>
<td>Included in the financial part</td>
<td>US$ 710 million</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td>N/A**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assistance</td>
<td>US$ 500 million</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>US$ 970 million</td>
<td>US$ 470 million</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C+D)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Assistance</td>
<td>KRW 0.363 trillion</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>KRW 1.148 trillion</td>
<td>KRW 0.785 trillion</td>
<td>216.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Local Currency*</td>
<td>KRW 0.363 trillion</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>KRW 1.148 trillion</td>
<td>KRW 0.785 trillion</td>
<td>216.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exchange rates used to calculate the local currency amounts are JPY133.72/$ (January 1991); JPY106.34/$ (January 2004); KRW725.16/$(January 1991); and KRW1,183.06/$(January 2004) (Source: fxtop.com)

** The assistance of US$ 500 million in R₁ includes the cost for the personnel assistance. Therefore, it is inappropriate to compare the US$ 500 million with the financial or personnel assistance in R₂ respectively.

An X-shaped Variation

The second variation is found in the size of the total assistance including the financial as well as the personnel assistance for the United States.³³ Here, we can find an

³³Notice that here we are not calculating the dollar-value of the life of a soldier included in the personnel part of the total assistance. We are simply calculating the cost required to implement the promised personnel assistance, and combine it with the cost of the financial assistance to find out the cost of
X-shaped variation: the size of the total assistance in $K_1$ was larger than that of $K_2$; on the other hand, more assistance was provided in $R_2$ than in $R_1$.

In terms of the nominal amount of the financial assistance, the Kaifu Administration obviously provided more than the Koizumi Administration: US$ 13 billion versus US$ 5 billion. Adding the cost of sending and maintaining the personnel assistance to the calculation does not change this observation. Still, the size of the total assistance in $K_1$ overwhelms $K_2$. The dispatch of GSDF by the Koizumi Administration was completed in February 2004, and they left Iraq by 17 July 2006. According to a document that JDA submitted to the Japanese Communist Party, the total expense for Japan’s personnel assistance for the Iraq War as of late April 2006 was estimated at JPY76.1 billion. In U.S. dollar terms, the cost amounts to US$ 663 million at the exchange rate of JPY114.78/$. Even if we factor this cost of the personnel assistance into the final total, still, as we can see in Table 7-3, the Kaifu Administration’s total assistance exceeds that of the Koizumi Administration, and if we translate the dollar-denominated amount into a yen-denominated amount, the gap becomes larger.

The total cost is broken down into (1) JPY64.2 billion for the GSDF contingent stationed in Samawah; (2) JPY11.3 billion for ASDF assistance, largely C-130 transportation support flying from Kuwait; (3) JPY0.44 billion for MSDF assistance; and (4) JPY0.16 billion for the JDA headquarters in Tokyo. However, this total cost does not include the expected cost for the withdrawal of the GSDF (JPY12 billion), and the cost for maintaining the ASDF assistance (JPY2.6 billion), which was supposed to be provided until December 2006 (Shinbun Akahata [Tokyo], 20 July 2006).

Moreover, if we consider the inflation rate, then the present value of the Japanese assistance in $K_1$ might become a little larger although the inflation of the Japanese yen in the 1990s was miniscule. The annual average inflation rate of Japan between 1991 and 2003 was 0.5% by consumer price index and -0.2% by GDP deflator (Source: World Development Indicator).

The Kaifu Administration provided US$ 13 billion. If we apply the monthly average Yen-Dollar exchange rate as of January 1991 (JPY133.72/$), then it corresponds to JPY1.738 trillion. The Koizumi Administration provided US$ 5.663 billion including the cost of the personnel assistance. If we apply the monthly average Yen-Dollar exchange rate as of January 2004 (JPY106.34/$), then it amounts to JPY0.602 trillion.
The Roh Tae-woo Administration (R₁) provided US$ 500 million, and this amount included the cost for dispatching and stationing the medical and construction units. On the other hand, the financial assistance from the Roh Moo-hyun Administration (R₂) was only US$ 260 million. However, the cost for the military contingent was massive. The South Korean military division stayed in Iraq for about four years between 2004 and 2008. The estimated cost for this stationing was about KRW723.8 billion, or US$ 710 million (Matbul [Seoul], 17 March 2008). Then, in nominal terms, the assistance in R₂ was US$ 970 million when the cost of the military assistance is included. It almost twice as large as that of R₁, and if we calculate the Korean won-denominated amount, then the gap becomes much larger. Simply speaking, in terms of total assistance (the amount

87 The first contingent of the Zaitun Division, which was composed of 2,796 soldiers, arrived in Iraq and began the task on 22 September 2004, and they stayed there until 9 December 2008. The history of the Zaitun Division and the military assistance for the Iraq War was retrieved at the homepage of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (www.mnd.go.kr/common_index7.jsp) on 11 January 2011.

88 The article that contains this estimation of the cost for the assistance for the Iraq War was retrieved at www.left21.com/article/5087 on 3 March 2013. The exchange rate applied for this calculation is KRW1,020/$, the approximate average won-dollar exchange rate in this period. A governmental source estimated the cost of dispatching and stationing a South Korean soldier in Iraq for one year at around KRW50 million, or about US$ 49,000 (Yonhap News [Seoul], 20 October 2003).

89 The cost of the military assistance (US$ 710 million) plus the size of the financial assistance (US$ 260 million) in R₂ is about US$ 970 million. This is almost twice as large as the US$ 500 million, the size of the assistance in R₁.

90 If we apply the monthly average won-dollar exchange rate as of January 1991 (KRW725.16/$) for the total assistance in R₁, then, it is KRW 0.363 trillion. On the other hand, if we apply the monthly average won-dollar exchange rate as of January 2004 (KRW1,183.06/$) for the total assistance in R₂, then it is KRW 1.148 trillion. Therefore, in dollar terms, between R₁ and R₂, the total assistance increased by 94.0%[(970-500)/500] while in Korean won terms, the total assistance from South Korea increased by 216.3%[(1.148-0.363)/0.363]. Of course, if we consider the effect of the inflation rate, then the gap may become smaller. But, the inflation rate of South Korea between R₁ and R₂ was not as high as it should be for the assistance in R₁ to exceed the assistance in R₂. If the present value of the US$ 500 million is to exceed US$ 970 million as of the year 2003, the annual average inflation rate between 1991 and 2003 should be more than 6%, but in this period, the annual average inflation of South Korea was 4.7% by
of financial assistance plus the cost of implementing the personnel assistance), the Japanese provided less for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War while the South Koreans provided more for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War. In consequence, according to this inter-temporal cross-national comparison, there was an inter-temporal reverse in the amount of the total assistance for the United States between Japan and South Korea. Therefore, in Table 7-3, the mathematical operator that inter-temporally compares the size of the total assistance changes the direction from the Japanese cases to the South Korean cases (">" →"<"). In other words, the variation of the total assistance in the four cases shows a cross or an X-shape.

*Cross-national and Inter-temporal Variations: Militaristic Inclination*

In all cases, each Administration satisfied more than 50% of the demands, but, when we raised the sensitivity of our microscope, and looked more deeply into the details of each case, we could find that the specific extent of the accommodation in each case surpassing this 50%-mark was different from case to case. That is to say, the degree of flexibility, or the extent to which the reactive state specifically accommodated the foreign demands varied among the cases. More importantly, this variation in the flexibility evinced a possibility of systematic consistency.

Let us begin with the cross-national comparison. We could observe a militaristic inclination in R₁ and R₂. By the same token, we could observe a non-militaristic or financial inclination in K₁ and K₂. The evidence is unmistakable. In response to the Gulf Crisis/War, there was no personnel assistance in K₁, while in R₁, medical and engineering consumer price index and 5.5% by GDP deflator (Source: World Development Indicator).
units of the Korean Armed Forces were provided. More military elements are found in the South Korean case. This pattern is repeated a dozen years later. In K₂, the Japanese succeeded in dispatching some SDF soldiers to Iraq, but the size of the contingent was much smaller than that provided in R₂: about one-sixths of the Korean contingent.⁹¹ Again, more military elements are found in the South Korean case.

Table 7-4 National and Inter-temporal Variations among the Four Administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militaristic Inclination</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>△</td>
<td>Kaifu</td>
<td>Koizumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>(Japan)</td>
<td>(Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Roh Tae-woo</td>
<td>Roh Moo-hyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(South Korea)</td>
<td>(South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(The Gulf War)</td>
<td>(The Iraq War)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inter-temporally as well, we could observe a variation with a possible systematic source. Just like the cross-national variation mentioned above, another militaristic inclination is observed: more military elements are included in the assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf Crisis/War. In K₁, the Japanese provided US$ 13 billion, but no personnel assistance. In K₂, they provided US$ 5 billion plus SDF troops. The same pattern is observed in South Korea. In R₁, the Koreans provided US$ 500 million and some military units without combatants. In R₂, they promised only US$ 260 million, but the size of the personnel assistance considerably grew to be more than 3,000.

Consistently, more military elements are found in the assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War. Then, according to our observations, despite the fact that all the four cases

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⁹¹This comparison was made between the ground forces of the two countries. If we include the air and maritime forces, then the gap becomes much smaller.
passed the test of reactivity, we can see cross-national and inter-temporal variations in our cases. The variations are summarized in Table 7-4.

### 7.3 A Suggestion to Improve the RST

*Limit of the RST*

The test results of Chapter 6 showed that the RST is still useful in describing the foreign policy behavior of Japan as well as South Korea. But, the test of the competing theories, and the analysis and categorization of the test results in this chapter show that the descriptive power of the RST is limited because there are variations that the RST does not cover. Of course, the RST is not supposed to describe every aspect of Japanese foreign policy behavior. However, if there are variations that are not covered by the RST, and the critiques on the RST have some merits, we need to find a way to combine those separate theories into a larger unified theoretical framework.

Recall Figures 2-1 and 6-1. Through the descriptions of Chapters 4 and 5, and by the comparative test in Chapter 6, we could ascertain that our cases, as had been predicted by the reformulated RST, actually fell in the upper-right quadrant of the passivity-flexibility space. However, the weakness of the RST is that it is under-describing the variations in the set of the cases. In other words, it is silent about the distribution of the cases within the upper-right quadrant of the passivity-flexibility space.

*Combination of the RST and its Critics*

The findings of this chapter present a way to make up for this weakness. So far, we
have defined the passivity in terms of the sequence of actions and the excess to the original demands, and the flexibility in terms of the accommodation ratio and the time taken for the delivery. But, as a result of the discussion in this chapter, we found that the maximizing behavior within given parameters and the success and failure of accommodating U.S. demands are also important in describing the responses of the reactive state. Then, in order to enhance the sensitivity of our conceptual tools, we can include these additional concepts to the definitions of the passivity and the flexibility. Figuratively, it is like replacing the lenses of your microscope with those of higher magnifications in order to take pictures of higher resolution.

Figure 7-1 Distribution of the Cases within the Upper-right Quadrant of the Passivity-Flexibility Space

Specifically, we can hypothesize that the lack of maximizing behavior is a symptom of a higher degree of passivity, and that the lack of a failure to accommodate U.S. demands a symptom of higher degree of flexibility. Based on these additional definitions, we can conjecture the distribution of the cases within the upper-right quadrant of the
passivity-flexibility space as shown in Figure 7-1. Because the maximizing behavior was particularly indistinct in K₁, K₁ is positioned higher than other cases. On the other hand, R₂ is located to the right of other cases because we did not find any dramatic failure of accommodating U.S. demands in R₂. Then, we find an L-shaped distribution in the X-Y space, which corresponds to the upper-right quadrant of Figure 6-1.

Interestingly, this L-shaped distribution seems to be correlated to the X-shaped variation we observed in the previous section. The X-shaped variation was created because K₂ provided less assistance than K₁ while R₂ provided more than R₁. On the other hand, the L-shaped distribution was created first because the maximizing behavior was less distinct in K₁, and second because the failure of U.S. pressure was less conspicuous in R₂. Then, we can presume that the inter-temporal decrease in the assistance from the Japanese government is correlated to the inter-temporal increase in the maximizing behavior of the Japanese policymakers. At the same time, we can also presume that the inter-temporal increase in the assistance from the South Korean governments is correlated to the inter-temporal increase in their flexibility. The finding of this correlation suggests a causal relationship between the X-shaped variation and the L-shaped variation. We will further explore this issue in Chapter 9.

7.4 Summary of the Findings

In Chapters 6 and 7, we assessed the debate on the RST by testing each competing theory, and discussed the test results by clarifying the strengths and weaknesses of the RST as well as its critics. In consequence, we reached the following findings:
1) The RST as reformulated by our discussion in Chapter 3 validly describes the response behavior of Japan and South Korea in their responses to the two U.S-led wars in Iraq: the observed behavior was reactive in all our cases. In this sense, we could find no variation in the set of our cases.

2) Some competing theories such as Potter & Sudo’s “passive leadership” approach and Miyashita’s “passive-but-rational” approach do not validly describe the foreign policy behavior of Japan as well as South Korea in our cases.

3) Some other competing models such as the “maximizing-under-restraints” predicted by Kohno, and Schoppa’s “limit-of-gaiatsu” approach were useful in describing part of the behavior that is not covered by the RST.

4) Testing Park Cheol-hee’s critique requires more case studies, but if we can explain the source of the reactive behavior, we can expect that the explanation may provide a clue to testing Park’s critique.

5) The RST is not describing all the aspects of the Japanese and South Korean responses. It has a limit in describing the behavioral patterns of the reactive states and the substantial outcomes of their responses in more detail. That is, there were some variations that the RST does not cover: the two outliers observed in the maximizing behavior and the limit in accommodating U.S. demands; the X-shaped variation in the total financial assistance; and the national/inter-temporal inclination skewed towards more military elements.

6) In conclusion, the RST is still valid and useful, but has a limit. But, we could partly complement this limit by including the insights provided by some of the competing theories into the reactive state model.

In the following two chapters, we will try to explain the behavioral and substantial
variations observed in Chapters 6 and 7 by comparatively testing possible explanatory theories.
CHAPTER 8. EXPLAINING THE UNIFORMITY

No matter what the subject, we have to bound the domain of our concern, to organize it, to simplify the materials we deal with, to concentrate on central tendencies, and to single out the strongest propelling forces.

Kenneth N. Waltz

How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?

Sherlock Holmes in *The Sign of the Four*

In Chapter 6, we found that there was uniformity in the behavioral patterns of the administrations in Tokyo and Seoul when those administrations responded to U.S. demands with respect to the wars in the Middle East. In Chapter 7, however, we could also find some variations in some respects such as the interest-maximizing behavior, the limit of U.S. pressure, the amount of total assistance, and the share of military elements in the composition of the personnel assistance. In this chapter and the next one, we will try to explain this uniformity and the variations.

8.1 The Framework of Explanation

By explanation, we mean to find out the causal variable(s) for the variations or the lack thereof. In trying to find the causal variable(s), there are two caveats. One is that the
causal variable(s) should be able to explain the uniformity and the variations found in the South Korean cases, too. This is not only because the South Korean cases are our comparative benchmarks, but also because our objective in this dissertation is scientific explanation, and the essence of the scientific enterprise is to generalize over a multiple number of unique and idiosyncratic cases. Therefore, we will seek to discover the variable(s) that can explain not only the Japanese cases but also the behavior of the reactive states in general. If we are successful with the four cases, then, in the future, we will be able to move forward with more cases, raising the level of generalization. The second caveat is that we do not just want to provide a list of all possible explanatory variables. Our aim here is specifically to compare the explanatory power of possible explanatory variables so that we can find out the most important ones.

In order to test and compare the explanatory power of each candidate variable, we will use the method of controlled comparison. The testing criterion of the controlled comparison is that the values on the explanatory variable have to co-vary with the values on the dependent variable. For example, suppose that, according to a proposed causal relationship, variable \( \alpha \) is the candidate explanatory variable and that variable \( \beta \) is the dependent variable. If values on \( \beta \) are higher in case A than in case B, then values on \( \alpha \) should also be higher in case A than in case B. If the test shows that the values on \( \alpha \) are indeed higher in case A than in case B, then, the proposed causal variable passes the test (Van Evera 1997, 56-7). In order to complement the method of controlled comparison, we will also try to show the chain of causation between variables when necessary.

In order to be exhaustive in comparing the explanatory variables, we will adopt a deductive approach. In the field of foreign policy analysis, it is generally acknowledged
that there are five source categories to explain the foreign policy behavior of a country: external, societal, governmental, role, and individual sources (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 18). Based on this categorization, we will try to see which variable in which category can better explain our test results. To this end, for each category, we will propose some representative causal variable(s) extracted from existing researches on Japanese foreign policy behavior, and try to test which variable(s) from which category better explains our dependent variables.

8.2 The Governmental Source: Fragmented Authority over Foreign Policy (?)

The first candidate comes from the governmental source. Recall that the third argument of the RST was about the source of the reactive behavior. Calder (1988) argued that the main behavioral source of the Japanese reactive state is found in domestic constraints. Then, what variable in the domestic constraints is causing the reactivity? Calder (1988) mentions many variables, but the main explanatory variable is the lack of centralized authority.

Japanese domestic political structure discourages proactive foreign policy behavior in several respects. Perhaps most importantly, the fragmented character of state authority in Japan makes decisive action more difficult than in countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States or Fifth-Republic France. . . . Japan has, as Karel van Wolferen puts it, “a hierarchy, or complex of overlapping hierarchies, without a top,” the intermittent attempts of figures such as former Prime Minister Nakasone to play transcendent leadership roles notwithstanding (Calder 1988, 528-9; underline by author).

Fifteen years later, in an article that reassesses the reactive behavior of the Japanese
state, he reaches the conclusion that Japan is still reactive, and just like his argument 15 years previously, indicates as the main explanatory variable “Japan’s own domestic institutions” such as “the lack of a strong chief executive,” “the unusually arcane, time-consuming, and convoluted nature of Japanese parliamentary process,” “historically embedded deficiencies in bureaucratic structure including the weaknesses of the Defense Agency, intelligence agencies, and foreign services,” and the “deeply factionalized character of the ruling LDP” (Calder 2003, 614-5).

Of course, he also mentions the importance of external variables such as the “embedded stakes in the U.S.-Japan relationship,” and yet, the center of gravity is put on the domestic side.

These domestic constraints are especially crippling to Japanese diplomacy on issues where prospective Japanese initiatives counter U.S. policy. Embedded stakes in the U.S.-Japan relationship are so strong as to make the hurdle toward proactive policymaking almost impossible to surmount in the absence of broad domestic unity, centralized decision-making, or a major crisis in which U.S. support is not forthcoming (Calder 2003, 615; underline by author).

In fact, the explanation that identifies the sources of Japanese foreign policy behavior in their domestic institutions is also found in Japan. Yakushiji Katsuyuki, a longtime observer of the Japanese Foreign Ministry argues that the preparations for the UNPC bill were slowed down by the lack of a coordinating top that can break through the disagreement among the Prime Minister’s Office, the MOFA, the JDA, and the LDP. In response to this failure of coordination, the MOFA in 1993 created a new Bureau specializing in long-term planning and foreign policy coordination—the General Foreign Policy Bureau (Yakushiji 2003, 79-80).
However, the descriptions and the discussions of the previous chapters do not empirically support the arguments based on domestic institutions. In fact, remember that one of the purposes of the research design of this dissertation we clarified in Chapter 1 was to test the third argument of the RST. One empirical conclusion of this dissertation would be that, according to the observations, South Korea and Japan are indeed reactive, but that the main source of the reactivity as we observed in this research does not lie in the domestic constraints such as the governmental institutions. In most of the factors that Calder (1988; 2003) pointed out as the main explanatory variables for the reactive behavior—executive, legislative, and party characteristics—the South Korean conditions are different from the Japanese. In short, unlike Japan, the power within the governmental structure—the parties, the executive branch, the legislature—is more centralized than diffused, and the South Korean president is sitting right at the coordinating top of the whole governmental structure. Despite this explicit difference in the governmental structure, according to our observations, the South Korean behavior as observed in the process and the outcomes of the policy cases that we chose was found to be similar to the Japanese behavior.

Let us elaborate on the difference in the governmental structure between South Korea and Japan. First of all, most importantly, unlike Japan, the South Korean political system has a strong chief executive. The South Korean president is elected every five years with a fixed term and without the possibility of being reelected. However low the approval ratings of the president, no one can unseat the president before her term expires. The president does not need to consult other faction leaders of the ruling party when she
appoints or fires her cabinet ministers. She can veto any legislative attempt by the National Assembly unless the two-thirds majority of the legislature overrides the presidential veto. Moreover, in the area of foreign policy, the chief executive of the presidential system usually enjoys the so-called presidential prerogative in the conduct of diplomacy. Unlike the Japanese prime minister, who is viewed as merely one of the subjects of Tenno, the Japanese monarch, as the head of state and commander-in-chief of the National Armed Forces, the South Korean president can present herself as a symbol of national unity and a sole undisputed champion of the national interest.

Second, the South Korean legislative process is simpler than the Japanese. The South Korea legislative branch is structurally different from its Japanese counterpart. The South Korean legislature is unicameral: there is no Upper House. The number of the lawmakers is also much smaller in South Korea: 300, while the combined number of the lawmakers in the Japanese Houses of Commons and Councilors is 722 (480 + 242). Traditionally, the influence of factions on the legislative process was also weaker in South Korea than in Japan. The South Korean presidents as head of the ruling party used to use the public recommendation for the party nomination to whip the lawmakers in order. In addition, they could also control the flow of political funds to lawmakers. In

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92Since June 2000, when the confirmation hearing for the post of the prime minister was introduced for the first time in the constitutional history of the Republic of Korea, the scope of the governmental posts that require the confirmation hearings of the National Assembly has expanded: since 2003, the appointees for the posts of the chief of the National Intelligence Service, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the chief of the National Police Agency, and the chief of the National Tax Service have had to go through the National Assembly hearings; since 2005, all members of the State Council, that is, all Cabinet members also have had to go through the hearings. But, except for the posts of the prime minister, the justices of the Supreme Court, the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and the chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), whose appointment requires the prior approval of the National Assembly by the Constitution, the South Korean president is not constrained by the opinions of the National Assembly. Even if the National Assembly opposes the appointment of a specific candidate, the president can go ahead and finalize the appointment.
In comparison with the Japanese legislative and party process, it has been easier for the South Korean chief executive to control the legislative process.

Lastly, and most importantly, the South Korean president is equipped with institutional trappings of power that the Japanese prime ministers in the 1990s and the early 2000s could not even dream of. First and foremost, the presidential office, or the Blue House, itself is a large-scale organization whose sole purpose is to assist and advise the president in presiding over the cabinet. Dozens of senior secretaries to the president and additional staff man the office: they are selected from among the best and the brightest of the private sector, or the experienced and ambitious members of the bureaucracy. At the end of the term of President Kim Dae-jung in February 2003, the legally prescribed number of government employees in the Office of the President was 405. Five years later, the number rose to 531 (Park 2002; Han 2008).\footnote{There has been not much change in the number of the Blue House staff in comparison with its Japanese counterpart. The size of the staff at the end of the Kim Young-sam Administration was 375. The Roh Tae-woo Administration, 384. For both the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye Administrations, the number was 456 respectively (Park 2002; Chang 2013).} This number does not include the agents of the Presidential Security Service working in the Blue House, which counts more than 500 (Chang 2013).

On the other hand, the legally prescribed number of government employees in the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat—roughly the institutional counterpart of the South Korean Office of the President—was 377 in 2000 before Prime Minister Hashimoto’s Administrative Reform that began in the late 1990s took roots. Twelve years later, the number of government employees in the Cabinet Secretariat rocketed to 807 (Cabinet Secretariat 2013, 3). But, this dramatic increase was mainly due to the 13 temporary policy offices or ad-hoc response teams nominally created under the Cabinet Secretariat.
(Shinoda 2004, 31-33). The core number of public servants working in the Cabinet Secretariat is not many. The central part of the Cabinet Secretariat is the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, which is functionally closest to the idea of the South Korean Office of the President, because that is where the real coordination and planning take place. As of December 2001, the number of public servants working in the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries counts approximately 100.94

In addition, the South Korean President can wield the massive organization and manpower of the huge intelligence agency. The National Intelligence Service (NIS), the successor organization of the notorious KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) is directly affiliated to the Office of the President, and not answerable to any other offices within the executive branch including the Office of the Prime Minister and the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI). In terms of the size, the NIS dwarfs the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO), its Japanese counterpart. Also, South Korea has a large military, about 640,000 strong. Traditionally, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was powerful and prestigious. As commander-in-chief of the National Armed Forces, the president commands the military. She can also monitor and discipline the top brass of the military through the penetrating organization of the Defense Security Command, which is not answerable to any other generals but the defense minister and the president.95

In sum, the South Korean president in comparison with the Japanese prime minister retains much larger authority and power. And it is important to note that this difference

94See the table in Shinoda (2004, 27). Shinoda created this table based on the telephone directory of the Cabinet Secretariat.

95In the past, sometimes, the commander of the Defense Security Command (DSC) used to bypass even the defense minister and reported directly to the president, particularly when he felt the need to criticize the defense minister, his legal supervisor, in a tête-à-tête with the president.
does not stem from their personalities or social backgrounds. In the South Korean political system, structurally, the authority and power to make important foreign policy decisions are not fragmented but rather centralized in the hands of the president. Despite these differing conditions, we could find no significant cross-national variations in the reactive behavior of South Korea and Japan.

Inter-temporal comparison also strengthens our empirical finding. As we had observed in Chapter 6, we could not find any significant inter-temporal variation between K₁ and K₂ in terms of the reactive behavior. In the meantime, however, as we had pointed out in Chapter 1, there had been several major institutional reforms that resulted in the stronger power of the Japanese prime minister: electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s and the change of the rules for the LDP presidential election in early 2000s (Krauss and Pekkanen 2005). Despite these great changes, the main features of Japanese foreign policy behavior were constant. If cross-national and inter-temporal comparisons show that the changes in the domestic constraints did not significantly affected the behavioral patterns, then, the origins of the dependent variable—the reactive behavior—should be found in other sources.

8.3 The Societal Source: the Public Opinion, Interest Groups, and Culture

In addition to the governmental structure, Calder (1988) also emphasized the

---

96Krauss and Pekkanen (2005) emphasize the electoral and administrative reforms of the 1990s and the new prominence of the prime minister as a result of those reforms and other changes as a source of the new Japanese security policy. Unlike this research, which emphasizes the continuity of Japanese foreign policy behavior, however, notice that the aim of Krauss and Pekkanen (2005) is to explain the “change” of the Japanese security policy. They claim that the Japanese security policies shifted really and substantially between the Gulf War and the Iraq War. They argue that this shift was due to the institutional reforms and the resulting changes in the party politics of Japan.
monopolized structure of the Japanese media market as an intervening variable for the reactive behavior. The premise of this argument is that the public opinions do matter: the opinions in the civil society as represented by the mass media do affect foreign policy behavior as a causal variable. If the public opinions do not matter, then, the importance of the structure of the mass media market as an intervening variable will also be weakened. Another variable coming from the societal source is the influence of interest groups. In Chapter 3, based on Schoppa’s argument, we hypothesized that interest groups such as those representing the industrial interests of the energy and defense sectors would affect the decision process regarding the wars in the Middle East. The third candidate variable from the societal source is culture. No one in the RST debate as reviewed in Chapter 2 directly advocated the role of culture. And yet, cultural explanations are the most oft-quoted ones in popular discussions on Japanese uniqueness. For instance, many people point to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution as the institutional anchor of the pacifist culture, which constitutes the unique context of the foreign policy process in Japan. Below, we will test whether these predictions are fulfilled in the Japanese cases as well as in the comparative benchmarks.

Public Opinion

The most representative and epistemologically easy-to-access variable in the societal source category is public opinion. In the ideals of modern liberal democracy, it is the public that makes decisions in the final analysis. No policy that does not obtain public support can persist in the long run because a policy not favored by the electorate will be selected out through the competitive electoral process. (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley2008,
Then, if the source of both Japanese and South Korean reactive behavior is in public opinion, we should be able to find the movement in the public opinions of South Korea and Japan that justify the reactive behavior of Seoul and Tokyo. For example, if we want to demonstrate the causal relationship between public opinion and policy behavior, then, we need to find an observation that the public opinion comes first, and then the direction and substance of the policy follows as the public opinion dictated.

### Table 8-1 Japanese Public Opinion on the Gulf Crisis/War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Polling Institution</th>
<th>Poll Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sep. 1990 (Right after the 1st assistance package) | Kyodo<sup>A</sup> | 83% opposes to sending SDF  
59% satisfied with the Japanese contribution  
22% Japan contributed too much  
16% Japan contributed too little |
| 1 Oct. 1990           | Asahi<sup>B</sup>  | 40% Japanese contribution “lukewarm” while 77% of the Americans think that the Japanese contribution is not sufficient  
67% prefers non-military contribution if the same crisis recurs |
| Late Oct. 1990        | Kyodo<sup>C</sup>  | 50% opposes / 13.3% supports the UNPCC  
66.8% opposes / 12.9% supports the sending of SDF  
55.3% supports to send the personnel assistance  
45.4% wants to limit the assistance to non-military aspects. |


Let us take a look at the Japanese public opinion on the Gulf Crisis/War first. As you can see in Table 8-1, the Japanese were strongly opposed to the idea of sending SDF troops to the Gulf (83%); they preferred non-military contributions (67%). On the issue of personnel assistance, however, Japanese public opinion is ambivalent. According to a *Kyodo* poll in late October 1990, about half of the respondents were opposed to the
UNPCC. But in the same poll, 55.3% of the respondents supported the idea of sending personnel assistance. When public opinion is evenly divided or ambivalent on an issue, it is hard for policymakers to build a consistent policy direction based on the public opinion. These strong oppositions or ambivalent reactions from public opinion notwithstanding, the Kaifu Administration pushed forward with the UNPC bill up to the gate of the Diet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Polling Institution</th>
<th>Opposition to a possible U.S. strike on Iraq or the Iraq War (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2002</td>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2002</td>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2003</td>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. (20-21)</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. (29-30)</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2003</td>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ishibashi (2003, 768).

What was the public response to the Gulf Crisis/War in South Korea? In Seoul, too, the opposition to the U.S. requests of assistance was quite strong. Some opinion leaders

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97 On these poll results, Ito (1991, 281) raises a question. About half of the respondents were opposed to the UNPCC, but more than half of the respondents supported the idea of sending personnel assistance. Then, it means that some Japanese regarded the UNPCC as closer to military assistance than to non-military personnel assistance. Ito claims that “the fundamental problem was the different manner in which Prime Minister Kaifu presented the question.”
were not positive even about financial assistance. As we noted in Chapter 4, the editorials of major newspapers in Seoul were mostly unfavorable to the U.S. requests, (1) because South Korea was already shouldering heavy burdens for the defense against North Korea; (2) because the South Korean economy was ailing due to the serious trade deficits accumulating since the end of the Seoul Olympics in 1988; and (3) because of the devastating flood that damaged the whole country in the summer of 1990. Despite these strong negative opinions, the Roh Tae-woo Administration went ahead with the assistance package.

After the South Korean decision to help the United States was made, however, the public opinion in South Korea began to change. An opinion poll conducted by ChungangIlbo on 11 January 1991 shows that “the deployment of a medical team is most favored, followed by economic assistance and deployment of troops: 49.3% support the deployment of a medical team, while 23.5% oppose; 36.6% support economic assistance, while 36.2% oppose; and 24.2% support the deployment of troops, while 54.2% oppose” (ChungangIlbo [Seoul], 13 January 1991, 1). According to these results, the opposition to the medical team was less than one-fourth of the respondents, and pros and cons over the economic assistance were evenly divided. Later, after the delivery of the assistance was almost all completed, the change in public opinion was more dramatic. In an opinion poll conducted by the Korea Research Center, “an overwhelming 88.4% lauded the government for sending military medical and air transport teams to support the MNF” (Yonhap [Seoul], 2 March 1991).⁹⁸ According to our observations, then, the public

⁹⁸This poll was conducted at the request of the Information Ministry of the Republic of Korea. This fact may undermine the reliability of the poll results, and yet we can still see in the poll results the trend of the public opinion on the government’s decisions regarding the assistance for the Gulf Crisis/War after the war was over.
opinions of Japan and South Korea during the Gulf Crisis/War were not able to provide clear directions to the policymakers because they were mixed or evenly divided.

Moreover, sometimes, public opinion changed following the government’s decisions rather than leading them.

In fact, a similar pattern is observed in $K_2$ and $R_2$. As for the Iraq War, the public opposition was very strong in Japan. Table 8-2 shows that the Japanese public’s opposition to the Iraq War was consistently strong before, during, and after major U.S. operations in Iraq. Even a poll taken by the conservative *Yomiuri* found that more than half of the Japanese were opposed to the Iraq War (Ishibashi 2003, 768). Therefore, we can see that the Koizumi Administration decided to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq not because of, but despite this strong opposition of the Japanese public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Poll Results (%)</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2004</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2004</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Yomiuri</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2003</td>
<td>Yomiuri</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>&lt;</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2004</td>
<td>Yomiuri</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>Yomiuri</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>Mainichi</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2004</td>
<td>Mainichi</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, the Japanese public’s support for and opposition to the SDF dispatch shows a pattern similar to that observed during the Gulf Crisis/War. This time, too, public opinion changed as the government implemented the dispatch, in the direction of the support for the government’s policy. As you can see in Table 8-3, the Japanese public’s opposition to the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq was quite strong throughout 2003. As the deployment of SDF troops materialized from January 2004, however, the opposition began to go down, and the support for the dispatch began to surpass the opposition as the Yomiuri and Mainichi poll results show in Table 8-3. Even the poll results of the liberal Asahi Shimbun show that from March 2004, the support for the dispatch of the SDF surpassed the opposition. Again, public opinion followed rather than led the decision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Approval Ratings (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2002</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2003</td>
<td>Asahi</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2003</td>
<td>Kyodo</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2003</td>
<td>Kyodo</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Mainichi</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Interestingly, exactly the same pattern is found in the approval ratings of Prime Minister Koizumi. Expressing support for an unpopular war was a political challenge for Prime Minister Koizumi. As you can see in Table 8-4, as Prime Minister Koizumi
announced his official support for the Iraq War in March 2003, his approval ratings plummeted. The dilemma did not stop there. Later, Koizumi had to delay the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq twice in 2003: one after the bombing of the UN headquarters in Iraq on August 19, and the other after another bombing in Nasiriyah on November 12. After the Japanese deployment of SDF troops to Iraq was actually implemented, however, Koizumi’s approval ratings regained the pre-Iraq War level.

Table 8-5 South Korean Public Opinion on the Dispatch of Non-combat Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Poll Results (%)</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 20, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Iraq War begins.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 21, 2003</td>
<td>Sekye Ilbo</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 24, 2003</td>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 25, 2003</td>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31, 2003</td>
<td>Hankyoreh</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2, 2003</td>
<td>Donga Ilbo</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 9, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baghdad falls.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 30, 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Korean medical (Seohee) and engineering (Jema) troops depart for Iraq.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lee (2006, 487)

A similar pattern is observed in the responses of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. When the Iraq War broke out, the South Korean government provided non-combat forces mainly composed of medical and engineering units. However, even to the dispatch of the non-combat troops, the public opposition was quite strong. In Table 8-5, we can find that the pros and cons over the dispatch of the non-combat troops to Iraq were almost evenly divided. The National Assembly, too, was reluctant. The lawmakers of the ruling and opposition parties delayed the decision on the dispatch, and passed the buck to President Roh. Finally, President Roh had to personally address the legislature to persuade the
lawmakers and the public opinion. Again, the public opinion failed to provide a specific policy direction.

The observation that the public opinion changes following the decision by the government is also found in South Korea. As shown in Table 8-6, when the United States asked for the dispatch of additional troops, the public opinion was strongly against the request. However, once President Roh made the decision to send additional troops to Iraq, the public opinion began to change: in the first poll taken after the decision, the majority of the respondents supported the dispatch of additional troops to Iraq, and in two additional polls conducted by Moonhwa Ilbo and Kookmin Ilbo, the opinions were almost evenly divided. These poll results are in contrast to the pre-decision poll results: before President Roh’s decision on 17 October 2003, the public opposition to the dispatch of additional troops was unmistakable.

Table 8 -6 South Korean Public Opinion on the Dispatch of Combat Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Poll Results (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 4, 2003</td>
<td>Richard Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense asks for additional troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18, 2003</td>
<td>The South Korean NSC holds a standing committee meeting to discuss the U.S. request.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 16, 2003</td>
<td>Joongang Ilbo</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 20, 2003</td>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 20, 2003</td>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 22, 2003</td>
<td>Hankyoreh</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 22, 2003</td>
<td>Chosun Ilbo</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 16, 2003</td>
<td>The UNSC approves Resolution 1511, which supports an international force in Iraq under U.S. authority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2003</td>
<td>President Roh decides to send additional troops to Iraq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 21, 2003</td>
<td>Hankook Ilbo</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2, 2003</td>
<td>Moonhwa Ilbo</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1, 2003</td>
<td>Kookmin Ilbo</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In sum, the survey of the public opinions in K₁, R₁, K₂, and R₂ shows that public opinion is not the explanatory variable that we have been looking for. First, public opinion does not explain the flexibility. Seoul and Tokyo decided to support and help Washington despite the public opposition. Sometimes, public opinion even shifted in a direction of favoring the support for the United States after the government announced the decision. In this sense, the public opinion in our cases was a dependent rather than an independent variable.

Second, public opinion does not explain passive behavior, either. Recall that the essence of passivity in our definition was that the reactive state waits for U.S. actions without preemptively producing its own policies. Therefore, in order for a state to be non-passive, the state has to announce its policy before U.S. actions, based on its own calculation of the national interest. Of course, public opinion was a factor to be reckoned with when the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul had to decide on whether to provide the demanded assistance in what amount and when. It must have been a gamble for the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul to decide to help the Americans, knowing the existence of strong public opposition. This was probably the reason why the policymakers in the Koizumi Cabinet were so cautious in their steps, and why the Roh Moo-hyun Administration had to go through a fierce debate over the issue of sending the additional troops. That is to say, public opinion can slow down the process of formulating a policy responding to U.S. demands.
However, notice that, in our definition, passivity is defined not by the speed of policy implementation, but by the timing of policy formulation and announcement. If public opinion is to be the explanatory variable for passivity, the public opinion on the policy response to the crisis in the Middle East should have been formed before the initial policy response was formulated. According to our observation, however, the public opinion was formed after U.S. demands were specified. Not until the U.S. demands had been made known publicly or indirectly did the public opposition in South Korea and Japan materialize. In other words, in the initial stage or the pre-initial stage of the decision-making process, there was no pronounced public opinion to be reckoned with. Remember that the first thing that Prime Minister Kaifu did in response to the news of the Iraqi invasion was to gather and listen to the opinions of energy experts. The public opinion had not crystalized yet. That is, there was no specific public opinion to be considered in deciding on the response to U.S. demands because there had been no U.S. demands yet. Likewise, in the summer of 2003, there was no South Korean public opinion about a U.S. request of additional troops because Washington had not yet submitted the request. By then, the security situation in Iraq was already deteriorating, but Seoul did not spontaneously produce its response to the situation. Seoul’s policy process responding to the worsening situation in Iraq began after Washington submitted the request, and then the public opinion began to materialize.

Comparison with non-reactive cases also supports our conclusion. Prime Minister Thatcher and her Cabinet’s initial response to the Iraqi invasion did not come out of their sophisticated calculation of the British public opinion. When President Mitterrand decided to take independent actions when the Iraqi invasion broke out, the decision was
based on the French calculation of her interest rather than on the French public opinion. In short, Japanese and South Korean policymakers were already passive even before their public opinion was specified.

*Interest Groups*

The second candidate from the societal source is the influence of interest groups. The modern democracy is pluralist democracy. In pluralist democracies, where the freedom of association is guaranteed, interest groups, or the people who gather together to achieve a special purpose, do influence political processes. And when we dealt with the implications of Schoppa’s theory in Chapter 3, we hypothesized that industries representing the energy or defense interests would influence the decision-making process in regard to the response to U.S. demands. In addition to the energy or defense-related interest groups, it is also plausible that NGOs based on public opinion would amplify the effect of the specific aspects of the opinion.

However, our observation does not find any evidence that such influence existed. No evidence suggests that organized industrial interests actively expressed their opinions on the issue of assisting the United States during the wars.\(^99\) For example, Hong (2005)’s

\(^99\)One rare exception although not covered in our case descriptions is found in Japan’s decision-making process about the dispatch of minesweepers to the Gulf in April 1991. Hiraiwa Gaishi, Chairman of the Keidanren or the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, the voice of big business in Japan, held a press conference on 8 April 1991, and announced a “Chairman’s opinion,” arguing that Japan has to dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf. Two days later, Suzuki Eiji, Chairman of the Nikkeiren or the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations, another big interest group representing the Japanese business interests expressed his opinion to support the dispatch. The next day, on 11 April 1991, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association, All Japan Seamen’s Union, and the Arabian Oil Company, which was at the time involved in the development of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait officially and/or unofficially demanded the dispatch. Finally, on 24 April 1991, Japan decided to dispatch the minesweepers, and those minesweepers set sail on 26 April 1991 (Shinoda 2006, 70-1). However, this type of expressions of opinions by the business interests about security issues were very rare as Shinoda himself acknowledges. All the predecessors of Hiraiwa Gaishi had firmly kept the principle of the separation of politics and economy. Moreover, it should be noted that by April 1991, the Gulf War had already been over. Hiraiwa,
research on the “impact of NGOs on South Korea’s decision to dispatch troops to Iraq” concludes that “NGO activities did not successfully change those conservatives or realists who firmly believed that sending troops would best serve the national interest” (Hong 2005, 36). The finding of the research also shows that [the NGOs] did not challenge the Roh [Moo-hyun] government’s decision to renew the duration of the Korean forces in Iraq for another year despite [their] rhetoric which opposed [the renewal] (Hong 2005 44).

The decisions on whether to support and provide assistance to the United States and on the amount and timing of the assistance were made by a small number of people on the highest echelons of the governmental structure. Sometimes, even the members of the legislature were not properly briefed about the process. Or, the lawmakers were reluctant to participate in the decision-making process themselves because they were not willing to share the responsibility of sending their young men in harm’s way.

This result is in fact not surprising. Usually, the influence of interest groups on politics is larger when the issues are domestic non-security issues. The more public attention the issues gather, the less influential the impact of interest groups becomes, because interest groups usually exert their impact through behind-the-scenes lobbies focusing on a single issue, whose economic pluses and minuses are clear-cut to the interest groups (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 302-3). However, the issues that the administrations in Tokyo and Seoul had to deal with in our cases were fundamentally different from the kind of issues that are amenable to interest-group pressure. First of all, the U.S. request of financial and personnel assistance created a sense of crisis within the

himanself, attached three conditions for the dispatch: (1) it should be limited to the peacetime; (2) it should be understood by the Asian neighbors; and (3) it should not create legal problems. That is to say, what they encouraged was not to participate in a war, but to secure the sea-lane.
governments; it was a matter of national security; the issues grabbed much public attention; and the interests at stake could not easily be reduced to economic calculations. In short, there was no room for interest groups to intervene in the decision-making process.

Moreover, if interest groups or NGOs are to be an independent factor in influencing the policy behavior of a government, then the interest groups or NGOs have to be independent from the government in the first place. Yet, energy and defense industries in Japan and South Korea are usually under tight control of the government through various regulations and administrative guidance. NGOs, too, are in reality not very independent from governmental influences because their financial resources are limited. Particularly in South Korean cases, “[NGOs’] budget had come from governmental subsidies . . . It is highly unlikely that the NGOs would dare challenge the government if they are financially dependent on the government” (Hong 2005, 37).

Culture

The last candidate from the societal source is culture. Can a cultural variable explain the reactive behavior? Since Ruth F. Benedict’s monumental work on Japanese cultural patterns (Benedict 1946), many scholars have tried to find the true uniqueness of the Japanese system, and many of those attempts found the source of the Japanese uniqueness in the Japanese culture (Wolferen 1989, Okimoto and Rohlen 1988, Part I; Odaka 1983, chs. 8, 9; Hashimoto 1995). Similar attempts continued in the 1990s in explaining the continuity of Japanese defense policy. For example, Thomas U. Berger (1993, 120) argues that Japan will not “seek to become a major military power.” He
claims that “the primary reason for Japan’s reluctance to do so is not to be found in any structural factor . . . but rather is attributable to Japan’s postwar culture of anti-militarism.” According to him, both the Japanese public and elites learned a lesson from the fiascoes of the 1930s and 1940s. The lesson is, “the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored,” and this lesson is “institutionalized in the Japanese political system.”

We can find a similar argument in Peter J. Katzenstein’s work on the relationship between cultural norms and security policy of Japan. Katzenstein (1996) argues that institutionalized norms in domestic politics, not the international balance of power or the interest defined by the international environment can explain the continued peculiarity of Japan’s security policy. Japanese security policy avoids violence, not just outwardly, but also domestically. The cause of this reluctance, according to Katzenstein, comes from the institutionalized norms of pacifism. The normative context of Japanese law and society pushes the instruments of security policy in an economic rather than military direction. This is because in the realm of economic security, the norms are uncontested: there are not many disagreements. On the other hand, in the area of military security, the norms are contested: there are many disagreements among the Japanese about how to implement military security policies. In short, when the norms are contested, the policy is marked by stalemate; when the norms are not contested, the policy is flexible.

The concept of political culture is defined as political values, ideas, and ideals that people hold about society and politics. However, what are these values, ideas, and ideals? The answer varies from scholars to scholars (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 243). Due to this conceptual flexibility, cultural explanations are sometimes convenient
because the term “culture” may mean different things to different people. Therefore, when we choose culture as an explanatory variable, we have to go to greater pains to define it exactly.

Nevertheless, in Berger (1993) and Katzenstein (1996), the core concept or the main explanatory variable is under-defined. Berger (1993) never directly defines what he means by culture. Likewise, Katzenstein (1996) does not provide an operationalized definition of norm or institution. For example, Katzenstein says:

Norms are social facts whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms help coordinate political conflicts (regulative norms), and they shape political conflicts over identity (constitutive norms). To disregard norms and take the interests of actors as given is thus to short-circuit an important aspect of the politics and polity of national security. In brief, this book establishes that norms matter for national security policy (Katzenstein 1996, x; underline by author).

These are not testable definitions of the norm. Katzenstein specifies many functions of the norm, but does not provide a criterion with which to distinguish between norms and non-norms. In addition, Katzenstein seems to prefer to use the term, an “institutionalized norm,” but does not explain the difference between institutions and norms. For example, according to Douglass C. North (1990, 40), a norm is a kind of an institution. Then, an institutionalized norm is tautology if the institution is not otherwise defined.  

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100 For example, Geertz (1973, 4-5) lists eleven different definitions of culture.

101 North (1990, 3) defines the institution as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In short, institutions are rules or constraints. There are two types of constraints: formal and informal. Informal constraints have three aspects: (1) extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, (2) socially sanctioned norms of behavior, and
Moreover, when Berger and Katzenstein explain how cultural or normative variables affect the security policy of Japan, their explanations are in fact more political or institutional than cultural. For example, Berger places the ideological position of the Yoshida Doctrine in the middle between the Left and the Right of the political spectrum: a sort of a casting voter. To summarize Berger’s explanation, in the Japanese politics of the 1950s and 1960s, the Left espoused two tenets: one is the total denunciation of military forces including the SDF, and the other, the UN-centric diplomacy whereas the Right pushed for remilitarization and restoration of the prewar status as a normal state. On the other hand, the Centrist chose to concentrate on economic growth, limit spending on the military, and depend on the United States for Japan’s security. The continuity of the Japanese culture of anti-militarism, Berger argues, is based on the balance among these three political forces. The LDP was a coalition between the Right and the Centrist. However, whenever the Right within the LDP tried to change the status quo of security policy, the Centrist “defected and supported opposition forces in blocking the new defense initiative” (Berger 1993, 140-1).

Interestingly, Berger uses this political balance when he explains the change of Japanese defense policy, too. The change in the defense and security policy is possible when and only when there is a consensus between the Centrist and the Right within the LDP. Naturally, this change is slow and incremental because the change was made possible under domestic constraints, that is, by the reluctant cooperation of the Centrist, and because, even when agreeing, the Centrist wants to place every conceivable safeguard on the new defense initiative (Berger 1993, 142). Although seemingly

(3) internally enforced standards of conduct (North 1990, 40; underline by author).
persuasive, this is not a cultural explanation. Rather, Berger’s ‘explanation’ of the culture of anti-militarism as specified above is a typical description of the process of coalition-building.

The same can be said of Katzenstein’s explanation of the role of institutionalized norms. In order to show how the pacifist norm is institutionalized in the Japanese defense structure, Katzenstein describes the organizational structure of JDA (Katzenstein 1996, 104-8). JDA is permeated by powerful non-military ministries such as MOFA, MITI, and MOF. The uniformed officers of the SDF do not play a direct advisory role for the prime minister. Rather, they are cut off from the top. Inside the JDA, it is the civilians that occupy the functional high ground. Katzenstein seems to want to show the institutional basis of the pacifist norm by this description. However, this explanation is more institutional than normative.

Of course, most of the cultural explanations do not stand alone (Harrison and Huntington 2000, 3). Culture or norms interact with other variables, and influence human behavior in conjunction with other variables. Sometimes, cultural variables work through intervening variables such as institutions and rational calculations. However, we should be careful not to mix different variables together. In the usual usage of social science terminology, culture comprises “phenomena such as family structure, religion, moral values, ethnic consciousness, ‘civic-ness,’ and particularistic historical tradition. . . . Culture can be defined as a-rational, ethical habit passed on through tradition” (Fukuyama 1995, 8). However, Berger and Katzenstein explicate the arrangement of political forces within the Diet or the structure of governmental institutions when they say they are highlighting the basis of cultural or normative variables. This dissertation
does not intend to underestimate the importance of political and institutional variables. But we do need to distinguish them from culture.

Culture may be able to explain the passive side of the reactive behavior: the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul could not determine and deliver their positions to the United States because the East Asian culture prevalent in Japan and South Korea, which respects elders, authority, and hierarchy may work as a brake. However, if culture is a brake, then, which aspect of the culture explains the flexible side? It is usually presumed that culture changes slowly. But, the Japanese and South Korean responses to U.S. demands were sometimes very swift. It took only a couple of months for the Kaifu Administration to write up the draft of the UNPC bill and submit it to the Diet. The Koizumi Administration was likewise surprisingly fast in finishing all the legal requirements for the SMHRAI Law. Why did the culture of anti-militarism and the institutionalized norms of pacifism not work at the time?

Katzenstein recognizes this problem, and admits the importance of the calculation of long-term interests, saying that “the [norm-based analysis] does not insist that norms determine all the interests that inform policy choice” (Katzenstein 1996, 150). In other words, the long-term interest of the Japanese state calculated in view of the bilateral relationship with the United States overrode the normative context of pacifism because “Japan cannot escape its relationship with the United States. . . . Government officials view the world largely through the prism of the relationship, and so have been receptive to American pressure” (Katzenstein 1996, 146). Katzenstein, quoting David Bobrow, finds the source of Japanese flexibility in the relations with the United States. “[S]tronger relations with the United States have become the dominant view . . . dependence [on the
United States] remains the single most supported position” (Katzenstein 1996, 148). At the same time, however, Katzenstein emphasizes the fact that Japan was strongly resistant to American pressure when it came down to the transfer of militarily relevant technology. Even the importance of U.S.-Japan relations could not change the resistant behavior because, according to Katzenstein, the norm of enhancing economic independence and Japanese business interests worked against the transfer.

Therefore, in Katzenstein’s theorizing, the normative variables do work in some cases, but not in others. Then, the next question should be when they work and when they do not. Why do such important variables as norms institutionalized in every corner of Japan’s defense and security policy apparatus not work if the relationship with the United States is concerned? Does the power of U.S. interests always triumph over the influence of domestic norms? And if not, what is the limit of the American pressure? On these questions, Katzenstein does not provide specific answers.

Lastly and most evidently, the power of culture is limited in our benchmarks: cultural variables do not explain the foreign policy behavior of another reactive state: South Korea. In South Korea, there is no such thing as culture of anti-militarism or pacifist norms. If anything, South Korea has a strong culture of militarism. The absence of anti-militarist culture or institutionalized norms of pacifism in South Korea is obvious. Notice that, despite this obvious absence of pacifist culture, we could find explicit observations of the reactive foreign policy behavior in the South Korean cases. Then, it will be natural to raise suspicion about the reliability of cultural variables as the source of the reactive foreign policy behavior. Let us examine the absence of pacifist culture in South Korea more closely.
First of all, constitutionally, South Korea has no such thing as the Peace Constitution, although the South Korean Constitution does renounce “all aggressive wars.”\textsuperscript{102} Naturally, therefore, there is also no such organization within the executive branch as CLB (Cabinet Legislative Bureau), which can interfere with the defense and security policies in the name of the Constitution.

Second, institutionally, the military in South Korea is not isolated and downgraded. Unlike the JDA, MND of the Republic of Korea has an established and independent position within the governmental structure. No other Ministry permeates and penetrates MND. The mainstream or the group that steers MND traditionally comes from among the graduates of the three prestigious Korean Military Academies, particularly, the Army. Those who passed the Higher Civil Service Examination, another route to the status of power and prestige in South Korea, usually do not prefer to join the MND, because they know that in the MND, they will be marginalized by the ‘soldiers.’ In South Korea, important posts of the MND including that of the defense minister are filled with former or active-duty military officers.\textsuperscript{103}

Third, socially as well, the South Koreans are familiar with the military. Between 1961 and 1992, generals or former generals ruled the country. It was not hard to find graduates of the military academies or former military officers in every government organization. The military way of management was prevalent in the South Korean state

\textsuperscript{102}Article 5 of the Constitution reads: (1) The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall renounce all aggressive wars. (2) The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and defense of the land and their political neutrality shall be maintained (underline by author).

\textsuperscript{103}Unlike the United States, where former military generals do not get the post of the secretary of defense as a rule, no civilian has ever occupied the post of the defense minister in the Republic of Korea since the end of the Second Republic in 1961.
as well as its society. Being admitted to one of the military academies was prestigious not only for the student but also for the family. Even today, by law, all men except for the disabled have to serve in the military about two years. When two male strangers get together, they can easily share their experiences in the military.

Fourth, culturally, coercion or use of force was not uncommon in South Korea; often, it was justified as one of the proper policy instruments by the present danger arising from external threats. The threats were actually not illusory. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, a series of provocations and terrorist attacks from the outside threatened the South Korean security: attempted assassinations of South Korean Presidents in 1968, 1974, and 1983; shooting down or bombing of South Korean civilian aircrafts in 1983 and 1987; a submarine infiltration into the South Korean sea and soil in 1996; naval skirmishes in the Yellow Sea in 1999 and 2002; killing of a South Korean tourist in Kumkang Mountain in 2008; and recently, sinking of a South Korean Naval ship, and shelling of a small island in the Yellow Sea in 2010. Constant threats created the atmosphere of fear, which, in turn, spawned what Kent E. Calder called “fiat politics.” In South Korea in contrast to Japan, “policymakers rely on coercion rather than compensation to enforce popular adherence to security policies . . . In its dealings with the private sector, the government typically requisitions; it does not appease” (Calder 2007, 148).

All in all, our analysis shows that the variables from the societal source—public opinion, interest-group influence, and culture—do not explain the reactive behavior as defined and observed in our cases: evenly divided public opinion could not provide any specific direction; and public opinion was following rather than leading the decisions of the administrations. As for group influence, we did not observe any evidence that interest
groups or NGOs greatly influenced the actual policy behavior of the government: the interest groups in our cases were dependent rather than independent variables. The explanatory power of the cultural variables was limited, too: the cultural variables as used by the culturalists were under-defined; even if culture was able to explain the passive side of the reactive behavior, it was less useful for explaining the flexible side; and most conspicuously, the main characteristics of the cultural variables that we observed in the Japanese cases—anti-militarism or pacifism—were missing in the Korean cases. That is, the Koreans showed the reactive behavior even without the culture of pacifism.

8.4 The Individual Source: Values, Experience, and Leadership Style

So far we have dealt with variables working on the macro-level such as governmental institutions, national constitutions, public opinion, influences of interest groups, culture, and norms. However, there are also some variables working on the micro-level or variables that work through psychological processes of individual participants. It is now time to see whether such micro variables can explain the reactive behavior.

Governments or countries do not make decisions. When we say that “Seoul” made a decision XYZ, for example, the “Seoul” in this context actually represents the president of the Republic of Korea and his close advisors or the government bureaucrats. It is specific and particular people made up of flesh and blood that make decisions, not the state much less the nation. In fact, this observation is perfectly in accord with the basic premise of modern liberal democracy: the electorate gives their mandate to a candidate
on the condition that the candidate would fulfill their wishes. If they judge that the candidate failed to fulfill the promises that she made in the previous electoral campaign, the electorate will retract the mandate, and another candidate will replace the incumbent. The whole electoral process of democracy is based on the assumption that individual officeholders can make difference in history.

If an individual in an office can change the goals and functions of the office, or the way the office works, then, such psychological and biographical factors as her prior experience, knowledge, values, beliefs, drives, management style, personal characteristics, and the way she relates to other people will be important in explaining and predicting the work of the office. In other words, if the person participating in the decision-making process matters, then we have to pay attention to the personality of the decision-maker.

The same logic can be applied to our cases. The personal characteristics or prior experiences of those who made the decisions may be able to explain the reactive behavior. Moreover, we need to keep in mind that we are dealing with a crisis situation in which the main topic was whether to use force to help the Americans. As we had discussed in Chapter 3, dealing with Schoppa’s arguments, in a crisis situation, when use of force is discussed, ordinary procedures are short-circuited, and the authority of the decision is concentrated in a small number of people, or in the person of one decision-maker. In such situations, naturally, the explanatory power of the variables from the individual source is expected to rise.

Indeed, there are some scholars who emphasize such variables by attributing to the supreme leaders the success or failure of the responses. For example, Ito (1991) is very critical of Prime Minister Kaifu’s response to the Gulf Crisis/War:
Apparently, Kaifu had no clear conception of the enormity of the problem contained in the proposal that SDF be dispatched to a strife-torn foreign region for the first time since the enactment of the postwar constitution and against a background of worldwide change. . . . He should have openly expressed his political convictions concerning the Gulf crisis and Japan’s role, asserted that ‘we have no choice but to change the customary interpretation of the constitution,’ . . . Kaifu lacked the courage to propose a reinterpretation of the constitution, and he presented to the Diet a bill that had no hope of passage without precisely such a reinterpretation. . . . [S]uch pandering to the emotions of ‘one-country pacifism’ was characteristic not only of Chairwoman Doi but of Prime Minister Kaifu as well (Ito 1991, 278; 281; underline by author).

In a nutshell, Ito argues, Kaifu was not aware of the historical significance of the UNPCC in the constitutional history of Japan. As a result, he lacked the conviction and determination to push forward with the UNPC bill. Kaifu should have staked his political career to persuade the Japanese public and the opposition parties, Ito maintains. Even if he had failed in that endeavor, he would have been able to “arouse the Japanese to a sense of their international mission and an awareness of national security” (Ito 1991, 278).

It is not difficult to find other experts and commentators who would agree with Ito. Karl D. Jackson, who was White House Senior Director for Asian Affairs during the Gulf Crisis/War, indirectly answered the question of whether Prime Minister Kaifu was the reason behind the passive response of Japan by saying, “He was a pacifist” (Jackson 2010). Sankei Shimbun was more straightforward. Analyzing the cause of the failure of the UNPC bill, the Sankei Shimbun editors argued, “The total lack of all such high level political judgments is the bill’s greatest flaw. . . . The cause lay all too obviously in the absence of political decisiveness on the part of Prime Minister Kaifu as the country’s leader” (Ito 1991, 281-2).

A very similar argument is found on the Korean side. Hong (2005) argues that
President Roh Moo-hyun should have been more proactive and decisive in deciding on the assistance for the United States.

President Roh was put in an awkward position since he had to deal with two directly opposing forces of one, the external pressure from the U.S., and the other, the societal pressure that strongly opposed assisting the U.S. war efforts in Iraq. There was no easy way out. The best he could do was to delay making the final decision as long as he could afford to. . . . However, President Roh could not totally ignore the U.S. request . . . In the end, President Roh opted to send troops but that of a much smaller size than what the U.S. originally requested and at a much later moment than the U.S. might have wished for. . . . the delay of the decision cost the President a golden opportunity to regain confidence of both the Bush administration and the American military establishment. Particularly, according to critics, South Korea’s decision to refuse to work together with the U.S. in its stabilization efforts in the Kirkuk area was a big mistake (Hong 2005, 33; underline by author).

Nevertheless, passing the buck to the supreme leaders is easier said than done. First of all, as we had concluded in Chapter 6 as a result of the comparison of the delivery speed between South Korea and Japan, there is not much difference in the speed of the delivery of assistance between Japan and South Korea. To be sure, there were some delays, but the cause of the delay was for both Seoul and Tokyo basically an external factor: the security situation in Iraq. That is, from a comparative standpoint, the assumption of Hong (2005)’s criticism is not accurate in the first place. Secondly, as for the criticism of Ito (1991) that Kaifu as the supreme leader of Japan was not sufficiently active in managing the legislative process for the UNPC bill, Kaifu himself would not agree on this criticism (Kaifu 2003, 77). Kaifu does not even recognize the active role of Ozawa Ichiro in planning and implementing the strategy for passing the UNPC bill through the Diet. Kaifu claims that he, assisted by Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo, was always at the helm of the legislative process.
Moreover, attributing the political responsibility on a symbolic level to the supreme leaders is one thing, and tracing back the empirical cause of specific policy behavior to their personalities and values is quite another. Constitutionally, as a leader of the nation, presidents and prime ministers have to be accountable for a foreign policy decision made during their tenures. But, in reality, a chief of the executive branch cannot always take care of all policies made and implemented under his or her stewardship. Sometimes, the president delegates her power to some credible subordinates in order to concentrate on what she finds more important. Or, in an area where the SOPs are well established, the policy grows on its own without the love and care of the supreme leader. In other words, we cannot simply assume the existence of the influence of a leader on a specific policy and attribute the responsibility to her even when the issue concerns an important foreign policy decision. In order to check whether the personalities of the leaders actually affected the policy behavior, we will have to test the causal relationship against the cases.

The test criterion here will be, as we had set up in the beginning of this chapter, that the value on the candidate explanatory variable should be uniform across the cases. For the purpose of testing, we will focus on value orientation, prior experience, and leadership style of the four supreme leaders of our cases.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴There must be many aspects of an individual as a decision-maker to be considered when we have to test an individual’s influence on the policy behavior. Then, why do we have to focus on these, not other aspects of an individual? One simple answer is that we do not need to know everything about the life of a political leader to see his or her influence on the policy behavior. For example, we do not need to know President Roh Moo-hyun’s taste in cookies to see his influence on South Korea’s foreign policy towards the United States. An ordinary and commonsensical principle of relevance will work here. For instance, Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley (2008, 505-7) argue that eight psychological concepts including nationalism, need for power, etc. are “linked to the foreign policy attitudes, beliefs, and behavior of foreign policy elites.” However, when they discuss the linkage between the characteristics of the presidential advisory system and the personal characteristics of the President, they focus on only three personal aspects of the leader: need to control, sensitivity to context, and prior experience.
Value Orientation

First of all, Prime Minister Kaifu might have been under the influence of the value of postwar Japanese pacifism. Even when the Japanese had to speedily come up with a response to U.S. demands, he was interested in curbing the influence of JDA. On the issue of whether to include the active members of SDF into UNPCC, Kaifu diverged from other LDP leaders. Nevertheless, the leaders in the other cases—President Roh Tae-woo, Prime Minister Koizumi, and President Roh Moo-hyun—do not seem to have been under the influence of any consistent value system regarding diplomacy or use of force.

Roh Tae-woo’s career is far from pacifism. As is well known, before December 1979 when he ordered his military division located near DMZ to go southward to help his longtime friend General Chun Doo-hwan, his career was entirely military. After becoming the president in 1988, however, contrary to the public expectations, his government was reluctant to be coercive and play the authoritative tactics on the opposition. As a result, he used to be called pejoratively “Mool,” meaning water in Korean language: he was criticized for being passive, inconsistent and without any clear-cut positions on many domestic issues (Kim 2006, 453; 494). Despite this “Mool” image in the domestic arena, however, outwardly, he presented the Northern Policy, an ambitious vision of rapprochement with former communist countries, and proactively and consistently pushed forward with it. Therefore, when the Iraqi crisis occurred in 1990, the foremost issue for President Roh Tae-woo was the success of the Northern Policy, and for this purpose, he was willing to deal with other issues pragmatically. However, we cannot just name him a pro-Americanist. Many people simply presuppose that Roh Tae-woo was pro-American considering his long military background. But, we need to remember that
he was the first postwar president in South Korea who began the negotiations with Washington for the relocation of the USFK bases out of the middle of Seoul.

We cannot judge that President Roh Moo-hyun was pro-American. He was a human-rights lawyer who defended anti-American student activists in a legal court. He always belonged to a minority on the left wing of the opposition parties. Before becoming president, he had never been to the United States. However, his value system was more pragmatist than ideological. For President Roh Moo-hyun, the paramount goal was to ameliorate the security situation in the Korean peninsula. In conjunction with the negative public opinion on the Iraq War, his backgrounds and beliefs might have worked against the “unjustified” war. Yet, Roh Moo-hyun decided to use force to help the Americans. To President Roh Moo-hyun, the use of force was a legitimate instrument to achieve a larger goal.105

Prime Minister Koizumi’s value system with regard to diplomacy is a little unclear. An observer positions him on the pro-American side. Indeed, he used to say, recognizing his pro-Americanism, “I am a hawk. If somebody asks if I am a dove, then the answer is, ‘I am a hawk.’ The Fukuda faction has always been pro-American since Kishi” (Matsuda 2006, 166).106 On the other hand, other commentators regard Koizumi’s views on the Japan-U.S. relations as inconsistent and on the dispatch of SDF overseas as opportunistic. For example, Asahi Shimbun (4 April 2003) criticizes Koizumi, saying, “Koizumi’s consistent and unilateral pro-Americanism is a cover-up over the fact that he has not had

105 His pragmatism is repeated when he chose to begin the negotiations to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States despite enormous oppositions from his own supporters.

106 In 1970, Koizumi Junichiro cut his political teeth as a personal secretary to Fukuda Takeo, who was then-Finance Minister, and later became Prime Minister. Fukuda had been a political and personal mentor for Koizumi from then until his death in 1995.
any clear position on diplomacy and the United States. For example, Koizumi wanted to control Japan’s international contribution after the Gulf War.” In a similar vein, Former Deputy Prime Minister Gotoda Masaharu recollects that when Koizumi was the postal minister in the Miyazawa Cabinet in the early 1990s, Koizumi’s image was a strong dove, and that Koizumi was negative about the overseas dispatch of the SDF at the time. According to Gotoda’s assessment, Koizumi is a kind of a person that “is very quick in grabbing an opportunity, and can change his position at the last moment, being subject to the needs of the situation” (Marukusu 2004, 75; translation by author).

Summing up, the observation across the four leaders shows that, whether it is pacifism or pro-Americanism, or anything else, it is hard to find any consistent value system working across the cases to uniformly influence the leaders.

Experience in Foreign and Security Affairs

As for prior experience, the backgrounds of the leaders vary, too. As two-time education minister, Kaifu belonged to the so-called education tribe (Monbuzoku). He had more knowledge and experience in educational affairs than in other fields, but foreign policy or security affairs were obviously not his strengths. As one of the originators of the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), the Japanese version of the Peace Corps, he advocated the UNPC bill in the Diet debate, obliquely likening it to the JOCV (Kaifu 2003, 83). Drawing an analogy between personnel assistance for a war and an overseas voluntary group of youths reveals the amount of Kaifu’s prior experience in security affairs.

Prime Minister Koizumi, either, was not much experienced in foreign policy. As
one-time postal minister, he wrote two books about postal reforms. In addition, he three
times served as welfare minister. His interest was mainly focused on the reform of the
bureaucracy and the curtailment of the excessive public sector. However, foreign and
security policies were not his strong point. Since his first election to the Diet in 1972, he
did not have many opportunities to be involved in diplomatic negotiations or foreign
visits (Shinoda 2004, 10-11). Before becoming the prime minister, he was not familiar
with the history and significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and not at all interested in
North Korea although later as prime minister he became famous worldwide due to his
historic visits to Pyongyang (Matsuda 2006, 171).

Lack of experience in foreign affairs is also found in President Roh Moo-hyun.
Before entering the Blue House, he had never visited the United States. He even signed a
petition for withdrawal of USFK from South Korea, which he later renounced. He
debuted as a freshman lawmaker in 1988, but spent most of his career running
unsuccessfully for electoral districts in the southeastern Kyongsang Province. He once
served in the Kim Dae-jung Administration as a cabinet minister, but his portfolio was
maritime and fisheries affairs.

Perhaps, the only exception is President Roh Tae-woo. Although he spent most of
his career in the military, Roh Tae-woo was carefully groomed to be an heir, during the 7-
year tenure of President Chun Doo-hwan. After being discharged from the military in
1981, he was appointed as Chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Later,
he served as Minister without Portfolio, Chief Negotiator for the Inter-Korean High-
Level Talks, and Chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Seoul Olympics. In
addition, as special envoy on behalf of President Chun, Roh Tae-woo used to visit many
foreign countries. In all these capacities, he could accumulate important experience in foreign affairs (Kim 2006, 434). His interest in foreign affairs continued after becoming president. More than anything else, Roh Tae-woo is remembered for his Northern Policy; he paid more attention to the area of foreign policy; and his positions on foreign policy issues were better-defined and more consistent than on domestic issues. For example, he had five ministers for EPB (Economic Planning Board) and five senior presidential secretaries for economic affairs for his term of five years. His cabinet ministers’ average term in office was only 13.7 months. On the other hand, he had changed his foreign minister only once, and his diplomatic and national security advisor was never replaced for the five years (Kim 2006, 493).

In consequence, just as in value orientation, we could not find any uniformity across the leaders in their prior experience in foreign affairs. If there is no strong commonality in the values and experience of the leaders, then, what about their styles and attitudes?

**Leadership Style**

Hermann and Hermann (1989, 377-8) emphasize the importance of the sensitivity of a leader to the context of decision-making in assessing the individual leader’s leadership style and its effect on the policy outcome. The contextual sensitivity is measured by the leader’s attitudes on three objects: political constraints, new information, and task: if a leader challenges rather than accepts political constraints, then the leader is less sensitive to the decision-making context; if a leader seeks the information which conforms to her preexisting ideas rather than looks for new information without prejudice, then the leader is less sensitive; and if a leader foci on the task or the problem itself rather than her
relations with other actors in the policy process, then she is less sensitive to the policy context (Hermann et al. 2001, 89-94). Based on this 2 x 2 x 2 typology, Hermann et al. (2001) creates eight types of leadership style, as shown in Table 8-7.

Table 8-7 Leadership Style as a Function of Contextual Sensitivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude to Constraints</th>
<th>Attitude to Information</th>
<th>Attitude to Task</th>
<th>Relationship Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>Closed to Information</td>
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<td>Constraints</td>
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<td>Respects</td>
<td>Closed to Information</td>
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<td>Constraints</td>
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</table>

Sources: Hermann et al. (2001, 95)

In this typology, we can put Prime Minister Kaifu in the accommodative style. He had never been famous for his challenging style. That was probably the reason why the largest faction of the LDP—former Tanaka faction—chose him to be their proxy. He had

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This reactivity is not exactly the same as the definition of the reactivity we defined in Chapter 3. But, it also has some similarities. First of all, a reactive leader as defined by Hermann et al. (2001) is interested in what is possible in the current situation just as the passive behavior in our definition shows. The first job of the Japanese and South Korean negotiators was to identify the bottom-line of the American demands—“what is possible in the current situation,” and then they did not surpass that parameter delimited by Washington. Within that parameter, however, they showed a certain level of flexibility.
to be open to information. Like his predecessors, he was only the first among equals, whose political life is supported by other faction leaders. It is not surprising and new, therefore, that he, as prime minister, had to listen to the opinions of other faction leaders and party elders to make important domestic and foreign policy decisions. He was more focusing on the relationship rather than the task. When making a decision, he was always concerned with whom he should talk to on the matter.108

President Roh Tae-woo’s overall leadership style belongs to the reactive style. Like Kaifu, he was not the type of a person that challenges his political environment. Rather, he used to “wait under a persimmon tree until a persimmon falls.” “He rarely got angry, avoided a frontal clash with anybody, and always wanted to play the role of coordinator and conciliator” (Kim 2006, 434). He was open to information. Whenever an issue is raised, he wanted to listen to as many sources as possible. Probably, these styles are the reason why he was given the nickname, “Mool,” meaning irresolution and indetermination. One of his closest advisors complains about his leadership style. “President Roh was always reluctant to call the shots. He used to wait until everyone in the room reached an agreement. That was his style” (Park 2005a). However, on foreign policy issues, he tenaciously concentrated on tasks rather than relationship. The most prominent example is his Northern Policy. He had a grand design for diplomacy and unification, and was consistent to realize the design. Arguably, his tenacity and

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108 In an interview reminiscing about important decisions made during his tenure, former Prime Minister Kaifu specifies what kind of people he consulted with on that issue when an issue is raised by the interviewer, not revealing his own positions. He also proudly emphasizes the fact that he consulted with his mentor, former Prime Minister Miki on the legislative procedure of the UNPC Bill. He describes the relationship between then Finance Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and then Chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Kato Mutsuki as that between dog and monkey, alluding to the obstacle that the rocky relationship created, although both of them were legally his subordinates. He also describes how strongly and tenaciously the Americans put pressure on him. He does not emphasize his opinions and beliefs on important policy affairs (See Kaifu (2003)).
consistency were one of the most important causes of the success of the Northern Policy (Kim 2006, 497).

Prime Minister Koizumi’s style was different. In all three aspects of contextual sensitivity, Koizumi was diametrically opposed to Kaifu, and thus belong to the expansionistic category. His political career was punctuated by his challenges to accepted norms. Continuously, he challenged for the post of LDP president although the probability of success was not high because he belonged to a small faction. He continued to criticize the overblown size of the state sector in general, and advocated for postal reform in particular. He defined those who defied his idea of reforms as the “resistant forces,” and announced that he would even destroy his own party, if the LDP stood in the way of reform. He was closed to information. He did not have many colleagues and close advisors. An observer remarked that “the closest person to Koizumi is Koizumi himself,” and that “He never listens to anybody . . . there is no one he can trust” (Matsuda 2006, 146; 164). Koizumi once acknowledged that he did not read books for fear that he might lose his own thinking. He cared more about his agenda than about his relations with others. For decades, Koizumi strived to reform the state sector, particularly the postal service and other large government-affiliated corporations and agencies. Other goals and entities could be subjected to these larger objectives.

The leadership style of President Roh Moo-hyun is similar to that of Prime Minister Koizumi: expansionistic. Roh Moo-hyun’s political life, too, is summarized by the challenge to the establishment, particularly, the regionally aligned structure of South Korean politics. Incessantly, he ran for a seat in his hometown Busan, the second largest city in South Korea, which was the stronghold of conservative political forces. Many
advised him against the challenge, but they could not stop him. He was not very open to information. Rather, he was a kind of a conviction politician. Yoon (2009) testifies that he “had to be very careful when he provided a piece of advice to Roh Moo-hyun because that advice, when it was different from what President Roh believed, might stimulate President Roh and let Mr. Roh turn around and run in the direction opposite to the advice.” When Roh Moo-hyun found that some core members of the Kim Dae-jung Administration were allegedly involved in the illegal transfer of money to North Korea in exchange for the promise of holding an inter-Korean summit, he decided to establish an independent counsel as required by the opposition for the investigation of the matter despite strong backlash from his own party. Consequently, this backlash destroyed his own party, and paved the way for his impeachment the next year. He was focused more on his agenda than on the impact of his decision on his relations with other people. For example, when he decided to push for an FTA with the United States, most of his political comrades, even the closest ones were opposed to it. Some of his staunch supporters even turned against him. And yet, he drove on to accomplish his declared goal.

All in all, we could not find the uniformity in the candidate individual variables across the cases: such personal traits as values, prior experiences, and leadership styles of the supreme leaders all varied. Therefore, their variation cannot explain the lack of variation in our dependent variable, or the reactive behavior.

8.5 The External Source: Polarity, Power Disparity, and Asymmetric Security Dependence
The main feature of our observations—the reactive behavior uniformly observed across our four cases—and the discussion of the explanatory power of the possible candidate variables above-mentioned point to the necessity of examining external variables or what Kenneth N. Waltz called “systems-level forces” as the explanation for the uniformity (Waltz 1979, 39).

We are interested in explaining the similarity in the set of the cases. As Waltz (1979, 39) argued, “Where similarity of outcomes prevails despite changes in the agents that seem to produce them . . . systems-level forces seem to be at work.” Systems-level forces are expected to be useful in explaining the cross-national and inter-temporal similarity found in our cases because the enduring feature of the system “acts as a constraining and disposing force” across states and over different time periods (Waltz 1979, 69). Waltz found this enduring feature of the system that is analytically separate from those variables observed on the national level in the distribution of power among states. His argument is that “the distribution of power among states defines the structure of the international system, and the structure, in turn, determines state’s behavior” (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 146). In other words, the behavior of the individual state changes depending on the structure. The structure or the distribution of power in Waltz’s theory is in fact defined by the polarity or the number of great powers, which in turn affects the behavior of the state. For example, in a multipolar world, where more than two great powers exist, constant efforts to make and maintain alliances define the behavior. When the power of a state rapidly rises, other powers try to create an alliance to balance the rising power. On the other hand, in a bipolar world, where only two great powers exist, a tight rivalry or a typical tit-for-tat defines the behavior because one great power in trying to balance the
other cannot find another great power to make an alliance with.

**Variation in the Structural Backgrounds**

If the structure explains our dependent variable, then, we should be able to find the same structure in the backgrounds of the four cases. However, the structure surrounding $K_1$ and $R_1$ was different from the structure given to $K_2$ and $R_2$. When the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait occurred in 1990, the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was drawing to a close, and after the Gulf War, what Charles Krauthammer called the “Unipolar Moment” came: the United States emerged as an undisputed sole superpower of the world, which was “the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself” (Krauthammer 1991, 24).

Charles Krauthammer predicted that the unipolar moment would persist for decades. But, it did not require a decade for the world to see the limit of the “Lonely Superpower.” Surely, U.S. military power was still unrivaled, and the United States could “veto the actions” initiated by others. That is, “settlement of key international issues” required the participation of the United States. But the United States alone was not enough. It also required “some combination of other major states.” Samuel P. Huntington named this changed system a “uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers” (Huntington 1999, 36).

This systemic shift was reflected on the normative dimension, too. The most striking difference between the U.S. responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War is their normative underpinnings. The former was authorized by the UN, but the latter was not. In the run-
up to the Iraq War, the United States realized that she was not able to secure the unanimous agreement of other major powers on the attack on Iraq despite her undisputed supremacy in military power. In stark contrast to the global consensus created under U.S. leadership in the Gulf Crisis/War, President George W. Bush failed to draw full support from global public opinion. In the Gulf Crisis/War, even the Soviet Union, a country that had deep-rooted interests in the Middle East acquiesced in and followed U.S. leadership. On the other hand, in response to the U.S. plan of attack on Iraq in 2003, major powers such as France, Germany, and Russia created an entente against the U.S.-led coalition. Major cities over the world saw large-scale demonstrations protesting the U.S. attack on Iraq. Some foreign leaders, who advocated the U.S. cause, were ousted from power in the next elections.

Inter-temporal comparison of the external variables such as the polarity and the global public opinion show that they varied. That is to say, other things being equal, the scope of global actions for the reactive states must have been larger in $K_2$ and $R_2$ than in $K_1$ and $R_1$ because the distribution of power on the global level and the resulting normative atmosphere at the time must have allowed more room to maneuver for $K_2$ and $R_2$ than for $K_1$ and $R_1$. Nevertheless, the observed behavior was uniform across the cases. Therefore, the systemic variables such as polarity and global public opinion fail to pass the test.

*Bilateral Power Disparity*

However, we can find an applicable external variable if we slightly lower the level of analysis. The polarity is a system-wide external variable. That is, its effects are
uniformly felt across the whole international system. But, there can be region-wide or bilateral external variables with smaller scope of applicability. For example, we can conceive of a bilateral power disparity or distribution of power between two countries as a bilateral systems-level variable.\textsuperscript{109} It can also be legitimately called an external variable because it is defined above the national level. One state can increase its national power on its own, but its power disparity vis-à-vis another state is defined relatively in terms of the ratio between its own power and the power of the compared state. On the other hand, obviously, the scope of the effect of the power disparity as a bilateral external variable will be more limited than such system-wide variable as polarity.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Sources of Disparity} & \textbf{Countries} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{1990} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{2002} & \textbf{Inter-temporal Change**} \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{|c|}{\textbf{Amount}} & \textbf{Ratio*} & \textbf{Amount} & \textbf{Ratio*} & \textbf{(1990-2002)} \\
\hline
\textbf{Economic Size} & United States & 5,751 & 100 & 10,590 & 100 & 0% \\
& Japan & 3,104 & 54 & 3,981 & 38 & -30% \\
& Republic of Korea & 264 & 5 & 576 & 5 & 0% \\
& United Kingdom & 1,019 & 18 & 1,602 & 15 & -17% \\
& France & 1,244 & 22 & 1,452 & 14 & -36% \\
\hline
\textbf{Military Expenditures (US$, mn)} & United States & 249,149 & 100 & 329,616 & 100 & 0% \\
& Japan & 16,311 & 7 & 37,070 & 11 & 57% \\
& Republic of Korea & 6,637 & 3 & 12,615 & 4 & 33% \\
& United Kingdom & 19,574 & 8 & 35,249 & 11 & 38% \\
& France & 18,113 & 7 & 38,005 & 12 & 71% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Five Powers' Military and Economic Power Disparity with the U.S.}
\end{table}

*The size of the other countries when the level of the United States is assumed to be 100. 
**As measured in terms of the difference in the ratios between 1990 and 2002.

\textsuperscript{109}Dr. Kim Byung-kook, former Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security for President Lee Myung-bak and former Chancellor of the KNDA (Korean National Diplomatic Academy), suggested the importance of this bilateral power disparity as an explanatory variable in a conversation with the author held on 14 November 2012 at KNDA.
Statistics show that the power disparity with the United States passes the test. As we can see in Table 8-8, when measured in terms of GDP and annual total military expenditures, the bilateral power disparity is clearly observed in all the four cases. The U.S. economic and military power overwhelms the other states. Particularly, the disparity is consistently more conspicuous on the military side of the table. In 1990, the U.S. military expenditures were 14 times and 33 times larger than those of Japan and South Korea, respectively. In 2002, the gaps became smaller, and yet, they are still wide: the U.S. military expenditures are 9 times and 25 times larger than those of Japan and South Korea, respectively.

However, the power disparity does not pass another implicit test, because the power disparity is also conspicuous in the cases of the United Kingdom and France, which are not reactive states. Then, what are the unique characteristics of the power disparity found in the Japanese and South Korean bilateral relations with the United States as distinct from those found in the United Kingdom and France’s bilateral relations with the United States?

*Asymmetric Security Dependence*

Unlike the United Kingdom and France, the bilateral power disparity takes the form of asymmetric security dependence in the Japanese and South Korean bilateral relations with the United States. Although the military power of the United Kingdom and France are inferior to that of the United States, they sought ways to balance the American power. Militarily, they developed nuclear weapons, a convenient and cost-efficient instrument to complement their military inferiority in the conventional war capability, and maintained
the power projection capability such as an aircraft carrier group. In response to Soviet threats, they needed American deterrence, so they accepted U.S. leadership and participated in NATO, a multilateral organization for collective security in which they could expect to neutralize and balance the unilateral influence of the United States. In addition, as a legacy of the Second World War, they were entitled to a veto power in the UNSC, the most important political body with regard to the international use of force.

Even when the power inferiority persists without serious balancing efforts, it is not a sufficient condition for security dependence. Canada and Mexico are inferior to the United States with respect to military as well as economic power; both lack nuclear weapons and a veto power in the international collective decision-making apparatus. But, they do not depend on the United States for their security in the manner that Japan and South Korea do because they do not have the kind of security threats that the Soviet Union and the DPRK posed to Japan and South Korea.

Japan and South Korea are different from all these countries. They lack the nuclear weapons although they had already obtained the technical and financial capability to own them, and rather, depend on the U.S. extended deterrence for their nuclear security. In terms of nuclear security, the obligations are not reciprocal but asymmetrical. As for conventional capability, they also asymmetrically depend on the United States: they accommodate U.S. military on their soil while the United States does not accommodate the Japanese or South Korean troops on the mainland. The SDF and the South Korean military are in strategic as well as tactical terms, tightly combined with the U.S. military. This combination created a kind of an anomaly and asymmetry in the military structure of Japan and South Korea. The SDF is smaller than the military of other major powers.
considering the relative size of the population and the economy, and lacks the level of power projection capability that other major powers already have or seek to obtain. In the South Korean National Armed Forces, the size of the army is disproportionately overblown in comparison with their navy and air force because the air and sea power is supposed to be complemented by the U.S. forces according to their joint defense plan. More importantly, the South Korean intelligence-gathering capability is under-developed, and thus, the South Korean military asymmetrically depends on the United States for geospatial and signals intelligence. Both Japan and South Korea do have security treaties with the United States as the United Kingdom and France do participate in NATO, but those treaties are bilateral in which they are directly revealed to the U.S. influence.

Moreover, the treaty obligations are asymmetrical: according to the security treaties, Japan and South Korea are not obliged to help the U.S. military if the United States is under attack outside the Pacific area.\(^{110}\) Finally, Japan and South Korea do not enjoy the positive legacy of the WWII: in 1945, one was defeated, and the other was just liberated. From then, both had a long way to go to reestablish their national economies.

Participating in the intentional collective decision-making process was not their first priority.

All these features of asymmetric security dependence continue even today. Other external variables such as the polarity of the international system and the international

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\(^{110}\)The first sentence of Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S.A. reads, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger.” Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea reads, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties . . . would be dangerous . . . and declares that it would act to meet the common danger . . .” (italicized by author). The treaties claim in their titles that they are mutual, but the obligation of the defense created by the treaties is not mutual, but asymmetrical.
public opinion on the wars for which the United States demanded assistance from Tokyo and Seoul varied inter-temporally between the Gulf War and the Iraq War. However, the asymmetric security dependence of Japan and South Korea on the United States is found in the background of all the four cases. Therefore, security dependence passes our test.

8.6 The Role Source: Role Conceptions within the Authoritative Decision Unit

Congressmen change, but the working logic of the Capitol Hill does not. Same complaints can easily be found on the pages of newspapers published in Seoul and Tokyo. At every election, many new people come to Yeouido and Nagata-cho, but the way they handle their jobs do not rapidly change. As the Miles’s Law says, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” Therefore, the role theory posits that “the positions decision-makers occupy, rather than their individual characteristics, influence their behavior and choices in making and executing the nations’ foreign policy (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 456). Then, how can a position or a role have this effect?

Each role (or position) carries with it social and psychological demands and expectations that shape perceptions of how it should be performed. . . . They influence anyone filling a particular role, regardless of personal preferences. Thus every individual behaves similarly to others who have occupied the same role. Furthermore, changes in policy presumably result from changes in role conceptions rather than from changes in the individuals who occupy the roles. (Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008, 456; underline by author; italicized in the original).

In other words, what people expect of a position affects the behavior of the occupant of the position. This expectation is called the role conception. Indeed, there is a scholarly attempt to apply this role theory to explain the changes in Japanese foreign policy.
behavior.

Collective Identity

Catalinac (2007) argues that identity theory can explain Japanese security policy. She begins with the puzzle of why the Japanese response to the Gulf War was different from that to the Iraq War. According to her, in the former, the Japanese government was paralyzed while in the latter, the Japanese showed “more enthusiasm, more initiatives, and more support for the position of the United States” (58). After criticizing both neorealist and neoliberal explanations, she presents role identity theory as the explanation. That is, she claims that the shift in the role identities held by Japanese politicians is the cause of the shift in the Japanese response. In order to prove her argument, she conducts a content analysis of all the statements made by the Japanese lawmakers in both Houses of the Diet from July 1990 to April 1991 and from February 2003 to July 2003, and codes those statements into four categories: centrist, independentist, pragmatic multilateralist, and pacifist. The finding of the survey is that, between the two periods, the centrist statements rose from 14% to 55% while the pacifist statements declined from 46% to 16%. Therefore, this shift in role identity explains the shift in the Japanese response, Catalinac argues.

Our description does not necessarily agree with Catalinac’s. Catalinac and others who want to praise the Japanese response to the Iraq War might want to emphasize the Japanese proactivity. According to our criteria, however, there was no inter-temporal shift in Japanese foreign policy behavior. Moreover, in terms of the legal basis of the SDF dispatch, there has been no fundamental change between the 1990s and the 2000s.
(Okamoto 2001). Notice that, legally speaking, the SDF troops dispatched to Iraq were stationed in a non-war zone. The war was legally over at the time, and according to the SMHARAI Law, the purpose of the dispatch was to help rehabilitate postwar Iraq. It is also worth noting that the Koizumi Cabinet made it clear up front that it was constitutionally impossible to participate in the Iraq ‘War’ and share the ‘War’ cost. Even to date, no legislation has ever been created in the Japanese legal system to enable the dispatch of SDF to a war zone for the purpose of defending another country.\footnote{As of 2014, the Abe Cabinet is trying to change this situation by legislating a new law that allows the SDF troops to help another country in a war. This attempt is being made in the name of regaining the right of collective self-defense. There are still many hurdles left over for the Abe Administration to achieve the goal. If that attempt is successful, however, it may open the door to a new era in Japanese military and security policy. However, it should be noted that those who argue for the right of collective self-defense in Tokyo is claiming that the right is required to defend Japan, not “another country,” and that the right of collective self-defense should be used within a minimum necessary limit that is justified only by the purpose of self-defense.} If the Gulf Crisis of 1990 is repeated in the same manner, the Japanese government will have to go through the same debate whose result is remembered by the Japanese as a “defeat.”

As for the explanation, Catalinac (2007) framed a spurious causal relationship. That is, she mistakes a dependent variable for an independent variable. In determining personnel assistance for the Gulf War, it was indeed the Diet where the final decision on the UNPC bill was made: the UNPC bill was finally killed in the Upper House of the Diet. On the other hand, it was not the Diet that made the real decision regarding the Japanese response to the Iraq War. It was the summit between Koizumi and Bush where the decision was made. More precisely, in anticipation of President Bush’s request, Prime Minister Koizumi made the decision, and the decision was in turn shared with Koizumi’s coalition partners after being agreed upon with the United States. The ruling coalition’s decision was then imposed on the LDP and the Diet. Notice that by the time the legislative deliberations on the draft bill of the SMHARAI Law began in the Diet, all
major political leaders within the Diet had already made the decision to support the bill. Even public opinion began to change in the direction of supporting Koizumi’s decision. Descriptions of the decision-making process of the Koizumi Administration suggest that the distribution of the role identities within the Diet was more a result than a cause of the decision to support and provide assistance for the United States.

If we want to justify the necessity of a survey of the role identities held by all politicians within the Diet, we have to be able to hypothesize a causal relationship between the statements made within the Diet and the final decision made by the prime minister. However, usually, statements made by dozens of freshmen lawmakers have much less weight than a passing remark made by the prime minister. Moreover, in the decision-making process over the SMHARAI Law, even the ranking members of the large factions within the LDP could not resist Koizumi’s decision. The most important problem of Catalinac’s argument is that she gives an equal weight to all politicians. In reality, however, those who participate in the core decision-making and those who do not are not equal in their influence on the final outcome. Therefore, without additional evidence that Prime Minister Koizumi felt constrained by the statements made during the Diet deliberations, we did not need to go through all the statements made by all lawmakers on the SMHARAI Law.

Norms Felt by the Actual Decision-makers

The problems found in Catalinac’s arguments suggest a lesson: if we would like to analyze the effect of role conceptions, we need to limit the scope of the analysis to the role conceptions held by those who made the substantive decisions. For this purpose, here,
we introduce what Margaret G. Hermann called the “authoritative decision unit (from here on ADU)” as a conceptual tool to focus our analysis on the core decision-making. According to Hermann (2001, 48), the authoritative decision unit is an individual or a set of individuals with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, when faced with a problem, the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed. There are three types of authoritative decision unit: a predominant leader, a single group, and a coalition of autonomous actors.

Interestingly, an application of our test method to the ADUs in each of our cases shows uniformity in role conceptions. Specifically, we can find common perception among the leaders of each administration that, if the United States makes a request, then, they will have to provide support and assistance for the U.S.-led coalition in one way or another. The policymakers in each case felt that it was inevitable to meet at least part of U.S. demands. The subject matter of the discussion or the thinking within the decision unit was limited to the issue of ‘to what extent.’ It can be described as a shared sense of *shikatanai* or *dori-eopta* (‘There is nothing we can do about it.’). What is more interesting is that the sense of inevitability was not a result of the discussion or rational calculation within the decision unit. Rather, the perception was prevalent in the decision unit before the members of the decision unit began the discussion or even before the United States submitted the list of requests. In other words, a norm of behavior that they had to accept the U.S. demands had been internalized by the Japanese and South Korean policymakers.112

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112According to *Oxford Dictionary of Social Work and Social Care* (2013), internalization is a process by which people learn and accept as *inevitable* the values and norms of society, as applied to the *positions* they *occupy* within it (underline by author). In the same dictionary, a norm is defined as an informal rule: a norm is "an expectation of behavior that has connotations of what is desirable and acceptable, and can be a
This role conception is most conspicuous in R₂. The ADU in R₂ was President Roh Moo-hyun himself. The opposition GNP occupying the majority of the National Assembly held a veto because according to the South Korean Constitution, “dispatch of armed forces to foreign states” required prior approval of the legislature.¹¹³ And yet, the GNP was not willing to wield it because the GNP supported the dispatch.

Except for the GNP, no other actor within the South Korean political system could reverse or even challenge President Roh’s decision. He did listen to the opinions of his advisors in the Office of the President and the Cabinet, but this group of advisors was more a consulting body than a collective decision-making entity. President Roh Moo-hyun never released his autonomy and authority to decide on the matter. Despite enormous oppositions from his own support base, President Roh Moo-hyun decided to send additional troops as requested by the United States. At the same time, however, he discounted the size and function of the military contingent to the bottom-line of the U.S. demands, which was an independently operable military division. As former South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon (2009) observes, “[President Roh Moo-hyun] raised the hand [of the pro-assistance group] once, but then, he raised the hand [of the pro-independence group] the next time.” In other words, he took up the cause of the pro-assistance group when he decided to send additional troops, but he sided with the pro-independence group when he discounted the size and function of the contingent to be dispatched to Iraq. This is how President Roh kept the balance within his government, and

¹¹³ Article 60, section (2) of the South Korean Constitution reads, “The National Assembly shall also have the right to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, and the stationing of alien forces in the territory of the Republic of Korea” (underline by author).
thereby his authority to decide on the issue of how to respond to U.S. demands.

Then, what factors affected the psychology of President Roh as the individual decision maker regarding this matter? From the descriptions in Chapter 5, we could see that President Roh did not believe in the cause of the Coalition of the Willing, and rather, thought that his own decision to support the United States regarding the Iraq War was wrong, and would be historically recorded as such. Despite his personal beliefs, he made a decision to help the United States because he believed that the decision was inevitable for the security of the Korean Peninsula. Namely, the demands of the position or his role conceptions overrode the personal beliefs. In fact, not only President Roh Moo-hyun but also his close advisors who opposed the dispatch of combat troops believed that a positive response to U.S. demands was inevitable. According to available evidence, no one who participated in the fierce debate on how to respond to U.S. demands seriously advocated the Canadian model, that is, the option of publicly opposing the U.S. invasion into Iraq.

Like President Roh Moo-hyun, Prime Minister Kaifu was reluctant to provide personnel assistance for the Gulf War. In this case, however, Kaifu was not the sole decision-maker. The ADU was a loose coalition of autonomous actors including various members such as then LDP Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro and other party leaders, and the Cabinet members representing MOF, MOFA, JDA, and CLB. When it came to the personnel assistance, namely, the UNPCC, even the opposition parties occupying the majority of the Upper House could influence the decision because they held a veto, and were threatening to use it. Even in this case, however, there was a widespread belief across the political system that they had to do something to help the Americans when the
Americans asked for assistance. There was no compelling evidence that the Japanese found a crucial national interest in repelling Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, which could warrant spending such a large sum of money plus establishing the UNPCC.\(^{114}\) The tacit consensus within the decision unit was that they had to help the United States and the MNF one way or another when the Americans asked. No one inside the decision unit could effectively challenge this consensus.

Such role conceptions are found in \(R_1\) and \(K_2\) as well. In \(R_1\), the ADU was a group of Cabinet ministers who dealt with security affairs such as foreign and defense ministers, and the intelligence chief. Of course, the final say belonged to the president, and no one in the South Korean political system could reverse his decision. But, President Roh Tae-woo was not willing to come to the fore and exercise his authority on this matter because he was not much interested. His main concern was the Northern Policy. Helping the United States was important because they had to maintain U.S. cooperation for the more important agenda. Therefore, he delegated much of his authority on this matter to his advisors so that his deputies could relatively autonomously work within a broad guideline of supporting and helping the Americans.

There were several groups or venues that made the decisions regarding the South Korean responses to the Gulf Crisis/War: the temporary special committee for the Gulf Crisis, the inter-ministerial conference for security affairs, and the National Security Council. The members of these groups largely overlapped. And, we can also observe in

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\(^{114}\)Japan indeed had an important oil interest at stake at the time. The Arabian Oil Company of Japan held a large-scale oil field named Khafiji near the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. However, we could not find evidence showing that in the internal debate of the Kaifu Administration over how to respond to U.S. demands regarding the Gulf Crisis/War, the Khafiji issue was regarded as crucial in determining the response. If it was an oil issue that was at stake, the Japanese and the South Koreans could easily think that they could get a free ride on the bandwagon of the Americans and the Europeans handling the issue.
the deliberations of the members a shared perception that expressing support and providing assistance for the MNF are inevitable.

In $K_2$, the main decision was made by Koizumi, by himself. In this sense, the ADU in $K_2$ is the individual predominant leader. When making the decisions, however, Koizumi took utmost care to get on board his coalition partners such as the New Komeito. The New Komeito obviously held a veto: they could simply walk away from the coalition, letting the Cabinet collapse. But they were not willing to cast the veto in part because, with the veto, they had to throw away all the perks and privileges they enjoyed as a member of the ruling coalition. But, that was not the only reason for the coalition partners to decide to uphold Koizumi’s decision to help the Americans. According to the testimonies of those who participated in or observed the internal decision-making of the Koizumi Cabinet, Prime Minister Koizumi made the decision to support the United States long before he publicly expressed the support. Within the coalition as well as the Cabinet, there was widespread recognition that the Japanese government could not help but support and help the United States with respect to the Iraq War. As a matter of fact, what mattered was only when to publicize it. Therefore, even the New Komeito whose motto is “clean government, peace, and welfare” could not challenge this shared recognition (Editorial, *Asahi Shimbun*, 31 October 2004; italicized by author).

8.7 Correlation and Causation: Transmission Paths of the Causal Variable

Through the examination of the candidate explanatory variables from five source categories, we found two variables that correlate with the uniformity of the reactive
behavior: bilateral asymmetric security dependence and the normative role conceptions within the ADUs. The role conceptions within the decision units were that it was inevitable to assist the United States.

In order to explain the dependent variable with these two variables, we need to tackle two additional tasks: one is to clarify the transmission paths among the variables. That is, we need to show the direction of the causation, and how the causal influence is transmitted from one variable to another. Second, we need to explain simultaneously both passive and flexible sides of the policy behavior to explain the reactivity. How can these variables explain the two seemingly contradictory aspects of the same behavior?

As for the first task, we need to begin with the fact that security dependence is an external variable. The transmission paths of the domestic variables such as personal traits, fragmented authority, public opinion, and interest-group influences are intuitively clear: personal traits such as beliefs and values psychologically act on the minds of the agent; the fragmented authority directly limits the decision-making power of the agent; public opinion or interest group pressures work through the electoral process or the logic of the representative democracy to constrain the agent. Then, how do external variables such as security dependence affect behavior? Kenneth N. Waltz clarifies two ways in which systems-level or external variables affect the behavior of the agent:

Agents and agencies act; systems as wholes do not. But the actions of agents and agencies are affected by the system’s structure. In itself a structure does not directly lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within the system, but does so indirectly. The effects are produced in two ways: through socialization of the actors and through competition among them (Waltz 1979, 74; underline by author).
**Socialization**

External variables affect behavior through socialization. Socialization is a “process through which individuals *internalize* the values, beliefs, and norms of a society and learn to function as its members” (italicized by author). If socialization is internalization of values, beliefs and norms, we have already found the evidence of this socialization as the transmission path of security dependence. The role conceptions that we have just described as being held by the policymakers within the ADU are results of such socialization. Security dependence as an external variable was internalized by the policymakers in the form of norms of behavior or informal rules that once the United States asks for assistance, it is inevitable to meet the demands. Therefore, security dependence is the explanatory variable, and this explanatory variable worked through the role conceptions within the ADU as an intervening variable.

**Competition or Selection**

The second transmission path of the structural effect is competition. Precisely speaking, what Waltz called competition is close to selection. The structure works its way down to the agents by selecting in those who conform to the structure, and by selecting out those who do not. For example, in a town where five fast-food providers compete, those who successfully adjust themselves to the needs of the market—consumers’ taste and expectation on the service requirements and the speed of preparation and delivery, geographical distance among the competitors, etc.—will prosper while those who fail to adjust will perish. In Japan as well as in South Korea, those who conformed to the

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structure of the security dependence were selected in, and those who challenged were selected out. The working of the structure is not deterministic, though; that is, some challengers may survive the structural force. Still, even the successful challengers cannot escape the structural tendency influencing the behavior of domestic actors.

Magosaki Ukeru (2012), former Japanese Ambassador to Iran, describes in detail how this structural tendency worked in postwar Japan. Particularly, he highlights the role of the U.S. intelligence community in the select-out process. More importantly, however, the select-out process works through the domestic electoral politics. If the electorate believes that the United States withdrew her support for a political leader, the leader has to risk being ousted from power in the next election. Even without elections, a withdrawal of U.S. political recognition may seriously shrink the scope of a leader’s political influence because the opposition parties and even part of his entourage may begin to suspect the legitimacy or political viability of the leader, particularly in view of constant military threats from abroad.

This is why the prime ministers and the presidents of Japan and South Korea attach so much importance to their visits to Washington. They have to renew and publicize to their public the political recognition bestowed on them by the United States. For example, when South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan came to office in August 1980 after brutally suppressing the Kwangju protests, his first priority in foreign policy was to visit Washington and have a summit with President Reagan because he knew that the summit would demonstrate his legitimacy to his own people as well as his North Korean counterpart. Chun’s objective was known to the Americans. The State Department briefing book for the summit lists five expected objectives of President Chun, and the
second objective was “to consolidate his position within South Korea and legitimize his new government in the eyes of the world.” And, the White House granted President Chun what he wanted. The second sentence of President Reagan’s talking paper for the summit reads, “Chun’s ability to meet with you validates and legitimizes his leadership in Korea as no other single event could.”

The Japanese and South Korean leaders in our cases, too, must have been aware of the pressure from this selection process. The pressure must have been felt more sorely when their domestic political base was weak and precarious like that of Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh Moo-hyun. For example, Koizumi announced his intention to legislate a new law enabling the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq on his way to a summit with President Bush. Likewise, President Roh Moo-hyun unexpectedly held an emergency NSC meeting on 17 October 2003 to decide to send additional troops to Iraq only three days before his scheduled summit with President Bush.

**Transnational Networks**

This is how the socialization and the selection processes work in Japan and South Korea. However, our case descriptions suggest an additional intervening variable. Dense transnational links, as was predicted by the RST, are indeed found in all the four cases. As we could see in the bilateral consultation process in the run-up to the Gulf and Iraq Wars, each sub-part of the U.S. federal government approached and had close consultations

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117 National Security Archive, Memorandum, Richard Allen to President Reagan, January 29, 1981, Subject: President Chun of Korea, with attached cover memorandum, Donald Gregg to Allen, same date, available online at [http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB306/doc01.pdf](http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB306/doc01.pdf).
with their counterparts on the other side of the Pacific. The bilateral dialogue was substantial and penetrative. Through these networks of bilateral dialogue, U.S. officials could incessantly explain the necessity and inevitability of the wars, and remind their counterparts of the reasons why they had to help the U.S.-led coalition such as the existing foreign threats and the possibility of having to move the U.S. troops stationed in Japan and South Korea to the Middle East to reinforce the U.S. troops there in case Japan and South Korea do not help. That is, they constantly stimulated the normative underpinnings of the alliance.

True, the transnational links worked two-way. Japanese and South Korean negotiators, too, could access to their counterparts in Washington. But, they used this pipeline mainly for the purpose of discounting, that is, to discover the bottom-line of U.S. demands and to explain the reasons for not meeting the whole demands. However, the extent of the accessibility was asymmetrical. U.S. ambassadors in Tokyo and Seoul could have meetings with the supreme leaders if they so wished: a privilege that their counterparts in Washington never enjoyed. The asymmetry is also found in the military networks. For example, General RisCassi, Commander of the USFK during the Gulf War could ordinarily have a meeting with the ROK Defense Minister whereas no four-star general from Tokyo and Seoul could readily have a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Internalized Dependence and Passivity

Now that we have set up the variables and their causal chain, there remains one final question. Can this model explain the passive side of reactive behavior? All variables in
the model—security dependence, role conceptions, and transnational connections—seem to point to the direction of higher flexibility because they strengthen the tendency to accommodate U.S. demands. Then, how can we explain passivity or the initial reluctance on the part of Japan and South Korea?

In order to understand the causation between security dependence and passive behavior, we need to take a look at the effect of the conditions of security dependence. Let us draw a figurative analogy. A child, who is dependent on the protection of his parents, is usually reluctant to go beyond his backyard because he does not know what is waiting for him there as well as what he can play with there. However, if the parents fence an area and allow the child to play inside the fences freely but safely, dramatically lowering the risk of playing in that area, he would begin to play actively within the fences. The conditions of the protection socialized the child with passive behavior.

Likewise, the conditions (or the physical expressions) of security dependence or the power disparity—the absence of nuclear weapons, the distorted structure of the conventional armament, a deficiency in the multilateral paths to international prestige, asymmetric treaty obligations, and a lack of veto power in the international political process—all brought about the effect of limiting the Japanese and South Korean interests and attention to their territories or the areas immediately surrounding their territories. As a result, when a crisis occurred outside these parameters, the Japanese and the South Koreans could not determine the terms of reference for themselves. So, they waited for their American patrons to provide the direction and draw the parameters on behalf of them, hence, became passive. However, once the contour lines of the parameters were delineated by Washington, they began to move full-speed ahead within the given
parameters as the pressure of the asymmetric security dependence dictated.

Unclear Terms of Reference

Of course, even if a crisis broke out outside the ordinary fences, when what the Americans wanted and what the Japanese or the South Koreans could do were clear, they acted swiftly just as they responded quickly to the Afghan invasion. At the time of the invasion, the shockwave of the 9/11 attacks was still reverberating across the globe, absorbing global attention, and had the effect of clarifying what the Americans wanted and what Japan and South Korea could do, temporarily expanding the normative parameters given to Japan and South Korea. The Japanese and the South Koreans also went beyond the parameters when the terms of reference or SOPs were given in advance. For example, originally, sending SDF troops abroad in the name of the United Nations was an unfamiliar idea for the Japanese until the early 1990s just as we could see in the fate of the UNPC bill, but once the PKO Law was enacted in 1992, Japan could actively participate in the UN PKO within the expanded parameters given by the PKO Law.

8.8 Summary of the Explanation

At last, we have reached the explanatory model completed with a chain of causation. The bilateral asymmetric security dependence is the main explanatory variable. However, this external variable could not work in a vacuum. Its effects had to reach down to the behavior of agents or policymakers through domestic intervening variables. The structural effects of the main variable constrained the foreign policy behavior of Japan
and South Korea through the role conceptions within the ADUs. Before the American parameters were clearly recognized, they constrained the behavior negatively, suppressing prompt policy response. On the other hand, once the American parameters got clearly established, they constrained the behavior positively, accelerating the policy process. The role conceptions in the ADUs were created and maintained by socialization and selection processes that constantly reflected the effects of asymmetric bilateral security dependence. In addition, the penetrative transnational links existing across the Pacific accelerated the socialization and the selection processes by stimulating and strengthening the normative basis of the security dependence.
CHAPTER 9 . EXPLAINING THE VARIATIONS

To every action there is always an equal and opposite reaction.

Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion

The speed of light does not vary with time or place; the speed of light is the upper limit for the speeds of objects with positive rest mass.

From Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity

The task of this chapter is to explain the variations that we observed in the cases. In Chapter 7, we found three types of variations: two outliers, an X-shaped variation, and cross-national and inter-temporal militaristic inclinations. Just as we tried to find a variable that is uniformly observed across the cases to explain the uniformity in the reactive behavior, we will first have to find a variable that is correlated with the variations to be explained. Then, which variable can become the candidate explanatory variable?

9.1 The Framework of Explanation: Demand and Discount

The first candidate is U.S. demands. That is to say, we can simply presume that the variations came from the U.S. demands: the Japanese and South Korean responses varied along with the demands. In the simple theory of supply and demand, usually the demand explains the supply. For example, if Ford Motors decides to increase the supply of Mustang, the main ground for the decision would be their expectation on the consumers’
demand for Mustang: ‘we have to produce more Mustangs because consumers would want to buy more Mustangs.’ If the theory is applied to our cases, then, we can for example presume that the main force to create the cross-national militaristic inclination is the U.S. demands: ‘South Korea provided more military assistance than Japan did because Washington expected more military assistance from South Korea than from Japan.’

This presumption is plausible based on our descriptions on the negotiation process across the Pacific over the assistance for the wars in Iraq. The Japanese and the South Korean decisions regarding the response to U.S. demands were made under overwhelming U.S. pressures transmitted through penetrative transnational links across the Pacific. Their security dependence on the United States created great psychological pressures, which, in turn, imposed constraints on the Japanese and South Korean freedom of action. The policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul knew that they could not evade the whole U.S. demands completely. What they could do was merely to discount them or to evade part of the demands. Of course, sometimes, they could turn the U.S. demands to their advantage by fast-tracking the decision or linking their responses to what they wanted in other issue areas. Still, we need to keep in mind that all these reactions were allowed only within the parameters set by the United States as we could see in the comparative confirmation of the uniform reactive behavior in Chapter 6. Therefore, the U.S. demands should be the most important factor in explaining the substance as well as the style of the Japanese and South Korean responses.

If we understand the restrictions that Tokyo and Seoul faced in their negotiations with Washington, then, it is not unreasonable to presume that a fairly large part of the
variations was created by the United States in the negotiation process. In fact, the first step of the negotiating with the United States was to identify or speculate about the bottom-line of U.S. demands. Once learned, this bottom-line worked as a demand for Tokyo and Seoul. Tokyo and Seoul in turn adjusted their supply—the quality and quantity of their assistance for the United States—according to the demands. Of course, part of the demands could or could not be met because there was a discounting process on the part of Tokyo and Seoul. And yet, it is an undeniable fact that the U.S. demands greatly influenced the variations in the negotiated outcomes.

The second candidate will naturally be found from among the domestic variables of Japan and South Korea, because the U.S. demands will not be able to explain all the variations. Not all U.S. demands were accommodated readily and promptly. The U.S. demands went through a certain discounting process. Naturally, we can presume that the remaining part of the variations that are not explained by the U.S. influence came from the discounting by Japan and South Korea.

If both the external and domestic variables are affecting the outcomes simultaneously, then, in trying to find the explanatory variable for each variation, we will have to answer three questions: (1) How much of the variation came from the external variable, that is, the U.S. demands, and how much originated from the domestic discounting process?; (2) What is the main source of the U.S. demands?; and (3) if the discounting process was working, then which variable(s) played the central role in the discounting? In trying to answer these three questions, the criterion would be the agreement between the variation to be explained and the variation in the candidate
The first variation to be explained is the behavioral outlier found in K₁. The U.S. demands cannot explain this outlier because it is hard to imagine that only in K₁, Washington suppressed the maximizing behavior of its negotiating partners. Then, which one among the domestic variables can explain the outlier? What is the variable whose value is much lower in K₁ than its values measured in R₁, K₂, and R₂?

One candidate among the variables we examined in the previous chapter is the value orientation of the leaders. As we observed in Chapter 8, the pacifist value orientation of Prime Minister Kaifu was more noticeable than other leaders. However, it should also be noted that Kaifu was not the only player much less the main player in the decision-making process regarding the Japanese responses to the Gulf Crisis/War. Therefore, the influence of his value orientation should not be overrated.

In order to find the variable to explain the maximizing behavior, actually, we first have to understand the political conditions for the maximizing strategy. To play the maximizing strategy in an international negotiation requires the coherence within the

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118 In some cases, it will be methodologically and empirically hard to separate the demands and the discounts because in real negotiation process, chances are that the demands and the discounts are actually fused and mingled because each side changes its positions as the negotiation proceeds. However, the argument here is that in establishing a theoretical framework to explain the variations in the responses of small states to large ones, the demands have to be conceptually separated from the discounts so that we can describe the real variations in the responses more correctly. For example, even if South Korea had provided 3,000 soldiers to help the Americans in Iraq, it might be recognized as a large number. However, if the number 3,000 had been a result that they got after discounting 70% of the original U.S. demands, that is, if the United States had originally asked for 10,000 soldiers, then, our evaluation on the final size of the assistance would change.
ADU. In the face of foreign demands or pressures, the members of the decision unit have to be united and well-organized to endure the pressure, to fast-track the policy process, and to link the issue at hand with issues in other issue areas. If the inner structure of the ADU is fragmented, then, it is hard to expect a consistent response from the decision unit. One essential condition for maintaining the coherence and preventing the fragmentation within the decision unit is that the decision unit has to be insulated from or insensitive to outside influences at least to a certain extent. In order to measure the degree of insulation or sensitivity of the decision unit, Hermann and Hermann (1989)’s theory of the decision unit will be useful.

Degree of Fragmentation within the ADU

According to Hermann and Hermann (1989, 377-9), all decision units can be categorized into two types depending on the political or psychological dynamics within the decision unit: self-contained or externally influenceable. For example, when the decision unit is one person—a single predominant leader, if the single predominant leader is psychologically sensitive to the decision-making context, then, the decision unit is externally influenceable, and vice versa; When the decision unit is a group of people—a single group, if the agreement within the group is readily reachable, for example, if “the core political beliefs are shared within the group,” and if “there is little substantive conflict over the foreign policy issues facing the nation,” then, the group is self-contained. On the other hand, if such conditions are not met, then, the group is externally influenceable; and when the decision unit is a coalition of autonomous actors,119 if the

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119 The single group as a decision unit is a multiple number of people, and the coalition of autonomous actors is likewise a multiple number of people. The key to understand the difference between a single group

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issue that the autonomous actors confronted is controversial among the actors, then, the decision unit is self-contained while, if the issue is less controversial, then the decision unit is externally influenceable.\footnote{According to Hermann and Hermann (1989, 379), “the more beset by controversial issues a cluster of actors is, the more likely they are to have a zero-sum or antagonistic and competitive relationship; the less controversial the issues . . . the greater chance their relationship has of being non-zero sum or non-adversarial.” The zero-sum nature within the decision unit makes a self-contained decision unit. When the relationship is of a zero-sum character, that is, when the decision unit is self-contained, the actors are in a stalemate, because it is hard to reach an agreement among the actors, or to change the status quo. Consequently, the policy process shows an immobilistic character.}

Then, what was the decision unit in the decisions of our concern? And what was the level of sensitivity of the decision unit?

In R1, when the Roh Tae-woo Administration submitted its assistance package in late September 1990, the U.S. side was in fact not satisfied with the amount. The U.S. complaints were conveyed to Seoul through the dense transnational links, but the Roh Tae-woo Administration endured the pressure and did not change the number. In October 1990, the South Korean government plays the tactic of fast-tracking: South Korea becomes the first among the members of the coalition against Saddam Hussein to provide transportation support. As had been observed in the previous chapter, President Roh Tae-woo did not get himself involved too deeply in the negotiations with Washington over how to respond to the Gulf Crisis/War. He delegated his authority on these matters. As a result, the decisions regarding these negotiations were made by a group of President Roh’s advisors. This group as a decision unit was self-contained, that is, coherent, because the members of the group shared the policy objective and political beliefs; there was little substantive conflicts over the issue; as a result, they could readily reach an agreement and abide by it.

and a coalition of autonomous actors is the group identity. If a multiple number of people believe that they belong to one group, it is a single group, but if there is no such group identity, it is merely a coalition of autonomous actors.

120 According to Hermann and Hermann (1989, 379), “the more beset by controversial issues a cluster of actors is, the more likely they are to have a zero-sum or antagonistic and competitive relationship; the less controversial the issues . . . the greater chance their relationship has of being non-zero sum or non-adversarial.” The zero-sum nature within the decision unit makes a self-contained decision unit. When the relationship is of a zero-sum character, that is, when the decision unit is self-contained, the actors are in a stalemate, because it is hard to reach an agreement among the actors, or to change the status quo. Consequently, the policy process shows an immobilistic character.
In R₂, the South Korean government set at 3,000 the number of the troops to be additionally dispatched to Iraq. Despite U.S. pressures, the South Koreans discounted the size of the military contingent. They also tried to link the additional dispatch with the U.S. attitude towards North Korea, and finally succeeded. All these policy feats required coherence within the ADU. The ADU for this occasion for decision was President Roh Moo-hyun himself. He was personally involved in the decision-making process, and for and by himself called the shots. According to our analysis of his leadership style, he was not very sensitive to the policy context: challenging the situation; not very open to information; and concerned more about task than relations. Therefore, the ADU for this occasion for decision was a self-contained predominant leader. The coherence provided by this decision unit contributed to the endurance against U.S. pressures and the success of the linkage strategy adopted by the Roh Moo-hyun Administration.

In K₂, the Japanese government clarified in advance what it could and could not do: the Japanese would not participate in the war, nor would they share the war cost. They helped the United States on the issue of the Iraq War, but in other issue areas such as their negotiations with the DPRK, the Koizumi Administration got its own way. Like in R₂, the ADU was Koizumi himself. He was not very sensitive to the policy context, thus, the decision unit was self-contained. This nature of the decision unit helped the Japanese government endure the domestic and foreign pressures and abide by its own decision.

In K₁, however, the ADU was fragmented. At the end of August 1990, the Japanese government suggested US$ 1 billion for the financial contribution to the MNF and the frontline states. Washington did not hide the displeasure at the amount and pressured the Japanese government to raise the amount of the contribution. In response, the Japanese
quadrupled the number only in two weeks. They failed to endure the pressure. The ADU in this occasion for decision was a group of Cabinet ministers including MOFA, MOF, and MITI. They lacked an identity as a single group, and disagreed among themselves about how to help the Americans as well as on the desirable size of the financial assistance. Unlike R₁, K₂, and R₂, where the supreme leaders played the role of controlling the disagreement among the advisors by personally making the decision or by providing a guideline for the decision unit, there was not a coordinating top to control the disagreement in K₁. Neither Prime Minister Kaifu nor Secretary-General Ozawa and other LDP leaders in the Cabinet and the LDP could provide consistent directions or guidelines, essential for the maximizing behavior. For example, when MOFA announced the aid package on 29 August 1990, the specific size of the financial assistance was missing because MOF did not give the specific number to MOFA. The number was announced the day after by MOF itself. The turf battles between the two ministries could have been prevented, had there been an effective leadership that could coordinate the inter-ministerial cooperation or had the group of leaders shared a guideline in responding to U.S. pressures. Without the coherence within the decision unit, however, the members of the decision unit could not be sure of the number they produced, especially when their single most important ally raised hell.

Accordingly, the variable whose value is much lower in K₁ is the coherence within the ADU. As summarized in Table 9-1, only in K₁, the ADU was fragmented or externally influenceable. This fragmentation crippled the decision unit, disabling it to formulate and implement the maximizing strategy.
Before we move on to the explanation of the second outlier, we need to briefly touch on the difference between the fragmented authority in the RST and the fragmentation within the ADU because some readers of this dissertation may criticize that the latter is simply a rehash of the former.

First of all, the fragmented political authority within the framework of the RST is introduced to explain the reactive behavior. However, the argument of this dissertation is that it is the asymmetric security dependence with the United States and domestic role conceptions felt by those who participated in the core decision-making process that explain the reactive behavior. We could find that the reactive behavior in South Korea and Japan co-vary with these two variables and we could also trace the transmission mechanism between the dependent and the explanatory variables.

Second, the concept of the coherence or fragmentation within the ADU was not
introduced to explain the reactive behavior but the maximizing behavior. In the process of describing the Japanese and South Korean responses to U.S. demands, we found some variations that both the RST and the asymmetric security dependence do not cover. We could observe that once the American parameters were given, the negotiators in Tokyo and Seoul tried to maximize their national interests within the given parameters, and in terms of the strength of this maximizing behavior, there was a discernible variation. Therefore, to use the concept of the coherence within the ADU to explain the maximizing behavior is not a rehash of the fragmented authority concept of the RST because the dependent variables are different.

Finally, and most importantly, the fragmented authority concept of the RST is different from the concept of the fragmentation within the ADU in terms of its scope of applicability and the degree of conceptual parsimony. The concept of the fragmented authority is applied to the governmental structure as a whole or such large institutions as political parties, the legislature, or the executive branch. However, the most important problem that occurred when we tried to apply this concept to explain the reactive behavior, which was uniformly observed in the set of our cases is that, structurally speaking, as the governmental structure as a whole or in each large political institutions, South Korea was starkly different from Japan. Therefore, it was hard to compare Japanese institutions or political structure with those of South Korea. On the other hand, the concept of the ADU is more parsimonious and easier to handle. Depending on the occasions for decision, the ADU can be an individual, or we can find an ADU across the boundaries of several political institutions.

As a result of introducing the concept of the ADU, we could compare more easily
what we had not been able to compare. For example, from an institutional perspective, the environment surrounding the Koizumi Administration was different from that surrounding the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. Prime Minister Koizumi had to maintain his coalition partners and deal with the non-mainstream factions in his own party although his coalition was controlling both Houses of the Diet. On the other hand, President Roh Moo-hyun could not control the unicameral National Assembly, which was occupied by a large opposition party grudging against him. He had no coalition to maintain because he broke out his own party and created a small one. Politically, he and his small party were under siege. Despite all these differences, we could find an important similarity between the two governments, which was relevant to explain our dependent variable. In both administrations, the ADU for the maximizing behavior was a self-contained individual leader. We could use this finding to explain the maximizing behavior commonly observed in both administrations.

9.3 Failure of Foreign Pressure and Veto Players

The other outlier is found in $R_2$: only in $R_2$, no dramatic limit of the U.S. pressure is observed; in $K_1$, no amount of U.S. pressure could force Tokyo to provide personnel assistance; in $R_1$, Washington failed to requisition combat forces from Seoul; and in $K_2$, U.S. requests could not induce the Koizumi Administration to participate in or financially contribute to the Iraq War during the active war phase. On the other hand, in $R_2$, when the United States asked for personnel assistance, the South Koreans provided medical and engineering forces. When Washington demanded additional forces of a division size, they
produced a division although the size of the division was discounted.

The U.S. demands cannot explain this variation. It does not make sense to assume that the U.S. negotiators asked for the failure of their demands. Then, which variable from the domestic arena can explain the second outlier? The condition for the explanatory variable for this outlier is that it should be missing only in $R_2$. No one among the variables we examined in the previous chapter meets the condition. In order to answer this question, however, we need to comparatively analyze the causal chains in the decision-making processes of Japan and South Korea, in which the U.S. demands were thwarted. Our objective will be to find a difference in $R_2$ from the other three cases. Again, the theory of the ADU will be used as our comparative framework.

In $K_1$, when the Kaifu Administration submitted the UNPC bill to the Upper House of the Diet and began the debate on the dispatch of the UNPCC to the Middle East, the ADU for this occasion for decision was a coalition of autonomous actors including the opposition parties in the Upper House. And these opposition parties as a whole worked as a veto player, because the enactment of the UNPC bill required their approval.\footnote{For the definition of a veto player, see note 14 in Chapter 5.} If part of the oppositions in the Upper House had defected, allowing the LDP the majority of the Upper House, then, the Kaifu Administration could have enacted the UNPC Law, because according to the Japanese Constitution, the Upper House at the time was the final stage before the enactment. However, the opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the UNPC bill, and willing to use the veto. Insufficient preparations for the bill on the part of the LDP strengthened the oppositions’ confidence against the bill. Finally, the UNPC bill was killed even without taking a vote. As a result, the U.S. demands for personnel
assistance were not accommodated.

In R₁, when the Roh Tae-woo Administration was internally considering the possibility of sending combat forces to the Middle East, the ADU for this specific occasion was a coalition of autonomous actors because, by Article 60 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, dispatch of armed forces to abroad requires prior approval of the National Assembly, and as a result, the political parties within the legislature including the oppositions came to participate in the decision. Of course, at the time, the two-thirds majority of the unicameral National Assembly belonged to the ruling DLP. Therefore, ordinarily, President Roh Tae-woo could have passed the motion for the dispatch through the legislature without the consent of the main opposition PPD. But, in this occasion, the second largest faction within the DLP headed by the party chairman Kim Young-sam switched sides, because Mr. Kim and his entourage held reservations about the dispatch of combat forces. If President Roh Tae-woo had seriously wanted to ram the motion through the National Assembly, he might have succeeded because, even without the lawmakers from Kim Young-sam’s faction, Mr. Roh could mobilize his own faction and the third largest faction to create a slight majority within the National Assembly. However, openly revealing the disagreement among the factions within the DLP might threaten the life of the newly created party itself, and President Roh and his entourage did not seem to have been so confident in the necessity of dispatching the combat forces as to risk revealing such an intra-party conflict. As a result, the U.S. request for the combat forces was silently rejected.

In K₂, when the Koizumi Administration decided not to participate in the active war phase, and not to share the war cost, the ADU for this occasion for decision was a
coalition of autonomous actors including his coalition partners such as the New Komeito. Usually, it was Koizumi as an individual predominant leader that made the decisions regarding the Iraq War. His coalition partners held a veto, but they were not willing to exercise it. However, the issue of participating in the Iraq War in its active war phase was essentially different in its nature. In fact, for the previous dozen years, whenever the Japanese government had confronted the issue of sending SDF troops abroad, the Japanese always chose the option of creating a new enabling legislation to realize the dispatch rather than amending or reinterpreting the Peace Constitution (Shinoda 2006, 23). According to the existing official interpretation of the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense. That is, the Japanese government cannot use force or even take any measure which might be identified with the use of force in order to help defend another country. Therefore, agreeing to participate in a war or to share the cost of the war meant a historic departure from the existing practice. As a “peace-loving” party, it was one thing that the New Komeito could not readily accept; moreover, it was an unpopular war. Therefore, as for the questions of sending SDF troops to Iraq during the active war phase, and sharing the war cost, the New Komeito came to be included in the ADU. Thus, the existing interpretation of Article 9 and the veto power held by the New Komeito within the ADU constituted a limit to U.S. demands. It is highly likely that Prime Minister Koizumi or his national security advisors such as Okamoto Yukio were aware that all his predecessors failed to go beyond the limit. Even the United States could not persuade them to exceed it.

On the other hand, in R₂, no such limit of U.S. pressure is observed. The ADU was still Mr. Roh Moo-hyun as an individual predominant leader. When it came to the
decision to send South Korean troops to overseas, constitutionally, the political parties within the National Assembly were supposed to participate in the decision-making, therefore, the opposition GNP, which was occupying the majority in the legislature at the time, held a constitutional veto. But, the GNP was not willing to use it because they were not opposed to the dispatch of the South Korean forces to Iraq in the first place or because they simply passed the buck to President Roh Moo-hyun. They did not want to make their hands dirty with the unpopular war. Some of President Roh’s close aides and confidants as well as his political supporters were strongly opposed to the dispatch of additional troops to Iraq, but they lacked the legal authority to veto the decision of President Roh.

Table 9-2 Explanation of the Second Outlier: Existence of Veto Player

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Explanation)</th>
<th>Responses to the Gulf War</th>
<th>Responses to the Iraq War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>K1: Kaifu (No Personnel Assistance)</td>
<td>K2: Koizumi (No Participation in the ‘War’ Period and No Sharing of the War Cost)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Player</td>
<td>Opposition Parties in the Upper House</td>
<td>New Komeito in the Ruling Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>R1: Roh Tae-woo (No Combatants)</td>
<td>R2: Roh Moo-hyun (Outlier) (No Dramatic Failure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADU</td>
<td>A Coalition of Autonomous Actors</td>
<td>A Coalition of Autonomous Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Player</td>
<td>Kim Young-sam and His Faction in the DLP</td>
<td>No Veto Player</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This observation is interesting because it is contrary to the popular belief that Mr. Roh Moo-hyun is anti-American, and thus, would want to balk at U.S. requests. It is true that the anti-American sentiment of the South Korean society partly contributed to his
electoral success, and that he used to work as a human-rights lawyer defending student activists, who used to participate in anti-American activities. However, the effect of his political and ideological backgrounds on his specific policy such as the response to the U.S. demands after he was inaugurated was limited. This is another piece of evidence that in determining how to respond to U.S. demands, the security dependence as a structural force and the resultant role conceptions are more important than the biographical backgrounds or political beliefs of an individual leader.

As summarized in Table 9-2, the causal analysis on the limit of U.S. pressure in our four cases shows that the success and failure of the U.S. pressure depends on the internal dynamics of the ADU for the specific occasion for decision, and the presence or absence of a veto player within it. In K₁, K₂, and R₁, the ADU for the decision to send troops to overseas was a coalition of autonomous actors. As a result, there could be a veto player within the decision unit, and there indeed was a veto player in the decision unit, who was willing to exercise the veto. However, only in R₂, the ADU was an individual leader, so there was no veto player, who could veto the decision made by the individual leader. Then, here, we can put together three conditions that constitute the limit of U.S. pressure: (1) when the ADU for a decision was a coalition of autonomous actors, (2) when there was a veto player in ADU, and (3) when the veto player was willing to use the veto against U.S. demands, no amount of U.S. pressure could force the reactive state to meet the demands from Washington. Therefore, the variable we have looked for, or the variable that is missing only in R₂ is an ADU with a veto player.

9.4 The Total Assistance and the Changes in the Relative Economic Power
The total assistance from each administration showed an X-shaped variation. As we can see in Table 9-3, the total assistance from Japan decreased between K_1 and K_2 (-56.4%), while the total assistance from South Korea increased between R_1 and R_2 (94%). Consequently, the gap in the total assistance between Japan and South Korea dramatically decreased between the Gulf War and the Iraq War by 62.5%.

Table 9-3 Total Assistance from Japan & S.Korea before/after Discounting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Assistance (US$, mn)</th>
<th>For Gulf War</th>
<th>For Iraq War</th>
<th>Inter-temporal Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before Discounting (A)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>11,663</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Discounting (B)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>5,663</td>
<td>-56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before Discounting (C)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,680*</td>
<td>110%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Discounting (D)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>970*</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-national Comparison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before Discounting (C/A)</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Discounting (D/A)</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-national Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before Discounting (A-C)</td>
<td>12,200(E)</td>
<td>9,983(F)</td>
<td>-18.2% [(F-E)/E]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Discounting (B-D)</td>
<td>12,500(G)</td>
<td>4,693(H)</td>
<td>-62.5% [(H-G)/G]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The assumption is that the financial assistance from the Roh Moo-hyun Administration is constant at US$ 260 mn, and the number of troops demanded by the United States was cut in half by the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. The cost of sending and maintaining the South Korean military contingent to Iraq was around US$ 710 mn. From this number we can trace back to the pre-discounting cost of the military assistance, which is calculated to be about US 1,420 mn (US$ 710 mn multiplied by 2). US$ 1,680 is the sum of the presumed pre-discounting cost of the military assistance from South Korea (US$ 1,420 mn) plus the amount of the South Korean financial assistance (US$ 260 million).

Do the U.S. demands explain this variation? The answer is complicated because we can see discounts in K_2 and R_2. If there had been no discounting on the part of Tokyo and Seoul, we could simply conclude that the variation in the U.S. demands created the X-shape. However, the Koizumi and the Roh Moo-hyun administrations discounted the U.S. demands: the Koizumi administration cut off more than half of the financial assistance that the United States had allegedly demanded; and the Roh Moo-hyun administration,
too, cut off almost half of the number of troops that Washington hoped for in working-level dialogues. According to Funabashi (2007, 236)’s research, the U.S. bottom-line for the number of troops from South Korea was around “5,000 to 7,000.” Then, the average of the demanded number of soldiers is around 6,000. But the Roh Administration provided only around 3,800 troops including medics and engineers.

Nevertheless, our conclusion is that this discounting does not explain the overall shape of the variation. Let us take a look at Table 9-3 again. Even if there had been no discounting at all, the total assistance from South Korea would have increased between R_1 and R_2 by 110%, and at the same time, the total assistance from Japan would have decreased between K_1 and K_2 by 10.3%. Even without the discounting, the variation in the total assistance would have shown an X-shape.

Did the domestic discounting change this X-shape in the variation to another inherently different shape? Or, did the domestic discounting create a fundamental shift in the variation of the total assistance from Japan and South Korea before and after the discounting?

Before the domestic discounting, the gap between Japan and South Korea in the total assistance declined by 18.2%, but, after the discounting, the cross-national gap decreased by 62.5% as summarized in the lowest two rows of Table 9-3. That is to say, the main feature of the distribution in the total assistance did not come from the discounting behavior, but from the U.S. demands: from a comparative point of view, the U.S. demands on Japan decreased between the Gulf War and the Iraq War whereas the U.S. demands on South Korea increased during the same period; hence, the X-shape. Likewise, in response to the varying U.S. demands, the responses from Japan and South Korea
showed an X-shape, too: between the Gulf War and the Iraq War, the Japanese total assistance decreased while the South Korean total assistance increased. Therefore, the domestic discounting effect did not change the basic shape in the distribution. It only strengthened the existing tendency of the X-shaped variation.

Then, which variable can explain this variation in the U.S. demands? Which factor would the U.S. policymakers have considered when calculating the size of the demands that they would submit to their allies? Which one of the considered factors shows an X-shaped distribution? Which variable could have best predicted the outcome of the negotiation across the Pacific over the amount of the total assistance?

One way to answer these questions will be to conduct in-depth interviews with those policymakers who participated in the decision-making over the U.S. demands on Japan and South Korea. Even with such interviews, however, it will be hard to get a definitive answer about the main determining factor of the U.S. demands because a multiple number of policymakers must have participated in the decision-making at different timings, and also because they must have considered various different factors simultaneously. For example, as we could see in Chapter 4, in September 1990, when submitting the amount of financial assistance it desired from South Korea, the U.S. Department of Defense took into account such factors as “South Korea’s oil imports from the Middle East, the size of ROK’s construction projects in the Gulf region, and the domestic economic situation of South Korea” (NSPA 1991, 384; translation by author). Namely, U.S. policymakers were examining various factors as the basis of their calculation.

However, here, we are not interested in making a list of all possible specific
variables that an individual policymaker or an individual governmental organ considered in each occasion for decision. Rather, we want to find the most important factor that affected the decision-making on both sides of the Pacific and the bilateral negotiation between the United States and the reactive state when they determined the specific amount of the assistance. If we find the factor, then, we will be able to use the factor as a predictor of the outcome of similar negotiations in the future. For this purpose, we need to test each possible explanatory variable to see if those variables fit the X-shaped variation observed in the dependent variable. There can be many possible explanations for the X-shaped variation, but, first of all, the variation of the candidate explanatory variable should correlate with the dependent variable. Without the correlation, we do not even need to proceed to check the causal relationship between the two variables.

*Energy Dependence on the Middle East (?)*

The first possible candidate is energy dependence. It is quite plausible presumption that the energy dependence of Japan and South Korea affected the U.S. decision-making process over how much to demand from Tokyo and Seoul as well as the response-making process of Japan and South Korea. This presumption is plausible because it is a familiar argument in the United States that other countries also have to contribute to the stability of the Middle East because they, too, depend on the oil supply from the region. Moreover, as we could see in Chapter 4, the policymakers and the public opinions in Tokyo and Seoul were quite concerned about the oil supply from the Middle East, particularly in the initial phase of the crisis.
Table 9-4 Japanese and S.Korean Dependence on the Middle East for Curde Oil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Import Origin</th>
<th>Dependence Ratio (A/B)</th>
<th>Import Origin</th>
<th>Dependence Ratio (C/D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East (A)</td>
<td>World (B)</td>
<td>Middle East (C)</td>
<td>World (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>177,761†</td>
<td>229,145</td>
<td>172,424</td>
<td>201,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>60,470</td>
<td>77,845</td>
<td>78,496</td>
<td>106,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† All import units are in 1,000 tons.

Nevertheless, the energy dependence on the Middle East does not pass the test. As shown in Table 9-4, Japan’s dependence on the oil from the Middle East rose from 77.6% in 1994 to 85.5% in 2002. On the other hand, South Korea’s oil dependence on the Middle East during the same period declined from 77.7% to 73.4%. The direction of the inter-temporal changes in energy dependence on the Middle East in Japan and South Korea was opposite to the expectation: the gap in the oil dependence on the Middle East between Japan and South Korea did not decrease but increased. Moreover, even if we disregard slight changes in oil dependence ratio of Japan and South Korea on the Middle East, what Table 9-4 shows us is that Japanese and South Korea oil dependence on the Middle East has been consistently high. Then, this consistently high level of dependence cannot correlate with the X-shaped variation.

If the oil dependence on the Middle East had been the main factor that U.S.

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122For years between 1990 and 1993, data are not available for the Republic of Korea on the OECD database, so we use the data for 1994 as a substitute, assuming that South Korea’s crude oil dependence on the Middle East did not change very much between 1990 and 1994. After all, we are interested in trends, not exact numbers. The year 2002 was picked because a serious debate on the war with Iraq began in 2002 although the field battles began in 2003.
policymakers considered in calculating the expected contributions from Tokyo and Seoul and if the stable oil supply from the Middle East had been the main concern of the Japanese and South Korean policymakers when they determined their amount of the total assistance for the United States, the total assistance from Japan should have slightly increased between $K_1$ and $K_2$ whereas the total assistance from South Korea should have slightly decreased between $R_1$ and $R_2$. Or, the relative total assistance from both countries should have just remained unchanged.

*From Each According To His Ability*

*National Capability as Recognized by the United States.* The other candidates are Japan and South Korea’s size of annual military expenditures and GDPs relative to those of the United States. Selection of these variables as the candidates to explain the variation in the total assistance is based on the presumption that the recognized capability of the allies affected the U.S. expectations on the contributions from the allies.

For example, on 15 November 1990, Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services held a press conference and announced a Persian Gulf Crisis Report Card, giving out student grades to each country from which Washington expected contributions for the upcoming war. In the report, for instance, Saudi Arabia was graded as “B” and named “underachiever” (For the record 1990, A22). Aspin and other legislators “criticized Saudi Arabia for not pledging to give all its profits from oil price increases related to the Crisis,” and Patricia Schroeder, then Chairwoman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities said, “Since August 6, the Saudis have made billions of dollars more in higher oil prices . . . than what
they have paid out to support the U.S. deployment” (Smith 1990, A22). Namely, Saudi Arabia was criticized for not meeting the expectations despite her sufficient capability to do it. Likewise, Japan and Germany were graded as “C” because they “could still contribute more.” On the other hand, “Aspin's report praised Turkey and Egypt for strongly supporting the U.S. military operation while enduring economic losses estimated at more than $1 billion” (italicized by author). It seems that the main yardstick of the Aspin’s report was the supplying capability of the allies.

Table 9-5 Economic Size of Japan and S.Korea Relative to the World Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP, current US$, bn</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3,104</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GDP, World Development Indicators

*The economic size of Japan and South Korea when the size of the world economy is assumed to be 100.

**As measured in terms of the difference in the ratios between 1990 and 2002.

The similar reasoning is also found on the other side of the Pacific. As we described in Chapters 4 and 5, in the initial stage of the Gulf Crisis, South Korean newspapers were negative about the assistance for the Gulf Crisis on the grounds that the South Koreans were already paying a lot to defend against North Korea; that the South Korean economy was not going well; and that the whole country at the time was damaged by raging floods. In a nutshell, they were emphasizing that South Korea was not capable of supplying the assistance for the MNF. Likewise, the Japanese bureaucrats in the Kaifu and the Koizumi
Administrations used to emphasize that the amount of the financial assistance they announced was the most they could provide without levying additional taxes. The Japanese were literally saying that they had already demonstrated their full capacities to provide, and that no more assistance was possible capability-wise.

*Military Expenditures and GDPs Relative to the U.S.* If, on both sides of the Pacific, the national capability was the key to understand the expectations on supply and demand of the assistance for the U.S. war efforts in the Middle East, then, we have to define the national capability to move on. However, the concept of the national capability is a composite object made up of various factors. In order to simplify the testing process, we will present the relative size of annual military expenditures and GDPs as the substitute variables respectively representing the relative military and economic capabilities of a country, and try to see whether the movement of the values in those variables shows an X-shape.

The test result on military strength is negative. As summarized in Table 8-8, the gap between Japan and South Korea in their military strengths relative to that of the United States increased: Japan’s relative military strengths as measured in terms of the ratio to the U.S. military expenditures actually increased between 1990 and 2003 by around 57%; South Korea’s relative military expenditures, too, increased by around one-thirds, but the increase was not as dramatic as that of Japan. Therefore, the military gap between Japan and South Korea increased.

On the other hand, the test result on economic strengths is complicated. When measured in terms of the relative size of their GDPs, the gap between Japan and South Korea indeed decreased. The relative economic size of Japan as measured in terms of the
ratio to the size of the U.S. economy decreased by approximately 30% between 1990 and 2002 whereas there had been no significant change in the relative economic size of South Korea. Therefore, the movement of the values on the candidate explanatory variable indeed showed an X-shape. However, the predictability of the relative economic size bilaterally measured as a share of the size of the U.S. economy is limited: the South Korean post-discounting contribution increased by 94% between the two Wars, that is, almost doubled, but, the economic size of South Korea relative to the U.S. economy was almost constant.

*The National Share in the World Economy as a Predictor.* In order to make up for this limit, we present the share of a country in the world economy as another substitute variable for measuring the national capability as recognized by Washington. As we can see in Table 9-5, the changes in the size of the Japanese and South Korean economies relative to the world economy show an X-shaped variation: Japan’s share of the world economy as measured in terms of the size of GDP declined by 15.6% between 1990 and 2002 while South Korea’s share rose by 41.7%. Therefore, the national share in the world economy passes the test of correlation.

Moreover, the predictive power of this statistic is remarkable in some of our cases. See Table 9-6. When predicted based on Japan and South Korea’s national share in the world economy, the prediction errors as defined as the difference between the Japanese and South Korean share in the total expected cost on one hand and their share in the world economy on the other, are quite small, especially in their contributions for the Iraq War: in $R_2$, it is only 0.1 percentage point (pp) or 5.9% (0.1pp/1.7pp), and in $K_2$, 1.6pp or 13.4% (1.6pp/11.9pp). This means that, had we used Japan and South Korea’s share in
the world economy as a predictor for their eventual share in the total expected cost of the Iraq War, we could have hit the target fairly successfully.

Table 9-6 the National Share in the World Economy as a Predictor of the Total Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wars</th>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>Realized Total Assistance (A) (US$, mn)</th>
<th>Expected Total Cost (War/Reconstruction) (B) (US$, mn)</th>
<th>Share in the Total Cost (A/B)</th>
<th>Share in the World Economy (C)</th>
<th>Prediction Error ((A/B)-C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Crisis/War</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>60,000*</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>7.6%-points (K₁)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-0.4%-points (R₁)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5,663</td>
<td>55,000**</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>-1.6%-points (K₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>970</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.1%-points (R₂)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As of March 1991, the total funds promised by the allies amounted to US$ 54.542 bn. The White House estimated that the total final cost of the Gulf War would be upwards of US$ 54.5 bn. According to the estimation of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the total cost was around US$ 60 to 65 bn. Another U.S. Administration official estimated that the total cost would range between US$ 60 to 70 bn (NSPA 1991, 159). US$ 60 bn is an approximation to the average of all these estimations.

**An estimate of the World Bank (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 5 October 2003).

On the other hand, there are fairly large prediction errors in predicting Japan and South Korea’s contributions for the Gulf War with their national share in the world economy. In K₁, Japan overshot the prediction by 7.6pp or by 53.9% (7.6pp/14.1pp), while, in R₁, South Korea undershot the prediction by 0.4pp or by 33.3% (0.4pp/1.2pp).

However, we can explain these prediction errors. Remember that K₁ was one of the two outliers; the maximizing behavior was missing only in K₁. The fragmentation within the ADU must have seriously weakened the discounting capability of the Kaifu Administration. Moreover, the failure of the UNPC bill in the Diet further weakened the negotiating position of the Japanese government. As a result, the Japanese policymakers
must have felt the pressure to compensate the lack of personnel assistance with the financial subventions by readily accepting U.S. treasury secretary Brady’s request in New York. Notice that when the Japanese accepted the demand of US$ 9 billion, it was a surprise even to the U.S. side.

Conversely, the compensation strategy worked the other way around in $R_1$. Advisors of President Roh Tae-woo decided to compensate the financial assistance with the personnel assistance by providing medical and engineering units for the MNF, and the cost for this dispatch was included in the sum total of the South Korean financial assistance. They even fast-tracked their transportation support with the purpose of maximizing the political effect of the provision explicitly in their minds. Washington was not fully satisfied with the amount of the South Korean assistance. But, the coherence within the ADU in $R_1$ helped the South Koreans endure the American pressure, and thereby contributed to the success of the discounting in $R_1$. Consequently, the Roh Tae-woo Administration could get away with much less amount of assistance for the MNF than predicted by their share in the world economy.

Amplifying or Silencing Devices

123 According to Herman and Hermann (1989, 382), “single group decision units that are self-contained show the most extreme commitment behavior.” For the statistical basis of this judgment, see Table 4, “Analysis of variance for commitment by type of ultimate decision unit” in Herman and Herman (1989, 381), particularly the mean for the self-contained single group decision unit, which is the largest among the six types of decision units. According to the definition of Callahan (Herman and Hermann 1989, 379), “commitment involves the degree to which a government’s current actions limit its future options either through the allocation of resources or the generation of expectations in others.” Therefore, high commitment involves “the irreversible allocation of resources and the signing of international agreements.” Notice that the meaning of commitment as defined by Callahan is similar to the word, “endurance” as used in this dissertation. The type of decision unit in $R_1$ provided the most favorable condition to endure U.S. pressures and thereby discount U.S. demands, because in $R_1$, the decision unit was a self-contained single group.
In addition, the prediction errors are consistent with our explanations of the two outliers. As we had found in the previous section, in K₁, the maximizing behavior was missing while in R₂, the veto player in the decision-making process was absent. On the other hand, in K₂ and R₁, we could observe both maximizing behavior and veto players. From these observations, we can expect to see overshooting or more assistance than predicted when the maximizing behavior or the coherence within the decision unit as an organizational basis of the maximizing behavior is missing or when the decision unit lacks a veto player. By the same token, we can expect to see undershooting or less assistance than predicted when the maximizing behavior on the part of the reactive state is frequently observed or when there is a veto player within the decision unit.

The prediction error column of Table 9-6 shows that our expectations are indeed fulfilled: the prediction errors in K₁ and R₂ are positive: they provided more than predicted, whereas, in K₂ and R₁, negative: they provided less than predicted. We can infer that the Kaifu Administration provided more than predicted mainly because of the lack of maximizing behavior, and the Roh Moo-hyun Administration provided more than predicted mainly because of the lack of a veto player. On the other hand, in R₁ and K₂, we can observe both maximizing behavior and the existence of a veto player. Both combine to have the effect of discounting U.S. demands: hence, both cases show negative prediction errors.

This finding strongly suggests that the fragmentation within the ADU and the absence of veto players in the decision-making process play the role of lowering the discounting performance of the countries responding to U.S. demands. Notice that in all the four cases the social resistance against the U.S.-led wars and the assistance for them
was considerable. Had the Japanese leaders in K₁ kept the level of coherence within the decision unit that is observed in other cases, and had there been a veto player in the decision-making process in R₂ regarding the assistance for the United States, this social resistance could have been channeled up to the final decision-making moment, and we could have observed higher performance in their discounting of the U.S. demands. In other words, we can conclude that if other things being equal, the presence of a veto player and/or the coherence within the ADU have the tendency of amplifying the discounting capability of the countries responding to U.S. demands. By the same token, the absence of a veto player and the fragmentation within the decision unit will have an effect of relatively silencing the discounting capability of the reactive states.

9.5 Militaristic Inclination and U.S. Perceptions on the Constitutional Constraints

As we had described in Chapter 7, cross-nationally, more military elements are found in the South Korean assistance package than in the Japanese. At the same time, inter-temporally, more military elements are observed in the assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War. Let us go back to Table 6-3. In the Personnel Assistance-Actually Delivered column of the table, we can compare the size and components of the personnel assistance from each Administration. In K₁, no personnel assistance was provided, while in R₁, military medics and engineers were provided: hence, more military elements on the South Korean side. In K₂, slightly more than 1,000 SDF troops went to Iraq, whereas in R₂, more than 3,000 South Korean soldiers went to help the Iraqis rehabilitate their country: hence, again, more military elements on the South Korean side. Inter-temporally,
it is obvious that more military elements are found in $K_2$ than in $K_1$. Likewise, the militaristic inclination is evident between $R_1$ and $R_2$.

What is the source of this cross-national and inter-temporal militaristic inclination? Is the cross-national militaristic inclination due to the pacifist culture in Japan? And, did the inter-temporal increase in the Japanese personnel assistance result from the weakening of the pacifist culture in the meantime? If the militaristic inclination is coming from domestic variations or changes, then, we should be able to find the source of the militaristic inclination in the process of domestic discounting. Conversely, if we find the source of the militaristic inclination in the variation of the U.S. demands, then, the argument that finds the source of the variation of the personnel assistance in domestic factors will be weakened. We can test if the source of the militaristic inclination is in the external or domestic variables by comparing the size and components of the personnel assistance before and after the discounting by each Administration.

_The Demands Were Different_

Let us take a look at Table 9-7. Even before the discounting, more military elements are found in the U.S. demands on South Korea than on Japan in case of the Gulf Crisis/War. As we had described in Chapter 4 in the quotation of Ambassador Armacost’s reminiscences about the negotiation with the Japanese, in $K_1$, what the United States wanted from Japan was symbolic presence of Japanese personnel. It could just be “a Japanese ship manned by Japanese personnel” (Armacost 1996, 102). It did not necessarily need to be ground troops that could play the combative functions. Notice that Ambassador Armacost did not even use the word, “troops” or “soldiers.”
On the other hand, in R₁, Washington seems to have asked for a symbolic number of personnel with combat functions. Therefore, the U.S. demands on South Korea included more military elements than the U.S. demands on Japan. Officially, of course, the U.S. demands did not include combat troops, and the Roh Tae-woo Administration even denied the existence of such a request. From the descriptions of Chapter 4, however, we know that Karl D. Jackson mentioned “troops” when he met a political minister of the Korean embassy in Washington on 11 January 1991. On the same day, then South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-gu suggested the possibility of sending combat troops although he quickly rescinded it in response to strong objections of opposition leaders. Defense Minister Lee’s suggestion may have been a coincidence, but anyhow, the timing is quite opportune and suggestive of U.S. pressures.

Likewise, Table 9-7 also shows that, in case of the Iraq War as well, before discounting, the U.S. demands on South Korea held more military elements than those on Japan. Richard P. Lawless, the point man of the U.S. side suggested “boots on the ground,” to Tokyo, and the number of the required boots was fixed at around 2,000,
meaning approximately 1,000 soldiers. In response, Japan provided around 1,000 troops although the number included ASDF and MSDF troops. On the other hand, Mr. Lawless suggested “a division” to the South Korean side, and in the ensuing working-level dialogue between the South Korean MND and the U.S. DoD, the size of the division desired by the U.S. side boiled down to around 5,000 to 7,000. In response, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration provided a division of about half the desired size.

Inter-temporal comparison also shows that the size of the military elements in the U.S demands increased between the Gulf War and the Iraq War for both Japan and South Korea. As summarized in Table 9-7, in K₁, the negotiators on the U.S. side asked for only symbolic number of personnel assistance, but 12 years later, in K₂, the demand rose up to around 1,000 troops. In R₁, the U.S. demand for personnel assistance was a symbolic number of combat troops, but in R₂, the demand increased to an independently operable military division.

The test results show that the origin of the cross-national and inter-temporal militaristic inclination is found in the U.S. demands in the first place. However, it may be too early to rush to the conclusion. These test results do not necessarily deny the effect of pacifist or militarist culture or any other domestic factors in the Japanese or South Korean decision-making process. Aside from the variation in the U.S. demands, we can also separately test the effect of the domestic factors by looking at the size of the domestic discounting of the U.S. demands.

No Pacifism Observed in the Discounting

Again, let us go back to Table 9-7 and take a look at the Personnel Assistance-After
Discounting column of the table. If the domestic factors such as pacifism are part of the source of the cross-national militaristic inclination between \( K_1 \) and \( R_1 \), and between \( K_2 \) and \( R_2 \), larger discounts should be observed on the Japanese side. However, as we can see in Table 9-7, it is hard to conclude that the Kaifu Administration discounted more of the U.S. demands for personnel assistance than the Roh Tae-woo Administration did, particularly because we know that the starting line for Japan was different from that for South Korea. The discounted amount in \( K_1 \) is “a symbolic number of personnel assistance,” while in \( R_1 \), the discounted amount is “a symbolic number of combat troops.” Moreover, in \( K_2 \), there was no significant discounting while in \( R_2 \), about half of the U.S. demand for personnel assistance was discounted. Contrary to the expectation, if any, larger discounts are found on the South Korean side by comparison between \( K_2 \) and \( R_2 \).

We can conduct the same test for inter-temporal comparison. If the domestic factors are the source of the militaristic skew found between the Gulf War and the Iraq War, then, we should be able to find a larger amount of discounts in \( K_1 \) and \( R_1 \) than in \( K_2 \) and \( R_2 \) based on the assumption that such domestic factors working against the increase of the military components as the pacifist culture weakened inter-temporally. However, actual test results do not perfectly fit the expectation. Indeed, between the Japanese cases, a larger discount is found in \( K_1 \) than in \( K_2 \) because in \( K_2 \), there was almost no significant discount for the personnel assistance. However, the difference in the amount of discounts between the two cases is not so dramatic: in \( K_1 \), actually, the discount was only “a symbolic number of personnel assistance.” Moreover, comparison between the South Korean cases shows an indeterminate result: in \( R_1 \), the discounted amount was “a symbolic number of combat troops” while in \( R_2 \), the discounted amount was around
3,000 troops. If we compare based on the quality of the military contingent, then, more of the U.S. demand was discounted in R₁ than in R₂ because the Roh Tae-woo Administration provided no combat troops while the Roh Moo-hyun Administration sent around 3,000 troops that could play combative functions. However, if we judge by the size of the personnel assistance, then, we can conclude that more discounts are observed in R₂ than in R₁. In other words, quantitatively speaking, a larger part of the U.S. demand for personnel assistance was discounted in R₂ than in R₁.

According to these test results, it is hard to judge that the source of the cross-national and inter-temporal militaristic inclinations is in the domestic factors of Japan and South Korea. Rather, it is more probable that the inclinations came from the variation in the U.S. demands. The U.S. demands were not uniform across our cases, and in the first place the variation in the U.S. demands was the main source of the variation in the assistance from Japan and South Korea. From an empirical point of view, the United States asked for more military assistance from South Korea than from Japan, and Seoul and Tokyo responded accordingly. Likewise, Washington expected more military assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War, and again, South Korea and Japan reacted in proportion to the U.S. expectations.

**U.S. Preconceptions of Domestic Constraints and U.S. Needs in the International Arena**

Then, what is the source of this variation in the U.S. expectations on Japan and South Korea? Why do the Americans expect more military assistance from South Korea than from Japan? Why did the United States demand more military elements for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War? The origin of the skewed U.S. expectations should be found
in the prior perceptions held by U.S. policymakers because the variation in the U.S. expectations was observed even before the negotiations began in earnest. In other words, the U.S. negotiators must have held either vaguely or clearly a preconceived notion of the domestic constraints imposed on the Japanese or what Japan can and cannot do even before they came to the negotiating table with the Japanese.

Japanese Domestic Constraints as Perceived by the U.S. We can find the evidence for this U.S. preconception in the remarks made by U.S. officials. For example, as we had quoted in Chapter 6, Ambassador Armacost’s expectation on the personnel assistance from Japan was not very high in the first place, because he understood the constitutional constraints that Japan faced. Likewise, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Richard L. Armitage, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State expressed his understanding of the fact that Japan cannot send troops during the active war phase. In fact, the U.S. tolerance and understanding of the Japanese constitutional limits on the use of military force are nothing new. They trace their history back to the Cold War era.

One great problem we have is that the Constitution of Japan forbids her to send troops to Southeast Asia. . . . Japan is now equal to the strong nations and can do its part and provide the leadership, even though this may be limited to sound financial assistance. . . . The Koreans have impressed the American people with their growth and by the fact that they have sent troops to Vietnam even though Japan cannot. We understand why Japan cannot do so. . . . This is a big country. We hope that Japan can help on these financial matters, particularly since she cannot send men because of her Constitution. . . . Japan can’t send men, but it would seem that she could provide dollars and could provide money for the ADB Special Fund (underline by author).²⁴

Quoted above is part of the conversation between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in a summit held on 15 November 1967. In this private conversation, President Johnson repeatedly expresses his understanding on the Constitutional limits of Japan, and strongly urges Prime Minister Sato to increase economic and technical aid for South Vietnam to ease U.S. burden, and presses for greater Japanese purchases of U.S. securities to reduce balance of payments deficit. At the time, President Johnson was in a predicament at home and abroad: he deployed a total of 600,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, but the war was not showing progress; and his domestic approval ratings were down to 24% in the polls.

It is worth noting that despite all these difficulties, President Johnson did not ask Prime Minister Sato to send troops to Vietnam. What he wanted from Japan was the provision of more Japanese funds to the ADB and the purchase of more U.S. securities. We can see that President Johnson’s conception on the domestic constraints imposed on the Japanese government was quite strong, and that his conception on the expected role of Japan was defined in economic rather than military terms. This role conception on what Japan can and cannot do continues to the post-Cold War era as we could see in the remarks made by U.S. officials such as Ambassador Armacost and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage.

*Domestic Effects of the Peace Constitution Questionable.* The strength and continuity of the U.S. role conception on Japan raise an interesting question about its foundations. Do the U.S. role conceptions on Japan have substantive grounds? Is the Japanese Constitution really such a central limit to Japan’s expanding military role abroad? Our answer is cautiously negative.
First of all, for the past two decades, foreign projection of the SDF has expanded without amending the Japanese Constitution. New constitutional interpretations and new enabling laws were sufficient for the Japanese government to participate in UN PKOs, the Afghan War, and the Iraqi reconstruction. All these participations were not even thinkable before the end of the Cold War. Even before the end of the Cold War, however, the Japanese could go around the Constitutional limit if they so wished sincerely. For example, even in the 1950s, the existence of the SDF was regarded as unconstitutional by the majority opinion of the Japanese civilian experts on constitutional law. But, the expert opinions could not stop the creation of the SDF when the Japanese government introduced a new interpretation to justify the birth of the SDF.\textsuperscript{125}

Second, from a positivist standpoint, if the Constitutional limit really had the effect of constraining the military elements in the assistance for the United States, that effect should be significantly observed in the process of discounting the U.S. demands. Indeed, the Constitution played a role. When Kaifu flatly rejected President Bush’s request of minesweepers, he quoted the Constitutional limit as the excuse. When Koizumi refused to participate in the active war phase of the Iraq War, the reason behind the refusal must have been the Constitution. Nevertheless, as our comparative test shows, the effect of the Japanese discounting on the size of the military elements in the assistance package was not large. Therefore, we reached the conclusion that the militaristic inclination began with the U.S. demands in the first place, and the domestic discounting did not

\textsuperscript{125}Even now, the majority opinion of the Japanese experts on constitutional law is that the SDF is unconstitutional. However, articles in a national constitution usually do not have punishment clauses. For example, even if a Japanese prime minister breaches Article 9 of the Constitution, no legal punishment will be imposed on him. Of course, he can still be held politically accountable for his new interpretation. But, if the majority of the Lower House of the Diet supports his ‘breach,’ then, legally as well as politically, he can remain in Kantei.
fundamentally change the shape of the variation created by the U.S. demands.

Third, notice that South Korea has no such thing as the Peace Constitution. Although the South Korean Constitution, too, renounces a war of aggression (Article 5), and requires prior consent of the National Assembly to dispatch the armed forces to abroad (Article 60), the South Korean Constitution never denounces war as a sovereign right, and never promises not to maintain armed forces as well as other war potential. If the specific wordings of the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has the effect of seriously constraining military components in the assistance package, and the South Korean Constitution has no such wordings, then, the cross-national difference in the discounted amounts of the U.S. demands should be explicit and significant. But, our test has just showed that the cross-national difference in the discounted amounts was small between K₁ and R₁. Moreover, when the difference was large as we observed between K₂ and R₂, the discounted amount was larger in South Korea than in Japan. The specific content of the Japanese and South Korean Constitutions are starkly different, but, the differences in their effects as measured in the discounting process are not so stark.

Lastly, the Japanese Constitution or the Japanese domestic constraints represented by the Constitution does not explain the inter-temporal increase in the military components in the Japanese assistance for the United States. Between 1991 and 2003, no word has ever been changed in the Japanese Constitution much less in the South Korean Constitution, but the military elements in both the Japanese and the South Korean assistance for the United States increased considerably.

The examination of the domestic effects of the Peace Constitution or the substantive foundations of the U.S. perceptions on the Japanese domestic constraints allows us to
trace the transmission path of the U.S. demands, and comparatively estimate the relative explanatory power of the domestic and external variables in the transmission path.

"Transmitted Externally Rather Than Internally." Simply put, we can estimate that South Korea provided more personnel assistance than Japan did, basically because the United States expected and demanded more personnel assistance from South Korea than from Japan. The source of the variation in Washington’s expectations was mainly their perception that the domestic constraints on the foreign projection of military forces are more restrictive in Japan than in South Korea. However, the domestic restraining effect of the Peace Constitution is dubious or at best limited in terms of actually constraining the actions of the agent. Remember that the Kaifu Administration swiftly pushed the UNPC bill up to the gate of the Diet despite the Peace Constitution. At least, according to our observations of the domestic discounting process, the direct discounting effect of the domestic constraints was less remarkable than expected. In fact, the domestic constraints of Japan played their role more effectively when they were exercised through the perceptions of U.S. policymakers.

To be sure, there were observations in which it was not the U.S. perceptions but the domestic constraint such as the veto player inside the ADU that frustrated the U.S. hopes. When the veto players within the Upper House of the Diet torpedoed the UNPC bill in October 1990, and when the Koizumi Administration had to make it clear up front that they could not participate in the active war phase and share the war cost, it was not the U.S. perceptions but the veto players that worked as a brake. And, the veto players used the Constitutional limit as their ammunitions. Even when the U.S. prior perceptions played the role of lowering the bar for the Japanese, their perceptions were not based on a
ghost. They were based on their solid reading of the Japanese Constitution.

In other words, we are not trying to claim that the Japanese Constitution does nothing to influence the Japanese foreign policy. Rather, our argument is that the Constitution, and for that matter, any other political institutions do not live in a vacuum; their effects are realized in political discourse among live agents. The Constitution does not stand alone, and alone, the Constitution does nothing. For example, many commentators quote the Japanese Constitution as the reason behind the failure of the UNPC bill in 1990. However, what if the LDP did not lose the majority in the Upper House as a result of the Upper House election of 1989?126 Or, what if the Kaifu Cabinet was given a sufficient amount of time to develop the justifications for the UNPC bill in the Diet? Would the Constitution still have forestalled the enactment of the UNPC bill? Depending on the distribution of seats within the Upper House at the time, the fate of the UNPC bill could have ended up in a different page of the book of history. What about Koizumi’s decision to avoid the war and participate in the reconstruction of Iraq? If the LDP had gained eight more seats in the Upper House election of 2001, and thereby, could have secured the majority within the Upper House without the support of the New Komeito, would the Koizumi Administration still have bothered about the opinion of the New Komeito and shown the same response to U.S. demands as they did in reality?

The finding that we want to emphasize as a result of this research is not that the Japanese Constitution was not a brake at all, but that even the Japanese Constitution, which is indisputably a domestic variable, was exerting its influence through the U.S. perceptions on the domestic constraints rather than directly through the domestic

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126 As a result of the Recruit scandal, the LDP lost the majority in the Upper House of the Diet after the election of 1989 for the first time since its inception in 1955.
discounting process. In this sense, the U.S. factor, which is an external variable, was important in explaining the variations in the Japanese responses.

*Washington Needs More Military Assistance for the Iraq War*

The same reasoning can be applied to explain the inter-temporal militaristic inclination. Both Japan and South Korea provided more personnel assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War not so much because their domestic constraints on the foreign dispatch of personnel have become less restrictive since the end of the Gulf War as because the United States demanded more personnel assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War, and also because Tokyo and Seoul responded to the demands accordingly.

In fact, the domestic situation in R2 was full of elements unfavorable to the dispatch of a large contingent to Iraq: the tragic killing of two middle school girls by a U.S. military vehicle lighted the fire of anti-American sentiments among the South Korean public; this anti-American wave propelled a human right lawyer who had never been to the United States to the post of the president; the upcoming war in Iraq was as unpopular as it could be in South Korea; and even some of the closest advisors of President Roh Moo-hyun was strongly opposed to the dispatch of combat troops to Iraq. Despite all these hurdles, President Roh Moo-hyun sent a military division to Iraq. Likewise, from a strictly legal point of view, the Japanese Constitutional limit on the foreign dispatch of SDF troops in 2003 was basically the same as in 1990; and, like in South Korea, in Japan, the Iraq War was unpopular, and the social opposition to the war was strong. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Koizumi accomplished the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq.

If the Administrations in Tokyo and Seoul increased their personnel assistance for
the Iraq War despite all these unfavorable domestic situations, then, the source of the inter-temporal militaristic inclination should be found in external variables, particularly on the U.S. side. At the time, the United States had every reason to demand more contributions from their faithful allies such as Japan and South Korea. Unlike the Gulf War, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, major powers refused to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against Saddam Hussein, and some countries even publicly criticized the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, raising suspicions on the casus belli presented by the United States. Being relatively isolated, Washington urgently needed political support from the existing allies. Of course, more financial assistance was needed, too. But, more important for Washington was the expression of a political will. Stationing a large military contingent under their national flag in the Iraqi desert must have been the best way to express the political will of an ally to advocate the American cause. That was what the George W. Bush Administration needed, and the Koizumi and the Roh Moo-hyun Administrations provided what the Americans needed.

9.6 Reactions under Constant U.S. Pressures

In the previous chapter, we concluded that the main explanatory variable for the behavioral uniformity in the reactive states such as Japan and South Korea is an external variable, that is, asymmetric bilateral security dependence. Interestingly, the test results of this chapter show that the main explanatory variable for the variations in the substance of the assistance for the United States is, again, an external one.

These results appear to be going against the conventional wisdom. Researchers in
the field of political science would presume that, if the consistency or uniformity observed in the set of data is coming from the systems-level, then, naturally the variations would be coming from the domestic level. However, our test results show that the substantive variations as well as the behavioral uniformity are mostly coming from the external variable—the U.S. demands. Just as the speed of light does not vary with time or place, the U.S. influence was powerful and constant whether it is on the behavioral uniformity or on the substantive variations.

For the X-shaped variation in the amount of the total assistance, the main source was the variation in the U.S. demands, and the variation in the U.S. demands was based on the perceptions of U.S. policymakers on the relative supplying capability of the responding countries. Based on this inference, we could present the responding country’s national share in the world economy as a predictor for the amount of the total assistance eventually provided by the reactive states.

For the cross-national militaristic inclination, the first and foremost source of the variation was found to be the variation in the U.S. perception of the strength of the domestic constraints imposed on the Japanese and South Korean governments. It seems that the Americans believe that the Japanese Constitution is more restrictive on the foreign projection of military forces than the South Korean Constitution, and adjust their demands accordingly. Japan and South Korea responded to the demands by discounting part of the demands, but their responses did not change the fundamental shape of the cross-national variation in the size of the personnel assistance. Consequently, the size of the military components in the South Korean assistance was relatively larger than that in the Japanese assistance even before the discounting.
For the inter-temporal militaristic inclination, the main source of the variation was found to be the U.S. needs determined on the systems level. The international distrust on the legitimacy of the Iraq War weakened the political leadership of the United States, and Washington had to supplement the weakened leadership with stronger political support from such faithful allies as Japan and South Korea. Consequently, Washington needed the larger military assistance from Japan and South Korea, not so much for the tactical purpose of conducting more efficient military operations in Iraq as for the political purpose of demonstrating the political will of the allies. Japan and South Korea responded to these political needs of the United States by reconfirming their political will through the dispatch of larger personnel assistance to Iraq.

However, just as there is always a reaction to every action in physics, there indeed was a reaction on the part of the reactive states to the U.S. demands. That is, not all variations are determined by the U.S. demands. Part of the variations came from within the discounting process of the reactive states. We could see how the reactive states discounted the U.S. demands and which variables played an important role in the discounting by explaining the two outliers.

The coherence within the ADU and the existence of a veto player were found to be the key to understand the discounting capability of the reactive states. In other words, when those who participated in the ADU or those who made the real final decisions regarding the U.S. demands were coherent among themselves and confident in their decisions, we could expect to see higher performance in the discounting by the reactive states. Likewise, when there was a veto player within the ADU, who was opposed to U.S. demands, no amount of pressures could force the reactive states to provide what was
demanded by the United States.

Nevertheless, we should not overrate the power of discounting by the reactive states, particularly in a crisis situation, which requires a decision on use of force. Just as the speed of light constitutes the upper limit for the speeds of all physical objects, the responses of the reactive states did not exceed the parameters set down by the United States. We need to remember that behaviorally as well as substantively, it was the United States that defined the central tendency of the responses from the reactive states in a security crisis. Discounting is discounting. Discounting does not nullify the whole U.S. demands, nor does it let them down below zero.

Now, we are ready to answer the three questions that we raised in the beginning of this chapter. First, it was the external variable, that is, the U.S. factor rather than the domestic variables or the discounting process that relatively played the more important role in explaining the substantive variations in the size of the total assistance and the share of the personnel components in the total. Second, it is estimated that the U.S. perceptions of the Japanese relative economic power and the domestic constraints were the main source of the varying U.S. demands. Lastly, it was the internal dynamics of the ADU and the veto player within the ADU that played the central role in the discounting process.
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general.

Karl Marx

Ideology... is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence.

Louis Althusser

The first task of this dissertation was to test the validity and reliability of the reactive state thesis (RST). The RST should grab the attention of those who are interested in Japanese foreign policy behavior because the Japanese foreign policy behavior as described by the RST goes against the conventional wisdom within the political science and the international relations communities. In a nutshell, the core argument of the RST is that Japan looks like a great power, but does not act like one. The structural pressure of the international system should have already bestowed a great-power status on Japan, but the behavioral characteristics of Japan were different from those of existing great powers and rather, closer to those states whose economic and demographic sizes were much smaller than Japan.

In fact, Kent E. Calder (1988) was not the only observer who sensed this anomaly. Kenneth N. Waltz (1993), in the beginning days of the post-Cold War era, sensitively perceived this mismatch between Japan’s international position and her behavior, and
predicted the end of the Japanese anomaly and the transition of Japan to a great-power status.

For a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly. For that reason, the choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries has risen in step with their material resources. Countries with great-power economies have become great powers, whether or not reluctantly... (Waltz 1993, 67; underline by author).

The basis of his prediction was structural. Japan’s growing material resources will change her economic size relative to those of other countries. Then, sooner rather than later, the structural pressures that the economic growth of Japan created will end the structural anomaly and propel Japan up to the status of great powers. It is only a matter of time. And, as a result of the shift, Japan’s international behavior would naturally change to match her international status.

That is to say, Waltz and Calder shared their diagnosis of the Japanese peculiarity: it is anomalous for Japan to act like a reactive state. However, they varied in their prognosis of the Japanese status and behavior. Unlike Waltz, who predicted that the structural anomaly would soon be over, Calder had never seriously predicted the change of Japanese foreign policy behavior. If anything, he was closer to the side of predicting its continuity. For example, fifteen years after he first termed the peculiar aspect of Japanese foreign policy behavior as ‘reactive,’ he refused to change his original judgment and declared that “Japanese foreign policy has changed remarkably little” (Calder 2003, 605). Calder diverged from Waltz because he found the source of the reactive behavior in the domestic institutions of the Japanese state, particularly, the fragmented character of the Japanese state and political parties, and because he believed that those domestic...
characteristics would not easily change. However, our findings are different from the predictions of Waltz and Calder.

10.1 Findings

In summary, as a result of this research, we reached five main findings. First, we found that the RST is still descriptively valid and reliable because we could find the predicted outcomes derived from the RST uniformly observed across our case descriptions. In other words, as Calder predicted, Japanese foreign policy behavior “has changed remarkably little” (Calder 2003).

However, the second finding is that the explanatory power of the RST is limited. The observed constancy of behavior is problematic, especially because we know that there had been great changes in important domestic factors of Japanese politics. Japanese foreign policy behavior changed little not because of the continuity in Japanese political institutions, but in spite of many significant changes in them during the 1990s. Where can we find the source of this remarkable continuity? We found that, as Waltz argued, external variables played an important role in explaining the continuity and cross-national uniformity. And yet, we need to make a step forward from Waltz’s argument.

Our third finding is that it was not the systems-level variable that Waltz predicted, but a variable that is found on the bilateral level, that is, bilateral security dependence. According to our finding, that was the central external variable to explain the constant reactive behavior observed in our cases.

Then, how can the external variables affect the behavior of domestic agents? This is
our fourth finding. We highlighted three transmission paths between external variables and the reactive behavior of domestic agents: internalization, competition, and transnational networks. External variables acted on the behavior by influencing the psychological process of domestic agents, domestic political processes, and the decision process within governmental organs.

And the final finding is that, from the critiques on the RST, we could extract some behavioral and substantive variations that are not covered by both the RST and asymmetric security dependence. In other words, there are some aspects of the observed foreign policy behavior in our four cases that are not constant. There indeed were variations in some aspects of the behavior. However, the RST did not predict these variations. In order to enhance the explanatory power of the RST, we added two additional variables—the coherence within the ADU and the presence of a veto player within the ADU—and thereby complemented the RST. And yet, we could see that the main explanatory variable to explain the substantive variations was still external at least in our cases: U.S. perceptions on the reactive states’ national capability and domestic limits. Even in explaining the variations, the U.S. influence was found to be significant.

**RST: Descriptively Still Valid and Reliable**

The descriptive part of the reactive state thesis (RST) was correctly describing Japanese behavior. The RST that Calder presented in 1988 was found to be still valid and reliable in describing the foreign policy behavior of the reactive states in early 21st century. Our comparative test across four cases shows that Japanese foreign policy behavior is indeed reactive, that is, passive but flexible, just as the RST predicted. Japan
is passive in the sense that she does not proactively produce her independent responses to the development of external events and rather, just waits out for U.S. demands. Nor Japan is able to provide her own creative alternatives to unfolding external situations. But, Japan is flexible. When Washington produces demands, Tokyo accommodates a considerable amount of the demands, and implements her promises within a reasonable amount of time. On the other hand, Waltz’s prediction has not been fulfilled. Our observations show that the structural force of the international system has failed to change Japanese foreign policy behavior.

We could reach this conclusion through cross-national and inter-temporal comparisons. Cross-nationally, we established South Korea—a confirmed reactive state in the theoretical framework of the RST—as a benchmark, and tested the validity of the RST against the cases gathered from South Korea. Since the RST claims that not only Japan but also South Korea is reactive, the RST could be tested against the cases from South Korea as well as Japan. If Japanese foreign policy behavior is reactive just as South Korean foreign policy behavior is, then, a test with Japanese cases will have to produce the same results as when we test with South Korean cases. For this comparative test, we raised the same standard questions across both Japanese and South Korean cases, and found that the empirical measures that we obtained as a result of the test all agreed with the predictions derived from the RST across the cases. It means that the behavior of the Japanese foreign policy was found to be reactive and behaviorally identical with that of South Korean foreign policy as had been predicted by the RST.

In addition to the South Korean cases, we used some samples from European cases such as the British and French responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War to test the RST.
As a result, we could see that the behavioral characteristics of Japan and South Korea were indeed discerned from those of the United Kingdom and France. Therefore, we could reach the conclusion that the RST is still valid because it is describing correctly what it intends to describe. We could also conclude that the RST is reliable because it was proved to be valid by testing a multiple number of cases including Japanese as well as non-Japanese cases.

We conducted an inter-temporal comparison as well. We found two similar cases from Japan with a time interval of a dozen years between them: K₁ and K₂. We raised the same standard questions across the two cases that are inter-temporally apart from each other. If the test results had been varying between the two cases, we could have concluded that there had been some change in Japanese foreign policy behavior inter-temporally. However, the empirical measures we obtained from the two cases all fell within the range predicted by the RST. Therefore, we could conclude that there was a behavioral continuity in Japanese foreign policy. This finding will naturally weaken the prediction of Waltz.

*Explanatory Power of the RST Weakened*

According to our test results, however, the source of the continuity is not explained by the RST. We could not find the main source of the reactive behavior as we defined in Chapter 3 among domestic variables. We tested the effects of domestic variables chosen from the governmental, societal, and individual source categories such as the fragmentation of political power in the governmental and party institutions, the resistance of the public opinion, the influence of interest groups and pacifist culture, and the
personal characteristics of political leaders.

Our method was to check and compare the variations in the dependent variable against the variations in the possible explanatory variables. Because the values on the dependent variable—the reactive behavior—were uniform across the cases, we wanted to find the same uniformity in the values on the candidate explanatory variable. It means that the values on the explanatory variable should be uniform across the compared cases. But, we could not find such uniformity in the domestic variables.

For example, unlike Japan, the political power in South Korea was highly concentrated in the hands of the president. Particularly, the South Korean president held much more independence and authority on the making of foreign policies. Notwithstanding this concentration, the behavioral aspect of the South Korean foreign policy responses that were our concern in this case study was found to be reactive. Then, the cross-national comparison weakens the RST’s proposition that the fragmented character of the decision-making authority is the very source of the reactive behavior.

The public opinion on the U.S.-led wars was indeed uniform across the cases, but the public opinion was uniformly opposing the wars. As for the more specific question of whether to provide assistance for the United States, the public opinions in Japan and South Korea were almost evenly divided, and thus, could not provide a specific policy direction. More importantly, the public opinions in Japan and South Korea changed after the governments’ decision to support the United States was made. They became more favorable to the assistance for the United States. Therefore, the public opinion could not explain the behavioral uniformity across our cases. The public opinion in our cases was more a dependent than an independent variable.
The RST also presented the level of concentration within the media market as an explanatory variable for the reactive behavior. In this condition, too, South Korea and Japan varied. Unlike in Japan, where a limited number of private media conglomerates virtually monopolize the whole media market, in South Korea, the control on the media market is more diffused. Despite this difference, the South Korean foreign policy responses were reactive just as the Japanese were.

We could not confirm the influence of interest groups. The autonomy of domestic interest groups in Japan and South Korea was limited because, usually, they were financially dependent on the state, or under tight regulatory control of the government. More importantly, the issues of high politics such as the issue of how to respond to wars in Iraq did not provide an occasion for interest groups to intervene.

The effect of cultural variables was not uniform, either. There was no pacifist or anti-military culture in South Korea. South Korea also did not have a Peace Constitution, which, many commentators believe, is the institutional underpinning of the Japanese pacifist culture. If anything, the South Korean culture was closer to militarist one. For a long time since the end of the Korean War, the military way has been prevalent in the South Korean politics and society. Nevertheless, the South Korean responses were found to be reactive just as the Japanese responses were. If the lack of a variable does not create a discernible difference in the values on the dependent variable, then, we will have to doubt the explanatory power of the variable.

A New Source: Asymmetric Bilateral Security Dependence

The uniformity was found in the external source category. In this regard, Waltz’s
prediction is relevant because he emphasized the importance of the variable that works above the national level to explain the continuity on the national level. But, the variable we found was a little different from such external variables as we usually find on the so-called systems level. Such systems-wide variables as the polarity or the distribution of power within the international system were found to be not uniform across the backgrounds of the four cases. Rather, it was the bilateral power disparity between the United States and the reactive states that was uniform across the four cases. To be sure, such power disparity is found between the United States and non-reactive states as well. Therefore, what was really peculiar in the power disparity between the United States on one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other was that both Japan and South Korea depend on the United States for their security and that the security dependence is asymmetrical. That is, for their own security, Japan and South Korea need the United States much more than the United States needs Japan and South Korea for her security.

Then, how did this asymmetric bilateral security dependence create the reactive behavior? We noted the fact that the conditions for the asymmetric bilateral security dependence had the effect of limiting the scope of the discourse on policy in Tokyo and Seoul. That is, the asymmetric security dependence limited the diplomatic tools of Japan and South Korea. Given the limited tools, policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul easily come to think that physically as well as institutionally, there were not many things that Japan and South Korea could do to make difference to what was taking place in the Middle East. Moreover, they could even believe that even without their contributions, other major powers including the United States would eventually find a solution to the crises. For these reasons, the asymmetric bilateral security dependence led to the initial passive
responses of the reactive states.

Then, can the asymmetric security dependence become the source of flexibility? It may appear contradictory for a variable to create two separate effects on the behavior of an agent. However, we noticed the way the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul interpreted the given situation before and after Washington submitted their requests to Tokyo and Seoul. Before the United States demanded support and assistance on Japan and South Korea, the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul did not take the events in the Middle East as a serious security threat to their countries. They might have taken them as a portent of an energy crisis, but not as threatening their own territories. After the United States specified their demands, however, the events in the Middle East in effect turned into security problems to Japan and South Korea. Once the United States made clear the terms and conditions of the expected contributions from Japan and South Korea or what Japan and South Korea should do to help the U.S.-led coalitions, the Japanese and South Korean governments began to move quickly and responded flexibly, because now the task has become simplified and easy to understand. Now, they have to satisfy their single most important security partner—the United States. From then on, the task began to be interpreted and assessed in the framework of their own security, because helping the Americans was then literally defending themselves. The U.S. demands had the effect of linking the events in the Middle East with the security of the reactive states, prompting more flexible responses from the reactive states.

New Transmission Paths: Internalization, Selecting-out, and Transnational Networks

And yet, this is not the end of the explanation. Was the accommodation of the U.S.
demands the only option for Tokyo and Seoul? Why did they not simply refuse the U.S. demands? Why did they have to be flexible to the U.S. demands? What is the immediate explanatory variable for the flexibility? The advice from Waltz and Calder were useful for answering these questions.

Waltz presented two transmission paths for a systems-level variable to act on the behavior of agents: socialization and competition. Socialization is a process of internalizing normative conceptions required to function as a member of a given society. Therefore, in order to highlight the transmission mechanism of the external variable, we need to find a socialization process of a normative conception across the four cases, which justifies the reactive behavior based on the asymmetric security dependence on the United States. In other words, we have to find normative conceptions that are uniformly observed across the cases.

Social norms are usually gauged by measuring public opinion. However, we could not find the evidence for the normative conceptions that justify the reactive behavior in the public opinion because, as we have just mentioned, public opinion in Japan and South Korea was more a dependent than an independent variable. However, we could find uniformity in the role conceptions held by the authoritative decision units (ADUs) or those who made the final decisions in response to U.S. demands. That is, the core decision-makers of both Japan and South Korea believed from day one that at the end of the day, it would be inevitable to provide support and assistance for the United States if Washington submits requests because the United States is so important a country for their security. It is worth noting that they believed so even before the negotiations over what and how much to provide for the United States began. In other words, they had already
internalized the normative conceptions stemming from the security dependence on the
United States, and these internalized normative conceptions were the intervening variable
that accelerated the working of the external variable on the flexibility.

We could also see the working of the other transmission path that Waltz had
presented. In democracies, the competition that Waltz mentioned creates the pressures of
selecting-out for those agents who do not conform to the structural demands mainly
through the competitive electoral process. Usually, it is hard for the issue of the national
security to become a central issue in ordinary electoral campaigns. However, if voters in
the reactive states begin to believe that the United States designated a candidate or an
incumbent as \textit{persona non grata}, then, the stigmatized politician would have to risk
losing many votes in the next elections because some of the voters would begin to doubt
the capability or even the very legitimacy of the politician who lost the seal of approval
of the single most important ally, which protects their countries. Being aware of these
selecting-out pressures, the decision-makers in Japan and South Korea must have
positively considered the option of accommodating U.S. demands even before
Washington submitted them.

Socialization links the external variable and the reactive behavior through a
psychological process, and the competition works through the domestic political process
of the reactive states. On the other hand, Calder attached importance to the transnational
networks between the reactive state and the United States, a variable that directly
penetrates the decision process of the government. Although we could not confirm the
effects of the domestic variables that Calder emphasized as the explanatory variables for
the reactive behavior, we could see in this research that there indeed were many thick and
dense transnational links between the governments of the United States and the reactive states as had been predicted by Calder. Officials from both sides of the Pacific incessantly shared pieces of advice, ideas and information through these transpacific pipelines. U.S. officials could use these pipelines to exercise their pressures directly on the decision processes of Japan and South Korea. Japanese and South Korean officials, for their part, used the transpacific networks to find out the bottom-line of U.S. positions and explain their positions to their American counterparts. These transnational networks had the effect of strengthening the flexibility of the reactive states.

In conclusion, the asymmetric bilateral security dependence between the reactive states and the United States was found to be at the center of the reactive behavior. The conditions of the asymmetric security dependence worked as a limitation on the diplomatic instruments, and restricted the scope of actions and thoughts for the reactive states. As a result, the reactive states showed passive behavior. On the other hand, when the U.S. demands on the reactive states materialized, the main variable worked to strengthen the flexible side of the reactive states through the three pre-existing intervening variables—socialization, competition, and transnational networks. Having been dependent on the United States for their security for many years, the policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul had internalized the norms that it is inevitable to help the United States when the United States is in need of help. The competition process created constant pressures on Japanese and South Korean policymakers, forcing them to move in the direction of more flexibility. The transnational networks, which were created by the long experiences of the security dependence, penetrated each segment of the governments of the reactive states and accelerated the flexible responses of the reactive states.
Sources of the Variations: Fragmentation within the ADU, Veto Players, and U.S. Perceptions

In addition to the limited explanatory power, we found that the RST has one more weakness. It is under-describing the behavioral and substantive variations in the responses of the reactive states although it is still valid in describing the reactive behavior. In the process of testing the critiques against the RST, we found that at least part of the critiques are valid and have merits in describing some cases. We could observe in some cases the symptoms of interest-maximizing behavior as predicted by Kohno. In some other cases, we could observe that the reactive states could refuse to accept part of the U.S. demands as Schoppa expected, although the refusal did not go beyond the parameters of reactivity in general. In addition, we found that the maximizing behavior and the refusals to accept part of the U.S. demands created outliers in the responses of the reactive states.

What is the key to understand these outliers? Our finding is that the coherence within the ADU and the existence of veto players are the key. The comparative test across the four cases showed that when the ADU was internally coherent and not fragmented, we could observe the maximizing behavior, and vice versa. Likewise, we found that when there was a veto player within the ADU of the reactive state, the reactive state did not accept the part of the U.S. demands that the veto player refused to accept. The position of the veto player constituted the limit of the reactive state’s accommodation.

Of course, the RST is not a panacea. It was not supposed to describe every aspect of Japanese foreign policy behavior. In order to bridge the gap between the RST and its
critics, however, we tried to incorporate the coherence (or fragmentation) of the ADU and the veto players into the framework of the RST. The concept of the reactive behavior stood on two legs: passivity and flexibility. We redefined the concept of passivity to include the fragmentation within the ADU. That is to say, we could expect that the fragmentation within the ADU of a reactive state would lead to more passive behavior of the state. Also, we expanded the concept of flexibility to incorporate the role of veto players. That is, we assumed that, other things being equal, when there is a veto player within the ADU of a reactive state, the responses of the reactive state would probabilistically become less flexible. Based on these assumptions, we could conjecture the variations, which had previously been not covered by the RST, on the passivity-flexibility space that the RST established.

In addition to the behavioral outliers, we also found substantive variations in the responses of the reactive states. The variation in the size of the total assistance defined as the sum of the financial assistance and the cost spent to deliver the personnel assistance showed an X-shape. Also, we found a cross-national militaristic skew between Japanese and South Korean cases, and an inter-temporal militaristic skew between the assistance for the Gulf War and the assistance for the Iraq War. Namely, in both wars, South Korea provided more personnel assistance than Japan did. Similarly, both Japan and South Korea provided a relatively larger size of personnel assistance for the Iraq War than for the Gulf War.

In explaining these variations, we found that the perceptions and needs of the United States played a more important role than domestic variables did. If domestic variables were crucial to explain the X-shaped variation, for example, the domestic discounting of
U.S. demands should have played a crucial role in determining the X-shape. However, we could observe the X-shaped variation in the U.S. demands even before the discounting, and also found that the discounting did not fundamentally change the shape of the variation. That is to say, the X-shaped variation in the size of the total assistance stemmed mostly from the variation in the U.S. demands, and the variation in the U.S. demands in turn came from the prior perception held by U.S. policymakers about the strength of the domestic restrictions imposed on Japan and South Korea.

Likewise, we found that the U.S. needs determined on the systems level were more important than domestic variables in explaining the inter-temporal militaristic skews. The domestic variables of Japan and South Korea were more unfavorable to the dispatch of personnel assistance in the Iraq War than in the Gulf War. If the key to explain the inter-temporal skews lay in domestic variables, the assistance for the Iraq War should have decreased dramatically from the level of assistance for the Gulf War. Contrary to the expectation, however, the size of the personnel assistance for the Iraq War increased dramatically in both Japan and South Korea in comparison with their assistance for the Gulf War. In order to explain the inter-temporal change, therefore, we inferred that the United States asked for and received more personnel assistance from faithful allies such as Japan and South Korea, because she wanted to compensate for her impaired international leadership by securing more military assistance from her allies as an expression of their political will. As Japan and South Korea flexibly accommodated these demands, we could naturally observe the inter-temporal militaristic skew as reflected on the variation in the size of personnel assistance.
10.2 Contributions

Descriptive Contributions

As we could see in Chapter 2, the debate on the correct description of Japanese foreign policy behavior is still ongoing. Some observers like Calder, Miyashita, and Schoppa argue that Japan is still reactive while critics like Kohno and Potter & Sudo see the signs of change in Japanese foreign policy behavior. We can find a similar debate in the practical world. Some negotiators complain about the passive attitude of the Japanese government and urge the Japanese to share a larger burden of global management with the United States. They believe that the Japanese have to make more efforts to change their foreign policy behavior. On the other hand, others believe that Japan is already on the way back to the normalcy or set out on a journey to find a new role to play in East Asia and beyond. They do not hide their misgivings about what would be the 'normalcy' of future Japan. The pros and cons over the change and continuity of the Japanese foreign policy behavior were in a stalemate in both theoretical and practical worlds.

Reconciliation By Differentiation. The first contribution that this dissertation has made is that it found a way to compromise between the pros and cons, or to resolve the debate itself. If two blind men debate on the correct shape of an elephant when, actually, one touches on the leg, and the other, on the ear, the debate can continue, but it will go nowhere. If they know that they are touching on different parts of an elephant, they do not need to argue any longer because each argument will find its own place in the whole shape of the elephant. Then, the debate will be resolved, and they can live in peace with
each other. In this dissertation, we suggested a way to compromise between debaters by showing them that actually they are touching on different parts of Japanese foreign policy.

The essence of the compromise is that the behavioral variations that the critics of the RST argued would refute the validity of the RST do not actually need to refute the RST because they were observed within the parameters of reactivity. The RST was valid because it described the actual behavior successfully according to our test results. On the other hand, the arguments of Kohno and Schoppa were also right because we could actually confirm the observable implications of those arguments in the cases. But, it is noteworthy that the maximizing behavior and the refusals to accept foreign demands did not go beyond the limit of the reactive behavior. As long as the behavioral characteristics of Japanese foreign policy met the four criteria that we established in Chapter 3, we could argue that Japanese foreign policy is reactive despite the partial observations of the maximizing or refusing behavior. In other words, we found that the reactive behavior did not exist on the same level of conceptualization with the maximizing or refusing behavior. This is the reason why we could subsume the maximizing or refusing behavior into the framework of reactivity by expanding the concept of reactivity.

The first step of this compromise was to conceptually differentiate the behavioral uniformity from the variations, or by clarifying what the RST can and cannot do. According to the results of our research, the RST was found to be valid in the sense that it can describe what it intends to describe: the reactive foreign policy behavior. Indeed, there had been some variations that the RST could not describe as the critics argued. But, it does not necessarily mean that the RST is useless. Notice that the RST was never presented as a unified theory of foreign policy behavior in general. The first and foremost
purpose of the RST as a conceptual tool is to describe the reactive behavior of a state. Therefore, if the RST can describe the reactive behavior of Japan, then it accomplishes its immediate original goal.

On the other hand, we could also see that some of the critiques on the RST were also valid. Japan could try to maximize the national interest and to refuse to accept part of foreign demands. But, it is worth noting that the maximization and the refusal all took place within the parameters of reactivity imposed by the United States. In other words, the finding of the discounts or rejection of part of U.S. demands did not need to refute the validity of the RST once and for all.

It may sound tautological, but, a state can be reactive while it maximizes the national interest or refuses to accept some foreign demands as long as those reactions do not go beyond the limit of reactivity. For example, even if Japan refuses to accept one item on the long list of requests from the United States, that observation alone does not refute the validity of the RST as long as the behavioral characteristics of Japanese foreign policy as a whole still meet the four criteria that we presented in Chapter 3. Likewise, Japan can be perfectly reactive even when she makes tremendous efforts to discount U.S. demands as much as possible because our original definition of the reactive behavior stands apart from the national-interest maximizing behavior.

In order to combine two things, we first have to separate them clearly. Since we found that the RST and its critics were actually shouting at each other standing on different floors, we could try to fuse them together into one organized system. We raised the sensitivity of the RST by redefining the concepts of passivity and flexibility and let it subsume the critiques of Kohno and Schoppa.
This conceptual differentiation of the reactive behavior from the maximizing and refusing behavior was made possible because we operationalized the basic concept of reactivity and clarified the observable implications of the critiques. In the debate on the RST, each debater was arguing for their arguments. Although they were debating on the reactive state, they did not spend sufficient time and efforts to more clearly define the concept of reactivity. As a result, the debate did not make progress. On the other hand, this dissertation broke down the concept of reactivity into two parts—passivity and flexibility, and presented the empirical criteria to distinguish between passivity and non-passivity on one hand, and between flexibility and non-flexibility on the other. By this method, we could empirically distinguish between the symptoms of reactivity and non-reactivity in case descriptions, and reach the conclusion that the RST can still validly describe part of the observed behavior of Japanese foreign policy while there are some aspects of Japanese foreign policy behavior that the RST cannot describe as the critics argued.

In other words, what we did in this dissertation is to more clearly define the arguments of each debater, and thereby, show each debater that they are actually looking at different parts of the whole reality. They do not need to compete because they can complement each other by combining their theories into one complete framework. One does not need to replace the other when they can peacefully live together on different floors.

*Balancing Against Political Criticisms.* The other descriptive contribution of this dissertation is that, based on comparative descriptions, we could do justice to the political criticisms leveled against some administrations in Japan and South Korea. We could see
that the Japanese and the South Koreans, even when they were severely criticized for not properly responding to U.S. demands, were actually performing better than the critics argued.

For instance, many Japanese politicians and foreign policy experts remember the Gulf War as a symbol of a great foreign policy failure because they believe that the response to the Gulf War was too slow and that the assistance for the MNF was inappropriate quantitatively as well as qualitatively. And the failure has been attributed in large measure to the immobilism and impotence of the Kaifu Administration, or Prime Minister Kaifu himself.

However, our case descriptions and cross-national comparison showed that the response of the Kaifu Administration to the Gulf War and its assistance were neither “too little,” nor “too late.” We could see through the comparison of the response speed of the Kaifu and the Roh Tae-woo Administrations that there was no fundamental difference between them. Moreover, the comparison with the response of the Roh Tae-woo Administration shows that the discount of U.S. demands made by the failure of the UNPC bill was not as large as it was felt by the Japanese. The UNPC bill was indeed torpedoed in the Upper House of the Diet. Likewise, however, we need to keep in mind that the Roh Tae-woo Administration, too, failed to accept the U.S. demands for combative forces because they knew that they could not overcome the veto players in the National Assembly. In other words, in terms of the response speed and the size of the assistance for the MNF, the response of the Kaifu Administration was not much inferior to that of the Roh Tae-woo Administration.
Despite the similarity in the response speed and the size of discounts between the Japanese and the South Korean responses, there was a discernible difference in the size of the psychological shock felt by the Japanese and the South Koreans. The failure of the UNPC bill forced many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats to do a lot of soul-searching about the limit on their international contributions. On the other hand, the Roh Tae-woo Administration’s refusal to provide combat forces to help the MNF left no such mark in the memories of the South Korean policymakers.

To be sure, the Kaifu Administration was fragmented in response to the Gulf Crisis/War, and the fragmentation led to the lack of maximizing behavior in the negotiations with the Americans. Had the Kaifu Administration been internally better-organized and more coherent, they could have discounted more of the U.S. demands. However, it is worth noting that the final effect of the fragmentation was not the smaller but the larger assistance for the MNF. The initial offer of US$ 1 billion was quickly quadrupled to US$ 4 billion, and the Japanese side quickly accepted the tab of US$ 9 billion for the second financial assistance without any discounting. Namely, the fragmentation and its effects cannot be the reason for the so-called “too little, too late” responses from the Kaifu Administration.

The more plausible source of the difference in the sizes of the psychological shocks may be traced to the different psychological atmospheres surrounding the Japanese and South Korean policymakers at the time. Before the Gulf Crisis occurred, the Cold War was winding down, and many Japanese believed that the era of the primacy of military might was coming to an end. The Japanese were full of hopes that they could use their
newly acquired economic high positions to contribute to the creation of a new world order emerging after the Cold War. They believed that Japan was about to be upgraded to a real great power based on their economic and cultural assets. On the other side of the Pacific, however, many Americans believed that the real winner of the Cold War might not be the United States but Japan, and regarded Japan as more a rival than a friend.\footnote{Notice that the title of the memoirs published in 1996 by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Michael H. Armacost is Friends or Rivals.} They believed that they could not turn a blind eye to Japan’s free riding any longer. To them, therefore, it was time to ask for more burden-sharing and contributions from Japan. Consequently, the rapidly rising expectations on both sides of the Pacific made the cut-off score for Japan much higher domestically as well as externally, and those expectations abruptly crashed with the failure of the UNPC bill. On the other hand, in 1990, South Korea was suffering from the after-effects of the success of economic and democratic catch-up. Between 1987 and 1989, South Korea saw an increasing number of labor disputes, deteriorating per-capita productivity, rising inflation, and declining economic growth rates (Heo et al. 2008, 13-5). There was no high expectation on South Korea in 1990, at home as well as abroad, of larger international contributions. Thus, the failure to meet external demands did not create a psychological shockwave, much less any soul-searching.

The descriptive findings of this research also enable us to do justice to the political criticisms against the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. Many observers in South Korea as well as in the United States regarded President Roh Moo-hyun and his administration as anti-American, and therefore, criticized that the Roh Moo-hyun administration was not
sufficiently forthcoming and proactive in helping the United States. We do not need to probe deep into the political ideology of President Roh here. However, the comparative assessment on the responses from the Roh Moo-hyun Administration shows that the response speed and the size of the assistance from the Roh Administration were no slower and no smaller than those observed in the other cases. To be sure, the final delivery of the personnel assistance from the Roh Administration was made much later than that from the Koizumi Administration. However, the delay was found to be due to those variables beyond President Roh’s control. Moreover, the absolute and relative sizes of the assistance from the Roh Administration were much larger than that from the Koizumi Administration: the absolute size of the military contingent was more than three times larger; in addition, remember that the total assistance from the Roh Administration overshot the prediction based on South Korea’s share in the world economy while the Koizumi Administration undershot the same prediction. Finally, unlike the other three cases, only in the case of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, was there no dramatic failure of meeting U.S. demands. All items on the list of requests from Washington—political support, financial subventions, and military assistance—were provided one way or another although there were some discounts.

Explanatory Contributions

To the explanation of the foreign policy behavior of Japan, we could make four contributions. First, we could explain the continuity of Japanese reactive foreign policy
behavior. The continuity was a puzzle because the domestic and international conditions surrounding Japan were all changing. Only the continuity can explain the continuity: the variable that explains the continuity in Japanese foreign policy behavior should be constant across all our cases. The explanatory variable that we found passed the test of cross-national similarity and inter-temporal continuity—the bilateral asymmetric security dependence—was found in Japan as well as in South Korea, our benchmark, and it continued to exist before and after the Cold War and inter-temporally across the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Finding of this variable could provide a new solution to the existing schools of explanation for Japanese foreign policy behavior because it was not a domestic variable, and it also differed from such structural variables as the polarity, whose effect is felt across the international system as a whole. As a result of this finding, we could see that, despite the structural change in the whole international system, the structure in a sub-system can continue and affect the behavior of domestic agents.

Second, we clarified the causal chains between the external variable and the behavior of domestic agents. As Waltz argued, an external variable does not directly act upon the behavior of human beings. It requires a path that transmits the causal effect of the external variable. Traditionally, Japan experts emphasized the role of institutional and cultural variables such as the Peace Constitution and the pacifist culture to explain uniquely Japanese behavior. However, this research found that it was such psychological and political processes as socialization, competition, and direct contacts between negotiators that were more important in realizing the effects of external variables.

Third, we contributed to the explanation of the limit of flexibility of the reactive
states. We found that the psychological process of interpreting the external restriction was important. But, it is worth noting that, in explaining the limit of external variables, it was not the psychology of the whole public in general but the role conceptions held within the ADU, or those who actually participated in the making of a specific decision that was more crucial. Therefore, we reached the conclusion that, in order to explain the limit of U.S. influence, we need to focus on the dynamics within the ADU such as the extent of fragmentation and the presence (or absence) of a veto player within the ADU.

Lastly, we examined and clarified the role of U.S. influence. We found that the U.S. influence was overwhelming in determining the behavior and substance of the responses of the reactive states. The original conditions that restricted the initial responses from Japan had been imposed by the security dependence on the United States. But, the submission of U.S. demands accelerated the flexibility of the Japanese response working its way through the three intervening variables to the behavioral level. In addition, our analysis showed that the U.S. influence was crucial in determining even the substantive variations in the economic and personnel assistance from Japan.

*Neither Domestic Nor Systemic.* The reactive behavior of Japan in fact was an explanatory puzzle because the existing schools could not explain the long behavioral continuity of Japanese foreign policy. For structuralists, Japan was an anomaly that would soon be over, because the international structure is the key to determine the long-term behavior on the state level. According to them, no agent can be free from the force of the structure, forever. Then, it was only a matter of time for Japanese foreign policy behavior to change as long as the size of the Japanese power is maintained on the great-power status. Likewise, for area experts or institutionalists, who emphasize the domestic
uniqueness of Japan, the continuity of the unique Japanese foreign policy behavior was not such a difficult puzzle. The Japanese behavior is unique because their domestic features are peculiar and different from those of other countries.

However, both schools could not properly explain the continuity of Japanese foreign policy behavior. During the period of the past quarter century, there was a great shift in the international system: the end of the Cold War bipolarity. However, it was not just the structure of the international system that changed. Almost all the domestic features of the Japanese state and society changed as well: electoral law, the internal structure of political parties, the power of the prime minister, the relative size of each industry in the economy, the composition of the social classes, the demographic composition, and the strength of the memory of the Pacific War. Despite all these changes, we could observe the continuity in Japanese reactive behavior.

Surely, there were some domestic variables that did not change such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the culture of anti-militarism or pacifism, or the strong public opinion against use of force abroad. However, the cross-national and inter-temporal comparison showed that the explanatory power of these constants is questionable. There are no such things as the Peace Constitution and the culture of anti-militarism in South Korea, whose behavior was found to be identical with that of Japan in our cases. The findings of this research strongly suggest that the legal and cultural restrictions on Japanese foreign policy process are the symptoms rather than the causes of the reactive behavior. Despite the continuity of the Peace Constitution, the Japanese could disregard and overcome the legal restrictions imposed by the Peace Constitution whenever the LDP and the opposition parties *politically* agreed to write a new law to go around the legal
restrictions. The restrictive power of the public opinions was limited, too. Like in Japan, the public opinion opposing the assistance for the United States was quite strong in South Korea. But, despite all these strong public opinion, Tokyo and Seoul finally provided assistance for the United States. The political leaders in both Japan and South Korea must have carefully read the results of opinion polls, but they did not just mechanically reflect the numbers published on newspapers. Their decisions could mold and lead public opinion.

Therefore, the first and foremost explanatory contribution of this dissertation is that we found the solution to this explanatory puzzle by making sure that the solution passed the test of correlation. The explanatory variable for the reactive behavior in Japan and South Korea should be found in both Japan and South Korea, and the variable should also be found continuously before and after the end of the Cold War. The asymmetric security dependence on the United States was found in Japan as well as in South Korea, and it has continued since the 1950s. As a result of this finding, we could explain the continuity and the cross-national similarity of the reactive behavior of Japan and South Korea. This finding is significant because we could explain what the other scholars in this field have not been able to explain. They tried to find the explanatory variable for the reactive behavior in the domestic or structural variables. But, no variable from the domestic or the systems levels has continued for so long a time. It was the bilateral asymmetric security dependence that met the condition. Obviously, it was not a domestic variable because it existed above the national level. At the same time, it was not a structural or systems-level variable because it was defined in terms of the bilateral disparity of power between two countries. And also, its effect was not felt across the whole international system, but was
felt only bilaterally across the states that are involved in the security dependence.

Everything surrounding the Japanese state changed for the past quarter century except for the essence of her bilateral relationship with the United States.

*Causal Chains among the Variables.* The second contribution to the explanation is that we compared the explanatory power of each variable and thereby clarified the causal chains between the main explanatory variable and the reactive behavior. So far, the experts who tried to explain the Japanese peculiarity have tended to provide a list of many possible causal variables without sufficiently clarifying the relations among them. They simply juxtaposed the variables. In order to have a more sophisticated model of explanation, however, we needed to know which variable is more important and which variable is the main or the intervening variable.

To this end, we tackled the task of comparing the explanatory power of each possible causal variable. The result of the comparison was remarkable. We found that the variables that Japan experts have tended to emphasize as the causes of the Japanese peculiarity—domestic institutions and socio-cultural uniqueness—are not suitable for explaining the reactive behavior. The root cause was found in Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. Of course, we also found that such domestic characteristics as the extent of fragmentation within the ADU and the presence of a veto player played an important role. But, their effect was limited to the size of flexibility rather than the reactive behavior itself. Furthermore, we were able to highlight the transmission paths between the main explanatory variable and the reactive behavior. We found that such psychological and political variables as socialization, competition, and
transnational networks were directly linking the cause and symptoms of the reactive behavior, transmitting and accelerating the effect of the main explanatory variable.

Limit of Flexibility Clarified. The third explanatory contribution is that we were able to pinpoint the variables that control the flexibility of a reactive state. As Kohno argued, in some cases, the reactive state could try to maximize the national interest, and did succeed in doing so. Likewise, as Schoppa pointed out, in some issue areas, the reactive state refused to accept part of foreign demand. Although all these maneuverings took place within the parameters of reactivity, we have to admit that there indeed was a scope of autonomy on the part of the reactive state. Then, what is the basis of this limited autonomy or the limit of flexibility? Kohno and Schoppa suggested many variables and conditions, but did not pinpoint which variable is the central one.

However, in the process of analyzing the explanatory power of role conceptions and explaining the two behavioral outliers observed in the cases of the Kaifu and the Roh Moo-hyun Administrations, we could find that the dynamics within the ADU was the key to understand the limit. Simply speaking, it was neither public opinions nor opinions of all politicians that mattered. The key was in the psychology and opinions of those who actually make the decisions. Therefore, it became important to analyze the arrangement of power within the ADU to predict the characteristics of expected decisions. The more coherent the relationship within the ADU was, the more likely it was that the maximizing strategy of the reactive state would succeed. By the same token, when there was a veto player within the ADU, it was more likely that the reactive state would refuse to accept part of foreign demands.

American Influence Reconfirmed. The final contribution to the explanation of the
reactive behavior is that we could reconfirm the overwhelming power of U.S. influence on the foreign policy behavior and decisions of Japan. As the findings of this research show, it was the security dependence on the United States that was the central source of the reactive behavior. The conditions of the security dependence limited the available tools for the reactive state and created the passive behavior. However, when Washington clearly specified its list of requests, the security dependence, working through the three intervening variables, strengthened and accelerated the flexibility side of the reactive behavior. The U.S. influence loomed large even in determining the substance of the assistance from reactive states. U.S. demands provided a guideline for Tokyo and Seoul, and they tried to accommodate the U.S. demands as faithfully as possible although they discounted some of the demands.

Some critics may argue against the significance of this contribution. They may claim that it was due to the selection bias that the American influence appeared conspicuous in the results of this research. In other words, we see strong American influence because we selected the cases in which the American influence was strong. True, we selected the cases in which the vital national interest of the United States was at stake. The successful conduct of the two wars in Iraq was essential for the supreme leaders of the United States, and the effective and swift coalition building and burden-sharing were a sine qua non. Therefore, if we had confirmed the absence of the reactive behavior in the selected cases, for example, if Japan had produced her idea of responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as quickly as the United Kingdom and France did, or if Japan had refused to accept the core of the U.S. demands and publicly criticized President Bush’s decision to go to war with Iraq, just as Germany and Canada did, then, we could have confidently concluded
that Japan has now graduated from the reactive school. However, the Japanese foreign policy behavior as observed in our selected cases all passed the four tests for the reactive behavior. Even the size and substance of their assistance for the United States did not deviate much from the original U.S. demands. Hence, we reached the conclusions that Japan was still reactive and that the U.S. influence was indeed overwhelming in making the Japanese foreign policy behavior reactive.

This conclusion does not lessen the significance of our research findings, because, in the selected cases, not only the U.S. influence, but also the structural influence from the international distribution of power, and the domestic influence, too, loomed large. In other words, the purpose of the design of this research was not just to prove or disprove the strength of U.S. influence on Japanese foreign policy behavior. By the same design, we could also expect to test and compare the strength of the structural and domestic forces against the American influence. First of all, we need to keep in mind that across the two selected research periods, the size of the Japanese economy was continuously the second largest in the world. In fact, the size of the Japanese economy had been such for many previous decades. As a result of this research, we could confirm that Japan was still reactive despite the enormous structural pressure that was created by the colossal economic size of Japan. We also need to remember that the domestic resistance against the wars in Iraq was quite strong in all the selected cases. In some countries such as Germany and Canada, the political leaders finally chose to diverge from U.S. positions and decided to publicly criticize the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. The basis of their decisions was first and foremost the strong domestic resistance against the U.S. decision. In Japan as well as in South Korea, however, the political leaders decided to help and
support the U.S. invasion into Iraq, knowing the strong domestic resistance against the Iraq War. Therefore, we could reach the conclusion that Japan was still reactive despite the strong domestic and structural demands on the Japanese state to be not reactive. In other words, the U.S. demands overwhelmed the domestic and structural demands.

In fact, this is where we can find the real significance of our explanatory contribution. The structural and domestic forces might be affecting Japanese foreign policy behavior one way or another. We might be able to observe some symptoms of change in Japanese foreign policy behavior stemming from the structural and domestic demands. This is probably the reason why, in Chapter 2, Potter & Sudo, and the research findings that they reviewed report the evidence of change in Japanese foreign policy behavior in some areas like Japanese diplomacy in Southeast Asia and the multilateral arena, where the vital American interests are not at stake. However, as a result of this research, we could reach the conclusion that even the strong structural and domestic forces that had continued for decades could not overcome the parameters imposed by the United States. When the American influence clashed with the structural and domestic forces, the former overwhelmed the latter two. Hence, in our selected cases where the core interests of the United States were at stake, Japan could not help but be reactive.

**Theoretical Contributions**

We made three theoretical contributions. First, we provided a common framework of measurement and comparison for the reactive behavior. Based on this framework we could raise the reliability of our findings and expect to accumulate the findings that we get from other similar cases. Second, we incorporated into our comparison and
explanation the theoretical contributions that foreign policy analysts have made for the past quarter century. We used the key concepts of the foreign policy analysis field such as the authoritative decision unit (ADU) to meet the needs of comparative politics. Lastly, we brought the political factors back in. Japan experts, who were interested in Japanese foreign policy behavior, have tended to focus on such enduring factors as institutions, norms, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds of foreign policy decisions. However, this dissertation highlighted the importance of the way that political leaders interpreted external restrictions or the political and psychological process of constructing external restrictions.

*Common Framework and Enhanced Reliability.* As we had pointed out in Chapter 2, the prior studies have not explicitly presented operationalized forms of the propositions that they want to prove or refute. This was the reason why they lacked a common framework of measurement and comparison. Therefore, our first job was to clarify and operationalize the propositions that we want to test. We extracted some testable propositions from the RST and the critiques against it, and then, tested those propositions through comparative case studies.

Some students of international relations or other experts in the field of comparative politics may not agree with the descriptive outcome of this research. We admit that, just like other case studies, the power of the descriptive inference of this research is limited, because this study, just like others, is based on a limited number of cases, leaving the possibility of being refuted by subsequent studies. However, one thing that is certain for those who want to refute the results of this research is that they already clearly know what they have to refute because we, in this research, have already specified the
propositions that we want to test and the method of testing them. Those who want to refute the results of this research simply can raise the questions that we operationalized in this research to other similar cases in the same manner that we applied in this dissertation in order to check the reliability of the conclusion we reached. Or, more fundamentally, they can raise problems with our way of operationalizing and testing. However, whatever the outcomes of those subsequent studies may be, we can expect accumulation of significant knowledge on Japanese foreign policy behavior in particular and foreign policy making in general because we clearly understand the framework of measuring and testing that we used in this research.

Moreover, in this research, we used a multiple number of cases from similar but different countries. As we had pointed out in Chapter 1, many traditional case studies on Japan have focused mainly on Japan. Focusing on the cases gathered from only one country is not enough to highlight the national characteristics of the country in comparison with others. Even when they compare cross-nationally, prior studies used to selectively pick out only those samples from other countries, which support their arguments. On the other hand, in this study, first, we extracted testable propositions from a theory that purports to describe Japanese as well as South Korean behavior, and then, applied those propositions to similar and comparable cases carefully selected from Japanese and South Korean experiences. In the test, the null hypothesis was that there is no behavioral difference between Japan and South Korea. After the test, we found no compelling evidence that the test results went over the predicted range. Therefore, the behavior of both countries was found to be reactive. We conducted the same test inter-temporally as well, and reached the same descriptive conclusion. In this manner, we
could raise the reliability and generalizability of our conclusion. Now we know through the tests that the RST can describe not only Japanese, but also South Korean behavior. If we accumulate such test results by testing more similar cases from other countries, we can expect to further raise the reliability and generalizability of the RST.

_Fusion of FPA and Comparative Politics._ In the foreign policy analysis (FPA) branch of political science, there has been a movement to unify various separate models and approaches into a unified framework. For example, the rational actor model is a strong and useful tool to analyze and predict the foreign policy of a state. However, it could not be applied to all types of occasions for decisions. When a group of a small number of people is involved in a decision-making process, understanding of such process requires the analysis of the psychological dynamics within that small group. If separate but competing groups are co-making a decision, then, the analysis of the coalition-building among the groups is more instrumental than the rational actor approach. Namely, to decide which approach is the most appropriate for a given occasion for analysis requires to know who makes the decision.

In the field of FPA, the concept of the authoritative decision unit (ADU) was developed to address this need. In order to decide on the suitable analytic tool for a given situation, a foreign policy analyst needs to know who makes the decision or what the ADU for the given situation is. And then, additional theoretical efforts were made to link the characteristics of the ADU with the characteristics of the decisions made by the ADU. That is, it was assumed that if we know who made the decision, we could also predict what kind of decisions would be made. For example, we could create a testable proposition that more closed an ADU is to outside information, the more independent and
The concept of the ADU and the theoretical attempt to link the nature of the ADU with the kind of decisions made by the ADU meant a new opportunity for comparative politics because now we could compare the governmental processes that had previously been regarded as incomparable. For example, in many aspects of their democratic institutions, Japan and South Korea are fundamentally different. In one, the executive branch is composed of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers with no fixed terms; the prime minister is only the first among equals; the power is diffused among faction leaders; and the projection of military power abroad is strictly limited by the constitution. In the other, the power is concentrated in one person with a fixed term; the cabinet comprises one employer and many employed ministers; and no article in the constitution prohibits retaining the military.

Despite all these institutional differences, we could find the comparability between the ADUs of Japan and South Korea. For example, we found that, when the Koizumi and the Roh Moo-hyun Administrations tried to discount U.S. demands, the ADUs of the two Administrations were similar to each other: a predominant individual leader, who is relatively insensitive to outside influences. In other words, in both cases, we found an individual basis of the coherence within the ADU, and we could explain the success of the maximizing strategy of the two Administrations with this similarity. On the other hand, when the Kaifu and the Roh Tae-woo Administrations responded to U.S. demands, the nature of the ADUs was different. In both cases, it was a small group of people that made the decision, but the internal dynamics were different. In the Kaifu Administration, the ADU was fragmented while in the Roh Tae-woo Administration, the ADU was
coherent. We inferred that this difference in the nature of the ADUs was the source of success or failure of their discounting efforts.

In addition, the concept of the ADU provided a useful insight about the scope of influence of a variable. For example, when we criticized Catalinac’s argument about the source of change in Japanese foreign policy behavior, the conceptual basis of our critique was the ADU or who makes the decision. We found that it was not the role conceptions held by the general public or all the politicians in the Diet that was central in determining the nature of the foreign policy behavior. We found the immediate cause of the behavioral characteristics in the role conceptions held by the ADU.

Primacy of Political Factors. Another important development in the field of the international relations theory for the past two decades is so-called constructivism. We tried to incorporate the contributions made by the constructivist thinking into our explanation. The essence of the constructivist ideas is that we need to probe into the social and political basis of the international norms and structure to understand the continuity or the possibility of change of the norms and structure. The social norms and structure seem to be constant and enduring. But, we need to keep in mind that all the norms and structure were created at a juncture in the past by some critical human interactions. For the norms and structure to be maintained, then, we need accumulation and repetition of the social and political practice that created them.

We applied this insight to probe into the social and political basis of the main variable we found. Asymmetric bilateral security dependence was affecting the observed behavior in our cases through socialization of agents, political competition among agents, and transnational networks of dialogue between agents. The causal effect of the main
explanatory variable was in turn maintained and reproduced through these three intervening variables. So far, those who tried to explain the continuity of Japanese foreign policy behavior have emphasized institutional, normative, and structural factors such as the fragmented character of political institutions, social norms of pacifism, and the bipolar structure of international politics. However, the finding of this research shows that such political and psychological factors as represented by the three intervening variables were more or at least no less important in explaining the reactive behavior than the institutional, normative, and structural variables because we could see that, despite the dramatic changes in the institutional, normative, and structural underpinnings, the reactive behavior continued.

10.3 Implications

From the findings of this research, we can extract three implications. First, the continuity we found in the Japanese reactive behavior is in fact precarious, because the basis of the behavior is precarious. Second, the United States needs to ask herself what kind of a role she expects from Japan before she urges Japan to be more proactive because a large part of the Japanese reactive behavior is in fact made of U.S. influence. Finally, in order to be more effective and efficient in their negotiations with the allies of the United States, U.S. policymakers need to know the ADU and its internal dynamics of the negotiating counterparts.
We proved the continuity in an important aspect of Japanese foreign policy behavior. Paradoxically, however, the first implication of the findings of this research is that the continuity is precarious. We found that such constant and enduring basis of the reactive behavior as political institutions, social norms, and the international structure is gone or seriously weakened. The causal effects of the bilateral asymmetric security dependence are then guaranteed primarily by political intervening variables. And the central psychological underpinning of all these political variables is the belief held by the Japanese policymakers that they need U.S. security guarantee and that the United States is willing and able to provide that security when Japan is in need. If the reliability about either the U.S. commitment or her capability to provide the security guarantee is seriously contested, then, the seemingly tight relationship between the bilateral security dependence and the reactive behavior may quickly be challenged. That is to say, all of a sudden, Japan may proactively seek to find an independent way of protecting herself, not responding flexibly to U.S. demands even when the core national interest of the United States is at stake.

If the psychological underpinning of the reactive behavior is the reliability of the security guarantee felt by the Japanese, then, we can presume that the change of Japanese foreign policy behavior will probably come from the outside. The personal reshuffle in the Japanese Cabinet, institutional changes in the legal arrangement that controls the Japanese projection of power to overseas, generational and demographic changes for the past decades will not fundamentally change Japanese foreign policy behavior because the behavioral root cause lay outside the Japanese territory.

This inference strongly suggests that the recent change in the power arrangement in
East Asia is ominous. The rapid rise in China’s military spending and the continuing curtailment of U.S. military expenditures will negatively affect the calculation of Japanese policymakers, and when the negative influence reaches a certain critical mass, then, it may trigger an abrupt and dramatic change in the institutional and normative underpinnings of Japanese foreign policy behavior, because the skepticism on the U.S. security guarantee against China will stop the three intervening variables from working properly. Then, from that moment on, we will have to face a Japan, whose behavior is fundamentally different from her postwar trajectory.

Reactivity Is What the United States Makes Of It

The second implication is that, if the United States wants Japan to be more proactive, then, at the same time, the Americans need to seriously think about how to reset the relationships between Japan and the other Asian countries such as China and South Korea.

Some American policymakers and commentators may claim that the United States needs to loosen the restrictions imposed on the military and security role of Japan because they want a more proactive Japan sharing the burdens of the global management with the United States, assuming that Japan would remain flexible to U.S. demands continuously.

However, the findings of this research provide two caveats. First, a proactive Japan may not sound like such a good idea to some Asian countries. We found that the cause of the reactive behavior was external, particularly, in the nature of Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. This finding strongly suggests that Japan’s flexibility is, as Park Cheol-hee argued, to be seen only by the United States. To many Asian
countries, on the contrary, Japan may have been not so flexible for a long time.

The proactive role of Japan in the security and military aspects of the international relations in Asia has been contained since the end of the Second World War. As is well known, the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific area has played a double role: to protect Japan and at the same time, to contain the re-expansion of the Japanese military, and thereby, to reassure the other Asian countries and to prevent possible security conflicts between Japan and the others, particularly China and South Korea. If the United States allows Japan to play a more proactive role such as the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, then, it may be interpreted as the weakening of the containment part of the double role. Then, China, South Korea or other Asian countries may raise a question on Japan’s more active role because in their experiences, Japan has not been so flexible to their demands. The return of a great power, which is not ready to accommodate their consistent demands, especially the demands to repent of their past sins, may not be so entertaining to them.

Second, U.S. influence on Japan is overwhelming, but as the United States releases her grip on the conditions of the Japanese security dependence on the United States, the flexibility of Japan to U.S. demands will also weaken. We found in this research that the Japanese reactive behavior was what the United States made. At the center of the reactive behavior was the Japanese asymmetric security dependence on the United States. Even the substance of the Japanese financial and personnel assistance for the United States was strongly influenced by the United States. However, the Japanese dependence and the U.S. influence will not persist long if the United States allows Japan to play a more active security and military role. Remember that another finding of this research is that passivity
and flexibility are tightly connected at the root cause. A proactive Japan will in the long run be less dependent on the United States, and thereby less flexible to U.S. demands.

From these two caveats, we can infer that, if the United States seriously wants Japan to play a more active and constructive security role in Asia, then, before it is too late, the United States needs to think hard about how Japan’s new role can be willingly accommodated by other Asian countries and how to find a way of settling the disagreements between Japan and the other Asian powers including China. The current security arrangement of Japan is actually the brainchild of the United States. If the United States wants Japan to grow out of this old arrangement, then, the United States needs to encourage Japan to adjust to the new security environment in Asia, suggesting a new pathway to Tokyo.

In fact, this encouraging role was exactly the kind of a role that the United States played in Western Europe immediately after the Second World War. We need to keep in mind that the essential task of the United States in postwar Europe was not just the reconstruction but also to let the Europeans cooperate with each other and let them accumulate the experiences of cooperation so that such a great tragedy would not repeat. The findings of this research suggest that the United States should encourage Japan to adjust her new role and image to the needs of the East Asian security environment just as Germany did in postwar Europe. Time is limited. The reactive state in Japan survived the demise of the Cold War, but it may not overcome the birth of a U.S.-China rivalry.

**Know Your Enemies And You Will Not Be Imperiled**

The final implication is for the policymakers and negotiators in Washington. We
found that there was a limit to U.S. demands, and that in determining the limit, three questions were important. First, what is the ADU in the Japanese government for a given occasion for decision, or who makes the decision for the given issue area? Second, what are the dynamics inside the ADU? That is, is it coherent or fragmented? And last, is there a veto player? If yes, then, who is the veto player?

In addition to these three factors, there can be countless other factors that affect the negotiating positions of the other party. However, observations of this sort would enable an in-depth and efficient analysis of the decision-making process of the negotiating counterparts. And, if Washington can predict the limit of the counterpart’s expected concession with much probability of success and with less cost, then, it will enhance the expected negotiating outcome without endangering the bilateral relationship with the allies.

10.4 Directions for Further Research

The structure of the research design of this study points to four future directions of research. First, we have to apply and test the design of this research to another similar country: a country that is dependent on the United States for her security by accommodating U.S. forces within her territory like the Philippines or Afghanistan, or a country that requires U.S. security guarantee because she is facing serious military threats from neighboring countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. We can observe the way the country responds to U.S. demands when the serious national interests of the United States are at stake. If the country shows responses similar to those we observed in
the cases we dealt with in this research, then it will raise the reliability of our research findings. If we observe different responses from that country, then, we will have to reexamine the model we established in this research, trying to find an additional intervening variable that created the variation between this research and the new research.

Second, we can observe the Japanese and South Korean responses to the demands from non-U.S. sources. For example, when a country on which Japan and South Korea do not depend for their security, asks for some assistance or requests something, would Japan and South Korea show the same response that they showed to the United States? For example, how would Japan and South Korea respond when France asks them to impose sanctions on Algeria? What if China asks them to be softer in their stances toward North Korea? If Japan and South Korean show a different kind of responses from the kind of responses they showed to the United States, then, our causal explanation on the relationship between the security dependence and the reactive behavior will stand. However, if Japan and South Korea show similar responses to the demands from non-U.S. sources, then, it will weaken our explanation. Then, we will have to go back to the reactive state model, trying to find a new variable that can explain the reactive behavior.

Third, we can observe and compare the Japanese and South Korean responses to U.S. demands in non-security-related issue areas. For example, if Japan and South Korea show the reactive behavior in their negotiations with the United States regarding the opening of their automobile markets, then, we can expand our theory to non-security-related fields. We can conclude that the security dependence is affecting the behavioral characteristics of Japan and South Korea even in non-security issues. If the Japanese and South Korean behavior is different from when they are dealing with security affairs, then, we can set up
the limit of U.S. influence on the demarcation between security and non-security affairs.

Lastly, we can compare Japan with a country that share the Japanese puzzle. That is, we need to try to find a country of a large size, whose foreign policy behavior is similar to that of Japan. For example, Italy is the ninth largest economy in the world,\textsuperscript{128} accommodates seven U.S. military bases in her territory,\textsuperscript{129} and has shown relatively cooperative behavior to U.S. demands. Then, we can compare Japanese and Italian foreign policy behavior attempting to see if they showed the same reactive behavior to U.S. demands. If the behavioral characteristics are the same, then, we can try to see if the source of the behavior was the same between the two countries. If we find any behavioral and causal differences between the two countries, then, we will have to try to find the source of the difference.

\textsuperscript{128}Based on GDP (current US$, 2012), World Development Indicators.

\textsuperscript{129}This information was retrieved from http://militarybases.com/overseas/italy/ on 9 March 2014.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>IRAQI ACTIONS AND REACTIONS FROM THE WEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2 '90</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait. The first UNSC resolution on the Iraqi invasion (S/RES/660(1990)) demands that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4 '90</td>
<td>In the evening, the EC announces its economic sanctions against Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 5 '90</td>
<td>President Bush declares that the invasion &quot;will not stand.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 6 '90</td>
<td>The second UNSC resolution regarding the Iraqi invasion (S/RES/661(1990)) states shall prevent the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 8 '90</td>
<td>Iraq announces the annexation of Kuwait. President Bush in a televised address announces the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.10 '90</td>
<td>U.S. Senate unanimously passes a resolution warning of a serious downgrading of relations with allies that were deemed not to have made appropriate contributions to the Gulf coalition effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.14-5 '90</td>
<td>United Kingdom and France announce deployment of 10,000 troops to the Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.29 '90</td>
<td>UN Security Council authorizes use of &quot;all means necessary&quot; to eject Iraq from Kuwait, and decides to send an ultimatum to Iraq by setting a deadline for unconditional withdrawal (S/RES/678(1990)).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 9 '91</td>
<td>James Baker meets Tariq Aziz in Geneva in an unsuccessful effort to find a peaceful solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.12 '91</td>
<td>U.S. Congress authorizes use of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 17 '91</td>
<td>Allied attack begins with Apache strike at 2:38 A.M.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 19 '91</td>
<td>First scud missiles strike Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 22 '91</td>
<td>Iraq begins blowing up Kuwaiti oil wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 25 '91</td>
<td>Iraq begins &quot;environmental war&quot; by pumping millions of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Feb. 8 ’91 Total U.S. troops in Gulf now over half million.

Feb. 24 ’91 Ground attack begins.

Feb. 26 ’91 Saddam Hussein announces Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

Feb. 27 ’91 Coalition forces enter Kuwait City. President Bush declares Kuwait liberated.

Feb. 28 ’91 Cease-fire takes effect at 8 A.M.*

*Hours are in Riyadh time.
APPENDIX 1-B. CHRONOLOGY OF THE GULF WAR: JAPANESE RESPONSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>U.S. DEMANDS AND RESPONSES FROM JAPAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4 '90</td>
<td>President Bush calls Kaifu in the morning urging the Prime Minister to take proactive actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 5 '90</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto announces a four-point package of economic sanctions against Iraq: oil import embargo; export embargo; suspension of economic aid; freeze on investment and loans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13 '90</td>
<td>Kaifu cancels his scheduled trip to the Middle East (Aug. 15-27). / President Bush talks to Prime Minister Kaifu by phone, outlining what support Washington wants from Tokyo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 15 '90</td>
<td>Ambassador Armacost submits the official request from the United States to Vice Foreign Minister Kuriyama. The requests are financial support for the coalition; economic assistance for frontline states; additional host nation support; and Japanese personnel contributions to back up the coalition including minesweepers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 16 '90</td>
<td>The Gulf War Task Force is set up in the Japanese government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29 '90</td>
<td>Japan announces its first specific package of gulf-related contributions. The contents are 1) a medical support team composed of 100 medical volunteers; 2) transportation support by chartering two ships and two planes; 3) support of equipment e.g. equipment to guard the troops against heat; and 4) unspecified loans and grants to the United States and frontline states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30 '90</td>
<td>The specific number of loans and grants is provided by Finance Minister Hashimoto at $1 billion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31 '90</td>
<td>In a press conference, the Finance Ministry announces that the $1 billion offered the previous day was the most Japan could provide in the 1990 fiscal year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 7 '90</td>
<td>U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nick Brady arrives at Tokyo, and holds meetings with Prime Minister Kaifu, Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama urging them to increase Japan’s contributions. / Japanese transport ship Sea Venus leaves Nagoya Port for Jeddah with 500 Toyota Land Cruisers and 300 Mitsubishi Pajeros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 12 '90</td>
<td>U.S. House of Representative passes an amendment to the defense authorization bill calling for the annual withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Japan beginning in five years if the Japanese government did not agree to pay the full cost of deploying U.S. troops in Japan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sep. 14 ‘90  The Kaifu cabinet announces a supplemental aid package valued at $3 billion; As a result, Japan comes to promise $4 billion in total up to this point. This day’s announcement also included a plan to seek legislation to create the United Nations Cooperation Corps, a civilian agency that would enable Japan to perform support functions for UN peacekeeping forces.

Sep. 27 ‘90  Kaifu announces the initial draft of the UN Peace Cooperation (UNPC) bill (国連平和協力法案).

Oct. 7 ‘90  Specific guideline to implement the proposed UN Peace Cooperation law is determined.

Oct. 16 ‘90  An extraordinary session of the Diet opens to deliberate on the UNPC bill.

Nov. 9 ‘90  The LDP agrees with opposition parties to scrap the UNPC bill without submitting it for a vote.

Jan. 17 ‘91  Prime Minister Kaifu announces that the government will provide additional financial assistance to the MNF and will consider the possibility of using SDF aircrafts for the purpose of transporting refugees.

Jan. 21 ‘91  Finance Minister Hashimoto has a one-on-one meeting with Treasury Secretary Brady on the margins of the G-7 ministerial meetings to discuss the coalition’s financial requirements. Brady appeals for an additional $9 billion, and Hashimoto secures a yes from Tokyo in little more than 48 hours.

Jan. 24 ‘91  The Japanese government officially decides to provide additional US$ 9 billion to the MNF and to dispatch SDF aircrafts for refugee transportation.

Feb. 25 ‘91  Prime Minister Kaifu officially submits to the Diet the motion for providing US$ 9 billion to the MNF.

Mar. 6 ‘91  The supplemental budget bill enabling the $9 billion contribution is passed in the National Diet.

Apr. 9 ‘91  The Saudi government requests Japan to dispatch minesweepers to demine the Gulf region.

Apr. 11 ‘91  Prime Minister Kaifu directs the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency to examine how to prepare the minesweepers for the requested task in the Gulf region.

Apr. 24 ‘91  Japan decides to dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf.
### DATE | U.S. DEMANDS AND RESPONSES FROM SOUTH KOREA

Aug. 2 ‘90 | U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg meets with Foreign Minister Choi Ho-jung, and submits a non-paper asking South Korea to condemn the Iraqi invasion and impose sanctions on Iraq. / The statement announced by the S. Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (KMOFA) expresses deep concern on the Iraqi military moves, hoping for peaceful resolution of the conflict, and asked Iraq to withdraw as early as possible.

Aug. 3 ‘90 | Douglass Paal, Asian Director at the U.S. NSC, in a meeting with Yu Myung-hwan, Political Counselor at the Korean Embassy in Washington, asked for South Korea’s participation in the economic sanctions on Iraq, saying that insufficient sanctions against Iraq might tempt Kim Il-sung to invade southward.

Aug. 8 ‘90 | Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Richard Solomon visits South Korea to make a demand for South Korea’s participation in the measures against Iraq.

Aug. 9 ‘90 | ROK decides to impose sanctions on Iraq such as oil import embargo from Iraq and Kuwait, export embargo to Iraq, suspension of construction projects, etc.

Aug. 13 ‘90 | Doug Paal expresses a hope that ROK will take an initiative with respect to Iraq before the U.S. makes a request.

Aug. 16 ‘90 | Robert W. RisCassi, Commander-in-Chief of the USFK, meets with ROK Defense Minister, Lee Sang-hoon. In this meeting, General RisCassy mentions that USFK units will not be sent to the Gulf.

Aug. 17 ‘90 | Undersecretary of State Bob Kimmitt invites ROK Ambassador Park Dong-jin and officially asks for transportation support and financial assistance for military operations in the Gulf region.

Aug. 21 ‘90 | Assistant Secretary Solomon, in a meeting with Ambassador Park, appreciates ROK’s sanctions against Iraq, and sounds Park’s views about additional assistance of aircrafts and vessels for MNF.

Sep. 6 ‘90 | President Bush delivers a personal letter to President Roh Tae-woo through Ambassador Gregg asking for a large-scale assistance from ROK. In this letter, Bush mentions estimated monthly cost of the war (US$ 2 to 2.5 billion per month) and the impact of the Gulf crisis on U.S. allies. / DoD delivers a request of US$ 450 million for sharing the war cost to the Office
of the Military Attache of the ROK Embassy in D.C.: US$ 50 million in cash and US$ 100 million in kind by the end of 1990; US$ 5 million per month in cash and US$ 30 million per month in kind from 1991. DoD explained that the numbers were based on ROK’s oil imports from the Middle East, the size of ROK’s construction projects in the Gulf region, and the domestic economic situation of the ROK.

Sep. 7 ‘90 U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nick Brady visits South Korea between September 6 and 7. In a courtesy call to President Roh, he asks for US$ 350 million in total: US$ 150 million for military operations in the Gulf and US$ 200 million for the frontline states.

Sep. 13 ‘90 Charles Kartman, an advisor for U.S. Undersecretary of State, mentions that as a U.S. ally, South Korea needs to provide assistance for the United States at the ‘right’ timing.

Sep. 17 ‘90 Karl Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs of the NSC visits ROK between September 15 and 19. In a meeting with ROK Defense Minister Lee, he asks South Korea to swiftly decide on the amount and means of the assistance, and to show a visible role. / Desaix Anderson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific, who visited South Korea with Jackson, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Choi, asked South Korea to decide on the amount of the assistance as early as possible, saying that timing is more important than amount with respect to assistance for the United States.

Sep. 21 ‘90 Ambassador Gregg makes a demand on ROK for additional financial assistance as well as dispatch of military medical units and transportation equipment.

Sep. 24 ‘90 S. Korea announces its aid package of US$220 million and the plan to dispatch medical units to the Gulf: US$120 million for MNF and US$ 100 million for the frontlines states; US$ 170 million in FY1990 and US$ 50 million in FY1991. The Package also included transportation support, which was actually an aircraft chartered from the Korean Airline.

Sep. 25 ‘90 U.S. Department of State welcomes the announcement by the ROK. / Secretary Brady, in the U.S.-Korea Finance Ministers’ meeting held in D.C. appreciates ROK decision to provide the financial assistance. In response, ROK Finance Minister Chung Young-eui says that it was by President Roh’s decision that South Korea could provide US$ 220 million despite the trade deficit and the deteriorating economic situation in South Korea.

Sep. 26 ‘90 Secretary of State Jim Baker in the U.S.-Korea Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in New York asks for additional financial assistance quoting the possibility of U.S. Congress making it a political issue as a reason.
response, the ROK side explains that the number is the maximum the ROK can pay considering the security and economic situation surrounding the ROK.

Oct.11 ‘90 Representatives from the U.S. and ROK hold a meeting in Washington to discuss the details of the transportation support and dispatch of medical units that ROK promised. In this meeting, the U.S. side appreciates the fact that ROK was the first to provide transportation support, and asks the ROK to directly approach the recipient states to work out the details of how to provide supplies to the frontline states. The U.S. side also emphasizes that ROK is more cooperating than other allies, and that ROK’s assistance is symbolically very important.

Oct.31 ‘90 From October 31 to November 7, a ROK delegation headed by Vice Foreign Minister visits Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey to discuss the details of the announced assistance for the frontline states. As a result of this trip, ROK comes to provide US$ 30 million to Egypt, US$ 15 million to Jordan, US$ 10 million to Syria, and US$ 20 million to Turkey.

Nov.13 ‘90 General Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army Chief of Staff in a meeting with his counterpart from ROK, Chung Ho-geun, reaffirms the U.S. security commitment for the Korean Peninsula.

Dec.20 ‘90 Undersecretary of State Kimmitt tells Kim Jong-hwi, Presidential Special Envoy of ROK, who visited the United States, about the complaints from U.S. Congress on the financial burden-sharing, and expresses a hope that ROK will actively cooperate if a request for additional financial assistance is made by the United States in January 1991.

Jan. 8 ‘91 President Roh Tae-woo announces in the New Year’s press conference that the ROK government is not considering the dispatch of combat units to the Gulf region, and that there was no request thereof. / Charles Kartman, in a meeting with ROK Ambassador, discloses that the United States will make a request for additional financial assistance, but that the amount requested will not exceed the amount that ROK had already promised. He also mentions that participation is symbolically more important than the amount of the money, so a spontaneous action from the ROK side will have politically stronger effect.

Jan.11 ‘91 Karl Jackson, in a meeting with Lee Seung-gon, Political Minister of the ROK Embassy in Washington, recommends that ROK provide a symbolic number of troops for MNF after indicating that there will be another demand for extra money.

Jan.14 ‘91 A 20-strong advance team of military medics leaves for Saudi Arabia. / Kartman mentions the need for South Korea to issue a statement
condemning Iraq when the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal (Jan. 15) is reached.

Jan.16 ‘91 When the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal is reached, KMOFA announces that it is regretful, and that the government of the ROK again urges Iraq to immediately withdraw from Kuwait.

Jan.17 ‘91 In a Korea Society luncheon speech, Assistant Secretary Solomon appreciates South Korea’s assistance.

Jan.20 ‘91 Gen. RisCassi, in a courtesy call to President Roh, reaffirms the U.S. security commitment for South Korea.

Jan.21 ‘91 South Korean National Assembly passes the Motion for Dispatching the Military Medical Team to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 223 for, 9 against, and 2 abstaining.

Jan.22 ‘91 Kartman mentions that ROK’s spontaneous provision of financial assistance will have a great effect since an additional demand for monetary assistance will come from Washington. / Doug Paal mentions the need to send troops to the Gulf in a meeting with Political Counselor Yu Myung-hwan.

Jan.23 ‘91 The Chief of the Korea Desk at DoD raises the need for ROK Air Force to provide C-130 transportation aircrafts for the Gulf War. / Stanley Roth, staff director of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a meeting with Political Counselor Lim Sung-jun, remarks that sending a combat unit of a symbolic size to the Gulf will be effective since American complaints about under-assistance from U.S. allies might spread to South Korea.

Jan.24 ‘91 Korean medical team of 134 soldiers arrives at Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

Jan.28 ‘91 Gen. RisCassi visits ROK Ministry of Defense (MOD), and provides his advices on the amount, delivery method of the assistance for the MNF. He specifically mentions that the additional monetary assistance should exceed the initial provision of US$ 220 million.

Jan.29 ‘91 ROK government decides to provide an additional US$ 280 million with US$ 170 million in kind and US$ 110 million in cash and transportation support. S. Korea also decides to dispatch five C-130 transportation aircrafts to the Gulf. As a result of this day’s decision, the total assistance of S. Korea sums up to US$ 500 million. / State Department welcomes ROK’s additional assistance; Ambassador Gregg appreciates ROK’s decision in a meeting with Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok.

Jan.30 ‘91 Karl Jackson remarks, when meeting with ROK Ambassador to Washington, that, although appreciable, the expectation of the American public opinion is
much higher than the amount of the assistance decided by ROK. / Assistant Secretary of State Solomon suggests to Ambassador Park that ROK provide additional US$ 1 billion considering the special relationship between the U.S. and ROK.

Jan. 31 ‘91 Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to Seoul says the U.S. wants $1 billion from S. Korea in a meeting with Foreign Minister Lee Sang-Ok. / Henry S. Rowen, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in a meeting with ROK Ambassador hopes that ROK will provide about 5% of the Japanese additional financial assistance (US$ 9 billion), which amounts to US$ 450 million.

Feb. 1 ‘91 State Department spokesperson states that the additional assistance by South Korea is an expression of ROK’s determination to help the international efforts against the Iraq invasion.

Feb. 4 ‘91 Bob Kimmitt tells ROK Ambassador that the additional assistance by South Korea is less than what Washington had expected and that criticisms will arise from within the Congress.

Feb. 5 ‘91 Robert Zoellick, Counselor of the State Department, in a meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Yu Jong-ha emphasizes the need for South Korea to be more forthcoming in consideration of under-appreciation of the U.S. Congress and the public opinion on the ROK’s contributions. He adds that ROK’s financial assistance of US$ 500 million will be compared to the US$ 3 billion that ROK loaned to the Soviet Union.

Feb. 6 ‘91 Vice Foreign Minister Yu, in a meeting with Assistant Secretary Solomon, explains that the loan for the Soviet Union was made on a commercial basis, and seeks understanding of the United States.

Feb. 7 ‘91 S. Korean National Assembly approves the government’s decision to send five C-130 aircrafts and 150 pilots and ground-crew with a vote of 191 out of 198 attending.

Feb. 8 ‘91 Richard Solomon mentions that at the moment, the dispatch of combat troops by South Korea is not required. / Sir Patrick Wright, Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, tells ROK Ambassador to London that John Weston, Deputy Under Secretary of State, will visit South Korea to ask for financial assistance to cover the British cost of the Gulf War.

Feb. 13 ‘91 John Weston, in a meeting with Lee Ki-joo, the 2nd Deputy Foreign Minister of ROK, makes a request for US$ 30 to 40 million to cover part of the British war cost.
Feb. 16 ’91 DoD declares that ROK has become the 33rd participant in the MNF.

Feb. 19 ’91 KMOFA decides to provide US$ 30 million to the U.K. / The first contingent of the ROK Air Force transportation unit of 72 persons departs. / DoD suggests that, of the US$ 170 million to be supplied in kind, US$ 50 million should be earmarked for refilling the reserve supplies of the USFK that had been used up for the Gulf war while the remaining US$ 120 million should be provided for the frontline states and other U.S. allies.

Feb. 22 ’91 The second contingent of the ROK Air Force transportation unit of 78 persons departs. / DoD informs ROK that the U.S. wants to cancel the request made on Feb. 19 that the remaining US$ 120 million should go to the frontline states and other U.S. allies.

Feb. 24 ’91 Thirty minutes after President Bush declares the start of the ground offensive, ROK government issues a statement that it is regretful that the MNF has to commence the ground war to execute the prior UNSC resolutions, and that ROK supports the international efforts to settle the situation. / The Office of the Korean Affairs of the U.S. State Department appreciates the fact that ROK issued the statement before the United States filed a request for it.

Feb. 28 ’91 Richard Solomon expresses gratitude for ROK’s active assistance for the United States, and mentions that it will have a positive effect on South Korea’s security by sending a warning signal to North Korea.

Mar. 14 ’91 President Bush, in a reply to President Roh’s congratulatory message, praises ROK’s efforts for the Gulf war, and asks for ROK cooperation on the reconstruction of the Middle East.

Apr. 10 ’91 ROK military medical team and ROK Air Force transportation units return to South Korea.
APPENDIX 2-A: CHRONOLOGY OF THE IRAQ WAR: U.S. RESPONSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>U.S. ACTIONS AND THE SITUATION IN IRAQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 11 `01</td>
<td>Terrorists attack multiple places inside the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 7 `01</td>
<td>The United States invades Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 11 `02</td>
<td>U.S. Congress authorizes an attack on Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 29 `02</td>
<td>In President George W. Bush's state of the union speech, he identifies Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as an &quot;axis of evil.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 1 `02</td>
<td>President Bush introduces the new defense doctrine of preemption in a speech at West Point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 12 `02</td>
<td>President Bush, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, says, “I will pursue ways to resolve the [Iraq] issue through the United Nations.” But, he also confirms his resolve by telling world leaders at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly to confront the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq, or stand aside as the United States acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 5 `02</td>
<td>As a result of the U.S. mid-term election, the U.S. Republican Party comes to control the both Houses of the Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 8 `02</td>
<td>The UN Security Council unanimously approves resolution 1441 imposing tough new arms inspections on Iraq and precise, unambiguous definitions of what constitutes a &quot;material breach&quot; of the resolution. Should Iraq violate the resolution, it faces &quot;serious consequences,&quot; which the Security Council would then determine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 18 `02</td>
<td>UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq for the first time in almost four years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 7 `02</td>
<td>Iraq submits a 12,000-page declaration on its chemical, biological and nuclear activities, claiming it has no banned weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 27 `03</td>
<td>The UN's formal report on Iraqi inspections is highly critical, though not damning, with chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix stating that &quot;Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28 `03</td>
<td>In his state of the union address, President Bush announces that he is ready to attack Iraq even without a UN mandate. (Shinoda 2004, 94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Feb. 14 ‘03 In a February UN report, chief UN inspector Hans Blix indicated that slight progress had been made in Iraq's cooperation. Both pro- and anti-war nations felt the report supported their point of view.

Feb. 24 ‘03 The U.S., Britain, and Spain submit a proposed resolution to the UN Security Council that states that "Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441," and that it is now time to authorize use of military force against the country. France, Germany, and Russia submit an informal counter-resolution to the UN Security Council that states that inspections should be intensified and extended to ensure that there is "a real chance to the peaceful settlement of this crisis," and that "the military option should only be a last resort."

Mar. 14 ‘03 The U.S. and Britain's intense lobbying efforts among the other UN Security Council members yield only four supporters (in addition to the U.S. and Britain, Spain and Bulgaria); nine votes (and no vetoes from the five permanent members) out of fifteen are required for the resolution's passage.

Mar. 17 ‘03 All diplomatic efforts cease when President Bush delivers an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave the country within 48 hours or else face an attack.

Mar. 19 ‘03 President Bush begins war with Iraq.

Mar. 20 ‘03 The war against Iraq begins 5:30 AM Baghdad time (9:30 PM EST, March 19).

Apr. 9 ‘03 The fall of Baghdad: U.S. forces take control of the city.

May 1 ‘03 The U.S. declares an end to major combat operations.

May 6 ‘03 President Bush names Paul Bremer, a veteran U.S. diplomat and counter-terrorism expert, as the top civil administrator to lead post-war reconstruction and political transition in Iraq (Xinhua [Beijing], 7 May 2003).

May 22 ‘03 UN Security Council adopts the resolution 1483, in which the UNSC “appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country” (S/RES/1483(2003)).

Jul. 17 ‘03 U.S. combat deaths in Iraq reach 147, the same number of soldiers who died from hostile fire in the first Gulf War; 32 of those deaths occurred after May 1, the officially declared end of combat.

Aug. 19 ‘03 Suicide bombing destroys UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24,
President Bush announces that $87 billion is needed to cover additional military and reconstruction costs in Iraq. He also indicates that he plans to ask Japan and Europe to contribute financially to the reconstruction of Iraq.

According to an interim report by David Kay, the lead investigator searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, no WMDs have been found as yet.

The UN Security Council unanimously approves the U.S. and UK resolution (Resolution 1511) on Iraq's reconstruction, which supports an international force in the country under U.S. authority.

The Madrid Conference, an international donors' conference of 80 nations to raise funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, yielded $13 billion in addition to the $20 billion already pledged by the United States. This amount fell short of the overall target of raising $56 billion, the figure the World Bank and the UN estimated that Iraq needs over the next four years.

A suicide bombing in Nasiriyah, Southern Iraq kills at least 26 people including 16 Italian soldiers.

Saddam Hussein is captured.

The number of U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq since the start of the war reaches 500.

David Kay informs a senate committee that no WMD have been found in Iraq and that prewar intelligence was "almost all wrong" about Saddam Hussein's arsenal.

A terrorist attack on a train occurs in Madrid, Spain. More than 190 people are killed or wounded.

Iraqi mob kills and mutilates four America civilian contract workers and then drags them through the streets of Fallujah, a city west of Baghdad that is part of the Sunni Triangle.

The Spanish government decides to withdraw their forces from Iraq.

The appalling physical and sexual abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad comes to light when photographs are released by the U.S. media.

Nicholas Berg, an American contractor, is beheaded by Iraqi militants, who
claim the grisly murder was in retaliation for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners.

May 17 '04  A suicide bomber kills the head of Iraq's Governing Council, Izzedin Salim, and six other people.

May 28 '04  Iyad Allawi is designated prime minister of the Iraqi interim government.

Jun. 8 '04  The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution (Resolution 1546) endorsing the appointment of an interim government in Iraq. It asks the UN members countries to assist the U.S.-led multinational forces.

Jun. 16 '04  The 9/11 Commission concludes in its report that there is "no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States."

Jun. 17 '04  In a poll conducted by the Coalition Provisional Authority in May, 92% of Iraqis saw the U.S. as "occupiers," 3% saw them as "peacekeepers," and only 2% viewed them as "liberators."

Jun. 28 '04  The United States transfers sovereignty back to Iraqis.

Jul. 9 '04  The Senate Intelligence Committee releases a unanimous, bipartisan "Report on Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq". It harshly criticizes the CIA and other American intelligence agencies for the "mischaracterization of intelligence": "most of the major key judgments" on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence report."

Jul. 13 '04  The Philippines decides to withdraw their forces from Iraq.

Jul. 14 '04  Bulgarian President announces that despite the killing of a Bulgarian by terrorists, the Bulgarian government would not withdraw the troops from Iraq.

Jul. 16 '04  The Thai government begins to withdraw their forces from Iraq.

Jul. 22 '04  The Egyptian Foreign Minister rejects the request of troops dispatch to Iraq by the Iraqi Prime Minister.

Jul. 26 '04  The European branch of Al Qaeda announces that they would attack the mainland of Australia unless the Australian government withdraws from Iraq. In response, the Australian government announces that “it would not cave in.”

Sep. 7 '04  The American death toll in Iraq reaches 1,000; about 7,000 soldiers have been wounded.
Nov. 2 ’04  President Bush is reelected.

Nov. 17 ’04  The motion to extend the stay of Hungarian troops in Iraq is rejected by the Hungarian legislature.

Jan. 30 ’05  Some 8 million Iraqis vote in elections for a Transitional National Assembly.

Mar. 14 ’05  The Netherlands withdraws 160 soldiers from Iraq. The remaining Dutch forces will leave Iraq in April.

Mar. 15 ’05  The Italian government announces that the withdrawal of the Italian troops in Iraq will begin from September. Ukraine withdraws 137 soldiers from Iraq. The remaining Ukrainian forces will leave Iraq no later than October 15.

Apr. 12 ’05  Polish Defense Minister announces that the Polish troops in Iraq would leave at the end of 2005.

Oct. 15 ’05  Iraqi voters approve a new constitution.

Oct. 25 ’05  The number of deaths of U.S. soldiers fighting in Iraq reaches 2,000.

Nov. 8 ’05  The UNSC extends the term of the multinational forces in Iraq for one year.

Dec. 15 ’05  Iraqis vote for the first, full-term government and parliament since the US-led invasion.

Dec. 30 ’06  Saddam Hussein is executed.

Dec. 31 ’06  The American death toll in the Iraq war reaches 3,000.

Jan. 10 ’07  In a nationally televised address, President Bush announces that an additional 20,000 troops will be deployed to Baghdad to try to stem the sectarian fighting.

Sep. 13 ’07  In a nationally televised address, President Bush outlines a plan for withdrawing troops from Iraq. He says that by July 2008 troop levels would drop from the current high of 169,000 to 130,000.

Nov. 18 ’07  U.S. military reports that for three consecutive weeks, the number of car bombs, roadside bombs, mines, rocket attacks, and other violence have fallen to the lowest level since January 2006.

Sep. 1 ’08  U.S. forces hand over control of the western province of Anbar - once an insurgent and Al-Qaeda stronghold - to the Iraqi government. It is the first
Sunni province to be returned to the Shia-led government.

Nov. 16 ’08  Iraqi Parliament approves a security pact with the United States under which all US troops are due to leave the country by the end of 2011.

Feb. 27 ’09  U.S. President Barack Obama announces withdrawal of most U.S. troops by the end of August 2010.

Jun. 30 ’09  U.S. troops withdraw from towns and cities in Iraq, six years after the invasion, having formally handed over security duties to new Iraqi forces.

Aug. 31 ’10  President Obama announces the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom with a withdrawal of combat troops. The U.S. will continue to be a presence in Iraq, mainly with civilian contractors but also with a smaller military contingent of approximately 50,000 troops. The remaining troops are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011.
## APPENDIX 2-B: CHRONOLOGY OF THE IRAQ WAR: SOUTH KOREAN RESPONSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>U.S. DEMANDS AND THE SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 6 `01</td>
<td>The National Assembly passes the motion to dispatch South Korean troops to assist in the Afghan war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18 `01</td>
<td>A South Korean Navy’s LST (Landing Ship Tank) with 171 crew members leaves Chinhae, a South Korean naval port to help U.S. military transportation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 28 `01</td>
<td>Four South Korean C-130 transportation aircrafts begin to airlift allied military materials for the Afghan war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 27 `02</td>
<td>A 100-strong military medical team of the ROK armed forces arrives at a U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 13 `02</td>
<td>Two teenage Korean girls are killed by a U.S. military vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 3 `02</td>
<td>James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs confronts his counterpart, Kim Gye-gwan with the evidence that the DPRK is secretly developing a Uranium Enrichment Program. The next day, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju acknowledges that the DPRK has such a program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 14 `02</td>
<td>KEDO (Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization) decides to cease the provision of heavy oil to DPRK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 20 `02</td>
<td>The U.S. government sounds out the South Korean government on Korea’s willingness to provide assistance for the Iraq crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 23 `02</td>
<td>Soldiers charged with negligent homicide for the killing of the two teenage Korean girls are acquitted by the U.S. military court.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 12 `02</td>
<td>The North threatens to reactivate nuclear facilities for energy generation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 14 `02</td>
<td>Massive demonstrations are staged in a number of Korean cities to protest the acquittal of the two U.S. soldiers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 19 `02</td>
<td>Roh Moo-hyun is elected president of the Republic of Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 23 `02</td>
<td>The South Korean government expresses its willingness to provide assistance for the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 24 `02</td>
<td>North Korea begins repairs at the Yongbyon plant. / South Korea’s key stock...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
index sags as increasing worries about a war in Iraq and North Korea’s nuclear threat weighs down on market sentiment.

Dec.27 ’02 North Korea says it is expelling the two IAEA nuclear inspectors from the country. It also says it is planning to reopen a reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons grade plutonium within months.

Jan. 6 ’03 South Korean government discloses phased countermeasures against a possible war between the United States and Iraq in order to reduce the economic impact.

Jan.10 ’03 North Korea announces it will withdraw from the NPT, or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Jan.13 ’03 In a meeting with James Kelly, who visited Seoul, President-elect Roh says that his government will play a leading role in solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. He also says, “Anti-Americanism is the voice of very few.” Kelly likewise dismisses press reports about Washington preparing two simultaneous wars, referring to Iraq and North Korea. Kelly assures Roh that neither sanctions against North Korea nor a military attack were currently being contemplated in Washington.

Jan.17 ’03 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard L. Armitage says, “We have no hostile intentions toward North Korea, and we’re not going to invade North Korea.”

Jan.18 ’03 President-elect Roh, speaking on South Korean television in Seoul, says that “U.S. hardliners, people in very responsible positions in the U.S. administration, were talking about the possibility of attacking North Korea and the possibility of war.”

Jan.19 ’03 White House spokeswoman, Jeanie Mamo says that President Bush “has made it clear that the U.S. has no intention of invading North Korea” and that “he has indicated he wants to find a peaceful resolution to the current situation North Korea has brought upon itself.”

Jan.28 ’03 In his annual State of the Union address, President Bush says North Korea is "an oppressive regime [whose] people live in fear and starvation".

Feb. 3 ’03 A special envoy of President-elect Roh, Chyung Dai-chul, arrives at Washington. In a private dinner with Americans, he mentions that “the incoming government would prefer that North Korea had nuclear weapons to seeing it collapse.”

Feb. 5 ’03 North Korea says it has reactivated its nuclear facilities and their operations are now going ahead "on a normal footing".
Feb.11 ’03 American credit-rating company, Moody’s Investor Service announces that it will lower the South Korean national credit-rating by two notches.

Feb.19 ’03 President-elect Roh tells members of the Korean Chamber of Commerce that he was “willing to differ with the U.S. if that helps prevent war. He also says that “an attack on North Korea could trigger a war engulfing the Korean Peninsula, and that it’s a serious issue, and at this moment I am against even consideration of such an option.”

Feb.24 ’03 North Korea fires a missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan.

Feb.25 ’03 Roh Moo-hyun sworn in as South Korean president. In his inaugural speech, Roh says, “We will see to it that the alliance [with the United States] matures into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship.” / U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell participates in the inaugural ceremony, and has a meeting with President Roh. In the meeting, he is reported as saying that “Washington intends to seek Seoul’s approval, if the situation comes down to an attack on the North.”

Feb.26 ’03 The bill to create the office of the independent council to probe the so-called “secretive money transfer to North Korea” scandal passes the National Assembly.

Mar. 2 ’03 Four North Korean fighter jets intercept a US reconnaissance plane in international air space and shadow it for 22 minutes.

Mar. 9 ’03 Bank Ki-moon, foreign policy advisor for President Roh, goes to New York along with officials from Defense, Unification, and economic ministries to defuse concerns among foreign investors about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Mar.10 ’03 North Korea fires a second missile into the sea between South Korea and Japan. / Presidential spokeswoman Song Kyoung-hee announces that “the United States demands our government’s support for the [Iraq] war, which includes assistance of medical troops and help in dealing with refugees.” Another South Korean official says that “Roh administration is planning to accept the request, . . . [but] the scale of the assistance is not expected to surpass that of South Korea’s support provided during the Gulf war in the early 1990s.”

Mar.13 ’03 In a telephone conversation, President Bush thanks President Roh for the support for the U.S. in the Iraq issue and President Roh promises to provide an active support for U.S. efforts to resolve the Iraq issue based on the spirit of the Korea-U.S. alliance. / The U.S. government submits a request list of assistance to the ROK government.
Mar.17 ‘03 A group of 22 lawmakers issues a statement urging the government to rethink its plan to send non-combatant troops to Iraq.

Mar.18 ‘03 For the first time, President Roh calls for a multilateral dialogue to settle the North’s nuclear issue, a setting the U.S. has been pushing for despite Pyongyang’s opposition.

Mar.19 ‘03 South Korean National Security Advisor, Ra Jong-il says that South Korea “might send soldiers to assist in the evacuation of refugees and in postwar reconstruction.

Mar.20 ‘03 Roh administration announces that South Korea will send a battalion of between 500 and 600 military engineers and about 150 military medical staff to Iraq in 7 to 11 weeks. In addition to personnel assistance, South Korea will also provide US$ 5 to 10 million in humanitarian assistance. President Roh says that he decided to support U.S. efforts in consideration of the importance of the military alliance between Seoul and Washington. Ranking members of both ruling and opposition parties support the government’s moves to dispatch non-combat forces to the Middle East.

Mar.21 ‘03 President Roh’s decision to send the troops to Iraq sparks off a heated debate in the morning session of the ruling party’s internal meeting, revealing a deep divide among member lawmakers. / The South Korean Cabinet submits the motion to dispatch construction and medical units of the Korean Armed Forces to Iraq to the National Assembly.

Mar.24 ‘03 President Roh in a meeting with his senior aides says, “I met a U.S. government official in a responsible position on a number of occasions and was told that the North is different from Iraq and (the nuclear issue) should be resolved peacefully.” / Nosamo, a major civilian support group for President Roh issues a statement that says Washington must stop its military campaign against Iraq, and urges the Seoul government to rescind its decision to send non-combat troops to Iraq.

Mar.26 ‘03 As major civic activists wage anti-war rallies and sit-in protests, the vote on sending the troops to Iraq is postponed. / Foreign Minister Yoon goes to Washington for a four-day visit. He has a meeting with Colin Powell to fine-tune joint measures to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue and to discuss the South’s support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq. / President Roh appoints the independent council to investigate the “secretive money transfer to North Korea” scandal.

Mar.27 ‘03 Yoo In-tae, senior presidential secretary for political affairs meets representatives of 10 major civic groups to persuade them to cease protesting against the dispatch plan. He is quoted as saying, “The troop
dispatch plan is unavoidable, in order to influence the U.S. to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully through dialogue.”

Mar.28 ‘03 A group of ruling and opposition lawmakers, including MDP’s Kim Geuntae, and GNP’s Suh Sang-su, issues a statement that says, “There is no ground at all for South Korea to send forces to help the unilateral military action led by the U.S., which lacks UN approval, under the name of the alliance. / A South Korean military construction unit begins to operate in the Bagram airbase in northern Afghanistan.

Mar.29 ‘03 The vote is delayed again when the speaker of the National Assembly accepts a demand by 71 reformist lawmakers to hold a conference meeting of all 272 lawmakers. Under the demand, all incumbent legislators are required to discuss the dispatch plan for two hours a day for two days with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs. It is the first time that the National Assembly has held such a meeting since 1960.

Mar.31 ‘03 The vote is delayed again when floor leaders of the ruling and opposition parties agree to put the dispatch bill to a vote after President Roh’s address to the National Assembly.

Oct. 2 ‘03 North Korea announces publicly it has reprocessed the spent fuel rods. / Cha Young-koo, South Korea’s assistant minister for defense policy says that Washington wants South Korean combat troops to be positioned in the city of Mosul in northern Iraq, replacing its airborne division there by early next year.

Apr. 2 ‘03 President Roh delivers an address to the National Assembly arguing that a strong U.S.-ROK alliance is essential for a peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear issue and that the alliance is the best way to prevent a catastrophic war in the Korean Peninsula. / An opinion poll shows that three quarters of South Koreans oppose the U.S.-led war in Iraq, while 47% each either agree to or oppose the government’s plan to dispatch troops. / The National Assembly approves a bill dispatching engineering troops and medics (the Seohee and Jema battalions) to Iraq by a 179-68 vote.

Apr. 3 ‘03 The South Korean government decides to donate US$ 10 million to international organizations in humanitarian aid to war refugees in Iraq. / The risk premium on Korea’s foreign exchange bonds falls in New York.

Apr.4 ‘03 In a telephone conversation, President Bush thanks President Roh for the South Korean parliament’s support of the dispatch of non-combat troops to Iraq. He also reaffirms his commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution to North Korea’s nuclear issue.

Apr. 8 ‘03 The first meeting of the FOTA (Future of the Alliance), a ROK-U.S. talks
over relocation of U.S. forces in Korea is held in Seoul.

Apr.14 ’03 A delegation of President Roh’s top advisers on foreign policy, defense and economic issues visits New York to defuse concerns among foreign investors about Korea’s financial stability.

Apr.17 ’03 A 20-member advance team of the construction and medical staff leaves for the Gulf.

Apr.23 ’03 Talks begin in Beijing between the U.S. and North Korea, hosted by China.

Apr.30 ’03 The first contingent of the Seohee (575 engineers) and the Jema (100 medics) leaves for Nasiriyah, Iraq.

May12 ’03 North Korea says it nullified an agreement with South Korea committing to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.

May14 ’03 The second party of the Seohee and the Jema leaves for Iraq. Now the 673 troops made up of 573 engineers and 100 medical staffers all went to Iraq. / President Bush and President Roh hold a summit meeting in Washington.

Jun. 5 ’03 Choi Byong-yol, the newly elected head of the Grand National Party (GNP) says, “We might have to have a confidence vote (on President Roh) before his term expires.”

Aug. 1 ’03 North Korea agrees to six-way talks on its nuclear programme. South Korea confirms. The U.S., Japan, China and Russia will also be involved.

Aug.14 ’03 In a public party meeting, Choi Byong-yol says, “If Roh does not come forward clean on the corruption problem, we will have to start a movement to oust him.”

Aug.27 ’03 Six-nation talks in Beijing on North Korea’s nuclear program. The meeting fails to bridge the gap between Washington and Pyongyang.

Sep. 3 ’03 President Bush has a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan at the White House. / The National Assembly votes to recommend that President Roh dismiss the Home Minister Kim Doo-kwan from the cabinet. President Roh refuses this recommendation, but accepts the resignation of Kim, when Kim submits it two weeks later.

Sep. 4 ’03 Richard Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense asks for additional troops in the fourth ROK-U.S. FOTA (Future of the Alliance) meeting in Seoul.

Sep. 9 ’03 The ROK National Security Council (NSC) holds a meeting with the
President Roh in attendance.

Sep.13 ‘03 Chang Young-dal, chairman of the defense committee of the National Assembly says South Korea’s additional troop dispatch would not be possible unless the UNSC adopts a resolution supporting troops dispatch to Iraq.

Sep.15 ‘03 GNP leader Choi Byong-yol has a meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in Washington. Wolfowitz asks South Korea to send combat troops to help keep order in postwar Iraq. Choi gives a positive response by saying, “We will clarify our position when President Roh makes a decision through consultation with the U.S. government and requests consent from us.”

Sep.16 ‘03 According to a source in the South Korean government, Washington did not specify the exact number of troops it wants South Korea to dispatch, but it cited a unit from Poland as an example. The Polish Division is a multinational force made up of a 2,500-3,000-strong brigade from Poland and 5,000-8,000 troops from 18 other nations. / Yoo In-tae, President Roh’s senior secretary for political affairs, tells a South Korean newspaper that, in his personal opinion, South Korea does not need to comply with a U.S. request for the dispatch of combat troops. He is quoted as saying, “There are many other rich countries, and I cannot understand why the U.S. has asked a divided nation like us to send combat forces. [Sending forces to Iraq] does not serve the national interest.” / Chang Young-dal, chairman of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee, says, “Sending combat troops could further increase the hostility of Iraqi people (toward our country). Even though the United States gained UN support, it seems inappropriate to send the combat forces.”

Sep.17 ‘03 President Roh says, “The people are divided on the issue [of dispatching troops to Iraq], and so are those close to me. I am unable to give an answer under the present circumstances.” He also adds, “When we dispatched troopers to Iraq in May, we were able to gauge the public’s view of the issue. This time, their opinion will be the final point of reference.” / A senior South Korean government official says on the condition of anonymity that South Korea is willing to send more than 10,000 troops to be mobilized from reserve divisions in response to a U.S. request for additional forces in Iraq. / Foreign Minister Yoon denies the report that the U.S. threatened to withdraw its frontline military from the North Korean border unless South Korea agrees to send additional troops, saying, “There were no such remarks at all.”

Sep.18 ‘03 The South Korean NSC holds a standing committee meeting to discuss the U.S. request.

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Sep. 19 ‘03 A major faction of the ruling party loyal to President Roh breaks away from the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). The faction tentatively names itself “People’s Participatory New Party.” / Chung Sye-kyun, chief policymaker of the faction loyal to President Roh says, “We would consider sending combat troops to Iraq if the UN issues a resolution and asks South Korea to send troops to form a peacekeeping force there. We need to find ways of sending the least number of combat troops possible . . . if we decide to send them anyway.”

Sep. 23 ‘03 Citizens’ Action against Deployment to Iraq (CADI), a coalition of 351 NGOs that oppose the dispatch of South Korean troops to Iraq, is established. / A South Korean inter-ministerial investigative team headed by an MND (Ministry of Defense) official goes to Iraq. The team comes back on October 3 with a report that the situation in Mosul is stabilizing and the terrorist threats are decreasing.

Sep. 26 ‘03 An MND internal review is completed. This review suggests sending 5,000 soldiers to Iraq. / On the same day, in New York, Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan has a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell.

Sep. 27 ‘03 More than 2,000 people march through Seoul in the largest rally against the U.S. request.

Sep. 29 ‘03 President Roh leaves the MDP on whose ticket he won the presidential election. / Finance Minister Kim Jin-pyo says that sending combat troops to Iraq would benefit the Korean economy because it would reassure investors of the solid alliance between Washington and Seoul.

Oct. 1 ‘03 President Roh addresses the nation, asserting that the ROK would send combat troops to Iraq only when peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is certain. He states that the most important factor in reviewing this issue is the prospect of, and conviction in, the peace and stability of the Peninsula through a stable atmosphere of dialogue. / National Security Advisor, Ra Jong-il, hints that sending combat troops is unthinkable in his interview with CBS radio by saying that “because the war in Iraq is over, we are not thinking about sending troops that might be involved in violent conflicts.” / Presidential spokesman Yoon Tae-young tells reporters that South Korea does not intend to tie a decision on the troop dispatch to the six-way talks.

Oct. 3 ‘03 President Roh tells reporters, “It is not good to make a quick decision on the troop dispatch.” The final decision, Roh says, will be made after closely checking a debriefing by a South Korean fact-finding team which returns from Iraq on Oct. 3, the progress on a proposed United Nations’ resolution on Iraq, international situations, South Korea’s national interest and public opinion.
Oct. 4 ’03  Chang Young-dal, who visited Iraq between Sep. 12 and 16, presents a written opinion suggesting sending more army engineers and medics, instead of combat units as requested by Washington, to Iraq and extending the service time of the Korean troops already in Iraq by another year.

Oct. 8 ’03  According to the results of two public opinion polls around 57% of respondents are opposed to sending more troops to Iraq. But in one poll result, 58.6% of the respondents said that they would agree if troops went in under a UN mandate. / Han Sung-joo, ROK Ambassador to the U.S. tells a visiting group of South Korean congressmen that it is advisable to dispatch extra troops to Iraq without negotiating any conditions.

Oct. 11 ’03  As many as 351 NGOs hold rallies across the country. In central Seoul, about 4,000 members of the CADI hold a march.

Oct. 13 ’03  President Roh proposes to hold a national referendum on his leadership around Dec. 15.

Oct. 14 ’03  GNP Chairman Choi Byong-yol insists that a thorough probe into allegations of corruption by a presidential aide should precede any confidence vote and he threatens to introduce an impeachment depending on the outcome of the investigation.

Oct. 15 ’03  Ban Ki-moon, foreign policy advisor for President Roh says that Roh would make no commitment to send troops to Iraq when he meets U.S. President George W. Bush next week. / Additional 379 engineers and 85 medics join the Seohee and the Jema battalions in Iraq.

Oct. 17 ’03  Defense Minister Cho Young-kil says that his ministry would decide on sending the combat troops before the annual ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting to be held in Seoul November 17-18. / In an emergency meeting of the NSC, the Roh Moo-hyun administration decides to send additional troops to Iraq and to provide US$ 200 million to help rebuild Iraq. But the exact number and type of the troops and the specific schedule of the dispatch are missing in the announcement.

Oct. 19 ’03  Rep. Im Jong-seok of the new party loyal to President Roh begins a hunger strike protesting the decision by President Roh.

Oct. 20 ’03  Sungkonghoe University professor Han Hong-koo says, “it was an act of betrayal” referring to President Roh’s decision to send additional troops to Iraq. On the other hand, Sogang University professor Kim Young-soo says Roh’s decision came too late and it is unlikely to help mend ROK-U.S. relations. / President Bush and President Roh have a summit on the sidelines of the APEC at Bangkok, Thailand. Bush highly appreciates South Korea’s
decision to send troops to Iraq. He also says that the U.S. could agree to the regime guarantee to North Korea once the North relinquishes its nuclear ambition.

Oct.21 ’03  Park Joo-hyun, senior presidential secretary for personnel affairs, says that there “exists a serious opposition” in Chong Wa Dae on the combat troops dispatch, and that “the president is aware of the atmosphere.”

Oct.25 ’03  CADI stages a massive rally in Seoul protesting the decision to send troops to Iraq.

Oct.27 ’03  An unnamed, high-ranking NSC official mentions “3,000” as the number of troops that might be sent to Iraq. The official is later revealed to be Lee Jong-suk, Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC.

Oct.31 ’03  A second fact-finding mission headed by Kim Man-bok, an NSC information officer, leaves for Iraq.

Nov. 4 ’03  Legislators from major parties issue a statement opposing the dispatch of combat troops to Iraq. Thirty seven out of 272 lawmakers sign the statement: 2 from GNP, 17 from MDP, and 18 from Uri Party a new political camp loyal to President Roh.

Nov. 5 ’03  A South Korean delegation sits down with their American counterpart in Washington D.C. to discuss the details of dispatching Korean troops to Iraq for five days. In this meeting, reportedly, Seoul proposed sending 3,000 troops, mostly non-combatant while Washington wanted a bigger deployment with more combat elements. As for the timing of the dispatch, the U.S. asked South Korea to dispatch troops to Iraq no later than February 2004 while South Korea proposed April or May. / A South Korean official on the condition of anonymity says that Seoul hopes to send about 3,000 non-combat troops composed of engineers and lightly armed troops.

Nov. 6 ’03  National Security Adviser Ra Jong-il hints that ROK could send a mixture of combat and non-combat troops to Iraq. / Presidential Chief of Staff Moon Hee-sang says that sending non-combat troops is one of many options being considered.

Nov.10 ’03  More than two-thirds of the National Assembly vote to establish an independent counsel to probe corruption charges involving President Roh’s entourage.

Nov.11 ’03  President Roh convenes a meeting of the KNSC standing committee to review the report of the second survey mission and exchange views concerning the dispatch of the additional troops. The committee decides that the role of the additional troops would be to assist in the reconstruction of
Iraq, not to maintain peace and order, which would have required combat troops. The committee also decides that South Korea would send a 3,000-division, commanded by a major general.

Nov.13 `03 ROK presidential office discloses that President Roh instructed his security ministers to stick to no more than 3,000 troops to be sent to Iraq and that the troops should be responsible mainly for reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Nov.14 `03 Foreign Minister Yoon says that the final number of troops to be sent to Iraq is still up in the air despite President Roh’s instruction. Yoon says Roh’s instruction is a guideline that officials should have in mind when having consultations with the U.S. Yoon adds that President Roh has made wise decisions on foreign policy issues so far, and that he is convinced that the president will do so in the future as well.

Nov.15 `03 The Defense Ministry submits two options to President Roh: the option one sends 1,800 engineers, medics, and transport personnel under the protection of 1,200 combat troops, and the option two adds a security role such as supporting and training Iraqi military and police, and the makeup will be more balanced between combat and non-combat elements. / About 5,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Seoul to protest sending troops to Iraq.

Nov.16 `03 U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld visits Seoul to participate in the two-day ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

Nov.18 `03 In a joint news conference following the SCM, Rumsfeld says that “it is up to Korea” to decide how many troops to send to Iraq. A Chong Wa Dae official says, “The government’s plan is to send an additional 3,000 soldiers, who will take charge of a certain region focusing on reconstruction works. We understand the U.S. has officially accepted the offer through a diplomatic channel and the SCM.” / A field investigative team composed of five members of the National Assembly goes to Iraq. When they come back on November 26, they suggest that the deployment to Iraq should include both combat and non-combat elements, and that the South Korean unit to be deployed should manage a fixed region of Iraq as an independent unit. While the investigative team is in Iraq, on November 21, their hotel is attacked by insurgents.

Nov.30 `03 Two South Korean businessmen working in Iraq are killed by insurgents. They are the first Korean casualties since the beginning of the Iraq war.

Dec. 1 `03 Foreign Minister Yoon says, “Our decision to send troops to Iraq remains unchanged.”

Dec. 4 `03 President Roh is quoted as saying, “The size of the troops to be sent to Iraq stops short of U.S. expectations, but I think the United States will
understand and accept our positon.” / The National Assembly overrides President Roh’s veto on the independent counsel. The independent counsel begins to work in January 2004, but after 86 days of investigation, most of the charges cited in the bill were found baseless. / The National Assembly extends the authorization for the Seohee and the Jema battalions to the end of 2004.

Dec.17 ‘03  The Roh Moo-hyun administration finalizes the number of soldiers to be sent to Iraq at 3,000. But, the presidential office says that the troops would not take part in combat operations. / With 3,000 soldiers in Iraq, the ROK force will be the third-largest allied contingent after the U.S. and the U.K. / A group of military officials headed by Lieutenant General Kim Jang-soo flies to Washington to hold talks on further details of the dispatch plan including a specific location and timing.

Dec.24 ‘03  President Roh finally approves the specific plan to send 3,000 troops to Iraq for a nine-month mission starting in April 1, and submits it to the National Assembly for approval. According to the plan, the unit will be composed of 1,400 combatants and 1,600 engineering and medical staff. The Korean unit is to replace the U.S. 173 Airborne Brigade operating in Attamin, which is better known as its oil-rich administrative capital, Kirkuk, about 250 km north of Baghdad.

Jan.12 ‘04  Additional Troops Dispatch Planning Group is established within the South Korean MND.

Jan.15 ‘04  Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan resigns following a row between his ministry officials and presidential advisers on the country’s foreign policy toward the United States. The dispute erupted in December 2003 with reports that officials in the ministry’s elite North American Affairs Division had made disparaging remarks about President Roh and his advisers at the NSC, calling them amateurish and pro-North Korea. In his farewell speech, Yoon stresses that a “practical relationship with the U.S. is different from blindly following the U.S.” and says that “like the bamboo tree in the piercing wind, which bends but does not break, that’s the diplomacy I want for us—both flexible and not losing the balance.” / Jeong Chan-yong, the presidential secretary for personnel affairs says, “Some Foreign Ministry officials were unable to shed the past foreign policy and failed to adequately understand the basic spirit of the new independent foreign policy advocated by the government.”

Jan.22 ‘04  U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker tells Congress that the delegates visiting Yongbyon were shown what appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but he did not see any evidence of a nuclear bomb.

Feb. 9 ‘04  Defense Committee of the National Assembly passes the motion for additional troops dispatch to Iraq. / The South Korean MND announces that
“the overall security in Krikuk, the region of Iraq to which the South Korean government would dispatch its soldiers, is stable.”

Feb.13 '04  The South Korean National Assembly passes the motion for additional troops dispatch to Iraq with 155 for, 50 against, and 7 abstaining in a vote where 212 out of 271 members of the National Assembly were present. The GNP and the Uri Party support the motion. The MDP outwardly opposes the motion but says it will leave the decision on voting up to individual lawmakers.

Feb.17 '04  President Roh pledges to provide US$ 200 million in additional aid to Iraq. In 2003, South Korea provided US$ 60 million in financial aid to Iraq.

Feb.23 '04  The Iraq Peace Rehabilitation Division or Zaytun Division (Zaytun meaning ‘olive’ in Arabic) is formed.

Feb.25 '04  Second round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing. North Korea reveals its willingness to give up its nuclear program on the condition that the United States ceases its antagonistic policy against North Korea.

Mar.12 '04  The MDP and the GNP vote to prosecute President Roh for impeachment by a count of 193 to 2. By the South Korean Constitution, the power of President Roh is suspended pending the verdict of the Constitutional Court. Prime Minister Go Kun temporarily takes over the presidential power.

Mar.19 '04  South Korea and the United States agree to change the location where the South Korean troops would be stationed due to the deteriorated security situation in Kirkuk.

Apr.15 '04  The general election for the National Assembly is held. As a result of this election, the Uri Party, which had only 47 seats (17%) in the previous assembly, gains the majority (152 seats, 50.8%). The former majority party, the GNP ends up with 121 seats (40.5%), losing 17 seats. / U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, remarks that “the United States would respect whatever decision the newly formed National Assembly of the Republic of Korea may make.”

Apr.16 '04  Uri Party floor leader Kim Geun-tae mentions that the troops dispatch should be delayed until after the handover of authority from the U.S.-led coalition to the Iraqi government.

Apr.17 '04  Uri Party chief policymaker Chung Sye-kyun says, “We still want a stronger ROK-U.S. alliance. There will be no dramatic change in our policies. But if the situation [in Iraq] deteriorates seriously, we might have to think about [reconsideration of the troop commitment to Iraq].”
May 11 ’04 Some Uri Party members call for a new authorizing vote for the troop dispatch. Uri Party’s new floor leader Chen Jung-bae floats the idea of sending money instead of troops.

May 14 ’04 The Constitutional Court overturns the 16th National Assembly’s impeachment vote of President Roh. President Roh is reinstated.

May 17 ’04 The United States officially informs South Korea that it will move 3,600 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq.

May 21 ’04 Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says that a military fact-finding team will head to Iraq to finalize details for the dispatch and that the actual troop deployment will take place after one or two months at most.

May 25 ’04 Foreign Minister Ban says, “It is not desirable to review the troop dispatch from scratch. After conducting surveys and reviews on the deployment site, South Korean troops will be sent as planned.”

Jun. 4 ’04 More than 20 ruling and opposition lawmakers submit a resolution this month to persuade the government to abandon the dispatch plan.

Jun. 7 ’04 It is reported that Bush administration presented a detailed plan to South Korea for withdrawing one-third of its 37,000 troops in South Korea by the end of 2005 as part of a wider effort to reposition American forces around the globe.

Jun. 10 ’04 Ninety lawmakers from ruling and opposition parties sign a petition for total reconsideration of the decision to send troops to Iraq.

Jun. 16 ’04 In a meeting with senior Uri Party officials, President Roh requests cooperation for the troops dispatch to Iraq, quoting as a reason the fact that “the safety of the troops has increased as the destination changed to Irbil from Kirkuk.

Jun. 17 ’04 The ruling Uri Party decides to uphold the bill on the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq, which was passed in the previous National Assembly. / In an opinion poll by the Hankook Ilbo, 57.5% of respondents oppose the troop dispatch while 40% support the plan. In a February poll by the same newspaper, over 60% backed the plan to dispatch additional troops to Iraq.

Jun. 18 ’04 The standing committee of the NSC is convened to reconfirm the plan to send troops to Iraq. According to the plan, a 900-strong advance team will go to Irbil in early August. The main 1,100-member contingent will leave for Iraq in late August or early September. The final 1,000-member unit will arrive at Irbil later on. Also, the NSC finally determines the location for troops dispatch to be Irbil in the Kurdish autonomous region. Reportedly,
South Korea cancelled its plan to dispatch troops to Kirkuk due to a U.S. demand for joint offensive operations.

Jun.20 `04 Al-Jazeera TV airs video footage showing that a South Korean worker named Kim Sun-il, who was kidnapped by Iraqi insurgents demands Seoul not send troops to Iraq. Hours after the broadcast, President Roh says that his government will not change the plan to send troops to Iraq.

Jun.21 `04 Opinion polls show that more than 60% of respondents oppose sending troops to Iraq.

Jun.22 `04 Kim Sun-il is beheaded in Iraq.

Jun.23 `04 Fifty lawmakers from ruling and opposition parties submit a motion to suspend and reconsider the additional troops dispatch to Iraq. / In Beijing, the third round of Six-Party Talks is held, with the U.S. making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it freezes then dismantles its nuclear programs.

Jul.31 `04 The National Assembly passes the motion to deploy an Air Force transportation unit to Kuwait to assist the activities of the Zaytun division.

Aug.31 `04 The 58th Air Transportation Brigade is created and named “Daiman” (‘always with you’ in Arabic). The Daiman unit operates four C-130 transportation aircrafts with 143 crew members.

Sep. 3 `04 During his speech on the last day of the Republican convention in New York, President Bush fails to name South Korea in his mention of the countries that deserve the respect of all Americans. He mentioned “Australia, Italy, Great Britain, Poland, Japan, the Netherlands, Denmark, El Salvador, and ‘other allies.’” / The Zaytun division departs from Irbil, Iraq.

Sep.22 `04 The dispatch of the Zaytun division is completed.

Sep.28 `04 North Korea says it has turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons.

Oct.24 `04 The Daiman unit begins to operate in Kuwait.

Nov.10 `04 The motion to withdraw the South Korean troops from Iraq fails to pass the Defense Committee of the National Assembly.

Dec. 8 `04 President Roh pays a surprising visit to the Zaytun division in Irbil, Iraq.

Dec.31 `04 The motion to extend the stay of ROK troops in Iraq passes the National
Assembly with 161 for, 63 against, and 54 absent.

Jan.19 ’05  Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's nominee as secretary of state, identifies North Korea as one of six "outposts of tyranny" where the U.S. must help bring freedom.

Jun.22 ’05  Foreign Minister Ban tells the donor conference for Iraq that South Korea would complete its provision of US$ 260 million of pledged aid by 2007 and write off some of Iraq’s debts.
APPENDIX 2-C: CHRONOLOGY OF THE IRAQ WAR: JAPANESE RESPONSES

DATE U.S. DEMANDS AND THE SITUATION IN JAPAN

Apr. 24 `01 Through the first open-door process in the history of the LDP, Koizumi Junichiro wins the election for the LDP presidency, and is named the LDP’s 20th president and Japan’s 56th prime minister. He wins 298 votes out of the 487 total. Of the 298 votes that Koizumi won, 175 came from LDP legislators, and 123 from provincial branches of the LDP.

Jul. 29 `01 The 19th Ordinary Election for the House of Councilors (the Upper House of the Diet) is held. In this election, the LDP occupies 52.9% of the contested seats, and the Komeito, 10.7%. As a result, the ruling coalition keeps the grip on the majority of the Upper House of the Diet by occupying 56.3% of the seats.

Aug. 13 `01 Prime Minister Koizumi visits the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.

Oct. 29 `01 The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures (ATSM) Law is enacted.

Nov. 9 `01 Three ships of the MSDF—the fuel supply ship Hamana and the escort ships Kurama and Kirisame—leave Sasebo pier for the Indian Ocean. Two weeks later, two additional vessels leave their home ports for the same destination. The departure of these ships marks Japan’s first wartime dispatch of naval vessels for operations abroad since the end of the war in the Pacific in 1945. (Okamoto 2002, 59)

Nov. 17 `01 Tanaka Hitoshi, director-general of the Asian and Oceania Affairs Bureau of Japanese MOFA, meets secretly with “Mr. X” of North Korea.

Feb. 18 `02 Three weeks after the “Axis of Evil” address, in a summit meeting held in Tokyo, President Bush tells Prime Minister Koizumi that the United States “will definitely attack Iraq.” In response, Koizumi is reported as saying, “Japan will always stand by the United States in the war on terror.” (Shinoda 2004, 86; Azad 2008)

Apr. 17 `02 The Japanese government submits three Emergency Measures Bills (yuji rippo) to the Diet.

Jun. 29 `02 A naval clash between North and South Koreas leads to the death of four South Korean sailors and the sinking of a North Korean vessel.

Aug. 8 `02 In a meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, former Prime Minister Nakasone advises: “If the United States plans an attack on Iraq, you should make a direct statement if you think (U.S.) restraint is necessary.” Another former Prime Minister Miyazawa, who joined the meeting, says, “In the
case of attack on Afghanistan, the world joined forces for peace. In the case of an attack on Iraq, I wonder if it is only designed to topple President (Saddam) Hussein, or if there is really sound justification for the action.” (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 29 August 2002)

Aug. 27 '02 In the first Japan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue held in Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi Yukio tells his counterpart, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage that “international cooperation is necessary to deal with the Iraqi problem” (Yasuaki 2005, 849; The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 29 August 2002). / Richard Armitage speaks with the three secretaries-general of the ruling coalition. In this meeting, Armitage reportedly states that “The U.S. will make a decision sooner or later. I hope Japan decides on measures through sufficient dialogue while keeping in mind the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance.” After the meeting, he announces that the United States hopes that Tokyo would pledge assistance for the U.S. when an attack occurs (Yasuaki 2005, 849). However, earlier in the day, he said that the United States has not yet decided on an action plan so it does not intend to ask for specific help from Japan at this point (Xinhua [Beijing], 27 August 2002).

Aug. 28 '02 “For Japan to invoke a special anti-terrorism law enacted last October to support U.S. military action on Iraq,” LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki Taku says, “either Osama Bin Laden . . . or his Al Qaeda network base must be confirmed to be in Iraq. He also says that the UN must pass new resolutions supporting such action, among other conditions, before Japan can implement the law and assist the U.S. Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo says that Japan’s cooperation with the U.S. is limited under current legislation, including the war-renouncing constitution, Japan-U.S. security treaty and the anti-terrorism law (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 28 August 2002).

Sep. 4 '02 Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Kato Ryozo says that “. . . [o]nly the U.K. has been keeping pace with the U.S. about attacking Iraq, while other state are requesting that the U.S. show a bit more prudence. Japan does not appear to be doing anything different from these countries” (Yasuaki 2005, 849). / At a press conference in Washington, Armitage explicitly links the Iraq problem and Japan’s promotion to permanent member status of the UN Security Council (Yasuaki 2005, 849).

Sep. 12 '02 In a summit meeting with President Bush held in New York, Prime Minister Koizumi says that while he “understood the resentment of the people of the United States, it was preferable to bear the unbearable and to undertake further international coordination.” President Bush replies, “We will make diplomatic efforts, but if this course of action is not successful, we cannot help but think about another path” (Yasuaki 2005, 849; Shinoda 2004, 90; Marukusu 2004, 49-50).
Sep.15 '02 Referring to President Bush’s request for assistance for a possible war with Iraq, LDP Secretary-General Yamasaki says, “If there is a UN resolution, I think [Japan] will be able to take considerable action.” However, on the possibility of enacting a new anti-terrorism law resembling one enabling the SDF to go to the Indian Ocean, he says, “We will not have enough time” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 15 September 2002).

Sep.17 '02 Prime Minister Koizumi visits Pyongyang. Japan and North Korea sign the Pyongyang Declaration.

Oct.23 '02 In the Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC) meeting held in Washington, Richard P. Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense meets with Nagamine Yasumasa, Deputy Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau of MOFA, and Iihara Kazuki, Vice Director-General of the Defense Policy Bureau of JDA. Reportedly, in this meeting, Mr. Lawless calls for “boots on the ground” and requests the same amount of logistical support by SDF as provided in the Afghanistan War, if Japan were to join the “coalition of the willing” (Yasuaki 2005, 850).

Nov. 6 '02 In response to a question by SDP leader Doi Takako about how he views a potential war between the United States and Iraq, Koizumi dodges the questions by saying, “I would like to refrain from commenting on what I think about a preemptive attack at this stage when it is not yet taken into action” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 6 November 2002).

Nov. 8 '02 U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith visits Tokyo. In a meeting with Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, he says, “The U.S. is grateful for Japan’s cooperation, and we hope that Japan considers an extension of the ATSM (Anti-Terrorism Special Measures) Law.” / In a meeting with LDP Secretary-General, Yamasaki Taku, Mr. Feith states that there was “clear proof” about the relationship between the terrorist group al-Qaeda and Iraq, suggesting that Japan could provide logistical support based on the ATSM Law (Yasuaki 2005, 850).

Nov.12 '02 Richard A. Christenson, the DCM at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo indicates his expectation about indirect logistical support for the Afghan War at a Japan-U.S. Coordinating Committee meeting in Tokyo (Yasuaki 2005, 851).

Nov.19 '02 The Koizumi cabinet changes the basic plan of the ATSM Law by extending it for half a year, and dispatches one transport ship and one escort vessel (Yasuaki 2005, 851).

Nov.20 '02 According to a report by Mainichi Shimbun, in early October, the U.S. side informally sounded out the Japanese on three points: 1) dispatching P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft and Aegis destroyers, 2) expanding the
provision of fuel to naval vessels besides those of the U.S. and the U.K., and 3) dispatching transport ships to the Indian Ocean (Yasuaki 2005, 851).

Nov.22 `02 According to a Yomiuri report, in the middle of November, 2002, the U.S. government formally asked Japan for its support and cooperation if the U.S. attacks Iraq. Reportedly, the written request was made to the MOFA through the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. The letter called on the Japanese government to 1) announce Japan’s support for U.S. military action against Iraq; 2) study ways in which the nation could support U.S. military operations against Iraq; and 3) study Japan’s possible diplomatic role following an attack on Iraq, including assistance to rebuild Iraq. It is reported, however, that the letter did not specify how Japan should utilize its SDF personnel nor what equipment they should use, thereby leaving such specifics up to the Japanese government (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 22 November 2002).

Dec. 4 `02 The Japanese makes the decision to send an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean (Yasuaki 2005, 851). In response to the decision, Kanzaki Takenori, the leader of the New Komeito, the coalition partner of the LDP, expresses his regret to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, but does not try to veto the decision. (Marukusu 2004, 68)

Dec. 6 `02 Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo says, in response to a media report, “Assistance to (post-war) rehabilitation is important. Our country will see many opportunities to cooperate. Legislation will need to be drafted for that purpose” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 6 December 2002).

Dec. 7 `02 JDA chief Ishiba Shigeru says that Japan may deploy troops in Iraq to help rebuild the country following a possible U.S.-led invasion.

Dec. 9 `02 Deputy Secretary Armitage in Tokyo meets with JDA Director Ishiba Shigeru, and MOFA Vice Minister Takeuchi, and expresses his desire to see the expansion of the fuel distribution to other navies. In the meeting with Armitage, Takeuchi says, “the international community has to continue to cooperate in ensuring implementation of the UN resolution. It is more important that the international community cooperates” (Yasuaki 2005, 852). In this meeting, Takeuchi draws a line on what Japan can do. Reportedly, he told Armitage that in the event of military strikes on Iraq, Japan will extend assistance for postwar reconstruction of the country, and will help with refugees in neighboring countries (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 10 December 2002). Armitage also meets Koizumi, and praises Tokyo’s decision to dispatch an Aegis-equipped warship to the Indian Ocean. In this meeting, Koizumi is reported as saying, “Japan will do what it should to fight terrorism.” / In a separate occasion, Armitage is reported as saying, “I have an absolute expectation that Japan will make decisions in accordance with their national interest. That’s all I’ll say” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 9 December 2002).
Dec. 20 '02 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, in a press conference, comments that “a new resolution is not an indispensable condition for an attack on Iraq” (Marukusu 2004, 68).

Jan. 6 '03 In the 2003 new year’s press conference, Koizumi explains Japan’s position on the Iraqi issue by saying, “On the basis of the international cooperation, and in consideration of the Japan-U.S. alliance, we will independently deal with the situation” (Marukusu 2004, 68).

Jan. 17 '03 Richard Armitage says, in a press conference, “If war is unavoidable, it will be necessary to reconstruct Iraq after the war and there will be a large possibility that Japan will participate in such reconstruction” (Yasuaki 2005, 852).

Jan. 25 '03 Prime Minister Koizumi in a telephone conversation with President Bush says, “It is duly important to maintain the international cooperation that [you have] constructed.” (Yasuaki 2005, 852) In this telephone conversation, they also agree that Japan and the U.S. will cooperate closely to reach a peaceful solution to the situation involving North Korea and Iraq (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 26 January 2003).

Jan. 27 '03 Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., Kato Ryozo, in a speech in New York, states that “[I]n considering about dealing with the Iraqi problem, the basis of it is the Japan-U.S. relationship. When the U.S. starts military action, Japan needs to declare its basic position” (Yasuaki 2005, 853).

Feb. 5 '03 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko visits the Kantei and tells Koizumi that “... in the end, there is no option except to support U.S. military action.” To this recommendation, Koizumi is reported as answering that “the adoption of a new UN resolution is desirable” (Yasuaki 2005, 853). / In response to a question raised in the Upper House of the Diet, Koizumi says, “it is hard to expect Japan to support a possible U.S.-led war against Iraq under Japan’s anti-terrorist legislation unless there is a major change in the situation (Radio Japan [Tokyo], 5 February 2003).

Feb. 6 '03 In a session of the budget committee of the Diet, Prime Minister Koizumi repeats the remark he made the previous day in the meeting with Kawaguchi: “The adoption of a new UN resolution is desirable.” (Yasuaki 2005, 853) However, in the same Diet session, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi says, “Resolution 1441 does not by itself legally justify a U.S.-led attack on Iraq. However, the government considers U.S. military operations legitimate because 1) Resolution 1441 clarified that Iraq has not complied with Resolution 687; 2) The Gulf War truce comes into effect only when Iraq complies fully with Resolution 687; and 3) If Iraq is in violation of Resolution 687, the truce is not effective and the use of force is theoretically
possible under Resolution 678” (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 15 February 2003).

Feb. 10 `03 In the second meeting of the Japan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue held in Washington, Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi withholds Japan’s support for the Iraq war, and tries to get Armitage to commit to the adoption of a new resolution. Armitage is reported as responding, “We are endeavoring to adopt a new resolution, but should those efforts fail, Iraq will be disarmed by countries that agree with the U.S” (Yasuaki 2005, 853).

Feb. 14 `03 On the pages of Yomiuri Shimbun, a MOFA official and a researcher from a government-affiliated research institution write op-ed columns highlighting the relationship between the strengthened Japan-U.S. alliance and the prevention of North Korean threats (Marukusu 2004, 69). / At the LDP Executive Council meeting, former JDA Director Norota Hosei says, “it’s a big mistake to follow a move just because it is something the United States would do. We should first see North Korea as the issue, and Japan has failed to lead an independent foreign policy in that regard.” At the meeting, Kamei Hisaoka, former chief of the National Land Agency says, “Japan . . . can’t convince the international community just by saying, ‘Please give us oil.’ We should have a balanced foreign policy.” / At a joint meeting of the foreign policy-related committees of the LDP PARC, lawmakers criticize the MOFA for its failure to rally the public behind Japan’s support for a possible U.S.-led attack on Iraq. A lawmaker is reported as saying, “We have no choice but to support the U.S., and say ‘Please defend Japan if North Korea attacks us,’ whether or not there is another UN resolution.”

Feb. 17 `03 According to a Mainichi report, the Japanese government decided to support the U.S. and the U.K. attack on Iraq, and started the drafting of the official comments on the upcoming attack (Marukusu 2004, 70).

Feb. 18 `03 Ambassador Haraguchi, in an address to the UNSC, emphasizes that “there is serious doubt as to the effectiveness of continued inspections” and remarks that “we consider it desirable that the Security Council adopt a new resolution that clearly demonstrates the determined attitude of the international community” (Yasuaki 2005, 853-4). / Koizumi has a telephone conversation with French President Jacques Chirac. After the conversation, the Prime Minister reportedly chastises MOFA officials, claiming that “Chirac’s attitude is very firm. This situation is different from the account I heard from you. MOFA had said that there was a possibility that France might change its position.”

Feb. 22 `03 Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Kawaguchi meet with U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and point out that “a new UNSC resolution would be desirable before any further action is taken by the United States. . . . The reason we prefer to have a new resolution is to
maintain, once again, the unity and solidarity among the international community . . .” (Yasuaki 2005, 854).

Feb.23 '03 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi says, in an NHK talk show that it is too early to clarify whether Japan supports a U.S.-led war against Iraq (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 23 February 2003).

Feb.24 '03 Koizumi, in a session of the budget committee of the Japanese Diet, says that “At the present time, as the U.S. makes a desperate endeavor for international cooperation, I think that there is a possibility that [a] new resolution will be adopted,” adding that “President Bush said that it was unnecessary to adopt a new UN resolution. Certainly there is that argument, but we retain the position that a new resolution is desirable.” However, in the case that no new resolution is adopted, Koizumi states that “Considering the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance sufficiently, I will make my judgment in view of our national interest” (Yasuaki 2005, 854).

Feb.28 '03 The Koizumi cabinet decides to provide fuel to three other countries (Germany, New Zealand, and France) in addition to the U.S. and the U.K (Yasuaki 2005, 851).

Mar. 1 '03 Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo publicly says, “In order to deter the North Korean nuclear weapons development, keeping step with the United States on the Iraq issues is required” (Marukusu 2004, 70).

Mar. 2 '03 Chairman of the LDP PARC, Aso Taro states on an NHK program that he “supports and understands” the United States (Marukusu 2004, 71).

Mar. 3 '03 According to a Mainichi poll, 84% of the respondents opposed an attack on Iraq, and only 11% approved. Among the 84% who opposed the attack, 72% says, “I am opposed to any war” (Azad 2008; Yasuaki 2005, 858). / Parliamentary Vice Foreign Minister Motegi visits Iraq and has a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Motegi urges Aziz to implement UNSC resolutions imposed upon Iraq, but to no avail. / Prime Minister Koizumi, says in a Diet Budget Committee session, that Japan will not bear costs of an anticipated U.S.-led war against Iraq. He also denies that Japan has received such a request from Washington. However, he says that Japan is ready to help foot the bill to assist refugees resulting from the war and assist in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 3 March 2003).

Mar. 4 '03 Ambassador Baker writes in Yomiuri Shimbun: “Countries like Japan and the United States that believe in the rule of law have the responsibility to set standards of behavior and to address the challenges of dictators and tyrants who defy the will of the international community” (Yasuaki 2005, 855).
March 8, 2003
The Japanese government declares support for the modified draft resolution that set a deadline for Iraq to abolish its WMD programs by March 17.

March 10, 2003
The Ruling Coalition Liaison Conference for Iraqi and North Korean Affairs is set up among the LDP, the New Komeito, and the Conservative Party.

March 11, 2003
Prime Minister Koizumi, in a meeting with leaders of the ruling coalition, says, “According to the most recent information, there still is the possibility that the UNSC may reach consensus. Since it might be possible to overcome the confrontation between the United States and France, we have to strive to the end” (Marukusu 2004, 71).

March 13, 2003
In an interview with Asahi Shimbun, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard H. Baker Jr. says, “When military conflicts occur, it is not unrealistic to desire a part of [the SDF’s] capability to act in cooperation with the U.S. military” (Yasuaki 2005, 852).

March 16, 2003
Prime Minister Koizumi publicly remarks that he feels an American-British attack on Iraq is valid with or without a new UNSC resolution (Azad 2008).

March 18, 2003
In the list of the members of the Coalition for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq announced by the U.S. Department of State, Japan is listed as a “post-conflict” member. / Prime Minister Koizumi holds a National Security Council meeting to discuss the Japanese government’s counter-measures to the upcoming war with Iraq. In this meeting, four main positions of the Japanese government on the war with Iraq are determined: 1) Japan will not take part in actual combat in a war against Iraq; 2) the government would make a great effort to ensure the safety of people in Iraq and to avoid economic instability in the event of a war; 3) the three existing U.N. resolutions—1441, 678, 687—could give legal grounds for the use of military force against Iraq; and 4) the government is ready to play a proactive role to help stabilize and rehabilitate Iraq after the end of the U.S.-led war (Mainichi Shimbun [Tokyo], 18 March 2003). / In an interview after the meeting, Koizumi states that “I understand that so far President Bush has made various efforts to obtain the international cooperation on Iraq,” and that “I support America’s position because I think President Bush’s decision was inevitable after such efforts.” Koizumi’s expression of support for the war with Iraq was announced only three hours after Bush’s ultimatum for Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 98; Marukusu 2004, 54).

March 19, 2003
Prime Minister Koizumi states in the Diet that “If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented.” (Ishibashi 2007, 766) On the legal basis of the attack, he explains that “Use of force is possible based on the past similar resolutions, and it is allowed even in the UN Charter” (Marukusu 2004, 55). / According to an article
published on *Mainichi Shimbun*, before the United States withdrew the draft resolution for authorizing an attack on Iraq, Tokyo approached Washington in secret, saying, “If it is impossible to pass a new resolution, the U.S. should emphasize not only its inherent right to self-defense, but also Iraq’s violation of the UN resolutions as a basis for military action” (Yasuaki 2005, 855). / Four Japanese opposition parties—DPJ, Liberal Party, SDP, and JCP—jointly submit a draft resolution to oppose military action without a new UN resolution (Yasuaki 2005, 855).

Mar.20 ’03 About one hour after President Bush’s declaration of war against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi announces in a press conference that he “understands and supports the U.S. attack on Iraq” (Azad 2008; Yasuaki 2005, 843; Yakushiji 2003, 42). In that press conference, Koizumi also states that “the Japan-U.S. alliance is functioning effectively against the North Korean threats.” This is the first time Koizumi links Iraq and North Korea publicly (Marukusu 2004, 72). / Former Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko, in the plenary session of the Lower House of the Diet, mentions that “we have to send a message to North Korea that Japan-U.S. alliance is tight and close” (Marukusu 2004, 72). / Prime Minister Koizumi holds a meeting of the NSC with all Cabinet members attending. In this meeting, the NSC decides on five emergency measures with regards to Iraq. Then, the NSC meeting is immediately converted to a Cabinet meeting, and the Cabinet decides to set up an inter-ministerial Iraqi Task force with Koizumi as its chief and all Cabinet ministers as members. In the first meeting of the Iraqi Task Force, it is decided to continue the assistance activities for the United States that are authorized under the ATSM Law, and to examine the ways to implement reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Iraq, which might require a new law. A team within the Cabinet Secretariat, which was in charge of the legal examination on emergencies in areas surrounding Japan, takes over the job of studying the possibility and the necessity of the new law (Shinoda 2004, 102).

Mar.21 ’03 In a telephone call with Koizumi, President Bush says that he is “always moved by Koizumi’s firm support for Washington and that he highly values Japan’s package of humanitarian aid measures announced immediately after the war began.” On the alleged U.S. request to send SDF to Iraq, Koizumi says, “I haven’t heard of it” (*The Japan Times* [Tokyo], 22 March 2003).

Mar.26 ’03 In response to a request from the U.S. to shut down the Iraqi Embassy in Tokyo, Prime Minister Koizumi says, “Japan should make its own decision. Japan will not close down (Iraqi Embassy in Tokyo) because it is not necessary” (*The Japan Times* [Tokyo], 27 March 2003).

Mar.27 ’03 Ambassador Baker tells reporters that he hopes Japan will help reconstruct Iraq after the war but “the United States will never specifically ask Japan to send the SDF” (*Kyodo News Service* [Tokyo], 23 March 2003).
Mar.28 ’03 Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda denies a report that the U.S. has informally asked Japan to provide US$ 660 million as assistance for reconstructing postwar Iraq (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 28 March 2003).

Mar.30 ’03 More than 4,900 people gather in Osaka, Nagoya and various other parts of Japan to protest against the Iraq War (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 30 March 2003).

Apr. 2 ’03 Richard Armitage, in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, expresses strong U.S. hopes to see Japan play roles in a wide range of fields for Iraqi rehabilitation, such as medical and educational activities as well as those for maintaining public peace and order (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 2 April 2003).

Apr. 7 ’03 The MOFA sets up an Iraqi Task Force, and announces a five-point policy on Iraq. The policy calls for: 1) maintaining Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) establishing a new government through the choice of the Iraqi people; 3) promoting humanitarian and reconstruction assistance through sufficient UN involvement; 4) continuous involvement by Japan in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq; and 5) its joint work with NGOs and the private sector in the efforts (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 7 April 2003).

Apr.11 ’03 The Japanese government announces that it would spend US$ 100 million on humanitarian relief in Iraq. However, a senior government official says, “Until the UN role is determined, there won’t be much we can do. There will be no legal basis for us to do reconstruction work in Iraq if a military occupation continues there.” According to a news report, the U.S. has asked Japan to send officials to act as foreign advisers to a U.S.-led interim authority in postwar Iraq (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 11 April 2003).

Apr.18 ’03 Foreign Minister Kawaguchi says that Japan will dispatch four to five civilian officials to Iraq to join the ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance). / Defense Chief Ishiba Shigeru says, in a Diet session, “At the moment, we are not considering the dispatch (of SDF troops)” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 18 April 2003).

Apr.21 ’03 The Japanese government announces an aid package for Iraq. According to the package, Japan will help preserve Iraq’s cultural assets in cooperation with the UNESCO, and reopen its embassy in Iraq as soon as possible. The package also calls for Japan to transport materials and goods for humanitarian aid to war-affected people in Iraq and the vicinity using SDF aircraft. The package also says the government is prepared to draw up new legislation if necessary in an indication of the willingness to consider the dispatch of SDF and civilian personnel. But Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda says, “The government has yet to make any decisions on new legislation”
Former Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko says, in an interview with The Nikkei Weekly, “Medical and engineers of the SDF should be sent if it is sanctioned by new legislation in Japan under a UN resolution. At this stage, however, Japan should not specify the exact amount of money it will contribute for the effort, although I do not mean Japan should not help pay for it” (The Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo], 21 April 2003).

May 9 ’03 A Japanese ship carrying 2,400 tons of domestic rice and 7,600 tons of imported rice leaves Nagoya port for Iraq (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 9 May 2003).

May 21 ’03 In an airplane en route to the United States, Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time mentions the possible establishment of a new law that enables the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq.

May 23 ’03 In a summit meeting with President Bush held in Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, Koizumi says, “It is good to see the international cooperation reestablished by the adoption of the Resolution 1483.” With regard to the dispatch of the SDF, Koizumi reveals that under the current legal framework, the Japanese government is examining the possibility of airlifting humanitarian materials to the countries surrounding Iraq by providing C-130 transportation aircrafts, and as for the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq, he confirms that Japan will provide “contributions suitable to Japan” based on the Japanese national strength (Shinoda 2004, 105). / In the joint conference after the meeting, Koizumi says, “With regard to the question of sending the SDF to Iraq . . . now that the UN resolution has passed (to lift the 13-year-old economic sanctions on Iraq), upon return to Japan, we shall study in detail what Japan can do. At any rate, the question of what Japan can do . . . is a matter for Japan to decide.” But, Bush says, in an apparent expression of hope that Japan will send the SDF to help rebuild Iraq: “Japanese forces will provide logistical support for humanitarian and reconstruction activities” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 24 May 2003).

Jun. 3 ’03 Kan Naoto, president of the opposition DPJ, announces a double-negative position, “We are not taking the stance that we will automatically not support necessary reconstruction in Iraq” (Krauss and Pekkanen 2005).

Jun. 4 ’03 The legal study team within the Cabinet Secretariat establishes the three-point framework of the new enabling law: 1) the legal basis of the new law will be the previous UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq; 2) the operation of the SDF in Iraq will be limited to non-combat areas; and 3) the existing criteria for the use of firearms will not be reviewed (Shinoda 2004, 105).

Jun. 5 ’03 One of Koizumi’s aides says, “Now we are not supposed to say, ‘We cannot send it,’” referring to the U.S. request for the SDF dispatch to Iraq that
President Bush made in the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in Crawford, Texas (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 5 June 2003).

Jun. 7 ’03 In a meeting with the three secretaries-general of the ruling coalition, Prime Minister Koizumi delivers his intention to submit the draft of the new law to the Diet. He also reveals his plan to pass the draft legislation through the Cabinet by June 13, that is, six days later. In this meeting, it is also agreed that the time limit of the new law will be four years, and that the ATSM Law, which was supposed to expire in November, will be extended for two years (Shinoda 2004, 105-6).

Jun. 9 ’03 In a meeting of the Ruling Coalition Liaison Conference, Prime Minister Koizumi officially asks for the cooperation from the ruling coalition by saying, “In regard to the reconstruction assistance for Iraq, I would like to provide contributions suitable for the national strength and status of Japan. In order to submit the draft and have it passed during the current Diet session, I look forward to your sincere cooperation.” On the same day, the Cabinet Secretariat gives a briefing on the details of the draft legislation to select members of the ruling coalition. According to the briefing, the SDF troops and the civilians to be dispatched to Iraq will embark on three main activities: 1) humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for Iraqi people; 2) medical, transportation, and logistical assistance for the American and British forces; and 3) assistance for the disposition of the WMD left over by the Saddam Hussein regime. (Shinoda 2004, 106).

Jun.10 ’03 The Cabinet Secretariat gives a separate briefing on the new legislation enabling the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq to the members of the Cabinet, Defense and Foreign Affairs committees of the LDP PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council). Some legislators raise such questions as “What is the distinction between combat and non-combat areas?” In the LDP Executive Council meeting, more questions and complaints are raised. One of the LDP legislators called the Prime Minister’s schedule to pass the draft through the Cabinet by June 13 “unreasonable” (Shinoda 2004, 107).

Jun.11 ’03 The Cabinet, Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees of the LDP PARC are held again. In response to the question on the distinction between combat and non-combat areas, the Cabinet Secretariat answers that no pre-designation of combat or non-combat area will be made and that the area in Iraq to which the SDF troops to be dispatched will be determined depending on the investigation on the situation of the area.

Jun.12 ’03 The Cabinet, Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees of the LDP PARC endorse the draft legislation on the condition that a permanent legislation, which stipulates the regulation concerning the use of firearms based on the international standards, should be swiftly enacted. However, in the plenary session of the LDP Executive Council held immediately after the
endorsement, the debate continues. Former LDP Secretary-General Nonaka claims that “it is lack of common sense to submit a draft legislation (without prior consultation) on the premise that Japan will one way or another dispatch the SDF to Iraq.” Former Director of Defense Norota argued that “the disposition of WMD should not be included in the draft since no WMD has yet been found in Iraq.” The LDP fails to produce consensus on the draft legislation. By this time, the New Komeito and the Conservative Party complete their internal process to endorse the draft submitted by the Koizumi Cabinet (Shinoda 2004, 108).

Jun.13 ’03 Finally, through the negotiation among the ranking members of the LDP, the “assistance for the disposition of WMD” is deleted from the draft despite objections from the Cabinet (Shinoda 2004, 108-9). At last, the Japanese government submits a bill concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (SMHRAI) to the Diet. According to the bill, SDF personnel are allowed to carry out activities only in areas where no combat operations are or will be taking place. They are not allowed to provide any ammunition or other weapons and to refuel or maintain aircraft for combat operations. SDF personnel can use weapons only to protect themselves, colleagues, people involved in the work related to the reconstruction of Iraq and others under their supervision (Xinhua [Beijing], 13 June 2003).

Jun.16 ’03 Leaders of the three ruling parties get together and agree to extend the ordinary session of the Diet, which is to expire on June 18, by 40 days to July 28. Four opposition parties strongly oppose this extension claiming that the extension of the Diet session permitted in the Diet law is for passing the draft legislations that had not been disposed of because of lack of time, not for passing an important draft legislation submitted around the end of the session. Despite the opposition, the ruling coalition enforces the extension (Shinoda 2004, 109).

Jun.19 ’03 The Next Cabinet of the DPJ establishes its guideline for dealing with the draft legislation submitted by the ruling coalition. The guideline is based on the report by a DPJ investigative team that just got back from Iraq. The four main findings of the report are: 1) the team could specify no emergency needs that cannot be accomplished without the SDF; 2) it is difficult to distinguish between combat and non-combat areas; 3) the dispatched troops might become targets for anti-American forces; and 4) it is hard to predict how long the SDF should stay in Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 111).

Jun.23 ’03 According to a Nikkei poll, the approval rating for the Koizumi Cabinet is 49%, and the disapproval rating is 38%. In comparison with the previous poll conducted in March, the approval went up by 7% point, and the disapproval went down by 3% point. As for the draft for the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Assistance in Iraq (SMHRAI Law), “support” was 43% while “not support” was 41% (Shinoda 2004, 110).

Jun.24 ‘03 The deliberation in the Lower House of the Diet on the draft legislation begins. In response to a question from an opposition lawmaker, Koizumi denies that the government has received any request from Washington about sending SDF troops to Iraq. However, according to a government source, Washington indirectly urged Japan to send about 1,000 SDF troops at the completion of the war, saying it wants to see “2,000 boots on the ground” (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 25 June 2003).

Jul. 1 ‘03 The DPJ submits a counter-draft. In this DPJ draft, a series of UNSC resolutions as legal basis for the dispatch is deleted, and the time limit is cut down to 2 years. Most importantly, the SDF troops are totally taken out from the draft. The argument of the DPJ is: 1) sending SDF troops to a combat area is unconstitutional; 2) it is hard to distinguish between combat and non-combat areas in Iraq; and 3) therefore, Japan cannot send SDF troops to Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 112).

Jul. 4 ‘03 The ruling coalition passes the draft legislation through the Lower House of the Diet. According to a government source, the Koizumi government is planning to send the first contingent of Japanese troops in October at the earliest (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 4 July 2003). In a meeting with Japanese officials held in Washington, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless is reported as saying, “Japan can do more” (The Weekend Australian [Australia], 5 July 2003). The U.S. reportedly requested that Japanese personnel fly CH-47 transport helicopters in Iraq on the assumption that they could carry weapons and soldiers for U.S.-led coalition forces. The Japanese delegates are reported as saying they will study the U.S. request further, and allegedly proposed that SDF personnel be stationed at Baghdad airport, which is under U.S. control, and supply safe water to the U.S. military (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 8 July 2003).

Jul. 9 ‘03 In a reply to a question in a session of the Upper House of the Diet, Prime Minister Koizumi says, “The argument that it is strange that no WMD has yet been found in Iraq is strange. Saddam Hussein has not been found. Does it mean that he had not existed at all in pre-war Iraq?”

Jul.10 ‘03 Two ASDF transport aircraft carrying 41 SDF officers leave Japan for Jordan to help deliver relief supplies for the Iraqi people. The 41 SDF members will be joined by 49 others who are travelling on a commercial airline. The troops are sent under an existing law on cooperation for UN peacekeeping operations, following a request by the WFP. The mission is scheduled to last until August 18 (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 10 July 2003).
Fifty-five per cent of respondents to a survey are opposed to sending Japanese troops to Iraq (Northern Territory News [Australia], 23 July 2003).

Prime Minister Koizumi says in a Diet session that “The SDF will be dispatched only to a non-combat zone [in Iraq], so the SDF dispatch will not violate the constitution.” However, when the DPJ leader Kan Naoto asks, “Is there a non-combat zone [in Iraq]? If there is, tell me an example.” Koizumi answers, “Even if you ask the question, how can I possibly answer it?” (Ishibashi 2007, 789; Shinoda 2004, 113).

In response to the enforcing tactics of the ruling coalition, the DPJ calls for a no confidence vote on Prime Minister Koizumi. According to opinion polls, the opposition to the SMHRAI Law is on the rise from 41% in late June and 49% in early July to 55% in the middle of July according to a survey by Asahi Shimbun (Christian Science Monitor [Boston], 25 July 2003).

According to a Japanese official, Japan will not send troops to Iraq for “several months” irrespective of the security situation (The Irish Times [Ireland], 22 August 2003).

Ambassador Baker, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi, asks Japan to send SDF troops to Iraq at an early stage to help rebuild the war-ravaged country, and discusses with Kawaguchi Japan’s possible financial contribution for Iraq’s rehabilitation (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 17 September 2003).
Sep. 20 ’03 Koizumi is reelected to be the president of the LDP by a landslide. He wins 399 votes (194 from legislators and 205 from the provinces). The runner-up, Kamei Shizuka gets only 139 votes (Shinoda 2004, 116).

Oct. 5 ’03 In a TV talk show, Defense Chief Ishiba denies that Japan is sending troops because the U.S. asked. He says the dispatch is necessary in consideration of Japan’s dependence on Middle East oil and the need to help improve the daily lives of Iraqis. He also implies that the JDA is considering dispatching ASDF transport aircraft and an advance unit of GSDF by the end of the year (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 5 October 2003).

Oct. 6 ’03 Prime Minister Koizumi says, “We will have to actively consider aid for Iraq’s reconstruction for the sake of Japan, . . . Pursuit of both goals of the Japan-U.S. alliance and international coordination is nothing but for the interest of Japan. It is not for the United States or the international community” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 6 October 2003).

Oct. 10 ’03 The legislation that extends the ATSM Law by two years enacted. / Prime Minister Koizumi dissolves the Diet. / According to a government source, Japanese government is considering a plan to provide about US$ 5 billion to help reconstruct Iraq in the four years beginning FY2004. The amount accounts for about 10% of the total expected cost of reconstruction, set at US$ 55 billion for the period between 2004 and 2007 by the World Bank (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 5 October 2003). / Hatsuhisa Takashima, A MOFA spokesman, says, “Koizumi will be making a promise to President Bush to provide money and personnel. Japan is aware of its obligation” (The Washington Post, 11 October 2003).

Oct. 15 ’03 Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda announces that Japan will provide US$ 1.5 billion in 2004 to support Iraq’s reconstruction. This initial pledge is part of a four-year US$ 5 billion package that Japan will likely announce at the Madrid conference (Japan Times [Tokyo], 16 October 2003). / Koizumi tells reporters that Japan would do what it had to do, and that he had told President Bush to leave the details to him (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 17 October 2003).

Oct. 17 ’03 In a summit meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi held in Tokyo, President Bush appreciates Japan’s role in fulfilling the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1511.

Oct. 24 ’03 Japan pledges US$ 5 billion in reconstruction aid for Iraq, US$ 1.5 billion of which will be provided in FY2004 as grants. On the other hand, the EU offered only 700 million Euro for the rehabilitation of Iraq in 2004 and 2005. US$ 1.5 billion accounts for 87% of Japan’s annual grant program of US$ 1.72 billion (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 26 October 2003).
Oct.31 ’03  Despite a UN announcement about temporarily withdrawing international staff from Baghdad amid the worsening security situation, the Japanese government says its plan to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq is unchanged (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 31 October 2003).

Nov. 5 ’03  Civilian members loaned from such ministries as Foreign Affairs, Economy, Trade, and Industry, Education and Science/Technology, and Welfare and Labor are added to the Office for Implementing Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

Nov. 9 ‘03  The 43rd general election for the House of Representatives (the Lower House of the Diet) is held. As a result of this election, the LDP loses the majority of the Lower House, but thanks to the coalition with the New Komeito, the LDP maintains the power. In this election, the DPJ makes a large progress rising from pre-election 137 seats to post-election 177. With the exception of the New Komeito, all other small parties virtually fizzle out after this election (Shinoda 2004, 116).

Nov.12 ’03  Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda says in a regular news conference that Japan is “sticking to the plan to carry out the dispatch by the end of this year” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 12 November 2003).

Nov.13 ’03  Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda says, “We could (send) the SDF there if circumstances permit. But there is no such situation.” In response to a question on if there is any change in the government’s plan to send SDF troops to Iraq by the end of the year, Koizumi says, “We will decide after closely watching the situation” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 13 November 2003).

Nov.14 ’03  Originally, the basic plan for dispatching the SDF troops to Iraq was to be announced on November 14. But the surprising progress of the DPJ, and the deteriorating situation in Iraq let the schedule be delayed (Shinoda 2004, 117).

Nov.15 ’03  Visiting U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says the United States would “value other countries’ assistance” in the reconstruction of Iraq, indicating that his country would welcome the dispatch of SDF personnel to Iraq regardless of the size and purpose of the mission. He says, “Other countries have to make decisions for themselves. . . . we would value their assistance, whatever way makes the most sense for them. I will let them characterize what they want to do” (The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo], 16 November 2003).

Nov.18 ’03  A 10-member fact-finding team comprising officers from GSDF enters Samawah to assess the local security situation (The Japan Times [Tokyo], 27 November 2003).
Nov. 19 '03  Opposition leader Kan, in a special session of the Diet, asks whether the government will send the SDF troops within the year after pointing out the deteriorating situation in Iraq. In response, Prime Minister Koizumi answers that he will “decide after closely watching the situation” (Shinoda 2004, 117).

Nov. 29 '03  Two Japanese foreign service officers are killed in Iraq.

Nov. 30 '03  Foreign Minister Kawaguchi says in a press conference, “We will not give in to terrorism, and Japan’s policy of being actively engaged in the Iraq’s reconstruction is unshaken” (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 30 November 2003). / Prime Minister Koizumi says, “There will be no change in Japan’s policy of providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq by sending people regardless of whether they are SDF troops, civilians or government officials. Japan should not be intimidated by terrorism.” However, Kato Koichi, a lawmaker and a close ally of Koizumi, says on TV that he opposes the dispatch and the war was a mistake (The New York Times, 1 December 2003).

Dec. 1 '03  According to an opinion poll in Japan, only 10% of the Japanese support sending Japanese troops to Iraq (The Age [Melbourne, Australia], 1 December 2003).

Dec. 2 '03  The LDP holds a joint conference for foreign affairs and defense-related matters, in which the opinion that Japan should not cave in to terrorist threats prevails. Prime Minister Koizumi says to reporters, “This is not the kind of things that one can talk garrulously about and get away with it. There are some information that we have to keep as secrets.” He admits that he enforced a gag rule on the government in order to prevent the leaks of information on the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 118).

Dec. 4 '03  In a meeting of the Defense Committee of the LDP PARC, complaints are filed about withholding the information on the current situation in Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 118). / In the Central Committee meeting of the New Komeito, Kanzaki Takenori, the leader of the New Komeito complains that “although we need to verify the field situation to exhaust our internal discussion, there is no explanation from the government” (Shinoda 2004, 118-9). / A high-ranking government official says, “The prime minister’s desire is to start the deployment as early as possible. We have seen the polls that indicate 70 to 80% of the public is opposed to the dispatch, but the prime minister will be explaining his decision to the people and he believes they will understand.” U.S. Ambassador Bakers says, “Japan’s participation would mean the coalition against terrorism has gained the full participation of the second-largest economy in the world . . . . I don’t think it matters so much whether it’s 300 people or 1,000 or 30,000” (The Washington Post, 5
The Cabinet Secretariat announces the basic plan for dispatching the SDF troops to Iraq. According to this plan, 600 GSDF troops will reconstruct social infrastructure such as medical, water supply, and schooling services around Samawah in Southern Iraq. The ASDF will provide 8 aircrafts including C-130 cargo planes as ‘assistance for ensuring the security’ activities for the sake of American and British forces. The period of the SDF dispatch to Iraq will be one year from 15 December 2003, but the start date of the dispatch was not specifically announced. (Shinoda 2004, 119; The New York Times, 10 December 2003). / In the morning, Prime Minister Koizumi calls in Defense Director Ishiba and Foreign Minister Kawaguchi to the Kantei, and directs them to start coordination with the LDP. In the afternoon, he meets with Kanzaki and the Komeito Secretary-General Fuyushiba Tetsuzo, and asks for their cooperation. In the Diet, the government explains the outline of the basic plan to the members of the Ruling Coalition Liaison Conference for Iraqi and North Korean Affairs. A similar explanation is given to the members of the Cabinet, Foreign Affairs, and Defense Committees of the LDP PARC. The LDP approves the basic plan(Shinoda 2004, 119-20).

The New Komeito approves the basic plan on the condition that Prime Minister Koizumi and the New Komeito leader Kanzaki exchange a memorandum stating that “the prime minister, after sufficiently investigating the field situation in Iraq, will issue appropriate direction.” As the New Komeito approves the basic plan, the Cabinet passes the basic plan for the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 120). / Prime Minister Koizumi tells the press that the SDF will not transport weapons or ammunition for U.S. and British forces in Iraq. The next day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda announces the government’s view that it is possible for the SDF to transport armed soldiers. His words are later endorsed by Koizumi (The Nikkei Weekly [Tokyo], 15 December 2003).

According to an Asahi poll, the approval rating of the Koizumi Cabinet plummets from 47% to 41%. Those who respond that Koizumi’s explanation on the dispatch of the SDF troops to Iraq is “understandable” are 23%, and “not understandable,” 64%. Support for the dispatch of the SDF is only 34%, while opposition occupies 55% of the respondents (Shinoda 2004, 120).

Kanzaki, who just came back from Iraq, has a meeting with Koizumi, and agrees to the dispatch of GSDF troops to Iraq on the condition that when the advance team and the main force of the GSDF contingents are dispatched to Iraq, the Cabinet will get the authorization of the ruling coalition and the Diet (Shinoda 2004, 122).
Dec. 26 ’03 A 40-strong advance unit of the ASDF leaves for Kuwait and Qatar.

Dec. 29 ’03 Prime Minister Koizumi in a meeting with U.S. special envoy James Baker says, “Japan would be prepared to eliminate the ‘vast majority’ of its debt of US$ 4.1 billion owed it by Iraq ‘if other Paris Club creditors are prepared to do so’ in the context of a Paris Club agreement.” The amount of Japan’s outstanding loans to Iraq comes to US$ 7 billion if late payment charges are added (Kyodo News Service [Tokyo], 29 December 2003).

Jan. 6 ’04 The Cabinet explains the plan to dispatch an advance team of the GSDF to the representatives of the LDP and the New Komeito (Shinoda 2004, 122).

Jan. 8 ’04 The New Komeito approves the dispatch of the GSDF advance team to Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 122).

Jan. 16 ’04 A 30-member advance unit of the GSDF leaves for Samawah in Southern Iraq (Shinoda 2004, 122).

Jan. 19 ’04 Prime Minister Koizumi in his third annual policy speech before the Diet announces his general position on Iraq: “Since we cannot necessarily say that Iraqi situation is secure, I decided to dispatch the SDF troops because they have accumulated training during the ordinary times, so they have the capability to avoid dangers and sufficiently operate in adverse environment. We will not use force.” At the end of the speech, he emphasize the importance of personnel assistance by saying, “Advocating peace does not necessarily make peace. Peace is something that the whole international community has to cooperate to build up. If we realize that the security and prosperity of our country lie in the peace and stability of the world, Japan has also to bear the responsibility by acting as a member of the international community” (Shinoda 2004, 123).

Jan. 20 ’04 According to an Asahi poll, “support” for the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq is 40%, and “not support,” 48%. The approval rating for the Koizumi Cabinet is 43%, and the disapproval rating, 38% (Shinoda 2004, 122-3).

Jan. 23 ’04 A 110-member main unit of ASDF arrives in Kuwait (Xinhua [Beijing], 23 January 2004).

Jan. 26 ’04 New Komeito leader Kanzaki has a meeting with Koizumi, and expresses approval of the dispatch of the main force of the GSDF to Iraq on the condition that the Cabinet will take all possible measures to ensure the safety of the troops.

Jan. 30 ’04 Despite objections from opposition parties, the ruling coalition rams the motion for dispatching the main force of the GSDF to Iraq through the Diet Special Committee on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,
and then the motion also passes the plenary session of the Lower House of the Diet (Shinoda 2004, 124).

Feb. 5 ’04 According to a Mainichi poll, 47% of Japanese support the SDF dispatch, up from 35% in the last poll (The Straits Times [Singapore], 5 February 2004).

Feb. 8 ’04 The main force of the GSDF joins the advance unit in Samawah.

Feb. 9 ’04 The motion for dispatching the main force of the GSDF to Iraq passes the Upper House of the Diet.

Dec. 9 ’04 The Cabinet decides to extend the dispatch of the SDF to 14 December 2005.

Dec. 8 ’05 The cabinet decides to amend the basic plan on countermeasures based on the SMHRAI Law and extends the period of dispatch of the SDF until 14 December 2006.

Jul.19 ’06 Japan withdraws its GSDF from Samawah, but it keeps an ASDF unit in the region.

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Curriculum Vitae

Booseung Chang was born in January 1975 in Seoul. He graduated with honors from the Seoul National University in 2000. After spending two years in the South Korean Foreign Service, he joined Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University in 2002, and graduated with distinction from SAIS with an M.A. in 2004 with double concentration on China and Japan, and then, he moved to the Ph.D program of SAIS. After finishing his coursework, he returned to the Foreign Service, and while working full time, continued to write his doctoral dissertation.

His area of interest is comparative policy analysis and political institutions. Particularly, he is interested in comparing how different countries respond to the same external challenges and how the same institutions are interpreted and applied varyingly in different national settings.

In 2005, he coauthored an article with Dr. Francis Fukuyama comparing the presidentialism of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It was published in Journal of Democracy. He also had a chance to participate in a research project of Dr. Kent E. Calder, the result of which was later published in Embattled Garisons (Princeton University Press, 2007). The research compared the “base politics” in about 90 countries that accommodate foreign military bases.

Booseung Chang would like to pursue his research interest by applying the measuring and comparing tools that he developed in his doctoral dissertation to the allies of the United States in other regions such as the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), Europe (Spain and Italy), and Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Singapore).

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