INCREASED RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESS: IMPACT ON THE U.S. ARMY’S ABILITY TO REGENERATE COMBAT POWER

by
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12 December 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR the Secretary of Defense
FROM Deputy Undersecretary for Strategy, Plans, and Force Development
SUBJECT: Increased Access to the Reserve Component during Periods Other Than War or National Emergency, Impact on the Army’s Ability to Regenerate Combat Power

1. Action Forcing Event

In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Army plans to reduce its active duty strength from a war-time high of 570,000 to 490,000 by the end of 2017. However, due to budget restrictions, it is likely that the Army end-strength will continue to shrink. Most analysts expect the Army will be cut further, to an Active-duty end-strength between 420,000 and 380,000. These numbers are significantly less than the Army deems necessary to execute its assigned missions.

To offset the risk assumed by a smaller force, the President and Department of Defense have directed the Army to maintain the ability to re-grow forces and capabilities. Both the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indicate that the Army should drawdown in a manner that will allow it to rapidly regenerate capabilities when they are needed in the future. The 2014 QDR states, "Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations... We will protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands."

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3 Statement on the Posture of the United States Army before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services (statement of John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army and General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army), 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 April 2014, 4.
2. Statement of the Problem

The Army is faced with a significant overarching problem: How to reduce size and capability while maintaining the ability to regenerate quickly. Depending on the extent of the force cuts, the Army may have to grow by as many as 190,000 personnel to regain its 2012 capability. The Army must be prepared to accomplish this growth while maintaining a high quality, all-volunteer force.

In April 2014, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox discussed problems related to the military drawdown with senior leaders at the Army War College. Fox explained that history demonstrates the United States will again need a capable ground force. "And so our challenge, your challenge, is to plan now to re-grow the army, even as you bring it down and how to reshape the army to support that growth in the future. We must determine what we need to retain in the smaller force to allow you to get to a larger force quickly, if necessary, when needed in the future."6

Due to a tightening budget, the Army is no longer expected to win in two simultaneous conflicts, a long-standing goal that has driven military force structure since the 1990s. In February 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined how a smaller Army means the United States must accept some risk in simultaneous or extended operations. The new force he notes will be “capable of decisively defeating aggression in one major combat theater - as it must be - while also defending the homeland and supporting air and naval forces engaged in another theater against an adversary.”7

The Army has taken some measures to protect its ability to regenerate forces. The 2012 Army Posture Statement identified four components that are critical to a smaller but expandable force. The report outlined how the Army would offset the strategic risk assumed as the active

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force reduces from 570,000 to 490,000. The Army plan calls for a "strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officer to form the core of new formations," investing in Army Special Operations Forces, increasing the readiness of the National Guard and Army Reserve, and maintaining the nation's industrial base.8

Two years later, the Army's reduction is expected to substantially exceed the number proposed by the Army in 2012. As the extent of the cuts grow, some defense experts are concerned about the Army's apparent unwillingness to embrace the need to prepare the ability to conduct a much larger regeneration. In May 2014 the Center for New American Security (CNAS) strongly criticized the progress of Army and Department of Defense's (DOD) remobilization planning. "Unfortunately, since the 2012 (Defense Strategic Guidance) first articulated the principle of reversibility or regeneration, DOD and the Army have done little apparent work to determine the best way to implement it."9

When faced with the need to regenerate or mobilize forces quickly, the Army essentially has two options: First is to rely on the Reserve Component, a amalgamation of organizations including the National Guard and Army Reserve, to provide the bulk of the force. The second option is to grow the size and capability of the Active Component.

Both options have downsides. Growing the Active Component takes time and costs money. In addition, this option requires the Army to attract new volunteers, an undertaking that is difficult during wartime. Increased reliance on the Reserve Component has its own downsides. The most notable is that the reserve units and personnel are not as easily accessed as active duty troops. Federal law limits the number and scope of Reserve Component mobilizations especially for operations that are undertaken in times other than war or national emergency.

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This memorandum will analyze how the Army can maintain the ability to regenerate, potentially by as many as 190,000 troops, while still maintaining a quality force that can be mobilized for a variety of scenarios when needed.
3. History

The Army, more than any service, has a history of dramatic growth during conflict, and correspondingly spectacular reduction once hostilities conclude. Post-conflict force reductions have almost always exceeded the recommendations of the nation's military leadership. As a result, the Army has almost always been unprepared for its next war.

Three weeks after the end of the Revolutionary War, in September 1783, Congress ordered General George Washington to begin demobilization of the Federal Army. Concerned about the cost and potential threat a professional Army imposed, most Members of Congress believed that a "well-regulated and disciplined militia" should be the U.S. choice for defense. This belief was later reflected in the United States Constitution which grants Congress the sole authority to raise and support Armies. The Constitutions' authors discouraged professional ground forces by limiting the Army's funding to two-year increments. As a result, America's Armies have always been somewhat temporary. The Army’s mandated post-Revolutionary War drawdown was only the first ebb in the cyclic rhythm of Army force structure.

At the end of the Civil War the Army was drastically reduced again, this time against the wishes of senior military leaders. The Army had substantial post-war commitments in the occupied Southern states, the Western frontier, and the unstable Mexican border. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, General in Chief of the Army, requested that a Regular Army of 80,000 men be retained. Congress, under pressure from the American people, and the troops themselves, ignored Grant’s appeal and instead sped the post-war demobilization. Between 1865 and 1869 more than a million volunteers returned to their home states leaving a Regular Army of only 27,442 and a poorly trained, under-equipped reserve of slightly more than 100,000.

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10 U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, "The Congress shall have the power . . . To raise and support Armies but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years."
In April 1898, an unsuspecting Army was called to free Cuba from Spanish colonial control. Utterly unprepared for the operation, the Army floundered as it struggled to regenerate the size and capability necessary for the operation. The mobilization was complicated by federal laws which prohibited the National Guard from deploying overseas. Guardsmen were eventually reorganized into volunteer regiments, and the force haphazardly deployed to Cuba, less than 100 miles from the Florida Keys.12

The Army ultimately defeated the Spanish garrison in Cuba. Unfortunately, the cost of committing an unprepared force in a tropical climate, was high. Nearly four thousand troops died from disease and accidents. In contrast, less than three hundred were killed in action or died from wounds received in battle.13

The Army significantly reorganized in the wake of the Spanish American War. New doctrine called for the Regular Army to serve as the "peace nucleus of the greater war army of the Nation." It recommended an active force sized to win small overseas conflicts and capable of forming the "first line of defense in order to give sufficient time to permit the mobilization and concentration of our greater war army. . ."14 The report also recommended a federal reserve be maintained at a high state of readiness, a proposal that drew strong opposition from National Guard supporters in the House of Representatives who feared loss of state control over the organization.15 This was to be the first of many political skirmishes between the Active-Duty Army and the National Guard.

Ultimately, a compromise was reached. The National Defense Act of 1916 led to a substantial increase of the Regular Army and National Guard and mandated that the National

15 American Military History Vol. 1, 388.
Guard respond to federal mobilization. The act maintained the state's authority over the National Guard while providing the federal government access to a much larger force if required.

The Army’s efforts to anticipate and plan for the next conflict were tested when the U.S. entered the First World War in April 1918. By April of the following year, the Army had expanded from 200,000 to 3.7 million.\(^\text{16}\) As the First World War drew to a close, the War Department requested that Congress retain a Regular Army of 500,000 troops capable of further expansion in the event of another major war. However, the American public and Congress disagreed.\(^\text{17}\) By February 1919, National Guard units had been demobilized and the Active Army had been reduced to a volunteer force of 225,000. Cuts continued and over the three years, Congress mandated the Regular Army be limited to 137,000.\(^\text{18}\)

Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the Army Staff prepared several series of mobilization plans designed to mitigate the risk associated with a small force. These Protective Mobilization Plans called for the Regular Army and National Guard to act as a security force to buy time for larger general mobilization. In addition, detailed plans were developed to transition U.S. industry into war capacity. Mobilization preparation continued throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s. By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, more money had appropriated for defense than during the entire the First World War.\(^\text{19}\)

The rapid demobilization following World War II stood in stark contrast to the planned deliberate mobilization that proceeded the conflict. To meet the requirements of post-war occupations and stabilization, the Army prepared detailed demobilization plans. The Army sought to retain a peacetime structure capable of regenerating into a 4 million man force within one year. These plans were not sufficient to overcome the post-war pressure to get troops home quickly.

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., 55.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., 61.
In August 1945, immediately following Japan's surrender, public and congressional pressure forced the War Department to scrap its plans for deliberate demobilization. The Army shrank further and faster than ever before. By 1946, half of the 8 million troops on Active duty had been released. Two years later, the Army had been reduced to less than one million. At the end of the decade, only 591,000 troops remained on active duty as U.S. policy shifted to rely on nuclear deterrence. Figure 1 provides a depiction of the scale of the post-World War II drawdown.

Figure 1 - Participation in the U.S. Armed Forces 1793–2002 (Percent of Population)
Many military experts disagreed with the drastic force reduction. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, lamented the decimation of the Army, a powerful force that he felt could have been used to further U.S. interests. Instead, MacArthur wrote, "in the short space of five years this power had been frittered away in a bankruptcy of positive and courageous leadership toward any long-range objectives." The post-World War II Army's lack of readiness became painfully apparent when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. As the U.S. entered the conflict, the majority of Army units were far below authorized personnel strength and lacked adequate weapons and equipment.

The first U.S. combat force dispatched to assist the South Korean defenses was Task Force Smith, an ill-fated battalion that was rushed to the Korean peninsula in a futile attempt to slow the North Korean advance. Hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the American force was decimated. General Douglas MacArthur later described the initially haphazard deployment of ground forces to Korea. "I had hoped by that arrogant display of strength to fool the enemy into a belief that I had greater resources at my disposal than I did." Although the America's commitment of forces did slow the North Korean advance, the cost was high. The first six months of the Korean War were marked by high casualties and humiliating defeats.

The Korean War demonstrated that the Army could not plan on full mobilization to win limited conflicts. In June 1950 Congress granted the President authority to activate individual members and units of the National Guard and Reserves. The Army, lacking an effective mobilization system, was unable to efficiently fill the ranks of both active duty and reserve units. As a result, many of the units initially committed to Korea were undermanned. Throughout the

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conflict, the Army relied heavily on recalled World War II veterans to augment active duty units. Between 1950 and 1953 857,887 reservists were involuntarily mobilized.27

At the conclusion of active fighting in Korea, the Army was once again downsized as the nation reoriented military strategy towards nuclear forces. Between 1953 and 1958, the Army decreased from 1.5 million to 900,000.28 During the drawdown, the Army attempted to develop a balanced force that could win a conventional or limited war without large-scale mobilization. This structure was tested the following decade in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War was the first large-scale conflict in which the United States did not rely on the National Guard to provide combat troops. In 1965, as U.S. forces in Vietnam increased, President Lyndon Johnson declined to activate the National Guard and instead chose increase the draft. Although reasons for this decision have been debated, most historians conclude that Johnson sought to minimize the impact of an already unpopular war on the American public and Congress. "The President had become 'increasingly sensitive,' reported the New York Times, 'to the possible political effects of a reserve call-up."29

Throughout the Vietnam war the majority of the fighting fell to the Regular Army whose ranks were augmented with draftees. In 1964 the President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation examined the U.S. draft pool and concluded that even with the draft, a program of "manpower conservation" was necessary to generate enough youth for military service.30 By September 1965, as demand for Soldiers increased, the Army and DOD began to substitute civilians for military personnel in noncombat positions to free military personnel for combat duty. In addition the Army lowered medical and aptitude standards in an effort to widen the enlistment

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Although these measures increased the number of voluntary enlistments, the Army was still forced to rely on conscription to fill its ranks. As the number of troops admitted under reduced standards increased, so too did discipline problems and poor performance. The conclusion of the Vietnam War brought the end of the draft and a force reduction. The Active-duty Army had grown to 1.57 million at the height of the conflict. By 1974, the Army had reduced to an all-volunteer force of 784,000 troops.

To meet defense requirements with a smaller force the Army adopted the Total Army concept which involved shifting support capability to the Reserve Component. In addition to preserving capability, the interdependent Total Force required the reserves be activated in order for the U.S. to commit a significant military force anywhere. The Total Force structure conserved resources since reserve units cost less than their active-duty counterparts. In addition, the structure sought to address concerns that a volunteer force could become disconnected from society it was designed to serve. By the end of 1973, 66 percent of Combat Support and Combat Service Support capability was in the reserve force.

The Total Force was refined throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1990 the organization faced its first significant test as the Army responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Of the 297,000 Army troops deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 39,000 were members of the Army Reserve and 37,000 were National Guardsmen.

In 1992 a study commissioned by Congress found that the effectiveness of the Total Force Policy during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to be mixed. The report cited problems with the Army's readiness reporting systems.

In general, the reserves were available and reported promptly when called during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Further, the reserve combat support and combat

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32 This trend is discussed in detail in Section 6 (Policy Analysis).
33 *American Military History Vol. 2*, 379.
service support units required relatively little post-mobilization training to be ready for deployment. However, the Army National Guard combat units apparently were not as ready as prior reporting indicated.36

The post-Cold War world led to new security challenges for the U.S. and new roles for the Army. The Army found itself increasingly deployed to unstable areas of the world to act as peacekeepers, provide humanitarian assistance, or protect U.S. interests. To meet these new missions, the Army restructured to reduce dependence on reserve support for immediate deployments. The Reserve Component was to backup active duty forces if required, later in the deployment.37 As the threat of conventional conflict with the Soviet Union evaporated, a large Army was not longer required. During the decade that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army shrunk 39-percent.38

A decade later, simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army to face its largest manpower requirement since the Vietnam War. From the beginning of the conflicts the Army had difficulty meeting demands. In July 2003, four months after the initial invasion of Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make the National Guard more "relevant and accessible in the current national security environment."39 The National Guard responded with a plan to transform the organization into a more ready force. "We are transforming the National Guard from a strategic reserve to be called only in time of World War III, to be an operational force that can be called at any time, any place, for any reason, both here at home or abroad." announced LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in 2004.40

39 Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve, 33.
As the Active and Reserve Components strained under the requirements of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army attempted to accomplish more with less personnel. Soldiers whose periods of active duty service were ending were involuntarily retained on active duty, a process known as Stop Loss. Units were reorganized to allow for more "tooth" and less "tail." Civilian personnel were hired to fill non-combat positions. Roles traditionally filled by support troops such as food preparation and base security were contracted to civilian firms in order to make more troops available for combat duty.41

In addition to mobilizing reserve units, the Army activated members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), a reserve component made up of members whose initial military commitment was complete. The IRR mobilization was largely a failure. In 2006 the Army only had accurate contact information for 20-percent of IRR members. Many activated members simply failed to respond to their mobilization orders. Army reserve managers were quoted as declaring that "using the (Individual Ready Reserve) as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept." and recommending that the force only be recalled in the event of full mobilization." A 2008 congressional report concluded that the Army's attempt to use the IRR as "a viable source of manpower for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been problematic."42

The Army's reorganization allowed a higher percentage of troops to be committed into combat however it did not solve the Army's capacity problem. A steadily declining enlistment rate exacerbated troop shortages. Despite increased bonuses and advertising, in 2005 the Army was forced to reduce entrance standards to the lowest since the Vietnam War. A 2007 a Defense Department study reported the Army Reserve, and National Guard were unable to meet the increased demand presented by Iraq, Afghanistan and the domestic responsibilities of civil

42 Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Reserve, Report to Congress and Secretary of Defense, 21 January 2008, 336.
support and homeland security. The report recommend a holistic examination of the Army's force structure.43

In January 2007 after four years of combat in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to increase the size of the Army by an additional 74,200 Soldiers. The increase was never fully realized. The majority of U.S. troops left Iraq in 2011 and with combat troops preparing to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the nation no longer needed a large ground force. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance announced that although the Army would retain the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capability gained from Iraq and Afghanistan, it would no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.44

44 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 6.
4. Background

History has demonstrated that at some point in the future the Army will once again be called on to expand into a formidable ground force. Major General H.R. McMaster, currently the commander of the Army's Capabilities Integration Center, noted in a 2013 *NY Times* op-ed, that the fundamental nature of conflict has not changed. "Budget pressures and persistent fascination with technology have led some to declare an end to war as we know it. . . We must not equate military capabilities with strategy. Achieving our aims in war will demand forces who can reassure allies and protect populations, as well as identify and defeat elusive enemies."45

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review articulates the need for an Army that is capable of growing to provide the capabilities McMaster describes. To accomplish this goal, the Army must be able to grow to rapidly and efficiently while maintaining an all-volunteer force that is capable of operating effectively on today's complex and technical battlefields.

The recruiting problems experienced during the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to be repeated in the event of future protracted conflict. Between 2003 and 2008 the military experienced what Clifford Stanley, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, described as "the most challenging recruiting environment since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973."46 During this period the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard all had difficulty meet recruiting goals. A healthy U.S. economy combined with increased casualties rates in Iraq, led to a severe shortage of recruits. In 2005 the Army Reserve and Army National Guard missed their recruiting goals by 16-percent and 20-percent respectively while the Regular Army fell 8-percent short.47

The Army's efforts to attract the necessary number of recruits was unprecedented. The Army added over 2,500 additional recruiters, raised the maximum age from 35 to 42, and added

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enlistment bonuses of $40,000. Between 2000 and 2007 the cost per Army recruit nearly doubled (See Figure 2).

**Figure 2 - Average Annual Cost per Recruit by Service, FY 2000-FY 2007**

The Army was also forced to lower entrance standards. As a result, the quality of Army recruits declined substantially between 2005 and 2007. By 2007, only 79-percent of Army recruits had high school diplomas, and only 61-percent scored above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, the lowest scores since the 1980s. The number of waivers granted for previously disqualifying medical or criminal history also increased substantially. Between 2003 and 2007 the percentage of Army recruits admitted with waivers increased from 12.7-percent to 22-percent.49

As Army enlistment standards lowered, violent and nonviolent crime, substance abuse, and suicide among troops increased. A 2012 Army report, *Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Ahead of the Strategic Reset*, found that "Soldiers with conduct waivers had a lesser

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48 Commission on National Guard and Reserve, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves*, 79.
probability of [separating from the Army] in their first year but a 13% higher probability to [separate] by the end of their first term of enlistment. Those with a drug waiver, moreover, had a 38% greater probability of [separating] in the same period."  

(Figure 3 depicts how, as the number of Soldiers with waivers increased, the number of Soldiers testing positive for illegal drugs nearly doubled.)

**Figure 3 - Drug / Alcohol and Conduct Waivers 2004-2011**

![Graph showing the number of soldiers testing positive for illegal drugs](https://example.com/graph.png)

The study concluded that soldiers admitted with waivers were more likely to commit crimes than those admitted under the previous standards.

The waivered population (as a cohort) committed over twice as many criminal offenses when compared against the non-waivered population with percentages ranging between 29-36% as compared to 15%. Those with drug waivers were 6 times more likely to commit a drug offense than the non-waivered cohort with 20% committing drug offenses compared to 3% of the remaining population. Additionally the waivered population was 2-3 times more likely to commit specific crimes while serving, including felony offenses of aggravated assault, failure to obey, and desertion; and misdemeanor offenses of AWOL, DUI, assault and battery and family abuse.  

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51 Information from *Generating Health and Discipline in the Force*, 152.  
52 Ibid., 152.
Waivers were not limited to criminal and drug history. Increasingly throughout the mid-2000s, more recruits had preexisting mental health conditions. Today, a large number of these Soldiers remain on active duty. In 2014, researchers found that 25-percent of Soldiers met the criteria for having a mental health disorder. Of that group, 77-percent reported the disorder began prior to their entrance into the Army.\footnote{Ressler, Kerry J., and Eric B. Schoomaker. "Commentary on 'The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS)': Army STARRS: A Framingham-Like Study of Psychological Health Risk Factors in Soldiers." \textit{Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes} 77, no. 2 (Summer 2014 2014): 120-129. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 20, 2014), 127.}

By 2009 the Army's recruiting difficulties had stabilized. A Congressional report attributed this to three primary factors. First, the economic downturn increased the unemployment rate driving more people chose military service. Second, pay and benefits improved significantly during this period. During the previous decade, Congress took measures to better align military compensation with the civilian workforce. The resulting improvement in housing allowances and pay coupled with increased educational benefits made military service a more attractive option for many. Finally, casualty rates decreased significantly following the 2007 Iraq troop surge.\footnote{Congressional Research Service, \textit{Recruiting and Retention}, 8.}

The factors that solved the Army's recruiting crisis may not have a lasting effect. As the economy recovers potential recruits will become increasingly attracted to non-military employment. Budget pressure is leading to decreases in housing allowances and other benefits. More attractive civilian employment options mean that the Army will face increased difficulty attracting qualified recruits even during peacetime. Evidence indicates this trend may have already begun. The Army's reserve components are currently experiencing difficulty attracting qualified recruits. In 2013, the National Guard failed to meet its recruiting goals,\footnote{113th Cong, 2nd Session, \textit{Impacts on Active, Guard, and Reserve Ability to Recruit and Sustain the Force}, MG Thomas Seamands, Statement before the House Committee on Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee, 16 January 2014, \texttt{http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS02/20140116/101633/HHRG-113-AS02-Wstate-SeamandsT-20140116.pdf}.} and the Army Reserve was unable to meet its goals this year.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD Announces Recruiting and Retention Numbers for Fiscal Year 2014," News Release No: NR-510-14, 6 October 2014, accessed at \texttt{http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16969&source=GovDelivery}.} The Chief of the Army Reserve recently directed
all Army Reserve units to "capitalize on all possible resources" retain and recruit personnel in response to a "critical" manpower shortage.57

Attracting volunteers during a conflict and competition from higher paying civilian jobs are not the only problem that faces the Army's recruiting efforts. America's recruiting pool is increasingly unfit for service. According to Major General Allen Batschelet, commander of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, 70-percent of the U.S. population age 17 to 24 is not qualified for military service due to obesity, criminal history, or cognitive ability. Batschelet explained that the shrinking recruit pool could present problems for the Army in the coming years. "I think that there are some really troubling signs on the horizon that we may not be able to find the quality that we seek or need. And without that solid quality foundation, we would be hard pressed to respond to whenever the nation needs us next."58

Not only is number of qualified candidates smaller, American youth are less attracted to military service. Virginia Penrod, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel, summed up future recruiting obstacles in recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. "Despite our continued recruiting success, the recruiting process does have inherent challenges. The size of our youth market is finite. Today, nearly 75 percent of our youth are not qualified for military service with medical conditions and weight accounting for most of the disqualifications. Compounding eligibility concerns is the lack of youth interested in military service."59

The Army Reserve Structure is currently unprepared to support the growth required to regenerate the Active Army. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), is made up of personnel who have recently received military training either in the Active Army or Selected Reserve (Army National Guard or Army Reserve). IRR members can be activated in a manner similar to the Selected Reserve. Unlike the Selected Reserve and the Active Component, the IRR end strength

57 MG Luis R. Visot, Acting Chief of Army Reserve, Memorandum, Subject: Assignment of Soldiers to Army Reserve (AR) Troop Program Units (TPU), 14 August 2014.
is not directly mandated by Congress, but is instead the end product of Army personnel policy.

All Soldiers who join the Army agree to serve for eight years. The amount of time spent assigned to an active duty or selected reserve unit varies according to the individual Soldier's enlistment agreement or service obligation. At the conclusion of the Soldier's active commitment, he or she is moved into the Individual Ready Reserve for the remaining term.

The IRR could provide the necessary pool of junior soldiers required to grow the Army however, its size is not predictable. IRR end-strength is not directly mandated by law like the Selected Reserve and Active Component. Instead, its size fluctuates based on the number of personnel who exit the Active or Reserve Component with a remaining service obligation.

Each military service component has its own IRR. As of September 2013, the combined total of all service's IRRs was 259,909. This is down from 776,080 in 1993 and 370,858 in 2000. In 2013, the Army IRR was made up of only 108,448 members.

**Policy Actors**

*Senior Uniformed Army Leadership*

The Chief of Staff of the Army and other senior uniformed leaders can be expected to oppose increased reliance on the reserve component. To date their stance has been to warn of the dangers of reducing the Active Component the hope that this will move Congress to lessen the severity of the cuts. In October 2014 the Army unveiled a new operational doctrine that will allow the Army to conduct multiple simultaneous small-scale operations throughout the world instead of traditional "major theater wars." Known as the Army Operating Concept, this approach also preserves many of the headquarters units required to conduct a larger scale conflict. The new operating concept is based on the assumption that the Army will "adjust to fiscal constraints and

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have resources sufficient to preserve the balance of readiness, force structure, and modernization necessary to meet the demands of the national defense strategy in the mid-to-far term.”

National Guard and Army Reserve Senior Leadership

The National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve senior leadership want their organizations to be viewed as an operational reserve that is ready to contribute immediately rather than a strategic reserve. Both the Army Reserve and National Guard can be expected to support legislation and policies elevate the Reserve Component's role in the Total Force.

Congress

The majority of Members of Congress can be expected to oppose any efforts to decrease National Guard capability within their state, even if they support cuts nationally. The National Guard has ties to every congressional district. This makes National Guard force structure changes difficult. Congress recently blocked an Army attempt to trade National Guard attack helicopters for utility aircraft currently in active duty units. Army attempts explain the need for the move were met with Congressional scrutiny, "The Army National Guard is the combat reserve of the Army, and I share other Senators' deep concern about removing all attack aviation capability from the Guard," stated Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). Congress can be expected to continue strict scrutiny of any policy that affects Reserve Component force structure.

Interest Groups

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is a non-profit organization that advocates for the United States Army. The association is among the most powerful military professional organizations with 75,000 members. The association can be expected to oppose efforts to reduce Active Component end strength.

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National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) Arguably the most powerful military advocacy organizations. NGAUS can be expected to aggressively defend the National Guard from budget cuts.64 The association will support legislation that strengthens the role of the National Guard as a part of the Total Force.

The Reserve Officer Association (ROA) is a reserve forces advocacy group. In 2014 the group has expressed support for a more capable, well-equipped reserve force that is a central component of the National Defense Strategy.65

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5. Policy Proposal

a. Policy Authorizing Tool

This memorandum analyzes a proposal to introduce legislation designed to increase access to reserve forces in a situation other than war or national emergency. Section 12304 of Title 10 United States Code authorizes the President to involuntarily activate members of the Selected and Individual Ready Reserve in times other than war or national emergency. Since 1990, every large military operation has required mobilization of reserve forces. In every instance, with the exception of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve mobilizations were authorized under Section 12304. Reservists were mobilized under this authorization to support Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, the 1995 Bosnia peacekeeping mission, and the Kosovo conflict. Since September 11, 2001 reserve mobilizations have been authorized under the national emergency declared after the 9-11 terror attacks which allowed for the mobilization of one million reservists. As time and circumstances distance the nation from the events of September 11th, future mobilizations will require separate authorizations that will likely be more restrictive.

In its current form Section 12304 authorizes the activation of up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserves. Not more than 30,000 of these personnel may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve. The proposed legislative amendment would increase the total number of reservists that can be activated to 350,000 of which 100,000 may be members of the IRR.

As the Army's budget is cut, it is being forced to choose between sacrificing readiness or capability. The primary purpose of the proposed legislation is to reassure the Army that in the future, the Reserve Component will be accessible for a variety of contingences. As budget cuts

necessitate tough choices, it is designed to provide the Army the tools to develop policies that lead to more efficient use of both the Active and Reserve Components.

b. Implementation method

The proposed legislative change will be simultaneously introduced as separate bills in the House of Representatives and Senate in January 2015. There the bill will be referred to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees for inclusion in the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. The Senate bill will be sponsored by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the incoming Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator McCain is currently the ranking Republican member of the Senate committee. He has been supportive of legislation and policies designed to preserve an efficient and effective military. In 1996, during the last military drawdown, Senator McCain stressed the importance of a Reserve Component that can contribute to the Total Force. "If these forces are required for the successful resolution of a conflict, then they must be ready to perform their mission when called upon. The current budget climate makes it increasingly difficult to justify the expenditure of scarce funds on forces which are not capable of significantly enhancing our national security."67

Today, in a period of similar fiscal austerity, Senator McCain's perspective remains applicable.

The House Bill will be introduced by Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX), the incoming Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Thornberry has been supportive of efforts to reform military structure. In 2014, he sponsored a bill to establish the Office of Net Assessment, an organization that is designed to allow the Department of Defense the ability to better analyze required military requirements based on a comprehensive analysis adversary capability.68

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6. Policy Analysis

The analysis contained in this section examines the positive and negative consequences of amending Section 12304 to allow more reservists to be activated in situations other than declared war or national emergency.

a. Advantages

As operations related to the Global War on Terror wind down, there is increased likelihood that future mobilizations will be constrained by the limits of Section 12304. As a result, the Army cannot depend on full integration of the reserve component for all potential operations. The proposed amendment to Section 12304 will positively impact the Army's ability to regenerate size and capability in the following ways:

**Effectiveness**

*Retain High Quality Force in the Event of Partial Mobilization*

The proposed policy will ensure that the Army is filled with higher quality personnel quality in the event of a mobilization. Currently, if required to increase size, the Army must rely on recruiting to fill its ranks. As discussed earlier, attracting the necessary number of qualified candidates during peacetime is challenging, even when the U.S. job market is weak. If the U.S. is engaged in a conflict, or the economy is strong, any significant mobilization will likely be hampered by lack of volunteers, especially for combat arms occupations. The Army will be once again forced to lower enlistment standards and find other methods to attract the necessary number of recruits. The effect will be similar to the reduction of standards during the Vietnam War, and the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Reducing enlistment standards have historically resulted in negative consequences for the Army. Misconduct, mental health problems, and drug use all increased when the Army reduced recruiting standards between 2005 and 2009. The spike in problems was not without precedent. Forty years earlier, the Army experienced similar results with recruits admitted during the
Vietnam War. It is too soon to know the long-term impact of the recent decline in standards however, studies of the Vietnam era standards reduction offer insight into what may come.

Case Study - Project 100,000

In 1966 the Department of Defense, under the leadership of Secretary McNamara, initiated a recruiting program designed to enroll men who would have been disqualified for low AFQT scores. The program, which became known as Project 100,000, sought not only to quench the military's need for active duty manpower, but to also "salvage" a segment of the population that had little opportunity for advancement. Each service was directed to establish special training units where the lower-aptitude recruits would receive special instruction to overcome their shortcomings. In all, nearly 350,000 military personnel were admitted into the military under Project 100,000. The majority served in Army and Marine Corps infantry and field artillery units.69

Service members admitted under the reduced standards of Project 100,000 underperformed in every significant indicator of potential to succeed in the military. The lower-aptitude enlistees tended have poorer performance in training and have more discipline problems than their higher-aptitude counterparts.70 Although the majority of the men admitted under Project 100,000 served honorably, their service failed to provide the "uplifting" effect predicted by McNamara. Additionally, the program perpetuated the widespread public belief that the Vietnam War was being fought by America's poor and uneducated.

In 1986 a Department of Defense study measured the long-term impact of military service on Project 100,000 enlistees. The report concluded that 20 years later, the lower-aptitude recruits admitted during the Vietnam era earned less money, were more likely to be unemployed, divorced, or deceased than both veterans of higher aptitude, and those of similar aptitude who did.

70 United States Congress, Readjustment of Project 100,000 Veterans, House Committee on Veteran's Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Session, 28 February 1990.
not serve in the military. In 1990 the study's authors testified to Congress "these results suggest that Project 100,000 was less than successful in its stated goal of providing low-aptitude and disadvantaged youth an avenue for upgrading their skills and potential through military service."\(^7^1\)

Since 2004 the Army's suicide rate, traditionally lower than the civilian sector, steadily increased until it surpassed the civilian rate in 2008. A recent study conducted by the National Institute for Health indicates that this trend may have been influenced by increases in mental health and aptitude waivers. The study found that Soldiers whose AFQT score is in the bottom 50th percentile have a history of mental health disorder, and who joined after the age of 27 are more likely to commit suicide while in the Army.\(^7^2\) Between 2005 and 2009, as a result of lowered enlistment standards, significantly more personnel who fall into these three categories were admitted into the Army.

The proposed legislation will mute some of the negative consequences of growing the volunteer force quickly by allowing the Army easier access to the Reserve Component, especially the IRR. A dependable, quality reserve force will delay the need to admit lower quality recruits. Although some standards reduction may still be necessary, especially if a large mobilization is required, the total quality of the force will remain higher than under the current system.

**Negative Consequences of Overburdened Recruiting System**

Between 2005 and 2009 the Army's recruiting system was placed under tremendous pressure to attract the numbers of volunteers needed to sustain the Army. As popular support for the war in Iraq waned, the Army failed to attract enough volunteers. Recruiters were pressured to bend the rules to get candidates into the Army. A second disturbing trend was an increase in depression and suicides among Army recruiters.

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\(^7^1\)U.S. Cong. Readjustment of Project 100,000 Vets, 6.
\(^7^2\) Ronald C. Kessler, et. al., "Predicting Suicides After Psychiatric Hospitalization in U.S. Army Soldiers: The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS), JAMA Psychiatry, Published online 12 November 2014, E5.
Between 2005 and 2009, Army recruiters were placed under enormous pressure to get recruits. In May 2005 the New York Times published the results of anonymous interviews with dozens of Army recruiters across the country. The article described widespread fraud as recruiters struggled to meet quotas. "Several spoke of concealing mental-health histories and police records. They described falsified documents, wallet-size cheat sheets slipped to applicants before the military's aptitude test and commanding officers who look the other way. And they voiced doubts about the quality of some troops destined for the front lines." Recruiter bending of the rules amplified effects of the Army's official relaxation of standards. Although the actual number of ineligible recruits is difficult to calculate, it is likely the number of lower quality personnel that were admitted during the mid-2000s is higher than the official statistics.

Stress and pressure took a toll on the recruiters themselves. Between 2001 and 2009 seventeen Army recruiters committed suicide, four of them from the Houston Recruiting Battalion. The spike in suicides prompted Congressional interest and an Army investigation. The inquiry concluded that the Houston battalion had a "poor command climate" and a "unhealthy and singular focus on production at the expense of soldier and family considerations." Senator John Cornyn, R-Texas, later told reporters, "This is a very disturbing report . . . This is not an isolated issue among four people who took their lives in the Houston battalion, but really points to Army-wide recruiting problems."

More reliable access to the IRR for a variety of contingencies will allow the Army to use IRR members to augment Active and Reserve units. The proposed change to Title 10 will allow the Army to utilize IRR members to make up for the expected decrease in recruits. As a result, the Army will be able to regenerate to current size and capacity with less pressure on the recruiting system.

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Efficiency

Cost

The cost of maintaining a Reserve Component unit is substantially less than a similar Active duty counterpart. The proposed legislation will provide the Army flexibility to move capabilities into the Reserve Component and be guaranteed access when needed. As a result, the Army will have the opportunity to increase efficiency.

The main difference in cost between Active and Reserve Component units can be attributed to personnel costs (pay and benefits). The annual cost to maintain an Infantry Brigade Combat Team during peacetime is $277 million of which 94-percent is personnel cost. A similar National Guard unit costs $66 million during peacetime. It costs approximately $97 million and three months to prepare the National Guard unit for deployment. The Active Component brigade can deploy for $8 million and requires less training time.76

The Army's current efforts to cut cost by reducing the readiness of the Active Component is not an efficient method. Reducing the training and maintenance funding of a typical Active duty unit only impacts a small percentage of the budget (only 6-percent of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team cost). The largest bill, personnel cost, remains. Unready Active Component units can take as long as well maintained Reserve Component units to train and deploy. Allowing the Army to commit a large Reserve Component force for the most likely future conflicts gives the Army the ability to reduce cost while maintaining similar capability.

More Capable Total Force

Today, the Army must plan to accomplish most required missions in the absence of declared war or national emergency. Since the end of the Second World War the Army has not been called to fight in a declared war. Despite the use of the national emergency following the September 11th attacks to justify mobilization of the Army for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is

76 Chuck Hagel, Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components: Report to Congress, 20 December 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 23.
unlikely that that the next conflict the Army will participate in will be the result of such an attack.

Therefore that Army must remain prepared to undertake a fairly large combat operation without large-scale activation of the Reserve Component. This requirement has caused the Army to be hesitant to move critical capabilities into the Reserve Component. Increasing access to the Reserve Component, including larger numbers of the IRR, will allow the Army to commit the appropriate forces to the next conflict. In addition, increased reliance on the Reserve Component will allow the National Guard to truly achieve its objective of becoming an operational reserve.

**Administrative/Technical Capacity**

*A More Accessible Individual Ready Reserve*

The Individual Ready Reserve is does not currently play a critical role in the Army's mobilization plans, especially for partial mobilizations. The primary reason for this is lack of access. Under Section 12304 no more than 30,000 IRR members can be mobilized across all military departments. As a result, the IRR has been largely ignored by Army mobilization planners. Increasing the number of IRR members who can be activated for operations other than war will provide the Army incentive to incorporate the IRR into a more meaningful role in the total force.

The IRR's lack of capability was demonstrated during activations for Iraq and Afghanistan when less than 50-percent of members responded to their mobilization notices. The primary reason for the IRR's failure is that the Army has not prioritized it as part of the Total Force. More reliable access to this important segment of the Reserve Component will encourage the Army to fix the IRR system.

Garri Hendell, a senior Army civilian in the Army National Guard Personnel Policy Division outlined the problems facing the IRR system in an article published in *Military Review*. According to Hendell, the IRR is hindered by a shortage of resources and lack of institutional focus. He points out that small changes to IRR management and personnel benefits would make
the IRR a more effective organization.\textsuperscript{77} If the Army can depend on access to the IRR, it will undertake prioritize the changes needed to fix the IRR. The result will be the IRR’s efficient integration as a contributor to the Total Force.

\textit{Equality/Liberty}

\textit{Reduction in Criminal Activity Associated with a Stressed Recruiting System}

Attempting to attract volunteers by increasing the amount of money spent on recruiting stresses the defense contracting systems and increases the likelihood of abuse. As the Army struggled to attract recruits during the mid-2000s, the Army National Guard and Regular Army introduced incentive programs to encourage current Guard members to provide recruiting referrals. Bonuses ranged between $2,000 and $7,500 for each referral that resulted in an enlistment. Fraud and abuse was widespread in the program between 2005 and 2010. Some National Guard recruiters collaborated with other Guard members to obtain bonuses for recruits who already planned on joining the National Guard. In other instances, high school counselors were given bribes in return for the names of students who were already considering joining the National Guard.\textsuperscript{78} Investigations by the Department of Justice and Army have resulted in the indictments and convictions of numerous National Guard members.\textsuperscript{79}

Allegations for fraud are not limited to individual recruiters, in October 2014, five senior National Guard officials and one civilian were charged with bribery involving $14.6 million in marketing, recruitment, and retention contracts.\textsuperscript{80} Earlier this year, the commander of the U.S.


Army Criminal Investigative Command testified before Congress that the total extend of the recruiting fraud may exceed $100 million.\textsuperscript{81}

The proposed legislation will limit the risk of recruiting fraud. Less dependence on the Army and National Guard recruiting system during a mobilization, will decrease opportunities for fraud and abuse. As a result, both Service members and the American taxpayers will be protected.

b. Disadvantages

The most significant negative consequences of the proposed policy action are related to the potential for over-reliance on the Reserve Component, including the IRR. As the reserves become a more important part of the Total Force, care must be taken to ensure they remain ready and are not overcommitted. Failure to do so could lead to a force that is unable to rapidly respond to emerging threats and sustain membership due to loss of community support.

*The Risk of an Unprepared Army*

The Army's Total Force concept incorporates the reserve component into nearly all military operations. However, there are challenges that are unique to deploying reserve units. Reserve Component units have limited training time, and as a result are maintained at a lower state of readiness than their Active Component counterparts. Traditionally, the activation of National Guard and Army Reserve units is followed by months of training before the units are deployed. The length of this training depends on the baseline readiness that the unit is able to maintain. To effectively utilize Reserve Component units, the Army must have effective tools to measure this readiness.

The Army experienced the difficulties associated with assessing the readiness of reserve forces during the mobilization for Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Although Reserve Component forces largely performed effectively, Army National Guard combat units were not as

\textsuperscript{81} U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight, *Fraud and Abuse in Army Recruiting Contracts*, 36.
prepared as pre-conflict reporting indicated.\textsuperscript{82} This did not present a critical problem at the time because the United States set the tempo of the conflict. The post-Cold War drawdown had not yet occurred and the 700,000 strong active force was able to backfill any reserve units that were unable to deploy. A 1992 DOD force structure assessment noted, "During the Persian Gulf War, we were able to call the forces that were needed, when they were needed, and still had a very large residual force of active and reserve units to deter adventurism in other parts of the world."\textsuperscript{83}

The current drawdown ensures that the Army will not have the capacity to make up for unready combat units. In future conflicts, the consequences of overestimating combat readiness could be more dire than during the Gulf War. As the Army becomes more dependent on the Reserve Component, it must prioritize the administrative capability to monitor and maintain readiness.

\textit{Potential for Loss of Employer and Community Support}

A second potentially negative consequence of this legislation is the potential for the Army to overuse the Reserve Component. In turn, this could lead to a loss in support from employers, communities, and reservists themselves. Joint Publication 4-05 warns "the impact of transferring productive members of the civilian sector into the military must be carefully weighed. Commanders must prudently weigh their needs to support a crisis with RC members with the needs of the civilian sector and its impact on future RC readiness."\textsuperscript{84}

There are indications that the conflicts of the past decade have begun to have a negative impact on the support employers have for their employees membership in the Reserve Component. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA) of 1994 mandates that reservists' civilian jobs are secured while they are absent for military service.

\textsuperscript{82} Assisting the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces, 56.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 294.
In February 2012, Ted Daywalt, CEO of VetJobs testified before Congress about the risk of losing employer support for membership in the Reserve Component. He warned that although businesses sought the skills and experience veterans provide, they do not want the burden associated with employees leaving for military service. "The message is they want to hire veterans," he said, “but they cannot go broke supporting their National Guard employees with constant call-ups and all the financial and legal obligations fostered onto the employers by USERRA."

Department of Labor statistics show a relationship between repeated use of the Reserve Component and civilian employer discrimination against reservists. Between 2005 and 2011, as reservists were increasingly called to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of USERRA cases handled by the Justice Department and Department of Labor increased 21-percent.

Increased access to the Reserve Component and IRR may create an environment where employers are less inclined to hire reservists. The consequences of over-commitment of the Reserve Component can be mitigated by increasing the size of the Active Component in the event the U.S. becomes involved in a protracted conflict.

7. Political Analysis

a. Key Stakeholders

*Senior Army Leadership (Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army)*

The proposed legislative change is designed to provide the Army greater flexibility in how it can allocate forces between the Active and Reserve Components. Army planners will be able to better anticipate what resources will be available and how they can be employed. Senior Army leaders will support the proposed legislation because of the increased flexibility it will provide.

In September 2014, General Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that projected cuts will reduce the Army's capability to a point that it will be unable to perform the tasks outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

“In my professional military judgment, these projected end strength and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater . . . Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation.”

The need for change is dire. By its own admission, the Army will become unable to accomplish its assigned missions. The proposed legislative change offers the Army increased flexibility to move capabilities between the Reserve and Active Components. Increased access to reserve forces will mitigate the Army leadership's aversion to cutting Active Component end strength.

*National Guard and Army Reserve Senior Leadership*

Senior leaders in both the Army Reserve and National Guard can be expected to support the proposed legislation. They view their organizations as good investments during times of fiscal austerity. “If you reduce the size of the Army Reserve, you don’t really save any money, because we’re already . . . pretty efficient,” Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve

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recently stated. “As we have to come down, perhaps, in our active-component strength, one of the ways that you mitigate that risk in national security architecture is by investing more in the reserve component -- not less.”

President of the United States

The President can be expected to support the proposed legislation. Future conflicts are more likely to require mobilizations under conditions other than war or national emergency. President Barack Obama has already used Section 12304 to activate a limited number of Reserve Component units and IRR members to respond to both the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the more recent Ebola epidemic in Africa. The proposed legislative change provide the President more options when dealing with crisis.

Congress

The majority of Congress can be expected to be supportive of the proposed legislative change. Legislative issues that involve the Reserve Component are generally subject to increased congressional scrutiny. Unlike the Active Component, National Guard and Reserve units are located in every state and territory. The proposed legislation offers an alternative to cutting the Reserve Component budget, an option that will affect every congressional district.

Changing Title 10 to allow the Army more flexibility to rely on the Reserve Component will protect National Guard and Reserve units from budget cuts. Although there will be some congressional opposition, the measure can be expected to be more palatable to Congress than other measures such as base realignment and closure.

Over the past year Army efforts to include the National Guard in force reductions have been strongly opposed by Congress. Although members understand the need to reduce cost, they do not want their districts to feel the associated financial pain. Mississippi Senator Thad Cochran

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(R-MS) expressed this view in June 2014. “Restructuring the Army may be necessary, but we shouldn’t rush into any plan that has a disproportionate impact on the Guard in Mississippi.”

Although the proposed change to Title 10 avoids impacting every member of congress, not all can be expected to support the change. Members of Congress from districts where Active duty Army units are stationed, will be less supportive of the plan. However, the change to Title 10 will generate considerably less opposition from these members than other cost cutting options. According to the Center for New American Security, Congress can be expected to oppose most defense reforms.

Members of Congress have strong incentives to oppose some of these reforms, especially BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) and changes to military compensation, because they generate strong opposition from affected constituents. Indeed, while defense experts widely agree that another round of BRAC is both necessary and desirable, Congress has blocked past BRAC proposals due to local economic and employment concerns – and early signs indicate that Congress is likely to reject DOD’s recent request for a BRAC round in 2017.

The proposed change to Title 10 does not directly impact the Army's budget or structure. Instead, the legislation erects a framework that allows the Army to increase its reliance on the Reserve Component for the most likely mobilization scenarios. Congress is more likely to focus attention on specific policy actions that emerge as a result of the change. This congressional interest must be addressed by the Army and Department of Defense when the time comes. For example, Active Component cuts may need to be distributed across congressional districts to minimize negative economic impact to any particular region.

The proposed change will not cause Congress to lose authority over the authorization and oversight of the Army or Department of Defense. Military end strength will continue to be approval annually through the National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act called for the establishment of a national commission that will

90 Bensahel, Beyond the QDR, 6.
examine the structure of the Army's mix of Active and Reserve forces. This commission will provide Congress the opportunity to have additional input on the Army's size and structure.91

b. The Public

The opinions of the general public significantly impact success of any legislation. The American public can be expected to be somewhat ambivalent in regards to the proposed change to Title 10. Studies indicate that Americans have little interest in military affairs and do not support alternatives such as a return to the draft.

The military is the smallest since the end of the draft. As a result, less Americans are serving, and those who do tend to serve longer. A 2011 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center concluded that only about 0.5% of Americans has been on active military duty at any given time since September 11, 2001.92 In addition, although Americans have a high opinion in their military, they are increasingly disinterested in military issues. Half of Americans surveyed responded that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had made little difference in their lives and only 36% said the conflicts came up in conversations with family or friends.93

An alternative to increased reliance on the Reserve Component is a return to the draft. The American public is clearly against this option. Survey show that 74-percent of Americans did not think the U.S. should return to the draft. In 2007, 87-percent of Americans between the ages of 17 and 29 were opposed to reinstating the military draft. As many as 46-percent of college graduates said that if implemented, they would avoid the draft.94 The proposed legislative change will decrease the chances that a future conflict will require the draft to be implemented. Because of this, the American public the public can be expected to support it.

91 U.S. Lib of Cong, CRS, Army Drawdown and Restructuring, 20.
c. Political Benefits

Implementation of the proposed change could have political benefits for the Department of Defense. The Army's most powerful advocacy groups are currently rowing in opposite directions when it comes to dealing with the effects of budget cuts. The Association of the United States Army, a strong supporter of a large Active Component, backs Army efforts to maintain a more capable Active Component. Retired General Frederick J. Krosen, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare, voiced the association's view that a robust Active Component is necessary for the Army to perform its role effectively. "[AUSA has] long advocated an Army of more than 700,000 as the force required to deter war or to win if deterrence failed. Today, there is no apparent support for that Army in Congress, the Defense Department, the think tanks, or the news media, but that does not invalidate or nullify the recommendation."95

The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) has maintained that the Reserve Component, especially the National Guard, should be an accessible, capable force. The NGAUS website outlines the this goal. "As the United States concludes its major overseas ground operations, it makes the most sense to maintain to a strong, operational Army National Guard used as needed in peacetime and a smaller standing Army as our Founding Fathers intended."96

Tension between Active and Reserve Component budgets came to a head in February 2014 when the President of NGAUS criticized the Army Chief's remarks on Guard readiness as being "disrespectful and not true."97 Both NGAUS and AUSA have expended considerable resources lobbying for their viewpoints. Disagreement and bickering between the Army's most powerful advocates is not in the best interest of the Department of Defense.

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The proposed change to Title 10 will provide the Army greater incentive to integrate the Active and Reserve Components into the Total Force. In turn, this would help mend the fragmented relationship between the Active Army and National Guard advocacy groups. Both AUSA and NGAUS could then focus their considerable political clout on other pressing defense related issues such as personnel benefit reform or advocating for a new round of base realignment and closures.

d. Political Costs

There is risk that increased reliance on the Reserve Component, especially the Individual Ready Reserve, could be perceived as a "back-door draft." The public, unaware of the details of military service contracts, may view the involuntary call-up of IRR members negatively. A similar backlash occurred in response to the "Stop-loss" policies implemented during the Iraq War.

An op-ed recently published in the *New York Post* outlines the view that IRR recall is unfair. The author, a former Army junior officer, criticized the President for cutting size of the Army while coercing others to active duty to combat the Ebola epidemic in Africa. "Last week’s executive order allows the Army to continue reducing the active force by 80,000 soldiers over the next four years and to keep sending pink slips to those still serving in Afghanistan, while simultaneously allowing the involuntary recall of former service members back to active duty." As the IRR becomes more accessible, it will become necessary for the Army to educate both service members and the public about the roles and responsibilities of IRR members.

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8. Recommendation

That the Secretary of Defense request the introduction of legislation to increase the number of reservists that the President can mobilize for purposes other than war or national emergency. This legislative change will provide the Army the flexibility to adapt its structure to changing demographics and shrinking budgets while maintaining a quality all-volunteer force.

The requirement to maintain a volunteer force will remain for the foreseeable future. There is no political or public support for alternatives such as a return to the draft. The Army must account for recruiting problems that will result if the Army attempts to regenerate during an ongoing conflict. Increased access to the Reserve Component, especially the IRR, for a variety of mobilization scenarios will encourage the Army to incorporate the reserves more effectively into the Total Force. In addition, it will allow the National Guard to become integrated as a true Operational Reserve.

When the Army is required to grow in the future, the proposed legislative change will ensure the quality of the force remains as high as possible for as long as possible. Substituting reservists for volunteers will slow the need for the Army to reduce entrance requirements. In the event of full mobilization, the more capable and accessible Reserve Component can be augmented by the draft to regenerate a large war-time Army.

It is cheaper to use the reserve component. This is important in today's austere budgetary environment. Instead of maintaining active units at low readiness levels, the Army will have additional incentive to rely on National Guard combat brigades instead.

Increased reliance on the reserve component is not without risk. The potential to overuse the Reserve Component could result in serious consequences for the Army. It is important for policymakers to understand this risk. If the United States becomes involved in a protracted conflict in the future, steps must be quickly taken to grow the Active Component to avoid potential strain on the reserves.
Curriculum Vitae
Damon M. Hunt
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Education:
Graduate Certificate in Strategic Studies, 2013, The Institute of World Politics, Washington, DC.
Bachelor of Arts in Sociology, 2002, University of Massachusetts; Amherst, MA.

Professional Experience

Brigade Chief of Operations April - August 2012
Synchronized near-term operations for an Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team in both garrison and field environments.

Airborne Infantry Rifle Company Commander October, 2010 – April 2012
Responsible for the training, welfare, readiness, and combat application of an Airborne Infantry Rifle Company. Deployed to Iraq in support of Operation New Dawn.

Battalion Operations and Assistant Operations Officer January 2009 – September 2010
Responsible for planning and synchronizing the training and operations of an Airborne Infantry Battalion prepared to deploy on short notice as a component of the Global Response Force. Provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Haiti the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

Responsible for initial and advanced training of U.S. Army Infantry Soldiers.

Task Force Assistant Operations Officer April 2006 – May 2007
Planned and synchronized the operations of an Infantry Battalion Task Force deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Detachment Commander 2005 – 2006
Commanded the Rear Detachment of a forward deployed Air Assault Infantry Battalion.

Rifle Platoon Leader and Anti-Armor Company Executive Officer - 2004 - 2005

Selected Military Education:
United States Army Command and General Staff College - 2013
Advanced Airborne/Jumpmaster Course - 2009
Maneuver Captains Career Course - 2008
Pathfinder School - 2007
Air Assault School - 2004
Ranger School - 2003
Airborne School - 2003
Infantry Officer Basic Course - 2003