UNDERSTANDING THE SINO-JAPANESE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

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Abstract

This thesis portfolio assesses the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship using three sources of contention. The main question is, "What are the main sources of conflict in the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship?" Each paper in the portfolio contributes to answering this overall question. The first paper discusses how nationalism has risen in Japan and China and its implications for the relationship. The second paper is a case study on the territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and how this contributes to the conflict between the two countries. The third chapter discusses the United States alliance with Japan, studying the language of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and Japan and the role of the United States in the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship.

This portfolio uses a historical-interpretative approach to conducting research and analysis. The most knowledgeable scholars in the field of Asian affairs from China, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have discussed the complex relationship and the reoccurring conflict between the two governments. The works of well-known Sino and Japanese scholars and defense strategists are analyzed and examined for common themes. For historical reference and theoretical analysis, the writings of Henry Kissinger, Paul Kennedy, and John Mearshimer are used. The ideas of Asia experts such as Robert Kaplan, Richard Bush, Christopher Hughes, Peter Gries and Lucian W. Pye, Bill Emmott, Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Fumio Ota, Dr. Paul Smith, Thomas Christensen, and Zhongqi Pan are analyzed.

Chapter One finds that ethnic nationalism is growing in both China and Japan, posing as a major contributor to the tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Chapter
Two concludes that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island is an important part of Japan and China's identity. Despite the liberal idea that war will be prevented by strong trade ties in a crisis situation, particularly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, both populations will be indifferent to maintaining trade ties. Chapter Three has found that the language in the Mutual Defense Treaty Between Japan and the United States of 1960 lacks clarity regarding the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the governments of China and Japan has been described
as having an “underlying awkwardness,” as “an emotional confrontation,” and as being
“seriously strained” at different times in history.¹ The violence of the past, which
includes wars, rapacious treaties, and a decade long Japanese occupation of eastern
China, has left a legacy of bitterness. In recent times, incidents such as the Japanese
government’s purchase in 2012 of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—located east of the
Ryukyu Island chain in the East China Sea—from a private owner caused widespread
anti-Japanese riots in many Chinese cities.² Other incidents such as the Japanese Prime
Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese soldiers (including those from
the war in China) are honored, have caused widespread riots in cities throughout China
and denunciation from senior government officials. At the same time, the economic
relationship between the two countries whose economies are among the world’s largest,
has been described as “large and full of promise.”³ Political scientists, foreign policy
experts, and Asia scholars frequently study the relationship between the two countries,
which has such an impact on the regional and global order.⁴ A military conflict between
the two countries over one of these issues would have far reaching implications, possibly
including the involvement of the United States. An understanding of the complex

¹ Peter Drysdale and Dong Dong Zhang, Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation In East Asia (Canberra:
Asia Pacific Press, 2000), 3; Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Engagement and Hedging: Japan’s Strategy toward
³ Drysdale and Zhang, Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation In East Asia, 3, 52.
⁴ Ibid, 2; Robert Taylor, The Sino-Japanese Axis: A New Force In Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1985), v-viii.
relationship between China and Japan is critical for the policymaker, scholar, and student alike.

The relationship between China and Japan must be put in the context of a larger Chinese movement. The beginnings of the modern Chinese government emerged in 1912, when Sun Yat Sen’s Nationalist government overthrew the Manchurian Qing dynasty and the entire dynasty system, which had ruled China for hundreds of years. This was followed by the Second World War, in which Japan brutally occupied parts of China, leaving a lasting bitterness among the Chinese for Japan to this day. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communist government.

Since then, the Chinese government has gone through various phases. Since the 1980s, it has gradually become stronger and more modernized under policies initiated by Deng Xiao Ping. At the same time, the Chinese have developed more far-reaching ambitions.⁵ China at present is not weak anymore. It has become the second largest economy in the world. This has spawned a rise in Chinese nationalism.⁶ China is beginning to have increased ambitions to expand in all sectors, primarily militarily and economically.⁷ That has brought them great success. In early 1997, Hong Kong and Macau became part of China. While this move later became problematic for China as evidenced by the recent protests in Hong Kong, the addition of Hong Kong and Macau (in 1997) increased China’s prestige around the world and increased nationalism among

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⁶ Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 73.
the mainland Chinese. Now, the Chinese government and people are ready to take the next historical step by pushing other countries out of what they claim is their own sphere of influence. China has not specifically decided to create trouble with Japan—all nations bordering China will begin to feel pressure from its expansion. The current territorial disputes with Japan must be seen as part of a larger historical movement, with Japan being only one of the parts. Japan has been targeted the most often because it is easy for the Chinese government to gain public support for anti-Japanese policies, due to the hatred the Chinese have for the Japanese. But Taiwan is also likely soon to feel Chinese pressure. Taiwan is very important to China.

The Meiji Restoration, which began in the late 1800s, spurred Japan to become a modern and economic power. The defeat of China in 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki gave Japan Chinese territories. Japan’s militarism and imperialism grew and was pushed by militarists who took control of the government. During the Second World War, China and the other Asian countries living under its occupation witnessed the Japanese desire for expansion and brutality. After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan has had to accept the terms of peace headed by the United States. Since then, Japan’s role in the world has drastically changed and it has played the role of what some call the “defeated aggressor.” It has had to accept occupation by the United States, reform to its government, and the drastic reduction of its military.
Japanese government and people have apologized to the world for its past misconduct for sixty years.\textsuperscript{14} But a new line of thinking in Japan has emerged, one that wishes to change the role Japan plays. Headed by the Revisionist Party, this emerging line of thinking calls for a more assertive foreign policy and revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces Japan's right to go to war as a sovereign nation, and makes Japan a "semi-sovereign state."\textsuperscript{15} Japan's foreign policy may begin to change to become more defensive in the near future.

The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the rise of nationalism in both China and Japan and its effect on Sino-Japanese relations. At the end of the Second World War, the world was tired of wars, and many nations rejected the idea of nationalism. Liberal political scientists began to argue that nationalism was an idea of the past that was outgrown by the human race that would be motivated by other ideas. Today's Western ideology is dominated by liberalism and universalism, as evidenced by the importance attached to international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{16} But in the past two decades, contrary to predictions, nationalism, one of the strongest human urges, has increased in many countries. This can be seen in the current crises around the world, particularly between the Ukraine and Russia, where individuals are willing to die to belong to their own country.

Nationalism in China has grown out of its past history with the West. China is emerging from a so-called "Century of Humiliation," characterized by military defeats,

\textsuperscript{15} Hughes, "Japan's Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism," 45.
\textsuperscript{16} Kaplan, \textit{Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific}, 16.
unequal treaties and racial discrimination. China developed a national inferiority complex during this time. The foreigner could always do what he wanted with China. The actions the Westerners took in China pained the Chinese and hurt even now. The Communist Party took over China in the 1940s. Today, Communism exists in name only in China. It has been replaced by an unabashed capitalism. Some of the richest people in the world live in China. But seeking money does not satisfy the desire for freedom, which the Communist leaders will not tolerate. Their solution is to steer the desire for liberty into China's nascent nationalistic feeling. Nationalism, with its hatred of the foreigner, especially the Japanese, is beginning to replace the old Communist ideology.

Nationalism is also beginning to emerge in Japan. Before and during the Second World War, the Japanese were an intensely patriotic people who were indoctrinated by their government to think they were superior to other races and had a divine mission. The Second World War was the height of patriotism for Japan, with an ideology in which young men flew their airplanes into enemy ships, willing to commit suicide for the sake of their country. This was an extreme sense of nationalism. The post-war period went to the other extreme when nationalism was nonexistent. But now, seventy years have passed and nationalism is beginning to return to a normal level between these two extremes. This can be evidenced in the willingness of the people to change the constitution, which had abolished the armed forces. This would not have been considered even ten or fifteen years ago.

The second chapter of the thesis builds on the first chapter. It aims to provide an original contribution to existing scholarship by explaining why tensions increased between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and if they can be defused. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, located in the East China Sea between Mainland China and Japan, are a group of five islands, some vacant and some sparsely inhabited, and three rocks protruding from the sea. The island group is named Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. China, Taiwan, and South Korea also contest Japan’s ownership of the islands.

The controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is only one of many problems that face China and Japan, but one of the main sources of tension. Scholar Yinan He points out that for the past forty years, China and Japan have experienced disputes about many issues. Beijing has repeatedly protested the Japanese Prime Minister’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors the Japanese war dead, who include soldiers from the Second World War and former war criminals. The series of Japanese history textbook controversies, which began in 1982 over China’s conflicting interpretation of the events of the Second World War in East Asia, also resulted in deteriorating relations between the two countries. The Chinese are infuriated by Japanese minimizing of the atrocities and aggression carried out by Japanese troops in China during the Second World War. The most noteworthy of these atrocities was the rape of Nanjing, where

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18 Tian, Dexin and Chin-Chung Chao, "Border Institutions—What Is Lacking in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute," *China Media Research* 9, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 27.

19 Ibid, 27.

20 Ibid.

21 Yinan He, "Forty Years in Paradox," *China Perspectives* 2013, no. 4 (December 2013): 8-10.

22 He, "Forty Years in Paradox," 8.
Japanese troops ran wild and murdered and raped thousands of Chinese citizens. But the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are more important to the Japanese and Chinese than the other disputes. The Islands represent the "core of their sovereignty, national pride, and security." In addition, each country is fearful that compromise will set a precedent for the territorial disputes it has with other countries. In particular, the Japanese are embroiled with the Russia over ownership of the Kuril Islands to the north of Japan.

The United States alliance with Japan is especially pertinent in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In early April 2014, United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited China for meetings with the Chinese military. Mr. Hagel visited the new Chinese aircraft carrier and discussed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Mr. Hagel also participated in a widely publicized press conference with the Chinese military. He became somewhat confrontational when the United States was denounced for its alleged policy of trying to contain China's expanding military. This press conference highlights the current friction in the United States, China, and Japan relationship. The United States is bound to Japan by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and Japan and large American private firms have trade agreements with China. If military hostilities should break out between the China and Japan, what steps should the United States take? These are analyzed in the third chapter. The third chapter of the portfolio aims to provide

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
a better understanding of the defense relationship between the United States and Japan and how it affects the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship. The language in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and Japan is analyzed. Also studied are the United States options if Japan and China become involved in an armed conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The third chapter of the thesis also touches on the balance of power and military alliances. Organized in the early 1950s to guard against Soviet Russia (USSR), NATO is one of the strongest alliances ever established. When the Second World War ended in Europe in 1945, the USSR was an ally to the United States. Many Europeans and some in the United States could not believe that the USSR was not a benevolent force. The realization that the USSR was an aggressive, offensive-minded force grew during the Berlin blockade and the Korean War. Shortly thereafter, the United States and European powers took steps to defend themselves. President Eisenhower set up NATO, designed for defense of all European countries including the smaller and weaker countries that could not begin to defend themselves. In this alliance, the members of NATO pledged to work together. NATO remained a defensive alliance until the 1980s when the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate and Soviet forces retreated to their own territory. The next step for NATO was to move into Eastern Europe—the wisdom of which can be debated. Many small, weaker countries that Russia had evacuated wanted to join NATO, to ensure United States protection in case of war. The present situation is a United States commitment to go to war if the Soviet Union or any other hostile force invades one of

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31 Ibid, 389.
these small countries.\textsuperscript{32} As will be shown in this portfolio, a defensive alliance such as NATO or any other treaty approved by the Senate has the force of law. This means that the United States is legally, as well as morally bound to defend Japan, the same as it does for these countries.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, written sixty years ago, directly relates to security issues in East Asia. While China is not mentioned in the Treaty, the United States alliance with Japan is a significant element in the study of the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. The Security Treaty was a major step for Japan, allowing United States troops on Japan soil indefinitely. In return, the United States is committed to supporting Japan in a war with China. In a worst-case scenario, the Treaty commits the United States to actions that could lead to the nuclear destruction of the United States. China is a very unpredictable and unstable country. It is unclear whether the drafters of the Treaty fully understood what they were committing the United States to do. The Treaty, for instance, does not specify the exact geographic area the United States is committed to defend. Neither did the Treaty drafters foresee that China was going to be a nuclear power in fifty years, and that it would constitute an economic and military heavyweight and competitor to the United States. The analysis in this chapter will clarify the intentions of both drafters of the Treaty.

\textsuperscript{32} Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000}, 518.
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN CHINA AND JAPAN
Introduction

Over the past twenty years, China has emerged from years of isolation to become a strong economic power. Since its downfall at the end of the Second World War, Japan has rebuilt itself to become one of the leading economies in Asia and a reliable ally to the United States. As China and Japan have emerged as major actors in the world, a strong sense of national pride in their success and achievements has emerged. This has developed into a strong sense of nationalism and an urge to assert themselves. The governments of China and Japan have received widespread domestic support for tough policies on territorial disputes and military buildup. Much of the support for these policies can be related to rising nationalism in both countries. Given its prevalence in China and Japan, it is necessary to examine the concept of nationalism, to trace the rise and current state of nationalism in both countries, and how it affects the Chinese-Japanese bilateral relationship. The main research question of this paper is: Is nationalism a cause of conflict between China and Japan? Answering this question will help answer the overall question of the thesis portfolio, which is: What are the main sources of conflict in the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship? This research paper shows that as China and Japan become stronger politically and economically, national pride is contributing to the conflict between both nations. The key finding of this chapter is that nationalism is encouraged by both governments. The Chinese Communist government utilizes nationalism to fill the lack of ideology that exists in China. On a smaller scale, nationalism is being utilized by the Japanese government as a means to develop national pride following the post-war deflation of the country.
This research paper examines the rise of modern nationalism in China and Japan and attempts to make an original contribution to the field of Asian governmental studies by comparing and contrasting the nationalistic elements present in both countries today, and by determining its role in furthering the conflict between both countries. This paper begins by explaining the importance of nationalism. The paper continues with a review of the relevant scholarly literature on the history of Chinese and Japanese nationalism, and argues that historical experiences with the West helped create the growth of nationalism. The main portion of the paper seeks to define the nature of nationalism in China and Japan today and its importance in the bilateral relationship. The research findings of this paper will contribute to a deeper understanding of the roots and causes of the conflict between China and Japan.

**Defining Nationalism**

Traditional views see nationalism as inherent in all human beings and having existed "since time immemorial."¹ This "primordialist" perspective characterizes nationalism as a phenomenon that has existed since the beginning of time and inherent in all human beings.² Typical nationalism "features the supremacy of the nation's claims over other claims to individual allegiance, and which features full sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program."³ An example of this is territorial sovereignty, which is proof of the power of a state.⁴

Scholar Michael Ignatieff defines nationalism through three lines of thought. As a political option, it is the idea that the world's nations have "the right to self-

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
determination, either as self-governing units within existing nation-states or as nation-states of their own.⁵ Culturally, nationalism is the assertion that “the nation provides (men and women) with their primary form of belonging,” meaning that all people like to associate with a larger unit.⁶ Citizens cannot defend themselves individually so they depend on their nation to defend them. Morally, it is “an ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defense of one’s nation against enemies, internal or external.”⁷ Many nationalists are romantic, sentimental people, who use nationalism to create a noble justification for violence.

Ignatieff discusses the difference between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism is the idea that the nations should be “composed of those....who subscribe to a nation’s political creed.”⁸ For example, the United States is composed of various ethnicities that subscribe to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, which is based on loyalty to political ideals, not on blood. This idea is in juxtaposition to ethnic nationalism, which claims that an “individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen and that the national community defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community.”⁹ This type of nationalism bases its allegiance on ancient traditions, history, culture, and the language a people share. These two types of nationalism are in competition with each other.

Civic and ethnic nationalism can be seen in its emergence in modern Europe. Civic nationalism rose in the 1800s in Europe as a way to overthrow imperialist

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⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid. 6.
⁹ Ibid. 6-7.
governments such as the Hapsburgs and the Romanov Dynasty.\textsuperscript{10} This type of nationalism promoted camaraderie within a group and encouraged cohesion and unity. Yet an overdose of nationalism, combined with militarism, led Nazi Germany to an over-aggressive foreign policy and two world wars. It also spurred the buildup of Imperial Japan. Ethnic nationalism prompted ethnic violence in both these countries due to its idea of racial superiority. This aspect of violence, which focuses on the difference between oneself and those of different groups, can lead to hatred against groups inside the state, as well as outside groups with different ethnic and cultural traditions. The 20\textsuperscript{th} Century experiences show the naturalness of nationalist urges but also the tendency to promote hatred, violence, and war.

As will be discussed in this chapter, nationalism in China and Japan existed since feudal times. For centuries, most Chinese felt proud to be Chinese and proud in their country's cultural achievements. Yet, as China came into contact with the West and began to modernize, it also came in contact with Western ideas. Nationalism came along with this development. The Chinese for the first time began to feel that they could participate in the ruling of their country, which they could never do before. The stirrings of modern nationalism in Japan also began with its contact with the West. Japan, less self-confident than the Chinese, in order to be on the same footing with the West, felt that it needed to modernize and develop its entire system of government, economy, and military. This was manifested in the Meiji Restoration, which created a great source of pride for Japan and helped spur the militarization of Japan.

Defense strategist and author Robert Kaplan argues that Asia today is seeing an upsurge of traditional nationalism and a realist ideology that is replacing liberal ideology.

\textsuperscript{10} Kaplan, \textit{Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific}, 16.
According to him, the balance of power in the 21st Century will be characterized by realism rather than liberalism. Japan and China are coming into a type of nationalism that suits their own background and historical position. In China, nationalism is being encouraged by the Chinese government and is acting as a substitute for the discredited Communist ideology. Japan is returning to normal levels of nationalism from a position of having none. It is also being stoked by the China’s aggressive actions. This chapter will explore the differences between nationalism in China and Japan and will also seek to explain how nationalism is one of the major factors in the conflict between the two countries.

**Literature Review: The Rise of Nationalism**

This historical literature review analyzes existing views on the causes of nationalism in China and Japan and considers the points of view of renowned scholars of both countries. The main argument of this literature review is that external factors, such as past interference from the West and colonialism in the early 20th Century are the main reasons for the development of nationalism in China and Japan. The nationalism that China and Japan experience today stemmed from the experiences both countries had with the West. China has emerged from a time of domination by the foreigner, followed by a time of relative isolation. Japan is emerging from a period of great nationalism, to a total deflation at the end of the Second World War and being forced to become an unnaturally pacifist nation. This literature review has found that gaps exist regarding the causes and nature of current nationalism in Japan. Further study on this topic is recommended.

Beginning at the end of the 18th Century, China had bitter experiences with the West and Japan. When Western ships and traders came to China at the end of the 18th

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11 Kaplan, *Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*, 16.
Century, China was “enclosed in the isolation of superiority...who wanted no influx of strangers.”\textsuperscript{12} Despite this, the Westerners wanted China to open its ports and allow trade, particularly opium, with the West. Differences over customs and trade practices led to two so-called “Opium Wars.”\textsuperscript{13} The ruling Qing Dynasty was so weak and disorganized that it could not assert itself and was defeated in both wars. After each Opium War, China had to subject itself to unequal treaties and Western invaders began to exploit China for economic gain.\textsuperscript{14} The Chinese experience with colonialism in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries left a bitter distaste for foreigners in the Chinese psyche. This is one of the main reasons Dr. Sun Yat-Sen was able to gain popularity with his nationalist discourse.\textsuperscript{15}

The Chinese experiences with the West were concurrent with bitter experiences in Japan. Nationalism and imperialism took root in Japan and the military began to dominate the country. This led to Japan’s victory over China in 1895 in the First Sino-Japanese War, fought between the Qing Dynasty and Meiji Japan over control of Korea.\textsuperscript{16} The war was a clear indication of the Qing Dynasty’s failure and resulted in foreign powers taking shares of China for their own.\textsuperscript{17} For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan; the prestige of the Qing Dynasty, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. Since China viewed Japan as a subordinate, a defeat at the hands of fellow Asians was a bitter psychological blow.\textsuperscript{18} Agitation against the Qing began. Further humiliation occurred when the Chinese

\textsuperscript{12} Tuchman, \textit{Stilwell and the American Experience In China: 1911-45}, 27.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{15} Tuchman, \textit{Stilwell and the American Experience In China: 1911-45}, 33.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Gries, \textit{China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy}, 70.
territory taken by the Germans before the First World War was given to the Japanese in the Treaty of Versailles. The Chinese believed that President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, which stated that the wishes of the people in colonial territories should be considered, would apply to China. They were bitterly disappointed that it did not change the tide of events, giving impetus to the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement of 1919. A “Century of Humiliation,” as rebellious Chinese students called it, began. These experiences constitute the main factors that set the stage for political changes led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

Japan had a different experience with the West. Even before the Meiji Restoration, when Japan had little contact with the West, it attempted to study and understand Western thought and science. Japanese intellectuals used the term, “Western science, Japanese essence,” to explain their use of Western ideas. While the Japanese believed they were unique, they knew they were competing with many others. Asian scholar Lucian Pye has commented that because of Confucian interpretation, the Japanese were able to make a seamless transition from ending an old regime to developing a new one. Even elements of a “defensive ethnocentric nationalism,” the idea that a strong defense must be maintained in order for Japan to defeat onslaughts from foreign powers, have been found in the first national writings of Japan.

Japanese history shows that external factors have played a key role in the development of nationalistic thinking. When the American Admiral Perry arrived in

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 45.
Japan with his fleet of “Black Ships,” he arrived with armament much more advanced than what Japan had. Many Japanese saw the arrival of Admiral Perry as a “regrettable necessity” and called for a policy of “cautious engagement,” in which Japan should learn from the West. They believed that the most effective way to resist the West was to build a modern society. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration acted in the name of restoring imperial rule in order to strengthen Japan against the threat represented by the colonial powers. The speed with which Japan modernized and rebuilt its military would not have occurred if it had not been faced with outside influences. Historians agree that the influence of foreign ideas was present in the writings of early Japanese nationalist authors. A specialist on nationalism, Erica Denner, describes the development: “The core set of national values—external sovereignty, cautious engagement, international leadership, and radicalization—which emerged in Europe in the 16th Century also developed later in Japan.” Japan continued its policy of “cautious engagement” in order to become one of the Western great powers.

The literature reviewed has shown that external factors played the largest role in the rise of Chinese and Japanese nationalism in the 20th Century. Nationalism existed in China and Japan before the foreigners came to Asia, but the nationalism was exacerbated by foreign intervention in the 19th and 20th Centuries, particularly in China. The Chinese have always been nationalistic, but the Western and particularly British actions in China such as provoking trade wars, burning down the Summer Palace, and demands for extraterritorial rights exacerbated Chinese nationalism. The conflicts with foreigners were not as bad in Japan as they were in China because the foreigners wanted to trade with

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25 Ibid. 23.  
27 Ibid, 23.
China more. But the wars between China and the west had a major influence on the growth of Japanese nationalism. The Japanese were made to realize that they were a backward country and were helpless compared to the Western navies. They did not want the Westerners to defeat them. This promoted the early nationalism that later gave way to an extreme form of militarism in Japan.

The nationalism that grew in China and Japan should not be completely blamed on experiences with the West. As discussed earlier, nationalism is a natural phenomenon and does not simply grow as a result of foreign intervention or quarrels. The Chinese people had no outside contact for thousands of years, but still felt pride in their race as Han Chinese and in their accomplishments. Nationalism rose as a natural phenomenon in both countries but it was sharpened by confrontations with the West. If the Chinese and Japanese had found the Westerners weak and disorganized, there might have been a different effect; nationalism might not have grown as fast or might have developed differently.

**History of Nationalism in China and Japan**

In order to understand nationalism in China today, it is necessary first to analyze the source of Chinese national pride. The Chinese words for nationalism are 民族主义 (Mínzú zhǔyì), which means pride in one's nation. The Chinese civilization is one of the oldest in the world.\(^{28}\) China has historically been the dominant country in Asia and modern Chinese see their country as the logical successor.\(^{29}\) In ancient China, where a Sinocentric order existed, an extensive tributary system to China was established. This

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included Korea and Vietnam, regarded as China’s vassals. Historian Paul Kennedy states that the ancient Chinese civilization was notable for “technological and cultural advance.” In fact, the Chinese looked down on Westerners and believed them to be barbarians. The Japanese civilization developed along parallel lines. While Japan was not a tributary to China, regular trade existed between feudal Japan and China. China is the older civilization and a great deal of Japanese culture and religion was adapted from China and made Japanese. This developed in the Chinese a feeling of cultural superiority, contributing to the modern belief that China should resume its rightful place in the world, particularly Asia. Even today, Chinese Nationalists have been able to use the sense of pride Chinese have in their complex history of cultural and scientific achievements to gain popularity.

As a traditional and backward civilization faced with conflict with the Western powers, China needed a cohesive national unity. A modern and unified form of Chinese nationalism began with the ideas and actions of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the first President of China. Dr. Sun Yat Sen developed the idea of the superiority of the Han Chinese, the ethnic majority in China. He led a revolt against the ruling Manchu Qing Dynasty, calling them outsiders because they had come from Manchuria and were not Han. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s Nationalist party successfully overthrew the Qing in a series of revolts, restoring

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Chinese rule to native Chinese. The Chinese Nationalist government ruled the country through the Second World War when it concurrently fought the Japanese and communists led by Mao Tse-Tung, continuously using the idea of patriotism and nationalism to remain in power.

The Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) between the Nationalists and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was a defining moment in China’s history. This is where the CCP captured the momentum of the nationalist movement, which was led by Sun Yat-Sen’s successor, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The CCP transformed and utilized the nationalist idea to make China strong and powerful, gaining support from the dissatisfied population. Their major source of support was from the Chinese peasants, who, after centuries of poverty, were able to fulfill their lifelong desires of ridding the country of landowners and the so-called bourgeoisie who previously had ruled the country. After the Nationalists were defeated and driven to Formosa (Taiwan), China’s national identity was based on Mao Tse-Tung’s propagation of the Marxist-Communist ideology of class struggle and communist unity. Mao’s programs, mostly focused on social and economic reforms, spurred by the Cultural Revolution, were intended to eliminate the middle and upper classes. For two decades, China expelled all foreigners and lived as an isolated nation, relying on the Communist revolutionary movement and ideology to unify the country.

The 1970s produced a major change in China’s outlook on the world. This period marked the beginning of a rejection of the communist ideology and an acceptance of a

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36 Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience In China, 35-41.
37 Ibid, 600.
capitalist economy. In 1972, China formalized relations with the United States. Deng Xiaoping took over leadership of the country following Mao Tse-Tung’s death in 1976 and began a serious set of governmental policy changes to promote a free-market economy. He needed a unifying ideology for the country, and a new way to legitimize the CCP’s rule.\(^3\) This ideology was nationalism, and a foreign enemy to encourage patriotism. Many authors point to Deng’s strategy of bringing public attention to Japanese atrocities during the Second World War to divert attention from the economic reforms that he was about to launch.\(^4\) The campaign against Japan increased after the Tiananmen Square protests, in which Chinese students were killed for protesting for democratic reforms.\(^5\) At the end of Deng’s rule, China’s brand of communism existed in name only and the country leaned towards capitalism. In the 1990s, as China grew to be a strong member of the world economy and a major actor on the political scene, its sense of national pride returned and began to grow stronger. This set the stage for the modern Chinese nationalism that exists today.

Like China, Japan takes great pride in its race and culture. For centuries it existed in isolation. Its geographic location, separate from the Asian mainland and protected by water, allowed it to fight off external attacks much easier than a land bound country.\(^6\) While regular trade with China and Korea existed, the Western presence in Japan was limited. In its isolation, Japan cultivated its traditions and distinctive culture. At the head of the Japanese world order was the Emperor, said to be a direct descendant of the Sun

\(^3\) Drysdale and Zhang, *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia*, 41.
Goddess Amaterasu, who gave birth to the first Emperor and gave his descendants a right to rule. Similar to the Chinese Yellow Emperor, Japan’s Emperor was believed to be an intermediary between the gods and humans and Japan’s official ideology stressed the divine ancestry of the Japanese. Thus Japan, like China, believed itself to be superior to other states and “nurtured an almost religious commitment to its unique identity.” This aspect of Japan’s unique history contributed to the buildup of modern Japanese nationalism prior to and during the Second World War.

Modern Japanese nationalism, ナショナリズム (Nashonarizumu), began during the Meiji Restoration, the political movement that restored imperial rule to Japan in 1868 under the Emperor Meiji. While economic reforms began, political reform did not flourish and political power simply moved from the Tokugawa Shogunate who ruled the country in conjunction with the Emperor, to rule by the Emperor, who was advised by an oligarchy of leaders. This mixture of “...church and state became one of the foundations of modern Japanese nationalism.” This reflected the belief in the more traditional practice of imperial rule, whereby the Emperor was the spiritual head of the nation. While other Asian nations failed in modernizing themselves, Japan succeeded. This was largely due to the foresight of the leaders of the country, the lack of colonialism in Japan, and also the willingness of the Japanese to adopt new methods of governance and rule. While China felt a strong sense of superiority and hesitation to change and Western ideas due to its terrible experiences with the West, the Japan was unhindered by this and the leaders were open-minded enough to guide their country to drastic change.

44 Kissinger, On China, 77.
45 Buruma, Inventing Japan, 1853-1964, 23.
Leading up to the Second World War, the oligarchy built up the military. Nationalism was very strong in Japan. Japan grew very quickly, and built up its military and industry, and worked to expand its borders in search of natural resources. The Japanese people in this era were indoctrinated with a twisted sense of nationalism, and regarded all other nations as inferior and even subhuman. At this time in Japan’s history, nationalism was misused and the Japanese actions during the Second World War reflect the negative effects of extreme nationalism.

The economic disruption of the Second World War caused heavy blows to the Japanese sense of security. The Japanese people experienced the atomic bomb and the sinking of the entire Japanese fleet. The Emperor was removed from his unique pedestal and a new Constitution was written under the guidance of General McArthur, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of Allied Forces Pacific). The Emperor’s image was changed to a symbol of national unity, rather than that of a “divine-priest king.” Included in the new constitution was the reduction of the Japanese military, renamed the Japanese Military Self-Defense Force. Japan was transformed into a peaceful nation with a weakened military. The war criminals of the previous regime were tried and hung. General McArthur kept the Emperor exempt from trial and punishment in order to make a peaceable transition from the imperial system to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) system, which is presently in place. The Japanese people became peaceful and agreeable. These changes made to the Japanese people created an unusual sense of pacification and were not likely to last long.

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47 Ibid, 142.
Present Day Nationalism in China and Japan

A major complication to the political situation is the ease with which Chinese nationalism can be directed towards Japan. This involves historical reasons—China’s bitterness at Japan for the atrocities it committed in China during the Second World War.\(^{48}\) The Chinese experience has influenced the bilateral relationship for years and will continue to do so. The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is a well-known event in China. The Japanese troops raped over 20,000 Chinese women and brutally killed hundreds of thousands of civilians.\(^{49}\) The Japanese atrocities of the Second World War have left a hatred for the Japanese that continues to this day. Nor is the resentment likely to go away. This historical event, ingrained in the Chinese mind, is easily manipulated for political purposes.

The atrocities of the Second World War do not provide a complete explanation as to why China and Japan experience tension and conflict. If their relationship is influenced by bitter history, why have China and Japan experienced cycles of reduced tensions preceding or following increased tensions? Under Mao’s leadership, Chinese and Japanese relations were not antagonistic.\(^{50}\) China endorsed the Japanese conservative government’s narrative that a small number of Japanese militarists were responsible for the war. In September 1972, China and Japan normalized relations and a short-lived peace existed from 1972 to the 1980s.\(^{51}\) Japan became China’s second largest trading


\(^{49}\) Drysdale and Zhang, *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia*, 18-19.

\(^{50}\) Buruma, *Inventing Japan, 1853-1964*, 3.

partner in the late 1980s. The fact that China and Japan have had relatively peaceful relations in the past proves that it is possible for the two governments to coexist without conflict.

Nationalism has grown in China because history is being utilized by the Chinese government for political reasons. Scholars that note this point of view believe in the concept of top-down policy effects as applied to official propaganda. Author James Reilly states that the propaganda effort was “a tool for enhancing popular support for the Party and its goals of economic development, national unity, and self-strengthening,” instead of an “attempt to merely increase dislike of the Japanese.” While authors disagree on the underlying reasons for the manipulation, they are united in their belief that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manipulates the war history between China and Japan as a means to stay in power. They have harnessed the nationalist feeling to mobilize the Chinese people for their expansionist agenda.

The CCP also has used tension with Japan as a way to detract from domestic problems. China is an authoritarian government. The Tiananmen Square massacre in 1980 revealed the authoritarian and unstable nature of the regime. The regime was unstable because there was great desire particularly on the part of students, for political reform. Senior leaders of the Communist party were fearful that this could get out of hand and in order to survive, needed to take forceful steps to crackdown on dissidents while simultaneously moving further in economic modernization. At the present time, incidents

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52 Drysdale and Zhang, *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia*, 97.
53 Bernstein and Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, 172; Drysdale and Zhang, *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia*, 15.
of terrorism by the Muslim minority group, the Uighers, are occurring and there is rampant corruption within the CCP.\textsuperscript{56} While China has become very strong economically, its economic growth is one sided. While the population—particularly in the coastal areas—is wealthier, the population in the interior remains extremely poor. In his book \textit{The End of the Chinese Dream, Why Chinese People Fear for the Future}, Professor Gerald Lemos depicts the problems facing modern China, “Social protection and family life have collapsed...leaving people anxious and frightened. Hundreds of millions of people are displaced from rural areas to cities with an insecure job...Citizens have no expectation of reliable, public administration.”\textsuperscript{57} People are restive, frustrated and dissatisfied.\textsuperscript{58} Afraid of renewed domestic upheaval, the new Chinese leadership has used nationalism as a political tool by targeting Japan, a natural enemy of the Chinese.\textsuperscript{59} The average citizens in China who have been left behind in the economic boom find it easier to vent on outsiders. These are the kind of individuals most easily swayed by propaganda. There has been no evidence of targeting of peasants, for the government is speaking primarily to the emerging middle class in the coastal provinces who are the most educated and most exposed to Western influence.

The usage of history and encouragement of nationalism by the Chinese government can explain the changing nature of bilateral relations. Author and former editor of the Economist, Bill Emmott states that when “relations improve, as since Shinzo Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2006, they are improved by shelving historical disputes

\textsuperscript{58} Matsuda, “Engagement and Hedging: Japan's Strategy Toward China,” 110.
\textsuperscript{59} Dyer, \textit{The Contest of the Century}, 11.
rather than by resolving them.” According to author Reinhard Drifte, the textbook crises of 1982, 1983, and 1986 reminded citizens of “Japanese aggression,” and were a means for the Chinese leadership to induce Japan to offer “greater or more generous economic engagement in China.” The majority of authors agree. When the government would like a certain outcome, they will either encourage nationalistic sentiment or constrain it.

An alternate theory is that Chinese nationalism is fueled by non-state actors rather than the government. Popular Chinese nationalism began to increase in 2000 and continues today. In a lecture delivered by renowned Chinese thinker Suisheng Zhao, at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, he stated that “although some scholars have been cautious in exploring the limits of Chinese nationalism, some others have found a reckless nationalism driven by China’s traditional Sinocentrism and contemporary aspirations for great power status.” He points to Peter Gries’s book, *China’s New Nationalism*, which labels the rising nationalism in China as a “new nationalism and states that an emotionally popular nationalism empowered by “victim narratives” is “beginning to influence the making of Chinese foreign policy.”

Peter Gries believes in the *bottom-up* concept of governmental policy—nationalism and aggression toward Japan is dominated by non-state actors like history activists who drive China’s government policy. In his book about Chinese public opinion, James Reilly concurs and argues that public opinion is the driving force of Chinese foreign policy.

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61 Drifte, *Japan’s Foreign Policy*, 53.
62 Drysdale and Zhang, *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia*, 35.
64 Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications” (lecture, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008), 2.
towards Japan. He believes the Chinese authoritarian government carefully and selectively suppresses and encourages the anti-Japanese feelings of the masses in order to ensure regime stability.\textsuperscript{67} Author Su-Jeong Kang, in the middle of both schools of thought, argues that China’s approach to Japan is influenced by both the top-down and the bottom-up concepts.\textsuperscript{68}

While many studies have been made on Japanese nationalism leading up to and during the Second World War, less worldwide scholarship has been made on Japanese nationalism since the Second World War. The rise of nationalism in Japan today is entirely different from that of the Chinese. Since its constitution was rewritten and its defense force reduced, Japan has been a peaceful nation and a strong ally to the United States with which it shares a defense treaty. It has rebuilt its economy and become a model member of the world community. Japan’s leaders have been deferential to the West. For a long time the leaders of Japan discouraged talk about patriotism and defending its national interest. But as mentioned earlier, nationalism is intrinsic in the human makeup. Now Japan has a major “dilemma about whether or not Japan will be a real world power again.”\textsuperscript{69} It is returning to become a state with a normal level of nationalism. It is not eager to expand into foreign territories but, in the face of China’s rise, it is prepared to defend its own.

Most experts agree that Japanese government policy is a reaction to China’s growing economic and military might.\textsuperscript{70} The Japanese are suspicious and nervous about

\textsuperscript{67} Reilly, \textit{Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion In China's Japan Policy}, 8-9; Drysdale and Zhang, \textit{Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia}, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{69} Gries, \textit{China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy}, 71-72.
China’s military power and feel extremely threatened by it.71 Towards China, the
Japanese favor a “soft nationalism.”72 But faced with China’s growing expansionism,
they quietly are seeking to expand their military and defense posture. Yasuhiro Matsuda
characterizes Japan’s strategy towards China’s growing power as one of “hedging.”73
This involves a buildup of the Japanese military and strengthening of alliances, which
has put China “on the defensive.”74 Japan’s foreign policy towards China is influenced
by the United States, which serves to protect Japan from China.75 In a similar analysis,
Christopher Hughes characterizes Japan’s policy as a mixture of “engagement” and a
global “soft containment.”76 This policy involves engaging China economically while
strengthening partnerships to slow China’s “free projection of power” around the
world.77 Nationalism may be furthered by the government if its policy of engagement
with China is not successful.78 In effect, nationalism is used as a political tool by the
Japanese government. Takashi Sekiyama states that popular anti-Chinese nationalism
influenced Japan’s policy of ending loans to China in 2004.79

Most experts agree that Japan’s policy is a consequence of its earlier financial
bubble and internal challenges. Dr. Paul Smith of the Naval War College points out that
part of the tension between the countries stems from Japan’s economic decline in the face

71 Taylor, Greater China and Japan: Prospects for an Economic Partnership In East Asia, 5,11.
72 Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, 106.
74 Ibid.
75 Taylor, Greater China and Japan: Prospects for an Economic Partnership In East Asia, 12.
76 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment,
Dangers of Collision,” International Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 855-856,
77 Ibid. 855-856.
78 Ibid. 856.
79 Takashi Sekiyama, “Japan’s Policy Toward China Under Strong Anti-Chinese Sentiment: A Case of
Terminating Yen Loans to China,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2012), 295-311, doi:
10.1007/s12140-012-9180-5.
Abe, and his party were recently re-elected on a nationalist platform.\textsuperscript{81} They have had much support from the Japanese people. Before he was elected, in July 2013, Prime Minister (PM) Abe visited one of the islands on Japan’s Okinawa Island chain. He spoke to members of the Japan Air Self Defense (JASDF) troops and discussed his resolve to “protect Japanese territories.” Prime Minister Abe’s visit to this region was important because it is close to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed by both Japan and China. In August 2013, Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine and laid a wreath on the shrine.\textsuperscript{82} Prime Minister Abe received support from many anti-Chinese nationalists in Japan.

Japanese nationalism has been described as a reaction to China’s aggression.\textsuperscript{83} Many scholars agree that the Japanese are likely to react to the situation the Chinese have put them into. The Japanese are reluctant to directly confront China, but will stand up to China if and when the time comes. With their aggressive policies the Chinese are creating the thing they fear the most. The world does not need an aggressive, nationalistic Japan, perhaps even one armed with nuclear weapons. But at the same time, it is unnatural for a country to become entirely passive and dependent on the United States to defend them.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The relationship between Japan and China is influenced by many factors, including past history, culture, bilateral trade, and conflicting sovereignty claims. An


\textsuperscript{83} Emmott, \textit{Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade}, 106.
underlying contributor of tension is nationalism. This was exacerbated by China and Japan's historical experiences with the West in the early 20th Century and has increased because of the policies of the two countries. Nationalism in China and Japan today is different from the nationalism of the West because of its focus on other countries and its mainly historical rivals. The nationalism that China and Japan experience is ethnic nationalism and is directed at each other. It is a resurgence of a traditional form of nationalism, justified by ancient passions and hatreds. This can be very dangerous for two competing world powers.

Although in recent history, as evidenced by the Second World War, nationalism developed in Europe, which denigrated and threatened other countries. Yet in today's liberal international community, these types of actions are not tolerated in Europe and America. The United States has gone through high and low points of nationalism. The United States currently is experiencing a low level of nationalism but this can change rapidly. The most recent high point of nationalism was following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. But nationalism has decreased as Americans slowly became more disillusioned with its foreign involvement, and become more critical of their own country and leaders.

Nationalism affects the relationship between China and Japan in all aspects of the relationship. The Chinese government for its own purposes has encouraged nationalistic feeling as a means for gaining support. The Chinese people are being distracted from the excesses of an authoritarian regime, and are channeling their discontent into hatred for the Japanese and a desire for expansion. The Japanese, having been a pacifist nation for so many years, are beginning to resume normal feelings of nationalism. Their natural
desire to stand on their own has increased, leading to a more aggressive foreign policy and conflict with China over territory and borders. In short, the Chinese want to expand and the Japanese are prepared to stand up to China. This does not project a positive outlook for the future.
CASE STUDY OF THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS
Introduction

The second chapter of the thesis, *Understanding the Sino-Japanese Bilateral Relationship*, will be a case study on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, whose ownership is disputed by China and Japan. These two countries, even before normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, had extensive trade relations.\(^4\) Each relies heavily on the other’s exports and imports. Still, the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has strained diplomatic and military relations. An ever-present possibility for military escalation exists.

This research study will test a liberal approach to understanding the probability of war, which argues that mutual economic dependence will minimize conflict between countries involved in territorial disputes.\(^5\) The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands will be used to test the validity of the theory, assessing whether fear of an economic backlash influenced three recent disputes over this territory. The main research question of the paper is: “*Has escalation of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands been defused by economic concerns?*” The research shows that fear of negative economic repercussions did not have an impact when the crises over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands escalated. Largely due to domestic political pressure and in order to maintain internal political control, the governments themselves escalated the disputes, rather than attempting to defuse them. Public opinion, not influenced by fear of worsening trade

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relations, drove the aggressive measures taken by each government. This public opinion was not driven by trade and economics, but by ethnic nationalism influenced by emotion, past history, and national pride. The rising nationalism in both China and Japan has had a much more influential effect on the government actions than economics. The governments of China and Japan, due to pressure from the populace, both have intensified the nationalism through state controlled media and other outlets.\textsuperscript{86} This has had a negative effect on disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands.

Sometime in the future, the United States may be involved in resolving a dispute between Japan and China. When attempting to understand the tension between the two countries, the United States must remember not only the trade ties, but the importance of cultural ties and the deep history that Japan and China have experienced together.

This chapter will begin by establishing the theoretical framework of the research and the main theory that is analyzed and tested throughout the chapter. The chapter continues with a review of relevant literature on the competing Chinese and Japanese claims to ownership of the islands, which is the bedrock of the dispute. Finally, the three instances when the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands intensified are analyzed. The first instance was in 2010, when the Japanese government arrested a Chinese fishing trawler captain fishing near the islands. In 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from private owners. Most recently, tensions escalated in 2013, when China declared its own Air Identification Zone over the East China Sea where the islands are located. Understanding the causes and

consequences of these recent instances will aid in understanding of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.

Many scholars have reviewed Sino-Japanese relations from different perspectives, but none have studied the dispute from the aspect of these three conflicts that escalated and occurred in the past four years. The conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is not only of theoretical importance. The United States 7th Fleet, Japanese Navy, and Chinese Navy patrol the waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and a possibility of escalation of the dispute is ever present. An understanding of the complex feelings of China and Japan towards these islands is critical to understanding the overall Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship.

The findings of this chapter disprove the liberal idea that the importance of economics will mitigate territorial disputes between China and Japan. Those findings will contribute to the overall thesis portfolio, which aims to identify the main sources of conflict between China and Japan.

**Theoretical Framework**

Many scholars cite the complex economic interdependence of China and Japan. They focus on a popular liberal theory, which states that as nations become increasingly economically interdependent, disputed issues will become less important and will be relegated to the background. 87 Christopher Hughes, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, correctly summarizes the view of some Japanese scholars and even policymakers who feel this way. Possibly to downplay the role of

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history as a cause of mutual tension, they state, “Japan-China ties are in a sense ‘bigger’ than any issues of history…if a traditional policy of the ‘separation of politics and economics’ is reverted to, then eventually shared economic interests will act as a self-correcting mechanism to stabilize bilateral ties...”\textsuperscript{88} These scholars stress the influence of mutual economic ties in current and future Sino-Japanese relationships. Hughes’ essay concludes with a formula for how the Sino-Japanese relationship can improve, by stating that “the processes of globalization and regionalization” are key to the improvement of relations between China and Japan.\textsuperscript{89} China scholar Dr. Robert Taylor of the University of Sheffield also has a positive view of the Sino-Japanese relationship due to the robustness of bilateral trade, and because they are economically dependent on each other.\textsuperscript{90} In the mid-1980s, Taylor stressed the importance of trade and categorized the relationship between the two countries as one based purely on economics. He predicted in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, Japan and China might form a “Sino-Japanese axis...built on Chinese culture and Japanese technology.”\textsuperscript{91} While acknowledging that an accidental collision of ships still exists over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, these thinkers argue that both nations are so aware of the negative economic consequences of a war that it is very unlikely they would allow an escalation of the conflict over the Senkau/Diaoyu Islands.\textsuperscript{92} They believe history will be forgotten or pushed aside by both countries when faced by the loss of prosperity and economic growth. This idea will be analyzed and tested throughout the chapter.

\textsuperscript{88} Hughes, “Japan’s Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism,” 38.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 49.
\textsuperscript{90} Taylor, Greater China and Japan: Prospects for an Economic Partnership In East Asia, 172.
\textsuperscript{92} Katz, “Mutual Assured Production,” 18.
An alternative possibility for defusing tensions between China and Japan is the presence of an “outside arbiter,” such as the United States, that would play a “policing role” in the security dilemma. Yet in the time of budget constraints and drawdown of the United States military, it is unclear whether the United States will have the universal respect and will be able to sustain its presence in the area. An alternative possibility for defusing a war between China and Japan is the theory of University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer. This possibility argues that a conflict will be mitigated by the “stopping power of water,” meaning that it will be more difficult for a nation to invade another defended territory by naval means than by a land invasion across a shared border. Since China and Japan do not share a land border but are separated by the sea, this makes a conflict less likely. Although this theory is applicable to the crisis between Japan and China, a naval clash in waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is still an ever-present possibility. Once the guns begin to shoot it would be very difficult to keep the conflict from spreading.

Literature Review

The majority of Asian scholars regard the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a major point of friction in an overall tense bilateral relationship. This literature review examines existing research regarding the conflict. The main research question is, “Which country has the best case for ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands?” According to the review, China has the best case of ownership. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have been referred to as part of the Chinese

93 Ibid, 50.
Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, 7.
95 Ibid, 7.
empire since the Ming Dynasty, although the Chinese never formally administered them. In 1895, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan secured the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Knowledge gaps regarding further developments over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands still exist, which will provide further understanding of the problem when addressed.

Sovereignty is at the heart of the dispute. Both sides vehemently claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the surrounding waters. But what does the concept of sovereignty entail? The core meaning of sovereignty is “supreme authority within a territory.” A state that has sovereignty must have authority, meaning a specific right to rule, or “legitimacy.” Sovereignty encompasses “territoriality,” or strict borders, which must be recognized by outsiders. By this standard, neither China nor Japan has a strong case for ownership. Until Japan annexed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 1895, neither country effectively administered them, nor distinctly marked them as part of their country or territory. Neither did either country settle people on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or prepare to defend them. Because of the uncertainty surrounding knowledge of the historical ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, both nations have put forth explanations as to why they were originally theirs.

In two different articles in the Naval War College Review, Vice Admiral Fumio Ota, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), (Ret.) and Dr. Paul Smith clearly articulate the Japanese point of view. Japan claims the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius, or uninhabited, when they were claimed by Japan in 1895. The

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were annexed by Japan by peaceful means and according to international law, which states that the first nation claiming a new discovery may claim ownership.\textsuperscript{101} Following the Second World War, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were administratively incorporated into the Ryukyu Island chain, which included Okinawa, which the United States administered by right of conquest until they were turned over to Japan in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{102} Scholars from this point of view contend the fact that Japan was the first country to formally claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands legitimates Japanese sovereignty over the islands.

Vice Admiral Ota also emphasized China’s “expansionistic and hegemonic intentions” which has been discussed by many political scientists.\textsuperscript{103} According to him, China began making steps towards this goal in 1992 when it announced a Territorial Law declaring that its territorial water included most of the South China Sea and also much of the East China Sea. David Shambaugh comments that publication of the Territorial Law, which asserted China’s claims to ownership of territory that is simultaneously claimed by Japan, has contributed to China’s conflict with Japan.\textsuperscript{104} This situation is similar to China’s ongoing territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, where China also claims ownership. (China’s “nine-dash line” declares China’s maritime rights as extending almost to the coastlines of Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. According to the United States, this has no legal footing.)\textsuperscript{105} After the declaration of the Territorial Law, China made many intrusions into

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\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 99; Ota, “In My View,” 147-148.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Shambaugh, “China and Japan: Towards the Twenty-First Century: Rivals for Pre-eminence or Complex Interdependence,” 96.
\textsuperscript{105} Dyer, The Contest of the Century, 29-31.
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the territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Richard Bush of the Brookings Institution states that China only claimed the islands in 1971, following the 1968 publication of a United Nations report indicating the possibility of oil below the seabed in the area of the islands. According to the Japanese, if China actually owned the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, why did they not claim them before 1971?

In his published manuscript, Chinese political scientist Zhongqi Pan articulates the Chinese point of view. His main discussion point, which is explained in less detail in other writings, revolves around which nation has best legitimate claims. He argues that during the Ming and Qing Dynasties (1644-1911), references to these islands as part of the “maritime defenses” were made in Chinese literature. Pan places grave importance on the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, which ended the first Sino-Japanese War. This is considered by some Chinese scholars as China’s “greatest humiliation,” which forced China to give up their territories of Korea and Taiwan to Japan. According to Pan, China “ceded” the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to Japan as part of the Treaty agreement. This proves they belonged to China, since China could not give away something it did not possess. The Chinese state that the United States, which assumed responsibility for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the aftermath of the Second World War, turned them over

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106 Shambaugh, “China and Japan: Towards the Twenty-First Century: Rivals for Pre-eminence or Complex Interdependence,” 96.
109 Ibid, 77.
110 Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, 71.
to Japan in the 1970s illegally, because they were Chinese territory.\textsuperscript{112} Even though the United States gave the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to Japan, it does not mean the Chinese right to the territory disappeared.

In a detailed analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by \textit{China Media Research}, Dexi Tian and Chin-Chung Chao, two professors who studied the problem, concluded that the literature on the future of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands falls into three groups.\textsuperscript{113} In the first group, the majority of experts state the situation is becoming worse and there is no indication it will improve.\textsuperscript{114} The second group believes China and Japan are making efforts to restrain worsening of the situation, possibly due to the involvement of outside influences, such as the United States.\textsuperscript{115} The third group of analysts believes that fluctuations in the dispute are a consequence of the internal politics and desires of the governments involved at the time.\textsuperscript{116} These analyses do not cover another possibility—that the two governments are helpless against the nationalist groups in each country.

Ownership of the Islands has become such a volatile subject that the politicians may not want to involve themselves in the problem. Rather, they may hope to postpone the dispute for future leaders. Even in the 1980s, Deng Xiao Ping famously stated the issue of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands should be postponed for ten years.\textsuperscript{117} But public opinion in both countries, manifested in newspaper editorials, television interviews, and public statements, may cause the situation to spiral out of control.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy From the Chinese Perspective," 77-79.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Tian and Chao, "Border Institutions—What Is Lacking in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute," 27-44.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy From the Chinese Perspective," 74.
\item \textsuperscript{118} He, "Forty Years in Paradox," 11-12.
\end{itemize}
Gaps in knowledge on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute still exist. The situation is so fluid that there is little published scholarly analysis of recent public exchanges between Japan and China. One recent development came in November 2013, when China’s Ministry of National Defense proclaimed the creation of an East China Air Identification Zone (ADIZ), which included the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands area. This caused an outcry against the Chinese by the international community.\(^\text{119}\) Also requiring further explanation are the fluctuating actions of each government regarding the dispute in relation to internal political problems. Finally, professional analysts have not yet studied the influence of economics and trade on the disputes between Japan and China. Further research on each of these areas will help solidify understanding of the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship.

This literature review has found that China has the best case for ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Since China has made references to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in its ancient historical documents, China was the nation that actually owned the Senaku/Diaoyu Islands prior to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.\(^\text{120}\) The problem is that China did not claim ownership until the 1970s, when the islands were already turned over to Japan by the United States. The competing claims of China and Japan are compounded because each country has feelings of ownership that are deeply rooted and date very far back in history.


Trade and Economic Relationship

The volume of trade between China and Japan is significant. Ancient China and ancient Japan had trading ties since feudal times. After the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and warlords ruled the country, the Chinese became extremely nationalistic and resistant to continuing trade with Japan. At the time, Japanese business interests were very powerful in the oligarchy ruling Imperial Japan. Japan wanted access to trade and natural resources in China. This was one of the reasons why the Japanese military mounted an invasion of the Chinese mainland in the 1930s.¹²¹

Currently, most Japanese exports to China are “capital intensive, high value-added goods, while China’s are mostly low-priced, less complex goods.”¹²² China is an important market for Japanese firms.¹²³ China’s exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan are essential for Japanese industries such as hybrid-automobile manufacturers.¹²⁴ According to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), trade between China and Japan amounted to US $311.995 billion in 2013.¹²⁵

Diplomatic tensions have impacted economic relations between China and Japan. Until 2011, China was one of the highest borrowers of Japanese yen, provided as loans to China beginning in 1979 as a form of Official Development Assistance (ODA). This helped grow China’s economy. By 2007, China had received a total of 3.3165 trillion yen. However, in 2007, Japan terminated its policy of yen loans to China, due to strong anti-China sentiment in Japan. Author Takashi Sekiyama argued that the Japanese

¹²² He, “Forty Years in Paradox,” 9.
public’s feelings towards China in 2005 stemmed from the buildup of the Chinese military, and as a reaction to anti-Japanese demonstrations occurring in China in 2004 resulting from China’s national team winning Asian Cup soccer. In this case, the strong feelings of the public influenced the actions of the Japanese government to terminate yen loans to China.

While bilateral trade between the two countries is considerable, pressure from internal problems has historically influenced government policies regarding the other country. The three instances below show that when disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands occurred, trade numbers were affected the bilateral economic talks suffered.

Conflicts Between Japan and China Over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

A. Japan’s Arrest of Chinese Fishing Trawler Captain

One of the most severe and public disputes between China and Japan occurred when a Chinese fishing trawler struck two Japanese ships near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on September 7, 2010. The Japanese government, controlled by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), arrested and detained the captain. In retaliation, Beijing cut exchange programs, and spoke publicly against the measures taken by the Japanese. International tourism was halted. After the incident, China halted shipments of rare earth to Japan for seven weeks before the shipments were reinstated. The Chinese

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response was widely viewed as an overreaction.\textsuperscript{131} Compounding the matter, media coverage of the event and its repercussions were extreme due to intense public interest on both sides. The Japanese Embassy in Beijing witnessed heavy demonstrations from the Chinese outside its walls. While the Chinese captain was eventually released, the implications of the incident were far-reaching. Dr. Paul Smith comments that this incident caused “relations between Japan and China to hit a new low.”\textsuperscript{132} Regarding this incident and others like it, both countries strongly believe that they are in the right. Both feel that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are their own property. The Japanese feel they were perfectly justified in detaining the fishing captain. The Chinese felt they had to respond to what they considered were mistaken actions of the Japanese. The situation resulted in the postponement of talks between both countries over the exploration of natural gas deposits in the areas near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.\textsuperscript{133}

The economic potential of the East China Sea area has been a contributing factor in the dispute. It increases the motivation of both Japan and China to gain ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and its territorial waters. While the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands themselves are infertile and not habitable, the East China Sea holds marine and oil deposits.\textsuperscript{134} Both the Xihu depression, nearer to China’s coastline, and the Okinawa trough, located closer to Japan’s Ryukyu Island Chain, are top areas for oil drilling.\textsuperscript{135} The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located at the end of the Okinawa trough. Since 1993, both China and Japan have competed for energy resources, with China projected to have

\textsuperscript{133} "China and Japan Dispute Islands in the East China Sea," Stratafor Analysis, 1.
a larger need for oil imports in the future. Although estimates are unreliable because little exploration has occurred, according to 2005 estimates the East China Sea held oil reserves between “100 to 200 billion barrels, enough to provide energy resources to either state for fifty to eighty years.”\(^{136}\) Since the publication of a 1969 report that suggested the area around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands contains oil, both countries have increased their desire to gain ownership of the territory.\(^{137}\) Both Japan and China are well aware of the economic potential that this area contains. This creates more of an incentive to define territory so their country can benefit from its resources.\(^{138}\) As shown by this incident, the dispute over claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is strongly influenced by the desire to gain economically from the resources on the islands.

When the situation escalated between Japan and China, neither the governments nor the people were influenced by the negative effect the situation would have on its trade relationship with the other. According to defense consulting firm Stratfor, the situation was used to fuel nationalism and hatred of the other country.\(^{139}\) During 2010, Japan’s ruling party was struggling and candidates for the next prime minister addressed the maritime tensions with China, giving weight to “uncertainties” in its “security environment.”\(^{140}\) The Japanese measures, while highly unusual, reflected internal pressure. The Chinese government also likely adopted a tough stance over the fishing boat incident due to pressure from the public who wished the government to adopt a tough stance on Japan. At the time, Beijing was “struggling to maintain stability” due to


\(^{138}\) Ibid.

\(^{139}\) “China and Japan Dispute Islands in the East China Sea,” *Stratfor Analysis*, 1-3.

\(^{140}\) Ibid, 2.
economic concerns and was fearful of social unrest.\textsuperscript{141} Earlier in the year, Beijing did not stop labor strikes targeting Japanese companies in China.\textsuperscript{142} It is likely this was due to fear of criticism from Chinese nationalists, who criticize weak Chinese responses to Japan.\textsuperscript{143} If the Chinese government allowed the Chinese fisherman to be tried in Japan, this would imply that the Chinese fisherman was guilty and had no business in the islands.\textsuperscript{144} This could be used as evidence that the Japanese owned the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, rather than the Chinese.

It has been suggested that neither government wants to engage in a full military confrontation due to economic reasons.\textsuperscript{145} This may be true. But rising nationalism, stoked by state and non-state actors, has not been tempered by economic concerns. Both sides would have profited from joint exploration of the waters near the islands and labor strife could have affected the balance of bilateral trade. But neither side would give way.

\textit{B. Japan's Purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands}

On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the five main islands in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island group from a private owner, in essence "nationalizing" the island group.\textsuperscript{146} According to author Yinan He, the Japanese government was forced into this action for reasons beyond its control, mainly due to internal issues and to unrelenting pressure from China.\textsuperscript{147} The foreign policy of the Japanese government, controlled by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had attempted

\textsuperscript{141} "China and Japan Dispute Islands in the East China Sea," \textit{Stratfor Analysis}, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Wan, "Sino-Japanese Relations Adrift in a Changing World," 74.
\textsuperscript{144} Weigand, \textit{Enduring Territorial Disputes Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement}, 94.
\textsuperscript{146} Smith, "A Crisis Postponed," 27-44.
\textsuperscript{147} He, "Forty Years in Paradox," 8.
to reverse the nationalistic stance of the previous Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had been headed by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001-2006. The DPJ’s strategy was to promote “Asian regionalism and to find a better balance between Japan’s alliance with the United States and cooperation with China.” ¹⁴⁸ Yet circumstances made the government take steps seen as provocative by the Chinese. The motives for the Japanese government to purchase the islands were to preempt Tokyo’s nationalistic governor, Shintaro Ishihara, from purchasing the islands with funds from a nation-wide fundraising effort.¹⁴⁹ In April 2012, Ishihara proposed to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, stating that the “Senkaku Islets will be purchased by Tokyo Metropolitan Government...(and) we will do whatever it takes to protect our own land.”¹⁵⁰ This compelled the Japanese government to step in and purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Regardless of the Japanese government’s motives, the Chinese government still reacted strongly to what they saw as a provocation. Following the incident, the Japanese government “ended up simply defaulting back into a strategy in the style of the LDP.”¹⁵¹ Due to the actions of the Chinese government and people, the Japanese government was not able to reverse anti-foreign feelings in Japan.

The results of this action were similar to the incident with the Chinese fishing boat captain. The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA(N)) dispatched an increased number of ships and aircraft to patrol the islands, and the Chinese government cancelled meetings it had scheduled with Japan.¹⁵² Widespread anti-Japanese protests, including

¹⁴⁸ He, “Forty Years in Paradox,” 12.
¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 27-44.
¹⁵¹ He, “Forty Years in Paradox,” 12.
¹⁵² He, “Forty Years in Paradox,” 8.
violence against Japanese persons and property occurred in many Chinese cities.\textsuperscript{153} The Japanese public was stunned by the violent reaction of the Chinese towards Japanese businesses.\textsuperscript{154} The incident had a devastating effect on Japan's economy—total bilateral trade in 2012 between the countries marked a decrease of 3.3\%-3.9\% from the year before.\textsuperscript{155} While JETRO analysis has stated that the decline was in part due to China's "economic slowdown" in 2012, it was also likely that worsening diplomatic relations caused the decrease in bilateral trade between the two countries.\textsuperscript{156}

In this instance, the Japanese government was forced by internal pressure to take steps it originally had attempted to avoid. Pressure from China contributed to the problem. The response from the Chinese citizens and government was harsh. The situation escalated but the citizens on both sides did not show concern about the negative impact on the economic and trade relationship. Bilateral trade suffered. The majority of scholars state that Japan played a defensive role in the conflict and China the offensive. As shown in this situation, the Japanese government was reluctant to increase tensions with China and had nothing to gain from continuing its conflict with China. Despite its public rhetoric, the Chinese were in a weaker position than Japan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not as well established or as stable as the Japanese government, making the Chinese government more inclined to increase tensions when it feels politically threatened. This influence makes it more difficult for the Chinese government to compromise on disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

\textsuperscript{154} Matsuda, "Engagement and Hedging: Japan's Strategy Toward China," 110.
\textsuperscript{155} He, "Forty Years in Paradox," 8.
C. China’s Declaration of East China Sea ADIZ

On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) declared the creation of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). According to newspaper reports, six aircraft identification rules included measures China would consider an encroachment of its airspace, including rule number three which stated, “China’s armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.” China’s unilateral move was a direct challenge to the Japanese and to the United States. While no economic impact was evidenced, the move resulted in widespread criticism of China by both Japan and the United States and steps taken to bolster military ties and structuring of defense posture.

Significant to the dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the fact that the military on both sides is deeply involved. Asia specialist and previous editor in chief of the Economist Bill Emmott, considers this zone one of the five flashpoints in Asia. If a conflict breaks out, it could involve the rest of the world powers. Other authors agree with his sentiments. According to Emmott, the situation is risky because either of the countries can “make a military point without the likelihood of provoking a wider conflict. It is also a place where an accident can provoke a conflict.” China or Japan could take provocative action thinking wrongfully that they can control the situation. A large risk is an accidental collision of ships. After China’s creation of an East

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157 Keck, “China Imposes Restrictions on Air Space Over Senkaku Islands.”
158 Ibid.
159 Emmott, Rivals: 245.
160 Katz, "Mutual Assured Production," 18-24; Drysdale and Zhang, Japan and China: Rivalry Or Cooperation In East Asia, 17.
161 Emmott, Rivals: Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, 258.
China Sea ADIZ, the conflict has escalated to include the possibility of a mid-air collision.\textsuperscript{162}

The Chinese motives for these steps remain unexplained. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Michael Swaine describes his findings on the Chinese intent: "Chinese...sources have explicitly or indirectly provided several justifications for its establishment, as well as for the timing of the move... authoritative sources cite the right of self-defense and the protection of national security under international law."\textsuperscript{163} Publicly the Chinese have stated that the move was aimed to bolster security, but the underpinnings of the actions are still unclear. It is possible that due to internal maneuvering inside the Chinese government, the leaders felt weak and under attack. This would lead them to divert public attention against Japan, and encourage the Chinese people to rally around the Chinese government. To date, China has not enforced the declaration. The Chinese government, when establishing these measures, did not seem to fear negative economic repercussions, and likely knew this would be an escalatory step that would have bad consequences.

This escalation did not negatively affect the trade numbers between China and Japan. In the first half of 2014, China and Japan trade increased from the previous year by 4.4%, to US $168.4 billion.\textsuperscript{164} But the situation did affect the relationship between China and Japan and China and the United States. Both the United States and Japan sharply criticized the Chinese and Japan continued its military buildup. Combined with

\textsuperscript{162} Keck, “China Imposes Restrictions on Air Space Over Senkaku Islands.”
other actions taken by the Chinese in the East China Sea (such as dispatching many maritime units to the waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), and China’s budgetary increase of 12.2% in military spending in 2014, Japan was prompted to shift its defense priorities from North Korea to China and increase the buildup of its military.165

As evident by these three incidents, the situation around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is like a thermometer, only it does not measure the temperature around the Islands, it measures the temperature in Beijing. When Beijing is embarked on a domestic policy of economic growth and calmness, it can be expected that the temperature around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands will remain calm. When Beijing is embarked on an expansionist program, the situation will get worse. There will be collisions of fishing boats, no-fly zones declared, and naval maneuvers conducted.

**Conclusion**

Sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is at the heart of the conflict. Asian scholars Paul Senese and John Vasquez, as quoted by Brooking Institution’s Richard Bush, warn not to underestimate territorial disputes, particularly those between neighboring countries, stating that nations “whose relations are dominated by territorial disputes or who simply have reoccurring territorial disputes....are more apt to go to war than those that are not contending over territory.”166 The current situation in the East China Sea shows that the argument predicting eventual cooling of disputes due to economics is incorrect. Despite growing economic ties and increased trade, the situation between China and Japan is worsening. In both Japan and China, nationalism is on the

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upsurge. Historical grievances are cherished. Old animosities are raked up. Whether the two governments themselves encourage these feelings, or if mass feelings drive government policies, the result is the same. Economic ties, commercial contacts, and trade agreements are relegated to the background.

Because of the rise of nationalism in both China and Japan, the situation in the Senakaku/Diayou Islands is very volatile. Each country sees the islands as part of its identity. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are a symbol for nationalists in both countries. The public in both countries have become deeply involved in the quarrel. Both China and Japan have a keen sense of history with extremely long backgrounds. With nations like China and Japan, history feeds nationalism.

Many scholars and strategists have attempted to find methods to resolve the conflict between China and Japan. They suggest a variety of methods and strategies, ranging from the development of non-state actors such as NGOs, to cross-cultural exchanges, to increasing “regionalization.” But this problem may not be able to be resolved in the near term. If China ended its claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and its outcries about history, Japan likely would be happy to end the dispute. The Chinese government seems to be less willing to compromise. Their growing economic and military strength increases their appetite for expansion. Neither would they like to oppose the nationalist forces in their own country.

The dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands puts pressure on the United States, which has trade ties with both nations and a longstanding security alliance with Japan. Since the United States routinely patrols the area around the

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167 He, "Forty Years in Paradox," 4; Hughes, “Japan’s Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism,” 49.
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is likely that it would be drawn into any military
confrontation, should one occur. This leaves unanswered the question of whether the
United States role will help or hinder the possibility of an amicable settlement.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Introduction

The security arrangement between the United States and Japan, which began after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, has been the foundation for United States foreign policy in Asia for sixty-five years.\(^{168}\) The Treaty of San Francisco and the Bilateral Security Treaty between United States and Japan were signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951.\(^{169}\) They formalized security agreements for Japan and the United States.\(^{170}\) Due to a series of changes within Japan, the Treaty signed in 1951 was replaced with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in Washington, D.C., on January 19, 1960.\(^{171}\) This agreement outlined the nature of the security relationship between both countries that has lasted to this day.\(^{172}\) In recent years, the security relationship has been contested by China, which opposes the presence of the United States military in Asia and its involvement in Asian affairs. This has caused tension in China’s relationship with the United States and Japan.

The relationship between the United States, China, and Japan is an important topic in current international politics. In recent months, the credibility of the United States has come into question. It is hypothesized that if an armed conflict between Japan and China occurs over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the United States government may

\(^{170}\) Ibid.
try to remain neutral, due to political pressure at home and weariness over overseas commitments. This research paper will analyze the language of The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to determine if the United States is legally bound to support Japan if it goes to war with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The main research question of the paper is, “Does the Treaty between the United States and Japan bind the United States to support Japan if a conflict occurs over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands?” As the third chapter of the thesis portfolio, this paper will contribute to the portfolio analysis by providing an overall assessment of how the security alliance between Japan and the United States affects the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship.

Studying the Treaty from a vantage point sixty years after it was written, it becomes apparent that the language of the Treaty left room for misinterpretation and misconception. The drafters were not careful in listing the territory the Treaty would encompass. This is particularly important in the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which should have been described by name as one of the Japanese territories. Also, the language of the Treaty gives the United States exit loopholes if it does not want to live up to its responsibilities. This may come about because of the lack of public support, budgetary constraints, and internal pressure in the United States. To put it bluntly, the people of the United States would not want to be dragged into a war with China so Japan can have the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

This chapter will begin with a literature review of existing scholarship on Chinese perceptions of the alliance between United States and Japan. This will clarify the Chinese position on the alliance. In order to understand the intentions of the drafters of the Treaty, the paper will examine the Treaty language and how it may affect the future actions of
the United States in Asia. To trace the history of the Treaty, the paper will study
Congressional hearings regarding the treaty and continuing efforts made by the Executive
branch and Congress to clarify the United States position. The conclusion of the paper
will complete the findings regarding the importance of language in any treaty.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this chapter is the concept of alliances. An alliance
is made up of two or more nations committed to common defense who legally bind
themselves to support each other against hostile action. A treaty is the solid reflection of
an alliance. It has the force of law. A classic example of alliances is the situation in
Europe at the beginning of the First World War. As described by historian Paul Kennedy,
the European nations at the beginning of the 20th Century believed strongly in the balance
of power principle. 173 This principle meant that every country in Europe should
participate in a system of alliances, which would force other countries to come to its aid
if attacked. 174 In Europe there was no single strongest country so the best way was to
establish equilibrium among nations. The First World War developed because this system
of alliances came apart. Instead of preventing war, the system of treaties forced countries
to go to war whether they wanted to or not. When the successor to the Austrian throne
was assassinated by a Serbian terrorist, Austria wanted to punish Serbia. But the Serbians
had defense arrangements with Russia against Austria. If Austria went to war with
Serbia, Russia had to come to the Serbians' aid. But Austria had an alliance with
Germany—if Russia attacked Austria, Germany had to go to war with Russia. Russia also
had an alliance with France who would have to go to war if Russia was attacked. The

174 Ibid.
system of alliances designed to prevent war actually caused an incident in the Balkans to turn into a world conflagration with millions of people killed.¹⁷⁵ As lessons from this case indicate, diplomats should think ahead and be very careful with whom alliances are signed.

The Treaty between the United States and Japan was directed against Russia and China.¹⁷⁶ Both Russia and China are nearby countries with significant military forces and hostile intentions. Both China and Russia have contested territories with Japan. Russia and Japan have contested ownership of the Kuril Islands. China and Japan are involved in a dispute over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Treaty between the United States and Japan does not threaten any nation. But the language of the treaty, which will be discussed in depth, states that the United States will aid Japan to defend its territory. Unfortunately, it does not identify the territory involved. Russia’s claims on the Kuril and Chinese claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can give Russia and China a reason to foment distrust between Japan and the United States.

**Literature Review**

This historical literature review will focus on the United States alliance with Japan and its impact on China. The main question of the literature review is, “What are Chinese perceptions of the United States alliance with Japan?” China has been increasingly vocal in its opposition to the security relationship between the two countries. The Chinese view the United States alliance with Japan with mistrust, and view the


United States presence in East Asia as impinging on its sphere of influence. The Chinese government will do anything to promote a rift between Japan and the United States.

When the alliance was made between Japan and the United States in the early 1950s, China was involved in the Korean War and had just emerged from the Civil War between the Communists and Nationalists. China was not active in the field of international diplomacy. Although there was much public rhetoric in Beijing, China was a very weak military power. China did not have a Navy or Air Force and its ground forces were comparatively weak.\textsuperscript{177} Although the Chinese soldiers had proven their bravery in the Korean War, the best units of the Chinese army had been decimated by the United States military. The main international focus of the Chinese government was to win its dispute with Taiwan over the offshore islands, Matsu and Kinmen, which China contended was its own territory. Because China was not in a position to begin a struggle against the United States, it did not protest the alliance between the United States and Japan.

Times change and China’s feelings about the United States’ alliance with Japan change with it. Deng Xiao-Ping opened China’s outlook on the world and developed a new foreign policy. China became more active in the diplomatic scene. At the present time, Chinese foreign policy decisions are guided and influenced by the outlook and personality of Premier Xi Jinping.\textsuperscript{178} He has led China to have a much more assertive foreign policy than in years past. Xi personally feels dislike and distrust of the West and


has publicly declared support for buildup of the Chinese military.\(^{179}\) Elizabeth Economy and Michael Levi, both fellows at the Council of Foreign Relations, state that one of President Xi’s first military visits was to China’s naval base at Hainan Island, located in the South China Sea.\(^{180}\) President Xi encouraged the soldiers there to prepare for conflict. The newly developed Chinese attitude towards the United States alliance with Japan can best be explained by the major changes occurring within the Chinese government.

Throughout the 20\(^{th}\) Century, China experienced terrible internal struggles under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping. Neither administration condemned the alliance between the United States and Japan. But now, China is focusing on expansion and reclaiming its status as the strongest nation in Asia. Now that China has developed its economy and has a competitive military, the Treaty between the United States and Japan has become very important. If Premier Xi and his government had a different outlook on foreign affairs, they likely could come to an agreement with Japan. Most authors agree that Japan is not seeking conflict with China. The United States certainly is not. It should not be difficult for the Japan and China to negotiate an agreement for joint exploitation of the oil resources in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But the Chinese method of conducting foreign policy has been characterized by aggression and demands rather than the politeness of diplomacy. These actions stem from China’s perception of itself as the leader in Asia.

China’s feelings towards the United States alliance with Japan have undergone changes. According to Thomas Christensen, before 1995 Chinese analysts and even some scholars from Japan and the United States believed the United States alliance with Japan

\(^{180}\) Ibid.
was acting as a "bottle cap." This idea meant that the alliance was the institution keeping Japanese militarism at bay. Without it, Japanese nationalism would emerge and Japanese military buildup would occur. This is what China has most feared from Japan. Since 1996, the Chinese have come to see the alliance between the United States and Japan as an "egg shell." This idea states that the presence of the United States in Asia will encourage Japan to grow its military, an idea not welcomed by Beijing. The Chinese position is that the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is not the affair of the United States. They believe that the United States does not belong in Asia and should not be an Asian power.

Napoleon once stated, "Give me allies to fight." According to military strategy, to defeat an alliance one must try to promote discord in the enemy camp so members will reverse or not live up to their commitments. Fighting an alliance provides room for diplomatic maneuver. The scholarly consensus is that China longs to take advantage of any mistrust between the United States and Japan. A rift between Japan and the United States would enable the Chinese to exploit the solution to its advantage.

Foreign policy frequently is dictated by internal problems. The Chinese, in many ways are their own worst enemy. By their actions, they are frightening their neighbors and driving them closer to the United States. As described by author Geoff Dyer, China has intended to lure Japan from the United States camp through diplomacy, but its

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182 Ibid.

183 Ibid.


185 Ibid.
aggressive actions towards the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have frightened the Japanese.\textsuperscript{186}

Seeing the harsh attitude of the Chinese, Japan has begun to build up its military and redeploy its forces from northern Japan to the south. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe views the situation critical enough to call for a change in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Although revision of the Constitution is unlikely, Abe still aims to reinforce the capacity of the SDF and expand the Japanese role in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{187} Through its inept actions, China has hindered its own cause.

The Chinese government, now more than ever, sees advantage in provoking trouble with the United States and Japan. This is evidenced in the Chinese government’s policy of raising tensions over disputed territory and history, and decreasing tensions just as quickly. This leads to the question of the United States position. If tensions between Japan and China increase, will the United States back out of its promise to defend Japan? Will the administration try to find words in the treaty that enable them to back out of the situation? An analysis of the language of the Treaty will allow for greater understanding of the possible roles the United States may take. The literature reviewed has gaps in certain aspects. There is not enough literature on the Chinese perception of the United States alliance with Japan at the end of the Second World War. Also lacking is scholarly literature on the Obama’s Administration’s views towards the Treaty and potential actions if the dispute between Japan and China worsens.

\textbf{The Role of the Military}

The Seventh Fleet, headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan, is the primary United States military force in the region. The area of responsibility of the Seventh Fleet is from

\textsuperscript{186} Dyer, \textit{The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China—and How America Can Win}, 84.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, 56.
the Kuril Islands to the Antarctic, and from the Pacific International Date Line to the 68th meridian east, a line that continues to the border between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{188} If a conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands breaks out between China and Japan, the United States Seventh Fleet will undoubtedly be involved. The Seventh Fleet consists of approximately forty thousand marines and sailors, approximately two to three hundred ships, and one aircraft carrier.\textsuperscript{189} It maintains a rigorous training and deployment schedule throughout the entire region. When crises such as the North Korean shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong occurred in 2010, the \textit{U.S.S. George Washington} carrier strike group sailed to the area to conduct exercises with the South Korean navy. This move and the presence of the strike group helped prevent further escalation.\textsuperscript{190} A similar move by the Seventh Fleet would be likely in case of conflict over the Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands. The Fleet’s military force is the main bargaining chip the United States has in the tension filled area. While the presence of the fleet acts as a stabilizing force, it concurrently increases tension in the relationship between China and the United States. The Chinese would prefer that the United States would leave the area entirely.

Concurrently with China’s economic rise and expansionist goals, the military is being further developed by the Chinese government. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) has seen a tremendous expansion and buildup since it first was established under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung with the aid of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{191} According to former United States Undersecretary of Defense Seth Cropsey, China is “constructing a

\textsuperscript{188} United States 7\textsuperscript{th} Fleet, “About the US 7\textsuperscript{th} Fleet,” accessed November 9, 2014, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/about.htm.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid, 158.
navy to protect its multiplying interest in the sea as a source of future national wealth and greatness.\textsuperscript{192} The PLA(N) capabilities have switched from mainly defense to developing offensive capabilities. The Chinese military is building newer land based missiles such as the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), which is able to target an aircraft carrier from almost 1,000 to 1,240 miles away.\textsuperscript{193} It has expanded its submarine fleet and capabilities and has for the first time successfully developed an aircraft carrier.\textsuperscript{194}

In comparison to the PLA’s one million six hundred thousand troops, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) comprise one hundred and forty thousand ground troops and one hundred and forty one maritime vessels.\textsuperscript{195} The 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) to establish military priorities echoes the 2010 NDPG, which focused on “changing Japan’s defense doctrine away from a reactive approach toward a ‘‘dynamic defense,’’ centered on a more versatile and mobile SDF that prioritizes advanced technologies, intelligence, and surveillance capacities and amphibious warfare.”\textsuperscript{196} In addition, Japan’s defense planners aim to bolster its military-to-military relationship with the United States military forces in Japan.\textsuperscript{197} By bolstering the SDF and strengthening joint Japanese/United States military capabilities, Prime Minister Abe seeks to deter China and its expanding military, and to play a less passive role than it has in the past. This has present and future implications for Sino-Japanese disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

\textsuperscript{192} Crospsey, \textit{Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy}, 161.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, 169.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, 162-163, 164.
\textsuperscript{195} Miller, “Abe’s Gambit,” 55.
\textsuperscript{196} Miller, “Abe’s Gambit,” 57.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid, 60.
The Role of the United States

The Treaty clause of the United States Constitution, described in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, gives the President the authority to propose and negotiate agreements on behalf of the United States and other nations. It states that the President "shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present consent." After agreements with foreign powers are drafted by the Department of State (which is responsible for drafting all agreements with foreign nations), and signed by participating nations, agreements are sent to the United States Senate for approval for ratification. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee may hold a hearing on the treaty, which is followed by a general floor debate. The treaty becomes law following approval of a supermajority, or two-thirds, of the Senate members.

The executive branch has come into conflict with Congress and the Courts in foreign policy matters. One of these cases involves treaties. Treaties involve approval from the Senate, which, according to the Constitution, should be involved in the foreign policy process. While the Constitution is clear about the approval process for treaties, it is unclear whether Presidents have the authority to cancel treaties. The drafters of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and Japan remedied this omission by specifying that the Treaty may be cancelled by either party after ten years, and by giving one year's notice. This has implications for the Sino-Japanese dispute over

199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. If the President should decide he cannot live up to the Treaty with Japan, he may cancel the Treaty with one year’s notice. There are precedents for this. Presidents in years past have unilaterally cancelled treaties. 202 In the case of *Goldwater vs. Carter*, President Jimmy Carter in 1978 unilaterally terminated the United States Treaty with Taiwan in order to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China. 203 This action caused an outcry and much criticism from the Senate, which was not consulted on the matter. 204 The Supreme Court ruled that the case was a political matter, and did not make a ruling on the constitutionality of the President’s actions. 205 Thus, there is no statute barring the President from respecting this procedure and cancelling a treaty.

President Barack Obama visited Japan in April 2014, and announced that the Mutual Defense Treaty between Japan and the United States included the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 206 This means that the United States would side with the Japan in the case of an armed conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 207 This marked a strengthening of the United States relationship with Japan but it also was a challenge to China. While the United States is obligated to support Japan, Japan does have other defense alternatives. They could build up their own defense forces and construct their own nuclear weapons. Whether it was a good idea or not, President Obama’s actions caused the United States to become more deeply involved in the situation.

204 Ibid, 247.
205 Ibid, 247.
207 Ibid.
Unfortunately, the credibility of the United States government has come into question, as seen by public debate regarding the actions of the government. Very few countries are joining the United States-led coalition to combat ISIS and if they are, it is for the limited goal of containing ISIS, not to destroy it. Although during his trip to Japan, President Obama stated that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were part of Japan and that the United States would support Japan, it may come to a point where domestic pressure compels the Administration to try to evade the commitments in the Treaty. If a confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands occurs between Japan and China, the situation will escalate very quickly. The United States government will need to make a quick decision about military involvement. This involvement could be very unpopular in the United States. The terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and Japan would then be studied very closely. Until now, the American alliance with Japan has not been a key issue in American political debate regarding foreign policy. Author David Leheny states that except for elite foreign policy circles, Americans are mostly disinterested in the relationship with Japan and only are interested if there is a crisis. In the event of a crisis, which certainly would be an explosive one, most Americans would suddenly pay attention to the role of the United States. Most Americans would like to reduce tensions between China and Japan with diplomatic means before using military force. The American public would not want to fight China over Japan’s ownership of the Islands, and the United States government would be looking for a way to stay out of the involvement or a way to force Japan and China to compromise.

In analyzing the legislative language and its impact on the actions of the United States executive branch, it is noteworthy that neither the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan of 1951 or the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 mention the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by name. Time and time again, the President and members of his cabinet, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have stated that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan, but nowhere is this indicated in the Treaty.\textsuperscript{209} This omission would give the United States an exit point should the political situation demand it. While it would be difficult for the United States government to change course and say the Treaty does not cover the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it would be possible to give one year’s notice and cancel the Treaty. As stated earlier, that is what President Jimmy Carter did when he broke diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government of Taiwan and recognized the Communist government in Beijing.

\textbf{Bilateral Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan of 1951}

The Treaty of San Francisco and the Bilateral Security Treaty between the United States and Japan were signed at a time when numerous uncertainties and doubts existed as to how to draft the document, which would shape the future relationship between the United States and Japan. The United States was involved in the Cold War and the Korean War was at its height. Japan was a frail and weak country in the aftermath of the Second World War. It lacked a military for its own defense. The United States had governed Japan since the end of the war. The San Francisco Peace Treaty gave Japan its

independence. In exchange, Japan agreed to the conditions of the Bilateral Security Treaty between the United States and Japan.

The Introduction of the Treaty discusses Japan’s past leadership, referring to “irresponsible militarism.” As discussed in Chapter One above, this is a reference to the pre-Second World War government in Japan. Following the Meiji Restoration at the turn of the century, which modernized Japan, the Japanese political system changed. According to Paul Kennedy, by the 1930s, “the cautious conservatives who ruled Japan were edged out by nationalists and militarists.” The oligarchy ruling Japan promoted a militaristic nationalism that led Japan into the Second World War. After the Second World War, Japan renounced its right to an offensive military. Because of this, in the Treaty Japan requested “as a provisional arrangement for its defense,” that the United States maintain bases on Japanese territory. Unspoken was the provision that the Treaty between the United States and Japan could only be enforced as long as the United States military forces remained strong. The defense treaty would be meaningless if the United States were not able to militarily defend Japan. At the present time, with reduced financial allocations to the United States Department of Defense, this is a very real problem. The reduced strength of the United States Armed Forces, particularly its naval

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211 Hughes, “Japan’s Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism,” 40.
214 Ibid, 301-302.
forces, will severely impact the ability of the United States to defend Japan and this will impact the relationship between the United States and Japan.

Article I grants authority for the United States to put down “riots and disturbances” in Japan.\textsuperscript{216} Although Japan is quiet and peaceful now, in the 1950s it experienced many internal political problems. In the 1950s, Japan had a very active Japanese Socialist Party, and many strikes and demonstrations occurred.\textsuperscript{217} This sentence in the Treaty reflected the concern felt by Japanese government. The Japanese government gave the United States the authority to use its armed forces to put down internal disturbances.

Article II promised that Japan would not give any country other than the United States basing rights.\textsuperscript{218} This article was intended to keep China and Russia out of Japan’s mainland territories. Russia specifically had indicated interest in administering Hokkaido Island. The territories presently contested between Japan, Russia, and China, the Kuril Islands and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, were not specifically mentioned in the Treaty.

Article III discusses the Status of Forces Agreement, an administrative arrangement regarding the jurisdiction of American troops stationed in Japan. Article IV states that the Treaty would “expire” at the time when “in the opinion” of the United States of America and Japan, “there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will

\textsuperscript{217} Hughes, “Japan’s Policy Towards China: Domestic Structural Change, Globalization, History and Nationalism,” 41.
satisfactorily provide for international peace and security in the Japan Area."219 This meant that the Treaty would expire whenever Japan, the United States, and the United Nations would come to a suitable arrangement for the security of Japan. At the time, the world still had a strong faith in the United Nations. The United Nations was expected to eventually take the place of the American military in defense of Japan.

The Bilateral Security Treaty was the first step towards establishing a strong alliance between Japan and the United States. Written very soon after the end of the Second World War, the language in the Treaty reflected the fact that Japan was a fragile nation still under the umbrella of the United States. The Treaty contained clauses that allowed the United States to put down internal uprisings in Japan. This led to some criticism from the Japanese Socialist Party and the anti-American factions in Japan, who did not want the United States to have a strong role in Japan.220 At the time, the framers were not concerned with a Soviet or Communist Chinese threat to mainland Japan so language regarding an invasion hostile force was not used.221 In 1960, when the Treaty was amended, the threat from the USSR and Communist China had expanded, causing the inclusion of language for the defense of mainland Japan.

**Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960**

In 1960 the United States had just emerged from the Korean War. The horrors of the war were behind it and the United States had arranged a satisfactory settlement. Domestically, the United States was in the midst of the Eisenhower years, which marked a period of great prosperity. When the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of

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220 Murata, “U.S. Japan Alliance as a Flexible Institution,” 133.
221 Ibid, 133-134.
1960 was presented to Congress for approval for ratification, lawmakers were uncertain about how far the United States should commit itself to defend Japan. This is evidenced by numerous debates occurring in Congress. In Japan, certain factions, mostly the Japanese Socialist Party and the anti-American “rightists,” continued to meet the Treaty with much resistance. They did not want Japan to have a Treaty with the United States, believing that Japan should rely on the United Nations for its defense. Another controversial point was that it allowed United States troops to stay on Japanese soil indefinitely, primarily in the Okinawa Prefecture. Nevertheless, despite the controversy in Japan, the Japanese government did not have a reasonable alternative to the Treaty. If United States did not support Japan, the country would have no strong military defense. Thus, the Treaty was passed in the Japanese legislature.

In Article I of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, both the United States and Japan promise to avoid the use of military action. Both countries agree “to settle any international disputes...by peaceful means in such a way...that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain...from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity...of any state.” The words “peaceful means,” give this statement a certain ambiguity. If China and Japan were to come to a heated diplomatic showdown, interspersed with military demonstrations, who is to say when “peaceful means” have been exhausted? Would a reluctant United States be willing to engage the Chinese military on Japanese assurances that “peaceful means”

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223 Ibid.
have been played out? Could not these two words give the United States Government reason to back out of the Treaty?\textsuperscript{225} If Japan is forced into a conflict with China, the United States Government could argue that Japan has not used all peaceful means to solve the dispute. From the position of the United States, Japan had contracted in the Treaty to solve all problems by peaceful means, and if they have not lived up to this portion of the treaty, the United States is not obligated to come to its help.

Article II of the Treaty directs Japan and the United States to advance peaceful relations with other countries. It states that both countries will “contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions...and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”\textsuperscript{226} At the present time, if a military confrontation should occur between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it could be argued that Japan is not living up to its promises in the Treaty of contributing to “peaceful and friendly international relations.”\textsuperscript{227} These words could also be used by the United States as grounds to avoid involvement in a military confrontation.

Article III of the Treaty deals with the promotion of national self-defense forces by each country. It states, “The Parties...by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop...their capacities to resist armed attack.”\textsuperscript{228} In this section, Japan agreed to build up its military forces to the limits of its new “constitutional provisions,” which were to have a military only for self-defense.\textsuperscript{229} If

\textsuperscript{226} ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} ibid.
\textsuperscript{229} ibid.
Japan calls on the United States for assistance, the words “self-help” in this section could be used against Japan.\textsuperscript{230} The United States Government could argue that the Japanese have not contributed to “self-help,” that Japan has been too quick to rely on the United States.\textsuperscript{231}

Article V of the Treaty commits the United States to defend against an armed attack against Japan. This article is one that contains unequivocal language regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It states, “each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger...”\textsuperscript{232} The words, “under the administration of Japan,” are the key words.\textsuperscript{233} Administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are now absolutely claimed by Japan. But when the Treaty was being drafted and signed, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not a major concern for lawmakers. China had not claimed ownership over them. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were still under the administration of the United States (they were turned over to the administration of Japan in 1971 along with Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands).\textsuperscript{234} But the language in this section undoubtedly commits the United States to Japan’s defense.

Article VII discusses conditions for cancelling the Treaty. It states that the Treaty may be terminated at any time by either party after ten years have passed and one years notice has been given. This could become a major problem for Japan. Rather than fulfilling the terms of the Treaty, the United States Government, under pressure from

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
domestic opponents, could unilaterally terminate the Treaty. Politically there would be a 
big outcry but the government might consider the move absolutely necessary and 
potentially manageable.

The Hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee shed some light on the 
thinking of the Senators at the time. When the Treaty was presented to the United States 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the primary concern among Senators was the 
Japanese domestic opposition to the treaty.\textsuperscript{235} Lawmakers in the United States expressed 
cconcern that there could or would be increasing opposition to the alliance because of the 
influence of Communist China and Soviet Russia. Although this was not a major 
concern, the Senators were not unmindful about the definition of territory that was 
included in the treaty. When asked directly by Senator Mansfield, Secretary of State 
Herter did not provide a clear explanation of what the Treaty area encompassed. He said 
vaguely that it was all areas under “the administration of Japan.”\textsuperscript{236}

The language of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between the United States and 
Japan shows the necessity of writing treaties in unequivocal terms. The drafters of the 
Treaty did not mention the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It likely was taken for granted that 
these territories would remain under the administration of Japan, but it does not say this 
specifically. The lesson to be learned is the need for specificity. Potential problems must 
be foreseen and addressed in the Treaty language.

\textsuperscript{235} Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan: Hearings before the United States Senate 
Committee On Foreign Relations, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, On June 7, 1960. Washington, 
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
Conclusion

The alliance between the United States and Japan is the key to stability in Asia. It makes the United States irrevocably involved in Asian affairs. If any military confrontation arises between Japan and China, the United States can hardly avoid becoming involved. The decisions to increase or decrease tensions with Japan and the United States are made in Beijing. The drafters of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security did not have the foresight to see that China and the United States would one day become competitors. China has lived with the Treaty for sixty years, and did not protest it. But today China is becoming more expansive and needs an outlet for internal political frustration. The future of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has suddenly become important to China.

The United States is involved in this situation due to its long-standing alliance with Japan, as clearly articulated in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. But there is language in the Treaty that can be interpreted in different ways. The basic question is the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and whether the United States would be willing to support Japan in a showdown with China.

If the United States Government does not want to live up to its Treaty obligations, due to political pressure at home, there are ways the United States may cancel the Treaty. The language clearly states that either party may cancel it. Although this would be unpopular in the United States, this is one option the United States Government might use.

It is unfortunate that the Treaty was not more specific in its language. It is unfortunate that it was not drafted more carefully. The Treaty was written long before
Americans paid attention to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and it does not appear that much thought was given to this issue. If the Treaty had been drafted more carefully, there would be less chance of misunderstanding between the great powers. Now the language of the Treaty cannot be changed.

In the future the appropriate role for the United States is to act as an intermediary to attempt to defuse any crisis that occurs. As stated by political scientist John Ikenberry, the regional alliances in East Asia that the United States is involved in are “the single most important anchor for regional stability.”237 The United States should absolutely stand by its ally Japan, even if it means going against China. But the United States should be cautious in its role as an intermediary and as a defender, remembering that it should act in conjunction with the Japanese government.

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CONCLUSION
This research portfolio has covered the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship from many angles. Specifically, it has covered the competing claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by China and Japan, the historical background of their dispute, the economic relations between the two countries, the confrontations between the opposing forces in the Islands, and most importantly, the resurgence of nationalism in both countries, which makes a peaceful settlement more difficult. Also analyzed is the United States Defense Treaty with Japan, in particular the language, which would make a cancellation of the Treaty legally possible. The conclusion of this portfolio is that this controversy over the Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands has been begun and kept alive by the Communist government in Beijing, which is following an expansionist policy aimed at bringing neighboring countries under its control and ejecting the United States from Asia.

Chapter One has found that ethnic nationalism is growing in both China and Japan. Ethnic nationalism is based on national identity, community, shared history, and national pride. It is stronger than civic nationalism, which can be artificially created. Ethnic nationalism makes people feel separate and united against the foreigner. Both Japan and China are racially unified countries with a long history of suffering together. When they think of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is very difficult for them to give up a piece of land that they think belongs to their national group. China has been humiliated for much of its recent history. Now the Chinese are very proud that China is becoming a prosperous country. The Chinese government is funneling this pride into nationalism, making the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands into a major problem in order to divert the attention of the Chinese people from the lack of democracy in their own country. As can be seen in the current crisis in Hong Kong, the Chinese people are restive.
and tired of one party rule. The Chinese government’s solution to the problem is to
distract the attention of the populace from domestic problems into foreign channels.

The conclusion from Chapter Two is that, despite the great volume of trade
between China and Japan, both populations will be indifferent to maintaining trade ties in
a crisis situation. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, with its claims of ownership by Japan, the
historical enemy, is an easy target for nationalists in China. In 2012, the dispute between
China and Japan over Japan’s purchase of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had a bad
effect on Chinese-Japanese trade. Yet this did not contain the fury of the Chinese and
Japanese populace.

Author Thomas Christensen has analyzed the security dilemma currently present
in East Asia. As discussed in the second chapter, he concludes that one possible
solution is for an outside arbiter to play a “policing role” in the conflict. This is the role
scholars believe the United States should take in the Pacific, and it also is the role the
United States sees itself taking. The United States should absolutely maintain this role
to contribute to peace in this region.

From Chapter Three it is evident that the alliance with Japan and the United States
must be maintained. This is absolutely necessary to keep peace in the area. A lapse in the
alliance would be likely to cause a situation analogous to the one in Europe before the
First World War when Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany allowed his alliance with Russia and
Austria, the Three Emperors League, to lapse, thus destabilizing the entire area.

Tensions and a system of alliances followed, which broke down and led to the First

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239 Ibid, 50.
241 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-
2000, 249-252.
World War. The beginning of the war happened very quickly. Within twenty four to forty eight hours, Europe was at war. As in Europe, the situation in the East China Sea may escalate very quickly. The Chinese, Japanese, and United States governments will each need to make decisions quickly.

When the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States was signed in 1960 it was obvious that China and the United States were on a collision course due to tensions from the Cold War. China wanted to establish a sphere of influence in the area adjoining its borders, and the United States was determined to remain in the area. A tension filled relationship has followed. China has manipulated this tension very cleverly. When internal pressure in China necessitated a foreign target, the Chinese leaders found one in the Senkaky/Diaoyu Islands. Right now the Chinese population is restive so it is not surprising that a crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was manufactured.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was drafted sixty years ago under conditions far different than they are today. Still, it seems strange that it was not drafted more carefully. Words are important. The most important omission is the position of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While it was assumed that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would ultimately be turned over to Japan, nowhere in the text are they mentioned. This gives the United States an excuse to evade its responsibilities if it were inclined to do so. Within the Treaty, the phrase “peaceful means” also lends itself to various interpretations.\textsuperscript{242} The United States government recently has given Japan oral assurances that the United States would support Japan in

any conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But this is not the same assurance as a solemn written treaty approved by the Senate. If the United States determination to defend the Islands had been spelled out from the beginning in non-ambiguous terms, it is conceivable that the Chinese Government, needing a foreign target, would have directed their pressure on another target, likely India, with whom they also have a contested border.

Right now, the tension between China and Japan is at an unpleasant but not dangerous level. Doubtlessly with the permission and encouragement of the Chinese Government, Chinese fishermen have been harvesting coral, which has a high resale value, from the reefs near the Islands.\(^{243}\) Japan has chosen to ignore this. At the time of writing, preparations for high-level talks on a variety of topics including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are being made. Japan’s Prime Minister Abe is planning a trip to China where he would have formal meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.\(^{244}\) But it is unlikely that they will solve the problem of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the past, the Japanese government has been unwilling to discuss the Islands, stating that they belong to Japan and there is nothing to discuss.

Through the years, the United States has had its share of misunderstandings with China. It experienced controversy over the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which led to the Taiwan Straits crisis. The United States stood up to the Chinese government


and sent a carrier to the Taiwan Straits.245 When it became obvious the United States was going to defend the Islands, China ended the crisis.246 At the present time, in the event of a crisis over the Senakaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is likely China again will stand down if the United States shows strength. But no one can guarantee this.

The relationships between China, Japan, and the United States are complicated by nationalism, which is growing in both Japan and China. This makes improving the relationship between the countries more difficult. The United States alliance with Japan has entangled the United States in the situation. The military forces of both Japan and China are being built up. The United States plays a pivotal role in stabilizing the situation and keeping the peace. The United States Seventh Fleet is the dominant military force in the region, but the impending budget cuts to the United States Department of Defense makes it unclear if the United States will be able to maintain its current force posture in the long-term.

The policy dilemmas and options the United States would face if the dispute over the Islands would deteriorate into actual hostilities must be considered. If hostilities should break out, the Japanese government doubtlessly would call on the United States for support. The United States, loyal to the Treaty, could respond with full military force. The Seventh Fleet, unless constrained by the new land/sea missiles China is building, would make short work of any Chinese forces in the area. The Japanese doubtlessly would be grateful. But the Chinese would be enraged. China would erupt in a passionate anger and the seeds of future conflict would be sown.

246 Ibid, 301.
Option two would be for the Seventh Fleet to be deployed to the area but only to make a demonstration and not to participate in actual hostilities. This option does not have much to recommend it. It would not affect the outcome of the quarrel and would infuriate both China and Japan.

Option three would be for the United States to declare its neutrality and cancel the Treaty. This is legally possible but it would mean expulsion of the United States from Asia. Seeing the perfidy of the United States, Asian countries would make their own agreements with China. China would again be the Middle Kingdom surrounded by client states.

These options doubtlessly are being studied by war planners at the Pentagon and the State Department. None of the options are attractive. It is one of the accidents of history that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, small rocks in the ocean, should have the capacity to provoke such turmoil in the civilized world. One can only hope for a peaceful outcome.
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Appendix

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN (JANUARY 19, 1960)

Introduction

Although the American Occupation of Japan came to an end on April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, the United States was hardly prepared to abandon its military presence in Japan. With Japan a key strategic partner in Cold War Asia, the Korean War still in progress, and the military threats from China and the Soviet Union apparently very real, American planners were insistent that substantial U.S. forces needed to remain in place in Japan. At the peace negotiations in 1951, the Japanese delegation was pressured to endorse a separate security agreement with the United States. The Japanese were reluctant to accept this ongoing subordination to America, but had no choice but to acquiesce, signing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty on the same day (September 8, 1951) as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Security Treaty was revised and renewed in 1960 and almost 50,000 American troops are still stationed in Japan today.

Selected Document

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States of America and Japan (January 19, 1960)

Signed at Washington, January 19, 1960
Approved by the diet, June 19, 1960
Ratification decided by the cabinet, June 21, 1960
Attested, June 21, 1960
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo, June 23, 1960
Promulgated, June 23, 1960
Entered into force, June 23, 1960

Japan and the United States of America,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN (JANUARY 19, 1960)

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN (JANUARY 19, 1960)

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN (JANUARY 19, 1960)

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and
the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations
arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to
the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate
one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally
authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR JAPAN:
Nobusuke Kishi
Auchiro Fujiyama
Mitsujiro Ishii
Tadashi Adachi
Koichiro Asakai

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Christian A. Herter
Douglas MacArthus 2nd
J. Graham Parsons
Curriculum Vitae

Aleksandra Natzke McCadden was born in San Francisco, California, on July 10, 1983. Aleksandra lived in Manila, Philippines for five years as a child, learning to speak Mandarin Chinese and Tagalog. She graduated from the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington in May 2005, receiving a Bachelor of Arts Degree in International Political Economy and Mandarin Chinese. Aleksandra worked for Colliers International Real Estate in San Francisco for two years, becoming an Assistant Property Manager of a high-rise office building. In 2009, Aleksandra joined the United States Navy as an Intelligence Officer, and was commissioned as an Ensign. From 2010 to 2012, Aleksandra was assigned to Carrier Air-Wing Five, the only permanently forward-deployed United States Navy air wing in Atsugi, Japan. Aleksandra served as an imagery and security officer to the wing, deploying on the aircraft carrier *USS George Washington* on four Western Pacific Ocean deployments. Following her assignment in Japan, Aleksandra was assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations-Intelligence Plot at the Pentagon where she became a watch officer, monitoring current intelligence issues and producing daily intelligence reports to the Chief of Naval Operations. In 2013, Aleksandra was promoted to Lieutenant, completed her active duty service obligation, and joined the United States Naval Reserve. Aleksandra and her husband, Lieutenant Kevin McCadden, an F/A-18 pilot in United States Navy, are moving to Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada.