THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY:
THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF REGIME CHANGE IN TURKEY

by
Barış Çetin Can Eren

A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Baltimore, Maryland
August 2014

©2014 Barış Çetin Can Eren
All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an analysis of the long-term trajectory of democracy in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic with a focus on class relations, revolutionary struggles and coups d’etat over the last century. I argue that two factors have intertwined to determine the trajectory of the political regime: social movements and competition within the power bloc. I make four main arguments, which diverge from the existing literature on democratization.

First, by using a two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy, I argue that during the last century, the Turkish political regime, far from being ‘trapped’ in the ‘unconsolidated’ domain, experienced four different modalities of democracy. I conceptualize coups, not as symptoms of democratic immaturity, but as means of regime transition.

Second, I challenge the argument that a weak civil society and the absence of social dynamics explain the fragility of Turkish democracy. I identify two waves of revolutionary movements -- from 1912 to 1930 and from 1974 to 1998 -- that have impacted the regime and vice-versa.

Third, in contrast to the widely used Weberian “center-periphery” analysis, I trace three cycles of capital accumulation in the last century, with a different group assuming the hegemonic role in each: (1) the palace-centered bureaucracy, (2) the party-centered bureaucracy, and (3) a coalition between the capitalist army and Istanbul capital. Each cycle gave rise to a competitive period within the power bloc (a crisis of hegemony) that politicized society and paved the way for coups.
Finally, I explain the interaction between social movements and competition within the power bloc. The nature of the resolution of each crisis within the power bloc depended on the nature of social struggles. Right now, Turkey is in the middle of a new regime crisis, the resolution of which will again depend on the nature of social struggles.

The empirical foundations of the dissertation are built on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including official statistics as well as two major databases compiled by the author from Turkish newspaper reports and other published sources on the instances and intensities of various forms of social unrest between 1876 and 2014.

**First Readers:** Professor Beverly J. Silver

Professor Giovanni Arrighi (1937-2009)

**Second Reader:** Professor Joel Andreas
To Mehmet Amca,
with love and disagreement...
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I came to Hopkins in 2000, one year after Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment and trial. As I stated in my letter of application, I had a specific question for the dissertation. I argued that extensive proletarianization of Kurds will shape the future of the Kurdish question as we knew it: on the territory of the national struggle, the guerilla warfare will cede its place to an Intifada style uprising; and in the west, Kurds, the major component of the new proletariat employed mainly in the informal sector, will be the engine of the struggle for democratization.

Indeed, in 2003, I had already completed the field work in Yenibosna for the dissertation, wrote a chapter and presented it at the Institute of Global Studies at Johns Hopkins. But then...

Then, as a result of a “vortex of combined circumstances”, I shelved that project and started this historical study. Although the agents and conspirators responsible for this change weren’t pleasantly remembered during the last decade, now I think it was a correct decision to change my dissertation topic. I thank all of them.

Although having a life span of a decade, ironically, this study has been written in one year as the sum of five separate intense periods of writing. The reason for this was my priorities and preferences that can be inferred from the conclusion of this study.

I wrote the proposal that can be considered the dormant form of the first chapter, in May-June 2004. The first draft of the second chapter was written in March 2008, the draft of the fourth chapter in September 2012. Right after the heydays of the Gezi uprising, I came back to Baltimore, between June 2013 and January 2014. I reformulated the whole argument, that implied the rewriting of all drafts from scratch, and wrote a
detailed synopsis. Finally, between July and August 2014, I wrote all the chapters at hand. I regret the fact that I did not have the necessary time to work on Chapter 3 as much as I did on other chapters. Although the chapter provides a minimally plausible argument, I implore the reader to consider the argument of that chapter as a set of working hypotheses.

Contrary to misunderstandings that label him as a theorist of the world-system, longue durée, and hegemonic competition or worse still the rise of China, and blur the very originality of his thought distinguishing him from Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank, Giovanni Arrighi was a great dialectician. He was able to identify the specificity of each cycle of capitalist accumulation, and show how each cycle contained, negated and at the same time superseded, the previous one, and demonstrate that the dissolution of each cycle was the very result of its strength and achievement. What made me come to Hopkins was the epilogue of The Long Twentieth Century. I consider myself extremely lucky to have taken his classes and joined his conversations during my presence in Baltimore between 2000 and 2003.

If this dissertation has any academic strength, it is no doubt because of Giovanni, who was at the same time my joint advisor. Not because of his approval but because of his disagreements. From day one, he, as my joint advisor, found the argument of this study very banal, my conceptualization boggy and my arguments unconvincing. In this sense he transformed me into a person who started to draw circles and arrows on all kinds of blank paper, followed by marching into Giovanni’s room and forcing him to a discussion. The source of the disagreement, as can be traced in Chapters 1 and 5, was my distinction between revolutionary and reformist movements. While writing and thinking
about the dissertation, his comment that “A more dialectical conception of historical processes is not necessarily more accurate than a less dialectical one”, haunted my mind. Not only his intellectual harshness but also his “good heart”, and our shared memories will accompany me till the end of my life. And I am sure I am not the only person to have these imprints and feelings.

Anybody would notice the impact of my other joint advisor, Beverly Silver’s Forces of Labor on the data collection process of this book. Without Beverly’s meticulous contribution to my proposal, I wouldn’t have received the grant from the National Science Foundation, so crucial to begin the research. She read and commented on the synopsis and did not complain about my bombardment of final versions of chapters.

Beverly was my protective shield against all kinds of administrative problems. Thanks to her solutions and interventions, I was able to survive all kinds of administrative crises. In the summer of 2012, when I was technically homeless, she shared her library carrel, her office, and even her desk with me.

Joel Andreas read my proposal super-carefully, and gave me confidence in the academic value of my two axes. He also read and commented on the synopsis. I’m afraid I did not incorporate his final suggestions concerning the axes of inclusion.

During the time when I was outside the US, Linda Burkhardt, Jessie Albee and Terrie Lovern solved all my departmental problems. And I am grateful to them.

Amy Holmes read and corrected the proposal several times. Aslıhan Tüdeş, Sinan Çelik, Gökhan Karaman, Nihal Uzan and Engin Gürbüz worked for the data collection project. Emre Altan helped supervise the data collection. After the depletion of NSF
money, Aslıhan worked voluntarily and completed the digitization of missing newspapers. Doğuş Çakan collected the images for the 2005-2010 period, and Nurcan Dağ coded the 2005 articles. In February, Erdem Yörük and İlhan Can Özen visited my office in MacCaulay at midnight and renamed the file names of the digitized newspaper articles. The early data for Armenian uprisings came from Şefika Kumral’s review of the relevant literature in February 2009. Daniel Pascuiti answered patiently my questions about Excel. Without Sezen Bayhan, access to the library of Boğaziçi University would have been too complicated. Finally, Murat Ö zgün drew the cube in Chapter 5.

After moving to Turkey in 2003, my address in Baltimore for my occasional visits was the house in Oakenshawe. Thanks to Rolande Glicenstein’s generosity, friendliness and humor, this address became not only an oasis but also a true home. I will not only miss our “kibbutz” but also our heated discussions concerning American politics.

During my self-imposed prison term in Baltimore, Stephanie Koziej and Amritha Lal brought me news from the outside world. Without Stephanie’s questions, invitations, songs, and invitations, my life in Baltimore would be a lot less tolerable.

Throughout this process, regardless of where I was, I was always together with Kıtan Eren, Vacide, Necla, Tülin and Yaşar Tunca, Nejla Torun, Firdevs and Emin Eyüboğlu, Sevinç Özer, Songül and Rafet Yılmaz, Sengül and Adnan Yurtsever, Nazmiye and Muzaffer Akyüz, Nimet Yazıcı, Ali and Gazel Özdemir. I am grateful to them and their memories.

As regards “friends”… Without their informed, patient, and courageous struggle, without their candidacy to truly revolutionary human practice, everything in this
dissertation would be meaningless. I can only apologize for my absence and promise to compensate for it.

For a slow writer like myself, writing up all the chapters on such a tight schedule would have been technically impossible. However, this dissertation is at the same time the product of a family enterprise: Laila Bushra, Yener Eren, Mualla Eren and Gülistan Eren. My sister Devrim Eren and my beloved niece Lara Julia Rana Seitz, joined us from Hamilton, New Zealand, with their joy and support.

During the last two months, Yener Eren was the research assistant responsible for the library and the political parties. Without Mualla Eren, it would have been impossible to update the database from 2005 to 2014. After my frustration with Microsoft Office’s drawing utilities, she learned Adobe Illustrator in two days and improved the quality of my figures dramatically. Almost everybody speaks positively about their parents, but mine surprised all first-hand observers this summer with their skills and stamina.

Gülistan Eren was the organizer; she was not only part of the data collection group, but also secured its smooth and permanent functioning. In the final phase, she assumed full control, mobilized all family resources, and coordinated the entire write-up process. She designed and formatted the document and spent several sleepless weeks in front of the computer.

Laila Bushra was the hidden and real hero in the family. When I was in Baltimore, she skyped me every other day. Given this study’s focus on Turkey, Laila was the last person to read and comment on it. But she did it and she did it very well. She read all the synopses more than five times, came to Istanbul in July, spent three weeks with me, and carried my files to London, San Francisco and Lahore. Suffice it to give the
number of files in my hard disk containing (laila-ed.) phrase: 167. In an era of selfishness, escapism and tiny calculations, Laila showed what true friendship is.

Certainly, the responsibility for this dissertation is completely mine. However, I can’t exaggerate the collective character of this work. Therefore, I ask the permission of my family members around the world to dedicate this work to somebody else: Mustafa Oktay, Mehmet Amca.

Long time ago in the mid 1980’s, our house was filled with my father’s friends, political activists, union organizers, journalists and directors - agents and products of the 68 generation like my father and mother. I grew up observing the long arguments of all these people with Mehmet Amca. Since his expulsion from East Berlin, he had been their professor and had also become mine. Those debates created the intellectual stimulus and fundamentals necessary for this study. One of those days, I revealed to them my intention of writing a book about “my fathers’ friends”. They liked the idea and constantly joked about it. But I was serious and a careful eye will notice that this study is indeed a book about my father’s friends and a response to their debates.

I hope Mehmet Amca will accept my dedication as a sign of gratitude for his labor and a belated attempt to compensate my absence at the conversation table.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... v  
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... xi  
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... xv  
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. xvi  
Chapter 1 Democracies, Coups and Social Struggles ....................................................................... 1  
  Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1  
  Defective Democracies ................................................................................................................ 4  
  Defining the Regime .................................................................................................................. 21  
  Coups d’Etat and Democracies .................................................................................................. 29  
  Democracy and Social Struggles ............................................................................................... 35  
    Marx ....................................................................................................................................... 35  
    Weber ..................................................................................................................................... 43  
    Schumpeter ............................................................................................................................ 47  
    Tocqueville ............................................................................................................................. 48  
  Contemporary Studies on Democratization .............................................................................. 50  
    Contemporary Literature on Democratization ...................................................................... 55  
    Historical Explanations of Turkish Regime Change ............................................................. 61  
  The Argument Concerning Social Struggles and Regime Change .............................................. 71  
  Research Design ......................................................................................................................... 74  
  Organization of Chapters ........................................................................................................... 78  
Chapter 2 Regress of Democracy: Trajectory of the Turkish Regime 1908-2014 .......................... 80  
  The Birth Certificate ................................................................................................................... 80  
  Phase 1 1908-1920 ..................................................................................................................... 87  
    March 31 Uprising .................................................................................................................. 92  
    The Position of the Regime ................................................................................................. 94  
    The 1912-1913 Coups ............................................................................................................ 99  
  Phase 2: 1920 – 1960 ................................................................................................................... 102  
    1919-1920 Coups ................................................................................................................ 103  
    An Exclusionary Regime ....................................................................................................... 107
Identifying the Waves .............................................................................................................. 176
The First Wave: 1896-1930 ...................................................................................................... 178
  1896 - 1913: Constitutional Revolution, the Balkans and the Middle East ............... 178
  Kurdish Uprisings ................................................................................................................. 188
  Sheikh Said and Ağrı Rebellions ........................................................................................... 190
The Silent Phase: 1938-1968 .................................................................................................... 194
  Before the Coup ................................................................................................................... 194
  After the Coup ...................................................................................................................... 196
The Second Wave 1968-1998 .................................................................................................. 201
  From Workers’ and Students’ Movements to the Anti-Fascist Struggle ......................... 201
  The Second Rise: Workers without Socialists ..................................................................... 211
  The Rise of the Kurdish Movement ..................................................................................... 215
The End of the Second Wave ................................................................................................... 219
A New Surge? Gezi’s Differences and Context ........................................................................ 227
Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Waves ............................................................................ 230
Chapter 5 Revolutionary and Reformist Movements’ Impact on the Regime ....................... 233
  The Three Dimensions of a Movement .................................................................................. 233
    Independence .......................................................................................................................... 234
    Violence ................................................................................................................................... 235
    Mass Participation ............................................................................................................... 237
  Eight Types of Movements and in-between Cases ................................................................. 239
    The Eight Types .................................................................................................................... 239
      Apparently in-between Cases .............................................................................................. 244
  Impacts on the Regime .......................................................................................................... 247
  Hypotheses .............................................................................................................................. 253
  Movements and Regime Change Attempts in Turkey .......................................................... 256
  The Big Picture ......................................................................................................................... 265
Chapter 6 Interaction of the two Struggles ................................................................................. 273
  Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 273
  Zone 1: Inclusionary Moves via External Pressure .............................................................. 276
  Zone 2: Parties as Scapegoats ............................................................................................... 278
  Zone 3: The Self-Confident Power Bloc ................................................................................. 285

xiii
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1 Distribution of Various Forms of Democracies .............................................................. 15
Table 2-1 Phases of Turkish Democracy ..................................................................................... 86
Table 2-2 Successful and Failed Coups in the First Phase .............................................................. 90
Table 2-3 Parliaments and Bureaucratic Institutions .................................................................. 96
Table 2-4 Phases and Ratios of Outlawed Parties ................................................................. 98
Table 2-5 Ratio of Outlawed Parties (Democratic Periods) ......................................................... 99
Table 2-6 Successful and Failed Coups in the Second Phase ....................................................... 105
Table 2-7 Imprisoned Journalists and Publicists between 1908 and 2013 ............................... 119
Table 2-8 Successful and Failed Coups in the Third Phase .......................................................... 125
Table 4-1 Social Movements before and after the July Revolution in 1908 ............................. 178
Table 4-2 Distribution of 1908 Strikes over Cities ................................................................... 180
Table 4-3 Share of Macedonian Unrest in the recorded Social Movements .............................. 184
Table 4-4 Repertoire of Kurdish Movements .......................................................................... 193
Table 4-5 Frequency of Selected Types of Social Action .......................................................... 195
Table 4-6 Recorded Strikes and Observed Labor Unrest between 1949-68 ............................ 197
Table 4-7 Number of Associations per Thousand People for Selective Years .......................... 207
Table 4-8 Average Monthly Intensities of Protests According to Mass Character of Protests and Violence Involved’ .................................................................................................................. 210
Table 4-9 Kurdish, Workers' and Students' Movements’ Yearly Share in Aggregate Movement 1987-1997 .................................................................................................................................. 216
Table 4-10 Comparison of the Two Waves .............................................................................. 231
Table 5-1 Regime Change Attempts and Movements ................................................................. 253
Table 5-2 Regime Change Attempts between 1908 and 2014 .................................................. 255
Table 5-3 Vertical Impacts of Intense Revolutionary Movements ............................................ 256
Table 5-4 Low Level Revolutionary Movements and Vertical Change Attempts ........................ 257
Table 5-5 Revolutionary Movements in 1918 .......................................................................... 258
Table 5-6 MVi and Horizontal Regime Change ......................................................................... 258
Table 5-7 Monthly Distribution of MVi During Horizontal Attempts ........................................ 260
Table 5-8 MVi and coups without Regime Change .................................................................... 262
Table 5-9 Revolutionary Movements and Non-Parliamentary Transitions .............................. 264
Table 6-1 Martial Law in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara ............................................................... 281
Table 6-2 Average Lifetime of Ottoman-Turkish Cabinets in Different Modes of Democracy (1908-2014) ....................................................................................................................... 282
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1 Dimensions of Democracy According to Schumpeter .......................................................... 21
Figure 1-2 Theoretically Possible Regimes .......................................................................................... 26
Figure 1-3 Locations of the Turkish Regime 1908-2014 ................................................................ 27
Figure 1-4 Quadrants of the Turkish Regime ................................................................................. 28
Figure 1-5 Theorists of Democratization Categorized ....................................................................... 56
Figure 1-6 The Framework of the Study .......................................................................................... 59
Figure 1-7 Cycles of Accumulation, Revolutionary Movements and Regime Change in Turkey 1908-2014 .................................................................................................................. 73
Figure 2-1 Transitions in Phase 1 ....................................................................................................... 88
Figure 2-2 Transitions in Phase 2 ....................................................................................................... 106
Figure 2-3 Percentage of Banned Parties .......................................................................................... 108
Figure 2-4 Transitions in Phase 3 ....................................................................................................... 118
Figure 2-5 Political Trials Settled with a Sentence ........................................................................... 121
Figure 2-6 Number of Cancelled Statutes by the Constitutional Court (1962-2012) ... 123
Figure 2-7 Visibility of the Bureaucracy ............................................................................................ 124
Figure 2-8 Government Programs and Expressions of Intentions for Constitutional Change ....... 133
Figure 2-9 Reported Detentions as Violation of Human Rights ....................................................... 136
Figure 2-10 Rise and Fall of the RPP 1908-1960 ............................................................................. 144
Figure 2-11 Rise and Fall of the Military 1960-? .............................................................................. 146
Figure 3-1 Waves of Competition and Hegemony ........................................................................... 154
Figure 4-1 Waves of Social Movements in Ottoman Empire-Turkey ............................................. 172
Figure 4-2 Intensity of Movements 1876-1945 ................................................................................. 174
Figure 4-3 Monthly Intensities of Movements in terms of Standard Deviations ........................... 175
Figure 4-4 Intensity of Movements in May and June ....................................................................... 176
Figure 4-5 Strikes, Celebrations, and Military Unrest in the Months after the 1908 Revolution. ............................................................................................................................................. 179
Figure 4-6 Separatist and Ethnic Unrest in the Ottoman Empire ..................................................... 182
Figure 4-7 Comparison of the Intensity of Labor, Socialist and Student Movements ............... 200
Figure 4-8 Standardized Intensity of Student Movements 1947-2004 ............................................. 204
Figure 4-9 Ratio of Group Action over Mass Protests between 1962 and 1980 ............................ 211
Figure 4-10 Real Wages between 1962-1994 (1976=100) ............................................................... 212
Figure 4-11 Mentioned Kurdish Protests per Month ................................................................. 215
Figure 4-12 Average Monthly Intensity of Protests according to Type and Location ................. 220
Figure 4-13 Intensity of Mentioned Hunger Strikes ....................................................................... 222
Figure 4-14 Ratio of Mentioned Events (Turkish Metropolis / Kurdish Cities) .............................. 223
Figure 4-15 Monthly Average of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Actions in Kurdistan ..................... 225
Figure 4-16 Share of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Protest in Total Protest in Kurdistan .................. 226
Figure 4-17 Share of Press Declarations in Aggregate Movement .............................................. 226
Figure 4-18 Intensity of Movements with the RPP (SDPP) as a participant/organizer ............... 230
Figure 5-1 Dependent and Independent Movements ................................................................. 235
Figure 5-2 Violent and Non-Violent Movements ................................................................. 236
Figure 5-3 Impact of Mass Participation ............................................................................... 237
Figure 5-4 8 Types of Movements .................................................................................... 248
Figure 5-5 Revolutionary and Reformist Movements and their Impact on Regimes ........ 252
Figure 5-6 Recorded MvI Mentions for Selective Months in 1970 and 1971 ................. 262
Figure 5-7 Recorded MvI Mentions in 1996 and 1997 ....................................................... 264
Figure 5-8 Pendulum of the Turkish Regime and Social Movements ......................... 266
Figure 5-9 Periodization of Revolutionary and Reformist Movements ......................... 268
Figure 5-10 Regime Change, Competition within the Power Bloc and Intensity of Revolutionary Movements .......................................................... 275
Figure 6-1 Recorded Protests and Uprisings Organized by Parties of Order ............... 289
Figure 6-2 Interaction of Revolutionary Movements nd Competition within the Power Bloc .................................................................................. 291
Figure 6-3 Change of the Political Terrain during Hegemonic Crisis ......................... 293
Figure 6-4 Change of the Political Terrain during Hegemonic Stability ...................... 294
Figure 6-5 Turkish Political Terrain between 1908 and 1960 ....................................... 295
Figure 6-6 Turkish Political Terrain from 1960 onwards .............................................. 295
Figure 7-1 Trajectory of Turkish Democracy ................................................................. 301
Figure 7-2 Regime Changes and Waves of Accumulation, Competition and Unrest ...... 304
Chapter 1
Democracies, Coups and Social Struggles

“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”
(Anna Karenina)

Introduction

Depending on which indicators one uses, there are two possible assessments of the Turkish political landscape. From one perspective, the regime seems to be in perpetual chaos. Turkey can be described as the country of coups and assassinations, regime crises, and constitutional changes. Between 1789 and 1922, five of the eight Ottoman Sultans were dethroned by coups or insurrections. During the parliamentary monarchy period between 1908 and 1922, five of the twelve grand viziers were deposed by coups and three others were assassinated. The balance sheet of the Republican period is not very different. Five out of a total of sixteen politicians who served as chief executives for longer than a year were political prisoners at one time- either before or after their tenures. Another one was recently sentenced for life but has not been imprisoned yet. Of the remaining ten, one was hanged, another assassinated eight years after his tenure, and a third one died from a suspicious heart attack. As for the constitutions, since 1908, the Ottoman Empire (and later the Turkish Republic) has been ruled under five different constitutions. And again for the last one decade, the formulation of another constitution from scratch has been at the center of political debates.
Fear of military coups is not a thing of the past. The specter of a coup is still haunting Turkish politics. The present Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has accused the opposition of having plotted a coup in December 2013. The opposition has countered by alleging that it is Erdoğan who is planning a civilian coup like Hitler, who ended the Weimar Republic. Ironically, at the most heated point of this debate, Erdoğan opened the door for the release of fifty generals who had been imprisoned after being accused of plotting a coup, by calling the trials themselves a part of the conspiracy. Five years ago, however, it was Erdoğan who proudly claimed to be the prosecutor of these trials.

From another perspective however, Turkey has a stable democratic life with strong historical roots. The national parliament has convened regularly for 100 out of the last 106 years of the empire-republic. Over this period, there have been twenty seven elections, of which twenty were competitive. Peaceful transfer of political power from one party to another is generally seen as one of the key characteristics of democracy. Since 1950, half of the elections (50%) have transferred power from the governing party to parties of the opposition. Compare this with 41% in the United Kingdom, 30% in Sweden, and 25% in Germany. Turkey has also been more advanced than many European countries regarding suffrage. In 1876, an almost universal suffrage for men was granted. Until 1918, 80% of all males of voting age could vote, whereas the same figure was 40% for the United Kingdom. And Turkey joined the camp of universal suffrage in 1934, more than ten years before France, Belgium, and Italy.

This seemingly contradictory coexistence of stability and instability has been one of the most striking puzzles for students of Turkish democracy. Most authors- regardless of their different emphases on the stable or unstable, or democratic or autocratic elements
of the Turkish regime - have tried to solve this puzzle by relegating Turkey to the grey zone of unconsolidated or defective democracies, situated between real democracies and dictatorships. Actually, Turkey has not been alone in this zone. Most of the countries which are considered ‘different’ from the democracies in Western Europe and North America, are similarly classified as ‘defective’ democracies. Turkey is considered to be either trapped in this domain or progressing slowly and painfully towards the democratic ideal. The defective character is explained generally by referring to the absence of a civil society or middle classes or the presence of a strong state tradition in Turkey, or to the ideological framework of Turkish political elites.

This study of the trajectory of regime changes in Turkey proposes and seeks to substantiate an alternative framework. Although the immediate targets of my critique are the historical and sociological accounts of the Turkish regime, I also challenge the three assumptions of the literature on democratization, which can be formulated as follows:

1) Democracies should be classified under two categories: advanced and underdeveloped.
2) Coups are incompatible with democracies, and their presence should be considered as the absence of democracy.
3) Social struggles have only a one-dimensional and undifferentiated impact on democratization.

This chapter begins with a review and critique of these three assumptions. The critique of each assumption helps clarify the conceptual framework of the study. In the second part of the chapter, I summarize the arguments that I put forward to explain the puzzle of democracy in Turkey. The final part consists of the research design and the outline of the subsequent chapters.
Defective Democracies

“Nothing is so treacherous as the obvious” wrote Joseph Schumpeter (1962) when he was questioning the socialist credo of being the stalwart defender of democracy (p. 235). “Until about 1916 the relation between socialism and democracy would have seemed quite obvious to most people and to nobody more so than to the accredited exponents of socialist orthodoxy. It would hardly have occurred to anyone to dispute the socialists’ claim to membership in the democratic club”. Yet according to Schumpeter, developments after the Russian Revolution revealed that the socialists had a much more ambivalent attitude towards democracy, casting doubt on the obviousness of the link. The same can be said for the link between Schumpeter’s own conceptualization of democracy and the current democratization literature. Seventy some years after the publication of his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* the link between the procedural definitions of democracy – the dominant approach in contemporary theories of democratization - and Schumpeter’s own definition is considered obvious. Schumpeter is considered to be the founding father of procedural theories. And yet, the relationship between adherents of the procedural definition and Schumpeter’s own definition is even more ambivalent than that between socialists and democracy.

For Schumpeter (1962) the democratic method is the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p. 269). All other factors, like unfair and fraudulent elections, constrained individual liberties, or depriving certain segments of population of electoral rights are irrelevant to determining whether a regime is democratic or not. Based on Schumpeter's definition, a regime where only a quarter of
the population votes and where only two parties compete for governmental posts would still be considered a democracy.

The advantage of his minimalist definition, Schumpeter believed, is its realism. The classical definition of democracy - the rule (kratos) by the people (demos) - was, he argued, unclear and unfeasible in at least three different senses. First, kratos never represented all persons in a society. Those who are below or above a certain age, mentally unfit or cannot support themselves have frequently been deprived of voting rights. Second, the notion “rule by the people” does not clarify how the rulers actually execute their functions. Direct rule is technically unfeasible if not impossible, unless one is talking about small cities. Third, the notion of a government representing the general will of the people is equally problematic because it is impossible to formulate a general will out of a multitude of contradictory beliefs and desires (Schumpeter, 1962, pp. 243-256). In contrast, Schumpeter believed that his minimalist definition has the merit of distinguishing really existing democracies from other types of regimes. In this way, it would be possible to use democracy as a concept in real-life spheres other than fiction and political phraseology (pp. 269-273).

Formulating his beliefs during the tumultuous period between 1916 and 1922, Schumpeter was concerned not just with conceptual clarity, but also with articulating his disbelief in the people’s capacity to rule themselves. In particular, his aristocratic political inclinations were deeply disturbed by the Austrian workers movement (Medearis, 2001, pp. 19-64). Just before the Russian Revolution, he advised prominent Austro-Hungarian aristocrats to apply the British method of gradual transition to democracy. In this way, it would be possible to retain aristocratic domination in the emerging democracy. Later,
during the heydays of the revolutionary council movement, Schumpeter as finance minister realized the threat posed by the workers who did not limit their political participation to voting but additionally demanded active control of economic activities. In 1919, Schumpeter considered the Austrian councils to be a more democratic and viable alternative to Soviet democracy in Russia. The Soviets’ capacity for ruling themselves increased his animosity towards attempts at mass sovereignty (Medearis, 2004, pp. 462-467).

While Schumpeter was wary of socialist attempts to expand popular control over all kinds of economic and administrative activities, he was simultaneously a keen (and rather cynical) observer of the way the parliamentary system really operated. And interestingly, in his cynical analyses of parliamentary politics, most of his ammunition came from Lenin’s criticism of the parliamentary system (Medearis, 2004, p. 465). Although both men were keenly aware of the sham character of parliamentary democracy, the political conclusions they drew from this observation were diametrically opposed. Whereas Lenin argued that democracy for the masses could be achieved only by smashing the parliamentary state apparatus and giving sovereignty to Soviets, Schumpeter was a realist and therefore content with limited democracy.

According to Huntington (1989), Schumpeter’s definition of democracy became dominant in American academia with the publication of Robert Dahl’s book titled ‘Polyarchy’ in 1971 (p. 24). In this book Dahl reserved the name democracy for an ideal political system, in which the government was completely responsive to its citizens. Political regimes that fulfill only two requirements of a democracy - inclusion and

---

1 For Lenin’s evaluation of parliamentary democracy see (Lenin, 1974 (1919)).
contestation—are designated as polyarchies (pp. 2-16). Although democracy is unquestionably preferable to a polyarchy, the rest of Dahl’s book is devoted to an analysis of which factors lead to the emergence of polyarchies and secure their survival. The book summarizes its conclusions in the form of advice to policy makers.

In his study of US democracy promotion strategies, Robinson (1996) documents how US policy makers from the late 1970s onwards were interested in promoting democratization processes throughout the world while preventing their potential radicalization. The emergence of the literature on democratization was mainly the product of this concern. According to Robinson, Dahl’s conceptualization of democracy was the theoretical backbone of the booming democratization literature. Having the ideological shield of this literature, Robinson (1996) claims, American policy makers could limit the political transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe within the confines of elite competition (pp. 56-72). Whereas the concept of polyarchy functioned as a euphemism to legitimize political systems with minimal mass participation and control, the critics of these regimes used such names as “limited democracy”, “controlled democracy”, “low intensity democracy”, and “restricted democracy” (p. 60).

Robinson has correctly emphasized the continuity between Schumpeter’s definition of democracy and Dahl’s definition of polyarchy. As he demonstrates, both these definitions were used by US policy makers to lower expectations about democratic regimes. However, with his focus on the similarities, Robinson misses Dahl’s major revisions of Schumpeter’s minimalist definition. The first revision is the separation of the ideal notion of democracy from the down-to-earth polyarchies. With this conceptual dualism, Dahl re-introduced the classical doctrine of democracy in the theoretical sphere,
albeit in the guise of an ideal-type. According to Schumpeter, the ideal of the classical
document of democracy does not carry any political and scientific meaning, but for Dahl
(1971) it functions as a yardstick to measure the relative ‘democraticness’ of a regime (p.
8).

The second revision is even more important. Although Dahl (2006) is in line with
Schumpeter’s procedural definition, he considers Schumpeter’s criteria for democracy
insufficient (p. 131). To be classified as a democracy by Dahl (1971), a regime should
satisfy eight conditions: “1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of
expression  3. Right to vote  4. Right of political leaders to compete for support
elections 8. Institutions for making government policies that depend on votes and other
expressions of preference” (p. 3). Actually, this second revision follows from the first
one. Once the democratic ideal is not rejected as fictive nonsense and becomes a
yardstick to measure the amount of relative democracy, the presence of competitive
elections for choosing the executive office becomes insufficient for classifying a regime
as a democracy.

Recalling Schumpeter’s closing words in the fourth part of his book, “In any case,
that democracy will not mean increased personal freedom. And, once more, it will mean
no closer approximation to the ideals enshrined in the classical doctrine” (Schumpeter,
1962, p. 302), the contrast between Dahl and Schumpeter becomes more evident.
Whereas Schumpeter decreases expectations about democracies for the sake of realism,
Dahl who has already reserved the term for an ideal regime, poses even more demanding
conditions.
Followers of Dahl have continued to pose additional criteria for distinguishing democracies from autocracies: the absence of veto power by the unelected (Schmitter, 1991, p. 81); reserved domains of authority and policy making (Valenzuela, 1990); rule of law (J. J. S. Linz, Alfred, 1996); alternation of governing parties (Przeworski, 2000, pp. 25-29); horizontal accountability (G. O'Donnell, 1998); and basic economic and social security (G. O'Donnell, 2004). In this way, scholars working on democratization have moved away step-by-step from Schumpeter’s definition back to what he had termed as the classical doctrine of democracy. Scott Mainwarring’s (2001) description of Schumpeter’s definition as “subminimal” shows the distance covered in this journey (p. 38).

This conceptual distancing from Schumpeter has certainly been noticed by scholars (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Michael Coppedge, 2007; Møller & Skaaning, 2013). Coppedge interprets the addition of new criteria as the ‘thickening’ of the concept and underlines the division of labor between the thick and thin definitions of democracy. Thinner definitions have no problems of applicability and in this way research with a large number of cases can be conducted (Michael Coppedge, 2007, pp. 110-112). On the other hand, the need for a thick concept is seldom justified. Collier and Levitsky (1997) consider the formulation of more precise definition as an attempt to “seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate.” (pp. 443-445). But they do not explain what specifically makes these very cases inappropriate for being labeled as democracies. A similar gap exists in Coppedge’s (2007) justification:
“Because more and more developing countries now satisfy the rather minimalist existing requirements for democracy, it is difficult not to notice that some of these political systems have disturbing characteristics that seem intuitively inconsistent with democracy. Some scholars therefore remind us of components of democracy that have been dropped or taken for granted in the past fifty years and quite understandably call for them to be restored or made explicit” (p. 217).

No information is given about what is “intuitively inconsistent” with democracy. According to Mainwaring, accepting Schumpeter’s criterion as a sufficient condition for democracy will not “do justice to the word” (Mainwaring, Brinks, & Perez-Linan, 2007, p. 133).

The scholarly body of work on democratization- as well as development- is the offspring of the literature on modernization. Given this, an analysis of the development literature sheds helpful light on the literature on democratization.

In their analysis of worldwide industrialization efforts, Arrighi et al. (2003) draw upon Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of illusio (pp. 21-22). According to Bourdieu, to catch up with social groups with higher cultural capital, groups with lower cultural capital start to invest their resources to obtain the credentials with which the superior groups legitimize their superiority. Bourdieu calls this strategy as illusion because it does not improve the social status of the previously inferior groups but simply results in the overabundance of hitherto precious credentials and the blurring of the lines of distinction between superior and inferior groups. To protect their status, groups traditionally associated with higher cultural capital change the rules of the game of status attainment, and engage in a new symbolic struggle.
According to Arrighi et al. (2003), up until the 1960’s, being industrialized was a precious credential with which the high income countries explained the differences in the wealth of nations. However, the waves of industrialization after the 1960’s did not decrease inter-country income inequality, precisely for the reasons Bourdieu refers to. When too many countries started to industrialize, the United States and other high-income countries switched from industrialization to financialization, leaving the rest of the world with the devalued industrial capital. Countries that were able to financialize their economy could not only distinguish themselves from the industrial world symbolically, but also reap the economic benefits of being financial centers where the profits of industrial capital were transferred.

A similar movement can be observed in the process of democratization. Up to the late 1980’s, democracy was the distinguishing feature of wealthy capitalist countries, and with the democracy promotion strategies explained by Robinson (1996), all countries were encouraged to democratize in the same way that they were encouraged to industrialize. But in the early 1990’s, with the dissolution of Latin American dictatorships and collapse of the Soviet Union, being a ‘democracy’ lost its distinguishing capacity and helped only to blur the lines between high income capitalist countries and the rest of the world. It was at this time that academics writing about democratization tried to distinguish traditional democracies from the new ones, engaging in what in Bourdieu's terms could be called a new symbolic struggle. Of course, unlike the switch from industrial to financial capital, the distinctions within formal democracies did not produce immediate economic benefits for the North American and Western European countries. However, changing- or narrowing- the definitions (and thereby the rules of the game) not
only helped to preserve the symbolic superiority of formerly democratic countries, but also gave them moral justification for intervening in the political affairs of the new democracies.

The outcome of these symbolic struggles in the academic literature was an inflation of the number of categories into which democracies fulfilling Schumpeter’s criteria were (re)classified. One of the initial solutions was to use the adjective ‘unconsolidated’. It underlined the fact that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in these countries was not yet complete. Although unconsolidated regimes were on the democratic path, a retreat was always a possibility, or worse, they experienced frequent attempts to restore the authoritarian order. To rephrase the widely used definition of Juan J. Linz and Stepan (1996) democracy was still not “the only game in the town”. The ‘unconsolidated’ feature also referred to the troubled characteristics, or relics from the authoritarian past, of these regimes, such as laws constraining civil liberties or institutions with which the military can intervene in the political process.

From the mid-1990’s onwards, scholars started to question the adjective ‘unconsolidated’ as well. O’Donnell (1996) criticized its teleological character and indicated that it implied a transitory status for unconsolidated democracies. According to him democracies in Latin America belonged to a different species- which he called “delegative democracies” (1994). Objecting to the all-purpose use of “democratic consolidation”, Andreas Schendler (1998) suggested restricting its usage only to issues related to the survival of democracy. Merkel (2004) used the term “defective democracies”, which Mainwaring (2007) rejected with the argument that a ‘defective’ democracy is not a democracy at all and suggested “semi-democracy” instead. Over the
last decade, attempts at classification dropped the name of democracy altogether and started to consider these regimes as variants of authoritarianism: competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, 2010), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2013), electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2009) and semi-dictatorship (Brooker, 2000).

Sub-classification and ranking attempts reached their apogee with Møller and Skaaning (2013) and Merkel (2004), who tried to synthesize existing classifications. Møller creates four different categories of democracies. Regimes satisfying only Schumpeter’s criteria are classified as minimal democracies; the ones with fair and inclusive elections are named as electoral democracies; the additional presence of civil liberties without deficiencies would promote these regimes to the rank of polyarchies. Finally, if a regime also satisfies the rule of law criterion, then it is considered a liberal democracy. Merkel similarly distinguished five different types of democracies: regimes satisfying all necessary conditions (inclusive elections, civil and political liberties, horizontal accountability and effective power to govern) are grouped under embedded democracies. If certain segments of the population are excluded from polls, then the regime is an exclusive democracy; if constitutional norms are frequently violated then we have an illiberal democracy. The powerlessness of the legislature and the judiciary vis-a-vis the executive is the sign of a delegative democracy. And finally, lack of effective power to rule indicates a domain democracy.

These definitional variants have been imported into the scholarly literature on the nature of the Turkish political regime. Acemoglu (2014) and Aknur (2012) consider Turkey to be an ‘unconsolidated but consolidating’ democracy in the original sense of the
word, whereas Heper (1992), Özbudun (1999), Öniş (2009) and Aydin-Duzgit (2013) use the concept to highlight the authoritarian elements of the Turkish regime and its troubled character. Romano (2006), Somer (2014) and Tugal (2013) consider Turkey to be a ‘semi-democracy’. Turkey is according to Eder (2013) a ‘suboptimal democracy’, according to Yılmaz (2014) a ‘defective’ one, whereas Yalçın (2006) and Özel (2003) prefer the adjective ‘illiberal’. McLaren and Cop (2011) try to explain the failure of Turkish democratization and when Kirişçi (2014) comments on the recent municipal election results, he talks about the victory of ‘electoral democracy’ but not of ‘liberal democracy’.

Counting 550 different adjectives utilized to distinguish between democratic regimes, D. Collier and Levitsky (1996) warned comparativists about the danger of miscommunication resulting from the competition to find a new famous phrase to describe the same phenomena. In 2005, Armony and Schamis (2005) criticized the “terminological Babel”. Today, it can be argued that the potential dangers they indicated have become part of the scholarly reality. One of the starting points of this study, however, is the argument that the real danger is not miscommunication and fruitless competition amongst the students of democratization but their unchallenged consensus on the conceptualization of democracy. Regardless of the apparent disagreements about the exact terms or designations, all of them establish insurmountable walls between the regimes of the global North and South. It is this consensus which represents in three senses a regression from Schumpeter’s earlier definition.

To begin with, the main merit of Schumpeter’s definition was its realism. Developing additional necessary conditions for democracy reduces its applicability to
most of the newly emerging democracies. Table 1-1 compares the distribution of regimes in the world according to Møller and Skaaning (2013). Only 15% of the states with a population of more than one million are completely democratic and this corresponds to 27% of the regimes which are classified as a sort of democracy. Moving from the number of states to population as the basis of comparison decreases the percentage of liberal democracies to 11.1% of all regimes (20% of all democracies). Hence, depending on the basis of comparison, deficient democracies constitute 70-80% of all democracies - not to mention the regimes classified as autocracies.

TABLE 1-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF DEMOCRACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Polyarchy</th>
<th>Electoral</th>
<th>Minimal</th>
<th>Autocracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of States</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage in all Regimes</strong></td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage in Democracies</strong></td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (millions)</strong></td>
<td>785</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>3107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage in all Regimes</strong></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage in Democracies</strong></td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Møller and Skaaning (2013) ** with population larger than 1 million

The second virtue of Schumpeter's definition is its openness to operationalization, enabling us to distinguish autocracies from democracies. Actually, as Schumpeter (1962) concedes, providing a clear-cut distinction between these two regimes is not possible even with his definition: “there is a continuous range of variation with which the
democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible steps” (p. 271). And with each additional criterion invented by his adherents, the problem of finding a cut-off point has become even more difficult.

If the problem were essentially a problem of measurement and finding the right cut-off point, it would not be doomed to a regression but might spark off a productive debate concerning the measurement of certain concepts. However, the crux of the problem lies somewhere else. Since the additional categories are not introduced out of theoretical necessity but invented to justify the argument that Northern democracies are different from- and superior to- the Southern ones, they are inevitably loaded with contradictions. A look at the United States and Germany, constituting half of the population of liberal democracies according to Møller, should illustrate the point. According to Møller (2013), these two countries have highly inclusive elections with integrity (p. 148). Concerning inclusion, in Germany approximately 8.4% of the voting-age population is excluded from the polls. In the United States, given the large number of illegal immigrants, non-resident citizens, and felony disenfranchisements, this ratio is probably even higher. In contrast to these paradigmatic cases of liberal democracy, Turkey, “the deficient democracy”, deprives less than 1% of the voting age residents from electoral rights. Moreover, in spite of what happened during the counting process in the 2000 presidential elections, the US electoral system is still classified as a system with

---

2 Calculated from Johnson (June 6 2009)
3 There is no accurate calculation of voting-age legal and illegal residents in US without voting rights. However, according to IDEA (2014) the voting age population in United States is approximately 241 million. Rytina (2012) estimates the number of legal residents as 13 million, whereas Passel (2013) estimates the number of illegal immigrants to be around 11.7 million. Assuming the proportion of adults in these populations is not different than the US ratio -76.3%, there are 18.9 million non-citizen adult residents. Adding 5.9 million citizens (The Sentencing Project (2010)), who are disenfranchised because of their felonies, to this number will give around 10.3%. However, the record-level difference between the registered voters (194 million) and voting age population (241 million) the proportion of disenfranchised people in United States indicates that even this is an underestimation IDEA (2014).
high integrity. Armony (2005) gives other examples from France and Italy: the reserved prerogatives of the French presidents blur the distinction between France and so-called unconsolidated democracies, and Berlusconi’s Italy could be easily classified as a delegative democracy. Sweden has been ruled for 63 years by the same Social Democratic Party, most of the policies of European states are decided by unelected bureaucrats, and in Great Britain during the Thatcher era, political power was concentrated in the hands of the executive office (pp. 115-118).

To turn to the third advantage of Schumpeter’s definition, because of the way “deficient democracies” are conceptualized, it is not possible to analyze the political process in a dynamic way. In most of the studies, unconsolidated or semi-democracies are treated like a laundry bag where all countries not fitting the ideal type are lumped together without any differentiation. Countries are grouped together in this category not because of what they have in common—rather their common denominator is what they don’t have compared to the democracies of the North. So the regimes are conceptualized to be either in a slow and painful (or sometimes rapid and astonishing) one-dimensional transition to the liberal democratic camp, or mostly caught in the trap of semi-democracies. In the latter case, despite many political changes, the regime remains essentially the same.

Compared to the widespread carelessness in the use of notions like semi-democracies or unconsolidated democracies, Merkel’s attempt to distinguish amongst defective democracies could be considered an improvement, even though he builds his sub-categories in line with the former approach. However, after establishing a checklist with four conditions, he defines one subtype of hybrid democracy for each missing
condition, making it possible to link each version of the defective democracies to embedded democracy - the central concept - in a way not different from the consolidation approach. If the defective democracy succeeds in fulfilling the missing condition(s), it would be promoted to the rank of embedded democracy. Conversely, if the embedded democracy fails to satisfy one of the criteria, it is considered to be a specific type of defective democracy, depending on the missing attribute. Since hybrid types are not linked to each other, there is no room for a transition from one version of defective democracy to another.

In other words, artificially separating Northern democracies from Southern ones conceives change, at best, as a teleological transition to liberal democracy or does not conceptualize change at all. Although Schumpeter did not attempt to classify different forms of democracy or autocracy, his definition is more suitable to explain variation and change compared to all the post-1970 definitions. The motivation to distinguish Northern democracies from the Southern ones produced a grey zone within which the movements and transitions cannot be theorized. Schumpeter’s advantage is the absence of this self-imposed grey zone. To get rid of all the conceptual barriers, what needs to be done is to return to Schumpeter’s minimalist definition and refuse to treat Northern democracies as a different or special species.

A return to Schumpeter’s definition does not prevent one from comparing the relative ‘democraticness’ of various regimes. Actually, from his definition and implicit discussion throughout the book, it is possible to infer two distinct variables with which one can map various regimes with a democratic claim: the competitive struggle and the power to decide.
Schumpeter’s (1962) understanding of political competition is not different from that of economic competition. In the economic sphere, monopoly is a competition-free environment. However, the presence of perfect competition, where everybody is free to enter every industry or sector is neither desirable nor possible. The same is true for the political sphere. What distinguishes democracy from other regimes is not the degree of competition but the type of competition; that is, electoral competition. Electoral regimes differ from one another in terms of the degree to which the government can be challenged. Democraticness in this sense is therefore gradational. It is important not to confuse the freedom to challenge the government by electoral means with the presence of civil liberties. Certainly, the extent of individual freedoms is interrelated with the degree of democraticness. However, democracies do not guarantee civil liberties, and therefore the extent of civil liberties cannot be interpolated from the extent of democratization. The indicator of democraticness is the freedom to compete “for political leadership by presenting himself to the electorate” (p. 272).

The second constitutive dimension of Schumpeter’s (1962) definition is the power to decide. When he compares constitutional monarchies with the parliamentary ones, he states that the presence of elections is not sufficient for a regime to be classified as a democracy since the parliaments “lack the power to impose their choice as to the governing committee” (p. 270). In an ideal democracy, the electorate elects all ministers directly. Since, according to Schumpeter, this is only possible at the local level, he considers the ability to elect the president directly an indicator of an ideal type. Even British parliamentarism, with a more indirect procedure for electing politically the most powerful person (the prime minister) could be considered an ideal case. In contrast,
France where the members of the parliament have a greater capacity to resist the prime minister—but the prime minister has no prerogative to dissolve the parliament—is considered to be a deviation from the democratic ideal.

Nevertheless, parallel to Schumpeter’s (1962) position on perfect competition, the logical extreme of this dimension—a regime where the elected have the power to decide about everything—is again neither possible nor desirable. In contrast, the success of the democratic method depends on the self-restraint of the elected not to interfere in issues which require expertise, and in the existence of a bureaucracy, that is “strong enough to guide and, if need be, to instruct the politicians who head the ministers”, i.e., “it [the bureaucracy] must be a power in its own right” (p. 293). For this reason, Schumpeter does not hesitate to designate the United Kingdom in the 19th century, where the House of Lords had the power to reject any bill proposed by the House of Commons, as democratic. Concerning this dimension, his understanding of democracy is again gradational. Regimes where aristocrats can block the elected and where the bureaucrats can instruct them are still called democracies (pp. 273-280).

Figure 1.1 shows the two dimensions of democracy according to Schumpeter’s definition. Since maximum freedom to compete electorally and maximum power to decide are unattainable, they are referred to as impossible democracies. If the competition or the power to decide falls below a certain degree, then we enter the domain of autocracies. In between we have the zone of really existing democracies.
Defining the Regime

Schumpeter’s two dimensions can be the starting point of a conceptual grid to map and rank different democratic regimes and to distinguish them from autocratic ones. But a clarification of the notion of ‘regime’ is necessary before that. As Gerardo (1996) states in his detailed study on the conceptualization of regimes, what is understood by a regime is not clearly defined in the literature on comparative politics (pp. 5-6). According to Munck, comparativists use ‘regime’ as a concept in two different senses, which he considers the two dimensions of the concept: procedural and behavioral. The procedural dimension concerns formal and informal rules about: a) the number and type of people who are allowed access to governmental positions; b) the method of access; and c) the rules that are followed in making publicly binding decisions. The behavioral dimension is related to major actors’ strategic acceptance and not axiomatic rejection of the
procedures. The procedural dimension is related to the studies of democratic transition and the behavioral dimension is related to the studies of democratic consolidation.

This study draws upon Munck’s definition of the regime, but only partially. Munck’s behavioral dimension is related to the consolidation of democracy, and as argued in the previous section, our study is based on the rejection of the concept of consolidation. So the behavioral dimension identified by Munck is not part of the analysis of the Turkish regime in this study.

Munck states that the first two aspects of the procedural definition refer to people’s relationship with governmental institutions, whereas the third aspect refers to inter-governmental distribution of power. He proposes a two dimensional model and states that if the first two aspects refer to the vertical dimension of the procedural definition, the last one refers to its horizontal dimension. His conceptualization of the procedural definition is parallel to the two dimensions mentioned in the previous section.

How can one distinguish different types of the same regime? According to Munck (1996), the comparative politics literature uses two different methods: neutral addition and creation of hybrid forms. In neutral addition, an additional criterion is used to distinguish different forms of the same regime. The hybrid form approach, on the other hand, considers different forms of regimes as poles and defines subtypes of regimes in terms of closeness or remoteness from the poles (pp. 16-20).

This study differs from Munck in its usage of the criteria to differentiate between various types of democratization. To differentiate democratic regimes from one another, I employ Schumpeter’s two criteria - that he uses to distinguish democratic regimes from non-democratic ones - in a slightly modified form. Exclusion and inclusion, and the
balance between the elected and appointed (non-elected) constitute the two axes of my conceptual grid.

Inclusion is one of the two dimensions in Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of democratic regimes. For Dahl the basic measure of inclusion is the extension of suffrage. Historically, suffrage has certainly been an important demand of the struggle for democratic rights. However, I do not use extension of suffrage as the criterion for measuring the inclusiveness of a democratic polity for two reasons. First, the suffrage criterion is not used consistently, with the clearest example being that of women’s suffrage. As Paxton (2000) reminds us, considering women’s suffrage as a criterion for democratization would change the results for most of the research in the literature. Switzerland was the first country to recognize universal male suffrage but recognized universal suffrage only in 1971, seven years later than Sudan, and was the last in Europe. Second, the relationship between extension of suffrage and democratization is also contingent. In Britain, enfranchisement of working classes went hand in hand with democratization of the country, whereas in Bismarckian Germany, Bonapartist France, and Kemalist Turkey, universal suffrage was the harbinger of a subsequent authoritarian period.

Although Schumpeter considers the freedom to participate in the electoral process as a measure of the democraticness of a regime, he does not give any hint about its operationalization. I use the barriers against party formation as the indicator of this variable. The more parties compete for elections without any restrictions, the more

---

4 With the exception of the principality of Liechtenstein. In Liechtenstein, women’s right to vote in national elections was granted as a result of the 1984 referendum. Previously, there had been three referendums in 1968, 1971 and 1973 on the issue of women’s suffrage (Paxton, Bollen, Lee, & Kim, 2003, p. 98).
inclusionary the regime becomes. Conversely, the regime becomes more exclusionary as more constraints are imposed on parties. In this way we can rank various regimes along an exclusion-inclusion axis. To determine the regime’s position along the inclusion and exclusion axis, I look at banned or outlawed political parties. A high ratio of outlawed parties to the number of parties participating in the elections signifies an exclusionary regime. Along this axis we can mark five possible locations: (1) no competition (zero parties) (2) single party regime (3) a multi-party system with a large number of outlawed parties (4) a multi-party system with a low number of outlawed parties, and (5) a multi-party system without any legal barriers to party formation. A move from (1) to (5) is a move from complete exclusion (EX) to complete inclusion (INC) and vice versa.

The second axis actually corresponds to what Munck defines as the horizontal relationship between different governmental positions. However, Munck uses it to distinguish democracies from non-democracies, whereas this study uses the criterion to distinguish amongst different forms of democracies.

Valenzuela (1990) distinguishes consolidated democracies from unconsolidated democracies by emphasizing the absence of tutelary prerogatives and reserved domains for the military (pp. 7-11). Przeworski (1988, pp. 60-61) and Merkel (2004, p. 41) also consider effective power to govern as a condition of democracy. However, no specific research so far has used this criterion to differentiate different forms of democracies from one another.

Mazzuca (2010) distinguishes between two different concepts: access to power and exercise of power. He claims that most of the literature on democratization concentrates on access to power: freedom of press, suffrage, free and fair elections, and
freedom of organization among others. But the exercise of political power is as important as the access thereto. To use Mazzuca’s terminology, the EL-NEL axis in this study is not about the access to power but its exercise. While examining the exercise of political power however, Mazzuca uses Weberian categories and distinguishes between clientalistic and bureaucratic regimes (pp. 341-343).
In contrast to Mazzuca and Valenzuela, what I distinguish in this study is the power of the elected representatives. Simply put, the minimal condition for a democracy is elections. There are again five possibilities: (1) nobody is elected (2) the elected have no executive or legislative powers but provide merely consultative services (3) the chief executive is elected but his control over the bureaucratic apparatus is limited (4) the bureaucracy is subordinate to the elected (5) all important posts in the bureaucracy are assigned as a result of elections. In this way we can create a second axis with the poles of

---

**Figure 1-2 Theoretically Possible Regimes**

In contrast to Mazzuca and Valenzuela, what I distinguish in this study is the power of the elected representatives. Simply put, the minimal condition for a democracy is elections. There are again five possibilities: (1) nobody is elected (2) the elected have no executive or legislative powers but provide merely consultative services (3) the chief executive is elected but his control over the bureaucratic apparatus is limited (4) the bureaucracy is subordinate to the elected (5) all important posts in the bureaucracy are assigned as a result of elections. In this way we can create a second axis with the poles of
maximum electoral control (EL) and maximum control of the appointed or non-elected personnel (NEL).

For a concrete analysis of regimes based on this conceptualization, it is possible to imagine a 5x5 table as in Figure 1.2. Given the limits of democracy under capitalism, Column A and Row 5 do not refer to cases possible for actually existing bourgeois democracies. The four squares B4, B3, C4, C3 are possible modes within this type of democracy. We can name these modes as inclusionary parliamentary, exclusionary parliamentary, inclusionary tutelary and exclusionary tutelary respectively.
For the purposes of this study, the finer distinctions between different forms of non-democratic regimes are not relevant. The main argument here is that once the regime enters the zone of democracy, authoritarian periods - whether long or short - are mechanisms of transition from one mode of democracy to another. For this reason, the first and second rows will be considered as one row. Similarly, Columns D and E will be considered as one column. In this way we obtain Figures 1.3 and 1.4.

Figure 1-4 Quadrants of the Turkish Regime

Figure 1-3 traces the regimes’ trajectory in a detailed way because it enables us to distinguish between different types of authoritarian transitions. Figure 1-4, on the other
hand, provides a more abstract view and enables us to distinguish between different modes of democratization without taking non-democratic periods into account. We cannot see the temporary transitions but we can define and compare different modes of democracy.

As can be seen, the criteria used to locate the regime are not formal rules but the practice of the operating institutions. However, that does not mean that formal rules are unimportant. On the contrary, the very notion of the modality implies that each mode of democracy has a “different spirit” and a different set of laws, even if the spirit cannot be directly read from the laws. For this reason, I consider a new constitution as the definitive sign of a new regime. For the narrative of each regime then, I consider the formation of a new constitution as the starting point of a new phase.

Figure 1-4 periodizes important turning points in Turkish political history which I discuss in Chapter 2 in detail. For now, it is sufficient to underline the two main arguments of this study on Turkish democracy. First, contrary to the portrayal of the Turkish regime as a stagnant, trapped, defective democracy, it is a dynamic regime, that has over time experienced all four modes of bourgeois democracy. Second, its course cannot be summarized as a slow democratization process, but a patterned de-democratization process. To understand the reasons behind this pattern, the next step should be the clarification of the relationship between coups and democracy.

**Coups d’Etat and Democracies**

In their research on worldwide coups between 1950 and 2010, Powell and Thyne (2010) define coups as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” (p. 252). This definition is the starting
point for this study, but it does not include autogolpes (self-coups). In Andrew Arato’s (2003) words an auto-golpe is a “coup or revolution carried out by a legitimate authority in place” (p. 423). Peruvian president Fujimori’s suspension of the parliament in 1992 is the best known example of an autogolpe. Despite their undertheorized status, auto-golpes constitute 40% of all democratic breakdowns between 1950-2004 (Maeda, 2010, p. 1130). This study includes an extended version of autogolpes into the domain of coups. Hence not only dissolving parliaments but also ending competition among parties by outlawing all forms of parliamentary opposition is considered a coup. The definition of the coup therefore is: illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive or to dissolve institutions, mechanisms and organizations necessary to change the sitting executive by electoral means.

An important assumption of the current literature on democratization is the incompatibility of democracy with coups. Beginning with McAllister’s (1961) and Huntington’s (1962) notion of the “praetorian state,” coups were seen as typical symptoms of unstable regimes “oscillat[ing] between extreme democracy and tyranny” (Huntington, 1965, p. 417). Since Juan Linz’s Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (1978), coups are considered to be typical examples of democratic breakdown Muller (1985); Schedler (1998, p. 97). Although Mainwaring (2001, p. 49) and Przeworski (2000, p.68) have respectively discussed the 1979 coup in Paraguay and the 1960 coup in Turkey which resulted in a democratic regime, the literature is generally silent on democratic consequences of coups with the exception of Varol’s article (2012), the historical context of which I discuss in the conclusion.
The assumed incompatibility of democracy with coups can also be observed in the attempts to define consolidated democracies, the condition for which, according to Linz (1990), is democracy being “the only game in the town,” and for Przeworski (1991) “when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions.” (p. 26). Munck (1996) has a weaker sufficient condition- no categoric rejection of the democratic norms (p. 6).

The extensive literature on democratic breakdown provides a variety of explanations for the collapse of democratic regimes. For Huntington (1965) it is the result of over-politicization of the military and over-mobilization of the society. O’Donnell (1978) has explained the rise of authoritarianism with the unsustainability of the populist developmentalist project. In Linz’s model (1978), democratic breakdown is the outcome of a chain reaction involving economic or political crisis, opportunistic attempts of opposition parties to deepen the crisis, and finally a loss of the population’s faith in the democratic method. For Collier and Hoeffler (2005), the most important variable is poverty, which explains Africa’s leadership in the league of coup-vulnerable countries.

Classifying coups as categorically anti-democratic and explaining their occurrence with different forms of crises leads one to the conclusion that democracy can flourish only in crisis-free environments. Not surprisingly, this was also one of the basic tenets of the modernization literature. In Some Social Requisites of Democracy, one of the earliest articles specifying the necessary conditions for democracy, Lipset (1959) argued that democracy could be the crowning step of a social differentiation process. Przeworski (2000) has recently affirmed this argument with a modification: there is not a necessary link between democracy and economic prosperity. However, the survival
chances of democracy in wealthy countries are much higher compared to those with a lower GNP per capita (pp. 136-137).

Although the literature on the damage done to democracy by coups in the developing world is immense, so far nothing has been written on the emergence of the Fifth Republic in France and the transition leading thereto —yet another indicator of the double standards in evaluating democracies of the global North and South. De Gaulle’s rise to presidency would have been unthinkable without Pierre Lagaillarde’s coup on May 13, 1958. However, the outcome of this coup was again a democracy with an institutional setting much less favorable to the Communist Party of France. If coups are so antithetical to democracy, how could the 1958 coup function as the midwife for another democratic regime? The same question can be posed for the 1960 coup in Turkey and mutatis mutandis for the one in 1980.

Turkish political history poses two other challenges to the classification of coups as categorically anti-democratic. If democratic regimes and coups belong to different worlds, one would expect the post-coup, allegedly ‘new’ regimes to be qualitatively different from their predecessors. Yet in 1946, the transition from the so-called Kemalist authoritarianism to a multi-party democracy took place without a single constitutional change. How can a smooth transition like this be explained? An equally smooth transition in the other direction also needs explanation. With the 1997 coup, the army was able to topple the government—again without a single constitutional change. How can democratic and allegedly dictatorial regimes operate within the same legal constitutionally

---

5 Ben-Eliezer (1998) could be considered as the only exception. However, even he does not consider it a coup but a revolt (p. 324).
framework? All these counter examples show that the relationship between coups and democratic regimes is far more complicated than is usually assumed.

The incapacity of democratic regimes to solve economic and political crises is also underlined by Schumpeter (1962). However, unlike his contemporary followers, Schumpeter did not see temporary dictatorships irreconcilable with the democratic principle. In cases of emergency, the democratic method of competitive struggle for leadership can temporarily cede its place to monopolistic leadership practices. A temporary monopolistic practice would mean merely a suspension of democracy, whereas a monopolistic practice without a time limit would mean its abrogation (p. 296).

Although Schumpeter does not mention coups even once, his distinction between suspension and abrogation of the democratic principle enables one, as this study does, to distinguish two different types of coups: one that ends the regime and one that protects it. However, the absence or presence of a constitutionally defined legal time limit should not be the criterion. If shifting from competitive to monopolistic leadership is constitutionally permitted, the switch to monopolistic rule should not even be considered as suspension of the democratic principle, but as an integral process of the democratic system. A suspension should be something exogenous to the institutional rules of the regime, like a coup or autogolpe violating the constitution. In this sense, the difference between abrogating and suspending democracy should be searched somewhere else. Regime changes could be a better alternative criterion. Coups that change or abolish the constitution should be considered as abrogative coups, whereas coups which simply bypass or freeze the constitution should be considered as protective coups- aimed at
protecting the status quo in terms of balance of power amongst the major actors of the regime.

Furthermore, not all coups that abolish the old constitution signal the beginning of an autocratic period. As in the case of the 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey, it could well be that coups abolishing an established democratic regime would form another one, albeit with a different institutional configuration. Hence it is possible to establish three different categories of coups:

1. Autocratic Coups: coups that replace a democratic regime with an autocratic one.
2. Protective Coups: coups that aim to preserve the social and political balance in the existing regime.
3. Transformative Coup: coups that not only abolish the existing regime but also found a new one.

Abandoning the simplistic equation of coups with breakdown of democracy and identifying the role played by coups in crisis resolution and regime changes enables us to discover a pattern in Turkish coups over the course of the twentieth century. Since the 1908 Revolution, which was a transformative coup itself, every transformative coup had been followed by a protective coup.

Differentiating the coups according to their role in regime protection and change does not help specify the conditions which lead to coups and secure the latter’s success (or failure). Similarly, the relationship between the coups and the direction of regime change also remains unexplained. To answer these questions, coups and regime crises should be linked to the competition within the power bloc, and to revolutionary movements of workers and oppressed nationalities.
Democracy and Social Struggles

To map the literature concerning the link between democracy and social struggles, two questions need to be asked: 1) Is there an intrinsic link and positive relationship between social mobilization and democratization? 2) Is there a positive relationship between centralization of capital and political power and revolutionary movements? Depending on the affirmative or negative answer to each question, it is possible to define four distinct positions.

Marx

Marx’s answer to both questions is determined by his understanding of the main dynamics shaping the modern bourgeois society. For him, the separation of the political from the social is characteristic of modern bourgeois society, distinguishing it from the feudal society where both notions were inseparable (1975m, pp. 232-233). The emergence of the state as an entity separate from the society is related to the emancipation of private property and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a separate national class (1998, p. 99). Modern bourgeois world consists of two realms: a Hobbesian civil society, where private interests reign; and a repressive republic with the claim of regulating the bellum omnium contra omnes. Regardless of its separateness from the social and its claims about universality, the state as a repressive entity serves the needs of the property holders.

True democracy for Marx was the end of this divorce, a reunification of the political and the social, but this time, in contrast to the feudal society, under freedom (1975f, pp. 87-91). Since the emergence of the bourgeois republic is strictly connected to
the rise of private property (pp. 175-177), this reunification should involve not only the dissolution of the political realm - the state - but also the civil society (p. 191). In Marx’s early articles, the dissolution of civil society involves democratization of private property (Draper, 1977, p. 91), which was later labeled in Capital as “expropriation of the expropriators” (1975b, p. 750).

Along similar lines, in his early writings, Marx considered universal suffrage a sufficient condition for the dissolution of the abstract bourgeois republic. Accordingly, once the property-less masses acquire the right to vote, the alienation between state and civil society would be overcome. This perspective helps explain Marx’s benevolent attitude towards the Chartists in Britain. However, with his increasing involvement in communist politics, he began to consider abolition of the existing state apparatus as necessary (1975e, pp. 411-412). No doubt certain democratic rights can be won under capitalism, but their presence does not change the politically undemocratic nature of the regime. For example, while writing about Lincoln, Marx described the American political regime as a “democratic humbug” (1975j, p. 562) and likened the functioning of the British parliament to a “safety valve for the effervescing passions of the country”. He subsequently wrote about the ‘embourgeoisment’ of the workers via parliamentary activities.

Nevertheless, for Marx, although true democracy cannot be realized under capitalism, the significance of really existing democracy is more than being a safety valve. In Manifesto of the Communist Party, he refers to “the battle of democracy” as a battle for political power, and capitalism produces and reproduces the battle of democracy on an ever-growing scale. In this battle, the bourgeoisie and the workers have
different demands and different methods. Whereas the former group can accumulate wealth and aspire to membership of the ruling class, the latter is under constant threat of dispossession (1975i, pp. 504, 492-506).

The bourgeoisie’s struggle for democracy is in one sense a struggle for becoming part of the ruling coalition and to increase its power therein. Their political demands vary from representative government and a powerful parliament to a republic and a cheap state with a light bureaucracy (1975i, p. 486).

The struggle for becoming the ruling class is not a struggle between two homogenous classes — the feudal classes on one side and the bourgeoisie on the other. In the Manifesto, Marx outlines the most general outcomes of capitalist development, but refers to the struggle of different bourgeois factions against each other in his analysis of concrete historical periods. For example, in Class Struggles in France, he portrays the attitude of various bourgeois factions towards the state in a more nuanced way. Whereas the nascent segment of the bourgeoisie - the industrial bourgeoisie - prefers a cheap state, the relatively older faction of the bourgeoisie - the financial aristocracy as the main creditor of the state - has an interest in a huge state with immense indebtedness. As a result, financial segments of the bourgeoisie also build alliances with the aristocracy and big landed proprietors. Marx observed a similar competition in the power bloc in England between the Whigs- the aristocratic and more industrially oriented segments of the bourgeoisie - and the Tories, consisting mainly of big landowners (1975h, pp. 327-331)

In contrast to the competing sections of the bourgeoisie, the workers are concerned with resisting exploitation and increasing their organizational capacity to improve their economic conditions. Participation in the political system and seeking
representation in the parliament are all a part of this struggle. Hence the workers’
democratic struggle is centered on inclusion and on the right to contest. The purpose of
political activity is to decrease the level of exploitation or at least to hold it at tolerable
levels (1975c, pp. 335-337; 1975l, pp. 492-493).

To gain the upper hand within the ruling coalition, the bourgeoisie cannot struggle
by itself. It needs either to mobilize the workers or manipulate an already present
mobilization. But to mobilize the workers, the bourgeoisie needs to promise political
inclusion. As stated in the Manifesto: “At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not
fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy,
the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole
historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so
obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.” (p. 496).

Nevertheless, this tactic is not peculiar to the bourgeoisie. Other segments of the
ruling bloc use the same method. If the relationship between the Anti-Corn Law League
and Chartists in Britain is an example of the former case, the relationship between
Bismarck and Lassalleans in Germany is an example of the latter. Engels in The Prussian
Military Question and the German Workers' Party, an article written under Marx’s close
supervision, summarizes the attitude of the decaying and emerging segments of the ruling
classes:

The feudal and bureaucratic representatives of the declining society appeal to the
workers to join them in attacking the blood-suckers, the capitalists, the sole foes
of the worker; the bourgeoisie make it clear to the workers that they jointly
represent the new social era and therefore have a common interest at least with
regard to the declining, old form of society. At about this time the working class then gradually becomes aware that it is a class in its own right with its own interests and its own independent future (1975n, p. 69).

However, the workers’ struggle also assumes revolutionary forms. This possibility denotes the second type of workers’ movements. Whereas the demands of the first type are limited to economic improvement or political demands such as voting rights, the second type of movements make political demands concerning the future of the regime. In this sense, the demands resemble the bourgeoisie’s demands but are more radical. The political goal of such movements need not be the dictatorship of the proletariat; even the demand for a republic can be revolutionary (1975a, p. 285).

Another important component of the revolutionary movements is the petty bourgeoisie, a class consisting mainly of urban artisans and peasants. Unlike workers, who are the “special and essential product” of capital accumulation, the petty bourgeoisie “decay and finally disappear in the face of” the same process. The antagonistic relationship between capital accumulation and class survival explains the explosive and revolutionary character of petty bourgeois movements. However, since petty bourgeoisie is a class with no future, its movement does not have a specific character. Allied with a proletarian movement it can be revolutionary; otherwise, especially in rural areas, the destabilizing movement can rapidly cede its place to a craving for order.

A final note about the petty bourgeoisie should be about its constant reproduction. Although the traditional petty bourgeoisie is constantly ruined, “a new petty bourgeoisie…[is]… formed, which hovers between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and continually renews itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society”. Since capital
accumulation fuels the renewal and decay cycle constantly, the revolutionary dynamic does not leave the sphere of social struggles.

The final component of movements with a revolutionary character is the nationalist movement, which was the most prominent category of revolutionary movements during the 19th century. Since nation-state is the typical state form under capitalism, capital accumulation goes hand-in-hand with nationalist aspirations and encourages them. These movements can do both: either destabilize pre-capitalist empires (as in the case of Polish nationalism and Russia) or weaken capitalist empires (as in the case of Irish nationalism and the British) (1975k, pp. 473-476).^6

However, it is important to note that there is not a Chinese wall between these two movements. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie’s mobilization of workers for the first type of movement paves the way for the second type of movement. A glance at what Marx has written on suffrage movements will reveal this connection. Despite being critical of the parliamentarist movements in Britain and France, and of their degeneration, Marx recognized the revolutionary potential of movements for enfranchisement.

Whereas the first type of workers’ movement arises out of the competition within the ruling bloc, the second type alarms all factions of the bourgeoisie and leads the parliamentary faction of the ruling class to surrender to the authoritarian bloc. Under such a circumstance, the authoritarian bloc has sufficient backing for an assault on the workers’ movements and can move the regime towards a more exclusive position.

---

^6 Up to the 1860’s Marx and Engels did not consider all nationalist movements progressive or revolutionary and distinguished between progressive movements like Polish nationalism and reactionary ones like Slavic nationalism Rozdolski (1986). However as Anderson (2010) demonstrates, starting with his 1853 New York Tribune articles, Marx seemed to drop the category of non-historic people.
Thus, by now stigmatising as “socialistic” what it had previously extolled as “libérât”, the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its own rule; that, in order to restore tranquility in the country, its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be laid to rest; that, in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to enjoy undisturbed property, family, religion and order only on condition that their class be condemned along with the other classes to similar political nullity; that, in order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles (1975g).

It can therefore be stated that the battle of democracy has two interrelated dimensions. On the one hand, it is a struggle among different factions of the power bloc to increase their relative shares in the control over the state apparatus. On the other hand, it is a struggle of oppressed masses for their political rights. The politicization of the former radicalizes the latter. In contrast, radicalization of the latter creates a disincentive for the former. One can even say that an ebb in the latter is a necessary condition for the former (1975d, p. 48).

This sketch of Marx’s understanding is sufficient to answer the two questions at the beginning of this section. As regards to the first question, there is an indispensable but not immediate link between capital accumulation and democratization. The accumulation of capital sparks off at least five different forms of social struggle involving different social actors: 1) between the declining and the rising classes (Bourgeoisie-Aristocracy) 2)
between the aristocratic and nascent factions of the rising classes (Financial and Industrial Bourgeoisie) 3) between workers and factions of the ruling classes 4) of the decaying petty bourgeoisie 5) of an oppressed nation. Moreover, the struggles of the last three segments can assume either a reformist or a revolutionary form depending on their attitude towards the factions of the ruling classes and other oppressed social groups. The trajectory of democracy in a given polity is dependent on the course of these five struggles.

The second question can be answered by remembering the four dynamics of revolutionary movements: 1) mobilization of workers and petty bourgeoisie as a result of conflicts within the power bloc 2) increasing class polarization 3) decay of the petty bourgeoisie and 4) spread of nationalist aspirations. Contrary to widespread beliefs, centralization of capital was not the end of competition for Marx Elliott (1980); Williams (1987, p. 10). Hence what should be expected is not the lessening but escalation of struggles within the power bloc. Similarly, since centralization of capital is accompanied by polarization between classes, the rise of revolutionary workers movements and eruption of petty bourgeois movements should also be the consequence of this process. As regards to the centralization of the state, what is important for Marx is not an increase in the repressive capacity of the state, but developments in the communications and the transport technology, which increase workers’ capacity to unite and resist (1975l, p. 493). Hence the mutual reinforcement of radicalism and state centralization is another tenet of Marx’s theory.
For Max Weber, democracy is a generic term which has a broader meaning than today’s procedural theorists attribute to it. The notion of democracy is closely related to equality, and democratization refers to the leveling of social differences. In other words, in the process of democratization, the politically privileged segments lose their position and previously excluded groups acquire the right to access state power. Hence each process of democratization involves usurpation of power and inclusion of certain segments of the plebes (1961, p. 236). It is important to note that democracy is not a modern phenomenon. Weber refers to two different democratization processes, one in Antiquity and the other in the Middle Ages.

In On the Situation of the Constitutional Democracy in Russia, where he reflected on the future of democracy rather pessimistically, Weber specified four factors responsible for the birth and survival of democracy in Western Europe 1) the capacity to expand overseas and being influenced by the winds from overseas 2) the specific economic and social structure of European countries 3) the rise of rationalism and 4) the Protestant ethic (1994a, pp. 69-70). Downing (1993) summarizes the features Weber considered specific to European economic and social structure as the rule of law, autonomous towns, decentralized military organization and citizenship rights (p. 4). Among these factors, the one related to social struggles is the self-administering towns because Weber explained their emergence with political revolutions, which are the key for each democratization process. To defend themselves, the elites in cities needed to arm the politically excluded segments and this military dependence led to political inclusion.

If we include his observations about the November Revolution in Germany and October Revolution in Russia, we have to refer to three democratization processes.
Hence if one adopts a very long historical perspective stretching from Antiquity to the twentieth century, Weber definitely considers social struggles important for democratization.

Having witnessed two revolutions in Russia and one in continental Europe, and being personally involved in the German Revolution, Weber was certainly aware of the existence and impact of strikes and peasant unrest. Since the Social Democratic Party in Germany was split evenly between the reformist and revolutionary wings, he was also aware of the differences between reformist and revolutionary mass mobilization, and actively supported the former wing (Mommsen, 1990, pp. 111-112). One of Weber’s central assumptions was the conflictual character of any society and he also observed the importance of collective social action in resolving these conflicts. Having strong liberal convictions, Weber was mostly, but not always, for the right of strike. Similarly, in Imperial Germany he was one of the rare Akademiker who recognized the importance of SPD for democratization. He considered social action and party politics as countervailing forces which could prevent – or at least check - bureaucratic domination in the political sphere (Mommsen, 1992a, pp. 65-67).

Nevertheless, although collective social action, and various forms of social conflicts that are not limited to class conflict have an important role in the functioning of a democratic regime, Weber does not explain democratization in the last five hundred years by drawing upon social mobilization. Socialist parties could certainly play a role in the establishment of parliamentary democracy. However this role could not be accomplished by mobilizing the masses but by controlling their mobilization within limits and channeling their interests in politics to the parliamentary negotiation process.
Whereas class struggle was non-essential in promoting democratization, its escalation always blocked the road to democratization and destabilized existing democracies (1994c, pp. 124-125). In this sense, democracy had firmer roots and a more stable character in regions where negotiations outweighed open struggle (Mommsen, 1992c, p. 11).

The essentially negative role of mobilization in the modern phase of democratization for Weber is related to two mutually reinforcing tendencies: centralization and concentration of capital and centralization and concentration of state power, which result in different forms of expropriation. The former separated the small producers from the means of production and implied their loss of control over the production process. The latter, known generally as bureaucratization, entailed the “separation of the official from ownership of the means of administration” (Weber, 1978a, p. 222). However, this separation implied much more than the monarch’s loss over the state apparatus, or the disappearance of the autonomous domains of the feudal nobility. It meant simultaneously the pacification and de-politicization of the citizenry as a result of the increasing distance between state and citizen and the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus (Held, 2006, p. 139). Hence, in contrast to Bürgers in Ständestaaten, the enfranchised masses during modern democratization processes did not join the political system as active participants but only as voters, following the demagogues as lambs following the masters a la Nietzsche8. He named this new type of democracy as plebiscitarian democracy and considered its emergence as an inevitable outcome of capitalist development.

8 For Weber’s Nietzschean perspective on the condition of masses under plebiscitarian regimes see (Warren, 1988, pp. 34-35,44). In contrast Mommsen (1992b, p. 186) claims that Weber did not share the Nietzschean disdain of the masses.
According to Weber, the only way to limit the scope of bureaucratization or slow down its domination of the political sphere is to strengthen the parliament as an independent institution where a class of professional politicians can negotiate with each other and produce legislation relatively independent of the mandate of their voters. Given the modern configuration of the political field, mass mobilization would not politicize masses but on the contrary create a greater incentive to follow the demagogues. That also explains Weber’s criticism of the “irresponsible” radicals in the SPD, who dismissed parliamentary activities and preached mobilization.

Actually, Weber was aware that modern democratization does have an alternative: direct democracy, abolition of the parliamentary and bureaucratic institutions, and active involvement of citizens in all political affairs. Being aware of how closely this alternative resembles the Marxist vision, Weber describes this hypothetical process as “the expropriation of the expropriated” in the political sense (Weber, 1994b, p. 315). Nevertheless, for him, this is only a theoretical alternative and given the enormous size of polities and complexities of political decision making process, this alternative has no applicability. Regardless of the intentions of its defenders, any project towards this goal would not go beyond hopeless attempts to restore the early periods of parliamentarism and would eventually result in an even more bureaucratic regime (1978b).

According to Weber, revolutionary movements, the greatest threat to democracy, could not thrive everywhere but only where the landed aristocracy could resist or dominate capitalist expansion by taking advantage of the centralized state structure to protect their class interests. The combination of a dominant aristocracy or a patrimonial authority, with a weak bourgeoisie provided the most fertile soil for revolutionary
movements (1995). In this sense, only in the early stages of capitalist development could social unrest have a negative role in democratization, it has no future with the progress of capitalist development and bureaucratization. This explains why Weber’s answer to both questions we posed above is negative.

**Schumpeter**

Schumpeter shared Weber’s belief in the absence of a necessary link between social struggles and democratization. To begin with, the democratic method was the outgrowth of the capitalist civilization and stamped with the characteristics of the bourgeoisie (1962, p. 296). Hence by definition, workers, peasants, and oppressed nations had no role in the emergence and advance of the democratic method. Schumpeter even explains the extension of suffrage in Britain, which is not essential for his understanding of democracy, less with the militancy of workers and more with the flexibility and leniency of the upper classes (p. 297).

Second, when he summarizes the history of the success of capitalism, Schumpeter notes that “the world of the lord and the peasant was destroyed primarily by political—in some cases revolutionary—action.” What he has in mind here is the economic world of the lord and the peasant. The peasant had never had a distinct political sphere but the lord had the political world as well. However, between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, Schumpeter does not observe a political battle but a symbiosis. This view is also in harmony with his portrayal of the bourgeoisie as a humble, non-militarist, and almost pacifist class, narrowly focused on economic activities and having no political ambitions at all (pp. 126-129). Naturally then, the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, and hence of the democratic method cannot be explained by a struggle and movement-centered approach.
Likewise, Schumpeter (1962) shares Weber’s belief that with the growth of population and advent of industrialization, the days of participatory democracy were long over. Hence the trend was not towards politicization of the citizens but their de-politicization. When workers entered the arena of bourgeois democracy they acted not as active agents with a desire to restructure the complete political system but as passive voters whose main concern was to improve their economic condition by electing a proper leader (pp. 256-268).

Schumpeter (1962) also had an economic explanation for the subsequent de-politicization he prognoses. He agreed with Marx that class polarization would lead to revolutionary outbreaks, which would jeopardize the survival of the democratic method. Yet he challenged Marx’s prediction concerning the link between capitalist development and pauperization and argued that capitalist development would have the exact opposite outcome, namely class convergence (p. 134). Thus for Schumpeter revolutionary movements were a symptom of the underdevelopment of capitalist development rather than being its consequence. Hence, although not completely written off from the list of possibilities, revolutions according to Schumpeter are unlikely events to occur in the future of capitalism.

**Tocqueville**

The origins of Weber’s distrust of the role played by social mobilization during modern democratization can be traced back to Tocqueville. As a veteran deputy during the 1848 Revolution and the author of one of the most widely-read books on the French Revolution, Tocqueville was no foreigner to social unrest. In fact it is his extensive
knowledge and probably his immediate experience of the Revolution that caused him to cast doubt on any positive outcome of mass-mobilization.

In many respects, Tocqueville was Weber’s predecessor. He was the first to define democracy as the “equality of conditions” (2009, p. 4), and to argue that democracy and liberty are not necessarily connected. Democratization for Tocqueville was a recent process, while the emergence of liberty went back to the towns in the Middle Ages as Weber would argue later (2011, pp. 22-24). Tocqueville’s definition of liberty as a notion with aristocratic origins is also in harmony with Weber’s claim that the most democratic states were city states under feudalism.

Nevertheless, as Kahan (2009) notes, if understood as equality of conditions, the antonym of democracy is aristocracy (p. 37). That is why there is not a necessary link between democratization and social mobilization. In the absence of an aristocracy, as the American example demonstrates, democracy flourishes by itself without any social struggles. “In America, democracy is given over to its own inclinations. Its pace is natural, and all its movements are free” (2009, p. 313). In Europe on the other hand, since there were “two opposing principles,” the advent of democracy necessitated a struggle against the aristocracy. However, as the British example shows, neither mobilization of masses nor complete annihilation of the aristocracy was a necessary condition for the substantial elimination of feudalism (2011, p. 25). In fact, it was not the strength but the weakness of the aristocracy that led to social unrest and eventually to a successful revolt in France.

Tocqueville’s fears about administrative centralization of the state structure as a potential threat to liberty adumbrated Weber’s concerns about the consequences of
bureaucratization. Whereas Weber thought that the parliament, as the representative of private capital, could be the only force to balance the bureaucracy, Tocqueville attributed the same function to the civil society—namely the organizations and associations functioning as a buffer between the state and the individual.

Despite all these similarities however, Tocqueville differed from Weber in evaluating the consequences of state centralization. Contrary to Weber, he conceived it not as a pacifying and depoliticizing dynamic but a politicizing and mobilizing one. In fact, the primary reason behind the French Revolution was the over-centralization of the state that led to politicization of even the problems of daily life. Thus, although he differed in his explanations, Tocqueville shared Marx’s belief that increasing centralization would result in an increase in revolutionary activities.

**Contemporary Studies on Democratization**

After Tocqueville and Weber, the majority of scholars of democratization situated themselves in the line between the two, and chose to ignore the impact of social unrest on the trajectory of democracy altogether. Only a tiny albeit influential minority chose an alternative path. While they agreed with Weber’s prediction concerning the diminishing likelihood of revolutionary political transformations, they differed from him in their emphasis on the role of social mobilization.

In his historical comparison of six different processes of modernization, Barrington Moore (1993) challenged Tocqueville’s and Weber’s arguments concerning the possibility and desirability of gradual democratization. As Moore showed, even British democratization—the most proximate case to the gradualist ideal type—involved revolutionary mobilization. Accordingly, revolutionary struggles and policy changes are
indispensable to the same process. In this sense, the evolutionary development of parliamentarianism in the 18th and 19th centuries could not be understood without taking into account the English Civil War that weakened the position of the crown vis-à-vis the nobility. Similarly, taking the American Civil War into consideration would challenge the Tocquevillian explanation of democracy in America flourishing in the absence of class struggles solely by its own dynamics. Moreover, in his discussion of Japan and Germany, Moore argued that countries with stronger aristocracies able to defend their privileged position and a peasantry unable to mobilize, namely with social structures less favorable for class struggle, followed the fascist road to modernization. Although revolutionary struggle did not guarantee a democratic regime –communism was the alternative path- its absence left fascism as the only option.

Moore’s explicit emphasis on the class struggle led some of his followers to call him a Marxist (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992, p. 23; Skocpol, 1973, pp. 1-2). Although Moore was closer to Marx when he considered the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy as the key variable to understand the course of democratization, he was closer to Weber-Schumpeter when he saw peasant mobilization as the main revolutionary dynamic in explaining modern political change. Weber, and especially Schumpeter, considered the bourgeoisie and also workers as market-dependent and economically minded classes. By neglecting the role of workers in revolutionary and reformist struggles for democratization and in paving the way for a fascist counter-revolution, Moore was in agreement with Schumpeter and Weber, who consider revolutions as an atavistic type of social change. Finally, Moore conceived democracy not as a terrain of class struggle but as one of the destinations of modernization
depending on the type and intensity of class struggles. In this sense, he occupies an intermediary position between Marx and Weber, recognizing the importance of class struggles in democratization, but having no room for them in capitalist-democratic regimes.

In their historical comparative study of democratization in Europe, British settler colonies, and South and Central America, Rueschemeyer et.al (1992) develop a nuanced version of Moore’s account by synthesizing it with Goran Therborn’s (1977) article about the role of the working class. They agree with Moore that the landed aristocracy is the most consistent and persistent anti-democratic class, but they attribute to it a much weaker role in the struggle for democracy (Rueschmeyer1992, pp. 141-142). Like Therborn, they argue that the working class is the key protagonist in democratization. However, unlike him, they underscore that the workers’ struggles by themselves are not sufficient for democratization and inter-class alliances are necessary for successful democratization. Finally, unlike Therborn, they consider the presence of strong socialist or radical movements inhibitory to democratization. These movements and especially their demands intimidate the middle-classes - a potential ally in the struggle for democratization -and isolate and weaken the workers politically. Hence for successful democratization, workers have to compromise with the bourgeoisie and refrain from demands concerning economic equality. After all, democracy is a class compromise.

In their analysis of the emergence of fascist and authoritarian regimes in Western Europe during the inter-war years and coup regimes in Latin America, Rueschmeyer et al. have room for the breakdown of fragile as well as restricted democracies. Even though their analysis also underlines the relationship between revolutionary movements and
democratic breakdown, in their conceptualization the outcomes of capitalist development—a denser civil society and a balance of class forces tilting towards the subordinate classes—will not only make authoritarian regimes in advanced capitalist countries more unstable but also make a reformist transition to democratic socialism more possible. When they are pessimistic about the future of Latin American democracies, it is not because of the dynamics inherent to the capitalist economy or bourgeois society that pave the way for a new revolutionary uprising, but due to external variables like the absence of strong states or the interference of transnational capital.

A different conclusion concerning the relationship between democratization and revolutionary movements has been drawn by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Przeworski (2009). Pressed with revolutionary threats, elites grant democratic reforms just to preserve their class dominance, and these reforms help in co-opting the rebellious segments. Seen from this perspective, democratic advances are the product of the dynamics of capitalist development, but democratization of the system drops the revolutionary option from of the agenda of the working class.

Amongst all the explanations concerning the impact of labor unrest on regime change, the clearest distinction between revolutionary and reformist movements can be found in Giovanni Arrighi’s (1990b) Marxist Century American Century and various related articles. Arguing that Marx has two different explanations for labor unrest, Arrighi distinguishes between reformist unrests that result from growing workers’ power, and revolutionary ones that originate from the bourgeoisie’s unfitness to rule. Accordingly, in advanced capitalist countries where workers had workplace bargaining power and capitalists had already depleted the semi-proletarian labor reserves (Arrighi &
Silver, 1984), workers used their leverage not only to extend their economic rights but also to democratize the system. Reformist movements thus became part of the political regimes in these countries. In countries with large non-proletarian reserves, where the workers lack workplace bargaining power, the condition of workers could only be improved by the acquisition of state power with the help of the non-proletarian segments. Hence these countries became fertile grounds for revolutionary movements which resulted in bureaucratic socialist regimes. In between these two types were countries like Germany and Italy, where the labor movements was strong enough to disrupt capitalist accumulation, but not strong enough to bargain against capitalists, and the outcome was fascism (1985).

According to Arrighi, the fact that reformist movements were dominant in core countries and revolutionary movements were limited to semi-peripheral and peripheral zones of the world-economy does not mean that peripheral and semi-peripheral zones were doomed to autocracies. On the contrary, capital migration from the global North to the South would empower workers in the workplace and give fuel to reformist movements aiming at democratization (1990a; 1984). Following the same line of argument, Silver (2003) explains democratization in Brazil, South Africa and South Korea with labor’s increasing workplace power. Overall though, despite their effort to distinguish different types of revolutionary movements, these explanations also see revolutionary unrest as the result of insufficient capitalist accumulation and resilience of pre-capitalist social categories.

In his account of democratization and de-democratization, Charles Tilly (2007) incorporates contentious movements into the processes underlined by Weber. For Tilly,
democratization depends on three conditions: the elimination of autonomous bases of power by the nation-state, the elimination of categorical political inequalities dividing the population, and the emergence of trust networks connecting people with different cultural identities and socio-economic backgrounds. Depending on the direction of these processes, one can speak of democratization or de-democratization. Contentious political action generally accompanies or precedes both processes and revolutionary movements can move the regime in either direction. However, Tilly also states that democratization combined with increasing state capacity tends to decrease the likelihood of revolutionary movements and limit contentious politics to the domain of peaceful social movements.

Contemporary Literature on Democratization

Contemporary literature on democratization does not consider social movements as a key variable for democratization. Citing the leading figures of this literature including Huntington, Rostow, Linz, and Diamond, Bermeo (1997) underscores the consensus concerning the fear from the masses. Some of them like O’Donnell and Valenzuela appreciate the importance of popular mobilizations in destabilizing authoritarian regimes. However, they too concede that beyond a certain threshold, movements pose a threat to the regime and consolidate the authoritarian coup coalition.

Given that the founding fathers of the contemporary literature on democratization were preoccupied with the rise of authoritarian regimes in the 1960’s and 1970’s, their attitude towards popular mobilization is not surprising. Social movements being threatening to the status quo has been one of the tenets of democratic breakdown theories. Accordingly, although popular mobilization does not necessarily have a positive impact on democratization, its radicalized versions almost always have a negative one on the
transition to and consolidation of democracies. In this sense, contemporary literature is on the same grounds as Tocqueville, Schumpeter, and to a certain extent Weber, as far as their views on the revolutionary movements at the beginning of the 20th century are concerned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marx</th>
<th>Tilly, Arrighi, Moore, Przeworski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tocqueville</td>
<td>Weber, Schumpeter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recurrent | Transient

Relationship between social mobilization and democratization

Figure 1-5 Theorists of Democratization Categorized

Like Tocqueville and Schumpeter, recent writers do not see an intrinsic connection between popular mobilization and the trajectory of the regime. The spread and radicalization of movements harm the regime, but their emergence is not the result of social conflicts related to the battle of democracy. The crisis is instead external. For O’Donnell, it is a crisis of accumulation in which the economic demands of the popular classes cannot be fulfilled; for Huntington (1968, p. 196) it is an institutional crisis whereby the speed of institutional development cannot keep up with the speed of social change and development; for Linz (1978, pp. 50-55) anything can be the cause of the crisis. In all of these accounts, once there is a crisis, it has a political impact on the mobilization of non-elites, and vice versa the movements can deepen the crisis. However,
since the crisis and the subsequent mobilization have no inherent causal connection with previous struggles for democratization, they are exogenously related to the dynamics which change and reproduce the regime.

Depending on an affirmative or negative answer to the questions at the beginning of this section, it is possible to define four distinct positions in the literature as presented in Figure 1-5. For Schumpeter, there is not a necessary connection between popular mobilization and democratization. Although extensive social mobilization undermines the pillars of bourgeois society, the advance of capitalism decreases the likelihood of revolutionary movements and hence secures the stability of the system. In a democratic regime, Weber ascribes to social protest a balancing social function that countervails the bureaucratic dominance. Yet social protest is not necessary for democratization and can be avoided by skillful and responsible politicians. Similarly, neither capitalist development nor democratization leads to politicization. On the contrary, thanks to bureaucratization, both processes result in the pacification and de-politicization of the citizenry. Tocqueville shares with Weber and Schumpeter the belief concerning the absence of an intrinsic relationship between social mobilization and democratization. However, for him, capitalist development and more importantly the centralization of the state apparatus pave the way for revolutionary movements. Most of the contemporary democratization literature falls between Weber and Tocqueville given its neglect of social mobilization or its conceptualization of social movements as an exogenous variable. A minority of scholars in this literature diverge from the Weberian-Schumpeterian line in a direction opposite to Tocqueville. Namely, they consider political mobilization of workers and peasants for democratic rights as a necessary component of democratization.
However, unlike Tocqueville and together with Weber and Schumpeter, they consider the rise of revolutionary movements and resulting domestic political instability not recurrent but transient features of capitalist development.

One of the central theses of this study is that the puzzles of the trajectory of Turkish regime change cannot be explained by these approaches unless one refuses the existence of the puzzle and relegates Turkey to the category of defective democracies. To make sense of the regime changes in Turkey, one has to distinguish different cycles of capitalist accumulation that involve different constellations of power bloc and class struggles. Struggles within the power bloc and between the classes are not only related to each other, but also shape and are shaped by the coups- the midwives of regime change. Without considering social mobilization intrinsically related to regime changes and without acknowledging the capacity of capitalist accumulation to create and destroy reformist and revolutionary movements, in other words without answering the questions at the beginning of the section affirmatively like Marx, such a dynamic understanding is not possible.
Figure 1-6: The Framework of the Study

- **Competition within the Power Bloc**
  - Via coups
  - Limits by consolidation
  - Refuels by "creative destruction"

- **Change of balance between elected and non-elected (inclusionary policies)**
  - Reconfigures the ruling coalition

- **Capitalist Development**
  - Promotes
  - Polarizes, mobilizes, and gives revolutionary impetus

- **Labor Unrest Nationalist Uprisings**
  - Liquidation and depoliticization
  - in case of failure: via coups

- **"Creative Destruction" A New Hegemonic Coalition A New Cycle of Accumulation**

- **Exclusionary Regime Change Repressive Mechanism**
Figure 1-6 summarizes the framework of this study in its most abstract form. Capitalist development promotes two different dynamics simultaneously: competition within the power bloc and mobilization of workers and oppressed nations. Competition within the power bloc politicizes the society, as a result of which mobilization of workers and oppressed nations intensify. With intensified mobilization the movements start to acquire a revolutionary character. At the same time, competition within the power bloc encourages political pursuits in search of a change in the balance of power between the parliament and the bureaucracy. Eventually this change occurs via a transformative coup, which leads to further politicization of the society and prepares a fertile ground for revolutionary movements. However, escalation of revolutionary mobilization threatens the power bloc and applies cohesive pressures on the latter. In addition to revolutionary activities, consolidation of the new ruling coalition as a hegemon decreases the competition as well. Concurrently, revolutionary movements strain the inclusionary regime. If popular movements are successful, then a revolution occurs and completely different dynamics start to shape the regime. If movements are not strong enough, then a different type of coup moves the regime in the exclusionary direction. The new regime eradicates the threatening movements. Nevertheless, neither competition within the power bloc nor popular unrest can be buried forever. Capitalist development, which has been re-fueled by the creative destruction of the previous hegemonic bloc, promotes both dynamics in a new cycle. Additionally, the stamping out of revolutionary movements clears the ground of obstacles to competition and therefore accelerates the rise of a second wave of politicization.
The shortcomings of alternative approaches dismissing the interaction between regime changes and constantly regenerated revolutionary mobilization become more obvious when one looks at how the Turkish regime change is concretely explained. What follows is a summary of these accounts

**Historical Explanations of Turkish Regime Change**

Studies on the trajectory and causes of regime change in Turkey can be classified into two categories: liberal and Kemalist. The two categories certainly have many loaded associations. And, as is the case for most broad categories, the adherents of each do not necessarily share the same perspectives and explanations about social problems; nor do they have similar political attitudes. Nonetheless, those in the same category do share an important common denominator which provides analytical clarity for the purposes of this study: their opinion about the role of Mustafa Kemal, the RPP, and the army in the development of Turkish democracy. To put it simply, Kemalists claim that Mustafa Kemal, the RPP and the army played a *sine qua non* role in the establishment and protection of a democratic regime in Turkey. Liberals hold the opposite view, and consider them among the biggest obstacles to democratization. Historically, the Kemalist approach set the precedent. It emerged in the 1930s, lived its heydays in the 1960’s, and managed to survive until the mid-1990s. The birth of liberal theories corresponds to the late 1960’s and with the demise of Kemalism since the 1990’s, these theories now enjoy an uncontested supremacy in the academia. The purpose of this section is to show that the theoretical and empirical foundations of liberal accounts of democracy are as weak as the Kemalist ones. I argue that the liberals’ neglect of popular unrest - a major factor in shaping modern Turkey and the nature of its regimes - is responsible for this weakness.
The Kemalist Approach

Although Mustafa Kemal was proud of the fact that his actions were not deduced from fixed dogma or frozen principles (Aydemir, 1991, p. 474), the regime he founded needed an ideology for its reproduction. The Kadro movement, comprised of prominent intellectuals of the era like Yakup Kadri, Vedat Nedim, and Sevket Sureyya, was the first well-known and most consistent attempt to formulate this ideology through their periodical of the same name (Türkeş, 2001, p. 464). Although Kadro was closed down by the regime after two years of publication, the principles it formulated remained intact and were subsequently propagated by state institutions.

The Kadro movement did not espouse a theory of democratization. It rather justified the existence of single-party rule in Turkey. The basic assumptions of the Kadro movement can be summarized as follows: Turkey had a different social structure from the western countries and Soviet Russia. The essential difference lay in the absence of modern classes. Both the parliamentarian regimes in Western Europe and the Soviet regime in Russia were different versions of class dictatorships. To reach the classless society, the Turkish Republic should not follow either of the two paths, but establish a regime where the state is completely autonomous from the classes and fight against pre-capitalist classes who constitute the biggest obstacle to a classless society. What was therefore necessary was a strong state, a strong party, and a strong leader (Türkeş, 1998, pp. 105,112-113).

One factor in the emergence and persistence of single-party dictatorship in Turkey was the [British] hegemonic crisis and the bellicose conditions of the era. However, Kemalism did not pass away even after the consolidation of the US hegemony and its defense of so-called democratic regimes against the Soviet Union. Ironically, American
promotion of development studies -which went hand in hand with its anti-communist struggle and is generally referred to as the Princeton Project- solidified Kemalist dominance in the academia (Kansu, 1997, p. 11).

The Princeton project’s main concern was to theorize the passage from traditional to modern society. And being a successful example of modernization, Turkey naturally attracted its attention. What the Princeton School saw in Turkey was rapid urbanization, industrialization, secularization, and the replacement of traditional values with universal ones (Lerner, 1958). Certainly, the development of democracy was also an important part of the modernization process and with the new wave of authoritarianism –the multiplication of single-party regimes between 1952 and 1970- the endurance of the multi-party system in Turkey attracted even more attention. Still, the modernist-developmentalist paradigm of this school was in harmony with the Kemalist assumptions. Single–party rule was a temporary but necessary price to be paid for development and was euphemized as a “tutelary democracy” (Weiker, 1973, pp. 3-4). Accordingly, Turkish modernization depended strictly on Mustafa Kemal’s and the RPP’s vision and their tenacity in applying radical reforms. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal, far from being against democracy, was its true believer. His approval of the founding of the two opposition parties PRP and FP, in 1925 and 1930 respectively, was evidence of this belief (Lewis, 2003, pp. 225-226). No surprises then, that although these parties were banned a few months after their founding, these examples are labeled “Turkish experiments in democracy” (Ahmad, 1977). Finally, the establishment of a multiparty regime in 1946
was taken as another sign of Atatürk’s and RPP’s commitment to democracy (Abadan-Unat, 1979, pp. 13-14).9

The military, according to this school, was a guarantor of modernization and the accompanying democratization process. Whenever religious or other forms of reactionary coalitions attempted to hinder modernization, the army acted with its responsibility to protect the principles of the Republic. Hence, the military coup in 1960 was not an indicator of the anti-democratic inclinations of the army. Quite the contrary, it was to put democracy on the right path. The retreat of the army to the barracks one year after the coup, and its urging for the preparation of a new constitution with checks and balances and an emphasis on social and political freedoms, provided more proof of its democratic commitments (Özbudun, 1995, pp. 251-252; Rustow, 1964, p. 368).

Another version of Kemalism was developed by Doğan Avcıoğlu – a well-known socialist of the 1960’s. Avcıoğlu was critical of parliamentary democracy encouraged by the United States and dismissed it as “Philippine type democracy”, where votes are bought and sold like any market commodity (Avcıoğlu, 1969b, pp. 247-255, 519-224; 1980). The army should remember its historically progressive role and take over the reins of power together with socialists to end the ‘sham democracy’. The purpose of the new government should be to foster the non-capitalist path propagated by the Soviet Union (1966; 1969b, pp. 477-480).

The Liberal Approach

Avcıoğlu was neither a theorist of democratization nor particularly fond of a democratic regime. However, his views on democracy are important for our analysis

---

9 For an extensive literature review see (Kansu, 1997, pp. 9-12)
because they initiated a debate amongst the socialists, which would later provide ample – albeit unacknowledged - ammunition to liberals in their critique of Kemalism. İdris Küçükömer, a member of the Turkish Labor Party and a professor of Economics, wrote a book titled *Düzenin Yabancılaşması* (Alienation of the Order), which scandalized his Kemalist opponents. For Küçükömer (1994b), capitalism had failed to develop under the Ottoman Empire because of the structural impediments- from population pressures to land distribution patterns (pp. 29-53). As a consequence, a civil society that would bring the state under its control could not emerge either, and this meant the state’s supreme control over all aspects of the society (Küçükömer, 1994a, pp. 49, 55-56). For Küçükömer, the Kemalist bureaucracy, especially the army, inherited the Ottoman conceptualization and tradition of the state and the single-party dictatorship was its manifestation. Hence, the army, the RPP, and Mustafa Kemal were not endorsers of the democratic ideal but impediments to its realization. Moreover, all social groups in the country resisted the absolutist agenda of the bureaucrats at every opportunity: whenever they had a chance to vote, they supported opposition parties whose agenda was evidently more religious than republican. That was the basis of Küçükömer’s (1994b) second claim: despite their parlor, the self-proclaimed leftist parties were actually rightist and conservative in that they were blocking the development of capitalism and democracy. The parties with a rightist parlor, on the hand, carried the opposite character and appealed to the democratic aspirations of the people (pp. 67-82).

While Küçükömer’s thesis challenged Kemalist tenets, his account was problematic in several ways. First of all, he did not explain why the people registered their protest only as voters and only when they found a chance to vote. Second, he did not
explain why and how parliamentary democracy comes and goes. As a corollary, in its absence, people sat on the passive side of the equation of democracy. The agent which `brought about` democracy and took it back was again and only the army.

The second stage of the development of liberal theories started in the 1970s with Şerif Mardin’s articles *Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire* and *Center-periphery Relations: a Key to Understand Turkish Politics*. Mardin framed Küçükömer’s “absence of capitalist development and permanence of the despotic state” argument into a Weberian rationalization-and-centralization context. Following Weber’s comparison of western absolutist monarchies with Oriental despotisms, Mardin (1969) concluded that the absence of civil society under the Ottoman Empire should be the starting point in understanding the unstable character of Turkish democracy (pp. 279-280)\(^7\). His main contribution, however, was the introduction of two concepts –center and periphery- to this debate. ‘Center’ referred to the Sultan and his Kul’s (statesmen considered as his slaves) whereas the ‘periphery’ denoted all kinds of social groups outside the center. The Ottoman Empire’s difference from the western absolutist regimes lay in the fact that in the absence of private property and feudal rights-and-duties mechanisms, Ottoman control of the periphery was much more direct, absolute and without any legal guarantees (Mardin, 1994, pp. 34-37).

As a result, whereas the periphery in western societies could encroach on, or integrate into, the center with a complicated set of legal negotiations, there was a permanent cleavage between the center and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire. In the

\(^7\) In his later articles, Mardin softens the Weberian dichotomy between western and eastern societies, and claims that elements of civil society –like a different guarantee of private property for peasants under the umbrella of the Sharia- can be found in the Ottoman Empire. However, he continues to claim that the essential social relations that could bring about civil liberties were definitely missing (1987, pp. 12-13).
absence of legal negotiations which formed the institutional basis of western civil society, the relationship between the center and the periphery depended on *de facto* power relations: a center pressing for total control of all aspects of society and a periphery craving for autonomy and making use of any opportunity for separating from the center. In the constant struggle between these two poles, the center enjoyed incomparable advantages and therefore always won the struggle. It had accumulated wealth, power, and a vastly superior organization. The various peripheral groups not only had cleavages with the center but also lacked any kind of stable bonds with one another. This low capacity for coordination would later be used by the liberals to explain the absence of large-scale social unrest under Ottoman rule.

From the beginning of the 20th century onwards, young military officers’ attempts to speed up the centralization and rationalization process aggravated the tension between the center and the periphery. The center abolished the rights previously granted to the periphery like autonomy in taxation and religious practice, and self-administration of local affairs. The periphery, on the other hand, tried to resist the centralist and secularist pressures by making use of religion, although this resistance was unsuccessful due to the lack of organization and communication within the periphery (Mardin, 1994, pp. 35, 50, 53). After 1945, however, successful peripheral politics became possible with the expansion of market relations and communication networks. Populist parties which used religion as the umbrella ideology of the periphery started defeating bureaucratic parties of the center in almost all the elections.

The periphery, being a “center-centered” category, contained various social orders and classes. The bourgeoisie, local rural notables, peasants, and urban workers were all
members of this all-encompassing category. Yet, in Mardin’s account, the determining element in this heterogeneous category was the relatively organized order: first the local notables, later the rising bourgeoisie. And the center-periphery struggle was actually the struggle of these two groups with the center. The peasants and workers could not become an active force in this struggle owing to their lack of organizational resources. What they did was to merely vote for the relatively organized sectors in the periphery. Further, the periphery’s struggle did not produce any democratic outcome in the western sense because once some group from the periphery conquered the center, as in the case of the bourgeoisie after the Second World War, or found a place in its mechanisms, as in the case of the local notables during the early years of the Republic, they replaced their peripheral identity with the value system of the center and defended the dominance of the center as strongly as its earlier members.

After Mardin, the major theoretical work from the liberal perspective was Çağlar Keyder’s *State and Classes in Turkey*, in which he combined Mardin’s framework with a world-systems perspective to develop an historical account of capitalist development in Turkey. In Keyder’s (1987b) account, what prevented the development of the civil society in Turkey was less the insufficient advance of capitalism and more the formation of the Turkish nation-state, which was based on drastic population engineering (pp. 198-199). At the beginning of the 20th century, non-Muslims had an approximate 20% share in Turkey’s population but after the Armenian massacre and the population exchange with Greece, this proportion decreased to 2.6% –a process which meant the annihilation of Turkey’s historical bourgeoisie and the destruction of its civil society. Eventually, to secure its foundations, the state needed and created a new bourgeoisie. From its birth to
its consolidation and development, this new class was directly dependent on the resources provided by the state and therefore never dared to challenge the political status quo openly.

Keyder (2011) explicitly states that workers and peasants played an insignificant role in shaping the Turkish regime. The absence of peasant radicalism was a consequence of the dominance of petty-commodity production relations in the rural areas. The absence of feudal bonds and landless peasantry, except in the Kurdish region, and high land-labor ratio enabled the ruling classes to connect peasant population to the system through market mechanisms. This high land-labor ratio gave credibility to the enrichment promise of the populist parties during the boom years of the world-economy. And even during recessionary times, the state could use the abundant land resources to sustain an urban populism by distributing land to migrant workers. That is why, up until the mid-1990’s, Turkey had not experienced full proletarianization and a large-scale labor movement.

Unlike Küçükömer and Mardin, Keyder (1987b) also attempted to explain the transformation of the political regime and the birth of the multi-party system. It was not domestic pressures but the expectations of the United States that led the bureaucrats to give up the single-party system (pp. 114-115). Consistent with his explanation, Keyder ended his book with the hope of increasing influence of the European community on Turkey. Seventeen years later, in 2004, in another attempt to interpret the ruling party Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) rapid reforms with the goal of democratization, Keyder (2004) again referred to the EU as the main factor (pp. 77-81).

Following the liberal framework developed by Küçükömer, Mardin and Keyder, scholars produced a plethora of studies concerning the link between the strong state
tradition and the unstable character of democratic regimes; and between the dependent bourgeoisie and reproduction of military hegemony in the political sphere. Although studies in the 1980’s and 1990’s focused mainly on the causes of the unconsolidated character of Turkish democracy, the mood and the research questions have changed since then with the much-lauded political reforms and the proposals and commitments of the JDP. In the last decade, an increasing number of scholars have started to theorize the causes of the most recent wave of democratization. In these accounts, either the EU’s pressure on Turkey, or the rise of a new bourgeoisie in Anatolia which is not as state-dependent as the hegemonic Istanbul bourgeoisie, are used as major explanatory variables.

Despite their seemingly antagonistic accounts, the common denominator of Kemalist and liberal approaches is their neglect of the link between social struggles and regime change. Hence, in Figure 1.5, the representatives of both approaches share the same zone: the triangle between Weber, Schumpeter and Tocqueville. In the Kemalist account, the uprisings - especially during the early periods of the Republic - are nothing but [traditionalist] reactions to Kemalist modernization. Similarly, the liberal approach claims that a weak civil society could not and did not produce strong social movements which could change the course of the political struggle. This neglect of the importance of social mobilization creates difficulties for both approaches.

Since the Kemalists start the history of Turkish democratization with Mustafa Kemal and his reforms, they cannot explain the presence of democratic practices before Kemal. Secondly, those who supported the so-called populist politicians were not the rural community but the most urban segments of the Turkish population. Hence the
Kemalist explanation for the appeal of populist policies with “backwardness and local bonds” has no explanatory power. The biggest problem for the civil society approach is the obvious negative correlation between expansion of democratic rights and the strength of the civil society in Turkish history. Democratic reforms have been instituted when the civil society was least powerful, and coups have occurred when the civil society was relatively more powerful.

**The Argument Concerning Social Struggles and Regime Change**

The trajectory of Turkish political regime is determined by a complex but patterned set of interactions amongst competing factions within the power bloc; reformist and revolutionary mobilizations; and transformative coups in different directions. Figure 1.7 summarizes these interactions that are the product of different cycles of accumulation, each with a distinct hegemonic coalition. In order to trace the social origins of regime change in Turkey, this study distinguishes three different hegemonic coalitions within the power bloc of Ottoman Empire-Turkey:

1. Palace-centered bureaucracy (1878 – early 1900s)
2. Party-centered bureaucracy (1925-1946)

Although the capitalist class has not always managed to become part of the power bloc, it has always played an active role in the rise and demise of each hegemonic coalition. Each hegemonic period was followed by a competitive period, whereby the nascent and traditional segments of the capitalist class entered into a fierce struggle:

1. The competition among the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, the Muslim bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (Early 1900-1925)
2. The competition among the army, commercial-capital, and industrial capital (1946-1971)

3. The competition among the finance capital in Istanbul (ex-Istanbul capital), the nascent Anatolian bourgeoisie (new industrial capital) and the army (1997 – Today)

Each competitive period has four basic properties. To begin with, all of them involve a struggle concerning the balance between the bureaucracy and the parliament. Second, in order to become the hegemon, aspiring factions of the power bloc need to invoke the support of the working class and/or oppressed nations. To obtain this support, inclusionary promises and policies are necessary. Hence each regime change along the horizontal axis of the conceptual grid involves an inclusionary move along the vertical axis. Third, escalation of the competition within the power bloc politicizes workers and oppressed nations as well. This politicization results in first the rise of reformist and later revolutionary movements. Finally, all regime changes along the EL-NEL axis happen as a result of a transformative coup that further increases the politicization and mobilization of workers and oppressed nation.

So far in Turkish history, the competition within the power bloc has triggered two transformative coups and two cycles of revolutionary movements. The first one was a cycle of separatist movements between 1912 and 1930 following the 1908 coup. The second cycle between 1974 and 1998 followed the 1960 coup and was a combination of worker and student unrest and the Kurdish uprising.
During each cycle of unrest, the growing intensity of revolutionary movements increased pressure on the regime and eventually paved the way for a transformative coup towards the exclusionary pole. In this sense, the coups in 1921 and 1980 targeted the revolutionary movements in the first and second cycle and produced a more exclusive regime with restricted political competition to fight them.

To sum up, according to the argument of this study, the regime’s trajectory is shaped by a series of crises: crises in the power bloc and revolutionary crises. The coups
in Turkish history are not signs of the immaturity of Turkish democracy but a means of solution of the said crises. The resolution of the crisis within the power bloc, as it was in 1908 and 1960, reconfigures the ruling coalition, but bribes and mobilizes the masses and paves therefore the way for a revolutionary crisis. If revolutionary movements fail, the way out of the crisis, as the examples of 1921 and 1980 coups show, is a repressive regime change, which eradicates the revolutionary movements and opens the door to renewed competition, and eventually to a new crisis within the power bloc. Right now, Turkey is in the middle of a new regime crisis. After tracing all the interactions leading to regime changes in their historical context, possible scenarios for the solution of the present crisis will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

Research Design

The research conducted for this study rests on the observation of three processes: the trajectory of the regime, the intensity of the reformist and revolutionary movements, and the competition within the power bloc. Because of their conceptual remoteness from one another, each of these dynamics required a different data source and measurement technique.

As regards to competition within the power bloc, this study relies mainly on secondary sources providing in-depth case studies for various periods of Turkish political and economic history.

To trace the regime along two dimensions, two distinct variables needed to be measured: the relative power of the elected vis-a-vis the appointed and the relative inclusiveness of the regime. There was no available data source for the former. In *The Handbook of National Legislatures* Fish and Kroenig (2009) develop an index to
compare the prerogatives of the parliaments all over the world. Similarly Pennings (2000) compares parliamentary control over the executive office. My study could not utilize these datasets for two reasons. First they are not historical and provide a comparative snapshot of relative powers of the parliament. Second, the basis of measurement is not *de facto* powers of the institutions but the *de jure* ones, which portray an unrealistic portrait of the power of the Turkish parliament. Another potential data source was the annually published *Freedom in the World* reports. Each year, Freedom House assigns a functioning of the government score between 0 and 12. The checklist with which the score is determined includes questions concerning the governments’ capacity to really rule the country. However, leaving aside the criticism of the ideological bias (Giannone, 2010) of these reports and the fact that this data set does not go to periods earlier than 2006, only two of the twelve questions are related specifically to governmental capacity-in determining the sub-score. In the absence of a consistent and historical quantitative data source comparing parliamentary power, I have considered the historical practices of the institutions with prerogatives to veto legislations. For periods before 1960, I relied mainly on secondary sources. For the post-1960 period, I made use of statistics concerning the number of vetoes and cancellations of the legislations by the non-elected.

Given the definition of competitiveness of a regime, to measure its position along the EL-NEL axis was relatively easy. Combining the information from TBMM, Tunaya (1952), Aykol (2009) and M. Kaynar (2007) I have prepared a list that enabled me to
calculate the party-ban ratios -the number of banned parties as a ratio of the number of founded parties - for different constitutional periods.

Regardless of one’s evaluation of the theoretical framework and historical theses of this study, one of the main contributions of this study is the dataset it uses for tracing the intensities of various forms of social unrests between 1945 and 2014. Until now, authors who have written descriptively about social movements in Turkey have used official strike statistics as evidence for the rise and demise of the labor movement (Çetik & Akkaya, 1999; Güzel, 1983, 1993). Official strike statistics can give information about the relative militancy of trade unions. Yet the data provided by these statistics cannot be considered sufficient for several reasons. First, our framework also emphasizes the role of movements other than labor, including Kurdish and student movements, in explaining the trajectory of the Turkish regime. Second, even for labor movements, the official strike statistics do not record important manifestations of labor unrest, such as political demonstrations organized by trade unions, or protest actions by the more than 90% of the Turkish working class that is not unionized. Finally, because it was illegal to strike until 1963, there is no official strike data for the pre-1963 period.

The source of information for the established dataset is the national daily *Cumhuriyet*. Using newspapers as a source for compiling data about social unrest has become a fairly widespread and developed methodology in the social sciences. Among the examples of those who have used newspapers to construct time series on social unrest one can count Korzeniewicz (1989), McAdam (2010), Paige (1975), Silver (2003), Tarrow (1989) and Tilly (1978). However, starting with Danzger (1975) the quality and

---

11 Parties that are liquidated by their founders within the first year of their founding, or parties that do not participate in elections are not included in the list.
the reliability of the newspaper data have been questioned (p. 582). Although not
discouraging its usage, Ortiz et. al (2005) advise that the two important biases of
newspaper data- selection and description bias - should be taken more seriously. After
reviewing criticisms regarding the biases, Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule (2004)
argue that data obtained from newspapers can still fulfill the accepted standards of quality
in the field as long as they are not used in an unexamined fashion. Similarly Barranco and
Wisler (1999) and Silver (1995, p. 31) underscore that newspaper data are a reliable
source for detecting long-term waves in social protest analysis.

*Cumhuriyet* is the only Turkish newspaper which has been published since 1945.
Since the initial research goal was to analyze the regime change from 1946 onwards, I
scanned the newspapers only for the period between 1946 and 2004. Since none of the
newspapers in Turkey are indexed to detect the mentions of social protest, I relied on the
titles and first paragraphs of the news items. If I found predetermined keywords
indicating a social unrest action, the article was digitally recorded and the protest event
was recorded in the database. Following Silver (1995), I based the methodology on the
assumption that events that are mentioned more frequently are more significant than the
less-mentioned events, and recorded mentions rather than events (pp. 25-26). The data
collection procedure can be found in the Appendix A and B.

For the pre-1945 period I have referred to literature on the political and social
history of that period. In contrast to the post-1945 data, the information collected here is
about events not about mentions. All events –not mentions- recorded in these studies are
included in the database. The list of reviewed books can be found in the Appendix E.
In both databases, it is not only the events but also their location, demands, action repertoires and identity of the protesters that are recorded. Additionally, violent incidents and clashes with state security forces are recorded.

**Organization of Chapters**

The second chapter presents the history of regimes by locating them at different positions in the conceptual grid, and the history of successful and failed attempts to change the regime.

The third and fourth chapters introduce the independent variables: competition within the ruling bloc and social movements respectively. I distinguish two big waves for revolutionary movements, and three for inter-capitalist competition. I then locate different periods of Turkish social struggles into the table presented in the previous section.

The fifth chapter discusses the correlation between revolutionary social struggles and successful and failed attempts to change the regime. I classify the regime-change attempts into four groups depending on their success and failure, and the presence or absence of a revolutionary movement. I demonstrate that whereas revolutionary movements pave the way for exclusionary moves, reformist movements accompany struggles along the EL-NEL axis. Finally, an attempt to make the regime inclusive or to change its location along the EL-NEL axis can only be successful in the absence of revolutionary movements.

The sixth chapter presents the different mechanisms through which social protest and competition within the power bloc have a combined impact on the regime.
Accordingly, I distinguish four different mechanisms in the four different zones – introduced in the previous subsection - responsible for regime change.

Finally in the conclusion, I summarize the arguments developed in this dissertation, and revisit the political history of Turkey. I argue that Turkey is about to complete its second big wave of regime change, and is at the doorstep of a new political transformation, the fate of which will be determined completely by the course of social movements.
This chapter presents the history of Turkish political regimes in four different phases by locating them in different positions in the conceptual grid, and the history of successful and failed attempts to change the regime. I start by discussing my reasons for selecting 1908 as the starting point of the analysis. The following four sections depict first the relevant characteristics of each phase, and then discuss successful and failed coups and inclusionary attempts in each phase. The final section brings the narrative together and provides a summary of the trajectory of Turkish regimes as the rise and demise of two ruling coalitions.

The Birth Certificate

Like all histories, the history of the Turkish regime needs its own birth certificate. When was Turkish democracy born? Depending on one’s conceptualization of democracy, this question can be answered in five different ways by referring to different turning points in Ottoman-Turkish history. In 1808, Sultan Mahmud II signed an agreement called Sened-i İttifâk (Charter of Alliance) with the local notables. For the first
time in Ottoman history, the Sultan made an official concession to a social group. Alternatively, one can refer to the year 1876, when Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned after a palace coup and the first Ottoman Constitution *Kanun-ı Esasi* (Basic Law) was promulgated. One year later, the short-lived Chamber of Deputies – analogous to the lower house of the legislature - convened for the first time. A third answer could be 1908, when the July 24 Revolution reconstituted the parliamentary monarchy and the first multi-party elections were held. Another popular, and probably the most widely believed, answer is October 29, 1923, when the Ottoman Empire was officially liquidated and Turkey was declared a Republic. Finally, in 1950, for the first time in Turkish history, an opposition party won governmental posts as a result of competitive elections.

Students of constitutional development in Turkey are divided over the causes and historical significance of the 1808 Charter. It was signed right after a successful uprising in the Ottoman palace army at a time when the survival of the Sultan depended on military backing of the local notables. Some interpret it as an imposition by the notables (İnalçık, 1995, p. 132), while others consider it to be a tactical maneuver, with which the Porte sought to force the notables to concede to its centralistic claims (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 2). Others have seen the charter as a temporary *modus vivendi* only a few years before Mahmud II’s fateful centralist move (Tanör, 2004, pp. 51-52). In terms of its significance also, the charter has been interpreted in different ways: as an Ottoman version of the Magna Carta (Ahmad, 1984, p. 6; Akşin, 1997, p. 91); the first significant document regarding Ottoman democratization (Toprak, 2007, p. 29); a failed attempt to establish a feudal order (Berkes, 1973, p. 510); a documentation of the negotiation process between centralist and decentralist aspirations (Kemal H Karpat, 1972, pp. 253-
254); a written expression of the apogee of decentralization (Quataert, 2008, p. 49); and lastly, an over-rated document in terms of its role in Ottoman-Turkish democratization (Ortaylı in Önsoy, 1986, p. 32).

For a study that combines the emergence of Ottoman democracy with its long-term trajectory and changes, 1808 could be the starting point as it signaled a retreat from decentralization. However such research is beyond the scope this study. Our starting point should be the beginning of democracy, not the beginning of a process leading to democracy. So the absence of an assembly, let alone a parliament, makes 1808 unsuitable as a starting point for an analysis of democracy. In fact, according to critics of the Magna Carta thesis, the absence of an assembly-like institution was the key distinction between the Magna Carta and the Sened-i İttifāk (Akşin, 1992, pp. 121-122; İnalcık, 1995).

The assembly defined in the 1876 constitution had very limited legislative powers, which can only be negatively defined, namely by referring to its right to withhold approval of the Sultan’s legislative proposals (Tanör, 2004, p. 141). However, this was not the fundamental weakness of the parliament in this period, because it forced the Ibrahim Edhem Pasha cabinet to resign even with its limited prerogatives. In fact, the short life of this parliament is indicative of its desire to control Sultan Abdülhamid (Tunaya, 2003, p. 15). The missing element in this period was competitive elections. The deputies of the first Ottoman Assembly were not chosen by the general electorate but by provincial councils (Devereux, 1963, pp. 200-203)\(^\text{12}\).

The thesis that democracy is the result of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic is closely related with the political motivation to portray Mustafa Kemal as the

---

\(^{12}\) Hasan Kayalı (1995, p. 267) doubts whether the election results would have been different had the deputies been elected through a popular vote.
unique revolutionary in Turkish history (Kansu, 1997, pp. 23-25). Given our definition, the changes in 1923 did not start the democratic process. Quite the contrary. Even before the declaration of the Republic there had been three competitive multi-party elections in 1908, 1912, and 1919 respectively. And as I discuss in the subsequent sections, the declaration of the Republic reversed the democratic process by shelving competitive elections for more than twenty years.

Finally, Çağlar Keyder (1987b) considers the 1950 elections to be a watershed for the Turkish regime, as they changed the rules of the game and incorporated the masses into the political process (p. 117). But the claim that an opposition party acquired the chief executive post by popular vote for the first time in 1950 can only be considered valid if we start Turkish political history with the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and regard the previous era as the dark ages. Which it was not. The opposition party acquired the executive post by popular vote formally with the 1908 elections and actually with the 1912 elections13.

Moreover, there is nothing intrinsic in our definition of democracy which requires the transfer of power (from the incumbent) to the opposition party. According to Huntington (1991), the necessary condition for a consolidated democracy is not one but two transfers of power from the governing party to the opposition (p. 263). Lijphardt (1999) rightly argues that these theses are developed within a majoritarian conceptualization of democracy. If we apply the turnover condition to European

13 The Liberal Party that was supported by the Porte suffered a defeat against the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the 1908 elections (Akbayar, 2008, p. 167; Fevzi Demir, 2007, 127-37). Yet, it shortly became obvious that deputies elected from CUP’s list had only formal loyalty to this party. The result of the 1912 elections, however, was a total victory for the CUP. For the competition in the 1908 elections see Kansu (2000, pp. 272-351). Kayali (1995, pp. 273, 279) on the other hand, claims that the 1908 elections occurred under the dominance of the CUP whereas the ones in 1912 demonstrated a more competitive electoral mobilization.
countries, he continues, the number of democratic countries declines dramatically. This observation is correct for Turkey as well.

“The twentieth century”, writes Feroz Ahmad (1993) “opened for Turkey on 23 July 1908 with the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 that had been shelved 30 years earlier by Sultan Abdülhamid.” (p. 32). Indeed, the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 was not only the starting point of a new century, but also of the democratic political regime in Turkey. By establishing a political structure in which competitive elections are used on a continued basis to assign some of the executive, legislative, or judicial posts, the 1908 Revolution laid the grounds for democracy in Turkey.

As Kansu (1997) rightly observes, the 1908 Revolution is seldom interpreted as a historical turning point. It is generally considered to be the starting point of the democratic regime but only of the “Second Constitutional Period”, which degenerated into despotism after a few years (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, pp. 27-28; Lewis, 1961, p. 207). But there are some exceptions. Tunaya considers the Second Constitutional Period as a laboratory of Turkish politics and traces multi-party politics in Turkey to the 1908 Revolution. Similarly, Zürcher and Karaömerlioğlu are critical of studies of democratization that wipe off democratic practice between 1908 and 1925.

True, the election regulations of 1908 had many procedures to exclude the majority of the adult population, especially women and non-tax payers. Additionally, it was a two-tier system which increased the possibility of state intervention in elections by pressurizing and/or bribing the secondary voters. Still, from 1908 onwards, elections for the executive and legislative posts became not an exception but a rule for the Turkish political regime (Kansu, 2001, p. 368).
The fact that electoral democracy was not an exception but a rule can also be observed by looking at the time interval between elections. Between 1908 and 2007, Turkey has had an election almost every four years, and this interval does not change significantly between different periods of the regime. The longest interval between two elections has been six years. Moreover, out of the 26 elections held, only 6 were closed to competition. Another indicator in support of this claim is the continuity of the Turkish parliament. Since 1908, the parliament has been held in abeyance only for seven years and even during these times, the junta leaders felt the need to explain that the suspension was only temporary (Kansu, 2001, p. 369).

From its first encounter with democracy in 1908 onwards, Turkey’s regime was open to, and compatible with, multiparty elections as well. Even during the “one-party” rule between 1925 and 1945, competing parties were founded, albeit for short periods of time. Although these parties never survived to participate in the general elections, they took part in local and municipal elections. Besides, for most of the one-party period, there was no law against the formation of opposition parties. The only legal means through which the state could prevent the formation of new parties was delaying the approval process. It is only after 1938, with the new Law of Associations, that state permission became requisite for the formation of a political party. However, even during this process, there were neither legal nor structural barriers against competitive elections. What prevented them were the repressive policies of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). The restrictions were *de facto* but not *de jure* (Tanör, 2004, p. 319).
Table 2-1 summarizes the trajectory of the Turkish regime. Over the course of the last century, the Turkish regime has passed through four phases of democracy. Each period starts with a coup and the formation of a constitution. And within each phase, we witness first a protective and then a transformative coup. Given the cautious approach of the democratization literature to anything related to Mustafa Kemal, it is not conventional to classify the political developments in 1920 and 1925 as a coup. However, as I show in the subsequent sections, they satisfy the definition of a coup developed in the previous chapter.

The four phases spread over a century can be conceptualized within two 50-year periods as the broader categories. The first fifty years correspond to a period when elected institutions were dominant. The last fifty years, on the other hand, represent a period of bureaucratic dominance. Each long period begins as an inclusive period and later becomes exclusionary. Finally, the ratio of democratic to non-democratic years is much higher in the second half of the fifty years.

The next four sections of this chapter describe each of these four phases in detail.
Phase 1 1908-1920

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was a secret society, comprised mainly of military school students and young officers. The officers had graduated from the most westernized schools of the Empire and were therefore most influenced by the political currents from Europe (Ramsaur 2007, pp. 31-37). After several waves of persecution under Abdülhamid’s rule, the CUP managed to expand its organizational capacity and political influence by uniting with another organization called the Ottoman Freedom Society, comprised mainly of low-ranked officers and bureaucrats (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 210-217). The leading cadres of the CUP shared a blend of Ottomanism, Islamism and nationalism to varying degrees and not necessarily a homogenous ideology. Their common denominator and uniting factor was the fear of the Empire’s disintegration as a result of separatist insurrections backed by the Great Powers (Ramsaur et al., 2007, p. 48). The memories of the Balkan revolts of the 1870’s were still fresh, and the Macedonian nationalist agitation convinced them that it was not an issue of the past. The CUP held Abdülhamid’s autocratic regime responsible for the growing threat of disintegration and considered parliamentary monarchy as a panacea (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 170; Kansu, 2001, pp. 360-361; Ramsaur et al., 2007, pp. 48, 113-115; Tunaya, 2004). The CUP’s social base was in the Balkans- the most urbanized and industrialized region of the Empire (S. Aydin, 2001, p. 124; Sohrabi, 1995, p. 1417). On the eve of 1908,

---

14 Aydin (2001) claims that there were not one but two CUP’s. The first comprised of intellectually oriented military and medical students; the second included more down-to-earth and somewhat narrow-minded low-ranked soldiers and bureaucrats in the Balkans. The first defended an Ottoman citizenship, whereas the second group promoted Turkish nationalism. The former were inclined to build closer ties with Britain and France whereas the latter were pro-German (p. 126). Sohrabi (2002) on the other hand, considers such distinctions as the dominant approach in the Young Turks’ historiography, as they portray Mustafa Kemal as the superior revolutionary (p. 49).

15 Hanioğlu (1995) argues that beneath the parliamentarist discourse of the CUP, one can discern its true agenda: “A strong government, the dominant role played by an intellectual elite, anti-imperialism, a society in which Islam would play no governing role, and a Turkish nationalism.” (p. 211)
despite being weak in Istanbul, the CUP had strong roots in some parts of Anatolia, and was able to exercise influence over the army in the Balkans.

Figure 2-1 Transitions in Phase 1

The crisis which led to the end of Hamidian despotism erupted in 1906, after a drought forced the Porte to increase taxes, setting off massive food riots and tax revolts in Anatolian cities including Erzurum, Trabzon, Kars, Van and Sivas (Aytekin, 2013, p. 323; Emiroğlu, 1999, pp. 159-163, 173-174, 201-218; Kansu, 1997, pp. 29-72; Kars, 1997, pp. 19-42). A similar discontent was spreading amongst the lower echelons of the military (Kansu, 1997, pp. 81-81; Kars, 1997, pp. 53-57). The revolution was triggered by the Reval meeting between Britain and Russia in June 1908. It was interpreted by the CUP as a rapprochement between the two Empires based on a consensus on partitioning
the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad, 1999, pp. 17-18). The CUP used its influence in the army to sever the connection between the Porte and the Balkans, and demanded that Abdülhamid re-convene the parliament. The growing intensity of the uprising in Macedonia that incorporated collective actions as diverse as armed demonstrations, collective telegrams to the Porte, and military disobedience, left Abdülhamid with no choice but to replace the cabined and announce a timeline for elections (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 265-275; Kansu, 1997, pp. 86-101).

The political change in 1908 was both a coup and a revolution. In terms of the concrete action, it was a coup. The level of mass mobilization was incomparably lower than mass revolutions of the same era elsewhere, say the Russian Revolution of 1905 or the Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Lenin, 1977 (1908), p. 222). More importantly, those who initiated and led the regime change were part of the state apparatus and relied on their power within that apparatus (Sohrabi, 1995, p. 1409).

Kansu has argued that 1908 was a revolution and not a coup because the CUP’s actions were backed by popular mobilization, and the military action was directed by the central committee of the CUP. Zürcher’s (2010a, p. 38) findings support Kansu’s claim: during the unrest period, dissident military officers did not command their own troops but organized separate bands of volunteers.

---

16 For the varying degrees of importance attached to the Reval meeting in the CUP’s historiography see (Zürcher, 2010a, pp. 34-35)

17 Hanioglu (2001, pp. 221-227) documents that forming bands outside the army and cooperating with those already founded by non-Muslim revolutionaries, together with assassinations, was a major tactic in the CUP’s strategy to restore the constitutional order.
Nevertheless, despite a rich repertoire of collective action in 1908, the key component of the CUP’s strategy was military action. This is also why Hanıoğlu calls CUP’s strategy a military insurrection. The course of events in 1908 was also in line with the CUP’s strategy and the Third Army in Salonica was the center of action. The CUP was influential in the Second Army in Edirne as well (Hanıoğlu, 2001, p. 278).

As regards the bands, their role in the events of June-July 1908 was neither to march to İstanbul to oust Abdülhamid nor to establish an alternative center of administrative power that would replace the bureaucracy. Notwithstanding a few isolated events, neither Kansu nor Hanıoğlu portray a split in the army or an open clash between the bands and the army. The regular army’s role in the June-July events had been
precisely its conscious passivity, with the purpose of demonstrating Abdülhamid’s helplessness in Macedonia. Moreover, as Hanioğlu (2001) shows, the CUP headquarters did not limit the regular army to the role of a passive observer (p. 273). The army had instructions, in case of Abdülhamid’s insistence on not calling elections, to march to Istanbul with the volunteer bands to depose the Sultan\textsuperscript{18}. In other words, Sultan Abdülhamid was forced to reconvene the parliament under the threat of being deposed by the insubordinate Third Army. Seen from this perspective, whether the Third Army was under the control of civilians\textsuperscript{19} or not does not change the fact that a part of the state apparatus was used to overthrow the chief executive\textsuperscript{20}. Once this feature is underlined, it is not difficult to note that the political change in July 23 fulfills the criteria for a coup d’état as defined in the previous chapter.

In terms of the transformation of the political regime however, 1908 was a bourgeois revolution. And the most if not the only successful bourgeois revolution between 1905 and 1911 (Sohrabi, 1995). To begin with, together with the subsequent coup in 1909, it transformed the political regime radically by reducing the role of Sultan to symbolic activities, and by re-establishing the assembly - the basic instrument of a bourgeois democracy - on a firm basis (Tanör, 2004, pp. 193-217). From this period onwards, the parliament and competitive elections became the norm in Turkey. In this way, 1908 paved the way for the bourgeoisie to become part of the ruling coalition.

\textsuperscript{18} As we shall see, the events in 1909 confirmed that this plan was not the product of wishful thinking but a concrete assessment of the situation.

\textsuperscript{19} Neither the CUP nor its internal headquarters responsible for practically leading the insurrection, were civilian. In 1908, two thirds of all CUP members were soldiers (Zürcher, 2010b, p. 101). (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 229) lists members of the Internal Headquarter of the CUP: three of them were soldiers (–two majors and one captain), one was the head of the Salonica Post Office, and Manyasizade Refik Bey was the only civilian member.

\textsuperscript{20} According to Sohrabi (1995), this feature of the 1908 Revolution made it the most successful constitutional revolution.
One major political player in the new regime was the CUP, which had centralism as its primary purpose. At first it defended a cosmopolitan brand of centralism: granting basic rights to all minorities would secure the unity of the Empire. So it stayed away from nationalism and tried to pursue a pro-British foreign policy. Later, after the Balkan wars, the CUP changed its policy to a combination of Islamism and nationalism and pursued a pro-German policy (Ç. Keyder, 1987b).

The second important protagonist of this period was the coalition of monarchist-decentralist forces. Some of them were members of the traditional ruling clique. The other sections were comprised of disillusioned CUP members. Although certain scholars like Kansu (2000) and Akşin (1994) have labeled these political groups as counterrevolutionaries, not all of them, not even the majority, were counterrevolutionary in the sense of aiming to return to the absolutist regime. As Ahmad (2001) rightly indicates, an important section of these groups was liberal, wanting a parliamentary regime without the CUP. But all of them were disturbed by the centralist vision of the CUP and their common denominator was the fear of a new form of despotism - a parliamentary one - replacing Abdülhamid’s absolutism\(^{21}\) (p. 102). Hence the common goal of these forces was to topple the CUP.

*March 31 Uprising*

The 1908 coup was the beginning of the bourgeois revolution but the constitutional changes came one year later in response to the uprising in March. The uprising can be seen as the eruption of political tensions simmering between the CUP and

\(^{21}\) After the failure of the 1909 coup, and with the increasing number of disillusioned ex-CUP members, the coalition became more decentralist and less pro-absolutist. Nevertheless, it retained the putschist elements till the end of the period.
the monarchist-decentralist coalition since the revolution in 1908. It began with a clash in
the cabinet between the CUP and Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha supported by the
monarchist-liberal coalition. Kâmil Pasha not only dismissed the pro-CUP faction in his
cabinet but also tried to exile their leading members to various foreign posts. The CUP’s
response was to unseat the Kâmil Pasha Cabinet by a vote of confidence (Ahmad, 1993,
pp. 35-37). Meanwhile, a liberal journalist Hasan Fehmi who had been critical of the
CUP was assassinated. Since the murder was attributed to the CUP, hundreds of
thousands gathered at his funeral and turned it into an anti-CUP demonstration (Kansu,
2001, pp. 72-75). Four days later, the March 31 uprising started as a military rebellion in
the 4th Battalion of the army. In a few hours the parliament was surrounded by the rebel
soldiers supported by students of religious schools, and several deputies were lynched.
An important section of deputies escaped to the Balkans where the CUP had political
supremacy. But the rest remained in Istanbul and continued with their parliamentary
activities, electing a new cabinet which was approved by the rebelling factions and the
monarchist bloc (Ahmad, 2001, pp. 79-81, 85-90).

The March uprising is one of the most controversial issues of late Ottoman
history. Concerning the initiators of the uprising, Akşin has divided the various groups
identified in the literature into three categories- 1) Abdülhamid 2) the liberal opposition
and 3) the CUP22- and considers the second group as the most likely culprit (1994, pp.
229-230). Kansu describes the uprising as a counterrevolutionary coup attempt conspired
by the monarchist opposition (Avcioğlu, 1969a, pp. 61-68), while Avcioğlu (1969a) has
analyzed it as the project of British Imperialism (pp. 61-68). In contrast, Hale (1994, pp.

22 Those who hold the third line claim that after having provoked the mutiny, the CUP used it as a pretext to
topple Abdülhamid and to silence the opposition.
40-41), Swenson (1970, p. 176) and Alkan (1999, p. 429) underline the spontaneous character of the uprising and explain it with the tension between the modern and traditional sectors of the Ottoman army.

Tensions there may have been, but the grievances of the dissident soldiers should not obscure the political motives of the coup. As Kansu (2000) has documented extensively, the rebellion was supported and encouraged by the high-level monarchist Pashas in collaboration with the liberals (pp. 75-125). And reminiscent of the 1908 Revolution (coup), the army pressured the government with its passivity. It did not attempt to suppress the mutiny, and tried to demonstrate the helplessness of the Unionists. However, in contrast to the coup in 1908, this attempt was crushed before it completed its first week. The Third Army, under the influence of the CUP, marched to Istanbul and deposed the new cabinet with a counter-coup. Afterwards, the parliament together with the upper house decided to depose Abdülhamid and enthrone Mehmed V (Akşin, 1994, pp. 66, 94, 211, 221-223).

The Position of the Regime

Despite empowering the parliament to an unprecedented degree, the 1908 Revolution did not touch the legal structure of the regime. The failed coup strengthened the hands of the CUP vis-à-vis the Sultan and made it possible to change the constitution according to the post-1908 balance of power. Two weeks after the failed coup attempt, the lower house started discussing the requisite changes in the constitution and after a three-and-a-half-months long crisis-ridden negotiation process, the upper and lower

23 Kansu considers the reluctance to disperse the rebels in the context of the monarchist conspiracy whereas Akşin (1994, pp. 52-53) explains it with the helplessness of Hilmi Pasha, the new Grand-Vizer appointed with the uprising.
houses agreed upon a radical constitutional change. Out of the 119 articles, 21 were changed, 1 was abolished, and 3 additional articles were appended (Eroğul, 2010, p. 111; Tanör, 2004, p. 192). The substance of the constitutional changes was more important than their number though, as the parliament acquired a formal status, reflecting its de facto power. Although the parliament had already been functioning as a legislative body, until 1908 it had merely been an advisory council which could use its legislative powers only if the Sultan permitted. With the new changes, the parliament acquired proper legislative prerogatives (Tanör, 2004, pp. 192-196). As noted by Tunaya (2003), these changes did not merely modify the old constitution but brought a new constitution -a change from absolutism to parliamentarianism (p. 21).

From a formal perspective, categorizing the 1909 regime as a regime dominated by elected representatives would be unacceptable for two reasons. First, the Sultan still had veto rights which he could use to delay- though not block- any legislative process. Second, the 1909 changes did not deprive the Assembly of Notables (the upper house of the legislature) from its veto rights and prerogatives enabling them to propose laws (Tanör, 2004, pp. 194-195). The assembly comprised of people, generally with a career in the bureaucracy, appointed by the Sultan for lifelong service (Demirci, 2006, pp. 385-386).
TABLE 2-3 PARLIAMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Deposed the Head of the State</th>
<th>New Constitution</th>
<th>Intervention to Presidential Election</th>
<th>Institutions Blocking Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908-1920</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Assembly of the Notables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1960</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1980</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senate President National Security Council Constitutional Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>President National Security Council Constitutional Court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually, the only institution that could check the legislative powers of the lower house was the Assembly of Notables. And the latter’s activities were not of minor importance between 1908 and 1912. In the first year of legislation, it modified 10 of the 53 legislative proposals coming from the lower house. The most important among them was the proposal concerning the amendments to the constitution. Although the legislative proposals from the parliament covered 120 articles –including proposals to transform the upper house into an elected body and curtailing its prerogatives- the Assembly of Notables approved only 22 of them and postponed discussions of the remaining articles without explicitly rejecting them. The notables were similarly active in interfering in fiscal regulations and procedures, an issue about which historically all parliaments are very sensitive (Demirci, 2006, pp. 186, 391-183).

96
The hyperactivity of the Assembly of Notables is especially striking if one keeps in mind Özgişi’s (2011) observation about the passivity of the Senate between 1960 and 1980 (pp. 101-102). One might be tempted to think that the parliament during the constitutional period was even weaker than the one between 1960 and 1980.

However this is not the case because there is a clear-cut difference between the parliaments before and after 1960, which make the parliaments of the former phase more powerful than their successors after 1960. As the narrative above indicates, the parliament in the first phase was the protagonist of the constitution-making process and acted like a constitutional assembly. In contrast, the parliaments established after the 1960 and 1980 coups were not the agents but the outcomes of the bureaucratic constitution making processes. As a result of this difference, the post-1908 parliament did not share its sovereignty with the non-elected institutions even in a limited way. Table 2-4 lists the institutions that have a constitutional right to restrict the law-making prerogatives of the parliament. As can be seen, the constitutionally-mandated bureaucratic control over the parliament has increased dramatically since 1960.

It is precisely because the post-1908 parliament was strong that all constitutional proposals after the 1909 reform were aimed at curtailing the prerogatives of the parliament or finding ways to evade parliamentarian control24. In contrast, especially after 1980, the primary focus of parliamentary activity has been to either expand the prerogatives of the parliament, or to get around the bureaucratic control mechanisms.

---

24 See Ahmad (1969, pp. 71-74) for the parliamentary debates concerning the secrecy of military expenses. Ahmad considers these as proof of extensive military control. Just the opposite. This debate demonstrates the difficulty of reserving certain privileges for the army. Since the 1960 coup, such parliamentary debates have been unthinkable.
Although the coup of March 31 was suppressed by the military, it was not the military but the parliament that prepared the new constitution. Given the strength of the parliament, the primary purpose of the CUP after the constitutional change was to make it easier for the executive office to dissolve the parliament (Eroğul, 2010, pp. 96-111).

The regime from 1908-1919 was an inclusive one. No doubt certain parties were outlawed during this period. However, the ratio of the banned parties to the number of active parties is lower than that for the 1919-1960 and post 1980 periods (Table 2-4). Moreover, if we just focus on the periods when the regime operated on democratic principles (authoritarian intervals and transformations not counted), the number of banned parties comes down to zero. And the ratios in 1908-1919 and 1960-1980 become strikingly similar\(^{25}\) (Table 2-5).

\(^{25}\) The same is true for the 1919-1960 and post-1980 periods.

---

**TABLE 2-4 PHASES AND RATIOS OF OUTLAWED PARTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Active Parties</th>
<th>Banned Parties</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908 - 1920</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 - 1960</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1980</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 -</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47.3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Authors Calculation. Source: Appendix D*
The freedom to form parties did not imply the presence of democratic rights and liberties. Killing journalists and closing down newspapers became a routine during this period, and later a tradition (Ahmad, 1969, p. 61; Sohrabi, 2011, pp. 226-264; Topuz, 2003). Until 1920, with the exception of two short phases (July 1908-April 1909, and July-October 1912), Istanbul was permanently under martial law (Köksal, 1996, pp. 20-25). After an important strike wave in 1908, one of the first initiatives of the CUP had been to outlaw strikes (Karakışla, 1998, pp. 201-205). However, despite all these restrictions, Turkey has never experienced a parliamentary period that is both inclusive and strong before or since this period. Therefore, contrary to the assumptions and expectations of the modernization literature, this phase is the most democratic period of Turkish political life, and the regime was located at A1 during this period (Table 2-2).

**The 1912-1913 Coups**

From 1909 onwards, the CUP started to lose its grip over the parliament, and its primary agenda after mid-1911 was to dissolve the parliament and announce new
elections. However, dissolving the parliament was almost impossible and the CUP’s attempts to do so merely aggravated the crisis. Eventually, in early 1912, the CUP used constitutionally debatable methods to dissolve the parliament and to call new elections. Thanks to its extensive use of various forms of coercion and pressure towards both the electorate and the opposition party’s candidates, the CUP won a landslide victory and almost complete control of the parliament (Fevzi Demir, 2007, pp. 265-289).

Rather than ensuring smooth sailing however, throwing the opposition out of the parliament led the former to use non-parliamentary means to obtain power. Three months after the elections, Halâskâr Zabitan (The League of Saviour Officers) - a group of officers close to the monarchist opposition - issued a memorandum asking for the cabinet’s resignation and the parliament’s dissolution. The move was successful. The cabinet resigned and the first task of the new cabinet supported by the opposition was the dissolution of the parliament. In this way the regime moved from A3 to C3 (Figure 2-2) and became an inclusive regime –none of the parties were banned- without a parliament. According to our definition then, the 1912 memorandum was a successful coup (Kansu, 2000, pp. 398-408; Tunaya, 1998a, pp. 344-345, 357-362).

The new cabinet started its tenure not with preparations for new elections but by persecution of deputies and journalists close to the CUP (Kansu, 2000, pp. 409, 415, 422, 427). Around that time, in January 1913, a military defeat in the First Balkan War and rumors of a humiliating peace agreement gave the CUP an opportunity to execute its own long-planned coup. Enver Pasha - a prominent leader of the CUP - stormed the government building with the support of some paramilitary troops, killed the Minister of
War, and forced the cabinet to resign (pp. 433-441). And thus was the successful 1912 coup followed by another successful coup.

Still, in January 1913, the CUP had not yet secured its position and therefore did not attack the opposition immediately. The coup leaders’ declared intention was to go to the polls again, but they did not offer a timeline for the elections. So despite the promise of elections, the regime’s position was still C3 (Figure 2-2). This time it was the opposition’s turn to plot a coup. One part of this plot was the assassination of the Grand Vizier Mahmud Shevket Pasha. The purpose was to get rid of the CUP by assassinating the leading cadre. However, the CUP’s response to the assassination was an autogolpe. After the assassination, all parties but the CUP were outlawed and their leaders sent into exile (Tunaya, 2000, pp. 517-520).

With this autogolpe coup the regime moved to C1 (Figure 2-2): it had become a single party regime without a parliament, although that was just a temporary position. With the confidence of not having a serious opposition, the CUP went to the polls. Not surprisingly, all the elected deputies were CUP candidates. The first task of the new parliament was to modify the constitution to permit the Sultan - in other words the CUP who controlled him - to disband the parliament without any constraint and to reduce the number of parliamentary conventions (Eroğul, 2010, p. 103). However, despite its weakness, there was a parliament and the fact that it was important can be understood by looking at the bargaining process between the CUP and representatives of the minorities. Taking the votes of the Christian minorities required extensive bargaining process (Fevzi Demir, 2007, pp. 301, 313-329; Erdem Karaca, pp. 85-99). As a result the new position of the regime was B1, where it stayed up to the end of the First World War.
After the Ottoman defeat in WWI, the CUP leaders fled to Berlin, and the party formally dissolved itself, while its deputies formed other parties, just as the returning exiles founded new parties. So unexpectedly, the regime became an inclusionary multiparty system again for a few months and moved to A3 (Figure 2-2). Nevertheless, confronted with a weak CUP but a parliament full of its ex-deputies, the Sultan dissolved the parliament and tried to replace it with an advisory council (Tunaya, 1998b, pp. 36-39). The Porte also banned the CUP’s successor parties on the pretext of their members’ involvement in the Armenian massacre - partly because of British pressure and partly due its own hostility against the CUP. However, this did not halt the rapid increase in the number of political parties and associations. Between October 1918 and February 1919, 10 new parties were founded (pp. 59, 106, 122). Therefore the regime’s inclusionary character did not change- and its new position was again C3.

Phase 2: 1920 – 1960

The first phase of Turkish democracy did not end with a sudden stroke but as a result of a series of coups between 1919 and 1920 closely related to the Ottoman defeat in WWI. The Mudros armistice and the subsequent occupations created discontent in the army. The Porte’s weak position vis-à-vis the Allied Powers and internal separatist claims created opportunities for soldiers with political projects and/or ambitions. Those who were closely associated with the CUP had been considering resistance against a possible occupation. Simultaneously and in cooperation with the CUP, representatives of the local Muslim-bourgeoisie organized congresses to articulate their demands. One of the frequently applied tactics in the preparations (for a resistance movement) was to organize paramilitary forces and attack the Christian forces with the purpose of changing
the balance of Anatolia’s population. This was not an original tactic, but one that had been applied by the Porte to consolidate the Empire’s position in the Balkans during the Balkan uprisings and in Eastern Anatolia during WWI. After the end of WWI, armed bands flourished amongst the Christian population as well, partly because of the political and ideological climate breeding nationalism and partly for the purpose of self-defense. As a result, north and north-east Turkey became a region of unrest that was labeled as the “intercommunal conflict” by British imperialists (Dündar, 2008; Kayali, 2008, pp. 119-123; Yerasimos, 1989, pp. 40-49; Zürcher, 2003, pp.,120-145).

1919-1920 Coups

Mustafa Kemal was one of the ambitious Pashas during this period who enjoyed, at best, a lukewarm relationship with the resistance movement. To fulfill his political ambitions, Kemal Pasha’s first choice was to collaborate with the Porte and join the cabinet. Once the limitations of this option became clear, Kemal started to develop his relations with the CUP-based resistance as well. The fact that he was dispatched to the north of Turkey by the Sultan and British Commanders to keep the unrest under control facilitated his coordination with the resistance and later strengthened his position therein. He joined forces with another general Kazım Karabekir, who was commanding the only military division of the Ottoman Empire that had not been disbanded (Zürcher, 2003, pp. 161-173).

To turn to the congresses being organized by the Muslim bourgeoisie in collaboration with the CUP, their ideological and political composition was quite heterogeneous and neither anti-monarchist nor anti-imperialist. Actually, what disturbed them about the armistice was not its terms or conditions, but its elastic formulation that
could open the door to an occupation of the Anatolian heartland. And what distinguished the congress from the Ottoman cabinet was the former’s demand for a more hawkish attitude during the peace negotiation process, which could only be accomplished by a new cabinet. As far as the functioning of the regime was concerned then, the primary demand of the congress was the reconvening of the parliament that was promised by the Sultan at the beginning of 1919. The primary obstacle to elections, for Kemal, was the Damad Ferit Pasha cabinet. So he channeled the energy of the congress to topple the cabinet. This was the first coup attempt of the period, in which Mustafa Kemal and his followers severed all communication between Istanbul and Anatolia by relying on the generals’ leverage in the bureaucracy and in the army. Eventually the congress was successful and forced the cabinet to resign. The first task of the new cabinet was to negotiate with the Ankara government and call for elections (Akşin, 1976, pp. 556-590; T. N. Karaca, 2004, pp. 138-154, 156-160, 169-178; Kayalı, 2008, pp. 124-126; Zürcher, 1998).
TABLE 2-6 SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED COUPS IN THE SECOND PHASE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Agent/Cause</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919 September</td>
<td>Mustafa Kemal and high ranked officers</td>
<td>Blocking the communication between Anatolia and the Porte</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 March</td>
<td>British Occupation/Sultan</td>
<td>Decree to dissolve the parliament</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 April</td>
<td>Mustafa Kemal and high ranked officers</td>
<td>Assembly declares itself as the unique representative of the state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 June</td>
<td>Kemal and RPP</td>
<td>Memorandum (Coup Threat) leading to Autogolpe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite its initial relatively modest goal of a simple cabinet change, this coup evolved into a transformative coup which opened the door to a new regime. Since the 1919 elections were boycotted by Liberty and Entente, the major anti-CUP party, the parliament was under the influence of the resistance forces. However, in March 1920, Britain, unhappy with the resolutions of the parliament and aiming for stricter control in Istanbul, raided the parliament and arrested several deputies. This attack gave the Sultan the opportunity for a coup attempt that was eventually unsuccessful. Three weeks after the British attack, the Porte issued a decree for the dissolution of the parliament which was unable to convene because of the formal British occupation. But twelve days after the decree, the Kemalists invited all deputies to Ankara and reconvened the parliament in Ankara as the legitimate heir of the parliament in Istanbul. To fill the parliament –as many deputies were exiled- bye-elections elections were held (Akın, 2001; T. N. Karaca, 2004, pp. 232-238, 291-316; Kayalı, 2008, pp. 127-129).
Among scholars, there is no a consensus on whether the convention in Ankara represents a regime change or not. Goloğlu (2010) considers the fact that there had not been any legal change in the period between the 1876 (1909) constitution and the Ankara parliament as proof of continuity, and calls this the third period of constitutional monarchy. Akşin (1976) uses the same label but considers the 1919 parliament ethnically more homogeneous. On the other hand, Tanör (2004) underscores that the new regime, a de facto republic, was qualitatively different from the constitutional monarchy (pp. 245-246).

Given the definition of a coup employed here, the first point to note is that the reconvening of the parliament in April 1920 was qualitatively different from the reconvention following the March 31 uprising. The latter was merely a reconstitution of
the pre-uprising regime. The Action Army and the CUP had not even changed the Grand Vizier for the five days following the uprising- let alone change the institutions of the regime (Akşin, 1994). True, dethronement of Abdülhamid as a major constitutional change followed the suppression. However, these actions did not move the regime to a new position but actually bridged the inconsistencies between its _de facto_ and _de jure_ positions. In contrast, the reconvened Ankara parliament in 1920, with its practical annulment of the executive office in Istanbul, was not only a _de facto_ coup but also a new regime.

_An Exclusionary Regime_

While this supports Tanör’s claim of a qualitatively different regime, I do not agree that increased parliamentary power set the new regime apart from its predecessor. As argued above, the 1908 parliament was also active in the constitution making process and did not share its sovereignty with other institutions. Moreover, despite all efforts to liken the 1920 parliament to a convention, the practice of the parliament was not different from a parliamentary regime (Akin, 2001, pp. 222-226).

The real differences between the pre-1920 and post-1920 parliaments lay not in the strength but in the exclusionary character. As shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, almost half of the parties were outlawed by the new regime. This is again at odds with the conventional historiography that hails 1920 as an important step towards democratization in Turkey. On the contrary, it represents an anti-democratic qualitative leap. Between 1920 and 1960, the power bloc could defend itself by banning or outlawing oppositional parties. Generally, this exclusionary character is explained by the military nature of Kemalist parties and their leaders. However, as Figure 2-3 shows, the percentage of
banned parties during the 1950-1960 sub-phase is approximately the same as the percentage in 1920-25 and 1946-50 sub-phases. Even the Democrat Party period that is generally not seen as an extension of the Kemalist regime is not very different.

Figure 2-3 Percentage of Banned Parties
Authors’ calculation. Source: Appendix D.

The new regime found its legal expression first in the 1921 Constitution that changed the name of the state from Ottoman Empire to Turkey, but did not completely renounce the constitutional heritage of the Empire. The legal and institutional framework of the new regime was not completed until the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution - a flag representing Kemalist victory over the opposition.

Between 1920 and 1924, the parliament was the epicenter of political struggle. However, despite its significance in terms of the number of deputies, the opposition against Kemal was very heterogeneous. The Kurds were there but they did not form the
dominant wing of the opposition. People with medrese [Islamic school] background were part of the opposition, but they had roughly the same weight among the Kemalists. Although the majority of the CUP-affiliated deputies were in the opposition, Kemal had a significant amount of support from the ranks of the CUP as well. The only common denominator was a fear of Kemal’s dictatorial tendencies. Whereas Kemal was able to form first a group then the Republican People’s Party in the parliament with help from his supporters in the CUP, his opponents remained scattered and weakly organized (Demirel, 1995; Finefrock, 1979, p. 16; Zürcher, 2007, p. 41)26.

In November 1922, two months after the military victory against Greece, Kemal abolished the monarchy using a combination of intrigues, open violations of assembly regulations, and military threats (Kansu, 1990, pp. 759-766). In April 1923, he used the same methods to force the parliament to dissolve itself and go to elections. The “High Treason Law” equated any possible criticism of Kemal’s political program with treason, and the assassination of Ali Şükrü Bey, one of the opposition leaders, a few weeks before its enactment demonstrated how the law would be enforced. Kemal was thus able to intimidate the opposition and contest the elections as a single party27 (Finefrock, 1976). Eventually, in June, all but two deputies were elected from Kemal’s list. Three candidates of the opposition could overcome Kemal’s resistance and enter the parliament from the RPP’s list (Tunçay, 1992b, pp. 56-57).

26 (Demirel, 2013b) and Tunçay (1992b, p. 42) claim that the opposition was not as loose as the Kemalist historiography has presented. However, they do not compare their organizational coherence relative to the Kemalists. Furthermore, Demirel claims that the opposition was at the same time an opposition against the CUP.

27 Finefrock (1976, p. 191) describes this law as Kemal’s “final and greatest political coup”. It seems that he uses the word coup in a different sense than this study.
In October Kemal initiated a crisis of the cabinet and then proposed the declaration of the Republic as a solution. With a *fait accompli* Turkey became the Republic of Turkey. In this way, the constitutional role of the Sultan was replaced by the president, who was to be elected by the parliament. Out of the 270 deputies, only 159 attended the session where the Republic was voted and Kemal became its president (Finefrock, 1976, pp. 251-257).

Kansu (1990) defines the declaration of the Republic as a coup d’etat and a turning point, establishing a Kemalist dictatorship and signifying the end of liberal democracy in Turkey (pp. 1040-1041). However, when he discusses the parliamentary debates about certain articles of the 1924 Constitution, he documents the parliament’s success in fighting off Kemal’s proposals for extensive presidential prerogatives including longer term of service, a suspensive veto, and the dissolution of the parliament (pp. 1055-1059). This very capacity to resist demonstrates two things. First, in 1924 the regime was not yet a dictatorship. Second, the parliament was the strongest institution of the regime, given that even the opposition could find room in it. In sum, the chain of coups and counter coups between 1919 and 1920 moved the regime to A3 (Figure 2-2) and the 1924 Constitution was the articulation of this new position.

*The Autogolpe*

Mustafa Kemal was able to get rid of the first group in the opposition with the 1923 elections. However as the parliamentary debates about the 1924 Constitution revealed, this defeat did not mean total elimination of all opposition. A new opposition emerged shortly- comprising of his former soldier and party comrades who had supported him in his assault in 1923. The ideological inclination of this opposition – like its
predecessor - was also towards liberalism and decentralism. Foundation of the Republic, abolition of the Caliphate, and the preparation of a new constitution were three important issues that led some members of the opposition to resign and found a new party called the Progressive Republican Party (PRP). Since the deputies of PRP were already in the parliament, Mustafa Kemal could not get rid of them by applying the old tactics (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 53-78, 150-153).

Still, the PRP also had a short life. One year after the promulgation of the new constitution, the regime experienced its first protective coup. A successful regime change towards autocracy occurred in 1925 with the Law for Maintenance and Order (LMO henceforth), which put an end to the exclusive-parliamentarian period of 1920-25. The justification of the LMO was the Sheikh Said Rebellion in the Kurdish regions of the Republic.

As a result of the LMO’s first article “The government is empowered to prohibit on its own initiative and by administrative measure… all organizations, provocations, exhortations, initiatives and publications which cause disturbance of the social structure, law and order and safety and incite to reaction and subversion.”, the PRP as the only legal opposition party was banned seven months after its founding. After this decision, the LMO remained intact for another four years (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 119-130, 201).

Karpat (2010) considers the LMO as a turning point signifying Mustafa Kemal’s successful usurpation of political power, and the start of the revolutionary process (p. 135). For Tunçay (1992b) it is the end of the relatively free regime and for Kansu (1990) it is the beginning of the institutionalization of dictatorship. In our conceptual framework however, Mustafa Kemal was actually replicating the CUP’s move against the
opposition. Kemal’s autogolpe was a protective coup—similar to the ones in 1912 and 1913. Although the consequence was again a single-party regime, the coup was not aimed at changing the regime, but only at stabilizing Kemal’s position and at silencing any possible opposition. This also explains the absence of any constitutional changes. Ironically, while restricting inter-party competition, the legal changes made the regime more inclusionary in Dahl’s sense. The Kemalist regime recognized women’s right to vote in the municipal elections in 1930 and in the national elections in 1934. With the 1935 elections, 18 women deputies entered the parliament (Gökçimen, 2008, p. 49; Tanör, 2004, p. 323). However, none of these changes made the regime more competitive.

The Free Republican Party: A Failed Democratization Attempt

It is important to note that besides not attempting to change the constitution, Kemal was not against all forms of opposition. On the contrary, in order to secure his position as the president, he needed an opposition that would prevent his own party from becoming too strong. With this goal, Kemal in 1930 tried to encourage the formation of an opposition party: the Free Party.

The short-lived Free Party (FP) period, between August 1930 and November 1930, is generally taken together with the events of 1925 and referred to as the second democratic experiment. However, the political and economic conditions had not remained the same for five years. In 1925, the RPP had been challenged by an incapable...
but real opposition. Five years later however, the opposition had no focus or strength. One year after the declaration of LMO, Mustafa Kemal made his final move that was the last nail in his opponents’ coffin. All the remnants of the disorganized PRP opposition and ex-CUP cadres were accused of plotting the assassination of Mustafa Kemal. In 1927, confident of his victory, Kemal read his official history of the so called “National Liberation War” in the parliament to much applause (Tunçay, 1992b, p. 179; Zürcher, 2003, p. 255). Certainly, the single party was a party with wings and the liberal wing criticized the state-centered policies of İsmet İnönü’s cabinet persistently. Yet, in contrast to the PRP, this new liberal wing was loyal to Mustafa Kemal and opposed only the prime minister.

What unsettled the regime in 1930 was the Great Depression, collapse of the world market, and popular discontent especially among the small peasantry in Western Anatolia -the heartland of Turkish agriculture. Decreasing commodity prices, unequal exchange between town and village, and the tax burden increased the indebtedness of the peasants and eventually led to their dispossession. Although not exposed as contentious actions, the deprivation and anger of peasants and merchants were noticed throughout Western Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal’s solution was to funnel this anger through parliamentary means and to absorb it before it became explosive. A reliably loyal opposition party would serve the purpose. So he pushed the button and asked a close friend and ex-prime minister Fethi Okyar to found the opposition party of his majesty – the Free Republican Party (FRP). After giving interviews about the principles of the party, Okyar announced the program and constitution of the party again via newspapers. Given the bureaucracy’s tight control over the press at the time, the newspapers’ interest
actually reflected Mustafa Kemal’s approval and encouragement of the new party (Emrence, 2006, pp. 26-33).

The adjective Republican in the name denoted the newly-founded party’s loyalty to the basic principles of the regime: secularism and a clear stance towards the Sultan and the caliphate. What distinguished the FRP from the RPP were its economic policies: its criticism of state intervention, tariffs, and taxes. On the political plane, the FRP defended the extension of civil liberties, especially freedom of speech. Another important difference was its eagerness to embrace the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities. Yet, even before its founding, the party openly declared that its doors would be closed to the Kurds who, without being named, were considered traitors to the fatherland (Emrence, 2006, pp. 77-88).

The FRP organized and consolidated itself with astonishing speed. Its first test of strength was the municipal elections in 1930. The RPP used all possible advantages of the state to coerce the peasants and workers to vote for it, to little effect. The FRP obtained significant success – two city municipalities and forty district municipalities - in the first direct elections of the Turkish Republic. However, this success also paved the way for the FRP’s liquidation. In his struggle to get past the bureaucratic obstacles, Okyar realized that Mustafa Kemal was as concerned about the FRP’s success as the leading cadre of the RPP. Since the FRP was not a party built by its founder’s own initiative, after this insight Fethi Okyar signed the liquidation decree of his own party addressed to the ministry of internal affairs. This was the closing scene of the first democratization attempt in Turkish history (Emrence, 2006, pp. 163-190).
Successful Democratization and the Fall of the RPP

After the so-called “Free Party experiment,” the Turkish political regime continued to stay in A1 up to the last year of WWII. A country that had preserved her non-belligerent stance throughout the war despite constant British pressure, Turkey declared war against Germany in the hope of participating in the San Francisco meetings in 1945. In May and November of 1945, President İnönü, Kemal’s heir, made two speeches which opened the way for a multiparty regime. In these speeches İnönü underlined the fact that Turkey deserved a multi-party democracy and promised a change from indirect to direct elections and the lifting of legal obstacles to the formation of class-based parties and associations. The change of the voting system, new laws regulating the press and associations, and the elections that immediately followed moved the Turkish regime towards the inclusive direction. As I discuss in the third and sixth chapters, within the RPP there was certainly a growing opposition that was not afraid of showing its discontent openly in the party and the parliament. However, at the beginning, the opposition did not have the agenda of forming a separate party and challenging the RPP. İnönü’s intention was to purge the opposition from the ranks of his party, encourage its leaders to form an alternative party, and keep them under control. Hence throughout the transition period, the political initiative lay in the hands of President İnönü (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 30-33, 46, 57-59).

After the founding of the National Development Party in late 1945, twelve other parties were founded in the following year. However, compared to the 1919-1925 period, the regime had not become more inclusionary. Party banning continued to be a common
practice. In 1946 alone, four parties were banned and liquidated. (Appendix D). Hence the position of the regime was not different from its initial location at A2.

Among the parties founded between 1945 and 1946, the most important was the Democrat Party (DP). The Democrat Party’s leaders had been active in the RPP until they were expelled in 1945. In terms of their programs, the two parties were not very different. Despite the secular and bureaucratic appearance of the DP, what it was promising was growth based on free markets and tolerance of religious practices.

The DP won the elections in 1950 and governed the country up to 1960. Thanks to the majoritarian electoral system, it was over-represented in the parliament and soon it became obvious that it would not act as a replacement of the RPP but as an alternative force challenging and undermining its supremacy. In 1954, this majority increased in a disproportionate way. Between 1925 and 1945, one could talk about a fusion between the state and RPP (Demirel, 2013a; C. Koçak, 2009). With its dominance in the parliament, the DP started to restructure all bureaucratic apparatuses and started to create its own bureaucracy (Albayrak, 2014, p. 309).

I discuss the underlying causes and the evolution of the crisis leading to the 1960 coup in chapters three and six respectively. For now, the following summary should be sufficient. The DP’s control in the parliament – the strongest institution of the regime - had already frustrated the RPP and the bureaucratic segments affiliated with it. However, the 1957 elections revealed that the DP, albeit still a majority, had started to lose its most important asset, i.e., electoral support. The DP’s retreat raised hopes of the opposition and gave fuel to the latter’s electoral mobilization that would eventually lead the DP to rely more and more on censorship and police repression to preserve its position. The
vicious cycle of mobilization and repression led also to the politicization of the younger officers, who thanks to US-sponsored military programs, were acquainted with modern warfare techniques and dissatisfied with the traditional minded commanders in the army. From 1954 onwards, this exasperation led many young officers to get involved in coup conspiracies. The increasing politicization in 1959 encouraged several low-level officers to revitalize their coup plans, which they had shelved some time ago. Thus the way was paved for a new coup in 1960 (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 151-159; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 88-130; Tunçay, 1992a, pp. 184-187).


In 1960, a conspiratorial organization of colonels and sergeants deposed the DP. The 38-member National Unity Committee (NUC), the official name for the junta, dissolved the parliament, but did not ban political parties- not even the DP. However, all prominent members of the DP were arrested including the president and the prime minister. Moreover, all party activities were frozen. With the new coup, the regime moved to C1 –an exclusionary regime with no party activity Figure 2-4.
Immediately after taking power, the junta announced its intention of going to the polls. Actually, the junta was not composed of politically homogenous elements and included officers who wanted to pursue a long-lasting coup like the one in Egypt and Iraq, as well as moderates who did not want to rule the state directly but preferred to control it strictly but indirectly via institutions. This tension caused an internal battle within the junta which resulted in the defeat of the hawkish faction (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 162-168; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 40-48).

At the beginning of 1961, the NUC permitted political activities and after seven months the regime moved to C2, where it would stay for another 8 months. During this period a new constitution was proposed by an assembly of representatives, who were elected from universities, trade unions, occupational organizations, bureaucratic institutions and political parties in a corporatist way. The new constitution was ratified in June and a new government elected in October.
TABLE 2-7 IMPRISONED JOURNALISTS AND PUBLICISTS BETWEEN 1908 AND 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>Phase IV**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Arrested or Sentenced Journalists</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>197.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests Per Year</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phase I: August 1908- August 1912 and August 1919-April 1920
Phase II: April 1920-April 1925 and May 1945 and May 1960
Phase IV: 1984-2013

* Journalists who were arrested during 1971-73 and released with the 1974 pardon not counted  
** 1988-1996 data is missing


The Position of the New Regime

Compared to the previous and subsequent constitutions, there was a special emphasis on civil and political liberties in the 1960 Constitution. With its 11th article stating that basic liberties can be only constrained by regulations that do not contradict the spirit of the constitution, it also aimed to preempt repressive policy proposals (Tanör, 2004, pp. 379-384). However, in spite of this emphasis, the NUC passed a new law prohibiting criticism of the 1960 regime, and several journalists were sent to trial on the basis of this new law. Similarly, Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, remnants of the prohibitions on communist propaganda, were hanging over all publicists like the sword of Damocles (Kabacalı, 1990, pp. 192-209). During this phase, hundreds of journalists and authors were prosecuted, although only a few were put behind bars, excepting the coup interlude between 1971 and 1974 (Table 2-7).
A significant part of the 1960-1980 period passed under martial law (See the appendix in Üskül, 1989), although the proportion of political prisoners to the total population was lower compared to the previous and subsequent periods (Figure 2-5).

As usual, Kurds were not amongst the beneficiaries of the new regime. In fact, one of the justifications and motivations for the 1960 coup was the fear of a potential Kurdish insurrection as a consequence of developments in Iraq. After the 1958 coup in Iraq, the new Iraqi president Abdul Karim Quasim invited Mustafa Barzani, the leader of southern Kurds, to Iraq and promised regional autonomy. Although Quasim did not fulfill his promise concerning autonomy, from that time onwards Barzani found the opportunity to organize and increase his political influence not only in southern Kurdistan, but also in the northern parts which are within the Turkish borders. Barzani’s mobilization and influence did not turn into an active resistance against Turkish forces, but the mere possibility of an insurrection fostered unity amongst Turkish colonels and led them to speed up the execution of their plans. After the coup, 55 Kurdish landowners who were suspected of being part of a Kurdish insurgency, were immediately –even before the Democrat Party members - arrested. The number of detainees soon increased to 550 landowners, all of whom were sent to an internment camp in Sivas, where they remained for six months. After six months in Sivas, 495 of them were released without any trial, but 55 were exiled to western Turkey, again without a trial (Çiçek, 2010; Ekinci, 2010; McDowall, 2000, pp. 302-308, 403-404).
Figure 2-5 Political Trials Settled with a Sentence
(per million person)

Nevertheless, according to the criteria in this study, the new regime was the diametric opposite of the regime between 1920 and 1960. Whereas the latter was exclusionary, this new regime was inclusionary. During its 20 years of rule, only four parties were banned (Table 2-5) and only one was banned during the democratic phase of the regime (Table 2-6).

Furthermore, in contrast to the parliamentarian second phase, the third phase moved the regime under the control of the non-elected. The new constitution stripped the parliament of its *de jure* privileges. The parliament was no longer the sole instrument of national sovereignty. It was only one of them. There were new institutions which could block the decisions of the elected legislature. These institutions were the Senate, the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council. The members of the Senate were elected from among university graduates, who comprised 2% of the total population. Members of the junta were natural and lifelong members of the Senate. Finally, the president could appoint several members to the Senate. The Constitutional Court could block any legislation by deciding that it was unconstitutional, and none of its members were appointed by elected representatives. The National Security Council was shaped according to the American National Security institutions during the Cold War. Being an institution composed of generals and ministers who advise the president and the prime minister about threats to national security, it became something more than an advisory council, and practically a third component of the executive office.

The powers of the elected were further curtailed by assigning autonomy to various strategic institutions like the Council of State, Chamber of Accounts, state universities, public television and radio channels, the Central Planning Agency, and the Central Bank.
The most important of these arenas of autonomy was the judicial reserved domain of the soldiers. Since 1914, the army had had an autonomous judiciary, but with the new constitution it acquired a constitutional status (S. Çelik, 2008, pp. 154-157; Özdemir, 1989, pp. 87-89, 122-126; Tanör, 2004, pp. 394-400, 404, 409-411; Yazıcı, 1995, pp. 46-58).

Among the three institutions that could curtail the powers of the parliament and the cabinet, the Senate was the least important. In terms of its power to block legislation, it was even less influential than the upper house had been between 1909 and 1912. According to Özgişi, it approved 88.4% of the law proposals coming from the cabinet without any changes and rejected only 1.1%. With regards to the proposals made by deputies and senators, it was a little less lenient and rejected 11.9% (p. 105).

The Constitutional Court on the other hand was an important means to block legislative action\(^\text{30}\) (Figure 2-6). In fact, its activism was one of the main concerns of the

\(^{30}\) For a detailed analysis of constitutional courts’ activism drawing upon the same data source see Belge (2006).
executive office, including its military partners. Despite the absence of a firm legal justification, the Constitutional Court appropriated for itself the prerogative to cancel constitutional amendments made by the parliament (Özbudun, 2007, pp. 259-260).

Of the three, the National Security Council (NSC) was the most important institution through which the generals could manipulate and influence the elected governments’ policies. It was not only a council where the generals could “convince” the cabinet of certain policy proposals, but also an institution through which the military could make public admonitions and threaten several social groups including students and workers. Even the preliminary steps of 1971 can be traced back to the discussions in the NSC (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 199-203).

![Figure 2-7 Visibility of the Bureaucracy](image)

**Figure 2-7 Visibility of the Bureaucracy**

*Ratio of news about the National Security Council, Constitutional Court and the Chief Commander over the news about the Grand National Assembly.*

In sum then, with the 1961 Constitution, the regime had become more inclusionary, but at the expense of the powers of elected institutions, which had been

---

31 To calculate this ratios, I relied a Cumhuriyet’s search engine and searched for the news articles containing the name of the institutions.
seriously curtailed (Parla, 2005, pp. 76-80). This also corresponded to an increasing visibility of the hitherto neglected representatives of the bureaucracy (Figure 2-7). In this way the regime moved to B2 where it would stay until 1980.

**TABLE 2-8 SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED COUPS IN THE THIRD PHASE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Agent/Cause</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 May</td>
<td>Low ranked soldiers</td>
<td>Arresting the president and prime minister</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 February</td>
<td>Colonel Aydemir</td>
<td>Surrounding the parliament and house of the president</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 May</td>
<td>Colonel Aydemir</td>
<td>Attacking the radio station</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 March 9</td>
<td>Bureaucrats, intellectuals, high ranked soldiers</td>
<td>Never attempted</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 March 12</td>
<td>Chief Commanders of the Army</td>
<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_The Failed 1961 and 1962 Coups_

After the 1960 coup, all the key DP figures were arrested. However, the coup did not eradicate the organizational basis of the DP. Moreover, on the eve of the coup, despite its decreasing popularity, the DP still enjoyed the support of an important segment of the population. In combination, these two factors created problems of legitimacy for the junta. To the surprise of the NUC, almost 38% of voters rejected the new constitution. Similarly, in the general elections, the total vote of the two heirs of the DP was equivalent to their predecessor. It seemed that the coup had been a kiss of life for the DP (Karakartal, 2011, pp. 168, 174-167). In 1965, the Justice Party (JP), composed of ex-DP members and claiming to be the inheritor of the DP, won 45% of the votes and formed the government. In 1969, the JP repeated its electoral success.

---

32 Two months after the ratification of the new constitution, Prime Minister Menderes and his two ministers were hanged. Curiously, one of their alleged crimes was the violation of the old constitution.
The coup leaders, who had at first refused to adopt the radical alternative of banning all political parties, tried to find a mid-way by enabling JP members to return to political life but ‘instructing’ them about the widespread frustration in the army and threatening them with possible military intervention.

The combination of aggressive verbal pressure with the “lenient” practical attitude towards the DP leaders created immense politicization in the army and increased the number of groups plotting a coup - some of whom failed. If the second phase provided us with examples of both failed and successful democratization, the third phase provides examples of failed coups together with one successful protective coup (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 177-180; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 165-180).

The first two failed coup attempts occurred in 1962 and 1963 respectively. They were plotted by Colonel Aydemir, who was discontented with the leniency of the new regime towards ex-DP representatives. He also complained about the new cabinet’s reluctance to apply social reforms. Although his final goal was a parliamentary democracy, he regarded a non-parliamentary regime as a necessary transitional phase. It would be an exclusionary regime, relentless against counter-revolutionaries and insistent in applying radical reforms. However, Colonel Aydemir was unable to obtain the support of the generals and was hanged after his second abortive attempt (D. Çakmak, 2008, pp. 43-58; Y. Demir, 2006, pp. 167-168).

**The Failed March 9 Coup and the Successful March 12 Memorandum**

The next (failed) coup attempt eight years later was different from that of Colonel Aydemir in two senses. First, those who plotted the coup this time were not only soldiers
but also included intellectuals, journalists and bureaucrats. Second, high-ranked officers including generals were more actively involved in the coup plot this time.

Despite these differences, the motivation for the coup was the same. The soldiers and intellectuals were dissatisfied with a JP government which they considered to be a recycled version of the DP. From their point of view, electoral results would not change without structural changes like agrarian reforms and a national industrialization move. Hence the coup had to do away with the electoral masquerade and establish a revolutionary government capable of implementing radical reforms. In short, the envisioned coup would move the regime towards the exclusionary bureaucratic zone (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 272-294, 301-218).

Not all members of the army adopted this radical line. Despite the politicization of generals, the chief commander and other high-ranked generals chose not to change the status quo. However, their authority over the army was not strong enough to expose and arrest the coup plotters. Instead they chose an alternative tactic and stole the role of the coup plotters by a preemptive coup. On March 12, three commanders of the army issued a memorandum, in which they underlined the need for structural reforms and a determined government. This memorandum was meant to be a call for the resignation of the already weak government. While the government was dismissed, the parliament was not dissolved, and a new technocratic cabinet was formed without any member from the JP. The civilians who were associated with the March 9 junta were arrested, and conspirators in the army were expelled through early retirements (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 319-326; Karavelioğlu, 2007).
Hence, in March 1971, the Turkish regime again experienced two coup attempts. One radical and transformative, and another balancing. The army’s top generals put the kibosh on the radical junta’s transformative coup. The March 12 coup was not a transformative coup and did not change the position of the regime even temporarily.

Nevertheless, the constitutional changes of the interim regime between 1971 and 1973 strengthened the army’s position within the state apparatus: the number of generals in the NSC increased. Also, whereas the NSC’s previous function was defined as “expressing opinions,” it was now in a position to “recommend” policies to the cabinet. The reserved domains of the military courts grew at the expense of civilian courts. State Security Courts, initially designed to operate only under martial law to control social unrest, acquired a regular character. With the constitutional amendments, some of the full and associate members of these courts would be appointed among the soldier judges. Similarly, military expenditures would not be controlled by the Chamber of Accounts anymore (Tanör, 2004, pp. 412-418; Yazıcı, 1995, pp. 96-109).

All in all, in the same way that the protective coup of 1913 helped the CUP rise to an unchallenged political status, the 1971 coup initiated the rise of the generals. Before the coup, the generals were one of the candidates for control of the state apparatus, the civil bureaucracy and low-level officers being the others. After the coup, there was no other candidate.

What makes the March 9 movement more interesting is the coup plotters’ intention and hopes of making use of the youth movement. On the eve of May 27, despite the absence of any organic links between university students and conspirators in the army, the colonels had made use of the political crisis caused by the spontaneous

Nevertheless, what the prospective junta leaders had not calculated was the rapid radicalization and politicization of the youth towards revolutionary socialism, which was at least in practice incompatible with the support of putschist movements. The coup government attempted to silence the growing social and political discontent through extensive political repression. During the coup period, the leading cadres of the three revolutionary organizations were annihilated, and hundreds of people were arrested. Yet after the 1973 elections, which marked the end of the coup period, all these cadres were released with an official pardon and most of them resumed their political activity by founding both legal and illegal organizations (STM, pp. 2172-2175, 2182-2178, 2193-2177).

Phase 4: The Bureaucratic Tutelary Post-1980 Regime

Similar to the one in 1971, the 1980 coup was the initiative of the very top echelon of the army. This time, however, there was no split within the army. More importantly, whereas the coup in 1971 protected the existing regime by solidifying the soldiers’ position in it, the leaders of the 1980 coup dismantled the old regime altogether and engineered a new political system wherein the army could exert maximum control. The 1980 one is the only coup in Turkish history that simultaneously dissolved the
parliament and banned all political parties. With this bold move the regime changed its position to C1- a no-party and no-parliament regime.

As far as we can glean from the autobiographies of the conspirators, the coup was the result of two years of planning and the commanders waited up to the point where the leaders of political parties would have no hope of restoring their credibility. Keeping this concern in mind, the commanders twice postponed the execution of their planned coup. When the day eventually came, the army arrested all the major cadres of legal political parties and shut the parliament down. A few months later, the parties were also banned. Once the actors of parliamentarian politics were silenced, the regime turned on non-parliamentary revolutionary movements (Aydoğanlı, 2007, pp. 404-405; Evren, 1990, pp. 276-283; İba, 1998, pp. 232-233).

As officially declared by the junta, the major goal of the 1980 coup was to smash all revolutionary and socialist organizations. With 650,000 detentions, 210,000 trials, 517 capital punishment decisions, more than 500 suspicious deaths, and 14,000 revocations of citizenship, the army managed to change the regime from tutelary parliamentarian to bureaucratic autocratic. In terms of the position of the regime, this was the most drastic regime change of the 1908-2012 period (Cumhuriyet, "Barışalım Yaşayalım," December 10, 1995; Zürcher, 2004, p. 279).

After a two-year-long repression period, the coup regime started the process of constitution-making and established a consultative assembly by appointments. The new constitution was ratified by 92% of votes and the junta leader was elected as president (Cumhuriyet, "Yeni Anayasa ile Yeni Dönem: Evren Cumhurbaşkanı," November 8, 1995). Simultaneously, military oppression gradually lessened and competitive elections
were held in 1983. So the regime moved back to democracy, but it was in an exclusionary mode.

The Exclusionary Version of the 1960 Regime

The difference between the post-1960 regime and the one after 1980 lay not in the relationship of the elected with the nonelected. In terms of favorably tilting the power balance towards the latter, there is continuity between the modifications in 1971 and the transformation in 1980. Since 1971, the cabinet can bypass parliamentary legislative procedures with statutory decrees, but with the post-1980 constitutional changes, these decrees can also regulate basic freedoms and rights. The president has no responsibility—as in the 1960 Constitution - but his position is no longer symbolic. On the contrary, with its prerogatives, the presidency is the strongest part of the executive office. The president not only appoints bureaucrats to key posts, but also has stronger delaying veto powers. As regards constitutional amendments, the president has the right to call for a referendum any time. Finally, the 1980 constitution increased the army’s control in the executive office33 (Parla, 2007; Tanör, 1994, pp. 115-125).

As a result of this process, the already visible segments of the non-elected upper echelons of the bureaucracy became even more visible. If we think of newspapers as the barometer of political life, we can measure the centrality of any given institution or bureaucratic position by comparing the number of news it elicits with the number of news about any other institution. Figure 2-7 shows the ratio of the news items covering the non-elected (National Security Council, Constitutional Court and the Chief Commander) to those about the parliament. With the 1960 coup there occurs a dramatic jump, mainly

33 Cf (Harris, 1988, pp. 194-196). Harris considers these changes to be merely procedural and goes as far as claiming that in some domains such as voting, the new constitution curtailed the political rights of soldiers.
because of the introduction of the new institutions like the National Security Council and the Constitutional Court. It is after 1980 however, that bureaucratic institutions start to play an even more prominent role in political life despite the fact that no new institutions were founded during this period.

The move from elected to non-elected personnel/institutions represented continuity from 1971. What had changed was the inclusionary character of the regime. The new regime narrowed the sphere of political competition and brought it to pre-1960 levels (Table 2-5). The first step in this direction was banning eighteen parties in one go in 1981.

The second step was the extensive screening or veto process before the 1983 elections. None of the parties considered as the continuation of the pre-1980 parties were permitted to contest the elections (Demirel, 2014; Soysal, pp. 2132, 2136-2140). A complementary step was extensive repression, and keeping socialists, one of the politically most active segments of the society, in prison. As Figure 2-5 shows, the number of political prisoners after the 1980 coup increased dramatically. Approximately 70,000 in number, political prisoners were also disenfranchised even after they completed their sentence (Top, 2004).

Another important and innovative strategy to remove socialists and especially Kurds from electoral politics was the 10 percent electoral threshold (Ağırdr, 2013; Gürsel, 2013). Before the coup Turkey did not have an electoral threshold. Afterwards she had the highest threshold in the world followed by Liechtenstein (8%) and Russia.

---

34 Actually, Figure 2-5 does not completely reflect the repressive character of the post-1980 period because the data do not include those who were sentenced because of the special anti-terror law (Article 3713 of the Penal Law), replacing the notorious 141st and 142nd articles.
(7%) respectively. Finally, from 1983 onwards, party banning became a frequently used tool of the new regime (Güney & Başkan, 2008, p. 266). Hence after the 1983 elections, the new position of the regime was B2.

![Figure 2-8 Government Programs and Expressions of Intentions for Constitutional Change](image)

**Source:** (Hükümetler ve Programları)

**The Failed Democratization Attempt between 1989-1995**

Since 1980, the Turkish regime has experienced two democratization attempts with the aim to change its bureaucratic and exclusionary character. A comparison of the relative weight in government programs of the post-1983 cabinets enables one to discern these two waves. The first corresponds to the period of the 49th and 50th (TPP) and the Social Democrat People’s Party (SDPP), the heirs of the Justice Party and the Republican People’s Party of the pre-1980 period. From 1984 onwards these two parties had started to oppose the domination of the army with modest demands for democratization and civilianization. However the campaign for democratization gained momentum with the

Despite the electoral victory of these parties, who governed Turkey up to 1995 as a coalition, none of their promises were fulfilled. Indeed, from 1993 onwards, the demand for a new or amended constitution dropped from the agenda of mainstream political parties altogether and became limited to discussions within a small but influential intellectual circle named İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler (Second Republicanists). The story of Cem Boyner, the former chair of the strongest business organization in Turkey, illustrates this phase well. In late 1994, with İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler’s backing, Boyner founded a political party with the name New Democracy Movement (NDM). Thanks to Boyner’s monetary and social capital, the party attracted enormous attention in the mainstream media. However, in the 1995 elections the NDM could not even receive 0.5% of the votes. Four months later, a frustrated Boyner claimed that the NDM had accomplished its mission and quit all political activities (Kömürcü, 2009, pp. 23-24; Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 127-129; Sakallıoğlu, 1996, pp. 153-156).

The Protective Coup in 1997

Two years later, in 1997, another coup took place. The gradual decline of the parties in the center created opportunities for the Welfare Party (WP), generally labeled as the “Islamist Party” or representative of “political Islam” by scholars writing about the

35 Here the discussion is limited to the major actors in mainstream politics. Socialist parties, and parties that affiliate themselves with the PKK are beyond the scope of this discussion. Since the beginning of the 1980 regime, these currents opposed it and tried to mobilize masses for a new regime. These movements and their demands will be discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters.
Turkish party system. The reasons for the rise of the Welfare Party will be discussed in the following section. For now, suffice it to say that the WP’s electoral victory first in the Istanbul municipal elections of 1994 and later in the general elections of 1995 alarmed the military. The sequence of events leading to the 1997 coup started with a press declaration after the monthly National Security Council meeting in 1997. The press briefing was notable for its harsh tone and its criticism of the Welfare Party government. According to the declaration, ‘Sharia’ [Islamic law] was the biggest threat against national security- even bigger than the Kurdish threat. In the following days, this rising threat of Sharia was used as a political weapon against the Welfare Party. The military started to give briefings about the Sharia threat and the companies and organizations supporting fundamentalist movements. Businessmen, professors, journalists and bureaucrats were invited as separate groups for such briefings. Eventually the Welfare Party resigned and despite being the party with the largest share of votes, was excluded from all coalitions. Simultaneously, the public prosecutor of the Republic Party initiated the legal process for outlawing the Welfare Party. Eleven months later, the WP was banned by the Constitutional Court. The Virtue Party founded by the members of the Welfare Party was banned three years later (Jenkins, 2007, pp. 345-346).

In April 1999, new elections were held, and according to the criteria of this study, the coup process had ended. The 1997 coup did not have an impact on the constitution, so it was a protective coup like the one in 1971. Similarly, although social movements were not the primary target of this coup, it did initiate a new rise in state repression (Figure 2-9).
The end of the 1997 coup corresponded to a turning point in Turkey’s relationship with the European Union. Up until the late 1990’s, European countries justified their reluctance to invite Turkey to the European Union by referring to her lack of democracy. One of the decisions of the EU’s Luxemburg Summit in 1997 was to freeze the discussions concerning Turkey’s candidacy. To address this concern, or better said to overcome this obstacle, Turkish governments between 1999 and 2004 amended the constitution no less than ten times. The Helsinki Summit’s acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in December 1999 thanks to extensive US pressure in Turkey’s favor speeded up and extended the scope of the reform process\textsuperscript{36} \textsuperscript{37}. The

\textsuperscript{36} Keyder (2004), Hale (2003), and Müftüler Baş (2005) trace the start of the reform process with the constitutional change in 2001 and therefore consider EU membership as the primary initiator if not the cause of the reform process. What they overlook however is the fact the reform process had already started with the constitutional change in June 1999, six months before the EU summit (Özbudun, 2006, p. 46). Although not as dramatic as the 2001 change, the 1999 change civilianized the State Security Courts and solved an important problem in the EU-Turkey relations. The program of the 51th government, voted in April 1999, also prioritized constitutional amendments.
reforms included the abolition of the death penalty and state security courts, weakening the constitutional role of the NSC as well as increasing the number of its civilian members, expanding press freedom, and permission for broadcasting in other languages (Ç. Keyder, 2004, pp. 79-81; Müftüler Baç, 2005, pp. 22-26; Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009, pp. 43-72).

However, none of these reforms changed the exclusionary practices of the regime. The banning of parties continued to be widespread. As late as 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court tried the Justice and Development Party (JDP), the party that has been governing Turkey since 2002. Although the majority of the court members voted for its liquidation, the JDP survived the trial because the majority was not a qualitative one. Still, the court decided to halve the state support for JDP38 (Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012, p. 119).

The JDP’s trial should be interpreted as part of another failed coup attempt. The JDP entered the political arena with the 2002 elections. Thanks to the weakening of the centrist parties during the 1990’s and to the electoral threshold, the 2002 elections functioned like a ‘tsunami’ sweeping all existing parties but one- the RPP, out of the parliament. As a result, the JDP, presenting itself as the dovish and moderate wing of the Welfare-Virtue party tradition, obtained 65% of the seats with 36% of votes. The United States, big businesses, and liberal intellectuals in Turkey celebrated the JDP in its early years as a staunch promoter of democratization, but the generals were not amongst the sympathizers. However, given the domestic and international support that the JDP

37 For American pressure about Turkey’s EU membership see Sayari (2003), Barkey (2008).
38 Parties that can get more then 7 % of the votes in the general elections are eligible for the financial support of the Treasury.
enjoyed, the generals did not launch an immediate assault but waited until the presidential elections in 2007. Given the critical position of the president, the soldiers were especially anxious to prevent the presidency of Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of the JDP and the minister of foreign affairs. To accomplish this task, the generals used a plan similar to the one against the Welfare Party. During the presidential elections for the parliament, huge demonstrations against the JDP were organized in all the big cities in Turkey. Then, to increase pressure over the Constitutional Court, the soldiers issued a memorandum reminding everybody of the army’s determination to fulfill its responsibilities to the Republic. However, right after the memorandum, the JDP went for an early election and increased its votes by more than 10 percent. It was consequently not only able to elect Gül as president but also pass a constitutional amendment regarding the election of the president. Henceforth, the president would be elected not by the parliament but by popular elections. The closure trial, filed one year after the JDP’s electoral victory, was another component of the military’s strategy to oust the JDP. At the time, the trial was interpreted as the army’s ace in the hole. As is obvious today, it was rather the swan song.

The decision of the Constitutional Court marked the decisive failure of the coup project (Özel, 2003, pp. 80-83; Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012, pp. 111, 117-118; Yavuz & Özcan, 2007, pp. 120-124)

Since 2010, amending the constitution has been at the center of politics yet again. In a political maneuver in 2010, Tayyip Erdoğan of the JDP held a national referendum on several constitutional amendments, wherein he obtained another sweeping victory39. During his electoral campaign, Erdoğan conceded that the changes were modest and

39 (“Turkey's constitutional referendum: Erdogan pulls it off,” 2010)
promised to prepare a new constitution after being elected\textsuperscript{40}. After winning the 2011 elections, one of the first initiatives of the JDP was to establish a commission for a new constitution. Although all of the four parties in the parliament agreed on the need for a ‘democratic’ constitution and participated in the commission, they have so far been unable to produce a draft. Today, there is consensus among party leaders and those who observe Turkish politics that the commission will be unable to prepare a new constitution (Işık, 2013).

*Where is the Regime Now?*

After so many constitutional changes and democratization packages, can one still claim that the Turkish regime is at the same location where the 1980 coup had brought it? If the president can be elected by the people, why should one consider the present regime as being dominated by the non-elected? If the army’s attempt to liquidate the JDP failed, and if no political party has been banned for the last five years, can one still categorize today’s regime as exclusionary? If one remembers that several socialists who are JDP’s arch-opponents today used to hail the constitutional reforms as the “completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution”, these questions deserve special attention (Laçiner, 2007; Pekdemir, 2004).

To begin with, the centrality of constitutional debates in the Turkish political arena indicates that the regime has not changed yet. As regards to its position along the elected-non-elected axis, the activism of bureaucratic institutions has not lost its momentum in the last decade. Despite the weakened or weakening position of the army, judicial instruments still control parliamentary activity. According to Shambayati (2009),

\textsuperscript{40} (“Erdoğan: Yeni anayasa için seçim sonrası gelin,” 2010)
the Constitutional Court is as active as before (p. 776). We can witness its hyperactivity in 2014 as well, when the court obstructed three crucial maneuvers of the JDP\textsuperscript{41} in rapid succession between March and July.

If the election of the president by popular vote becomes a resilient practice, it would certainly have an impact on the position of the regime and tilt the balance towards the elected. As I write these lines, the president has not been elected yet. However, very few people believe that Turkey’s system after the presidential elections would be viable-combining a powerful, elected, but irresponsible presidency with an elected but relatively weak and responsible prime minister (T24, 2014; Yayla, 2014; "Zombie democracy," 2013).

As regards the exclusionary character of the regime, the last party that was banned was the Democratic Society Party in 2009 with 21 deputies in the parliament (BBC, 2009). However, in the previous exclusionary phase - phase 2 between 1954 and 1958 - no party had been liquidated. The prosecutions related to the corruption of Prime Minister Erdoğan and his relatives in December 2013 revived the possibility of another trial against the JDP (Selvi, 2014; Türköne, 2014). Thus it might be too soon to conclude that the times of party dissolutions are over. Especially if one remembers that the state also relies on other methods to decrease political competition. In 2012, around 2000 BDP members, activists and sympathizers including 3 deputies and 31 mayors were in prison (sendika.org, 2012; Yağmur, 2012). Despite much advertised releases in the spring of 2014, 250 of them have not been released as of July (Türkiye Gazetesi, 2014).

\textsuperscript{41}In two of these the court lifted the ban on YouTube and Twitter (Cumhuriyet, 2014) (Cumhuriyet, 2014). The third obstruction was the annulment of the law that would increase the government’s control over the judiciary –so crucial for rescuing Erdoğan from all the corruption allegations (Uludağ, 2014).
In other words, thirty four years after the 1980 coup, the Turkish regime still resides in the exclusionary-tutelary zone. The dismantling of the pillars of the system with which the army regulated political life is not sufficient for the establishment of a new regime, and is actually responsible for the current political crisis. It would therefore not be an exaggeration to say that until the formation of a new constitution, Turkey will be in a permanent state of crisis.

Reprise

Because of the way we define modes of democracy, each phase starts with the formulation of a constitution and ends with a transformative coup. But the way the regimes change reveals a pattern:

1908 Inclusionary- 1920 Exclusionary- 1960 Inclusionary- 1980 Exclusionary. The other dimension has the following pattern: 1908 Elected-1920 Elected- 1960 Nonelected- 1980 Nonelected. The agents of the transformative coups also alternate in a patterned way: 1908 low-ranked – 1919 high-ranked -1960 low-ranked – 1980 high-ranked. The coups of low-ranked officers were the result of politicization of the army. The coups of high-ranked officers were the result of de-politicization in the army.

Instead of analyzing the four phases separately, dividing them into two categories will help us understand the big picture better. The first era is the age of the assembly between 1908 and 1960; and the second era is the age of the bureaucracy from 1960 until today. Each era starts with the transformative coup of politicized low-ranked officers and then initiates a de-politicization of the army, which results in the high-ranked officers’ coups. Each era starts with an inclusionary phase and transforms into an exclusionary
one. Once started, each era has the following coup pattern: balancing-transformative-balancing coup.

In these two eras, political power has been in different hands: Between 1908 and 1960, we observe the rise and fall of Kemal’s party RPP. Between 1960 and today, we observe the rise and fall of the military as an institution actively involved in politics. The first era started with the 1908 Coup (Revolution) and the second with the coup in 1960. Both coups changed the configuration of the state in a radical way. The first introduced electoral politics, the second usurped power from elected institutions and transferred it to bureaucratic ones.

Each phase actually consists of four different stages: First, the power struggle and de-politicization (de-radicalization) stage. At this stage, the transformative agents of the coup struggle against representatives of the old regime, and establish themselves as the unchallenged political power-holders by its end. They do not change the constitution, but modify and amend it to secure their position. And that is the reason why this stage ends with a balancing coup. It is balancing in the sense of demonstrating to the ancien-regime representatives that they cannot change the balance of power. This stage also corresponds to a process in which the transformative coup leaders try to de-politicize the army and liquidate the radical elements.

The second stage is that of consolidation, when the new power-holders eliminate all challengers eventually. This stage includes coups of all three types: Balancing-Transformative-Balancing again. With the first balancing coup, the consolidation starts; the subsequent transformative coup (re)designs the regime in line with the interests of the new power-holders. Finally, the second balancing coup eliminates all challengers.
Following this coup, which represents the apex of political power for the incumbents, the process of retreat sets in. And sooner or later, those who control political power have to make room for political competitors. This stage thus ends with the opening of the system.

The third stage corresponds to the dismantling period. At this stage, with the entry of new political forces into the system, the institutional securities and privileges of the previous power-holders are gradually dismantled. None of these changes alter the position of the regime, but they weaken and de-legitimize the old pillars, simultaneously creating a new wave of politicization in the society.

To present this narrative in more concrete terms, let us start with the first era (1908-1960): The first stage corresponds to the 1908-1913 period, when the CUP struggled against monarchist forces but simultaneously negotiated with high-ranked generals and the depoliticized army. After the 1913 coup, the CUP started to consolidate its power in the regime (Figure 2-10).
Figure 2.10: Rise and Fall of the RPP 1908-1960

- 1908 Transformative Coup
- 1913 Restorative Coup
- 1920-21 Transformative Coup
- 1925 Restorative Coup
- 1945 Democratization
- 1960 Transformative Coup

- Depoliticization
- Repoliticization
- Power Struggle
- Consolidation
- Dismantling, and Crisis

- Inclusionary Phase 1
- Exclusionary Phase 2

- Rise of the CUP and RPP
- Fall of the RPP
The second stage corresponds to the 1913-1945 period. In this stage, the CUP collapsed unexpectedly due to the defeat in WWI. And from its ashes rose Mustafa Kemal’s RPP. Like the CUP, Kemalists continued to de-politicize the army. Although they did not object to the Sultan, who only had symbolic power, they replaced the Sultanate with a presidential system that did not touch the elected-versus-non-elected relationship.

De-politicization at the same time meant increasing pressure for an exclusionary regime. That is why the Kemalist regime, which was established by a coup of high-ranked generals, moved the regime to an exclusionary position. Although CUP and RPP shared the same ideological and support bases, they were not the same. Indeed, there was cut-throat competition between them. However, after the 1925 coup which corresponds to the second transformative coup, Kemalists eliminated the CUP and became a political force without any challengers. Their very consolidation initiated the Kemalists’ political decline.

In 1945, after WWII, the Kemalists opened up space for new political parties as safety valves for the rising discontent. The new political force- the Democrat Party- did not change the regime but dismantled all Kemalist institutions one by one. Consequently, political life became unstable again and frequent political crises politicized the society. The result was re-politicization within the army, and a transformative coup in 1960. Politicization in the society meant an inclusionary start for the new era (Figure 2-11).
Figure 2.11 Rise and Fall of the Military 1960-2000

- 1960 Transformative Coup
- 1971 Protective Coup
- 1980 Transformative Coup
- 1997 Protective Coup
- 1999 Democratization

- Power Struggle
- Inclusionary Phase 3
- Consolidation
- Exclusionary Phase 4
- Dismantling and Crisis
- Repoliticization
- Depoliticization

Rise of the Military as a ruling institution
We can trace a similar pattern for the second era from 1960 until the present: the first stage corresponds to the 1960-1971 period. An active fight against representatives of the old regime was the defining theme of this stage. It was an active opposition against the Justice Party, which was the successor of the Democrat Party. But this was simultaneously a stage of de-politicization, when radical elements of the army made unsuccessful coup attempts or were neutralized before any attempt. This period ended with the balancing coup in 1971. The 1971 memorandum and the resignation of the Justice Party cabinet was the sign that political power was in the hands of the military.

The new power holders were different from those of the previous era. In the first era prestigious soldiers formed a political party -- first the CUP then the RPP -- and kept the army under their political control because of their unchallenged prestige amongst the ranks of the depoliticized army. In the second era, soldiers and bureaucrats governed the country by creating reserved domains and institutional mechanisms through which to manipulate the elected. Hence the first era corresponded to the ‘control-via–party’ regime, while the second era corresponds to the ‘control-via-institutions’ regime.

The second stage of the second era started with the 1971 balancing coup and ended with the EU- oriented reform packages in 1999 which also corresponds to the end of the second transformative coup in 1997 against the Islamic Welfare party. In the midst of this period in 1980, the army mounted a transformative coup with which the depoliticization of the army was completed and the political regime moved back to an exclusionary mode.
The 1997 coup, on the other hand, confirmed the untouchable character of the reserved domains of the army and the bureaucracy. It also eliminated any political challenge with an Islamist discourse. However this complete victory was at the same time the beginning of the decline of the army’s prestige.

But in contrast to the first era, opening up more space for political opposition occurred before the drastic decline of the army’s political prestige as a result of pressure exerted by the European Union.

The third stage started in 1999 with the EU reforms. Eventually the new force rising rapidly in the political sphere (the JDP) undermined the unquestionable credibility of the bureaucratic institutions one by one, and especially the army. This increased the level of politicization in Turkish society.

How will the current regime crisis be resolved? I try to answer this question in the concluding chapter. But before giving this answer, it is necessary to look at social forces and movements which determine the content and direction of political struggles for regime change. I deal with these issues in the following two chapters.
Chapter 3
The Competition within the Power Bloc

This idea and aim are exactly the same as the idea and the aim which underlay the economic teaching of Karl Marx. In fact, what distinguished him from the economists of his own time and those who preceded him, was precisely a vision of economic evolution as a distinct process generated by the economic system itself.

(Preface to the Japanese Edition of A Theory of Economic Development)

This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race.... In actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part. In the tender annals of Political Economy, the idyllic reigns from time immemorial. Right and “labor” were from all time the sole means of enrichment, the present year of course always excepted. As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic.

(The Secret of Primitive Accumulation)

Introduction: Power Bloc and Waves of Competition

As argued in the introduction, the dominant perspective on Turkey in the social sciences literature is based on the assumption of a ‘strong’ state and a ‘weak’ civil society. Accordingly, social and political change is explained as being driven by inter-elite struggles that arise because of differences in beliefs and value systems, not because of conflicting material interests. Class interests come into picture only to account for the anti-bourgeois sentiments allegedly harbored by the Turkish bureaucracy.
Complementing the strong-state approach is the conceptualization of capitalist development in Turkey, which is never presented as a process based on creative destruction. According to the dominant perspective, Turkish capitalists, because of their dependence on the state, constitute an economically non-innovative and politically non-assertive social group. Hence capitalists, as part of the civil society, and their struggles within the power bloc, never deserve any special mention.

This seemingly tranquil picture of accumulation, however, is in stark contrast to the violent history of capitalist accumulation in Turkey. There have been two important instances of ‘destruction’. The first occurred in the period 1913-1945 with the dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. The second has been underway since 1997 as a politically-motivated struggle for dispossession and its outcome is not yet clear.

Additionally, the history of capital accumulation in Turkey has experienced not only destruction but also innovations. One can talk of at least three innovative processes which were responsible for the rise of: a) the traditional Turkish bourgeoisie in the 1940’s b) the emergence of the Turkish army as a capitalist enterprise from 1960’s onwards, and c) the rise of the Islamic (Anatolian) bourgeoisie from late 1980’s onwards.

What is important to note is that both the creative and destructive aspects of capitalist development did not have purely economic dimensions. In fact, all of them were state-related and involved political transformations of state power. The political actors who changed the regime either had vested interests tied with certain capitalist factions, or had to make use of their interests in order to obtain a material base. Contrary to the dominant approach then, this study considers competition amongst the capitalists
of immense importance in determining the fate of political struggles and the shaping of the political system in Turkey.

In this analysis I draw upon the concepts of the power bloc and the ruling coalition. The concepts are based on Marx’ works, although the former was never explicitly used by him. It was Poulantzas, who defined the concept of power bloc in an articulate way:

[power bloc] indicates the particular contradictory unity of the politically dominant classes or fractions of classes as related to a particular form of the capitalist state…..The concept of power bloc covers both the concrete configuration of the unity of these classes or fractions in stages characterized by a specific mode of articulation and also a specific rhythm of the ensemble of instances. (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 234 emphasis in the original)

According to Poulantzas, a power bloc is distinct from an alliance in two senses. First, the contradictions within the power bloc are qualitatively different from the contradictions between the members of the power bloc and other classes and fractions. Second, there is ‘relative unity’ among members of the power bloc, whereas alliances are formed at a specific level of the class struggle (political, economic or ideological). As a result, a change in the configuration of the power bloc (the emergence of a new hegemonic class/fraction, the entering and exiting of classes, a redefinition of the principal aspect of class contradiction) would lead to a new state form (military dictatorship, liberal state) whereas a change in an alliance would only result in a regime
change (multiparty regime, two party regime, presidentialism among others.) (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 241)

Poulantzas’s work is focused not on regimes but on the comparison of different forms of the state. This study does not attempt to analyze transitions from one state type to the other, but focuses on regime changes under a specific state type: a bourgeois democracy. Poulantzas’s conception of regimes is also different from the one used in this study, and his unsystematic examples for regimes are closer to the typologies developed by Maurice Duverger (1959). With some departures, I still adopt Poulantzas’s definition of a power bloc in drawing the border lines of the domain, the contradictions of which is the subject of this chapter.

I depart from Poulantzas first by conceding more divergence and conflicts to the fractions within the power bloc. In fact, the very competition within the power bloc, arising from the contradictory character of capital accumulation, is one of the three driving forces of regime change in Turkey. Second, internal re-configuration of the power bloc does not necessarily lead to a new state form, but definitely to a new regime.

Due to the dynamic nature of the capitalist accumulation process, the balance of power within the coalition is subject to change. Additionally, due to the unevenness of capitalist development, some latecomers demand to join the power bloc and also struggle for it. Given the dynamic nature of the power bloc, one can divide the history of Turkish capitalism into two periods: i) a hegemonic period, when a class or fraction can form a coalition and represent its own interests as the general interest of all partners of the coalition, and ii) a competitive period when competition between different partners of the

---

42 Social movements constitute the second driving force, as discussed in the next chapter. An analysis of the third one, inter-imperialist competition, is beyond the scope of this study.
coalition exceeds the containable threshold and the coalition partners confront one another on multiple fronts. As a result of this destructive competition, a new coalition with a new hegemonic fraction emerges.

In this chapter we analyze three competitive periods: early 1900’s-1924; 1945-1971; and 1971-today. In terms of the world-historical context, the first competitive period started and ended before the terminal crisis of British hegemony, and the second one ended before the signal crisis of American hegemony. The third period started before the terminal crisis of American hegemony and has not yet ended.\(^\text{43}\)

All three competitive cycles share the same eight-step pattern:

- a) An initial contradiction leading to political pressure or struggle
- b) Emergence of a new political actor
- c) Defeat of the old hegemon in the ruling coalition
- d) Emergence of a post-transitional contradiction
- e) A split within the capitalist class
- f) Resolution of the conflict
- g) A struggle for hegemony
- h) Defeat of all rivals and the emergence of a new ruling coalition with a new hegemon.

In the following parts of this section I outline the story of three competitive periods according to these eight steps.

\(^{43}\) For signal crisis and terminal crisis see Arrighi (1994, p. 215)
The competition between 1903 and 1924

The Contradictions

The Ottoman Empire’s integration into the capitalist world-system had been completed in the early 19th century (Kasaba, 1988a, p. 34). This integration entailed not only free trade agreements between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, but also political reforms that paved the way for a constitutional monarchy and extended the rights and liberties of non-Muslim subjects (Ç. Keyder, 1997, p. 34).

However, Abdülhamid’s counter-parliamentary coup brought this integration process to a halt. Hamidian absolutism, product of the tumultuous 1870’s and the Russo-Ottoman War, brought stability to the country, but the price for this stability was the undermining of the pillars of despotism. There emerged two sets of contradictions: between the Sultan, who was the sole occupant of the power bloc at that time, and the bourgeoisie; and between the Sultan and the bureaucracy (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 52-54).
Abdüllahmid’s pan-Islamist policy\textsuperscript{44} did not restrict the economic activities of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, but it meant further exclusion of an economically strengthening social class\textsuperscript{45}. Hence the desire for political freedom was actually the bourgeoisie’s demand for participation in the political system\textsuperscript{46}. The combined development of non-Muslim capital with Abdülhamid’s emphasis on Islam aggravated the contradictions between the power bloc and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie chafing under limited political rights.

In a departure from his royal predecessors in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Abdülhamid was not a promoter of a western schooling system, nor did he encourage the empowerment of a meritocratic bureaucracy\textsuperscript{47}. In contrast, his educational reforms tended to incorporate the previously neglected Muslim population into the schooling system. The same

\textsuperscript{44} For the un-anachronistic character of this pan-Islamism see Deringil (1991).
\textsuperscript{45} There is no specific study but see Kasaba (1988a, 1988b) for an analysis of the growth of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the 19th century with a commentary on the Abdülhamid era.
\textsuperscript{46} In discussing the problem of the bourgeois revolution, Keyder (1988) considers theories about a bourgeois revolution empirically unfounded. According to him, first of all, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was too fragmented to act as a collective class and second, there is no evidence of bourgeois mobilization or politicization prior to the Constitutional Revolution. For Keyder, the functions of the bourgeois revolution had been fulfilled by the bureaucracy to pre-empt the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie (pp. 158, 163). Since then, several studies have empirically shown not only the bourgeois mass mobilizations prior to the revolution (Kansu, 1997; Sohrabi, 2011) but also the link between the non-Muslim and Muslim revolutionary organizations (Moundjian, 2012). Still, independent of the empirical evidence, Keyder’s argument has two short-comings. First is his sociologization of the notion of bourgeois revolution which is a political concept. If the necessary condition of a bourgeois revolution “from below” –here I leave aside the dubious versions like ‘revolution from above’ or ‘passive revolution’- is defined as bourgeois mobilization and participation then one would not be able to find a single bourgeois revolution. Neither Cromwell nor Robespierre, nor Noske was any closer to British, French or German “bourgeoisie” than the CUP members were to the Ottoman bourgeoisie. Keyder accuses the proponents of bourgeois revolution thesis of trying to read Ottoman developments from European blueprint. However, the findings of empirical studies about the French Revolution from Tocqueville (2011) to Guerin (1977) show that even the French Revolution does not fit the blueprint. Hence one is confronted with a choice: either drop the notion of the bourgeois revolution altogether, say like Francois Furet, or read Marx’s account of the revolution from a political perspective. Keyder’s second shortcoming is related to his transhistorical conceptualization of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the 20th century as representative of a Wittfogelian Asiatic despotic state. Seeing an unchanging Ottoman bureaucratic class over 600 years of the Empire, through several cycles of political, economic and social change and attributing to this class a transformative role is not a theoretically superior position than the one of vulgar Marxists he criticizes.
\textsuperscript{47} For the contradictory outcomes of bureaucracy and Abdulhamid’s despotism see Shaw (1977, pp. 211-221) and Arkarli (1976, pp. 104-146). For the contradictory outcomes in education see Bein (2006) and Rogan, 1996.)
segment, the social pillar of Abdülhamid’s clientalistic despotism, was also recruited heavily to bureaucratic posts. Yet, as in the case of capital accumulation, Abdülhamid did not abolish the western schooling system, nor did he take any measures to reduce the turnout of westernized civil and military bureaucrats from those schools. This very group of bureaucrats then became the second contender for membership of the power bloc. Abdülhamid’s turn to clientalism deepened the contradictions between the Porte and the young bureaucrats.

*The New Political Actor and the Defeat of the Old Hegemon*

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) emerged as a result of the second contradiction between the meritocratic system and patronage networks, which was nowhere as pronounced as in the army. Thessaloniki and İzmir were two port cities where the CUP had its greatest political influence, partly because of the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the monarchy.

Although it is difficult to pin down a starting point, the CUP’s revival after its second congress in 1902 can be considered as the onset of the competitive period. The CUP’s demands were the common denominator of the bureaucracy and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie: a parliamentary monarchy that would open the doors of the power bloc to both the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. Yet emphasizing the contradictions between the Porte and the aspirants for power bloc membership should not obscure the deep contradictions between the centralism of the CUP and the centrifugal tendencies of the Christian – especially the Greek - bourgeoisie. This dormant contradiction, because of the unhappy alliance of the oppositional forces, would determine the fate of the regime and Ottoman subjects in the subsequent decade(s).
The 1908 revolution shook Abdülhamid’s regime but could not topple it completely. Between the July 1908 Revolution and the April 1909 Counter-Revolution, the monarchy fought a life-and-death battle for survival that it ultimately lost. The failed Counter-Revolution was the end not only for Abdülhamid’s monarchy but for all future hopes for a strong monarch.

With the 1909 constitutional changes, the Ottoman Empire entered the realm of bourgeois democracy. The bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie joined the power bloc and the Sultan had to accept a junior, if not symbolic, role within this coalition.

*The Post-transitional Contradiction*

Soon after this transition however, the interests of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie started to contradict. What was responsible for the growing contradiction was not necessarily the planned initiatives of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, but rather its links with Britain and its functioning within the cosmopolitan financial networks under British hegemony. Within British geopolitical calculation, there was no room for the Turkish bureaucracy’s developmentalist aspirations partly because Britain’s trade privileges were incompatible with the CUP’s developmentalist policies, and partly because the Ottoman Empire itself was the target of Britain’s imperialist aspirations.\(^48\)

At the beginning of the 1908 Revolution, the leading cadre of the CUP was a combination of free trade adherents and national developmentalist. However, Britain’s distancing from the CUP and her active collaboration with the monarchy gave the nationalist elements in the CUP the upper hand and pushed the bureaucracy into an alliance with Germany, which had been propagating a Lisztian protectionism.

\(^{48}\) For Britain’s distancing from the Ottomans, see Ahmad (1966).
**Split within the Capitalist Class**

The adoption of a pro-German nationalist developmentalism intensified the distrust between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, as the latter had been benefiting from the cosmopolitan finance and trade networks and was not too disturbed by the geopolitical challenges. And so the non-Muslim bourgeoisie became unreliable in the eyes of the bureaucracy. To counter the former’s economic power, the CUP engaged in an ambitious project of creating a loyal Muslim bourgeoisie. This project was the first of the three creative destruction processes in the history of Turkish capitalism.

One aspect of this process was the creation of monopolies to which Muslim merchants were offered privileged access. The other aspect was creating barriers for non-Muslims in their commercial activities. Boycotts and mandatory use of Turkish language in commercial activities were examples of these practices (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 61-65; Toprak, 1982).

**Resolution of the Conflict**

The biggest blow to the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was the dispossession move which occurred during WWI with the Armenian massacre. Due to geo-strategic calculations during the war, the Ottoman Empire displaced approximately 1 million Armenians, who together with the Greeks had been at the heart of Ottoman commercial life. This displacement meant the acquisition of Armenian assets and properties by Muslim merchants at very low prices or at no cost at all (Üngör & Polatel, 2011).

The Ottoman Empire’s defeat in WWI and its occupation by the Allied Powers gave the non-Muslim bourgeoisie a second chance at claiming economic and political hegemony. However, the change of priorities in British foreign policy in response to the
growing Bolshevik threat, and the resulting Turkish-British agreement changed the course of the peace agreement and the bureaucracy gained the upper hand again.

The last straw for the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. As a result of this exchange, 1.5 million Greeks left Anatolia, which meant a radical dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie (A. Aktar, 2003; Ç. Keyder, 2003).

*Struggle for Political Leadership*

After the defeat and expulsion of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, a new struggle within the ranks of the power bloc started. One section of the bureaucracy was defending an alliance with the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie whereas the other segment led by Mustafa Kemal had no intention of sharing political power. The split of the bureaucracy into two parties, RPP and PRP, mentioned in the previous chapter, actually referred to this split.

Given Kemal’s political prestige as the savior of the nation and the almost complete disappearance of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, the Kemalist fraction won the struggle. The party of the opposition was banned from political life and rival factions were liquidated. Hence from 1925 onwards, the Kemalist bureaucracy declared its supremacy and started a new period which would last until the end of WWII.

*The Second Competitive Period*

The initial contradiction that sparked off a competitive process within the power bloc this time differed from the first period. The contradictions during the hegemonic period were caused by the accumulation process and its impact on the state apparatus as
both its beneficiaries - the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy - demanded inclusion. The period between 1925 and 1945, however, cannot be considered a proper accumulation regime. It was rather a transitory period and the priorities of the hegemon in the power bloc were first dispossession and later with the collapse of the world market, promotion of economic growth via state enterprises\(^4^9\). As a result, these twenty-five years did not see the emergence of a new fraction within the power bloc.

In the latter period, it was the distribution of power within the top tier of the power bloc rather than its composition that had changed. And this was related more to the decline of the bureaucrats’ sources of power than to the strengthening of the bourgeoisie. With the subordination and dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and establishment of an industrial base for capital accumulation, the role of the bureaucracy within the power bloc had become more marginal\(^5^0\).

Moreover, the measures necessary to fulfill the functions of both dispossession and accumulation alienated not only the population in general but also the bourgeoisie from the bureaucracy. Eventually, both of these dynamics weakened the bureaucracy’s position within the power bloc and initiated a new competitive process (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 112-115).

To protect its position, the bureaucracy adopted a strategy different from that of Abdülhamid. Its two-pronged approach consisted first of replacing extensive repression of the monarchy with limited liberalization of the political system to encourage the


\(^{5^0}\) As Tezel (2002) shows, even in 1950, five years after the wealth tax, non-Muslims constituted 22% of Turkish manufacturing employment. Given the division of labor in Turkish society, this indicates an even bigger share in ownership.
bourgeoisie to compete with itself in the political arena. Second, it attempted to restore its legitimacy through land reforms at the expense of landowning capitalists\(^{51}\).

**A New Political Power and the Defeat of the Old Hegemon**

The bureaucracy’s insistence on land reforms and electoral competition with the bourgeoisie led to the formation of the Democratic Party (DP), a party supported by the land-owning capitalists. However, rather than narrowly defending the interests of the land owning classes, the DP tried to establish a counter-hegemonic alliance against the bureaucracy. Its demands summarized the pillars of the coalition: general political and more importantly religious freedom; the transfer of state enterprises to the capitalists; and freedom for the markets.

In response to the DP’s challenge, the bureaucracy could neither implement land reforms nor win the peasantry’s support due to its incapacity to function as a political party, its vested interest with the capitalists, and more importantly, its 20-year long legacy of repression\(^{52}\). And so the bureaucracy’s attempts to marginalize the bourgeoisie backfired and resulted in its own marginalization within the ruling coalition.

In the elections of 1950, the RPP, as the bureaucracy’s political wing, suffered a humiliating defeat. Since the political system had been designed with the assumption that the RPP would be the majority party forever, the 1950 elections unexpectedly transferred an immense amount of power to the new party of the bourgeoisie.

Since it was impossible for the DP to purge all existing cadres of the bureaucracy and fill their posts with its own loyalists, the bureaucracy survived as part of the ruling coalition.

\(^{51}\) Karaömerlioğlu underlines the Kemalist conservative fear from proletarianization as an additional factor.\(^{52}\) Keyder (1987b, pp. 125-127) lists the close relationship between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie and the absence of a landed oligarchy as the primary reasons for the failure of this reform.
coalition, as did the RPP, although the latter was now in a marginalized position. Hence
the electoral defeat of the RPP did not establish the bourgeoisie’s hegemony, but simply
intensified competition within the power bloc.

Post-revolutionary Struggle and the Split

The displacement of the bureaucracy from its previously unshakable position
within the power bloc was soon followed by another struggle therein. This struggle
centered on the choice of an accumulation strategy and the development path that Turkey
was to pursue: should development be based on agricultural exports or import-
substituting industrialization (ISI)? The former implied that the agrarian sector would be
the motor of capital accumulation and thus the main recipient of state credits. The latter,
on the other hand, required the transfer of foreign exchange from agricultural exporters to
the nascent industrial bourgeoisie. Also, as the latter strategy entailed more elaborate
planning, it required the presence of autonomous bureaucratic institutions. The former
strategy appealed to the commercial capitalists with agricultural links whereas the latter
was preferred by the industrial capitalists (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 142-144).

In this market versus planning debate, the Democrat Party sided with the
agricultural exports advocates from the beginning. Being a populist party whose survival
depended on votes of the small peasantry producing for the world market, it did not have
any choice. In the early years, the DP’s leaders went as far as associating planning with
communism. Yet, from 1954 onwards, the shift to a new international climate less
conducive to export-based growth forced the party to change this attitude. The DP’s
reluctance to adopt a new line further alienated the industrial bourgeoisie, and led to a
split and the formation of the Freedom Party (FP) that articulated the interests of the
industrial bourgeoisie in its program. The FP’s share of 4% votes in the 1957 elections two years after the split, and its subsequent decision to join the RPP should not mislead anyone concerning its important role as the voice of the industrial bourgeoisie and urban populism. With the publication of its magazine titled Forum, the party shaped the contours of the incoming post-coup regime. Indeed, more than 30 articles of the 1961 constitution were taken from the program of the FP (Albayrak, 2008; Buğra, 1994, pp. 187-190; D. Çakmak, 2008). After joining the FP, the RPP exploited the split between agrarian and the industrial capitalists in its struggle within the power bloc. Over the years, the industrial capitalists distanced themselves from the agrarian capital and cultivated ties with the bureaucracy.

The initial struggle between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy had other repercussions as well. The bourgeoisie’s biggest supporter in its struggle against the bureaucracy was the United States. This support was not limited to financial aid but also included military training and modernization of the Turkish army under NATO’s guidance. Tellingly, although all the founding fathers of the Republic had been soldiers, not a single significant military modernization project was undertaken between 1925 and 1945. The army was a remnant of the crumbling Ottoman Army in the 1920’s, and American support for military modernization sparked the opposition between the young military officers and the older generation (Akyaz, 2002). As described in the previous chapter, the discontent of young officers combined with the crumbling structure of the army, and resentment for the DP’s revanchist policies against the RPP and the bureaucracy, prepared a fertile ground for putschist tendencies among young military officers.
Resolution of the Competition

After 1954, the contradictions between the agrarian capitalists and the industrial bourgeoisie increased the competition incrementally. Eventually, the contradictions were resolved by the military take-over in 1960, which settled the conflict in favor of the industrialist bloc and its accumulation strategy of import-substitution industrialization. While the coup signaled the defeat of agricultural capital, it still could not determine the dominant element within the power bloc. What it did establish (and portend) was a change in the army’s status. The coup had been an outcome of the army’s politicization and it politicized the army further.

The army was confronted with two choices after 1960. The first was to use the power acquired through the coup to go back to the 1920’s set-up and not share power with any member of the power bloc. This would mean reversing the division of labor between the civil and the military bureaucracy. Between 1925 and 1945, the civilian bureaucracy had controlled the system with power and legitimacy derived from the army. The army as an institution had not attempted to intervene in the political process, and the civilian bureaucrats played a direct role in the system as much as they had been utilized by the military. In contrast to this precedent, in 1960, the first alternative implied direct control of the system by the army. The Zeitgeist in the 1960s was indeed suitable for such a path. In fact, during 1950s and 1960’s, most of the Middle Eastern countries were ruled by “progressive juntas” (Haddad, 1965, pp. 20-32; Khadduri, 1953, pp. 523-524).

The second alternative was an alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie. The army would preserve the parliamentarian system and not dismantle the mechanisms with which the industrial bourgeoisie influenced the system in exchange for powerful and
autonomous posts in the political system. The alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie meant not only political but also economic privileges for the army. This alternative opened the door of possibilities for the army to accumulate capital as a private company with various tax exemptions and protected markets. Additionally the army could increase its capital by deducting forced savings from the officers’ salaries- an option not available to private capitalist companies at the time (Fırat Demir, 2005, pp. 675-685; Parla, 1998).

The period between 1960 and 1971 was a period of intense competition within the army between the respective defenders of the two options. The high-ranked generals’ preference for the second option marginalized the defenders of the first option, but did not hinder them from plotting coups. The latter group was eliminated from the army as a consequence of the three failed coups in 1962, 1963 and 1971. That is why 1971 - the year of the last failed coup- also marks the end of the competitive phase and the beginning of a new hegemonic period (Akyaz, 2002).

If the years from 1960 to 1971 marked the army’s gradual homogenization, they were also a period of the industrial bourgeoisie’s consolidation. At the end of 1950’s, members of the industrial bourgeoisie were scattered individual capitalists. In the following years industrial capitalists were able to organize themselves and defend their interests in a strong and articulate manner. Another fact that makes 1971 a turning point was the foundation of TÜSİAD, the association of Turkish Businessman and Industrialists (Buğra, 1994, pp. 336-337; Yavuz & Özcan, 2007, p. 113).
The Third Period of Competition: 1997-

The Initial Contradiction

The industrialist-military alliance lived its heydays during the 1970s and 1980s. In a protected domestic market, the industrial bourgeoisie profited without any innovation. The switch in 1980 from ISI to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) did not increase the competitive capacity of the industrial bourgeoisie either. The immediate consequence of this switch was to decrease wages and increase profit rates (Yeldan, 2001, pp. 44-48). Similarly, the army made extensive gains. It got involved in several sectors from biscuits to car manufacturing and became one of the biggest corporations of the country (Akça, 2006).

Still, the switch from ISI to EOI meant at the same time the emergence of a new industrial bourgeoisie in Anatolia. This group specialized in low-cost labor-intensive manufacturing like textiles which are the main source of Turkey’s exports revenues. Most of the owners of these middle-to-small scale enterprises had a pronounced Islamic identity which explains the label ‘Green Capital’ attached to them. In harmony with the American ‘green belt strategy’, the Turkish state’s post-1980 strategy to combat communism with a form of Islamism blended with nationalism solidified this identity of Anatolian capitalists (Adas, 2003, pp. 74-82; Bulut, 1999; Ö. Demir, Acar, & Toprak, 2004, pp. 168-172).

The financialization of the economy starting from the late 1980’s made the division of labor between the hegemonic bloc and the newly emerging Islamic bourgeoisie more visible. The TÜSİAD-Army alliance was involved in financial investments and high-profit (mostly import related) commercial and industrial activities
(Yeldan, 2001, pp. 127-157). The Islamic bourgeoisie on the other hand specialized in export-related activities with low profit margins. The credit mechanisms were controlled by the hegemonic bloc, but the Islamic bourgeoisie found innovative ways to form alternative credit mechanisms by exploiting the political atmosphere. Making use of the state’s dependence on Islam to combat revolutionary and separatist movements, the Islamic bourgeoisie relied on the network of religious sects to finance its investments. Together with export revenues, the money collected through sectarian channels enabled the ‘green capitalists’ to make ambitious investment plans.

A second consequence of the rapid growth of TÜSİAD and the army as capitalist powers and of the subsequent financialization was the need to integrate with European markets. The more urgently this need was felt, the more important the issue of European Union membership (or at least candidacy for membership) became (Öniş & Türem, 2002, p. 452). However, the Turkish army’s privileged position in the economy and the way it dominated the political system was incompatible with EU membership (Güney & Karatekeloğlu, 2005). This incompatibility, combined with the need for integration with western markets, was the main source of contradictions within the power bloc throughout the 1990’s and the early years of the new millennium.

As a result, the subsequent financialization and integration with western markets gave rise to two sets of contradictions:

a) The contradiction between the growth of the Islamic bourgeoisie as the motor of Turkish industry and its deprivation of official credit mechanisms.

b) The contradiction between the increasing financial and commercial integration with western markets and a political system incompatible with this integration.

These contradictions gave rise to two different struggles within the power bloc:
1. The Islamic bourgeoisie’s struggle for joining the ruling coalition.

2. A growing number of TÜSİAD members’ demands for democratization and reforms in the state structure.

The initial contradictions before the third competitive period contained elements of both the first and the second periods. Like the first period, there was a new member of the power bloc demanding to join the hegemonic coalition, if not to become the hegemonic fraction. And analogous to the second period, an older fraction of the ruling coalition wanted to change the balance of power therein.

Members of green capital supported the Welfare Party, which defended the nascent national bourgeoisie with an Islamist and anti-imperialist discourse. As described in the previous chapter, members of TÜSİAD did not participate in this struggle as an independent political force but preferred to be a silent accomplice of the army.

The TÜSİAD-Army alliance responded in two different ways to the two different forms of contradictions. The inclusion demand was rejected harshly and both segments of the ruling coalition attacked the Islamic bourgeoisie as defenders of Sharia. Their campaign escalated and eventually resulted in the coup of 1997. The ruling coalition’s approach to the second contradiction however was similar to the bureaucracy’s response on the eve of the second competitive period. Instead of completely ignoring the demands for reform, they attempted incremental reform.

The Formation of a New Political Actor

The initial attacks on the Islamic bourgeoisie and its political voice, the Welfare Party, resulted at first in the bankruptcy of several Islamic companies. Politically, the Welfare Party split into two wings and later two parties along the moderate-orthodox division. Hence two years after the 1997 coup, the political scene seemed as if a short but
intense competitive period had ended with the victory of the ruling coalition. It was probably this impression that gave the generals the confidence to make bold statements like: “If necessary February 28 process will continue for 1000 years”.

However, since nothing had changed in terms of the division of labor among Turkish capitalists, preventing the growth of the new Islamic bourgeoisie by political campaigns proved to be impossible.

Moreover, the JDP - the moderate wing of the Welfare Party - had suddenly become a staunch defender of the reforms for the European Union, i.e., privatization and financial liberalization. In this way, it was able to soften the opposition of the TÜSİAD if not to create an alliance (Uğur & Yankaya, 2008, pp. 588-594). Additionally, the existing political parties could not cope with the double contradiction and rapidly lost their political prestige. The result was the emergence of a power vacuum.

The End of the Ruling Coalition

In the 2002 elections, the three factors discussed above enabled the JDP to obtain a sweeping electoral victory. With the exception of the RPP, none of the parties from the coup period could obtain any seats in the parliament. Hence, like the historic elections in 1950, there emerged a two-party parliament with an overwhelming majority of the JDP.

With the rise of the JDP, it became obvious that the 1997 coup had signaled not the end but the beginning of competition within the power bloc. Like the post-1950 period, the competition was between the army and the JDP backed by Islamic capital. The army aimed to create conditions for an anti-JDP alliance as had happened in 1997. However, this time TÜSİAD did not side with the army and gave silent approval to JDP and its pro-reform, pro-European rhetoric.
The failed coup attempt in 2007 and the JDP’s subsequent electoral success was the turning point in the Turkish balance of power. From that point onwards, the army-TÜSİAD alliance has no longer been the ruling coalition. Nothing could illustrate the decline of this coalition better than the Ergenekon and Balyoz process between 2009 and 2013, after which one-third of all generals were jailed on allegations of coup-plotting.

However, the fall of the Army-TÜSİAD alliance and pacification of the army did not end but only intensified the competition between the Islamic bourgeoisie and TÜSİAD. Like the first competitive period, the rift between TÜSİAD and the Islamic national capital cannot be reduced to different economic interests. True, the former group’s monopoly over credit mechanisms and insistence on import-driven growth was in opposition to the latter’s insistence on the priority of exports and deprivation of cheap state credit. However, the economic strength of the Islamic bourgeoisie was not sufficient to challenge the economic dominance of TÜSİAD.

What fueled the competition were international dynamics. The JDP’s inability to implement democratic reform plans as envisioned by the United States led the US to look for political alternatives to counterbalance, in not to replace, the JDP.

Like the CUP, the JDP is a heterogeneous bloc, wherein one segment favors an agreement with the US, while the other harbors more nationalistic aspirations. With the American search for a stronger civilian opposition to the army, the nationalist segment gradually gained the upper hand. Like the CUP’s nationalist rhetoric with emphasis on the monopolistic rents of non-Muslim merchants, the JDP, with its increasing distance from the US, started to center its political propaganda on the monopolistic rents of TÜSİAD, accusing them of being an interest lobby.
Chapter 4
Historical Overview of Popular Struggles in Turkey

Introduction

This chapter presents a narrative of social movements in Turkey, to provide the necessary background for an analysis of the relationship between revolutionary movements and regime change in the following chapter. Although the dataset utilized in this chapter contains information about movements since the 1870’s, the starting point of our narrative is the eve of the 1908 Revolution. Information about earlier years is not used for explanatory purposes, but employed to demonstrate the contrast between the contentious 1870’s and the subsequent two decades.

53 Therefore some live in darkness/And others in light./We see those who live in the daytime/But not those who live at night. (Threepenny Opera translation from (Manvell, 1973, p. 276)
54 I could not cope with your lies and conniving ways. This has been rankling me. But I didn’t fall down to my knees in front of you. So let that rankle you.
While a conceptual analysis of social movements and their role in regime change is the subject of the next chapter, this chapter clarifies several points through its descriptive narrative. To begin with, so far, scholars writing about Turkish political change have neglected the existence of social movements in general. To be sure, the last three decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of historical studies concerning this or that social and political movement. As a matter of fact, without these valuable studies, establishing the first part of the database informing this chapter and the next would have been impossible. However, because of the particularistic focus on individual movements, they are not seen as entities that are part of a bigger wave-like
process with its own dynamics. The primary purpose of this chapter therefore is to make these waves visible. I demonstrate that Turkey witnessed two major waves of social movements in the twentieth century: i) between 1896 and 1930 and ii) between 1968 and 1999. Our data also hint at the signals of a third wave (Figure 4-1).

This chapter also compares the two waves of social movements, although this comparison is not the central focus of our narrative. Both waves are similar in the sense that they were initiated by competition within the power bloc and the resulting politicization. However, whereas the first wave was predominantly composed of separatist uprisings, the second wave was a combination of labor, student, and separatist movements. Furthermore, the instances of the first wave occurred more or less in the same time interval, while the second wave itself is comprised of two (sub)waves: a west-centered wave of labor and student movements followed by the second Kurdish awakening. I argue that this unsynchronized unrest in the second wave is partially responsible for the different reactions to the 1980 coup. Whereas the coup could easily stamp out the (student and labor) movements in the western part of the country, which had already lost momentum and were in a process of decline, it could not prevent the rise of the Kurdish movement which had just started to rise. I also argue that the lack of synchronization is also responsible for the blurring of the borders between the second and third waves.

55 In his rightful criticism of economistic theories of nationalism, Adanır (2001) considers the Macedonian unrest in the late 19th and early 20th century as the product of political projects of national elites (pp. vi-vii). Similarly Keyder (1997) sees the rise of Balkan nationalism as an unavoidable reaction to belated Ottoman democratization (pp. 33-34, 38-40).
Figure 4.2: Intensity of Movements 1876-1945

Source: The Social Movements Database 1945-2014 (SMD 1)
Figure 4-3 Monthly Intensities of Movements in terms of Standard Deviations

Source: SMD 1
Identifying the Waves

Figures 4-2, 3 and 4 show the aggregate intensity of social movements and their distance from the median in terms of the standard deviation. If we consider a distance of .5 σ from the median as the cutoff point for the beginning and end of a wave, we can observe two or possibly three different waves of unrest between the years 1876 and 2013:

(i) 1896-1931 (ii) 1968-1999 and (iii) a possible new surge from 2012 onwards.

---

57 Henceforth, all figures related to the intensity of unrest will show the distance from the median in terms of standard deviation on their y-axis. The medians and deviations for the 1876-1945 period and for the 1946-2014 period are calculated from two unrelated datasets.
None of the waves is smooth and continuous because all of them were interrupted by violent state repression. The first wave was interrupted four times: first by the Greco-Ottoman War in 1897, later by WWI in 1914, third by the National Resistance in 1920, and finally by the military campaign against Kurds in 1925. However, with the exception of the last, none of these interruptions could prevent the rise, let alone terminate the movement. What did terminate the first wave were the military campaigns between 1930 and 1938. The second wave was interrupted twice by military coups, first in 1971 and later in 1980. As with the first wave, the movements regained their momentum a few years after the coups. The terminal decline of this wave came with a complex set of repressive policies practiced in the 1990’s. The trajectory of the third wave has not become clear yet.

The following three sections present a descriptive summary of these three waves of social movements.
TABLE 4-1 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE JULY REVOLUTION IN 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Pre-Revolution</th>
<th>Post-Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrest in the Army</td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>50.0%Mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrations</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests Against the</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Category</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Period</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Movements Database 1876-1945 (SMD 258)

The First Wave: 1896-1930

1896 - 1913: Constitutional Revolution, the Balkans and the Middle East

Going by Figure 4-2, 1908 appears to be the most important year of the first wave, since it was the year of the Constitutional Revolution, and the intensity of recorded

58 For SMD 2 see Chapter 1 (page 76)
events in that year is more than $5\sigma$ above the median. However, such high intensity is misleading because most of the events recorded in 1908 were not really protest events but celebrations of the revolution in various cities$^{59}$ (Table 4-1). Another important component of the events in 1908 was the short-lived strike wave between August and September, which tried to use the freedoms of the post-absolutist era to improve labor conditions (Karakisla, 1995, pp. 22-23). But this movement ended as suddenly as it had started, and it took only one decree by the CUP regime (Figure 4-5). Indeed, after the Tatil-i Esğäl decree, the workers movement disappeared from the political scene without impacting the subsequent movements.

![Figure 4-5 Strikes, Celebrations, and Military Unrest in the Months after the 1908 Revolution.](image)

*Source: SMD 2*

To explain the weakness in the organizational capacity of the labor movement, one should emphasize less the level of capitalist development and more its ethnic composition. As Table 4-2 shows, 37% of the strikes were in the Balkan zone, where non-Muslims constituted the majority of the population. Thessaloniki, a primarily Jewish port-city, where a quarter of the population was employed in manufacture, especially functioned as the engine of militant labor movement and socialist activity (Dumont, 1994, pp. 59-72). Here the Jewish workers played a role similar to that of pre-Bund Jewish organizations in Russia (Ilıçak, 2002, p. 139). Similarly, approximately half of the strikes occurred in Istanbul, İzmir, Adana and Aydın, where Greeks and Armenians constituted a significant minority. The politically active labor force in the Ottoman Empire was comprised mainly of non-Muslims. According to the industrial statistics of 1915, two years after the loss of almost all Balkan territories, 85% of the labor force in manufacturing was non-Muslim. In 1919, the ratio for the western Anatolia was the same (Koç, 1992, pp. 74-78; Tezel, 2002, p. 98).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occurrence</th>
<th>İstanbul</th>
<th>Thessaloniki</th>
<th>İzmir</th>
<th>Other Regions in Balkans</th>
<th>Adana</th>
<th>Aydın</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** SMD 2

The loss of Thessaloniki and other Macedonian regions, the rise of nationalism, the loss of industrial districts as a result of wars, literal destruction, and forced migration

---

60 Cf (Quataert, 2008, pp. 183-185). Quataert shows that one cannot simply assume an ethnic division of labor in the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were also part of the labor force and the majority among the unorganized segments. He also states that non-Muslims constituted a privileged segment of employees. Koç agrees with this statement but reminds us of the crucial role played by the labor aristocracy in the first stage of class struggle.
of the labor force undermined – indeed precluded - the very possibility of class solidarity across ethnic divides and the rise of a workers movement in the Ottoman Empire. Hence the events in 1908 should not be considered as representing the first wave of social unrest in Turkey.

At the core of the first wave of social unrest was separatism in different parts of the Empire: the Balkans, the eastern regions heavily populated by Armenians, the Arabian Peninsula, and later Kurdistan. As can be seen from Figure 4-4, the suppression of the Bulgarian April Uprising in 1876 and the Russo-Ottoman War resulting in an autonomous Bulgaria, were followed by a relatively tranquil period for almost twenty years. The year 1896, the beginning of the second round of the Cretan revolt, can be considered as the starting point for the next wave. The political stance of the revolt leaders was in line with Greek irredentism and eventually this uprising led to the Greco-Ottoman War. The war resulted in an autonomous Crete and eviction of Ottoman troops from the island thanks to the intervention of European Empires (Şenışık, 2007, pp. 74-84, 326-327).
The Ottoman retreat in the Balkans had started in the early nineteenth century with the Serbian and Greek uprisings. After Bulgarian independence in 1908, Macedonia -- a region which covers parts of Greece, Bulgaria, the present-day Macedonian Republic, Albania, and Serbia -- was the last stronghold of the Empire in the Balkans. It was also the most urbanized and in the capitalist sense most developed region of the Empire. By extension, it was also the region with the most developed civil society in the capitalist sense. For these reasons, the earliest nationalist movements under Ottoman rule emerged in Macedonia; by the same token, the constitutionalist movement was also born in the Ottoman Balkans (Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, pp. 4-6).

The next important point in the wave was the Ilinden Uprising in August 1903 that surpassed April 1876 in terms of intensity. The insurrection was led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which would later split into socialist
and Bulgarian nationalist factions (Adanır, 1994, p. 35). The popular discontent that the IMRO strove to exploit was the inability of the Porte to abate the burden of taxes and other oppressive policies for the Christian peasantry, and implement tax reforms. The expansion of pastures at the expense of small farmers further added to the discontent (Adanır, p. 45; Pinson, p. 132). The rebels repelled the Ottoman army and declared a republic that was not based on a specific ethnic claim but could only survive for less than two weeks (Brown, 2003, pp. 12-18, 103-125). In any case, the declaration of the republic had limited popular backing and involved even more limited popular mobilization. It could not go beyond armed attacks of chetes, the Balkan version of guerilla bands, and was smashed by the Ottomans. By the end of the revolt, 200 villages had been burnt, 10,000 houses demolished, 5,000 peasants killed and approximately 30,000 exiled (Khadziev, 1992; Tekeli, 2003, p. 76).

Overall, it was not only during the Ilinden uprising that the rebels’ actions have been recorded as insurrectionary by the secondary sources and were anything but peaceful. Only a tiny percent of all recorded events were rallies and demonstrations, and even some of these were armed gatherings. The insurgents’ repertoire included road-blocking, cutting of telegraph lines, ambushing the gendarmerie, and finally, occupying certain zones.

---

61 Before the uprising, the organization had already been competing with the External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which was in favor of Macedonia’s annexation by Bulgaria (Adanır, 2001, pp. 119-125; Jelavich, 1983, p. 94).
62 Adanır (2001) documents several attacks against the Muslim population and claims that the insurgents’ deeds contradicted their non-ethnic discourse (pp. 199-200).
TABLE 4-3 SHARE OF MACEDONIAN UNREST IN THE RECORDED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMD 2

A few years following the suppression of Albanian *chetes* together with the Muslims, the officers constituting the backbone of the CUP went after the IMRO and also the Serbian *chetes* (Adanır, 2001, pp. 263-269). However, the decline of Christian *chete* activities did not solve the Empire’s problems. The mobilization of the Muslim population of Macedonia against the Christians paved the way for the Albanian problem. From the defeat of Ilinden onwards, most of the separatist activities were actually conducted by Albanian nationalists, who eventually managed to separate from the Ottoman Empire. Between 1903 and 1912, Albanian *chete* activities grew further and became the Empire’s most important domestic problem. The intensity of social protests in 1912 was one standard deviation above the median (Figure 4-2). And from 1909 to 1912, the Macedonian nationalist movement increased its share in the total. In 1912, one year before the CUP coup, the Macedonian movement had a 70% share in the total unrest (Table 4-3).

---

63 Cf Upward (2013 (1909), pp. 298-301) who cites Inspector General Hilmi Pasha’s reports documenting about 98 and 79 military confrontations between Ottoman troops and Bulgarian and Serbian chetes in 1907 and 1908 respectively, and writes about the inevitable failure of suppression attempts. Tekeli and İlkin (2003) highlight the unintended democratic influence of the chetes as freedom fighters on the officers fighting as the guardians of despotism (p. 47).
In its initial stages, the Macedonian nationalist movement, especially because of the religious affinity of the Albanian one, was not a separatist movement at all. What they demanded was more cultural autonomy. Albanian nationalists even supported the CUP in the first years of its rule. But the latter’s centralism and nationalism alienated not only the Greeks and Armenians but also Albanians and the demand for autonomy gradually made way for the demand for independence (Sönmez, 2007, pp. 225-228; Tallon, 2012, p. 198) (Tallon, p. 198).\textsuperscript{64}

The events in 1910 and 1912 correspond to two big waves of the Albanian uprising. The first uprising, which lasted two months, ended with Ottoman suppression and Albanian Muslims lost even the cultural rights they had acquired after the 1908 Revolution (Tallon, 2012, p. 167). Thanks to the war against Italians, the revolt in Yemen, and the widespread character of the rebellion, the second wave had the opposite outcome. In September 1912, the Ottomans had to accept almost all of the insurgents’ demands including a high degree of autonomy (p. 192).\textsuperscript{65} This concession split the leading cadres of the insurgency between the Northerners who were content with the acquired rights, and the Southerners who wanted to continue the struggle until complete autonomy. Given the military incompetence of the politically paralyzed Ottoman State torn by conflicts within the power bloc, the Balkan wars paved the way for a more radical third alternative - independence - for the Albanians who feared being attacked by the neighboring young Balkan nations (Sönmez, 2007, pp. 201-222).

\textsuperscript{64} Cf Bayraktar (2010) who argues that historically Albania was de facto independent under the feudal dominance of Ayans and Begs (pp. 2-3). Accordingly, it was this suitable socio-economic formation and the feudal resistance against centralization efforts that created a favorable environment for the “national awakening” in Albania.

\textsuperscript{65} The demands that were not accepted included the return of the expropriated weaponry and court martial of ministers responsible for the suppression of the revolt (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 293)
With the exception of the year 1915, the period between 1913 and 1920 corresponds to a period of relative tranquility caused mainly by WWI. However, compared to the periods outside the 1906-1931 wave, it still has high intensity. During these years, the events recorded as social movement/uprising have two main components: the Arab Uprisings and the Armenian Resistance. WWI opened the doors to freedom for the former and a disaster for the latter. In one of the bloodiest massacres of the 20th century, 1.16 million Armenians, who constituted approximately 6% of the population, were wiped out of Anatolia. In 1927 only 65,000 Armenians resided in Anatolia (Tunçay, 1994, p. 162).

So far there has not been a comparative analysis of the trajectories of the Bulgarian-Macedonian, Albanian, Arab, and Armenian nationalisms. Still, it is possible to discern three important factors. One is the presence of a strong landed class, with the capacity to mobilize the local population and resist Ottoman attempts at centralization. The Albanians and Arabs, although the former not necessarily always against centralization, had this advantage and therefore could fight effectively against the Ottoman armies in a crisis situation like the eve of the Balkan Wars and during WWI (Pula, 2011, p. 113). In contrast, neither in Macedonia nor in Ottoman Armenia was there a Christian landed nobility that could lead or support such a mobilization. The revolutionaries had to rely either on the peasantry or (non-Ottoman) imperialist backing.

66 Göçek’s (2002) resourceful article is the only exception. However, she does not develop a clear-cut comparative framework to explain the success or failure of different movements. Moreover, her conceptual confounding of Turkish nationalism, a nationalism developed by a state, with the Greek, Arab and Armenian nationalisms, developed without an already existing state apparatus, undermines her explanatory framework altogether.

67 For criticism of the theories explaining Arab nationalism as a reaction to Ottoman centralization attempts see Blumi (2003, pp. 57-81) and Kayali (1997, pp. 10-12, 174-176). However in both cases, regardless of their divergent concerns which were not necessarily decentralism, the landed notables played a crucial role and their capacity to mobilize the population was a central factor in the success of separatist movements.
Over time, in Macedonia, the second factor gained the upper hand (Adanır, 1994). The Bulgarian-Macedonian and Arab nationalist movements were supported by live and aggressive British and Russian imperialisms. In contrast, the Armenians stopped appealing for foreign intervention after the Constitutional Revolution. When they eventually and belatedly did demand European intervention, it was for the implementation of social and political reforms and not a separatist struggle (Kaligian, 2011). They turned to Russia only after the massacre in 1915. But the hour of destiny for Armenian separatism, 1915-1919, coincided with the hour of death for Tsarist Russia. Similarly, from 1920 onwards, the British Empire had its own problems and preferred to negotiate with the new regime in Turkey (Arslanian, 1978, pp. 524-525).

All of this brings us to the third factor, which is more important from the perspective of this study and will be discussed at length in the next chapter: independence from the power bloc of the Empire. Certainly all of the separatist/autonomist movements had relations with this or that faction of the Ottoman ruling coalition. However, whereas the leading cadre of all other separatist movements allied with the decentralist monarchist faction of the power bloc, the Armenian political leaders allied with the CUP. The alliance with the decentralist faction of the power bloc did not inhibit the growth of separatism among the ranks of Albanians and Arabs. However, internal wavering concerning separatism was highest among the Armenian political leaders (Kerimoğlu, 2008; Libaridian, 2011; Ter Minassian, 1994).

The political wavering of the Armenian nationalists and socialists can be read from graphs depicting the aggregate movements. Unlike the Arab, Macedonian or

---

68 From the 1913 coup onwards, all parties started to negotiate with the CUP, but this political ‘expedience’ should not be mistaken for ‘support’.
Albanian movements, the Armenian movement did not have a minimally continuous course. Since the Armenian parties did not have an independent line of action, their ‘movement’ occurred in 1896 and then in 1915 as short-lived eruptions following Ottoman atrocities (Figure 4-6). And in both cases the insurgencies had a defensive character. The primary purpose of both uprisings was to prevent further massacres.

With the end of WWI and collapse of the Empire, the Ottoman pashas’ attempts to defend the Empire’s heritage from Ankara sparked off two different social uprisings. The first, which constituted nearly one-fifth of all social actions, was comprised of strikes in Istanbul under British occupation. The strikers’ demands were narrowly economic and their leaders abstained from confronting British authorities. These strikes gradually disappeared from public life partly due to the victory of the National Resistance. The Greeks had constituted a significant section of not only the bourgeoisie but also the labor force of the Empire, and hence with the de-proletarianization following the population exchange, the material basis of the strikes was undermined (Yıldırım, 2013, pp. 293-296).

**Kurdish Uprisings**

As the labor movement declined, behind the surge in social action lay the Kurdish uprisings. The share of Kurdish uprisings in the movements between 1876 and 1920 was merely 3%, but it increased to 85% between 1920 and 1938.

The Koçgiri Rebellion started in late 1920 at the weakest position of the nationalist movement. At that time, British support for the Greek occupation of Anatolia had not ended and Greek armies were militarily advancing. To stop this advance, the Ankara government needed peace in the east to move its military forces to the western front (R. Olson & Rumbold, 1989, p. 46).
After the end of WWI, the Great Powers signed two peace treaties with the Turkish state. The first was the Sevres Treaty in August 1920 signed with the Ottoman Empire. This treaty entailed a drastic shrinking of the Empire and made an independent Kurdistan and Armenia a theoretical possibility. Not surprisingly, it was vehemently rejected by the Ankara Government and was used as the basic justification for the National Resistance. The Lausanne Treaty, according to which Turkey’s current borders were drawn, was signed by the Ankara government in 1924, and left no room for an independent Kurdistan.

The Koçgiri Rebellion took place three months after the Sevres Treaty, and pressed for an independent Kurdistan (Öz, 1999, pp. 43-50). The leaders of Koçgiri Rebellion were members of Kurdish Progressive Association, an organization enjoying a close relationship with Britain. Not all Kurds but only Alevi Kurdish Tribes in the Dersim region were mobilized. The insurgents put together a military force of 6,000 people, occupied the administrative offices of the government, and declared sovereignty. Moreover, even with a modest number of soldiers, they were strong enough to arrest, try and execute the commander of Turkish forces trying to suppress the insurgency.

Of all the Kurdish uprisings in that period, the Koçgiri Rebellion is the only instance when the Ankara government tried to negotiate with the insurgents. The government succeeded in suppressing the rebellion after five months and capturing 500 insurgents including their leader, Alişan Bey. However, given the critical situation in the National Resistance and Kemalist dependence on Kurdish support, almost all of the insurgents were pardoned (Dersimi, 1952, pp. 120-174; Lazarev, Mgoi, & Kale, 2001, pp. 115-117; Öz, 1999, pp. 123-161).
In the late 19th century and early 20th century, Kurdish uprisings like Emir Bedirhan’s in 1847, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s in 1880, and Bitlis and Barzan uprisings in 1914 were an integral part of social movements, but they were mostly the resistance of local notables and tribes to the Porte’s centralization efforts (Bozarslan, 2005, pp. 92-93). The Koçgiri rebellion in 1920, which took place in Dersim in northeastern Kurdistan close to the Russian border, contained the same anti-centralist elements. Several studies underline the local character of the uprising and claim that its demands did not go beyond autonomy (Bozarslan, 2005, p. 101; Van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 278-279). However, what set Koçgiri apart from other uprisings was the formation of the first Kurdish government, openly articulating the intention for independence (Dersimi, 1952, p. 130; Öz, pp. 259-260, 274-255). Although never researched so far, given the proximity of Dersim to Russian-occupied zones of Anatolia, and the cooperation between Russia and tribes from Dersim during WWI, Koçgiri seems to be a byproduct of the anti-colonial and nationalist wave following the October Revolution in Russia. After Koçgiri’s raising of the bar, all subsequent Kurdish uprisings would contain a nationalist element, pressing for a nation-state.

As the insurgency was not completely destroyed, Dersim continued to be a region not ruled and dominated by the Turkish state. Thus the upheaval in Dersim lasted until 1938, the year of the final attack and massacre by the Turkish state.

Sheikh Said and Ağrı Rebellions

The real peak of the first wave of social movements was the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. Compared to the movements in 1912, the intensity of this rebellion was 2.5 times higher. The rebellion started on February 8, 1925 and lasted for
approximately six weeks. It spread to the four cities of Diyarbakir, Bingöl, Muş and Elazığ, which cover approximately 5% of Turkey’s area. The estimated number of people killed in this insurgency is 5,000 (R. W. Olson, 1989, p. 160).

If Koçgiri was an outcome of the hopes aroused by the Sevres Treaty, Sheikh Said was fuelled by resentment of the Lausanne Treaty dictating a Turkish nation state. The demands of the uprising were a combination of Kurdish nationalism and Islam. Studies close to the Turkish state’s official narrative underline the religious title of the insurgents’ leader- ‘Sheikh’- as proof of the traditional and backward character of the rebellion (Mumcu, 1991; Toker, 1968). However, since the mid-1970’s, a rapidly growing historiography has provided evidence for the modern character of the insurrection. As was the case during the Albanian unrest, a clandestine organization called Azadi was behind the Sheikh Said insurrection. The organization consisted of Kurdish officers –colonels and majors - who had served in the Ottoman Army during the First World War and were part of the Turkish army during the National Resistance. Sheikh Said was not supposed to lead the insurrection but had to assume leadership because the Turkish state captured the leading cadre before the insurrection. Secondly, in this case too, the separatist demand was not a call for a return to the Ottoman period. Since the old empire had already gone, what they demanded was a new state (R. W. Olson, 1989, pp. 41-50; Özsoy & Eriş, 2007, pp. 87-94).

The third peak of Kurdish resistance was the Ararat rebellion in 1927. It was actually part of a new wave of Kurdish uprisings which occurred between 1926 and 1932 in two cities – Ağrı and Van- around Mount Ararat on the Iranian border. After a few small-scale uprisings, the Ararat rebellion intensified in 1928 and the Turkish state could
only suppress it after four years. Thus, compared with the short-lived Sheikh Said rebellion which spread to a wider region, the Ararat rebellion was concentrated within two cities but lasted longer. No doubt geographical factors were important: the insurgents’ base was at the Ararat Mountain and they could easily trespass through the Iranian border. But what really increased the Kurds’ resistance capacity was the leadership factor, and the link between the rebellion and effective commanders was evident. In 1924, right after the abortive Beytussebap insurrection, İhsan Nuri Bey, a captain and conspirator in the Turkish Army, joined Xoybun, the organization which led the uprising. In the following years, due to İhsan Nuri Bey’s military experience and guerilla tactics, Turkish forces suffered heavy casualties.

Xoybun (independence in Kurdish) was an organization founded by Kurdish nationalist intellectuals who had gone into exile after 1925. They certainly used religion as a tool for mobilization, but as the organization’s name suggests, nationalism was a far more dominant theme than religion, especially when compared to the Sheikh Said insurrection. Moreover, Xoybun’s leaders went far beyond the imagined autonomy-seeking rebel in the periphery in terms of their agenda. As a result of its republican aspirations, Xoybun declared the founding of the Kurdish Republic with Diyarbakir as its capital. Its leaders were as modernist as the founders of the Turkish Republic. What they demanded was not autonomy, but membership in the international state system. For this purpose, they even applied for membership in the League of Nations (Alakom, 1998, pp. 21-98; Emin Karaca, 1991, pp. 100-132).
TABLE 4-4 REPERTOIRE OF KURDISH MOVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Koçgiri</th>
<th>Sheikh Said</th>
<th>Ağrı</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack-Raid-Occupation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat-Confrontation</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plundering</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uprising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SMD 2

Amongst the three Kurdish insurgencies, Sheikh Said had an offensive expansionary tactic whereas the Koçgiri and Ağrı Rebellions were on the defensive side in their tactics. Nevertheless all three uprisings shared the same action repertoire: attacking forces, occupying and severing communication lines, and plundering (Table 4-4). Like the Macedonian separatists, they seldom relied on demonstrations and rallies. There was only one speech and it was Sheikh Said’s speech which started the insurrection.

After the Ağrı rebellion, the Kurdish insurgency got scattered and lost its momentum. From 1930 onwards, Turkish authorities held the initiative and organized ‘cleansing campaigns’ year after year, until 1939. The only exception was the Dersim uprising that had the character of a resistance to a predicted final assault by the Turkish state. Indeed, the attacks on Turkish patrols in Dersim only accelerated the official military campaigns. 13,000 Kurds according to the official sources, and 70,000 according to testimonies of witnesses were massacred and members of the surviving tribes associated with the uprisings were exiled to the western parts of Turkey (Aygün, 2008;

The Silent Phase: 1938-1968

Before the Coup

During the first eight years of this period, especially because of the atmosphere of war, it was impossible to find the slightest evidence of social unrest. However from 1945 onwards, rallies before the elections became the major form of social action expressing social discontent. Rallies constitute more than half of the social action, and are much more dominant during the election years of 1950, 1954 and 1957. As can be observed from Figure 4-2, 1957 was an exceptionally intense year in terms of social movements, mainly because of the cut-throat 1957 elections. Electoral rallies had been part of the political process since 1946, but in 1957, with the RPP’s attempt to mobilize the masses, albeit in a controlled way, it had become the central part (Table 4-5).
### TABLE 4-5 FREQUENCY OF SELECTED TYPES OF SOCIAL ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>OD</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*S: Student Demonstrations and protests    E: Electoral Rallies    Q: Armed Attacks and Quarrels    A: Anti- Atatürk Activities    OD: Other Demonstrations    L: Labor Unrest

Source: SMD 1

What deserves special attention during the first silent phase are the student demonstrations. This was mainly due to the emergence of the conflict between Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus issue. As a result of the nationalistic climate caused by this diplomatic tension, thanks to the DP’s use of national chauvinism to consolidate its position in the government, the Turkish public had become prone to provocations. This sensibility was exploited by forces within the Turkish state by spreading the news that Mustafa Kemal’s house in Thessaloniki had been bombed by Greeks. This manipulated misinformation triggered two days of looting in Istanbul and İzmir, which is generally known as September 6-7 events. This event was a turning point in two senses. First, it
opened the final chapter in the de-Christianization process of Turkish port cities, to be completed in 1964 with the expulsion of 40,000 Greeks overnight (Kuyucu, 2005, pp. 376-377). Second, it was the beginning of student movements motivated by nationalism, which would end only after the 1971 coup. From 1955 onwards, student demonstrations, not only limited to the Cyprus issue, would be an important part of the rising social protest (F. Çakmak; Szyliowicz, 1970, pp. 157-160).

Another important trend during this period was the increase in relatively violent events: clashes and armed attacks. In the beginning, most of the events recorded under this category were typical land disputes among peasants. However from 1956 onwards, the quarrels with the increasing tension in party politics, and the disputes and clashes between the respective supporters of DP and RPP became the main source of these disputes.

After the Coup

The Coming of a New Wave of Labor Unrest

The coup on May 27, 1960 was preceded by a wave of student demonstrations in Istanbul and in Ankara, which created a political atmosphere conducive to a military coup (Bali, 2006, pp. 24-25, 34; Çavdar, 2000, pp. 82-84). It is also true that the coup was welcomed by an important segment of the population not limited to students, who poured into the streets of these two cities. In contrast to the coups in 1925 and 1980, and similar to the one in 1908, May 27 was followed by an increase in social mobilization. Between May 28 and June 4 there were 46 rallies in 28 cities69. These demonstrations definitely

---

occurred under the guidance of the officers affiliated with the junta, yet they were by no means planned performances.

The 1961 Constitution was both politically and socially inclusive. In addition to defining the state as a “social law” state, it explicitly recognized the right to organize and protest, and made provisions for the right to strike. Moreover, as a reaction to the Democrat Party’s attempts to establish complete control over all bureaucratic institutions, the new regime guaranteed an autonomous domain for the ideological centers of the state such as the institute of planning, radio, television, and the universities. Autonomy for universities not only increased the legitimacy of protest by elevating these institutions to an almost untouchable position, but also decreased the risk of protest by removing the police from campuses. Hence the 1961 constitution paved the way for a wave of strikes and student protests (Table 4-6).

TABLE 4-6  RECORDED STRIKES AND OBSERVED LABOR UNREST BETWEEN 1949-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strike Data&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Data&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Çalışma Bakanlığı; Makal, 2002, pp. 333-334

<sup>b</sup>Author’s own calculation See: SMD 1
The Saraçhane meeting on 31 December 1961 can be taken as the harbinger of the coming wave of unrest\(^{70}\). Despite the Constitution’s emphasis on the social character of the state, the first elected government of the post-coup period did not implement any regulation concerning the problems of labor. The contradiction between constitutional promises and governmental neglect aroused immense discontent and led to the first workers’ demonstration under the new regime. The demands of the one hundred thousand workers from all over Turkey, an unprecedented number for a workers’ demonstration, were far from political and only articulated problems related to collective bargaining and low wages. Nonetheless, even such modest demands backed by the Constitution aroused fears in Ankara ("Saraçhane Mitingi," 1996).

The initial reaction of Türk-İş, the confederation founded under close supervision of the Democrat Party according to the principles of American trade-unionism, was diametrically opposed to its discontented member unions. This became clear a year later when Türk-İş organized an equally massive demonstration “condemning communism”, sponsored by the businessmen (Koç, 2012b)\(^{71}\). The consequence of both demonstrations was the radicalization and polarization of the labor movement, which eventually led the militant part to form a new organization called DİSK (Progressive Workers Union Confederation) - the protagonist of militant labor movements between 1967 and 1980.

Another forerunner of the coming strike wave was the Kavel resistance. Although strikes were not legalized at the time, workers of the Kavel cable factory – frustrated because of unpaid bonuses and lay-offs - locked themselves into the factory and

\(^{70}\) Koçak (2008) shows that workers were neither completely unorganized nor obedient during the 1950’s and emphasizes the continuity between 1950s and 1960s. Accordingly, the Saraçhane meeting was the fruit of the hard work of labor organizers throughout the 1950’s.

\(^{71}\) ("Ankara'daki İşçi Mitinginde Zaman Zaman Hadiseler Oldu," 1962)
sabotaged production. The factory occupation created a hitherto unseen network of solidarity among workers across sectors. Workers from various factories blocked the roads, organized marches, and collected money for the strikers. After two months of strike, Vehbi Koç, one of the wealthiest capitalists like his family members today, gave in and workers returned to their job. Four months after this movement, the government accepted the labor law and a new constitutional article – known as the Kavel Article since then - legalized strikes and obliged the employers to re-employ the workers laid off during a strike ("Kavel Direnişi," 1996)72.

**Student Movements**

Despite the efforts of the junta and subsequent governments to calm down the streets, student demonstrations were still frequent. In contrast to the workers’ movements which focused narrowly on their economic demands, the students were uninterested in their problems as students, and their demands were solely political. They were urging the government to take harsher measures against the toppled Democrat Party and protested whenever they noticed signs of leniency and concession. What triggered the biggest demonstration of the early sixties - the March Demonstration - was the release of Celal Bayar, the eighty-year old president of the Democrat Party era, from Kayseri prison because of his health problems. After the news spread in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, students occupied the streets in tens of thousands, and surrounded and attacked the headquarters of the Justice Party, which was seen as the heir of the Democrat Party. In

the following years, anti-Justice Party feelings continued to be the motor of student demonstrations (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 1994, pp. 94-101)\textsuperscript{73}.

The politicization of students was not limited to universities but also occurred in Turkey’s only military academy. The cadets showed their disgruntlement with the government’s tolerant attitude towards the “fallen politicians” through symbolic marches. In these marches, the cadets articulated their unshakable belief in, and active support for, Colonel Talat Aydemir, the leader of both the failed coups in 1962 and 1963 (Y. Demir, 2006, p. 163).

\textbf{Figure 4-7 Comparison of the Intensity of Labor, Socialist and Student Movements}

\textit{Source: SMD 1}

Despite their historical significance as the beginning of a wave of labor and student unrest however, these actions were too weak to influence the regime. As Figure 4-7 about the distribution of student and labor unrest between 1961 and 2004 illustrates, the intensity of both actions was lower than the subsequent period. They were signaling the beginning of the wave but should not be confused with the wave itself.

The Second Wave 1968-1998

*From Workers’ and Students’ Movements to the Anti-Fascist Struggle*

At the beginning, the second wave of social action had two components: workers’ movement and student demonstrations. As mentioned above, both of them had their roots in the post-1960 political climate. From 1968 onwards, one can observe a constant surge in the labor movement (with dramatic interruptions during the coup interregnums in 1971-73 and 1980-84). But the real explosion after 1968 was in the students’ movement, which rose dramatically over the next thirty years.

Unless one builds very abstract categories, it is not possible to conceptualize the Turkish student movement under the general heading of the 1968 movement, from which it was different in both its ideological and practical content. In the ideological sense, it was not a libertarian and anti-statist movement. On the contrary, being the outcome of a politicization process leading to a coup, political problems revolving around the issue of state power constituted the central concern of the Turkish student movement. Until 1970, students considered the Turkish Army as an integral part of the revolutionary forces. To give another example, whereas most of the youth mobilized in the 1968 movement in the West supported Dubcek and his socialism with a human face, the dominant trend
amongst the Turkish student movement was to support the Soviet invasion (Önderoğlu, 2008; "Sosyalizm mi? Reformizm mi?," 1968; Vardar, 2008a, 2008b).

At the practical level, the Turkish student movement had closer ties with the workers movement. The rift elsewhere between the workers’ and students’ movements, which could be openly observed in May 1968 in Paris, did not happen in Turkey\(^{74}\). On the contrary, the allegedly student organization Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) participated in the labor uprising in June 1970 (Koç, 2012a; Öztürk, 2001, pp. 430-435). Behind this lay not only the students’ rural or working-class backgrounds, but also their political motivation for building an alliance with the working class.

What triggered the uprising in 1970 was the government’s decision to annul the collective bargaining rights of DİSK and force the workers and their unions to surrender to Türk-İş. In protest against the government’s decision, workers from all factories of Istanbul blocked the highways and started to march to the city center. On the Anatolian side, approximately a hundred thousand workers gathered and managed to overcome the military barricades. Workers could only be stopped by Kemal Türkler’s (the secretary general of DİSK) radio announcement asking the workers “to stay within the limits of the Constitution and not to attack the members of the honorable Turkish army”. The balance sheet of the uprising was 4 dead and approximately 200 injured. Martial law was declared in Istanbul for three months and within a week, 260 demonstrators were arrested although all of them were released two months later ("70 bin işçi direnişe geçti," 1970; "Gece sokağa çıkma yasağı kondu, T.B.M.M Sıkı Yönetim kararını onayladı," 1970; "İstanbul ve İzmit'te sıkıyönetim," 1970; 2001, pp. 80-88)

\(^{74}\) The tension between the French Communist Party and the radical student movements as depicted by Mendel (1969, pp. 3-10) reveals at the same time the distance between the students and workers.
Being a socialist mass organization with more than 10,000 members and a much bigger capacity to mobilize the youth, Dev-Genç itself was the product of the student demonstration wave in 1968. From 1970 onwards, Dev-Genç - as the name suggests – was never an organization confined to students’ problems, and became the womb of revolutionary political organizations like THKO (People’s Liberation Army of Turkey) and THKP-C (People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey). Similarly, despite not being directly formed under the umbrella of Dev-Genç, members of TKP-ML learnt their political ropes in FKF (Confederation of Idea Clubs), which was the political predecessor of the Dev-Genç. These were all guerilla organizations, which, after the failure of June 15-16 events, were disillusioned with the political capacity of the working class to lead a revolution, and adopted foco, urban-guerilla and people’s war strategies respectively. The rapture of the youth, who at the beginning still spoke the Kemalist language, was practical rather than ideological. Instead of supporting a military coup, the youth decided to arm and to build their own army and fight against the regime (Çayan, pp. 325-334, 339-341; Kaypakkaya, pp. 333-340; Kürkçü, pp. 498-507).

The change in the youth’s orientation can also observed from a comparison of Figures 4-3 and 4-8. Although there is an increase in the general intensity of the movement from 1969 to 1970, we observe a dramatic fall in the intensity of the students’ movement. The shift in Dev-Genç’s priorities is responsible for this change.
Despite these groups’ attempts to build various forms of guerilla organizations, the 1971 coup regime was able either to annihilate or jail the leading cadres of all these organizations. It could also suppress the workers’ movement with the help of Martial Law provisions. In this sense, 12 March was a defeat for the left, although the material bases for these movements survived: rapid industrialization based on the import substituting strategy, the 1961 Constitution, a politicized society and finally, tens of thousands of socialist youth who were committed to socialism and motivated by the heroic deaths of the young guerilla leaders. And so a new surge in the workers’ and students’ movements began rapidly and immediately after the tight grip of the coup regime was relaxed in 1974. This second round, however, would not be a mere repetition of the first one.
As we can see from Figure 4-3, from 1974 onwards there is a rapid rise in the intensity of social unrest, and 1978 is the second peak after the 1925 revolt. Moreover, in the 1977-1980 period, the unrest intensity was permanently 1 standard deviation above the median. Such a long and sustained period of intensity is unique in the history of Turkish social movements. Besides, as can be seen from Table 4-7, this was not only a period with the highest incidence of political violence, but also with the highest rate of strikes, university boycotts and meetings. Finally, compared to the 1910-1913 or 1920-1930 periods, the protests were effective throughout the whole country.

The unrest before 1980 can be grouped into two categories: socialist and fascist, the latter generally euphemized as the ‘right’ or ‘far right’. The leftist movement was a combination of workers’ and student movements in addition to the political demonstrations organized by leftist parties or associations. The fascist movement’s action repertoire however, consisted mainly of attacks on leftists. These attacks were certainly not one-sided and were responded to by the leftists. Indeed, after a while, attacks became the main component of the leftist action repertoire as well.\(^75\)

Studies on the 1970-80 period conceptualize the leftist movement either as radical sects isolated from the masses (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 210-222; Lipovsky, 1991, pp. 109-110) or under the heading of political violence without referring to its class character (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 263-264).\(^76\) Nothing could be farther from the truth. Only a few organizations focused their activities on killing, kidnapping, and robbery. Moreover, most

---

\(^75\) Due to the socialist bias of Cumhuriyet, the left’s responses to these attacks are under-reported.

\(^76\) Curiously, several socialist organizations, who were actually part of the struggle, resort to the same explanation when trying to give an account of their past ("İşçi Sınıfının Komünist Programı İçin Temel İlkeler," 2001, pp. 153-154; Yakın Geçmişe Genel Bir Bakış ve Platform Taslağı, 1990, pp. 44-54) (Konferans Belgeleri, 1990, pp. 55-58). For a Leninist criticism see ("Tasfiyecilik Rüzgarları Eserken Kim Hangi Yolda Yürüyor (2)," 2008).
of these violent activities were not undertaken by marginal groups but by the major leftist organizations whose main activities were organizing meetings, demonstrations, and unionization struggles among others. To give an example, after 1980, seventeen members of leftist organizations were hanged after being indicted for terror and anarchy, and four of these militants belonged to Dev-Yol, (Revolutionary Path). Before 1980, Dev-Yol had either controlled or was the main opposition group in many important trade unions like Genel-İş, Maden-İş, and Dev. Maden-Sen (Pekdemir, 2007, p. 778; STM, 1988b, pp. 2258, 2261). Democrat, a daily newspaper read mainly by Dev-Yol supporters, is said to have a circulation between 50,000 and 70,000 ("Müftüoğlu’ndan Özkök’e ‘Şarlatanlığı bırak, kendi işine bak’," 2008). Similarly during the Dev-Yol trials, 40% of the 4400 defendants were either workers or peasants. And this was true not only for Dev-Yol but also for other major socialist organizations like Halkın Kurtuluşu and Kurtuluş (Çubukçu, 2007, p. 733). Hence the unrest of 1977-1980 cannot be simply labeled as the struggle of isolated leftist and rightist organizations. During these years, violence was deeply connected to the laboring segments of the society and therefore violent actions should be considered not the whole of, but a part of, the leftist movements.

The unrest between 1976 and 1980 is in another sense also a counter-example to the liberal approach, which explains the absence of democracy with the weakness of the civil society in Turkey, because it corresponds to a period in which the level of social organization was the same as the present, although the content was different. If we use the number of associations per ten thousand people as an indicator of the development of civil society, it is evident that the level of this development during the 1970’s is close to today’s level (Table 4-7).
The military was also aware of the power of these associations and banned approximately 20,000 of them, which corresponds to 50%. Second, the type and demands of these associations changed over time. Together with unions, associations in the 1970’s were based on more universalistic values compared to the post-1980 years – a period of the rise of identity politics. Needless to say, a rapid decline in trade union membership accompanied this process. So liberals who do not hesitate to label the present flourishing of identity-based associations as the rise of civil society, should actually make the same statement for the period between 1974 and 1980.

Source: (Yaşama Dair Vakıf, 2008) (Yücekök, 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Associations</th>
<th>Population (000)</th>
<th>Associations Per Thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>17000</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>19000</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21238</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7086</td>
<td>24 585</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18958</td>
<td>28 161</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>31281</td>
<td>32 556</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42170</td>
<td>35 464</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>18958</td>
<td>37 885</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>49365</td>
<td>43 133</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>53657</td>
<td>45 130</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>61000</td>
<td>58 222</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>72636</td>
<td>62 048</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>77259</td>
<td>64 862</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>85102</td>
<td>73 357</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To return to the differences between the political terrains before and after 1971, four factors were responsible for these differences: The first was the end of competition within the power bloc as discussed in the previous chapter. The second was the crisis of the import substitution industrialization strategy (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 187-196). The crisis not only inhibited the process of capital accumulation but also decreased the regime’s capacity that further undermined the competition within the power bloc. And so in contrast to the pre-1971 period, this strengthened the state’s capacity to smash the revolutionary movements.

Third, the 1971 coup happened at the beginning of the global détente but the second rise of the social movements went hand-in-hand with its decline. The coup terminated all types of social action right after the end of the détente with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a period when the US became more concerned about communist expansion and devoted more resources to crush revolutionary movements worldwide (W. Hale, 2012, p. 163; McCormick, 1995, pp. 203-212).

Finally, the rise of the fascist movement between 1971 and 1980 had a devastating impact on the Turkish socialist and workers’ movements. The fascist movement in Turkey did not start with the 1971 coup. Its origins date back to the WWII period, when Turkey had a close relationship with Nazi-Germany and pro-German politicians had important posts in the cabinet. It is also a well-known fact today that fascist militants were trained in the commando camps after 1960. But fascist violence escalated to a scale incomparable with the previous period only after 1974. Two developments gave an impetus to the fascist movement.
The first development was the social instability caused by capitalist accumulation and dispossession accompanied by the fear of the rise of socialist and revolutionary movements. The combined impact of both factors prepared a fertile ground for the fascist movement to recruit militants at an unprecedented scale (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 217-232).

Second, the fascist party took its place in the federal cabinet as the junior coalition partner after 1975. This enabled the fascist party to open up space in the state for its cadres, which eventually meant state support and protection for fascist aggression (Yanardağ, 2002, pp. 70-73).

Fascist violence assumed two different forms: (i) in big industrial centers, where fascists were politically weaker than socialists, their methods included kidnapping, bombing and killing, (ii) in cities where fascist had a mass base but socialists also enjoyed considerable mass support, provocations and mass mobilization for massacres were the main method.

After 1978, some factions of the left did counter the fascist attacks in two ways: (1) they started to respond in kind by retaliations and (2) in some cases by building resistance committees to repel the attackers. However the first method outweighed the second one which resulted in de-politicization of masses and their retreat from the political sphere. Despite the increase in the intensity of social action then, the number of mobilized people shrunk to a numerically small but determined segment of the population.

Whereas the coup in 1971 confronted a rising level of social action accompanied by politicizing masses, the coup in 1980 had to deal with high-intensity social action with
declining mass support. Therefore it could easily smash all kinds of organizations related to labor movement or socialism and atomize the opposition (Table 4-8 and Figure 4-9).

**TABLE 4-8 AVERAGE MONTHLY INTENSITIES OF PROTESTS ACCORDING TO MASS CHARACTER OF PROTESTS AND VIOLENCE INVOLVED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MV</th>
<th>Mv</th>
<th>mV</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>mV/(MV+Mv)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>26.17</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>41.67</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>28.80</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>56.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>34.17</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>57.67</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>43.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>21.33</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>67.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15.17</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>93.50</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>28.50</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>130.83</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>44.83</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td>268.50</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>29.88</td>
<td>53.13</td>
<td>169.13</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>93.50</td>
<td>251.00</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M: Movements with Mass Character  
V: Movements involving violence  
m: Movements without a Mass Character  
v: Movements without violence  
Source: See Chapter 5  
* Except the total protest column all averages show the intensity of independent movements. (For the definition of Independence see chapter 5)
The outcome was 650,000 detentions, 210,000 trials, 517 capital punishment decisions, more than 500 suspicious deaths, and 14,000 revocations of citizenship. The loss of political and associational freedoms of course had economic consequences as well. Between 1979 and 1985, the real wages of workers dropped by approximately 40 percent (Figure 4-10).

![Figure 4-9 Ratio of Group Action over Mass Protests between 1962 and 1980](source: Table 5-8  mV/(MV+Mv) Column)

**The Second Rise: Workers without Socialists**

Two days after the 1980 coup, the junta banned all trade union activities until the end of 1983- when a new Labor Law full of restrictions was promulgated. Since strikes were considered threats to internal peace, no strike happened until 1984. And even then, the strikes stopped far short of mobilizing a significant mass of workers, and it was not possible to speak of a workers’ movement until 1987. Yet, as was the case in 1971, the coup regime could not bring the labor movement to an end and freeze all kind of social

---

77 See Çetik and Akkaya (1999) for the post-coup regulations and their impact on unionization (pp. 121-124).
protest. With the relaxation of repressive policies from 1987 onwards, workers started to mobilize to regain what they had lost after the 1980 coup.

What (re)started the movement was the Netas – a Canadian telecommunication company– strike in Istanbul. In November 1986, the workers demanded an increase in wages, a bonus on the New Year and a voice in the disciplinary committee. After the 92-day-long resistance of 2600 workers, the company accepted all the demands of the strikers ("Netas Grevi ", 1996, p. 438). The Netas strike became a prototype for strikes in the following two years. Compared to the political strikes before the coup, almost all these strikes had demands related to wage increase or workplace authority. And be it in the private or the public sector, most of the strikes ended with workers’ gains. In 1990, workers’ wages in manufacturing were as high as in 1977 and one year later, they were approximately 17 percent higher (Figure 4-10). Yet due to high inflation, the workers could not retain these economic gains.

![Figure 4-10 Real Wages between 1962-1994 (1976=100)](chart)

Source: (Çetik & Akkaya, 1999, pp. 208, 215)
Strikes were not the only activity the workers engaged in. Sit-ins, demonstrations, work slow-downs and other forms of passive resistance were also part of their repertoire of mobilization (Voyvoda, 2011, pp. 90-109). The highest point in workers’ activity was the one-day long general strike – a solidarity strike in support of the miners in Zonguldak - in the first week of 1991. Approximately 48,000 workers had been on strike for over a month. And right after the general strike they decided to take the protest to Ankara. Since the buses could not enter the city due to the police blockade, the workers decided to walk to Ankara which meant walking a distance of 268 kilometers. So, with the decision of the trade union, approximately one hundred thousand people started to walk to Ankara. The army stopped the workers after the hundredth kilometer and the head trade-union leader sent the workers back home and went alone to Ankara. From that day onwards, workers were fed with empty promises as if the negotiations were continuing. Actually, what the government was trying to do was to gain time and to come to an agreement with 250,000 metal workers. After the collective agreement with metal workers was signed, the government used the Gulf War as an excuse –Turkey was not a belligerent country- to postpone all strikes for sixty days. This meant the end not just of the Zonguldak strike, but also the first part of the workers movement (Özen, 1998). After this episode, the workers’ movement entered a phase of decline, and real wages eroded again to approach the 1987 levels. Only after the 1994 economic crisis was there a new but temporary surge in workers movement and from 1997 onwards it disappeared from the scene for almost a decade.

In contrast to the pre-1980 period, the governments had the upper hand in their negotiations with various representatives and leaders of the labor movement. The first
reason was the position of the left in the post-coup situation. Whereas the left had survived the 1971 coup with increased political prestige and audience, the opposite was true after the 1980 coup partly because of leftist mistakes in responding to fascist attacks and partly because of high degree of state repression. Hence the bonds between leftist groups and unionized workers were incomparably weak.

Comparing the strike data of the pre-and post-1980 periods reveals that the post-1980 strikes included workers from all segments rather than being led by a movement of the politicized and ideologically committed segment of the workers. The maximum number of strikers in pre-1980 period was 82,000 in 1980, and the number of strikers in 1990 and 1991 were 166,000 and 164,000 respectively (Çalışma Bakanlığı). But at the same time, unlike the former, the latter were neither led nor influenced by any kind of a leftist movement. This phenomenon can also be read from Figure 4-7. Whereas the socialist movement went hand-in-hand with the workers’ movement between 1974 and 1980, after 1980 due to the weakness of the left and its isolation from the trade unions, there is a big gap between the intensity of both movements, which explains the lack of any political content in the strikes.

Another factor responsible for the weakening of the trade unions was the shift in Turkish capitalists’ industrialization strategy which meant deindustrialization of Istanbul, moving the capital to Anatolian districts (Doğruel & Doğruel, 2010, pp. 7-17; Kaya, 2013, pp. 176-180), and switching to informal labor (Eren, 2003).

Because of these two factors, despite the rise after 1987, the labor movement was on the defensive, and was unable to make substantial gains. And eventually after the 1989 peak, the labor movement started to fade from the political scene.
The Rise of the Kurdish Movement

In the third rise of the social wave during the 1980s, the Kurdish movement was more influential than the workers’ movement. Compared to the socialist movement, it entered the political scene pretty late. It also experienced the impact of the coup differently, which weakened and eventually liquidated most of the leftist movements and organizations. The Kurdish movement was already on the rise before the 1980’s. The coup just postponed this rise for a few years and after 1984, the Kurds intensified their struggle against the regime. Since it has been active for thirty years and is as intense as its previous peak in 1994, the Kurdish movement is the movement with the longest survival period within the Turkish borders.

Figure 4-11 Mentioned Kurdish Protests per Month

Source: SMD 1
After 1984, the Kurdish movement was led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), an ex-Marxist-Leninist organization originating from Turkish revolutionary groups and claiming to fight for a unified and independent Kurdistan. The PKK was founded in 1978, and at that time was not amongst the strongest Kurdish organizations in Kurdistan. But its capacity to resist and apply flexible tactics helped its rapid growth after 1980. The PKK initially chose Syria as its base and launched guerilla attacks into Turkish Kurdistan from there. From 1987 onwards, it was able to build a mass base and not only attacked Turkish state officers and collaborator villages but also started to mobilize the Kurdish masses in urban areas. Demonstrations and shutter-down strikes became routine in urban areas as a result. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PKK abandoned the

78 Kurdistan is a politically loaded and contested label. In this study the term Turkish Kurdistan, or simply Kurdistan when it is clear that the protest takes place within the borders of Turkey, denotes the cities with more than 40% Kurdish population. The percentages are taken from Servet Mutlu’s (1996) study (pp. 526-527)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Worker</th>
<th>Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SM D 1
official Marxist-Leninist line as an ideology and also its demand for an independent Kurdistan.

Despite its general image, the PKK has never been a movement with its roots in the peasantry, but recruited mainly the urban population (Esentur, 2007, pp. 112-114). Similarly it is very modern, in the sense of having a bureaucratic party apparatus, and a structure encompassing all local organizations in the four parts of Kurdistan. Although adopting a people’s war strategy, the PKK never adopted a movement strategy like the Maoist guerilla groups in India or Nepal. It trained the militants coming from big cities outside of Turkey, and attacked Turkish forces. The Turkish state burned almost half of the villages in Kurdistan in the hope of weakening the PKK, and enforced rapid urbanization. But this urbanization actually strengthened the PKK further. The election results since 1999 of parties and candidates indirectly affiliated with the PKK is one sign of this increasing strength (Erdem, 2014).

Despite its current distance from Marxism, the PKK has always been a socialist movement with a universalist and emancipatory discourse. Likewise, the position of women in the Kurdish movement, affiliated with the PKK, is incomparably superior to any other organization in Turkey, including all political parties (Diner & Toktaş, 2010, pp. 48-50). Given its radical egalitarianism and democratism, the demands and principles of the Kurdish Movement do not lag behind any Western-style civil society movement. In Turkey it is the Kurdish movement that supports the strengthening of local governments.

---

79 Partly due to the strengthening of the Kurdish movement, and partly due to its flexibility and creativity in terms of organization and politics, it is no longer possible to talk about the PKK as a guerilla organization with clearly defined organizational borderlines. Today, even if one excludes legal political parties indirectly affiliated with it, PKK refers to a cluster of sister parties, assemblies, congresses and associations (Joost & Akkaya, 2013, pp. 165-166). In this section when referring to the PKK, I do not denote the organizational nucleus but this entire cluster.
is a staunch defender of LGBT rights, mounts the most active struggle for ecological rights, and defends not only its own cultural rights but the cultural rights of all ethnic minorities (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2012; Joost & Akkaya, 2013). The difference of the Kurdish Movement from the western post-68 social movements lies not in its demands but its methods: its refusal to condemn the use of violence as a political method to strengthen its position.

Another important feature of the Kurdish movement is its level of social organization in Kurdish areas. If there are some civil society organizations in Kurdistan, most of them are founded by supporters of the Kurdish movement. In most of the urban regions of Kurdistan, the movement has attempted to organize people in cooperatives and associations. They also receive funds from the European Union, that are blocked by the state. These organizations have been repeatedly targeted by the Turkish state, and hindering, threatening, and eventually shutting them down is one of the state’s priorities in its fight against the PKK. Hence civil society organizations play a crucial role in Kurdish unrest. However, contrary to the liberals’ expectations, they are not against but in favor of the PKK and its organizational methods (Watts, 2006).

Given its demands and political values, the PKK is definitely not a remnant of the past but propagates an organization very similar to western-style social movements. And this similarity should pose at least some difficult questions for liberals. The first difficulty is to explain the absence of the correlation between capitalist development and flourishing of civil society organizations. Kurdistan is the region where capitalism is least developed in Turkey, but we find the most active and politicized civil society organizations there. Second, the civil society organizations are not against Kurdish
radicalism but mainly support it. Third, the PKK is condemned as a terrorist organization and within the conceptual schema of liberalism it is diametrically opposed to western-style social movements, which are considered to be products of a developed civil society. But the demands and values propagated are very similar. How can an “archaic”, and “totalitarian” organization defend most actively the values associated with liberalism and post-modernism? A center-periphery approach does not have an answer to any of these questions.

The End of the Second Wave

Despite the dramatic interruptions caused by both coups, the 1971 coup could not prevent the rise of social movements, and the 1980 one could not end them completely. However, a dramatic decline did occur after 1996 in three steps. The first one was related to the movements of workers outside the domain of trade unions. From the 1980 coup onwards, thanks to neo-liberal restructuring, the working class assumed a new form. The typical unionized industrial worker, employed in a big factory with a certain degree of job security, gave way to informal workers without unions and job security. The latter type of workers, who are generally not even recognized as part of the working class, are usually described by their residential location: people form varoş- a derogatory name for the outskirts of the city of Istanbul. Workers of varoş together with their families gave a lease of life to the weakening revolutionary organizations in Turkey, which consequently experienced a revival (Eren, 2003). Figure 4-12 compares movement intensity for workers who are under the control or within the orbit of unions, with the intensity of movements in varoş. Although this comparison is only for Istanbul, it is obvious that
from early 1990’s onwards, the intensity of social unrest cumulated- and eventually culminated - in varoşs with a reloaded radicalism.

Figure 4-12 Average Monthly Intensity of Protests according to Type and Location
Source: SMD 1

Two events in 1995 and 1996 represented the zenith of the varoş movement. The Gazi uprising - Gazi being the name of the varoş - was provoked by a gunned attack on three Alevi (an oppressed religious sect that constitutes approximately one fifth of Turkey’s population) cafés, killing one religious leader and injuring 25 Alevis. Right after the attack, residents of Gazi, many of whom are Alevis, marched to the police station instead of attacking the cafés of Sunnis (the dominant Muslim sect in Turkey). Surrounded by approximately ten thousand people, the police started to target and shoot at the demonstrators. The police intervention did not lower the political temperature or
intimidate the Alevi districts like 1 Mayis Mahallesi, and Gülsuyu. As a result of the three-day long uprising, 23 people were killed and over 400 injured. Despite the high death toll, Gazi was the event when workers were on the offensive side in their confrontation with the police rather than being on the defensive ("Alevilere Saldırı," 1995; "Halka Ateş Açıldı," 1995; "Sağduyuya Çağrı," 1995).

The second high point of the varoş movement happened the following year again after a provocation. Thanks to the radical winds blowing, 1996 witnessed the most crowded May 1 demonstration after 1977, which had ended with a provocation of snipers shooting randomly from a hotel roof at hundreds of thousands of people filling Taksim Square in Istanbul. In 1996, right before the beginning of the gathering for the demonstration, the police shot at the demonstrators and killed three people. In contrast to May 1 1977, when people had died not because of the sniper shots but of the stampede resulting from panic, in 1996 the demonstrators started chasing police forces, attacking banks, and burning cars instead of escaping ("1 Mayıs Coşkusu Kana Bulandı," 1995; Soner, 1996). After this incident, workers of varoş and their hostility towards the system became an object of curiosity even for the mainstream media which reflected the fears of the Turkish bourgeoisie: “One day from the districts they live in and will cut our throats.”

Nevertheless, like all peaks, May 1 1996 was simultaneously the beginning of a retreat. Following the Gazi and May 1 incidents, as Figure 2-9 in the second chapter indicates, police repression of revolutionary organizations intensified. The state also started to systematically separate varoş workers from unionized workers and their demonstrations by terrorizing and criminalizing all kinds of political activities. The
success of the government’s endeavors became evident in the May 1 demonstrations in the following two years, where the unions continued to celebrate May Day, while revolutionary organizations, which constituted more than one third of the total crowd, were left outside and subjected to violent police attacks. As a result, radical organizations in varoş who could not fashion a flexible response to this move lost their support basis and became politically paralyzed ("Emekçilerden Birlik Çağrısı," 1997; "Göstericiler Polisle Çatıştı," 1998; Soner, 1997).

![Figure 4-13 Intensity of Mentioned Hunger Strikes](image)

The last nail in the coffin of varoş-based revolutionary organizations was the state’s attack on the prisons. From the mid-1980’s onwards, Kurdish political prisoners, who constituted 15% of all prisoners in Turkey, had transformed the prisons into an organizational base and a training and recruitment institute. Hence state repression and arrest of sympathizers of political organizations lost the desired deterrence and rehabilitation effect. On the contrary, collective life in prisons consolidated the political identity of the younger members. As a result, after the mid-1990s, ‘rehabilitating’ the prisons became a top priority for each successive government. After two hunger strikes
and one prison massacre, when 30 prisoners died and 230 were injured, the state was able to put all prisoners in isolated cells and break further the political power of these organizations.

Ironically, all these incidents of selective terror went hand-in-hand with democratic reforms like improving detention conditions, and extending the scope of freedom of speech. Turkey’s reforms were even applauded by the European Union, which used to justify the postponement of membership talks with Turkey with the latter’s notorious human rights record. In other words, the more successful the state was in repressing the movements, the more courage it showed in applying various democratic reforms.

Another important development on the Kurdish front was also responsible for the decline of protests in general in the Turkey of 1990s. In 1998, with US diplomatic support, Turkey was able to force the PKK’s leader Öcalan to leave Syria. Four months later, Öcalan was captured by US forces and handed over to the Turkish state. In his post- 

---

80 For the EU’s attitude towards the prison problem in Turkey see ("Avrupalılar F Tipini Beğendi," 2001) and (Dorsey, 2001)
trial public messages, Öcalan asked the PKK to declare a ceasefire and withdraw its forces from Turkey. The PKK’s acquiescence caused a dramatic decrease in its activities. Since the PKK’s actions had constituted a significant proportion of recorded social actions, a fall in the Kurdish share in the aggregate (from 35% in 1993 to 13% in 2002-SMD 2) also led to a significant decline in the overall intensity of social movements from a peak of 2.63σ above the median in July 1996 to a minimum in June 2002 with an intensity 0.38 σ below the median. All of these developments have changed the relative importance of the Turkish metropolis for social movements (see Figure 4-14). Another indicator is the ratio of social actions in the biggest five Turkish cities to those in Kurdish cities. Despite the well-known metropolitan bias of national newspapers, the ratio was close to 1 in 1993, while in 2003, at the height of the PKK’s retreat, the weight of Turkish cities increased six times (Figure 4-14).

However, while referring to the PKK’s retreat, two important points concerning its beginning and end should not be forgotten. Ever since the Turkish state started to negotiate with the PKK, many scholarly and non-scholarly articles have been written, hailing the negotiation process as an historic event, a beginning with new possibilities, and a convergence, whereby both the government and the PKK moved away from their old positions and dogmas and created a basis for dialogue and peaceful solution. Certainly, even the acknowledgment of PKK as an organization to be negotiated with is a radical change in the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish population. Yet from the PKK’s perspective, it was hardly a new step for two reasons. First, the PKK had been founded as an organization aiming at the independence of Kurdistan by means of people’s war, and its first retreat was in 1993 for reasons related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
first Gulf War. At that time, at the peak of its intensity, the PKK had declared a ceasefire and offered to start negotiations with the state on terms comparable to the terms of today. The PKK then offered a unilateral ceasefire with several months’ extension in 1995 and then again in 1997. Parallel to the change in its party line and tactics, the PKK decreased the intensity of its activities with each ceasefire, and the level of social action reached its nadir in 2003. Second, the PKK’s retreat did not last forever. Indeed, starting from 2004, the trend again turned upwards. However, this newly rising movement was anything but a replica of the guerilla action backed by occasional urban uprisings of the previous period. While the movement had previously started in Kurdish rural regions and later spread to urban areas, the new movement emerged first and foremost in the cities of Kurdistan and later sparked the guerilla movement. This time, it was an urban mobilization for the democratic rights of Kurds backed by guerilla action (Figure 4-15 and 4-16).

![Figure 4-15 Monthly Average of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Actions in Kurdistan.](image)

*Source: SMD 1*
By 2002, social movements in Turkey were not only at their lowest level of intensity, but had also started to assume a new form. Concentrated more in the centers of big cities, symbolic actions and peaceful press declarations took the place of radical and violent actions in *varoṣs* and guerilla warfare in Kurdistan. The masses were in retreat, and various organizations - from liberal to socialist - were trying to fill this void with their symbolic and fragmented demonstrations.

*Figure 4-16 Share of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Protest in Total Protest in Kurdistan.*  
*Source: SMD 1*

*Figure 4-17 Share of Press Declarations in Aggregate Movement.*  
*Source: SMD 1*
A New Surge? Gezi’s Differences and Context

The second silent phase has not been as quiet as it was between 1938 and 1962. As Figures 4-3 and 4-4 demonstrate, with the exception of 2001 the average protest intensity has generally been above the median. Then again, with the exception of a couple of months in 2004, the monthly intensity could not pass the .5 σ cut-off point that was considered necessary for being the starting point of a new phase.

Nevertheless, the same figure also hints at the coming of a new wave. It might be too soon to predict and the data might be considered insufficient to give an explanation or accurate picture of the years since 2004. Keeping all these caveats in mind, it is not possible to overlook the fact that the monthly mentions of protests since 2010 have been above the cut-off point.

Certainly, the Gezi uprising in June 2013 makes the new upward trend even more dramatic. Like most uprisings Gezi had not been predicted by any observer of Turkish politics and “struck them like a thunderbolt from a clear sky”. At that time, sitting at the negotiating table with the Kurds made Erdoğan believe that he had finally managed to bring the Kurdish resistance under control if not to silence it, and bolstered his self-confidence. It was probably this self-confidence that led him to open Taksim Square to the May Day demonstrations. Again, the same self-confidence was probably responsible for his insults towards women, Alevi, and all segments of the opposition. In

---

81 After the massacre on May Day in 1977, Taksim Square acquired a symbolic meaning for the left. From 1978 onwards, the Square had been closed to socialists and workers for 32 years. As a result of this restriction, between 1987-91 and 2007-2009, conquering the Square and confronting the police comprised a significant portion of the recorded events in May. Partly out of a desire to market himself as a democrat a few months before the 2010 referendum, and partly out of the fear of increasing Kurdish involvement in the struggle to free the Taksim Square, Erdoğan opened the square to the demonstrators.
this sense, police violence against the youth at the park in Taksim was in line with Erdoğan’s preceding performance.

The demonstrators at the park were mainly university students with a bourgeois background. They tried to resist Erdoğan’s plans to replace the park with a shopping mall with a repertoire reminiscent of the 1968 occupations in the European and North American movements. The expected result was another easy victory for Erdoğan. However, things turned out differently this time and on May 31st the resistance at the park transformed into an uprising.

What distinguished Gezi from the social protests preceding it can be summarized in two points. The first difference is quantitative. The average intensity of protests during Gezi was 6 σ above the median, a record for the 1945-2014 period. It was also the most widespread protest in Turkish history. At no other point in Turkish history had so many demonstrations occurred on the same issue at the same time.

The second difference is related to Gezi’s being an uprising. Most of the protests in the previous months were protests of militants under the discipline of several organizations. Gezi was a mass uprising involving more than three and a half million participants as per police reports, and only 22% of the detained people were affiliated with a political party or organization (Şardan, 2013). Moreover, in contrast to the popular portrayal of Gezi as a peaceful resistance, it was a violent and offensive movement. Participants of the uprising did not hesitate to attack the police and occupy the roads, buildings and parks. Before Gezi, the pattern of a typical confrontational protest with mass participation was: police warning, wavering and hesitating masses, limited aggression of several militant groups, police attack and escaping masses. This pattern was
reversed during Gezi which saw determined and aggressive masses, hesitating police, and political organizations watching the masses.

This particular pattern of uprisings had been observed at two other times in Turkish history: the 15-16 June uprising in 1970, and the Gazi uprising in 1995. However, a third characteristic of Gezi distinguished it from these two uprisings as well. Gezi was an explicitly political uprising with a single agenda: forcing Erdoğan to resign. In this sense it was similar to the anti-Menderes, anti-DP student demonstrations on the eve of May 27. Ironically, this third characteristic of Gezi not only separates it from previous uprisings, but also underlines its similarities with the post-2010 protests. An important determinant of Gezi was the competition within the power bloc and bourgeois politicization of the society as a result of hatred against Erdoğan, propagated by the media channels and universities still under the control of “old capital”.

In spite of its social democratic credo, historically the RPP had been reluctant to mobilize the masses. Its recent hyperactivity was in contrast with this historical passivity and alarmed supporters of Erdoğan. However, the RPP’s interest in popular mobilization did not emerge out of the blue but developed together with the increasing politicization of the bourgeois society (Figure 4-18). In this sense, the resilience of the post-2010 movements above the 0.5 σ cut-off line makes it plausible to consider 2010 as the beginning of a new wave. The conclusion of the previous chapter adds weight to this possibility.
Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Waves

This chapter conceptualized social movements in Turkey as cycles and traced the rise and fall of these movements in two cycles. The first cycle started in 1896 at the time of Cretan uprising and lasted until the suppression of the Ağrı Rebellion in 1930. The following silent phase continued for more than thirty years. However, especially during the last ten years of this phase, the politicization within the power bloc not only sowed the seeds of a new wave but also shaped its initial political line. The new wave started in 1968 and phased out in 1998. At present, the lasting intensity of protest events since 2009-10, and increasing competition within the power bloc, hint at the beginning of a new wave.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>First Wave</th>
<th>Second Wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1896-1930</td>
<td>1968-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending Coup</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ending Massacre</td>
<td>1937-38 Dersim</td>
<td>2000 Prision Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Incomparably High</td>
<td>High, But relatively low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td>Center and Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>Separatist Movements</td>
<td>Labor, Student, Antifascist, Separatist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements’ ability to survive the silent phase</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-10 summarizes the similarities and differences between the two waves. First, none of the waves rose smoothly but started with several eruptions. In the first wave it was the Cretan uprising followed by the Ilinden uprising. In case of the second wave, it was first the student boycotts in June 1968 and later the 15-16 June uprising of workers in Istanbul. Second, both waves were interrupted several times by coups: 1913 and 1920 for the first, and 1971 and 1980 for the second one. Third, the final assault on both waves also came with protective coups in 1925 and 1997 respectively. Finally, in the early periods of both phases, it is possible to observe a final and hopeless attempt to resist the coup regime, that ended with a massacre: the 1937-38 Dersim uprising and massacre in the first silent phase, the 2000 prison resistance and massacre in the second one.
As regards the differences between the two waves, violence is one of the key factors. It is not possible to ignore the number of casualties in the second phase, especially during the post-1980 period, but the violence applied by the movements and also against them is incomparably higher. Another difference is related to the location of movements, with the second wave being more urban centered. With the exception of the March 31 uprising in 1909, the story of the movements in the first phase can be narrated without referring to protests in Istanbul. For the second phase that is not possible. The third difference concerns the politics and social composition of movements. Although the previous wave was composed mainly of separatist movements, the second phase was a combination of labor, student, anti-fascist and later Kurdish movements. Fourth, the silent phase of the first phase lasted for a much longer time. Finally and related to previous difference, whereas all failed movements of the first phase had been annihilated by the state, especially the Kurdish movement managed to survive the second silent phase. It is especially this final difference that will be important in the fate and success of the movements in the coming phase.
Chapter 5
Revolutionary and Reformist Movements’ Impact on the Regime

To pit this single assertion, that “in the Absolute all is one.” against the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development – to give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black – that is the very naïveté of emptiness of knowledge.
(The Phenomenology of Spirit)

But to live outside the law, you must be honest.
(Absolutely Sweet Marie)

The Three Dimensions of a Movement

The second chapter depicted the trajectory of the Turkish political regime, which is the dependent variable of this study. The third and fourth chapters introduced the historical development of competition within the power bloc and social movements respectively as the independent variables. In this chapter, I establish the first link between the dependent variable- regime change- and one of the independent variables- social movements.

As argued in the first chapter, the common denominator of the literature on Turkey is the absence of social movements as an explanatory factor, I contested this argument in the previous chapter by showing that Turkey has experienced two major waves of social unrest in the twentieth century. The aim of this chapter is to show that the success of attempts to change the regime’s position is dependent on the absence or presence of social movements. However, the label ‘social movement’ covers a variety of
movements which affect regimes in different directions at different levels of significance. To disentangle the heterogeneous category of ‘movements’, this study will draw upon Marx’s discussion of revolutions and revolutionary movements and develop three criteria to classify different types of social movements. Marx did not develop a sociological theory of revolution and revolutionary movements, but criticized the movements he witnessed and participated in according to three criteria: mass mobilization, violence, and independence.

**Independence**

For Marx, independence is the primary condition for a truly revolutionary movement. Without independence from the dominant ideology, any attempt to change the system would result in the status quo reproducing itself. This ideological independence can only be secured by organizational independence and a movement needs to be led by an independent party to be able to act in a revolutionary way. But organization in itself is not sufficient. In his critical analysis of the defeat of French workers in the 1848 Revolution, Marx’s diagnosis was the lack of ideological independence. Except for the Blanquists, all self-proclaimed and formally independent workers’ parties were actually under the influence of bourgeois ideology. And it was this ideology which pushed the workers’ parties to bourgeois parties over the course of the struggle.82

---

82 “Such a union would turn out solely to their advantage and altogether to the disadvantage of the proletariat. The proletariat would lose its whole independent, laboriously achieved position and once more be reduced to an appendage of official bourgeois democracy. This union must therefore, be most decisively rejected. Instead of once again stooping to serve as the applauding chorus of the bourgeois democrats, the workers, and above all the League, must exert themselves to establish an independent secret and public organization of the workers' party alongside the official democrats and make each community the central point and nucleus of workers' associations in which the attitude and interests of the proletariat will be discussed independently of bourgeois influences” (Marx, 1975a, pp. 281-282).
Independence is therefore the first dimension of my analysis of social movements. Accordingly, a movement’s opposition to the status quo increases with its ideological independence. By the same token, a movement’s increasing dependence would increase its preference for the status quo (See Figure 5-1). However, a caveat is necessary: the intention to change the regime, by itself, neither implies a course of action attempting regime change, nor does it guarantee a power to change the regime. Indeed, history is replete with organizations with a radical program but a conciliatory course of action.

![Figure 5-1 Dependent and Independent Movements](image)

**Violence**

Our conceptualization of violence is not very different from its usage in ordinary language, namely damage to life and property. Charles Tilly (2010) defines collective violence as

… episodic social interaction that immediately inflicts physical damage on persons or objects ("damage" includes forcible seizure of persons or objects over restraint or resistance), involves at least two perpetrators of damage, and results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts (p. 118).
However, for Marx, violence has a different and deeper meaning: complete dismantling of the existing bureaucratic state apparatus. In this sense violence is synonymous with change of the existing political order through a revolution. To be sure, this destruction cannot occur without physical violence (Colletti, 1973, p. 220). But violence used in this sense is pushing the limits of the system and increasing the energy of the masses. In other words, physical violence is an indicator of the first sense of violence, but its existence is not a proof of revolutionary violence. For violence to be revolutionary, it should be directed towards the bourgeois state in toto.

Understood in this way, violence is the second dimension which enables us to categorize social movements. To be revolutionary, a movement needs to be not only independent with a program of radical change, but also push the limits of the system and destroy it by violence. In the same way, physical violence becomes revolutionary only if it is directed by an independent organization pursuing independent politics.

![Diagram of Violent and Non-Violent Movements](image)

*Figure 5-2 Violent and Non-Violent Movements*

---

83 “Above all things, the workers must counteract, as much as is at all possible, during the conflict and immediately after the struggle, the bourgeois endeavors to allay the storm, and must compel the democrats to carry out their present terrorist phrases. They must work to prevent the direct revolutionary excitement from being suppressed again immediately after the victory. On the contrary, they must keep it alive as long as possible. Far from opposing so-called excesses, instances of popular revenge against hated individuals or public buildings that are associated only with hateful recollections, such instances must not only be tolerated but the lead in them must be taken” (Marx, 1975a, p. 282).
Mass Participation

Independence and violence are the two necessary conditions for revolutionary movements for Marx. However, not every revolutionary movement is capable of accomplishing the envisioned social and political change. For a revolutionary attempt to be successful, a third condition is necessary: mass participation. For Marx, what makes the proletarian movement a truly revolutionary movement is its ever-growing mass base. As the proletariat becomes the immense majority in contrast to the decaying social classes, its increasing ability to unite and communicate increases its capacity to accomplish a truly ‘social’ revolution.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
    \draw[->,ultra thick,blue] (0,0) -- (6,0);
    \draw[-<,ultra thick,blue] (6,0) -- (0,0);
    \node at (-1,0) {m};
    \node at (7,0) {M};
    \node at (0,-1.5) {No Mass Participation};
    \node at (7,-1.5) {Mass Participation};
    \node at (0,-2) {No capacity to change the regime};
    \node at (7,-2) {Capable of changing the regime};
\end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Impact of Mass Participation}
\end{figure}

Without the participation and mobilization of the “immense majority”, all revolutionary movements are doomed to fail. Their offensive action – unless backed by

\textsuperscript{84} “But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more… Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another” , “Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product”, “All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority” (Marx, 1975l, pp. 492-495).
mass participation - can pressure the regime but its only outcome would be an authoritarian backlash (Figure 5-3).

In fact, this emphasis on mass participation was the criterion that distinguished Marx from Blanqui, whom Marx respected a lot and considered a revolutionary leader, a phrase he never used for the leaders of other working class movements. Marx and Engels criticized Blanqui’s and his followers’ distrust of the masses and their attempts to establish a dictatorship of the enlightened minority, not because of their belief in democratic ideals but because of their belief in the capacity of the masses. Any type of revolutionary action in the absence of mass participation would not be different from suicide.⁸⁵ Hence mass participation is not a criterion distinguishing revolutionary

⁸⁵ “Since Blanqui regards every revolution as a coup made by a small revolutionary minority, it automatically follows that its victory must inevitably be succeeded by the establishment of a dictatorship— not, it should be well noted, of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small number of those who accomplished the coup and who themselves are, at first, organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals”, “If one thing is certain it is that, after the exhausting war, after the hunger in Paris and, notably, after the awful blood-letting of the May days in 1871, the Paris proletariat needs a long rest to recuperate, and that every premature attempt at an insurrection can only end in a new, perhaps still more horrible defeat” (The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune Engels, 1975b, pp. 14-15)
movements from non-revolutionary movements, but one providing a distinction between
two types of revolutionary offensive strategy.

Accordingly, one can create a third dimension to the analysis of social
movements: mass participation, which brings the capacity to change the system. However, it is important to note that not having the capacity to change the regime does not necessarily mean having no impact on the regime. As Marx’s discussion with Blanqui suggests, a revolutionary movement without capacity to change might still incite a repressive governmental reaction.

After having determined the three dimensions, it is possible to define eight
different types of movements depending on the fulfillment of each criterion: mass participation (M), violence (V), and independence (I). Below, I briefly discuss each type of movement and its expected impact on the regime.

**Eight Types of Movements and in-between Cases**

*The Eight Types*

**Uprisings and Civil Wars (MVI)**

When all three criteria are fulfilled, there emerges at least a glimpse of a revolutionary situation. The February Revolution in 1917 Russia and the November Revolution in 1919 Germany are the most obvious examples of MVI. However, to classify a protest or an episode as belonging to this category, one does not necessarily need such widespread and long lasting events. Several protests in the first and second wave of social movements in Turkey can be classified as MVI.
The most typical examples would be the General Albanian Uprising in 1912 and the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. Both of them have been discussed in the previous chapter. They satisfy the criterion of violence not only because of their armed character but also because their demands and activities were incompatible with the Ottoman-Turkish political system at the time of the uprising. The Albanian rebels’ demands ranged from a high degree of autonomy to independence, whereas Sheikh Said openly defied Turkish sovereignty in Kurdistan. Compared to the Sheikh Said rebellion, the Albanian uprising was relatively incoherent and not coordinated by one center. However, even in the case of Sheikh Rebellion that was planned by the conspiratorial organization called Azadi, the majority of the rebel army was not directly linked with Azadi.

As regards independence, it is true that both Albanians and Kurds had more trouble with one faction of the ruling bloc than the other –the former being anti-CUP, the latter being anti-Kemalist. However, none of them had any direct or indirect affiliation with the other faction(s) of the ruling bloc. In fact, during the last phase of the Albanian Uprising, a cabinet supported by the Liberty and Entente Bloc was in power and the cabinet did continue to fight for a while. Similarly, the PRP supported the RPP’s campaign against the Kurds.

Warfare of the Vanguard (mVI)

Under this category, we have persistent violent attacks of political groups who are determined to change the regime or to separate from the existing state. The difference from the first category is the absence of popular mobilization. The attack on Monacada Barracks in 1953, and the ANC’s activities in South Africa during the 1970’s belong to this category.
In Turkey, the THKP-C’s actions, right after the 1971 coup, would be typical examples from the second phase of social movements. For instance on May 17, members of THKP-C stormed the house of Ephraim Elrom, Israel’s consul general in Istanbul, and took him hostage. They demanded the release of all arrested revolutionaries in exchange for Elrom, and killed him after the state refused to negotiate.

Another typical example can be given from the first phase. On August 26 1896, 25 fighters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation raided the Ottoman Bank’s center in Istanbul. The purpose of the occupation was to draw the attention of European states to Abdülhamid’s massacres, as a result of which 300,000 Armenians were killed.

Reformist Anti-systemic Movements (MvI)

Here we observe mobilization of the masses by organizations that are independent of the power bloc, but do not challenge the state’s monopoly of violence or laws protecting private property. Most of the organized strikes and peaceful rallies fall under this category. The worldwide anti-war rallies in March 2003 can be considered a typical example of this category of movements.

In Turkey, an example from the first phase would be the May Day demonstrations in 1909 in Thessaloniki and Skopje, when Muslim, Christian and Jewish workers celebrated the first May Day in the Empire with their march and rally. A similar example from the second phase would be the ‘clean society’ rallies protesting the mafia-state connections. On April 14, one-and-a half month after the protective 1997 warning by the National Security Council, socialist parties organized two rallies in Istanbul and Ankara respectively. The Ankara rally was the bigger one with 50,000 participants, and slogans like “Ankara, don’t hide the chetes”, and “Solidarity of the People will beat the
chetoș” had a central place. The demonstrators urged the parliament to discuss the mafia scandal and impeach the deputies involved. The organizers of these rallies were the Freedom and Solidarity Party in Ankara and the Party of Labor in Istanbul—neither of which had any involvement with any institution of the state.

**Civil War within the Power Bloc (MVi)**

This category refers to a rare escalation of conflict within the power bloc, when a section of the bloc mobilizes masses to either directly attack some part of the state’s coercive apparatus, or to violate the legal structure of its administration. Political parties affiliated with the power bloc play an important role here. Sometimes, as in the recent Egyptian uprising, the military, and not necessarily a party, can support these movements. An example from Turkey would be the 1906 tax revolts in Anatolia on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. The monarchist mobilization against the Ankara government between 1919 and 1921 would be another example.

Although these movements involve conflict within the power bloc, their direct targets are not always members of the other faction of the power bloc. For instance, in the case of September 6-7 riots in 1954, discussed in the previous chapter, the primary purpose was to consolidate popular support for the DP’s policies. The victim of the mass mobilization, however, was the Greek Population in İstanbul.

**Counter Guerilla Activity (mVi)**

What distinguishes this category from the previous ones is the agent of violence. Here controlled and disciplined groups follow the violent directives emanating from segments of the power bloc instead of the masses. The object of violence is also different. Whereas MVi frequently involves violence against another segment of the power bloc, mVi is usually directed at independent organizations and the masses they mobilize.
Fascist violence under the Weimar Republic is the most graphic example of mVi (Schumann, 2009, pp. 145-186, 251-305). A similar form of violence was widespread in Turkey in the late 1970’s. Another version of this type of movement was revived in the 1990s in the form of unidentified bombings and murders.

As in the case of MVi, another less frequent mode of mVi is also possible. For example, assassination of prominent officers loyal to the Porte was one of the tactics employed by the CUP before coming to power. Between July 6 and 19 in 1908, CUP members killed 8 officers, including 3 Pashas and 2 Beys.

**Electoral Mobilization (Mvi)**

When parties affiliated with the power bloc organize rallies and marches without violating any of the rules of the regime, we observe instances of Mvi. Most of the events in this category are rallies on the eve of elections. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1957 election campaign provides the best examples of Mvi. However, there are also other forms of Mvi, like the 1908 celebrations following the Revolution, unrelated to elections. If one remembers Abdülhamid’s claims that he decided on his own to convene the parliament, then the CUP’s motivation for these celebrations becomes clear as well – to exploit the political climate and corner Abdülhamid, thereby demonstrating the real agent of constitutional change.

**Attitude Declaration (mvl)**

This type of movement gains wide currency when formally independent forces are weak and scattered, or when the price of direct action (violent repression) is high. It includes press declarations and/or brief marches, which do not go beyond a symbolic declaration of various groups’ position on social and political issues. However, some

86 For the Communist response, see Rosenhaft (1983)
groups or movements in this category represent extreme forms of passive resistance: hunger strikes and death fasts, which in the Turkish case comprise the main body of this type of action.

**Extensions of lobbying activities (mvi)**

Like mvI, mvi also comprises of mainly symbolic and sometimes spectacular actions. The primary purpose is to articulate the demands of the movement by attracting attention. Generally under this category, we observe movements closely related to lobbying politics. Petitions and placing wreaths at monuments erected by the established parties of the regime are the most frequent instances.

**Apparently in-between Cases**

None of the dimensions of movements discussed above have a dichotomous character, but each category represents a different degree and combination of mass participation, violence and independence. Therefore drawing the border lines to transform the continuity to a duality requires more elaboration. In this section I discuss possible intermediary cases for each dimension and justify my classification.

**m or M?**

Assessing the mass character of a movement presents a problem especially in two cases. The first one is related to categorizing persistent guerilla activities. On the one hand, guerilla activity occurs under a strict military-like discipline, and by its very nature cannot be considered mass protest. On the other hand, a persistent guerilla war that survives and thrives for decades indicates not only a successful recruitment strategy but also mass politicization and participation.
To solve this puzzle it is necessary to discuss the issue more concretely and compare the chetes in the Balkans during the first phase of Turkish social movements with the PKK’s activities during the second phase. As a matter of fact, compared to the amateur chetes in the Balkans, PKK had been far more successful in sustaining guerilla warfare and building links with the local population. The distinction between chete members and recruits from the local population had never been clear cut. Actually, far from being professionals, chete members continued their daily life as farmers. Yet, this very amateurishness of the chete’s, in other words the absence of clear-cut bureaucratic borderlines between the party and the masses, give the chete movements a mass character whereas the armed attacks of modern PKK should be classified not under mass but under organizational actions.

The same problem occurs when we compare various massacres initiated and backed by political parties. Here we can contrast the Armenian massacre in Adana in 1909 with the one in 1915. In both cases the role of the ’Parties of Order’ is obvious, Liberty and Entente in the former and the CUP in the latter. Simonyan’s (2012) account of the Adana massacre demonstrates mass participation on the pretext of “self-defense of Muslims”. In contrast, studies focusing on the deportation in 1915 hint at a more state-administered process without much mass mobilization. The number of Muslim casualties also strengthens this interpretation: in the first case the Muslims suffered more than 1000 casualties, whereas during Anatolia-wide deportation, there were only a few instances- of clashes between the local population and the Armenians as in Musa Dağ, Zeitun, Shebin
Karahisar and Urfa. Hence the former falls under MVi whereas the latter is classified as mVi.

v or V?

Can one consider strikes, disrupting the capitalist accumulation process as violent or not? Are demonstrations that start peacefully, but assume later after several police provocation a violent character violent or peaceful? Given the capitalist sensitivity for labor productivity, and widespread coupling of the word strike with weapon, it is tempting to consider every strike as a confrontational activity. However, to be really a weapon, a strike should be decided by the workers alone, not by a third party negotiation committee. But, especially since the 1980 labor laws, organizing a strike in a factory has become a very institutionalized and controlled process. The state can regularly intervene and postpone the strike by citing national security concerns. In other words, a strike is only permitted if it is considered harmless (A. Çelik, 2008). More importantly, the disruption caused by the strike is an economic one, and its political consequences cannot be measured by the losses to the capitalists. The context and impact of a strike can be understood only by looking at political factors, and its most important indicator is the concrete relationship between strikers and the coercive apparatus of the status.

To speak more concretely, in spite of its poetic appearance, the march of a hundred thousand people, mine workers and their families, the Zonguldak workers, to Ankara in 1991 (see chapter 4), did not have any disruptive political consequences. The gendarmerie stopped them in Mengen after 97 kilometers and without any confrontation with the state. The fact that this march had started one day after the one-day-long general

---

87 Because of the mass participation, the Van Resistance in 1915 is classified under MVI and not this heading.
strike underlines the political dwarfism of these movements and the absence of any confrontational attempts.

Second, as regards to the provocations to “peaceful demonstrations”, unless there is a public prosecution concerning misuse of police force afterwards, police warnings and interventions should be considered as an indicator of what is permitted by the regime or not. Hence regardless of the intentions of the demonstrators, a clash with the police, whether the demonstrators are on the active side of the violence or not, is considered sufficient for the event being categorized as violent. We can now interpret the events in June 15-16 (Chapter 4) thus: although the intentions of the marching workers were not violent at all, the interaction between the police and workers (not to forget Dev-Genç members marching together with the workers) transformed the whole event into a milestone in the rise of revolutionary movements in Turkey.

**Impacts on the Regime**

Figure 5-4 summarizes the basic features of all movement types. Since MVI fulfills all the criteria for a revolutionary movement, it definitely has an impact on political regimes according to the theoretical framework employed in this study. Similarly, since mvi does not fulfill any of these criteria, no further justification for its exclusion from the group of influential movements is necessary. The impact of the remaining six types of movements over the trajectory of regimes requires further discussion.
Let’s start with mVI. Given the lack of mass involvement, its capacity to change the regime is limited. However, an intensive mVI would mean a persistent effort to push the regime to its limits, since the combined presence of I and V can be considered as the necessary condition for a revolutionary movement. Hence the combined presence of I and V in both MVI and mVI means constant revolutionary pressure on the regime. The regime’s response to both movements is not limited to repressive measures. Agents for the reproduction of the regime additionally try to depoliticize the already politicized masses in the case of MVI or try to prevent politicization of masses in the case of mVI. Narrowing the channels of participation, in other words moving the regime towards the
EX pole, is necessary for de-politicization. Hence, both types of revolutionary movements would incite an exclusionary backlash.

Since MVI not only applies pressure on the system, but also creates situations where complete system change is a likely outcome, the stakes for the power bloc are higher. Hence in the case of MVI, one would expect longer and bloodier non-parliamentary transitions because of stronger exclusionary pressures. In contrast, the state can live with a resilient guerilla insurgency (mVI) and fight against it under an exclusionary democracy.

In contrast to both MVI and mVI, mVI does not have a significant impact on the regime. Although organizations leading the movements of this type have the intention to change the regime (I), they do not have the necessary capacity to accomplish the change (m). Similarly they cannot sustain a significant level of action straining the limits of the regime (v). In other words, the presence of (I) is not sufficient for political significance unless it is combined with a capacity (M) or permanent attempts (V) to change the regime.

MVI is another type of politically significant movement. In this case, the leaders of the movement are directly linked to the power bloc (i). As a result of this connection, none of them has an agenda of change. What they aspire for is either a change of government or preservation of the status quo. Since a violent mobilization of the masses (MV) indicates an action repertoire incompatible with the existing regime and with a capacity to change it, this rare type of movement has a visibly destabilizing impact on the regime. Not surprisingly, coups with an intention to change the regime along the EL-NEL axis either follow such movements as in the case of April 28-29 demonstrations and May
27 coup in 1960; or are followed by them as in the case of 1908 Revolution and March 31 Uprising. In other words, although unintended by parties leading the MVi, these movements unleash massive social and political energy which makes regime change an actual possibility. Since members of the power bloc are disturbed by this process, they generally try to end this process via military coups.

Since those who support and fight against MVi belong to the power bloc, despite bloody episodes, this movement does not trigger an exclusionary response, and certainly not a non-parliamentary one. First of all, the violent mobilization shakes the pillars of the regime and adopting an exclusionary practice would mean further alienating the competing elements in the power bloc, which would lead to higher levels of mobilization and increase the risk of a shift from MVi to MVI. Second, excluding an established member of the power bloc from political life is a more difficult task than closing the doors of parliamentary politics to the masses. Therefore MVi does not involve long-term, non-parliamentary transitions.

In contrast to MVi, mVi has no significant impact on regime change. When discussing mVi, I argued that despite the absence of mass participation, resilient attempts to confront the limits of the regime apply revolutionary pressure on the regime. In the case of mVi, however, the movements are led by defenders of the status quo. Moreover, in most cases, violent action is directed against other movements with the intention of paralyzing or at least hindering them. The revolutionary energy arising out of the combination of M and V is also lacking. Hence, the violence employed by this type of movement does not push the limits of the regime but lessens the pressure for change.
MvI is the last type of movement that has an impact on regime changes and coups. The coupling of the demand for systemic change with the capacity for the same make MvI particularly significant, although regime change is not a real possibility given the absence of the destructive combination of mass mobilization with violence. What one observes instead is pressure for change, and although the actors have a discourse of change they do not really challenge the regime. So the demand for change cannot go beyond pressure for the extension of democratic rights without changing the regime. Additionally, the absence of the attempts at regime change despite the mobilized capacity enables competing members of the power bloc to make use of these movements in toppling governments without destabilizing the regime.

Like MvI, Mvi also applies pressure within the limits of the regime. However, as the combination of v and i denote, the mobilization taking place under this type reflects the preservation of the status quo or at best the demand for a new government. Mvi therefore cannot go beyond the confines of electoral politics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MV (Civil War within the Power Bloc)</th>
<th>MVI (Revolutionary Civil War)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change along EL-NEL axis</td>
<td>Successful: Social Revolution or Separatist Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief non-parliamentary transitions</td>
<td>Failure: High Exclusionary pressure and long non-parliamentary transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent coups following each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MvI (Reformist anti-systemic movements)</th>
<th>mVI (Guerilla Warfare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No regime change</td>
<td>A low chance to obtain state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental democratization or governments are toppled</td>
<td>Exclusionary pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No non-parliamentary transition</td>
<td>Regime can continue in exclusionary zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively short non-parliamentary transitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, it is possible to categorize four different types of movements with four different impacts on regimes (See Figure 5-5). Because of the VI combination (the desire and attempt to change the regime), both MVI and mVI belong to the domain of revolutionary movements and both movements evoke an exclusionary reaction from the regime. However, since MVI makes revolution a much more likely outcome, in case of its failure, the regime stays in the non-parliamentary zone for a longer time period. In contrast, reformist movements do not cause an exclusionary backlash. However, due to the explosive potential of MV, regime change becomes a likely outcome in the case of
MV$i$. In contrast, the reformist MV$I$ results in democratic reforms within the same regime or a coup that changes the government but not the regime.

**TABLE 5-1 REGIME CHANGE ATTEMPTS AND MOVEMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Failed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↑ EX</td>
<td>High MV$I$ or high m$VI$</td>
<td>Low MV$I$ and low m$VI$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ INC</td>
<td>Low MV$I$ and low m$VI$</td>
<td>High MV$I$ or high m$VI$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ NEL</td>
<td>Low post-coup M$v$</td>
<td>High post-coup M$v$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← EL</td>
<td>Low Mv$I$</td>
<td>Low Mv$I$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hypotheses**

Table 5-1 summarizes the expected relationship between social movements and successful and failed regime change attempts. Note that whereas revolutionary movements directly determine the failure and success of the regime change attempts along the INC-EX axis, their impact on changes along the EL-NEL axis is less clear. The absence of intense revolutionary movements is a necessary condition for successful regime change along the EL-NEL axis, and for toppling the government without a regime change. However, for change along the horizontal axis, another necessary condition should be fulfilled: the MV$i$ should be brought under control after a coup attempt. So, the presence of intense level of post-coup MV$i$ decreases the chances of success of horizontal regime change attempts. Finally, high level of Mv$I$ is a necessary condition for successful coups-by-memorandums.
These expected outcomes can be formulated as hypotheses:

1. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime to the EX pole would be successful.

2. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements attempts to move the regime to the INC pole would fail.

3. In the absence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime to the INC pole would be successful.

4. In the absence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime to the EX pole would fail.

5. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime along the EL-NEL axis would fail.

6. If the attempt to change the regime along the EL-NEL axis cannot decrease the intensity of MVi, then the attempt would fail.

7. In the absence of intense MiV, any memorandum to change the government would fail.

8. The duration of non-parliamentary transitions incited by movements can be ranked as follows: MVI, mVI and MVi.

Table 5-2 locates all failed and successful regime change attempts between 1908 and 2013 in Turkey. Each attempt is a test case for one or more hypotheses listed above. Appendix C summarizes the intensity of four types of movements in terms of standard deviations from the median. This table provides the necessary data for testing the hypotheses. The fifth and sixth columns give the intensity of all revolutionary movements and of all movements (aggregate intensity) respectively. The cut-off point for classifying a movement as intense is 1 standard deviation above the median. Median is a better measure than the mean because explosive years bring the mean to such a high level that 70% of years for the first phase remain below the mean and we need the intensity of a year in comparison to the year in the middle. Similarly the 1σ cut off point enables us to identify 20% of years for the first phase and 15.7% of the years in the second phase,
which I consider to be a good indicator. It is important however, to distinguish this cut-off point from the .5 $\sigma$ in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter we wanted to mark the beginning of a wave whereas here we want to determine an intense period that requires a higher cut-off point.

TABLE 5-2 REGIME CHANGE ATTEMPTS BETWEEN 1908 AND 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Failed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↑ EX</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1962-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1971 (March 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1971 (March 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ INC</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ NEL</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← EL</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coups without regime change 1971 (March 12) 1997
### TABLE 5-3 VERTICAL IMPACTS OF INTENSE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attempt</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>2 years before</th>
<th>1 year before</th>
<th>Coup Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Successful Exclusionary Attempts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913 coup</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 coup</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 coup</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 coup</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Failed Inclusionary Attempts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Movements and Regime Change Attempts in Turkey

Table 5-3 compares the general intensity of all mentioned events with the intensity of revolutionary movements in the three years preceding all regime change attempts. In all of the successful attempts, the intensity of revolutionary movements is above the 1 \( \sigma \) cut-off point, which corroborates H1. In three of the four cases, the aggregate intensity is also above the cut-off point, but the revolutionary intensity is always higher than the aggregate intensity. In the 1921\(^{88}\) and 1925 coups, the revolutionary intensity is more than 60% higher than the aggregate intensity, meaning the exclusionary pressures are higher than the aggregate intensity reveals. The same table

---

\(^{88}\) Actually pinning down this coup is not an easy task. As discussed in Chapter 2, starting with the coup in 1919, transitions during this period involved a series of coups and the process was completed with the 1921 Constitution. However, the promulgation of the constitution was simultaneously the turning point to the new exclusionary regime, as Kemal’s offensive against the opposition started right afterwards. Hence considering 1921 as the date of the coup would be more appropriate for the purposes of this chapter.
shows that the years preceding inclusionary attempts have an intense level of revolutionary activity and support H2.

**TABLE 5-4 LOW LEVEL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND VERTICAL CHANGE ATTEMPTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>2 years before</th>
<th>1 year before</th>
<th>Coup Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Successful Inclusionary Attempts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Exclusionary Attempts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (9 March)</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-4 provides the intensity data for three years preceding successful inclusionary moves and failed inclusionary attempts. In all cases, the intensity is below the cut-off, supporting H3 and H4. In half of the cases (1945, 1961, 1962-3 and 1983) the intensity is even below the median. For the remaining four, 1908, 1909 and 1971 are lower than or equal to $0.4 \sigma$. Only one case, 1918, is barely under the cutoff. Actually in
this case, the intensity comes from the Pontic movement starting after the inclusive step in early October, corresponding to the dissolution Congress of the CUP and to the Ottoman armistice negotiations with the Allies (Table 5-5).

### TABLE 5-5 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recorded Instances of Revolutionary Movements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually, 1909 and the other two cases above the median corroborate H1 and H2 in a different way. The intensity of revolutionary movements in 1918 is not high enough to invite an exclusionary coup, but sufficiently high to make the emerging regime fragile. That is why one observes several coup attempts (Chapter 2) between 1918 and 1920. In the same vein, the failed attempts in 1909 and 1971 could not take the regimes to the EX pole. However, in both cases the revolutionary intensity was high enough to invite additional exclusionary measures without changing the regime. After 1909, the CUP ruled the country under martial law. Similarly, as mentioned in the Chapter 2, from the 1971 memorandum to the 1980 coup, most Turkish cities including Istanbul were governed under martial law for more than 40% of the period. Moreover, following the failed coup attempt in the same month, the 1971 Memorandum brought constitutional amendments narrowing the political sphere.

### TABLE 5-6 MVi AND HORIZONTAL REGIME CHANGE

**Successful EL-NEL Change**

258
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1 year before</th>
<th>During coup</th>
<th>1 year later</th>
<th>2 years later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Failed EL-NEL Change Attempts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1 year before</th>
<th>During coup</th>
<th>1 year later</th>
<th>2 years later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between revolutionary movements and attempts to change the regime along the horizontal axis can only be tested partially. In all cases (Table 5-6), the intensity of revolutionary movements is low, but there is no example of a failed coup together with a high level of revolutionary activity. As an explanation, revolutionary movements should be at low levels just to attempt a change along the horizontal axis. Indeed, two of the failed attempts (in 1909 and 1971) occurred during a somewhat high level of revolutionary activity. Arguably, even a modest level of revolutionary activity is frightening enough to deter members of the power bloc from attempting a regime change.

What explains the difference between successful and failed coup attempts is the presence or absence of post-coup MVi intensity. In 1908, the leading force behind the MVi (CUP) was able to end the violent mobilization wave immediately, which created...
conditions for the survival of the new regime. Similarly, the almost complete absence of MVi in 1960 enabled the coup leaders to effect a smooth regime change.

TABLE 5-7 MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF MVi DURING HORIZONTAL ATTEMPTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to 1908, the regime change attempts in 1909, 1919 and 1920 were followed by a dramatic increase in violent mass mobilization. In the case of 1909, the attempt started with the eruption of an insurrection in Istanbul. And mass mobilization not only persisted after the change of government, but spread to other cities and assumed the form of massacres. The pogrom triggered by the monarchist regime change attempt explains the record level of MVi intensity in April 1909, like the approximately 30,000 Armenians killed in Adana in one week (Table 5-7). The dynamics triggered by the monarchist coup plotters prepared the conditions for their own failure. In a destabilized political regime shaken by mass violence, it was relatively easy for the fallen CUP to consolidate support over the army and strike back.

In case of the series of coups between November 1918 and April 1920, the first instance of violent mass mobilization emerged in May 1919, seven months after the first coup. The mobilization acquired a new intensity with Kemal’s counter-coup in
September 1919 - higher than the peak of 1909 - and lasted until late 1920 (Table 5-7). The destabilization of the regime by monarchist insurrections increased Kemal’s legitimacy and hence his control over the military, which secured his success in preserving the status quo.

At first glance, the failure of the 1971 coup seems to falsify H6. There is no intense revolutionary movement and no instance of MVi at all. In this sense, the coup attempt is not different from the successful one in 1960. So what explains the failure? Actually, the March 9 coup attempt would have been successful had it not been coupled with an intention to move the regime to the EX pole. An exclusionary coup in an environment of low-level revolutionary movements had little chances of success. Hence what determined the outcome of March 9 coup project was not the intensity of MVi but the low level of revolutionary activities (MVI and MVi), that was only sufficient to justify the coup three days later.
Table 5-8 provides the data necessary to test H7. Since the coups in 1971, 1997 and 2001 happened in March, February and April respectively, it would make more sense to compare the intensities of the previous year(s). As can be seen, whereas the months preceding the memorandum in 1971 and 1997 witnessed relatively high levels of MvI, the year 2007 lacks such intense mobilization (Figure 5-6 and 5-7). Certainly, the army
and TÜSİAD tried to organize mass rallies against the government (however half-heartedly) with the intention of repeating the performance, and they were quite successful: three consecutive rallies in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir with at least 1 million participants each, and several mini-rallies in more than ten cities. However, these attempts were not sufficient to increase the general intensity of the movement and faded away in the atmosphere of general elections.
TABLE 5-9 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND NON-PARLIAMENTARY TRANSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coup</th>
<th>Type of the Preceding Intense Movement</th>
<th>Duration of the non-democratic Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>Less than 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>More than 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>MVI and MVI</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>No Movement</td>
<td>Around 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>MIV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>mVI and MIV</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To test H8, we need to compare types of movements preceding the coups and the duration of non-parliamentary transitions following the coup. (See Table 5-9) As expected, MvI’s are followed by coups not interrupting parliamentary rule. By the same
token, MVI’s are followed by longer non-parliamentary regimes compared to mVI. The only exception is the coup in 1921. Despite the existence of MVI there is no parliamentary interruption. The reason for this “anomaly” is MVi, which lasted from mid-1919 to late 1920. With a lurking civil war specter, Kemal would not dare attempt a non-parliamentary adventure.

**The Big Picture**

The evidence provided in this chapter contradicts the basic assumptions of studies of Turkish politics. First, contrary to general belief, social movements do have a determining impact on regime changes in Turkey. Second, the periodic recurrence of these movements reveals that their presence or absence cannot be explained with reference to the level of development of the civil society in Turkey. On the contrary, after 1908, the development of Ottoman civil society was high enough to give rise to escalating social conflicts and movements.

The discussion in this chapter provides the conceptual tools necessary to disentangle the aggregate social ‘movement’ into its constitutive dimensions: independence, violence and mobilization. These criteria enabled us to define two types of movements – revolutionary and reformist - with two different subtypes each and with four different impacts on the regimes. With this categorization and analysis of impact of the different movement types on regimes, we saw how the distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements is more than “outdated leftist jargon” as is widely believed.
Figure 5-8 Pendulum of the Turkish Regime and Social Movements

A₁ reformist politicization with local demands for reforms
A₂ reformist politicization with socio-economic demands for reforms
Δ revolutionary politicization
C revolutionary surge
D₁ depoliticization and repression with liquidation
D₂ depoliticization and repression with partial liquidation
The trajectory of the regime illustrated in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-11) resembles the movement of a pendulum of exclusion and inclusion. (See Figure 5-8) The poles of the pendulum at $t_0$ ($t_4$) and $t_2$ are respectively the most exclusionary and inclusionary locations of the regime. Whereas $t_1$ and $t_3$ are the points of regime change, $t_0$ corresponds to the beginning of the politicization process which would continue until $t_2$. From $t_2$ to $t_4$, we observe a movement in the opposite direction.

Politicization does not immediately strengthen the revolutionary movements. On the contrary, at first it remains within the domain of the power bloc. At $t_1$, when the regime enters the inclusive zone as the result of a coup, reformist movements are at the peak of their strength. However between $t_1$ and $t_3$, increasing politicization starts to give impetus to revolutionary movements. From $t_4$ onwards, these movements start to threaten the regime, and its major actors - including its ideological centers - change their discourse from democratization to security and attempt to depoliticize and demobilize the society.

However, before moving the regime back to the exclusionary zone, repression only contributes to further politicization and gives fuel to the revolutionary fire. Therefore on the eve of $t_3$, when the regime re-enters the exclusive zone, revolutionary movements are at their maximum strength and the influence of the reformist movements is minimal.

The phase between $t_3$ and $t_4$ is a period of battles between revolutionary movements and the state. In this battle, the state is on its own coercive and exclusionary terrain, and has therefore the upper hand and pacifies the revolutionary movements at point $t_4$. This is at the same time the starting point of a new cycle.
Figure 5-9 Periodization of Revolutionary and Reformist Movements

Standard Deviation from the Median Intensity. Data for 1876-1946 and for 1945-2014 are taken from different sources. Unification of both standard deviations has illustrative purpose.

Sources: SMD 1
Figure 5-9 illustrates the intensity of revolutionary movements in terms of standard deviation from the median. Finally, Table 5-10 compares relative revolutionary intensities of different periods. With the help of this figure and tables we can fill the abstract time spots $t_0$, $t_1$, $t_2$, and so on. The starting point of our story is the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, a coup with which the regime entered the inclusive zone $t_1$ in our discussion above. The inclusionary phase, the interval between $t_1$ and $t_2$, was pretty short. That was partly because of rapid escalation of the revolutionary movements that had not been completely wiped out during the Hamidian era which had relied on a combination of reform and repression. As a result, the inclusionary period of Ottoman democracy provided a climate conducive to the growth of revolutionary movements. The de-politicization process started with the 1913 coup. However what we observe between $t_1$ and $t_3$ is the growth of revolutionary movements. Only after the 1921 transformative coup $t_3$, with which the regime moved to the exclusionary zone, did the revolutionary movements start to lose ground and a period of revolutionary insurgencies with heavy losses continued until $t_4$—the Dersim insurgency and massacre in 1938.

The time interval up to 1960 ($t_5$) can be considered a period of politicization within the power bloc, which gave life to reformist movements. As it was during the post-1908 period, this was the time when reformist currents had maximum influence over the social movements. There are however two important differences between reformist dominance in the two phases. During the first phase, revolutionary movements had not been completely liquidated, whereas after Dersim in 1938, it was not possible to talk of revolutionary movements. Second, “the reformism” of the reformist movements was also different. Whereas it was more related to the improvement of the conditions of various
ethnic and religious groups in the first phase, reformism in the second phase did not involve any demands on such “sensitive issues.” Instead the reformists’ demands were centered on issues of secularism, and social and economic development.

Between 1960 and 1980 (t7), revolutionary movements intensified once again. The closure of the regime and the beginning of de-politicization from 1971 (t6) onwards did not prevent the rise of revolutionary movements, but intensified the political crisis which eventually led to the 1980 coup (t7). after which the exclusionary regime could attack the old movement more aggressively. The fight against revolutionary movements with the security discourse and all-encompassing attempts continued until 1999, which we can consider the peak of the exclusionary period (t8). And from that point onwards, the agenda of Turkish regime gradually changed from security to democracy over the years.

In early 2014, the pendulum of the Turkish regime oscillates back to the regime change point (t9) that has not been entered yet. So far, none of the regime changes occurred without a coup. Will the forthcoming change be an exception to the generalization derived from the previous four major regime changes in 1908, 1921, 1960 and 1980? To discuss such a possibility, which I do in the conclusion of this study, one needs to look at the interaction of the competition in the power bloc with revolutionary movements. This is the topic of the next chapter.

The analysis in this chapter can nonetheless highlight important differences between the two periods of intense revolutionary movements (Rev1 1912-1938 and Rev2 1974-1997) that shed light on some parts of the question above. First, although the relationship between the transformative coups and movements is the same in both phases,
the time spans are different. Whereas the lifespan of Rev1 stretched beyond the restorative coups in 1913 and 1925. Rev2 started after the restorative coup in 1971 and lost its significance right after the 1997 coup. This is not simply a chronological difference, but as the analysis in this chapter showed, related to the types of the coup. The transformative coups in the first period were responses to ascendant revolutionary movements, whereas the restorative coups of the second period were results of competition within the power bloc. In other words, the closure of the regime started before Rev2 and after the transformative coup in 1980, the regime did not need any special measures to suppress the movement.

Asking about the reasons for this difference brings us to another difference. Rev1 was predominantly an MVI type movement, whereas Rev2 fell under the category of mVI. Hence compared to Rev2, Rev1 posed a stronger threat to the regime. Not surprisingly, after 1908, all coups within the power bloc were failures in the first period, and successful in the second one.89

The difference between MVI and mVI brings us to the third divergence: the regime’s reaction to Rev1 and Rev2. Compared to the first exclusionary period, the second exclusionary period (from t7 up to now) was a time of parliamentary rule with the exception of three years, and the violence was not concentrated but diffused over the years and regions.

Fourth, while all movements were wiped out during Rev1, the state could not completely suppress Rev2. Part of the explanation is the state’s preference to fight against mVI within the limits of an exclusionary democracy, as we saw in the previous section.

89 In 1971 there were two coup attempts: March 9 was a failure whereas March 12 was a success. However as we saw, the reasons for the failure of the March 9 coup were its exclusionary intentions.
The other equally important part of the explanation, however, is the PKK’s ability to fight and retreat effectively, plus its post-1997 timing in switching from guerilla warfare to urban-based civil protests without dismantling the guerrilla army.

As a result, whereas the pendulum of democracy approached the regime’s turning point in 1960 on a clean terrain without a single oppositional force, today it approaches the same point without having wiped out an important revolutionary force which has dramatically extended its mass base since 1997. Actually, the situation in the Balkans before the 1908 revolution was analogous. The Ottomans were able to suppress the rebellions in the repressive post-1878 period, but the revolutionary organizations were not completely eradicated and were even able to organize some serious uprising as in the case of Ilinden in 1903, or the “successful” Revolt in Crete in 1896-7.

In today’s Turkey, although all post-1974 revolutionary organizations except the PKK are de facto liquidated, the PKK’s potential in terms of fighting capacity, organizational sophistication, and mass base is far superior to all of the Balkan chetes taken together. Hence as democratization and inclusion dominate the Turkish agenda again after sixty years, Turkey is on the eve of another 1908, and not another 1960. The 1908 transition to democracy rapidly translated into a surge of revolutionary movements and was therefore short-lived (4 years). Given today’s higher revolutionary intensity and capacity compared to the pre-1908 period, the current phase will probably be shorter. Or perhaps this time the leading force of regime change will not be parties affiliated with the power bloc but an independent revolutionary organization. The answer to this question cannot be found in scientific analysis but in the political praxis.

---

90 The peak in 1895 is probably an exaggerated one. The Turkish state extensively supports studies demonstrating the tiniest amount of Armenian resistance. The same can be said for the peak in 1915, the result of the records concerning Armenian resistance around the city Van.
Chapter 6
Interaction of the two Struggles

The February revolution was the beautiful revolution, the revolution of universal sympathy, because the contradictions which erupted in it against the monarchy were still undeveloped and peacefully dormant, because the social struggle which formed their background had only achieved an ephemeral existence, an existence in phrases, in words. The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the nasty revolution, because the phrases have given place to the real thing, because the republic has bared the head of the monster by knocking off the crown which shielded and concealed it.

"Order! was Guizot's war-cry. Order! shouted Sebastiani, the Guizotist, when Warsaw became Russian. Order! shouts Cavaignac, the brutal echo of the French National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie.

"Order! thundered his grape-shot as it tore into the body of the proletariat.

"None of the numerous revolutions of the French bourgeoisie since 1789 assailed the existing order, for they retained the class rule, the slavery of the workers, the bourgeois system, even though the political form of this rule and this slavery changed frequently. The June uprising did assail this system.

Woe to the June uprising!
(Class Struggles in France)

Introduction

So far we have talked about the impact of social movements on regime change. However, as stated in the first chapter, this impact is indirect. In other words, in the last 100 years, Turkish social movements have not been the agents of regime change. The
agents of regime change under a democracy have been either various segments of the bureaucracy or ‘Parties of Order’.

According to the theoretical framework of this study, revolutionary movements decrease competition within the power bloc, or at least dramatically weaken one of the competing sides, and open up space for an authoritarian agent. This agent could be a leader from the bureaucratic ranks or a bureaucratic institution of the regime in general. Hence the greater the revolutionary intensity of social action, the greater the bureaucratic pressure for exclusionary and repressive measures such as martial law, party bans, and restriction of individual liberties. Parties of Order either surrender to the proposals of the authoritarian agent, or become victims of the exclusionary-repressive measures.

When revolutionary intensity is low, the bureaucracy slowly retreats from its insistence on exclusionary measures. If the regime is already in a democratic quadrant, then those who attempt to impose exclusionary measures are blocked by the parties.

During times of high competition within the power bloc, factions within the bloc need to mobilize the masses to gain the upper hand in the struggle. Hence high competition corresponds to an increase in party efforts aimed at mass mobilization, However, once a movement acquires a revolutionary character, the party’s support declines rapidly given the revolutionary fears of the bourgeoisie.

Military coups are also a possibility during times of high competition. However, in such cases, the coups are not top-down planned actions but projects of a politicized fraction in the army in close collaboration with political parties. Hence coup plotters are subordinate to party politics, whereas in the case of high revolutionary activity, party politics is subordinate to coup plotters.
During times of low competition, parties are disinterested in mobilization. They are locked within the framework of parliamentary politics and debates. The combination of low level of competition with high intensity of revolutionary movements makes the parliament rapidly redundant because the parliament cannot provide a solution to the crisis on the streets.

Given the information in previous chapters it is possible to map the regime changes in Turkey as follows:

![Figure 6-1 Regime Change, Competition within the Power Bloc and Intensity of Revolutionary Movements](image)

It is possible to categorize four different zones where depending on their intensity, the two variables- revolutionary movements and competition within the power bloc – combine to have different impacts on the political actors of the regime.

In Zone 1, neither revolutionary action nor competition within the power bloc has any effect on the political agents. Here the transformation of the regime occurs because of other factors like foresighted leaders or international pressure among others. Zone 2 refers to situations where social movements confront a unified regime. The conflicts
between the actors of the regime are reduced to a secondary status and all actors within the power bloc unite against the movements. And parties having an existence independent of the bureaucracy lose ground. The bureaucracy (or the strong leader) marches step-by-step to an exclusionary repressive regime. The key factor dominating political life is security.

In Zone 3, parties play the most prominent role possible for them. The absence of revolutionary movements gives them confidence in asserting democratic demands. They mobilize the masses for a regime change by utilizing democratic and religious values, depending on the direction they want to move the regime. The dominating factor and political keyword is democracy,

In Zone 4, both factors are present. Although the rise of revolutionary movements dilutes inter-capitalist competition, other dynamics related to the logic of inter-capitalist and inter-state competition stimulate the internal struggles. In this zone both the bureaucracy and the parties are active. Whereas the bureaucracy presses for exclusionary measures, different factions of the power bloc try to resolve the contradictions by mobilizing the masses. However, due to high intensity of revolutionary action, parties are much weaker and less assertive about democratic demands, whereas the bureaucracy is more directly involved in politics due to high competition.

**Zone 1: Inclusionary Moves via External Pressure**

The examples for this zone are the periods 1943-1950 and 1980-1983. In both cases, revolutionary action was almost completely absent and there was no obvious competition within the power bloc. However, no competition does not mean no aggravation for the oppressed. In the early 1980’s, both workers and Kurds suffered from
economic, social and political consequences of the regime (Cürikkaya, 2014; Geniş, 1994; Nebiler, 1990). Similarly, in the 1940’s the regime lost its legitimacy not only in the eyes of the popular classes, but also in the eyes of the land-owning classes and the urban bourgeoisie (Karaömerlioglu, 2006, pp. 96-97).

The 1945 transition primarily occurred as a result of the initiative of a foresighted leader, İsmet İnönü (VanderLippe, 2012). The formation of an opposition party was also suggested by İnönü (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 126-133). The lack of actual opposition mounted by the ‘opposition’ party was so blatant that several observers suspected and even accused the opposition of having colluded with the ruling party (F. Çakmak, pp. 3-4,13-14). Similarly, inter-party and intra-party struggles did not precede but followed the decision to move to a relatively inclusive zone. The tempo of these struggles also depended on the tempo of the transition,

Like in 1945, the inclusive move in 1982 was the initiative of the junta leaders. In fact, their intention was not to establish a non-parliamentary order, but to redesign the existing regime in an exclusionary fashion. Compared to 1945, their control over the transition was even stricter (Tachau & Heper, 1983, pp. 28-32).

An important difference between these two transitions was their duration. In the former case, the transition to parliamentary democracy took twenty years, whereas the latter transition occurred in three years. In 1925, the regime did not have a prepared road map for democratization. Bureaucratic rule appeared as if it would never end. In contrast, right after the coup in 1980, the junta announced a timetable for democratization\footnote{For the international constraints faced by the generals, see (Dagi, 1996).}.
Certainly the intensity of social struggles in 1925 and their mass character as discussed in Chapter 4 was a crucial reason for the different durations. But there were factors related to the embeddedness of the political agents in the capitalist system as well.

The first factor was the closeness of the relationship between the Turkish army and the US in 1980 compared to the RPP’s relationship with the UK or the US in the 1920s. After WWI, partly because of the disintegration of the inter-state system, and partly out of fear of a Soviet confrontation, the Turkish state did not join international institutions and instead tried to come together with neighboring states through pacts. Turkey was even hesitant about the membership in the League of Nations and joined it as late as 1932 (Ulusun, 2008, pp. 245-247). In contrast, Turkey in the 1980’s was a member of almost all international organizations, the only NATO member sharing a border with the Soviet Union, and an extremely dependent American ally. The US had also completely restructured the Turkish army in the 1950s (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 52-55). Second, as explained in the previous chapters, the armed forces’ alliance with members of the capitalist class was much more developed in 1980 than in the 1920s, when the bourgeoisie had been subordinate to the army. Moreover, in 1980, the army itself was acting as a prominent capitalist group.

All these factors corroborate the thesis in the first chapter. The more integrated the actors of the power bloc are with networks of capital accumulation, the stronger is the pressure for minimal democratization.

**Zone 2: Parties as Scapegoats**

The 1924-25 period leading to the exclusionary coup occurred in Zone. At the time, the Kemalist regime was able to weaken and eliminate its rivals in the power bloc
despite confronting strong resistance from the Kurdish population. Thanks to the Armenian massacre and population exchange with Greece, it became impossible to speak of a non-Muslim bourgeoisie. The monarchist opposition as well as the CUP faction were either in exile or excluded from the political system completely. In this sense we could talk of a relatively unified coalition of the bourgeoisie and landowning classes.

The decline of competition was accompanied by the decline of bourgeois opposition on the parliamentary plane. Initially, the opposition to Kemal was comprised of four political actors, but the Porte had been eliminated through the resistance, and the liberal opposition and the CUP members were pacified right afterwards. Hence the only candidate for opposition was from Kemal’s own ranks and without a coherent ideology. The party –PRP- was the voice of the opposition. Comparing the programs of RPP and PRP would not reveal a significant difference. As discussed in Chapter 2, what the PRP’s supporters feared were Kemal’s dictatorial tendencies.

The 1925 coup had a pattern that, mutatis mutandis, would also be observed in the process leading up to the 1980 coup: an uprising paralyzing the parliamentary functioning of the state, local martial law, generalization of the martial law, and finally the coup. Yet at the same time, 1925 grew out from within the parliament and liquidated one wing of the bourgeois opposition. Such liquidation could only be possible with the demagogy about collaborators in the parliament.

Kemal’s immediate reaction to the Kurdish insurgency is in line with the framework employed in this study. As already noted in the previous chapters, in June 1925 he dissolved the opposition with one decree without wasting time in political activities (Gürlevik, 2009, pp. 110-113). Of course Kemal had not been alone in his
insistence on banning the PRP, several deputies of the RPP had also been insisting on radical measures against the PRP since the beginning of the uprising. In the following months, the independence tribunals, revitalized for the third time for trying the Kurdish rebels, decreed the closure of the PRP’s local branches, although there was no legal decision concerning the closure of the PRP itself.

The 1925 coup is an exemplary case of how a revolutionary movement silences opposition and competition within the power bloc. After the insurgency, the PRP was at a crossroads. Support for Kemal’s repressive measures would eventually hurt the party by changing the balance of the power in favor of the Kemalists, Resistance against exclusionary politics would bring the party on the same plane as the insurgents. For the PRP, neither its political background nor its organizational capacity permitted it the second option. The party made a hopeless and brief attempt to find a third way: supporting martial law for Kurdistan but opposing its generalization to all Turkey, under the guise of the Maintenance Law. Failing that, the noose around the PRP tightened gradually and finally forced the party to surrender to the repressive policies of the Kemalists (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 115-119)\(^\text{92}\).

Banning the PRP and other oppositional organizations was only the first step towards the exclusionary period. Over the next two years, the opposition party was not only liquidated but the leading cadres of the opposition were labeled as traitors and completely excluded from political life. Eventually, not only social movements but also the bourgeois opposition suffered a heavy blow.

---

\(^{92}\) Kansu(1990, pp. 1086-1087) writes about the PRP’s “stout opposition” to the Law of Maintenance and Order. However, he does not mention the same party’s approval of the martial law for Kurdistan.
The two peculiarities of the 1973-80 period were: (1) the high frequency of martial law decisions in comparison with other periods (2) the short tenure of governments established within these seven years (Table 6-1 and 6-2).

TABLE 6-1 MARTIAL LAW IN ISTANBUL, IZMIR AND ANKARA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>27*</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.3%**</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* months
** share in the period
Source Üskük (1989)

Instead of building a causal link between these developments and explaining the resilience of the martial law regime with the rise of revolutionary movements, studies of Turkish political history consider both of these phenomena as the combined consequence of the electoral system and imprudent actions of the leaders of center-left and center-right. As per this narrative, the election system was responsible for the political crisis because it gave way to small parties and made it very difficult for a central party to rule without coalitions. The party leaders, Ecevit and Demirel, were responsible for the crisis because they refused to form a coalition with the two parties on the center left and right with a joint vote of approximately 75% (Özbudun, 1995, pp. 236-237; Sunar & Sayarı, 1986, pp. 177-182).
TABLE 6-2 AVERAGE LIFETIME OF OTTOMAN-TURKISH CABINETS IN DIFFERENT MODES OF DEMOCRACY (1908-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration (in months)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cabinets Formed</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Cabinet Life (in months)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Hükümetler ve Programları)

The first obvious shortcoming of such an account is its assumption concerning the link between fragmentation and political crisis. True, the 1977-80 years were the most fragmented phase of the 1960-80 era. However, the 1980’s and 1990’s were much more fragmented than the 1970’s. Therefore fragmentation can occur in other electoral systems as well and does not necessarily lead to a political crisis.

More interestingly, after 1971, hegemonic members of the ruling coalition pressed first for a coalition between the two center parties and later, after their disillusionment with Ecevit, for a strong government, expressing their distaste for coalitions taken hostage by small parties. This should be considered a sign of the decreasing level of competition within the power bloc ("Egeli Sanayicilerden Bir Kısımı Seçim Hükümeti Bir Kısımı da CHP-AP koalisyonu istedi," 1980; Güzelsarı & Aydın, 2010; "Koçman: "Meclisler İşlevlerini Yerine Getirecekse Seçime Gidilmesi Yerinde Olur"," 1980; "TÜSİAD: "AET'ye tam üyelik için hemen başvurulmasını istiyoruz"," 1980)\(^{93}\).

The internal structures of both parties after the 1971 memorandum were more akin to each other compared to the pre-1971 period. The JP got rid of the hawks who

\(^{93}\) For a sarcastic analysis of these developments see (Avcıoğlu, 1980)
advocated a more uncompromising attitude against the army, whereas those with a more statist attitude left the RPP and formed another party. As a result, despite the commonly accepted argument about ideological polarization, convergence from opposite directions made collaboration much more likely.

What made collaboration between the RPP and JP impossible was not ideological but political polarization, and the rise of the revolutionary wave in Turkey. In the 1970’s, the JP could openly defend interests of the industrialists and voice the fears of the rural segments of the population. And its strategy during the 1960’s and 1970’s was not to fight with the army, but to try and harness it to debilitate the revolutionary movements.

The RPP’s rise on the other hand requires more attention. Typically, the rise of the RPP is recounted as a narrative of Turkish society leaning towards the left of the political spectrum. However, no explanation for the causes of these left leaning tendencies is provided. Actually, what was responsible for a climate change in Turkish politics was the rise of the revolutionary movements. Without the support of the revolutionary organizations, it would be impossible to speak of Ecevit’s rise.

However, revolutionary support for Ecevit was contingent upon Ecevit’s uncompromising attitude towards Demirel. Hence, those who explain the political crisis with reference to quarrels between Ecevit and Demirel forget the fact that the RPP’s political future as a strong center-left party depended on its uncompromising opposition to the JP. For the RPP, cooperation with the JP would mean the loss of a significant portion of its votes.

The RPP’s opposition to the JP can be summarized in two terms: (1) opposition to increasing police and military control in daily life; and (2) opposition to ending the
populist income distribution of the ISI period. However, the rise of the revolutionary movement, mentioned generally as the rise of “political violence”, gradually broke the RPP’s attitude in the 1970’s and after the Maraş Massacre in December 1978, the RPP surrendered to the bureaucratic pressure for martial law.94

The RPP’s real power without the support of revolutionary organizations became obvious in the 1979 elections, when it lost 40% of its votes, with only 10% going to the JP. The remaining 30% went to socialist parties and revolutionary groups that had boycotted the elections ("TİP, TSİP ve TBP liderleri oy kullanabildi," 1979). This election led to the collapse of the RPP and after its resignation from government, the political crisis deepened because the party with the most seats became the opposition party. The fragile coalition of the remaining parties was too ineffective to struggle against the revolutionary movements.

After 1979, it was already too late to return to a parliamentary solution to the crisis. Half of Turkey was under martial law, and the generals started making plans for a military coup to re-shape the political system.

One of the three differences between the 1925 exclusive transition and the 1980 coup was the slow progress of an authoritarian regime and the almost routinization of martial law. This slow speed is also related to the intensity of revolutionary action. In 1925, what the Ankara government confronted was partial state collapse. In the late 1970’s however, regardless of the intensity of revolutionary movements, that was never the case. Second, RPP’s leader Ecevit resisted authoritarian and exclusionary measures longer than the leading cadre of the PRP. Due to the inclusionary political system,

94 For the change in the RPP’s attitude about the martial law, see (Üskül, 1989, pp. 259-288)
Ecevit’s political fate depended more on the support of revolutionary and socialist organizations than the political opposition in the 1920’s. As a result he had to insist on an anti-martial law stance and populist policies that made a coalition with the Justice Party impossible and led eventually to the paralysis of the parliament.

The third difference is related to the balance of the institutions in the regime. In 1925, the parliament was the strongest institution, and although Mustafa Kemal as president was not a deputy, the coup had to emerge from within the parliament. In contrast, since the post-1960 parliaments had already been subordinated by bureaucratic institutions, the parliament was not the battleground and a resort to internal collaborators demagogy was not necessary. The military’s strategy was to discredit the parliament to the point of paralysis and then condemn its “inability to fight terrorism”. In fact this third difference helped further the de-politicization of society.

**Zone 3: The Self-Confident Power Bloc**

The years between 1945 and 1960 correspond to a period of increasing competition within the power bloc without a significant increase in the level of revolutionary activity. During this time, parties supported by factions of the power bloc were involved in social protests.

The Democrat Party (DP) was the first political agent to use democratic demands to mobilize mass support. Thanks to the DP, demonstrations became part of daily political life in Turkey. In fact, increasing levels of popular discontent prepared a fertile ground for massive demonstrations. Thus the DP did not need extra effort for mass mobilization. In fact, it could be said that the DP’s efforts went in the opposite direction, as it tried to decrease the level of mobilization and tame the anger of the masses--a
decision that led to a great upheaval in the party and ended with the resignation of 21 out of the 64 deputies from the party (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 126-133).

After the DP acquired governmental posts, democratic demands lost their function for the party. The DP fulfilled very few of the democratic promises promoted in its campaign.

The real mobilization started from 1955 with the intensification of competition in the power bloc. The first step was to transform the RPP from a statist bureaucratic institution into a political party with the ability to contact the masses. The second step from 1957 onwards was to undermine the DP’s monopoly of democratic demands. This included propagandist publishing as well as exposing the anti-democratic attitude of the government. The third step was to organize mass meetings similar to the ones organized by the DP one decade ago. After the DP-run government amended the laws regulating public meetings and demonstration, the RPP’s attempts to go to the masses evolved easily into provocative confrontations. The DP tried to counter the opposition’s attempts at mobilization by establishing the Vatan Cephesi, (the home [patriotic] front) (Uyar, 2001).

Finally, during the last months of the DP government, the RPP started providing active support to social protests by the students (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 514-538).

There is no clear evidence that RPP leaders were among the conspirators of the coup. On the contrary, the existing evidence is against this allegation. Nonetheless, regardless of its intentions, the RPP pushed mass mobilization up to the point of regime crisis. Of course, the level of popular mobilization, let alone revolutionary mobilization, was far too low to enforce a regime change. Yet, it was precisely this weakness that
encouraged members of the power bloc to highlight and project the political unrest and use it as a justification for the coup.

Ironically, the causal relationship between coups and social movements in 1960 is the reverse of the same relationship in 1925 and 1980. This time, politicization and mobilization on the eve of the coup paved the way for the second wave of social unrest.

**Zone 4: Après Moi le Déluge**

Periods with intense revolutionary action and a high level of competition within the power bloc correspond to Zone 4. In Turkish history, the long struggle between 1912 and 1924, with shifting alliances, can be said to fall in Zone 4.

In this zone, we expect to see increasing bureaucratic pressure for exclusionary practices due to intense revolutionary activity. We also expect more attempts at mobilization by the Parties of Order.

Although the political agents of this struggle varied over time, we can observe a growing pressure coming from the bureaucracy for exclusion between 1912 and 1924. In the first phase, it was the CUP that established stronger contacts with the bureaucracy and pressed for exclusionary practices. What the CUP articulated were actually the demands of high-ranking bureaucrats. The first proposal came in 1911 right after the start of the Balkan insurgency. The cabinet supported by the CUP wanted to change the constitution and weaken the parliament. But the composition of the parliament was an obstacle, so the CUP-bureaucracy alliance dismissed the parliament and called for new elections.

---

95 For the relationship between Mahmut Şevket Paşa and the CUP see Tunaya (2000, pp. 173-192).

287
The elections, however, had to ensure *de facto* exclusion of the opposition from the parliament to serve the purpose. And the CUP-bureaucracy alliance used various pressure tactics, including physical violence, during the elections to keep the opposition out of the parliament. Finally, after the 1913 coup, in the midst of the Balkan War, all members of the opposition were arrested for their alleged involvement in the assassination of the Grand Vizier. Analogous to what happened in such instances in Zone I, the opposition could not resist the nationalist fervor emerging after the loss of Edirne and assassination of the Grand Vizier.

The Armenian bourgeoisie and its political representatives followed a similar path. According to official Turkish history, since the Armenians including their bourgeoisie supported the separatist movements *en bloc*, the Ottoman state planned a massacre of the Armenian population. Actually, contrary to popular myths, despite the growth of revolutionary movements in Armenia, the Armenian political organizations supported the CUP and the Armenian bourgeoisie in Istanbul had not been particularly fond of the Armenian revolutionaries (Ter Minassian, 1996). The position of the church was no different.

Unlike the 1925 and 1980 coups, the opposition in this instance did try to mobilize the masses, but their support was weak and hesitant. In other words, the increasing intensity of Armenian revolutionary movements forced the parties of the Armenian bourgeoisie, who were in a fragile position, to cooperate with the CUP. After the massacre of Adana in 1909, the Armenian bourgeoisie unambiguously sided with the CUP (Kaligian, 2011, pp. 43-80). Although, from the Balkan War onwards, increasing
international tensions and interventions in Ottoman politics made the continuation of this already frail alliance impossible (Kalogian, 2011, pp. 163-220).

During this period, the monarchist opposition had been active as well. The monarchist liberals tried to expose the anti-democratic practices of the CUP and to garner support of the Greek and non-Muslim population by raising democratic demands. Their mobilization attempts were not limited to forming a broad coalition against the CUP. As we saw in Chapter 2, the monarchist liberal opposition actively flirted with politicized military officers and encouraged them to issue a memorandum and topple the government. However unlike the failed 1909 coup, which was also encouraged and orchestrated by the monarchist opposition, the coup in 1912 involved less mass mobilization. The CUP responded to the opposition in kind by mobilizing the masses by appealing to nationalist sentiments and meetings. As a result, between 1911 and 1914, we observe an increase in the number of pro-war demonstrations organized by the CUP (Y. Aktar, 1990, p. 194; Dumont, 1994, p. 70).

Figure 6-2 Recorded Protests and Uprisings Organized by Parties of Order
Source: SMD 2
After the fall of the CUP cabinet as a result of the defeat in WWI, the coexistence of bureaucratic proposals for exclusion and mobilization of the masses re-emerged. This time the mobilization was more dramatic and assumed the form of civil war. During the so-called war of independence, the armies of Ankara government did not fight against the armies of imperial powers. Their battles were either against the Porte, the liberal-monarchist faction of the power bloc, or against the Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie.

Among all rival factions within the power bloc, the Porte was the most serious initiator of mass mobilization given the resources it commanded. During the civil war, the Porte tried to trigger various revolts with the aim of weakening the Ankara government. Ankara on the other hand used the revolts and the occupation as a means to silence the opposition of the Porte. Mustafa Kemal and his friends invoked threats to national security to garner support for their proposal to concentrate all powers in one office. Banning political parties like the Turkish Communist Party, excluding deputies from ministries, and obtaining extra-executive prerogatives were steps leading towards an increasingly authoritarian regime (Akın, 2001, pp. 82-84, 217-231; Tunçay, 1967, pp. 123-130).

In this sense, the 1920-21 coup shared the pattern of the 1925 and 1980 coups: emergence of a revolutionary situation (rise of revolutionary movements in the case of 1976-80 period), responded to with a discourse of national security by the bureaucratic components of the power bloc, and eventually military measures pacifying the opposition. Due to the elected-non-elected balance, the 1920-21 coup also grew from within the parliament, and therefore shares another similarity with the 1925 coup. Both of
the coups made use of a demagogic campaign against collaborators and actually tried and sentenced them with the same institution: the independence tribunals.

Nevertheless, the 1920-1 coup was also very different from the other two in that there were three very assertive competing factions trying to defend their interest at all cost. Opponents of the Kemalist bureaucracy, the Christian bourgeoisie, and the Porte could not be intimidated like the opposition of the liberals or relics of the CUP. As a result, the competition within the power bloc could only be resolved through civil wars and massacres.

![Diagram](image_url)

*Figure 6-3 Interaction of Revolutionary Movements nd Competition within the Power Bloc*

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter analyzed the combined impact of competition within the power bloc and revolutionary social movements on political regime changes. So far, regime changes in Turkey have occurred in four different ways (Figure 6-3).
The Low Competition-Low Revolution zone is generally the period after the eradication of revolutionary movements and consolidation of the power bloc. This zone is generally a fertile ground for heightened competition within the power bloc, which would move political struggles to a different zone (High Competition-Low Revolution). On this terrain, members of the power bloc exhibit maximal ability for mobilizing masses and politicizing the society. However, the calm created by the absence of revolutionary movements is temporary. The politicization plus the inclusionary promises prepare the conditions for a revolutionary surge,

The revolutionary surge can shift the political arena to two different locations. The first alternative is to threaten members of the power bloc and lessen their competition (Low Competition-High Revolution). Here, the civil society rapidly depoliticizes and the parliament as an institution becomes paralyzed. Nothing could hinder the regime from using its bureaucratic apparatus to isolate and smash the movements and to consolidate its dominance over the competing factions.

The revolutionary surge can actually lead to a different scenario as well. During hegemonic crises when international competitive pressures increase, the revolutionary threat is not sufficient to mollify the competition (High Competition-High Revolution). This is the period when bourgeois factions fight each other with the most radical measures and make use of massacres and wars. Capital accumulation via dispossession is also part of this process. However, due to the fearful nature of the property-owning classes, this competition cannot last forever. Eventually one side retreats from the competition and accepts its subordinate position. In this way the regime moves back to the Low Competition-High Revolution terrain, which after failure of the revolutionary
insurgency, goes back to the Low Competition-Low Revolution zone and completes the political cycle.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 6-4 Change of the Political Terrain during Hegemonic Crisis**

One can illustrate the changes in their ideal-type form as Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-4. Figure 6-5 shows a cycle during a hegemonic crisis. In this case increasing intensity of revolutionary movements has no direct impact on the competition within the power bloc. The cycle passes through the zone of civil wars, massacres and dispossessions. Figure 6-5 on the other hand shows the regime cycle during hegemonic stability. In this case, the domestic revolutionary surge has an immediate negative impact on the level of competition. In this case the new candidate for the dominant bloc can smash the movements and consolidate its power more easily.
Figure 6-6 illustrates the concrete trajectory of the Ottoman-Turkish political terrain between the first and second big regime changes. As we can see, it is quite similar to the ideo-typical trajectory during a hegemonic crisis. The difference is caused by the temporary silence of revolutionary movements during World War 1.
Figure 6-6 Turkish Political Terrain between 1908 and 1960

Figure 6-7 Turkish Political Terrain from 1960 onwards
In Figure 6-7, we can observe the trajectory from 1960 onwards. The difference between Figures 6-5 and 6-7 is more striking. After the exclusionary coup in 1980, the repressive policies effectively smashed the revolutionary movements. But a few years later, we observe a comparable surge which lasted for another ten years and then retreated hand-in-hand with increasing competition within the power bloc. As we discussed in chapter 4, the reason for this erratic pattern is the de-synchronized behavior of the waves in western Turkey and in Kurdistan. The retreat in Turkey is accompanied by a rise in Kurdistan.

The difference between the two movements of the political terrains gives a better idea of the differences between the 1908 and 1960 regime changes. The hostile international climate transformed the post-1908 revolutionary surge into a series of civil wars, mass uprisings and massacres. Whereas the stable international conditions after 1960 helped the regime overcome the revolutionary crisis, and end the competition not through a violent series of dispossessions, but with a *modus vivendi*. 
I started working on this dissertation in July 2003, only eight months after the JDP’s sweeping electoral victory, and four months after the lifetime political ban on Tayyip Erdoğan was lifted and he became the prime minister. That was the time when US President Bush would laud Turkey as a model democracy (White House, 2004), and a Financial Times editorial (2003) praised Turkey’s “Quiet Revolution” and Erdoğan’s dedication to democracy. That was also the time when public opinion surveys indicated that the military was seen as the most reliable institution in Turkey (Group, 2004, p. C25), just as a lot of ink was being spilled in academia over the long expected awakening of the Turkish civil society and the hope of getting rid of military tutelage or juristocracy (İnsel, 2003; Kanra, 2005; Öniş & Keyman, 2003).

A little over a decade later, as I conclude this dissertation, Erdoğan is again in the headlines. This time he is on the cover of the June 2013 issue of The Economist photomontaged as Sultan Selim III with a title describing him as “Democrat or Sultan?” In the same month, not long after posting a picture of President Obama holding a baseball
bat while talking on the telephone with Erdoğan (Daily Mail, 2013), the White House issued fifteen warnings to the Turkish government regarding human rights abuses and violation of democratic liberties (Tanış, 2013). A few months later, when Erdoğan’s telephone conversation with his son about how to hide and distribute tens of millions of euros and dollars stored in his family residence was leaked, he almost surpassed Obama in one night and became a YouTube star amongst world politicians96. And lest we forget the military, in January 2014, approximately a quarter of Turkish generals, including the former Commander-in-Chief, are serving life sentences for allegedly planning a coup against the government. Much like his representation in the American media, Erdoğan’s stance has changed over the course of these trials. Six years ago he was calling himself the prosecutor of these trials ("'Evet Ergenekon’un savcısıyım,'" 2008), whereas in 2014 his circle of advisors term these trials a conspiracy against the army and are attempting to find ways for a re-trial (Akdoğan, 2013). Erdoğan’s campaign succeeded right before the local elections in March 2014, and all of the generals have since been released (Dombey, 2014a).

In academia, descriptions and explanations for the JDP’s ‘democratic revolution’ seem to be out of fashion. The new trend is to comment on Erdoğan’s rising authoritarianism (Özbudun, 2014, p. 4; Taşpınar, 2014, pp. 49-51). For some, the distinction between him and Vladimir Putin is rapidly blurring (Öniş, 2013, p. 103). One of the most cited recent articles about Turkey is titled ‘The Democratic Coup’ (Ozan O

96 Obama’s most popular video on YouTube has been watched three million times (Amanda, 2012), whereas Erdoğan’s clip was watched more than two million times within twenty four hours (Dombey, 2014b). As of today, despite the censorship and existence of many cloned versions it has been watched more than five million times.

Apparently, a lot of things have changed over the last decade, except for Erdoğan’s prime ministership. With the exception of hard-core Erdoğanists, observers of all shades of opinion seem to agree that Turkey is in deep political crisis (Atılbaz, 2014; Cemal, 2013; Çakır, 2014; Göktürk, 2014; Koru, 2014). According to a special report published by Freedom House (Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins, & Schenkkan, 2014): “The crisis of democracy in Turkey is not a future problem—it is right here, right now” (p. 1). Moreover, with his recent candidacy for the presidency, Erdoğan has made it clear that he has no intention of abating the crisis. Nevertheless, there is not the slightest hint of a consensus regarding the contours of the crisis, and the direction, explanation, and desirability of the upcoming transformation. Therefore, the conclusion of this dissertation seems to be an appropriate place to try to answer the oft-repeated question: “Where is Turkey going?”

In its analysis of Turkish regimes, the literature on democratization with its premises derived from modernization theory and its Turkish variants share similar assumptions: a stagnant civil society and the absence of social dynamics necessary for democratization. The state, an entity above and beyond all social classes, is either too weak and therefore could not confront the social relations antagonistic to democracy, or too strong and strangled civil society’s modest and hesitant attempts at democracy. As a result, during the 20th century, Turkey was trapped in the domain of unconsolidated or defective democracies.
This study challenged these dominant theses in three ways: with its multi-dimensional conceptualization of Turkish political regimes, its historical analysis of the variation of Turkish regimes, and finally its rejection of the stagnant and/or weak civil society assumption.

Combined with the maximalist definition of democracy, a one-dimensional analysis of Turkish regimes could only observe an oscillatory move between the poles of autocracy and democracy, better said a regime stuck in the middle. It is not possible to analyze the variation in the trajectory of the regime within this framework. This study used a two-dimensional conceptualization of democratic regimes to show that during the last century, the Turkish political regime, far from being ‘trapped’, actually experienced four different modalities of democracy.

In light of this analysis, coups, generally condemned (or applauded) for terminating democratic practices, acquire a different meaning— that is, political instruments for the transformation of the regime from one mode to another. In contrast to the widespread belief, coups have not been a symptom of democratic immaturity, but a necessary condition for moving from one regime to another in the absence of a revolutionary constitutional assembly.

The literature on Turkey has not progressed beyond the assumptions of the modernization-democratization paradigm due to its static (ahistorical) perspective that does not take variation across time into account. The current literature finds that present-day Turkey is - albeit to an insufficient degree - more democratic than the Ottoman Empire in 1908. In contrast, the historical analysis provided in this study illustrates that, even if one accepts the normative evaluations of the democratization literature (the
superiority of elected over non-elected is more democratic than the superiority of the non-elected over the elected, an inclusionary regime is more democratic than an exclusionary regime), the opposite is true. The one-century-long trajectory of the Turkish regime is a story of regress from a parliamentary-inclusionary regime in 1909 to a bureaucratic-exclusionary regime in 2014 (see Figure 7-1).

![Figure 7-1 Trajectory of Turkish Democracy](image)

Finally, this study shows that the move from a parliamentary inclusionary regime to a bureaucratic exclusionary regime did not occur because of a weak civil society and
absence of social movements. On the contrary, two interrelated social dynamics were responsible for this change: competition within the power bloc due to capitalist accumulation, and revolutionary social movements. In other words, the key factor behind regime changes was the strength of the civil society, not its weakness.

Between 1908 and 2014, the Turkish political regime traversed all the modes of democracy conceptualized in this study (Figure 7-1). The 1908 coup moved the regime from the non-parliamentary exclusionary zone to the parliamentary and inclusionary zone. The subsequent changes in 1921, 1960 and 1980 also occurred as a result of coups, but there are important variations amongst these regime changes. The military coups in 1908 and 1960 signaled significant changes by moving the position of the regime along both axes of our four-dimensional framework. The coups in 1921 and 1980 on the other hand, merely pushed the regime towards the exclusionary pole. Hence it makes more sense to conceive the 1921 and 1980 regime changes as a transfer from one sub-phase to another of the 1908 and 1960 regimes respectively.

The leading force behind the regime changes is competition within the power bloc related to the waves of capital accumulation. The incompatibility of the social formation emerging from these waves with the regime established by the dominant bloc resulted in regime changes.

What preceded the 1908 transformation was a wave of capital accumulation that created a non-Muslim bourgeoisie and its Muslim variant in an infant stage (Figure 7-2). The contradiction between their growing strength and their exclusion from the dominant bloc constituting the Sultan and the Porte bureaucracy, gave fuel to coup attempts of frustrated low-ranked bureaucrats, who were also excluded from the dominant bloc.
The first big regime change in 1908 neither ended the crisis within the power bloc nor replaced the already crumbling dominant class with a new one. However, it moved the regime on to a new terrain which enabled the excluded members of the power bloc to challenge the dominant bloc directly and to attempt to consolidate their own dominance.

As argued in chapter 1 and shown in Chapter 5, this regime change could only take place in the absence of revolutionary movements. However, the politicization preceding the 1908 coup and its subsequent escalation led to a surge in social movements—first reformist and then revolutionary in character. The first wave of revolutionary movements was comprised only of the Macedonian, Arabic, Pontic, Armenian, and Kurdish separatist movements. Due to the forced migration of the Ottoman labor force, which was overwhelmingly Christian, the labor movement which had made a quick reformist start right after the 1908 movement, declined in importance.

The systematic threats posed by the separatist revolutionary movements were countered by members of the power bloc first with a protective coup in 1913, and then with a transformative and exclusionary coup in 1920-21. The coup in 1913 signaled the end of the first period of politicization and inclusion, and the beginning of a long period of de-politicization and exclusion. It was at the same time a period of consolidation because the new power bloc - the bureaucracy and its junior partner the nascent Muslim-bourgeoisie - could only win its battles against the revolutionary movements and consolidate its dominance after these coups. In this sense, the Turkish National Assembly, the founding of which is generally celebrated as a revolutionary and democratic turning point in Turkish political history, was rather an exclusionary and counter-revolutionary version of the Ottoman parliamentary regime established in 1908.
Figure 7-2: Regime Changes and Waves of Accumulation, Competition and Unrest

- **BRC**: Big Regime Change
- **SRC**: Small Regime Change
- **Bc**: Balancing Coup
- **Poi**: Wave of Politicization
- **Bce**: End of Balancing Coup
- **Cons**: Wave of Depoliticization and Consolidation
- **Rev**: Revolutionary Surge
- **Comp**: Wave of Competition

Timeline:
- 1878: BRC1
- 1908: SRC1
- 1920-21: Dis
- 1938: SRC2
- 1950: BRC2
- 1980: SRC2
- 1997: Bce 4
- 2014: Pol 3

Waves:
- PAcc 1
- Comp 1
- Cons 1
- Bc 1
- Rev 1
- Dis
- Pol 2
- Bce 2
- Comp 2
- Cons 2
- Bc 2
- Rev 2
- PAcc 2
- Comp 3
- Bc 3
- Bce 4
- PAcc 3
The world historical time of the competition within the Ottoman power bloc also determined its fate. Owing to the British hegemonic crisis and escalating inter-state and worldwide inter-capitalist competition, the revolutionary surge after 1908 did not pacify the domestic competition within the power bloc. On the contrary, it assumed the most extreme form, which also shaped the nature of capitalist accumulation in the subsequent phase—accumulation by dispossession. The non-Muslim bourgeoisie was expropriated through confiscations, taxes, exiles, and massacres. In short, due to the fateful combination of failed revolutionary movements and national and international inter-capitalist competition, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie disappeared from the political scene instead of being strengthened or joining the power bloc. As a result, in the new dominant bloc, the coalition of the previously excluded segments of the bureaucracy and the Muslim agricultural capitalists carried disproportionate weight.

The protective coup in 1925, through which the Kemalist dominant bloc eliminated all rivals, intensified the dispossession process and warfare against revolutionary movements. By the end of WWII, the Kemalist alliance had succeeded in stamping out all revolutionary movements and transferring non-Muslim wealth to Muslim capitalists. However, in an exemplary dialectical way, the success of the Kemalist regime prepared the conditions for its own dissolution.

With the disappearance of the revolutionary threat and strengthening of agricultural capitalists, the Kemalist bureaucracy had to loosen the conditions restricting multi-party competition. The regime’s return in 1946 to the position where it was in 1921 signaled not only the end of the long interregnum beginning with the 1925 coup but also
the beginning of a new wave of competition within the power bloc, it was at the same
time the beginning of the second wave of inclusion and politicization, which would
shortly turn into a regime crisis.

The crisis preceding the 1960 transformation shared the essential features of the
pre-1908 crisis. It was caused by the demise of the old dominant coalition, wherein the
pillars of the old regime could neither adsorb the tensions and conflicts of the emerging
social formation, nor fulfill the institutional needs of the new wave of accumulation. Like
in the previous crisis, the competitive pressure intensified politicization, which, in the
absence of revolutionary movements, encouraged coup attempts by frustrated low-ranked
soldiers. And like the one in 1908, the 1960 coup changed the regime along the
parliament-bureaucracy axis, the major relevant problem in the bourgeois struggle for
democratization. Likewise, as the price for politicization of masses and in order to fulfill
the democratic promises of the coup plotters and backers, the starting point of the regime
was an inclusionary zone reminiscent of the 1908-21 regime.

Moreover, as it was during the period following the 1908 coup, the consolidation
of the new dominant bloc—the coalition between the embourgeoisified army and the
industrialists—could start only after the minor regime change in 1980. Likewise, the 1971
coup was the end of the second wave of politicization and the beginning of the second
phase of de-politicization which continued until the second balancing coup in 1999.

Finally, with the 1960 coup, the politicization wave reached the popular classes
and gave an impulse first to reformist and later to revolutionary social movements. In a
manner similar to the first phase of de-politicization, members of the power bloc
responded to the revolutionary movements with an exclusionary coup in 1980 and fought
the movements in the exclusionary zone until the decline of the revolutionary wave in 1997.

However, despite these essential similarities, the 1960 transformation was not a mere repetition of 1908. The most obvious difference between the two periods was the economic and political context of the capitalist world-system. Contrary to the first quarter of the twentieth century, its third quarter was a period of hegemonic stability, with a significantly reduced degree of inter-capitalist and inter-state competition. Hence the threat posed by the revolutionary movements was sufficient to decrease the intensity of competition within the power bloc. As a result, the second phase of politicization did not occur in a hostile environment like the former.

Second, the type of accumulation was different. The 1908 coup followed a phase of accumulation of the privileged, in which the non-Muslim bourgeoisie controlled the credit mechanisms, and enjoyed a favored position in foreign trade. Given its economic position, this bourgeoisie was more assertive and involved in political activities. Additionally, the privileged and protected position of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the Muslim bourgeoisie made the competition even more aggressive.

In contrast, the bourgeoisie before the 1960 coup was the product of dispossession and property transfer and therefore less assertive and more state dependent. So the bureaucracy played a major role during the crisis of this regime. Second, since all segments of the pre-1960 bourgeoisie had benefited from the accumulation-by-dispossession, the conflict within the power bloc was smoother and easier to reconcile. Third, although the dispossession process transferred wealth, it did not lead to wealth concentration, which made another wave of dispossession unnecessary. The goal of the
post-1960 dominant bloc was similar to that of the pre-1908 bourgeoisie: obtaining control of credit mechanisms and monopolies. Therefore, the post-1960 accumulation was another episode of privileged accumulation by the military-industrial bourgeoisie alliance.

The status of revolutionary movements was different for the two coups as well. After the 1878 coup, Sultan Abdülhamid’s bureaucratic despotism had considerably weakened the revolutionary movements. However, the organizations were still active, even if they were in a vegetative mode. They even provided a reminder of their continued existence in the form of the explosive 1903 Ilinden uprising. So the reformist presence was short-lived in the first wave of politicization, and only two years after the regime change, revolutionary movements started to dominate the political struggles. In contrast, because of the success of the Kemalist dominant bloc in completely erasing the resistance and dealing with the rebels with “the bronze hand of the Republic”, the 1960 transition was bourgeois-dominated. Relatedly, reformist movements had a longer presence and dominance during the second wave of politicization.

A second difference concerning the revolutionary movements was mass participation. As illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, between 1960 and 1998, the labor movement was an integral component of aggregate social movements. However, most of them were reformist movements. Although the revolutionary movements had a wide mass base, what characterized the second revolutionary surge was not mass uprisings but group action: urban and rural versions of guerilla warfare. As we saw in Chapter 5, this type of unrest evokes a ‘milder’ form of repression and therefore the state did not attempt massacres and complete annihilation of the local population along with the rebels after
the 1980 coup. Even in western Turkey, where the defeat was obvious, the revolutionary organizations survived. In Kurdistan, one could not even speak of a defeat. In its fight against Kurdish separatism under an exclusionary bureaucratic democracy, the most the state could achieve was to force the PKK to a draw. The PKK withdrew from guerilla warfare and people’s war as a strategy, but kept it as a tactic in its action repertoire.

What Now?

Hegel once remarked that the precondition for an object to change is its being both A and ~A, i.e., to violate the principle of self-identity\(^{97}\). This is probably the most accurate description of the Turkish regime. On the one hand, in terms of its institutional structure, the Turkish regime has the most exclusionary and bureaucratic form of democracy. On the other hand, in terms of discourses, goals, demands and to a certain extent attempts, Turkey is one of the most democratic places in the world. All significant actors of the regime express their longing for a parliamentary inclusionary regime. This contradiction brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter.

From the summary of regime change patterns, it seems that Turkey has long been in the third wave of politicization. As we saw in Chapter 3, competition within the power bloc has been intensifying since the mid-1990s. After financialization and integration with global capital, the existing institutional framework is no longer compatible with the needs of TÜSİAD (association of industrialists). Another consequence of financialization has been the emergence of new industrial capital in Anatolia, with a nationalist and Islamist orientation. The exclusion of this fraction from the dominant bloc is the second

\(^{97}\) Something moves not because at one moment of time it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here (Hegel, 1969, p. 440).
dynamic behind the present competitive wave. The third source of competition within the power bloc is TÜSİAD’s control of credit mechanisms and its access to monopolies.

The dismantling of the institutions of the second protective coup in 1999 paved the way for a new crisis, with the failure of all attempts to reform the regime. These attempts were geared towards discrediting and dismantling the building blocks of the regime, and replacing them piece-by-piece in place of a complete overhaul. In other words, after having exhausted the inclusionary and exclusionary modes of the bureaucratic 1960s regime, Turkey is approaching the third big regime change. The direction of this change, as this analysis suggests, is towards an election-based inclusionary regime. Yet how and under whose agency this change would be accomplished is another question.

As I discussed in the first chapter, Giovanni Arrighi (1990b) distinguishes three different paths of labor movements in capitalist countries: British, Russian and German. The British path corresponds to the peaceful way of reform, where the capitalist class has both the economic means and political capacity to absorb labor unrest and to integrate the workers into the system. In the Russian path, in contrast, the capitalists cannot even feed the rapidly growing number of workers. This incapacity paves the way for a revolution, The German path, on the other hand, lies in between reform and revolution. The capitalists have a certain amount of wealth and political capacity, but not sufficient to fulfill the workers’ demands and to cushion the systemic shocks. In the German path, workers do revolt and fail because the majority of workers still pin their hopes on the promises of reform. Failed revolutions invite fascist regimes and coups.
Mutatis mutandis, these three paths could be considered as three alternative roads to different democracies. The Turkish regime appears to be a stable follower of the German path from one mode of democracy to another. But this does not mean that Turkey is destined to remain on this path in the event of a future political crisis. In contrast, the three alternatives present themselves as concrete political projects today.

Today, the British road could be labeled as the “Great Consensus” scenario. In this case the two major competitors in the power bloc – TÜSİAD and the Anatolian capital – would form a new dominant bloc, with a new parliamentary and inclusionary regime and would force the parties to cooperate for a brand new constitution. This peaceful version of regime change can occur in two ways: by forcing Erdoğan to a compromise or by eliminating Erdoğan and restructuring the political landscape.

The German path can be named as “the reoccurrence” scenario. In this version, as it was during the pre-1908 crisis, politicization would grow, the political arena would polarize further and Turkey would leap to a parliamentary regime with a coup. It could either be a military coup involving popular mobilization –similar to what happened in Egypt in 2011 or in Turkey in 1908, 1971 and 1997, or a temporary autogolpe, with which Erdoğan à la Chavez might try to establish a Bolivarian Republic with Islamic tones. Nevertheless, none of these alternatives would be able to end the increasing competition within the power bloc. Moreover, the coupling of hegemonic crisis in the capitalist world-system with the high organizational and political capacity of revolutionary movements will ignite a new anti-systemic fire, which might end up in drastic massacres and dispossession, or result in a revolutionary victory.
The third scenario is the Russian path which could be termed as “From 1908 Back to 1905”. As noted in Chapter 2, what differentiated the 1908 [Ottoman] Revolution from its Russian variant in 1905 was the absence of revolutionary mass uprisings. If Turkey were to follow the “Russian path”, the subsequent transformation of the regime would compensate for the missing mass element during the bourgeois revolution. The conflicts within the power bloc and the geopolitical interstate tensions are too big to reconcile and therefore the politicization and polarization would continue to intensify. However, the fear of revolutionary mobilization combined with the current paralysis of the military restrains all competing actors from a coup. As a result, increasing politicization sparks off revolutionary uprising without awaiting entry to the parliamentary zone. In case of failure, this path would merge with the German path. However, if the uprisings succeed in changing the regime in a revolutionary way, then Turkey will be on a completely new path. It would at the same time mean a rupture from the vicious Heraclitian cycles of mortal factions of the power bloc under the seemingly immortal Ottoman-Turkish state structure.

What is important to note, however, is the main argument of this study: although the processes leading to regime crisis are initiated by competition within the power bloc, the resolution of the crisis is determined by the revolutionary movements. What will matter are their choices in the deepening crisis and their preparedness for the “battle of democracy”.

And what is the role of an understanding of the social roots of regime change in Turkey in this battle? For a long time, at least since Tugan Baranovsky, sociology has provided a comfortable and prestigious shelter for retired revolutionaries. If my analysis
in this study and assessment of the three alternatives is correct then the call of the third alternative to the student of historical sociology could not be any different from the last sentence of the incomplete *The State and Revolution*, whose author never regretted politics as a vocation: “It is more pleasant and useful to go through the "experience of revolution" than to write about it.”
APPENDIX A

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE 1945-2014

The construction of the Social Movements Database used in Chapter 4-6 involved the following phases:

a) A pilot study for scanning the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet (December 2004 - May 2005)
b) Scanning and reading the newspaper articles for every other day from 1945-2014 (June 2005 –September 2005)
c) Digitizing, storing and naming the newspaper articles (September 2005-October 2005)
d) Recording the “Mentions” of Collective Action from the digital images in the database (October 2005-June 2006; June 2012; and December 2013-June 2014)

The first phase was completed by the author and one assistant. For the second and third phases, the author worked with four assistants. For the different steps of the last phase, the author worked with one coder. Given the immense scope of the project, inter-coder reliability was tested only at the beginning of each phase. Different years were coded by one person. At the end of the project, the author went over the Microsoft Access database to compare and re-check the “suspicious” records and to clean the database.

Following are the translated versions of the instructions for each process distributed to the assistants.

Instructions for Scanning

1. Check the dates from the calendar to find the newspapers to be scanned
2. Substitute the missing issues according to the following ranking:
   a. The newspaper of the day before
   b. The newspaper of the day after
   c. The newspaper of 3 days before
   d. The newspaper of 3 days after
3. Scan and record each article separately. To be classified as an article, a title is necessary. Do not scan opinion pages, columns, commentaries, cartoons and pages devoted to foreign news, culture, television, or entertainment.

4. To complete a scan it is necessary to read:
   a. The first paragraph
   b. The first paragraph below the photograph
   c. The title
   d. The spots

5. If you notice one of the keywords in Table below, read the entire article

6. Record the article if it mentions at least one instance of collective action (CA) related to the key word.

7. Do not record the article if
   a. The event has not taken place at the time of the reporting
   b. The time interval between the event reported and the published article is more than one year

8. Do not record unidentified, alleged but denied bombings/explosions/assassinations/kidnappings. Record the article if an act of robbery and murder is in a report that satisfies conditions 6 and 7.

9. To be recorded, an article does not need to be explicitly about CA.
   a. It might refer to previous CA’s to provide background information for the article.
   b. It might quote a person, who mentions the CA

10. If an event is recorded several times in a single issue, then record each article separately.

11. Record photographs as an independent article only if the CA has not been mentioned in any of the articles of that issue.

12. Record an article about CA not satisfying the conditions 6 and 7, if the issue contains another article about the same CA that contains the necessary information to satisfy the conditions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grev</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Kurşunlama</td>
<td>Shooting/Throwing bullets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çatışma</td>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>Baskın</td>
<td>Raid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miting</td>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>Anma/Kutlama</td>
<td>Commemoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protesto</td>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Molotof Kokteyli</td>
<td>Molotov cocktail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Öldürme</td>
<td>Killing</td>
<td>Slogan</td>
<td>Chanting slogans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ölüm Orucu/Açlık Grevi</td>
<td>Death Fast/Hunger Strike</td>
<td>Katliam</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yürüyüş</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>İmza</td>
<td>Petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saldırı</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Kaçırma</td>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olay/Hadise</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Açık Hava Toplantısı</td>
<td>Open air Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direniş</td>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Patlama/Patlayıcı-Dinamit Atma</td>
<td>Explosion/Throwing explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ateş Açma/Tarama</td>
<td>Firing from covered positions/cross fire</td>
<td>Toplu Viziteye Çıkma</td>
<td>To report sick (collectively)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boykot</td>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Pankart</td>
<td>Showing placards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İş Bırakma/İş Yavaşlatma</td>
<td>Work Stoppage/Slowdown Action</td>
<td>Kundaklama</td>
<td>Sabotage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eylem</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Şehit Etme/Olma</td>
<td>Martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basın Açıklaması</td>
<td>Press Declaration Speech</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Beating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konuşma</td>
<td>Gathering</td>
<td>Pusu</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toplantma</td>
<td>Shutter down</td>
<td>Yol Kapatma</td>
<td>Road blockage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepenk Kapatma</td>
<td>Military/Police Operation</td>
<td>Yol Kesme</td>
<td>Latrocination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operasyon</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>Bıçaklama</td>
<td>Stabbing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gösteri</td>
<td>Wounding</td>
<td>Şenlik</td>
<td>Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaralama</td>
<td>Brawl</td>
<td>Sakal Brakma</td>
<td>Grow a Beard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavgə</td>
<td>Leaflet Distribution Bombing</td>
<td>Afiş Asma</td>
<td>Hanging Banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bildiri Dağıtımı</td>
<td></td>
<td>İşgal</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instructions for Recording the Articles

What needs to be recorded is the articles not the information it contains.

13. For each article provide following information:
   a. Year
   b. Month
   c. Date
   d. Page
   e. Column
   f. Title

Instructions for Creating the Digital Images

14. To prevent confusion take the picture of the issue identifying the date of the article whenever you switch from one article to another.

15. Take the picture of each item in the record sheet with multiple pictures if necessary. Name the picture as follows: C/Last two digits of the year/month/day/number of the article for that day/letter if multiple pictures are taken.

Instructions for Recording on Collective Action Events

16. Use criteria 6 and 7 to decide whether a CA should be recorded or not

17. If the same CA is mentioned in the same article several times, record it only once. If a CA is mentioned in several article of the same issue, record it multiple times.

18. Record the more specific event if an article refers to a CA with varying degrees of specificity.
   a. For example,
      i. If an article published at the end of December refers to “student protests” in 1968 then record the mention without giving a specific month
      ii. If the same article contains another mention about the boycott wave in May, then record only the second mention without specifying the day
iii. If the same article also contains information about the boycott on May 24 at Istanbul University Faculty of Law, then record only this last mention

b. If a mentioned event has information about the location and the type of action then no other specifics for recording are necessary

19. Generally a mentioned action has a variety of repertoires. In this case no separate recording is necessary. All different elements of the repertoire are to be recorded as one entry.

20. However, if the CA transforms into another event during its course, then an additional recording is necessary.

   a. For example after the funeral of a student killed as a result of a fascist attack, some university students might not end the protest and choose to walk to their university district and attack the bookstores associated with the fascists. In this case the development of the funeral should be recorded as two separate mentions.

**Recording Detailed Information of Collective Action Events**


22. For each record the following information need to be entered:

   a. Name of the Coder
   b. Name of the Newspaper
   c. Year/Month/Day (Day of the report not the event)
   d. Location (city)
   e. Location 2 (everything else)
   f. Type of Action: should not be interpreted, but recorded as expressed by the newspaper. Record all reported types
   g. Demands: not all slogans and speeches but keywords from them
   h. Identity the participants as expressed by the newspaper; all participating organizations need to be entered
   i. Clash with security forces
   j. Destruction of property
   k. Detention
      i. Yes/No
      ii. Number of participants
      iii. Number of other civilians
   l. Wounded
      i. Yes/No
      ii. Number of participants
      iii. Number of other civilians
   m. Death
i. Yes/No
ii. Number of participants
iii. Number of other civilians
n. Additional Information
APPENDIX B
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE: DATA COLLECTED AND MISSING DATA

Scanning a daily from 1945-2014 every other day has been a time consuming project. The average time taken for scanning, recording, and digitizing a newspaper issue is 10 minutes and again a coder’s average speed varies between 10-20 entries per hour. Hence a basic calculation from the following two tables (plus the deleted entries) reveals that the total amount of time spent for the data collection in this project was between 5500-6500 working hours, something between 700-800 full working days. I started this project with support from an NSF grant (Eren, 2004), which enabled me to collect the data with a team. However after the grant money ran out. I had to collect the data individually and I was not able to the finish the entire data collection process. Table 1 provides basic information about the data collection process. Table 2 shows the current stage of the research.

Table 3 illustrates the monthly distribution and average monthly value per year of the digitized records. Table 4 does the same job for the coded months. Looking at the averages in Table 5 reveals that there are significant differences among the averages of different months over the years 1946-2004. However, as the counting numbers hint, the difference is less related to intrinsic differences among months than the fact that months with high average are predominantly concentrated in the ‘intense’ phases of social movements.

In this dissertation, when preparing the figures and comparing standardized scores. I utilized my incomplete data in two ways. By dividing the number of mentions
recorded in one year by the number of months coded in that year. I obtained a monthly average for each year. This average was the basis of my comparison. In Chapter 4, to depict the waves I compared monthly values between 1945-2014, a dataset that is almost complete. Yet whether these limited samples can inform us about the “general trend” is a question worth asking.

Since I have digitized 95% of the articles for 1946-2004, looking at the correlation between monthly averages of the coded mentions for each year and the monthly averages of the digitized reports can inform us whether the coded months are reliable indicators of the general trend or not. As the correlations in Table 8 indicate, despite incomplete dataset, the monthly averages of the coded reports are highly correlated with the monthly average of digitized records (0.87). Similarly, the correlation between the average coding in May (June) and the monthly average for each month is also high (.88 and .75 respectively). These results give us a significant degree of confidence in the reliability of the data set.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Newspapers to be Scanned</td>
<td>12509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Months Scanned and Recorded</td>
<td>739 (89.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Months Digitized</td>
<td>716 (74.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Months Coded</td>
<td>478 (58.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Amount of Entries</td>
<td>50432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of All Entries Coded</td>
<td>33098 (55.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Classifiable Entries Coded</td>
<td>28113 (84.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Number of Entries (Until Dec 2004)</td>
<td>37634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Classifiable Entries Coded (Until December 2004)</td>
<td>26408 (70.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry Per Issue</td>
<td>≈ 2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classifiable Entry Per Issue</td>
<td>≈ 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Pictures Taken</td>
<td>31.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture Per Issue</td>
<td>≈ 2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Digitized Articles (Until December 2004)</td>
<td>9574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Digitized Articles Per Month</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE B 3 MONTHLY NUMBER OF RECORDED ARTICLES: 1946-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

326
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>75.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>86.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>96.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>91.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>50.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure B 1 Histogram of Digitized Articles
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>Average Entry Per Month (AVEP)</th>
<th>Estimated Yearly Total (EYT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>304</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>674</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57.67</td>
<td>692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.33</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(AVEP)</td>
<td>(EYT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130.83</td>
<td>1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>471</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>268.83</td>
<td>3226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>252</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>169.13</td>
<td>2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>246</td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>231.33</td>
<td>2776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69.25</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81.25</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>158.4</td>
<td>1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>111.83</td>
<td>1342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112.08</td>
<td>1345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>106.25</td>
<td>1275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>126.17</td>
<td>1514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>125.6</td>
<td>1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>126.67</td>
<td>1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>85.08</td>
<td>1021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.88</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.44</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

330
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>(AVEP)</th>
<th>(EYT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60.22</td>
<td>723</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>804</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>461</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3552</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>142.5</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Estimated Total** 51289

---

**TABLE B 5 AVERAGE, MEDIAN AND STD OF MONTHLY COLLECTIVE ACTION MENTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coded Months</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages (Dec 2004)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median (Dec 2004)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>125.5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD (Dec 2004)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages (June 2014)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median (June 2014)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>125.5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD (June 2014)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE B 6 CORRELATION OF MONTHLY RECORDED ARTICLES (1946-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>AVRG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVRG*</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes the average monthly value of coded mentions in a year
TABLE B 7 CORRELATION OF MONTHLY CODED COLLECTIVE ACTION MENTIONS (1946-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>AVRG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUL</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUG</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVRG</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes the average monthly value of coded mentions in a year

TABLE B 8 CORRELATION FOR SELECT VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENT05</th>
<th>ENT06</th>
<th>REP05</th>
<th>REP06</th>
<th>AVRGENT</th>
<th>AVGREP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENT05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENT06</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP05</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP06</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVRGENT</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVGREP</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENT05: Number of codings for the month May (1946-2014)
ENT06: Number of codings for the month June (1946-2014)
REP05: Number of digitized reports for the month May (1946-2014)
REP06: Number of digitized reports for the month May (1946-2014)
AVRGENT: Average Number of Monthly Coded Entries in a year (1946-2014)
AVGREP: Average Number of Monthly Recorded Reports in a year (1946-2014)
APPENDIX C
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS IN CREATING SUBTYPES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

To distinguish between the eight types of movements in chapters 4-6, I have relied on information from the original two social movement databases I created for this dissertation—(1) Social Movements Database 1 (see Appendices A and B) and Social Movements Database 2 (see Appendix E). Due to the low quality of reporting, the information acquired from the database is limited, but it is still possible to operationalize the criteria for distinguishing among these movement types developed in Chapter 5.

**Independence**

This criterion distinguishes whether a social action is organized or supported by independent groups or political instruments of the power bloc, the latter being grouped under the label ‘Parties of Order’ (PO). To distinguish between independent and dependent social movements. I use the participants in the action as the criterion. If an institution of the state is recorded amongst the participants, then the action is considered a dependent action belonging to the domain of PO. Since outlawing parties is a frequent practice, very few parties can continue their political life with the same name. Therefore, parties which consider themselves inheritors of an outlawed PO are also considered PO. Similarly, parties or associations that have coup leaders, generals, or top-level bureaucrats in their leading cadre, are also considered PO, as are associations that have organic ties with the PO. Table 1 provides a list of political organizations whose participation therein is considered sufficient to label a social action as a dependent action.
For the pre-1945 period, I have also added actions/movements where PO involvement is claimed by more than one scholar.

‘Independence’ is a more problematic concept because in several cases, even “independent” organizations have affiliations with the state or leading capitalist factions. More frequently, political parties prefer to obscure their involvement in sensitive political issues, and give the impression that there exists an independent political opposition about the issue. Hence, while interpreting the data about the independence of movements, one should keep in mind that although the data provide information about the explicit involvement of PO, they do not say anything about their indirect and implicit involvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE C 1 MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE POWER BLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-1945</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idealists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fascists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mass Participation**

Here I look at the action type and search for several keywords to distinguish between the mass or group character of an event. Below is the list of each category with the most frequent coding.

**TABLE C 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Participation</th>
<th>Group Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>Hunger Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering</td>
<td>Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>Firin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>Death Fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evetn</td>
<td>Raid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>Press Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>Protest Placate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Stoppage</td>
<td>Wounding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebration</td>
<td>Sit-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Brawl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sick</td>
<td>Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shutter down</td>
<td>Explosions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum</td>
<td>Petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambush</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
 Violence

Compared to previous categories, the presence or absence of violence can be distinguished relatively clearly. To begin with, certain actions, as presented in Table C 3 involve violence by definition. Moreover, since violence is always worth reporting, information about violent incidents in demonstrations, marches and other events is available in the news. Due to the definition of violence in Chapter 5, all demonstrations attacked by the police are considered violent actions.

TABLE C 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack with explosives*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assasination*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebellion*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgence*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurrection*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarrel*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounding*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed attack*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table C 4 Number of Recorded Events Divided in 8 Subtypes: 1876-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>MVI</th>
<th>MVi</th>
<th>MvI</th>
<th>mVI</th>
<th>MiV</th>
<th>mVi</th>
<th>mvI</th>
<th>mvi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>MvI</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>Mvi</td>
<td>mVi</td>
<td>mvI</td>
<td>mvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

339
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>MVI</th>
<th>MVi</th>
<th>MvI</th>
<th>mVI</th>
<th>Mvi</th>
<th>mVi</th>
<th>mvI</th>
<th>mvi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coded Months</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>mVl</td>
<td>Mvi</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>mVi</td>
<td>mVl</td>
<td>mvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coded Months</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>mvI</td>
<td>Mvi</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>mVi</td>
<td>mvl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1514</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coded Months</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>MVI</td>
<td>MVi</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>Mvi</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>mVi</td>
<td>mVI</td>
<td>mvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX D

### LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES 1908-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Party</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>Banned</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İttihadı Muhammedi Fırkası</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muteddil Hürriyetperveran Fırkası</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahali Fırkası</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teceddüt Fırkası</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahali İktisat Fırkası</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesai Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyet ve İtilaf</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulh ve Selameti Osmanlıye Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmanlı Çiftçiler Derneği</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Party</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Phase 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Ahrar Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Türk Fırkası</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Fırkası (Resmi)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (Cumhuriyet)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cumhuriyet) Halk Fırkası (Partisi)</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Kalkınma Partisi</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İslam Koruma Partisi</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Demokrat Parti</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yalnız Vatan İçin Partisi</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Party</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat Parti</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Partisi</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Yükselme Partisi</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet Partisi</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Köylü Partisi</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İslam Demokrat Partisi</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Köylü Partisi</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatan Partisi</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi) (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyet Partisi</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalet Partisi</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet Partisi</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Türkiye) Birlik Partisi</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Milli Güven Partisi) (Güven Partisi)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Nizam Partisi</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Party</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Parti</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Selamet Partisi</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Sosyalist İşi Partisi</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Emekçi Partisi</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vatan Partisi</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist (Devrim) Partisi</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam Partisi</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi**</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist Vatan Partisi**</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyetçilik Millet Partisi**</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hür Demokratlar Partisi**</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Büyük Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Türkiye) Huzur Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkçı Parti</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayrak Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refah Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anavatan Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

347
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Party</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>Banned</th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetiçi Hareket Partisi (Milliyetiçi Çalışma Partisi) (Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakar Parti)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet Partisi (İslahatçı Demokrasi Partisi)</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Sol Parti</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Büyük Anadolu Partisi</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist Parti</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkın Emek Partisi</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist Birlik Partisi</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖzgürDIRECTORY ve Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyalist Devrim Partisi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat Parti</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İŞÇİ Partisi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genç Partisi (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Parti</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Büyük Birlik Partisi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Party</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkın Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (Demokrat) Parti</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasi ve Değişim Partisi</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emek Partisi</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Barış Hareketi</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barış Partisi</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emek Partisi (Emeğin Partisi)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Kitle Partisi</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazilet Partisi</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Halk Partisi</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Değişen Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydınul Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadet Partisi</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Party</td>
<td>Founded</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Banned</td>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Phase 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yurt partisi</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Toplum Partisi</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi 2</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkın Sesi Partisi</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetçi ve Muhafazakar Parti</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not all parties are included in this list. If a party is dissolved by the state – with the exception of those dissolved because of their inactivity - it is still included. But for all other parties the condition for being included is participation in the elections.

** Although being dissolved by the state these parties are not included to the list. Because two of them did not participate to the Senate election in 1979 and the other two did not have meaningful time span for being active. Their inclusion however will support the thesis of the second chapter further.

Although these parties were dissolved by the state, they are not included in our list. Two of them did not participate in the 1979 Senate elections, and the other two did not have a meaningful tim-span to be considered politically active. Their inclusion however would support the thesis of the second chapter further.

Sources: (M. K. Kaynar et al., 2007; Tunaya, 1952; Tunaya, 1998a, 1998b)
APPENDIX E

SOURCES REVIEWED FOR THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Abak, 2011)</th>
<th>(Fotiadis)</th>
<th>(Lazarev et al., 2001)</th>
<th>(Schumacher, 2012)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Dersimi, 1952)</td>
<td>(Kayali, 1997)</td>
<td>(Reid, 2000)</td>
<td>(Yerasimos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Doinov, 1979)</td>
<td>(Khristov, 1983)</td>
<td>(Eugene Lawrence Rogan, 1991)</td>
<td>(Yıldırım, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(O. Doğan, 2011)</td>
<td>(Kosev, 1977)</td>
<td>(Saliba, 1972)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T. Doğan)</td>
<td>(Kühn, 2005)</td>
<td>(Sasuni, 1992)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Newspapers, Magazines and Web Pages

Anayasa Mahkemesi İstatistikleri. from http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/Istatistik/


Financial Times. (2003, July 31 ). A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU, Editorial.


353


Önderoğlu, E. (2008, August, 19, 2008). Demir Küçükaydın: "Çekoslovakya'daki Reform Sosyalizm Değildi; İşgalı Destekledik". *40 YIL SONRA ÇEKOSLOVAKYA*


References in English and German


Fotiadis, K. The Pontian Genocide From the Time of the Young Turks to the Advent of Mustafa Kemal.


Göçek, F. M. (2002). The decline of the Ottoman empire and the emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms. Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East, 15-83.


Lenin, V. (1977 (1908)). *The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East.*


Mommsen, W. J. (1992c). Politics and Scholarship:


Taşpınar, Ö. (2014). The End of the Turkish Model. *Survival*, 56(2), 49-64.


Zürcher, E. J. (2010b). Who were the Young Turks? The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's Turkey (Vol. 87, pp. 95-109): IB Tauris.

References in Turkish


Aslan, T., CAKIR, İ. E., GÜVENÇ, S. Ş., KARAER, N., KESKİN, Ö., ÜNLÜ, M., . . . KLAVEREN, J. v. 31 Mart Hadisesi Üzerine Vilayetlerde Çıkan Olaylar Karşısında Alınan Tedbirle ve Askerî Faaliyetlere Dair Yazımlar


Aysal, N. Örgütlenmeden Eyleme Geçiş: 31 Mart Olayı.


Çakmak, F. Demokrat Parti'nin Muhalifeti Sürecinde İzmir'de İktidar Muhalifet İlişkisi (1946-1950).


Sönmez, B. İ. (2007). *II. Meşrutiyette Arnavut Mühalefeti* (Vol. 33); YKY.


Reports

Aydin-Duzgit, S. K., Fuat. (2013). EU-Turkey Global Turkey in Europe: Political, economic, and foreign policy dimensions of Turkey's evolving relationship with the EU (Vol. 9).


İHD. (2012). Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu. İstanbul: İnsan Hakları Derneği.
İHD. (2013). Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu. İstanbul: İnsan Hakları Derneği.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Barış Çetin Can Eren

Department of Sociology
Johns Hopkins University,
3400 North Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218

Education:
August 2014 : Ph. D., Sociology
Johns Hopkins University
*The Trajectory of Democracy:*
*The Social Origins of Regime Change in Turkey*

May 2002 : Johns Hopkins University
Department of Sociology, MA.

September 1995 - June 2000: Bogaziçi University, Istanbul
(BA) Philosophy-Sociology

Teaching Experience:
Spring 2012 - Spring 2013  Instructor, Koç University
Spring 2006 – Spring 2007  Teaching Assistant, Johns Hopkins University
Fall 2003 – Spring 2005  Instructor, Marmara University
Fall 2004 – Spring 2005  Instructor, Koç University
Fall 2001-Spring 2003  Teaching Assistant, Johns Hopkins University
Research Experience:

Summer 2007  Research Assistant for Giovanni Arrighi  
(Preparation of the book Adam Smith in Beijing)

Fall 2001  Research Assistant for Dr. Beverly Silver  
(Preparation of NSF Proposal entitled “The Nexus of Domestic and International Conflict 1880-2000”)

Fall 2000- Spring 2001:  Research Assistant for Dr. James Ron  
(Review of English Language Social Science Journal Literature about Modern Turkey)

Papers:

Garments Workers in Yenibosna: Istanbul’s New Proletariat,  
(Presented in March 2003 at the Institute of Global Studies, Johns Hopkins University)

Trajectory of Democracy: Social Roots of Political Change in Turkey 1945-2004  
(Paper Presented at American Sociology Association Panel (August 2005)

Languages:  
German fluent  
English fluent  
Turkish native speaker