MORE FOR LESS: PROTECTING AMERICA’S SECURITY INTERESTS THROUGH SOFT POWER PROGRAMS

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A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies

Baltimore, Maryland
May, 2014

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Department of Defense is engaged in budget cutbacks that will have significant future implications for many defense programs. At the same time, emerging global threats require investment in diverse mechanisms for national defense over the long-term. Within this context, it is important to highlight the effectiveness of less traditional softer approaches to security in comparison to their cost as many of them may best be accomplished by the country’s hard power agency. This thesis explores three different soft power programs either funded and/or managed by the U.S. Military or Department of Defense: educating foreign military officers, deploying U.S. Navy medical ships on proactive humanitarian missions, and funding biological scientific engagement to counter the use of biological weapons of mass destruction. Each chapter analyzes the primary question of the individual program’s substance in comparison to its cost. The thesis acknowledges the difficulties of assessing the less quantifiable concept of soft power but seeks to make a qualitative assessment of each program’s relative value. This assessment is done by applying generated metrics shaped by reviewing literature applicable to each program’s goals to case studies of countries where each program has been implemented. Conclusions on the three programs’ current soft power influence is determined on the basis of existing data as applied to these expressed metrics. Additionally, based on evidence of the measurable metrics, each chapter draws a conclusion about its program’s indeterminable value in the future. Overall, this thesis contends that although modest and somewhat imprecise, measurable increases to U.S. soft power due to these programs can be shown. Furthermore, their relative low costs, along with their potential benefits to American and global security in an uncertain future, make them well worth their investment.

Thesis Advisors: Dr. Rameez Abbas & Dr. Jacob Straus
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I’d like to thank Dr. Rameez Abbas for her insights, guidance, and counsel throughout this thesis project, as well as Dr. Jacob Straus for his writing instruction and expertise, especially regarding the second chapter. I’d also like to thank everyone who helped me brainstorm ideas, think through methods, and proofread the final work, especially my friends Trish and Rebecca, and my always-encouraging mother, Marianne. Finally, this endeavor would have been impossible without the support of my husband, Erik. His reassurance, and his thoughtful attention to our infant son while I researched, thought, and composed on a great number of nights and weekends from 2012-14 was unquestionably of most significance.
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INTRODUCTION

“In this turbulent new century, the security of the United States will depend increasingly on how we engage, persuade, and inspire people in countries in the rest of the world.”

- Gen Anthony Zinni (ret) and ADM James Stavridis (ret)

In the 1990s Joseph Nye first coined the phrase “soft power,” defined as the ability to attain one’s own goals through actions that elicit the admiration and desired emulation of others. As a form of influence, it is the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”

Over the past decade, the U.S. government has started to recognize the importance of this less conventional approach to global security in a rapidly changing and complex environment. For example, the 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) discussed and alluded to partnerships with the international community on 10 occasions, whereas the 2010 NSS made it a cornerstone of the strategy, mentioning “partnerships” in over 40 instances. Inevitably, resources drive action, and funding has not matched the rhetoric to develop and deploy softer approaches to national security. For decades, the budget for hard power programs through defense has dwarfed the budget for programs in diplomacy and development. Many softer programs, designed to invest in partnerships and operations to expand American influence and American legitimacy, are not only extremely low cost, but also effective and add an important additional instrument that can be leveraged given the changing security environment. Ironically, the reality remains that some of these more cost effective softer power approaches today may best be accomplished by the country’s hard power resource, the Department of Defense (DOD). Soft power programs nested within the Defense Department have been under recognized, underfunded and under researched relative to their hard power counterparts.

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Highlighting the value and price of soft power approaches is more important now than it was a decade ago. With overall federal budget cutbacks already in law, there is clearly movement to reduce costs within the DOD, purposed to provide hard power programs of enormous proportion, and some of questionable value. In an attempt to shrink defense budgets, it may be tempting to reduce funding for softer programs because their value for dollar spent is more difficult to measure. While it’s challenging to define the effectiveness of softer power programs, this thesis contends that these programs do have significant value. In fact, due to the nature of future threats, such as potential biological attacks, and militarization caused by environmental resource insecurities, softer tactics may become increasingly important security tools for the United States. This paper examines three different soft power programs either funded and/or managed by the Department of Defense. Within each chapter, this paper will address such questions as: what is the relevance of the program? Can we find tangible measures of effectiveness of the program? And are the programs worth the investment?

Chapter one of this paper examines the soft power effect of the U.S. government’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which seeks to educate foreign military leaders. This chapter asks whether the IMET program affects a foreign military’s “democratic” values and policies.\(^5\) This chapter examines case studies of American IMET education with three “partly free” countries’ militaries (Bangladesh, Ukraine, and Nigeria) over a twenty-year period to determine if some level of improvement in democratic values among the three countries is linked to the U.S. education of their military leaders.\(^6\) Whenever there was evidence of an increase in a foreign military’s respect for civilian control or its respect for human rights over time, the analysis traces the sources of these changes to look for any potential connections to the training that the military leadership received through the IMET program. In all three case studies, slight progress in democratic values, although inconsistent, could be indirectly linked to education provided by the IMET program. Even though distinct consistent improvement cannot be seen with regards to the democratic values, the chapter finds that the slight progress that is indirectly linked to IMET is worth the effort given the program’s broader role in developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low cost.

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\(^5\) Note: “Democratic” military values are defined as respecting civilian control of the military and respecting human rights both internal and external to a military’s host country.

\(^6\) Note: “Partly Free” as defined by Freedom House Rankings for 2010.
Chapter two examines the U.S. Navy’s proactive use of hospital ships – a soft power program developed as a result of changing global environmental dynamics. Researchers are finding more evidence of climate change every day. Environmental fluctuations have already been manifested in increasingly powerful natural disasters in the past decade. Disasters such as typhoons, tsunamis, and hurricanes brought about by man-made or natural causes can have unpredictable future bearing on global security by exacerbating migration, starvation, and disease. How the United States responds to this issue of global human security directly impacts world perception of America, either as a disinterested giant, or an attuned, generous responder. Policymakers have increasingly acknowledged the importance of a national response to climate change. The U.S. Navy has adapted to the perceived environmental threat by increasing its emphasis on the softer humanitarian operations, not only in reactive disaster relief missions but also in proactive medical missions around the world.

Chapter two asks the specific question: does the U.S. Navy’s increased use of proactive humanitarian assistance medical deployments improve U.S. visibility, access, and influence in the regions in which they take place? To assess this question, this chapter looks at three case studies of countries hosting annual U.S. Navy humanitarian deployments (Indonesia, Colombia, and Vietnam) over the past seven years. Links between the deployments and an increase in U.S. access and influence in a region were determined by analyzing any increased military-to-military or diplomatic contacts and cooperation resulting from the humanitarian outreach. Any increase in U.S. visibility in a region was determined by researching the extent and character of local media attention and public opinion resulting from the deployments. Despite the lack of both data and literature on the soft power effects of humanitarian ship deployments, this chapter concludes that there is a connection between these deployments and increases in U.S. soft power regionally and to a lesser extent globally. This connection is stronger in regions where relations with the United States have historically been strained. The missions have provided an important tool in strengthening security relationships. Given this fact, coupled with the modest monetary cost of such deployments, conducting these proactive humanitarian operations even in a time of budget austerity should be prioritized.

Chapter three examines a DOD program that employs soft power to counter the use of biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Rapid advances in technology have led to unprecedented
developments in the life sciences. While these advances (gene sequencing as an example) are extraordinary, they also have the potential to be used for nefarious purposes. Tougher bio-defense measures like greater regulation that carries legal or criminal ramifications may arguably work within the borders of one developed country such as the United States, but are unrealistic internationally. Hard power approaches to countering the biological threat in an era of rapid “dual-use” technologies are likely to be ineffective as invisible pathogens can easily be spread state-to-state, continent-to-continent, either purposefully or accidentally. The manner in which the United States responds to such increasing, visibly undetectable threats is of growing concern to the security community. Both the security and scientific communities are debating achievable, effective methods to prevent and defend against an actor with the knowledge and (easily procurable) equipment to spread a biological pathogen. Hard power tools such as guns, tanks, and airplanes will almost certainly prove ineffective against such a threat. An international inspection regime based on the Biological Weapons Treaty is non-existent primarily because of American opposition based on concerns about cost to its own domestic biological research institutions and industry. Sanctions are an inadequate tool if no verification mechanism exists to ensure compliance of demanded actions. Even intelligence is limited in a world with thousands of dual-use laboratories and a growing desire for more biological advances to fight naturally occurring diseases.

This chapter asks the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological Engagement Program’s (CBEP) soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks? Three measures of effectiveness of the CBEP in two case studies of one country (Georgia) and one region (Southeast Asia) are examined to determine if the engagement produces the outcomes of greater scientific open communication, trust, and health and human security, which are said to help counter biological threats. The research examines the links between the CBEP and a host region’s increase in biosecurity, biosurveillance capability, and biological-related partnerships with the United States. In both case studies, using these three metrics, the program demonstrated a positive effect to varying degrees. Given the limited hard power defense solutions and limited diplomatic solutions to countering the broad biological threat, this type of soft power program within the DOD may be the most effective and important long term.

7 Note: “Dual-use” is defined as materials, equipment, hardware, and knowledge that have peaceful applications can also be exploited to produce weapons.
Scholars and policymakers have advocated for the importance of soft power in security strategy in a variety of ways. Former presidential candidate Gary Hart called for the elevation of soft power or what he described more broadly as the “power of principles” to be added to the traditional American economic, political, and military forms of power.8 Joseph Nye and William Owens argued that the soft power in the new information age is a “force multiplier” to engage states in “security dialogues to prevent them from becoming hostile.”9 Soft power has been cited as being effective in a range of security related issues from countering asymmetric threats to nuclear non-proliferation to the expansion of democratic values. For example, Carol Atkinson advocated for the importance of soft power by arguing that U.S. hosted educational exchange programs are effective in spreading liberal democratic values particularly to citizens of non-democratic states.10 Numerous think tanks and policy advisors have proposed the application of soft power to address asymmetric challenges to national security such as such as control of networks for exchange, travel and migration, telecommunications, healthcare delivery, multinational cooperation, and cybersecurity.11

On the other hand, skeptics of soft power place more emphasis on hard power, including economic and military. Author and strategist, Colin S. Gray argues there are serious limitations to the use soft power as an instrument of policy, that its idea has “not been subjected to a sufficiently critical forensic examination,” and that it should not be considered an equal when compared with hard military force.12 Policymakers such Senator John Kyl and Richard Perle warn of the dangers of relying on soft power approaches to security particularly in relation to the proliferation of WMD.13 Soft power has also been criticized for its lack of measurable effectiveness and even for its “dark side” which can twist “minds in resentment and rage” because, regardless of intent, soft power could lead to repulsion rather than

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attraction.\textsuperscript{14}

However, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have come to agree on the importance of the use of “smart power” or the synthesis of both hard and soft power in security policy-making. These advocates argue that the application of both hard and soft power simultaneously may be the only way to overcome unconventional threats.\textsuperscript{15} Numerous security leaders have advocated for this policy balance. Former Admiral and NATO commander James Stavridis argued for a hard-soft/public-private balance he calls “open source security.”\textsuperscript{16} Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued for this concept in her nomination hearing by stating, “We must use what has been called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – to develop a coherent, integrated national strategy to meet the asymmetric threats the nation faces today.”\textsuperscript{17} At the same time, former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, advocated for its use as well when he stated, "I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power."\textsuperscript{18} This was an unprecedented argument by the leader of America’s hard power forces for more resources to be allocated to diplomacy and development as Gates declared that, “no one could ever recall a secretary of defense calling for an increase in the State Department budget.”\textsuperscript{19} Clearly, many in the policymaking realm have embraced the need for soft power approaches to security but there have been few studies on its overall security impact.

\textsuperscript{15} CACI International Inc. and the U.S. Naval Institute. “Employing Smart Power,” 2.
CHAPTER 1
THE SOFT POWER INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION ON FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICERS

Introduction

In 2010, the United States Government spent $108 million of federal funds to bring members of foreign militaries to the United States to attend approximately 150 U.S. Military institutions and/or receive U.S. funded military training. This International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program was established by Congress in 1976. The IMET program’s goal has been to strengthen foreign nations’ militaries through professionalization, and a growth in respect for democratic values and human rights. There has always been speculation, however, whether this program actually fosters democratic values in its foreign military students, or whether it simply gives advanced military training with no impact on military policies. The program has been criticized for giving training to foreign students who may actually end up using that same military training to more efficiently abuse human rights and stifle democratic values.

This chapter argues that there are no predictable positive effects on recipient militaries of the IMET program. While unpredictable the effects may be, the value of the IMET program is such that even minimally measured effects can be very meaningful. There is evidence that significant numbers of foreign military officers trained in the IMET program do indeed rise to levels of significant power within their armed forces. Evidence suggests that IMET training is a highly desirable military distinction for graduates, and therefore, it is not far reaching to assume that these individuals are in a position to influence the policies of their militaries.

This chapter utilizes three case studies (Ukraine, Nigeria, and Bangladesh) to demonstrate that some level of improvement on a recipient military’s respect for human rights and civilian control can be obtained through the IMET program. While improvements in these areas are inconsistent among case studies, accepting the notion that the program has no impact on a recipient military’s democratic values would be narrow and inaccurate. The value of the IMET program remains part of a larger security relationship strategy that has broader positive security impacts. The relative gains from the IMET program...
program far outweigh the costs; as this chapter will illustrate in later sections, the U.S. Government spends only $108 million per year on this program. This is $50 million less than the production of one single Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, the product of another controversial defense program.\textsuperscript{21} Given the low cost of the IMET program and its already established role in developing and maintaining security relationships, even small unpredictable progress in democratic values and attitudes in the recipient countries’ militaries is well worth the effort.

The chapter first explains the IMET program and its stated goals. Second, a literature review analyzes the possible relationships between U.S. training of foreign militaries and the recipient nation’s military policies. In assessing the ways in which the IMET Program can potentially foster democratic values in foreign militaries, the chapter explores the relative benefits of the program’s stated mission. Third, the soft power influence of the IMET program regarding democratic values is examined through three case studies of Ukraine, Nigeria and Bangladesh. These three studies focus on countries whose militaries have little history of democratic values in order to evaluate the theory that the IMET program has no effect on these values. Through this examination, I argue that even though distinct consistent progress cannot be seen with regards to the democratic values in the three case studies, even slight progress is worth the effort given IMET’s role in developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships at a very low monetary cost. The fact that the results are hard to quantify does not mean that results aren’t there. Even a small sign of progress is worth the pennies the U.S. Government is spending to continue this program.

Written and Unwritten Objectives of IMET

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) – the U.S. government agency responsible for implementing the program – the stated objectives of the IMET program are the following:

- To further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and

• To increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic
democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights.22

The first objective is widely understood. In fact, most U.S. military officers think the IMET
program’s main goal is to develop military-to-military relationships that will last throughout a foreign
officer’s career. The majority of Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs) (the experts on managing IMET
and other military assistance programs) think human rights is “not a consideration or priority compared
with other IMET objectives.”23 Less than half the training plans for IMET participant countries that the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) ranked as “not free” included training objectives dealing with
civil-military relations, rule of law, or human rights. The GAO questioned whether the IMET goals of
promoting democratic values are being met. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
(DISAM) is also currently trying to ascertain whether these goals are being met. It is possible that the
stated objective of promoting democratic values has taken a back seat in the past to less
overtly stated
objectives such as managing counterterrorism, leadership training, and developing military relationships.
However, the ambiguity seems to be disappearing. A State and Defense Department Study of the
Effectiveness of the IMET Program: 2007-2009 showed that international students cited improved
understanding of internationally recognized human rights in surveys of graduates at the time of
graduation.24

DSCA does have language on the topic of democratic values and can be evidenced in two of
the six official training objectives of the program:

1. Demonstrate the proper role of the military in a civilian-led democratic government
2. Foster an understanding of internationally recognized human rights

Using DSCA’s own descriptive language around these objectives, it is possible to define the term
“democratic values” and measure change in two categories: (1) level of civilian control of the military; and
(2) regard for human rights.

24 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. State Department and DISAM Study on the Effectiveness of the IMET
Program, by Mark Ahles, Michael Relig, Aaron Prince, and Litsu Rehak, N.p.; DISAM, 2009,
Ways the IMET Program Could Influence Democratic Values (Literature Review)

There are several possible ways the IMET program could have influence on a recipient country's democratic values.

**Influence of Powerful Alumni**

John Cope, a Fellow from the Institute for National Strategic Studies, wrote a significant study in 1995 entitled *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*. It is the most comprehensive work outlining the overall effectiveness of IMET with many first-hand accounts based on surveys. Like many of the articles on the IMET program, Cope's study tends to focus less on the program's influence on democratic values and more on the international graduates as rising leaders in their militaries and the ability of the United States to then connect to and leverage those leaders when required.

There is consensus throughout much of the literature on IMET acknowledging the difficulty of quantifying progress/effectiveness with regards to democratic values. Cope, for example, says success with regards to the advancement of human rights can only really be defined after the fact, when human rights violations have not occurred. However, as foreign military officer graduates further their careers in their own respective armed forces, presumably they advance in rank, have more responsibility, and have the potential to be the future leaders of their forces. As leaders of their militaries, they might remember the democratic values to which they were exposed while being educated at one of the various institutions under the IMET program, and would thus be able to significantly influence their military's behavior. As an example, in a review of the effects of security cooperation in Romania by Ira C. Queen, there appeared to be a link between U.S. security cooperation with Romania and Romania's more pro-Western policies. In addition to providing assistance in improving Romania's military justice system and inter-ministerial cooperation, many Romanian officers attended training through the IMET program and they have IMET graduates in over 17 different ministries within their government. Queen noted that Romania's goal has not only been to enhance its military's capacity to integrate with the U.S.- or NATO-led missions, but also to reform its own interagency relations. A 2008 George C. Marshall European Center for Security

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Studies report showed that its international military educational program produces alumni who (in surveys) claim they are able to influence their respective militaries in such ways as improving relations with their own country’s civilian ministries, and developing new versions of military and counter-terrorism laws.\textsuperscript{27} Through the use of three case studies, U.S. Air Force Colonel Ruby and Professor Gibler in 2010 attempt to show that U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) is a stabilizing force during times of democratic transition. In their case studies, they show that countries used the U.S. PME system as a model to encourage civilian control of the military in emerging democracies.

Conversely, some reports indicate the influence of the IMET program is marginal at best. Jennifer Morrison Taw prepared a report for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1993 regarding the training of international military students (specifically training on internal defense and development). In it, she argues that the training program is too small to really make an impact because only a small percentage of each military’s personnel receive the training and “powerful historical, political, cultural, and economic influences on foreign militaries behavior and development” are much stronger.\textsuperscript{28} A 2011 GAO report on the IMET program looked specifically at IMET’s impact on a recipient country’s respect for human rights. The study used countries’ \textit{Freedom House} ranking in its assessment, evaluated all the U.S. PME curricula, and used numerous interviews to reach its conclusion that human rights training had not been emphasized enough in the IMET curricula. This report did not focus on civilian control of the military. Despite the GAO report and Taw’s assessment, alumni successfully completing IMET training, returning to their country, and subsequently rising through the ranks appears to be the most effective means for the program to have a positive influence on democratic values.

\textit{Enhancement of Military-to-Military Relationships}

Another way the program could have a lasting impact is by deepening the military to military relationship between the two countries causing increased exposure to the U.S. Military. As foreign military officers are exposed to American exercises and gain contacts and relationships with American military

\textsuperscript{28} Jennifer Morrison Taw. \textit{The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development} (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993).
officers, they might be more likely to influence their own military leadership to be more involved in multilateral or bilateral exercises or operations in cooperation with the U.S. Military. More exposure of their forces to American forces would potentially spread democratic values. Miles Wolpin of the University of New Mexico suggests that U.S. military assistance programs such as IMET do have a moderate impact on foreign officers’ ideological thinking.\textsuperscript{29} His work focused on the political socialization of officers from 3rd world countries from 1946-1970. Wolpin’s conclusion is drawn by comparing the proportion of a nation’s armed forces trained by the United States with the incidences of ideological interventions. When the proportion of forces exposed to U.S. forces by training and exercising with them is larger, Wolpin found that the number of conservative coups is higher than the number of radical coups. Wolpin studied cases during the cold war and did not discuss a military’s behavior regarding democratic values. Conservative versus radical coups were defined by nothing more than the way in which the foreign military or future government leaned (east or west) for future partnership following the takeover. There are numerous articles from \textit{DISAM Journal} touting the positive benefits of the program, the majority of which emphasize the increased military-to-military relationships resulting from the training. The majority of this literature expresses the impact of the program at solidifying global relationships and increasing the interoperability of working with the same equipment rather than the expansion of democratic values. These articles also appear in a journal that is published by DSCA, the agency responsible for the implementation of the IMET program itself. While both DISAM and DSCA’s journals provide admirable studies of the IMET program itself, both agencies’ interest in the continuation of IMET casts doubt on the neutrality and objectivity of their studies. However, the number of countries with whom the U.S. has participated in military-to-military exercises has increased since the beginning of the IMET program.

One can postulate that there is a certain amount of prestige that graduates receive as a result of completing the program. For example, Rear Admiral Kazi Sarwar Hossain of the Bangladesh Coast Guard is pictured in uniform in a publication of distinguished graduates of the U.S. Naval War College with his U.S. Navy SEAL trident prominently displayed on his chest, suggesting the value that he places on his

American training and the prestige that he receives from this training. It is likely these IMET graduates are eager to reconnect on a professional level with the country that educated and trained them.

**IMET used as a Foreign Policy Tool**

Amongst the volumes of case studies touting IMET as a positive national security tool, still a few individuals claim IMET in fact has a negative impact. Most cite as examples the *School of the Americas*, which critics claim was a training ground for El Salvador’s military officers to become more efficient abusers of human rights in the early 1990s or more recently the fact that some Indonesian military officers are trained in the U.S. The Indonesian military helped to inflict a campaign of terror and violence in East Timor in 1999. The argument, although not written in a scholarly journal, is that the United States should not be associated with oppressive militaries. In 2000, when the Indonesian military controversy was taking place, *CQ Weekly* reported that at that time, scholars of civil-military relations said there has been no academic study investigating how these types of education programs affect alumni behavior. This argument has spurred the program to be used as a foreign policy tool. If a receiving country does not meet a minimum standard outlined by the Leahy Law, which prohibits any foreign assistance such as IMET funds to go to a country where there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations to which its government is not adequately responding, threatened withdrawal of IMET funds could occur. If a receiving country’s military is grossly disregarding human rights, the United States could stop inviting their military students to be educated under the program. In the early 1990s, Congress cut off IMET funding to Indonesia due to that country’s human rights record. Some funding was restored in 1995 but then cut off again in 2000 after more reports of human rights violations. However, the effectiveness of the IMET
program used as a foreign policy tool is the least productive area of influence. Expelling foreign students of an offending military/government from the IMET program removes the potential for changing its military for the better. Furthermore, expulsion from IMET has historically been inconsistently applied making it an ineffective tool for change.

Other Factors Influencing a Foreign Military’s Democratic Values

Broadly speaking, there are many factors that might impact a foreign military’s behavior with regards to democratic values. The strength of a foreign country’s central government is likely to influence the extent to which that government’s civilian leaders control the military. In addition, civilian control of the military is often dependent upon perceived external threats. Richard Kohn argues that an internal or external crisis “can produce disorder or chaos at such a level as to invite military rule, as occurred in many newly-independent nations in Africa and Asia in the wake of decolonization after World War II.”

International political pressure for involvement in multinational military operations from outside the country itself can influence change in particular foreign military’s behavior. Moreover, exposure to the U.S. Military in exercises through security cooperation can foster an increase in democratic behavior. Stephen Rosen addresses the connection between a country’s military and its internal domestic social structures by concluding that internal societies have much influence on military behavior and military power. The existing laws of a country, such as its constitution (or lack of a constitution) could also have an influence.

Methodology of Research

The link between IMET and a foreign military’s progress in democratic values is explored by looking at three militaries as case studies. As Figures 1 and 2 show, these three countries from different

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regions – Ukraine, Nigeria, and Bangladesh – have approximately the same size military, and all have approximately the same number of military members taking part in the U.S. IMET program in FY 2010.

Figure 1: Size Comparison of Case Study Armed Forces

![Size Comparison of Case Study Armed Forces](image1)


Figure 2: IMET Students per year (1999-2010)

![IMET Students per year](image2)


Countries that have a higher amount of IMET funding rather than a lower amount were chosen in order to maximize the likelihood of discernible impact. Figure 3 shows the IMET funding levels for the three case study countries over the past ten years. The average money the United States spent on the IMET program per country out of all 125 countries is shown for 2010. All of the case studies are from the
top 30 countries out of 125 receiving funding in 2010 (top 25%). This is much higher than the average as Figure 3 shows.

Figure 3: IMET Funding per year (1999-2010) in U.S. Dollars

These three case study countries – which are considered “partly free” according to the Freedom House rankings for 2010 – were chosen in order to be able to identify some improvement during the researched years, as contrasted to countries that are considered “free” whose militaries are more likely to have already ingrained democratic values. Similarly, countries considered “not free” whose militaries are more likely to have shown no improvement, would not enable this study to identify progress. Progress in democratic values was analyzed from 1990 to present due to the fact that it was at the end of the cold war in 1990 that Congress expanded the stated goals of the program to include the enhancement of democratic values such as human rights and civilian control of the military.38

Democratic values were measured by IMET’s own stated goals, the enhancement of human rights and the enhancement of the level of civilian control of the military. For each case study, evidence of progress in the democratic values of a foreign military was explored by looking specifically at the country’s civil-military relations and its military’s human rights record over time. Civilian-military relations were researched using scholarly journal articles and books on each country. Evidence of human rights was explored by reading language in Department of State and independent human rights reports over the years.

38 22 US Code, Sec. 2347.
in question and looking specifically at language dealing with military behavior. In addition, human rights research employed media reports and articles from scholarly journals. As evidence of progress appeared, the potential link to the IMET program was examined. It should be noted that the enhancement of respect for rule of law is a democratic value that is also a part of IMET's stated goals. However, this research focuses on those values that can be more easily applicable to and measurable in military behavior. The enhancement of rule of law applies mostly to civilian institutions. Therefore, civilian control of the military and a military’s respect for human rights are the two values of measure for this research.

IMET’s potential influence is established by focusing on three processes in which the program could impact that military’s democratic values (through alumni, increasing military-to-military relationships, and IMET used as a foreign policy tool). Determining alumni in positions of power is challenging. To begin, there is no comprehensive list of IMET graduates. To identify alumni who are in a position to influence their respective countries’ militaries in the three countries discussed, a search was conducted in order to identify distinguished graduates of the various U.S. military educational institutions. However, not all U.S. PME institutions have such lists. Therefore, graduates were found by looking at the biographies of high-ranking military and civilian leadership within the countries researched available online.

The military-to-military relationship with the United States was evaluated by looking at the major operations the countries participated in along with the United States in the past twenty years. In addition, training exercises involving the countries in question with the United States over the past five years were discovered by using open source press releases from U.S. embassies and various media reports.

The source information for IMET being used as a foreign policy tool came from looking at funding levels for all security assistance programs for the case study countries for the past twenty years and reading the State Department reports to Congress as to the reasoning behind any drop in funding.
Limitations of the Research

Research was limited due to a lack of measurable data in many areas. There was neither a comprehensive U.S. Government list provided as to the names of IMET alumni, nor was there a list from all institutions as to their own foreign military graduates of distinction. There is no published data following-up on the activities/careers of international graduates. Prior to 1999, when the State Department was required to submit a report to Congress on foreign military training, data as to the numbers of students and funding levels of different programs was inconsistent. Other military security assistance training programs are often in place independent of IMET, making it hard to isolate the IMET program’s impact from the larger security assistance picture.

Findings

Most of the literature written on this topic indicated that even though one of the written goals of the program was to foster democratic values, the program was not seen by its international students or by American military officers as having the goal of furthering these values. Based on this fact and the fact that the GAO report recommended more formal human rights training placed into the curriculum, a likely hypothesis would be that the IMET program would show no positive effect on furthering a foreign military’s democratic values. One might conclude that the training and education of foreign military officers isn’t worth the U.S. taxpayer money if no progress could be found in this area or democratic values. However, the IMET program’s value lies not just in its potential to further democratic values but also as part of a larger global security cooperation strategy. Furthermore, upon detailed examination, some links between the IMET program and the advancement of democratic values were reasonably discovered in all the countries selected for case study. There are alumni who are now in the top positions in their militaries and they maintain contact with the United States through military training and exercises. Expressions of the value of their IMET training continue to be evident in the consistency in which they cite their IMET training in biographical material and they physically display their qualifications earned in the United States. Progress in democratic values in the case study countries still remained inconsistent and
unpredictable. However, given the low cost of the IMET program for the United States, even small, unpredictable data based progress is worth the effort.

Case Study 1: Ukraine

Background on Ukrainian Military and History with IMET

For most of the 20th century, the Ukrainian territory was part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military had a large presence in the area and when Ukraine became an independent state, it inherited a very large portion of the former Soviet armed forces. In 1992, when the Ukrainian military institution had just come into existence, officers with no democratic history populated the large, “over manned” force.39 Ukraine started from scratch in developing a framework for democratic civilian control of the military. A bloated military at the start of a new democracy could have been cause for concern. However, the Soviet legacy left Ukraine’s military with little “lust for power”. 40 Ukraine was able to develop a framework for solidifying civilian control of the military primarily through the Ukrainian Constitution.41 According to the Ukrainian Constitution, the Parliament or “Verkhovna Rada” has oversight of the military. It formulates legislation and the legal basis for military policy. It also controls the military’s budget. The constitution stipulates that the President of Ukraine serves as the supreme commander in chief of the armed forces. Serving military officers are prohibited from being president.42 The National Security and Defense Council controls all major military decisions. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for the condition and development of the armed forces. This MOD is subordinate to and appointed by the President.43

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43 Ibid., 198.
Today the Ukrainian military consists of 130,000 regular members and 85,000 paramilitary also called “security service” members. The “security service” is an internal force that could be mobilized for international conflict if necessary but has a primary function of homeland policing. These forces are separate from the regular or external forces whose primary mission is external conflict. Ukraine started receiving IMET funds for military training almost immediately after its independence. In the mid-90s, the IMET program was considered its primary U.S. security assistance program. The U.S. trained 66 Ukrainian students under IMET in 2010 and 2,522 since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Based on this strong presence of Ukraine in the IMET program, one would predict that if any progress in a military’s respect for democratic values could be linked to the IMET program, Ukraine would be a good candidate.

Civilian Control of the Military in Ukraine

Between 1991-2000, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 125 laws regarding Ukraine’s national security system, and as a result, the armed forces underwent serious reform by becoming more transparent. The legal framework concerning the Armed forces had been strengthened. However, there remains concern that Ukraine’s internal troops do not fall under the same framework of civilian control. The absence of democratic control over Ukraine’s internal security forces (33,000 internal troops) has remained unchanged since the early 1990s. Even though a constitutional framework exists (as described earlier), there have been reports of a declining role of Parliament in defense and military issues. At the same time, there was evidence of a tense relationship between the MOD and military general staff. A lack of understanding of democratic civil-military relations by the highest-ranking officers continues. Key positions within the MOD are still held by military members or retired military members. The military still

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views the civilians in government as being inadequate and unable to set defense policy. Efforts to improve oversight of the military by Parliament have been resisted by the military.

There is recognition that much remains to be done to improve Ukraine’s level of civil-military relations. However, the trends of democratizing the military, particularly the external forces, have been “steady and positive.” This consistent positive trend has continued in line with the U.S. education of Ukrainian military officers through IMET. There is evidence that Ukrainian IMET graduates have become reform-minded leaders within the Ukrainian national security bureaucracy. Some have assumed key positions. In 2007, the defense minister started to recognize the diplomas Ukrainian servicemen earned in the U.S. and was “personally interviewing returning students from abroad in order to recommend their appropriate placement in the forces so as to leverage their education and experience.”

Anatoliy Gritsenko, a graduate of the U.S. Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, served as the Defense Minister of Ukraine from 2005-2007 and was considered one of the few “non corrupt” and “pro western” Ukrainian politicians. His research while studying abroad focused on democratic civilian control of the armed forces “pioneering this research in Ukraine.” Later, while serving in the Ukrainian Parliament as Chairman of the National Security and Defense Committee, he actively pushed for anti-corruption reform especially within the Ukrainian army. By the end of 2011, 290 IMET-trained Ukrainian officers served on staff at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, or service staffs and more of the current military senior leadership is thought to support reform. In general, Ukraine has brought more civilian experts to the Ministry of Defense and has supported increasing the amounts of training of Ukrainian officers receive in the West. The IMET program has provided master’s-degree level education in civil-military relations to numerous current and future senior Ukrainian military leaders.

Despite this, there are less-positive trends such as reports that the internal “Security Service” of Ukraine at times “acted with impunity and appeared to act to further the political interests of the

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51 Ibid., 202.
55 Ibid
56 Department of Defense Combined Education and Training Program Plan for Ukraine Budget Year 2013 provided by DSCA.
President.” This could be due to the two-tiered structure in the Ukrainian armed forces described earlier. Leaders in the external forces typically are chosen for IMET training and therefore, large numbers of senior leaders primarily from the internal forces still have little exposure to the West. The non-transparency and perhaps the more politicized arm of the internal armed forces are considered a consequence of this lack of exposure to Western training. Anatoliy Gritsenko, the IMET graduate referred to earlier, has been openly critical of the “politicization” of these forces and their harassment of Presidential political opponents.  

**Respect for Human Rights by Ukraine’s Military**

There does seem to be some progress within the Ukrainian Military in respect for human rights. The U.S. Department of State’s 1999 Human Rights report for Ukraine indicated that the military had some role in politically motivated killings, and partook in the torture of prisoners to death. The report noted that the military’s “pervasive corruption” and connections between it and organized crime networks “blurs” the distinction as to who specifically committed the attacks on “politicians, politically connected businessmen, and journalists.” By 2011, however, there were no reports that the government or its agents committed any politically motivated killings or disappearances. In 1999, there were reports of beatings of conscripts in the army by fellow soldiers. In that same year, these army beatings resulted in 30-40 deaths. These types of beatings were recorded for the next five years. In 2005, it was noted that there was increased accountability of the armed forces. The violent beatings of conscripts still occurred, but by 2005 there were no reported deaths as a result of these beatings. Since 2008, there have not been any reports of these violent beatings. The beatings of recruits were a tradition handed-down from the Soviet military.

Since Ukrainian independence, its military has been involved in various multinational operations and exercises. The military has been an active participant in NATO’s Partnership for Peace exercises. It

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has played a role in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and in UN Peacekeeping missions in Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Ivory Coast. In the 2002 Prague Summit, the official NATO-Ukraine Partnership Action Plan was adopted. This plan urged Ukraine to focus its reform efforts on “strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the market economy.”

In 2003-2005, Ukraine deployed 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeepers to Iraq. It has also cooperated in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Such exposure via partnerships with Western armed forces in exercises and operations, and via military leadership being trained in the United States is likely to have played a part in stopping the inhumane practices of beatings and killings that characterized the military prior to the training experience. Moreover, the Defense Minister from 2005 to 2007 – when the beatings of recruits appears to have stopped – was an IMET graduate; an important distinction to make within the context of this study. The issue of hazing in the military is stressed during IMET courses and likely influenced the graduates who held positions of authority.

The practice of military-to-military relationship building has continued and expanded. For example, the U.S. and Ukraine began a strategic partnership in 2008 holding its first partnership meeting in 2009. Exercises between the two countries are not uncommon. Some 1,400 armed forces personnel took part in the two-week Ukrainian-U.S. Rapid Trident military exercise in 2012 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in the Lviv region.

Despite these strides, Ukraine’s human rights record still remains poor. Even though its constitution prohibits torture, there were reports that security forces tortured and beat detainees and prisoners. The government generally still fails to prosecute the forces that commit these abuses, especially

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62 Department of Defense Combined Education and Training Program Plan for Ukraine for Budget Year 2013 provided by DSCA.
against ethnic minorities and prisoners. However, there has been some modest demonstrated progress in its armed forces respect for human rights in the past twenty years since Ukrainian independence.

Ukrainian Case Study Conclusion

Despite the fact that Ukraine is only twenty years old, it has one of the more extensive experiences with the IMET program. There has been a strong consistent presence of Ukrainian students graduating from the IMET program. Ukrainian IMET students are not only military officers but also senior officials from the Ministries of Defense, Economics, and Border Troops. The Ukrainian military has shown some modest progress in both civilian-military relations and human rights, and its ministries that have utilized Western expertise have reformed more quickly. Alumni from the IMET program have facilitated this reform.

Case Study 2: Nigeria

Background on Nigerian Military and History with IMET

The Nigerian Military first inserted itself into Nigeria’s government and politics in 1966, following the collapse of the Nigerian “First Republic” government. From 1966 to 1979, the country was ruled by its military. A brief four-year period of civilian rule in the “Second Republic” took place between 1979-1983. In 1984, a military coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida, a graduate of the U.S. Army Armored Officer Course and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in California, ousted the democratic regime. Nigeria had various military dictators until 1999 when it held democratic elections in which the former military head, Olusegun Obasanjo, was elected the new President. Nigeria has had three presidents since 1999.

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Nigeria’s current military – consisting of 80,000 regular and 82,000 paramilitary troops – has many problems. Its equipment is very old, its units seldom train, and when they do, training tends to be provided by a wide variety of countries and organizations with different doctrines and varying values. In addition, Nigeria has been receiving IMET funding inconsistently for the past 20 years, as opposed to a strong consistent program like the Ukraine. The United States trained 73 Nigerian students in 2010 and 1,449 since the program began. Due to the inconsistent participation of the Nigerian forces to IMET training, one would suspect to find little or no progress in the enhancement of democratic values.

Civilian Control of the Military in Nigeria

The military is widely seen as “the only institution capable of solving the country’s many political, economic and social problems,” and thus, the army holds a great deal of political power. Military generals remain some of Nigeria’s most popular political figures. The military seems to have the mentality that they are not bound by the same rules as ordinary citizens. Military officers enjoy a higher social status both within and outside of the military. In addition, for many years since the end of military rule, the Nigerian military had repeatedly intervened in the political process of its own country. However, there does seem to be some sign of progress in the Nigerian Military’s attitude towards the democratic values. Since Obasanjo’s administration, Nigeria has had two more Presidents – neither of which have come from the military.

An orderly reorganization within the armed forces has been instituted allowing high-ranking positions to experience systematic turnover. Other concrete progressive steps taken are the seizure of selected officers’ corruptly acquired money and landed properties. President Obasanjo has made new appointments in key defense positions as part of his administration’s overall plan to assert effective civilian control over the military.
control over the military.\textsuperscript{74} Even though Nigeria lost almost a decade of training due to sanctions, some alumni have risen in the ranks and have impacted their country’s civil-military relations. General Martin Luther Agawai, a graduate of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. and U.S. Army Armor School became Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces from 2006-2009. IMET graduates have continued to rise to the top of their nation’s armed forces. The Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike trained in the United States for the Undergraduate Pilot Training. He went back for the Instructor Pilot Training in Texas and is a graduate of the U.S. Air Command and Staff College in Alabama. Under their leadership, the Nigerian military refused to get involved in the April 2007 elections.\textsuperscript{75} This is significant, given the history of the Nigerian military’s political involvement in the past.

\textit{Nigerian Military’s Respect for Human Rights}

Since 1995, the Nigerian military has deployed as peacekeepers in Liberia (1997), Ivory Coast (1997–1999), Sierra Leone (1997–1999), and in Sudan’s Darfur region (2007–present). During this timeframe, there was widespread evidence of serious human rights abuses by the Nigerian military peacekeepers. The Nigerian forces were accused of “failing to do enough to minimize civilian casualties when carrying out operations, of abusing human rights, and of establishing and running criminal networks.”\textsuperscript{76} In Liberia, they “targeted women . . . and committed sexual and gender based violations against them including, rape of all forms, sexual slavery, forced marriages, [and] forced recruitment.”\textsuperscript{77} In Sierra Leone, the Nigerian peacekeepers “raped women and girls, forcibly enlisted boys and youths, and murdered and mutilated non-combatants at random”.\textsuperscript{78} More crimes included the looting of private property, the execution of enemy fighters and their alleged civilian supporters, and the unlawful detention of combatants and non-combatants.\textsuperscript{79} Evidence exists that the military used excessive, sometimes lethal,\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 12.\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
force against its own citizens as well. In the Ogoniland area of Nigeria from 1990-1999, The Nigerian forces committed gross sexual violence sending “a message of utmost fear and insecurity.”

The Nigerian military still seems to be using violence against its own people. Political or religious riots are put down by the Nigerian Military since the civilian police force is inadequate and the methods used to quell the demonstrations have been violent. In 2001, in the city of Jos, around 1,000 people died in demonstrations that brought about clashes with the Nigerian security forces. In 2004, more than 700 people were killed in riots in Yelwa. Again in Jos in 2008, hundreds more civilians were killed by the Nigerian military and security forces. There is still great tension between the military and civilians in Nigeria. The military often is perceived with “images of terror in the minds of the civil populace.” In 2008 in Bauchi city, an Army Captain ordered his men to brutalize a female civilian by beating her and tearing off her clothes. One woman was beaten, dragged on a road and eventually stripped naked in public by naval forces for allegedly obstructing Rear Admiral Harry Arogundade’s convoy. The Admiral apparently watched the event without stopping it. Naval authorities publicly contended that the woman “provoked the Naval Ratings and deserved what she got.” In the 1980s-90s, the average rating for Nigeria on the Political Terror Scale was a 2-3. It has since worsened since the mid 1990s to an average of 3-4.

As evidenced in the above data, progress in the area of respect for human rights remains bleak. According to the U.S. Department of State, the Nigerian government continues to commit numerous arbitrary and unlawful killings. During 2011, a Joint Task Force (including the Nigerian military and security services) “conducted raids on militant groups in the Niger delta resulting in numerous deaths and injuries to civilians.” Also in the report, the Nigerian military was said to have conducted “illegal killings”. In addition, the military “destroyed property, illegally detained residents, raped women” and conducted “executions”. Torture is still not criminalized and the military regularly engages in torture of

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80 Ibid.
82 Hill. "Thoughts."
86 U.S. Department of State. "Department of State Human Rights Report 2011."
demonstrators, criminal suspects, and detainees. Authority have still not prosecuted members of the police and military for unlawful killings.” In 2012, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights & Labor, Michael Posner, urged Nigerian forces to be disciplined in their use of force and to abstain from violence against civilians. However, as this evidence has illustrated, not much has changed in the Nigerian military’s behavior.

Despite overwhelming reports of atrocities, there does seem to be “a growing determination among Nigeria’s most senior officers to push ahead with the professionalization” of Nigeria’s Army, Navy and Air Force. Officers are starting to push for the improvement in the conduct of the men and women under their command. There is recognition that “the abuses of civilians that have occurred in the past, both at home and on peacekeeping missions abroad, have hindered and undermined the military’s efforts to restore or maintain peace.” This push toward more respect for human rights by Nigeria’s military has been motivated by both the need to achieve operational effectiveness and improve its international reputation. International reputation is important especially when it comes to participating in exercises with the U.S. military. The recent Exercise Africa Endeavor in 2008 highlighted the current Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Armed Forces and graduate of the Defense Intelligence College in Washington D.C., General Owoye Andrew Azazi. General Azazi is pictured in numerous government and media reports along with U.S. Military leaders as overseeing the exercise in which both the U.S. and Nigeria participated along with other African nations. This exercise occurred again in 2012. Despite more recent efforts, it is fair to say there has been very little or no real progress in the area of respect for human rights.

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87 Ibid.
90 Hill. “Thoughts.”
91 Ibid.
92 Hill. “Thoughts.”

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IMET Used as a Foreign Policy Tool in Nigeria

The inconsistency of IMET training occurred in two instances in which there was flagrant disregard for human rights and democratic values by the Nigerian government. The withholding of funding is a well-known foreign policy tool. The idea behind doing so in these cases was to show displeasure for bad behavior on the part of the Nigerian Government, and to encourage human rights and democracy. For example, the Clinton Administration responded to the Nigerian dictator General Babangida's annulment of the June 1993 presidential elections by terminating Nigeria's $450,000 IMET funding and expelling the five Nigerian Military officers receiving military training at the time. IMET was again suspended from 2003-2006 because the former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who was accused of war crimes, went into exile in Nigeria. Funding was restored when Nigeria extradited him in 2006. The use of suspending IMET funding as a foreign policy tool may be effective in achieving the short-term human rights/democracy goals (such as the extradition of a single human rights offender). However, stopping the training of the Nigerian forces lessens the chance that IMET can help improve their forces with respect democratic values. By losing a decade of training due to these measures, it should come as no surprise that there is little progress.

Nigerian Case Study Conclusion

Nigeria has shown some progress in civilian control of the military and former IMET graduates have been a significant part of that progress. However, Nigerian forces have shown little to no progress in human rights. Withholding IMET funding and activity for significant periods of time within the last two decades cannot be exclusively cited as the reason for no progress in the area of human rights. Multiple variables were likely operative. However, training on democratic principles like that obtained by Nigerian officers in the IMET program, has the potential to be passed on to their forces.94

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94 Ojo, "Taming the Monster," 12.
Case Study 3: Bangladesh

Background on Bangladeshi Military and History with IMET

Since Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan in 1971, it has undergone numerous military coups and years of military rule. For much of Bangladesh’s history, the failure of democratic politics to gain a firm hold in the country and the “lofty political ambitions of high ranking [military] officers” allowed militarism in government to become normal.\textsuperscript{95} For many years, “groups within the armed forces did not trust any politicians.”\textsuperscript{96} The military’s interests were upheld at the expense of other forces in society. Several serving and retired military officers were commonly placed in strategic positions in civil and police administration, and public enterprises.\textsuperscript{97} The last period of military rule ended in 1990 and since then it has been a parliamentary democracy.

The Bangladesh military today consists of 157,000 regular forces with 64,000 paramilitary members.\textsuperscript{98} Bangladesh has inherited influence both from the British Indian Army training system, and the Pakistan Army training system, which is not strong in professional or general liberal arts education. The United States trained 56 Bangladesh students in 2010 and 1,667 since the start of the IMET program. Given the historical precedent of military rule in Bangladesh and the consistent presence of Bangladesh in the IMET program, some progress in the Bangladeshi military’s respect for democratic values should be able to be traced back to this training.

Civilian Control of the Military in Bangladesh

Although there is room for improvement, Bangladesh has shown some positive trends in civil-military relations. It has had civilian rule since 1990. Critics will say that members of the military are still too involved in Bangladesh’s politics, citing that in 2001, competition between the political parties to recruit former army officers as election candidates saw four former army chiefs, one former head of the air

\textsuperscript{97} Zafarullah and Akhter. "Military Rule," 81.
force, six former generals and 16 army officers run for parliament. However, even the United States has had its share of former generals running for political office after their time in the armed forces. The more concerning possible regression of civilian control of the military took place in 2007. Early that year, the scheduled elections were cancelled and emergency law was declared following widespread political unrest. The army was instrumental in the cancellation of elections and the establishment of a caretaker government or “CG”. There are those who postulate that a CG backed by the military was the best way to dispel the extensive corruption, disorder and political violence in the country. The military did assist the CG in its drive against corruption, and Bangladesh's position in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index improved from being at the very bottom, where they had been for three years in a row, to 147th in just one year. Although the corruption index moved from 162 to 147, many people in Bangladesh see the Army’s role in the government turnover as dangerous. People there felt that from that point on, the army has been given “a kind of knowledge that can never be revoked – the certainty that it can step forward and take control” when it deems the government and people incapable of governing. Many in Bangladesh fear that the civilian “grip on democracy will always be tenuous.” While this government did seem to root out corruption, from the point of view of civilian control of the military, one could view the establishment of the CG as regressive. However, for the past twenty years there has not been an outright military takeover of the civilian government, a significant change from the years preceding. During this same time period, Bangladesh has had significant participation in the IMET program. It also participated in the American-led coalition during the 1991 Gulf War to liberate Kuwait by contributing 2,300 troops to the operation. Bangladesh’s military has become significantly more professionalized during this time. Many of its armed forces leaders were IMET graduates with ties still to the U.S. Military. For example, Vice Admiral Zahir Uddin Ahmed, the current Chief of Naval Staff (head of the navy), is pictured as a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island where he graduated in 1992.

102 Ibid.
103 United States Naval War College. "United States Naval War College Distinguished Alumni."
Bangladesh has continually increased its partnership and participation in regional exercises and operations. For example, a 2009 U.S. Embassy press release indicated the U.S.-Bangladeshi exercise “Tiger Shark” took place in order to train together for counterterrorism, combating piracy, maritime, and coastal threats. In 2012, disaster assistance exercises included the navy-navy CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) maritime security exercise and DREE (Disaster Response Exercise and Exchange) by the U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Air Force. Recently, Admiral Locklear, U.S. commander in the pacific region stated “the United States, Bangladesh and other regional neighbors all stand to benefit from a strong U.S.-Bangladeshi military-to-military relationship.” Assigning "a very good grade" to the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Bangladesh, Admiral Locklear said he would like to build on it to become stronger partners in ensuring a positive security environment. All of this advancement in the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Bangladesh is likely to have been an important factor in encouraging the Bangladesh Military’s commitment to constitutional rule and discouraging any military coup attempts as seen in the past. The alumni rising to the top of the Bangladesh military and the subsequent military-to-military connections have likely aided in the military of Bangladesh’s more moderate stance.

Bangladeshi Military's Respect for Human Rights

In the past ten years, there has been inconsistent progress in the Bangladesh Military’s respect for human rights. In 2004, an elite force called the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) was established. The RAB, composed of members of the military and police forces, are assigned from their parent organizations, to which they return after serving with the unit. However, according to international human rights groups, the RAB has been involved in human rights abuses since its development. Human Rights Watch and others have long documented extrajudicial killings and torture by the RAB. In private, some officials admit that they are aware that RAB engages in human rights violations but that the

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106 Ibid.
government is afraid to confront it because this would anger the army. “There is an obvious culture of fear within the government when it comes to confronting [the] RAB on any issue.” The most significant human rights problems were killings and torture by security forces. The government did not take comprehensive measures to investigate cases of these security force killings.

The percentages of high-ranking officers in Bangladesh’s army who are IMET graduates during this time period cannot be found. However, through the investigative efforts described earlier, it is clear that many rose to top leadership positions. Still, no documented progress in the army’s behavior with regard to the RAB could be found. In the 2003 Department of State Human Rights Report, the army used “unwarranted lethal force” in Operation Clean Heart. In this operation, the army was accused of assaulting, torturing and killing a man. In 2006, security forces were considered to “act with impunity and commit acts of physical and psychological torture.” The RAB used unwarranted force killing 355 people. No member of the RAB has been prosecuted. In 2009, after the return of a democratically elected government and the repeal of the state of emergency, there was a slight increase in the number of extrajudicial killings by security forces. In 2011, human rights reports still showed numerous killings and torture by security forces and a lack of investigations into the killings.

Today, the Bangladeshi Army does have an IMET graduate in charge. Army Chief General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan is a graduate of the peacekeeping course (Defense Institute for International Legal Studies) in Rhode Island, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Although steps have been taken to rein in the RAB – such as the development of an internal investigation unit to hold members accountable for respecting human rights – not much human rights progress can be seen in this area to date.

At the same time, the army manages the Bangladesh Institute Peace Keeping Operations and Training (BIPSOT) Center, which is considered a world-class training center and the Bangladesh army has become a world leader in peacekeeping operations. Bangladesh fields the world’s largest contributor

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(10,736) to UN peacekeeping forces. This has given the country’s military much prestige. In the past decade, Bangladesh had major deployments in Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Ivory Coast.

Bangladeshi Case Study Conclusion

While the status of Bangladesh in civilian control of the military and its military’s respect for human rights is not as grossly deficient as Nigeria, there has been conflicting evidence of progress in these areas. Speculation as to the origin of the mixed picture of democratic values in Bangladesh would have to recognize that there is substantial training from different sources. Bangladesh receives substantial amounts of military training from China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. For example, every year, several Bangladeshi military officers attend the Chinese Senior Service College program for international students. Training in India and Pakistan focuses on officer skills, both technical and professional. The additional sources of military training do not attempt to inculcate democratic values. Continuing the IMET program is more likely to have an effect in this area. Furthermore, the U.S-Bangladesh partnership, broader regional security and international security continues to be strengthened by having IMET graduates as evidenced by Bangladesh’s involvement in peacekeeping operations, and regional counterterrorism, and disaster relief operations.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the question of whether the IMET program has had any measurable impact on the democratic values of the militaries of participating countries. The impact of the training has been haphazardly assessed in the past. An attempt was made using the limited data available to link the IMET program with progress in democratic values hypothesizing that no link could be found. In general, the case studies reveal no predictable positive effects from the IMET program on the progress of democratic values in a country’s military. However, some small links between the program and improvement in these

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values were revealed in all three case studies. There was evidence in the exploration of the Ukrainian civil-military relations and its military’s respect for human rights that the IMET program likely played a part in helping it to progress. The Nigerian case study showed that although almost no progress could be seen in human rights, there was some progress in civilian control of the military that could be linked to IMET. Finally, the study revealed the inconsistency of the human rights behavior and civilian control of the military in Bangladesh. Through these case study results, it is clear that distinct consistent progress cannot be seen with regards to the democratic values, but even slight progress is worth the effort given IMET’s role in developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low fiscal investment. Even the small signs of progress that are linked to the IMET program are worth the pennies the U.S. Government is spending to continue this program.
CHAPTER 2
SECURITY & THE POWER OF GOODWILL:
PROACTIVE U.S. NAVY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

Introduction

Natural disasters are occurring more frequently. Between 1975 and 2009, the number of reported disasters has increased. As a result of this changing environment, the U.S. military’s security efforts have been impacted on a global scale. The effects of environmental change and the overall negative effects of disasters have led not only to an increase in the number of humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, but they have additionally led to strategic changes within the U.S. military. These changes have elevated the importance of soft power, particularly in U.S. Navy’s overseas missions.

This chapter examines the security implications of the increasing number of softer U.S. Navy’s humanitarian assistance and proactive medical missions since 2004, using three case studies. The chapter asks the question whether the U.S. Navy’s humanitarian and proactive medical deployments help accomplish any of the Navy’s stated strategic policy outcomes, of increasing U.S. access, influence, and visibility; thereby, ultimately increasing American soft power regionally. This examination tests the common-held belief that humanitarian health operations cannot be linked to any significant soft power increases globally or in the regions in which they occur, and that these operations cannot justify their cost in a time of budget constraint.

It concludes that there is a connection between these deployments and increases in American soft power regionally and, to a lesser extent, globally. This connection is more strongly demonstrated in countries in which the United States had strained diplomatic and defense relations prior to the humanitarian engagements. Given the potential benefit for outreach to countries located in strategically important regions where relations with the United States have historically been strained, coupled with the

modest monetary cost of such operations, this chapter concludes that these missions do have a significant soft power impact. Halting the use of hospital ships and warships for these softer operations under the rubric of fiscal austerity would be a costly mistake.

U.S. Navy’s Humanitarian Assistance Operations in the Past Decade

In late 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean was estimated to have released the energy equivalent to 23,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs. It generated what National Geographic Magazine labeled the “deadliest tsunami in history,” causing over 225,000 deaths and displacing 1.7 million people.115 According to Robert Kaplan, this Indian Ocean tsunami was a “curtain raiser” to disasters ahead, where in the coming decades more than any other time in history, people “are likely to be killed or made homeless by Mother Nature.”116

The number of humanitarian assistance and civic action projects undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) rose sharply in the years following the tsunami.117 Since 2004, the U.S. Navy reinvigorated its small fleet of hospital ships that had “seemed headed for the scrap yard,”118 incorporated HA/DR operations into its core missions, and expanded the use of hospital ships to accomplish proactive medical deployments.

Brief History of U.S. Hospital Ships

America’s two hospital ships, the USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort were not designed as hospital ships. These two converted oil tankers – owned by the Military Sealift Command (organized under the DOD) – are manned with medical crews, most commonly from the U.S. Navy. As long as twenty years ago, views were expressed within the Navy medical community that hospital ships should be used as a

national asset by the U.S. government to expand its disaster relief operations worldwide.\textsuperscript{119} Despite this rhetoric, however, there continues to be debate over the designation of the primary purpose of these ships. Some claim the ships are “obsolete” or “relics” in the mission of evacuating the sick and wounded from the battlefield.\textsuperscript{120} As had been expressed by the naval medical community, the service’s hospital ships had not been utilized in their primary purpose of caring for wounded U.S. military personnel during wartime since the Vietnam War.

\textit{Changes in Navy Strategy}

In 2007, two years after the tsunami relief effort, the three maritime Services – the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – released the \textit{Cooperative Strategy for 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Seapower}. This strategic document elevated HA/DR to a core competency of the maritime armed services and essentially placed the soft power mission of “global cooperation” on par with hard power missions such as power projection and nuclear deterrence. The strategy was heavily influenced by the perception that environmental factors will contribute to regional instability. It stated, “the effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands and coastal flooding could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability and regional crisis.”\textsuperscript{121} In a strategic shift, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) remarked that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.\textsuperscript{122} A large part of that prevention was the expansion of military soft power. Specifically, in the greater use of hospital ships, not for their previously stated primary purpose of caring for U.S. troops, but for their “secondary” purpose of HA/DR operations and the new soft power mission of “proactive humanitarian assistance operations.”\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{121} Wilkenson. "Navy Ship."
\end{flushleft}
Deploying hospital ships with the sole mission of rendering goodwill and aid had rarely been pursued prior to 2007. However, since the first proactive medical deployment in 2007, the U.S. Navy has deployed not only its white hospital ships but also its grey warships for these medical diplomacy missions on a routine, yearly basis. Overall, naval leadership has said these missions engender “trust and invite further cooperation in addressing our collective security interests.” In 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed military leadership to focus on developing response capabilities to handle problems created by increasing populations in coastal areas, and to mitigate the weak ability of third world countries to respond to natural disasters. Humanitarian assistance had become the leading other-than-war mission executed by the U.S. Navy.

**Effects of Budget Constraints on New Proactive Medical Missions**

Given the current fiscal environment, national security experts continually grapple with the balance between applying U.S. military power through proactive humanitarian missions, and applying it through traditional maintenance of combat readiness. In 2012, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Greenart stated that the Navy’s strategy did not reduce the importance of assisting partners and friends, but that “there will not be a noticeable decrease in our ability to support HA/DR operations.” Admiral Greenart seemed to take a more critical view of humanitarian missions, relegating them as inferior when compared to the Navy’s traditional core competencies. He has been explicit about the Navy’s priorities: warfighting first, operating forward, and being ready. None of these priorities appear to validate the importance of HA/DR despite it being listed as a maritime core capability in the *Cooperative Strategy*. Despite his assertion that there would be no noticeable decrease in the Navy’s ability to

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125 Roughead, “Remarks Delivered to International Seapower Symposium.”
127 Ibid.
perform HA/DR missions, the 2013 “Continuing Promise” proactive medical deployment to South America was cancelled due to the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act’s “sequestration,” while the “Pacific Partnership” proactive medical deployment to South Asia did take place. Additionally, the hospital ships have already undergone extensive maintenance to keep them afloat and they are rapidly reaching the end of their serviceable life. To date, no formal plans to build a next generation hospital ship or to convert any of the old Amphibious Assault Ships (LHAs or LHDs) as had been the resounding recommendation just a few years ago.

**Literature Review**

Most of the literature surrounding the performance of the Navy’s humanitarian operational deployments using hospital ships centers around three main themes: mission operations and logistical efficiencies, future purposes of hospital ships, and implications of humanitarian operations on security.

**Mission Operations and Logistical Efficiencies**

Significant literature is dedicated to the logistical aspects of HA/DR operations indicating that these missions have been increasing in intensity and will likely continue in the future. However, successful missions are defined in terms of efficiency of operations. These studies do not tackle the overall strategic impact of the operations. Drs. Benita Beamon and Burcu Balcik, for example, discuss performance measurements for humanitarian operations, but focus on supply chains and their effectiveness. U.S. Army doctor and researcher Derek Lucina wrote about the Navy’s contribution to global health

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outcomes. However, Lucina does not directly analyze the Navy’s humanitarian operations as a security issue.

**Future Purpose of Hospital Ships**

Recent literature indicates a speculative trend about the future of the U.S. Navy’s hospital ships. Some authors recommended that the U.S. Navy adapt its current fleet of ships to account for this predicted increase in humanitarian operations. David Richardson suggested adding six new hospital ships and Coast Guard LT Jim Dulbow suggested fifteen new hospital ships and converting older Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA or LHD) into hospital ships in a “Great White Fleet.” U.S. Navy Commander Wayne Gluf also argued the U.S. should reconfigure LHAs from amphibious platforms for Marine forces into hospital/disaster relief ships for an improved capability.

**Humanitarian Operations Effects on Security**

There is a dearth of literature drawing definitive conclusions about the security impact of humanitarian operations, the increased role of proactive medical deployments and how to evaluate their strategic success. A Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study in 2008, for example, concluded that these missions do have a positive influence on strengthening relationships with the nations in which they occur. Another CNA “Synthesis of Analyses” conducted on these missions concluded that even though the outcomes of these missions are difficult to track, determining progress could occur by focusing on attitudinal and behavioral trends in the areas affected by the missions. In contrast, although Natalie Webb and Anke Richter conclude that researchers “clearly believe providing public health services

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136 Richardson, Packwood, and Aldana. "A Great White Fleet."
137 Dulbow. "Let's Have a Fleet," 12.
138 Gluf. "From Warrior to Lifesaver."
139 Note: It was an LHD type ship that was the first to arrive and start the Indonesian tsunami relief effort in 2004 due to its speed and aviation assets.
increases power and influence in the world,” they also conclude that there is little or no proof that military medical missions generate desired outcomes. Webb and Richter argue there is no process that collects needed data to verify whether this soft power generation lasts beyond the mission and that there is no research providing “evidence that hospital ship humanitarian operations missions increase security and stability.” There seems to be little information about the long-term outcome of these missions, their impact on diplomatic relations with the governments of the countries visited, or the effects of the missions on the general population. Researchers and the U.S. Government have recently acknowledged this gap in understanding the security impact of these operations. A 2012 Government Accountability Office study called for the need for better project evaluation of the military’s humanitarian and development assistance overall. In January 2013, Congress acknowledged the need to understand the effectiveness of these missions by ordering the Secretary of Defense to “develop a process to ensure that health engagements conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and efficient in meeting the national security goals of the United States.” Shortly thereafter, a Center for Strategic and International Studies report written in part by a former Chief of Naval Operations called for a “strong measurement and evaluation program” to be made a priority to reach a conclusion on the effectiveness of these missions but argued that the missions should be sustained even in increasingly constrained budgets.

Methodology of Research

Case Study Selection

Since 2007, the U.S. Navy has performed proactive medical engagements in 33 different countries. To assess the U.S. Navy humanitarian missions, this chapter examines three cases: Indonesia, Philippines, and Uzbekistan.
Colombia, and Vietnam. The choice of case studies was based on geography and frequency of visits. Additionally, an effort was made to select at least one country from deployments to the two main geographic regions where Navy medical engagements occur: South Asia, and South and Central America.

Indonesia is used as the first case study because of the unique impact of the humanitarian disaster of the 2004 tsunami that led to reoccurring proactive medical visits to that country. Unlike most other countries, U.S. Navy medical ships have visited both Indonesia and Colombia almost every year since the start of these deployments. If a positive soft power impact could be connected to any of these reoccurring deployments, it would most likely occur in a region/country in which the U.S. Navy visits the most often. The U.S. Navy visited Vietnam with a frequency second only to Indonesia, in the region. Vietnam (like Indonesia) is chosen because it provides a case study of a country in which U.S. relations have historically been strained.

**Assessment of Soft Power Metrics**

To assess the soft power influence of these U.S. Navy missions, the Navy’s stated objectives are considered. Do these missions meet the stated objectives and do those objectives then lead to soft power influence? According to Navy policy guidance for DOD Health Engagements, the missions are a “valuable tool” to accomplish “theater campaign plan objectives and achieve strategic end states in support of U.S. interests as defined in the Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) and the Joint Security Cooperation Plan.” The policy goes on to state the intent of these missions is the build partner capacity and to improve “DOD visibility, access, influence, and interoperability” in a host nation or region. Following a factual account of events for each case study, an assessment is made as to the soft power impact of these missions using the Navy’s stated policy objectives. Evidence of increased access;

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146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.


Note: this document Global Health Engagement activities “may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian assistance (HA), foreign disaster relief (FDR), humanitarian civic assistance (HCA), or supporting the aims of USG Global Health Initiative.”


149 Ibid.
influence; and visibility is equated with an increase in soft power. Interoperability, while important for joint military operations, is assumed to have less soft power impact because it deals more with how a military force operates tactically.

Access and Influence

Both access and influence can be understood in the context of intensity of military-military operations and contact. If a nation is increasing its military connections via exercises, personnel exchanges, joint training, and foreign military sales, it is likely that U.S. leadership (diplomatic or military) would have more access to and potentially more influence on the leadership and defense forces of the foreign country. Soft power missions could open the door for more useful diplomatic relations or increased military partnerships with the foreign country. The case study assessment evaluates any increased access during the timeframe of these new humanitarian health engagements to determine if there is a connection.

Visibility

The case study assessment also evaluates ways in which these missions increase DOD visibility. It is a reasonable theory that the Navy’s policy goal of visibility implies positive visibility and that positive visibility leads to an increase in America’s overall soft power. To assess visibility, local media reports on the engagements are considered to determine the extent and character of media attention. Additionally, public opinion polls for the country in which the missions took place are examined to determine the existence of a connection between increased positive feelings toward the United States and the proactive humanitarian operations. Finally, an overall assessment of the global visibility of these missions (visibility outside the immediate region of the operation) is analyzed by showing how other countries and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may be trying to emulate the United States or cooperate with America in its overseas humanitarian operations as a result of these medical deployments.
Case Study 1: Indonesia

Background of U.S.-Indonesian Defense Relations

While Indonesia was not aligned to either the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States has granted development and military aid to Indonesia since the 1950s. In the United States, this assistance was extremely controversial because Indonesian dictators and the military, both notorious for human rights abuses, have historically ruled Indonesia. In the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions and severed diplomatic ties with Indonesia because of its human rights record. After September 11, 2001, however, America became less concerned with human rights abuses and more concerned with Indonesia’s effectiveness as a “partner of the War on Terror.” The United States tried to re-establish its military ties and its non-military assistance to Indonesia.

2004 Tsunami Maritime Relief Effort

The 2004 tsunami precipitated a change in the U.S. military doctrine. Following the tsunami, the military shifted to a more proactive stance in responding to environmental disasters and viewed global health as more of a security issue. Nine countries were directly affected by the massive tsunami. Over half of the 225,000 deaths occurred in the Banda Aceh province Indonesia. Land transportation was almost totally destroyed on many Indonesian islands. Areas had lost electrical power and all communications with the outside world. The tsunami destroyed ports, roads, and bridges. As a result, only military helicopters were able to deliver aid.

The first U.S. military unit to arrive and assist was the USS Bonhomme Richard, an LHA with U.S. Marines onboard. A few days later, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln arrived. The operation, which came to be known as “Unified Assistance” grew to encompass 22 U.S. Navy ships and six Maritime...
Prepositioning ships over the course of 81 days and became the largest humanitarian assistance operation in U.S. Navy history.\footnote{Greenfield and Ingram. “An Analysis of U.S. Navy Humanitarian Assistance.”}

\textit{Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Indonesia}

Following the tsunami, the hospital ship USNS \textit{Mercy} arrived later than many other Navy ships and did not begin to treat patients until more than a month after the disaster.\footnote{Bruce Ellemann. "Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia,” Naval War College, Newport Papers, Feb 2007, 96.} However, after it was on station, the \textit{USNS Mercy} medical crew examined over 100,000 patients and performed nearly 500 operations on tsunami victims.\footnote{Donald Smith. “Hospital Ship Mercy Deployed on Humanitarian Mission,” U.S. Department of Defense official news website, 11 May 2006, <www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15792>}. Additionally, the crew was a mix of U.S. government and private personnel from a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) called “Project Hope.” The Navy-NGO partnership was able to bring naval personnel and volunteers together for an unscheduled deployment. The partnership further relieved pressure on U.S. Navy medical personnel, who were already stretched because of wartime deployments. The overall mission of “Unified Assistance” was branded a success.

The tsunami relief effort started a trend of proactive medical deployments to Indonesia. In 2006, the first post tsunami deployment occurred when the \textit{Mercy} was again off the coast of Indonesia as part of a five-month deployment called “Pacific Partnership.” This mission also included medical engagements with Bangladesh, Timor-Leste, and the Philippines.\footnote{Nelson Balido. “USNS Mercy Arrives in Ternate as part of her Indonesian Tour for Pacific Partnership 2010,” U.S. Navy official website, 19 Jul 2010, <www.c7f.navy.mil/news/2010/07-july/21.htm>}. In 2010 and 2012, the U.S. deployed two more times to Indonesia through Pacific Partnership.\footnote{Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Pacific Partnership History.”}
Case Study 2: Colombia

Background of U.S. - Colombia Defense Relations

Colombia, the third most populous country in South America, endured long periods of “intense crime and mayhem” in the 20th century, characterized by kidnapping and assassinations. Despite its continued high poverty rate and five decades worth of internal conflict, Colombia has forged a “close partnership” with the United States especially in the areas of counter narcotics and counterterrorism. After 2001, the United States increased its aid and cooperation with the Colombian government primarily in the form of intelligence sharing, furnishing precision-guided munitions for counter narcotics targeting, and military hardware such as helicopters. With the assistance of the U.S. government and military, the security conditions in Colombia improved by the time the humanitarian mission “Continuing Promise” first visited in 2007.

Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Colombia

Each year from 2007 to 2011, the United States deployed its “Continuing Promise” proactive medical mission to Colombia. In each of these deployments, U.S. Navy ships stopped at a different Colombian port, with the type of ship rotating between the Navy hospital ship USNS Comfort and an amphibious assault ship. During each of these eight- to ten-day engagements, the U.S. Navy partnered with volunteers from humanitarian NGOs to provide medical care to between 5,000 and 7,000 patients. Care included minor surgeries, prescription medications, and eye exams. Additionally, U.S. Navy crewmembers provided non-medical assistance tasks such as repairing medical equipment at local clinics, building schools, and repairing local infrastructure. An outline of Continuing Promise missions into Colombia is summarized in Table 1.

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163 Ibid.
Table 1. Continuing Promise Missions to Columbia since 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Type Ship</th>
<th>Town Visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>USNS Comfort</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Buenaventura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>USNS Kearsarge</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault</td>
<td>Santa Marta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>USNS Comfort</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Cartagena &amp; Tumaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>USS Iwo Jima</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault</td>
<td>Coveñas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>USNS Comfort</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Tumaco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case Study 3: Vietnam

Background of U.S. – Vietnam Defense Relations

The United States and Vietnam had “minimal” relations for twenty years between the fall of Saigon in 1975 and 1995. The push toward normalizing relations between the two countries’ militaries first occurred in 1995 and 1996. Relations had been strained since the end of the Vietnam War but both countries attempted to move beyond that war’s legacy. The United States became focused on repairing economic, trade, and diplomatic relations with Vietnam and the Vietnamese Government became increasingly interested in bilateral defense relations. In the late 1990s, the United States and Vietnam conducted some senior military leader visits and cooperated in defense related conferences and seminars. In 2000, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited to Vietnam. Even though the primary focus of the visit was to discuss Vietnam War POW/MIA issues, it was still a positive sign of increasing defense relations. In 2003, the U.S. Navy made its first port call to Vietnam. For the next four years, Vietnam allowed one U.S. Navy ship annually to make a port call in its country until the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership mission arrived in 2007.

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164 Kingsley and Verton. “Disaster Relief,” 93 & 111.
168 Ibid, 5.
Hospital Ship and Medical Missions to Vietnam

In 2007, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Gary Roughead, visited Vietnam and met with Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense. The Ministry informally inquired about the U.S. Navy visiting Vietnam with one of its hospital ships and stressed the “lessons of the U.S.-led disaster relief operations” in Indonesia in 2004. The Vietnamese ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs felt that the Indonesian environmental experience in 2004 might have significant relevance for their country. The USS Peleliu (LHA 5) visited Danang City for ten days in July 2007 in the second Pacific Partnership mission, the same mission that had visited Indonesia the year prior with a hospital ship. U.S. Navy and NGOs onboard the ship provided medical and dental care for over 3,500 patients. The ship also sent a “biomedical repair team” to repair local medical equipment, provided subject matter experts to cooperate with local medical personnel on best medical practices, and deployed a U.S. Navy Seabee unit to renovate schools and several local medical clinics and hospitals. Due to the success of the initial 2007 mission to Vietnam, significant trust was built between the two countries, and a U.S. team returned in 2008, 2010, and 2012.

In 2008, the USNS Mercy deployed to Nha Trang, Vietnam in the Khanh Hoa Province. This visit marked the first time since 1975 that a U.S. military humanitarian assistance mission was permitted to perform surgeries in Vietnam. Additionally, the mission was the first time any foreign military vessel was allowed to visit Nha Trang. In 2010, the Mercy returned to the central coast of Vietnam visiting Quy Nhon in the Binh Dinh Province for 13 days. Again, hundreds of patients were seen onboard the hospital ship and the U.S. Navy sent personnel to perform community service projects in conjunction with several NGOs and Vietnamese military personnel. In 2012, the Mercy again performed a similar mission.

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169 Commander Pacific Fleet. “Pacific Partnership History.”
172 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
to Vinh, Vietnam. This time, the U.S. Navy brought along a record 13 partner nations militaries and 23 NGOs to provide medical care and community service projects to the region.\textsuperscript{175}

**Analysis of the Security Effects**

The Navy and the Department of Defense assert that their humanitarian operations help a country in need and support the accomplishment of DOD theater objectives, specifically those related to improving DOD visibility, access, and influence.\textsuperscript{176} They also strengthen military and diplomatic relationships with the affected nations.\textsuperscript{177} If these operational goals are achieved, they are likely to create the conditions for an increase in U.S. soft power regionally and globally.

**Access and Influence Resulting From Humanitarian Operations**

**Indonesia:** Initially, in 2005, there were reports that some in the Bush Administration saw the tsunami disaster in South Asia as a “terrific opportunity to rebuild relationships with Europe, the United Nations and Asia that have been badly damaged by the Iraq war.”\textsuperscript{178} Lawmakers and diplomats alike cited the relief efforts frequently as an illustration of way to maintain security ties in the region. Admiral Thomas Fargo, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, saw the deployment of the hospital ship as a way to engage with Indonesia politically.\textsuperscript{179} Increased military-to-military relations directly resulted from the tsunami relief effort. The *New York Times* reported that the tsunami crisis cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia had been a “springboard to restore closer military ties after a decade of limited contact.”\textsuperscript{180} U.S. Government restrictions on military aid were relaxed to allow the sale of spare parts for Indonesia’s C-130 military cargo planes so they could deliver disaster relief supplies. The Indonesian

\textsuperscript{175} Commander Pacific Fleet. “Pacific Partnership History.”


\textsuperscript{177} Roughead, Morrison, et al. (2013) , VI.

\textsuperscript{178} Paul Kennedy, “America’s "Dual Use" Military Reach: For War and Disaster Relief,” interview by *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Spring 2005, 52.

\textsuperscript{179} Elleman. “Waves of Hope,” 104.

defense minister appealed to Washington to provide more training for his officers. There were hopes that the tsunami relief effort would “open the door” to better U.S. relations with Indonesia which had struggled due to the historical human rights abuses of the Indonesian military.\footnote{181 Schmitt. “U.S. and Indonesia.”}

Two months after the tsunami, the U.S. resumed the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesian military personnel as well as the sale of nonlethal military equipment. President Bush lifted the embargo on military exports and foreign military financing to Indonesia and allocated a million dollars in aid to the Indonesian Navy for the following year.\footnote{182 Ellemann. “Waves of Hope,” 104.} To this end, the tsunami relief effort was a strategic success. The U.S. significantly reestablished diplomatic and military relations and trade with Indonesia following the event, and therein, fulfilled National-level goals of increasing the U.S. military presence in the Pacific.

\textbf{Colombia:} There is some evidence that the deployments to Colombia have helped increase regional security. The Center for Naval Analyses credits the 2007 engagement in Buenaventura with helping to drive out drug traffickers and helping to reduce the Continuing Promise visits were associated with behavioral changes in the local population in an area considered by “senior Colombian officials” as a main export route for drug trafficking. The U.S. Navy’s presence slowed down drug trafficking known to cause regional instability by reducing the influence of drug traffickers in the area, at least temporarily.\footnote{183 Maria Carolina Gonzolez. “Continuing Promise in Colombia,” dialogo-Americans.com, 1 Oct 2011, <http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/making_a_difference/2011/10/01/feature-pr-16>.
} However, there is little evidence that the medical deployments in Colombia expanded access and influence in a way which could not have been done by already established U.S.-Colombian security cooperation ties such as the joint U.S.-Colombian military cooperation to detect and interdict organized crime elements and the U.S.-led police training of Colombian security forces. When \textit{Continuing Promise} was cancelled in 2013, there seemed to be no large outcry from the Colombian government or people as a result.

\textbf{Vietnam:} The \textit{Pacific Partnership} missions did have a direct impact on U.S. access and an indirect impact on U.S. influence in Vietnam. Since 2007, U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral relations have grown. Military-to-military connections improved. The 2007 \textit{Pacific Partnership} mission was the first time Vietnam
allowed any foreign navy to use landing craft in its territorial waters in 40 years. After the USS 
Peleliu left 
Vietnam in 2007, three Vietnamese physicians were allowed by the Vietnamese government to stay 
onboard to participate in future stops during the mission. In 2008, the Vietnamese Prime 
Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung visited President Bush, and meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. During the 
2010 Pacific Partnership visit to Vietnam, Vietnam’s Minister of Health along with U.S. Ambassador to 
Vietnam spent a day onboard the U.S. ship. U.S. Ambassador Michael W. Michalak praised the mission as 
increasing the “trust and confidence between the two nations” and enhancing the “military-to-military 
relationship to a new higher level.” That same year, Vietnam allowed the USS John S. McCain, a guided 
missile destroyer to make a port call in Danang. In a symbolic step toward bettering relations, this 
particular ship was named for the admiral who commanded U.S. forces in the Pacific during the Vietnam 
War, while his son – sharing the same name – was a prisoner of war in Hanoi.

In 2011, a year after the Mercy’s visit to the Binh Danh Province, the U.S. DOD and Vietnam 
signed a memorandum of understanding for “advancing bilateral defense cooperation.” This document 
aimed to enhance cooperation in five areas, one of which was humanitarian and disaster relief 
collaboration. The President of the U.S. National Defense University visited Vietnam while the first 
Vietnamese People’s Army officer enrolled in National Defense University as a student.

Also in 2011, the U.S. Navy Surgeon General signed a statement of intent (SOI) with Vietnam’s 
military medical director on military medical cooperation in Hanoi. This committed both sides to continue 
exchanges and joint research. The SOI was the first official military to military relationship between the 
United States and Vietnam since the fall of Saigon in 1975. The rule of allowing only one U.S. Navy ship 
per year had been changed since Pacific Partnership first came into port in Vietnam as U.S. ships now
“regularly call on Vietnamese ports.” In 2011, for example, three U.S. Navy ships were allowed to make port calls in Vietnam. U.S. State Department officials indicate that due to these reoccurring missions, they have “clearly developed a constructive and productive working relationship now and in the future.

It is important to note that regional security changes in the past decade could be another strong, potential contributor to the increased U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral military relations. Vietnam has tried to strengthen its defense relations with such countries as Russia, India, France and Australia. Vietnam could also be reaching out to the United States in response to Chinese military assertiveness. The Vietnamese are fearful of Chinese influence especially in their disagreements over the South China Sea and see an American presence as a buffer against Chinese power in the region. Although, the timing of the first U.S. Navy medical engagements there demonstrates the mission’s ability to increasingly open U.S. access in the region.

Regional Visibility Resulting From Medical Missions

When the U.S. Navy engages in an overseas humanitarian or proactive medical operation, there is the potential for its efforts to increase the Navy’s and subsequently the U.S.’s visibility in the region. Increased visibility could lead to a positive change in local attitudes or opinions about the U.S., thereby increasing its soft power capability in the region.

Indonesia: In the Indonesian case, the Indonesian media gave a large amount of coverage to U.S. relief efforts. Eleven days after the tsunami hit, the Jakarta Post featured a “long and reverent profile of American pilots” with the headline, “USS Abraham Lincoln Enjoys Aceh Humanitarian Mission.” The Deputy Director of the Indonesian Survey Center wrote that one of the most memorable images in the Indonesian press also featured on the cover of Jawa Post was a picture of a U.S. Marine carrying an elderly

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192Manyin. “U.S. Vietnam Relations.”
196 Ibid.
tsunami victim in his arms. The Indonesian press also covered the details of the Mercy’s arrival, crew, and the numbers of tsunami victims cared for onboard.198

According to members of the U.S. Navy’s Medical Corps, the public-private partnership with Project Hope represented the “U.S. people and not just the U.S. Government.” Their conclusion was that this helped make the overall tsunami relief effort well received by the local and national Indonesian leadership, including the military.199 The polling data from an American non-profit organization called Terror Free Tomorrow is most prominently cited in literature. The organization published a report in 2006 regarding Indonesian public opinion showing that Indonesians who opposed the U.S. efforts in combating terrorism decreased by 50% in the year after the tsunami (from 72% in 2003 to 36% in 2005).200 Others have also cited ambiguously that polls show that the U.S. is looked upon more favorably in affected areas. “Poll data confirms that approval ratings of the United States tend to increase after these events.”201 Dr. Bruce Elleman wrote that the U.S. Navy’s response helped to transform Indonesia’s attitude toward America.202 Joseph Nye cited the positive effect of U.S. efforts in Indonesia as an example of soft power.203

Other than the Terror Free Tomorrow poll, there has been no other international poll data citing any significant change in public opinion in Indonesia that can be directly linked to the tsunami relief efforts. The U.S. Global Leadership project poll is inconclusive in its results regarding Indonesians view of U.S. approval.204 However, a recently released poll from the Lowy Institute in Australia showed a rather large increase in favorable “feelings” toward the United States over the past six years. In 2006, 54% of Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States while in 2012, that percentage increased to 64%. Of nine foreign countries, the United States climbed to have the highest proportion of Indonesians “trusting it a great deal to act responsibly in the world” (28%). More than half (58%) of Indonesians also backed

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201 Grosev and Reveron. “Waging War, Building States.”

Note: Approval of U.S. leadership in recent years as follows: 2007 (31%), 2008 (46%), 2009 (35%), 2010 (33%), 2011 (32%), and 2012 (23%).
the United States to be the “leading military power in Asia in 20 years” compared with only a quarter (25%) who chose China.\(^{205}\) This cannot directly be attributed to the tsunami relief efforts or to the proactive medical deployments that followed in Indonesia but the timeframe of mid to late-2000s corresponds to the beginning of opinion shift in that country. This is the same timeframe of the medical deployments to the region. Other factors such as the U.S. military withdrawal from the Muslim country of Iraq and the election of President Barack Obama, who lived in Indonesia during part of his childhood, are also viable reasons for a shift in public opinion.

Colombia: There is no clear evidence that public opinion in Colombia has changed significantly as a result of these deployments. CNA noted that in 2008, the local Colombian population finished some construction projects started by the U.S. Navy and were “inspired” by the U.S. sailors “to work together to solve collective problems in their own community.” The report claims that the deployment had even “changed the political discourse in the community.”\(^{206}\) The commander of the Joint Medical Group of Continuing Promise 2010 stated during the visit that, ”after these first few days in Colombia, surveys tell us that 98 percent of respondents have a favorable view of the United States, so I think our efforts are paying off.”\(^{207}\) However, there appears to be no written documentation of the surveys he cited. CNA reports of positive media coverage in every country Continuing Promise visited and cited that in national polls the center conducted in the countries in which the missions were carried out, that the mission helped create more favorable views toward the United States in 70% of the respondents.\(^{208}\) However, the data on the polls cited was not published. The Global Leadership project poll is inconclusive in its results regarding Colombians’ view of U.S. approval.\(^{209}\) The best that can be hoped for is the fact that there are numerous online accounts and blog posts of the annual humanitarian operation there and internet usage in Colombia is on the rise.\(^{210}\) With the advent of the internet, millions of people can read the blogs


\(^{206}\) Kingsley and Vernon. “Disaster Relief,” 93.

\(^{207}\) Barker. “Continuing Promise,”

\(^{208}\) Kingsley and Vernon. “Disaster Relief,” 92.

\(^{209}\) The U.S. Global Leadership Project Report, 16. Note: Approval of U.S. leadership in recent years as follows: 2007 (34%), 2008 (48%), 2009 (60%), 2010 (58%), 2011 (46%), and 2012 (47%).

associated with the deployment, see official pictures on social media sites, and read the personal stories of patient care in the region.211

**Vietnam:** The *Pacific Partnership* missions in Vietnam show good evidence of increased U.S. visibility. Local media coverage of the 2007 Vietnam mission was “remarkably extensive and positive.”212 The state run media allowed the release of positive online and print articles about the mission. Additionally, the state run Vietnam television and Voice of Vietnam positively reported on the mission during prime time.213 There is also a correlation between U.S. approval ratings in Vietnam and visits by the U.S. medical ships. A Gallup poll asking Vietnamese whether or not they approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the U.S. showed a 30% approval rating in 2007 when *Pacific Partnership* first visited that country. Approval ratings grew every year the *Pacific Partnership* mission visited Vietnam, and dropped each year the medical mission did not visit the country.214 While it cannot be proven that the approval rating is directly linked to the deployment visits, it is an interesting trend to note and follow.

**Global Visibility Resulting From Medical Missions**

A natural tendency could be to think that these humanitarian efforts by the U.S. military improves overall perception of the United States not only in the affected areas but worldwide. In 2005, as an example, historian and author Paul Kennedy expected “quite a modification” of positive opinion about the United States in Canada, Japan, and Australia as a result of the relief efforts in Indonesia.215 However,

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213. Ibid, 132.
there does not seem to be any evidence of long-term opinion change worldwide that can be connected in any way to these humanitarian efforts. However, the missions have made two important global soft power impacts: They have exposed a growing number of Non-Governmental Organizations to the U.S. military with positive effects; and other countries, such as China, are emulating these missions.

**NGO Exposure to U.S. Military:** Many NGOs, especially those of a humanitarian nature, have historically acquired and retained a distrust of the U.S. Department of Defense. NGOs and U.S. military often do not see eye-to-eye in conflict zones overseas. However, the U.S. Navy medical missions have involved an unprecedented number of NGOs. Not only are the NGO healthcare personnel volunteers but NGOs also come with their own donated supplies. This cuts the cost of the missions. Additionally, NGOs are able to interact with members of the U.S. military in a way that can help counter mutual stereotypes. This may lead to better cooperation in the future. Many of these civilian volunteers have become staunch supporters of the U.S. military.\(^{216}\)

**Echoing of Missions by Other Countries:** One diagnostic for perceived global mission effectiveness is to observe and determine if other countries employ their navies for humanitarian medical missions. China’s humanitarian efforts following the Indonesian tsunami were considered “modest” in comparison with the U.S. efforts. China did not order their navy to sea. This signaled that the U.S. military was still the region’s primary security provider.\(^{217}\) China appears to be trying to change this dynamic. David Axe noted in *World Politics Review* that China is expanding its country’s soft power influence around the world by emulating the U.S. Navy’s humanitarian medical deployment mission.\(^{218}\) The Chinese Navy commissioned its own first hospital ship called the “Peace Ark” or “Daishandao” class designed specifically for hospital and humanitarian missions.\(^{219}\) Its first overseas deployment, called “Mission Harmony” occurred in 2010. The following year, it sailed to provide humanitarian assistance to the Caribbean nations of Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.\(^{220}\) Additionally, since the Indonesian tsunami, other nations have also expanded their humanitarian maritime capabilities. New Zealand commissioned a “multirole” vessel HMMNZS *Canterbury* in 2006. It was designed to support

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\(^{220}\) Ibid, 26.
operations such as disaster relief. Australia acquired a ship dedicated to humanitarian assistance missions in 2012. The U.K.’s acquisition of a new carrier was justified to the British public by its enabling of these missions.\textsuperscript{221} Clearly, these missions do have a soft power impact globally as many powers are positioning themselves to emulate them in the future.

Cost of Proactive Humanitarian Missions in Context

According to the U.S. Navy’s budget office, Military Sealift Command spent $39.25 million in FY2012 to operate the USNS \textit{Mercy} for the entire year.\textsuperscript{222} That same year, Pacific Partnership - the mission for which the \textit{Mercy} deployed - cost approximately $20 million.\textsuperscript{223} Therefore, performing a 150-day medical deployment costs an additional $20 million on top of the approximately $40 million in the maintenance cost of the ships annually. Considering the U.S. maintains two hospital ships, one on each coast, and typically performs two proactive humanitarian operations per year, the total cost of the maintenance of the ships and the deployments would be no more than $120 million annually. Additionally, the U.S. Navy maintains the hospital ships in a ready-to-deploy status (for their primary purpose of caring for U.S. troops) even if the humanitarian missions are not being performed. Moreover, the U.S. Navy must already spend the $40 million annually to maintain the hospital ships: the additional $20 million per year to perform the humanitarian missions is a modest additional in cost. In FY2012, the U.S. spent $646 billion on defense. The cost of just one day’s operations in Afghanistan that year was $300 million, twice the amount spent annually in maintaining and deploying these medical ships.\textsuperscript{224} Theoretically, the Pacific Partnership mission could be performed every year for eight years straight for the cost of a single F-35 joint strike fighter now being developed by the DOD.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{222} Naval Center for Cost Analysis. Website of the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs Management Information System (VAMOSC) , <www.vamosc.navy.mil> (5 Nov 2013). Note: This includes both reduced and full operating status costs.
Conclusion

As world population expands and migration toward the coastal regions continues, the risk of natural disasters affecting the large populations in these areas becomes ever greater. The U.S. military has perceived this as a security threat and adapted its forces accordingly by increasing roles in humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the U.S. Navy has started a trend of proactive humanitarian deployments that has been copied by many other maritime powers. However, since there is not a strong understanding of the strategic impact of these medical missions, they could easily be downsized in the current fiscal climate. As Robert Kaplan stated in his book *Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, “the future of American power is related directly to how it communicates its concern about issues like climate change…This matters just as much as the numbers of warships it has; maybe more so.”

The U.S. military’s 2005 tsunami relief mission has raised strong possibilities that efforts directed at relief of stricken nations have positive soft power impacts. The continuing ability to engage in this type of soft power operation in the event of an environmental disaster has the potential to turn what would be a security threat into a positive security activity. The expansion America’s soft power image regionally and globally remains vitally important for America’s future security.

The proactive medical engagements do show evidence of soft power impact, especially in countries that have not previously had robust defense relations with the United States. The missions show some connection to building trust with other nations and can open doors that might otherwise remain closed. Given the relatively low cost and the significant soft power benefits regionally and globally, the United States should invest in this capability and continue the proactive missions even in a time of budgetary constraint.

Postscript

The global response to the Typhoon “Haiyan” that hit the Philippines on November 8, 2013 is a great example of the soft power influence of humanitarian operations. The already established proactive maritime medical missions the U.S. Navy had performed in the Philippines in 2007, 2008, and 2012, have

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likely aided the ongoing U.S. maritime response to disaster areas in the Philippines both diplomatically and operationally.\textsuperscript{227} China’s relatively weak response to the typhoon has been internationally criticized and the country has experienced a loss of regional soft power.\textsuperscript{228} In contrast, the U.S. response has received much international attention. Reports indicate an improvement of defense relations between the United States and the Philippines as direct result of the relief effort.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{227} Commander Pacific Fleet. “Pacific Partnership History.”
CHAPTER 3

SOFT POWER TO COMBAT BIOLOGICAL THREATS: AN EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL CHOICE

Introduction & Security Context

The proliferation of deadly biological agents is a global issue endangering “hundreds of thousands of lives,” and countering biological threats remains a high priority in the national security strategy of the United States.\(^{230}\) A biological attack with roots in almost any country could easily claim victims elsewhere and the “worldwide psychological impact of a major bioterrorism incident would be traumatic.”\(^{231}\)

This threat is not new. Anthrax letters were disseminated in the United States in 2001. Plans for bioterrorism were set forth in documents recovered from al Qaeda training camps in 2001. In 2007, security systems installed by the U.S. government thwarted an attempted theft targeted at the pathogen collection at the central reference laboratory for animal health in Indonesia.\(^{232}\) While the danger is not new, nonproliferation of biological pathogens is becoming more difficult. Three major factors contribute to this difficulty. First, pathogens are increasingly available because of the rapid advances in biotechnology. Second, there are greatly decreased costs associated with new bio-technology, and third, rapid advances in information dissemination have allowed many around the world to gain access to complex technical biological knowledge.\(^{233}\) The pace of biotechnology growth is startling.\(^{234}\) According to biologist Malcolm Dando, “what would require the skills of a Nobel prize winner in one decade will

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\(^{234}\) Note: Since 2008 costs have decreased even more rapidly than Moore’s Law, the iconic measure of advances in computing power and capacity. Moore’s Law refers to the observation by Gordon Moore, founder of Intel Corporation, that the number of transistors on a computer chip roughly doubles every two years. Source: Jo L. Husbands. “Cooperation on Biosecurity as Part of a Strategy to Prevent Misuse of the Life Sciences,” Chapter 8 of *Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation: Between Control and Cooperation*, Edited by Oliver Meier (New York: Routledge, 2014), 159.
become commonplace laboratory practice in the next.” The number of facilities and individuals working with high-risk pathogens is rising exponentially. In an age of expanding international travel and trade, pathogens have become more mobile than ever before. To combat these challenges, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) as a part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Its utility and softer approach to combating these new challenges is the question of this chapter.

**Argument**

This chapter asks the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological Engagement Program’s soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks? The impacts of CBEP have not been thoroughly studied and the measurements of success for this program have continually changed. The means to counter biological threats must likely go beyond the hard power tools of more armed guards, weapons or economic sanctions. In many countries, countering these threats are not a high priority while international intelligence agencies “have repeatedly found it difficult to pinpoint” even developed biological weapon programs, much less smaller bioterrorist networks.

This chapter argues that the most effective way to counter the rapidly growing proliferation of deadly biological pathogens being used as a weapon is the soft power approach of engagement with the international scientific community, especially in targeted areas of concern. With the acknowledgement that there are few, if any, technical solutions to the dual-use proliferation of biotechnology around the world, this chapter concludes that although the effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) soft power program to counter biological threats is difficult to measure in all regions, it has had a measurable impact over time in selected countries.

**Chapter Overview**

First, a literature review outlines the broader understanding of the extent to which soft power could be effective in countering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In literature, certain soft power


236 Ibid, 244.

237 Ibid, 246.
impacts have been predicted to decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks. Second, while acknowledging this determination, measurements of effectiveness of the program are reviewed in order to determine a proper methodology for assessing the program’s value. Three metrics are determined for research, a host region’s increase in biosecurity, biosurveillance capability, and an increase in biological-related partnerships with the United States. Finally, the methodology is tested on two case studies in which the United Stated has engaged through the Department of Defense’s CBEP, one country (Republic of Georgia) and one region (Southeast Asia). The two case studies lead to the conclusion that despite its limitations, the program does have an impact in the targeted countries it has been applied and its results suggest that the use of soft power to counter biological threats may be the critical means of biological nonproliferation in the future.

Cooperative Biological Engagement Program Background

The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, originally called the Biological Threat Reduction Program, is a part of the U.S. government’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. CTR was established at the end of the cold war to secure and dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass destruction. It is commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, named for the two senators responsible for introducing legislation to fund the program. In its beginning, the program’s focus was on nuclear arms dismantlement. However, over time, its focus changed to countering biological threats not only in the former Soviet Union (FSU) but worldwide. Today, CBEP comprises nearly 60% of the CTR program, is the single largest component of DOD’s estimated $580 million in annual global health-related activities, and is considered the largest biological nonproliferation program in the world today.

Literature Review

Extent to Which Soft Power Approaches are Effective in Countering the Use of Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction

One could easily question the applicability of soft power in countering WMDs especially when applied to powerful rogue states wishing to defy international agreements and norms. The use of soft

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240 National Research Council, Countering Biological Threats.
power against these states is difficult to defend even as harder power approaches to WMD proliferation in North Korea and Iran have arguably had little success. Soft power approaches would seem even less effective. It probably was not Muammar Gaddafi’s admiration for the United States or his desire to emulate American values that made him give up his nuclear weapon ambitions. More likely, he was reacting to America’s dominant use of hard power conventional force in ousting the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2001-02 and in quickly overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. In Syria, it was the threat of American hard power force that caused the Assad regime to agree to give up its chemical weapon arsenal, not Assad’s aspiration to abide by international norms made attractive by the United States.

Despite soft power’s significant limitations especially in dealing with rogue states, there remains ample literature espousing the need for soft power approaches to countering the broader threat of biological WMD. Siegfried S. Hecker argued that relationships that built trust had concrete effects to reducing global nuclear dangers by showing that bonds between FSU scientists and those from the west led to increases in safety and security of nuclear materials in the FSU, China, and South Asia.241 Soft power approaches to countering biological weapons use was considered particularly important because of the risks of “dual-use” biotechnology, a phenomenon that is global in nature and not just contained within rogue states.

Dual-use means that the materials, equipment, hardware, and knowledge that have peaceful applications can also be exploited to produce biological weapons.242 Dr. David Franz, former commander of the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, argued that trust and relationships are more important than technical solutions when it comes to countering biological threats.243 The director of the Centers for Disease Control concluded after the anthrax attack in 2001 and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 that the “solution was to find partners around the world and to connect them in ways that would allow for the creation and sharing of knowledge during a crisis.”244


Note: In 2001, letters laced with anthrax began appearing in the U.S. mail. Five Americans were killed and 17 were sickened in what became the worst biological attacks in U.S. history. Source: FBI website “Anthrax Investigation” <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-anthrax> (8 Feb 2014).

Note: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is an upper respiratory viral infection with no known treatment. While many victims survive, it is often fatal. In 2003, according to the WHO, a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with
Researchers Caitriona Mcleish and Daniel Feakes argued the fact that scientific and industrial communities have initiated self-governing activities, such as codes of conduct, demonstrates that the emergence of non-state actors such as civil society are the “serious stakeholders in the governance of biotechnologies.”  They conclude that although less developed than pure governmental networks, the creation of non-state networks is rising because the use of biological weapons cannot be managed by states alone or “addressed simply through a single treaty.”

Within the scientific community in the past decade, consensus was built that “new approaches to dual-use technology governance” and security were needed due to the fact that biological technologies are becoming increasingly globalized and based on “intangible information rather than specialized materials and equipment.” While there was significant political and institutional support within the security community for harder concrete actions of dismantling facilities designed to produce biological weapons, there was less support (at least initially) for the softer engagement component of the CTR program. However, the biological and non-institutional security communities jointly continued to lobby for softer power approaches to counter the bio-threat, namely increasing the use of biosurveillance, increasing global public health and the building of scientific security partnerships and networks.

The National Research Council (NRC) and global health experts argued for the importance of strengthening global biosurveillance networks because pathogens and diseases are not caught at the borders of nation states. The increased rate of globalization means that diseases spread quickly around the world. The longer it takes to identify the presence of an outbreak, the more the pathogen will spread and the more people will get sick and die as a result. According to directors of the World Health Organization (WHO), the 2003 SARS outbreak needlessly spread to 29 countries because the Chinese government stalled in communicating disease information to the global community. In 2009, the H1N1 influenza pandemic spread “with unprecedented speed” migrating as far in 6 weeks as previous pandemics...
had spread in 6 months.251

In addition to strengthening biosurveillance and communication networks, the soft approach of improving global public health gained momentum. Numerous scientists claim that improving health conditions could influence the intent of terrorists and could be an effective soft power tool for policy makers.252 Researcher, Dr. Rebecca Katz considers strong public health infrastructure as the best defense against an outbreak, either naturally occurring or a biological attack, because a strong public health system is critical to quickly identifying an outbreak, containing “the number of patients, and help restore calm to society.”253 The character of a strong public health system begins with local doctors having the ability and connections to quickly and accurately send blood samples to local, federal, and international laboratories to diagnose diseases. This is the start of an effective disease containment process that eventually includes getting pharmaceuticals and vaccinations back to the population and enacting quarantine procedures.254 Gregory Koblentz, a biosecurity expert, believes that the enhancement of global health security “could have a deterrent effect by denying terrorists the ability to cause mass casualties,” and such an approach will “yield more capable and willing partners” to counter future biological threats.255

The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism stated that the “United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists.”256 Knowledge, not hardware is really the key.

The development of harmful pathogens is complex and disseminating biological agents involves additional technical hurdles.257 Growing consensus evolved among experts that the international scientific community was in the best position to detect suspicious misuse of biology and to identify emerging technologies and their risk to biosecurity. Thus, relationship building became another key component of soft power approaches being discussed. Jonathan Tucker, world renown chemical and biological weapons

253 Ibid., 72.
254 Ibid., 72.
257 Tucker, Innovation, Dual-Use, 6.
expert, proposed that strong networks would be important to counter the bio-threat because scientists consider biotechnology as an activity that “demands a high level of personal and communal tacit knowledge” and “whose technical and social dimensions are inextricably linked.” A strong network would allow the scientific community to warn of internal security threats or biological misuse. Experts continue to conclude that evidence of deliberate biological misuse cannot be collected by one group but requires an exchange of information and “cooperative thinking across national and professional boundaries.”

Greater cooperation between the biological community and government, and the development and orchestration of public-private networks was considered essential. A 2009 NRC report, commissioned by Congress, recommended that the biological component of CTR’s major guiding principle going forward should be partnerships with counterpart organizations within host countries. A 2009 National Academy of Sciences report on global security engagement argued for the Executive branch and Congress to recognize the need for the development and sustainment of “personal relationships and professional networks” through the CTR program as contributing “directly to our national security.” Fostering this cooperation became a main effort of the Defense Department’s soft power strategy shortly thereafter.

In 2009, the Obama Administration released its National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. This strategy placed a primary focus on strengthening international public health, and intended to reduce biological threats by improving global access to “tools to combat infectious diseases”; establishing and reinforcing “standards to discourage the misuse of the life sciences;” and instituting a “series of activities to help influence, identify, inhibit and interdict those who seek to harm others through the

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258 Tucker, Innovation, Dual/Use, 23.
260 Garrett cites a collaborative pool of expertise. Examples within the U.S. Government are CDC, FBI, HHS, DOD, Intelligence community, USAID, State Department. International examples cited as WHO, Interpol, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Pan American Health Organization, African Union and NGOs such as the BioBricks Foundation.
misuse of life sciences.”\textsuperscript{263} Accepting the recommendations of a growing number of scientists, the administration more broadly recognized that biological issues involve dual use technology, and changed its focus from “active prevention by identifying and capturing malfeasant actors,” to cooperation with and education of “life science actors”\textsuperscript{264}

In general, the main soft power approaches to countering the proliferation of biological WMDs espoused by scholars include such things as increasing the education of the global scientific community on biosecurity and biosafety, and increasing regional and local biosurveillance capacities. Additionally, a major part of any soft power approach is the relationship and trust building mechanisms among the global scientific and security communities. Biosurveillance capabilities, for example, will not work without the knowledge to use them and the trustworthy connections that allow for effective communication with international partners who may have more specialized diagnostic capabilities such as the United States. Furthermore, the ability of foreign scientists to informally communicate any perceived threats to their American counterparts fostered by stronger relationships is an important aspect of the success of the softer approach to nonproliferation.

\textit{Limitations of Soft Power Approaches in Countering the Use of Biological WMDs}

The vast majority of scholars note that is not feasible to prevent the increase in dual-use biotech capabilities. However, some argue for more regulation of work in the bio-sciences. According to Amy Smithson, a biological weapons expert, harder policies that carry noncompliance penalties such as fines and loss of certification can govern the work of scientists in the same manner as highway safety laws such as speed limits and drunk driving laws and she recommends that countries consider requiring scientists to be screened initially and periodically for problems that could “negatively influence their reliability, trustworthiness and reasoning.”\textsuperscript{265} On the other hand, with rapidly changing technology and a lack of international enforcement, others say such hard policies will only increase costs and deter scientific research.\textsuperscript{266} Most proponents of the soft power approach concede that such an approach will not prevent

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\textsuperscript{264} Paul Rozenweig, “Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats,” Defense and Technology Paper of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, October 2011, 5.  \\
\textsuperscript{265} Smithson, \textit{Germ Gambits}, 242 and 248.  \\
\textsuperscript{266} Koblentz, “From Biodefence to Biosecurity,”143.  \\
Franz, “With the Changing Biological Threat.”
\end{flushright}
all biological attacks but will only reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate the consequences of such an attack. Another challenge is that improving global health security may require resources beyond the allocation ability of many countries. This waning interest is evidenced in the resource constraints of the WHO, which is “perpetually underfunded” and has “shrunk in size and influence.” 152 countries signed onto the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) agreement but by 2012, fewer than 35 countries could comply with the biological safety and surveillance regulations. Most countries are more concerned with channeling resources into fighting natural diseases that affect their populations immediately rather than global bio-safety or the global bio-threat.

A major limitation of the soft power network approach is the tension between the scientific and security communities. For networks to be effective, scientists must be willing partners with law enforcement, defense officials and the intelligence community. This relationship has been strained in the past damaging trust and making effective cooperation in the future challenging. Especially after the 2001 Anthrax attacks, many scientists felt they were treated unfairly by security community. Scientists were resentful of the biosecurity regulations imposed and surveys showed they were still mistrustful of those in the security community such as the FBI. Additionally, a softer approach of peer governance through networks even in the United States is “not exercised comprehensively or evenly.” Another constraint is the fact that the field of bio-science is becoming increasingly attractive to amateur scientists taking advantage of new automated equipment that allows them to tinker into work previously done only by those with elite skills. These newer “biohackers” often work with even less oversight or training making networking even more difficult.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Soft Power in Countering the Use of Biological Weapons

The lack of measures of effectiveness of soft power in general is widely recognized. Defense programs that focus on soft power approaches suffer from the same measurement challenges and

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267 Smithson, Germ Gambits, 245.
269 Koblentz, “From Biodefence to Biosecurity,”146.
270 Smithson, Germ Gambits, 242.
271 Ibid.
literature acknowledges that soft prevention missions such as the CTR are “difficult to quantify.”272 A NRC report concluded that determining adequate measures of program effectiveness is difficult when goals and objectives are largely “unquantifiable, such as relationship building and strengthening partnerships.”273 There is an acknowledged understanding that the benefits of soft power approaches such as international scientific engagement in biosecurity may not be recognizable until many years into the future.274 Another challenge widely reported is the fact that it is frequently difficult to separate the impact of DOD’s program from the impacts of other overlapping U.S. government and international programs.275 The separation of the various U.S. government agencies’ programs makes analyzing the effects of any specific program without analyzing the whole government approach difficult. A 2013 Center for Strategic International Studies report entitled a Biological Threat Prevention Strategy calls for “high-level” analysis to be conducted to weigh the costs and benefits of current and alternative U.S. bio threat prevention policies and global initiatives due to the rapidly changing dynamics in the biosciences and the seemingly current “uncoordinated effort of government and civil society.”276

Past measurements specific to the DOD’s CBEP included numeric metrics such as the numbers of facility upgrades, consolidated pathogen collections, number of weapon scientists involved in projects, number of scientists trained, number of cooperative research projects and the level of matching contributions by cooperating governments.277 In 2007, the NRC recommended that as the program grows, more “intensive evaluations” are “highly desirable” and suggested that measurements take into account such things as timeliness, adequacy, and quality of responses to outbreaks should they occur.278 Two years later, NRC recommended that the DOD continue to track the quantitative measures of effectiveness but also look at how to track improvements on identifying diseases and information sharing.279 The need for better measures of effectiveness regarding the CBEP has driven the DOD to continually change its evaluation metrics. In 2010, the DOD submitted an overall CTR Metrics Report

273 National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement, 47.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 National Research Council Countering Biological Threats, 9.
showing 25 different measures of effectiveness for the CBEP program. Although the latest National Academy of Sciences report in 2012 stated that these metrics were useful and complete, it criticized the program for not prioritizing them and not clearly linking them to threat reduction. A DOD memo in August 2013 outlined new implementation guidance for the CBEP that calls for its activities to be “measured against a metrics model outlined in a separate annex.” However, that annex is either not written yet or not releasable. To this day, steady measures of effectiveness continue to be a challenge for the DOD and the overseeing bodies of this program.

Methodology: Proposed Measures of Effectiveness

A major constraint to researching the effectiveness of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program is the lack of published documents about to the program. Most of what is publicly available concerning the program, even from the Defense Department, are broad generalizations of the program’s success without further specifying data. The 2013 DOD memo outlines three “strategic policy objectives” for the program, the destruction of biological weapons and related equipment, the enhancement of capabilities to secure dangerous pathogens, and the enhancement of detection and diagnosing biological incidents “of security concern.” The first of the three policy objectives I chose to omit from studying because it only applies to FSU partner countries and is largely complete. I sought out assessments that look forward to what will be needed in other regions in the future and most countries do not have large remnants of BW infrastructure. To measure the last two policy objectives, three different metrics were identified.


283 Ibid., 3.

Note: the actual language in the memo is provided:

1) Dismantle, destroy, and prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or use of stockpiles of biological weapons, means of delivery, and BW-related equipment, technology, and infrastructure.

2) Enhance partner country/region’s capability to identify, consolidate, and secure collections of pathogens and diseases of security concern in order to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release if such pathogens and diseases.

3) Enhance partner country/region’s capability to rapidly and accurately survey, detect, diagnose, and report biological terrorism and outbreaks of pathogens and diseases of security concern in accordance with international reporting requirements.
Facilities biosafety and biosecurity upgrades are the most tangible measurement of the soft power approach. Upgrading facilities does not just mean making sure a laboratory has a fence surrounding it and locks to important facility locations, but also training local scientists to use safety measures in order to help prevent the unintended release of dangerous pathogens. One concrete way to measure facilities upgrades is through the Biosecurity Level (BSL) rating system. Another example of progress would be the physical consolidation of pathogens into fewer central repositories with better security.

Effective communicable disease control relies on high-quality disease surveillance. Largely, this is a product of how quickly local officials can identify a biological incident, and how interconnected a country is at the local level with national and international laboratories. Evidence of this connection can be seen in the technical form of presence of internationally recognized biosurveillance systems, and also the means and knowledge to use them, tested either in simulations of or real life outbreak responses.

The softest measurement of effectiveness, and also the most difficult to quantify, is the relationship building piece of this program. One can assume that the more joint projects undertaken successfully, and the more conferences/workshops held and widely attended, the more informal relationships will take hold. Joint projects often lead to the publication of scientific work in international journals. This greatly increases transparency, and discussion of possible security implications. Conferences and workshops are assumed to expose scientists to the international community (both scientific community and security community) and create informal networks that could be used as an

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284 Note: Biosecurity levels include 1 through 4. BSL-3 means the facility has a “high” level of containment while BSL-4 has the “maximum” capacity for containment. Source: Lela G. Bakanidze, Paata Imnadze1 and Dana Perkins. “Biosafety and biosecurity as essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation,” BMC Public Health, 3 Dec 2010, <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S12/ >.


286 Note: Studies have shown that the faster a natural outbreak or biological attack is identified, the less damaging it will be. To put this in context, if Anthrax was exposed to a population of 100,000 and it was able to be identified within 24 hours, and antibodies were able to be distributed to that same population, 5,000 people will die and the economic cost will be $128 million. However, if it takes, for example six days to identify that same attack, 6.5 times as many people die (33,000) at a cost 205 times higher at $26.3 billion. Source: Katz, “Public Health Preparedness,” 72 and 73.
informal but critical reporting means in the event of a crisis. As in the case of SARS in China in 2003, if
the government of the country in which the outbreak occurs is able to diagnose the outbreak but fails to
report what is going on to the global community, whether due to a lack of trust or due to a lack of
scientific and security connections, the result can be catastrophic. This is why softer mechanisms such as
conferences, projects, and seminars that build relationships and networks become so important to the
overall goal of preventing a biological weapon use.

Case Study Selection

CBEP has almost a twenty-year history in seven different FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). Any case study must include at least one of
these countries that have had such a history with the program. The Republic of Georgia was selected
because more data was available about the Georgia-U.S. links through the CBEP than many of the other
countries. A regional perspective was chosen for the second case study. Over time, the focus of CBEP
changed from bilateral engagement to regional engagement. While CBEP has expanded into two other
major regions beyond the FSU in in the past few years, the relatively short duration of engagement so far
makes it very difficult to obtain sufficient evidence on the three measures of effectiveness for any single
country in those areas. Southeast Asia was selected over Africa because the CBEP has had slightly more
time to develop in that region (approximately one extra year).

Case Study #1: Republic of Georgia

Background/History of the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program in Georgia

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Republic of Georgia struggled with a poor economy.
The healthcare system seemed nearly “non-existent.” Meanwhile, thousands of scientists now spread
throughout the FSU “lost their jobs, went unpaid, or received meager salaries insufficient to support their
families.” In addition, the region is naturally prone to continual outbreaks of highly infectious disease.

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287 Defense Threat Reduction Agency. “Cooperative Biological Engagement Program,” Official talking points, provided by
Mr. Lance Brooks, Director CBEP, on 7 February 2014, 2.
288 National Research Council The Biological Threat Reduction Program, 28.
289 Bakanidze, Immadze, Tsalava, and Tsertsvadze, “Disease Surveillance in Georgia,” 254
Central Asia’s economic crisis after the fall of Soviet Union, its proximity to unstable states, and the Soviet bioweapons legacy made U.S. engagement with Georgia and other FSU countries a priority. \(^{290}\)

From 1998-2007, funds allotted to Georgia amounted to $95.7 million, or 25% of the total CBEP funding. \(^{290}\) Initially, the funds were almost exclusively used for the dismantlement of suspected former Soviet BW facilities and securing pathogens. The non-Russian states of the FSU, including Georgia, were “willing partners” to this initial goal. \(^{292}\) When the Soviet Union collapsed, these facilities lacked security and safety measures and many were in disrepair. \(^{293}\) CBEP funds helped to dismantle biological weapon (BW) facilities and destroy excessive dual-use equipment. As the former Soviet BW capacities were completing destruction, CBEP transitioned to funding the softer aspects of bio-engagement.

### Facilities Upgraded or Constructed by CBEP

Over the past decade, CBEP funds have been allocated for numerous upgrades of Georgia’s biological laboratories, primarily focusing on increased security and safety. The largest area of progress in biological facilities upgrades in Georgia is the completed construction and operational capability of the Georgia Central Health Reference Laboratory, which was renamed the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research in 2012 by the government of Georgia. \(^{294}\) This is a laboratory built to BSL-3 (Biosecurity Level 3) standards intended to secure all dangerous pathogens in the country and provide the capability to characterize pathogens and validate diagnoses. \(^{295}\) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Andrew Weber, described this facility as a “new, modern disease control

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290 Kassenova. “Biological Threat Reduction in Central Asia.”
291 National Research Council The Biological Threat Reduction Program, 28.
293 Note: Example - For example, Biokombinat (Tabakhmela), a biological facility located in Georgia, was a major producer of vaccines for the Soviet Union, primarily for Foot and Mouth Disease. These types of facilities were generally assessed to be BW mobilization sites for pathogen production because they were deemed to have production capacity that “far exceeded any possible vaccine need.” Biokombinat’s lack of use after the fall of the Soviet Union and large industrial size biological equipment made it a “dual use hazard” and by 2007, CBEP funds helped to complete the dismantlement of the facility, destruction of its dual-use equipment and destruction of its Foot and Mouth Disease virus stocks.
295 Note: Georgia named the facility after former U.S. Senator Richard “Dick” Lugar, a key legislator enabling the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program commonly known as the “Nunn-Lugar program”. CBEP falls under the much larger CTR program.
296 National Research Council The Biological Threat Reduction Program, 68.
297 Note: BSL-3 means the facility has a “high” level of containment while BSL-4 has the “maximum” capacity for containment. Source: Lela Bakanidzel, Paata Imnadze1 and Dana Perkins. “Biosafety and biosecurity as essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation,” BMC Public Health, 3 Dec 2010, <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S12/>.
center for the South Black Sea and Caucuses region.” The center has modern “biosafety and good security, but also has important cutting edge diagnostics, and genetic sequencing capability.” CBEP funds also provided new equipment and systems to help with better pathogen security. For example, the Pathogen Asset Control System is now deployed in Georgia. It is a modern system for accounting, management and control of biological agent stocks. The Lugar Research facility is a joint Georgian-U.S. laboratory staffed by Georgian, U.S. and international technical experts. This lab is already functioning according to its website and the Defense Department says it will be “fully operational by 2018.”

_Surveillance Abilities Improved by CBEP in Georgia_

One of the goals of CBEP was to enhance bio surveillance by establishing a threat detection and response network in FSU countries. In Georgia, program funds were used to install a system called the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) and to train Georgian scientists on its use. This “sustainable” system is said to improve detection, diagnosis, and reporting of “especially dangerous pathogen outbreaks.” The system not only links all the Georgian ministries who need to know of an outbreak (Ministry of Health, Defense and Agriculture), but also links with the other countries in the region and data can be sent off “in near-real time to U.S. counterparts.” The establishment of this bio surveillance system also brings together Georgian, American, and International scientists. Its project team includes members from several U.S. Government organizations, not just American Defense Department officials and its training “implementers” include academic and foreign entities such as Penn State University and the UK Health Protection Agency. According to DOD, initial assessments of the

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297 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #15.
299 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #17.
300 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #18.
301 Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #9.
303 Kassenova, “Biological Threat Reduction.”
304 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, talking points.
Note: project team includes members from Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Center for Diseases Control, Walter Reed Army Institute for Research, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, and Naval Medical Research Center.
surveillance system in Georgia have already successfully taken place totaling 122 sites for 500 end users in 2012.\footnote{Department of Defense. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report,” 22.}

**CBEP Engagement Projects and Training in Georgia**

CBEP has funded numerous cooperative biological research projects, training, exercises, and conferences intended to “understand disease baseline, increase transparency, encourage higher ethics standards, and strengthen the integration of scientists into the international community.”\footnote{James Reid, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)). Personal interview. Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, 30 January 2014.} In 2012 alone, CBEP offered 317 classes with over 99,000 student contact hours.\footnote{Department of Defense. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report,” 22.} CBEP funded the “Southern Caucasus Workshop on Public Health, Security”, the “Law Enforcement Partnership in Bio-Incident Pre-Planning and Response” exercise and the associated “Southern Caucasus BioShield 2010 Tabletop Exercise” that were held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2010.\footnote{Bakanidzel, Imnadze1 and Perkins. “Biosafety and Biosecurity as Essential Pillars of International Health Security and Cross-cutting Elements of Biological Nonproliferation,” BMC Public Health, 3 December 2010, <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S12/> .} All activities were co-organized by the Georgians. In 2007, the National Academy of Sciences reported four joint Georgian-American biological research projects funded by CBEP. On average, each cost around $750,000 but many have led to numerous publications in scientific journals.\footnote{National Research Council, The Biological Threat Reduction Program, 101.} The Georgian project of “Characterizing *Yersinia pestis* strains led to a publication in *Clinical Microbiology and Infection*.”\footnote{Obiso, “United States Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction,” slide #15.} Another project analyzing *Vibrio cholera* using new technology led to over 12 publications.\footnote{Ibid, slide #16.}

Additionally, in all of these projects, conferences and training, scientists are drawn from a variety of U.S. government agencies and academic institutions. CBEP works with eight different American universities to aid in these efforts.\footnote{Ibid, slide #7.} For example, the project “Clinical, Epidemiologic, and Laboratory-Based Assessment of *Brucellosis* in Georgia” involves scientists not only from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, but also from...
Louisiana State University. Another project called “Active Surveillance of Especially Dangerous Pathogen in Southern Caucuses Region” involves the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the Naval Medical Research Center.\(^{312}\)

Exact numbers of scientists trained, conferences held, and research projects undertaken could not be determined. However, there is evidence that the training has been successful. In 2009, Georgian scientists trained under the CBEP, and working in CBEP supported laboratories were responsible for diagnosing a case of avian influenza and the “clinical recognition, epidemiological investigation, laboratory diagnosis, and successful response to outbreaks of the Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever” in Georgia.\(^{313}\) Their training enabled them to identify the source of that outbreak in their country to a tick in Uzbekistan.\(^{314}\) In addition, the lab network in the FSU that the CBEP program helped build was crucial to the identification of Georgia’s case of a orthopoxvirus. The Orthopoxvirus genus includes camelpox, monkey pox, and smallpox, a deadly virus that has been a threat to humans for centuries.\(^{315}\) In this case, Georgian scientists used the developed network to immediately ship the unidentified pathogens to the United States’ Center for Disease Control laboratory in Atlanta, GA for verification.\(^{316}\)

Due to the training, joint research and engagement venues that CBEP has helped to provide, Georgian scientists are very active in collaborating with the World Health Organization and other organizations and partners in technical consultations related to the International Health Regulations.”\(^{317}\)

Georgian biosafety domestic laws and biological risk management now involves a set of regulations on biosecurity that is based on the U.S. Select Agents Rule, and similar rules and norms the U.S. enforces regarding facilities, personnel registration, emergency response, record keeping, inspections, notifications for theft, loss or release, transfer, and import/export guidelines.\(^{318}\)

\(^{312}\) National Research Council *The Biological Threat Reduction Program*, 73.


\(^{314}\) Kassenova. “Biological Threat Reduction.”


\(^{316}\) Brooks, Interview.

\(^{317}\) Bakani dzel, Imnadze1 and Perkins. “Biosafety and Biosecurity.”

\(^{318}\) Ibid.

Note: biosafety norms are consistent with the “Bio-safety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories” guidance published by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regulations for import, export, containment, transfer, and handling of biological agents and toxins; and guidelines for safe transportation of infectious substances and diagnostic materials.
Analysis of Georgian Case Study

In the case of Georgia, all three of the measurements for successful engagement demonstrate that over a 20-year period, and for a relatively modest monetary investment, great strides can be made not only in biosecurity but also in the development of closer defense and leadership ties to a foreign country. The Georgian Lugar Research Center staffed by American and Georgian citizens, for example, helps the United States understand the disease distribution in that part of the world to “get us to the point that we can track disease events, biological events like we track the weather.” The surveillance system investment is crucial to linking to global response capabilities. If what constitutes the normal status quo can be understood using historical data, new scientific tools such as the bio surveillance system can be applied to quickly identify “abnormal events no matter what their cause, whether it is natural or a deliberate biological incident.” The engagement piece has also been successful based on the increased transparency of published scientific research, and the increased networking between American and Georgian scientists. The fact that the staff at the Lugar facility is jointly comprised of American, Georgian and international scientists reinforces international partnerships. The World Health Organization’s report card on countries complying with the IHR shows that Georgia is among the very best scoring 100% for capacity in such areas as legislation, coordination, surveillance, response, preparedness, and communication (91% in laboratory). This is very high in comparison to other countries worldwide.

While the Georgian case is largely successful, a DOD policy official noted that the 20-year involvement with Georgia is actually a really good lesson for the overall CBEP program in that the United States may have “built more capacity than was needed.” This indicates a learning process taking place within the DOD on the amount of facilities and engagement DOD feels is needed to meet constantly changing goals. What would aid in this assessment process would be more readily available information on the program’s projects within its partner countries. According to the DOD, this program has no classified elements and is completely transparent. There is no reason why the program should not have a detailed comprehensive country-by-country (or regional) outline of all its activities. Unfortunately, that is

319 Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Audio Interview with Andrew Weber.”
320 Ibid.
Note: Even the United States scored 60% in meeting compliance with the IHR regulations in the laboratory component.
323 Reid, Interview.
324 Brooks, Interview.
not the case currently. The program is documented in general terms only, making assessments, even ones as obvious as the Georgian case, difficult to measure.

Georgia has been able to overcome the challenge of enacting its own national legislation that adapts to Western norms and regulations, one that requires a minimum internationally recognized standard of biosafety and security. However, the mechanisms for implementation of these laws are still being developed. Enforcement of legislative regulations, effective screening of Georgian scientists (particularly ones who have received research grants) and changing the country’s criminal code to enforce sufficient penalties for bio-crimes remains a challenge. There is also concern that legislation can be easily changed or in Georgia based on persons in power. Dangerous pathogens are being handled in that country not by professionals but by less qualified “specialists” with no practical experience. Though, without the resources provided through the CBEP in terms of exposure to security expertise and funding, Georgia would likely have a much harder time complying with the IHR. As stated earlier, Georgia is currently one of 35 countries (out of 152) who have met the IHR standards. The tension between scientific and security communities in Georgia seems to be quelled by the fact that the staff of Georgia’s main laboratory that houses dangerous pathogens has a robust and willing partnership with United States scientists funded by the security-minded DOD. It is important to note that the investments of CBEP in Georgia do not seem to stem the potential growth of the biohacking, a limitation of the soft power approach outlined in the literature review. Overall though, the investments in Georgian biosecurity and biosafety, and the funding of modern disease surveillance infrastructure and capabilities have led to proven detection and response to outbreaks in a timely manner, most likely faster than what would have occurred without CBEP’s engagement in Georgia. CBEP not only strengthened public health and biodefense capacities but also its engagement piece served the larger purpose of building trust between the U.S. Government and Georgian government. The sustainability of the program makes it likely these positive results will continue with the acknowledgement of the limitations of such an approach.

Case Study #2: Regional Perspective – Southeast Asia

Background/History of CBEP in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is home to almost “every global emerging disease threat, including potential pandemic influenza strains.”\(^{328}\) Outbreaks of diseases in the region have not only claimed lives but also have had a negative economic impact. The estimated impact of SARS across Asia in 2003 was $30 billion.\(^{329}\) Politically over the past decade, many of the region’s countries are evolving from autocratic political systems to young democracies and have proactively sought a stronger bilateral relationship with the United States.\(^{330}\) In 2011, the DOD received authorization to expand the CBEP beyond the FSU. In October 2012, Senator Richard Lugar and several Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff members traveled to the region to encourage relationships through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program “as part of the renewed strategic emphasis by the United States on relations with the countries of the region.”\(^{331}\) Today, as part of the CTR program, DOD’s CBEP is most heavily engaged with Vietnam, has “more targeted projects” in Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia, and expects growth in the Philippines.\(^{332}\) According to DOD officials, there is good emphasis on working with already established regional networks such as the Asian Pacific Biosafety Association.\(^{333}\) Goals in this region are tailored to the specific needs of each country while encouraging regional cooperation.

Facilities Upgraded or Constructed by CBEP

According to the CBEP Director, in the Southeast Asian countries, military laboratories provide 80% of the diagnostic services to the regional population.\(^{334}\) This makes DOD’s CBEP a natural way to help influence an increase in biosafety and biosecurity in the regional laboratories because the United States Defense Department is building upon already established military-military relationships. In Vietnam, CBEP provided consultative support towards the construction of new BSL-2 facilities for Vietnam’s National Center for Veterinary Diagnostics and the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases. In both Vietnam and Cambodia, CBEP provided laboratory equipment and upgrades to multiple national

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\(^{329}\) Ibid., 7.


\(^{331}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{332}\) Defense Threat Reduction Agency, talking points, 3 and 4.

\(^{333}\) Defense Threat Reduction Agency slides, #8.


\(^{335}\) Reid, Interview.

\(^{336}\) Lance Brooks, Interview.
laboratory facilities. Malaysia’s biological facilities were already advanced. Therefore, the program tailored its resources there towards partnership building with that country’s Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE), the largest proponent of biosecurity in that country.

Surveillance Abilities Improved by CBEP in Southeast Asia

Many of the countries in this region have different types of biosurveillance and reporting systems of various qualities, some with proven success such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network. Therefore, the Southeast Asian regional goal of CBEP is not necessarily to institute DOD’s Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS), a platform provided to a host nation, which may choose to share data with the U.S. government. Rather, the goal is enhance whatever system a country has already in place in order to bring the country into compliance with the World Health Organization’s 2005 IHR. There is interest among partner nations, especially Vietnam, for implementation of e-surveillance systems such as EIDSS but issues such low absorptive capacity, lack of national legislative support, and lack of a robust communications infrastructure have prevented implementation. Three of the four CBEP countries in Southeast Asia are involved in the DOD’s Global Emerging Infectious Surveillance (GEIS) biosurveillance network that was active in 73 global outbreak responses in fiscal year 2011.
However, this is an area where more can be done as three of the four CBEP partner countries are still not in compliance with IHR biosurveillance standards.\textsuperscript{341}

\textit{CBEP Engagement Projects and Training in Southeast Asia}

According to the DTRA Director, a major difference between the engagement in the FSU and the newer engagement program in Africa and Southeast Asia is a focus on regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{342} When the program first started in the FSU, bilateral engagements were seen as more productive because building a regional consensus and cooperation were not as feasible at the time. In Southeast Asia, however, there is a greater understanding that the threat is a regional (or global) problem as opposed to being contained within the border of a nation-state. CBEP has supported multiple workshops and training across Southeast Asia to date. Most recently, in January 2014, CBEP (partnered with US Department of Health & Human Services [HHS] and US Pacific Command) hosted a workshop designed to “assist Lower Mekong countries developing and planning their own national preparedness plans.” Similar workshops in the past have included support to the ASEAN Regional Forum bio-preparedness exercises.\textsuperscript{343} In Cambodia, CBEP has provided various diagnostic training and quality management systems training. This involvement in the human and animal health sectors there has helped to establish the DOD “as a trusted partner, providing increased access” and “opportunities for further engagement.”\textsuperscript{344} In Vietnam, the government is identifying the gaps in biosecurity as a result of consultation with CBEP and has grown increasingly transparent in their efforts to fill those gaps by releasing their projects.\textsuperscript{345} In Malaysia, DOD has seen the most progress with “astounding results” in increased connections between the Ministry of Defense and DOD. Government and scientific representatives who may have only met for the first time during a CBEP-STRIDE workshop are “talking openly about sector-specific practices and needs and have demonstrated a willingness to work together for bio-preparedness.”\textsuperscript{346} Malaysia has increased its participation and presentations in the BWC meetings with the help of CBEP experts and consultations.\textsuperscript{347}

\textsuperscript{341} World Health Organization. “Implementation of the International Health Regulations.”

\textsuperscript{342} Brooks, Interview.

\textsuperscript{343} Lebo, D’Amour, Weir. Interview

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{345} Reid, Interview.

\textsuperscript{346} Lebo, D’Amour, Weir. Interview

\textsuperscript{347} Reid, Interview.
Government officials have started to revise legislation to address biosecurity and CBEP’s involvement has enhanced Malaysia’s ability to implement this pending legislation.\textsuperscript{348}

\textit{Southeast Asia Analysis}

Although CBEP has only been engaged in the Southeast Asian region for a short amount of time, the lower-level cooperation through CBEP has led to modest improvements in capabilities for the partner countries, strengthening the biosafety and biosecurity in the region. The fact that the program has clearly promoted a more open dialogue in Malaysia, and that Vietnam is interested in a biosurveillance partnership with the United States are good examples of incremental progress. The positive relationships built with CBEP also have the potential to expand engagements with other DOD programs as well. For example, CBEP funds the Naval Medical Research Unit-2, Armed Forces Research Institute for Medical Sciences’ laboratory in Phnom Penh, Cambodia as part of its engagement with that country. This laboratory supports U.S. interests in DOD’s Pacific Command (PACOM).\textsuperscript{349} It is important to note that CBEP may not develop in any of the Southeast Asian countries the same way it developed in the Republic of Georgia. Each country in this region has different needs. For example, Malaysia already had robust biosecurity and biosafety practices implemented throughout its national laboratories prior to the expansion of CBEP into its region and it did not need any assistance with facilities upgrades or technical assistance in this area.\textsuperscript{350} Most of the engagement with that country focused on the enhancement of scientific and security partnerships and relationships. Additionally, each country within the region has different limitations for implementation of CBEP within its borders. For example, although Vietnam has expressed interest in increasing its biosurveillance capacity, a lack of national legislative support has prevented its implementation.\textsuperscript{351} The program is limited by regional political processes in some countries in the region. For example, political issues in Indonesia have so far stifled any implementation of CBEP engagement in that country.\textsuperscript{352} Bilateral agreements with most countries also tend to take a long time to put in place but some progress is likely to continue if investments remain. Even though each country in the region may be

\textsuperscript{348} Lebo, D’Amour, Weir. Interview.
\textsuperscript{349} Lebo, D’Amour, Weir. Interview
U.S. Naval Medical research Unit No. 2, Phnom Penh official website.
\textsuperscript{350} Lebo, D’Amour, Weir. Interview.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid.
different as to the extent of CBEP engagement and some countries currently may not be able to be engaged at all, the program shows modest progress in the three areas of measurement from a regional perspective. Additionally, the program shows a great deal of potential for expansion in this region over time.

Defense’s Role in Soft Power Biological Engagement Programs

Any assessment of CBEP alone is limited because it does not always consider accomplishments and/or failures of the numerous other U.S. Government programs all designed to do roughly the same type of global biological engagement. There are more than 25 presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed positions within the various agencies of the federal government with “responsibility for organizing a federal response to biological threats.” Of the programs that focus specifically on foreign biological engagement, the Defense Department’s is still the largest. The State Department’s Bio Security Engagement Program maintains the exact same three goals of engagement as CBEP but has only 1/10th the budget. USAID maintains an “Emerging Pandemic Threats” (EPT) program to build capacity to combat diseases in many developing regions. HHS (CDC and Prevention and National Institute of Health) and US Department of Agriculture manage six different programs of the same types of engagement.

Because there continues to be “confusion and an overlap of responsibilities,” it is appropriate to ask why this program should be managed by Department of Defense and not a more traditional soft power agency such as the Department of State, HHS or USAID. Certainly, there is greater health and scientific expertise in many of the other agencies. However, I contend that it is not as politically feasible to fund a domestic agency such as HHS and CDC to train and build infrastructure in foreign countries. Meanwhile, international development budgets at the Department of State and USAID are

353 Rosenzweig, “Challenges to Leadership,” 7.
consistently underfunded. Soft power programs such as CBEP being funded by “defense” dollars may be less conspicuous in a very large DOD budget. Additionally, Defense officials cite that the DOD brings an important and different approach to engagement, namely a greater expertise and emphasis on security and safety issues as opposed to other government agencies that may be more focused on health, diplomatic or development concerns.\textsuperscript{358} DOD manages a larger and globally established logistics and personnel network. DOD has connections through the combatant commands’ headquarters and experience in security assistance though defense attaché and security cooperation officer links worldwide. DOD already has an established overseas network of laboratories and medical research facilities that provide bases for supporting such a program.\textsuperscript{359} Furthermore, in countries with weak civilian emergency response capacity, governments often turn to their militaries for emergency responses. A focus on military-military activities, on building military public health capacity could fill important gaps in global disease detection and response.\textsuperscript{360} Practically, despite the inefficiencies, the federal bureaucracy and legislative barriers may be too great to combine funding for biological engagement programs into one agency and in a time of fiscal constraint, a program like CBEP may be better off from a funding perspective in a larger defense budget than a small, specialized agency more affected by sequestration. A more important concern for this soft power program may be that with Senator Lugar no longer in Congress, the program has less support on the Hill. Soft power programs such as CBEP have no American constituency lobbying for their need. Unlike other defense programs such as weapons systems, vehicles and airplanes, programs such as CBEP create very few jobs in states and districts to bolster Congressional backing. This fact may prove worrisome in a time of budget cuts but the program is still better off nested within the Defense Department rather than anywhere else.

Conclusion

Although the soft power approach of CBEP has its limitations and measurements of success are difficult to evaluate, the 20-year effort in Georgia was worth the investment. This engagement has increased transparency and trust, considered so important to outbreak reporting and understanding the

\textsuperscript{358} Brooks, Interview.
\textsuperscript{359} Reid, Interview.
intentions of scientists who work with dangerous pathogens. It is too early to conclude the same regarding
the program in Southeast Asia, but initial signs are positive. CBEP’s success in Georgia may not be easily
replicated in all countries in Southeast Asia, or in other areas such as Africa. For this type of soft power
program to succeed in all three areas of measurement, the host country must be a very open and willing
partner, as exemplified in the Georgia case study. However, progress in any of the metrics outlined in this
research is worth the effort so even if a country is not fully welcoming on all engagement fronts, the
program still has merit. What is special about all the countries that have been engaged by the CBEP is that
they volunteer for some level of connection. They may not be strong allies of the United States (such as
Vietnam), but they agree to further partnership. Should this program in the future result in countering or
mitigating an outbreak or a biological terror incident in one of these partner countries, it increases the
possibility that more countries (especially non-allies) may be incentivized to partner with the United States,
opening new doors for cooperation and diplomacy. Additionally, a soft power program’s success is
broadened by the fact that other countries wish to emulate American actions. There is evidence CBEP has
generated this type of momentum internationally as many European countries are now very engaged in
taking on the biosecurity problem globally.\textsuperscript{361}

Although it may be clear that programs that help increase biosafety and biosecurity in many
countries with weak practices are worth the investment, given that a host country is a willing participant, it
is less clear whether that investment should be undertaken from the defense establishment or by another
federal agency. Practically though, funding for such soft power projects will most likely remain within the
DOD for bureaucratic and political reasons. CBEP’s engagement approach, still in its beginning phase,
needs to be continued as an important part of a long-term solution to an uphill battle. Recently, U.S.
diplomats to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Conference reported that overall trust building
efforts are getting worse rather than better as they cited only 63 of 166 countries had submitted “voluntary
data about bio-related activities under confidence-building measures sought from all BWC member
nations over the past year.”\textsuperscript{362} However, this does not mean that soft power programs are not working; in

\textsuperscript{361} Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Audio Interview with Andrew Weber.”
United States of America. “Confidence Building Measures: Time to redouble efforts for effective action,” Working
paper submitted to the 2013 Meeting of the States Party to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 9-13
fact, it may be testimony to the need for more of them. Given the fact that the United States will not agree to any mandatory monitoring of the biosciences, soft power programs such as CBEP become increasingly important and are likely the best option to combat a growing biological threat.\textsuperscript{363}

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\textsuperscript{363} Note: In 2001, the United States withdrew from the multi-year talks to negotiate a binding verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Treaty. The Obama administration has upheld opposition to the establishment of a mandatory monitoring regime for the Treaty based on concerns about cost to domestic biological research institutions and industry.
THESIS CONCLUSION

Soft Power

While the hard power programs within the Department of Defense are the most prominent, its soft power programs should not be discounted. Even though they may only be moderately effective in increasing U.S. soft power in the present day, they are extremely low cost and they add an important additional tool that can be leveraged given today’s changing security environment. Indeed, many of America’s softer power approaches to security may best be accomplished by the country’s hard power agency. Highlighting this fact and the relative value of soft power approaches is more important now than ever before as defense budgets decrease. While it’s challenging to define the effectiveness of softer power programs, this thesis contends that due to the nature of future threats, these programs may become increasingly important security tools for the United States.

Chapter Summaries

This thesis examined three different soft power programs either funded and/or managed by the Department of Defense to address the primary question of each program’s worth in comparison to its investment. Chapter one examined the soft power effect of educating foreign military leaders. That chapter specifically asked the question: does the IMET (International Military Education and Training) program affect a foreign military’s “democratic” values and policies? Through the use of three case studies (Bangladesh, Ukraine, and Nigeria), indirect links to American education of foreign military leaders through IMET were demonstrated to have a positive influence on increasing democratic values in recipient military forces, although this progress was inconsistent. Even slight progress that is indirectly linked to IMET is worth the effort given the program’s broader role in developing security relationships and creating enduring partnerships for a relatively low cost.

Chapter two examined a U.S. Navy soft power program by asking the specific question: does the U.S. Navy’s increased use of proactive medical humanitarian assistance deployments improve U.S. visibility, access, and influence in the regions in which they take place? This chapter also looked at three case studies of countries hosting these annual deployments (Indonesia, Colombia, and Vietnam). Despite some research limitations, this chapter concluded that there is a connection between these deployments
and increases in U.S. soft power regionally and to a lesser extent globally. This connection is stronger in regions where security relations with the United States have historically been strained and these missions have provided an important tool in strengthening regional security relationships. These results and the modest monetary cost of such deployments make this program still worth the effort during a time of budget constraint.

Chapter three examined a soft power Defense Department program to counter the use of biological weapons of mass destruction. With rapidly changing scientific and communication advances, the uses of traditional hard power tools to fight biological weapons are being doubted. This chapter asked the question: does the Department of Defense Cooperative Biological Engagement Program’s (CBEP) soft power approach decrease the likelihood that dual-use biotechnology will be used to wage biological warfare or launch bioterror attacks? Two case studies using one country (Georgia) and one region (Southeast Asia) were examined to determine if the engagement produces the outcomes that are said to help counter biological threats. In both case studies, using three metrics of increased biosecurity, biosurveillance capability, and biological-related partnerships with the United States, CBEP demonstrated a positive effect to varying degrees. Given the limited hard power defense solutions to countering the broad biological threat, this type of soft power program may be the most effective and important long term.

Limitations of the Study

More time for research and more robust data are needed to solidify these findings. The first chapter could be improved in many ways. Having no comprehensive list and no post-graduation tracking of IMET alumnae creates many holes in research data that have to be discounted to some extent to make solid conclusions. The data used in this thesis could only come from what is publically available with a reliance on broad reporting of trends instead of specific cases. For example, it would have been enlightening to be able to research specific cases of human rights abuses inflicted by foreign militaries to determine whom the commanders were at the time and if they were IMET graduates. That was not possible so conclusions had to be made based on overall trends. Additionally, the IMET program is very diverse in that it covers many different types of U.S. military institutions and lengths of study. In order to more accurately make solid conclusions, it would have been better to have taken one institution within the
IMET program (such as the U.S. National Defense University’s National War College) and studied the impact that 1-year course had on its foreign graduates. Presently, such follow-up data does not exist.

The major limitation of the second chapter on the U.S. Navy’s hospital ship deployments was the fact that there are so many other factors that can sway American access, influence, and visibility in a region. Determining visibility and influence is not an exact science. Public opinion polls are not standardized and often do not ask the right questions to tease out the specific impacts of these engagements. Increased access and influence can be attributed to leadership personalities or domestic politics and this thesis did not take into account all possible reasons for this in its case studies.

For chapter three, it is difficult to prove the program’s effectiveness if biological weapons are never used. The program may never be able to be proven effective if a biological attack does not occur because one would never know why a biological weapon was not used. Was the reason because the strong scientific and surveillance networks deterred its use, or not? Additionally, each country is different in terms of its own health capacity, internal politics, and its diplomatic and cultural relationship with the United States so comparing even quantifiable results such as number of scientists trained or number of facilities upgraded, may not be enormously useful in applying past results in one country with future engagement expansion in another. In other words, one size does not fit all; so replicating what the United States accomplished in the FSU may not be applicable to all other countries in the same way.

Implications for Further Research

In each chapter, research highlighted interesting new questions for further study. For example, the IMET program’s effects might be able to be demonstrated better if one were to compare two similar countries’ militaries, one having a strong IMET relationship and one having little or no IMET involvement. Could we see a clear difference in those foreign military's respect for democratic values? Another approach would be to take a detailed look into one country’s military and compare the actions of military leaders who were IMET graduates and who were not. Could we see a difference in respect for democratic values? For example, how would IMET trained military leaders compare against their non-IMET trained counterparts when it comes to such things as gender-based violence in conflict zones? Supposedly, IMET trained officers have been exposed to female military officers from the West through
their training with them. Would this make a difference in their leadership after they returned to their countries?

For the second chapter, further study on the long-term impact of proactive medical deployments should be considered. This would require going back to the specific regions in countries where medical deployments occurred in the past and assessing the health and psychological impact of the missions years later. Did these missions make a lasting positive impression on the populations? Do the local people remember the operations? Another idea for further research would be to compare the impact of U.S. Navy medical missions versus other U.S. government humanitarian efforts in similar regions. Are there better, more cost effective ways to have the same humanitarian visibility and impact in a country using other agencies like USAID or is there no substitute for a large white hospital ship or a small fleet of warships present off the coast as a sign of goodwill?

Finally, chapter three presents many new questions for further research. The results from CBEP in the FSU should be compared in some way to the status in a similar country with whom the United States has had no biological outreach to determine the level of impact associated with CBEP. Have there been more outbreaks in similar countries in which America has no engagements? Have similar outbreaks in both a CBEP country and a non-CBEP country been handled so differently as to effect the response times and the numbers of people sickened or killed regionally and globally? It would also be interesting to compare CBEP to its counterpart programs in other U.S. federal agencies. For example, CBEP holds ten times the amount of funding per year compared to its State Department counterpart. Are the results of CBEP somehow ten times more effective? What are the benefits of using an agency such as the Department of Health and Human Services for the same type of outreach instead of the Department of Defense? When compared, which program is most valuable in terms of effectiveness and overall cost?

Final Thoughts

It is interesting to note that these three programs can all be united to each other within the defense and security context. For example, the Vietnamese Military and Ministry of Health allowed the U.S. Navy to begin its semi-annual proactive medical deployments to that country in 2007. Just four years later, Vietnam agreed to send its first senior Vietnamese military officer to attend the U.S. National Defense University through IMET. Today, Vietnam’s military and health sectors are now interested in
partnering with the United States to raise its bio-surveillance standards through DOD’s CBEP program. This raises interesting questions as to how the outreach of these programs helps develop new relationships not previously seen. One soft power door that is opened produces the unlocking of other doors in different areas but all tied by a broader security framework. There seems to be little negative effects of a growing soft power partnership with another country. Softer connections made through medical forces, scientific, or military leadership educational training are likely to be less threatening to other countries (particularly adversaries) than arms sales or security agreements. While acknowledging the concern that these softer programs being nested within the Department of Defense may lead to the a growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy, there are tangible benefits of these programs being managed by the DOD. In the current American political system, the defense budget far outweighs the budgets of other federal agencies (including the Department of State and HHS) and has done so for some time. This mismatch in funding over time directly results in DOD’s greater global operational capability in personnel and logistics in comparison with other agencies. While DOD may not be the most ideal organization to take on proactive medical engagement or work to increase biological scientific networks, it may be the most practical. Additionally, if foreign countries can create security partnerships through the connections made during the implementation of these softer programs, they may be more likely to trust the U.S. military and DOD as a partner rather than an adversary in a time of crisis.

Each one of these program’s direct soft power influence is limited to a certain extent and measuring the soft power associated with them is imperfect. However, they all have some value now and potentially great value should their connections and links be needed in a future crisis. The IMET program was clearly designed to increase military-to-military (security related) associations on a personal level. However, it does show some degree of reaching foreign military leaders in a softer way, extending western ideas to a greater range than having no program at all. Is the IMET program going to change all of the foreign military students’ actions and opinions on democratic values in significant ways? No – but the program does seem to have selected impact that, in addition to its design of increasing security related connections, is worth the small cost. The soft power effects of U.S. Navy hospital ships and warships to perform proactive medical deployments around the world may never be fully realized. However, the connections and goodwill bought with these deployments (regionally and globally) may become very useful in the future. The United States is one of the only countries in the world with such capability and if these
partnered efforts continue, much like what we have seen recently in the disaster relief effort in the Philippines, one never knows when the United States might need to draw on its networks and influence fostered by these proactive deployments in the future. Can anyone ever prove that DOD’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program stops a bioterrorist or a biological weapon attack on the United States? No – but it does build global resiliency should an attack occur in another region of the world and could lessen the consequences to the United States of an attack originating elsewhere. It increases the global capability to narrow down the source of an attack and increases the international scientific and security connections that can mitigate the impact of a bioterrorist attack by helping to stop the spread of a pathogen more quickly. It is very difficult to impose bio-surveillance and scientific networks on other countries. They have to desire and value the involvement of the United States and the international community. Advancing this desire is the purpose for the soft power approach. If these countries can be solicited to partner with the United States through CBEP, then their overall resiliency toward biological attacks increases, thereby increasing global resiliency. Overall, these programs’ modest quantifiable effectiveness and present-day significance are greatly outweighed by their low cost and their potential benefits to American and global security in an uncertain future.
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