Post-9/11 Changes in U.S. Strategic Defense Policy

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ABSTRACT

September 11, 2001 and conflicts that followed spurred a significant change in U.S. strategic defense policy, signaling a definitive end to Cold War era strategic thinking. This paper explores these policy changes in the wake of 9/11 through the examination of three important defense-related elements: use and function of the reserve component, costs of defense and resource allocation, and strategic intelligence planning under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

For each of these elements, the author presents a comprehensive review of the existing literature surrounding the topic, followed by a case study comparing representative pre-9/11 policies with those that developed in the mid- to late-2000s. The results of the three studies shed light on the effect 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on U.S. national defense policy and indicate how these effects will influence current and future defense policy. Although the role of the United States in these combat missions has all but concluded, the events and lessons learned since 9/11 will continue to shape U.S. defense policy, even in the face of new threats and strategic priorities.

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INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 incited American outrage, prompted a worldwide backlash against Islamic extremism and terrorism, and served as the catalyst for American involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The events of this day had far-reaching implications, effectively beginning a new era in U.S. national defense policy. It was not obvious until a few years later, but the wars the United States fought and countermeasures taken against this new type of enemy required a marked shift in military strategic planning and defense policy. Although the Cold War had ended more than a decade before 9/11, Cold War thinking still dominated U.S. national security policy at the time of the attacks. The threat posed by terrorism and the wars the U.S. military fought in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded a new paradigm for national defense planning.

The strategic thinking that developed during the Cold War era continued to influence U.S. national security policy into the dawn of the 21st century. As a result, the U.S. defense establishment struggled to adapt to the new threat posed by terrorism and conflict outside the scope of conventional war. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, the United States derived its military superiority from its vast arsenal of conventional capabilities. These capabilities were vital to the U.S. policy of deterrence, and they allowed the American military to quickly and decisively defeat its enemies on a physical battlefield. Consider Operation Desert Storm, a conflict that epitomized conventional warfare. This conflict resulted in a relatively quick, clear American victory, primarily due to the superior military equipment and mastery of conventional military strategy and tactics brought to bear by the U.S. military.
This military might played an important part in the bipolar system that characterized the Cold War, and with the fall of the Soviet Union, the superiority of U.S. military capabilities became unparalleled. Enemies of the United States realized that they could not succeed in challenging the United States through conventional military means, so the nature of the threats to American national security began to evolve. 9/11 was the prime example of this evolution, and it proved to have significant effects on defense spending, personnel, and even intelligence.

The overarching theme of this paper focuses on the post-9/11 changes in U.S. strategic defense policy and planning considerations. The United States has been embroiled in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for the better part of the 21st century to date, resulting in significant shifts away from Cold War thinking and toward strategies and doctrine better suited to counter non-conventional, or asymmetric, threats. Although the United States military has all but concluded its participation in these particular conflicts, the changes they brought about within the defense establishment will have persistent implications for U.S. strategic defense planning today and in the future, meriting a closer examination of the subject.

This paper will cover three main areas in which the changes resulting from the shift in the nature of the threats the United States faces are particularly important and evident. The first chapter discusses the use of reserve personnel, the second explores defense costs and resource allocation, and the third focuses on strategic intelligence planning. By investigating significant changes that occurred in these areas between the Cold War era to today, one can better understand the most important considerations for
strategic defense planning in the current threat environment, both in times of war and
times of peace.

This work begins by focusing on a particular piece of the U.S. military that the
events of 9/11 and the subsequent conflicts significantly affected – the reserve
component. The first chapter asks how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the use
of the U.S. reserve component, both in the short-term and long-term. Considering the
post-9/11 shift in U.S. military strategy and doctrine away from conventional warfare, the
chapter draws attention to the contribution reservists made in areas such as
counterinsurgency, as well as some of the challenges involved in mobilizing the reserve
component during prolonged conflicts. This chapter explains the doctrinal difference
between the strategic reserve that was created after the Vietnam War and the operational
reserve that serves in today’s military. Comparing the benefits and challenges of
deploying reservists in wars like in Iraq and Afghanistan with the strategic role for which
they were intended allows for an assessment of the reserve component’s performance in
the past 13 years, as well as an observation of the role reservists play in supporting
today’s strategic defense policy.

After exploring the background of relevant military doctrine and the use of
reservists in Iraq and Afghanistan, the paper presents an analytical comparison of the
envisioned role of the reserve component in military doctrine, the use of reservists in
conventional conflicts, and their role in counterinsurgency missions during the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Although they were initially intended to be a strategic force, the
consistent deployment of reserve troops during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrates that reservists are undoubtedly now an operational reserve that will be
relied upon by the U.S. military in future conflicts. Additionally, reservists were particularly well suited to counterinsurgency missions due in large part to the civilian skills they bring with them, and skill sets they bring to bear directly support current U.S. strategic defense priorities. Thus, the paper concludes that even in an era of financial restraints across the DoD, reservists will continue to be key players to future conflicts and military operations of all kinds, in large part because of their unique skills and expertise.

The second chapter of this paper examines how the broad shift from conventional to irregular warfare has affected the costs of U.S. national defense. Since American capabilities for conventional war are far superior to any challengers, enemies have turned to asymmetric tactics and strategies; in other words, the focus of United States defense shifted away from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare. Although the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded and waned, respectively, the majority of defense experts and scholars agree that irregular warfare will continue to be relevant to at least some degree in potential future conflicts. Given this new reality, the paper identifies three primary characteristics of irregular warfare: stability and support operations, counterinsurgency missions, and reliance on Special Operations missions. Using key elements associated with these three areas as a basis for analysis, the paper compares the 1993 Bottom Up Review with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to understand how costs were affected by this shift from a time when conventional warfare was the primary concern of the United States to an era in which irregular warfare demands equal attention in defense strategic planning.

The comparison of the Bottom Up Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review focuses on the overall tones and themes of the documents, their analyses of future
military planning and requirements, and the recommendations for future defense spending and resource allocation within each. Both reviews occurred following wars, at times when defense spending was experiencing a tightening of the proverbial belt. The results of the comparison are interesting in that they both include maintenance of conventional capabilities, but the 2010 QDR includes more recommendations for equipment aligned with irregular warfare needs, and it advocates and emphasizes building and maintaining partnerships and international engagement for conflict resolution. Despite these findings, however, the author notes that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by which the QDR was most influenced were funded in large part by Congressional budgetary supplementals, so peacetime financial planning has not yet reflected the shift to irregular warfare. Although there is little hard evidence thus far, long-term costs of defense will likely decrease with the shift to irregular warfare, because even in cases where the initial costs of irregular warfare capabilities are high, the long-term costs are generally lower. Thus, the chapter concludes, irregular warfare will require less funding to achieve U.S. strategic objectives, and will potentially reduce the cost of defense in the long run.

The third chapter of this paper focuses on the intelligence facet of strategic defense policy, seeking to determine how the creation of the Director for National Intelligence (DNI) has affected strategic intelligence planning. As evident thus far, the 9/11 attacks significantly affected functions and long-term planning of the U.S. military, and these were paralleled by substantial changes in the U.S. intelligence apparatus. In response to American public outcry, President Bush established the 9/11 Commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks, and out of the Commission’s findings and recommendations
evolved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The intelligence reforms that resulted from IRTPA remain some of the most hotly contested issues among Washington insiders today, but the simple truth remains that strategic intelligence planning 13 years after 9/11 is decidedly different from that prior to the attacks. One of the most obvious changes was the creation of the position of the DNI, and this chapter explores the most divisive views on the creation of this position and its performance to date. Charged with overseeing the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), the DNI naturally reflects the current U.S. strategic intelligence planning paradigm.

Comparing the DNI’s mechanism for intelligence requirements prioritization (the National Intelligence Priorities Framework - NIPF) with its pre-DNI predecessor (Presidential Decision Directive 35 – PDD 35) serves as the basis for an analysis of the current strategic intelligence planning posture. This analysis explores the strengths and weaknesses of both mechanisms, concluding that the NIPF is clearly a superior mechanism to that promulgated by PDD 35. Given that the NIPF is the DNI’s sole mechanism for establishing intelligence priorities, this tool allows the DNI to exercise his responsibilities for oversight and management of the IC, ensuring that the highest priority intelligence issues are covered while maintaining flexibility to shift focus to unexpected issues, should they arise. Scholars maintain different viewpoints on the performance of the DNI to date, and the fact remains that the creation of this office did not mirror the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Despite often- tepid evaluations, however, the DNI has positively affected strategic intelligence planning, at least to a degree, through the maintenance and use of the NIPF.
In order to fully explore the three topics outlined above, the author first examines the existing literature surrounding each topic, and then draws upon specific historical cases to provide a basis for addressing each research question. This framework for analysis allows the argument of each chapter to support the overall theme of the thesis. Through examination of these three areas – use of the reserve component, budget planning and resource allocation, and strategic intelligence planning – this paper seeks to provide a thorough evaluation on how 9/11 has affected the American defense policy at the strategic level. There is no doubt that the American defense establishment today looks significantly different from that in place on September 10, 2001, and many of the changes that occurred since then will continue to influence strategic defense planning, even as the U.S. military draws down from wartime levels and returns to peacetime status. Understanding the specific factors that have contributed to the change in both structure and mindset, however, will allow policymakers to effectively plan for the future and be better prepared to avoid strategic surprise, such as that incurred by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. defense policy has adapted to consider and prepare for future threats. Emerging threats outside the scope of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with decreasing budgets and a restrained fiscal environment prompted a refocus in U.S. defense policy, which is set forth in President Barack Obama’s 2012 strategic defense priorities. This policy shifts away from focusing primarily on Iraq and Afghanistan to promulgate other strategic considerations, including a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, engagement with allies and partners around
the globe, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹ That said, the policy lists counter terrorism and irregular warfare as the first of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, indicating that these concepts will remain key components of U.S. defense policy, even as strategic priorities evolve.² The broad lessons learned and shifts in defense policy resulting from over a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan are reflected elsewhere in the document as well. Although the strategy indicates that some of these missions, such as counterinsurgency, will decrease with reductions in manpower, the underlying concepts that became entrenched in military doctrine and strategy in the wake of 9/11 will continue to influence policy in the years to come.

² Ibid., 4.
CHAPTER I: THE AMERICAN RESERVE COMPONENT IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS

Introduction

The beginning of the 21st century has presented challenges to American national security that differ significantly from previous threats the United States faced. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed gave rise to a greater focus on elements of irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency missions. As the United States maintained a primarily conventional warfare capability prior to 9/11, this shift toward non-conventional, or irregular warfare, greatly affected manning and personnel requirements within the Department of Defense (DoD). Furthermore, the lessons learned and changes brought about during this most recent decade of war continue to be reflected in U.S. defense policy and future planning considerations. Focusing on a critical subset of the U.S. military force, this chapter explores what effects 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on the function of the reserve component, and considers how these effects influenced the future role of reserve forces given current strategic defense policy.

In the days immediately following 9/11, it was obvious that the United States would go to great lengths to retaliate against the perpetrators of the events and prevent future attacks, which resulted in wars on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conflicts were unlike most of those the United States had fought previously, as the enemy was a non-state actor using asymmetric tactics against United States forces. Although the United States military declared success in Iraq in 2003 after toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime, the conflict worsened after that time period, shifting to a counterinsurgency
nature and persisting for several years. Although combat troops are slated for withdrawal by the end of 2014, U.S. troops have been consistently fighting in Afghanistan since late 2001. The personnel requirements and skill sets needed to fight these wars were different in some ways from those necessitated by previous conventional wars. One of the most significant differences was the mobilization of a large number of reserve units to fight for years on end in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence, the military extended reserve component deployment lengths in order to retain troop strength and skill sets necessary to successfully conduct counterinsurgency efforts both during the conflict and as operations drew down.

In order to understand how 9/11 affected DoD’s use of the reserve component since 2001, this chapter will first explore the intended role of the reserve component in U.S. military doctrine prior to 9/11. The author will then examine the various viewpoints on post-9/11 reserve mobilization and its involvement in counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following examination of the relevant concepts and schools of thought surrounding the use of the reserve component, the paper will conduct a case study on the use of reservists during the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The chapter argues that reserve components are crucial to any conflict because of the expertise and skill sets they bring to bear, particularly for non-traditional missions such as counterinsurgency. For this reason, although frequent and lengthy deployments pose challenges for the reserve component, this force will remain entrenched in strategic defense planning, even in peacetime or against unknown future threats.
**Reserve Component in Military Strategy and Doctrine**

The reserve component of the U.S. military, which includes federal reserve troops along with state-based National Guard units, was integrated in the Total Force concept during the transition from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) following the Vietnam War. Although reservists played a relatively minor role in the Vietnam War, under the Total Force construct, the reserve force was intended to be adequately prepared for quick mobilization to participate in contingency operations or small-scale conflicts. In the case of a significant conflict that the AVF could not handle on its own, the military could activate conscription through the Selective Service to achieve the troop strength needed to successfully fight a large-scale conventional conflict. Under such circumstances, as Lawrence Korb and David Segal explain, the reserve component would serve as a “bridge to conscription,” providing adequate combat support while the conscripts underwent training for their role on the battlefield.³

In the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the reserve force augmented active duty forces on the battlefield to form a significant portion of the troop numbers on the ground. For example, in 2008, reservists formed 40-50% of the troops engaged in counterterrorism missions.⁴ The troop numbers required in Iraq and Afghanistan could be sufficiently filled by a combination of active duty and reserve troops, allowing policymakers to avoid discussion of the politically unpopular reinstatement of the draft. These wars, however, placed excessive strain on reserve

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troops, many of which had never dreamed they would serve back-to-back tours in Iraq when they joined the reserve force.

The attacks of 9/11 prompted an outburst of American patriotism and unity, and drove many to consider volunteering to serve either on active duty or in the reserves. What many of these volunteers and existing service members – particularly those in the reserves – could not predict, however, was the extended and frequent tours they would serve as part of their duty. As Michael Musheno and Susan Ross observe, “Even reservists with considerable experience were shocked by the length of their deployments and time away from home.”

Musheno and Ross conducted extensive interviews and observations of a particular Army reserve unit, and their conclusions indicate the stark difference between the intended use of reservists within the Total Force construct and the reliance on these troops in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In their words, “The nearly fifty years of the Reserve as the home of America’s weekend warriors has come to an abrupt end. They are now the new conscripts of the twenty-first-century U.S. Army.”

This conflict solidified the movement of the reserve component away from the strategic role for which it had been designed toward that of an operational force.

Strategic vs. Operational Reserve

At its inception, the Reserve Component was designed to be strategic in nature, but there is little argument that it has become an operational force as it stands today. The strategic function envisioned for the reserve components is illustrated by the “bridge to conscription” idea mentioned above. In completing their drills one weekend a month and

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6 Ibid.,14.
two weeks a year, the reserve component troops would maintain their ability to participate in domestic contingency operations, such as natural disaster relief, or temporarily augment the active component in the event of a major conflict. Under this construct, reservists would not fight alongside the active component in conflicts extending multiple years; rather the active component would draw upon conscripted soldiers to obtain the numbers of troops needed to fight a large-scale conflict. In an operational role, however, reserve forces fight alongside the active forces for as long as the conflict lasts and serve in many of the same roles held by active duty troops.

Given the continued use of reservists in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for more than a decade, the transition from a strategic to an operational reserve is obvious and, arguably, permanent. American defense policymakers recognized the necessity of drawing from the reserves during a conflict after they neglected to do so in favor of building troop levels through conscription during the Vietnam War. In the wake of the disastrous Vietnam War, policymakers abolished the draft and downsized the U.S. Army, and in doing so, “the Reserve Component became, at least conceptually, an ‘operational’ asset of the ‘Total Army.’” Most scholars, however, view the shift toward an operational reserve as a more recent occurrence, notably during the post-9/11 wars. Regardless of the exact moment of this transition, there is a broad consensus that the operational nature of today’s reserve component demands significant changes in organization, manning, training, equipping, compensation and deployment of these forces.

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Major General Mark MacCarley explores the obstacles the military encountered when relying on the reserve component as an operational force during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield, detailing the lack of operational readiness the reservists demonstrated when mobilized for combat. To rectify these shortcomings, the military implemented new training regimens and force structure throughout the 1990s, and took further steps to meet the challenges of readying reserve troops after 9/11.

MacCarley notes that the proper training and preparation has allowed Reserve Components to be truly “trained and ready” as part of an operational, rather than strategic, reserve in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, Korb and Segal acknowledge that although many reservists had joined to be part of the strategic reserves, in the post-9/11 era, they “had effectively become an operational expeditionary force.”

It is worth noting, however, that these scholars communicated their conclusions towards the end of the war in Iraq. Observations from the beginning through the peak years of the war tended to focus on the lack of training and subpar or inefficient equipment for reserve personnel.

In an article published in early 2008, Michael Lynch and William Stover highlight the difficulties the reserve component experienced in the early and middle years of the war in Iraq, during which time they were augmenting an already-strained active force. The reserve component faced frequent mobilizations and lengthy deployments, often with inadequate training and equipment. According to the authors, “The National Guard and Reserves, once the United States’ grand strategic reserve, has been transformed into an operational force, continuously and extensively utilized with plans underway to continue

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10 Korb and Segal, “Manning and Financing,” 82.
that heavy utilization.”

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study from a few years earlier foreshadowed this transformation and provided two reason for the equipment shortfalls at the time, the first being the Army’s resource allocation “based primarily on the assumption that they would deploy overseas only in the latter stages of major combat operations and would receive additional resources during a mobilization phase.”

Legal Framework

The shift of the reserve component from a strategic to operational force was accompanied by several policy and legal complications. Under U.S. federal law, reserve forces can be mobilized in three ways: full mobilization, partial mobilization, and presidential reserve call-up. During the most recent conflicts, reservists were partially mobilized, which by law, means that the President can declare mobilizations lasting no longer than 24 consecutive months. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued and troops became increasingly strained, however, confusion arose over the allowed mobilization lengths. In contrast to the legal wording, DoD’s mobilization guidance stated that reservists could be mobilized for no longer than 24 *cumulative* months, rather than consecutive months. Lynch and Stover quote General Lance Smith’s adroit observation of the implication of the term cumulative rather than consecutive: “…you’d

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13 Ibid., 5.
be able to mobilize for 23 months, 29 days, demobilize them, and bring them back the following day and do it again.”\(^{14}\)

Another complicating legal factor regarding the mobilization and deployment of reservists arose with the DoD’s use of the Stop Loss program. The Stop Loss program gives the President authority to involuntarily extend active duty enlisted service members beyond their established separation date and continue activated reservists on active duty through their scheduled mobilization during times of national crisis.\(^{15}\) The program was derived from a law implemented in 1984, and it was designed to ensure the military would be able to maintain adequate troop strength and expertise during times of a national conflict. President George H.W. Bush delegated authority for this program to the Secretary of Defense in 1990, who delegated the authority to the Service Secretaries in 2001, where it has remained in the post-9/11 conflicts. Stop Loss can be skill-based or unit-based, retaining service members with critical skills or units in their entirety, and it has been used primarily by the Army as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan persisted. For reserve components, Stop Loss meant they could not separate from their units from the time the unit was mobilized until 90 days after demobilization. Although Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, issued guidance to minimize the use of Stop Loss, the Army estimated the program would be necessary through 2009, citing its necessity to “ensure that only trained and ready units were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.”\(^{16}\)

This disconnect between the laws regulating reservist mobilization, including Stop Loss, and the DoD guidance set the stage for significant debates and caused many

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 6.
reservists to fear that they could effectively be mobilized almost indefinitely. Although General Smith’s comments indicate his belief that the DoD does not intend to do as such and follows a policy akin to Congress’ cumulative service lengths, Lynch and Stover illustrate the various defense policy makers’ differing interpretations of this law. In their view, “… the new DoD policy is self-enforced, and the Pentagon can simply change that policy any time their leaders see fit. Therefore, there is effectively no law that governs the length and frequency of reserve component mobilizations.”

Consequences of Mobilization and Alternatives

The use (or abuse, as scholars such as Musheno and Ross view it) of reservists in Iraq has prompted calls for alternate courses of action. Few reservists prior to 9/11 could have foreseen the extent to which they would be required to serve, and this led to a great deal of personal, psychological, and institutional challenges during this time period. Musheno and Ross categorize the reservists they studied into three types: adaptive reservists, struggling reservists, and resistant reservists. As indicated by the term, adaptive reservists, “adjust quickly, moving lockstep with changing institutional expectations as a result of a dynamic sense of their identity, and of relational networks that run deep at home and in the military.” Struggling reservists, on the other hand, are more prone to stress not only caused directly by serving in a war zone, but also from the often negative effect their military service has on their families and home lives. Finally,

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18 Musheno and Ross, Deployed, 146.
19 Ibid., 7.
20 Ibid., 8.
resistant reservists “resent the interruption of their civilian routines, dismiss military life while they live it, and are more likely to oppose the war even as they fight in it.”

Although the personal situations of reservists vary by individual, the way they react to the challenges that accompany their roles as “citizen soldiers” generally falls within one of the three aforementioned categories. Charles Moskos explores this idea on a more macro scale, looking at the trends among reservists in the middle of the Iraq War in 2005. Moskos attributes the discontent among reservists to the perception of being “second-class members” compared to active duty troops, as well as lengthy tours of duty that are often extended, and stalled promotions. If not rectified, these negative factors could affect the number and quality of candidates electing to join the reserves in the future.

Despite the recognition of the hardships reservists faced in the post-9/11 years, there is little consensus about what can be done to alleviate these difficulties. A few experts have called for the reinstatement of the draft to end the reliance on reserve components in the event of a prolonged conflict (indeed, the supposed logic behind the Total Force construct). Most scholars stop short of advocating this politically unpalatable option, however. Musheno and Ross are vocal critics of the military’s overreliance on reserve units, and they portray their reserve case study subjects as conscripts to the military in an attempt to “awaken the public to their sacrifices and draw the attention of decision makers to halt the abuse of reservist call-ups to sustain protracted wars that are neither just nor in the interest of the United States.”

Moskos sets forth a proposal for short-term active-duty enlistments, fulfilled by recent college graduates, as an alternate to

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21 Ibid., 11.
23 Musheno and Ross, Deployed, 146.
reservist mobilizations. He advocates a 15-month active duty commitment during which time the enlistee would perform certain duties currently performed by reservists or active-duty personnel, in exchange for tuition payment incentives.24

Although many have expressed concern and even outrage at the current use of reserve components, it is unlikely that U.S. policymakers will make radical changes to the existing system, such as reinstating the draft or creating short-term active-duty enlistments. Reserve units have proven their ability and worth in the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, solidifying their role in Total Force construct. The mobilization and use of these troops will likely remain a subject of debate, but there is little doubt that reserve components will continue to play a key role as an operational force in future conflicts in which the United States becomes engaged.

**Reserve Forces and Counterinsurgency Efforts**

At the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), American military commanders expected to quickly topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, turn over security operations to local police and military forces and withdraw in a timely manner. They did not expect to become mired in a counterinsurgency that would span almost a decade. Consequently, the first troops in Iraq were ill prepared to perform the functions associated with counterinsurgency operations. For this reason and others, many of the required tasks for fighting a counterinsurgency fell to mobilized reserve troops.

Many of the counterinsurgency tasks and training guidelines were captured in a joint Army-Marine Corps field manual, FM 3-24. A 2006 revision of this manual solidified counterinsurgency missions in U.S. military doctrine. Although the impetus for

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a substantive revision of this manual was the war in Iraq, the inclusion of the idea in current military doctrine reflects the importance military commanders placed in counterinsurgency, both short-term and long-term. In other words, “the military’s leaders were projecting a ‘long war’ against Islamic extremists, which was likely to draw up on the same skills.”

Despite the acknowledged prominence these types of operations would supposedly have in future conflicts, many scholars argue that the U.S. military did not prepare its troops sufficiently or draw upon the resources at its disposal to carry out counterinsurgency missions, including the civilian skill sets of the members of the reserve component.

U.S. military reservists have extremely diverse backgrounds and are employed in myriad positions in their civilian lives. Many of these positions encompass skill sets that are directly applicable to counterinsurgency and reconstruction missions, such as economic development, rule of law, governance, agriculture, and law enforcement training. One trio of senior Army officers has even called for an entirely civilian reserve corps, modeled after and comprising a branch of the National Guard, to be responsible for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. In the words of these officers, “Military commanders can set the conditions for stability and reconstruction by focusing on security tasks, but skills found at state and local levels of government or in the private sector are what rebuild societies and make permanent peace.”

Recognizing that this recommendation for a civilian reserve corps requires a long-term policy change, the authors propose a short-term focus on utilizing the capabilities of the National Guard to develop state-to-province partnerships in Afghanistan and allowing more flexible civil

engagement teams to adapt to the particular needs of the area to which they are deployed.27 Along the same lines as this idea is the newly created Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) that will facilitate the deployment of civilian experts to “enhance DOD’s ability to work alongside and help build the capacity of partner defense ministries.”28 The CEW is still in its nascent stages, so military personnel, particularly reservists, continue to conduct a significant portion of the counterinsurgency tasks on the ground.

Although somewhat similar to the idea of a civilian reserve corps in terms of getting civilians on the ground to perform missions outside the purview of conventional military operations, CEW draws from existing DoD personnel and has a global reach; it does not support only one particular conflict. The civilian reserve corps as envisioned by Danner, et. al. would draw from non-DoD personnel during or in the wake of a crisis, just as the reserves do. These personnel would concentrate on counterinsurgency and stabilization missions, and they would be qualified to do so based on their civilian expertise. In the meantime, however, counterinsurgency and related non-combat efforts are a natural fit for reserve and National Guard forces because they can draw up on their various civilian skill sets for stability and reconstruction missions. This is reflected in the Army Operating Concept, which states, “… the Army identifies Soldiers and leaders within the active Army and the Army Reserve component who possess unique skills, training, and experiences that could assist commanders until conditions permit other agencies to contribute.”29

27 Ibid., 17.
As the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan nears, counterinsurgency missions performed by the U.S. military also wane. One of the lessons learned from the post-9/11 conflicts, however, is the key role the reserve component played in these types of missions and the broader conflicts due to their skill sets and expertise. For this reason, reserve forces will undoubtedly be integrated into the force structure of future conflicts and operations, regardless of the specific nature of the mission. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reflects this in its discussion of adjusting the balance between active and reserve components as a subset of rebalancing the Joint Force, calling for the DoD to sustain capable reserve components. Furthermore, the document indicates that, “As the [DoD] evolves its forces and capabilities, the Reserve Component will seek to recruit personnel with critical skill sets, retain highly experienced personnel, and maintain complementary capabilities with the Active Component.”30

**Reserve Recruitment and Retention**

The manpower intensive conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan posed challenges to every branch of service, particularly the Army and Marines, in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel while relying completely on an all-volunteer force. Although there was a spike in patriotism and American unity immediately following 9/11, along with increased inquiries at recruiting offices, this did not translate to significantly higher enlistment numbers.31 The need to secure the necessary troop numbers compelled the U.S. military to lower its standards by granting more waivers and accepting under-qualified troops. According to Karin de Angelis and David Segal, “the demands

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necessitated by the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq test the viability and effectiveness of today’s All-Volunteer Force in a manner never seen before.”32 Citing a decrease in both numbers and personnel quality, as well as a disproportionate representation of lower socioeconomic classes and minority recruits in the armed forces, these scholars convey the idea that the all-volunteer force has become stretched thin by the ongoing, manpower-intensive conflicts abroad.

Another area of contention with regard to troop strength is what that strength should be, and to what extent reserve troops should be utilized. Given the current financial woes, such as sequestration, that DoD and other government agencies face, many have called for a significant decrease in troop strength and other military-related spending. This is a marked reversal of the cries for building military forces, both reserve and active duty, during the height of the war in Iraq. Consider Michael Gordon’s 2006 observation with regard to U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq: “To provide adequate resources for the new doctrine on counter-insurgency, maintain sufficient forces for dealing with unanticipated contingencies, and bring coherence to American defense strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase…ground forces.”33 This translated into an increase in active duty as well as higher mobilization rates for reserve components.

The calls for troop increases waned, however, in the aftermath and drawdown period of these conflicts. General Raymond T. Odierno, at the time Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, advocated a decrease in the number of active duty soldiers as the Army transitioned away from these conflicts and the military purse strings tightened. In the same article, however, he highlighted the integration between active duty and reserve

32 De Angelis and Segal, “Building and Maintaining,” 44.
33 Gordon, ”Break Point?” 68.
forces that resulted from the conflicts in the previous decade. He observed that the reserve component was at its historical best, and he indicated that they would be deployed in future operations around the globe.\(^{34}\) Despite the current fiscal constraints and decreased troop strengths, the role of the reserve component that remains will continue its role in military operations, particularly those of a counterinsurgency nature.

**Case Study: Evolution of the Contemporary Reserve Forces**

In order to fully understand the current role of the reserve component and assess the implications for its future significance in strategic defense planning, this paper will consider three cases. The first is the incorporation of the reserve component into the Total Force structure following the Vietnam War and the events and circumstances that led to this decision. The second case examines the use of the reserve component in Operation Desert Storm, a conventional war, and the after-action evaluations of the performance and contributions of these troops during the conflict. The third case focuses on the use of reservists in the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which represent asymmetric conflicts dominated by counterinsurgency missions. Exploring the evolution of the reserve component over time and in various types of crises will facilitate an analysis of the challenges reservists face as well as the benefit they add to the overall American defense capability.

*Reserve Component in the Total Force Policy*

The Total Force, designed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, came to be in 1973 in response to pending defense cuts and abolition of the draft. The policy

“advocated the integration of active-duty and reserve forces into a ‘total force,’ with reserve forces responsible for augmenting their active counterparts.”35 This concept directly resulted from the defeat the U.S. suffered in the Vietnam War, and it provided a new framework for American involvement in future conflicts.

The incorporation of the reserve component in the Total Force policy was rooted in lessons learned from the Vietnam War. Rather than mobilizing reserve forces to fight this war, President Lyndon B. Johnson opted to send conscripted soldiers to the front lines. According to experts, his motivations for doing so were twofold and political. First of all, by instating the draft rather than activating reserve forces, Johnson better avoided alienating a significant portion of his supporters, which would incur “a much greater political impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a deferment.”36 Secondly, by not activating reservists, Johnson hoped to “prosecute the war on a low-key basis, not really having to go to war big time.”37 Taking steps such as asking Congress to declare war or mobilizing the reserve force as the conflict escalated would fully acknowledge the U.S. involvement in the conflict and would allow for debate that could very well demonstrate a lack of public support for the war. Because support for the war within Congress and the press was tenuous at best, opening this debate to the public was a situation that Johnson desperately sought to avoid because he knew his support base on the matter was limited.38 Given these factors, Johnson decided to avoid mobilizing the reserves, and instead relied on draftees to fight the war.

37 Ibid.
Of those reservists that did serve during the Vietnam War, most were relegated to non-combat roles, based on the idea that, "The possibility of ‘citizen soldiers’ being at the forefront of combat was thought to be an unnecessary and unacceptable vision." About 7000 reserve component forces eventually served in Vietnam, such as Air Guard units that flew combat and transport missions, but this number comprised only a fraction of the peak troop strength of over 500,000 servicemen on the ground in one year. As such few reservists saw action overseas during this war, the reserve component was regarded as a way to fulfill one’s military service obligation while generally avoiding combat. Reservists who had served before the war were often dismayed by the reputation the reserve component earned during the Vietnam War, a negative characterization that would persist in the years following the conflict.

President Johnson’s refusal to activate the reserves during the Vietnam had major implications for the planning and outcome of the war. First of all, lacking trained and experienced reservists, the U.S. military faced a severe shortage of expertise and competent leadership essential to planning and executing combat missions. In order to meet the numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) required to lead troops in combat, the Army was forced to decrease the length and lower the standards of military training. As the war continued, the services faced even greater shortfalls, as trained and experienced officers and NCOs quit when facing continuous involuntary deployments.

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Another drawback of Johnson’s decision related to American public support for the war. By relying on draftees to fill the ranks of the military, Johnson lost the opportunity to earn support from communities across the United States that would likely have accompanied mobilization of local National Guard units. One observer notes that, “as the war dragged on and casualties accumulated, support for the war waned, even in the communities that would have backed their Guard unit.” Thus, although one of Johnson’s primary goals was to avoid negative political backlash he thought would accompany reserve mobilization, he ultimately encountered exactly what he attempted to prevent.

In the wake of the Vietnam War, defense policymakers sought to avoid the mistakes made in the events both before and during the war. This meant creating an all-volunteer force capable of fighting future conflicts such as the one in Vietnam. One of the key players in this effort was Army Chief of Staff, Major Creighton W. Abrams, who, as Vice Chief of Staff during the Vietnam War, noted the negative implications of failing to mobilize the reserve component. Consequently, Abrams redesigned the Army structure in 1973 in such a manner that the Army would be incapable of waging war without drawing upon the reserve component, a policy that appropriately became known as the Abrams Doctrine. Abrams explained the thinking behind this redesign, promising, “If the unfortunate circumstance should occur that, under some set of things, we would have to use the Army again, then we will use the active, the National Guard, and the Reserve together.” Thus, the Total Force policy established the basis for the

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44 Jensen, “A Lesson Learned,” 32.
military as we know it today by ensuring that policymakers would draw upon existing expertise and leadership during future military engagements.

**Reserve Component in Operation Desert Storm**

Although nearly two decades passed between the formulation of the Abrams Doctrine and the execution of Operation Desert Storm, this conflict marked the first major test for the Doctrine in practice. At the beginning of the conflict, the Doctrine appeared to hold true to its intent. President George H.W. Bush called for the mobilization of reservists; as a result, 97,484 reservists served on active duty in combat, combat support, or combat service support roles. These troops mobilized quickly, but upon reporting to their mobilization stations many exhibited a lack of training and qualifications necessary for deployment. The combat support and combat service support units performed well after additional on-the-ground training and acclimation in Saudi Arabia, but many commanders refused to deploy units intended to augment active duty forces on the ground.

The challenges the reserve components that were intended to support combat brigades faced in their mobilization during Operation Desert Storm demonstrated one shortcoming of the Total Force policy – the potential for a lack of readiness for combat operations among reserve components. In his commitment to ensuring reserve components would be incorporated in future combat operations, Abrams had promoted the “roundout” concept. Under this idea, U.S. Army divisions with only two active combat brigades would be “rounded out” with a third reserve combat brigade during a war, thus ensuring that the reserve component remained entrenched in the Total Force

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Given its nature as a conventional war, Operation Desert Storm relied almost solely on the firepower and other combat capabilities of the services for success. Thus, it was crucial for the roundout brigade to be on par with the capabilities of its partner active duty brigades.

When this concept of roundout brigades was tested during Operation Desert Storm with the mobilization of three reserve combat brigades, however, it did not produce the intended results. Major MacCarley cites as an example the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia National Guard that was designed to be one of these roundout brigades. After six months of post-mobilization training, the Army refused to deploy the brigade to the conflict, deeming the unit unfit for combat operations. Another report cites the specific shortcomings endemic in these three reserve brigades, including lack of preparedness, poor quality of leadership, and lack of military discipline. Although one brigade was eventually determined to be fit for combat, the conflict ended before the unit could be deployed, and the three brigades were demobilized soon afterwards.

This situation prompted a review of the reserve components’ role in combat operations, as well as an effort to determine the factors underlying this lack of readiness.

One of the primary reasons the reserve combat brigades were unprepared to deploy during Operation Desert Storm was insufficient training and equipment. Due to their reserve status, the roundout brigades were low priority for equipment allocations, which meant that they often trained with outdated or inadequate gear. This contributed to their lack of operational readiness during Operation Desert Storm. As a remedy to this problem, the Army implemented the “Bold Shift” strategy, designed to provide better

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46 Sorley, “Creighton Abrams,” 47.
equipment, training, and integration between reserve and active components to those units designated for early deployment in the event of a conflict. Assessments of this program in the years following its implementation, however, indicated that it did not achieve its goals, as units would still require extensive post-mobilization training before deployment.  

An alternative lesson drawn from the reserve combat brigade’s limitations in Operation Desert Storm centered on the type of mission for which they would be mobilized. As Martin Binkin bluntly observes, “…round-out brigades should not be assigned missions that require their early deployment. These units, under the best of circumstances, require a period of post-mobilization training of at least several months, and, more likely six to nine months.” Rather than designating entire brigades of reserve forces, Binkin advocates small roundout units that could maintain a higher level of peacetime readiness. In sum, although the use of the reserve component in Operation Desert Storm was not entirely successful, the reserves were mobilized and did contribute to the combat support mission, thereby solidifying the Abrams Doctrine in American military strategy.

**Reserve Components in Post-9/11 Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan**

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks have been characterized by asymmetric or irregular warfare, rather than by conventional warfare that dominated during Operation Desert Storm. As mentioned above, the reserve components of the U.S. military have played a significant role in these conflicts, lending

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further credibility to the logic underlying the Abrams Doctrine. Whereas Abrams envisioned reserve components incorporated into conventional force structure to augment Army divisions for combat, however, the role reservists have played in Iraq and Afghanistan has been much different due to the asymmetric nature of the conflict.

This paper has previously examined the inability of U.S. policymakers and military leaders to anticipate the length and counterinsurgency nature the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would encompass. As such, the nature of these conflicts placed unique demands on the reserve component. In planning for combat in Iraq, military commanders mobilized reservists in order to provide adequate troop strength for the conflict in accordance with the Total Force concept and the Abrams Doctrine. In fact, a *New York Times* article preceding combat operations in Iraq roughly equated the numbers of the reserve forces to be mobilized in the case of an attack on Iraq with those mobilized during the Persian Gulf War nearly a decade earlier. Although the article recognizes that the post-9/11 role of reservists would differ from that in Operation Desert Storm, it attributes these differences to a need for homeland security and force protection missions in response to the threat posed by terrorism. The actual “war plan,” the *Times* notes, would “probably call for fewer troops for a new offensive against Iraq than the Pentagon and allies deployed in the first gulf war.”

As the conflict in Iraq wore on, however, both reserve component and active duty troops became stretched thin in the face of a growing counterinsurgency mission that required large numbers of troops on the ground to be successful. Theoretically, under the

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design of the All-Volunteer Force, at this point the President and Congress would have activated the Selective Service in order the relieve the reserve troops, who would serve until the incoming conscripts received their basic training.\textsuperscript{52} Rather than reinstate the draft, a political impossibility in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century, military leaders instead increased terms of service and deployment frequencies of both active duty and reserve troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in accordance with Stop Loss and the reserve mobilization policy.

Part of the reason for the reliance on reserve components centers on their civilian skill sets. The nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly counterinsurgency missions, encompassed many tasks that fell outside the purview of traditional combat roles, and reservists were often best positioned to fill these roles by drawing upon their civilian expertise. This is reflected in the composition of certain jobs within the military; for example, as of 2010, the reserve component comprised 87\% of the Army’s Civil Affairs capacity and almost half of its military police and information operations groups.\textsuperscript{53} Retired Army General David Petraus who commanded troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan reiterated the importance of reservists’ civilian skill sets, observing that these conflicts necessitated “diplomats, builders, trainers, advisors, service providers, economic developers, and mediators” and that “citizen-soldiers have performed these diverse tasks in particularly impressive fashion, and in so doing, they have demonstrated the unique edge, the unique quality that they bring to every military

\textsuperscript{52} Korb and Segal, “Manning and Financing,” 78.
endeavor.”54 According to the U.S. Army Reserve 2020 Vision and Strategy Statement, “Army Reserve forces are ideally supported for missions that improve infrastructure, security, and institutions within foreign nations.”55 These observations are indicative of the roles these reserve troops have filled, which vary greatly from those envisioned by the conventionally focused Abrams Doctrine.

One of the biggest differences between reserve forces in Operation Desert Storm and those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is the length of mobilization. Operation Desert Storm lasted only a few months, barely enough time for reserve forces to complete their post-mobilization training. Of all of the units mobilized during Operation Desert Storm, none served on active duty for longer than six months.56 Conversely, reserve component troops have been deployed continuously to Iraq and Afghanistan to support Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom since President Bush first authorized mobilization in September 2001. In fact, 80% of all Army reservists and Guardsmen had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan as of early 2007, and of those, 20% had been deployed more than once.57 The strain of repeated, lengthy deployments has severe implications for the well-being of the force, both currently and in the future.

As reserve deployment lengths and frequencies increased during the height of the war in Iraq, many reservists experienced severe hardships, either directly resulting from their military service or from the burden their service placed on their families, which prompted them to separate from the force at their earliest opportunity.58 There are signs,

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56 Korb and Segal, “Manning and Financing,” 78.
57 Ibid., 82.
58 Musheno and Ross, Deployed, 6.
however, that the Bush administration recognized the negative impacts this burden could have on the reserve force and took steps to avoid the negative consequences that could result. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the implementation of extension pay and limited mobilization lengths to 12 months rather than the 16 or 24 months for which some reservists had previously been activated.\textsuperscript{59} This was a positive step toward relieving some of the stress on the reserve component, helping avoid the negative impacts that would result from depriving the military of a body of expertise and experience required for conducting essential missions such as counterinsurgency.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The role of the U.S. military reserve component has clearly changed since the inception of the Total Force policy in 1973, notably from a strategic function to an operational force. As one article notes, “…the often derided ‘weekend warriors’ of yesteryear have been replaced by men and women who joined the Guard and Reserves knowing full well that they will participate routinely and regularly in ongoing military missions.”\textsuperscript{60} In the wake of the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers learned the importance of activating the reserve component during a significant conflict, both to augment active duty troops with established military expertise and training and to better gain domestic public support for military involvement in overseas conflicts. Operation Desert Storm confirmed the basis of the Abrams Doctrine, but also demonstrated one of its shortcomings; the roundout combat brigades were not ultimately used in combat due to


\textsuperscript{60} Nagl and Sharp, “Operational for What?” 22.
their lack of readiness and the short length of the conflict, but reservists played key roles in combat support and combat service support units.

These observations reinforce the hypothesis that the reserve component is crucial to any conflict because of the expertise and skill sets reservists bring to bear, and it will remain entrenched in strategic defense planning, even in peacetime or against unknown future threats. Having established the necessity of mobilizing reservists during a conflict, one must consider the way they have been utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade plus. Reservists are a natural fit for missions such as counterinsurgency, due to their ability to draw upon their civilian skill sets to carry out tasks such as civil affairs, law enforcement, partner engagement, and so on. Although reservists have indeed endured lengthy and extended mobilizations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the reserve mobilization policy and Stop Loss, it is now widely accepted that they are part of an operational force, rather than the strategic reserve of decades past. There have admittedly been problems with retention and recruitment as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wore on, but this understanding of the role of the reserve component in military conflicts will potentially offset losses in the future and minimize the number of “resistant reservists.”

Reservists will continue to be critical to U.S. military operations, particularly those of a non-conventional nature, in which the United States will continue to engage in the 21st century. Many of these troops have civilian skill sets that are particularly suited for various tasks, and these skills must be better integrated into overall military doctrine. In fact, there are many experts that advocate increasing the use of reservists for non-combat missions. Policymakers must remain cognizant of maintaining this capability and
they must be careful not to overextend it, but if they use reserve forces in the roles to which they are best suited, both the individuals and the overall U.S. military will benefit.

Given the current budgetary constraints, DoD is reducing troop numbers across all services, including the reserve component. The recently released 2014 QDR addresses U.S. defense priorities through the lens of fiscal austerity, and it recognizes the importance of the reserve component in upholding the strategic interests of the United States. Reservists will uphold U.S. strategic interests, in this case “protecting the homeland, building security globally, and projecting power and winning decisively.” Moreover, the document states, “To meet future defense requirements, the [DoD] will sustain Reserve Components that are capable of providing trained units and personnel to augment and complement their Active Components when needed.”

In conclusion, the United States reserve components will continue to comprise a crucial capability of the Total Force construct, which should be reflected in strategic defense planning. Regardless of the nature of future conflicts, the U.S. military must maintain an agile reserve component, and must draw upon the civilian expertise of these troops to augment active duty capabilities, as determined by the situation. In this way, the military will be able to maintain a capable force in the most efficient way possible.

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CHAPTER 2: IRREGULAR WARFARE – IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE COSTS

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States military experienced a notable shift in military strategy and operations. The kind of conflict the United States and its allies fought in these theaters of operation differed dramatically from previous U.S. military engagements, namely because the principal opponents were ideologically motivated non-state actors rather than other nation-states. Consequently, the United States military had to adapt its military strategy and operations to effectively counter this new enemy. This shift from conventional warfare, with which the United States has historically resolved most of its major conflicts, toward irregular warfare impacted doctrinal, operational, and financial considerations for U.S. national defense.

Although doctrinal and operational factors are admittedly crucial, in an era where fiscal considerations dominate policymakers’ decisions, it is imperative to understand the costs associated with irregular warfare. Wartime costs have dominated the U.S. defense budget since the paradigm shift from conventional to irregular warfare, however, so a long-term comparison of the overall cost-effectiveness of each is not yet possible. Accordingly, this paper will explore the following research question: How has the shift from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare in the past decade affected the costs of U.S. national defense? The chapter will focus specifically on the allocation of resources and budget planning associated with U.S. national defense as well as the likely effect the shift will have on long-term defense costs.
In an effort to determine the relationship between the costs of U.S. defense and the shift to irregular warfare, this chapter will explore three factors of irregular warfare to explain the resources and costs associated with each. The chapter first reviews the literature of the prevailing research and opinions regarding the three factors, focusing specifically on their required capabilities, equipment, and costs. Examining the elements of these factors will lead to formulation and testing of a hypothesis detailing how the shift from conventional to irregular warfare affects the resource allocation and U.S. defense budget formulation. Following the literature review, the chapter will detail a case study based on the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), of which the purpose of both is to make recommendations for defense planning and resource allocation. The study will explore the hypothesis that the shift from conventional to irregular warfare decreases long-term costs of defense by altering the types of military equipment and resources allocated in defense budget planning.

**Conventional vs. Irregular Warfare**

There is little disagreement that U.S. national military strategy tilted in favor of irregular warfare vice conventional warfare in the decade plus of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some U.S. defense experts debate the balance between conventional and irregular warfare capabilities and programs the United States should develop as a result. This is in large part due to disagreements over what path future wars will take, whether threats to the United States will come from state actors with large military arsenals or small, non-state actors using asymmetric tactics. Michael Mellilo, for example, recognizes that interstate wars are less prevalent now because the United States has
proven its conventional military superiority so enemies must use alternative methods if they hope to be successful in fighting against the United States.\textsuperscript{62} Phil Reynolds takes this view one step further in asserting that the types of conflict the United States has experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to persist in the international system while traditional “state-versus-state wars” will decrease.\textsuperscript{63} Regardless of their opinions on the matter, defense experts recognize that irregular warfare must be considered at least to some degree when planning for U.S. military operations and capabilities.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could not be fought strictly by conventional means due to their insurgency-centered and asymmetric nature, and the U.S. military adapted accordingly. Although the military continued to maintain its conventional superiority, it also created and improved capabilities and strategies that better supported irregular warfare operations. One example of this is the change in the U.S. Army’s force structure. Prior to 2003, the Army was division-based, which allowed it to efficiently respond to conventional threats. The Army has since evolved into a brigade-based expeditionary force, however, which positioned it to better conduct irregular warfare missions.\textsuperscript{64}

An increase in deployments of both active duty and reserve component troops was one of the main catalysts for this change in structure. Budgetary supplementals and Overseas Contingency Operations funding that Congress repeatedly allocated for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provided the financial means to make this change possible, and this discretionary spending was separate from the requirements of the annual

\textsuperscript{63} Phil W. Reynolds, "What Comes Next?" \textit{Military Review} 92, no. 5 (2012): 35.
Department of Defense (DoD) budget. This uptick in funding allowed the military to expend resources on establishing or expanding capabilities associated with irregular warfare while simultaneously maintaining the appropriated defense budget needed for conventional military capabilities. Current budget constraints, however, may compromise the Army’s ability to fight both conventional and irregular wars by forcing the military to choose between capabilities and defense programs.\(^65\)

As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close, there is much debate about what form future threats to the United States will take and how DoD should develop and maintain its forces and strategy. While some scholars opine that the United States should prepare to confront the primary threat posed by rising state actors such as China by focusing on conventional warfare capabilities, most experts believe that many future conflicts will involve irregular warfare, thereby necessitating maintenance of the developments from the past decade. Those that favor a focus on conventional capabilities argue that irregular warfare tactics, such as counterinsurgency, are expensive and difficult and that the United States needs to maintain conventional superiority in order to deter potential aggressors.\(^66\) The alternate view, promulgated by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, acknowledges that no one can predict the future, but argues that the United States should “hedge against uncertainty” by increasing and maintaining irregular warfare capabilities for potential conflicts similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^67\)

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., 301.
Both of these viewpoints present compelling arguments, but the prevailing opinion among scholars indicates that national defense policy must consider irregular warfare, at least to some extent. This is substantiated in the recently released QDR, which identifies “rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflicts” as a key tenet of rebalancing the Joint Force for the 21st century, one of the three initiatives the QDR advances. As stated in the document, “Future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to high-end conflict against a state power armed with WMD or technologically advanced anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.”

Although not the only consideration, irregular warfare, indicated in this case by the terms “hybrid contingencies” and “asymmetric approaches,” is a significant influence on present-day defense policy and doctrine formulation, so this paper will consider how its factors affect resource allocation for national defense.

In order to understand implications the shift toward irregular warfare has for defense costs and budgets, one must examine factors that differentiate irregular from conventional warfare. Although military and foreign policy scholars commonly use the term irregular warfare, its scope and definition vary by author. LTC Bruce Floersheim begins by describing irregular warfare in very broad terms, falling “in the range between non-combat uses of the military… and major combat operations,” but he also notes that, according to the official military definition, “irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton include stability operations and counterinsurgency as elements of

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irregular warfare,\textsuperscript{70} as does Michael Melillo in his definition of “small wars,” which he acknowledges is a synonymous term for irregular warfare.\textsuperscript{71}

Almost every definition of irregular warfare, however, includes the following three factors: emphasis on stability and support operations on the ground, a counterinsurgency role for U.S. forces, and increased special operations missions. “Stability and support operations” is an incredibly broad term that can be applied in many contexts, but generally it refers to efforts to establish or maintain order and a secure environment.\textsuperscript{72} Counterinsurgency is another term that has various definitions, within which stability and security operations are sometimes included. For this paper’s definition of irregular warfare, however, counterinsurgency refers to broad efforts to win the support of the local population, thereby denying the enemy a safe haven from which to operate. Finally, special operations units have long comprised key capabilities of the U.S. military, but irregular warfare has increased the demand for these capabilities because they allow for increased flexibility and adaptation in hostile environments.

\textit{Stability and Support Operations}

Stability and support operations are key components of irregular warfare. While U.S. forces have historically conducted stability and support operations in one form or another, only in the past decade have these types of operations been formally codified in U.S. military doctrine and accepted as essential elements of military operations.\textsuperscript{73}

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized the importance of these kinds of

\textsuperscript{71} Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military,” 26.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 377-378.
operations to prevent the need for future U.S. military involvement. As an alternative to
direct military action, he advocates a role for the U.S. military to help partner
governments build their security and defensive capacities.\(^74\) This is summarized well by
another scholar’s view: “No longer does the mission of the military stop at winning wars,
now it must also help ‘win the peace.’”\(^75\)

On the other hand, stability operations are also crucial to recovery after an initial
military intervention, and the military is often the only entity capable of conducting them.
Melillo notes that while civilian organizations, such as the State Department, may be the
preferred agencies to oversee postwar reconstruction, only the military has the
“expeditionary capability to deploy to austere (and war-ravaged) environments and
sustain itself while providing the requisite assistance to restore order and promote U.S.
interests.”\(^76\) Jack Kem endorses the use of the military for these types of operations,
because long-term stability is a military operational priority.\(^77\)

The acceptance of stability and support operations as a military function in the
past decade has had significant organizational implications across the service branches.
Each branch of the U.S. military, especially the Army and Marine Corps, adapted their
structure and capabilities to accommodate deployments for stability operations and
provide training to troops who would not likely participate in stability operations in
conventional war.\(^78\) Given the manpower-intensive nature of stability operations, the
Army and Marine Corps had to draw from other units to fill the ranks of troops

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\(^77\) Kem, “Future Face of Conflict,” 1.
traditionally charged with stability operations-related missions. Not only did the services reallocate troops to fill existing units, they also created new units based on the needs of the conflict.\footnote{Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military,” 31.}

About five years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, President George W. Bush, announced 30,000 additional troops would be deployed to Iraq, a strategy known as the “surge.” These troops were essentially charged with security and support operations, in order to empower Iraq to take control of its domestic security, eventually leading to the withdrawal of all American combat troops. The troop deployments required for this surge, as well as the costs of training and equipping host nation forces were funded by Congressional supplementary budget allocations.\footnote{Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, CRS Report RL33110, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 2, 2010): 2.} With the absence of the Congressional discretionary spending that funded a large portion of the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, budgetary planning and resource allocation will have to take into account additional reorganization, training, and reassignment of resources required for stability and security operations in the future. As the military already organized into a structure that facilitates these types of operations, future costs will focus on maintaining the established capability of conducting security and support operations.

Many military strategists argue that defense funding should focus more on specialized equipment needed for stability and support operations rather than on high-tech, costly conventional military equipment. Gates captures this sentiment by stating, “A given ship or aircraft, no matter how capable, can be in only one place at one time.”\footnote{Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” 34.}

He goes on to explain that the existing military procurement processes favor
conventional, high-tech equipment, while it is just as necessary, and potentially more cost-effective, to build numbers of equipment such as up-armored Humvees, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) programs.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, while conventional warfare requires a budget focused on high-tech weapons and other military materiel, an increased focus on irregular warfare would shift resource allocation toward tactical equipment and programs associated with ISR. Future planning can accommodate a combination of both types of warfare capabilities, however. Referring to Gates’ quote above, budget planners could slightly decrease or simply not opt to increase certain conventional warfare capabilities. Instead of allocating funds for a costly battleship or fighter jet that would increase conventional warfare capabilities only marginally, for example, budgetary planners could expend that money on several Humvees, MRAPs, or ISR capabilities, significantly contributing to an increased ability to conduct security and stability operations.

\textit{Counterinsurgency}

Counterinsurgency is arguably one of the most hotly debated topics among contemporary military scholars and strategists. Although this paper will not debate the merits and drawbacks of counterinsurgency, the fact remains that this strategy has become entrenched U.S. military operations in the past decade and must be considered when looking at costs and resource allocation. At its core, the goal of counterinsurgency is to deny the enemy support by winning the trust and loyalty of the local population. This is a time- and resource-intensive strategy, as it requires constant presence among the local population. Secretary Gates iterated that “measures aimed at promoting better

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
governance, economic programs that spur development and efforts to address the grievances of the discontented, from which terrorists recruit” must take precedence over military kinetic operations whenever possible.\(^{83}\) Nagl and Burton discuss the proposal that civilian agencies would be responsible for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, including nation-building activities. Despite efforts to build the necessary capabilities within civilian agencies, such as the State Department, they conclude that the military currently maintains the most substantial ability to conduct these efforts.\(^{84}\)

Counterinsurgency efforts are a key component of irregular warfare, but they can be extremely costly, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reynolds accepts that counterinsurgency efforts are a key component of irregular warfare, but warns against using conventional forces for this purpose, citing the extremely high costs of deployments as a reason.\(^{85}\) Like Reynolds, Floersheim recognizes the necessity of counterinsurgency elements within irregular warfare, particularly training host nation military and security forces. His recommendation calls for a restructuring and expansion of Army training procedures and commands for both active duty and reserve units to ensure that the Army’s own soldiers have the skills necessary to train foreign troops.\(^{86}\) Michael Horowitz and Dan Shalmon likewise focus on the training aspect of conducting counterinsurgency operations, arguing that an adjustment in U.S. military culture is needed as much if not more than increased funding in order for counterinsurgency efforts to succeed.\(^{87}\)

\(^{83}\) Ibid., 29.  
\(^{84}\) Nagl and Burton, “Dirty Windows and Burning Houses,” 94.  
\(^{85}\) Reynolds, “What Comes Next?” 36.  
\(^{86}\) Floersheim, “Forging the Future,” 484.  
\(^{87}\) Horowitz and Shalmon, “The Future of War,” 315.
To avoid the expense incurred by large numbers of forward-deployed conventional forces while still maintaining the ability to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations, Carter Malkasian and J. Kael Weston advocate small, elite military teams living and working with the local population. Focusing on the current situation in Afghanistan and approach to U.S. withdrawal, they acknowledge that Afghan government would likely be unable to maintain security in the country if the U.S. pulled out completely, potentially undermining the efforts of the U.S. in the past decade. In order to prevent this outcome while simultaneously taking into account the current constrained fiscal environment in the U.S., the authors propose leaving these small, elite military advisory teams in Afghanistan after the broader U.S. military drawdown scheduled for 2014. These teams would serve as advisors to Afghan security forces, and would live and work among their Afghan counterparts. Their withdrawal would be gradual and steady in order to ease the security transition at a manageable cost to the U.S. The increased emphasis on this element of irregular warfare reduces the costs required for troop deployment and eliminates operating costs for large military bases, thereby reducing the overall funds needed to fulfill strategic military objectives.

*Special Operations*

As a key component of irregular warfare, special operations have increased markedly in the past decade. Gates cites the increase in Special Operations Forces (SOF) funding and personnel as one of the major strides the military has made in the post-9/11 era. The increased visibility and importance of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is a further example of the

establishment of SOF as a cornerstone of irregular warfare, as Melillo notes. He also mentions the shift of certain tasks for which SOF was previously responsible to conventional units in order to allow SOF to focus on its specialized missions.90

Due to SOF elements’ ability to conduct specialized missions accurately and efficiently, they are often viewed as more cost-effective than conventional forces. Reynolds argues for continued increases in funding for SOF, reasoning that they can “do more with less,” thereby demonstrating higher efficiency. He contrasts the relatively low budget for USSOCOM with astronomical funding apportioned for procurement and technology costs for the services, primarily for conventional warfare capabilities.91 Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman hold a similar view of the cost–effectiveness of SOF. While they argue for an overall reduction in U.S. defense spending, they acknowledge that SOF can adequately handle the most important U.S. defense missions. Consequently, Adams and Leatherman advocate a smaller, more focused military in order to reduce budgets without compromising U.S. security.92 SOF elements are a crucial component of the lower cost counterinsurgency strategy proposed by Makalsian and Weston because they would be capable of conducting counterterrorism missions and support operations for Afghan security forces when needed, rather than maintaining a large conventional military for these functions.93

93 Ibid., 120.
The Future of Irregular Warfare

The three factors discussed above set the stage for examining the implications for resource allocation and budgetary planning necessitated by the shift from conventional to irregular warfare. In order for this discussion to be accurate, however, one must assume that this shift will continue after the conclusion of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nagl and Burton accept that this will be the case, as conventional military threats to the U.S. have not increased while the demand for counterinsurgency and stability operations has remained at the forefront of defense operations in the post-9/11 era.94 While Tucker and Conroy do not necessarily disagree that irregular warfare will not dominate future conflicts, they worry that the expertise needed to maintain U.S. conventional warfare superiority is quickly disappearing from today’s Army, as training favors irregular warfare missions, as mentioned above.95 Regardless of the caveats they may add, most defense experts recognize that elements of irregular warfare are here to stay in one form or another, and the U.S. military must prepare to accommodate it.

The discussion of the three elements of irregular warfare outlined above sets the stage to examine the relationship between U.S. costs of defense and the increased emphasis on this type of warfare. Given that the majority of defense experts expect irregular warfare to persist to at least some degree in future military planning, strategy, and operations, the above information indicates that resource allocation and costs will shift accordingly. Therefore, the case study will seek to determine how the shift from conventional to irregular warfare affects U.S. defense spending planning and resource allocation.

95 Tucker and Conroy, “Maintaining the Combat Edge,” 15.
Case Study: Comparing the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

In order to understand how the shift to irregular warfare has influenced defense budgetary planning, one must consider the changes in resource allocation. One could compare the defense budgets of two representative years, but this would not accurately capture ongoing trends. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, much of the funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars came in the form of supplemental funding, so looking at the budget without also taking into account the resources funded by these supplemental appropriations would provide a skewed analysis. Additionally, portions of the defense budget are classified, which prevents the comparison of specific items.

The best way to understand the budgetary implications resulting from the shift from conventional to irregular warfare is to compare defense budget planning recommendations that drive the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which projects estimated costs for defense programs over a five-year period. These recommendations are presented in congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), so by examining the evolution of QDRs over time and comparing the differences between them, one can better understand the how shifts in U.S. defense policy and strategic paradigms affect resource allocation and budget planning.

When the Cold War ended, the United States suddenly had no clear objective around which to base its military strategy and spending. As a result, Congress called for a full-scale reassessment of defense strategy and priorities in order to guide defense programming, operational planning and budgets. The first of these assessments was the

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1990 Base Force Analysis, which was followed by the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. In
1997, Congress passed legislation mandating regular assessments, now known as
Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), to occur in the year following the U.S. presidential
election. These reviews examine current defense strategy and programs and attempt to
forecast the future course of defense priorities for the next 20 years.\textsuperscript{97} Not surprisingly, however, current U.S. defense posture is strikingly different from that envisioned in the
1993 Bottom-Up Review’s 20-year projection.

The situations under which the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR were
conducted are similar in a few significant ways. Both of these reviews were released two
years after the peak year of the wars by which they were influenced. That is to say, the
peak year of the Persian Gulf War, which represents the focus on conventional warfare,
occurred in 1991, and the peak year of the post-9/11 conflicts occurred in 2008.\textsuperscript{98} Given
this timeframe, it is logical to conclude that the respective wars influenced the
recommendations and analyses set forth in each of the reviews, a fact acknowledged
within each of the documents. Additionally, each of the Reviews was conducted in the
face of declining defense budgets and White House direction to reduce overall military
spending levels. As a result, they both examine how to increase efficiency of existing
defense assets and invest wisely in future capabilities in order to remain capable of
defending U.S. strategic national interests and responding to potential future threats.

Although similar in some respects, the conditions under which both Reviews were
conducted also differed in some significant aspects. The Bottom-Up Review was
produced at a time where quadrennial reviews were not mandatory, and although the

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{98} Daggett, \textit{Costs of Major U.S. Wars}, 2.
Base Force Analysis had been released in 1990, there was no established procedure or structure for producing this kind of review. The 2010 QDR, however, was written in accordance with the requirement of the 1997 law mandating quadrennial reviews, and it followed the process established by its three predecessors. Furthermore, the recommendations and reviews of the Bottom-Up Review followed the United States’ involvement in a war in Iraq the first time, a war that was fought with conventional means and strategies. The 2010 QDR, on the other hand, was conducted while the United States was fighting in Iraq for a second time, this time engaged in a conflict that was more irregular than conventional.

The 1993 Bottom-Up Review was conducted largely because the United States found itself for the first time in decades without a known threat to guide its defense policy and posture. The Cold War mentality continued to dominate defense planning, however, and it is reflected in all aspects of the Bottom-Up Review. The Review followed soon after the Persian Gulf War, a conflict that epitomizes modern conventional warfare. Consequently, the analyses, assessments, and recommendations set forth in the Review have a distinctly conventional outlook. Given this focus, the Bottom-Up Review will serve as the basis for understanding the force structure, costs and implications associated with conventional warfare in this case study.

As outlined above, since the beginning of the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. defense policy has shifted from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare. This shift is evident in the content of the 2010 QDR, which includes the three aforementioned aspects of irregular warfare – security and stability operations,
counterinsurgency, and Special Operations – as key initiatives in rebalancing the force. As a result, the 2010 QDR will represent the irregular warfare considerations within this comparison.

This study will examine the defense themes reflected in each of the reviews and analyze the resource allocation and budget structure associated with these themes. The study will also compare the projected future budgets for the FYDP each Review recommends, as well as the areas of growth within each FYDP. By comparing the recommendations and analyses of these two Reviews, one can understand the resource and budget differences between conventional and irregular warfare.

The 1993 Bottom-Up Review

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted in 1993 to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed for the U.S. military in a post-Cold War world. The Review mentions several key lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm, and it focuses its strategy on countering nuclear dangers, regional dangers, dangers to democratic reform, and dangers to American economic prosperity. The recommendations set forth in the Review are consistent with a continued focus on conventional warfare. The main premises of the defense strategy are to keep U.S. forces ready to fight, to sustain the quality of military personnel, and to maintain the technical superiority of U.S. military weapons and equipment, to which it attributes American success in Operation Desert Storm. Recognizing the need for budget restraint, the Review nonetheless adopts as a

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101 Ibid., 10-11.
key tenet the need for a balanced modernization program. Based on the objectives and strategy, the Review called for the force structure outlined in Table 1 to be reached by 1999.

**Table 1: 1993 Bottom-Up Review Force Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions 1 5+ Reserve Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>11 Active Aircraft Carriers 1 Reserve/Training Aircraft Carrier 45-55 Attack Submarines 346 Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings 7 Reserve Fighter Wings Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 Active Personnel 42,000 Reserve Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Nuclear Forces</td>
<td>18 Ballistic Missile Submarines  Up to 94 B-52H Bombers 20 B-2 Bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addressing force modernization, the Bottom-Up Review focuses on the following programs: theater air forces, attack and reconnaissance helicopters, ballistic missile defense, aircraft carriers, attack submarines, space launch, military satellite communications, and V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. Citing the effectiveness of air operations in the Persian Gulf War, the Review describes the need for modernization and replacement of aging combat aircraft including the A-6 Intruder, F-15C/D Eagle, F-16A/B Fighting Falcon, and the F-14A/D Tomcat. After examining the requirements, programs and operational capabilities, the Review sets forth its decisions to proceed with

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102 Ibid., 11-12.
103 Ibid., 28.
104 Ibid., 34.
105 Ibid., 35.
development and procurement of both F/A-18 E/F and the F-22, retire the A-6, cancel the A/F-X and the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF), and terminate production of the F-16. The Review takes a similar approach when considering modernization of Army attack and reconnaissance helicopters, deemed essential to “conduct the fast-paced maneuver-type warfare [expected] to dominate future conflicts.” The recommendation for this modernization focuses on fielding and procuring the RAH-66 Comanche, and the AH-64 C/D with Longbow, the justification of this option being the enhanced capability these systems provide for a reasonable cost. The Review also advises spending approximately $18 billion over the FYDP for ballistic missile defense, and directs funding for a new aircraft carrier and attack submarines as part of modernization efforts. This modernization decisions demonstrate a shift in Cold War thinking and acceptance of decreasing military spending, but they also show a persistent focus on conventional warfare.

Another key component of the Bottom-Up Review is the emphasis on reserve component forces. The Review has a favorable opinion of reserve forces, attributing much of the success of the Persian Gulf War to the commitment, dedication, and professionalism of these forces. Although recognizing the importance of reserve forces, the Review proposes reductions in size or consolidation of missions across the services to better meet the requirements of a post-Cold War military.

In addition to outlining key modernization and strategy changes, the Bottom-Up Review considers the economic costs and savings that accompany its recommendations.

106 Ibid., 37-38.
107 Ibid., 39.
108 Ibid., 42.
109 Ibid., 48, 54, 57.
110 Ibid., 93.
The Review was conducted to develop a strategic framework for reduction in defense spending, specifically to identify ways to reduce the $1.325 trillion baseline cost of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for 1995-1999 to reach the Clinton administration’s target goal of $1.221 trillion. The recommendations of the Review trimmed the proposed FYDP 1995-1999 budget by $91 billion dollars in adjustments to the FYDP for 1995-1999, savings that included $24 billion cut from force structure and $32 from recommendations related to modernization and investment.111

The Bottom-Up Review’s focus on high-tech acquisition and maintenance of conventional military capabilities exemplify the mindset of the U.S. defense planners and policymakers following the Cold War. Because no one had been exposed to conflicts like those that would be conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan nearly a decade later, the Review projected a somewhat reduced force designed to counter any threats through maintaining superior conventional capabilities. It was this mindset that influenced the planning for the “fast-paced maneuver-type warfare” mentioned above that would largely fall by the wayside in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2010 QDR was conducted in the height of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The recommendations and themes found in the 2010 QDR are significantly different than those of the Bottom-Up Review, in large part due to the shift away from conventional warfare toward irregular warfare. The QDR further differs from the Bottom-Up Review in that the United State was still heavily embroiled in conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010, whereas in 1993 they had emerged the clear victor of the

111 Ibid., 107-108.
Persian Gulf War. These factors are reflected in the stark differences between many aspects of the two Reviews.

The contrast between the Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR is evident as early as the second paragraph of the Executive Summary of the QDR, which includes phrases such as “strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces” and “advise, train, and support Iraqi security forces,” and which mentions “allies and partners” twice. The objectives it sets forth, however, echo those included the Bottom-Up Review – to rebalance and reform the military in order to provide the United States with adequate defense capabilities while considering the economic implications of doing so.\textsuperscript{112} Like the Bottom-Up Review, the 2010 QDR sets forth recommendations to guide the FYDP, in this case for fiscal years 2011-2015. The force structure it recommends is summarized in Table 2 below.\textsuperscript{113}

**Table 2: 2010 QDR Recommended Force Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>4 Corps headquarters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Division headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (45 Active and 28 Reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) (13 Active and 8 Reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Patriot battalions</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>10-11 Aircraft Carriers and 10 carrier air wings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53-55 Attack Submarines and 4 Guided Missile Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>225–256 Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126 – 171 land-based ISR and EW aircraft (manned and unmanned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 maritime prepositioning squadrons</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 – 32 Airlift and Aerial Refueling Wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wing equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 – 11 Theater Strike Wing-equivalents</td>
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\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 46-47.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
<td>Long-range Strike (bomber) wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Air Superiority Wing-equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Command and Control Wings and 5 fully operational Air and Space Operations Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Space and Cyberspace Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>3 Marine Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Marine Divisions (3 Active and 1 Reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 infantry regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 artillery regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups, 4 support groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces(^{114})</td>
<td>Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments [OADs])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Ranger battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This structure is more detailed than that contained in the 1993 Review, breaking force structures down into smaller components. To explain the difference in Army force layout, recall that the Army changed its structure from division-based, which was effective for conventional warfare, to a brigade-based expeditionary force necessary for achieving success in irregular warfare.\(^{115}\) This shift in missions explains the change in force structure for most of the service branches. The Navy has maintained similar projected numbers of carriers and submarines and decreased numbers of other ships, but increased ISR assets. Likewise, the Air Force projected fighter and bomber capabilities are comparable between the two years, but the proposed increase in ISR and other

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\(^{114}\) In contrast to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, nuclear forces are not included in the QDR, while Special Operations Forces are broken out into a separate category. Nuclear forces are addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review, which serves as a supplement to the QDR (QDR 2010: 47).

\(^{115}\) Tucker and Conroy, “Maintaining the Combat Edge,” 8.
mission support capabilities is consistent with irregular warfare functions. The breakdown of specific units within the Marine Corps rather than the numbers of personnel included in the Bottom-Up Review is consistent with the various roles the Marine Corps plays in irregular warfare missions. Moreover, the inclusion of Special Operations Forces as a separate category also demonstrates the focus on the function they perform, which is a key component of irregular warfare, as discussed above. Overall, budget recommendations indicate U.S. military planners intend to maintain (but not significantly increase) conventional capabilities while also placing more emphasis on those military components required for success in irregular warfare.

The 2010 QDR acknowledges the continued superior combat capabilities of the U.S. military, but it also focuses on the roles and responsibilities that accompany that distinction in the international system. This exemplifies the idea that U.S. core strategic objectives can remain the same while the paradigm for fulfilling them – in this case, irregular vs. conventional warfare – can change dramatically within a few years. The QDR uses the term “hybrid” war to discuss the myriad new strategies that enemies might cultivate in order to circumvent the superiority of American conventional warfare capabilities. In order to maintain American military superiority as well as the ability to defend the homeland, then, adaptability and flexibility are paramount to U.S. defense strategy. This is reflected in the four key strategic objectives laid out in the QDR: 1) prevail in today’s conflicts, 2) prevent and deter conflict, 3) prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and 4) preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer force. Although these objectives could be applied to both conventional and

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117 Ibid., 11.
irregular wars, the 2010 QDR moves away from basing objectives and force structure on the ability to fight two major regional wars, and instead broadens the scope to the possibility of facing various scenarios.\textsuperscript{118}

Given that it was conducted while the United States was deeply involved in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2010 QDR accordingly presents recommendations and analyses for both homeland defense and overseas operations. Moreover, it acknowledges that the recommendations serve as the basis for further defense reform and restructure in the future, even after the 2011-2015 FYDP.\textsuperscript{119} Homeland defense initiatives presented in the QDR include reorganizing consequence management response forces, enhancing capabilities for domain awareness, accelerating the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities.\textsuperscript{120} The core of the study however, remains focused on the U.S. military functions vis-à-vis foreign enemies and aggressors.

The QDR focuses many of its recommendations on succeeding in counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations as well as building the capacity of partner states, particularly through security force assistance (SFA) missions. The goal of SFA missions is to train host security forces so that they become wholly responsible for the security of their country, thereby significantly reducing or even eliminating the need for the presence of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{121} The recommendations included in the Review are quite robust, consisting of changes in methods and procedures as well as

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 28.
\end{flushright}
additional technical equipment and capabilities. It is clear from the detail and recurring themes within the QDR that these types of operations are the way ahead for the U.S. military, and the force rebalancing will reflect this across the spectrum of military planning for the foreseeable future.

On the strategy and methodological side, the QDR advocates expanding intelligence, analysis, and targeting capabilities, which are essential to counterinsurgency and special operations missions. This expansion includes additional manpower, training and support systems for collection, dissemination, and analysis of information. Many of these capabilities will appear in units that provide organic combat support to special operations forces, including logistics, communications, information support, and forensic and intelligence analysis. Other requirements include active-duty civil affairs forces and enhanced language and regional expertise within the military, which will assist in both counterinsurgency operations and SFA missions. The QDR cites the Department of Defense’s (DoD) $33 million investment in language training detachments for general forces and $14 million for Special Forces language training as evidence of this. Overall, these changes require a reevaluation of personnel management practices, professional military education, and career development pathways.

In terms of technical equipment, the QDR calls for an increase in both fixed- and rotary-wing assets and AC-103 gunships. These aircraft are essential for transporting and resupplying troops in the remote locations often associated with counterinsurgency efforts, training partner forces, and providing combat support to special operations forces. Additionally, countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

122 Ibid., 22-23.
123 Ibid., 24.
124 Ibid., 29.
requires additional airborne electronic warfare (EW) platforms such as the C-130, E/A-18G, and the EA-13B aircraft, and manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are necessary for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).  

The 2010 QDR does address threats from hostile nation-states that the U.S. would traditionally counter with conventional warfare capabilities. It outlines specific nation-states that could pose a threat to the United States with advanced conventional or nuclear weapons and it considers certain vulnerabilities the United States faces as a result. The section of the QDR that discusses this threat, however, is noticeably smaller and less detailed than other elements discussed above. Moreover, the recommendations set forth lack the specificity observed in other sections of the QDR, and the programs are discussed in a vague, non-committal nature. The threat is not ignored completely, but the efforts associated with countering it are continuations of existing programs rather than innovative solutions or proposals for new equipment or capabilities. 

Shift in Resource and Budget Allocations

As seen from the discussion about the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. defense costs and resource allocation shifted dramatically during this time period. Both reviews seek to eliminate superfluous programs and materiel in order to cut the overall budget, but that is about the extent of the similarities between the two studies. The Bottom-Up Review focused on downsizing the U.S. military in the wake of the Cold Ware while maintaining overall military superiority in conventional warfare capabilities. Citing specific order of battle and force structure rather than broad ideas or strategies, the Review barely addressed cooperation with allies.

\[125\] Ibid., 21-23, 30.
\[126\] Ibid., 32-34.
or advising and training roles for the military in partner nations. This is obvious in the message from the Secretary of Defense that serves as the foreword to the Review; the message refers to maintaining capabilities to fight and win major regional conflicts, improving strategic mobility, enhancing anti-armor capabilities and overall continuing to project superior American military might around the world.127

On the other hand, the 2010 QDR consistently refers to partner nations, allies, and international cooperation in its recommendations. While it, too, recognizes the need to maintain sufficient combat capabilities, this Review highlights efforts to prevent conflicts through international engagement and assistance as well as training host nation security forces to take control of their own defense. This is evident in the message from the Secretary of Defense at the beginning of the 2010 QDR, which takes a much different tone than that which prefaces the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. The message in 2010 acknowledges that the QDR reflects the wartime environment, but whereas the Secretary recognizes the need for conventional and strategic military modernization programs, he also emphasizes the “importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners.” Both of these elements compose the “broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict” that the Secretary deems essential to managing the wartime threat environment.128

A comparison of the force structures presented in both the Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR as recommendations for the FYDP provides good insight into the effect the shift from conventional to irregular warfare has had on resource allocation.

Although the 2010 QDR does recommend forces and equipment needed for conventional capabilities, the quantities are not substantially greater than those recommended in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. For example, the number of aircraft carriers and attack submarines remains largely unchanged, and the number of ships actually decreases slightly. If conventional wars were predicted to increase or remain at the center of U.S. defense policy and planning, one would expect a noticeable increase in the numbers recommended for these capabilities, as they would constitute the backbone of American military doctrine.

The fact that conventional warfare capabilities have remained relatively constant for almost two decades of FYDP planning indicates that even if defense planners do not expect conventional warfare to disappear, they anticipate budget priorities to more closely align with irregular warfare-related efforts. The breakdown of the 2010 and projected 2020 defense budgets in Figure 1 below reinforces this idea. If conventional warfare capabilities were expected to increase, the projected Acquisitions portion of the budget would likely remain closer to current levels rather than shrinking by 2020. The increase in Operations and Maintenance is consistent with maintaining but not increasing conventional capabilities, as well as reflecting the irregular warfare focus.
Although the base amount of equipment recommended for conventional capabilities is relatively constant over the two Reviews, the 2010 QDR includes many additional capabilities designed for irregular warfare capabilities. For example, it recommends additional ISR assets for both the Air Force and Navy. This begs the question, then, about the cost implications of this recommendation. While the

conventional military capabilities (i.e. aircraft carriers, attack submarines, etc.) have expensive price tags, the only cost they incur at this point are operation and maintenance purposes, since they are already present in U.S. military arsenals. The fact that the QDR maintains overall levels of this equipment means that new purchases and acquisitions are likely used for irregular warfare-related costs. When these conventional capabilities are no longer functional, will policymakers continue to focus on resources associated with irregular warfare? If not, how will they decide which item has priority? Additionally, with the conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as U.S. economic troubles at home, budgets are likely going to become tighter in future years, forcing U.S. defense planners to choose between these capabilities. Because the shift toward irregular warfare has occurred during wartime and has been funded largely by budgetary supplementals, there is no reliable way of predicting how the U.S. military will balance the costs or determine how to allocate resources during peacetime.

The comparison between the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the 2010 QDR demonstrates that a change in the allocation of resources and budgetary planning for defense has occurred in the past almost two decades. Given the capabilities and strategies reflected in the most current QDR that focus on security operations, greater ISR capabilities, and expansion of special operations missions, this change is supports the observation of a shift from conventional toward irregular warfare and countering asymmetric threats described in the opening of this chapter.
Conclusion

The nature of the post-9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the shift from conventional toward irregular warfare in U.S. defense strategy. These conflicts relied heavily on the three core elements of irregular warfare: security and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and special operations forces. While U.S. defense experts disagree about the degree to which the United States should forego its conventional capabilities in favor of developing and increasing those associated with irregular warfare, most concur that future conflicts in which the United States becomes involved will entail at least some aspects of irregular warfare necessary to counter asymmetric threats. Consequently, U.S. defense budget planning and resource allocation will continue to focus on programs and equipment designed for irregular warfare operations. Rather than increasing conventional weapons, such as fighter aircraft and attack submarines, defense spending allows for greater numbers of tactical equipment and ISR assets, as well as more training and cultural programs for military personnel.

As the United States has not planned for peacetime budgets since the increased focus on irregular warfare, the overall cost of this shift away from conventional warfare is not yet fully evident. U.S. defense policymakers were able to build irregular warfare capabilities with budget supplementals allocated for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so they have not yet had to balance conventional and irregular warfare capabilities in the overall defense budget. It is likely, however, that the overall cost of defense will decrease because of the lower costs associated with the primary elements of irregular warfare, as presented above. For example, it is less expensive to increase the number of MRAPs and Humvees than it is to procure tanks. Similarly, investment in language and
cultural training for military personnel will pay more long-term dividends than procuring an additional battleship or fighter jet. Future military operations may not involve the exact same missions and conditions U.S. troops experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they will very likely be focused on countering asymmetric threats that will require resources that fall outside the focus of conventional warfare.

Although some elements of irregular warfare, such as counterinsurgency missions, are manpower intensive, these costs occur primarily only in times of conflict and are not incurred during times of peace. This can be seen in the current projections of reduced troop levels over the next few years. With the counterinsurgency missions in Afghanistan drawing to a close, the U.S. military can afford to reduce its forces while maintaining the ability to ensure strategic defense priorities. Should the United States become involved in a conflict necessitating counterinsurgency operations in the future, however, it can rebuild the necessary troop strengths without needlessly incurring the costs of maintaining high troop levels at all times. Thus, even in cases where the initial cost of irregular warfare capabilities is high, the long-term costs are generally lower. Irregular warfare, which will continue to be present in U.S. military doctrine and planning, will require less funding to achieve U.S. strategic objectives, and will contribute to reduced costs of defense in the long run.
CHAPTER 3: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

Introduction

As with other elements of U.S. strategic defense policy, the first decade of the twenty-first saw an enormous shift in U.S. strategic intelligence planning and priorities. The September 11 terrorist attacks enraged the American public and caught U.S. policymakers and military officials off-guard, prompting a substantial overhaul of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Scholars and policymakers alike had previously noted the need to reform the outdated Cold War-focused strategic intelligence paradigm in the United States, but the 9/11 attacks provided the impetus for doing so. As a result, today’s IC looks much different from the U.S. intelligence apparatus in place in 2001, and the reforms have consequently affected American strategic intelligence planning.

U.S. strategic intelligence planning refers to the national-level coordination and allocation of intelligence resources and capabilities to determine and mitigate the highest priority threats to U.S. national security and protect U.S. national interests. Although there are aspects of national security that are outside the DoD scope, strategic intelligence planning directly relates to U.S. strategic defense policy through a common and interrelated focus on countering threats to the United States and safeguarding U.S. national interests.

The Congressional Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2011 assumed initial responsibility for investigating the performance of U.S. intelligence organizations regarding the events of 9/11, and it released its findings and recommendations in
December 2002. Yielding to demand for a thorough, independent investigation into the factors that contributed to the attacks, Congress and President George W. Bush created the bipartisan, independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Among the Commission’s several recommendations for IC reforms based on identified intelligence failures was the establishment of a national director of intelligence. Congress enacted many of these recommendations through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), including creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The authorities granted to the DNI by IRTPA, however, were much weaker than those envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, prompting vigorous debate among national policymakers, intelligence and military officials, and other national defense experts.

Vigorous debate notwithstanding, the DNI is currently a key player in the structure of the IC, responsible for many strategic intelligence planning duties and decisions. In addition to this new IC structure, the U.S. strategic intelligence focus today is also very different than it was at the time of the 9/11 attacks, and consequently, so are strategic intelligence considerations. Although many scholars have explored the various merits and drawbacks of the creation of the DNI, few have questioned the relationship between this position and the current strategic planning model. In an effort to address this issue, this chapter will explore the following research question: How did the creation of the DNI affect the U.S. strategic intelligence planning paradigm?

The main argument set forth herein determines that the DNI is able to better formulate strategic intelligence planning guidance across the IC than was his predecessor, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), by virtue of the tools and responsibilities
inherent in the DNI position. He uses the tools at his disposal, particularly the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), to prioritize intelligence requirements in such a way as to allow for both long-term, standing intelligence needs as well as short-term, unanticipated strategic intelligence requirements. Although intelligence is inexact by nature, this system allows the DNI to allocate resources and focus analytical efforts on issues that are of highest priority to the IC, while maintaining flexibility to respond to international incidents as necessary. This ability, combined with the improvement in analysis across the IC and other DNI initiatives, positions the IC as a whole to better prevent strategic surprise and counter threats to U.S national interests in the future.

The author will first explore the prevailing literature surrounding the factors affecting the creation of the DNI, as well as the performance of the position to date. It will then draw upon the DNI’s use of his “sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities,”\(^\text{130}\) the NIPF, to compare the current strategic intelligence planning process with that in place prior to 9/11, namely the process and priorities enumerated by President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD 35). In doing so, the author will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each method to determine the effectiveness of the NIPF as a tool for strategic intelligence planning, and how the DNI relies upon it for this planning process. Finally, the chapter will present an analysis of the implications of these conclusions for strategic intelligence planning in the future.

\(^\text{130}\) Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, Intelligence Community Directive Number 204 (2007), 2.
The Path to Intelligence Reform and the Creation of the DNI

The creation and performance of the DNI and the intelligence reform efforts that led to the establishment of this office provide the basis for some of the most contentious debates among contemporary intelligence scholars and practitioners today. Although discussions surrounding this office reflect a few common themes, the views of experts in the intelligence field vary regarding the specific factors and processes that led to its creation. Likewise, assessments of its performance and prognostications for the future are far from uniform in their analyses. This literature review will explore the viewpoints surrounding the creation and performance to date of the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in order to assess holistically its impact on and role in strategic intelligence planning.

The idea of creating a national director of intelligence was broached long before publication of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker traces the roots of the call for a centralized intelligence director to 1955, after which time it was repeatedly advocated, particularly in the wake of the Cold War. Tucker cites bureaucratic and political resistance as reasons the proposal failed each time it was presented, even with backing from influential individuals or political bodies.131 Amy Zegart offers a detailed discussion of the various pre-9/11 government commissions and studies that, according to her research, offered 340 recommendations to improve intelligence capabilities across the board.132 Arthur Hulnick similarly dates the recommendation for a DNI to the beginning of the Cold War, but remains unconvinced

this course of action is necessary, observing, “Every investigation of U.S. intelligence cannot help but conclude that the system is unworkable as now constituted. Yet, it seems to function in spite of its complexity, bureaucracy, and lines of command.” Indeed, few reforms advocated in the post-9/11 period had not been suggested previously, and there remained staunch critics of many aspects of reform.

Despite historical failure and vocal opposition from some scholars, many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, including the creation of the DNI, were implemented through IRTPA. So why did intelligence reform come to fruition in the post-9/11 period when it had failed so often in the past? The Commission’s findings exposed the poor quality of intelligence collection and analysis that led to “intelligence failures,” the lack of coordination both among the agencies within the IC and between the IC and law enforcement elements, the absence of central oversight regarding the activities and efforts of IC members. These primary factors drove many of the IRTPA provisions, including the creation of the DNI, although scholars vary in their emphasis of one factor over another. Additionally, the political climate at the time of IRTPA’s creation was such that intelligence reform was a key issue, a significant reason this reform effort succeeded where previous efforts had not.

Policy and Intelligence Failures

Some scholars attribute at least some of the blame for the 9/11 attacks and failure to accurately assess Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program as policy failure as much as an intelligence failure. At the beginning of their thorough examination of

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intelligence reform and the creation of the DNI, John Negroponte, who served as the first DNI, and Edward Wittenstein acknowledge that the IC shouldered an unfair portion of the blame for these events, and they assert that, “intelligence is not a substitute for sound diplomatic and defense policy.” Richard Betts also recognizes the importance of differentiating between policy and intelligence failures, and he highlights the potential for politicization in the debate between the two. These men, however, are undeniably in the minority when citing policy decisions as a contributing cause to the cataclysmic events of 9/11 and the erroneous assessment of Iraq WMDs.

The majority of scholarly work addressing intelligence reform and the creation of the DNI cites the events of 9/11 and the search for WMD in Iraq as the driving events behind the reform of the IC. In contrast to Negroponte and Wittenstein’s attempt to divide the blame between policy failures and intelligence failures, Richard Russell summarizes bluntly that “America’s intelligence performance in assessing Iraq’s WMD programs in the run-up to the 2003 war was… arguably one of the greatest intelligence failures since the CIA’s inception in 1947.” Russell tepidly applauds efforts to reform the IC, but argues that these reforms do not address the real problem, which he characterizes as “pathetically poor human intelligence and shoddy analysis primarily produced by the CIA.” Although his article deals with one particular agency, he advocates a change in institutional culture and business practices to address intelligence shortcomings, rather than a total restructure of the IC.

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137 Ibid., 478.
Lack of Coordination

Some assessments, such as that presented in Richard Harknett and James Stever’s “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” conclude that the driving factor was the need to bring domestic and foreign intelligence entities together to create an integrated homeland security component. In their discussion of IRTPA and the resulting reforms, the authors acknowledge that, although terrorism threats prompted changes in the IC, the reforms focused on a wider scope of homeland security threats. Combating homeland security threats required a fusion of domestic and foreign intelligence, responsibility for which, prior to 9/11, resided in separate agencies with little if any collaboration.\footnote{138} Former DNI Mike McConnell deems the integration of domestic and foreign intelligence one of the most important responsibilities of the DNI, and even those who are otherwise critical of the Congressional recommendations generally recognize the importance of the homeland security aspect of intelligence reform.\footnote{139}

One of the most often cited factors for the creation of the position of the DNI is the “stovepiping” that dominated the IC culture prior to reform efforts. Harknett and Stever characterize the pre-reform IC as having an “individual-unit bureaucratic, silo-like orientation,” which prevented individual actors from pooling their efforts to adequately identify and prioritize strategic intelligence gaps.\footnote{140} Along the same lines, Zegart believes that many of the pre-9/11 intelligence failures stemmed from “organizational routines and cultures that are highly resistant to change,” and many of the failures could have been avoided had certain agencies been less internally focused and more willing to

\footnote{139}Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 51.
\footnote{140}Harknett and Stever, “Struggle to Reform,” 700.
work together.\textsuperscript{141} In fact, the 9/11 Commission report lists “structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work” as the first of the problems indicating a need to restructure the IC.\textsuperscript{142} Although some scholars argue that the stovepiping issue would eventually be resolved through greater information sharing efforts aided by technological advances, this failure to share information was one of the primary factors in advancing the creation of the DNI.\textsuperscript{143}

\textit{Oversight and Management of the IC}

Prior to the creation of the DNI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was dual-hatted as both the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the director of the entire national intelligence apparatus. Although the suggestion to separate these two positions surfaced recurrently for decades, only after 9/11 did this idea become reality with the creation of the DNI. In its published report, the 9/11 Commission outlined in detail the challenges the DCI faced prior to the creation of the DNI. Citing the three jobs the DCI had – running the CIA, managing the “loose confederation of agencies that is the intelligence community,” and serving as principal intelligence advisor to the president – the Commission acknowledges that “no recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively.”\textsuperscript{144} Furthermore, the responsibility that was most often neglected was management of the IC, primarily because the DCI lacked strong authorities to carry out this task. Citing his interactions with then-DCI George Tenet, Michael Hayden

\textsuperscript{141} Zegart, “September 11,” 110.
\textsuperscript{143} Michael A. Turner, "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment," \textit{International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence} 18, no. 3 (2005): 391.
refutes this claim that the DCI did not have the authorities needed to perform his job, but he concedes that “the source of his strength (that he was director of the CIA) brought with it inherent limitations.” Hayden further observes that, based on his experience as a CIA director who was not also the DCI, he often wondered how his predecessors handled the many hats they had worn in the pre-IRTPA IC. Hayden’s observations echo those of many experts who reluctantly supported the creation of a DNI, recognizing that this move could potentially succeed in effecting positive intelligence reform. In order to do so, however, the position would need to have very strong authorities over the entire IC, including the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components.

Political Considerations

Other intelligence scholars provide a more situational argument for the outcome of intelligence reform. Recall the observations of Tucker, Hulnick, and Zegart mentioning the myriad attempts at intelligence reform, dating back almost to the IC’s inception. Experts generally agree that the impetus for IRTPA was the failure of the U.S. to predict the 9/11 attacks, but the underlying reason reform succeeded on this occasion when previous efforts failed was an outcome of the situation in Washington in the early 2000s. Whereas the question of intelligence reform had previously affected only Washington, the topic reached the wider American public preceding the presidential election of 2004 when the topic of intelligence failures contributing to the 9/11 attacks and Iraq WMDs became discussion points at the national level. Hayden candidly admits that the IC failed in the difficult but not impossible tasks regarding 9/11 and the Iraq WMD estimate, and he notes that “The American people had forgiven us for getting

some things wrong, but they wanted to see some visible changes.” Likewise, Hulnick’s anecdote about President George Bush announcing the creation of the DNI in response to John Kerry’s call to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations reinforces the idea that national politics were a significant factor in implementing various aspects of intelligence reform at the time.  

Politics surrounding the presidential election was not the only factor creating a situation ideal for intelligence reform. Zegart agrees that reform occurred due to the situation at the time, but rather than citing election politics, she focuses on three factors that created a favorable climate for reform in Washington: the resignation of CIA director, George Tenet, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report severely criticizing the IC’s assessments of Iraq’s WMD capabilities, and the 9/11 Commission’s final report. Negroponte and Wittenstein add “the scale of the 9/11 tragedy, the public nature of the ensuing enquiry, and the invasion of Iraq” to the list of contributing factors. Betts summarizes the importance of the situation regarding intelligence at the time, opining “if there were ever a moment where public demand might overcome the entrenched institutional interests that block radical change, this should be it.” None of these factors was significant enough in isolation to spur intelligence reform, but the aggregation of them created circumstances under which reform, including the creation of a DNI, was all but inevitable.

146 Ibid., 36.
147 Hulnick, “Does the U.S. Intelligence Community Need a DNI?” 710.
148 Zegart, “‘September 11,‘” 108.
Challenges to DNI Creation and Implementation

Although most experts agreed that intelligence reform was necessary in the wake of 9/11 and the search for WMDs in Iraq, the scope and nature of that reform remained a point of contention, particularly when discussing the creation of the DNI. The 9/11 Commission designed the DNI as centralized authority in an independent, national-level position to govern the IC and address shortcomings related to national intelligence. The considerable reluctance of IC members and policy makers to embrace reform, even several years after its implementation, however, demonstrates the controversy that accompanied the creation of this office. As envisioned by the 9/11 Commission and implemented by IRTPA, the DNI has as primary responsibilities overseeing the IC, serving as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, and managing the national intelligence program and overseeing its component agencies.\(^\text{151}\) The authorities granted to this office to carry out these duties, however, became points of contention between intelligence experts, politicians, and policymakers even before passage of IRTPA. The major disputes lie in the scope of the authorities granted to the DNI, including the control it has over budgetary decisions, and the reach of its oversight and its role in the IC.

Scope and Strength of Authorities

Regardless of the acceptance (albeit sometimes reluctant) of intelligence experts to create a DNI, many scholars doubted the feasibility of creating a strong DNI, despite the recognized need for oversight of the IC promulgated by the 9/11 Commission recommendations. The 9/11 Commission identified the authorities the DNI needed to

successfully fulfill its envisioned role as “control over purse strings, the ability to hire or fire senior managers, and the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure and personnel.” Accordingly, the Commission bestowed all three of these authorities upon its vision for a National Intelligence Director who would replace the DCI as principal intelligence advisor to the president and manager of the IC.

Most experts recognized that the DNI’s success depended on his ability to exercise strong authorities over the IC, including the combat support agencies within the DoD – the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Without support over these agencies, as Hayden starkly explains, “there was real danger of Congress creating a leader of the IC who truly had less power than DCIs had historically been able to wield.” In a more realistic assessment, however, Betts highlighted the political challenges of giving a DNI control over DoD intelligence functions, explaining that the military “will never accept dependence on other departments for performance of their core functions, which include tactical intelligence collection, and politicians will not override military protests that their combat effectiveness is being put at risk.”

Negroponte and Wittenstein also discuss the opposition many intelligence components – the CIA and FBI in addition to DoD – expressed to falling under the authority of the DNI. These components were able to influence Congress to the degree that IRTPA became “a consensus piece of legislation that created a DNI position with broad responsibilities but only vague authorities in critical respects.” Similar to this

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view, Turner expressed the concern that the DNI’s level of central oversight would not solve the bureaucratic obstacles inherent in the IC, especially given the “piecemeal nature of the reforms.” Helen Fessenden summarizes the potential manifestation of this concern in her evaluation of Negroponte after his first few months in office: “Concern is growing that [ODNI] is simply another layer of bureaucracy over all agencies rather than a force that can push through necessary structural changes to streamline the intelligence community and foster more accountability.”

Despite the recommendations set forth by the 9/11 Commission and senior intelligence officials such as Hayden, IRTPA created a DNI without strong budgetary and oversight authorities entrenched in the office. In Hayden’s view, political wrangling over the DNI’s control vis-à-vis other cabinet positions caused the legislation to be enacted without specifically defining this authority, instead leaving it open for the President to determine. As a result, and much to Hayden’s chagrin, in 2008 the National Security Council (NSC) rewrote Executive Order 12333 to stipulate that the DNI “shall not abrogate the authorities of various department heads.” Negroponte and Wittenstein echo this view of the legislation’s shortcomings in their observation that “IRTPA stopped far short of creating a position akin to a Secretary of Intelligence.” This lack of inherent authority is perhaps one of the greatest ironies in the evolution of the DNI. As discussed above, the 9/11 Commission advocated separating the roles of the DCI and the DNI largely due to a perceived lack of strong authority that contributed to the DCI’s failure to properly manage the IC prior to 9/11. Because IRTPA avoided granting the

156 Turner, “Intelligence Reform,” 390.
DNI with strong overarching authority across all of the elements of the IC, however, the DNI was not set up for success to accomplish this from its inception.

**Oversight and Role in IC**

In Betts’ astute opinion, it is impossible to avoid all intelligence failures, but the ability to prevent future mistakes “will come less from any structural or procedural tweak than from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of senior officials. How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunately, has never been clear.”

Similarly, Hulnick concedes that there is definite room for improvement in the IC, but he warns against reforms that are simply “hasty cosmetic adjustments.” That said, he also admits the creation of a DNI in conjunction with other carefully crafted steps “might help shift the U.S. intelligence system away from its lingering Cold War mentality to new thinking.”

Russell’s view toward the creation of the DNI and other 9/11 Commission recommendations, however, is much harsher. Unlike the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and the views of many IC reform proponents, Russell advocates change from a grassroots level. In his view, “The establishment of the DNI… unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community.”

Harknett and Stever examine the challenges the DNI faces in carrying out the reforms envisioned in IRTPA. Rather than explicitly mandating the DNI to carry out broad structural reform, IRTPA relies on “granted presidential authority and power of persuasion vis-à-vis existing intelligence agencies” to achieve this transformation of the

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161 Hulnick, “Does the U.S. Intelligence Community Need a DNI?” 729.
162 Ibid., 722.
Hayden holds a similar view, explaining that the DNI’s success depends on a “series of intangibles,” primarily political deftness, closeness to the President, and relationship with the CIA director. The relationship between the DNI and the CIA is one that has been understandably tenuous, although it varies somewhat depending on who occupies each position. Hayden, having experience both as the deputy DNI and director of the CIA, is well qualified to explain the reasoning behind this tension: “The law puts the [DNI] at the center of the [IC]. History and tradition and even many current operations suggest that the DCIA, however, has pride of place, and the agency’s collective culture is reluctant to admit otherwise.” Betts similarly highlights the importance of the personalities in these key positions in his 2004 article, arguing, “The best chief of intelligence is one who has the personal confidence and trust of the president, but who delights in telling the inner circle what it does not want to hear.” That hoping for compatible personalities between the DNI, the heads of other intelligence agencies and the president is the best resolution these scholars can offer bodes ill indeed for the future of the DNI. Fessenden illustrates this idea in her 2005 evaluation of Negroponte’s performance as the first DNI, commenting “concern is growing that the former diplomat is better suited to forging smooth relations with the powers that be than making hard decisions on structural reform.”

166 Ibid., 43-44.  
168 Fessenden, “Limits of Intelligence Reform,” 108.
Assessment of DNI Performance

Few would disagree that the position of DNI has not played the role the members of the 9/11 Commission advocated. That point aside, however, evaluations of the DNI with regard to the underlying factors that led to its creation run the gamut. As is often the case with a contentious issue, most evaluations focus on the negative results of the DNI rather than on any positive outcomes, and the issue remains as polarizing as ever. As Turner observes, “The new way of doing intelligence business in the United States will continue to please neither proponents of centralization nor the advocates of sticking to the traditional way.”\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore, many of the criticisms presented in the initial discussions of the creation of the DNI are echoed to some degree in the years afterward, and many of the warnings and shortfalls experts portended have come to bear. McConnell contends that the challenge the DNI faces is “to strike the right balance between centralized direction and decentralized execution so that the Office of the DNI does not just end up being another layer of bureaucracy on top of the existing structures.”\textsuperscript{170} In an article published a few years later in 2011, Harknett and Stever conclude, “the response to the complexity of the intelligence challenge is an incomplete process at this stage because of the complexity of the threat and the bureaucratic environment.”\textsuperscript{171} That conclusion appears baseless, however, since those factors mentioned are two of primary reasons underlying intelligence reform and discussion of creating a DNI in the first place.

\textsuperscript{169} Turner, “Intelligence Reform,” 390.
\textsuperscript{170} McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 51.
\textsuperscript{171} Harknett and Stever, “Struggle to Reform,” 701.
DNI Turnover Rates

One of the primary examples that critics of the DNI cite when denouncing this position is the high turnover rate. As Harknett and Stever observe, “Four very accomplished officials with wide and successful national security experience have held the position in only six years.” They go on to say that most of these officials believe that the position of DNI is essential, but “fundamentally hamstrung.”\(^{172}\) The National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG), the follow-on to the 9/11 Commission, expresses concern with this high turnover rate in their “Tenth Anniversary Report Card,” explaining, “Short tenures detract from the goals of building strong authority in the office and the confidence essential for the president to rely on the DNI as his chief intelligence advisor.”\(^{173}\) On a more optimistic note, however, James Clapper has occupied the position since 2010 and some are hopeful that his tenure will reverse the high turnover trend.

Improvements in IC Analytical Efforts and Collaboration

Despite discussion of negative evaluations of the DNI to date, there have been significant examples of positive outcomes associated with its creation. The NSPG lists these successes in its “Report Card,” lauding the DNI for “increased information sharing, improved coordination among agencies, sharpened collection priorities . . . additional expertise into the analysis of intelligence, and further integrat[ing] the FBI into the overall intelligence effort.”\(^{174}\) Negroponte and Wittenstein stress the analytical success,

\(^{172}\) Ibid., 703.
\(^{174}\) Ibid.
noting, “Given the DNI’s role as principal intelligence advisor to the President, one of the easiest things to influence was the quality of analysis served to the Commander-in-Chief.”\footnote{Negroponte and Wittenstein, “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration,” 396.}

One of the areas the DNI has been able to positively influence is increased analytic collaboration within the IC. Tucker highlights the ability of the DNI to “reinvigorate[e] projects previously unable to gain community-wide support.”\footnote{Tucker, “Cultural Revolution in Intelligence,” 50.} These projects include the creation of the Analyst Resource Catalog (ARC), an IC-wide directory of personnel listing their specialties and expertise, and A-Space, an online forum that allows analysts from various agencies to collaborate on common topics.

Given Russell’s standpoint that “the lack of analytic expertise… undoubtedly contributed to the series of intelligence failures surrounding the pre-war assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs,” these tools will ideally improve analytic expertise to avoid such assessments in the future.\footnote{Russell, “A Weak Pillar,” 475.} McConnell similarly touts the DNI’s efforts to develop “virtual communities of analysts who can securely exchange ideas and expertise across organizational boundaries and harness cutting-edge technology to find, access and share information and analytic judgments.”\footnote{McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 54.}

The DNI has also played a fundamental role is standardizing analytic methods and practices across the IC. Tucker draws upon her firsthand experience leading the ODNI’s Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards (OAIS) to discuss the efforts initiated by the DNI to improve analysis and analytic products. Although the task of identifying IC-wide standards for analysis initially drew criticism and hostility from within some offices,
Tucker indicates that many people supported these efforts and the ODNI support for them. Tucker also details the OAIS effort to require better sourcing information in analytic products to help avoid intelligence failures like the one that contributed to the Iraq WMD assessment that was largely based on unreliable single-source reporting.\(^{179}\)

The efforts to standardize analytic practices across the IC and the corresponding hesitation to do so among members of the community reflect the challenges the DNI still faces years after its creation. McConnell emphasizes the DNI’s effort to minimize stovepiping, identified as one of the major contributors to the intelligence failures leading to 9/11, by replacing the “need to know” mantra with one stressing the “responsibility to provide.”\(^ {180}\) As Tucker highlights, this change will only come about through widespread education across the IC, an effort undertaken by the DNI through creation of courses such as Analysis 101. This course brings together new analysts from all of the agencies within the IC to improve critical thinking skills, learn and use ODNI-created IC Analytic Standards, and build their professional networks to increase collaboration.\(^ {181}\) Along the same lines, McConnell also understands the need to address the identified gap between intelligence analysts and intelligence collectors, proposing, “The challenge now is to convince collectors that they are not data owners so much as data providers.”\(^ {182}\) As the many proponents of IC reform at the DNI level recognize, these measures implemented at the DNI level are the first steps in addressing the cultural change that the 9/11 Commission called for in order to avoid future intelligence failures.

\(^{179}\) Tucker, “Cultural Revolution in Intelligence,” 50-51.
\(^{180}\) McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 55.
\(^{181}\) Tucker, “Cultural Revolution in Intelligence,” 52.
\(^{182}\) McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 55.
The creation of the DNI also facilitated a change in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), transforming this elite intelligence product from a CIA-centric publication into one encompassing intelligence from across the IC. The DNI accomplished this by encouraging agencies across the IC to contribute to and make suggestions for improvement of the product. Even in her less-than-enthusiastic evaluation of Negroponte’s performance in his first few months in office, Fesseden approves of the changes to the PDB, as well as the president’s daily threat report and National Intelligence Estimates, that allow for more “nuance and input” from all agencies within the IC.¹⁸³ Negroponte and Wittenstein note that, in addition to increasing cooperation, the DNI was able to “reorient the PDB to include more strategic analysis and occasionally augment the briefing with ‘deep dives,’ in which top analyst would discuss their analysis with President Bush.”¹⁸⁴ These changes were intended to partially address the shortcomings the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission identified regarding both collaboration and quality of analysis within the IC.

Ongoing Reform and Outlook for the Future

It has now been more than nine years since IRTPA’s implementation, and the debate over the performance of the DNI is still going strong. Based on the assessments of intelligence experts, one can surmise that the DNI has not fully succeeded in responding to the factors that spurred its creation and rectifying the shortcomings of the IC. The DNI envisioned by the 9/11 Commission was a cabinet-level official that would oversee the functions and performance of the IC in the same way that the Secretary of

¹⁸³ Fessenden, “The Limits of Intelligence Reform,” 119.
Commerce is responsible for the Department of Commerce and the Secretary of State controls the affairs of the Department of State. The DNI as it stands today, however, lacks the strong authorities, including control over the budget, to command the many disparate factions of the IC and mandate compliance with his directives. Russell, a pessimist toward intelligence reform as outlined by the 9/11 Commission, demanded of both the DNI and the director of the CIA “strong, enlightened, aggressive, and innovative leadership that recognizes the profound need to change the business cultures and practices of analysis and spying.” This leadership and change is not altogether impossible, but even the most optimistic proponent of intelligence reform would likely agree that the IC has quite a bit of ground to cover before reaching that point.

Its weak authority aside, the DNI is not likely to disappear any time soon, nor should it. The individuals in this position have succeeded in increasing collaboration and strengthening analytic methods and standards across the IC, tasks that are crucial to reduce the likelihood of intelligence failures like those that preceded the 9/11 attacks. The DNI serves well in his capacity as national intelligence advisor to the president, and provides oversight on a number of programs designed to foster cooperation and IC collaboration and improve intelligence analysis. He is in an optimal position to set and oversee national intelligence priorities and provide guidance for strategic intelligence planning, using various tools and opportunities. Although the position is not necessarily a manifestation of the vision set forth by the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the DNI still has a valuable role in the IC in fulfilling these duties. As this position becomes more and more entrenched in the national intelligence and political apparatus, it may well gain the ability to address more of the existing shortcomings of the IC.

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As outlined above, evaluations of the performance of the DNI to date range from positive to negative, but some argue that it is still too early to conclude if this position is succeeding in rectifying the problems that prompted its creation. Harknett and Stever, while pessimistic about ability of the DNI to enact structural reform, are unsure if we have reached the zenith of intelligence reform yet, concluding that “whether this is the extent of the reform or whether a fuller reform is possible is the open question.”\textsuperscript{186} McConnell also opines that the success of intelligence reform cannot yet be determined, and stating specifically, “it will take years to fully clarify and coordinate the DNI’s responsibilities and powers.”\textsuperscript{187} Thus, the debates over this position will likely endure, but only with time will a complete assessment be possible.

**Case Study: Systems of Strategic Intelligence Planning Pre- and Post-IC Reform**

Although scholars and defense experts have expressed myriad opinions on the performance of the DNI, determining how this position has specifically affected strategic intelligence planning demands a more thorough examination of its tools and methodologies, rather than simply observing the opinions of scholars on its performance to date. In order to answer the initial research question of how the DNI affects strategic intelligence planning, this study will examine the development and content of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), as well as its role in the national intelligence process. The paper will then compare the method for strategic intelligence planning prior to 9/11, as laid out in Presidential Decision Directive 35, with the creation of the NIPF in order to assess the differences.

\textsuperscript{186} Harknett and Stever, “Struggle to Reform,” 701.
\textsuperscript{187} McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence,” 58.
As scholar Paul L. Pillar aptly notes, “The U.S. Government has a long history, filled with an alphabet soup of documents and directives, of different formal mechanisms for determining which topics warrant the Intelligence Community’s attention.”\(^{188}\) This study, however, will focus primarily on comparing the NIPF with its immediate predecessor, the prioritization mechanism established within Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD 35) in 1995. During the Cold War, policymakers had a clear, dominant intelligence priority in the Soviet Union, so they did not need to prioritize issues in the same manner that they did in the post-Cold War environment. Comparing the NIPF and PDD 35 systems will best facilitate an analysis of contemporary intelligence prioritization mechanisms and allow for an assessment of contemporary strategic intelligence planning.

**The National Intelligence Priorities Framework**

DCI George Tenet originally developed the NIPF in 2003, prior to the creation of the office of the DNI. In 2007, however, by the authority of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 207, the NIPF became “the DNI’s sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities.”\(^{189}\) As outlined in ICD 204, the NIPF consists of intelligence topics approved by the President, a process for assigning priorities to countries and non-state actors relevant to the approved intelligence topics, and a matrix showing those priorities.\(^{190}\) The matrix itself is classified, but a 2008 RAND Corporation Technical Report provides a more detailed definition of the product:

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\(^{189}\) Roles and Responsibilities for the NIPF, ICD 204 (2007), 2.

\(^{190}\) Ibid.
“Critical topic areas and challenges are organized into groupings, called bands, running from A to C, with A being a group of the most pressing and important challenges for the nation. Both nations and non-state actors are then extensively listed and their importance in relation to each banded topic areas evaluated and numerically weighted—a factor labeled “propensity.” A national intelligence priority scale is then established as the product of the two (band position times propensity). The highest intelligence priorities are then A-band issues associated with nations or nonstate actors with the greatest propensity to engage in that issue—to the potential detriment of the United States.”

Robert M. Clark cites Tom Fingar, the former National Intelligence Council Director, to clarify that that bands together include 32 intelligence topics, while the states and non-state actors number about 220. He also explains the system of determining prioritization in which cells are scored from zero to five, zero indicating that the topic will receive almost no coverage. A score of one indicates the highest priority, and five indicates a low priority need, generally to support diplomatic responsibilities or areas with a “potential to flare up with significant implications for U.S. interests.”

In short, the NIPF effectively gives the DNI a formula for establishing which of the numerous strategic intelligence topics and focus areas are of the highest priority at any given time. As Mark M. Lowenthal summarizes, the NIPF “allow[s] policy makers and intelligence officers to identify the countries of interest and the activities in that country that were of interest and then give them relative levels of importance as

intelligence priorities.”

Prior to the creation of the NIPF, intelligence issues were generally addressed from either a geographic standpoint or a functional standpoint. In very few cases, however, are policymakers concerned with all of the activities and issues in a particular country, so this method was not always the most efficient or comprehensive way of prioritizing issues. The NIPF emerged as a tool to circumvent the need to choose between focusing on either geographic or functional issues. Lowenthal explains that the NIPF addressed the problem “by relating each issue to the countries or non-state actors where it is important or, conversely, by showing which issues are relevant for a given country, because not every issue will matter for each country or non-state actor.”

ICD 204 not only establishes the NIPF as the DNI’s tool for determining national intelligence priorities, it also dictates that the DNI and the IC will use the NIPF as a basis for allocating collection and analytical resources against these priorities. The NIPF highlights intelligence issues that are of highest concern, thereby allowing policymakers to maximize the use of limited intelligence resources. This is evident from the ODNI’s Fact Sheet detailing its achievements through 2011. One of these specifically cited the NIPF as a crucial tool used by the DNI to develop a performance-based budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The NIPF allowed the DNI to “align collection and analytic resources across the IC to ensure that adequate resources are reaching the most complex national security challenges and emerging threats.” The mechanism is not only used to

194 Ibid., 61.
determine individual FY budgets, but also considered in the five-year budget cycle.196 This direct correlation between the NIPF and budgetary planning indicates the importance of the mechanism in policymakers’ decision-making processes.

One of the reasons for the NIPF’s utility is the frequency with which it is reviewed, as well as the level at which this review occurs. As outlined in ICD 207, “The NIPF is updated semi-annually, and ad hoc adjustments may be made to reflect changes in world events and policy priorities.”197 (President Obama changed the review frequency from semi-annually to annually or on an as needed basis; however, this does not undermine the importance of having an established review process.) The level at which the NIPF is reviewed, at the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee (PC), as well as its final approval by the President, indicates that this is a mechanism with recognized authority. The frequent review at high levels ensures that the integrity of the NIPF is sufficiently respected by the IC to allow the DNI to use it to set and direct intelligence priorities for the entire community.

Despite its utility for establishing intelligence priorities, the NIPF is not entirely free from criticism. Critiques often come from experts believing that the NIPF oversimplifies the process of prioritizing intelligence issues. A 2008 RAND study acknowledges the NIPF’s utility, but warns that, “it also provides an incentive to reduce spending resources on all but the hottest current priorities, often at the expense of deeper assessments of longer-term challenges.”198 Similarly, Clark identifies the tendency of collectors and analysts to also focus their efforts on the highest priority topics, neglecting

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197 Roles and Responsibilities, ICD 204, 2.
those lower level issues, as a result of this system of prioritization. These downsides, however, are endemic in strategic intelligence rather than resultant from the prioritization mechanism. The inexact nature of intelligence and the constantly changing international system make it difficult, if not impossible, to fully cover every issue of potential concern to U.S. national security. Thus, it is necessary to give more attention to those situations and issues that have the greatest potential to threaten U.S. national interests at the expense of losing fidelity on issues deemed less of a threat.

Overall, the NIPF is a useful tool for prioritization of requirements. Given the incredibly diverse range of intelligence issues across the IC, as well as the varying focus areas of individual players, not all stakeholders will agree on every priority. Clark observes, however, that the NIPF is superior to its predecessors in that it allows for a better focus on issues across the national intelligence spectrum. That is to say, previous methods for prioritizing intelligence requirements allowed for urgent military requirements to take precedence over less time-sensitive national requirements. Since the National Security Council reviews priorities across the board under the NIPF, however, this is less of a concern today. According to Clark’s analysis, “the result is a longer term perspective on intelligence needs than that associated with immediate military operations support.” This allows for more thorough strategic intelligence planning, because the DNI can maintain focus and resources on high-priority strategic issues even if a sudden military operation arises.

199 Clark, *Intelligence Collection*, 449.
200 Ibid., 450.
Prior to the implementation of the NIPF for use in strategic intelligence planning, intelligence officials relied on the priority system established by President Bill Clinton under Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD 35). PDD 35 was issued in 1995, at a time when U.S. defense policymakers were adjusting to a post-Cold War strategic environment, and it was designed to account for the shift of American defense policy away from the newly defunct Soviet Union. U.S. policymakers now had to focus on areas that had been secondary concerns for decades, and they needed a system to rank those concerns commensurate with the threat they each posed.

PDD 35 “set priorities for specific, named intelligence topics by assigning them to different ‘tiers.’”\textsuperscript{201} It was a marked departure from the previous prioritization policies because it was developed with buy-in from senior policymakers in the prioritization process, rather than simply leaving the determination of priorities to the DCI. PDD-35 prioritized topics according to the tier under which they fell, with higher-level tiers receiving greater attention. More specifically, tier one focused on warning and crisis management, while tier four included countries that were of virtually no interest to the United States.

Although the document itself is still classified, there is a general consensus about the priority issues included in PDD 35. Frederick Hitz explains that it likely covered eight “holy” concerns: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, international criminal enterprise, international narcotics trafficking, economic issues, environmental issues, foreign scientific breakthroughs that might pose a threat to U.S. national security, and

\textsuperscript{201} Pillar, “Adapting Intelligence,” 151.
states of concern such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and China. Clark identifies similar topics, but specifies that PDD 35 “separated intelligence requirements into two broad categories: so-called hard targets (such as Libya, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) and transnational issues (such as international crime, terrorism, and weapons proliferation). The highest priority within PDD 35, however, was the broad topic of Support to Military Operations (SMO).

Despite some optimism at its inception, PDD 35 was by no means a perfect solution for prioritizing national intelligence requirements. Creating this document required a great deal of effort among senior policymakers, who envisioned periodic revisions and updates to keep the document current. Because of the extensive time and effort required to create the one document, however, PDD 35 was never revised as intended. For this reason, the guiding document became increasingly antiquated as the years passed and the issues identified in the document became more or less threatening to the national interest of the United States. This demonstrated a critical shortfall with this prioritization mechanism. As Pillar observes, “PDD-35 continued to be invoked as a reference point for decisions on deploying intelligence resources, but each passing year increased the unease of using a document that everyone knew was gradually becoming outdated.” Additionally, PDD 35 did not adequately cover all of the intelligence topics and questions that concern Presidents, and it could not adequately justify the level of effort by the IC on certain topics. Although a good concept and arguably an

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203 Clark, *Intelligence Collection*, 449.
205 Pillar, “Adapting Intelligence,” 151.
influence on the later development of the NIPF, PDD 35 was not robust enough to fulfill the needs of policymakers for prioritization and new identification of intelligence requirements.

*Prioritization in Future Strategic Intelligence Planning*

Strategic intelligence planning is, by nature, a difficult and uncertain undertaking. Having a mechanism to prioritize strategic intelligence requirements has been and will continue to be crucial to policymakers’ abilities to allocate resources and direct coverage of the highest threats to American national interests. Although both PDD 35 and the NIPF are just such mechanisms, there can be little argument that the NIPF is a better system than that implemented by PDD 35. The differences are not only inherent in the structure and content of these mechanisms, but are also found in the differences in the policymakers responsible for their creation and management.

One of the most important differences between the NIPF and PDD 35 is the review process for setting priorities. Although the policymakers who created PDD 35 intended for it to be a living document, revised as appropriate, there was no codified process for regular, periodic updates to the document. The fact that it was issued at the presidential level conveyed authority, but made it exceedingly difficult to coordinate updates among stakeholders. As a result, the priorities it outlined quickly became outdated, and strategic intelligence planning did not necessarily focus on the most current priorities. Conversely, managing the NIPF falls squarely in the DNI’s lane of responsibility, so he is able to orchestrate its review at least once a year through an established process with buy-in at the NSC level. Whereas the DCI was likely an
important player in the formulation of PDD-35, he was not the sole policymaker responsible for its creation and update. Furthermore, his many duties (recalling that he was not only responsible for national intelligence, but that he was also the head of the CIA) probably prevented him from being able to focus enough attention and corral support and coordination among the members of the IC in order to effectively manage this document. The DNI’s mandate to ensure collaboration and manage the IC naturally allows him to maintain the NIPF efficiently and accurately. Thus, the NIPF better reflects the most current strategic situation and highest corresponding intelligence concerns of senior policymakers than did PDD-35.

Another key difference between PDD 35 and the NIPF is the method of prioritization of topics. The use of the tier system in PDD 35 only constrained policymakers to ranking a certain number of specific issues, regardless of whether they were “hard targets” or transnational issues. The matrix ranking system of the NIPF, however, allows for more granularity and nuance in prioritization, as policymakers prioritize the relationship between a transnational issue and a specific actor, rather than requiring them to choose one or the other. As a result, policymakers, and in particular the DNI, can allocate resources to adequately cover the areas and issues that are of the highest concern, while simultaneously allowing for shifts in priorities that result from the ever-changing nature of the international system.

The NIPF is much more useful in strategic intelligence planning than was the PDD 35, which prioritized Support to Military Operations above all other issues. Constantly shifting focus and resources to support military operations compromised the IC’s ability to maintain persistent focus on long-term issues, which often comprise
strategic intelligence planning needs. The construct of the NIPF allows for some shift in focus, particularly during review, but not at the expense of losing sight of long-term strategic objectives. This allows the DNI to draw upon the established strategic priorities to determine resource allocation, without compromising the success of U.S. military operations or the ability of U.S. intelligence officials to quickly shift focus if an unexpected international incident arises that merits attention.

The NIPF appears to be an accepted system of prioritization for strategic intelligence planning, at least for the moment. Politicians and policymakers have reputations for creating new systems and policies to replace those of their predecessors, so the fact that the NIPF has survived two presidential administrations is testament to its utility and worth, as well as the ability of the DNI to maintain and rely on it for strategic intelligence planning purposes. Lowenthal remarks that, “Long-time observers of the national security policy process found this carryover interesting, as each new administration, when it takes over the NSC system, renames various committees and memos, largely as a rebranding operation, to show there are new people in charge.”

The NIPF is likely to remain the DNI’s “sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities,” due to its utility in strategic intelligence planning and its ability to reflect changing situations as a result of its established periodic review. The ability of the DNI to procure stakeholder buy-in at such senior levels as the NSC and the President is crucial to flexibility and authority of this process. This is not to say that the framework will foresee unanticipated challenges or imply that it has the ability to completely prevent strategic surprise. Due to the inherent uncertainty in strategic intelligence, there will always be perceived “intelligence failures” that no system will be able to prevent, but the

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207 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 61.
DNI’s maintenance and use of the NIPF is currently the best resource available to help policymakers do their utmost to avoid these.

**Conclusion**

The U.S. intelligence reform that resulted from IRTPA and subsequent changing policies continues to incur questions and criticism, specifically about the authority and role of the DNI. Many observe, correctly, that the DNI as it stands today does not play the role envisioned and recommended by the 9/11 Commission. Further reforms or restructuring of authorities may come eventually, which would potentially strengthen the position of the DNI, but the position’s current status still has important implications for national security concerns and strategic intelligence planning. This chapter has detailed some of the challenges that the DNI faces, as well as some of the accomplishments creation of this office have contributed to the IC to date, particularly in the area of strategic intelligence planning. The DNI’s sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities, the NIPF, continues to play an important part in setting national intelligence objectives, to which the nation’s intelligence activities are directly tied. It allows the DNI to play a role in determining resource allocation and budgetary planning for many intelligence activities, although as mentioned, the DNI does not have budgetary control over the defense intelligence components.

Through the direction and maintenance of the NIPF, the DNI has the ability to manage strategic intelligence priorities with buy-in from the most senior U.S. policymakers. The regular revision of the NIPF allows the DNI to shift focus as necessary to emerging short-term issues, while still maintaining coverage on long-term
strategic priority areas, which were neglected in under previous prioritization mechanisms. Unlike its predecessors, the NIPF allows the DNI to prioritize the relationship between transnational issues and specific actors, rather than choosing one or the other. This allows him to maximize resource allocation by reducing attention on certain issues in geographic areas of lesser priority. Maximizing resource allocation is particularly important in today’s constrained fiscal environment, so the NIPF will likely continue to be a key mechanism in strategic intelligence planning in the years to come. Although noted that, like all strategic intelligence planning tools, the NIPF is not an infallible system, it appears to be a marked improvement over previous mechanisms, thereby giving the DNI more control over strategic intelligence planning.
CONCLUSION

The twelve plus years that have passed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have marked a significant shift in U.S. strategic military planning and defense policy. This paper has demonstrated three of the broad areas that have been affected: use of the military reserve component, defense budgets and resource allocation, and strategic intelligence planning. Although many other factors in the defense realm have changed significantly since that fateful September day in 2011, these three areas are representative of the transition away from the conventional war paradigm that dominated the Cold War toward a global system in which asymmetric, irregular conflicts will characterize a significant portion of the threat environment in the foreseeable future.

This paper is not meant to serve as an exact, fail-safe formula for predicting how to counter future threats to American national interests. As has occurred time and again throughout U.S. history, the likelihood remains that the next great threat will come from where least expected. Given the continued superiority of American conventional forces, however, chances are good that future enemies will try to exploit American vulnerabilities in non-conventional areas. Defense planning will never be an exact science, but considering some of the themes this paper has covered can help American policymakers prepare to the best of their ability to counter obvious and perceived long-term threats, such as terrorism, as well as those priority areas that could eventually develop into areas of concern.

The United States has been faced with the threat of terrorism for nearly two decades now, and has adapted accordingly to counter it. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over and drawing down, respectively, the American defense establishment
has again begun paying attention to other potential areas of concern. That is to say, there is no doubt that terrorism will remain a high priority issue, and indeed, it is reflected in current defense strategic planning guidance, but policymakers are increasingly focusing on and preparing for other issues. Two that dominate many strategic foreign and defense policy conversations include the “pivot toward Asia” and cyber threats. Some of the lessons and conclusions presented in this paper can potentially be applied to emerging threats, as well as the strategic environment of the past decade plus.

As outlined above, the U.S. military now maintains an operational reserve component, rather than the strategic reserve envisioned in the Abrams Doctrine. In the same way that many reservists have skills from their civilian jobs that can be applied to counterinsurgency missions, they may also have experiences upon which the military could draw for future missions and concentrations in cyber warfare or cyber defense. The world is becoming increasingly digitally focused, and job sectors in technology and computer information systems are growing. Reservists come from a variety of backgrounds, so it is very likely that many have the skills and qualifications the military could use to grow or maintain its cyber capabilities. Keeping in mind the negative consequences associated with overextending the reserve force learned during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military should make a concerted effort to identify qualified individuals and encourage development of their skills in order to meet the demand set forth by cyber threats. This is in line with recent defense policy emphasizing the need to adjust the balance between active and reserve components while also recruiting skilled personnel and retaining experienced personnel.208

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American defense budget planning and resource allocation will likely continue to move away from building and maintaining strictly conventional capabilities as well. The recently released 2014 QDR continues to emphasize some of the primary themes of its immediate predecessor, but its focus is unmistakably adaptation to a constrained fiscal environment that includes sequestration and significantly reduced annual defense budgets. The QDR embraces a three-pillar defense strategy to build the defense strategic guidance, aiming to protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively.\(^{209}\) Like its immediate predecessor, this strategy emphasizes international partnerships and security cooperation with allies in order to deter conflicts before they begin, but it does not compromise on assuring the continued dominance of U.S. defense capabilities. The majority of recommendations are presented in terms of their overall financial benefit; for example, modernization of existing capabilities in order to increase efficiency and decrease the high levels of costly equipment and forces. The recommendations and outlook of this QDR are in line with the conclusions presented in this paper: the shift from conventional to irregular warfare will decrease the costs of defense in the long run. Because the United States is facing hard times financially at present, however this decrease in costs of defense will hopefully pay off sooner rather than later.

This paper has demonstrated the significant changes in the strategic intelligence planning paradigm in the United States in the years following the 9/11 attacks. There is little doubt that the DNI as it stands today is not what the 9/11 Commission envisioned in its recommendations, but this office has enjoyed various successes, including increased collaboration within the IC, improved analytic capabilities, and more efficient

\(^{209}\) United States, Department of Defense, QDR 2014, v.
prioritization of intelligence needs. Although the position remains the subject of debate among intelligence scholars and experts, the DNI will likely continue to influence U.S. intelligence activities and retain primary responsibility for ensuring coordination among members of the IC.

The IC currently stands on the brink of another potential reform, but this time a perceived lack of effective intelligence oversight is the hot topic. The information detailing NSA activities leaked by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, has garnered a great deal of media attention and caused many policymakers to call for investigation and reform. The current DNI, James Clapper, unequivocally denounced Snowden’s actions, characterizing them as the most “massive and damaging theft of intelligence in our history.” President Obama has taken several measures to address the issues that came to light in the wake of the Snowden leaks, and he has delegated responsibility to DNI Clapper for many of them. Some of these measures include mandating the DNI (in conjunction with the Attorney General) to conduct annual reviews of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decisions, to implement reforms of government communications intercept programs to address incidental collection on American and foreign citizens, and to extend protections intended to safeguard the privacy of Americans to overseas citizens as well. These responsibilities indicate that the DNI does have real authority, albeit not budgetary, to implement policies that will significantly affect the activities of the entire IC and likely shift the course of U.S. strategic intelligence planning in the future.

The 9/11 attacks were one of the watershed moments in U.S. history that signaled the beginning of a new era, one that marked a decisive end to the Cold War strategic mindset. The decade that followed the attack saw significant changes in U.S. defense; the reserve component, defense costs, and strategic intelligence planning detailed in this paper were just a few examples of these changes. As history has repeatedly shown, there is no way to predict and counter every attack or affront, but understanding and improving its current defense posture will help the United States best protect its national interests and its citizens today and in the future.
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CURRICULUM VITA

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