INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES:
GREAT POWERS, FRAGMENTED ALLIES, AND ALLIANCE-
MAKING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by
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ABSTRACT

International relations (IR) theory on alliances traditionally focuses on how and why states balance (resist) or bandwagon with (appease) external threats. But most threats faced by states today are not from other states. Rather, they come from within the states themselves in the form of civil war, rebellions, insurgencies and coups. Faced with threats emanating from within weak polities, great powers and the regimes ruling such peripheral states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. The weak state’s leaders are motivated to make sure they remain in power, while the great power seeks to safeguard its interests associated therewith. These “internal threat alliances” differ fundamentally from those in which states align to balance a threat external to their borders (what I refer to as “external threat alliances”) but have not been adequately examined in the literature.

To help fill this gap in IR theory, this dissertation explains four of these core differences and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened state (regime) and its prospective alliance partner. In so doing, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. These core differences are the following. First, rather than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard state security and territorial integrity, the great power/regime align in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s survival and great power interests associated therewith. Second, instead of comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the military, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the great power aligns with an extremely internally fragmented ally whose relevant actors/ agencies often decide
to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the national interest. Third, rather than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning in traditional alliances, some regime agencies balance the target threat while others simultaneously collude with the same set of actors. And fourth and finally, when deciding how to respond to threats the regime largely does not do what is best for their countries’ national interest—as is the case with traditional military alliances—but, instead, takes those actions that would preserve their political and personal power.

The dissertation establishes this argument by employing a qualitative case study research methodology to examine two such internal threat alliances: the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). This included fieldwork and interviews in Colombia and Afghanistan. The dissertation is important in illustrating how the nature of alliance making has changed and for guiding policy given that great powers will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with them today.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES: GREAT POWERS, FRAGMENTED ALLIES, AND ALLIANCE-MAKING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

International relations (IR) theory on alliances traditionally focuses on how and why states balance (resist) or bandwagon with (appease) external threats. But most threats faced by states today are not from other states. Rather, they come from within the states themselves in the form of civil war, rebellions, insurgencies and coups. It is to be expected that regimes ruling peripheral states that seek to survive will pursue protection from these internal threats. Since many of these regimes lack the ability to defend themselves from such menaces, they seek alliances with countries, in particular great powers, which can help them do so. Examples of these “internal threat alliances” include those between the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). In each case, the great power and regime brought their security policies into close cooperation (and thereby aggregated capabilities) to balance a threat internal to the weaker regime’s borders yet with implications for the national security of (and thus common to) both states. For each case, the threat was associated with political violence and internal conflict within the weaker state.

These internal threat alliances differ fundamentally from those in which states align to balance a threat external to their borders (what I refer to as “external threat alliances”) but have not been adequately examined in the literature. To help fill this gap in IR theory, I will explain these differences and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened state and its prospective alliance partner. The four differences I examine are: (1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align,
(2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. In detailing these four core differences, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

My dissertation is important in illustrating how the nature of alliance making has changed and for guiding policy given that great powers will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with them today. The dissertation follows prior work by scholars on the dynamics of alliances formed to balance external enemies—both “peacetime” alliances (Snyder 1997) and “wartime” alliances (Weitsman 2004)—and makes a distinct contribution to IR theory by helping understand the dynamics of internal threat alliances.

THEORETICAL AND POLICY RELEVANCE

The changing nature of threats within the international system makes this dissertation increasingly relevant, as states are confronted by and act to balance new types of menaces to their security. Through the end of the Cold War, conflict with other states represented the core threat to sovereign polities. In response to such threats and in order to ensure their national interests defined in terms of power and territorial survival, states brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances (external threat alliances) to defeat or deter attacks from adversaries outside of their borders.\(^5\) International Relations scholars responded in kind and espoused theories regarding the formation of these military alliances as well as why some of them remained together and others did not.
In particular after the Berlin Wall’s collapse, however, the form and character of the principal threat to states across the globe has changed—political violence and intra-state conflict (in particular within weaker polities in the “periphery”) have eclipsed their inter-state counterpart as the principal form of mass organized violence in the international system. In tandem with the “long peace” and decline in battlefield deaths at the hands of conflicts between states, fatalities resulting from violence and wars within states have been on the rise and taken more than 25 million lives. Depending on the threshold for battlefield deaths used, such internal violence has afflicted from one third to one half of nations across the globe. Nearly 97 percent of conflicts were intra- and not inter-state in nature from 1995 to 2010 and at the time of this writing 21 civil wars are ongoing. While 61 intra-state wars occurred from 1990 to 2007, only eight incidents of inter-state conflict transpired in the same period. In addition to enduring longer on average than inter-state war, internal conflicts are unusually persistent: 20 percent of civil wars since 1960 have lasted for ten or more years.

Though distinct in context and characteristics from inter-state conflict, political violence and internal war nonetheless pose genuine and severe threats to states across the globe. This new principal form of mass organized violence threatens the survival of peripheral regimes within whose borders conflict occurs and creates consequences that imperil great power interests in various ways including by: challenging the survival of allies; creating instability that terrorist organizations can take advantage of to plan and launch attacks; endangering access to vital natural resource reserves; and causing mass migration of refugees, among others. Faced with threats emanating from within weak polities, and like their response to hazards posed by external enemies, states have brought
their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances (internal threat alliances) to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. Although many IR scholars have paid close attention to external threat alliances, few have analyzed internal threat alliances.

Just as Weitsman (2004) contended that theory on peacetime alliance dynamics (the lion’s share of literature) could not be directly applied, due to their unique characteristics, to make predictions regarding those of wartime alliances, and thus developed a new framework to do so, the distinct nature of internal threat alliances requires a similar effort. In explaining the core differences between traditional and internal threat alliances, this is where I seek to make my scholarly contribution.

The importance of this dissertation is further amplified by the likelihood that internal war and political violence will continue well into the future, as the principal causes at the root of such conflict show no signs of abating. Consequently, political violence including to the degree of internal war and associated threats posed to great powers and peripheral regimes are likely to endure—and therefore so too will internal threat alliances continue to be a central aspect of international relations as states seek ways in which to secure their interests in the face of such dangers. As we continue into an age where the principal threat to states will likely be political violence and consequences emanating from within polities, as opposed to state-on-state violence in the territories or sea lanes of the international system, this dissertation will provide theorists a mechanism via which to make predictions regarding and understand the dynamics of state responses to these threats.

THE ARGUMENT AND OUTLINE OF CHAPTER
I address this gap in the literature by revising alliance theory to demonstrate how internal threat alliances are in some ways like external threat alliances and in other ways
different. Though the characteristics of these alliances are distinct in several ways, these differences can be distilled into a single distinguishing factor: *where traditional military alliances deal with securing the state and national interest, internal threat alliances deal with ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it*. Just as this core *characteristic* of the alliance changes, so too will their *dynamics*. Therefore, I argue that internal threat alliances are distinct from their external counterparts in four ways. Collectively, these four elements represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat *domestic in origin* that imperils a *regime*. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is *external in origin* (another state or group of states) and imperils the *state as a whole*. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the *regime’s survival*. The regime aligns because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, while external threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral
state with major internal fragmentation. Due to this fragmentation, there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics and therefore need to be accounted for in theory. Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of states in internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies are essentially cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion and central governments that control all component parts. Combined with the nature and location of the threat, this requires expanding the relevant levels of analysis from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational.

Third, because of this fragmentation, “bandwagoning” (appeasing a threat) in internal threat alliances is distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances. The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, balancing (resisting a threat) and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence. This contrasts with traditional alliances, where states either balance or bandwagon when faced with an external enemy. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external
threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon *while the allies are together.*

In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the great power will manage relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power may need to bypass a bandwagoning *central* regime and work with other regime elements to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.

Fourth and finally, when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on *their own political survival* rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state.

After forming an external threat alliance, states work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more “cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer together (increase
cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace (increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival.

Like traditional alliances, internal threat alliances can only be strong when the peripheral and core states are willing to work together to defeat the shared enemy. The successfulness of the alliance depends on the severity of the threat and the quantity of resources needed to counter the threat. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests.

To demonstrate these four differences between traditional and internal threat alliances the chapter unfolds in three core sections. The first section describes four elements of military alliances driven by external threats. The second section presents my argument. It demonstrates how internal threat alliances are distinct from their external threat counterpart in these four areas and outlines how I modify alliance theory to account for these differences. Subsequent chapters evidence these four differences through close case analysis of two such alliances. The third section provides conclusions and an outline for the balance of the dissertation.
I. External Threat Alliances: Characteristics & Associated Dynamics

Military alliances have been a fundamental aspect of international relations since the time of Thucydides. Spurred by “common perceptions of threat and overlapping strategic interests,” states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and combined military and economic resources in order to defeat or deter attacks from common external enemies or offensively seek revisions to the status quo. Reflecting the prevalence of alliances as a form of statecraft, the IR literature on military alliances is vast and has enriched our theoretical understanding of why and under what conditions states, mainly great powers, form alliances in order to achieve their mutual security goals. Drawing on literature reviewed in greater detail in the next chapter, this section provides a stylized summary of four of the main elements of alliances formed to cope with external threats.

For the purpose of this analysis, the four elements examined are: (1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align (formation), (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. The purpose of the section is to be able to later in the chapter juxtapose these elements to those of internal threat alliances.

1. Nature of Threat and Why States Align: External Enemies and to Safeguard the National Interest

States form military alliances in response to a threat external to their borders as represented by a state or groups of states. For example, beginning in 1891 France and Russia aligned to balance an external threat as represented by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain). Similarly, in the early 1940s Britain,
France and Poland (joined later by the U.S.) aligned in response to the external threat comprised of a resurgent Germany and its Axis power allies (Italy and Japan).  

Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to form external threat alliances is their need to preserve security and the national interest—defined in terms of power and territorial survival—and amass those capabilities perceived as necessary to do so. As an automatic response (in structural IR accounts) or due to a “perceived” increase in threat (in neoclassical realist IR treatments) states A and B align because they view threat T (external to their borders) as imperiling their security and realize that alone they lack the capabilities (military, economic, territorial control, or other) sufficient to defeat (or deter) that threat.  

In turn, they agree to bring their security policies into close cooperation and collaborate militarily in order to pool resources perceived as sufficient to defeat (or deter) that threat and preserve their security. In World War II, for example, the Allied powers aligned in order to balance the Axis Powers in order to preserve their national security.

2. Characteristics of Allies: Cohesive Actors, Slight Internal Fragmentation  

In examining the dynamics of alliances forged to cope with such external threats, most of IR theory focuses on those formed by Western states (mainly great powers) of comparable degrees of development and internal cohesiveness. While external threat alliances involve countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. Accordingly, associated theoretical frameworks largely assume that states comprising the alliance are “like units” that serve the same list of functions yet differ according to their capabilities. Internally, their political order is structured in a hierarchical fashion and as a result they act in a “rational” manner: preferences are ordered when making decisions and preserving national security and
associated territorial survival trump other concerns. Due to their internally cohesive manner, the actors considered relevant to alliance dynamics and thus examined in IR theory are core national-level security-policy decision-makers (in some cases referred to as the “Foreign Policy Executive”) who communicate and decide to align (formation) as well as work together to devise goals and strategies in order to deter aggression from or defeat this threat (cohesion). Other actors within the allies—their militaries, for example—are assumed to be under the control of central decision-makers and to rationally execute alliance strategy including use of pooled resources (effectiveness).

A. Relevant Levels of Analysis: International

Due to the nature of the external threat and the internally cohesive composition of the allies, to examine why states formed an alliance and were (or were not) able to deter or defeat their common threat, the relevant level of analysis and therefore that which IR theory focuses on is predominantly international. The threat’s location and profile mean that allies confront it principally in the sea lanes and foreign territories of the international system. The core decision-makers of states A and B based in their respective capitals coordinate policies to balance their common threat (T). In the event of escalation and ensuing conflict, A and B apply the capabilities they have collectively amassed to combat T, generally outside of their respective borders. In 1866, for example, Prussia and Italy aligned and then combatted the naval forces of their external threat, the Austrian Empire, in the Adriatic Sea. More than 100 years later and in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. and other states invaded Iraq so as to preclude Hussein’s further advance into Saudi Arabia. The national or subnational levels of analysis have largely not been considered relevant to examining external threat alliance dynamics (in particular cohesion and effectiveness).
3. Why and When States Bandwagon: Security and “Spoils” to Advance the National Interest and Territorial Survival

Whereas balancing is defined as “allying with others against the prevailing threat,” states can also “bandwagon,” defined as “alignment with the source of danger.” Bandwagoning with the source of threat can take two forms as distinguished by motivation or purpose.22 “Offensive” bandwagoning represents a state’s decision to align with the dominant state in order to share in that state’s “spoils of victory.” And “defensive” bandwagoning is a “form of appeasement” – a state aligns with an aggressor in order to avoid attack and survive (Walt 1987).23 Others take issue with this treatment of bandwagoning and argue that states will bandwagon even in the absence of a threat—states enter a conflict on the side they perceive to be stronger (and thus more likely to win) with the aim of securing material benefit in the event that side wins. That is, states “bandwagon for profit” (Schweller 1994).24

In analyses centered on cohesion, bandwagoning is one factor IR scholars hold may lead to the “dissolution” of external threat alliances: after aligning and facing an escalating threat, an ally may decide that the alliance is no longer able to advance its national interest. The state defects from the alliance and aligns (bandwagons) with the “source of danger.” States of lower power status are particularly prone to bandwagoning; lacking capabilities necessary to affect the outcome of a given conflict, they must select the “winning side” in order to survive. During World War II, for example, after initially aligning with the Axis Powers to fight on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces, Romania defected and bandwagoned with the empowered Soviet Union to ensure its survival.25

In sum, due to the nature of the threat an ally may bandwagon to “survive” or “for profit,” but both decisions are driven by the state’s core motivation to preserve national
security and territorial survival. Further, bandwagoning and balancing is a binary phenomenon—states either bandwagon or balance. As Walt says: “when confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon.” Bandwagoning implies departing an alliance, so they cannot do both simultaneously.

4. Primary Ally Motivation in Response to Threats: the National Interest

After forming an external threat alliance, core decision-makers based in the allies’ capitals work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. They work together “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends.” This is referred to alliance “cohesion.” In so doing, they are working toward the shared goal of deterring or defeating a common external menace. And whether they achieve this goal is referred to as the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.” Essentially, these two terms boil down to the alliance’s target threat and what the allies agree to do about it. Specific variables can cause variation in cohesion and effectiveness. In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival. To be sure, the leaders of states in traditional alliances make decisions that benefit their own interests yet do not necessarily help the country as a whole. However, in response to external threats they generally pursue the course that will ensure the national interest and their country’s territorial survival.

A. Cohesion: Desire to Secure National Interest Pushes Allies Together in Face of Escalating Threat

IR scholars cite various factors that can affect cohesion including but not limited to “strains” between partners linked to alliance “decision-making structure,” “capabilities of partners” as it affects bargaining power within the alliance, “military dependence,” and the “scope of the alliance” and extent to which interests overlap. The single most plausible and agreed on factor said to inform alliance cohesion, however, is a change in the level or
“intensity” of the external threat (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Boulding 1962; Calvocoressi 1966; Wolfers 1966; Stevens 1961; Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan 1973; Walt 1997; Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). Two facets of traditional military alliance cohesion are: allies working together to combine resources and remain together (preclude defection by allies). These dynamics then inform whether allies are able to deter or defeat their common foe (effectiveness).

Motivated by their core desire to preserve state security, allies are more likely to agree on goals and strategy (work together) and stay in the alliance should the external threat be high and adversely affect all partners. In the face of an escalating threat, the allies stay together and work together because doing so is necessary to ensure territorial survival. Should the threat decrease or adversely affect one ally more than another, collaboration between allies should decline.

B. Effectiveness: To Secure National Interest, Allies Apply Capabilities Against their Common Enemy

Some alliances succeed, while others fail, and IR scholars have attempted to understand this variation in this effectiveness or efficacy (Liska 1962). To determine whether a given alliance has been effective its “goal” must be clarified. As outlined above, traditional military alliances form in response to an external threat and largely have one of two objectives—to deter an attack (“defensive” or “peacetime” alliances) or to defeat a common enemy (“offensive” or “wartime” alliances). The bulk of IR scholarship focuses on the former and conceptualizes effectiveness largely as commensurate with cohesion—if allies pool resources and remain together, then the alliance deters the common adversary (efficacy is therefore presented as degree of alliance “cohesiveness” or “durability”). A handful of scholars of defensive alliance cite factors distinct from cohesion that might
condition effectiveness but their insights are chiefly not formulated as generalizable arguments.\textsuperscript{30}

Given that the goal of offensive/wartime alliances is most like that of internal threat alliances—to weaken or defeat a common enemy, rather than deter an attack from it—it is most appropriate to hone in on arguments within this strain of literature. However, few IR scholars theorize explicitly regarding why some such alliances derived to defeat a common enemy are more effective than others; those few works that do generally agree that cohesion is \textit{prerequisite for} effectiveness—working together leads allies to pool military capabilities, which they then apply against the external threat (Holsti 1970; Rosen 1970; Weitsman 2004). Due to the characteristics of allies as unitary states with internal political orders structured in a hierarchical manner that yield rational behavior, these frameworks largely assume that allies will act to advance the national interest, according to agreed alliance policy, and apply their resources against a common foe.\textsuperscript{31}

Of these, Weitsman’s (2004) is one of the only frameworks that offers generalizable insights and therefore is employed as representative of shared assumptions in alliance theory. She argues that the level and “symmetry, clarity, and commonalty” of external threat as perceived by allies will determine the three aspects of cohesion with “direct implications on the prosecution of a war.” These are the ability of states to: “coordinate their war-fighting strategy”; “agree on war aims”; and “prevent a separate peace” (avoid an ally from defecting/bandwagoning). The more allies are able to agree on these elements, the more likely they will be able to aggregate capabilities and then defeat their common foe.\textsuperscript{32} The Triple Entente, according to Weitsman, was more effective than the Central Powers because each ally perceived a high degree of threat from Germany and agreed it
was the principal source of threat. This shared threat perception made them more able to agree on strategy and war aims as well as prevent an ally from defecting/bandwagoning. By contrast, the Central Powers perceived different levels of threat and disagreed on the primary enemy, which “severely diminished the effectiveness of the alliance.”

**Traditional Military Alliances: a Synopsis**

In sum, the four elements of external threat alliances examined are as follows. First, states form traditional alliances in response to a threat external to allies’ borders that consists of a state or group of states (counter-alliance). Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating alliance *formation* is to secure their national interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state—and obtain those capabilities needed to do so.

Second, while external threat alliances are with countries that have some fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors that are of comparable levels of development and have political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion. Therefore, the central government controls all its component parts, which act to advance the national interest and ensure territorial survival. Combined with the nature of the external threat, the required level of analysis is predominantly international.

Third, states in traditional alliances can *either* balance (resist threats) *or* bandwagon (appease threats) and do so to survive or to secure a share in the spoils of victory. These decisions are driven by the state’s core motivation to preserve national security and territorial survival.

Fourth and finally, after aligning the allies work together to balance a common target. In working together to devise strategy and pool resources, decisions and actions are largely made to advance the national interest and safeguard territorial survival.
III. THE ARGUMENT:

CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES AND TRADITIONAL MILITARY ALLIANCES

This section presents the dissertation’s core argument and demonstrates the four ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from traditional military alliances. It demonstrates how external and internal threat alliances are distinct in each area, describes how theory needs to be updated to account for these differences, and outlines how my dissertation does so. In detailing these four core differences, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

1. NATURE OF THREAT AND WHY STATES ALIGN: INTERNAL TO THE WEAK STATE, TO SAVE THE REGIME

With internal threat alliances, the location and profile of the threat is distinct from traditional military alliances. Internal threat alliances stem from some domestic threat to a regime that an outside country cares about. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is external in origin (another state or group of states) and imperils the state as a whole. With internal threat alliances, the allies bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat that resides within one of the alliance partners (the weaker state). Accordingly, regarding the profile of the threat, it is not comprised of a state or group of states (counter-alliance) but, rather, a high level of political violence including but not limited to internal war.

This political violence directly or through its repercussions is perceived as a threat by the great power and peripheral regime alike. For example, France and Gabon in the 1990s aligned their security policies to balance political violence from opposition forces threatening the Omar Bongo regime; and the U.S. and Mexico in the following decade
aligned in response to instability threatening the Latin American ally from violent drug cartels (a conflict that has taken approximately 40,000 lives since 2006). Given that the location/profile of the threat inherent to internal threat alliances is distinct from those involved in external threat alliances, it requires a stand-alone definition and associated conceptualization.

A. **Nature of the Internal Threat: Political Violence and Consequences**

Prior work in IR defines a threat as emanating from systemic or domestic sources and including: “other great powers and extra-regional actors, regional powers in the locale, or domestic opponents.” In keeping with yet slightly expanding this conceptualization, the threat in response to which states form an internal threat alliance can be defined as *any form of political violence occurring within a given state that either directly or through its consequences can be perceived by states as imperiling their security and interests more broadly.* States may perceive the threat as endangering their interests in particular ways; however, the defining characteristic of the internal threat alliance is that the threat is common to the peripheral regime and the great power, thereby spurring them to form an alliance to respond to this threat. On one side, the regime within whose borders the violence is occurring perceives the threat as a direct challenge to its existence; the great power, by contrast, may perceive instability and other consequences that result from this political violence (as linked to the regime’s security) as a threat to its interests.

This definition and associated conceptualization allow for consideration of a broad range of threats generalizable across a range of cases that may motivate great powers and peripheral regimes to form alliances including: terrorist organization activity, transnational crime, and other illegal armed groups and rebels or insurgents. For the purpose of this dissertation, the specific form of threat examined is *high level of political violence*
including but not limited to internal war—both the threat to regime survival (physical and political) posed by non-state actors including insurgents mounting campaigns that imperil the regime’s existence and the consequences such conflict poses for other actors (namely great powers) in the international system. The location and profile of the threat driving internal threat alliances has implications for the motivations spurring the great power/regime to align.

B. Why States Align: To Preserve the Peripheral Regime

In traditional military alliances, the primary factor motivating alliance formation is the need to balance an external threat in order to preserve state security and the national interest. This does not hold for internal threat alliances, however, where the nature of the threat and factors underlying why states get involved are different. At the core of internal threat alliances is the need to preserve the peripheral regime—the weak state’s leaders are motivated to make sure they remain in power, while the great power seeks to safeguard its interests associated therewith. The regime aligns because it needs capabilities to survive, while the great power gets involved because its interests are linked to the regime’s stability.

To conceptualize why internal political violence is perceived as a threat by both peripheral regimes and great powers, and therefore explain why and when they will form alliances to balance such a threat, I draw on Steven David’s omni-balancing framework (1991) and analysis of the “catastrophic consequences” (2008) that political violence including internal war pose to the U.S. (which I take to represent great powers more broadly).

i. Why the Peripheral Regime Aligns: Threat to its Physical/Political Survival

Steven David’s omni-balancing framework can be employed to explain why threats associated with political violence motivate a peripheral regime to align. Where traditional balance of power theory focuses on alignment behavior by states as responses to external
threats from other states, David’s theory focuses on the elites and leaders (drawing on cases from the Third World) of states and recognizes that they face domestic threats that could end their reign including coup attempts or secessionist movements, among others. External threats cannot be ignored but internal threats tend to exert a more powerful influence on alignment behavior, which in the Third World is ultimately driven by the “calculation of…leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do whatever necessary to keep them in power.” As a result, leaders will seek external alignments (even with states they consider a secondary threat) in order to balance against the “more immediate and dangerous” threat to their survival. Regimes, like states, seek to survive and will therefore act in ways (including forming alliances with secondary threats) to keep themselves in power. When confronted with rebellions, potential coups, or other non-state actors fomenting political violence, then, they will logically seek to align with stronger states in order to receive military capabilities needed to weaken or defeat this threat and therefore survive.

Various examples elucidate that these factors motivate weak regimes to form internal threat alliances. Beginning in 2010, for example, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad faced a mounting insurgency fomented by Islamist and non-Islamist groups seeking to overthrow his government. In order to ensure his regime’s survival, Assad sought support from Russia, which provided munitions, weapons, and helicopters the regime proceeded to use against those actors threatening to remove him from power. Similarly, in Colombia, in response to rising threats from rebel groups and drug-trafficking organizations, the government brought its security policies into close cooperation with the U.S. to balance these threats to its survival. And in Afghanistan, the Hamid Karzai regime
perceived intensifying threats from the resurgent Taliban and other non-state actors fomenting political violence and therefore sought cooperation with the U.S. to balance these menaces. Leaders in each country needed resources and support in order to defeat or weaken actors contesting their rule. Aligning with the great power, therefore, made sense.

ii. Why the Great Power Aligns: Threat to Interests Tied to Regime

By definition, political violence and intra-state wars occur principally within borders; however, the effects of such conflict often spill over borders to affect the interests of other states, including great powers. And Steven David’s work on consequences of political violence for the U.S. demonstrates why political violence within other states can generate threats to interests of great powers and therefore spur them to balance against such consequences, including by forming alliances.

Instability resulting from political violence can lead to lost economic opportunities, decreased access to crucial natural resources, and cross-border flows of refugees, among other implications. Instability in a country with weapons of mass destruction in general, and nuclear weapons and fissile material in particular, risks accidental detonations of such arms or loss of government control of weapons stores. Internal violence further debilitates already weak states, providing terrorist organizations “safe havens” from which they may plan and launch attacks onto international powers as well as their territories or strategic assets. Great powers rely on access to natural resources in general and oil in particular, and such conflict raises the cost of and inhibits access to each. Trade and investments abroad are the lifeblood of economic well-being at home—but political violence and the associated uncertainty it generates can send stock prices into a tailspin, with concomitant repercussions for great powers’ budget deficits, among other implications. Political
violence also threatens the citizens of great powers—either directly, by endangering expatriate communities abroad, or indirectly, by forcing mass flows of refugees across borders and affecting communities on the other side.\textsuperscript{47} For all of these reasons, great powers have an incentive to mitigate the aforementioned consequences that stem from internal war and political violence.\textsuperscript{48} Accordingly, they may bring their security policies into close cooperation with the besieged regime in order to weaken or defeat that threat.

Various examples elucidate that these factors motivate great powers to get involved in internal threat alliances. After the Cold War ended, for example, France maintained such alliances with Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) in order to preserve these regimes and French interests linked to them. In Zaire, France needed to maintain a strategic ally in the region and protect the sizeable contingent of French expatriates there.\textsuperscript{49} And in Gabon, France needed to maintain stability to preserve access to the state’s oil deposits and other natural resources while Bongo required military capabilities to balance internal opposition. To guarantee stability within Gabon and maintain access to such resources, France provided Bongo with approximately $1 million in annual military aid and placed French army officers in the regime’s security forces.\textsuperscript{50} As Bongo described the core motivation for the alliance: “Gabon without France is like a car with no driver. France without Gabon is like a car with no fuel.”\textsuperscript{51} Returning to the more recent example of Syria, Russia provided military capabilities to the embattled Assad regime to (among other factors) safeguard its single military base outside the former Soviet Union as well as preserve access to oil and gas fields and other economic interests including Russian companies involved in natural gas extraction (a sector valued at $20 billion).\textsuperscript{52}
In sum, political violence and those actors who foment it directly imperil the physical and political survival of the regime within whose borders such violence is occurring. And the consequences that stem from such violence, including the potential demise (or instability within the borders) of an ally, can imperil a great power’s interests. To achieve the mutual security goal of balancing this threat, and because they lack sufficient capabilities to do so alone, the regime and great power align their security policies to balance the threat. Regarding why states form internal threat alliances, then, it can be expected that: if a great power and regime perceive a moderate level of threat (emanating from within the weaker ally’s borders) and are dependent on each other to balance it, then they will bring their security policies into close cooperation to do so. The location and profile of the threat driving internal threat alliances has implications for the characteristics of allies that will form such alliances.

2. Characteristics of Allies: Internally Fragmented, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests

Traditional alliances are formed between states that have some internal fragmentation but are essentially between two cohesive actors. For internal threat alliances, by contrast, the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation.

Great powers will not represent the source of the target threat or need to form internal threat alliances with their peers because they maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders. And in the event political violence does occur within a great power’s territory, it will not pursue external alignments because it already
retains capabilities sufficient to quell such threats. For example, instead of seeking assistance from other states to suppress riots and political violence in Paris and its environs in 2005/6, France employed its own security forces to do so and arrested more than 3,000 people fomenting these acts. Though a weak state may align with another weak state to balance a common internal threat, the probability that this will occur is small: given low levels of development weak regimes generally lack capacity to preserve a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their own borders, let alone allocate capabilities to another state via an alliance. As a result, peripheral regimes will tend to pursue alliances with stronger powers as opposed to their peers.

Due to the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation (and location of the threat as within its borders) there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics and therefore need to be accounted for in theory. This also means that the relevant levels of analysis need to be expanded from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational.

i. **Weaker Ally: Internally Fragmented, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests**

The unequal levels of development and accompanying differences in internal fragmentation mean that allies—the great power and peripheral regime—do not share the same state characteristics. The great power’s internal political order is hierarchically structured. As a result, it will act as a unified unit that rationally prioritizes preserving national security when rendering decisions and associated actions related to the alliance. Therefore, the assumptions used in theory on external threat alliances to determine priorities and associated actions by great powers remain applicable.

By contrast and as reflected in the literature on state-building in the periphery (Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002; Boone 2003), weak states are less developed, at times based
on artificially placed borders, and generally lack the robust institutions commensurate with a great power’s hierarchical ordering and the prioritization of national security above all else that comes with it.\textsuperscript{57} In contrast to traditional military alliances, then, the great power aligns not with another state but, rather, the elite-led regime atop its state apparatus. Accordingly, because the allies are fundamentally distinct in character the same assumptions used in IR to determine priorities and associated actions by great powers cannot be used to understand decisions and associated actions of the weaker state’s regime vis-à-vis alliance dynamics. New assumptions are required.

Problematising the influence of a weaker state’s characteristics onto alignment decisions in general and alliance dynamics more broadly is in keeping with the precedent in IR theory as represented by the work of Steven David (1991) and Randall Schweller (2006). These scholars predict (concerning external threat alliances) that characteristics within a state’s limits—in particular its regime type—will inform its alliance behavior outside of those borders including choice of allies as well as ability to mobilize resources to balance the external enemy.\textsuperscript{58} This remains relevant for explaining the formation of internal threat alliances; however, the nature of the internal threat means that the weaker state’s characteristics are also relevant to understanding bandwagoning, cohesion and effectiveness.

The weak state’s lower level of development and associated fragmented internal political order introduce two factors distinct from great powers examined in traditional alliance theory that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions in the alliance. First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or components therein). Accordingly, regime actors may act contrary to stated alliance
policy. This differs from great powers, which control all elements of the state. And second, *the regime* (central decision-makers or bureaucratic agencies) *may prioritize interests other than the national interest when making decisions*. And this is distinct from great powers, which act rationally and prioritize national security. As outlined in David’s “omni-balancing” framework, the central regime will prioritize its political and physical survival over the state’s national interest. Since the principal concern of leaders is to remain in power, they will at times “protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.” Regimes, like states, seek to survive and will therefore act in ways to keep themselves in power.

The patron-client relations imbedded in such lesser developed states represent a second factor that peripheral regime actors may prioritize over securing the national interest. Though the specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on the context—some are based on tribal and ethnic linkages, while others are rooted in economic exchange—they fundamentally represent a source of power and influence for actors that comprise the regime. In making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest. This includes contravening stated alliance goals and strategy. Given that this is not addressed in existing alliance scholarship, I consult the comparative politics literature on clientelism to account for it. For example and illustrative of the lack of central control and factors that may trump the national interest, the regime may instruct a bureaucratic agency (as agreed with the great power) to implement a strategy aimed to defeat or weaken a rebel movement or drug-trafficking organization whose activities and associated violence imperil the regime’s survival. Instead
of implementing the central regime’s decision, however, the agency ignores or acts in contradiction to it in order to maintain its relationship with the rebel movement or traffickers—in exchange, the agency actor receives some form of payment or benefit. Instead of balancing against the threat, they bandwagon with it.

Due to the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation (and location of the threat as within its borders) there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics by balancing against (or bandwagoning with) the threat and therefore needed to be accounted for in theory. This also means that the relevant levels of analysis need to be expanded from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational.

**ii. Bridging the International and Subnational Levels of Analysis: Accounting for Actors “In the Field”**

The domestic nature of the threat with internal threat alliances means that the great power/regime confront it principally within the territorial borders of the weaker state. For example, beginning in 2001 the Philippines and U.S. brought their security policies into close cooperation to ensure the regime’s survival in the face of attacks from insurgent groups. Security forces of the former applied alliance resources within its borders in order to weaken these actors.⁶² Accordingly, understanding the dynamics of such internal threat alliances requires an expansion in levels of analysis from those employed to problematize traditional military alliances. The international level of analysis remains important because internal threat alliances by definition involve two states working together to balance a threat; however, the threat’s location/profile make the *national* and *subnational* levels relevant as well—why and when allies bandwagon, and whether the alliance is effective,
depends not only on interaction between states and thus the international level but also on what transpires at the national and subnational levels.

The weaker ally’s internal fragmentation also makes necessary this expansion to national and subnational in order to account for the influence of those great power and peripheral regime actors working together within the weaker state’s borders to devise strategy and apply alliance resources. The central decision-makers of the great power/regime remain important to all dynamics: they communicate and decide to bring their security policies into close cooperation (formation), collaborate to set alliance strategy (cohesion) and to some extent control how pooled resources are applied against the common threat (effectiveness). As the great power/regime proceed to coordinating goals and strategies (cohesion) and then applying resources against their common enemy (effectiveness), though, additional bureaucratic agencies outside the writ of the central decision-makers become involved—partner militaries, for example, work together to devise joint strategies and combat forces attacking the regime. Returning to the Philippines example, its central regime and U.S. counterpart agreed to form an alliance (international level), but the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other subnational officials collaborated to use alliance resources to balance the threat (national and subnational levels). To explain variation in bandwagoning, cohesion and effectiveness, then, decisions and actions of these bureaucratic agencies relevant to the alliance but outside of the central regime and acting at the national and subnational level must also be examined.

Expanding the levels of analysis employed in alliance theory is in keeping with the precedent in IR literature for problematizing phenomena at the subnational level and implications of such phenomena for security of states. In one of the first works to bridge
the international and domestic levels of analysis in general and examine the international aspects of internal war in particular, Rosenau (1964) disaggregates the “conflict-ridden” state into various “subsystems” and argues that to fully examine the relationship between political violence and international relations, one needs to delve beyond the national to the subnational, writing: “The interplay between the two sets of variables is continuous and complex, leaving the analyst no alternative but to examine a broad range of political and social processes, from subnational to national to international.”

To some extent this is in keeping with Waltz’s (1954) precursor, seminal work that examines the effects onto IR of three “levels”: state system, state, and individual. And specifically conceptualizing the influence of actors at these lower levels or “subsystems” of analysis is consistent with a precedent in IR theorizing as arguably initiated by Jervis (1976) who, citing the tendency in IR to view states as unitary (as inapplicable to non-Western polities), argues that the state should be viewed as disaggregated into various parts with distinct interests which in turn affect their actions and overall state behavior.

Though developed to understand external alignment decisions, the assumptions underlying his framework provide a foundation for and are relevant to understanding the influence of such “component parts” of the state and weaker regime onto the dynamics of internal threat alliances.

As George Liska (1968) presciently argues in one of the first works on alliance politics, the strategies and goals set by policy-makers in the capital must be carried out by “those in the field.” For external threat alliances, these are partners’ armed forces working together in sea lanes or foreign territories to combat a common enemy. In the context of internal threat alliances, the “field” is located within the weak state’s borders and therefore comprises the peripheral regime’s national security-related bureaucratic agencies (and
subnational officials) working with their great power counterpart to debilitate or defeat the threat. I refer to these actors as “Critical Bureaucratic Agencies,” defined as those actors outside the central regime holding a mandate related to security and directly involved in the alliance including but not limited to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, Army, National Police, and governors of subnational areas in which the alliance partners confront the threat. Given that existing alliance scholarship does not provide assumptions on which to explain priorities and associated actions vis-à-vis alliance dynamics of such agencies, I leverage insights from the bureaucratic politics literature to do so.69 These agencies are active at the national level, interacting and collaborating with the central regime and its great power counterparts, and subnational level, using alliance military resources against the common threat. And as alliance partners work together to devise strategies (cohesion) as well as apply military capabilities to balance their common threat (effectiveness), they are increasingly involved and operating in contexts independent of the central decision-makers based in allies’ respective capitals. Bureaucratic agencies of the great power can be viewed as an extension of the central decision-makers. Though the weaker state’s agencies are not entirely outside the central regime’s control, the state’s fragmented character may reduce the regime’s control over these actors.

Just as the regime’s central decision-makers may prioritize their survival or desire to enhance power and influence over the national interest (and therefore alliance strategy) so too may the weaker ally’s bureaucratic agencies at the national and subnational levels. What is more, even if the central regime acts in accordance with agreed alliance strategy as derived in agreement with their great power ally, bureaucratic actors at the subnational level may contravene alliance strategy. Thus, and distinct from external threat alliances,
some actors *within* one of the allies may cooperate and *balance* the threat (per the alliance agreement) while others do not and instead *bandwagon* with it.

In sum, traditional alliances are formed between states that that have some internal fragmentation but are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation. As a result, there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics and therefore need to be accounted for in theory.

3. **Why and When Regime Actors Bandwagon: Simultaneous with Balancing and Motivated by Clientelism (and Survival, Profit)**

Like external threat alliances, after aligning and in the face of escalating threat an actor comprising the peripheral regime may decide that the alliance is no longer able to advance its interests. As a result, the central regime or those bureaucratic agencies involved in the alliance may defect from the alliance and “bandwagon” with the threat out of fear for their survival or to enjoy the winning side’s spoils of victory.

Adjusting and extending from the existing IR concept to account for the nature of the internal threat, this is referred to as “subnational bandwagoning” and defined as alignment between peripheral regime actors and those entities fomenting political violence, including any behavior that aids the threat (bandwagons with it) as opposed to pursuing the purpose of the alliance (balancing it). Instead of acting in accordance with the alliance and carrying out agreed strategy or tactics devised to weaken the internal threat, these actors decide to bandwagon with it. Like actors who form external threat alliances, the weaker state’s actors will bandwagon to survive or for profit. However, these actors will
bandwagon to ensure their regime’s survival or their own patron-client interests rather than advancing the national interest (as in external threat alliances).

Due to the nature of the threat and characteristics of the weaker ally, though, the profile and scope of bandwagoning will be distinct from that experienced in traditional military alliances in three ways (in addition to location).

i. **Balancing and Bandwagoning Occur Simultaneously**

   First, because the central regime does not fully control all bureaucratic agencies balancing can occur *simultaneously with* bandwagoning. The central regime may work with the great power to implement alliance strategy and *balance* the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are *bandwagoning with* actors fomenting violence. Similarly, a given component of a regime agency (the Army or National Police, for example) may balance while another component bandwagons. In external threat alliances aligning *against* or siding *with* the “source of danger” is a binary phenomenon—states *either* balance *or* bandwagon. Here, they can bandwagon *and* balance at the same time, thus complicating the relationship and making it distinct for internal threat alliances.

ii. **Bandwagoning to Advance Regime Interests, Patron Client Ties (and Survival, Profit)**

   Second, in addition to bandwagoning to survive or share in spoils of victory, regime actors (central or subnational) will bandwagon to preserve or expand clientelistic relationships that enhance their power and influence. These relationships are generally based in patronage but also include those based in fealty to tribe or ethnicity. If the weaker state’s actors have an alternative loyalty to those actors fomenting violence—insurgents or narco-traffickers, for example—they may prioritize this loyalty (and thus bandwagon) over the terms of the alliance (to balance it). Bandwagoning to advance patron-client ties is *in*
addition to bandwagoning to ensure survival or profit share. Including patron-client linkages as a motivating factor is important to explain a wider range of such behavior, including why subnational bandwagoning may occur in locations and by actors whose survival is not threatened as well as by actors not necessarily motivated by a share in the spoils of victory. For example, during the internal threat alliance between the U.S. and Iraq to quell political violence threatening regime survival, various (Sunni) representatives of the (predominantly Shia) government and its security forces colluded with Sunni belligerents instead of implementing agreed alliance strategy; and in Afghanistan, government officials bandwagoned with instead of balanced insurgents due to prioritizing fealty to ethnicity (Pashtun) as well as economically or politically profitable illicit business ties (“it is a toxic triangle of alliances…corrupt officials work with drug traffickers who, in turn, help the Taliban.”)\textsuperscript{70}

iii. Two Manifestations of Subnational Bandwagoning: Active and Passive

Third and finally, regime actor subnational bandwagoning (motivated by threat, profit, or patron-client) will manifest in one of two forms: “active” and “passive.” Active bandwagoning comprises any action that directly aids and thus reflects alignment with the internal threat including but not limited to diverting alliance resources to the threat; turning a blind eye to threat activities; or refusing to enforce laws aimed to hinder the threat. For example, a regime actor funneling money to insurgents or a member of the judiciary not prosecuting narco-traffickers would constitute active bandwagoning. Passive bandwagoning involves peripheral regime actors diverting aggregated capabilities to their clients and thus away from their use for the alliance purpose; however, capabilities are not diverted directly to the threat. For example, a representative of the Ministry of Interior may divert resources pooled to purchase arms for use against rebels to a political ally or fellow
tribesman. This constitutes bandwagoning in so far as the regime precludes alliance resources from being used to balance the threat. Whether active or passive, the implication for alliance effectiveness is that actions divergent from terms of the alliance will empower (as opposed to weaken) the source of the threat. Active bandwagoning will have a more acute effect, yet both forms of bandwagoning will hinder alliance effectiveness.

Two examples of bandwagoning by peripheral regime actors help elucidate these distinct manifestations and motivations of bandwagoning in internal threat alliances. The internal threat alliance between the U.S. and Afghanistan includes examples of peripheral regime actors bandwagoning due to fear for survival (police in Helmand turned a blind-eye to insurgent activity to survive) as well as patron-client relations rooted in tribe/ethnicity (the governor of Kapisa actively aiding insurgents)\(^7\) and illicit industries linked to enhancing power and influence (security forces were “more concerned with extracting revenue for themselves and doing their local patrons’ bidding…than effectively combatting the insurgents”).\(^7\) In each case regime actors violated alliance strategy and bandwagoned in order to pursue a priority they deemed more important; this occurred while the central regime was working with the U.S. to balance insurgents.

Similar forms of bandwagoning occurred on the other side of the globe and in the context of the U.S.-Mexico alliance formed to quell political violence as fomented by drug-traffickers. Instead of implementing agreed alliance strategy and working to weaken and defeat the various cartels, for example, elements of Mexico’s police and army in specific provinces bandwagoned with these drug trafficking organizations: out of fear for survival or patron-client relations rooted in desire to enhance personal power and influence, these agencies actively assisted cartel operations or turned a blind eye to such behavior.\(^7\) And
they did so as the central Felipe Calderon regime worked with the U.S. to balance against these drug-traffickers. These examples demonstrate that bureaucratic agencies of the regime working within the alliance at national and subnational levels prioritize their survival or enhancing personal power and influence over the national interest and alliance strategy. Contravening guidance from the central regime, they bandwagoned with the source of threat as opposed to balancing it.

In sum, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances proceeds as follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables balancing and bandwagoning to occur simultaneously (whereas states in traditional alliances can either balance or bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). Given that bandwagoning for internal threat alliances is not binary—that is, regime actors bandwagon while the allies are together—it will have implications for alliance cohesion and effectiveness, as addressed below.

4. **Primary Ally Motivation in Response to Threats: Leaders of Threatened State Act in Their Interests, Not the National Interest**

After forming an internal threat alliance and like their external threat counterpart, the great power/regime engaged in an internal threat alliance must work together “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends.” As with traditional alliances, this is referred to as “cohesion,” where the “goal” of the alliance is commensurate with its purpose and defined as defeating or debilitating the common internal threat to the extent that allies no longer perceive it as a core threat to their interests. And like traditional alliances, whether the great power/regime achieve this goal
is referred to as the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.” As with traditional alliances, specific variables will cause variation in both cohesion and effectiveness. Comparable to traditional alliances, level of threat will influence whether the great power/regime are able to work together and agree to strategy (cohesion) and the amount of resources they are able to amass will determine whether they weaken their common menace (effectiveness).

The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the leaders act after the alliance has formed and in response to threats—and therefore understanding cohesion and effectiveness—requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning and in response to threats these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests. In order to understand internal threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness, then, theory must take into account these regime-specific interests.

**A. Cohesion: Also Influenced by Regime-Specific Priorities**

Due to the weak state’s fragmented character and the motivation’s driving its decisions, cohesion in internal threat alliances will be distinct from traditional alliances in one fundamental way. In addition to level of threat and military dependence, cohesion for internal threat alliances will be further determined by regime-specific interests. Specifically, whether collaborating across all alliance strategy components and against (to balance) all actors generating violence advances the regime’s desire to ensure and maximize political survival and power. The central regime (or components therein) may have political priorities that alter its willingness to work with the great power or have
patron-client ties to actors responsible for political violence. At precise junctures and in response to threats, then, the regime may decide that working to defeat specific actors or implement specific tactics (and collaborating with the great power to do so) is detrimental to regime political survival, power, and influence. Working with the great power across all areas of strategy and tactics might be in the national interest, but not necessarily help the regime remain in power or secure re-election. Such regime priorities will not be enough to pull the allies apart in the face of a high level of threat—because the regime still relies on the great power to survive—but will make it more difficult for the allies to agree on specific strategy and tactics. Accordingly and distinct from traditional allies, cohesion may slightly decline even as the threat level remains high.

The U.S.-Afghanistan case and Hamid Karzai’s actions demonstrate the influence of regime-specific political/patron-client priorities onto internal threat alliance cohesion and how internal threat alliances place the primary focus on the interests of the leader rather than the national interests of the state. Time after time, Karzai worked against the national interest of Afghanistan by subverting national institutions, appointing known corrupt officials, and cooperating with the drug trade, not because these actions benefited Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but because they helped keep him in power. This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated by the difference in Karzai’s actions before and after he was re-elected president in 2009.

From 2001 through 2004, Karzai needed U.S. largesse and influence to (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his power/influence. Due to these regime-specific interests and a high threat level, Karzai
agreed to work with the U.S. and cohesion remained moderate to high. Close collaboration with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime authority. After Karzai won the 2004 elections and had leveraged U.S. support to secure passage of institutions and legislation that cemented powers in his office, however, the central regime began to treat non-military aspects of the alliance strategy as a liability to winning and consolidating power for the long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that Karzai “combat corruption” (passive bandwagoning) to ensure proper use of alliance resources and bolster Afghan state capacity.\(^77\) For Karzai, appointing “corrupt” clients to regime positions, turning a blind-eye to their diversion of alliance funds, and himself using regime monies (alliance or non-alliance) as patronage were vital to garnering support sufficient to win re-election in 2009. Alliance goals called for the central regime to curb these forms of bandwagoning because reducing corruption and erecting more viable and reliable institutions was in the better interests of Afghans writ large; however, doing so was contrary to what would facilitate Karzai remaining in power. Consequently, the central regime proceeded to engage in simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning: a high threat level pushed Karzai’s regime to work with the U.S. on military tactics and balance because its physical survival relied on doing so; however, he began violating non-military aspects of the alliance (bandwagoning) in order to grease the wheels of his get out the vote machine including by diverting (and using as patronage) alliance resources and appointing corrupt officials to bolster patron-client links key to re-election.\(^78\)

When two states work together in a traditional alliance to balance an external enemy, regime-specific factors related to their political survival largely do not affect actions or decisions. Due to their hierarchically structured political orders, unified states
respond to rising threats by rationally rank-ordering priorities and acting to protect the national interest and territorial integrity. A regime’s fragmented character and core motivation for alignment, by contrast, coalesce to complicate cohesion in internal threat alliances: working with the great power in response to threats and across all areas of alliance strategy must be in the regime’s interests. These regime-specific interests (and their ability to change rapidly, with turnover in regime) affect internal threat alliance cohesion but are not relevant to understanding traditional alliances, where rising threats (and allies’ shared dependence to defeat them) press states together and to agree on strategy and tactics.

B. **Effectiveness: Also Influenced by Regime Willingness to Curb Bandwagoning**

Like external threat alliances and drawing on Weitsman’s (2004) treatment of effectiveness, the principal determinant of internal threat alliance effectiveness will be allies’ ability to aggregate capabilities sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat. Only when the great power/regime are able to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed toward those ends (as a result of consistently high cohesion), will they be able to collectively amass resources sufficient to weaken or defeat their common menace. Due to the weak state’s fragmented character and the motivation’s driving its decisions, however, internal threat alliance effectiveness will be distinct from traditional alliances in two ways.

First, the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation means that it cannot be assumed that the regime’s actors will (as with unitary states in traditional alliances) necessarily apply capabilities pooled through the alliance, in line with agreed strategy. When examining alliances between two essentially cohesive actors to balance external enemies, traditional
alliance theory generally assumes that allies act in order to advance the national interest and therefore automatically apply resources according to agreed strategy and against the common external threat. Provided the level of capabilities is sufficient to defeat the common adversary, the alliance should be more likely to achieve its goal.

The weak state’s fragmented character and the motivations driving its decisions, however, mean that elements of the regime may contravene agreed strategy and not apply resources to combat the common menace. This takes the form of active or passive bandwagoning and (regardless of motivation) can hinder effectiveness by: (1) precluding unified balancing; and/or (2) diverting resources amassed as part of the alliance either away from their intended purpose (passive bandwagoning) or directly to those actors fomenting violence (active bandwagoning). For internal threat alliances dealing with regime survival as opposed to the national interest, then, pooling resources sufficient to weaken the internal threat will be necessary to ensure effectiveness but not sufficient.

Regime actor bandwagoning during the U.S.-Colombia alliance clearly demonstrates that bandwagoning hinders effectiveness in internal threat alliances. While U.S. President Reagan and Colombian President Gaviria were collaborating to defeat “narco-insurgents,” for example, cohesion increased due to a surge in threat and the regime’s desire to survive politically. However, bandwagoning regime actors hindered allies’ ability to implement anti-cartel tactics—and effectiveness therefore suffered. In response to cartel threats (and in order to survive) or promised bribes (to cement patron-client ties), Police and Military elements bandwagoned with traffickers by providing tips on anti-cartel efforts. Distinct to internal threat alliances, a regime agency was bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence while the central regime, the U.S., (and
other agencies) were *simultaneously* seeking to balance them. As a result, Reagan and Gaviria were forced to find alternative means by which to secure their interests and circumvent these bandwagoning elements. This included forming a police unit of vetted (non-bandwagoning) staff to destroy the cartels, what Gaviria’s Defense Minister called an “island of integrity in a sea of corruption.”

Such efforts to curb bandwagoning, including creating a component within a regime agency that could be relied on to balance (not bandwagon), would not be necessary in traditional alliances where agencies implement government guidance (balance) to advance the national (not their own) interest. The U.S. was presented with a situation in which the central regime was more willing than its component parts to target actors imperiling American interests, leaving the great power to juggle alliance dynamics between multiple actors. This does not occur in traditional alliances where the allies’ central policymakers agree on alliance policy (or do not) and, in line with such agreements, work to devise strategy and tactics (or do not).

As a result and representing the second difference between traditional and internal threat alliance effectiveness—the ability and willingness of the peripheral regime to curb such bandwagoning will be an additional determinant of effectiveness. To some extent this is a modification of a factor Weitsman (2004) indicates will determine effectiveness—the ability of allies to “prevent a separate peace”; that is, to stop a state within their alliance from defecting. My concept is distinct, however, because the nature of the threat renders the great power less able (relative to external threat alliances) to curb such bandwagoning. In the context of internal threat alliances, then, whether allies achieve their goal will be further determined by the regime’s willingness to curb bandwagoning and push its
component parts to balance in a unified manner. Should the weak regime be able and willing to curb bandwagoning, alliance effectiveness should not suffer. In the event the weak regime is unable or unwilling to do so, however, alliance effectiveness may decrease. With traditional alliances between two essentially cohesive actors, these factors are generally not relevant.

Events through the internal threat alliances in Syria and Mexico reflect these two core differences between internal and traditional alliance effectiveness. In Syria, a high level of threat to the regime pushed the Assad regime and Russia together, leading them to agree on strategy and build up capabilities accordingly. In spite of continued arms transfers to the embattled regime, however, bandwagoning (defections) by the regime’s army and other agencies hindered allies’ ability to weaken those insurgents seeking to topple the regime. This included bandwagoning by high-level generals (Army and Air Force) as well as an estimated 50,000 soldiers (of 280,000) seeking to survive, share in the spoils of victory, or maintain their patron-client relations as motivated by ethnic ties (soldiers prioritizing loyalty to fellow Sunnis).\textsuperscript{82} Similarly, in Mexico, the Calderon regime and its U.S. counterpart have (particularly since a surge in violence in 2006) been pushed together by a shared high level of threat. Stemming from the associated ability to devise strategy and associated tactics, they pooled resources to balance their common foe—the U.S. has contributed nearly $1.4 billion to the alliance in order to strengthen the regime’s security forces (army and federal police) to balance the cartels threatening its survival.\textsuperscript{83} Though the military hardware and other resources have helped enable the regime to balance the common internal threat, bandwagoning by the same actors receiving resources (and the Calderon regime’s inability to curb such actions) has hindered alliance effectiveness.\textsuperscript{84}
In sum and akin to external threat alliances, whether alliances derived to cope with internal threats achieve their goal will be determined by allies’ ability to amass capabilities sufficient to weaken or defeat their common adversary; and their ability to consistently agree on alliance goals and strategy will determine whether they do so. Due to the nature of the threat and because allies are cooperating to ensure the weak regime’s existence, however, achieving this goal will be further determined by the regime’s willingness and ability to ensure its actors engage in subnational balancing (as opposed to bandwagoning). The table below summarizes the four ways in which dynamics of internal and external threat alliances are distinct.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat &amp; Why States Align</th>
<th>Characteristics of Allies</th>
<th>When and Why Allies Bandwagon</th>
<th>Core Factor Driving Ally Decisions / Actions in Response to Threats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Threat Alliances</strong></td>
<td>Threat: State or Group of States (counter alliance). Motivation: To preserve national interest and territorial security.</td>
<td>Comparable levels of development; Generally internally cohesive / hierarchical</td>
<td>Manifestation: <em>Binary</em>: Balance or Bandwagon Motivation: Survival and Profit To advance the national interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Threat Alliances</strong></td>
<td>Threat: Political violence and consequences Motivation: To preserve the peripheral regime’s survival and great power interests associated with it.</td>
<td>Incomparable levels of development Internally fragmented</td>
<td>Manifestation: <em>Simultaneous</em>: Balancing/Bandwagoning occur at same time. Motivation: Survival, profit, patron-client relations To advance the regime’s interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Conclusion

In this chapter I drew from and modified aspects of existing IR theory to demonstrate the following four ways in which the characteristics and associated dynamics of internal threat alliances are distinct from military alliances designed to defeat external threats. Collectively, these four elements represent the dissertation’s contribution to IR theory and provide a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat *domestic in origin* that imperils a regime. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is *external in origin* (another state or group of states) and imperils the *state as a whole*. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the *regime’s survival*. The regime aligns because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, while external threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation. Due to this fragmentation, there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics and therefore need
to be accounted for in theory. Distinct to internal threat alliances, the great power does not deal with a *single* and *unified* state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with traditional alliances). Instead, the great power deals with a *fragmented* regime that sits atop but lacks control of its agencies and other subnational actors. Each of these actors has respective interests they seek pursue.

Hence, these characteristics of states in internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies are essentially cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion and central governments that control all component parts. Combined with the nature and location of the threat, this requires expanding the relevant levels of analysis from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational.

Third, because of this fragmentation, “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances is distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances. The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, balancing and bandwagoning can occur *simultaneously*: the central regime may work with the great power to implement alliance strategy and *balance* the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are *bandwagoning with* actors fomenting violence. This contrasts with traditional alliances, where states *either* balance *or* bandwagon when faced with an external enemy. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) *in addition to* fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where
bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon *while the allies are together*. As a result, it can affect cohesion and effectiveness.

In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the great power will juggle relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power may need to bypass a bandwagoning central regime and work with other regime elements to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.

Fourth and finally, when threats are encountered leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to calculate what to do in response to this threat focusing on *their own political survival* rather than what is good for the national interest. In traditional (external) alliances, after aligning the states work together “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends.” This is referred to alliance “cohesion.” And in so doing, they are working toward their shared goal of deterring or defeating their common external menace; whether they achieve this goal is referred to as the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.” In external threat alliances, specific variables cause variation in both cohesion and effectiveness—*level of threat* influences whether the great power/regime are able to work together and agree to strategy (cohesion) and amount of
aggregated capabilities determines whether they weaken their common menace (effectiveness). However, in response to external threats and due to the allies’ internally cohesive nature their decisions related to cohesion and effectiveness are made so as to advance the national interest and ensure territorial survival.

With internal threat alliances, and comparable to traditional military alliances, *level of threat* and amount of aggregated capabilities will determine cohesion and effectiveness, respectively. Distinct to internal threat alliances, however, when making decisions related to cohesion and effectiveness the threatened state acts not in the national interest, as is the case with traditional alliances, but in the interests of the *leaders of the regime*. As such, determining how the leaders act after the alliance has formed and in response to threats—and therefore understanding *cohesion* and *effectiveness*—requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the *leaders of that country*. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to *their power* that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interest.

**V. Outline of the Dissertation**

In order to evidence the four aspects of internal threat alliances the dissertation unfolds in five chapters including this one. Chapter two provides a review of the alliance theory literature to demonstrate the gaps in this body of work my dissertation seeks to fill. It also points to areas of extant scholarship that I drew from to inform this chapter and describes the dissertation’s research methodology. Chapters three and four use case study analysis to evidence the dissertation’s core arguments. They show how the U.S.-Colombia (1980-2010 – chapter three) and U.S.-Afghanistan (2001-2012 – chapter four) alliances
were clear examples of an internal threat alliance that differed from external threat alliances in the aforementioned four ways. Chapter five provides conclusions, summarizes findings from the case study chapters, points to areas for future research, and outlines the dissertation’s potential relevance to policy.
Some scholars use alliance to refer to a formal treaty between states, where others employ the term more loosely and to denote alignment of security-related policies. I do not attempt to contribute to this particular conceptual debate and instead use “alliance” and “alignment” interchangeably and to reflect the following: when a state brings its policies into cooperation with another state in order to pursue mutual goals related to national security.

The debate surrounding conceptualizations of and definitions for those states outside what has been termed the “international liberal system” is often hotly contested, with some arguing that “periphery” should replace previously employed “third” or “second world.” One useful conceptualization is offered by Goldgeier and McFaul (1992), who divide the post-cold war era into “core” and “periphery” states (or “spaces”) according to factors related to economy and power. The “core” is comprised of the industrialized states of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. By “periphery” they refer to “the agriculturally based, industrializing states of the developing world.” Concerning measure of “power” the peripheral space is occupied by “states which are ‘weak’ relative to the core of great powers.” Steven David (1992) makes a persuasive case that despite the decline in utility of the term “Third World” many states who were formerly associated within this name indeed often share the same characteristics. Although they make distinct arguments, Goldgeier and McFaul and David agree on some key points that distinguish the periphery from the core – among others, (1) that military force remains a viable tool to secure political outcomes; (2) the “newness” of such states, often sovereign in “name only” and formed “overnight” as opposed to through centuries of war, means that they often lack strong state institutions and therefore face internal and external challenges to their rule – thus conditioning their behavior; and (3) these states do not have a set of “shared norms” or, according Goldgeier and McFaul, the “predictability” that would accompany them given the presence of regional security systems with different forms of government. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era”, International Organization, Vol. 46, (Spring 1992), 467. Steven R. David, “Explaining Alignment in the Third World”, World Politics, Vol. 43 (January 1991).” Steven David, “Why the Third World Still Matters”. International Security 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992), 127

“International power” and “great power” are used interchangeably throughout and refers to those countries considered, broadly within the IR literature, as great powers following the end of World War (WW) II, given the dissertation’s focus on alliances formed during this period. Scholars employ different measures for and definitions of what constitutes a great power. The dissertation recognizes that the list of great powers evolved from WWI as well as through inter-war period and during and after WWII. While recognizing this as well as the debate within IR theory on thresholds of power and definitions for great power, the dissertation does not aim to make a theoretical contribution here. Rather, it accepts and employs the following conceptualization of state power and how a given state’s ‘rank’ of great power should be determined: “States are placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 131. Based on this criteria as well as status in international organizations such as the UN Security Council, the following states can be considered great powers: United States, China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Russia. For an overview of the evolution of great powers in the international system, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987).

In keeping with prior work on alliance theory capabilities are defined as any military or economic resource aggregated between the great power and peripheral regime the purpose of which is to shift the balance of power in favor of the alliance and against the target threat.

This dissertation recognizes the contested nature of the term “national interest” and does not seek to contribute to this debate. Rather, it uses the term interchangeably with “national security” and employs the definition provided by Morgenthau: “national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions.” In other words, and as applied to alliances, states form traditional alliances so as to aggregate sufficient power to safeguard the integrity of their national territory and associated domestic apparatus. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1959), 586.

In this dissertation “civil war,” “intrastate war” and “internal war” are used interchangeably. Although many agree that civil wars have negative consequences, the definition for what actually constitutes a “civil war” is
itself disputed. This debate essentially revolves around the number of battlefield deaths that must occur initially and for each year of the conflict thereafter. One of the more commonly used definitions is armed conflicts occurring in mainly one country that yield at least 1,000 battle-field deaths per year. See the Correlates of War (COW) project. Noting that 1,000 is perhaps too high, other scholars lower the battlefield death threshold to 100 or 500 per year. Adherents of the latter definition include Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). I do not attempt to contribute to this debate. Rather, I use the essential elements of the CoW definition as set forth by Small and Singer, that a civil war comprises the following elements: (1) military action internal to borders of the state; (2) active military action taken by the national government; and (3) effective resistance from the national government and opposition group or groups. Melvin Small and David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing, 1982). I find the 1,000 battlefield death threshold somewhat arbitrary and do not include it here; however, nor do I offer a different threshold.


8 Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War; Second figure according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which collects information on various aspects of armed violence that have occurred since 1946. For a review of the methodology underlying this estimate, see the UCDP web-site http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/

9 Intra-state “war” refers to conflicts that meet or exceed the 1,000 battlefield death threshold. Correlates of War (COW) project, Inter-State War Data Set (4.0) and Intra-State War Data Set (4.0) Available for download here: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW20Data/WarData_NEW/WarList_NEW.html#Intra-State War Data


11 For an excellent analysis of why civil wars will continue and persist as the principal form of mass organized violence, see Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). See also Ann Hironaka, Never-ending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).


15 Non-structural treatments of military alliance dynamics as reviewed in next chapter hold that alignment decisions are based on the “perception” of these threats. Contours of the international system and distribution of power influence state behavior; however, their precise influence is refracted through and informed by perceptions of a core group of national security policy makers—in some cases referred to as the “Foreign Policy Executive”—who make alignment decisions. Prominent examples of neoclassical realist include: Michael E. Brown et al., eds. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Randall L. Schweller. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); William Curti Wohlfarth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998), 144-172; and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


17 Though other bureaucratic agencies (in particular the armed forces of each partner) are also involved in devising strategy and applying aggregated resources to balance a common threat, alliance theory, as reviewed in the next chapter, largely does not theorize explicitly regarding effectiveness—and those select few scholars who do problematize effectiveness tend to conceptualize partner regimes as unitary.

18 Foreign Policy Executive” (FPE) is defined as the “head of government and ministers and officials responsible for making foreign and security policy. Steven E. Lobell, “Threat assessment, the state, and

Though fighting may occur within one of the allied states (A or B) and thereby lead to some interaction between the armed forces of S (the adversary) and national entities in A or B, this interaction is minimal and not the primary location in which conflict occurs.


23 Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), 21

24 Though Walt and Schwell refer to bandwagoning as an initial response to external threats (and thus an alternative to balancing) the state behavior is also applicable to why states act contrary to agreed alliance policy of balancing and instead decide to bandwagon with the original threat. Lacking the capabilities to win in a given conflict, states bandwagon with an external the side most likely to prove victorious to ensure their survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition. Stephen Walt (1986), for example, argues that states will capitulate to (bandwagon with) the source of danger in order to survive. Schweller (2006) takes issue with Walt’s treatment of bandwagoning and argues that states will bandwagon even in the absence of a threat—states enter a conflict on the side they perceive to be stronger (and thus more likely to win) with the aim of securing material benefit in the event that side wins. That is, states “bandwagon for profit.”


27 Their conceptualization of cohesion contains both behavioral and attitudinal components. To measure the behavioral component, the scholars take the “mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads connecting all alliance members.” They used an “indirect” research approach to quantify and measure the attitudinal aspect of cohesion and defined this component as “co-orientation of decision-makers toward an external actor which is perceived by all members of the alliance…this assumes that the more similarly the alliance members perceive the same object, the greater will be the cohesion among them.” Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1973), 94-95 and 100-102.

28 Authors citing “decision making structure” include: Haas 1969; Duchacek 1966; Fedder 1962; those citing, “capabilities of alliance partners” as it affects bargaining power within the alliance are: Morgenthau 1948;
Miller 1959; Liska 1968; North, Rich, and Zinnes 1970; Olson and Zeckhauser 1970; and Dinerstein (1965) makes the argument related to the “scope of the alliance” and extent to which interests overlap.

29 Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, (1973), Unity and Disintegration, 16.

30 As discussed in chapter two, these factors are “integration of forces” (Liska 1968) and “trust” between partners (Morgenthau 1959).

31 As discussed in the chapter two, these scholars list cohesion as a prerequisite for effectiveness and list additional factors that determine whether an alliance is effective. Coupled with cohesion, and presuming unified application of capabilities, the effectiveness of ‘war-time’ alliance is further determined by: “trust” between allies and whether they “help each other diplomatically” (Holsti 1970) and the allies’ “willingness to endure harm to achieve their goal” or “cost-tolerance” (Rosen 1970). Holsti (1970) conceptualizes this as whether an alliance is an effective “fighting organization.”


33 Weitsman (2004), Dangerous Alliances, 150.

34 See, for example, “The War on the Mexican Cartels,” Final Report, the Institute of Politics National Security Student Policy Group (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, September 2012).

35 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 51.

36 The dissertation focuses on political violence including but not limited to the extent to which it would be defined as a civil war that involves non-state actors contesting the peripheral regime’s control over its territory, including but not limited to insurgency. Where referenced, insurgency is defined as a “struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers.” David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (2004), 112. A recent useful study differentiates between rebellions and insurgencies that seek to replace the government (replacement) or alter the relationship between government and society (legitimacy). David Sobek and Caroline Payne, “A Tale of Two Types: Rebel Goals and the Onset of Civil Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (March 2010), 213-40.


39 There are conflicting reports as to the precise level and type of assistance Russia provided to Syria. However, reports indicate this assistance included guns, helicopters, and a missile defense system. See for example Chris McGreal, “US says Russian-made weapons are killing Syrians on ‘an hourly basis’,” The Guardian, June 13, 2012. Syria also sought similar military assistance from China.

40 Further details regarding this case as well as evidence for the regime’s motivations are presented in Chapter three.

41 Further details regarding this case as well as evidence for the regime’s motivations are presented in Chapter four.

42 For the most comprehensive analysis of why internal war affects the interests of states in general and the U.S. as great power in particular, see Steven R. David, “On Civil War,” The American Interest (March/April 2007); and David, (2008), Catastrophic Consequences.

43 David (2008) makes this argument with regard to risks posed to the U.S. by instability in Pakistan.

44 Various scholars demonstrate that weak states and “ungoverned territory” therein may provide the space in which non-state actors including terrorist organizations may plan and launch attacks against states in general and great powers (as well as their assets) in particular. See for example Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), 30. Patrick elaborates on this initial version of the framework in Stewart Patrick, Weak Links – Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 18-60. See also Angel Basa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O’Brien and John E. Peters. “Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.). Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2008),

45 David, (2008), Catastrophic Consequences.

46 David (2008) makes this argument with regard to China, which holds a large amount of U.S. Treasury bonds. Sustained civil conflict in China, then, could have negative implications for the U.S. budget deficit.
Patron-client relations, also referred to as “clientelism,” is a form of relationship widely examined in the political science literature at both the micro- and macro-levels—examples of the former include studies of village level politics, where macro-level studies might, for example, demonstrate why an entire political system could be characterized as “clientelistic” in nature. Clientelism is examined in political science as both dependent and independent variable. For the former, there are two general approaches that seek to explain why clientelism (explanatory variables) developed in a given country. Scholarship on this topic tends to be divided into “culturalist” and “developmentalist” explanations—the former argues that clientelism stems from cultural traits unique to particular countries and give rise to such behavior, including familialism, tribalism, and clannism. Developmentalist approaches argue that clientelism develops and persists in particular countries due to the lack of formal institutions of representation. There is no single definition of clientelism accepted across the academy. In general, however, scholars tend to agree on a small set of characteristics that make a relationship “patron-client.” First, the relationship is dyadic and occurs between actors who have unequal power and status. Second, the relationship is based on some agreement of reciprocity—maintaining the relationship is based on the expectation that the client will provide agreed goods in exchange for those goods provided by the patron. And third, the relationship is private and tends to fall outside the remit of public law—in other words, formal law or institutions to not govern its operation. Much of the political science literature on clientelism examines the relationship between political candidates (as patron) and voters (as client), with the former doling out a variety of goods in exchange for the individual’s vote. However, there are many other arguments that use a broader conceptualization of patron-client relations to include elite networks that dominate the state and attempt to build and solidify networks of clients in order to maintain their power and influence throughout a given country. I draw on some literature within the first group, though rely most heavily on authors within the second. The specific definition of ‘goods’ depends on the actor (patron or client) and specific form of exchange. Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 3 (1974), 285. In addition to clientelism in lesser developed polities, a separate strain of political science literature examines the relationship between political party and candidate (as patron) and voter (client), and the resources and goods the former provides to the latter in exchange for their political support. In weaker states and given the resources and power they represent, state actors may have greater loyalty to (and prioritize) their client than to the state and securing the national interest. This is common in non-Western states which have not benefited from centuries of state-building where institutions were formed in order to repel external threats and thus commanded loyalty from the populace. By contrast, primary loyalties in lesser developed polities can be to tribal, familial, or ethnic linkages. Clientelism is not limited to underdeveloped countries but tends to be more prevalent in these polities because strong, independent institutions do not exist as a check onto such actions. And even if such institutions do exist, the regime tends to control them and therefore negates any possibility that they will perform their intended role. Faced with two options in a given decision, elites may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest. The effect of this phenomenon is to hinder the efficient use of government resources in particular and governance more broadly, which in many cases retards economic development.

I am not concerned with why patron-client relations develop in a given polity, nor do I attempt to contribute to the associated scholarly debate. Rather, I accept the premise that the behavior of regimes in weaker states tends to be characterized by patron-client relations and instead list those three insights from this literature applicable to understanding decisions and actions of peripheral regime actors (both the FPE and CBAs). First, elites who occupy government positions in lesser developed societies have relationships with clients, which represent a source of power and influence, which can be based on a range of motivations including but not limited to ethnic ties (or factions), economic motivations (illicit industries), regional loyalties, and political ideologies. Factionalism is understood as involving a political and economic competition between ‘clans’, ‘tribes’, or “regional” (both ethnic and non-ethnic) groupings. Patrons seek to solidify their power and influence and therefore endeavor to maintain and strengthen those relationships perceived as crucial to doing so. These relationships represent loyalties that compete with a given actor’s loyalty to the state. In making decisions, elites in general and those in government positions in particular may prioritize maintaining these relationships over the national interest or betterment of society as a whole. For the FPE, this group of actors may or may not rely on maintaining these relationships for their political survival. Regardless, the FPE can see maintaining these relations as beneficial to their political longevity or economic well-being. In this


context, corruption can be viewed as a form of patron-client relations. As applied to understanding internal threat alliance dynamics, the peripheral regime’s FPE and CBAs will have patron-client relations that may lead them to act in ways contrary to the national interest. The FPE sees maintaining these relations as beneficial to their power and influence, including political survival or economic well-being. Actors within CBAs, as components of the state, can also have patron-client relations that affect their decisions and associated behavior. Such patron-client links can be sufficiently robust to motivate CBAs to act in ways contrary to guidance from the FPE in particular and contrary to the national interest in general. In sum, actors (in particular CBAs) within peripheral regimes may prioritize maintaining ability to reap benefits from patron-client ties over achieving the alliance purpose. Second, elites and by extension those with control over the FPE and CBAs may divert state resources to their clients (as a source of patronage) in exchange for elements associated with enhancing one’s power or influence including political support or loyalty, economic gain, or ethnic affiliation. The motivation that undergirds the link between patron and client may vary. Like all governments, weaker states have budgets with associated coffers—and those with control over these capabilities at times divert them to key supporters as a form of patronage in exchange for support and the power this brings. By doing so, the regime precludes the use of these resources for their intended purpose (a result of diversion of economic resources) or decreases the efficiency of government (a result of allocating a political post to an unqualified individual, for example). Applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, actors (FPE and CBA) with patron-client relations will divert government resources, including those capabilities aggregated as part of the alliance. By extension, just as patron-client relations can hinder economic development by diverting resources, the mis-use or diversion of capabilities can also decrease the effectiveness of internal threat alliances—patrons may coopt those resources transferred as part of the alliance in order to issue patronage to their clients and thus secure their core priority, which is not always in line with the national interest and thus alliance purpose. Third and finally, elites and by extension those with control over the FPE and CBAs may enact (or refuse to enforce) government policies to benefit their clients and by extension their power and influence. In exchange for political support or a financial pay-off state actors may ‘turn a blind eye’ to actions by their clients that contravene stated law and government policy. As applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, actors (FPE and CBA) with patron-client relations may contravene government policy, including the purpose of the alliance agreement, by not working against the internal threat. This may take various forms including but not limited to deciding to turn a blind eye to CBAs aiding actors fomenting political violence or not stopping CBA actors from diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose.


64 The actors involved in internal threat alliance dynamics are the Foreign Policy Executive and Critical Bureaucratic Agencies (CBAs). In keeping with neoclassical realism, actors of the Foreign Policy Executive will be the most central to understanding alliance formation, cohesion, and effectiveness; decisions by great power and peripheral regime FPEs are important as they interact to decide to form an alliance, devise strategy and aggregate capabilities, and then apply those capabilities to combat a common internal threat. After the point at which an alliance is formed, however, CBAs will be involved in agreeing on alliance strategy and tactics (cohesion) as well as carrying out associated activities toward those ends (effectiveness). Bureaucratic agencies of alliance partners can to varying degrees be viewed as extensions of their FPE counterparts; none are entirely outside the control of its central government.


67 Robert Jervis (1976) argues that “The state’s behavior is usually seen as centrally controlled rather than as the independent actions of actors trying to further their own interests and their partial and biased conceptions of the national interest.” This is part of his broader argument that in order to fully explain foreign policy-related decisions analysis must also take into account the way in which decision-makers perceive the world and the actors in it; these actors do not always accurately perceive the world or the intent or actions of actors in it—these departures from reality (misperceptions) inform their behavior. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 324.
The influence of bureaucratic organizations within a given state can affect that government’s specific decisions and overall behavior vis-à-vis other states. Building on insights initially flagged by Jervis (1976), Allison holds that the actor in IR is not a single, unitary state but, “a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations” each of which has primary responsibility for its particular “facet of foreign affairs”—for example, a Ministry of Defense purchases arms and coordinates troop deployments, while a state’s intelligence service coordinates gathering information on potential threats. In Allison’s view, the central administration (the FPE in my framework) of a given state remains critical to explaining that state’s actions, but the influence of other organizations (CBAs in my framework) within a given state must also be considered to gain a richer and more nuanced explanation of state behavior.

The influence of these bureaucratic organizations is enabled by their autonomy from the central administration as well as the authority (“primary power”) they wield over their facet of foreign affairs. Central leaders (FPE) “can substantially disturb” but “rarely precisely control” the behavior of these bureaucratic organizations.” As a result, “each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions with considerable autonomy. Allison, (1999), 143 and 166. Drawing on Allison and as applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, the FPE will retain some control over CBAs but these actors will still pursue their interests and objectives independent of the central administration. This is particularly pertinent for examining phenomena relevant to alliance cohesion and effectiveness, wherein alliance partner CBAs collaborate to agree on a strategy, aggregate resources, and then apply these resources against their common, internal adversary. The second insight from Allison’s framework I leverage to understand CBA decisions and actions is that interests other than a rational summation of what is best for the national interest can affect the behavior of these bureaucratic organizations. In Allison’s view, the bureaucratic organization’s behavior is not driven by an overarching and automatic sense of rationality but, rather, a “logic of appropriateness” defined by their “mission” [commensurate with their facet of foreign affairs] and “the view held by the dominant group in the organization” of what their mission should be and those capabilities required to achieve that mission. How the organization implements its mission is affected by a “sets of beliefs about how a mission should be implemented and what capacities are needed or wanted to perform it.” These beliefs stem from the organization’s “primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems” combined with the “gritty, everyday requirements of action” (Allison 1999, 167). This set of beliefs creates as “organizational culture,” the components of which create in such organizations “relatively stable propensities concerning priorities, operational objectives, perceptions, and issues.” The individuals within these organizations (the “operators”) aim to achieve stated targets. For the operators, performance is equated with compliance with successful performance. Allison (1999), 177. As applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, the decisions and actions of CBAs (great power and peripheral regime) vis-à-vis alliance dynamics will be affected by their perceived “logic of appropriateness,” which can include desire to secure resources commensurate with their mission or other motives. The extent to which these decisions and actions deviate from the need to assure the country’s security, however, will depend on the degree of autonomy these CBAs have. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 143 and 166. For other prominent works on the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy-making see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics Vol. 24 (1972), 40-79; and Graham T. Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

On government actors in Iraq colluding with Sunni insurgents see, for example, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni-Arab Insurgency,” Military Review, (May/June 2006). As outlined in O’Hanlon and Sherjan (2010), referring to the Iraqi security forces and U.S. efforts to train them: “In effect, we were equipping them for contributing to sectarian warfare rather than stopping it, because the units were heavily infiltrated by extremists who often supported militias and criminals rather than opposing them.”

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68 Liska (1968) states “An alliance supplies the undeniable justification and the irremovable sanction for the exercise of control; actual authority has to be supplied by those who implement the alliance at the summit and in the field.” George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 40.

69 Two aspects of Allison’s organizational process model (1999), one of the seminal works on bureaucratic politics, are applicable for conceptualizing the interests and associated influence onto alliance dynamics of great power and peripheral regime CBAs. In drawing on these elements of Allison’s framework, however, I do not adopt Allison’s view that state behavior is a combination of organizational outputs or seek to contribute to organizational theory or the scholarly debates therein. I do not accept nor apply all aspects of Allison’s model, however. Instead, I apply only those aspects applicable to and most relevant for explaining the formation, cohesion, and effectiveness of internal threat alliances. First, bureaucratic organizations within a given state can affect that government’s specific decisions and overall behavior vis-à-vis other states. Building on insights initially flagged by Jervis (1976), Allison holds that the actor in IR is not a single, unitary state but, “a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations” each of which has primary responsibility for its particular “facet of foreign affairs”—for example, a Ministry of Defense purchases arms and coordinates troop deployments, while a state’s intelligence service coordinates gathering information on potential threats. In Allison’s view, the central administration (the FPE in my framework) of a given state remains critical to explaining that state’s actions, but the influence of other organizations (CBAs in my framework) within a given state must also be considered to gain a richer and more nuanced explanation of state behavior. The influence of these bureaucratic organizations is enabled by their autonomy from the central administration as well as the authority (“primary power”) they wield over their facet of foreign affairs. Central leaders (FPE) “can substantially disturb” but “rarely precisely control” the behavior of these bureaucratic organizations.”

69 As a result, “each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions with considerable autonomy. Allison, (1999), 143 and 166. Drawing on Allison and as applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, the FPE will retain some control over CBAs but these actors will still pursue their interests and objectives independent of the central administration. This is particularly pertinent for examining phenomena relevant to alliance cohesion and effectiveness, wherein alliance partner CBAs collaborate to agree on a strategy, aggregate resources, and then apply these resources against their common, internal adversary. The second insight from Allison’s framework I leverage to understand CBA decisions and actions is that interests other than a rational summation of what is best for the national interest can affect the behavior of these bureaucratic organizations. In Allison’s view, the bureaucratic organization’s behavior is not driven by an overarching and automatic sense of rationality but, rather, a “logic of appropriateness” defined by their “mission” [commensurate with their facet of foreign affairs] and “the view held by the dominant group in the organization” of what their mission should be and those capabilities required to achieve that mission. How the organization implements its mission is affected by a “sets of beliefs about how a mission should be implemented and what capacities are needed or wanted to perform it.” These beliefs stem from the organization’s “primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems” combined with the “gritty, everyday requirements of action” (Allison 1999, 167). This set of beliefs creates as “organizational culture,” the components of which create in such organizations “relatively stable propensities concerning priorities, operational objectives, perceptions, and issues.” The individuals within these organizations (the “operators”) aim to achieve stated targets. For the operators, performance is equated with compliance with successful performance. Allison (1999), 177. As applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, the decisions and actions of CBAs (great power and peripheral regime) vis-à-vis alliance dynamics will be affected by their perceived “logic of appropriateness,” which can include desire to secure resources commensurate with their mission or other motives. The extent to which these decisions and actions deviate from the need to assure the country’s security, however, will depend on the degree of autonomy these CBAs have. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 143 and 166. For other prominent works on the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy-making see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics Vol. 24 (1972), 40-79; and Graham T. Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
ween the Afghan regime’s agencies with sources of threat and measure variance in cohesion, various indicators of those capabilities are:

- The size of the opposition (threat) vis-à-vis variance in
- A decrease in these factors is considered an increase in ally government ability to balance against an internal
- Number of attacks employed by the opposition relative to the government’s military personnel;
- Amount of territory controlled by the opposition;
- Alliance effectiveness
- Alliance the following measures related to the opposition are used:
  - Alliance effectiveness
  - High when the threat is no longer a core threat to partners’ security. To conceptualize variation
  - 3) amount of training provided including number of trainers deployed to the
  - Aggregation of military capabilities employed: (1) funds (adjusted for inflation) transferred to the government to implement aid programs
  - Transferred to the peripheral government to purchase military arms and equipment;
  - Direct transfer of funds (adjusted for inflation) given to the government to combat access to illicit financing (for example, crop eradication or drug interdiction); (3) number of aid personnel (government or contractor) deployed to assist with these development efforts; (4) amount of training provided as measured by number of trainers deployed to country and number of government personnel trained.

Effectiveness of internal threat alliances is demonstrated by indicators that reflect the capability of the internal threat and will range from low to high—low when the threat continues to imperil the security of both allies; and high when the threat is no longer a core threat to partners’ security. To conceptualize variation in alliance effectiveness and therefore measure whether the internal threat has been debilitated as a result of the alliance the following measures related to the opposition are used: (1) total number of opposition personnel relative to the government’s military personnel; (2) amount of territory controlled by the opposition and (3) number of attacks employed by the opposition (and where possible, frequency and intensity of those attacks). A decrease in these factors is considered an increase in ally government ability to balance against an internal threat to its sovereignty. The first data factor provides a measure of the size of the opposition (threat) vis-à-
vis the peripheral regime, while the second provides an indication of the opposition’s ability to organize and leverage their personnel to obtain territory. This second factor is also a useful measure to track changes in strength of the threat opposition strength throughout the intervention and identify relationships between these factors. For example, should amount of opposition-held territory decrease following formation of the alliance and continue to decline, this may be an indication of alliance effectiveness. The third and final data factor also provides an indication of the opposition’s ability to organize and leverage their personnel, yet in this case to plan and implement kinetic actions. This third factor is also a useful measure to track changes in intensity of the threat over the course of the alliance For example, if the number of opposition-employed attacks decreases following initial alliance formation and continues to decline, this may be an indication of alliance effectiveness. By tracing variation on these factors I seek to demonstrate potential effect of the alliance onto the targeted internal threat.


This follows Weitsman’s conceptualization of “ambiguous threats” in external threat alliances. Just as allies in “wartime” alliances may attribute the threat to one actor more than another, the “symmetry, clarity, and commonality” of the way in which allies perceive threats in internal alliances will determine the extent to which they “agree on necessary action to confront those threats” including goals, strategy, and tactics.

Following Escobar’s escape, the U.S. and Colombia worked closely to track him down and kill him, demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and Colombia to closely cooperate and coordinate their policies and activities. The effort involved collaboration by the CIA, DEA and their counterparts in Colombia. Interview with author, Rafael Pardo, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.

Due to the fluid situation in Syria and inability of journalists to access areas and interview individuals as well as verify reports, it is difficult to corroborate statistics regarding bandwagoning (defections) as well as their impact onto alliance effectiveness. For a running estimate of “high-level” defections, see “Interactive: Tracking Syria’s defections,” Al-Jazeera. Available here: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/syriadefections. Various news reports since the beginning of the internal conflict evidence that army officers, cabinet officials, and others have defected. For example, see: Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syrian army defectors say Assad regime crumbling,” Reuters, July 18, 2012.


Their conceptualization of cohesion contains both behavioral and attitudinal components. To measure the behavioral component, the scholars take the “mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads connecting all alliance members.” They used an “indirect” research approach to quantify and measure the attitudinal aspect of cohesion and defined this component as “co-orientation of decision-makers toward an external actor which is perceived by all members of the alliance...this assumes that the more similarly the alliance members perceive the same object, the greater will be the cohesion among them” Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1973), 94-95 and 100-102.
CHAPTER TWO

ALLIANCE THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL TERRAIN

This chapter provides a critical review of international relations (IR) literature on alliance dynamics and has two objectives. First, to demonstrate the need for my contribution to theory by highlighting that existing IR scholarship has yet to adequately examine internal threat alliances and in its current form is ill-equipped to explain their dynamics. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the nature of alliance-making has changed dramatically; however, scholars have yet to update IR theory to account for and explain the more common forms of alliances in the contemporary world. And second, the chapter seeks to highlight those elements of existing literature applicable to understanding internal threat alliance dynamics that were therefore modified and incorporated in the previous chapter. The chapter also provides an overview of the dissertation’s case study research methodology.

The literature review portion of the chapter proceeds in five core sections, one each for works on alliance formation, bandwagoning, cohesion, effectiveness, and unified frameworks (scholars that examine more than one dynamic in a single cohesive theory). Each section traces the evolution of alliance literature, provides a critical review of the main arguments, and highlights gaps the dissertation seeks to fill. The final section outlines the dissertation’s research methodology.

I. ALLIANCE FORMATION

“It is the existence of an enemy...that gives rise to the need for allies.”

Alliance formation consists of two core issues that scholars have attempted to explain. First, why do states bring their security policies into close cooperation with another state? In examining this question, IR scholars broadly agree that presence of a common
external threat—a state or group of states—is the most prominent factor motivating states to form alliances. And second, why do states seek to align with one *specific* state (or group of states) instead of another? In exploring this issue, scholars aim to account for the size of particular alliances as well as the pattern of alliance formation over time (Riker 1968; Gross 1970; Rosen 1970). The former is most relevant to my dissertation and therefore the focus of this section.

Theories on why states form military alliances generally agree that they do so in response to an external threat as represented by a state or groups of states (counter alliance) but remain divided over whether this external threat, broadly conceived, is the *only* factor that affects alliance formation. For the sake of presentation, these arguments can be disaggregated into scholars who give primacy to external threat as motivating alignment (and view states as like units defined by capabilities) and those arguing that other non-material variables also determine alignment decisions (and examine the influence of domestic variation onto alignment).

1. **Like Units Align to Balance External Threats**

   Scholars in this strain of literature include those who examine alliances as responses to threats represented by specific states (or groups thereof) and those more closely associated with balance-of-power theories. Generally, they conceptualize states as similar units defined by capabilities whose domestic structure mostly does not condition behavior. These internally cohesive polities form alliances in order to secure the national interest defined in terms of state security and territorial integrity.

A. **Early Alliance Literature: States Align to Balance External Enemies**

   Representing the advent of political science literature on alliances, Arnold Wolfers (1962) and George Liska (1968) examine alliances as state responses to balance external
threats. According to Wolfers, states form “cooperative arrangements” (alliances) that “line up” the partner countries for “mutual assistance against a common external foe”\(^4\) in order to “to ward off threats to their national security interests…emanating from some specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential.”\(^5\) States choose to form alliances due to “the conviction that the creation of military strength sufficient to ward off the specific threat would be beyond their national capacity.”\(^6\) Like Wolfers, Liska argues that an external threat to security is the primary factor that spurs alliance formation. States form an alliance “only when another state intervenes as a threat” and with the purpose of “supplement(ing) each other’s capability” to reduce “the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one’s independence.”\(^7\) Without the capabilities to alone defeat/deter this threat, states will pool resources with others to be able to do so. Motivated by their core desire to maximize security and preserve territorial integrity, states weigh the costs and benefits of forming alliances and proceed accordingly after determining that such arrangements provide more security-related gains than liabilities.\(^8\)

Two other early alliance theory scholars echo Liska’s position and use economic theory to argue that states form alliance in order to produce a “public good” that is in the “interests of all” in the alliance: deterring “aggression by a common enemy” (Olson and Zeckhauser 1970).\(^9\) Alone, states lack the capabilities necessary to produce the public good (security) and therefore will join together to do so.\(^10\) In line with with their focus on threat and treatment of states as similar units defined by capabilities, these scholars downplay the relevance of other factors for explaining alliance formation including “religious and ideological homogeneity” (Wolfers 1968) or shared “ideology” (Fedder 1968).\(^11\)
Scholars who championed the early study of alliances made important contributions to understanding why states form them and the purposes they serve. In doing so, they motivated subsequent scholars to examine alliance dynamics in greater detail and provided a foundation of assumptions on which the academy could build. Despite these advances, they offer few generalizable insights applicable to a broader universe of cases in general and internal threat alliances particularly. In defining threats as external and comprising a state (or group thereof) Wolfers, Liska, and others overlook why threats other than states—such as political violence and associated instability emanating from within a given polity—might also motivate two governments to align their security policies. Though Wolfers and Liska do mention alliances between great powers and smaller states, they still largely conceptualize states as defined by capabilities and overlook (or do not theorize regarding) the potential influence onto alliance formation of differences in structure within allies. Though weaker powers may be less developed and thus fragmented, with various groups therein jockeying for power, these early works on alliances do not problematize the potential influence of such differences and generally focus on alliances between great powers.

Within the strain of literature focused on external threat as the primary factor motivating alliance formation are those that can be broadly conceived as balance of power theories. Where Wolfers and Liska conceptualize external threat as a state or group of states and alliances as a means to ensure security in response to such threats, balance of power frameworks (in particular with the advent of neorealism) cast alliances as responses to balance accumulations of power.
B. ALIGNING TO BALANCE ACCUMULATIONS OF POWER / THREAT

Traditional balance of power theory focuses on systemic responses to accumulations of power, where constraints put in place by the structure of the international system inform patterns of state behavior. As Friedman (1970) writes in one of the earlier studies on alliances, “the alliance process supplies the means for maintaining the balance of power” and “can stabilize the balance and counter tendencies toward its disruption.”

The distribution of capabilities across states within the international system is viewed as the principal force motivating alignment behavior. Without an authoritative world-spanning government to provide security, states exist in a “self-help” environment based on power and must rely on themselves to survive. As an “ordering principle” distinct from domestic politics, anarchy within the international realm promotes a pattern of state behavior and “balancing” dynamics that characterize international politics. According to this approach, states form alliances to prevent any one state or group thereof from securing predominant power.

Unique to balance of power theories is their position that alliances form almost automatically and in response to perceived power shifts. States are like units who rationally rank-order their preferences and seek to amass power to preserve their own security. As states perceive modifications to the distribution of power they will seek alliances with other states in order to offset this shift and restore the balance, selecting prospective alliance partners based solely on their capabilities and ability to help achieve this purpose.

One of the earliest proponents of this position is Hans Morgenthau (1959), who argues that “the historically most important manifestation of the balance of power…is to be found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.” According to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979;
version of balance of power, states are viewed as “like units,” hierarchically structured, that serve the same list of functions, differing according to their capabilities and seeking at minimum to survive. Due to the anarchic nature of the international realm, states will engage in balancing behavior—“externally” (forming alliances) or “internally” (increasing military strength)—to prevent any one state or alliance of states from dominating the international system. In order to survive, states “behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power.” States align with a given state as a matter of “expediency” and the common need for security and to aggregate capabilities, and not a shared “principle,” similar ideology, regime type, or other factors.

In an important theoretical advance, Stephen Walt’s (1987) “Balance of Threat” theory builds from Waltz and prior alliance literature to argue that states balance external threats instead of only accumulations of power. Level of threat is comprised of another state’s total power, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity, and hostile intentions: as level of threat increases, so too does the probability that a threatened state will form an alliance. Though Walt found that ally ing again st a threat (balancing) is more prevalent than allying with it (bandwagoning), others such as Randall Schweller (1994) hold that he underestimates the prevalence of the latter. In particular, Schweller argues states may in specific circumstances find it most advantageous to bandwagon to benefit from efforts by the revisionist state.

These structural accounts made important advances relative to earlier “traditional” alliance theory by presenting theoretical frameworks that incorporate systemic influence onto alignment decisions. Despite these and other advances, these works also have two principal gaps. First, their definition of threat remains focused on external enemies and
largely overlooks why threats emanating from within a given polity (such as coups and civil war, and the consequences these might bring for great powers and their allies alike) may also motivate states to align. By focusing on external threats as the predominant factor affecting alliance formation, these frameworks overlook why internal threats might also inform alignment decisions. Second, by conceptualizing states as unified entities defined by capabilities, they do not recognize the potential influence onto state behavior in general—and alliance formation in particular—of differentiation within states. This is especially relevant for smaller, weaker states whose internal character may not be hierarchical and unified in decision-making (and therefore with the national interest as their top priority) but, in contrast, fragmented and characterized by various groups competing for control of government.

2. Non-Material Variables & Disaggregating the State

Arguments within this strain of literature differ in three ways from those reviewed above. First, other early alliance scholars responded to work by Liska and Wolfers to argue that non-material variables in addition to external threat must be considered to fully explain formation. Second, later frameworks built from Waltz and Walt and blended systemic influences with domestic variables in order to explain alliance formation. And third and finally, traditional and more contemporary arguments problematize states’ internal makeup and the influence of such domestic factors/institutions onto state behavior/alignment.

A. Early Alliance Literature: Formation as Influenced by Ideology / Culture

To some extent responding to work by Liska and Wolfers, other earlier alliance scholars argue that external threat *alone* is insufficient to fully explain alignment. External enemies, they concede, motivate states to pursue alliances; however, states choose a particular ally not only because they provide capabilities necessary to defeat/deter their
enemy but also because this prospective ally shares some common characteristic including but not limited to: “ideological affinities” or “psychological penetration” of one ally’s ideology onto the other (Osgood 1968; Teune and Synnestvedt 1970); common traits (Russett 1960; Dawson and Rosencrance 1966), “cultural similarity” between allies (Guetzkow 1957), and language.²³ To some extent the “democratic peace” theory can be viewed as an extension of these earlier works and a response to balance of power explanations: due to cultural and structural factors, democracies are predisposed to align with (rather than confront) each other.²⁴

Scholars who offered revisions to traditional alliance theory and cited the influence of non-material factors onto alignment decisions made contributions by recognizing that allies’ political structures may vary and affect alignment decisions. At the same time, these arguments largely view states as unified units that rationally rank-order their preferences and seek to amass power to preserve their own security. And despite noting that domestic characteristics can affect alliance formation, they focus on external (as opposed to internal) threats as the principle factor that initially spurs alignment. Additionally, and most problematically, these arguments generally do not describe or provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the causal mechanisms through which non-material variables (ideology, for example) affect alliance formation more than threat. The more recent addition of democratic peace theory also makes an important contribution by considering domestic factors when examining alignment decisions. In addition to broader empirical issues with democratic peace theory as outlined by others, however, it is generally unable to explain why a democratic nation would align with another state despite it being non-democratic.
B. ALIGNMENT AS INFLUENCED BY DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, THREAT PERCEPTION

Later frameworks presented more nuanced treatments of how domestic factors influence alignment decisions (Barnett and Levy 1991; Levy and Barnett 1992; Kaufman 1992). Within the neoclassical realism strain of IR theory, for example, scholars concede that contours of the international system influence state behavior but argue that the precise influence (including onto alignment decisions) is refracted through/informed by intervening domestic variables. These include domestic politics and the strength of a country’s state apparatus or “state power” (Zakaria 1998) and decision-makers’ perception of threats and dominant intellectual currents that inform those perceptions. It is not so much external threats themselves (still represented by states) that inform alignment but, rather, states’ misperception of them. Christensen and Snyder (1990), for example, show that civil-military relations and past experience can lead states to misperceive the distribution of offensive or defensive capabilities in the international system, producing “chain-ganging” and “buck-passing” behavior, respectively. Others such as Lobell (2009) show that threat perception can lead great powers to respond to a component of (instead of aggregate) a rising power’s capabilities and in turn generate “over” or under “reaction” (“inappropriate balancing”).

By disaggregating the state and allowing for variation on those factors that inform threat perception, these scholars make an important advance by addressing one shortcoming of traditional balance of power/threat theories. Nonetheless, they still predominantly employ a narrow understanding of threat as an external challenge. As a result and like traditional balance of power approaches they seek to amend, such analyses overlook threats internal to sovereign entities. Finally, though they advance theory by problematizing the influence onto alliance formation of internal state structure, they tend
to overlook why internal fragmentation and threats emanating from within a given state may affect that same polity’s alignment. This gap in particular, however, is filled by Steven David (1991) and Randall Schweller (2004; 2006).

**C. Alignment as Influenced by Internal Threats and Constraints**

Steven David is one of the few scholars to have recognized that states pursue alliances to balance external and internal threats. David’s omni-balancing framework amends the neorealist conceptualization of the state and posits a theoretical approach that accounts for internal fragmentation and varying degrees of anarchy and hierarchy and associated (in)stability. Where traditional balance of power theory focuses on alignment behavior by states in response to external threats from other states, David’s theory focuses on leaders of weaker states and recognizes that they face domestic (internal) threats—coup or secessionist movements, among others—that also influence their alignment decisions.

External threats to states cannot be ignored, but internal threats tend to exert a more powerful influence on alignment behavior, which in the Third World is ultimately driven by the “rational calculation” of “leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do whatever necessary to keep them in power.” As a result, leaders will seek external alignments (even with states they consider a secondary threat) in order to balance the “more immediate and dangerous” threat to their survival. Since the principal concern of leaders is to remain in power, they will at times “protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.” This amends traditional balance of power theory and is an important advance on other alliance politics literature which assume that alignment decisions are driven primarily by the national interest. Regimes, like states, seek to survive and will therefore act in ways (including forming alliances with secondary threats) to keep themselves in power. Others such as
Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997) attempt to build on David’s framework, but whether their contribution is unique remains unclear.³³

To some extent building from David’s work, Schweller’s (2004; 2006) theory of “underbalancing” argues that four domestic-level factors predominantly found in weaker states can lead to “paltry” and inadequate responses including “under-balancing” in reaction to rising threats in the form of other states.³⁴ Where traditional balance of power assumes a state’s ability to mobilize resources to balance, Schweller argues that such assumptions do not necessarily apply to weaker states where a lack of elite consensus, societal fragmentation, and internal instability lead to under-balancing.³⁵ These characteristics make it more difficult for such states to display full balancing behavior in line with the actual threat level.

The work of David and Schweller contain two important advances over prior scholarship that make them superior to balance of power/threat for examining internal threat alliances. First, they disaggregate the state, demonstrate why the neorealist view is not necessarily applicable to weaker polities, and therefore why particular internal structures (or lack thereof) of such states must be considered when attempting to explain their alignment decisions. In the case of David’s omnibalancing framework in particular, it is not so much the “state” as the central elite “regime” that is making alignment decisions. And second, they go beyond neoclassical realists to clearly devise a broader conceptualization of threat: weaker states face external pressures as well as internal challenges to their rule and both can affect their alignment decisions.³⁶ This is an important advance in two ways: it broadens the academy’s conceptualization of threat beyond external pressures as represented by states or groups thereof; and second, David recognizes
that regime survival (rather than only the national interest) can also motivate alignment. At the same time, both David and Schweller do not directly recognize that the threat internal to the weaker regime could also threaten and therefore motivate alignment decisions of a larger power—that is, they do not problematize alliance formation between great powers and weaker (peripheral) regimes where the internal threat is common to and therefore motivates both states to form an alliance. Harknett and VanDenBerg also overlook why threats internal to the peripheral state can be common to that regime and the great power.

**Alliance Formation: Summary of Gaps in Theory**

As the review outlined above demonstrates, IR theory mostly overlooks internal threat alliances and has various gaps that render it incapable of explaining why they form. First, theories examining why great powers align narrowly conceptualize the threat that prompts this behavior as external and comprised of a state or counter-alliance. In part, this stems from the universe of cases examined. Writing at a time where inter-state war was at its peak (pre-Cold War) or very possible (during the Cold War), scholars understandably developed theories to explain why these factors external to states’ borders drove alignment decisions. These works also assume that states align in order to safeguard the national interest—that is, state security and territorial survival. David’s omnibalancing framework and Schweller’s underbalancing theory bring the academy a step closer to filling these gaps by demonstrating why threats (or constraints) internal to a weak regime’s borders can affect that regime’s external alignment behavior. And David’s theory rightly notes that weak regimes have motives other than the national interest—remaining in power—that drive their alignment decisions. At the same time, both David and Schweller do not focus specifically on those factors motivating the alignment decisions of the external, stronger power with whom weaker regimes align. David rightfully notes that internal threats affect
the weaker regime’s alignment decisions and Schweller demonstrates why internal fragmentation hinders weak regime capacity to mobilize resources (and thus balance); however, both do not explicitly recognize that such instability within the weaker regime might also threaten the stronger power’s security and thus motivate them to form an alliance.

II. BANDWAGONING

The term “bandwagoning” was first used in IR theory by Waltz (1979) to essentially describe the antithesis of balancing—a state joining the stronger coalition, whereas balancing reflects aligning allying with the weaker side. Building from Waltz, Walt (1987) further refines bandwagoning but retains the dichotomous, “either or” conceptualization of balancing/bandwagoning: “when confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon” (emphasis mine). According to Walt’s (1987) definition, whereas balancing represents “allying with others against the prevailing threat,” bandwagoning signifies “alignment with the source of danger” and can take two forms as distinguished by motivation or purpose. “Offensive” bandwagoning is a state’s decision to align with the dominant state in order to share its projected “spoils of victory.” And “defensive” bandwagoning is a “form of appeasement” where a state aligns with an aggressive state in order to avoid attack and survive. According to Walt, weak states are particularly prone to bandwagon because they lack capabilities necessary to affect the outcome of a given conflict and therefore need to select the “winning side” in order to survive. And allying against a threat (balancing) is more prevalent than allying with it (bandwagoning). Many other scholars have discussed bandwagoning, yet employ Walt’s definition and therefore need not be reviewed here.
Other scholars have critiqued Walt’s argument that balancing is more common than bandwagoning. Schweller (1994) holds that Walt underestimates the prevalence of bandwagoning and argues that states will bandwagon even in the absence of a threat by entering a conflict on the side they perceive to be stronger (and more likely to win) with the aim of securing material benefit in the event that side wins. That is, states “bandwagon for profit.” While differing from Walt in this respect, Schweller retains his dichotomous understanding of balancing/bandwagoning and assumption that the core factor motivating states to bandwagon (or balance) is to secure the national interest defined broadly as state security and territorial survival.

In a later examination, Weitsman (2004) differs from Walt and Schweller by arguing that bandwagoning is a function of the level of threat a state faces rather than the size of the state being threatened. Where Walt argues that smaller (weaker) states bandwagon, Weitsman holds that “big states” can also be “asymmetrically threatened” and therefore exhibit bandwagoning behavior. Despite the slight differences between Walt, Schweller, and Weitsman, they all agree on two points: states bandwagon (whether to survive or for profit) in order to advance the national interest; and bandwagoning/balancing is a binary phenomenon where states do one or the other.

In analyses centered on cohesion, bandwagoning is one factor IR scholars hold may lead to the “dissolution” of external threat alliances: after aligning and facing an escalating threat, an ally may decide that the alliance can no longer advance its national interest. The state defects from the alliance and aligns (bandwagons) with the external threat.

**Bandwagoning: Summary of Gaps in Theory**

Scholars who examine bandwagoning made important advances to IR theory yet can be critiqued on two grounds as it relates to understanding internal threat alliances. First,
by viewing balancing and bandwagoning as an “either or” phenomenon the potential for these to occur simultaneously is overlooked. This shortcoming is linked to scholars’ conceptualization of the state. In treating allies as generally cohesive units whose internal orders are structured in a hierarchical manner, these frameworks discount the possibility that agencies or components within a given state may seek to bandwagon with another state while the central government is balancing it, or vice versa. When examining alliances between two generally cohesive actors, this manifestation of fragmented and simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning would be uncommon. At the same time, it renders traditional alliance theory’s treatment of bandwagoning not fully applicable to understanding the dynamics of internal threat alliances where one ally is weak, internally fragmented, and comprised of actors who act to advance their own interests and may choose to bandwagon rather than balance. Accordingly, a new conceptualization of bandwagoning in the context of internal threat alliances remains necessary.

III. ALLIANCE COHESION

“Common interests are the rock on which all alliances are built. Yet upon this rock all kinds of structures may be erected, some solid and spacious, others crumbling and confining.” – Hans J. Morgenthau

IR scholars have also examined why (or why not) alliance partners remain together and are able to cooperate in pursuit of their stated goals. Broadly, these aspects of alliances are referred to as alliance “cohesion” and used in three principal ways: (1) the ability of the alliance to survive, where alliances are cohesive if they do not “disintegrate”; (2) the degree to which alliance partners are able to set goals, a strategy to achieve these goals, and then coordinate activities to implement the agreed strategy; and (3) the extent to which allies “maintain similar attitudes about objectives and targets and continue to behave in a collaborative manner.” Though definitions vary, scholars examine the following factors
that affect whether alliance partners stick together and work together to confront the common menace: external threat; allies’ capabilities; as well as alliance structure and “scope.” Even though external threat is the single factor most agreed upon across the literature as affecting cohesion—and supported by robust analysis—I discuss the other two factors so as to demonstrate the evolution of alliance theory.

1. Cohesion as Influenced by Level of External Threat

There is wide agreement across the literature that a common external threat is a prerequisite for alliance cohesion. States form an alliance in response to a threat and when that threat disappears allies no longer (necessarily) need to remain together and thus might disband. The more useful arguments examine actual variation in cohesion and why change in the intensity or level of external threat—and whether alliance partners’ are equally threatened—affects cohesion. Theorists coalesce on two positions related to threat and cohesion.

First, the intensity of the external threat influences the degree of cohesion—as the threat from the external enemy rises, cohesion should increase as partners need to cooperate more closely to be able to address that threat; in tandem, cohesion will decrease as the intensity of threat dampens. Increases in threat intensity can enhance group (state) cohesiveness and “unify” alliance partners (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Boulding 1962). And a decline in threat can “undermine,” “weaken”, or “decrease” cohesion (Wolfers 1966; Stevens 1961; Calvocoressi 1966). In sum, “greater conflict between alliances tends to exert an integrative impact on alliances” (Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan 1973). Others argue that a high enough level of threat can “trump” disagreements or strains within the alliance (Holsti 1967).
And second, the influence of level of threat on cohesion depends on the extent to which this threat adversely affects all alliance partners equally. The “unity” of the alliance can decrease should there be a “discrepancy” in the degree of threat faced by alliance partners (Wolfers 1959) and “decision-making” within alliances is made more difficult should the threat focus on one (rather than all) alliance partners (Liska 1962). In sum, alliance partners will remain together and be more likely to work together should: the common external threat be present, high, and perceived as such by all alliance partners. Should the threat decrease or one ally perceive it as lower than another, collaboration between partners decreases.

There are two main shortcomings with these arguments. First, they focus on external threats and overlook threats internal to one of the alliance partners that could also influence cohesion. And second, they tend to conceptualize states as like units that are hierarchically structured. While applicable to alliances between two generally cohesive units, this makes the frameworks less able to explain cohesion of alliances involving a weaker state. In such cases, actors of the ruling regime might perceive threats differently—the small ruling elite, for example, may view the threat as greater than actors in other bureaucratic agencies or governors. In turn, these actors may be more or less inclined to work with their ally to balance, leading to variation in cohesion.

2. Cohesion as Influenced by Allies’ “Capabilities”

Some scholars also argue that allies’ capabilities can influence cohesion and tend to agree that the capabilities an ally brings to the alliance affects their “bargaining power” within the alliance. In defensive alliances the “core” power can use coercion in order to push their weaker ally into line and force them to cooperate, thereby increasing cohesion (Morgenthau 1948; Liska 1968; North, Kich, and Zinnes 1970). The “distribution of
power” within the alliance determines whether partners are “able to coordinate” to achieve alliance goals and the more powerful ally is likely to “have its way.” But, an ally may have a specific valuable “asset” that despite traditional measures of power increases its leverage within the alliance (Morgenthau 1948; Miller 1959; Olson and Zeckhauser 1970). Scholars also note that “heterogeneity of alliance partners” can affect cohesion, but there seems to be less agreement on (and evidence for) this point. 

Insights on why allies’ capabilities affect cohesion are important in so far as they logically note that power may affect who gets what in a given alliance. Despite these advances, in focusing on capabilities scholars largely assume that all (in particular weaker) allies are eager and willing to cooperate, that all actors within this ally and relevant to the alliance share this willingness and are acting to secure the national interest. It has been argued that as alliance partners have greater capabilities they will be more able to devote those resources necessary to work together. In the context of an internal threat alliance, though, the weaker regime (or specific actors within it) may prioritize (as David notes) its survival or interests over the alliance. Despite the logical relevance of this factor, the extant literature has not fully examined its influence on alliance cohesion.

3. Cohesion as Influenced by Alliance Decision-Making Structure / “Scope”

The size and decision-making structure of alliances—political and military arrangements made to coordinate goals, strategies, and then aggregate capabilities—is the third factor said to influence alliance cohesion. Aside from noting that larger alliances make coordination more difficult, scholars take two polar positions about the influence of decision-making structure on cohesion. On one side, they argue that centralized and hierarchical decision-making structures make alliances more cohesive (Haas and Whiting 1956; Haas 1969) and able to “readily respond to external threats” (Masters 1961). At
the same time, others argue the opposite and that hierarchical decision-making structures with a dominant leader decreases cohesion by fomenting resentment (Fedder 1962; Liska 1968; Duchacek 1966; Rothstein 1966).  

Linked to the influence of decision-making structure is the alliance’s “scope” (number of issues addressed) and the degree of overlap on partners’ interests as it relates to alliance goals. The cohesion of the alliance (in these arguments referred to as its “durability”) will be inversely related to its scope: alliances that address fewer issues and are clear on goals (“limited” alliances or those of “limited purpose”) should have higher cohesion (endure longer) because it is easier for partners to initiate and maintain cooperation on fewer issues (Liska 1962; Dinerstein 1965; Morgenthau 1959; Haas 1969). An alliance will last longer if it is based on “limited interests” and more likely to be operative should the interests of partners extend to “concrete policies and measures.” In a later study, however, Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan (1973) find that there is only a weak relationship between the scope of an alliance (“goal structure”) and coordination (cohesion).

All of the arguments about the influence of decision-making structure or scope onto cohesion seem plausible, but can be critiqued due to their conceptualization of states as like units that are hierarchically structured. This renders them largely unable to recognize the various actors within a given state—the police, military, Ministries, among others—involved in setting goals and strategy (core elements of cohesion) that might influence (and therefore explain) allies’ ability to work together. Whether defensive or offensive, alliances are complex endeavors involving coordination and planning by various actors within each partner; however, the reviewed works largely overlook these sub-state actors and opt
instead for assuming that states’ leaders act to advance the national interest and make decisions related to cohesion accordingly.66

**Alliance Cohesion: Summary of Gaps in Theory**

As the review outlined above demonstrates, the literature has various gaps in general and that render it incapable of explaining cohesion of internal threat alliances particularly. First, scholars are right to highlight that level of threat influences cohesion, but largely overlook internal threats. Second, and rooted in the universe of cases examined—mostly great powers and Western states of comparable degrees of internal cohesiveness and development—they conceptualize states as unified and hierarchically structured units and in so doing overlook the potential influence of other bureaucratic agencies within the state. These various entities may perceive threats differently, or prioritize other interests (patron-client ties, for example) over the national interest, and therefore express higher, or lower, degrees of cooperation. Instead of acting in accordance with alliance strategy and balancing the threat, for example, they might decide to bandwagon with it. As the alliance dynamic under consideration changes from formation to cohesion, and thus the establishment of the alliance to coordinating its strategy, more actors become involved. But, the extant literature largely overlooks such actors. Third and finally, scholars largely assume that allies will be willing to work together to derive and implement strategy and tactics. In the context of great power/peripheral regime alliances, actors comprising the latter may not necessarily act in accordance with initially agreed alliance strategy.
IV. ALLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS

“States form alliances for a purpose, but do not always achieve that aim.” - Brent Scowcroft

Alliance effectiveness has broadly been defined as “the ability of the alliance to achieve its goals.”67 For traditional “defensive” (or “peacetime”) alliances the goal is to deter an attack; and for “offensive” (or “wartime”) alliances to defeat a common enemy. Scholars have focused on the former but also examined why offensive alliances do (or do not) achieve their goal.

For defensive alliances, effectiveness is conceptualized as allies’ ability to remain together with sufficient capabilities to deter a common enemy’s advances. For these cases, which represent the lion’s share of alliance theory, effectiveness is generally equated with degree of cohesion (or “durability”). Most make no specific reference to effectiveness, but two scholars do mention “effectiveness” and factors in addition to cohesion that influence an alliance’s ability to deter its enemy. According to Liska (1968), alliance effectiveness (“efficacy”) is influenced by allies’ ability to act together to “restrain the adversary” (cohesion) and the degree to which allies’ activities are “integrated” in specific areas.”68 Like Liska, Morgenthau (1959) argues that alliance effectiveness (“quality”) is influenced by cohesion and “the relations of trust and respect among its principal statesmen.”69

Though most literature examines defensive alliances, some scholars have problematized offensive alliance effectiveness.70 Like Morgenthau, Holsti (1970) argues that cohesion and “trust” between allies that each will fulfill commitments shall influence the ability of alliances to be effective “fighting organizations.”71 With perhaps the most straightforward argument on effectiveness, Rosen (1970) contends that a combination of alliance “strength” and “cost-tolerance” (willingness of allies to endure harm) influences
whether allies achieve their goal. Though Rosen notes that allies’ “sharing of costs may be a heated controversy,” and thus hinder effectiveness, he does not fully explain the mechanisms underlying this relationship.

**Alliance Effectiveness: Summary of Gaps in Theory**

Scholars working on why alliances do (or do not) achieve their goals make important advances on other work by highlighting factors in addition to cohesion that might influence effectiveness. At the same time, they have two principal shortcomings that must be addressed to enrich IR theory in general and understand internal threat alliance dynamics particularly. First, while it seems plausible that higher degrees of integration (Liska) and trust (Morgenthau) might influence alliance effectives, these arguments are neither presented as generalizable insights nor tested through case study or further analysis. And second, due to their focus on Western states these arguments are grounded in the assumption that partners are internally cohesive and will unswervingly apply alliance resources according to alliance strategy. Unitary states that are internally, hierarchically structured prioritize the national interest and therefore act accordingly: to *balance* the adversary. While this may apply to developed states, the assumption may not necessarily hold when one of the partners is a weaker, peripheral state devoid of an internal character characterized by hierarchy and rationality.

**V. Unified Theories of Alliance Dynamics**

Building on insights and arguments from many of the scholars reviewed above, three theoretical frameworks attempt to explain more than one aspect of alliance dynamics in a single study (Holsti, Hoppmann, and Sullivan 1973) or contiguous theoretical framework (Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). These frameworks make important advances on prior scholarship but also share some of the gaps in works outlined above.
1. Correlations on Formation and Cohesion

One of the first attempts to examine more than one aspect of military alliance dynamics in a single study was by Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan (1973) who employ bivariate quantitative analysis to determine those factors that across hundreds of cases explain alliance formation and cohesion. Effectiveness as distinct from cohesion is not explicitly addressed. The authors confirm states typically form alliances in response to external threats and rule out other variables as relevant to alignment. And in examining variables said to influence cohesion, their analysis confirms higher threat as one of the only variables across cases that has a strong influence on cohesion: “greater conflict between alliances tends to exert an integrative impact.”\(^\text{73}\) In addition to disproving other commonly cited variables as relevant to formation and cohesion—and evidencing threat level as crucial to explaining each—the authors made an important contribution by developing perhaps the first succinct definition of cohesion applicable to a broad range of defensive and offensive alliances (other than the propensity for allies to stay together): the ability of states within an alliance “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed toward those ends.”\(^\text{74}\)

The authors make important advances by offering and testing generalizable insights. However, they share many of same shortcomings referenced above. First, they focus on external threats as represented by states and therefore bypass internal threats. Second, what they gain in presenting high-level correlations between commonly examined variables—and ruling out many of the previously described factors said to influence formation and cohesion—they lose in being unable to demonstrate through careful tracing of mechanisms \textit{why}, for example, a higher threat necessarily generates greater cohesion. Third and finally, the universe of cases examined includes defensive or peacetime
alliances. This limits the generalization of these insights onto alliances whose goal is to defeat an external (or internal) enemy.

2. **Alliance Formation and “Management” (Cohesion)**

Glenn Snyder’s *Alliance Politics* (1997) leverages assumptions from game theory to present one of the first unified theoretical frameworks about formation *and* cohesion of alliances “with a military or security purpose.” Employing an approach that includes cost/benefit analysis (like Liska [1968]) and viewing states as like units defined by capabilities, Snyder contends that states form alliances when pressed by an external threat *and* when the benefits (increased security obtained through the ally’s commitment) outweigh the costs (loss of autonomy).

Approximating cohesion, Snyder defines the “management” of alliances as “the joint and unilateral processes by which alliance members try to keep the alliance alive and advance their interests within it.” Management focuses on short-term interactions (bargaining) within an alliance and between the alliance and its external threat. Allies and adversaries interact and through these interactions exhibit variation in behavior in three “arenas” of IR in accordance with alliance goals: to deter an attack (“preparedness”); to negotiate terms with another state or alliance (“diplomacy”); or to work together to attack another state or group of states (“action”). Allies’ bargaining power determined by military dependence, commitment, and interests influences outcome of interactions.

“Alliance stability,” or the probability allies remain together, examines longer-term interactions and how allies maintain and maximize their net benefit from the alliance. Stability is governed by the “alliance security dilemma”: allies fear being abandoned and entrapped and associated risks vary inversely. If allies share the same adversary and need
to balance it for the same reason, the security dilemma is low and cohesion or “alliance stability” high.\textsuperscript{83}

Snyder’s framework enhanced IR theory on alliance dynamics by: examining multiple facets of alliance dynamics in a single framework; employing a broader definition of threat; demonstrating causal mechanisms of formation and cohesion (as opposed to correlations); and referencing the influence of domestic structure onto dynamics.\textsuperscript{84} Despite these important advances, the framework has three gaps that make it ill-equipped for examining internal threat alliances. First, it retains the literature’s focus on threats external to allies’ borders and alliances as responses to secure the national interest in the face of such dangers. Second, Snyder says intra-alliance bargaining occurs \textit{related} to action (war) but presents no hypotheses or arguments related to this particular arena.\textsuperscript{85} By contrast, internal threat alliances deal with what Snyder would characterize as \textit{action}: coordinating and implementing policy and action to defeat a common internal threat. This limits the applicability of Snyder’s work to offensive alliances in general and internal threat alliances particularly. Third and finally, Snyder references domestic factors (implying a more nuanced view of the state) by arguing that the influence of threat level and the anarchic nature of the international system is translated through “a domestic politics prism consisting of the perceptions and values of decision-makers and the domestic constraints that bear on them.” However, he provides little explanation of these decision-makers or how their perceptions affect alliance dynamics.\textsuperscript{86} Despite referencing domestic differences of allies, then, he largely retains prior structural treatments of such states as comparable units with similar internal makeup.
3. Dynamics of Peacetime and Wartime Alliances

In an important shift from prior scholarship, Weitsman (2004) offers a unified theory of alliance formation and cohesion of peacetime as well as wartime alliances. To do so, Weitsman combines into a single framework assumptions from realist (balance of power) and rationalist (institutionalist) theory to argue that level of external threat explains alliance formation and cohesion. The framework differs from prior scholarship in three ways.  

First, in examining formation Weitsman argues that different levels of threat produce four distinct types of alliances (behavior). The core motivation for each remains to secure the national interests; however, “tethering” and “hedging” alliances have purposes and levels of commitment slightly different from the traditional balancing and bandwagoning.  

Second, Weitsman follows prior scholarship to argue that level of external threat affects cohesion but diverges from the academy by showing that threats within the alliance also matter: whether allies perceive threats from each other and disagree on the “raison d’etre of the alliance.” As Weitsman says: “If states are coming together to counter a uniform external threat, it will certainly be relatively easy for them to coordinate their goals and strategies to attain those goals…if states ally in order to reduce the conflict between them…the very forces that lead states to ally will inhibit the cohesion of the resulting alliance.”  

Third and finally, Weitsman examines the dynamics of peacetime and war-time alliances. This departs from Snyder and others who predominantly examine either pre-1914 alliance behavior or formation and cohesion of the American and Soviet alliance “systems” during the Cold War. She demonstrates that the different circumstances confronting an
alliance in wartime as opposed to peacetime influence alliance cohesion in distinct ways. Accordingly, she argues, assumptions derived to explain peacetime alliances cannot therefore simply be applied to explain wartime alliances. As a result, Weitsman modifies concepts to accommodate aspects of alliance behavior unique to each.

Despite these important improvements, Weitsman’s framework has three shortcomings that limit its utility in explaining dynamics of internal threat alliances. First, the framework examines only alliances formed between equal powers in response to threats from other states; and although wartime alliances are examined, the framework predominantly centers on peacetime alliances. Second, Weitsman explores the influence of “internal” threats but employs the term in reference to the probability that one ally will attack the other. As a result, the theory overlooks why a threat within one of the allies that is common to both might influence alliance dynamics. Third and finally, Weitsman largely employs the realist conceptualization of the state and overlooks the role and associated influence of partner bureaucratic agencies onto cohesion and effectiveness.92

VI. CONCLUSIONS ON LITERATURE REVIEW

The discussion above provided a critical review of IR literature on alliance dynamics and achieved two goals. First, it demonstrated the need for my contribution to theory by highlighting that existing IR scholarship has yet to examine internal threat alliances and in its current form is ill-equipped to explain their dynamics. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the nature of alliance-making has changed dramatically; however, scholars have yet to update IR theory to account for and explain the more common forms of alliances today. And second, the chapter highlighted those elements of existing literature applicable to understanding internal threat alliance dynamics—particularly David’s work
and associated assumptions—that were therefore modified and incorporated in the previous chapter.

Weitsman filled a gap in IR theory by providing a framework to explain the dynamics of war-time alliances. Doing so required modifying and adding to extant literature to devise assumptions and arguments most applicable to the unique context and associated circumstances for such alliances. Understanding the dynamics of internal threat alliances requires a similar effort. Providing mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations regarding the divergent characteristics and associated dynamics of internal threat alliances collectively represent the contribution this dissertation seeks to make to IR theory. In the following chapters, I evidence these core differences through analysis of two cases: the internal threat alliances between the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). Before proceeding to case analysis in the next chapter, however, an overview of the dissertation’s research methodology is warranted.

VII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Much the same as other political science fields, IR theory on alliances includes quantitative and qualitative studies—both research approaches have strengths and weaknesses as well as topics and questions for which they are generally most appropriate to tackle. With these trade-offs in mind, scholars must select a research methodology best suited to achieving the goals of their particular inquiry. The purpose of this section is to explain why I employed a qualitative research approach involving case studies for this dissertation. It then describes the approach and specific methods used while conducting the research.
Quantitative or Qualitative?

Quantitative or “variable-oriented” analysis is particularly useful for identifying macro-level correlations between variables across a large number of cases. Accordingly, much of IR literature on alliance employs quantitative analysis due to their scope and focus—generally analyses exploring subjects such as patterns of alignment, the frequency of alliance formation, or when states bandwagon rather than balance. Indeed, quantitative analysis is appropriate for such endeavors that seek to evidence correlations between independent and dependent variables across longer periods of time. What such quantitative analyses gain in being able to identify macro-level relationships across a large number of cases (large-N), however, they lose in being less capable of identifying and evidencing relationships between and mechanisms linking these variables. This is where qualitative research approaches come in.

Qualitative studies focus on uncovering and demonstrating how and why variables are linked as well as the mechanisms that enable one variable to generate change on another. This is particularly true with the case study approach, where scholars examine in greater depth a smaller number (n) of cases and delve deeper into hypothesized relationships therein. This form of qualitative, causal analysis is focused on explaining what occurred and why rather than obtaining more robust significance test scores—and evidence for correlation between two variables—by increasing the number of observations. The qualitative approach is rooted in the “method of causal imputation” which diverges from “the mode of causal inference in statistical-correlational studies.”

Scholars must select a research approach best suited to achieving the objective of their particular inquiry. This dissertation’s research objective was to produce mid-range,
contingent theoretical generalizations regarding the dynamics of internal threat alliances. As a result, the most appropriate way in which to evidence the four core elements of internal threat alliance dynamics was to identify the mechanisms linking variables within each. This made a qualitative approach the most appropriate choice to address the dissertation’s core research questions and subjects. Based on the scope of the research project, the dissertation employs a qualitative case study research approach comprised of two research tools: process-tracing and semi-structured interviews. The following sections briefly outline the research approach and methodology. This approach, described below, included primary and secondary document review as well as extensive interviews and field work in both Colombia and Afghanistan.

1. **Research Approach: Qualitative Analysis Using Case Studies**

The case study approach can be defined as the “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”94 The case study is an “in-depth” analysis “of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena.”95 Based on their puzzle and topic, the researcher selects a particular episode delimited by time, location, and presence of key variables. As with any topic in political science, there is a separate literature debating the pros and cons of employing a case study approach versus others.96 This is in addition to epistemological divides over the purpose and aims of different strands of social science inquiry. A full review of these texts is beyond the scope of this chapter and marginal to its central analysis; however, a brief outline of pros and cons of using case studies is necessary in order to demonstrate why this approach was best suited for the dissertation.
Scholars highlighting the “drawbacks” of case study research typically argue that social science inquiry should approximate the hard sciences in method and objective. As such, they contend that one of the principle disadvantages of case study research is the lower number—relative to quantitative analysis—of cases; or what they refer to as the “small-n problem.” Within this strain are scholars such as Lijphart (1971) and King, Keohane and Verba (1994) who tend to argue that social science research should approximate the logic of the hard sciences, the standard bearer for demonstrating cause and effect. In order to determine whether a given observed pattern is systematic or “just due to the transient consequences of random processes,” the best way is to increase the n (sample size) and employ repeated tests across different contexts. Based on these positions, these scholars tend to view case studies as a tool but one that needs to be improved in order to “meet the standards for valid inference.”

On the other side of this epistemological division are scholars who champion qualitative research and argue that social science inquiry need not approximate that of the hard sciences. The world and universe of questions that political scientists (as well as sociologists and others) examine is “messier” (or “less reactive”) than, say, chemistry and therefore not necessarily subject to similar research methodologies. “These complexities of human and social reality,” Almond and Genco (1977) argue, mean that “the explanatory strategy of the hard sciences has only limited application to the social sciences.” Despite the legacy of the hard science-driven methodology of quantitative analysis and causality, therefore, the social sciences needs its own philosophy of science.

Building from this position there has been a “resurgence” in qualitative methods generally—and case study approaches particularly—in political science. Within this
strain are scholars who argue for the value of qualitative methods independent from quantitative research in general and case studies particularly (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2006; George and Bennett 2005). Case study research is not a “primitive form” of variable-oriented research that needs to be “improved”—rather, it is “a different mode of inquiry with different operating assumptions.” In one of the seminal works on qualitative case study research, George and Bennett demonstrate that case studies have a different methodological logic than other approaches and value without increasing the number of observations and have important implications for both theory testing and development.

Even within the strain of literature on case studies, scholars recognize the advantages and disadvantages of using case studies. Though others exist, some of the cited disadvantages of case studies are as follows. First, information gleaned can be unique to the specific event or process studied. To account for this, the researcher needs to employ well-defined concepts and can increase the number of cases examined. Second, it can be difficult to establish “external validity”—that is, to demonstrate that the findings are applicable to a broader range of cases. To account for this, the researcher must be careful to define the “class” or “subclass of events” (cases) that they seek to examine and perform focused, structured analysis. In so doing, they must concretely specify the universe of cases being examined and be clear that insights gained are applicable in a contingent manner to this finite class of cases. The researcher’s findings, therefore, are not broadly generalizable—rather, they are mid-range generalizations contingent to this specific set of cases. If the researcher wants to put forth insights generalizable to a broader universe of events—for example, to all forms of alliances—the scholar should perhaps not employ the case study approach. And finally, some contend that case study approaches are subject to
selection bias—that is, choosing cases that demonstrate a predetermined outcome. To account for this, the researcher should clearly define case selection criteria and ensure variation across variables examined.

On the other side, the case study approach has various benefits that make it appropriate for specific research projects. Principally, case studies enable the scholar to perform more in-depth analysis of politically complex phenomena. The inherent trade-off as described above, however, is the degree of generalization the researcher can render. Associated with this advantage, case studies are particularly optimal for identifying causal mechanisms between variables, an element that is necessary for explanation. Where quantitative studies point to correlations between variables across a broader set of cases, the detailed analysis inherent to case studies enables the researcher to delve deeper into and explain the mechanisms underlying target phenomena where “mechanism” is defined as “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished.”

A further benefit of employing the case study approach is that it can help account for equifinality—that a single outcome could have resulted from multiple paths.

With these advantages and disadvantages noted, the dissertation employs a case study approach for two core reasons. First, because it is best suited for obtaining and analyzing information vital to achieving the objective of this research: to demonstrate the four core elements of internal threat alliances, provide a detailed explanation of the relationships inherent to each, and evidence that these elements are indeed generalizable to a broader yet contingent universe of cases. My research objective was to develop theoretical generalizations contingent to a finite set of alliances (internal threat alliances). This required a research approach and associated methodology suitable for identifying why
variables are linked and the processes by which one generates variation on the other. Producing contingent, mid-range generalizations relies on the researcher’s ability to identify these links and demonstrate the mechanisms underlying associated processes.

Accordingly and second, the case study approach was selected because it inherently entails deep analysis of mechanisms and relationships—including across multiple levels of analysis—and therefore is calibrated to demonstrating the relationships and associated mechanisms inherent to the four examined elements of internal threat alliances. For example, I needed to examine and evidence why balancing and bandwagoning occur simultaneously with internal threat alliances. To explain this distinct manifestion of bandwagoning, I needed a research approach that enabled detailed analysis of mechanisms linking why a state’s internal fragmentation enables balancing/bandwagoning to occur at the same time. And to account for the distinct motivation spurring bandwagoning by regime actors, I required an approach that allowed me to display regime actors bandwagoning to advance their own (patron-client) interests—in addition to survive or “for profit”—and evidence this phenomenon at the national and subnational levels. Quantitative analysis would not have helped evidence the relationships inherent to this and the other core elements of internal threat alliances. As outlined in my conclusion, however, there are future areas of research on internal threat alliances where quantitative analysis could be useful.

A. CASE STUDY APPROACH: CASE SELECTION AND “STRUCTURED, FOCUSED” COMPARISON METHOD OF ANALYSIS

In order to demonstrate the four ways in which internal threat alliances are distinct from their external counterpart, I selected two cases or “classes of events” (George and Bennett 2005) that fit the “subclass” of alliance I seek to examine—“internal threat
alliances.” The empirical cases selected were the internal threat alliances between the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). In each case, the great power/regime brought their security policies into close cooperation to balance a threat internal to the weaker regime’s borders yet with implications for the national security of (and thus common to) both states. In each case, the threat was associated with political violence and internal conflict within the weaker state.

In addition to complying with the parameters of my definition for internal threat alliances, the cases were selected due to variation in duration and outcomes. Regarding duration, the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance was shorter in duration than the U.S.-Colombia alliance. And the cases had divergent outcomes (degrees of “effectiveness”)—by most accounts, the U.S.-Colombia alliance was more effective than the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance. In the former, the allies were by 2010 able to lessen the threat level whereas in the latter the Karzai regime remained under siege as Barack Obama’s first presidential term came to an end.

As outlined in chapter one, the dissertation’s research objective was to explain a finite set of differences between “external threat alliances” and “internal threat alliances” and in so doing provide a framework of mid-range, contingent generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. In order to achieve this research objective, the dissertation employed a version of George and Bennet’s case study research method of “structured, focused comparison.” This approach involved three principal steps. First, insights on the four core distinct aspects of internal threat alliances were developed. This involved constructing arguments regarding relationships between independent and depending variables for each core element. For example,
regarding why such alliances form, that alignment (dependent variable) is driven by a need to secure interests tied to the regime (independent variable for the great power) and need to preserve political survival (independent variable for the regime). These four elements comprised the framework which was then applied to and tested through each of the two cases.

Second, the individual cases were constructed using the methods of process-tracing and semi-structured interviews (addressed below). Development of the cases was “focused” in two ways—first, as delimited by the specified period of time; and second, in that analysis centered on evidencing the four elements and not all aspects of the alliance writ-large. Accordingly, each case begins with an historical overview of the alliance period the purpose of which is to give the reader background on major events therein. Thereafter, the cases are structured by the four aforementioned elements. The third and final step was to compare across cases in a structured, focused manner. This step was critical for confirming that identified mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations were not only inherent to each alliance studied but, rather, generalizable to cases beyond those examined. During this step, focus was given to similarities and variation across the cases for each of the four elements examined. This step involved asking questions such as: Were the same mechanisms observed in both cases? Did relationships vary? If so, how? In order to construct the cases and perform the necessary focused, structured comparison two qualitative research methods were employed: process tracing and semi-structured interviews.
B. METHODS: PROCESS TRACING AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Process tracing is defined as a method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”112 In employing this method the researcher “examines archival documents, interview transcripts, and other primary as well as secondary sources to determine whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”113 This method is appropriate for analysis of case studies with the goal of extrapolating mid-level, contingent theoretical generalizations because it enables the researcher to identify and document causal mechanisms. Process tracing was vital to this dissertation in order to demonstrate, for example, factors motivating initial alignment as well as bandwagoning by regime actors.

Primary and secondary sources were examined in order to construct and perform the structured, focused analysis of the two cases. To construct the cases, secondary sources included but were not limited to news reports from national and international news agencies and organizations, reports and analyses released by national and international think-tanks, and relevant works in history and political science. Where available, memoirs by officials working for the great power or weaker state during the period examined were also carefully scrutinized. Such secondary sources were used to construct a narrative of the case and illustrate relationships between presented variables. Primary sources were used to delve deeper into posited relationships and, in line with the literature on qualitative analysis, evidence posited causal mechanisms. Examples of primary sources examined for the dissertation included but were not limited to: speeches by great power and regime policy
makers, data released by government agencies (for example, figures released by the Colombian Ministry of Defense on military spending), and documents outlining alliance strategy or the outcome of alliance tactics or activities (for example, the U.S. government’s strategic plan for Afghanistan). Descriptive statistics were also used, from secondary and primary sources. The purpose of these statistics was generally to demonstrate increases and decreases in threat level as well as increases or decreases in resources pooled together by the alliances.

Complementing the methods outlined above, I conducted “semi-structured” interviews with individuals who had knowledge of or participated in the aforementioned alliances. These interviews represented a core aspect of this dissertation’s data-gathering approach and included performing fieldwork and interviews in Colombia and Afghanistan. These interviews contributed to constructing case narratives but their primary purpose was to evidence posited causal relationships inherent to the examined internal threat alliance dynamics. Semi-structured interviews involve the researcher asking questions to interviewees identified to have information or insights relevant to the research topic. Where “structured” interviews involve asking the interviewee a predetermined set of questions and not deviating from this script, semi-structured interviewees are discussions framed around a set of themes relevant to the research topic. The interviewer asks questions relevant to these themes and aims to gather specific information; however, deviating from structured interviews, the questions are broader so as to allow the interviewee the opportunity to expand on particular topics. Additionally, the semi-structured format enables the researcher to ask new questions that seem relevant to them during the interview process.
As a primary source of information, information gleaned from interviews was used in two ways: (1) to help identify posited relationships as well as demonstrate the causal mechanisms linking examined variables; (2) and to “triangulate” information gained through other means—that is, to either validate or repudiate relationships and mechanisms identified through process tracing analysis of primary and secondary sources.

The interview methodology and approach was approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board (HIRB) on December 20, 2011. A standard set of interview questions was used for all interviews. Prior to initiating the interview, interviewees received a standard summary of the scope and purpose of the project and a confidentiality statement informing the interviewee they may stop the interview at any time. The semi-structured format framed discussion surrounding particular topics so as to enable gathering of key pieces of information, yet also allowed the interviewee to expand on particular topics based on their experience and knowledge. In accordance with confidentiality protocols and to ensure anonymity of the interviewees, names of interviewees are not listed in the text. The interviewee’s agency or employer affiliation is listed only if they agreed to its inclusion in the text. However, the interviewee’s title or position in this organization is not provided. As an additional precaution to ensure privacy of interviewees, all interviewees were assigned a code for information-gathering purposes. When taking notes during interviews, the interviewee-specific code was listed in these notes. A list of names and codes was developed and then stored on an encrypted hard-drive (password necessary). All interview notes were only stored on an encrypted hard-drive, to ensure only the researcher has access to this information. In some cases, the interviewee
indicated that their name may be listed in the dissertation text. For such cases, their name and affiliation are listed accordingly.

In total, I conducted more than 75 interviews. The majority of these were performed in person, but others were done over the phone, Skype, or email due to individuals’ locations and varied availability. As previously mentioned, individuals interviewed included those who participated in or had knowledge of the respective alliances. In targeting potential interviewees I aimed to speak with members of both governments working at each of the examined levels. This included members of the Foreign Policy Executive and Critical Bureaucratic Agencies for the great power and peripheral regime alike.

For both cases, I interviewed members of the U.S. Military (Army, Marines and Department of Defense) as well as representatives of the U.S. Department of State and USAID. For the Colombia case, I conducted interviews in Washington, DC and, through two weeks of fieldwork, in Colombia (in Bogota, Cartagena, and various other towns). In order to cover travel costs to Colombia I applied for and received a small grant from the J. Brien Key Fund, which allocates monies to graduate students completing theses or dissertations.116 While in Colombia—or before or after and via telephone or Skype—I interviewed representatives of the following agencies based in that country: Colombian Ministry of Defense, National Police, and Military, U.S. Military, and USAID. For the Afghanistan case, I conducted interviews in Washington, DC and, through three weeks of fieldwork, in Afghanistan (in Kabul, Kandahar, and other towns). For the case of Afghanistan, representatives from the following agencies based in Afghanistan were interviewed over the phone or email: Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, National Police,
and Military, U.S. Military and USAID. Additionally, I interviewed representatives of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and staff of non-governmental organizations with direct involvement in (or knowledge of) the Afghanistan alliance.
ENDNOTES—CHAPTER TWO


2 Also treating states as defined by their capabilities, and to some extent building on Liska’s use of economic theory to explain why states form alliances, other scholars such as Riker (1968) and Gross (1970) apply coalition theory in order to explain variance in size of alliances (the number of states in a given alliance) — states will form alliances of a size which will maximize the benefits granted should they prove victorious. Others such as Rosen (1970), though, question Riker’s assumption regarding the state and contend that “larger-than-minimal” alliances may form. These arguments are important in so far as they represent one of the first examples of scholars combining IR theory with other frameworks to explain some aspect of alliance dynamics. Riker (1962) argues that states will form alliances of a size which will maximize the benefits granted should they prove victorious. Riker’s model is premised on the assumption that states (actors) have access to the same information, behave rationally, and that the game is ‘zero-sum’ — benefits to be secured from a ‘successful’ alliance are finite. John G. Gross, “Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic and Political Coalitions,” in Alliance in International Relations (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 205; William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

According to Rosen (1970), states do not have access to the same information and engage in alliances to defeat a common enemy, contingent on “bring[ing] the enemy’s perception of the relative power situation to the point where he will agree to the settlement that you seek.” Because they are unsure what degree of “strength” (the ability of a state to harm others, measured by manpower and weaponry) and “cost-tolerance” (willingness of a state to endure harm to achieve their goal) is necessary to ensure victory, in some cases “larger-than-minimal” alliances may form. Rosen, “A Model of War and Alliance,” in Alliance in International Relations eds. Friedman, (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 231.

3 K.J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” in Alliance in International Relations eds. Friedman, Blasen, Rosen (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 94.


6 Writing during the Cold War, Wolters argues that the U.S. pursued alliances with states across the globe in order to “ward off” the Soviet Union. Where later alliance theory concentrated on alignment between great powers, Wolters also examines alliances involving great powers and smaller states—where access to a weaker partner’s territory represented a capability crucial to deterring a rival great power. These states provided the U.S. access to territory necessary to deter their adversary. Wolters, (1962) “Collective Defense versus Collective Security,” 192.

7 George Liska, Nations in Alliance – the Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 13-26. According to Liska, “alliance builders must not collect haphazardly all available allies…they must consider the marginal utility of the last unit of commitment to a particular ally and the last unit of cost in implementing commitments.”


9 While Wolters and even Liska note that great powers aligned with weaker states and in some instances transferred resources to these governments so that they could put down internal rebellions, they do not recognize these internal threats themselves as imperiling (and thus informing the behavior of) the great power’s interests.


11 Julian R. Friedman, “Introduction: Alliance in International Relations,” in Alliance in International Relations (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 23.
At its core, the democratic peace hypothesis or theory posits that pairs (or dyads) of democracies will not go to war with each other. Shared democratic principles and perceptions between states lead to peace: peoples in a given state that are autonomous and resolve their conflicts peacefully are more inclined to do the

Recent work presenting frameworks that contain structural and domestic factors include the following:


Domestic state structure refers to what Zakaria (1998) defines as “state power”: “Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government…state power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends.” State power serves as an intervening variable—the systemic pressure of the anarchic system bears influence on state behavior, yet specific responses (such as the formation of military alliances) are informed by those resources available to policy makers and how easily they can access them. The second intervening variable, threat perception, refers to what qualifies to states as a threat and how states perceive such threats. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9.

Where Walt’s theory assumes that threats are easy to perceive (determine) and quantify, others such as Stephen Van Evera’s “Offense-Defense Theory” contend that misperception of national power is the core driver of state behavior in general and war in particular. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, 255). Van Evera’s Type IV Realism “locates the causes of war in national misperceptions of the fine-grained structure of international power—in exaggeration of power of the offense, the size of first-move advantages, the size and frequency of power fluctuations, and the cumulatively of resources.”

Chain-ganging, as witnessed in pre-1914 Europe, before WWI; and buck-passing, as evidenced in pre-1939 Europe, prior to WWII. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990).

Steven E. Lobell, “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 68-70.


Steven R. David, “Explaining Alignment in the Third World”, World Politics, 43 (January 1991), 236. The cases of from Egypt (Sadat) and Ethiopia (Mengistu) are examined to evidence the argument.

The authors contend that their framework differs from David’s by recognizing that alignment is driven by the “reaction to the most pressing threat” and that this threat can be external, internal, or interrelated. Alignment responses to interrelated threats are termed “omnialignments,” reactions “against or toward” threats comprised of internal and external elements. Further, they argue, the framework differs from omnibalancing in so far as it holds that external alignments can serve to appease an internal enemy, something they argue David overlooks. Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. VanDenBerg, “Alignment theory and interrelated threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis,” Security Studies 6, no 3 (1997), 114.


However, David is more concerned with why weaker regime’s form alliances to balance these internal threats, where Schweller views such internal threats as a domestic political constraint that affects that states balancing behavior toward an external enemy.

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (1979), 126.


Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), 21


Though Walt and Schweller refer to bandwagoning as an initial response to external threats (and thus an alternative to balancing) the state behavior is also applicable to why states act contrary to agreed alliance policy of balancing and instead decide to bandwagon with the original threat. Lacking the capabilities to win in a given conflict, states bandwagon with an external the side most likely to prove victorious to ensure their survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), x and 21-26. Walt’s balance of threat theory (1987) argues weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat as opposed to balancing against it. See also Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southeast Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988), 277. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer, 1994), 72-107; Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest.


Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1973), 94-95. Their conceptualization of cohesion contains both behavioral and attitudinal components. The behavioral component is measured as the “mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads connecting all alliance members,” where the attitudinal aspect is defined as “co-orientation of decision-makers toward an external actor which is perceived by all members of the alliance” (Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan 1973, 100-102). These factors are said to either facilitate (or retard) cooperation and create (or resolve) tensions between alliance partners. IR scholars present a range of arguments regarding why these factors create or resolve tensions between partners or facilitate or retard cooperation between them; some examine one specific variable, others examine various. Others have argued that common ideology is necessary to hold alliances together, but I do not examine their arguments here. See for example Nitze (1959) who argues that ideology in the form of “common aspirations of a concept of world order…is an essential element in an alliance and coalition” Paul H. Nitze, “Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order,” in Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Arnold Wolters, ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 26.

As Holsti and Hopman note, “alliance members are more likely to engage in collaborative behavior and exhibit consensus with their allies on basic issues during times of external threat than during periods of relative détente.” Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, (1973) Unity and Disintegration, 93.

Over the course of coordination and discussions regarding alliance strategy and policies, tensions between alliance partners can arise. According to scholars such as Holsti, however, a threat of a sufficiently high degree can supersede such issues because states will put differences aside in order to balance it: “commonly perceived threat is likely to overcome other incompatibilities among alliance members.” K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Publishers, 1967), 116.


“Capabilities” is used in the literature in two ways: to refer to power as traditionally conceptualized (military and economic capabilities a given state brings into the alliance) and the alliance partners’ levels of political development.

Liska (1968) argues that “the leading ally may coerce lesser partners into greater exertions,” while North, Kich, and Zinnes (1970) echo his point and argue that the “durability” of an alliance is contingent on the “power or relative capacity” each partner has for “inflicting his will” onto the weaker partner Liska (1968), *Nations in Alliance*, 102-112. Robert C. North, Howard E. Koch, Jr. and Dina A. Zinnes, “The Integrative Functions of Conflict,” in *Alliance in International Relations* (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 298.

The other core factor that Morgenthau lists is extent to which the nations’ interests overlap. For alliances to be operative, he argues, “members must agree not only on objectives, but on policies and measures as well.” Morgenthau, (1948), *Politics Among Nations*. *Politics Among Nations*.

Morgenthau is careful to note, however, that distribution of power within the alliance goes beyond material capabilities: “a weak nation may well possess an asset which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable [such as territory on which the great power needs to position a base].” This specific asset, then, may afford the weaker nation more bargaining power. Morgenthau, (1948). This position is echoed by other scholars such Miller (1959), who posits that power (as traditionally measured) does not necessarily translate into ability to coerce a partner. Writing on the American alliance system during the Cold War, Miller argues that despite the U.S. advantage in power vis-à-vis its allies it required each state for various reasons and therefore “[could not] proceed …by anything approaching authoritative decree.” In part because the more powerful state has “relatively less to gain than its small ally from driving a hard bargain,” they posit, there is “no reason to expect that there is any disparity of bargaining power in favor of the larger ally.” In turn, the smaller nation may—as is their proclivity to do so—be successful in securing alliance terms in which it contributes less. Olson and Zeckhauser, (1970), “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” 188. William Lee Miller, “The American Ethos and the Alliance System,” in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Arnold Wolfers, ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 35.

First, different national institutions across alliance partners may mean one ally is unfamiliar with how security policy is derived in the other ally, complicating coordination and decreasing cohesion. And second, lesser developed polities may be less likely to “accept reciprocal limitations on independence as a necessary condition of existence” due to nationalist sentiment overriding other concerns. Gordon A. Craig, “The World War I Alliance of the Central Powers in Retrospect: The Military Cohesion of the Alliance,” *The Journal of Modern History* Vol. 37 (1965), 336. This can lead to strains in relations with the stronger partner (and thus decreased cooperation) because leaders in the lesser developed country will face pressure from the public to resist intrusion as well as produce divergence in the alliance objectives as it relates to security. Liska, (1968), *Nations in Alliance*, 106.

Some scholars have mentioned this variable vis-à-vis its influence on whether a state will fail, but defined it in a different way and did not problematize its influence on intervention success. See Stewart Patrick, *Weak Links – Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 18-60.

Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), 183. In a separate work using NATO as his empirical case, Haas (1969) also argues that an alliance’s “organs of political consultation,” which include the frequency of meetings, whether “vital issues” are discussed before votes are taken, and whether these votes translate into commitments from states to act, can affect its


62 Liska (1962) argues that if the cohesion of an alliance is based on the oppressive rule of a single power (which uses coercion to force cooperation of smaller states), it will be more prone to “erosion” (decreases in cohesion). This position is shared by Duchacek (1966), who contends that hierarchically structured alliances led by a “superpower” are more prone to “erosion,” as well as Rothstein (1966), who argues that a powerful state’s interference into the domestic affairs of its alliance partners can generate resentment within the latter and therefore decrease cohesion. According to Fedder (1962), decision-making structures which are more decentralized and enable smaller partners to voice opinion not only in the approval of policies by also in their development are more likely to foment “solidarity” among partners and thus increase cohesion. Liska, (1962), *Nations in Alliance*, 116; Ivo D. Duchacek, *Nations and Men: International Politics Today* (New York: Holt, 1966), 342-343; Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); see also Rothstein, “Alignment, Non-Alignment, and Small Powers,” *International Organization* 20, No 3 (1966). Edwin H. Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1968), 83.

63 The former refers to the range of issues relevant to the alliance and therefore on which states must coordinate strategy, policy, and action; the latter denotes the extent to which alliance partners share common interests (including but not limited to balancing the common, external threat).

64 Morgenthau, “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (1959), 191. Morgenthau (1959) notes, for example, that as the scope (degree of generality) of an alliance increases so too will its duration (cohesion) decrease. This position is echoed by Liska (1962), who argues that “limited” alliances, those formed to address a finite number of issues (as opposed to global commitments spanning a range of issues) enable states to focus coordination; cooperating on fewer issues leads to fewer internal tensions and greater ability to coordinate strategy to deter the common external enemy. Similarly, Dinerstein (1965) argues that those alliances of “limited purpose” are likely to be more stable and thus cohesive.64 With regard to interests and their influence onto operation of alliances, Morgenthau writes that whether the alliance will be operative and for how long “depends upon the strength of the interests underlying it…against the strength of the other interests of the nations concerned.” Morgenthau, (1948), *Politics Among Nations*; Liska, (1962) *Nations in Alliance*; Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The Transformation of Alliance Systems,* *American Political Science Review* LIX (1965), 599.

65 Same relationship with the number and “ambiguity” of alliance goals. States engaged in an alliance with ambiguous goals might therefore be more able to engage in “tradeoffs” depending on their interests. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (1973), *Unity and Disintegration*, 74. A variant of this general argument was made earlier by Haas (1969), though, who argues that lack of clarity on alliance goals and broader scope of an alliance hinders partners ability to cooperate and therefore decreases cohesion. Haas, (1969), *Tangle of Hope*, 108.

66 While examining why states form alliances it is sufficient to view states as like units with a select few individuals channeling the state’s national interest while making alignment decisions. These higher level actors comprising the regime are also heavily relevant to decision-making within alliances and thus cohesion. High level policy-makers are involved in setting alliance goals as well as establishing a strategy and associated activities. Beyond this stage, however, it can be assumed that other bureaucratic agencies from alliance partners are also involved. The various elements above might also affect the way in which these other agencies do or do not cooperate; however, the extant frameworks leave us guessing with regard to their influence.


68 Liska, (1968), *Nations in Alliance*. The three areas are: First, “command over forces in the field,” which relies on consultations between partners in political, military, and economic policy; second, in “facilities for communication, transport, and supply of all sorts.” The movement of “ideas, instructions, and forces,” argues Liska, is “indispensable for effective consultation and command”; and third, the specialization of allies in “research, production of material, and kinds of forces to be contributed to the over-all capability of the alliance.” Liska, (1968), *Nations in Alliance*.

69 Morgenthau (1959) equates “cohesion with an alliance’s ability to translate common interests into policies. Further on the importance of “trust” to alliance effectiveness, Morgenthau argues that “the smooth and effective operation of an alliance…depends in good measure upon the relations of trust and respect among
its principal statesmen” And that “an alliance, in its day-by-day operations, rests in good measure upon the mutual confidence in the willingness and ability of its members to cooperate effectively in achieving the common purpose. That confidence, in turn, rests upon …the character and ability of its leading statesmen.” Morgenthau, (1959), “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” 199.
70 Though Holsti predominantly references defensive alliances, I include him here because he examines the effectiveness of alliances as “fighting organizations.”
71 K.J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” in Alliance in International Relations eds. Friedman, Blasen, Rosen (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 99. According to Holsti, if alliance partners perceive a common enemy and form the alliance based on their agreement to defeat or deter this enemy, the alliance will be more likely to “withstand strains caused by ideological incompatibilities or distrust arising from personality differences between political leaders.” If partners forge alliances based on “incongruent objectives,” though, such personal differences will likely cause insurmountable strains. Second, the more alliance partners share “cultural, political, and social traditions” the more likely the partners will be able to overcome disagreements between decision-makers. If the “major social and political values of allying states are incompatible,” they will be less likely to overcome the factors that endanger alliance effectiveness including “misunderstanding and suspicion.” Holsti, (1970), “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” 99.
72 Rosen conceptualizes effectiveness as whether the “strength” (the ability of a state to harm others as measured by manpower and weaponry) and “cost-tolerance” (willingness of each state to endure harm to achieve their goal)2 of alliance partners is sufficient to “bring the enemy’s perception of the relative power situation to the point where he will agree to the settlement that you seek.” Steven Rosen, “A Model of War and Alliance,” in Alliance in International Relations eds Friedman, Blasen, Rosen (Boston, MA; Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 1970), 231.
73 74 Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, (1973) Unity and Disintegration, 126.
74 Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, (1973) Unity and Disintegration, 94-95.
75 While noting these formal aspects of alliances, Snyder (1997) is careful to recognize what he terms the “political reality” of alliances—those elements beyond the treaty that also condition alliance dynamics in general and their management in particular. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). 9.
76 The benefits of forming an alliance as they relate to security include: enhancing deterrence from attack; enhanced capability to defend against an attack; enhanced deterrence of attack onto one’s ally; precluding an alliance between the alliance partner and a potential opponent; precluding the possibility that the partner will attack; and enhanced control over the partner. The costs of forming an alliance include: the enhanced risk of having to aid the partner, when in other circumstances (short of an alliance) the state’s preference would be not to do so; risk of entrapment in a war because the partner becomes reckless or aggressive in its disputes with the opponent, as a result of increased confidence due to their new partner’s support; formation of counter-alliances by adversaries; the foreclosure of other alliance options; constraints on the freedom of alliance partners, as a result of the need to coordinate policy and actions. Again similar to structural accounts that treat states as like units, the capability of states—the “size” of the security benefit that these partners present—affects which specific alliance partners they choose to partner with. The “size” of the security benefits is a function of three factors: (1) state’s need for such an alliance; (2) extent to which the potential alliance partner meets that particular need; and (3) the terms of the alliance contract. The “need” for an alliance is conditioned primarily by the threat posed by an adversary—the capabilities of that adversary (relative to the state’s) and the degree of conflict in which the state is engaged with the adversary.
77 This bargaining can be explicit or tacit. Synder, Alliance Politics, (1997), 3.
78 Where neorealists equate interaction and behavior as essentially the same thing, Snyder differentiates the terms. Interaction is itself state behavior and denotes “actual communication between states, or some physical action, such as armament or war, that impinges on others.” Interactions (behaviors) that Snyder lists include preparedness, diplomacy, and (mainly military) action. “Relations” or “relationships” are the “situational context of behavior,” and defined as “the conflicts, common interests, alignments, and power relations that motivate and shape behavioral choice.” These relationships sit between structure (anarchy) and state interaction (behavior) and, in other words, “are the conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior.” Synder, Alliance Politics, (1997), 18-20.
79 The anarchical nature of the international system and the pressures it brings serve as the overarching influences that sets the backdrop or foundation on which these bargaining games are played and, in conjunction with the presence of an external threat condition states action in the three arenas. However, the
precise outcome of bargaining games in each of these arenas depends on the individual interactions between states (allies or adversaries). And these interactions are determined principally by common or conflicting interests, the capabilities of the states (which translates into bargaining power) and the interdependence of these partners—the extent to which one state needs the other, politically and militarily, to balance the perceived threat. Commitment refers to the commitment of states to the alliance and has two sources: verbal promises as put forth in the alliance contract; and the strategic interest a state has in aiding an ally, aside from the verbal promise. “The more firmly one is committed to the alliance, the less credible, and therefore the less effective, are threats to withdraw support from the ally or abandon the alliance.” Synder, *Alliance Politics*, (1997), 168. Capability is defined as “what a state can accomplish with its military forces against particular other states” as measured by the size of actual and potential military assets (“power resources”), which inform bargaining power between allies as well as the degree of harm adversaries may inflict. Synder, *Alliance Politics*, (1997), 168. Dependence refers to the mutual dependence between politico-military allies and is conceptualized as “the amount of harm allies can do to each other by deserting the partnership or failing to live up to expectations of support.” The influence of allies over one another turns not only on power resources but also “their comparative dependence on, or need for, each other’s aid.” Synder, *Alliance Politics*, (1997), 31.

80 The effect of strategic interests vis-à-vis commitment differs for strong and weak powers: “A strong state will have a clear interest not only in the existence and independence of a weak partner but also in acting to protect the partner, since the partner cannot defend itself. But a weak state, although it has an interest in the continued existence of the stronger partner, may have no interest in acting to preserve it, if the ally is strong enough to defend itself. Therefore, the strong state cannot credibly threaten to withhold support, whereas the weak state can do so.” Paradoxically, then, the weaker state in terms of power resources may have more bargaining power on specific issues than its stronger (vis-à-vis power resources) ally.

81 Interests can be common (preserving the alliance) and conflicting (other issues on which they bargain, such as the tenets of joint military planning). States make threats that might have negative consequences on the common interest—for example, to defect from the alliance—in order to secure their interests or position on the other issue on which they are bargaining. The main interest at play in intra-alliance bargaining is how to implement the common interest of the allies vis-à-vis their adversary. The allies share a common interest in deterring the adversary. However, they conflict on how to do so and how to share the costs of benefits of doing so. These conflicts include those related to how much they should contribute to militarily to the alliance, what the joint strategy should be in the event of war, as well as where, geographically, to focus the alliance’s efforts. Synder, *Alliance Politics*, (1997), 171.

82 In order to decrease risk of abandonment by State B, State A may draw closer to it. As a result, however, the risk that State A will become entrapped and thus dragged into conflict against its adversary will increase. Avoiding abandonment equates with moving closer to an ally and trying to keep the alliance together, which Snyder takes for alliance cohesion, measured as a function of “alliance stability.” Alliance partners are more likely to stay together, and thus not disband, “when existing allies are tightly bound by common interests and have high levels of conflict with their adversaries.” Avoiding entrapment involves moving away from an ally. Abandonment comes in various forms including cancelling the alliance, failure to fulfill alliance commitments, and failure to provide diplomatic support to the ally. Entrapment involves five variables and also takes various forms including an ally provoking the adversary’s attack, the ally directly attacking that adversary, and holding a position to the extent that it leads to war. Synder, *Alliance Politics*, (1997), 185.

83 Both the risk of abandonment and entrapment are low in this situation—one ally is not likely to abandon the other, because they share the same interest in defeating the adversary; similarly, risk of entrapment is low because even if State A drags State B into war, they are fighting for their shared interests (and not dragged into a conflict in which their interests are not at stake). In this condition, allies are likely to remain together.

86 This is a particularly vital gap given that he examines alliances between great powers and weaker regimes—where, as I discuss elsewhere above, the domestic structure of each (and those actors that comprise this structure) might differ as well as have different interests or what he refers to as “values.”
87 Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances — Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), end note 1, p. 188. Weitsman defines an alliance as “any formal or informal agreement between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states. It is a continuing security association among member states with an element of forward planning and understanding to aid members states militarily or through benevolent neutrality.”
By contrast, tethering—the purpose of which is to “manage or constrain” alliance partners by “drawing closer to it via agreement.” State A and B perceive moderate threats of a “reciprocal and symmetrical” nature from each other—to restrain one another, they tether themselves together. The states conciliate each other, yet one state does not (as with bandwagoning) capitulate to the other; this “mutual antipathy” distinguishes tethering from hedging. At an even higher threat level, states engage in “balancing” alliance behavior whereby they aggregate capabilities with the purpose of deterring (peacetime) or defeating (wartime) external enemies. At the fourth and highest threat level, at a point where a state perceives that its survival is at risk, this state will engage in “bandwagoning” alliance behavior—to assure its survival, the state capitulates to adversary and forms an alliance with it. Weitsman, (2004), Dangerous Alliances, 4-20.

Cohesion is defined as the ability of states within an alliance “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends. Cohesion is considered high when states are confronted with a decision on policy and “mutually agree on how to approach the situation”; and when states “agree on mutual goals and strategies toward those ends.” Cohesion is considered low when states cannot agree on their goals and strategy and moreover should they employ policies that undermine allies.

In “balance/balance” alliances, for example, both states are experiencing a high level of external threat and have formed the alliance for a clear, common purpose—both are motivated to balance the external threat. As a result of overlapping motivations and high external threat, cohesion will be high. By contrast, tethering alliances will experience low cohesion because states formed the alliance “as a consequence of their differences” and therefore, and lacking the external threat to unite them, will have difficulty setting goals, strategy, etc. All of these combinations apply to cohesion of peacetime alliances.

For example, Weitsman modifies the three elements of cohesion in peacetime alliances in the following way to account for cohesion of wartime alliances: the capacity of members states of the alliances to coordinate their war-fighting strategy; the ability of members states to agree on war aims; and the ability of the alliance to “prevent a separate peace” (preventing an ally from defecting to form an alliance with a third state). These factors will have “direct implications on the prosecution of a war.” Whereas level of threat most prominently informs level of peacetime alliance cohesion, the “balance of interests” of alliance partners—their motivations for entering the alliance—seem to play a greater role in wartime alliance cohesion.

Weitsman only examines alliances between stronger powers that are relatively developed and as a result cannot be critiqued (as with Snyder, who examines “unequal alliances”) for failing to examine the influence onto alliance dynamics of various actors of underdeveloped regimes.


George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005).

Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For,” (2004), 341.

For an excellent overview of some of the fallacies generally associated with qualitative research, see: Gerardo L. Munck, “Symposium I: The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinction,” Newsletter of the American Political Science Association - Organized Section on Qualitative Methods (2005).

Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971).


For this terminology as well as an excellent review of this so-called resurgence, see David Collier and Colin Elman, “Qualitative and Multimethod Research: Organizations, Publication, and Reflections on Integration,” in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 779-795.

For this position as well as excellent overviews of the benefits of case studies, see: Harry Eckstein “Case Study and Theory in Political Science” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7 (1975); John Gerring, Case Study Research – Principles and Practices (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005).


For an excellent overview of these “strengths and weaknesses,” see Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For,” (2004).

For some of the common critiques of case studies, and a rebuttal to each, see Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry, 2006, Vol. 12 no. 2 (2006) 219-245.


For an explanation of equifinality and its importance in qualitative research see Henry Brady and David, Collier eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 2000).

For a detailed overview of “structured, focused comparison,” see Alexander and George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005).


George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005), 6-7.


The interview methodology and approach was approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board (HIRB). The HIRB approved the researcher’s application for an exemption on December 20, 2011. Letter of approval for application for an exemption is included as an annex.

For more information on the J. Brien Key Fund, see their web-site: http://krieger.jhu.edu/research/opp/key/.
CHAPTER THREE

U.S.-COLOMBIA INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 1980-2010

This chapter will show how the U.S.-Colombia alliance was a clear example of an internal threat alliance that differed from traditional (external threat) alliances in the following four ways, beginning with the nature of the threat and why great powers/weak regimes form internal threat alliances. As the first core difference, it demonstrates that the U.S. and Colombia brought their security policies into close cooperation and aggregated capabilities in response to political violence fomented by two principal actors (leftist guerrillas and narco-traffickers) in order to preserve the regime’s survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from belligerents and drug traffickers, while the great power got involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability including: curbing drug flows onto American streets, maintaining access to oil reserves, and preserving stability in its “backyard,” among others. By the late 1980s, and particularly with the Berlin Wall’s collapse, the core factor underlying U.S./Colombia alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; and where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances, it demonstrates that Colombia’s internal order was fragmented. Building from this, it shows that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire
apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traces Colombia’s political trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act to advance the national interest.

Third, it demonstrates why the motivations for and manifestations of bandwagoning in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional alliances. Colombia shows that in internal threat alliances, it is simplistic to ask whether states balance or bandwagon. Instead, they do both at the same time. As will be seen, while some elements of the Colombian National Police fought against drug-traffickers, others actively cooperated with them. While some mayors resisted guerrilla incursions, others aligned with the belligerents. Clearly, the either/or dichotomy of traditional alliances concerning whether to resist or appease threats did not apply to Colombia. The case also shows that clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s
character generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). Military officials, police officers, and central regime representatives bandwagoned due to fear (for survival) and because they thought the opposition may win (for profit); however, they also did so to consolidate or further patron-client relationships based mainly in financial exchange.

In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s presidency) or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. during Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning central regime and worked with the National Police to secure U.S. interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.

Fourth and finally, it shows that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-Colombia alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the
common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the *leaders of the regime*.

Cohesion was higher during the Andres Pastrana and Alvaro Uribe regimes partly because they viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an *asset* to their political survival (compared to prior presidents, who oscillated between viewing full collaboration as a *liability* or benefit) and they were able to reign in bandwagoning regime actors. With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, pooling resources sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance weakened the internal threat. In addition to the consistently high alliance cohesion [and an increase in available U.S. state power for the alliance] that enabled the allies to amass resources sufficient to weaken actors fomenting violence, effectiveness was higher during the Pastrana/Uribe regimes due to their consistent efforts to purge civilian and security agencies of actors bandwagoning with the narco-guerilla threat.

Following a brief historical study, I will show in detail how the U.S.-Colombia alliance differed from traditional alliances in each of these four ways.


**HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

**FROM THE “BRINK OF COLLAPSE” TO “TURNING THE TIDE”**

The U.S. and Colombia began to bring their security policies into close cooperation in the 1960s in response to threats each state perceived from a surge in Colombia’s internal violence. This political violence is rooted in a civil war (“La Violencia”)¹ between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties that, since its inception, has claimed between 50,000 and 200,000 lives and internally displaced three million.² From and
through this conflict two main actors emerged that fomented political violence that imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1) leftist guerrilla groups that aimed to topple the Colombian regime, principally the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) and the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army, or ELN) and (2) narco-trafficking “cartels” who employed violence that threatened regime survival and produced/transported narcotics that took American lives and provided funding to the guerrillas.³

Initially, the U.S. sought to cooperate militarily with Colombia as part of Plan LASO (Latin American Security Operation) that aimed to eliminate the “leftist” guerilla movements in order to balance Soviet influence in the Hemisphere.⁴ As the Soviet Union waned, though, and guerrilla forces, drug-traffickers, and associated political violence they wrought began to swell, the threat to the great power and the regime (and thus composition and dynamics of the alliance) began to change.

Facing a narcotics “epidemic” in the 1970s and with drug traffickers exploiting Colombia as a transshipment point for cocaine,⁵ the U.S. decided to balance this threat by attacking drugs “at their source.” The Andean nation became ground zero for the great power’s “war on drugs”⁶ and the regime (and therefore its survival) vital to balancing this threat. The U.S. and Colombia further aligned their security policies and agreed that the great power would provide capabilities to balance the threat from narcotics and those actors involved in or enabling the trade: “The combination of leftist guerrilla activity with the narcotics industry…added a major dimension to what was already viewed as a security
threat…officials treated the guerrilla movement as a threat to Colombia, the U.S., and the region.”

Through the administration of president Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), U.S. threat perception and associated decisions vis-à-vis Colombia were informed by the need to balance the Soviet Union’s influence in America’s “backyard” and curb the flow of drugs onto America’s streets. And in the administration of Colombian president Cesar Turbay (1978-1982), the U.S. found a like-minded ally whose hardline approach to the guerrillas made “him consistent with the views and policies of the Reagan administration.” Closely consulting the U.S., Turbay gave the Army “carte blanche to crack down on communist guerillas and other lawless elements” and signed into law a treaty allowing the extradition of narco-traffickers to the U.S. for prosecution.

As the Reagan administration gave way to the Presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993), the alliance morphed in full from external to internal threat alliance. As the Berlin Wall fell, the basis for the alliance officially morphed. What began as an alliance based on the great power’s need for Colombia as a means to balance the Soviet Union and preserve territorial security (and rooted in Colombian regimes’ need for military capabilities to thwart groups attempting to topple the government and weakening its economy) changed to one motivated primarily by high levels of political violence (and its consequences) common to both allies.

If the states were only motivated to form the alliance to combat an external enemy, security cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia should have stopped with the Soviet Union’s demise. But instead, it escalated: “Despite the end of the Cold War, U.S. military aid has not only continued but towards the end of the 1990s it radically increased and made
Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world.” Building from prior engagement the great power/regime continued to work together to devise strategies to weaken and defeat insurgent forces and narco-traffickers and, by the late 1980s, were engaged in an internal as opposed to external threat alliance. As Randall argues, “The combination of guerrilla activity with the narcotics industry...was viewed as a major national security threat,” leading the U.S. to “assist Colombia in containing armed insurrection.” The U.S. viewed political violence in Colombia as a threat to its ally regime’s survival and this threat perception drove the great power to form (and maintain) an alliance whose core motivation was to preserve the regime and thereby safeguard American interests associated with it.

Despite work to quell violence and dismantle burgeoning drug-trafficking outfits, the Medellin and Cali drug cartels increased in influence and operational capability, drawing renewed concern from the U.S. that its ally may fall. Echoing the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia’s cable noting that increased violence was “threatening to topple the state,” domestic U.S. policy-makers began calling for further U.S. action to stand-up its ally and curb this challenge to national security. Representative of such demands are remarks by U.S. congressman Charles Rangel, who said: “If Colombia falls, we could find ourselves an island of democracy in a sea of narco-political rule.”

This escalation in “narco-terrorist” violence during the Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) presidency pushed the great power/regime closer together and into an “abrazo de oro” [golden embrace], where “Bogotá needed Washington’s cooperation” and the U.S. needed the Barco regime’s cooperation to pursue what had become a “top national security priority” of curbing drug flows into the U.S. As part of this enhanced alignment, the U.S.
provided funding and training to better equip the Colombian military and police to offensively combat the FARC as well as dismantle the Medellin and Cali drug cartels.\textsuperscript{16} In accordance with the Bush administration’s regional strategy (the “Andean Initiative”) to quell narco-trafficking, the U.S. augmented assistance to Colombia, granting $65 million in emergency military aid to help enable Colombian security forces regain control territory held by the FARC and drug traffickers.\textsuperscript{17} Though official U.S. policy stated funds were only for use against narcotics trafficking, “a significant amount of U.S. assistance” was “employed to combat the guerrillas.”\textsuperscript{18}

Though political priorities and regime-specific interests hindered cooperation somewhat during the Barco and then Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) administrations, the allies were able to devise alliance strategy, tactics, and carry out associated activities because the regime needed to show progress against the guerrillas and narcos to ensure political survival and the U.S. needed a stable regime in place to curb drug flows.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, by the end of Gaviria’s term the “foundations of a good working relationship” had been established and associated enhanced cohesion yielded alliance victories, including the capture and killing of Medellin drug cartel boss Pablo Escobar.

In spite of such advancements, however, insufficient military resources and bandwagoning by regime elements (notably the Police and components of the Judiciary) with insurgents and narco-traffickers hindered allies’ ability to lessen the internal threat. Consequently, as Gaviria stepped down the FARC had escalated attacks to levels not seen under prior presidents;\textsuperscript{20} and though they had killed the infamous Escobar, other drug-running outfits filled his void.
Relations between the allies deteriorated with the election of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) due to suspicion among core U.S. policymakers that he bandwagoned with drug cartels, notions confirmed when evidence surfaced that Samper had accepted $6.1 million from a cartel for use in his presidential campaign. This so-called “Processor 8000” case/scandal sent alliance relations into a tailspin: “The country went through four years of relative international isolation, as an historic alliance…was interrupted by constant and public confrontations between Washington and Bogota.”

Needing a central regime committed to balancing, the U.S. began publicly recriminating Samper in an attempt (according to some) to discredit the president domestically and internationally so that he would resign (or be impeached) and be replaced with a more reliable, balancing-prone president.

Though Samper was eventually absolved of “direct” involvement, the U.S. deemed Colombia not sufficiently cooperative in anti-narcotics efforts and “decertified” it, rendering the regime (in 1996 and 1997) ineligible to receive U.S. capabilities in this area. The nearly complete stoppage of resource flows associated with decertification and tense relations between the allies provided the guerrillas a window in which to expand their reach throughout the country: “By placing Colombia in the decertification doghouse and regularly bashing Samper, [U.S. President William] Clinton created a schism in Bogota that ruptured the credibility of the government and allowed the armed groups in the civil conflict to multiply their presence inside the borders of the nation…the bullying of Bogota aided the guerrillas.”

As Samper stepped down, Colombia had reached a near “failed state” scenario with the “FARC at its zenith and the Colombian military at its all-time low.”
It was in this state of hyper violence that Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) campaigned for president and won on a “strong peace platform” and promise to end his peoples’ suffering from decades of conflict. As he took office in 1998, Colombia faced a surge in political violence arguably not witnessed since the early days of the nation’s civil war.\textsuperscript{28} Unless it was “drastically restructured” and strengthened, the Army faced an “absolute defeat within five years” from “drug-financed Marxist guerrillas,” according to a leaked U.S. Intelligence report.\textsuperscript{29} And a U.S. military official who in 1997 assessed the “strength of the Colombian state” echoed this by telling me that Colombia “was on the brink of failure” and needed “increased assistance from the U.S. to prevent its full collapse.”\textsuperscript{30}

Informed by its view on why prior presidents failed to weaken the “narco-terrorist” threat, Pastrana’s regime assumed a different approach (and policy agenda) to do so, fulfill his mandate, and secure its political interests: negotiate from a position of power and, if that fails, have the military means to wipe out the belligerents.\textsuperscript{31} Further diverging from prior regimes, Pastrana openly recognized the link between the insurgents and narco-traffickers and that to defeat the former his regime needed to curb cocaine-linked financing. As he said, “To achieve peace in Colombia…we needed to strengthen all the programs related to the fight against narcotics, because they were the main financial sources of the illegal armed groups.” Accordingly, the regime began developing a strategy to balance the “narco-insurgent” threat (later developed into “\textit{Plan Colombia}”); however, to implement it and secure his associated political mandate Pastrana needed resources to grow the Colombian security forces. And in the administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton (1993-2001) he found a great power ready to assist, secure its interests tied to the regime, and sharing Pastrana’s view on the conflict: “Growing U.S. recognition of the insurgent threat
turned Colombia into a top national security priority” and (through 1998/9) “support among U.S. policy makers for a more direct role in the Colombia counterinsurgency effort grew considerably.”

As Clinton said in a press conference with Pastrana: “The narcotics trade and the civil conflict have fed off each other as rebels” do business “with violent drug traffickers” making the “fight” against them “our joint responsibility.” Noting why U.S. assistance was justified to balance this threat, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that “well-armed narco-terrorists” posed such a threat that “without U.S. help” Colombia could “lose this war. Early in Pastrana’s term a common refrain among core U.S. policy-makers was: “This is our war as much as Colombia’s.” And Pastrana clearly shared the U.S. assessment, stating that “narco-terrorism” was the main threat to Colombia and a “common enemy” he and U.S. had to “unite our efforts to fight.”

In 1998, with peace negotiations ongoing but appearing likely to break down the U.S. and Colombia formed a bi-lateral working group “to facilitate increased U.S. training, sharing of aerial and satellite intelligence data,” and to generate strategies for “the modernization of the Colombian military.” Building from task force recommendations the U.S. provided $289 million in military capabilities for Colombia’s use against the “Unholy Alliance” of guerrillas and narco-traffickers. After this military aid proved inadequate to stifle political violence, the U.S. and Pastrana agreed that further military resources were required and began discussing elements of a strategy that would eventually become Plan Colombia. Following high-level meetings between alliance delegations, and after U.S. officials publicly called for a new strategy (and escalation in military aid) to balance the narco-terrorist threat, Pastrana released the broad contours of his regime’s
“Marshal Plan for Colombia”: a $7.5 billion initiative to lessen violence by increasing military capacity to defeat drug traffickers/guerrillas and addressing sources of violence through economic development.\textsuperscript{41}

Informed by prior discussions with Pastrana and his plan, in 2000 Clinton announced a proposed $1.6 billion aid package for Colombia, asserting to Congress that the majority of resources therein would enhance regime military capacity through training and new equipment (mainly helicopters) for two new specialized army battalions. After being decreased, the $1.3 billion \textit{Plan Colombia} aid package was approved for alliance use to balance guerrillas and narco-traffickers.\textsuperscript{42} By the end of Pastrana’s term, cohesion was high and the allies had weakened the belligerents, but not to the point they no longer threatened regime survival and U.S. interests. Nonetheless, U.S.-Pastrana relations “laid the foundation” for “an even closer, more effective alliance” between the successor to Pastrana (Alvaro Uribe) and U.S. President George W. Bush (2001-2009).\textsuperscript{43}

When Uribe (2002-2010) took office, Colombia remained under a consistent and formidable threat from opposition forces. Though Pastrana and the U.S. has developed and began pooling military resources according to the \textit{Plan Colombia} strategy, insurgent attacks reached all-time highs in 2002\textsuperscript{44} and regime security forces were still not up to the task of weakening the narco-insurgents. This rising threat affected alliance dynamics by making finding a solution to dampening political violence more urgent and pushing them closer together to do so. However, cohesion also increased because Uribe strongly desired a second term, needed to bolster domestic support to pass the required constitutional amendment to allow presidential re-election, and therefore urgently needed to strengthen his military so as to show immediate results vis-à-vis the insurgency. This pushed Uribe
closer to the U.S. and to strategically agree (as Pastrana had already begun to do) to cast the narco-belligerents as narco-terrorists to ensure the U.S. would augment its flow of military aid. And in the Bush administration he found a great power ready to assist and secure its interests tied to the regime. As Bush said, “we stand with the Colombian people in their fight against narco-terrorists who threaten their democratic way of life.”

Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. viewed “ungoverned spaces” in general and those proximate to the American homeland particularly as a national security threat because terrorists could exploit them (as in Afghanistan) to launch attacks onto U.S. interests. As reflected by Ann Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia: “Plan Colombia continues to be the most effective anti-terrorist strategy we could ever have designed,” as the 9/11 attacks turned U.S. “attention to linkages with international violence; that includes terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime.” Linked to this, the U.S. classified the FARC as a national security threat and “the most dangerous international terrorist group based in this hemisphere.” Per the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, insurgents threatening regime survival were terrorists, drug-trafficking their key source of financing, and the U.S. needed to shore up its ally to defeat both.

Recognizing the increase in threat from instability in Colombia, and within the post-9/11 context, U.S. domestic policy-makers augmented the “state power” available to the alliance by authorizing all capabilities to be applied as a “unified campaign” against “narco-trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations.” This “expanded authority” enabled Bush/Uribe to openly use capabilities against the guerrillas (“narco-terrorists”). To be sure, the allies had since the 1980s used alliance resources against both actors; however, the change enabled the U.S. “to be more
transparent with regard to the enemies it defined” and “present a more overt strategy for dealing with them.”

As part of the ongoing Plan Colombia, the U.S. and Uribe devised a strategy and associated tactics to weaken the “narco-terrorist” FARC that eventually took the form of Uribe’s new national security strategy, the Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSDP). The core of the DSDP strategy, which drew criticism from domestic and foreign human rights groups, was to crush the guerrillas and “consolidate” regime control (provide security) throughout Colombia’s territory. As part of the DSDP, Colombia launched an extensive military offensive (Plan Patriota), developed with the U.S. and supported by 800 American advisors, to dislodge the FARC from urban areas and subnational strongholds. U.S. SOUTHCOM assisted the Defense Ministry in “operational and logistical support” and “security planning” and trained Colombian military units. Further, the U.S. trained approximately 2,000 Colombian troops in skills specific to weakening the narco-terrorist threat and ally agencies devised (and Uribe implemented) a restructuring of Colombia’s Army.

To make regime agencies more effective, the November 2002 U.S. Presidential Directive 18 expanded intelligence sharing with the regime from “drug-related targets” (under Clinton) to all U.S.-gathered intelligence including “tactical information such as insurgent groups’ movements and locations.” Needing to generate immediate results to advance his re-election prospects, Uribe immediately leveraged this “flood” of intelligence and new military hardware to conduct “an unprecedented effort to identify and kill those individuals orchestrating the violence for the narco-terrorists.” Additionally, Uribe increased extraditions. The allies devised and began implementing Plan Colombia’s non-
military component, the National Consolidation Plan (NCP), which aimed to decrease threats to the regime by distributing social/economic assistance in cleared areas to prevent a recurrence of violence there. In 2005 Plan Colombia’s mandate ended, but the threat remained; accordingly, the U.S. funded a three-year extension [Plan Colombia Consolidation Plan (PCCP)] to enable the regime to continue balancing the “narco-terrorists.”

As Uribe prepared to step down (having won a second term) alliance effectiveness was high. Though minor disagreements occurred the allies had weakened the narco-terrorist threat and accomplished “goals thought impossible in 1998.” The guerrillas and narco-traffickers no longer posed a threat to regime survival, Uribe had secured the amendment to allow and won a 2006 presidential election, and the U.S. had stabilized its Andean ally, removed terrorist safe havens, and secured increasingly significant oil stores.

There is a clear divergence in alliance effectiveness pre- and post-Samper presidency and Plan Colombia when the state went from the “brink of collapse” to being touted as a model to other polities facing similar internal threats. In sum, the allies were more able to lessen the internal threat from 1998 onward for two reasons. First, an increase in resources aggregated via the alliance augmented the ability of the regime’s security forces to combat the “narco-terrorist” threat. And second, Pastrana and Uribe took more concerted action to curb bandwagoning by actors within their regime. For descriptions of the variation in level of threat and how capabilities enabled the allies to weaken the guerrillas and narco traffickers, see relevant Appendices at the end of this dissertation.
II. **Core Differences Between Internal and External Threat Alliances**

Having provided an overview of the alliance period, this core section draws specific examples from the case to demonstrate the ways in which internal threat alliances differ from external threat alliances in the following four areas: (1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align, (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. The core section is divided into four sub-sections—one each for these four elements.

1. **First Core Difference - Nature of Threat / Why States Align: Internal Threat / To Ensure Regime Survival and Great Power Interests**

   “In Washington’s eyes, the Colombian government was fighting for its survival.”

   The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the nature of the threat and core factor motivating the formation of internal threat alliances is distinct from that in traditional alliances. In traditional (external threat alliances), states form alliances in response to a threat *external in origin* (another state or group of states) that imperils the *state as a whole*. Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to align is their need to preserve security and the national interest, defined in terms of power and territorial survival.

   In contrast, internal threat alliances stem from some threat *domestic in origin* to a *regime* that an outside country cares about. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align
in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability.

To evidence this core difference, the section shows that the threat spurring the U.S.-Colombia consisted of a high level of political violence including but not limited to internal war: both the threat to regime survival (physical and political) posed by non-state actors including insurgents mounting campaigns and the consequences such conflict poses for other actors (namely great powers) in the international system. And to demonstrate the distinct motivation underlying internal threat alliances, the section demonstrates that the core factor underlying U.S./Colombia alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. It demonstrates that particularly by 1991 the U.S. and Colombia had shifted from an alliance motivated principally by the need to balance an external threat, represented by the further spread of Communism via formation of another Soviet satellite state, to one based on a common threat from within the weaker state. Table 2 illustrates this shift from external to internal threat alliance.
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<th>Period</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Alliance Type</th>
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<td>(Threat): Political violence from guerrillas</td>
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<td>(Motivation): Obtain capabilities to ensure physical/political survival</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1970s to 1980s</td>
<td>(Threat): Political violence from guerrillas and narco-trafficking;</td>
<td>(Motivation): Ensure regime survival to ensure regional stability, stem flow of drugs, and maintain access to oil.</td>
<td>Internal Threat Alliance</td>
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<td>Soviet Union disrupting Balance of Power.</td>
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<td>(Motivation): Ensure regime survival to ensure regional stability, stem flow of drugs, and maintain access to oil.</td>
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<td>1991 to 2010</td>
<td>(Threat): Political violence from guerrillas and narco-trafficking;</td>
<td>(Motivation): Obtain capabilities to ensure physical/political survival</td>
<td>Internal Threat Alliance</td>
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**A. Profile of the Internal Threat: Insurgents & Narco-Traffickers Imperiling Regime Survival and U.S. Interests**

The threat that spurred the U.S. and Colombia to bring their security policies into close cooperation consisted of political violence from insurgents and narco-traffickers that imperiled regime survival (physical and political) and the consequences such instability and regime failure posed to U.S. interests.

This political violence is rooted in a civil war ("La Violencia") between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. Referred to as the “ unholy trinity” of “generators of violence,” three actors emerged from and through this conflict that fomented political violence that imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1) the leftist guerrilla groups FARC and ELN that aimed to topple the Colombian regime; (2) narco-
trafficking “cartels” who employed violence that threatened regime survival and produced/transported narcotics that took American lives and provided funding to the guerrillas; and (3) paramilitary organizations that citizens formed for protection against the guerrillas. Though the paramilitaries have their roots in and contributed to Colombia’s internal violence, sufficient evidence exists to suggest that the allies largely did not view these actors as a core threat to regime survival. On the contrary, Colombia’s military in many cases colluded with them to combat the guerrillas. The paramilitaries’ human rights abuses notwithstanding, then, the threat is viewed as principally comprised of guerrilla organizations and narco-traffickers.

i. Evolution of the “Narco-Guerrilla” Threat

To protect against Conservative party supporters and their paramilitary “death squads,” members of the Liberal and Communist Parties established guerilla units in the country-side. Though most guerilla groups were demobilized before or killed/captured in a 1964 military offensive, others established five “Independent Republics” in southern subnational regions and continued to contest the regime’s authority and monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The ELN was established in 1963 and concentrated in the northeast, while the more formidable FARC was established in 1964 and centered in the Southern and Eastern regions. Broadly speaking, their goals remained relatively constant: to topple the Colombian regime in order to represent the interests of the rural poor.

In tandem with, partly enabled by, and contributing to political violence in Colombia was the emergence of the drug-trade. A confluence of factors yet mainly demand from U.S. consumers contributed to a boom in cocaine production in Colombia in the 1970s and the emergence of three principal cartels through the late 1990s: Medellin, Cali, and Norte del Valle. This expansion of Colombia’s cocaine “industry” posed threats
to the regime and associated U.S. interests in three ways that contributed to the formation and maintenance of the internal threat alliance.

First, the flow of cocaine onto American streets took American lives and tax payer dollars to crack down on dealing and associated crime and healthcare costs. Second, the cartels in general and Medellin outfit particularly targeted and killed representatives of the Colombian regime (national and subnational) and to varying degrees over time imperiled its control over the country. The “narco-terrorist” Escobar and his associates intimidated, kidnapped, tortured, or assassinated rivals and uncooperative government officials who posed obstacles to their enterprise. As an official in the Colombian Ministry of Defense in the 1980s told me in an interview: “The narco-traffickers shook the country to its core and threatened the government’s very survival.” Further contributing to political violence, cartels exploited a political system rooted in patron-client relations and used bribes to ensure regime officials would turn a blind eye to (or actively assist) cartel operations. That is, these officials bandwagoned while others in the regime were balancing.

Third and finally, narco-trafficking endangered regime survival by providing an additional source of financing to the guerrillas. As U.S. “Drug Czar” Barry McCaffrey said in the mid-1990s: “It is undeniable that the FARC and ELN are funded with millions of dollars in drug money.” Following the influx of drug production into Southern Colombia, the FARC generated revenue from cocaine by “taxing” coca farmers and traffickers operating in guerrilla-held territory, leading then U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs to dub them “narco-guerrillas.” In the late 1980s, the relationship between the FARC and narco-traffickers became more symbiotic: “The drug traffickers struck a deal with the guerrillas: lay off the business, and we’ll pay the taxes. The rebels charged for
everything.” For U.S. and Colombian policy-makers, by the early 1990s the FARC essentially was a “drug cartel” using associated revenues to grow its military capacity.84

In sum, brazen attacks, assassination attempts, and other forms of violence and illicit activity carried out by guerillas and narco-traffickers endangered the regime’s physical and political survival. Lacking the military/economic capabilities necessary to maintain their hold on power, Colombian regimes aligned and worked with the U.S. to obtain resources necessary to do so.

B. WHY THE U.S. AND COLOMBIA ALIGNED: TO SAFEGUARD THE REGIME AND U.S. INTERESTS ASSOCIATED THERewith

Responding to the threat profile outlined above, the U.S. and Colombia brought their security policies into close cooperation to balance against the threats each state perceived from a surge in Colombia’s internal violence. And as demonstrated through the discussion below, why the great power/ regime aligned was clear and in line with the core motivations for formation of internal threat alliances. For Colombia, guerillas and traffickers indirectly and directly generated violence that threatened the regime’s survival and hold on political power. Without sufficient capabilities to balance the threat and stay in power, the Colombian regime sought U.S. assistance.

For the U.S., these groups threatened their ally’s survival as well as sowed instability that enabled narco-trafficking to operate. Colombia has consistently been one of the top sources of narcotics consumed in the U.S. and in the 1990s was responsible for 90 percent of cocaine on American streets. The flow of narcotics produced in or trafficked through Colombia had real costs for the U.S. in money and lives: from 1989 to 1999, 100,000 Americans (14,000 annually) suffered cocaine-related deaths; 70 percent attributed to cocaine from Colombia.85 In addition to it being a core source of cocaine,
Colombia is strategically important to the U.S. for various reasons that could be imperiled due to high levels of political violence and instability endangering the regime there.

In addition to the size of its population, location, and proximity to the Panama Canal, which make Colombia of geostrategic importance, it is consistently in the top ten suppliers of oil to the U.S. The Andean nation is also a prime trading partner with the U.S. and major destination for U.S. investment, with annual bi-lateral commerce averaging $11 billion through 2009. U.S. ability to extract oil, and investors’ confidence and ability to reap financial rewards, depend on political stability there. Further, political violence in Colombia threatens U.S. expatriates and can push individuals to seek refuge and economic opportunities elsewhere. The needs these individuals require upon arrival can strain the resources of the destination state; by 1999 Colombians were the second largest group of illegal aliens in the U.S. after those from Mexico.

Due to these strategic considerations, the U.S. had an interest in aligning with the peripheral regime to weaken the insurgents and narco-traffickers and ensure regime survival. While balancing the Soviet Union remained a concern through the 1980s, curbing the flow of drugs onto America’s streets began to increase in priority. Doing so was not possible without safeguarding its ally regime and weakening the traffickers and “narco-guerrillas.”


Through the Reagan administration U.S. threat perception and associated decisions vis-à-vis Colombia were informed by the need to balance the Soviet Union’s influence in America’s “backyard” and curb the flow of drugs onto America’s streets. Threats from Marxism’s potential expansion and the drug-trade in the Western hemisphere were
perceived as intimately linked: Communist ally governments in Latin America were viewed to collaborate with guerrillas in South America to facilitate the drug trade, financing from which they used to “support insurgencies and subversion.” In Colombia, Reagan saw a regime that might fall to the increasingly strong FARC and ELN and become “another Nicaragua or Cuba.” Facing skyrocketing consumption of drugs at home, though, Reagan also needed to stem the flow of narcotics onto U.S. soil and in 1982 declared his “war on drugs.” The Reagan administration saw Colombia as a core producer of and transshipment point for narcotics and at the same time viewed the drug-trade as an increasingly important source of financing for the insurgents that threatened to topple the “friendly” Colombian ally. The narco-traffickers and guerrillas were perceived to be collaborating (and in some cases one in the same) and if left unchecked with the potential to topple the fragile regime. Safeguarding U.S. national security and interests, therefore, meant curbing the flow of drugs and those actors generating violence threatening regime survival. This perceived threat to the U.S. is reflected in Reagan’s April 6, 1986 National Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221), which classified narcotics trafficking and violence as imperiling the regime’s survival as a threat to U.S. national security:

The national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. borders…Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban terrorists can undermine the stability of the local government…The narcotics trade threatens the integrity of democratic governments by corrupting political and judicial institutions. The effect on U.S. interests from such a situation can range from a regime unwilling or unable to cooperate with counter-narcotics programs to a government that is unable to control key areas of its territory and elements of its own judiciary, military, or economy…The international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is therefore the policy of the United States…to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual governments to confront and defeat this threat.
During the same period, the administration of Colombian president Turbay was confronted with burgeoning violence from guerrillas and narco-traffickers. In addition to violence, the narco-trafficking industry was bringing “distortions into the Colombian economy and increasing the drug problem among Colombians.” To quell violence and address these issues (among others) necessary to remain in power, Turbay would continue to work with the U.S. as well as “establish a drug control agreement” involving “additional security measures” in subnational areas. That Bogota and Washington were in agreement on the threats they faced, and therefore needed to remain aligned, is further echoed by Randall: “Turbay’s perception of the insurgency…made him consistent with the views and policies of the Reagan administration.”

When Belisario Betancur assumed the presidency, his regime shifted Colombia’s priorities and associated view on the alliance. That said, and still needing capabilities to balance the internal threat, he continued to collaborate with the U.S. “Despite Betancur’s goal of non-alignment in foreign policy,” Kline (1995) demonstrates, “extradition of Colombian drug dealers to the United State continued.” Late in Reagan’s term Colombia had further realized that narcotics trafficking, alone and through financing the guerrillas, “affect[ed] both internal stability and the democratic prospective of the country.” Willingness of specific regimes to work closely with the U.S. to balance these threats varied, but all continued to do so because the capabilities provided by U.S. were vital to fulfilling political mandates and preserving their hold on power. The U.S. and Colombian government agreed on the “narco-guerilla link” and to bring security policies into close cooperation and pool resources to balance both non-state actors.

The period when U.S. president H.W. Bush and Colombian president Barco were in office includes the juncture at which the alliance morphed in full from external to internal threat alliance. Like Reagan, the H.W. Bush administration began its term perceiving analogous threats from Colombia: its role in deterring Soviet influence in the region and the threat to U.S. national security posed by narco-trafficking, belligerent forces, and political violence that endangered Colombia’s stability. Such continuities from Reagan to Bush notwithstanding, the latter administration arguably represents a change in the primary threat the U.S. perceived from Colombia and therefore basis for alignment. As of 1982 and summarized in NSDD 71, Reagan’s “highest priority” vis-à-vis Colombia was external and described as “the reduction—and eventual elimination—of the influence and presence of the Soviet Union on its client states in our immediate environs.”101 Similarly, through 1991 the Soviet Union remained a threat to U.S. national security under Bush; however, not in the context of “containing” Soviet influence in the region—an objective associated with territorial survival declared “complete” in a 1989 National Security Decision Directive.102 By 1989, then, the principal threat from Colombia to U.S. national security had evolved: from Colombia’s importance to balancing an external enemy to perceiving political violence, instability, and narco-trafficking as the principal threat to the U.S. That instability in Colombia generated by guerrillas/narco-traffickers was the core threat to U.S. national security is evidenced by the August 1989 NSDD 18,103 which made clear that these sources of political violence were a threat because they destabilized and endangered ally regimes in the Hemisphere and killed American citizens addicted to drugs:
One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if possible, eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. The impact of illegal narcotics use on our society has been and continues to be devastating...the violence and corruption of the drug traffickers and their alliance with insurgent groups has had a destabilizing effect on friendly governments. It is thus imperative...that this problem be dealt with aggressively...Colombia...will be the primary focus of our effort...[to assist them to] regain control of their country from an insidious combination of insurgents and drug traffickers.104

Despite another change in regime, Colombia under Barco continued to require capabilities to balance internal threats. The regime initially pursued an “ideologically neutral” foreign policy in order to focus on its top priority relevant to retaining political office: growing the (faltering) Colombian economy.105 As part of this stance, Barco at first distanced himself from the U.S. for political purposes and refused American requests to extradite Colombian nationals to the U.S. This reticence soon gave way to more close collaboration, however, after the Medellín cartel assassinated (anti-cartel) presidential candidate Luis Galan.106 A more hardline stance was required to respond to calls from politically-influential actors. Consequently, and recognizing the “key U.S. support being provided to the police to defeat the traffickers,” Barco agreed to a strategy in line with U.S. recommendations and ordered an “all-out offensive” against the narco-traffickers: “The death of Galan prompted the Barco government to declare (with support of the Bush Administration) a “War on Drugs.”107 Following consultations with the U.S., Barco reinstated extradition by executive order.108

As the Berlin Wall fell, then, the basis for the U.S.-Colombia alliance officially morphed. What began as an alliance based on the great power’s need for Colombia as a means to balance the Soviet Union and preserve territorial security (and rooted in Colombian regimes’ need for military capabilities to thwart groups attempting to topple the government and weakening its economy) changed to one motivated primarily by high...
levels of political violence (and its consequences) common to both countries. As of 1991, then, the U.S. and Colombia were engaged in an internal threat alliance.

In this section I demonstrated that the U.S. and Colombia aligned in response to threats *domestic in origin* and to the regime—high levels of political violence—and that the core factor underlying this alignment was the need to ensure regime survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. This is distinct from traditional alliances, where states align to balance *external* threats from *other states* and do so to preserve territorial security and the national interest. The following section examines the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances.

### 2. Second Core Difference - Characteristics of the Weaker Ally: Major Internal Fragmentation, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests

“The Colombian state is not the sum of its parts but, instead, the interplay of these actors and their competing interests…which would go on to sometimes hamper, and other times help, efforts to bring peace and stability to the country.”

The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the characteristics of the allies involved in internal threat alliances are distinct from states that form traditional military alliances. External threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal fragmentation; however, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation. Given that the U.S. is a great power, its internal cohesiveness can be assumed. Focusing on the weaker ally’s characteristics, then, this sub-section demonstrates that its major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct
from great powers in traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions in the internal threat alliance.

First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

In sum, the section demonstrates that the U.S. was dealing not with a *single* and *unified* state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with essentially cohesive states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a *fragmented* central regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components therein, and other subnational actors, each with their respective interests.

**A. the Colombian Ally: Fragmented Regime, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests**

In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, Colombia lacks strong state institutions, firm control over those agencies that exist, or a writ that extends throughout its complex topography. This weakness stems partly from a history devoid of centuries of state-building, where a lack of external threats meant government actors were not compelled to create institutions to protect the nation and by extension command loyalty from the populace. Over time, Colombia would develop central agencies charged with maintaining a monopoly on the use of force; however, this
“consolidation of a central state” was a “slow and difficult accomplishment” given the nation’s “daunting geography” and “weak, outwardly oriented economy,” among other factors. The products of Colombia’s state formation relevant to alliance dynamics would be two-fold: first, bureaucratic agencies that were weak, corrupt, and did not always act to advance the regime’s interests, and a central regime that could not wholly control their actions; and second, a fragmented nation characterized by subnational systems of political and economic power, the regime actors in which prioritized their interests (patron-client, survival, or a share in the spoils of victory) over the central regime (and eventually alliance strategy). As Bejarano and Pizzaro (2004) argue, where the “central state has severely contracted” at the subnational level, there are “unparalleled opportunities for accumulation of group and personal power and wealth” where actors “invest heavily in controlling or overcoming their competitors in order to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure and expanding territory.”

For the period examined, Colombia’s central regime was comprised of the President and his Cabinet. These actors worked with the U.S. to align security polices and agree to alliance strategy and tactics. The Executive has authority to formulate (and quickly alter) foreign and defense policy, enabling these alliance-relevant policies to change quickly (and decidedly) from one presidential regime to the next. The implication for alliance dynamics, and combined with (until 2004) single-term limits on the presidency, was that the U.S. faced an ally whose policies, political priorities, and preferred strategies related to balancing the threat turned over rapidly.

The core bureaucratic agencies involved in devising alliance strategy and carrying out agreed tactics “in the field” were the Ministries of National Defense and Interior and
the National Army and Police. Technically, Colombia’s Ministry of Defense controls
the Army. However, Colombia’s lower level of development and political history
combined to grant them greater autonomy in terms of policy planning and activities,
especially in subnational areas. This is rooted in reforms in the 1940s/50s aimed to
“depoliticize” the armed forces which had the unintended consequence of providing a
degree of autonomy more “than would be desirable within a democratic regime.” As
Bejarano (2011) argues, over time “Colombia’s civilian elite openly abdicated their
responsibility in terms of formulating and implementing defense and security policy,
therefore granting the military key reserved domains in these policy-making areas.” The
military’s autonomy “consistently expanded” and includes “capturing and preserving” key
“domains in the areas of internal security and public order.” Through the period
examined the military continued “to have a powerful veto on matters of internal
security.” Leveraging this autonomy from the central regime and to maximize resources
flowing into their coffers, the Military and Police (and components therein) would take
actions (including violating central regime guidance) to jockey for a greater share of the
defense budget.

Colombia’s fragmented character is aptly encapsulated by Geddes (1994), who
argues that analysis of the state in Latin America generally, and Colombia particularly,
assumes that states “behave as unitary actors” whereas “in reality, they often do not.” The
issue is not that the level of development is so low that there is no state, or, as she says,
“that there is ‘no there there,’ but instead that there are “too many theres there”—the
fragmented state is comprised of component parts not necessarily under the control of a
central government, “each having different capacities, intentions, and preferences.”
In sum, the regime’s fragmented character meant that during the alliance agencies and components therein leveraged their autonomy and made decisions (and used government resources) to advance their interests—maximize resources or solidify patronage ties—over alliance goals. What is more, the further intra-fragmentation of regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency components (Police unit A, for example) may be balancing the threat, but others (Police unit B) could simultaneously be bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to understanding external threat alliances, the great power had to juggle dynamics between the central regime and a menagerie of agencies in order to secure its interests. This fragmented character enabled various regime actors to influence alliance dynamics in general and to simultaneously balance/bandwagon particularly.

B. CLIENTELISM: COMPETING LOYALTIES AND A DISTINCT SOURCE OF BANDWAGONING

Various scholars of Latin American politics and history have documented the root causes and presence of patron-client relations (clientelism) in Colombia as well as its effect onto the Andean nation’s politics, governance, and economic development. A full review of these texts is beyond the scope of this chapter and marginal to its central analysis; however, a brief outline of the causes and main manifestations of clientelism (relevant to impelling actions by regime elements) in Colombia is necessary to demonstrate its influence onto alliance dynamics.

Lacking a strong central state apparatus and faced with a vast and mountainous topography, Colombia was unable (and for years made few attempts) to extend its writ throughout its territory; individuals therefore forged loyalty to powerful actors in their given region as opposed to the national interest. Though state weakness in some ways
enabled clientelism to emerge, the contours of these relations—the identity of the patron and forms of patronage—and their affect onto politics and decisions made by regime actors evolved over time. Initially, patron-client relations were rooted in “caciquismo” or loyalty to an individual strongman, generally a large land-holding elite. For these regional elites and their clients “local power was more important than the abstract concept of a nation-state.” The effect was to firmly embed a sense of loyalty—and thereby influence onto decision-making—to regional power-brokers over a central state or national interest/identity. As the country’s main political parties emerged and their reach into subnational areas grew, party leaders largely supplanted regional strongmen as primary patron with relations evolving into a clientelistic system based on party patronage. Regional and local leaders received patronage (money, regime posts) in exchange for mobilizing votes for party leaders in Bogota, while individuals and the state institutions they ran prioritized fealties to party over the national interest or other considerations. The effect was that “when Colombian leaders had to choose between their need for political survival [clientelism] and longer-term interests in regime stability [building the state], they chose the former.”

As Colombia modernized the basis of clientelism morphed again. The state became patron: “Rather than the dominant party” the state “would provide services in the best clientelistic tradition, with support presumably flowing throughout the formal hierarchical structure.” Drug-trafficking’s rise further consolidated (including among government actors) prioritizing patron-client relations over the national interest: “Along with the new resources these actors [drug traffickers] injected…they also helped create new regional alliances, linking sectors of the security forces, traditional party cadres, drug traffickers,
and local elites behind private violence.”\textsuperscript{128} These regime actors favored relationships that would enhance their personal wealth and power as opposed to loyalty to the state, and drug-trafficking revenues enhanced the incentive to do so.

Political and economic “decentralization” reforms (1988-1991) changed the contours of clientelism further.\textsuperscript{129} By increasing the amount of public funding going to local governments and the control subnational officials had over these monies, the reforms swelled the pool of resources guerrillas could attempt to extort from subnational officials. This also further incentivized attempts to press regime representatives to bandwagon (for survival or clientelism). As a result, “the same patronage practices that used to bolster the traditional parties alone now benefit the FARC.”\textsuperscript{130}

The detailed trajectory of Colombia’s variant of clientelism aside, this process yielded two products that continued to make regime actors choose their interests and patron-client relations over loyalty to the national interest (and thus subnational bandwagoning, over balancing) during the period examined and are directly relevant to examining alliance dynamics. First, it firmly entrenched and incentivized prioritizing increasing power/influence over the national interest and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “the allegiance…to patron was more basic than identification with an amorphous national identity known as Colombia.”\textsuperscript{131} And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national interest. Referred to as “political archipelagoes” (Kline 2007), mini “mafia” states (Vargas 2004), or regional “control systems,” these arguably approximate the “subsystems” Rosenau (1964) argued IR scholars must problematize when examining the link between political
violence and international relations.\textsuperscript{132} These sub-systems based in maximizing personal power/influence over the national interest motivate regime agencies to contravene orders from the central regime: “It is at the regional and local level that the political archipelagoes are most evident with politicians from those areas with different power bases than the national president, hence at times likely to oppose (either overtly or covertly) what the chief executive is trying to do.”\textsuperscript{133}

In sum, Colombia was a fragmented nation characterized by subnational systems of political and economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime elements to act in ways contrary to the alliance or national interest including by contravening central regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. In accordance with this distinct characteristic of internal threat alliances, and as the following section on bandwagoning further demonstrates, it was not two generally cohesive states working together (as in traditional alliances), but a great power dealing with multiple actors of a fragmented weak regime (agencies, components therein, and powerbrokers within subnational state-lets) that each had competing interests. Sometimes they prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced.

3. \textbf{THIRD CORE DIFFERENCE – WHY AND WHEN ALLIES BANDWAGON: SIMULTANEOUS WITH BALANCING AND MOTIVATED BY FEAR, PROFIT, AND PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS}

The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation makes “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances.

In traditional alliances, countries \textit{either} balance (resist threats) \textit{or} bandwagon (appease threats) when faced with an external enemy. Driven by the core motivation to
preserve the national interest and territorial survival, states bandwagons with the threat in
order to ensure their survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition (“for profit”).

By contrast, with internal threat alliances the peripheral ally’s weak character
means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result,
balancing and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with
the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its
police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors
fomenting violence. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a
motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and
to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances).

Through the period examined, regime actors in the capital or subnational areas
including police, military, governors, or central regime actors contravened alliance strategy
and bandwagoned in order to survive, “for profit” (share in the spoils of victory), or to
maximize their own power/influence (as rooted in patron-client relations). Distinct to
internal threat alliances, even as the great power and central regime collaborated to balance
insurgents and narco-traffickers, that regime’s agencies (and components parts therein)
were simultaneously bandwagoning with these actors. The discussion below demonstrates
that balancing and bandwagoning occur simultaneously in internal threat alliances and
provides examples of bandwagoning motivated by all three factors.

i. Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources

As part of their repertoire of action aimed at toppling the regime, guerrillas entered
subnational areas and threatened civilian (mayors, for example) and security sector
(national police, in many cases) regime actors to the point they agreed to collude with the
insurgents in order to survive. As of 1998, for example, more than 70 percent of mayors in
one province indicated that they had to “hand over 10% of their budgets to finance the narco-FARC,” or be “killed or kidnapped.” To ensure their survival, regime actors handed over money or agreed to appoint FARC-preferred candidates to positions with control over the coffers. The guerrillas “would tell us to either agree to our terms, resign, or die,” one official holding office in the late 1980s said.

Following the decentralization reforms, FARC attempts to force bandwagoning increased. In order to fuel their operations, the FARC through 1998 had become increasingly “involved in the armed oversight of municipal budget administration, which has involved kidnapping and threatening mayors.” According to estimates from the Colombian Army, 13 percent of Colombia’s mayors through the late 1990s had “direct links” with the FARC or ELN, with a further 44 percent “collaborat[ing] in some form with the insurgency” including by “implement[ing] policies that are favorable to the insurgency” as well as “divert[ing] government funds to the guerrillas.” In the department of Valle de Cauca, for example, by 1998 the threat level from guerrillas heightened to the point where the governor, in a move “independent of the national government” (and contrary to alliance strategy), pursued a “peace” deal for his department with the guerrillas. He went so far as to travel abroad to garner support for his efforts. As these regime actors were bandwagoning with belligerents in order to survive, the central regime and other agencies were actively working to balance the same insurgents.

Narco-traffickers also coerced regime officials into compliance. Escobar’s Medellin outfit notoriously harassed, intimidated, and threatened to kill regime actors and their families until they agreed to turn a blind eye to trafficking and production (passive bandwagoning) or actively aid in the enterprise (active bandwagoning). Throughout the
“halcyon days of the 1980s and early 1990s,” the Medellin cartel “intimidated and murdered scores of Colombian government officials at all levels to protect its drug operations.”¹³⁹ In a clear example of regime actors bandwagoning to survive, in 1987 a “thoroughly intimidated Colombian Supreme Court” ruled that that extradition treaty between the U.S. and Colombia was unconstitutional.¹⁴⁰ As these judges and other regime representatives colluded with drug-lords to save their own lives, the central regime and components of the police force were simultaneously devising and implementing strategies to balance the narco-traffickers.

ii. Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self-Interest over National Interest

Distinct to internal threat alliances, fear for survival or a share in the spoils of victory cannot account for all instances of regime bandwagoning during this period. Interviews and secondary sources indicate that central and subnational regime actors also bandwagoned with narco-traffickers and guerrillas in order to maximize their power or influence (mainly financial).¹⁴¹ And analogous to the examples cited above of bandwagoning to survive, these forms of passive and active bandwagoning rooted in patron-client relations occurred at the same time as other regime actors were actively attempting to balance the guerrillas and drug-traffickers.

In deciding whether to implement alliance strategy and tactics, actors in the capital or carrying out activities “in the field” decided to prioritize augmenting their power and influence and to take action that benefited the patron-client links necessary to do so. This manifested principally in regime representatives accepting financial payment in exchange for passively or actively assisting the armed actors. As Mauceri argues with regard to insurgents and narco-traffickers and their clientelistic ties to the regime at all levels: “The ability of these groups to corrupt state officials and challenge the state’s monopoly on

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violence has…in many ways co-opted the state itself. Either through support, bribery, or intimidation, violent groups have gained influence over mayors, judges, bureaucrats, and other state officials, thus reducing and restricting the policy autonomy of state institutions.”¹⁴² The narco-traffickers in particular, one analyst of the conflict noted, “enjoyed enough money, power, resources, and flexibility to efficiently neutralize the government’s countermeasures.”¹⁴³

Through payoffs to government actors, the narco-traffickers and in some cases the FARC “developed a very effective counter-intelligence network that neutralized most state action against them.”¹⁴⁴ By 1980 narco-traffickers had “put dozens of strategic middle-level government bureaucrats on their payroll in order to know the regime’s “every move.”¹⁴⁵ Through the 1990s no agency or level of government was immune from these influences and the passive or active bandwagoning they spurred. As Bejarano (2011) demonstrates, the narcos had “infiltrated politics in all its electoral and non-electoral forms to the point of jeopardizing the stability of the regime” and through payoffs and other actions “undermined the key state institutions such as the judiciary, the army, and the police.”¹⁴⁶ Thereafter and through the 1990s, “traffickers increasingly fueled corruption in the justice, police, and political structures of the country.”¹⁴⁷

According to a former U.S. official involved in the alliance, the influence of patron-client ties “reached the highest levels of government” and made it “easy to bribe government, police, and military officials in exchange for turning a blind-eye to their activities.”¹⁴⁸ Indicative of the degree to which regime actors were bandwagoning through the late 1980s, a cartel was able to “hire” a military unit to break into an apartment building in Bogota and kill its rival.¹⁴⁹ Bandwagoning by regime actors had by 1998 “penetrated all
branches of government, from the national to the local level: dozens of congressmen have accepted drug money in return for providing political protection for the mafias…countless judges have released traffickers because of bribery or intimidation…military officers [have] not been exempt from such temptations.”\textsuperscript{150} Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman said years later that, in his view, 70 percent of Colombia’s Congress was by 1997 “bent”: corrupt in general and influenced by the drug-trade particularly.\textsuperscript{151}

Subnational bandwagoning persisted under Pastrana and Uribe as regime elements continued to prioritize survival, spoils, or their desire to increase personal influence and wealth (patron-client relations) over the national interest and therefore bandwagoned with actors generating the threat, rather than balancing them. Representative of regime actors continuing to bandwagon because they prioritized maximizing power/influence over alliance goals, a May 1999 report indicated that police and army elements would allow the FARC to transport trucks filled with military arms for a bribe of $365.\textsuperscript{152} Like decisions by regime actors from 1980-1997, these police and military actions contravened central regime guidance and hindered allies’ ability to weaken the internal threat.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{iii. Circumventing Bandwagoning Regime Actors}

Three specific examples from the Colombian presidential administrations of Barco, Gaviria, and Samper further demonstrate that balancing/bandwagoning occur simultaneously with internal threat alliances and that such bandwagoning generates actions by the allies not found in traditional alliances.

During the Barco regime, he and U.S. President Reagan worked closely together, particularly on devising strategy and tactics to crush the narco-traffickers in general and the Medellin cartel particularly. Although the central regime and the great power were able to work closely to balance their common threat, the Colombian Judiciary hindered alliance
efforts to implement an anti-cartel strategy because it was “in the pocket” of and bandwagoning with influential drug-lords. The cartels recognized that Barco was committed to extradition and dismantling their operations and pushed the Judiciary in general and Supreme Court particularly to bandwagon with them out of fear (death threats were levied onto family/friends) or patron-client incentives (cartels paid judges large sums in exchange for favorable court decisions). Bribes, “violence,” and “threats thereof” were used “with the goal of paralyzing the justice system.” At least partly due to this campaign, Colombia’s Supreme Court deemed the extradition treaty unconstitutional, temporarily derailing tactics agreed by the central regime and its great power counterpart. As one analysis states, it had become increasingly “clear that the Colombian judiciary” had become “corrupted.”

Distinct to internal threat alliances, a regime agency (the Judiciary) was violating alliance strategy by opposing extradition and hindering the allies’ ability to weaken the threat. To circumvent this bandwagoning actor and following consultations with Washington, Barco used his presidential authority to reinstate extradition of cartel members to the U.S. by Executive order.

Similar bandwagoning occurred during Gaviria’s tenure. Despite close collaboration between Gaviria and U.S. President H.W. Bush on strategy and tactics, Colombian Police (and some Military) elements were bandwagoning with the narco-traffickers either due to death threats (to survive) or in exchange for bribes (patron-client motivations). This hindered the allies’ ability to weaken the internal threat. In order to circumvent these bandwagoning elements, the U.S.-Colombia formed a police unit of vetted (non-bandwagoning) staff to destroy the cartels. As Gaviria’s Defense Minister
recounted to me in an interview: “The unit can be viewed as an “island of integrity in a sea of corruption” where the police and the military had links with the drug-traffickers; by creating this special unit, we were able to crush the larger cartels.”¹⁶₀ The implication for allies’ ability to achieve their objectives, as Gaviria’s Minister of Interior told me during an interview, was that “by creating this unit to get around those actors working with the cartels, we killed Escobar.”¹⁶¹ Such efforts to curb balancing/bandwagoning, including creating a component within a regime agency that could be relied on to balance (not bandwagon), would not be necessary in traditional alliances where agencies implement government guidance (balance) to advance the national (not their own) interest.

Examples from the Barco and Gaviria administrations demonstrate that regime agencies may bandwagon, hinder cohesion, and generate actions by allies not found in traditional alliances: the great power/central regime pushing these agencies to balance or secure their interests by other means. Phenomena during the Samper presidency demonstrate that a central regime may bandwagon in order to advance its own interests and generate additional actions not found in (nor applicable to understanding) traditional alliances: a great power by-passing the central leadership to work directly with a (balancing-prone) regime agency.

The U.S. in 1994 faced another situation not found in traditional alliances: determining how to secure its interests vis-à-vis an alliance, within a country, when faced with a bandwagoning central regime. As outlined above, Samper was implicated in colluding with the narco-traffickers, a core target of the alliances. The U.S. view that Samper’s regime was bandwagoning is reflected in testimony on decertification:

We work with some extremely dedicated Colombian officials who…have continued to attack drug syndicates…these efforts have been undercut at every turn, however, by a government…plagued by corruption [and] fostering corruption to protect themselves.¹⁶²
The testimony also indicates that in order to secure its interests the U.S. by-passed Samper and worked with specific (balancing-prone) regime actors (“extremely dedicated Colombian officials”) outside the central regime; as does the following from a policy-maker who said decertification had “cut the life line of our allies.” And indeed, to secure its interests the U.S. side-stepped the (bandwagoning-prone) central regime to work directly with regime agencies more prone to balancing (primarily the Police but also the Prosecutor General) to weaken the narco-traffickers. While juggling its relations with the central regime, the U.S. played into the agencies’ desire for resources to push the Police to balance. As Myles Frechette, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia during Samper’s tenure, told me in an interview: “We worked closely with [Police Chief] Serrano and simply bypassed Samper. This is why all was not lost during this period.” This U.S. confidence in the Police was echoed Thomas McNamara, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, who told me that Colombia was “able to hold up their end of the bargain because of the Police chief.” Officials within the Ministry of Interior during Samper’s regime echoed this position: “the U.S. trusted Serrano, continued to collaborate as a result of this relationship, and despite strains in the relationship with Samper.” Though U.S. relations with Samper’s central regime were “difficult,” its relationship with the Police were “excellent” and U.S. assistance “continued to find its way into Colombia” and “almost entirely to support the Police.”

In the section above I demonstrated that throughout the alliance regime actors engaged in simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning. Specific regime elements bandwagoned (while others balanced) because they wanted to survive, share in the spoils of victory (both found in traditional alliances), or augment their power/influence or their
clients’ (distinct to internal threat alliances). Pushed by these three motivations, regime elements bandwagoned by enabling forces fomenting violence to continue operating and in some cases, as with extortion of subnational officials, provided the FARC with alternative sources for capabilities. Such ties led officials and military/police officers to bandwagon rather than balance: to avoid specific areas, fight half-heartedly, or simply not engage at all. Officials and soldiers within the army and police turned a blind eye to the actions of narco-traffickers (passive bandwagoning), or in some cases actively assisted their operations through provision of information on Colombian government efforts (active bandwagoning). Instead of unswervingly implementing the alliance strategy agreed to with the U.S. and carrying out activities accordingly, regime actors colluded with the alliance’s primary threat.

Whereas this subsection focused mainly on regime actors outside the central decision-makers and why they bandwagoned (and when), the following section centers on decisions and actions by the central regime.

4. FOURTH CORE DIFFERENCE – PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS: LEADERS OF THREATENED STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The purpose of this fourth sub-section is to evidence the fourth and final difference between external and internal threat alliances: that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state.

With traditional (external) alliances, after aligning states work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics,
and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more “cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace (increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival.

Level of threat and resources influences regime/great power ability to work together and defeat the internal menace. This is like traditional alliances. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests.

is organized chronologically and demonstrates how regime-specific priorities affected decisions related to cohesion—choosing strategy and whether to work closely with the United States—and effectiveness—choosing whether and if so how to curb bandwagoning.

Arguably, the following actions would have increased state security and thus the Colombian national interests: weakening the drug-trade, dismantling the cartels, and balancing the insurgents. Doing so would have decreased violence, removed the threat that imperiled the fabric of the country, and enhanced economic and other opportunities for the nation’s people. The following sections demonstrate that instead of and often at the expense of these goals, Colombian presidential regimes—when faced with these threats—often acted mainly and primarily with their own political interests in mind.


During the Turbay regime the allies worked closely together not only because of a surging threat and dependence on each other to balance it (as in traditional alliances) but also because, for Turbay’s regime, working with the U.S. to balance the insurgents/narco-traffickers would help ensure his political survival. A report aired on the CBS “60 minutes” television program alleged that Colombian politicians (including Turbay) had links to the drug-trafficking industry. As a result, Turbay needed to “clear his name” and put forth a hardline stance on the drug issue in order to salvage his political mandate. Moreover, he needed to maintain crucial export markets for Colombian coffee, and speculation the regime was “crooked” could have jeopardized resources from this sector. “Accusations against Turbay made him play an active role in negotiating the extradition treaty” and controlling the drug-trade; this “proactive stance” in turn “inspired” the U.S. to give the regime “funding and equipment” needed to balance insurgents/narco-traffickers. Turbay cooperated mainly because doing so was an asset (not a liability) to his political survival.
ii. **Betancur (1982-1986): Close Alignment Morphs from Political Liability to Asset**

After Betancur’s election in 1982, a continued threat kept the allies working together but their ability to agree on alliance goals, strategy, and tactics deteriorated because the regime viewed close collaboration as a political liability. As Thomas Boyatt, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, told me in an interview: “Betancur was more nationalistic than Turbay,” and “this put a damper on our relationship.” To win and remain in office, the regime pursued a foreign policy “independent” from the great power. This stance and associated political priorities informed how the regime worked with the U.S. to dampen internal violence. Where Turbay, like Reagan, advocated a military strategy to the guerrillas, Betancur’s regime for reasons tied to political survival shifted to peace via negotiation. To fulfill campaign pledges, Betancur established negotiations with the guerrillas and agreed to a ceasefire with the FARC. While Turbay had worked closely with Reagan (because doing so was a political necessity), Betancur jettisoned anti-communist rhetoric and cooperation on anti-belligerent military efforts (because doing so would have been a political liability).

Regime political priorities also initially hindered cooperation against narco-trafficking, as working closely with the U.S. against it was at odds with Betancur’s campaign platform (to rely on domestic assets) and political interests. Accordingly, he eschewed close collaboration in counter-narcotics initiatives, attempted to address the issue with domestic means, and rejected several extradition requests. Linked to the regime’s nationalist stance, it viewed Colombia as less militarily dependent on the U.S. and instead sought support from other countries in the region.

Toward the end of Betancur’s tenure, rising violence morphed collaboration with the U.S. to balance (guerrillas and narcos) from a liability to regime political survival to an
asset to salvaging it. A combination of failed negotiations and reports Betancur was considering re-introducing extradition made internal violence surge: belligerents seized the Palace of Justice (leaving hundreds dead) and the Medellin cartel assassinated Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara. Facing calls for greater action, and to survive politically, the regime needed to take a harder-line approach to the guerrillas/narcos and adopted a “militarist” and “overtly repressive strategy against the insurgency,”\(^{178}\) ended talks with the guerrillas, and agreed to extradite narco-traffickers.\(^{179}\) The regime needed to curb surging violence to retain office and this “moved Betancur to bend toward the U.S. pressure” in order to “obtain resources for the war.”\(^{180}\) The 1985 debt crisis and the regime’s need for U.S. help to address it also increased cohesion by pushing Betancur “closer towards the United States inasmuch as Washington was crucial for obtaining the $1 billion dollar “jumbo” loan in 1985.”\(^{181}\) In exchange for U.S. backing with the Banks, the regime cooperated with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts.\(^{182}\)


U.S.-Colombia relations during the Barco regime largely mirrored those under Betancur. Initially, the allies were less able to agree on alliance strategy because the regime viewed doing so as a political liability. Rising violence and changing political priorities thereafter, however, pushed Reagan and Barco into a “golden embrace:” working with the U.S. to balance (guerrillas and narcos) changed from liability to regime political survival to an asset to salvage it.

Described as a “pragmatic turn” in Colombian foreign policy, the Barco regime’s top priority (and key to its political survival) was to maximize markets for Colombian exports (and access to IMF financing) to grow the faltering economy. Despite broad agreement between the allies on the internal threat (“We wanted the closest relationship,”
his Minister of government told me) regime decisions related to political survival initially hindered cohesion. In order to maximize avenues to re-start the economy, Barco was initially hesitant to work closely (or overtly) with the U.S. to militarily thwart belligerents due to its political calculation that doing so would endanger ties important to bolstering Colombia’s economy (and regime political standing). The U.S. remained in a Cold war paradigm and Barco needed to “de-contaminate” (from external actors) the internal conflict. Accordingly, it pursued a regime-led negotiated solution (with some military actions) to guerrilla violence, while Reagan preferred a military-oriented approach.

By contrast, from day one of Barco’s tenure the allies closely collaborated to curb narco-trafficking because doing so was in the regime’s interests and in line with its political mandate. Narco-trafficking produced violence and commodity distortions that hurt the economy (his main political priority) and pushed Barco closer to the U.S. on drugs. The “threat” drug-trafficking posed to Colombia, he said, was “a matter of survival of democratic institutions and public liberty.” Similarly, for Reagan, the “twin evils” of “narcotics trafficking and terrorism” were the most “dangerous threat to the hemisphere today.” To that end, great power/regime agencies worked to eradicate crops and capture (albeit low-level) cartel leaders.

In the second half of Barco’s tenure, rising violence morphed working with the U.S. to balance (guerrillas and narcos) from somewhat of a liability to regime political survival to an asset to saving it. With cartel/insurgent threats rising, Barco needed to take a more firm stance, quell this violence to remain in power, and U.S. resources would help do so. The Medellin cartel in 1989 assassinated a presidential candidate, violence from guerrillas was on the rise, and due to their stepped up actions in the Magdalena Metio
oil fields “the guerrilla groups were clearly hurting the economy.”190 Facing political pressure to take firm action in response to these and other developments191 Barco coupled talks with more vigorous military action because, as he said in October 1988, “no one believes the empty words of the subversive groups.”192 At this juncture, then, working closely to balance insurgents/narco-traffickers was in the regime’s political interests (advance the economy; lessen violence) and the great power’s (secure its ally to curb drug flows) and pushed them into a “golden embrace”193 and the allies took actions reflecting increased ability to devise/implement strategy including: Barco ordering an “all-out offensive” against narco-traffickers (per U.S. recommendations);194 Barco via executive order increasing military patrols and penalties for drug offenses;195 and Barco accepting “more overt and covert military help” from the U.S. to do so.196 The allies devised a strategy to dismantle the Medellin cartel197 and (particularly after Bush assumed office) U.S. funding/training for Colombia’s military/police escalated.198

Recognizing that bandwagoning was hindering alliance effectiveness, Barco fired the National Police Chief over his connections with drug traffickers and his replacement soon thereafter sacked 2,075 officers because of similar links.199 Nonetheless, bandwagoning continued: many “high-level” regime elements “were on the payroll of the drug groups” and bandwagoning.200


Gaviria inherited a country faced with surging violence. FARC attacks had increased three-fold and the Medellin cartel attempted to assassinate (then candidate) Gaviria. For the regime, this escalation in violence required (from a political standpoint) firm action against the belligerents and cartels. For the U.S., it threatened a regime key to curbing drug flows onto American streets and201 required shoring up its ally against
insurgents and cartels to, per its National Security Policy, balance the “threat” from “instability itself” in Colombia. This high level of threat and shared dependence to balance it increased cohesion (as with traditional alliances); however, and distinct to internal threat alliances, cohesion was high also because collaboration against guerrillas and narco-traffickers was an asset to the Gaviria regime’s political prospects.

Having attempted to negotiate peace (talks with the guerrillas broke down) and in response to rising belligerent-initiated violence, Gaviria changed regime policy (and its political promise to Colombia’s people) to a military victory over the guerrillas. To do so, he changed the Military’s mandate from external defense to “internal security” and took domestic measures to accrue resources (a “war tax,” among others) necessary to quell the insurgents. A rise in military spending did not yield “increased efficacy in the field of battle,” however, and Gaviria needed supplementary military capabilities to augment security forces, weaken the belligerents and, by extension, secure regime interests and priorities.

To offset this shortcoming, fulfill his policy agenda, and in doing so preserve his regime’s political interests, Gaviria turned to closer collaboration with the U.S. (and increased cohesion) by: Gaviria accepting U.S. assistance to reorganize military intelligence gathering against “armed subversion”; the U.S. allocating $65 million in (emergency) military aid to help the regime “regain control” of territory, and the U.S. allowing its military assets to participate in (as opposed to only advise) counter-narcotics military operations including against the FARC [viewed as an extension of the traffickers]. Regime political imperatives also drove it to cooperate more fully with the
U.S. to combat “narco-terrorism,” which Gaviria described as “the principal threat to our democracy” that “we will confront it without concessions.”

Despite a clear escalation in narco-violence, though, the regime was initially reticent to assume (in full) the U.S. preferred approach (extradition plus force) to dismantle the cartels because formidable political pressure from elites important to the president’s political interests had mounted to decrease narco-violence by striking a deal with (rather than military confronting) the cartels. If Gaviria was truly acting in the national interest, he arguably would have stayed true to his hardline stance and campaign promises and directly confronted the cartels. Instead, Gaviria relented to the political pressure—because these individuals were vital to remaining in power—and agreed (despite U.S. opposition) not to extradite drug lords in exchange for their going to prison (including Escobar).

The strategy soon unraveled as Escobar escaped and still-free commanders employed “violence as a means to money.” After the cartels attacked a wealthy neighborhood of northern Bogota, political forces that had initially urged Gaviria to negotiate with (instead of militarily pursue) the cartels now pushed the regime to militarize the conflict with the drug-lords. In order to offset the potentially-devastating political blow of Escobar’s escape and shore up his political standing with these sectors, Gaviria flipped back to a hardline strategy to crush the cartels. To pursue this approach and salvage political standing, he needed and sought cooperation with the U.S. and “told the Americans as far as he was concerned the door was now open…and would welcome any and all help the Americans could give.” And the U.S. was ready to assist. Narcotics trafficking remained a core national security threat in so far as drugs continued to “severely” damage the “social fabric” of U.S. society. In order to stop the flow of drugs onto American
streets, the U.S. needed to crush the cartels and safeguard its ally, and worked closely with the regime to do so.

Perhaps more so than his predecessors, the central Gaviria regime took proactive steps to curb bandwagoning. For example, the central regime tried to curb bandwagoning in the Judiciary through reforms including: “anonymous judges” (so cartels could not target individuals) and creating the Office of the General Prosecutor. Even during the Gaviria regime, though, bandwagoning was widespread. Armed actors used bribes and other payoffs to “seduce hundreds of important armed forces officers, police officials, judges and political actors.” The Commander of the Police anti-drug unit and three Ministers of Defense, for example, accepted bribes from the Cali cartel purportedly in exchange for not deploying security forces to disrupt their operations.


U.S.-Colombia relations deteriorated with Ernesto Samper’s election due to evidence that he bandwagoned with drug cartels. If Samper was acting in the national interest, he would have pursued a hard line against narco-trafficking and adhered to Colombian campaign finance regulations and eschewed any such monies flowing from illegal actors. Instead, he initially waffled on counter-narcotics efforts and accepted $US millions from the Cali cartel to bankroll his campaign.

After determining that Samper’s regime was not sufficiently cooperating in counter-narcotics efforts, the U.S. “decertified” Colombia, rendering the regime (in 1996 and 1997) ineligible to receive U.S. capabilities in this area. Facing calls for his impeachment, Samper’s political survival depended on looking “hard on drugs” and pushed him to accept U.S. preferred strategies. The result was to increase cohesion in so far as Samper knew he needed to look firm against narco-trafficking in order to survive
politically and that accepting U.S. strategy would help. In order to secure American interests, the U.S. exploited Samper’s political vulnerability and pushed him to take firmer action against narco-trafficking (to balance).220 The results of Samper’s vulnerability (and great power pressure) were his central regime: agreeing to nominate the U.S.-favored choice for National Police Chief (General Serrano); ordering agencies to execute an “all-out war” against drug-traffickers; and passing legislation that re-instated extradition.221 Further, he took action to curb bandwagoning. The regime decreed a “cleansing” of the Police of individuals bandwagoning with criminal elements222 and authorized its Chief to fire police officers with such links.223


During Pastrana’s regime, a marked in increase in threat level and shared military dependence to balance it drove the allies together and increased cohesion. However, an additional factor distinct to internal threat alliances also increased cohesion: for the regime, closely working with the U.S. to devise and implement the $1.3 billion Plan Colombia directly aligned with the Pastrana’s stated approach to the threat and would help ensure its political survival.

It was in the high level of violence stemming from Samper’s term that, as a candidate, Pastrana had campaigned on a “strong peace platform” that included de-militarizing part of the country for talks with the FARC.224 Worn down by ever-escalating violence, the Colombian citizenry wanted a “messiah of peace” and elected Pastrana chiefly on his pledge to end the conflict by resuscitating failed negotiations with the belligerents, albeit coupled with military pressure. “I assume the leadership to build peace,” Pastrana said, “and call on all Colombians to follow and work within the agenda for peace
that I am going to direct.”

Informed by its view on why prior presidents failed to weaken the “narco-terrorist” threat, Pastrana’s regime assumed a different approach (and policy agenda) to do so, fulfill his mandate, and secure its political interests: negotiate from a position of power and, if that fails, have the military means to wipe out the belligerents.

In tandem with the aforementioned surge in violence, Colombia was experiencing the worst economic crisis in its history, forcing Pastrana to sign a $2.7 billion credit deal with the IMF. These and other crisis-related adjustments shrunk the pool of resources available to implement the regime’s approach to the internal conflict and therefore secure its political mandate. Where Pastrana had originally intended to unilaterally drum up resources required for Plan Colombia, and was pushing this agenda forward to quell calls from politically-important urban elite to dampen violence at their doorsteps, the fiscal austerity plan meant “Colombia was not in a financial position to pay for the escalation in the civil conflict…and would have to turn to the United States to secure additional military and economic assistance.” The recession pushed Pastrana’s regime further toward the U.S. in so far as doing so would help him amass the capabilities needed to carry out Plan Colombia and his political mandate.

The surge in violence and dependence on each other to balance it (as with traditional alliances) had by 1998 driven the allies closer together. Cohesion was high and the allies would go on and devise and implement Plan Colombia, however, due to an additional factor distinct to internal threat alliances: working with the U.S. to balance guerillas and narco-traffickers aligned with and would further the Pastrana regime’s interests (political survival). For Pastrana, working closely with the U.S. was a formidable asset to his political prospects: the regime needed U.S. resources to implement its counter-
insurgent approach (negotiations plus military action) and therefore agreed to more close collaboration with the great power, specifically on counter-narcotics efforts. As for the U.S., it needed Pastrana to dampen drug flows and therefore agreed to help grow Colombia’s military and police.\textsuperscript{229}

Diverging from his predecessors, Pastrana took more proactive and consistent efforts to curb bandwagoning rooted in patron-client relations. As part of this effort, Pastrana’s central regime consistently attempted to cull the Police and Army of elements linked to and bandwagoning with actors threatening the regime. His regime issued a decree mandating that officers with these links be dismissed from service and subject to further sanction. This led to numerous such expulsions. To assure the Army was run by personnel serious about restraining bandwagoning, Pastrana replaced its Head with the more hardline Fernando Tapias, who fired dozens of officers and other high-level officials during his time in office. In addition, Pastrana fired three generals for purportedly bandwagoning with non-state actors perpetrating violence.\textsuperscript{230} Pastrana’s efforts to promote unified balancing, however, did not stop with the military or police: in 1999, for example, he prosecuted the National Drug Council’s director due to links with actors threatening the regime and in 2000 fired the Intelligence service’s Director and Director of counterintelligence for bandwagoning with narco-traffickers.\textsuperscript{232}

Representing a further shift from prior regimes, Pastrana established two mechanisms to identify and prosecute regime elements diverting alliance resources. First, Pastrana formed the Presidential Program to Fight Corruption (\textit{Programa Presidencial de Lucha contra la Corrupcion})\textsuperscript{233} that established interagency coordination to better identify and prosecute bandwagoning elements.\textsuperscript{234} Additionally, Pastrana established Colombia’s
first agency to curb money-laundering and continued the process started under prior administrations to further professionalize the Police. High-profile sackings and associated decrees diverged from prior administrations, which at most fired a handful of low-level officers and did not pass relevant reforms (aside from Gaviria’s reforms to the Judiciary).


Changes following Uribe’s election to factors that condition internal threat alliance cohesion increased even further the allies’ ability to agree on strategy, tactics, and carry out associated activities. Primarily, for the Uribe regime closely working with the U.S. was vital to obtaining the military resources required to implement his preferred (“mano dura”) military campaign to crush the “narco-terrorists” and not only fulfill this initial political mandate but obtain sufficient support to be the first Colombian president elected to a second term. Coupled with enhanced cohesion, the alliance was more effective during Uribe’s tenure partly because its central regime took actions necessary to ensure bandwagoning regime elements would not hinder cohesion.

In the wake of Pastrana’s failed negotiations, the Colombian citizenry elected Uribe largely based on the “appeal of a hardline candidate at a critical juncture in Colombia’s internal conflict” and his promise to take an “iron fist” approach to defeat the “narco-terrorist” guerrillas. Divergent from prior regimes Uribe had essentially written-off a political solution to insurgent-initiated violence and turned fully to a military campaign aimed at crushing the belligerents. The Uribe regime’s interests extended beyond fulfilling this political mandate, however, and to seeking an unprecedented (and not constitutionally allowed) second term. Given the single term limit for Colombian presidents, doing so required amending the country’s constitution. To that end, and with an eye toward a second
term and associated spoils, Uribe soon after taking office began drumming up support for and pressing the Constitutional Court to allow re-election (approved in 2005).237

Fulfilling his political mandate to crush violence and obtaining support sufficient to amend the constitution relied on having a military capable of weakening the narco-terrorists and demonstrating immediate results in crushing the insurgency. Core political interests would not back amending the constitution to assure a second term for a regime that failed to bring greater stability to the nation. Accordingly, Uribe moved closer to the U.S. and strategically agreed (as Pastrana had already begun to do) to cast the narco-belligerents as narco-terrorists to ensure the U.S. would augment the military resources flowing to the regime. And in the Bush administration he found a great power ready to assist and secure its interests tied to the regime.

The surge in violence and dependence on each other to balance it (as with traditional alliances) had driven the allies closer together. Cohesion was high and the allies would devise and implement Uribe’s new strategy for quelling violence, however, because working with the U.S. to balance “narco-terrorists” aligned with and would further the Uribe regime’s interests (political survival). Working closely with the U.S. was an asset to regime political prospects: it needed U.S. resources to implement its military campaign and secure re-election, and therefore agreed to more close collaboration with the great power. This extended to publicly backing the U.S. decision to invade Iraq,238 which netted the regime an additional $100 million in military aid for its “struggle against terrorism.”239

Effectiveness increased during Uribe’s administration arguably and at least in part because he took actions not seen in prior regimes to ensure bandwagoning regime elements would not hinder cohesion. Within his first two weeks in office, Uribe declared a “State of
“Internal Unrest,” which permitted the central regime (in addition to levying a “war tax”) to: use executive decrees to defeat the insurgents; bypass agencies that may decide to refuse to implement alliance strategy; authorize the military (without Judiciary approval) to make arrests without warrants; and establish subnational areas under military (not civilian) rule.240 And the U.S. fully backed this move.241 Some dubbed this an “authoritarian turn” and against Colombia’s national interest; however, it was what Uribe needed to ensure unified balancing, crush the insurgents, and therefore secure his regime’s interests.242

Arguably, this hardline stance and associated actions vis-à-vis the “narco-terrorists” were in the national interest—even though warrantless arrests, for example, stretched the rule of law they also decreased violence and helped restore the fabric of society by enhancing government control of specific areas. At the same time, other actions Uribe took in order to ensure passage of the constitutional amendment to allow presidential re-election clearly represent decisions that violated the national interest. If Uribe was acting only with the national interest in mind, he would have respected the rule of law and deferred to the legislature and courts to decide on proposed changes to the constitution. Instead, he ordered his internal intelligence service (the DAS) to wire-tap phones of political opponents and employ political smear campaigns against the Supreme Court in order to safeguard stakeholders vital to his political survival and pressure decision-makers to pass the change.243 Even amid the increased cohesion due to alignment of great power and regime interests, therefore, the latter was still abusing its power and taking actions that violated the Colombian national interest.244

Uribe continued efforts started under Pastrana to remove bandwagoning regime elements. By 2007, for example, Uribe’s Defense Minister had fired more than 100
bandwagoning officers and through 2009 purged the Military of elements bandwagoning with actors targeted by the alliance.\textsuperscript{245} The Uribe regime convicted former police General Mauricio Santoyo due to bandwagoning with narco-traffickers\textsuperscript{246} and prosecuted 23 individuals (including former Director of the Army’s intelligence branch) for bandwagoning with narco-traffickers and other actors fomenting violence.\textsuperscript{247} To prevent recurrence of bandwagoning, Uribe passed legislation that prohibited individuals prosecuted for bandwagoning from re-entering the regime.\textsuperscript{248}

Building from Pastrana’s anti-corruption efforts, Uribe established “Colombiemos,” a program that enabled citizens to share information on bandwagoning regime elements, and formed a nation-wide “citizen informant network” whereby regime actors stationed in subnational areas could inform the central regime of collusion between local officials and guerrilla forces.\textsuperscript{249} Pastrana and Uribe proactively purged bandwagoning regime elements and established formalized mechanisms to curb such actions. In doing so, they made more concerted efforts to shift what had become widespread simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning to more unified regime balancing. This represents a marked shift in the peripheral regime’s willingness to curb bandwagoning, and arguably helped transform the weak state into a more unified and reliable ally.

In contrast to regimes in office from 1980 to 1997, Pastrana and Uribe increased the degree to which the weak state balanced the alliance’s common threat in a unified manner. With the necessary capabilities to balance the threat, and with fewer elements of the regime bandwagoning as opposed to balancing, the alliance was able to weaken the threat to the point where it no longer jeopardized regime survival and associated U.S.
interests. The alliance had effectively “turned the tide” from a situation in which the peripheral ally was “on the brink of collapse.”

Having outlined in this core section the four ways in which internal threat alliances are distinct from their external threat counterpart, the following and final section provides conclusions.

III. CASE CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I used the U.S.-Colombia case to evidence the following four key ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from alliances forged to balance external enemies. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

First, I showed that the U.S. and Colombia brought their security policies into close cooperation and aggregated capabilities in response to political violence fomented by two principal actors (leftist guerrillas and narco-traffickers) in order to preserve the regime’s survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from belligerents and drug traffickers, while the great power got involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability including: curbing drug flows onto American streets, maintaining access to oil reserves, and preserving stability in its “backyard,” among others. By the late 1980s, and particularly with the Berlin Wall’s collapse, the core factor underlying U.S./Colombia alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states bring their security policies into close
cooperation in response to a threat *external in origin* (another state or group of states) that imperils the *state as a whole*; and where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances, it demonstrated that Colombia’s internal order was fragmented. Building from this, it showed that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traced Colombia’s political trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a *single* and *unified* state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a *fragmented* regime consisting of *various actors*. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act to advance the national interest.

Third, I demonstrated why the motivations for and manifestations of *bandwagoning* in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional alliances. Concerning manifestation, it showed that regime elements leveraged their
autonomy to act independently, advance their own interests, and contrary to alliance strategy and thus bandwagoned while other regime elements were *simultaneously* balancing. Accordingly, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances proceeds as follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables balancing and bandwagoning to occur *simultaneously* (whereas states in traditional alliances can *either* balance *or* bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) *in addition to* fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon *while the allies are together*, which has implications for cohesion and effectiveness.

In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s presidency) or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. during Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning *central* regime and worked with the National Police to secure U.S. interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.
Fourth and finally, I showed that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-Colombia alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. And these regime-specific decisions rooted in their desire to survive politically impacted actions related to cohesion and effectiveness.

Cohesion was higher during the Andres Pastrana and Alvaro Uribe regimes partly because they viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to their political survival (compared to prior presidents, who oscillated between viewing full collaboration as a liability or asset) and they were able to reign in bandwagoning regime actors. With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, amassing resources sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance weakened the internal threat. In addition to the consistently high alliance cohesion [and an increase in available U.S. state power for the alliance] that enabled the allies to pool such resources sufficient to weaken actors fomenting violence, effectiveness was higher during the Pastrana/Uribe regimes due to their consistent efforts to purge civilian and security agencies of actors bandwagoning with the narco-guerilla threat.

In sum, the U.S.-Colombia alliance clearly elucidates the core ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances. Rather
than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard territorial integrity, the U.S. and Colombia aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s survival and American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the National Police, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with an extremely internally fragmented ally whose relevant actors often acted to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the Colombian national interest. Rather than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning present in traditional alliances, in this case some Colombian agencies balanced insurgents while others were simultaneously colluding with the same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to respond to threats various Colombian administrations largely did not do what was best for the Colombian national interest but, instead, took those actions that would preserve their political and personal power.
ENDNOTES—CHAPTER THREE

5 According to data obtained by Marcy (2010, 13) as of 1976 the U.S. had traced 90 percent of cocaine destined for the U.S. as having passed through Colombia.
16 Military support was primarily in the form of arms transfer and training to units charged with attacking the cartels and FARC. U.S. Special Forces provided training to the Colombian military as well as assisted with planning missions.
19 In turn, this meant that whereas the U.S. policy was to combat narcotics trafficking, “a significant amount of U.S. assistance...would be employed to combat the guerrillas.” Spencer, et al, *Colombia’s Road to Recovery* (2011), 18.
20 To an average of 457 per year. For these statistics refer to table on Level of threat in the Annex to this chapter at the end of the dissertation.
23 Borda, *The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts*, (2009), 60.
24 Interviews in Washington and Bogota with U.S. and Colombian government officials.
On the certification process, see Testimony by Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Before the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, DC: March 1, 2001).


For these examples Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War*, (2001), 21, 249.


Anonymous SOUTHCOM official, interview with author, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.

For an excellent analysis of Pastrana’s views on prior attempts to negotiate, see: Borda, *The Internationalization of Domestic Conflicts.*, (2009), 62-64.


Official transcript of the joint press conference by President Clinton and Colombian President Pastrana as released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 28, 1998.


Recommendations included including replacing voluntary conscripts with professional soldiers; retraining soldiers in skills specific to the current threat profile; and shifting the Air Force’s mandate to support for military and police units. Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War*, (2001).

This included “funding to stand up a 950-strong Colombian army counter-narcotics battalion, support to the National Police in funding, training, and arms…[and] a “CIA-sponsored” intelligence center in the Amazon region Douglas Farah, “US to Aid Colombian Military,” *Washington Post*, December 27, 1998.

As cited in LeoGrande and Sharpe (2000).

Discursos sobre la paz, “De la retórica de la paz a los hechos de paz”, August 11, 1998

Dates from *www.ciponline.org/colombia*.

Author interview, Colombian government official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.

Of 1,873 and 540, respectively. See table in Annex for specific numbers of attacks at the end of this dissertation.


As the National Security Strategy states: “In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups...by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory.” President George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States – 2002,” (Washington, DC, 2002).

This language was initially included in and passed as House of Representatives resolution H.R. 358 that called on the white house to immediately support the government of Colombia to “protect its democracy from United States-designated foreign terrorist organizations.” The full H.R. 358 is available at: [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr358eh/pdf/BILLS-107hr358eh.pdf](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr358eh/pdf/BILLS-107hr358eh.pdf). Accessed February 2012.

Thomas Ginsberg, “Latin Battleground - The U.S. is joining its anti-terror fight with the war on drugs in Colombia. It could be a success, or a mess,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Sunday, December 1, 2002.


The DSP outlined the following tactics among others: (1) provide adequate equipment and training to soldiers; (2) increase intelligence capacity to identify the opposition; (3) increase defense spending; and (4) gain control over major national roads. As presented by Alejandro Arbeleaz, Deputy Minister of Defense for President Alvaro Uribe, in interview with author. Washington, DC, June 12, 2012.

4 These were Guaviare, Meta, Caqueta and Putumayo departments. For an overview of operations see Ramsey III, “From El Billar,” (2009); and Spencer, et al, Colombia’s Road to Recovery (2011).

5 In 2002 the U.S. Congress voted to approve $93 million in counter-terrorism funding devoted to protecting an Occidental Petroleum pipeline in Arauca.

51 This included adding mountain battalions Kline Showing Teeth, (2009), 42.


55 Murillo, Colombia and the United States (2004), 126.

56 Kline, Showing Teeth, (2009), 41.


59 Mario A. Murillo, Colombia and the United States – War, Unrest and Destabilization (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 49-50.


62 See Manuel Jose Bonnett Locarno, Estrategia General De Las Esfuerzas Militares Por La Seguridad de la poblacion y sus recursos, December 1997, as quoted in Spracher in Zackrison, Crisis? What Crisis?

63 The links between the Colombian military are well-documented. See also “The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links,” Human Rights Watch (Washington, DC: February 2000).


68 The M-19 were a third (but less formidable) insurgent group.


70 Author interview, U.S. government official involved in counternarcotics operations, Washington, DC, July 2012.

71 On the cartels, see Ronald Chepusiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe: Taking Down Colombia’s Cali Drug Cartel (New York, NY: Praeger, 2003); See also U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency.
80 Author interview, Colombian government official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
89 Drexler, *Colombia and the United States*, (1997), 82.
90 On the Reagan administration’s view of the FARC/traffickers as one in the same, see George Shultz, “A Forward Look at Foreign Policy” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, October 19, 1984).
91 Interview with author, Colombia Ministry of Interior Official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
92 The “war on drugs” was made official by the U.S. Congress passing the Defense Authorization Act.
105 Rafael Pardo, 1997.
106 He was an advocate for more forceful government action against the narco-traffickers.
108 Interview with Author, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Minister of Governments under President Barco and Minister of the Interior under Gaviria, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
Violence.” Similarly, Ricardo Bache Letelier contends that in such regions a “spirit Mafioso” has developed that stands as a contestation to the drug cartels, paramilitary squads, and the government itself…within each region different groups accrue wealth…through political systems, with a variety of ‘disorganized organizations,’ including the guerrillas groups, the paramilitary squads, and the government itself. For an overview of these, see Kent Eaton, “The Downside of Decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia,” *Security Studies* 15, no. 4 (2006), 533-562.

119 In the 1980s and 1990s the government of Colombia enacted political and fiscal decentralization reforms aimed to grant subnational units more authority over the use of their resources as well as individuals in these areas the ability to select those officials who would serve in public office. For an overview of these, see Kent Eaton, “The Downside of Decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia,” *Security Studies* 15, no. 4 (2006), 533-562.

120 Coined by Kline (2007), “political archipelagoes” refers to the presence of “an assortment of regional political systems, with a variety of ‘disorganized organizations,’ including the guerrillas groups, the paramilitary squads, and the government itself…within each region different groups accrue wealth…through the drug-trade, others through selling their abilities to threaten or punish with violence.” Similarly, Ricardo Vargas (2004) contends that in such regions a “spirit Mafioso” has developed that stands as a contestation to...
The text appears to be a page from a book or article discussing the Colombian government's role in regional control systems and the actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It references various sources and interviews to support its arguments.

133 Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure*, (2007), 23
135 Interview with author, Colombian government official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
141 For a discussion of corruption in the Colombian government see “Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: Democracy at Risk,” (Washington, D.C., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 2nd session, 1996.)
154 Interview with former Colombian government official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
157 Livingstone *Inside Colombia*, (2005), 58.
158 As recounted in an interview, though, even before this official reinstatement, though, he had already directed his Minister of Justice to continue with extraditions. Interview with Author, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Minister of Governments under President Barco and Minister of the Interior under Gaviria, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
159 Interview with author, Rafael Pardo, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
160 Following Escobar’s escape, the U.S. and Colombia worked closely to track him down and kill him, demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and Colombia to closely cooperate and coordinate their policies and activities. The effort involved collaboration by the CIA, DEA and their counterparts in Colombia. Interview with author, Rafael Pardo, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
161 Interview with Author, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Minister of Governments under President Barco and Minister of the Interior under Gaviria, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.
The response of the government is to strengthen our security capabilities, to better equip the military and police to combat then increasingly influential drug cartels, by extension and due to few restrictions (at the subnational level) on how the Colombian government used the monies, the Colombian military also used funds and resources to combat the FARC and ELN. Bruce Bagley and William Walker III, eds. Drug Trafficking in the Americas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, 1994). For an excellent overview and analysis of the U.S. support to Colombia’s effort to kill Pablo Escobar see Bowden, Killing Pablo, (2001), 64-65.

As quoted in El Espectador, October 1988.


The death of Galan prompted the Barco government to declare (with the enthusiastic support of the [H.W.] Bush Administration) a “War on Drugs.” Police and military forces arrested more than 11,000 people in raids on ranches, homes, companies.” Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War, (2001), 174-175.

Barco also enacted various decrees aimed to target the finances of drug dealers including making it easier to extradite narcotics (at this time, a treaty was necessary) as well as making it easier for law enforcement officials to seize property (including real estate or other material goods) from suspected traffickers if they could not, within five days, prove how they were able to pay for (legally) these items. Suspects of drug trade or terrorism could also now be held for seven as opposed to one day. Cromos, August 29, 1989.


On U.S. training and help creating this Search Bloc see Bowden, Killing Pablo, (2001), 79.

Military support was primarily in the form of arms transfer and training to units charged with attacking the cartels and FARC. U.S. Special Forces provided training to the Colombian military as well as assisted with planning missions.


Kline, Statebuilding, (1999), 60.


To keep politically-vital campaign promises to influential sectors, Gaviria coupled negotiations with military action to decrease guerrilla violence. Talks eventually broke down, however, due to guerrillas’ intransigence and Military efforts to undermine the process including attacking primary FARC headquarters without Presidential authorization. Interview with author, Ministry of Defense Official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.

Saying in March 1992: “the response of the government is to strengthen our security capabilities, our armed forces, to be sure that the outcome of the peace process being carried out in Mexico does not matter.”

As quoted in La Prensa, April 2, 1992.

Kline, Statebuilding, (1999), 113.

Gaviria issued Executive Decree 416 that created a “war tax” to generate revenues for “expenses related to fortifying internal security” including better intelligence gathering capabilities for armed forces as well as establishing two 1,500 solidior mobile brigades and additional Army companies to patrol pipelines. As summarized by Kline, Statebuilding (1999), 86, from Semana Magazine (Bogota, Colombia), August 28, 1990; on military elements of Gaviria’s strategy, Drexler, Colombia and the United States, (1997), 156.

At the invitation of Minister of Defense Pardo, late in 1990 a team of defense and military advisers from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) traveled to Colombia to provide Gaviria’s regime with recommendations on how to reorganize the military’s intelligence to better combat the internal threat. Based on advice received from this team, the military developed a strategic plan to “combat escalating terrorism by armed subversion” from cartels and guerrillas. Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War, (2001), 181.
Under prior administrations, U.S. Special Forces were limited to a training and advisory role. H.W. Bush secured a change to the Posse Comitatus Act that enabled Special Forces and Green Beret units to directly participate in operations in other countries that were deemed as “law enforcement” and part of the counter-narcotics effort, which had previously required congressional approval. Ronald J. Ostrow, “Ruling Allows Wider Action By U.S. Military,” Los Angeles Times, December 18, 1989; also Michael Isikoff, “Bush decides military can take law agency role,” Austin American-Statesman, December 16.


Gaviria viewed the issue (divergent from Barco) as comprising cartel violence (“narco-terrorism”) and production/trafficking of cocaine (“narco-trafficking”). Kline, Statebuilding (1999).

Regarding the threat from cartels, he pursued a softer-line by indicating that if they “submitted to justice” they would not be extradited to the US. See Bowden, Killing Pablo, (2001).

Interview with Author, Government official in Gaviria administration, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.

More than 100 were injured in the El Chico neighborhood attack. Bowden, Killing Pablo, (2001).


For an excellent overview of the details and analysis of the effects of the economic crisis, see Livingstone, Inside Colombia, (2004).


Arguably, the event that consolidated this shift was the FARC’s 1998 attack onto El Billar.


“Colombia’s Anti-Drug Chief Fired in Corruption Case.” Buffalo News. May 6, 1999


John C. Dugas, “The emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia? The case of Alvaro Uribe,” Third World Quarterly, 24, no. 6 (2003), 1134 and 1126.

Kline, Showing Teeth, (2009)


As reported in El Tiempo, March 27, 2003.


Reflective of this general opposition, see “New Escalation in Repression,” Colombia Solidarity Network. October/December 2002.


Author confidential interview with Colombian ministry of Defense official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.


CHAPTER FOUR

U.S.-AFGHANISTAN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 2001-2012

This chapter will show how the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance was a clear example of an internal threat alliance that differed from traditional (external) alliances in the following four ways, beginning with the nature of the threat and why great powers/weak regimes form internal threat alliances. As the first core difference, it demonstrates that the U.S. and Afghanistan brought their security policies into close cooperation in response to violence fomented by insurgents (and at times warlords) in order to preserve the Hamid Karzai regime’s survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from insurgents, while the U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch attacks (as they did on September 11, 2001) and ensure access to natural resources in the region. By 2002 the core factor underlying U.S./Afghanistan alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; and where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances, it demonstrates that Afghanistan’s internal order was fragmented. Building from this, it shows that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of
its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traces Afghanistan’s political trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act to advance the national interest.

Third, it demonstrates why the motivations for and manifestations of bandwagoning in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional alliances. Afghanistan shows that in internal threat alliances, it is simplistic to ask whether states balance or bandwagon. Instead, they do both at the same time. As will be seen, while some elements of the Afghan army fought against the Taliban, others actively cooperated with them. While some warlords resisted Afghan incursions, other aligned with the worst of the Afghan leaders. Clearly, the either/or dichotomy of traditional alliances concerning whether to resist or appease threats did not apply to Afghanistan. The case also shows that clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and
to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). Military officials, police officers, and central regime representatives bandwagoned due to fear (for survival) and because they thought the opposition may win (for profit); however, they also did so to consolidate or further patron-client relationships based in ethnicity or financial exchange.

In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising the peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between a somewhat cooperative central regime and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular after Karzai was re-elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to balancing/bandwagoning at the same time. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.

Fourth and finally, it shows that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s
decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime.

And Hamid Karzai’s actions clearly show how internal threat alliances place the primary focus on the interests of the leader rather than the national interests of the state. Time after time, Karzai worked against the national interest of Afghanistan by subverting national institutions, appointing known corrupt officials, and cooperating with the drug trade, not because these actions benefited Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but because they helped keep him in power. This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated by the difference in Karzai’s actions before and after he was re-elected president in 2009.

Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion declined because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-term. Karzai recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively bandwagoning). After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying
on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.

With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, aggregating capabilities sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat (as determined mainly by cohesion) influenced whether the alliance weakened the internal threat. However, Karzai’s insufficient efforts to curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness.

Following a brief historical study, I will show in detail how the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance differed from traditional alliances in each of these four ways.


   **HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

   The events that precipitated the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance—the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001—have their roots in the war-torn country’s prior decades of conflict and strife. This arguably begins with the 1978 Saur Revolution, where the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), with support from the Afghan military, toppled President Mohammad Daoud Khan’s government. Seeking to expand its influence and acting in the context of the Cold War paradigm, the Soviet Union soon thereafter began providing support to the PDPA government and its pursuit of socialist goals. The PDPA regime’s policies and persecution of dissenters spurred opposition elements to form militia groups (*Mujahedeen*) and attempt to overthrow the government and reincorporate Islamic principles into the state.¹ With the *mujahedeen* increasing in force due largely to support from the U.S. and Pakistan, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979 to shore up the PDPA government.² Nine years later, worn down by the *mujahedeen*’s insurgent campaign and abetted by its domestic economic demise, the Soviet Union began withdrawing troops. In 1992, the mujahedeen ousted the PDPA and replaced it with an Interim government.³
Building on popular resentment of the nascent government, religious leader Mullah Omar in 1994 established the Taliban ("religious students"), a politico-religious movement comprised of former mujahedeen and religious scholars. Leveraging an increased flow of supporters (and government financial support) from Pakistan, the Taliban expanded its goal from removing Kandahar province’s governor to overthrowing the central government and taking control of the state.⁴ The Taliban eventually captured Kabul and installed Islamic policies.⁵

This development had implications for Afghans and regional/global security alike. For the people of Afghanistan, it saw the rise of a repressive regime whose strict interpretation of Sharia law brought punishing “un-Islamic” behavior with barbaric acts (including public stonings) as well as forcing women to wear the burqa (a garb that covers the entire body and face) and forbidding them from pursuing education and other basic opportunities.⁶ Given the Taliban regime’s brutal nature, only three states recognized the government during its rule, which lasted from 1996 to 2001. In response to the Taliban’s ascent to power and in opposition to its repressive rule, regional powerbrokers (“warlords” or commanders) affiliated with a particular ethnicity or faction joined remnants of the deposed regime in order to reclaim Afghanistan from the Taliban. Commonly referred to as the “Northern Alliance,” these militias were led by the ousted government’s Defense Minister.⁷ With follow on effects for regional and global security, the Taliban welcomed the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, into Afghanistan. With the government’s permission, bin Laden established training camps in Afghanistan⁸ from which he extended Al-Qaeda’s “operations around the world.”⁹
Five years after the Taliban came to power, on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda hijacked airplanes in the United States and flew two into the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon just outside of Washington, DC. The attacks were master-minded by bin Laden. In response to the 9/11 attacks U.S. President George W. Bush declared a global “war on terrorism.”10 As part of this, he launched Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan through which the U.S. cooperated with the Northern Alliance opposition to remove the Taliban regime and capture or kill bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda affiliates.11 In October 2001 and as part of this operation the U.S. collaborated with NA commanders and other prominent leaders controlling militias (including Hamid Karzai) to rout the Taliban and capture/kill bin Laden.12 By December the U.S. and this “anti-Taliban front” of “warlords, strongmen, and political factions”13 had defeated the Taliban and killed Al-Qaeda operatives or forced them into Pakistan (though bin Laden escaped).14

As the Taliban fell and Al-Qaeda was routed from Afghanistan and across the border into Pakistan, a grouping of Afghan and international leaders assembled in Bonn, Germany, to develop a transitional political process for Afghanistan (the Bonn Agreement) and select an Interim Leader. They chose Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader who worked with the Northern Alliance opposition to defeat the Taliban. In June 2002 and per the Bonn Agreement, a grand council (Loya Jirga) of elders elected Karzai to a two-year term as Interim President, marking the official start to his regime.

With Karzai in office the U.S. began weighing options for safeguarding the regime and ensuring Al-Qaeda would not again use territory there to launch attacks. Ultimately, the U.S. selected a “light footprint” approach and in 2002 deployed 8,000 troops to
Afghanistan with the objective of killing Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters and training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—comprised of the National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP). Other states pledged assistance and the United Nations established a Mission (UNAMA).

The U.S. soon became increasingly pre-occupied with its pending invasion of Iraq, limiting American resources available for Afghanistan. In accordance with its light footprint approach, due to competing priorities in Iraq, and in line with the U.S. focus on Al-Qaeda (versus Karzai’s preoccupation with a Taliban regrouping in Pakistan), the great power devised and pushed Karzai to accept what later became known as the “warlord strategy” for balancing threats in the country. After the collapse of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance commanders and “warlords” the U.S. had worked with to oust the repressive regime reclaimed the subnational “fiefdoms” they ruled before the Taliban came to power. These regional powerbrokers were largely “considered U.S. allies” and by paying these individuals “to not fight one another” and “maintain stability in their outlying areas” a means by which the U.S. could ensure stability without more American boots on the ground. Accordingly, the alliance strategy involved deploying U.S. Special Forces to hunt Al Qaeda throughout Afghanistan while “relying on the warlords to keep Pax Americana in the countryside”

Building from this initial alignment, the allies were able to work together to agree on strategy, tactics, and activities. As James Dobbins, U.S. envoy to Afghanistan following 9/11, told me in an interview: “Once the Karzai interim government had been installed, it was fully cooperative and willing to do anything it could, within its capabilities, to advance our agenda.” The U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad,
worked closely with Karzai to forge all aspects of alliance strategy, with “no significant decision made by Karzai during this period without his involvement.”

It soon became clear that the warlords-cum-regime actors were more interested in solidifying control over subnational strongholds than balancing threats and securing alliance goals. Rather than using alliance capabilities to fight insurgents, for example, the warlords fought each other over control of territory and associated spoils. These purported “extensions” of the central regime “were not reconciled to the Karzai presidency and remained potential threats” to his rule. By 2003, they “were becoming stronger while the Karzai regime lacked the resources to compete.”

Due in part to warlord bandwagoning and the flow of insurgents back into Afghanistan from havens in Pakistan, the international community’s initial triumphant sense of “victory” gave way in 2003 to dire assessments of resurgent attacks throughout Afghanistan. Whereas U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney had exultantly declared in October 2001 that the “Taliban is out of business, permanently,” the insurgency was soon thereafter clearly back in business and continued to mount attacks that threatened regime survival and U.S. interests. This wave of violence prompted further concerns in Washington that the Karzai regime might collapse, with dire consequences for U.S. interests. As Khalilzad said at the time in remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: a “lack of success” to include a “renewed civil war, a narco-state, a successful Taliban insurgency, or a failed state” would “undermine efforts in the global war on terrorism and could stimulate an increase in Islamic militancy and terrorism.”

It was in this context that the allies looked toward holding the 2004 Afghan presidential elections. Recognizing that threats were rising and the election was a
watershed moment in the Bonn process, Bush called for a “Marshall Plan” for Afghanistan and in 2003 approved what would become the alliance’s new strategy. This “Accelerated Success” strategy diverged from its “warlord” predecessor by adding the Taliban and insurgents as principal threats (in addition to Al-Qaeda) and recognizing and including tactics to strengthen the regime’s capacity to reclaim “ungoverned spaces” in which target actors could operate. The new strategy’s *military component* consisted mainly of U.S. and Afghan Army forces conducting operations against insurgents and training and equipment for the Army and Police to grow their size and capacity. And its *non-military component* included strengthening regime capacity to have “a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force throughout the country” and included: training/funding to agencies relevant to alliance goals, activities to reduce poppy production and drug-trafficking (to remove a form of insurgent financing), and establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in subnational areas to work with regime actors “to extend its authority” and “develop a stable and secure environment.”

Working from this strategy and through the 2005 parliamentary elections, a continued threat to the regime and allies’ dependence on each other to balance it pushed the U.S. and Karzai together and (by and large) to cooperate on alliance goals and strategy. Reflecting this, in 2005 the allies agreed to the “Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership,” to “strengthen U.S.-Afghan ties to help ensure Afghanistan’s long-term security” so as to facilitate “common efforts to cooperate in the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The allies agreed to “organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan forces” and “continue intelligence sharing” among other initiatives.
To be sure, Karzai’s need for the U.S. military to balance rising insurgent violence pushed the “mercurial leader” closer toward Bush and facilitated their ability to work together (enhanced cohesion). However, Karzai was eager to collaborate also because he recognized that the alliance—and U.S. leverage and largesse that came along with it—was a key asset to solidifying his political power and influence, both short- and long-term. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system (options were being weighed at the time) that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his power/influence.

Following Afghanistan’s 2005 Parliamentary elections, the threat remained. Insurgent attacks increased by nearly approximately 300 percent through 2006 and a CIA assessment that year said the insurgency was a greater threat “than at any point since late 2001.” In response, U.S./Afghan officials began to “openly ask” just “how long the regime could survive,” recognized that more resources were needed to balance the insurgents, and agreed that to do so the Afghan Army should further increase in size and effectiveness. As a result and with “few other countries” willing to contribute, the U.S. was “compelled to invest substantially more of its own troops and considerably more funds to stem the Taliban tide.” This included transferring $2 billion in weapons and armaments to the Afghan army beginning in 2006.

Karzai’s need for U.S. resources to balance unrelenting violence pushed him to collaborate with the great power to implement joint operations against insurgent forces and agree to the “Afghanistan Compact” in 2006. The Compact outlined a strategy to
decrease political violence in order to “contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security” and the allies’ agreement to: increase the Army’s size; allow Afghanistan to take more “ownership” of the Army and Police; and to focus efforts on “building lasting Afghan capacity” in the security sector. Partly due to mounting U.S. concern about (passive) bandwagoning by regime elements, the Compact also included efforts to “combat corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability.” Even though Karzai’s central regime and particular Army elements initially cooperated with the U.S. to implement the Compact and military operations to balance insurgents, other regime components were at the same time diverting resources and aiding insurgents (passively bandwagoning) or turning their weapons on and killing regime forces (actively bandwagoning) in “green on blue” attacks.

In spite of continued military assistance and alliance efforts to quell violence, at the end of Bush’s term and as Barack Obama prepared to take office “nearly all indicators of progress” were “trending downward,” “al-Qaeda remained active,” the “Taliban were spreading their wings,” and “suicide bombings terrorized Kabul.” At this point, Karzai recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election in 2009 he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively bandwagoning). Karzai’s prioritizing his interests and power (over the Afghan national interest) and simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning to secure his interests started in the twilight of Bush’s second term and metastasized during Obama’s presidency.
Linked to Obama’s campaign pledge that cast Afghanistan as a “war of necessity” and responding to an escalating threat, the U.S. conducted two reviews of its Afghanistan strategy and associated military tactics. These shared a similar conclusion as distilled by one of their final reports: “the overall situation is deteriorating” as the insurgency is “resilient and growing.” The U.S. recognized that it needed to adjust alliance strategy accordingly; however, its core policy-makers had two competing views on preferred alliance strategy. On one side, members of the U.S. military argued the alliance could fail unless Taliban momentum was reversed with a “comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy” that required a “surge” of 44,000 additional troops based on the premise that if the U.S. retained its current strategy of “chasing terrorists in remote valleys” the “Taliban would continue to seize more territory” and “if insurgents toppled Karzai’s government, it would open the door for al Qaeda’s return.” Securing U.S. interests required reaching the point “where the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the state.” On the other side, policy-makers argued the U.S. should secure its objectives through “Counter Terror-Plus”: Special Forces attacks onto terrorists combined with growing/training the ANA. They would eventually select the former.

In the midst of and informing this strategy debate, reflecting a decline in cohesion, and Karzai’s turn to fully prioritizing his regime’s political prospects over what was best for Afghanistan’s national interest, the U.S. was increasingly skeptical if Karzai was reliable as an alliance partner and asking: “Could we live with this situation for another presidential term? Did the international community have a solid interlocutor in the presidential palace?” And in answering these questions, the U.S. “had serious doubts.” In a 2008 cable to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, U.S. Ambassador to
Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry listed six reasons why the surge/COIN would not be successful including that “Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner” and “continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden” including sacking corrupt officials.\textsuperscript{53} Citing further concerns with the Karzai regime, he said in a later cable that a “credible partner in Kabul” was required for the COIN strategy but a “variable” he lacked confidence in.\textsuperscript{54}

In contrast to the Karzai regime’s view before the 2004 elections (close collaboration with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime power) in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election it viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to winning and consolidating power for the long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that Karzai “combat corruption” within this regime (curb passive bandwagoning) to ensure proper use of alliance resources and bolster Afghan state capacity.\textsuperscript{55} For Karzai, appointing (“corrupt”) clients to regime positions, turning a blind-eye to their diversion of alliance funds, and himself using regime monies (alliance or non-alliance) as patronage were vital to garnering support sufficient to win. Alliance strategy called for the central regime to curb these forms of bandwagoning because doing so was in the better interests of Afghanistan writ large; however, for Karzai doing so was contrary to what would facilitate remaining in power. Consequently, as the election approached the regime violated these aspects of alliance strategy in order to grease the wheels of its get out the vote machine and in doing so hindered cohesion and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{56}

As reflected in a classified version of U.S. Afghanistan strategy at the time, Karzai’s actions were not lost on the U.S., which viewed him as a liability to securing American interests: “The implication is clear: Karzai is not our man in this upcoming election.”\textsuperscript{57} Doubting whether another five years with Karzai as president would best
position the U.S. to secure its interests, the U.S. quietly urged other (more pro-U.S.) candidates to run against Karzai.\textsuperscript{58} News of these U.S. actions soon reached and incensed Karzai, who accused the U.S. of a “British-American plot” to oust him from office.\textsuperscript{59} After the U.S. recognized that its push to promote alternate candidates was futile, it shifted support back to Karzai, who eventually was declared the winner in the 2009 presidential contest.\textsuperscript{60}

The consequences for alliance dynamics of events surrounding the election were palpable: “Even as Obama committed far more resources to Afghanistan in his first two years in office than Bush did over eight years in two terms, the Afghan leader grew convinced that the new U.S. president was out to get him. \textit{He began to fear for his political survival} [emphasis mine].”\textsuperscript{61} The U.S. no longer viewed Karzai as a reliable ally and Karzai no longer viewed the partnership as serving his interests but, instead, as a direct challenge to them.

Reflecting the continued need to preserve Karzai’s regime, however, the COIN alliance strategy rolled out in full after the 2009 elections sought to “deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.”\textsuperscript{62} Deploying 30,000 additional troops to fight with and train regime Army/Police to “reverse the Taliban momentum,” demonstrated the U.S. continued need to safeguard the regime and, as Obama said in 2009, “seize the initiative.”\textsuperscript{63}

Having secured re-election, however, the Karzai regime’s willingness to work with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly. No longer relying on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, “Karzai was finally free to be Karzai,” a former U.S. diplomat said, and “it wasn’t long before his behavior toward the coalition would
Like its position vis-à-vis the 2006 Compact, the Karzai regime viewed aspects of the COIN strategy as potential threats to its political interests; specifically, the tactic of building “more credible” institutions at the subnational level and in so doing supplanting the patron-client power relationships vital to maintaining his power. Even though a high threat level remained and should arguably have pushed the allies closer (and thus divergent from cohesion of traditional alliances) Karzai’s regime “was not a willing partner in America’s grand plans” and began to openly disagree with alliance strategy and take actions contrary to the Afghan national interest.

The rift between the U.S. and Karzai’s central regime had by November 2012 grown so wide that the *Wall Street Journal* editorialized: “Afghanistan is now a two-front war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a bitter political rift with the Afghan president.” This encapsulates alliance dynamics at this juncture and the distinct characteristics of internal threat alliances: regime components were working with the U.S. in its “military struggle” to balance the insurgents, while other actors in the same regime (including Karzai himself) were engaged in bandwagoning to further their political/personal agendas.

Through Obama’s first term and the period examined here, alliance effectiveness was moderate to low. In spite of $US billions in resources pooled through its alliance with the Karzai regime, the threat from an active insurgency remained. In sum, two factors (among others) hindered the allies’ ability to lessen the internal threat. First, the alliance did not sufficiently increase the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in size and effectiveness. And second, the Karzai regime did not curb bandwagoning by actors within his regime; what is more, his central regime itself engaged in bandwagoning. For
descriptions of the variation in level of threat and how capabilities did not sufficiently strengthen the Afghan security forces, see relevant Appendices at the end of this dissertation.

II. **Core Differences Between Internal and External Threat Alliances**

Having provided an overview of the alliance period, this core section draws specific examples from the case to demonstrate the ways in which internal threat alliances differ from external threat alliances in the following four areas: (1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align, (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. The core section is divided into four sub-sections—one each for these four elements.

1. **First Core Difference - Nature of Threat / Why States Align: Internal Threat / To Ensure Regime Survival and Great Power Interests**

The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the nature of the threat and core factor motivating the formation of internal threat alliances is distinct from that in traditional alliances. In traditional (external threat alliances), states form alliances in response to a threat *external in origin* (another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole. Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to align is their need to preserve security and the national interest, defined in terms of power and territorial survival.
In contrast, internal threat alliances stem from some threat *domestic in origin* to a *regime* that an outside country cares about. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the *regime’s survival*. The regime aligns because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability.

To evidence this core difference, the section shows that the threat spurring the U.S.- Afghanistan alliance consisted of a high level of political violence including but not limited to internal war: both the threat to regime survival (physical and political) posed by non-state actors including insurgents mounting campaigns and the consequences such conflict poses for other actors (namely great powers) in the international system. And to demonstrate the distinct motivation underlying internal threat alliances, this section shows that the *core factor underlying U.S./Afghanistan alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it*. It demonstrates that particularly by 2002 the great power and the regime had formed an alliance based on a *common* threat from *within* the weaker state: the Karzai administration needed military and economic capabilities to balance threats from insurgents and remain in power, while the U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch attacks. To safeguard these interests, it needed to make sure its ally regime did not fall. The table below provides a summary of these motivations disaggregated by presidential administration.
### Table 3. U.S.-Afghanistan – Internal Threat Alliance Formation

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<td>2001-2008 (AFG):</td>
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<td>Karzai (US):</td>
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### A. Profile of the Internal Threat: Insurgents Imperiling Regime Survival and U.S. Interests

The threat that spurred the U.S. and Afghanistan to bring their security policies into close cooperation and begin pooling resources consisted of political violence from insurgents that imperiled regime survival (physical and political) and the consequences such instability and regime failure posed to U.S. interests.

This political violence can be disaggregated into two periods. The first is the period of internal war (mid-1990s through 2001) that enabled Al-Qaeda to carry out the 9/11 attacks (reviewed above in the Historical Overview section) and witnessed the advent of insurgent or militia actors that re-merged after the alliance onset and attempted to topple Karzai’s regime. The second period and focus of this case includes the continuation of and escalation in political violence after Karzai came to power, when insurgent groups returned to Afghanistan to topple and replace the regime with a “more Islamic” state.

In sum, three sets of actors emerged from and through these periods of conflict that fomented political violence and imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1)
insurgent groups of Afghan and foreign fighters aiming to overthrow the Karzai regime and rout foreign forces including the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, and Al-Qaeda, among others; (2) factional militias controlled by regional “warlords” who used violence to control “subnational fiefdoms” and associated power; and (3) narco-criminal bands who exploited a weak (and pliable) government to traffic opium in Afghanistan. Militias and narco-criminal elements generated violence but were not the alliance’s main focus. For the purpose of this analysis, then, the principal threat to the U.S./Afghanistan is what I broadly refer to as “insurgent forces.”

i. The Insurgent Threat

After Karzai was named Interim President, various insurgent outfits that had regrouped in Pakistan began to re-enter Afghan territory and mount attacks against the regime. Collectively, the insurgents comprised “a xenophobic, anti-secular, anti-Western, ethno-linguistically Pashtun opposition.” The belligerents lacked a common command structure or unified ideology but “maintained a radical Islamist line” and shared a core overlapping objective: to jettison foreign forces from Afghanistan and overthrow the Karzai regime in order to replace it with a “more Islamic” regime (the Taliban’s motive) or recover “occupied” Muslim territory (Al-Qaeda’s desire).

While insurgents attacked the regime, the aforementioned regional powerbrokers engaged by the alliance to maintain stability were also churning up violence. These warlords were concerned primarily with increasing their power/influence rather than alliance objectives, and used these resources not to dampen political violence but instead act with “contempt for the government and its international backers” and “create further mayhem in the countryside.”
Collaborating with belligerents and corrupt regime actors, drug-traffickers increased the production and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan and in so doing indirectly endangered regime survival by providing insurgents with an additional source of financing. The Taliban and others relied on opium-related revenues for 70 percent of operational costs, leading the allies to conclude that Afghanistan’s opium trade “fueled the Taliban insurgency.”

In sum, brazen attacks, assassination attempts, and other forms of violence and illicit activity carried out by insurgents and warlord militias (and enabled by drug money) endangered the regime’s survival. Lacking the military/economic resources necessary to maintain its hold on power, the Karzai regime aligned and then worked with the U.S. to obtain capabilities necessary to do so.

B. WHY THE U.S. AND AFGHANISTAN ALIGNED: TO SAFEGUARD THE REGIME AND U.S. INTERESTS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH

Responding to the threat profile outlined above, the U.S. and Afghanistan brought their security policies into close cooperation to balance against the threats each state perceived from a surge in Afghanistan’s internal violence. And as demonstrated through the discussion below, why the great power and the regime aligned was clear and in accordance with the core motivations for formation of internal threat alliances. For the Karzai regime, insurgents generated violence that threatened its survival and hold on political power. Without sufficient capabilities to balance the threat, the regime sought U.S. assistance. For the U.S., these groups threatened their ally’s survival and sowed instability that could enable terrorist organizations to again use Afghanistan as a staging ground for future attacks as well as imperiled American access to Eurasian energy stores. Therefore, the U.S. had an interest in helping amass capabilities to weaken the insurgents and ensure
regime survival. For the U.S., insurgents threatened their ally’s survival and sowed instability that imperiled two strategic imperatives related to Afghanistan that drove alignment.

First, Afghanistan is located amidst energy-rich polities and is a transit point for moving gas and oil stores from Eurasia to the U.S. market. Recognizing this, the U.S. has since the 1990s sought to construct an oil/gas pipeline across Afghanistan to reduce U.S. dependence on Arab oil and forego using Iranian or Russian pipelines in the region. By jeopardizing U.S. ability to do so, and making it harder to extract other resources from Afghanistan, political violence there hinders its ability to reduce dependence on Gulf oil.

The second and more primary reason that Afghanistan is strategically important to the U.S. is that it served as a staging ground for terrorist organizations (namely Al-Qaeda) to attack American interests and territory. Instability within Afghanistan as an enabler for attacks onto U.S. interests increasingly became a threat in 1996, when the Taliban government allowed Al-Qaeda to establish training camps in its territory. From its base there and as part of its global jihad, Al-Qaeda recruited and trained members as well as implemented attacks against U.S. targets across the globe including Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (1998), a U.S. Navy destroyer stationed in Yemen’s port of Aden (2000), and the attacks on 9/11.

In addition to killing 2,753 U.S. residents, the 9/11 attacks wrought damage and destruction that sapped American resources and capabilities including but not limited to: $55 billion in physical damage, $123 billion in lost economic opportunities and business devaluations, and a six day closure of the New York Stock Exchange. As facilitated by Afghanistan’s “ungoverned spaces” (and pliable Taliban regime) Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts
represented a threat to the U.S. because they killed American civilians and destroyed U.S. military installations and strategic assets at home and abroad. Continued instability within Afghanistan generated by political violence, then, represented a threat to U.S. interests and needed to be balanced.

Both before and after Karzai was named Interim President—and thus marking the start to his regime—political violence as enabling instability that could facilitate terrorism represented a threat to the U.S. After Karzai assumed power, however, U.S. ability to balance this threat became intimately linked to his regime’s survival. As insurgent attacks onto the regime increased from 2003 onward, then, so too did the risk to U.S. interests. As discussed below, political violence perpetrated by insurgents endangered the regime’s survival and U.S. interests. Due to these strategic considerations, the U.S. had an interest in aligning with the regime to weaken the insurgents and ensure its survival.

i. George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance Terrorism

Statements by U.S. President Bush and his foreign policy team concerning America’s engagement in Afghanistan and alignment with the Karzai regime clearly demonstrate that the core factor motivating the great power to align was to balance perceived threats stemming from instability in the Central Asian state. In order to prevent another 9/11 the U.S. needed to make sure Afghanistan was stable and devoid of “safe havens” terrorists could use to launch attacks, and preserving the Karzai regime’s survival was required to do so. As a senior official serving in the first Bush administration told me in an interview: “we knew terrorists could use those mountains/valleys to launch attacks and to make sure it didn’t happen, Karzai needed to be able to stand up; we needed to make sure he didn’t fall back down.”
Reflecting this threat perception, Bush on October 7, 2001 explained the motivation for U.S. “carefully targeted actions” in Afghanistan as “designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.” In doing so, the U.S. would “make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.” Further to this point, Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, summarized the threat to the U.S. and the strategy it should pursue to balance it as not only “capturing people and holding them accountable” but “removing the sanctuaries, the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism.”

Propping up the Karzai regime was crucial to removing safe havens terrorists could use to attack the homeland. As the U.S. National Security Strategy for 2002 holds, the U.S. was “threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” and therefore needed to make sure the regime sitting atop the Afghan polity did not crumble. This core incentive for U.S. alignment remained relatively constant through the end of Bush’s two terms. The 2005 State Department counterterrorism strategy holds, for example, that “denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively” and therefore is why the U.S. in Afghanistan “is helping to build a safe, stable society” that “eliminates an environment in which terrorist groups have flourished.” Similarly, the March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states that the U.S. “must deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror” and goes on to state regarding Afghanistan specifically that:

The terrorists’ goal is to overthrow a rising democracy; claim a strategic country as a haven for terror…and strike America…with ever-increasing violence. This is why success in Afghanistan is vital, and why we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas.
The continued need to safeguard Karzai’s regime to mitigate future terrorist attacks is reflected in Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2008 statement regarding the U.S.-Afghan alliance: “All future success will hinge on the defeat of the extremists and the terrorists who want to pull this country back to the dark ages…the commitment of the United States is firm and unshakable.”

A senior U.S. official who served in the second Bush administration and was involved in Afghanistan policy echoed this statement when he told me in an interview that “like it or not, we needed to keep him [Karzai] stable. He was “our man” in Kabul, and routing terrorists meant we needed to keep him/his people alive.”

Various statements by the Karzai regime demonstrate that it aligned in order to obtain capabilities needed to thwart attacks from insurgents and remain in power. When asked about the importance of U.S. engagement in 2002, for example, he noted that “the cost of the U.S. not staying committed is too high” and that without continued U.S. capabilities “Afghanistan could slide back into lawlessness and anarchy.” He lacked a national army to combat increasingly active insurgents and depended on “international security forces in Kabul to stay in power.” Absent reliable body guards and with a fragmented Defense Ministry (elements of which, discussed below, lusted after his seat), in July 2002 Karzai asked the U.S. to replace his Afghan protectors with U.S. Special Forces. That Karzai relied on the great power’s soldiers for his personal security detail “was a stark reminder of this weakness.” Without security forces to thwart attacks, the regime relied on U.S. capabilities devoted to the alliance to balance the threat. This remained relatively constant through 2005 when Karzai said, after being asked what would transpire should U.S. forces leave, that his country would “go back immediately to chaos” and would “not make it as a sovereign, independent nation able to stand on its own feet.”
And this continued through the end of Bush’s second term. Through 2007 Karzai was “heavily” dependent on the U.S. presence “for his safety and consolidation of his government” and in a 2008 press conference with Bush said his regime needed “to continue our cooperation” with the U.S. “until we have defeated terrorism and extremism and the threat that emanates from them to us.” Afghanistan, he said, would “not allow the international community to leave before…we are strong enough to defend our country.” There was “no way” his regime could “let [the U.S.] go” before “we have taken from President Bush and the next administration billions and billions of more dollars.” Though this statement reportedly drew laughter from the crowd in the Afghan presidential palace, it is indicative of how the regime’s survival continued to depend on its great power ally and therefore underscores the core factor motivating its decision to align.

ii. Barack H. Obama (2008-2012) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance Terrorism

“We will prevent the Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven from which international terrorists can strike at us or our allies. This would pose a direct threat to the American homeland, and that is a threat that we cannot tolerate.” – President Barack Obama, December 2009

The Obama administration’s threat perception and associated motivation for (continued) alignment with the Karzai regime was like that of Bush. Soon after assuming office, Obama stated that the U.S. objective in Afghanistan remained to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda” and to “prevent their return in the future” and that the Karzai regime’s survival was vital to achieving this objective: “If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.” This view is further evidenced in comments made by James Jones, Obama’s National Security Advisor, who said in June 2009 that “If we’re not successful here…you’ll have a staging base for
global terrorism all over the world.”100 These core motivations for U.S. alignment are formally reflected in the 2009 “Terms Sheet” outlining the Obama administration’s U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan:

The United States goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government [emphasis added]. The strategic concept for the United States…is to degrade the Taliban insurgency while building sufficient Afghan capacity to secure and govern their country…This approach is tied more tightly to the core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating Al Qaeda and preventing al Qaeda’s return to safe havens in Afghanistan.101

The U.S. need to safeguard Karzai’s regime against overthrow in order to guard against safe havens informed Obama’s decision to escalate the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through two “surges” in force deployments: 17,000 troops before Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential elections and a further 30,000 soon thereafter, bringing the total to more than 100,000 by 2010.102 As described by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, safeguarding Karzai’s regime also guided use of non-military alliance capabilities devoted to “stabilizing” the country: “The goal of our assistance…is to create the conditions for a more stable, democratic government capable of resisting attempts by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups from returning and establishing safe havens from which to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.”103 Insurgents posed direct and indirect threats to U.S. national security and needed to be weakened or defeated.

The Karzai regime’s core motivation for aligning with the U.S. remained analogous from the Bush to Obama administrations: to secure capabilities he lacked yet were required to ensure his regime’s political survival. Speaking at a press conference with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2009, for example, Karzai said there was a “realism on our part that it will be some time before Afghanistan is able to sustain its security forces entirely on its own.”104
In this section I demonstrated that the U.S. and Afghanistan aligned in response to high levels of political violence and that the core factor underlying this alignment was the need to ensure regime survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. This is distinct from traditional alliances, where states align to balance threats from other states (or disruptions in power) and do so to preserve territorial security and the national interest. The following section examines the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances.

2. SECOND CORE DIFFERENCE - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAKER ALLY: MAJOR INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING INTERESTS

The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the characteristics of the allies involved in internal threat alliances are distinct from states that form traditional military alliances. External threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal fragmentation; however, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation. Given that the U.S. is a great power, its internal cohesiveness can be assumed. Focusing on the weaker ally’s characteristics, then, this sub-section demonstrates that its major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct from great powers in traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions in the internal threat alliance.

First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the
specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

In sum, the section demonstrates that the U.S. was dealing not with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with essentially cohesive states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a fragmented central regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components therein, and other subnational actors, each with their respective interests.

A. THE AFGHAN ALLY: FRAGMENTED REGIME, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING INTERESTS

In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, Afghanistan lacks strong institutions, firm control over those agencies that exist, or a writ that extends throughout its complex topography. This lower level of development is rooted in a state formation process plagued by external intervention and subnational factions competing for power. As a result of its geopolitically-advantageous location, for centuries Afghanistan was the “playground” for the “Great Game” fought between Russia and Britain. Through this period Afghanistan became a “rentier state” whose central regime relied on largesse from great powers to maintain internal order and balance demands from ethnic groups and “elite, patronage-based networks” competing for power and influence. Due to this combination of invasion and insufficient attempts (or resources) to standup a robust government, Afghanistan’s central state became “defined more in its relation to outside players and the negotiation of a complex web of kinship-based patronage than any
internally generated sense of national unity among the ethnic, national, and tribal units within its borders.\textsuperscript{106}

Despite external and internal challenges, Afghanistan’s rulers over the course of decades developed central agencies charged with maintaining a monopoly on the use of force. In doing so and driven by their core desire to maximize power/influence, rulers endeavored to centralize authority in the capital (and executive office) and establish sway over outlying areas. However, they were able to “consolidate their power” at the national level only by “playing [ethno-regional] groups against each other” and even then control over territory remained “precarious.”\textsuperscript{107} In some respects, the Bonn agreement sought to strike a balance between prior attempts\textsuperscript{108} to consolidate authority by constructing central institutions reflecting Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic make-up while devolving some authority to subnational (mainly provincial) actors; however, efforts thereafter related to fleshing out institutional protocols and funding streams arguably re-balanced authority in favor of the center.\textsuperscript{109} The 2004 constitution further consolidated central (presidential) authority. Despite these and other efforts to centralize power, though, deeply imbedded competing loyalties and “tribal and religious resistance to central government authority” continued to make central control of subnational areas feeble.\textsuperscript{110}

The products of this stylized synopsis of Afghanistan’s state formation process relevant to alliance dynamics would be three-fold—first, bureaucratic agencies that were weak, corrupt, and did not always act to advance the regime’s interests, and a central regime that could not control their actions; second, a fragmented nation characterized by subnational systems of political and economic power, the regime actors in which prioritized \textit{their} interests (patron-client, survival, or a share in the spoils of victory) over the central
regime (and eventually alliance strategy); and third, a central regime tightly entangled in these elite-based, ethno-regional patronage networks that strongly informed its decisions and actions, particularly related to alliance dynamics. In sum, these three products of state formation meant that the state under Karzai was “on the whole an empty shell occupied by forces which claim to be acting in the name of the state but are in fact pursuing their own ends, whether individual, familial, tribal or ethnic.”\textsuperscript{111} The characteristics of the central regime and its component parts are described further below.

For the period examined, Afghanistan’s central regime was comprised of the President and his Cabinet.\textsuperscript{112} These actors worked with the U.S. to align their security polices and agree to alliance strategy and tactics. Analogous to peripheral states needing to form internal threat alliances, the central regime can be conceptualized as “neopatrimonial” wherein the leader “maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than ideology or law and” occupies their office “less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status.”\textsuperscript{113} To remain in power and maximize influence Afghan leaders must appease regionally-based ethnic-patron networks and use the spoils of government to do so: the “matters and resources of state” are “treated by the ruler as his personal affair.”\textsuperscript{114} Since the 2004 constitution, the Executive has been one of the more powerful branches of government. In his dual role as head-of-state and commander-in-chief, the president formulates (and can quickly alter) foreign and defense policy and appoint (or can remove) governors and ministers. As applied to alliance dynamics, the regime’s core motivations meant Karzai’s decisions on policy/strategy were linked to the option that would best augment his influence; and presidential authority enabled him to change these policies quickly and as needed, to secure these interests.
The core bureaucratic agencies involved in devising alliance strategy and carrying out agreed tactics “in the field” were the Ministries of Interior and Defense—and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) they oversee, respectively. Provincial governors are relevant in so far as they control ANP forces and oversee government agencies in their area of authority.\(^\text{115}\) Technically, Executive authority should include sway over agency policies and actions. Analogous to peripheral states and a core factor that enables simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning, however, Afghanistan’s level of development and political history combined to grant them greater autonomy in terms of policy planning and activities. As former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Dr. Robert Finn told me in an interview: “Karzai was President and people in and out of government and throughout the regions recognized that, but then did what they wanted.”\(^\text{116}\) In prioritizing their interests and instead of unshakably implementing central regime guidance, regime agencies “defend[ed] their bureaucratic turf” and aimed “first to preserve the interests of stakeholders, which usually center on patron-client relations.”\(^\text{117}\)

In addition to this *de facto* autonomy from the central regime, Afghanistan’s particular political context further fragments agencies’ *internal* structures to in essence yield Ministries consisting of various *component parts*. Competing loyalties to ethno-regional fealties that permeate Afghan society and institutions create factions *within* regime agencies in general and security forces (Army and Police) particularly. These can be viewed as sub-components of the key ministries and is particularly pronounced in the armed forces: “With ethnic frictions and political factionalism undercutting institutional loyalty” the army “remains a fragmented force” that serves “disparate interests.”\(^\text{118}\) As summarized by an Afghan security official, “you do not have a *national* army or a *national*...
police” but rather a “factionalized army and police” that “are fighting for their factions, not the country.” Rather than pursuing alliance objectives, the security forces (from Ministers to lower officers) were “little more than pawns in an elaborate game of chess between multiple regional powerbrokers.” Leveraging this de facto autonomy from the central regime, the Military and Police (and sub-components therein) throughout the alliance took actions to pursue their primary interests and not alliance goals: “Despite the billions of dollars spent, the army’s expansion is likely to yield diminishing returns because of the government’s failure to check ethnic factionalism, with senior military commanders, backed by powerbrokers, engaged in dangerous political rivalries.”

In sum, the regime’s fragmented character meant that agencies (and components therein) leveraged autonomy and made decisions (and used government resources) to advance their personal interests—maximize resources flowing into their coffers, solidify patronage ties, or to benefit their ethnic kin—over alliance goals. What is more, the further intra-fragmentation of regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency components (Police unit A, for example) may be balancing the threat, but others (Police unit B, for instance) could simultaneously be bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to understanding external threat alliances, the great power had to juggle dynamics between the central regime and a menagerie of agencies in order to secure its interests. This fragmented character enabled various regime actors to influence alliance dynamics in general and to simultaneously balance/bandwagon particularly.

B. CLIENTELISM: COMPETING LOYALTIES

“In Afghanistan, patron-client relationships are key to power and regime actors prioritized them over alliance goals.”

Various scholars of Central Asian politics have documented patron-client relations (clientelism) in Afghanistan and its effect onto the nation’s politics, governance, and
economic development. A full review of these texts is beyond the scope of this chapter and marginal to its central analysis; however, a brief outline of the root causes and main manifestations of clientelism (relevant to influencing actions by regime elements) in Afghanistan is necessary in order to demonstrate its impact onto alliance dynamics.

Rather than any sense of or allegiance to a national identity, Afghans’ “primary loyalty” has always been to their “own kin, village, tribe, or ethnic group” (“Qawn”), ethno-factional “solidarity groups” generally concentrated in a particular subnational region. These patron-client networks with associated motivations permeated (and continue to) agencies and associated actions and “regularly trumped any loyalty to the central state or national interest.” In so far as regime actors affiliated with (and loyal to) an ethno-regional network run the regime’s agencies, these political institutions were and “remain deeply rooted in Afghan cultural values and social organizations”, and actors therein prioritized these fealties over the national interest or other considerations. Concurrent with consolidation of subnational power bases rooted in these allegiances, attempts by Afghan rulers’ to establish control outside the capitol laid a foundation for patronage-based power dynamics between the center (Kabul) and periphery (subnational regions) where in the latter “concepts of patriotism, citizenship, or indeed any sense of political obligation to the state was almost entirely absent.”

During the Soviet occupation, the contours of patron-client relations changed in two ways. First, aligning with an outside power “to obtain resources to solidify local power bases, only to then contravene that agreement,” was institutionalized. Second, the center-periphery disconnect was solidified and “the collapse of a functioning central government led to the formation of parallel power structures at the local level, often headed by local
commanders.” By the late 1990s such “regional and ethnic power brokers had emerged that stood in opposition to Kabul-based elite” and acted to advance the power/influence of their competing elite networks. This laid a foundation for inter-elite network competition that later dominated Afghan politics. As the Soviet-based regime crumbled, Afghanistan consisted of a central regime that needed to cement power and to do so employed great power-provided patronage to gain favor with and control subnational power brokers; and an array of regional powerbrokers who sought not to serve the center but, instead, solidify and expand their subnational power bases. After international actors routed the Taliban, the scope and manifestation of patron-client relations morphed further.

The Bonn Agreement altered the power dynamics of clientelism by mandating space for representatives of competing networks (and their opposing interests) within government/regime positions and agencies relevant to the alliance. As the Interim regime took shape, two broad “political constructed ethno-regional” networks “principally defined along ethnic lines” emerged to compete for power and influence within the state: a broad patchwork assembly of former Northern Alliance commanders and the other headed by Hamid Karzai. The “distribution of government ministries on the basis of a spectrum of political representation” essentially “resulted in the establishment of ethnic fiefdoms in the ministries that quickly set up networks of nepotism, bribery and corruption.” Instead of establishing a viable form of administrative government, then, the Bonn agreement “set into motion a fierce internal competition between different elites within the government” with bureaucratic agencies (and parts therein) motivated principally to serve patron-client ties based in such elite networks. The resources introduced via the U.S.-Karzai alliance swelled the revenues and thus patronage (influence) these elite networks could compete for
to divert and distribute as patronage to actors in exchange for their support and associated influence.\textsuperscript{135} This influx of alliance monies also enlarged the pool of resources insurgents could extort from subnational officials and further incentivized attempting to press regime elements to bandwagon.

The detailed trajectory of Afghanistan’s variant of clientelism aside, this process yielded two products that pushed regime actors to choose patron-client relations over loyalty to the national interest (and thus subnational bandwagoning over balancing) during the alliance and are directly relevant to examining its dynamics. First, it firmly entrenched prioritizing increasing power/influence over alliance goals (or the national interest) and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “Rather than thinking of…effective or enabling decisive decision-making, Afghans consider all their actions in terms of kinship, patronage networks, and the complex society of which they are a part.”\textsuperscript{136} And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national interest. Where in Colombia alternative fealties generated subnational “political archipelagoes,” in Afghanistan these created at any given time over the alliance period “sub-state political communities” (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009), “micro-societies of tribal power” (Sharan 2011), or “de facto states controlled by regional power-holders” (Wilder and Listed 2011).\textsuperscript{137} These subnational bases of power arguably approximate the “subsystems” Rosenau (1964) argued IR scholars must problematize when examining the link between political violence and international relations and comprise a mix of the elite-based networks fused with government positions and the “local leaders and ethnic regional strongmen” that are “resistant to the project of building a nation-state” whose power is
based on “financial and military strength, as well as personal, factional and historical
loyalties”\textsuperscript{138}

In sum, Afghanistan was a fragmented nation characterized by subnational bases of
political/economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime actors to contravene
central regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. In line with this distinct
characteristics of internal threat alliances, and as the following section on bandwagoning
further demonstrates, it was not two generally cohesive states working together (as in
traditional alliances), but a great power dealing with multiple actors of a fragmented weak
regime (agencies, components therein, and powerbrokers within subnational state-lets) that
each had competing interests. Sometimes they prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned;
other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced.

3. **Third Core Difference – Why and When Allies Bandwagon:**

**Simultaneous with Balancing and Motivated by Fear, Profit, and Patron-Client Relations**

The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that because of the weaker ally’s
internal fragmentation “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances is distinct in
manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances.

In traditional alliances, countries either balance (resist threats) or bandwagon
(appease threats) when faced with an external enemy. Driven by the core motivation to
preserve the national interest and territorial survival, states bandwagon with the threat
either to ensure survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition (“for profit”).

By contrast, with internal threat alliances the peripheral ally’s weak character
means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result,
balancing and bandwagoning can occur *simultaneously*: the central regime may work with
the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances).

Through the period examined, regime actors in the capital or subnational areas including police, military, governors, or central regime actors contravened alliance strategy and bandwagoned in order to survive, share in the spoils of victory, or to maximize their power/influence (as rooted in patron-client relations). Distinct to internal threat alliances, even as the great power and central regime collaborated to balance insurgents and narco-traffickers, that regime’s agencies (and component parts therein) were simultaneously bandwagoning with these actors. The discussion below demonstrates that balancing and bandwagoning occur simultaneously in internal threat alliances and provides examples of bandwagoning motivated by all three factors.

i. Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources

As part of their repertoire of action aimed at toppling the regime, insurgents threatened civilian (governors and their staff, for example) and security sector (national police officers, in many cases) regime actors to the point where they agreed to collude with the insurgents in order to survive. This bandwagoning took many forms yet two manifestations (both active) were most prominent: first, Army or Police components defected to the insurgents to save their lives or their families’; and second, insurgents extorted regime actors by forcing them to give up alliance resources (money, arms, etc.) in exchange for living or permission to operate in a given area.
Representative of security force defections as a form of bandwagoning to survive, in response to “the threat of death” from insurgents in July 2008 various police officers in Nuristan and Farayab provinces “defected” to the Taliban in order to save their own lives or those of their families’ lives.\textsuperscript{139} Instances of extortion by insurgents were more widespread (or regularly reported) than security force defections to survive and include, for example, a Jalalabad provincial official paying the Taliban ($2,000 to $4,000) monthly in exchange for the group not killing him and his family. As the official recounted: “We pay so they don’t kill us. And the Taliban are happy with the sum and leave us alone.”\textsuperscript{140} As a U.S. official who worked in Paktika province told me in an interview: “government officials’ survival relied on keeping the Taliban satisfied, and that often meant giving them what they wanted—money.”\textsuperscript{141} Similar bandwagoning to survive occurred in Kandahar, as a Senior U.S. official who worked there told me: “Provincial officials were holding money and skimming it off of the top. They had to give a cut to who held that territory (Taliban or other insurgents) to make sure they survived.”\textsuperscript{142} Much the same occurred in Kunar province, where “insurgents pushed local government officials to give them a cut of resources used in their area” under “threat to them and their families.” It was “abundantly clear” that “insurgents were extorting government officials.”\textsuperscript{143} And in Nangahar, regime representatives did “what was necessary to stay alive” and this often “was opposite to what was agreed at the center and involved colluding with the opposition.”\textsuperscript{144} In addition to threatening and forcing regime representatives to hand over alliance monies to survive, insurgents targeted foreign organizations working with (and viewed as an extension of) regime actors. As a U.S. military official who worked in Helmand province told me, these actors “paid the Taliban in order to prevent attacks on their
workforce” and there was “no doubt money was making its way into opposition hands and
buying weapons for them to use against us.” 145 Insurgents pressing actors to bandwagon in
this manner swelled to the point where the Taliban established an office in Kabul to receive
such payments in exchange for “clearance” to work in an area. 146 In Kandahar, this “fee for
survival,” as one interviewee dubbed it, ranged from 10 to 20 percent of an alliance activity
budget. 147 A separate investigation concluded that “handing cash out to insurgents to keep
them from attacking projects was a common practice.” 148 “Like their co-conspirators in the
Afghan government,” another analysis concluded, “the insurgents learned how to score
U.S. taxpayer money for their own purposes.” 149 150
Regime actors were actively
bandwagoning by diverting alliance capabilities to insurgents who used said monies to fund
anti-regime operations. After insurgents extorted funds from regime actors and
organizations working on a construction project, for example, they used them to purchase
weapons then used against alliance forces. 150

International and regime representatives corroborated that this form of active
bandwagoning occurred throughout Afghanistan. As a senior ISAF official who managed
such funds told me in an interview in Kabul, “we were under the illusion that increasing
resources would reduce violence in some areas” but instead “the opposite happened and in
many cases the number of violent attacks actually increased because insurgents were
extorting funds and then using them against us.” 151 Senior U.S. representatives were also
aware of this active bandwagoning. A report to the U.S. Congress indicated that funds paid
to the Taliban for “security” (safe passage through a given area) were “a significant source
of funding for the insurgents.” 152 Secretary of State Clinton said in 2009 testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Committee that “siphoning off contractual money from the
international community” is a “major source of funding for the Taliban.” The U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan came to a similar conclusion: “American and coalition dollars help finance the Taliban. And with more development, higher traffic on roads, and more troops, the Taliban would make more money.” And the UN, as reflected in comments by its Kabul-based Representative, came to analogous suppositions: “Money disappears into the hands of wealthy Afghans” and was paid “to the Taliban to ensure safe passage”

Non-governmental officials and the insurgents themselves also substantiate that belligerents pressed regime actors and their foreign organization extensions to divert resources and bandwagon to survive. As an NGO worker with more than ten years’ experience in Afghanistan told me in an interview, “most people consider aid project taxing to be the most important source of revenue for insurgents” after opium. And as a former Taliban foreign affairs official said, implying the insurgents relied on extorting regime elements: “The Americans have been deceiving themselves” by “saying the Taliban has been getting all of their money from drugs.”

This form of bandwagoning had become so widespread in the alliance’s later years that the great power/regime established Task Force 435 to investigate and devise mechanisms to stop it. In July 2011 this unit concluded that insurgents had extorted an estimated $2.16 billion in alliance capabilities. As one journalist covering Afghanistan found, it was “an accepted fact” that “the U.S. government funds the very forces American forces are fighting.” The U.S. and central regime agreed to pool resources and weaken insurgents partly through a strategy of “winning hearts and minds”—but instead, as an Army captain would tell me, “because these guys were defecting or handing stuff over to
the Taliban,” resources were instead used to purchase “bombs and mines” used against alliance forces.\footnote{160}

\textbf{ii. Bandwagoning for Profit: Switching to the Winning Side to Share in Spoils of Victory}

Regime actors also bandwagoned “for profit.” This is in line with Afghanistan’s “culture of defection” wherein the “art” of “opportunistic betrayal is as old as Afghanistan itself.”\footnote{161} The “ultimate aim” of Afghans is “to survive in their unstable land by joining the winning side.”\footnote{162} Bandwagoning to share in the spoils of victory manifested in two main forms. Examples below should be viewed as distinct from those presented above insofar as regime actors contravened alliance strategy because they believed the insurgents may win.

The first form of bandwagoning for profit included defecting to the insurgency and can be seen as a function of the Taliban’s structure of supporters within the population and regime, which can be disaggregated into two broad networks: “hard core militants” and “networkers.” The former (\textit{Talib}) fervently supported the insurgency and consistently remained “aligned to it” even after the alliance routed the Taliban. The “networkers,” by contrast, were “local leaders” and other regime actors “of various kinds” who practiced “flexible alignment politics” that were contingent “upon the balance of threats, rewards and solidarity factors.”\footnote{163} Where the \textit{Talib} unswervingly supported the insurgency after initial U.S.-Karzai alignment, the networkers largely defected (at least overtly) from the movement and “sat on the fence in the intervening years” until the Taliban returned and started to attack the regime.

As there appeared to be “momentum behind the insurgency” (and victory looked probable) “networker” regime elements proceeded to “join the antigovernment forces” because there was “something in it for them.”\footnote{164} Police, Army, and other actors decided to
actively aid (and bandwagon with) the Taliban at this juncture not out of fear for survival but because they had hedged their bets, decided the insurgents were the most likely winning coalition, and sought to share in the spoils of its (at that point) likely victory. In eastern Afghanistan in July 2008, for example, “collusion took place” between the National Police chief there and governor in a specific district with the insurgents that enabled the belligerents to carry out a surprise attack against alliance forces. These regime actors were to provide actionable information to and work with alliance authorities to balance insurgents but instead shared information on planned military operations with the insurgents, which then conducted a deadly counter-offensive. As an army assessment found: “the district police chief and district governor were complicit in supporting the attack.” Similarly, regime elements allocated non-military activity budgets to individuals known to financially support the Taliban. Kapisa’s governor, for example, allocated alliance funds to individuals with proven ties to the insurgency who in turn gave “a part of the funds allocated” to “HiG and Taliban commanders in Kapisa province and Sorobi District (Kabul province).” One year later, the insurgency ballooned in these areas.

a. **“Green-on-Blue” Bandwagoning**

The second form of bandwagoning for profit involved Army or Police elements carrying out “green on blue” attacks wherein they (in “green” uniforms) attacked other non-regime alliance personnel (in “blue” uniforms”) and in some cases regime security forces who were balancing. This is arguably the most conceptually pure form of bandwagoning in that it involved regime actors slaying other regime actors (or U.S. soldiers) in order to assist the insurgents’ campaign to topple the regime. Since alliance actors began tracking this phenomenon in 2008, there have been 80 (reported) incidents of green-on-blue bandwagoning and the frequency of such attacks has progressively
increased: by 50 percent from 2008 to 2009; 220 percent from that year to 2011; and by 175 percent from 2011 to 2012.¹⁶⁸

Regime Army and Police components were most responsible for these incidents of active bandwagoning. To cite but a few examples of each, in November 2010 a soldier killed two U.S. Marines at a base in Helmand and then “fled to the Taliban.”¹⁶⁹ The following year, a police representative killed two alliance soldiers in Helmand and a few months later a soldier killed two and wounded seven U.S. soldiers in Kandahar.¹⁷⁰ In July 2011, a soldier killed an ISAF soldier in Helmand while on a joint patrol.¹⁷¹ Though concentrated in southern Afghanistan, green-on-blue bandwagoning also occurred elsewhere.¹⁷² In April 2011, for example, a soldier killed several U.S. soldiers in Kabul airport and in 2012 a soldier killed two U.S. soldiers in Nangahar province, other Army members assassinated two American advisors inside the Ministry of interior, and a police officer in Paktia killed nine officers. This bandwagoning (particularly in the south) occurred at the same time as other regime actors were carrying out activities (in the same areas) to balance insurgents.¹⁷³

iii. Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self Interest over National Interest

“I described this is a Mafia state. We see the Afghan state on one side, and the Taliban on the other. But the reality is they work together.” – Peter Galbraith, UN Special Representative for Afghanistan.¹⁷⁴

Distinct to internal threat alliances, fear for survival or a share in the spoils of victory cannot account for all instances of regime bandwagoning during this period. Indeed, central and subnational regime elements also bandwagoned to maximize their power or influence (mainly financial).¹⁷⁵ Bandwagoning motivated by this priority seems to have been the most widespread, yielding “a grand collusion between the insurgents and the Afghan authorities” that resulted in a “pattern repeated over and over” where
“traditional enemies are working together wherever there’s a chance to make money.”

Regime actors bandwagoning in this manner occupied posts at all levels and included warlords used to maintain security outside of Kabul, Ministers and their staff, as well as Army soldiers/officers and those of similar rank in the Police.

Due to the pervasive nature of bandwagoning across all actors, this section melds examples of passive/active bandwagoning rooted in patron-client relations and to streamline the summary is organized by regime actor. The primary form of passive bandwagoning was diversion of alliance resources from their intended purpose and to enhancing one’s personal power and influence. And this manifestation of passive bandwagoning had tangible implications for the alliance’s ability to achieve its goal: “Corruption has become a factor contributing to terrorism, insurgency, and narcotics. It has done more damage to Afghanistan than much of the violence.” The two main forms of active bandwagoning were regime actors: (1) diverting alliance capabilities directly to insurgents; and (2) turning a blind eye to (or aiding) the narco-trafficking industry (a source of insurgent financing).

a. Bandwagoning enables Bin Laden’s Escape

In October 2001 U.S. and Northern Alliance allies had driven a large contingent of Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives (including bin Laden) to the mountainous region known as Tora Bora. The U.S. paid various Afghan commanders presumed to be reliable allies to ensure the belligerents could not escape into Pakistan—some of these Afghan commanders actively pursued (and balanced) opposition elements, but others were simultaneously bandwagoning with al-Qaeda and helping them escape. In exchange for payments amounting to a reported $6 million, specific Afghan commanders aligned with the U.S. helped 800 Al-Qaeda fighters and bin Laden escape into Pakistan. Even as the
U.S. and some NA commanders balanced opposition elements, “Bin Laden could count on other Afghan helping hands” that guaranteed his escape.\(^{182}\) Capturing bin Laden “was the single most important objective” and this simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning prevented the allies from achieving it “precisely because the United States’ new Afghan allies refused to stand in their way.”\(^{183}\) This bandwagoning enabled Taliban and insurgent actors to flee and later return to mount campaigns against Karzai’s regime and was also a sign of further balancing/bandwagoning to come.

b. “Warlords” Bandwagon to Safeguard Subnational Fiefdoms

“Encouraged by their own ambitions and U.S. support, the warlords refused to disband their private armies, and routinely engaged in armed clashes over control of territory...The most senior and well known warlords served as provincial governors, but refused to accept direction from Karzai’s central government in Kabul.”\(^{184}\)

An element of initial strategy was to give arms and cash to regional powerbrokers (“warlords”) to dampen political violence in their subnational regions; and viewed as extensions of the regime, they were expected to apply these capabilities to carry out alliance activities against the internal threat. During this time, some warlords operated according to alliance strategy and balanced opposition elements. “We could rely on some of them to track down the insurgents,” a former U.S. official told me.\(^{185}\) At the same time and particularly by 2002, however, rather than unswervingly implementing agreed strategy (and balancing) the warlords were bandwagoning by running “their enclaves like private mini-states, often without regard for the central government.”\(^{186}\) Instead of ensuring stability per alliance strategy they had instead “stolen peoples’ homes, arbitrarily arrested their enemies, and tortured them in private jails.” And rather than actively working with U.S. and Afghan forces to track down, kill, or capture actors fomenting violence, the warlords had through 2004 “focused much of their efforts on drugs, extortion, and
intimidation, using their relationships with U.S. soldiers to frighten local civilians and advance their own greed.”

Actions by Ismail Khan, the alliance warlord in Herat (2002-2004), are illustrative of such bandwagoning. Instead of maintaining stability in his area of influence, Khan deployed militia forces to clash with another (Pashtun) warlord. Rather than yielding a pacified subnational territory according to alliance strategy, then, Khan’s bandwagoning to cement control over more territory meant that “the central government was faced with the threat of a major interethnic war.” Assumed and intended to serve as an extension of the regime and implement strategy (and produce stability), Khan instead prioritized increasing his power/influence and acted accordingly (and generated violence).

In addition to using alliance resources for their own gain, warlords such as Khan directly contravened specific regime requests associated with alliance tactics. In October 2002, for example, the alliance ordered warlords to hand over their militia forces for incorporation into regime forces or disband their militias. Instead, many warlords “defied” the central regime and acted to advance their interests: by retaining (instead of dissolving) militia forces to guard against the “internecine struggles between and among them” (only 16 percent of militia forces had disbanded by 2004).

Thus, the U.S. and Karzai during these initial years were juggling alliance dynamics that included regime elements balancing agreed targets while others (in this case passively) were bandwagoning with them. The implications of bandwagoning were clear: “as the factional militias have wreaked havoc among the general population, the Taliban have started to recover and regroup, especially in the south and east.” These forms of bandwagoning confounded alliance assumptions at the time arguably rooted in logic.
underpinning external threat alliances (all forces will balance) yet were in line with internal threat alliance dynamics: regime actors are primarily inclined to pursue their own objectives, even if doing so violates alliance goals.

To reign in this behavior and as part of the Bonn political processes, the alliance decided to incorporate warlords into government by allocating them positions in the cabinet or other agencies.\textsuperscript{192} Rather than bringing warlords and militias under the central regime’s writ, this “created a situation where those with a vested interest in keeping central government institutions weak and ineffective, and their own personal power and regional fiefdoms strong, were placed in positions of authority over the very institutions that needed to be strengthened.”\textsuperscript{193} Accordingly, instead of implementing alliance strategy and following Karzai regime orders, warlords (now in positions of power) chose to “flout his authority” by aiding (directly or indirectly) actors within their region generating political violence or using new positions to expand their networks’ hold on power.\textsuperscript{194}

In some cases they directly challenged Karzai, while in others they used alliance resources to cement control over subnational bases of power and the associated spoils.\textsuperscript{195} Regarding direct challenges to Karzai, before Fahim Khan (then Defense Minister) was sacked (for various reasons) he nearly implemented a plot to forcibly overthrow Karzai and “only the presence of international forces in the capital prevented a coup.”\textsuperscript{196} The warlord-cum-government officials leveraged their new positions to cement wealth and power by engaging in narco-trafficking: “the opium-trading warlords quickly figured out how to use the U.S.-backed Afghan government to their advantage” and through their regime positions lay “the foundation for the corrupt nexus between drugs and political power that soon pervaded Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{197} It was not long before “narco-kleptocracy” had “extended its
grip around President Karzai,” who by 2003 was “regarded by some as increasingly isolated by a cadre of corrupt officials.” As Karzai, the U.S., and other regime elements sought to curb narco-trafficking and stem the violence it fueled, these warlords and other regime elements were simultaneously colluding with the traffickers to amass revenue and solidify or expand their respective power bases.

Rather than steadfastly carrying out this mandate and balancing threats, however, many warlords chose to prioritize maximizing their personal influence and solidify their power subnationally. They did so and bandwagoned while other warlords or regime actors worked with the U.S. to decrease the threat by pursuing al-Qaeda or Taliban insurgents. This desire to enhance power and influence (rooted in patron-client ties) also pushed agencies (and components therein) to bandwagon.

c. Ministries of Interior (and Police) and Defense (and Army) Bandwagoning

“The inflow of billions in international funds has cemented the linkages between corrupt members of the Afghan government and violent local commanders – insurgent and criminal, alike.”

Over the course of the alliance and as one U.S. official told me, Ministry and Police elements worked with the U.S. to carry out strategy and balance: “the Ministry and National Police had some credible, reliable people and units who helped stabilize areas and cut down drug flows.” In accordance with the distinct dynamics of internal threat alliances, however, while these regime elements were balancing other components from the lowest (Afghan Auxiliary Police) to highest (deputy Minister of Interior) levels were (either passively or actively) bandwagoning to advance their patron-client linkages. This took two forms.

First, they accepted bribes in order to aid or turn a blind eye to insurgent activity. Instead of implementing agreed alliance policy, for example, Police would “often do the
bidding of whoever paid them the most money.” The “deeply corrupt” Ministry of Interior was one of the two “fatal weak points” in Afghanistan’s government. The implication for the alliance was that “without effective and honest” administrators and police the regime “can do little to provide internal security.” This assessment was echoed by Senior U.S. Representative for Afghanistan Holbrooke, who said that Ministry and “Provincial and police chiefs are deeply on the take.” Drawing a similar conclusion, another analysis indicated that Police elements were so prone to passive bandwagoning that they are “almost extensions of militias and cannot be relied on to subdue them.” And a 2010 analysis indicated that “regular officers as well as the border police, pose even larger problems as corruption are rampant in the ranks.

The Afghan National Auxiliary Police, formed to dampen violence at the village level, was a component particularly prone to this form of bandwagoning. Rather than carrying out its alliance mandate of “effectively combatting the insurgents or protecting the local population,” the regime element was “more concerned with extracting revenue for themselves and doing their local patrons’ bidding.” In addition to passively or actively aiding actors fomenting violence, components of the Ministry in specific areas “became a center for drug trafficking with police posts in opium-growing regions being auctioned to the highest bidder.”

And second, Interior Ministry and Police officials passively bandwagoned by diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose and to oneself or their patronage network. Such bandwagoning “occurred along tribal lines” (motivated by patron-client ties) and was “perpetrated by actors serving in government positions.” Where alliance capabilities were amassed with the purpose of “benefiting the populace or
calming the insurgency,” they instead “flew out of the country.” Capabilities provided to the Interior Ministry to balance threats were (in full or part) not used for their intended purpose and instead diverted to actors fomenting violence (active bandwagoning) or not directly to insurgents but nonetheless contrary to alliance strategy (passive bandwagoning). In 2003, for example, regime representatives in Masar-I Sharif were “to ensure the flow of resources from the center to the police headquarters” but, instead, “became party to their diversion.” As one scholar notes of this example and form of passive bandwagoning more broadly: “diversion of resources through corruption in the Afghan government was a major constraint” because it reduced capabilities available to balance.

The Ministry of Defense and its forces engaged in similar bandwagoning. Components of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), for example, were “ostensibly under the defense ministry’s control” yet were in actuality “often more loyal” to “a local commander than to national priorities,” resulting in “a weak chain of command…plagued by high desertion rates and low operational capacity.” Rather than balancing insurgents in a unified manner, AMF components violated central regime guidance, worked for powerbrokers, and diverted alliance resources.

Bandwagoning was not limited to lower level officials or soldiers, however, and extended to the highest levels and the Defense Minister himself. Rather than focusing on coordinating forces to balance insurgents, the Minister used resources to expand his subnational “fiefdom” and played “a double game” by “pledging loyalty to Karzai and the Americans” but at the same refusing orders to dissolve his militia forces and using regime security forces to protect his stake in the drug-trade. This (mainly passive) bandwagoning fueled an “escalating rivalry” that threatened “to further destabilize Afghanistan’s shaky
government.” Similar incentives pushed governors and provincial-level regime components to bandwagon.

d. Powerful Provincial Figures Bandwagon to Expand Power, Influence

“In much of the country…the government was at best a reluctant partner…Most governors…Instead of trying to win over the population, sat in their lavish homes and brokered personally enriching deals.”

The most prominent form of bandwagoning by provincial officials was their diverting alliance capabilities and then using these resources (money, materials, or other) as a form of patronage to help solidify control over subnational “fiefdoms.” Part of alliance strategy included allocating resources to regime actors to “build government institutions” in subnational areas based on the assumption that doing so would reduce violence in (“stabilize”) them. The strategy was therefore contingent on the regime actors applying resources accordingly. Instead, a “consistent theme” in many provinces “was that a select group of tribally affiliated strongmen took advantage to secure government positions and gain access to government and development funds” which they used as a form of “patronage to reinforce one’s own position and marginalize others” to “consolidate political and economic power among their own people.” As one leader in Paktia province indicated, this was widespread: “Millions of dollars are stolen. If you increase the amount of money it will also be useless because the government will simply steal more.”

Governors in five separate provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Paktia, and Ghazni) engaged in this form of bandwagoning.

Rather than employing funds according to alliance strategy to “build institutions” and “provide other basic services,” for example, Helmand’s governor (Akhundzada) used them and his authority “to reestablish his family’s dominance over the drug trade” and “pocketed much of the profit.” Due to and reflecting the extent of this bandwagoning,
the U.S. viewed the governor as “part of the problem, not the solution” and pressed Karzai to replace him. Eventually Karzai sacked the governor, but before this occurred Akhundzada sent his militia forces to work with the Taliban. In exchange for accepting and paying these men (many were the governor’s clients or linked to politically-important actors) the Taliban was able to put “its tentacles into [Akhundzada’s] drug trade” and obtain “tens of millions of dollars every year to expand its guerrilla war.”

Kandahar’s governor Agha Shirzai engaged in similar bandwagoning. Rather than applying aggregated capabilities per alliance strategy and to stabilize the province, Agha Shirzai employed them “to solidify his power at the expense of Hamid Karzai’s central government.” Much the same occurred in Uruzgan, where the governor leveraged his position “to exert tight control over the province” for personal gain and did so by diverting and distributing alliance resources as patronage.

The governors of Paktia and Ghazni passively bandwagoned by using alliance resources as patronage and actively bandwagoned by diverting funds to insurgents. Regarding Paktia, a 2009 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul says the governor’s “Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) [insurgent] connections…leadership of a province-wide corruption scheme, and suspected contacts with insurgents make him detrimental to the future of Afghanistan” and therefore alliance goals. While other regime elements were balancing target threats, this governor was violating alliance strategy by diverting resources (“corruption scheme”) and colluding with insurgents (“HiG connections”). A cable from the same year indicates that Ghazni’s governor (Usmani) and his staff engaged in comparable bandwagoning: “[they] routinely embezzle government funds and international aid money intended for public administration and humanitarian assistance.”

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Instead of a unified subnational regime acting in unison to balance the common threat, Ghazni’s governor and his regime representatives were a “criminal enterprise masquerading as public administration.”²²⁶ During the period examined, then, key provincial-level regime actors actively and passively bandwagoned with forces fomenting violence. They did so while other actors were balancing the common threat and in order to solidify control over their subnational area of influence (governors of Helmand and Kandahar) and/or actively aid insurgents (governors of Paktia and Ghazni).

In the section above I demonstrated that throughout the alliances regime actors engaged in simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning. Specific regime elements bandwagoned (while others balanced) because they wanted to survive, share in the spoils of victory (both found in traditional alliances), or augment their power/influence or their clients’ (distinct to internal threat alliances). Pushed by these three motivations, regime elements bandwagoned by: turning a blind-eye or sending funds to insurgents; carrying out “green on blue” attacks and killing alliance personnel; accepting bribes or other financial incentives to ignore or aid activities by actors fomenting violence or engaged in drug-trafficking; and diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose and using them as a form of patronage (or to insurgents).

Whereas this subsection focused mainly on regime actors outside the central decision-makers and why they bandwagoned (and when), the following section centers on decisions and actions by the central regime.
4. **FOURTH CORE DIFFERENCE – PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS: LEADERS OF THREATENED STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL INTEREST**

The purpose of this fourth sub-section is to evidence the fourth and final difference between external and internal threat alliances: that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on *their own political survival* rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state.

With traditional (external) alliances, after aligning states work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more “cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace (increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival.

Like traditional alliances, level of threat and resources will influence regime/great power ability to work together and defeat the common internal menace. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the *leaders of the regime*. As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to
threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests.

This section evidences this core difference by citing examples from 2001 to 2012 and during the Karzai administration [2001-2012] and U.S. presidential administrations of Bush [2001-2008] and Obama [2008-2012]. For the sake of simplicity, it is organized chronologically and demonstrates how regime-specific priorities affected decisions related to cohesion—choosing strategy and whether to work closely with the United States—and effectiveness—choosing whether and if so how to curb bandwagoning.

Arguably, the following actions would have increased state security and thus the Afghan national interest: build up national institutions, install representative forms of governance, reduce corruption, lessen the drug trade, and focus on defeating the Taliban threat that endangered the fabric of the country. The following sections demonstrate that rather than pursuing (and often at the expense of) these goals in the Afghan national interest, Karzai acted mainly to advance his own interests—financial and political.

1. **Karzai and Bush, Early Days: Regime Priorities Smooth Path for Strategy Agreement**

   As Karzai took office as Interim President, political violence had lessened but the threat to his regime remained, leading the great power/regime to ultimately agree to the “warlord strategy.”\(^{227}\) As with traditional alliances, a high threat level and the Karzai regime’s military dependence pushed it to agree to this strategy and (for the moment) put aside its view that any strategy needed to take into account Pakistan’s role in enabling violence.\(^{228}\) With an “empty treasury and no security force of his own,” Karzai conceded
and agreed to rely on warlords to provide stability throughout the country. However, another factor distinct to internal threat alliance cohesion also pushed Karzai to agree to this strategy: recognizing that the U.S. could help advance his primary/core priority of consolidating power in his office and maximizing political/financial power and influence. Two examples demonstrate the U.S. helping him do so and that it needed to preserve his regime.

First, during the 2002 Loya Jirga, the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan convinced the main challenger to Karzai, Zahir Shah, to withdraw and support Karzai. After other prominent candidates withdrew, delegates selected Karzai as interim leader. And second, in early 2003 the U.S. helped Karzai ensure that Afghanistan’s constitution being drafted at the time would establish a presidential rather than a parliamentary system of government. Where the former would maximize Karzai’s authority to make politically-valuable appointments and institutionalize other powers in his office, a parliamentary system would have diluted central authority and established additional checks on it (such as a Prime Minister). Throughout the drafting process, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (Khalizad) actively lobbied for a constitution that enshrined strong presidential powers. Partly due to Khalizad’s back-room dealing, and recommendations from a U.S. advisor helping write the constitution, a presidential system was approved in January 2004. This was a “win-win” for the great power/Karzai regime. For the U.S and reflecting its core need to preserve the regime, it “would retain the benefit of having a clearly identifiable Afghan partner whom it would know well and indeed preferred.” And for Karzai, he received the protection he needed while laying the foundation for his regime’s long-term political survival and influence.

In the run up to the 2004 elections, a surge in threat from insurgents and dependence on each other to balance it (as in traditional alliances) drove the allies together, pushed them to agree to a new strategy ("Accelerated Success"), and maintained cohesion through much of Bush’s two terms. However, two regime-specific motivations distinct to internal threat alliance cohesion also drove them together during this period: Karzai recognized that U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his power/influence.

With regard to the 2004 elections, Karzai recognized U.S. funding and influence could help him win. The recently arrived U.S. Ambassador had a $1.4 billion budget and was to spend a “significant portion” before the elections on building schools and an array of other highly visible public works. The central regime recognized that such projects would garner support from the populace and his “core network of patron supporters” and help win the election. As a former U.S. official told me in an interview, “Karzai came close” and agreed to cooperate across all alliance strategy components “because the money we brought in was going to win him key votes.” Further, even after receiving credible reports that the poll would be flawed (in Karzai’s favor), the U.S. did not send election observers or push the UN to do so. The decision was made to avoid criticizing “the election of the only candidate who stood any chance of stabilizing the nation” and securing American interests. With alliance monies funding voter-popular projects, and the U.S. deterring checks onto the election’s credibility, Karzai won and did so “buttressed with a great show of American support and largesse.” The U.S. needed to keep a (thus far) reliable ally in office; and Karzai wanted to remain in power and reap associated spoils
(“for him and his network of cronies,” as an interviewee described it).\textsuperscript{238} This increased cohesion.

Regime-specific motivations to install a pro-center electoral system also drove Karzai closer to the U.S. In early 2005 Afghanistan was considering two system options, one known to hinder development of viable opposition parties/alliances (Single Non-Transferable Vote, or SNTV) and the other to encourage their formation (Proportional Representation, or PR). Wanting to maximize his authority and minimize checks against it, Karzai strongly preferred SNTV\textsuperscript{239} because it would splinter the opposition and help his “strategy to streamline power in the executive branch by fragmenting the parliament and weakening the opposition.”\textsuperscript{240} Accordingly, as applicable Afghan bodies weighed these options Karzai actively campaigned against PR and in favor of SNTV because, and corresponding to motivations of regimes in internal threat alliances, he was “not so much interested in institution-building” (the national interest) “as in the centralization of patronage” (and consolidating his power).\textsuperscript{241}

Where domestic Afghan stakeholders and foreign actors (United Nations and European Union) backed the PR option because it was “better for the country and its future,”\textsuperscript{242} the U.S. actively supported Karzai’s campaign for SNTV by: bankrolling and widely distributing a report advocating against PR (and for Karzai’s preferred SNTV); and Khalizad promoting SNTV in meetings on system options, including declaring that President Bush had said “SNTV is the choice. SNTV is going to happen.”\textsuperscript{243} At least partly due to U.S. pressure and Karzai’s back-room dealing, legislators approved an SNTV-based system and parliamentary elections soon thereafter (run on the new system) yielded Karzai’s desired results: a largely disjointed parliament devoid of any block of
individuals/parties to challenge his policy decisions or (politically important) appointments. American support again helped consolidate Karzai’s authority and pushed him closer to the U.S.

Like traditional alliances, the allies were largely able to agree on strategy and tactics through 2006—in part evidenced by their signing the “Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership in 2005 and the “Afghanistan Compact” in 2006—because a high level of threat (and their common need to balance it) pushed allies together. Additionally and not found in external threat alliances, however, Karzai’s desire to consolidate power (and U.S. help in doing so) pushed him closer to the great power and increased cohesion through 2007. This is reflected in remarks by each leader that year. Bush said that the U.S. was “proud to call you [Karzai] an ally in this war against those who would wreak havoc” and the presidents were “working closely together” and weekly spent a “fair amount of time talking about our security strategy.” For Karzai, he said that his regime would continue to “fight terrorism” and was “committed” and hoped U.S. “assistance will continue.” Continued violence against Karzai, Bush then said, made it “in the interests of” the U.S. “to tip the scales of freedom your way.”

The U.S. might have shifted the “scales of freedom” in favor of Afghanistan but in doing so also ensured that the political scales were tilted in Karzai’s favor. American support facilitated Karzai’s triumph in the 2002 Loya Jirga, U.S. monies (and inaction vis-à-vis voter fraud) aided his victory in the 2004 presidential contest, and U.S. backing helped Karzai push through an electoral system that hindered opposition alliance development and consolidated central regime power. By largely agreeing to and implementing U.S. alliance strategy and thus balancing (albeit while other regime
components bandwagoned), Karzai achieved many of his core objectives. To this point, implementing all alliance tactics (and balancing) was an *asset* to the Karzai regime’s political survival and drive to consolidate authority. With many regime-specific priorities secured, however, Karzai began to view comprehensively implementing all alliance tactics as less of an *asset* and more of a *liability* to safeguarding regime interests. This began to manifest in Karzai contravening non-military aspects of alliance strategy and thus (passively) bandwagoning; specifically, by diverting alliance resources to important clients and refusing to enact desired reforms, among other acts. As former Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann told me in an interview regarding this juncture, the regime “was less concerned with implementing our agreed strategy and more focused on their own political/personal survival, based in patron-client relations, and used the assistance accordingly.”

iii. **Karzai Shifts in Full to Simultaneous Balancing/Bandwagoning (2006-2008)**

Following Afghanistan’s 2005 elections, insurgent violence kept alliance cohesion relatively high but signs began to emerge that Karzai was becoming less willing to cooperate across all alliance areas. He proceeded to (more fully) *simultaneously* balance and bandwagon. Given that Karzai’s central regime relied on the alliance to combat insurgents seeking his overthrow, it remained in its interests to work with the U.S. (militarily) and *balance*. At the same time, Karzai had attained most items required to consolidate power and influence and therefore began making decisions that would help guarantee re-election in 2009 but also violated non-military aspects of the alliance (*bandwagoned*) and were contrary to the Afghan national interest. This included diverting (and using as patronage) alliance resources and appointing corrupt officials to bolster patron-client links key to re-election: “Political criteria became increasingly evident.
Karzai sought to co-opt potential rivals, rebels or critics by appointing them as special advisors and distributing positions in the provinces.”

As Kai Eide, Senior UN representative for Afghanistan, said regarding this time period, the regime “seemed not to listen any more” and “the British and Americans were his main targets.” As one interviewee told me, Karzai “began to slide off the rails” on non-military alliance aspects by refusing to sack corrupt regime elements, firing U.S.-favored officials, and appointing individuals the U.S. opposed including a person previously imprisoned for drug charges to head regime anticorruption efforts. Rather than using authority to make provincial appointments to promote “civil service reform,” an alliance tactic to thwart threats in subnational areas, Karzai “increasingly used” them “as a strategy of political survival.” These actions hindered allies’ ability to implement tactics. And U.S. praise for Karzai as “indispensable” changed to “disparagement of his weak leadership.”

Starting from this juncture, then, the U.S. was aligned with a central regime cooperating with some alliance tactics (and balancing) but violating others (and bandwagoning). Where rising threats to traditional alliances drive allies together to preserve the national interest, the Karzai regime’s priorities related to political survival (inherent to internal threat alliances) pulled the great power/regime apart. All the while, other regime agencies (and components therein) were also bandwagoning. Clearly illustrating the distinct dynamics of internal threat alliances, the central Karzai regime itself oscillated between balancing/bandwagoning and its security agencies did the same. Karzai prioritizing self over alliance and simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning metastasized during Obama’s presidency.
iv. Karzai and Obama: “Bandwagoning for Ballots” Drives Allies Apart

“Your enemies will make you laugh and your friends will make you cry.” - Traditional Dari and Pashto euphemism/saying.

After President Obama assumed office and informed by two strategy reviews, his administration decided to send a “surge” of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan and fully shift its military strategy to COIN. As demonstrated through reservations voiced by senior U.S. officials (see Historical Overview section), the great power was increasingly questioning the viability of Karzai as an ally. These reservations informed the strategy review process, demonstrate the lower state of alliance cohesion at the time, and illustrate how Karzai was increasingly playing a “double game” and simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning. And Karzai’s remarks clearly demonstrate his regime’s opposition to the strategy. When asked his opinion of COIN, for example, he said in 2008 that “sending more troops to the Afghan cities, to the Afghan villages, will not solve anything.”253 If Karzai was acting in the national interest he would have responded to the high threat level and cooperated in order to balance an insurgency that remained robust and imperiled the country’s fabric—instead, he publicly denounced the alliance and waivered on tackling the insurgents in order to secure the regime’s core priority: winning the 2009 presidential elections. Events surrounding the election reflect decreased alliance cohesion and show that a regime will do what is necessary to remain in power (including contravening alliance agreements).

In contrast to the Karzai regime’s view before the 2004 elections (close collaboration with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime authority) in the run-up to the 2009 contest it viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to winning and consolidating power for the long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that Karzai “combat corruption” (passive bandwagoning) to ensure proper use of alliance resources and bolster Afghan state capacity.254 For Karzai, appointing (“corrupt”) clients to regime
positions, turning a blind-eye to their diversion of alliance funds, and himself using regime monies (alliance or non-alliance) as patronage were vital to garnering support sufficient to win. Alliance strategy called for the central regime to curb these forms of bandwagoning—doing so was in the national interest; however, restraining such bandwagoning was for Karzai contrary to what would facilitate his remaining in power. As a result, as the election approached the regime violated these aspects of alliance strategy in order to grease the wheels of its get out the vote machine, and in doing so hindered alliance cohesion.255

Arguably, if Karzai was simply looking out for the interests of Afghanistan, he would have culled his regime’s ranks of actors known to be siphoning resources or colluding with insurgents. Instead, Karzai’s bandwagoning ballooned as he “cut deals” with “a number of unsavory Afghan politicians” in order to “ensure his reelection.” He was “determined to win reelection” and therefore “looked to the political past to maintain his power even at the cost of weakening the state structure.”256 For example, the U.S. asked Karzai to deny a warlord’s request to reenter Afghanistan given the likelihood he would sow (not dampen) political violence. Rebuffing this demand and to cement his election victory, Karzai allowed Dostum’s homecoming in exchange for the warlord’s “assistance to have the votes he needed from the Uzbeks in the north.”257 Such “bandwagoning for ballots” also included appointing to regime posts (or pardoning) individuals linked to the drug-trade, Taliban, or other actors in exchange for support/assets valuable to the presidential campaign. For example, Karzai attempted to replace Helmand’s governor with “a crony of questionable administrative and anti-corruption credentials”258 and went so far as to “release criminals from prison so they can campaign for him.”259 The disconnect on
strategy and what was in the Afghan national interests versus Karzai’s personal interest is aptly summarized here:

While some embassies were thinking in terms of gradually building or rebuilding institutions and staffing them, or at least were claiming to be doing so, the political instinct of Karzai and of most groups in government was to establish their own patronage network which they could control and use for their own political purposes, including re-election.\textsuperscript{260}

The central regime was increasingly “unpredictable” and issuing “decrees pointing in a specific direction at one moment and then abruptly turning in the opposite direction the next.” This disconnect became so profound that the U.S. worried Karzai “might, without Washington’s knowledge, conduct secret negotiations with Taliban leaders on a reconciliation formula that might not work.”\textsuperscript{261} Even though the threat remained and Karzai should have been cooperating to advance Afghanistan’s interests, he was less willing to implement strategy and tactics because doing so, he determined, would imperil re-election prospects. The impact on cohesion was to “make coordination with his government difficult.”\textsuperscript{262}

This decline in cohesion due to central regime motivations escalated as the election drew closer. Concerned primarily with winning re-election to retain his post atop Afghan’s state apparatus and the patronage available for distribution therein, Karzai increasingly defied U.S. requests, violated (mainly non-military) alliance tactics, and siphoned off alliance resources for use as patronage. In a move to shore up votes but opposed by the U.S. (which viewed it as a “serious setback”) and contrary to alliance strategy and the Afghan national interest, Karzai selected former Defense Minister Fahim as his Vice presidential running mate.\textsuperscript{263} Rather than selecting a reform-oriented individual devoted to advancing alliance objectives, Karzai chose a corrupt powerbroker in “an important tactical move to mobilize the votes” he needed to remain in power.\textsuperscript{264} To be sure, Karzai’s priorities
drove him to simultaneously balance/bandwagon and the accompanying decline in cohesion. At the same time, U.S. efforts to push candidates to challenge Karzai in the election also decreased cohesion. Karzai’s response (outrage) reflect the objectives that motivate peripheral regimes in internal threat alliances: stay in power. These events arguably thrust Karzai further toward the balance/bandwagon approach he began under Bush and would hinder allies’ ability to carry out the new strategy rolled out after the election.

v. U.S. Tries to “Make Nice,” but Karzai Continues to Bandwagon

“Karzai appeared at times to treat the United States as just one more faction to juggle in his balancing of contending Afghan and outside forces, not as a partner providing enormous support to him and his country.” – U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Peter Tomsen

Following the 2009 election, the U.S. initiated its new COIN strategy in full. Having secured re-election, however, the Karzai regime’s willingness to work with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly. No longer relying on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, “Karzai was finally free to be Karzai,” a former U.S. diplomat said, and “it wasn’t long before his behavior toward the coalition would change.” Additionally, the Karzai regime viewed aspects of the COIN strategy as potential threats to its political interests; specifically, the tactic of building “more credible” institutions at the subnational level that would supplant the patron-client power relationships vital to maintaining his power. Even though a high threat level remained Karzai’s regime “was not a willing partner in America’s grand plans” and began to openly disagree with alliance strategy. Karzai’s actions in Kandahar in 2009 reflect this pattern.
Per alliance strategy, Karzai traveled with Commander of U.S. forces to Kandahar prior to military operations there because obtaining support from subnational actors for such actions was a tactic of the new strategy. Karzai was to “urge elders to support the upcoming security operations.” Instead of cooperating in the interest of Afghanistan, he violated alliance strategy and in remarks to local leaders openly opposed the military operations: “We have to demonstrate our sovereignty,” he said, and military operations would not occur until elders were “happy and satisfied.” Similarly, in April 2010 Karzai told elders in Marja he was “opposed” to the operation there.

Although the overall threat level continued, and the allies remained dependent on each other to balance it, cohesion decreased because elements of the alliance strategy threatened the Karzai regime’s interests. Attempts to “build local governance” were a direct affront to and “disrupting” the “natural system of self-regulating Pashtun governance” that Karzai relied on for political power. To retain office and ensure political/financial influence after 2014 (when he would step down), Karzai needed to preserve (not upend) the sub-systems of power the U.S. actively sought to modernize.

Despite U.S. efforts to “Make Nice with Mr. Karzai,” as the New York Times wrote, such overtures again gave way to low cohesion and a “shaky and vulnerable” partnership. Disagreements and associated decreased cohesion extended from tactics (Karzai opposed night raids because they incensed local leaders important to his influence) to overall alliance approach to the insurgents. Deviating from alliance strategy of “reversing the momentum” of the Taliban, for example, Karzai said “he would seek to reconcile with top-level Taliban leaders” and intended “to convene a tribal Jirga” to “discuss how to bring the Taliban back into Afghan political life.” Karzai met
representatives of HiG (an insurgent group), which presented a peace plan. Reflecting that Karzai’s actions contravened alliance strategy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, called the meetings “premature.” The Karzai regime’s actions vis-à-vis curbing bandwagoning—and specifically related to effectiveness—also evidence that regime priorities trumped the national interest.

vi. Karzai’s “Pendulum Approach” to Curbing Bandwagoning

Arguably, it was in Afghanistan’s national interest to cull the government’s ranks of individuals known to be corrupt, sack officials colluding with the insurgents, and dampen the drug trade through firings and more forceful action. The Karzai regime did not entirely ignore such forms of bandwagoning and took some steps to curb them; however, these countermeasures throughout the period examined were largely half-hearted and failed to ensure unified balancing by regime actors. For example, in 2003 and following U.S. pressure, Karzai removed Agha Shirzai (Kandahar’s governor) for contravening strategy by using alliance resources to cement control over his subnational fiefdom. Instead of jettisoning this bandwagoning-prone actor from the regime entirely, however, Karzai reassigned him as the Minister of Urban Affairs. At face value, Karzai firing Shirzai can be seen as an attempt to promote unified balancing by replacing a colluding official with a (balancing-prone) regime actor who would implement agreed strategy. At the same time, Karzai’s decision must be viewed in the context of when it happened (when he needed U.S. support to win the 2004 elections) and what transpired thereafter: Karzai replaced Shirzai with the warlord’s cousin (allowing Shirzai continued influence in the region) and a mere two years later re-appointed Shirzai as governor, because the votes Shirzai could rally were vital to Karzai’s re-election.
In a similar move, Karzai in 2004 sacked Ismail Khan as Herat’s governor. On paper, this can be viewed as an attempt to promote more unified balancing by replacing a governor who passively bandwagoned by diverting alliance resources and regularly using militia to “enforce his will” instead of curbing insurgent violence. Like Shirzai’s dismissal, though, Karzai curbed Khan’s behavior less to advance alliance objectives and for Afghanistan’s interest than to secure his own and win the upcoming presidential election. Replacing Khan a month before the poll “helped Mr. Karzai in the election by opening up the political scene and removing his [Khan’s] political control of the region.” Further, with an eye toward the 2009 contest and needing Khan’s support to win Karzai did not remove Khan from the regime but re-shuffled him to the position of Minister of Energy and Mines where he would again passively bandwagon, by diverting alliance resources (by some estimates $70 million).

The central regime’s actions vis-a-vis such warlord-cum-governors can be viewed as a “pendulum approach” to curbing bandwagoning that reflects the motivations driving weak regime actions: Karzai curbed bandwagoning when doing so was in his interests—to get U.S. help for the 2004 elections [Shirzai] or remove an actor that hindered re-election [Khan]—only to then swing back and re-instate bandwagoning actors because (even though their actions were detrimental to the Afghan national interest) they were important to his political survival.

As the alliance wore on, the U.S. recognized insurgents were obtaining (via direct and indirect diversion) capabilities transferred to the alliance to defeat them. In addition to creating American-led institutions to stop this from occurring, the U.S. pressed Karzai to curb diversion of aid capabilities (passive bandwagoning) by regime agencies and actors
in his central regime. This phenomenon was fueling escalating violence as well as hurting the Afghan national interest, in so far as funds that could be used to improve infrastructure or erect institutions (among other areas), were being diverted from these purposes. Partly in response to this pressure, and according to alliance strategy (outlined in the Afghanistan Compact), Karzai in 2008 created the High Office of Oversight to investigate corruption claims; and soon thereafter, he established an inspectors-general office in each Ministry to investigate and remove from office regime actors with “illicit” links to insurgents, narco-traffickers, or other entities fomenting violence. One year later, Karzai launched a specialized Task Force in the National Police to pursue organized crime within and outside of the Afghan government.

Initially, it looked promising that these new “anti-bandwagoning” bodies would help curb passive collusion. In 2010, for example, the Task Force arrested and jailed a key regime official on charges of corruption. The prospects of this anti-bandwagoning body making any real difference soon washed away, however, as Karzai took to his “pendulum approach” to bandwagoning and secured this individual’s release. Of the dozens of cases started, a U.S. official told me in an interview, “very few would yield results, and the spigot of resources flowing out because of this and to the bad guys wouldn’t shut off.” Another analysis of Karzai’s inaction vis-à-vis bandwagoning notes: “Karzai did not support his anti-corruption squads when they attempted to arrest corrupt ministers, and he was unwilling to remove corrupt governors who were friends.” By keeping in office actors prone to bandwagoning, and sidestepping efforts to cull ministries of colluding elements, Karzai’s actions went against the Afghan national interest (and alliance goals), hindered alliance effectiveness, and are in accordance with the distinct dynamics of internal threat.
alliances: the regime prioritizes physical and political survival above all else and acts accordingly, including by violating alliance strategy when it will advance these goals. As aptly encapsulated by Barfield (2010):

Karzai was not really interested in building an institutionalized state structure. Despite the large sums that the international community was investing…Karzai’s model of government was patrimonial…personal relationships determined everything from who would amass personal wealth to who would be thrown in jail. Karzai…used [the assets of the state] to create a patronage network of personal clients bound to him.288

These “personal clients” included regime actors that bandwagoned but also represented power and influence that would help Karzai remain in power. Accordingly, it was not always in Karzai’s interests to push them to balance (as opposed to bandwagon). Reflecting this, in a meeting to decide by how much the U.S. should increase military resources to secure alliance objectives, a senior U.S. official argued that it was “premature to discuss resources until we have a very clear sense of how we” will “deal with corrupt and predatory Afghan governance.”289

vii. “Feathering his own nest”: Karzai Bandwagons to Bolster Power

“The regime of Karzai has become a powerful, interlocking criminal enterprise.”290

Not only did Karzai take insufficient measures to curb bandwagoning and “swing back” to undermine some he did, the leader and close central regime associates engaged in (mainly passive) bandwagoning. In particular after Karzai had won the 2004 election and rammed through institutions to consolidate his power, alliance resources became attractive sources of patronage. Karzai “maintained his grip on power” and built a “body of personal patronage in support of his rule” by “capitalizing upon his position” as the “distributor of American and foreign aid, weapons and cash and the appointer of powerful government offices”291 Karzai’s actions were aptly described by U.S. General Brent Scowcroft, who helped Obama select his national security staff and told me in an interview that the leader
was “more interested in feathering its own nest” than “working closely with the U.S.” for the betterment of Afghanistan as a whole. The central regime’s attempts to “feather its own nest” and bandwagon occurred in two forms that correspond with motivations determining actions by regimes in internal threat alliances. While engaged in these forms of bandwagoning, Karzai’s central regime was also working with the U.S. to balance insurgents seeking its overthrow (because doing remained in its interests).

First, Karzai abused executive authority in ways that violated alliance objectives and went against the Afghan national interest but advanced his own by maintaining or expanding patron-client links vital to staying in power. This included appointing (or refusing to fire) actors known to bandwagon in order to reap the patron-client benefits associated with them. A few weeks after being named Interim Leader, for example, Karzai replaced the recently-installed governor of Kandahar with the province’s most powerful warlord (Agha Shirzai). Doing so helped Karzai retain influence in the region (benefiting prospects for the 2004 election) but hindered alliance effectiveness because Shirzai proceeded to bandwagon by ensuring a “high level” Taliban leader’s (and target of a U.S.-led manhunt) escape into Pakistan and facilitating the departure from Afghanistan of Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s deputy. Routing the Taliban/Al-Qaeda were vital to improving the lives of Afghans as well as core alliance objectives—yet Shirzai’s bandwagoning, enabled by Karzai’s appointment, hindered allies’ ability to realize them.

Nearly ten years later, Karzai continued to retain actors proven to bandwagon, for example by refusing to sack Ismail Khan from his position as Minister of Energy and Water due to allegations he was diverting and using as patronage (SUS millions) alliance resources to maintain his domestic influence. A leaked U.S. memo from 2009 refers to
Khan as “known for his corruption and ineffectiveness at the energy ministry.” Karzai refused to remove Khan despite “repeated interventions directly with Karzai,” the U.S. memo says, because of “Karzai’s deeply personal bonds with Khan.” This “personal bond” was based in a mutually beneficial patron-client relationship defined mainly by Khan’s pivotal role in helping Karzai win the 2009 presidential election (and what he received in exchange for this support). Warlords-cum-regime actors such as Khan openly “pledged support” for Karzai’s bid for re-election and actively drummed up votes in exchange, reportedly, for receiving new or retaining existing (as with Khan) lucrative cabinet-level posts. Such actions led a historian to dub Karzai’s 2009 reelection campaign the “warlord reunion tour:” the president “paraded around” and promised these actors positions or financial payoffs in exchange for support in a given region. By retaining such bandwagoning regime actors that would go on to compete fiercely for alliance resources and turf, however, Karzai not only facilitated collusion (and corruption) that was not in Afghanistan’s better interests but also an increase in violence/threat: the “conflict over the state” between elite networks of bandwagoning actors “brought Afghanistan closer to inter-factional political violence.”

In addition to using executive powers to appoint/retain bandwagoning regime actors, Karzai leveraged this authority to perform favors for actors who could help him remain in power. For example and in violation of a prior agreement with the U.S., Karzai facilitated the release of a prominent Taliban commander (Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir) in order to appease Sher Momaddem Akhundzada (former governor of Helmand) and receive this subnational powerbroker’s support in the upcoming presidential election. Akhundzada wanted the commander released (due to his patron-client ties to the operative)
and Karzai needed votes in Helmand. Events thereafter clearly demonstrate that Karzai’s decision to prioritize patron over alliance objectives hindered effectiveness: Zakir returned to Pakistan, became a higher level Taliban military commander, and then returned to Afghanistan as the Taliban’s commander in Helmand.\textsuperscript{300} The decision clearly benefited Karzai (he won the election) but hindered alliance effectiveness: “the vast majority of U.S. military fatalities and injuries occurred in areas under Zakir’s authority” in 2009.\textsuperscript{301} Not only was the U.S. dealing with components of Afghanistan’s Army/Police who were bandwagoning (while others cooperated/balanced) but also a central regime prone to bandwagon when it best suited his interests; and to the point where deals beneficial to central regime power cost alliance lives.

Second, Karzai \textit{directly and indirectly participated in opium trafficking to swell his personal wealth and power.} In some provinces, Karzai worked with the U.S. to curtail narco-trafficking, known to aid the insurgency endangering Afghanistan’s stability and distorting its economy.\textsuperscript{302} Simultaneously and in other areas, though, his central regime frequently “tolerated” the “unchecked activities” of “clients” (including family) “in land, narcotics, and other questionable dealing.”\textsuperscript{303} The President’s brother, Walid Karzai, for example, leveraged his power as regime emissary to Pashtuns and provincial councilor to grease ethno-regional ties and “own” opium trafficking in Kandahar. Consistent with central regime desire to “feather its nest” and protect actors vital to doing so (particularly family), Karzai refused to curb Walid’s bandwagoning: “Karzai was involved [in opium trafficking] and made sure his government would not impinge on his or his family’s involvement in the trade.”\textsuperscript{304}
Aside from turning a blind-eye to narco-trafficking, Karzai was involved in the trade. As a “Western intelligence official” said in a 2009 interview, and in line with various other accounts, Karzai would “systematically install low-level officials up to provincial governors to make sure that, from the farm gate, in bulk, the opium is moved unfettered.”

The U.S. had aligned with a regime it assumed would implement strategy and curb narco-trafficking because associated revenues increased insurgent strength and wrought consequences dire to Afghanistan’s future and thus national interest. Rather than unswervingly carrying out alliance directives and taking action that would better Afghanistan as a whole, however, Karzai aimed to swell personal power and influence by taking part in (rather than thwarting) opium production.

Whether internal threat alliances achieve their goal hinges not only on level of military resources aggregated, but also the central regime’s ability and willingness to corral their regime’s component parts and push them to carry out agreed strategy (and balance). In the case of Afghanistan, it seems Karzai was largely unable or (more likely) not willing to take these steps. And whether and when he did so was always linked to if these actions would advance central regime interests. The implication for alliance effectiveness of bandwagoning by regime elements and Karzai’s insufficient attempts to curb it was to essentially preclude unified balancing by regime actors against the insurgents. Whether active or passive in form, a lack of effort by the Karzai regime to curb this bandwagoning—and its own involvement in such bandwagoning—benefited the central regime’s interests but hindered the alliance’s ability to further Afghanistan’s national interest. As former Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani said in 2009, it was not the insurgents who were the “largest threat” to Afghanistan but, rather, the “(Karzai) government” itself.
III. Case Conclusions

In this chapter I used the U.S.-Afghanistan case to evidence the following four key ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from alliances forged to balance external enemies. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

First, I showed that the U.S. and Afghanistan brought their security policies into close cooperation and aggregated capabilities in response to violence fomented by insurgents (and at times warlords) in order to preserve the Karzai regime’s survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from insurgents, while the U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch attacks (as they did on September 11, 2001) and ensure access to natural resources in the region. By 2002 the core factor underlying U.S./Afghanistan alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; and where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.

Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat alliances, it demonstrated that Afghanistan’s internal order was fragmented. Building from this, it showed that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of
its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traced Afghanistan’s political trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act to advance the national interest.

Third, I demonstrated why the motivations for and manifestations of bandwagoning in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional alliances. Concerning manifestation, it showed that regime elements leveraged their autonomy to act independently, advance their own interests, and contrary to alliance strategy and thus bandwagoned while other regime elements were simultaneously balancing. Accordingly, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances proceeds as follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables balancing and bandwagoning to occur simultaneously (whereas states in traditional alliances can either balance or bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for
bandwagoning (patron-client relations) *in addition to* fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon *while the allies are together*, which has implications for cohesion and effectiveness.

In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between a somewhat cooperative central regime and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular after Karzai was re-elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to balancing/bandwagoning at the same time. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities.

Fourth and finally, I showed that when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on *their own political survival* rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but
rather to advance the interests of the *leaders of the regime*. And these regime-specific
decisions rooted in their desire to survive politically impacted actions related to cohesion
and effectiveness.

Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan
presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S.
as an *asset* to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the
2002 *Loya Jirga* partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that
U.S. influence could help him win the 2004 presidential elections and install an electoral
system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby
enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion declined
because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a *liability* to
winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-term. Karzai
recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army
to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election he
simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) to
curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively bandwagoning).
After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying on the U.S. to
cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work with its ally
and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.

With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, pooling
resources sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance
weakened the internal threat. However, Karzai’s insufficient efforts and “pendulum
approach” to curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness.
In sum, the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance clearly elucidates the core ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances. Rather than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard territorial integrity, the U.S. and Karzai aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the mercurial leader’s survival and American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the military, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with an extremely internally fragmented ally whose relevant agencies (and parts therein) often acted to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the Afghan national interest. Rather than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning found in traditional alliances, some Afghan agencies balanced insurgents while others were *simultaneously* colluding with the same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to respond to threats the Karzai regime largely did not do what was best for the Afghan national interest but, instead, took those actions that would preserve his political and personal power.
ENDNOTES—CHAPTER FOUR

9 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 15.
16 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009).
17 This term was coined by Ahmed Rashid. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos – The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009), 127.
18 Ismael Khan controlled vast expanses in the West, while General Rashid Dostum controlled territory in the north. General Daud had control over three provinces in the northeastr and Kunduz. In the south, Gul Agha Sherzai controlled four provinces. And in the center, Karim Khalili, Syed Akbari, and Mohammed Mohaqiq essentially controlled various territories. For an excellent overview of these warlords as well as their rivalries, motives, and activities, see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 127-130.
19 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 131.
22 In January 2002, for example, and representing passive bandwagoning, militiamen loyal to two warlords (Fahim and Dostum) fought each other in Mazar Sharife; and in April of the same year Hekmatyar attacked Fahim in Jalalabad.
24 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 133.
24, 2009; and Michael E. O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 7.

27 Statement by Zalmay Khalizad before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 23, 2003. Statement made in hearing to consider his Nomination to be Ambassador to Afghanistan. Accessed via U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations web-site and hearing.

28 For these figures and annual breakdowns see relevant table for this chapter in the Annex at the end of the dissertation.


31 As stated by the U.S., the purpose of the aid component of the intervention was to “support Afghanistan in its efforts to ensure economic growth led by the private sector, establish a democratic and capable state governed by the rule of law, and provide basic services for its people.” United States Agency for International Development, “USAID Assistance to Afghanistan 2002-2008”, Press Release from March 27, 2008.


33 Signed on May 17, 2005.


35 During this period, suicide bombings increased from 27 to 139 (400 percent), the number of IEDs detonated from 783 to 1,677, and there was a three-fold increase in insurgent initiated attacks (from 783, in 2005, to 1,677, in 2006. Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency State Failure and Jihad.” International Security 32, No. 4. Spring 2008, 7-8.


37 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 362.

38 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 203.


40 This was a marked increase from prior annual allocations to the alliance—$797 million (2004) and $830 million (2005-2006). Statistics cited in Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 203.

41 For an excellent review of military operations see Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: W Norton, 2010).


43 “The Afghanistan Compact,” as released by NATO. To operationalize these agreements, the allies formed the first high-level inter-ally coordination group since 2001. The group was part of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and comprised of senior U.S. military and civilian officials, major donors, and led by Karzai, to discuss strategy and priorities monthly As outlined in “The Afghanistan Compact,” as released by NATO.


45 As described in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (2010).


49 Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 120.

50 And doing so required a new tactic—protecting population centers and helping the regime “earn the trust” of the Afghan people. Commander’s Initial Assessment, as released via the Washington Post, August 2009.
Advocates of CT-Plus were Vice President Joe Biden and Karl Eikenberry (U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan), among others. See Toby Harnden, “Joe Biden: the worrying rise of Barack Obama’s Mr Wrong,” The Telegraph, October 17, 2009.


The cable is summarized in Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 122-125.

The cable is quoted in Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 125-126.


This after some discrepancies regarding vote tabulation led to calls for a run-off between Karzai and the second-place finisher. “Karzai Re-elected Amid Turmoil,” CBS News, November 2, 2009.


“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Press Release from the Office of the Press Secretary, Whitehouse, December 1, 2009.


Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 168.


Combined with other actors, these three encompassed what Jones (2009) termed the “complex adaptive system” of actors representing the “threat environment” in Afghanistan. Dr. Seth G. Jones, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, United States House of Representatives, April 2, 2009.

These included elements of the Taliban (“Neo”-Taliban), Al-Qaeda, and two groups that originated as mujahedeen and again took up arms to push a new (now American) occupation from Afghan soil: Hezb-i-Islami and the “Haqqani network.” On these two insurgent groups see Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” (2008).


By 2002 these actors had re-solidified control in the following areas: Rashid Dostum (Mazar-I Sharp); Doud Khan (north-east); Karim Khalili (Center, in Hazara); Bacha Khan Zadran (southern areas, along the Pakistan border; Hazrat Ali (also in the south, in Nangghahar); and Gul Agha Shirzai (Kandahar). Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009).


Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 131.

As paraphrased in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (2010), 43-44.

On why the region has been considered important for U.S. energy security, see “House Bill S.2749, To update the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109s2749is/pdf/BILLS-109s2749is.pdf.


Author interview, anonymous U.S. government official involved in Afghanistan policy Washington, DC, August 2012.


U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, April 2006, 6-33


Author interview, anonymous U.S. government official involved in Afghanistan policy Washington, DC, August 2012.


Sino, Organizations at War, (2008), 259.


For an excellent overview of the Afghan government and associated powers see Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).


See Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War, (2013).


The ANP includes the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The Army consists of corps, the largest unit size, of which there are seven in Afghanistan—six are ground forces and one is the National Army Air Force. Each corps is divided into divisions, and divisions into brigades—similar to the U.S. military after which it was modeled, brigades are divided into battalions, companies, and platoons.


“The Afghan beneficiaries pledge allegiance to the ideology of their outside patron while avoiding any commitments that might limit their freedom of maneuver against local rivals. At an opportune time, they switch to other patrons, always with an eye to increasing their personal power and wealth and weakening their local rivals.” Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, (2011), 58.


The two networks were: first, the former Northern Alliance (NA) jihadis, consisting mainly of the Panjshiris in Shura-yi Nezar, which is the military wing of the Jamiat Tanzim; and second, Hamid Karzai’s elite network. Timor Sharan, “The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron-Client Networks in Afghanistan,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 63, no. 6 (2011), 1110.


Sharan, “The Dynamics of Elite Networks,” (2011), 1117. See also Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, (2004), xxiii


As MacGinty argues, the alliance itself provided additional incentives for bandwagoning: “many of these warlords also benefited from the post-Taliban state-building process: exploiting reconstruction resources,


141 Interview with author, USG official, via Skype, June 2012.

142 Interview with author, USAID DST Team member, via Skype from Kandahar, Afghanistan, June 2012.

143 Interview with author, USG official, Washington, DC, June 2012.

144 Interview with author, USG official, Washington, DC, June 2012.


152 Interview with author, NGO worker, via Skype from Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2012

153 These “various kinds” of actors included “mullahs, tribal chiefs, ex-mujahedin and local commanders.”


156 Interview with author, NGO worker, via Skype from Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2012


160 Interview with U.S. Army captain who served in Afghanistan, via Skype, September 2012.

161 These “various kinds” of actors included “mullahs, tribal chiefs, ex-mujahedin and local commanders.”


163 Interview with author, NGO worker, via Skype from Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2012


166 Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, (2012), 171.

These occurred mainly in the southern provinces of Helmand (19 attacks) and Kandahar (16 attacks) and accounted for 15 percent of U.S. soldier deaths in 2012. These and other statistics as summarized and analyzed in Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data,” *Longwar Journal*, August 12, 2012.


The attacks were concentrated in Helmand (19 attacks) and Kandahar (16 attacks).


Other accounts indicate this was also motivated by tribal code dictating such collusion. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, (2009).


Interview with author, former U.S. official who worked on Afghanistan policy, Washington, DC, July 2012.


At minimum his decisions did not contribute to dampening violence in his area.


The government would go on to be comprised of “militarily strong Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara factions, and a weak Pashtun majority. Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” (2004), 44.38.


Interview with Senior U.S. government official, Washington, DC, August 2012.


As quoted during a lecture Holbrooke delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, August 5, 2008.


According to various accounts, these very forms of collusion or bandwagoning spurred the alliance to disband the Auxiliary police in 2008. Isby, *Afghanistan - Graveyard of Empires*, (2010), 325.

Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, (2009), 204.


On one day in July 2010, for example, $190 million in cash left Afghanistan and from 2007 to 2010 $3 billion left in suitcases via the international airport.” Wissing, *Funding the Enemy*, (2012), 242.


When the Interim government was formed soon after the U.S. effectively routed the Taliban, Mohammed Fahim was appointed as Minister of Defense in 2002 and served in this post through 2004, when the elected Afghan government took over for the Interim administration.


Chandrasekaran, *The War Within the War for Afghanistan*, (2012), 79.

“Westerners, to a degree unique in history, invest their loyalty in institutions…[and] Western officials on the ground in Afghanistan were acting instinctively within this conceptual framework…But Afghanistan is not there yet. In Afghanistan, loyalties and allegiances are to individual” Sarah Chayes, *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban* (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2007), 169.


This U.S. Cable was written in December 2009, and then leaked and then published in full by the *Guardian* newspaper. See the Guardian’s series on the “U.S. Cables” and for this specific document “US embassy cables: Corrupt governor in eastern Afghanistan,” *the Guardian*, December 10, 2010.

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This term was coined by Ahmed Rashid. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, (2009), 127.


That Khalizad was intimately involved in this process was widely reported by international media. For an excellent review of the process through which the constitution was drafted, see Alexander J. Their, “The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan,” New York Law School Law Review, 51 (2006/7).


Interview with author, Anonymous U.S. government official, July 2012


Interview with author, Anonymous Aid worker in Afghanistan during period in which electoral system was written, Via Skype, September 2012.


Remarks by President George Bush, President of the United States, The President’s News Conference With President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at Camp David, Maryland August 6, 2007.

Remarks by Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan. The President’s News Conference With President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at Camp David, Maryland August 6, 2007.

Remarks by Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan. The President’s News Conference With President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at Camp David, Maryland August 6, 2007.


Per the “The Afghanistan Compact,” as released by NATO,


Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 168.

Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 164.

Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 165.


Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 165.
These included devising “a reinvigorated U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue” to develop a “shared vision and commitment to Afghanistan’s future. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,” May 12, 2010.


Hoarding such revenue had become so widespread that Karzai deployed Finance Minister (Ghani) to Herat to demand that Khan hand over more tax revenues (Ghani flew back to Kabul with $20 million.) Gulshan Dietl, “War, Peace and the Warlords: The Case of Ismail Khan of Herat in Afghanistan,” Alternatives – Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 283 (2004), 57.


The term “threat finance” began to be used within the government to describe the phenomenon whereby the Taliban and other insurgents—through direct and indirect means—obtained funds allocated for reconstruction or military efforts and use these capabilities to finance their operations and attempts to overthrow the regime. Passive bandwagoning in the form of extortion and corruption (diversion) of non-military alliance capabilities had escalated to the point where the U.S. adjusted aspects of the alliance’s tactics and activities so as to curb it so as to “ensure dollars are not being diverted from their purpose by extortion or corruption.” Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan,” A Majority Staff Report (Washington, DC: Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 8, 2011), 3.

The U.S. established the “Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) for this purpose.


Interview with author, anonymous U.S. government official, Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2012.

Williams, Afghanistan Declassified (2012), 197.

The U.S. determined by end of the period examined that of six ministries evaluated none were able to “provide reasonable assurance of detecting significant vulnerabilities” that in turn, according to another report, “could result in the waste or misuse of U.S. Government resources USAID evaluation as quoted and referenced in: “Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan,” A Majority Staff Report (Washington, DC: Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 8, 2011), 2.


Interview with author, anonymous U.S. government official, Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2012.

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James L. Jones, as quoted in Woodward, Obama’s Wars (2010), 165.


General Brent Scowcroft, Interview with Author, Washington, DC, July 17, 2012.


Scott Johnson, “U.S. Struggles to Find Honest Allies in Anti-Terror Hunt.”

Memos cited were from 2009, as quoted in “Wikileaks: US officials pressured Karzai to remove former warlord Ismail Khan for “corruption and ineffectiveness,” Associated Press, January 1, 2011.

Memos cited were from 2009, as quoted in “Wikileaks: US officials pressured Karzai to remove former warlord Ismail Khan for “corruption and ineffectiveness,” Associated Press, January 1, 2011.


Later, his area of responsibility for the Taliban expanded to include Kandahar and other regions in southern Afghanistan.


304 Interview with Senior Afghan government official, March 2012.
306 This was in reference to the government ‘losing’ 80 billion in tax revenue due to corruption. As quoted in, Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai In His Labyrinth,” New York Times Magazine, Aug 9, 2009.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

In particular since the Berlin Wall’s collapse, the profile of threats faced by states in the international system has shifted—from war between sovereign polities toward conflict and high levels of political violence within them. Such political violence and intra-state conflict are distinct in context and characteristics from inter-state war yet nonetheless threaten the survival of the peripheral regimes within whose borders they occur and create consequences that imperil great power interests in various ways. Faced with threats emanating from within weak polities, and like their response to hazards posed by external enemies, states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances (internal threat alliances) to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. Examples of these “internal threat alliances” include the cases examined in this dissertation—alliances between the U.S. and Colombia and the U.S. and Afghanistan. In each instance, the regime needed resources (military and economic) to secure core interests and thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power got involved to safeguard interests tied to the embattled regime.

These alliances differ fundamentally from those in which states align to balance a threat external to their borders. Even though the nature of alliance-making has thus evolved since the end of the Cold War, however, scholars have yet to update IR theory to account for and explain the more common form of alliances in the contemporary world. To help fill this gap in IR theory, in this dissertation I explained the core differences between traditional (external threat) and internal threat alliances and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened regime and its prospective alliance partner. The four differences examined were:
(1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align, (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it.

The dissertation is important to theory and policy. Regarding its scholarly contribution, it illustrated how the nature of alliance making has changed and—through detailing the four core differences—provided a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the dynamics of the more common type of alliance today. And it is important for guiding policy given that great powers will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with them today. Given that political violence and associated threats to regimes show no signs of abating, the dissertation is likely to remain increasingly relevant for theorists seeking to understand internal threat alliances and strategists debating whether to form them. Resulting from a complex interplay of factors such as state weakness and poverty, among others, peoples across the world are likely to continue to believe they have a right to rebel, have confidence in their ability to win, and thus develop or join insurgencies, rebel movements, or other illicit non-state actors to push their interests. Consequently, political violence including to the degree of internal war and associated threats posed to great powers/peripheral regimes are likely to endure—and therefore so too will internal threat alliances continue to be a central aspect of international relations as states seek ways in which to secure their interests in the face of such dangers.

This concluding chapter has three objectives. First, to summarize the dissertation’s main arguments and evidence from the cases that substantiates these points. Second, to outline future areas of research. And third and finally, to briefly discuss the dissertation’s
potential relevance to policy. Accordingly, the chapter proceeds in three core sections—one each to address these three items.

I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT:

CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES

This section summarizes the dissertation’s core arguments and evidence from the two examined cases to demonstrate the four ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from traditional military alliances. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today.

1. NATURE OF THREAT AND WHY STATES ALIGN: INTERNAL TO THE WEAK STATE, TO SAVE THE REGIME

First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat domestic in origin that imperils a regime. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is external in origin (another state or group of states) and imperils the state as a whole. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia and Afghanistan substantiate this core difference.
A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Balancing Narco-Terrorists and Insurgents to Safeguard the Regime, Associated U.S. Interests

In Colombia, the regime aligned because it needed military and economic resources to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from guerrillas and narco-traffickers, while the U.S. got involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability including: curbing drug flows onto American streets, maintaining access to oil reserves, and preserving stability in its “backyard,” among others. And in Afghanistan, the Karzai regime aligned because it needed capabilities to safeguard its political and economic priorities as well as thwart challenges to its existence from insurgents. As for the U.S., it needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch attacks (as Al-Qaeda did on September 11, 2001) and ensure access to natural resources in the region.

For the Colombia and Afghanistan cases—by the late 1980s in the former and 2002 in the latter—the core factor underlying alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. This is distinct from the core motivation underlying formation of traditional military alliances: to weaken or defeat an external enemy to secure the national interest and preserve territorial survival.

2. Characteristics of Allies: Internally Fragmented, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests

As the second core difference, while external threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation. The peripheral
ally’s major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct from great powers in traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions in the internal threat alliance (and therefore need to be accounted for in theory).

First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

Distinct to internal threat alliances, the great power does not deal with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with traditional alliances). Instead, the great power deals with a fragmented regime that sits atop but lacks control of its agencies and other subnational actors. Each of these actors has respective interests they seek pursue. Hence, these characteristics of states in internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies are essentially cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion and central governments that control all component parts. Combined with the nature and location of the threat, this requires expanding the relevant levels of analysis from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia and Afghanistan substantiate this core difference.
A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Fragmented Allies, Subnational Bases of Power Incentivize Bandwagoning

In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, both Colombia and Afghanistan lacked strong state institutions, firm control over those agencies that exist, or a writ that extended throughout their complex topography. In each alliance, the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling all its apparatus but, instead, a fragmented central regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components therein, and other subnational actors. Throughout each alliance, Colombian and Afghan regime agencies and components therein leveraged their autonomy and made decisions and used government resources to advance their interests—maximize resources or solidify patronage ties—over alliance goals. What is more, the further intra-fragmentation of regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency components (Police unit A, for example) were balancing the threat, but others (Police unit B) were simultaneously bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to understanding external threat alliances, the U.S. had to juggle dynamics between the central regime and a menagerie of agencies in order to secure its interests.

And in each case, the weaker ally’s internal political order was characterized by patron-client relations. In making decisions related to the alliance, regime actors at the national or subnational level prioritized the alternative which best enhanced their own power and influence (or that of their domestic client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals.

In Colombia, the history and trajectory of clientelism yielded two products that made regime actors choose their interests and patron-client relations over loyalty to the national interest (and thus subnational bandwagoning, over balancing) during the alliance.
First, it firmly entrenched and incentivized prioritizing increasing power/influence over the national interest and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “the allegiance…to patron was more basic than identification with an amorphous national identity known as Colombia.” And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national interest. Referred to as “political archipelagioes” (Kline 2007), mini “mafia” states (Vargas 2004), or regional “control systems,” these arguably approximate the “subsystems” Rosenau (1964) argued IR scholars must problematize when examining the link between political violence and international relations. These sub-systems based in maximizing personal power/influence over the national interest motivated regime agencies to contravene orders from the central regime: “It is at the regional and local level that the political archipelagioes are most evident with politicians from those areas with different power bases than the national president, hence at times likely to oppose (either overtly or covertly) what the chief executive is trying to do.”

And the history and trajectory of clientelism in Afghanistan had similar effects onto alliance dynamics. Particularly, this process yielded two products that pushed regime actors to prioritize and act to maximize their personal power/influence (as rooted in fealty to patron/client) over loyalty to the national interest or alliance goals.

First, it imbedded prioritizing increasing power/influence over alliance goals (or the national interest) and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “Rather than thinking of…effective or enabling decisive decision-making, Afghans consider all their actions in terms of kinship, patronage networks, and the complex society of which they are a part.”
And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national interest. Where in Colombia alternative fealties generated subnational “political archipelagoes,” in Afghanistan these created at any given time over the alliance period “sub-state political communities” (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009), “micro-societies of tribal power” (Sharan 2011), or “de facto states controlled by regional power-holders” (Wilder and Listed 2011).”6 And like the Colombia case, these subnational bases of power arguably approximate Rosenau’s “subsystems” (1964). They comprise a mix of the elite-based networks fused into government positions and the “local leaders and ethnic regional strongmen” that are “resistant to the project of building a nation-state” whose power is based on “financial and military strength, as well as personal, factional and historical loyalties”7

In sum, despite differences in history and other factors both Colombia and Afghanistan were fragmented nations characterized by subnational bases of political/economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime actors to contravene central regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. As a result, in both Colombia and Afghanistan the U.S. was dealing not with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with essentially cohesive states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a fragmented regime comprised of various actors each with their respective interests. This fragmented character enabled various regime actors to influence alliance dynamics.
3. Why and When Regime Actors Bandwagon: Simultaneous with Balancing and Motivated by Clientelism (and Survival, Profit)

As the third core difference, bandwagoning (appeasing a threat) in internal threat alliances is distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances. The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, balancing (resisting a threat) and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence. This contrasts with traditional alliances, where states either balance or bandwagon when faced with an external enemy. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon while the allies are together.

In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional alliances) the great power will manage relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power may need to bypass a bandwagoning central regime and work with other regime elements to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found
in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia and Afghanistan substantiates this core difference.

A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Bandwagoning to Survive, for Profit, and Patron

In both the Colombia and Afghanistan alliance cases, regime actors in the capital or subnational areas including police, military, governors, or central regime actors contravened alliance strategy and bandwagoned in order to survive, “for profit” (share in the spoils of victory), or to maximize their power/influence (as rooted in patron-client relations). In Colombia and pushed by these three motivations, regime elements bandwagoned by enabling forces fomenting violence to continue operating and in some cases, as with extortion of subnational officials, provided the FARC with alternative sources for capabilities. Such ties led officials and military/police officers to bandwagon by: avoiding specific areas, fighting half-heartedly, or simply not engaging at all. Officials and soldiers within the army and police turned a blind eye to the actions of narco-traffickers (passive bandwagoning), or in some cases actively assisted their operations through provision of information on Colombian government efforts (active bandwagoning). Similarly, in Afghanistan, regime elements bandwagoned by: turning a blind-eye or sending funds to insurgents; carrying out “green on blue” attacks and killing alliance personnel; accepting bribes or other financial incentives to ignore or aid activities by actors fomenting violence or engaged in drug-trafficking; and diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose and using them as a form of patronage (or to insurgents).

In each case, even as the U.S. and the central regime collaborated to balance guerrillas and narco-traffickers (in Colombia) or insurgents (in Afghanistan), that regime’s
agencies (and components parts therein) were \textit{simultaneously} bandwagoning with these actors. With regard to juggling relationships with multiple actors, over the course of the alliance with Colombia the U.S. managed relationships between cooperative central regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s presidency) or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. during Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning central regime and worked with the National Police to secure U.S. interests. And in Afghanistan, the U.S. juggled relationships between an initially somewhat cooperative central regime and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular after Karzai was re-elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to balancing/bandwagoning at the same time.

4. \textbf{Primary Ally Motivation in Response to Threats: Leaders of Threatened State Act in Their Interests, Not the National Interest}

As the fourth and final core difference, when determining what to do in response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on \textit{their own political survival} rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state. After forming an external threat alliance, states work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more “cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military
hardware, for example) the states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace (increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival.

Like traditional alliances, with internal threat alliances level of threat and resources will influence regime/great power ability to work together and defeat the common internal menace. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia and Afghanistan substantiate this core difference.

A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Regime Interests Trump National Interest

For the U.S.-Colombia alliance, cohesion was higher during the Pastrana (1998-2002) and Uribe (2002-2010) regimes partly because they viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to their political survival (compared to prior presidents, who oscillated between viewing full collaboration as a liability or asset). With regard to effectiveness, an increase in allies’ ability to pool resources enhanced their ability to weaken the internal threat—this was due to consistently high alliance cohesion from 1998 onward and an increase in available U.S. state power for the alliance. However, an additional factor that
increased effectiveness during the Pastrana/Uribe regimes was their consistent efforts to purge civilian and security agencies of actors’ bandwagoning with the narco-guerilla threat.

And in the U.S.-Afghanistan case, Hamid Karzai’s actions clearly show how internal threat alliances place the primary focus on the interests of the leader rather than the national interests of the state. Time after time, Karzai worked against the national interest of Afghanistan by subverting national institutions, appointing known corrupt officials, and cooperating with the drug trade, not because these actions benefited Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but because they helped keep him in power. This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated by the difference in Karzai’s actions before and after he was re-elected president, in 2009.

Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion declined because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-term. Karzai recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively
bandwagoning). After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.

With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, the inability of the U.S. and Afghanistan to amass sufficient resources played a part in their being unable to weaken or defeat the insurgents. However, Karzai’s insufficient efforts to curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness.

**The Argument: A Synopsis**

The cases examined in this dissertation clearly elucidates the four core ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances; and therefore the mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations regarding the more common form of alliance today. Rather than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard state security and territorial integrity, the U.S. and Afghanistan/Colombia aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s survival and American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (military, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with two extremely internally fragmented allies whose relevant actors/agencies often decided to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the national interest. Rather than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning in traditional alliances, some Afghan and Colombian agencies balanced insurgents or narco-traffickers while others were simultaneously colluding with the same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to respond to threats the Karzai regime and specific Colombian administrations largely did
not do what was best for their countries’ national interest but, instead, took those actions that would preserve their political and personal power.

II. Future Areas Of Research

This dissertation and the transformation in threat profile within the international system point to potential areas of future research. This includes additional studies on internal threat alliances as well as careful examination of other less formal modes of statecraft great powers may employ in the future in order to balance threats.

1. Additional Research on Internal Threat Alliances

Just as the academy enriched our understanding of the dynamics of external threat alliances—both “peacetime” and “wartime”—more can be done to understand what will likely be the more prominent form of alliance moving forward. As a first step and much the same as IR theory on traditional military alliances, the academy would benefit from stand-alone studies on internal threat alliance formation, bandwagoning, and cohesion. With regard to initial alignment, IR scholars could explore in greater depth the precipitating conditions that lead to internal threat alliances between great powers/weak regimes. One question studies might examine is why great powers select alliances over other forms of statecraft. This could take the form of statistical analysis over a large number of cases or, like this thesis, in-depth case study analysis of other alliances.

Similarly, IR theorists could examine in greater detail the various aspects of subnational bandwagoning present in internal threat alliances. Among other areas, research could problematize whether (and if so how) great powers have sought to curtail this regime behavior (or simply allowed it to transpire). Though it would include a more comparative politics lens, theorists could also construct a model including threat thresholds to determine
at what level regime actors choose to bandwagon (for survival) rather than work with the alliance to balance it.

More can also be done to understand variation in cohesion of internal threat alliances. As a starting point, scholars might construct a framework for gauging degree of internal fragmentation of weaker states. After developing a scale that assigns value to these degrees, they might employ quantitative analysis to determine across a broader set of cases the strength of relationship between internal fragmentation and cohesion. This dissertation would suggest that as fragmentation increases, cohesion should decline. Additionally, scholars might examine the influence of alliance duration on allies’ ability to devise strategy and tactics. This variable is referenced—though under examined—within the traditional alliance literature yet could provide useful insights for theory and policy alike.

Whether and if so why allies achieve their goal is equally important to understanding why alliances form in the first place; however, effectiveness has not received attention comparable to that given to other alliance dynamics. For offensive external and internal threat alliances alike, IR theory could benefit from analysis of variables aside from capabilities that determine alliance effectiveness. As this dissertation demonstrated, the weaker ally’s willingness and ability to promote unified balancing (to curb bandwagoning) influences whether the great power/regime are able to weaken the internal threat. Examination of other variables is warranted.

2. TRENDING TOWARD GREAT POWER DISENGAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD?

The trajectory of threats within the international system suggests that great powers in general and the U.S. particularly will likely continue employing internal threat alliances as part of their foreign policy toolkit. Threats emanating from the developing world show
no signs of abating—and in specific circumstances, powerful states will choose internal threat alliances in order to secure interests in the periphery. The same goes for rulers of weaker states in such regions—little if any evidence suggests that such leaders will face fewer threats, have more capabilities to thwart those they do, or be less motivated to stay in power and reap the associated spoils of government. For all of these reasons, peripheral regime leaders will likely continue pursuing alignment with great powers.

These points notwithstanding, dissertation research and current events suggest that, moving forward, such alliances may not have a monopoly on the statecraft options great powers select when they need to secure interests in the developing world. Specifically, the high costs and meager returns associated with such alliances—as well as waning public support at home for engagement abroad—suggest that powerful states may turn to less formal or visible modes of statecraft.

With regard to costs, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the U.S. expended tremendous blood and treasure for what some would deem inadequate returns—in the former, failure to secure a long-term security agreement that would have helped safeguard the U.S. against terrorist attacks emanating from the central Asian state; and in Iraq an increasingly unstable country ruled by a regime seemingly keen on accepting U.S. arms but less willing to cooperate on regional security or grant U.S. companies energy deals. This is not to mention the thousands of Iraqi and Afghan lives lost in both locations.

Coupled with this unfavorable cost/benefit ratio is an American public less eager to engage abroad. At the time of this writing, public opinion seems to be shifting against employing high cost/visibility engagements in the developing world—consequently, elected politicians and those policy-makers they appoint may also be pulled away from
such engagements and toward employing other methods to secure American interests in these areas. In 2013, the U.S. public was more reluctant than ever before to engage overseas: 52 percent of Americans agreed their country should “let other countries get along the best they can on their own,” according to Pew. This represents the highest proportion in favor of the U.S. “minding its own business” since polling on the subject began 50 years ago. Americans’ enthusiasm for supporting democracy in Middle East’s “Arab Spring” transitions also curbed—63 percent polled said having stable regimes in the Middle East and North Africa was more important than democracy taking root there.

Officials and policy-makers control the purse strings of government; however, years expending blood and treasure abroad render domestic stakeholders weary of such endeavors, and those they elect (generally) follow suit. As President Barack Obama said in a 2011 address to the American people in which he announced 33,000 troops would be removed from Afghanistan: “Over the last decade, we have spent $1 trillion on war, at a time of rising debt and hard economic times…America, it is time to focus on nation-building here at home.” The Obama administration’s calibration toward “nation building at home” tracks prior such statecraft patterns and may suggest that internal threat alliances will be rarer moving forward.

Combined, these trends suggest that great powers, and especially the United States, may in the future turn toward less binding/formal modes of statecraft—options perhaps deemed less costly and more palatable to public opinion. This could include approaches already employed such as raids by highly-trained Special Forces Units to eliminate terrorist threats or less comprehensive and more focused assistance to finite weak state bureaucratic agencies (the army and police, among others).
Reticence to unilaterally bear the burden of alliance costs may push great powers to find other means as well—this could include working through sufficiently capable regional allies to curb consequences of political violence. Just as we are seeing a shift to “regionalization” of world trade—from the still pending Transatlantic Trade and Partnership Initiative (TTIP) to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—it is not unreasonable to think the same may come true for balancing threats and conflict management. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, should political violence imperil U.S. access to oil stores or expatriates living there, the U.S. may opt to work with and through a regional power (such as South Africa) or organization (the African Union) rather than putting U.S. boots on the ground.

These preliminary trends/developments suggest that IR scholars should consider three potential areas of research in addition to further examining internal threat alliances. First, scholars should look for increased use of Special Forces and seek to understand the politics of such interventions. For example, they may seek to understand the precipitating conditions that lead great powers to select this option rather than more comprehensive alliances. Yet, scholars must also examine this issue from the weaker state’s perspective. As this dissertation demonstrated, despite being weaker in traditional power measures the regimes who rule developing states can influence the trajectory of internal threat alliance outcomes.

Accordingly and as the second area of further inquiry, IR scholars would be well served to problematize whether and if so how regime rulers seek to influence great powers’ decisions vis-à-vis statecraft—that is, whether countries such as the U.S. and France prefer and employ internal threat alliances (and bring the abundance of resources that come along...
with them) or scaled down versions thereof. This dissertation would suggest that such regimes would prefer and therefore push for the former, yet more research is required to validate this assumption.

Third and finally, IR scholars should carefully track the potential “regionalization” of threat balancing. Like other areas of inquiry above, scholars could examine why great powers decide to work through regional powers rather than go it alone—via an internal threat alliance or less visible form of engagement.

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy relevance of this dissertation is evidenced at least in part by the trajectory of the principal form of mass organized violence in the international system—a transition from inter-state conflict and toward greater intra-state political violence. To be sure, future wars between states cannot be ruled out. The diffusion of power and accompanying “rise” of China and other “emerging” powers may point—in the long-term—to greater competition over resources and interests. And as some analysis in the field of power transition suggests, a reigning hegemon (such as the U.S. now) may choose to engage in preventative war to curb the ascent of a rising challenger. Just as states formed alliances to balance external threats before, they may do so again. And this points to the continued policy-relevance of the extant literature on traditional military alliances.

At the same time, the threats states face today come more from within the borders of weak polities than from other states. And these menaces pose core challenges to states’ interests that will continue to drive them to form alliances to balance such threats. Moving forward, then, the generalizable insights this dissertation presented should help great power policy-makers as they navigate alliances with other weaker states—both alliances already
formed and as they debate whether to form such alliances anew. Four potential areas of policy relevance stand out.

First, the dissertation suggests that great power policy makers should alter expectations/assumptions that weaker allies will balance in a unified manner, as is the case when two states come together to deter or defeat a common external enemy. With internal threat alliances, the major internal fragmentation of the peripheral ally—and the clientelistic relationships that undergird power dynamics (financial and political) therein—mean that the unified balancing commonplace with traditional alliances cannot be assumed. Instead, the great power should assume that some ally actors will balance the target threat while others bandwagon with it. Simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning—instead of unified balancing—is the norm for internal threat alliances. And great power policy makers should devise their strategies accordingly.

Second, the dissertation suggests that in specific circumstances great powers might be better off opting for a form of statecraft other than an alliance in order to secure their interests. In the event a state’s internal fragmentation is so deep so as to suggest no possible way to facilitate sufficient unified balancing, the great power should question the utility of forming an alliance with that regime. This suggests that policy-makers would be well suited to perform in-depth analysis and intelligence gathering on their potential regime ally’s internal make-up—particularly, whether its core bureaucratic agencies have intra-fragmentation that could lead to factions contravening agreed strategy by bandwagoning with the target threat as opposed to balancing it. In hindsight, the Afghanistan case points to this insight.
Third, my findings suggests that policy-makers should carefully weigh the interests—short and long-term—of their central regime ally. Particularly, they must recognize that such leaders align not to thwart threats in general or advance their country’s national interest in particular—but rather to consolidate their authority and remain in power. Again, the Afghanistan case points to this peril, for the period examined and thereafter. At the time of this writing, Hamid Karzai continues to prioritize his survival over the Afghan national interest and in so doing hinder alliance ability to achieve its goals. Most recently, this manifested as Karzai rejecting a bi-lateral security agreement (BSA) with the U.S. that would have allowed a long-term presence of American troops to stabilize the country. In spite of formal Afghan institutions (a Loya Jirga) approving the agreement (because it was in the Afghan national interest)—and Afghan Army officials publicly calling for Karzai to sign such a BSA—Karzai refused to sign because doing so went against his own priorities.\textsuperscript{11} A few months later, Karzai released some 50 Taliban prisoners—despite concerns from the U.S. and his own national security apparatus regarding the implications of just such a release for renewed violence there.\textsuperscript{12} In such cases, the less formal or visible modes of engagement discussed above—from smaller scale Special Forces operations to working through sufficiently powerful regional allies—might be more appropriate than full alignment and the transfer of resources associated therewith.

Fourth and finally, the dissertation suggests that (for internal threat alliances) capabilities alone are not sufficient to shift the balance in favor of the threatened regime and secure great power interests. A core assumption underlying great power strategies as it relates to traditional military alliances has been that should states A and B pool sufficient resources to shift the balance in favor of alliance A-B and against threat T, then A-B should
prove victorious. In other words, capabilities are the recipe for a highly effective traditional alliance. With internal threat alliances, however, this assumption does not hold. The peripheral regime’s actors may—or may not—apply alliances resources against the target threat. As a result, great powers would be well served to devote more attention to pushing regime actors to balance rather than performing force ratio calculations.

**Final Thoughts**

Political violence and state responses to such threats are issues relevant to IR theory and human well-being more broadly. As we continue into an age where the principal threat to states will likely be political violence and consequences emanating from within polities, as opposed to state-on-state violence in the territories or sea lanes of the international system, this dissertation will hopefully provide theorists and policy-makers a mechanism via which to make predictions regarding and understand the dynamics of state responses to these threats. Alliance making has been a core tenet of statecraft for centuries. This dissertation aimed to help understand what is likely to be the more common form of alliance moving forward.
ENDNOTES—CHAPTER FIVE

3 Coined by Kline (2007), “political archipelagoes” refers to the presence of “an assortment of regional political systems, with a variety of ‘disorganized organizations,’ including the guerrillas groups, the paramilitary squads, and the government itself…within each region different groups accrue wealth…through the drug-trade, others through selling their abilities to threaten or punish with violence.” Similarly, Ricardo Vargas (2004) contends that in such regions a “spirit Mafioso” has developed that stands as a contestation to central power and expresses a “sentiment that arises from a belief that an individual can be assured the protection and integrity of their person and property through their own worth and influence, independent of the actions of the authorities of the law.” “Regional Control Systems” was a term used by an interviewee.
9 As quoted in Scott Wilson, “Obama announces plan to bring home 33,000 ‘surge’ troops from Afghanistan,” June 22, 2011.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

U.S.-COLOMBIA INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 1980-2010

APPENDIX 1.1 – DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL

APPENDIX 1.2 – DESCRIPTION OF HOW ALLIANCE RESOURCES ENABLED REGIME TO WEaken guerrillas and Narco-Traffickers

APPENDIX 1.3 – TABLES – THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES

APPENDIX 1.1

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL


The purpose of this Annex and the discussion below is to briefly summarize information provided in the tables in Annex 1.3, indicating that the threat level remained high through the end of Ernesto Samper’s presidency (1994-1998) and therefore that alliance effectiveness was low.

The number of insurgent forces aiming to topple the regime swelled through 1998: the FARC from a few hundred adherents to 17,000 soldiers and the ELN from a few dozen to 4,500.¹ Insurgents leveraged their increased size to seize and take control of more territory, reflecting an increased threat to the regime. In the late 1970s the FARC controlled select key areas amounting to a few hundred hectares; by the late 1990s, it occupied 40-50

¹ BBC News “Colombia Seizes 'key Farc Data’” September 23, 2008; and Government Accountability Office, Report Number 09-71 (Plan Colombia) to Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 2008. The AUC also grew during this period.
percent of all Colombian territory. Reflecting the proximity of threat to the regime, by 1998 the FARC was active in 70 percent of municipalities in the department of Cundinamarca, which surrounds the capital. Partly due to their increased territorial reach, the FARC increased drug-linked revenues to $551 annually by 1998. Intensity of the conflict reflected in total annual deaths is also indicative of the threat to the regime and U.S. interests. From 1988 to 1999 fatalities never fell below 1,200 and rose from 1,236 (1989) to 1,582 (1996) and then 2,710 (1999). By 1999 Colombia was in a state of “hyper-violence” with 30,000 murders per year. 

The efficiency and brazen nature of insurgent attacks also evidence that the proximity and intensity of threat to the regime remained high through 1998: “most observers in Colombia and the United States considered the security situation grave.” This “grave” scenario and associated threat level is reflected in a FARC attack in El Billar in Caqueta department (260 miles from Bogota) where 500 insurgents killed 62 soldiers from one of Colombia’s most elite brigades. In August 1998 alone, the FARC completed 55 raids onto key regime targets across 18 departments including a U.S.-funded police outpost 250 miles from Bogota where 600 FARC destroyed the base. A few months later, more than 1,000 FARC soldiers crushed a contingent of 150 police and held a town (Mitu) for

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nearly three days. Combined, these statistics indicate that the alliance between the U.S. and Colombia was by 1998 largely unable to weaken the internal threat to the point it no longer represented a threat to the regime and U.S. interests.


This discussion briefly summarizes information provided in the tables in Annex 1.3 for Chapter three, indicating that the threat level decreased by the end of Alvaro Uribe’s second term (2010) and therefore that alliance effectiveness was moderate to high by the end of the period examined.

Representing a decreased threat to the Colombian regime, the FARC’s size declined from an all-time high in 1998 to fewer than 8,000 in 2009 due to deaths (by the Military and Police) and defections (which increased by 2,000 percent). Coupled with this decline in force size, the FARC lost several high level commanders to alliance operations including its second-in-command, Raul Reyes (2007), and three members of its central committee (2008). The ELN decreased in size by more than half through 2009.

The number of opposition attacks also decreased consistently through 2009. FARC attacks declined by 86 percent from 2002 to 2009 and ELN-initiated attacks decreased by 90 percent during the same period. Other forms of violence belligerents used to fund

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11 Due to defections (2,000 For these statistics see table on Level of Threat in the Annex.
14 This data according to a security analyst based in Bogota and the Colombian Ministry of defense.
15 *BBC News* “Colombia Seizes ‘key Farc Data’” September 23, 2008; see also Government Accountability Office, Report Number 09-71 (Plan Colombia) to Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 2008.
16 As reflected in the associated table on Level of threat.
operations also declined including acts of “terrorism” [from 1,645 (2000) to 46 (2009)]\(^\text{17}\) and kidnappings [849 (2000) to less than 120 (2006)].\(^\text{18}\) Protecting oil interests was a core factor motivating U.S. alignment, and attacks onto oil pipelines decreased from 110 in 2000 to 17 in 2005.\(^\text{19}\)

The opposition’s control of territory also declined and by 2008 the government controlled 90 percent of territory, up from 70 percent (2007) and 50-60 percent (early 1990s).\(^\text{20}\) Significantly, by 2009 the regime controlled the Department of Macarena, once the primary FARC stronghold.\(^\text{21}\) FARC-controlled municipalities also decreased from 54 (1998) to 15 (2001) and then to two (2008) and nine (2009). Municipalities with some presence or under some threat (not under opposition control) decreased by more than half through 2009.\(^\text{22}\) Reflecting a decline in the proximity of threat to the Colombian regime, by 2009 the FARC had no presence (aside from intermittent attacks) in urban areas and was operational mainly in remote border locations.\(^\text{23}\) In 2003 the Colombian military “ended the threat to Bogota” in the “largest, most complex, and most successful operation conducted by Colombian forces.”\(^\text{24}\) The number of municipalities under ELN control


\(^\text{21}\) John Otis, “After dominating southern Colombia for years, numerous setbacks deal serious blows to FARC; Putting rebels on the run,” Houston Chronicle (South America Bureau), June 15, 2008.

\(^\text{22}\) Interview, Colombian Ministry of Defense official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012.


declined as well: from 13 (1998), to 8 (2000) and then two (2009). FARC profits from cocaine also declined. Combined, these statistics indicate that by the time Uribe stepped down the alliance was largely able to weaken the threat to the point it no longer imperiled the regime and U.S. interests.

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25 See table on FARC strength.
APPENDIX 1.2

DESCRIPTION OF HOW ALLIANCE RESOURCES ENABLED REGIME TO WEAKEN GUERRILLAS AND NARCO-TRAFFICKERS

The purpose of this Annex and the below discussion is to briefly summarize how the increase in capabilities aggregated by the allies – particularly though Plan Colombia – enabled Colombia to weaken the internal threat. Further details on the amount of resources amassed through the alliance can be found in the tables provided in Annex 1.3.

By the end of the 1990s, the alliance had not pooled resources sufficient to weaken actors threatening regime survival because those agencies charged with balancing the threat lacked the size and material to do so. “The irregular guerrilla war that the military was fighting” was “difficult to win” without creating “mobile ground forces” supported “by an effective air force and navy.”26 Neither of the allies “was willing to assume these costs.”27 Though Colombia’s Army had 146,000 soldiers it was, according to a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, “basically a barracks military,” not “organized to go after the guerrillas,” and essentially “a reaction force, and not a very mobile one at that.”28 Colombia’s Air Force was similarly ill-equipped, making it a “fair-weather, daytime” force.”29 The National Police was better equipped, with 87,000 members, 56 helicopters, and 17 fixed-wing aircraft but, even so, unable to deploy to the majority of Colombian municipalities.30 As a Ministry of Defense official noted, “we simply didn’t have the manpower” and this enabled “the FARC and other actors to expand their control of and

activities in vast expanses of territory.” While the regime was “starved of revenues” due to the recession and “sharp reduction” of aid, belligerents “captured hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from drugs.” The threat remained.

Beginning with Pastrana’s election, Colombia and the U.S. were able to consistently work together on all facets of the alliance. For the Pastrana and Uribe regimes, core interests fully aligned with balancing the narco-traffickers and belligerents and doing so required obtaining capabilities from the U.S. In contrast to the fragmented cohesion across prior presidential regimes, during this period cohesion was consistently high and enabled the allies to steadily work together to amass resources and implement strategy. In part due to these resources, higher than those amassed from 1980-1997 (see Annex 1.3 for summary), the regime’s military forces increased in size, effectiveness, and mobility: “the security forces that had been not up to the task of confronting and defeating the insurgents in 1998 dominated the countryside; attacked an enemy reduced in strength by combat actions, desertions, and government programs; and conducted successful hostage rescues and high-value target attacks that demonstrated skillful, professional planning and execution based on actionable intelligence, capable units, and rapid reaction.” In turn, these actors were able to weaken the sources of violence to the point they no longer posed a core threat to Colombia’s survival and U.S. interests. These capabilities seemed to have tipped the balance in favor of the alliance due to three factors.

First, alliance resources enabled the Colombian government to drastically increase the number of professional soldiers and mobile units trained in tactics specific to balancing

the internal threat (the police and military doubled to a combined 500,000 members)\textsuperscript{34} and, as a result, to augment the strength, frequency, and success rate of operations.\textsuperscript{35} With such capabilities the regime was able to carry out *Plan Patriota* and, with more helicopters, deploy more forces with greater frequency and geographic spread to engage and defeat the guerrillas.

Second, military hardware and intelligence gathering technology transferred to Colombia enhanced the security forces’ effectiveness. Military capabilities (and their impact) include: transfer of logistics and communications equipment (Army more able to coordinate activities and raids); provision of a real-time intelligence through an established satellite-enabled surveillance system (security forces more able to track and target the internal threat); transfer of radar systems to the military (Army more able to track guerrilla force movements); training and armaments for Army units targeting guerrillas (skills enhanced battlefield effectiveness).\textsuperscript{36}

Third and finally, alliance resources to the National Police enabled the regime to increase state presence throughout the country. The aforementioned decline in guerrilla presence and increase in government control (Annex 1.1) should be viewed in the context of increase capacity and presence of the National Police beginning in 2002 and then 2004, the first time the Police had presence in *all* Colombian municipalities.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} For an overview of this assistance, see “Ramsey III, “From El Billar,”” (2009).\textsuperscript{160}.
\textsuperscript{36} On these intelligence gathering capabilities, see: Spencer, et al, *Colombia’s Road to Recovery* (2011), 29.
### APPENDIX 1.3

**TABLES—THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES**

Table 3.1: Level of Threat to Colombia and the U.S.: Force Size, Number of Attacks, and Control of Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Force Size – Number Troops</th>
<th>Fronts</th>
<th>Number of Armed Actions</th>
<th>Municipal Capitals Under Opposition Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>ELN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4,280</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6,500(7,000)</td>
<td>3,300 (3,000)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6,600 (7,000)</td>
<td>4,000(3,000)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,700(8-12,000)</td>
<td>4,500 (3-5,000)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10-12,000 (8-12,000)</td>
<td>4,400-4500(3-6,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Est. 10,000(9-12,000)</td>
<td>Est. 5,000(3-6,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17,000(9-12,000)</td>
<td>Est. 5,000(3-6,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17,000(9-12,000)</td>
<td>Est. 3,500(3-5,000)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Up to 18,000 (9-12,000)</td>
<td>Est. 3,500 (3,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18,000(9-12,000)</td>
<td>Est. 3,500 (3,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18,000(15,000)</td>
<td>4,000(3,000)</td>
<td>60 (crisis)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12,000+(15,000)</td>
<td>3,000(3,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12,000+(9-12,000)</td>
<td>3,000(3,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12,000+(9-12,000)</td>
<td>3,000(2,000)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10-11,000 (9-12,000)</td>
<td>(2,000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Colombia for Use to Balance Internal Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Military Capabilities Aggregated</th>
<th>Total Economic Capabilities Aggregated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td>50,015,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>9,515,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20,830,000</td>
<td>6,112,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>7,590,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>46,980,000</td>
<td>15,253,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,390,000</td>
<td>20,329,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>20,325,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,350,000</td>
<td>20,572,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>17,106,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>96,720,000</td>
<td>17,704,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>140,360,000</td>
<td>32,558,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81,170,000</td>
<td>31,187,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>84,530,000</td>
<td>35,246,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>43,320,000</td>
<td>72,130,824</td>
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### Table 3.4: Breakdown of Military Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Colombia for Use to Balance Internal Threat

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APPENDIX TWO

U.S.-AFGHANISTAN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 2001-2012

APPENDIX 2.1 – DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL

APPENDIX 2.2 – DESCRIPTION OF HOW INCREASED CAPABILITIES ENABLED REGIME TO WEaken guerrillas and narco-traffickers

APPENDIX 2.3 – TABLES – THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES

APPENDIX 2.1

DESCRIPTION OF THREAT LEVEL

A. Demonstrating the Continued Threat to Regime Survival, U.S. Interests

The purpose of this Annex and the discussion below is to briefly summarize information provided in the tables in Annex 2.3 for Chapter four, indicating that the threat level remained moderate to high through the period examined and therefore that alliance effectiveness was low.

The number of insurgent forces aiming to topple the regime increased by 800% from 2002 to 2009 and reached 36,000 in 2010. In tandem with this growth, the “organizational capabilities and operational reach” of the insurgents were “qualitatively and geographically expanding.” The insurgency had capacity sufficient to “sustain itself indefinitely” and retained access to a multiplicity of reliable sources for funding. In

1 See table on Level of Threat to Afghanistan regime in the index. These numbers are further corroborated by U.S. government sources. Two illustrative examples are: (1) In 2009 and soon after beginning his 60-day Afghanistan review, as requested by Obama, McChrystal himself said that there “are 25,000” Taliban in Afghanistan and that this figure was “higher than anything” he had previously estimated the number to be. As quoted in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (2010), 133.; and (2) A U.S. estimate published in 2009 put the number of insurgents in Afghanistan at 25,000, the highest number since initial engagement in 2001. Jonathan S. Landay and Hal Bernton, “While U.S. Debates Afghanistan Policy, Taliban Beef Up,” McClatchy Newspapers Report, October 16, 2009.


tandem with this increase in size, the insurgent attacks onto regime and U.S. targets escalated: by 400% (2002 to 2006), 4 51 percent (2007 to 2008), 5 with all but two provinces experiencing a rise in attacks over this period, 6 and a further 300 percent through 2009. 7 Weekly attacks in 2010 were the highest since the beginning of the alliance, 8 average monthly attacks escalated by 41 percent over the next two years (and never below 1,500). 9 Through the period examined attacks occurred with “much greater frequency” and in more “varied locations”. 10

Beginning around 2003 insurgents steadily increased presence in and control of territory, representing an escalation in threat to Karzai’s regime—centrally and subnationally. In 2004, the UN designated 33 percent of the country as “high risk” for their staff. Northern provinces remained relatively stable but the “situation in the south and southeast” was “more complex,” 11 with insurgents “operating openly” in Zabul and

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4 These figures are summarized in Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency,” (2008), 7.
6 Some provinces experienced a decrease in insurgent activity, but they were either relatively inactive previously (Sari Pul province, which decreased from 15 to 2 attacks) or experienced what we might consider rather marginal decreases (Balk province, where the total number of attacks decreased only by three from 44 to 41). These figures are drawn from Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghan Index – 2009,” Brookings (2009).
8 This number was 1,100. These figures are drawn from Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghan Index – March 2012” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 21, 2009). Accessed March 2012.
Uruzgan provinces, among others.\textsuperscript{12} On the heels of the insurgency’s further spread, in 2007 the regime controlled “a very small portion of Afghanistan” (Kabul and some southern/western areas) and “much of the country” was under the influence of either “armed local leaders” or insurgent forces.\textsuperscript{13} The same year, the UN designated 84 percent of territory as “high risk” and\textsuperscript{14} insurgents functioned “fairly freely” in Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktia, and Kunar provinces, among others.\textsuperscript{15} Challenging the regime’s authority (national and subnational) the Taliban sought to establish alternative governments in Afghanistan’s provinces; and these “shadow governors” increased by 200 percent from 2005 to 2009 (11/34 to 33/34 provinces).\textsuperscript{16} Territory with a “permanent” insurgent presence also increased from 54 percent (2007) to 72 percent (2008) and then again in 2009 to 80 percent.\textsuperscript{17} Early in 2010, the Taliban was active in more than one-third of Afghanistan’s 400 districts, up from 2001 when they had a “negligible presence in the country.”\textsuperscript{18} Regime control over southern provinces (particularly Helmand and Kandahar) remained particularly tenuous\textsuperscript{19} and the Taliban had “gained de facto control over many

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{13} These “insurgent forces” included mainly the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-I Islami. Abdulkader H. Sino, \textit{Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 262.
\textsuperscript{14} As another reflection of the change in threat level through 2007—where the UN agencies were able to operate freely throughout approximately 60-70 percent of the territory comprising Southern Afghanistan from 2004-2005, in 2006 they were able to operate ‘freely’ in only 6 (of 50) of the same region’s districts. What is more, Taliban-initiated attacks and riots in the capital increased the proximity of threat to the regime in 2006. As quoted in Hafeez Malik, \textit{U.S. Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan} (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31.
\textsuperscript{15} Sino, \textit{Organizations at War}, (2008), 262.
\textsuperscript{17} See table on Level of Threat to Afghanistan regime in the Index
\textsuperscript{18} Michael E. O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, \textit{Toughing it out in Afghanistan} (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 78.
\textsuperscript{19} An analysis in 2012 based on extensive fieldwork, for example, concluded it had “become increasingly clear that ISAF is unable to dislodge the Taliban from its strongholds in the south and east.” “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition,” Crisis Group (2012), 16.
\end{flushleft}
outlying areas in Kandahar,” leaving “Afghanistan’s second-largest city…cut off from Kabul.”

Afghanistan’s seat of government and Karzai himself also remained under duress, as attacks and assassination attempts in Kabul occurred regularly through 2012. Illustrating the proximity of threat to the central regime, by 2008 the insurgency had fronts in areas of provinces that are within a 60-minute drive of the presidential palace. By 2009 at least 80 districts had to be secured “in order to weaken the insurgency enough that it would no longer pose a threat to the central government [emphasis mine].” Insurgents continued reaping revenue from the opium trade that (by 2006) provided more than 70 percent of Taliban funding and (through 2010) roughly $150 million annually to insurgents.

The efficiency and brazen nature of insurgent attacks also evidence that the threat to the regime remained high. According to a 2006 CIA assessment, the insurgency was a greater threat “than at any point since late 2001.” The Taliban’s response to “Operation Medusa” (2006 in Kandahar) and the military assets uncovered thereafter bring to life this dire assessment. Over several days of fighting where more than 500 Taliban were killed and 160 captured, the insurgents discharged 4,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 RPGs, and 1,000 mortars. After the fighting stopped, ally forces uncovered 1 million rounds of ammunition, a fully-stocked field hospital, and a facility for training suicide bombers. Nearly ten years after the alliance began, insurgent forces could execute sophisticated and effective attacks in Kabul. In 2010, for example, insurgents battled Afghan forces for five

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Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, (2012), 103.
22 Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 74.
23 See table in Annex on Level of threat.
25 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (2009), 364.

322
hours a mere 200 yards from the presidential palace\textsuperscript{26} in “one of the most dramatic attacks on Kabul” since the Taliban’s demise” in 2001.\textsuperscript{27} In September 2011, the Taliban staged a 20-hour siege on regime buildings in Kabul—located near the U.S. embassy—and soon thereafter orchestrated the elaborate assassination of the Chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council.\textsuperscript{28} The week before this author visited Afghanistan, insurgents infiltrated the Ministry of Interior and assassinated top level officials.

These statistics and examples indicate that by the end of the period examined the alliance was largely unable to weaken the threat to the point that it no longer endangered the regime and U.S. interests.

\textsuperscript{27} Lynne O’Donnell, “Kabul on high alert after brazen Taliban strikes,” \textit{AFP}, January 18, 2010
\textsuperscript{28} “Afghan peace council head Rabbani killed in attack,” \textit{BBC News}, September 20, 2011.
APPENDIX 2.2

DESCRIPTION OF HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES ENABLED INSURGENTS TO CONTINUE OPERATING

“ Afghanistan was a mission that in past years was poorly defined and under-resourced. ”29
U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry

The purpose of this Annex and the below discussion is to briefly summarize how the insufficient capabilities pooled through the alliance contributed to the allies’ inability to weaken the internal threat. Further details on the amount of resources amassed via the alliance can be found in the tables provided in Annex 2.3.

By the end of Obama’s first term, the alliance had not aggregated capabilities sufficient to weaken actors threatening the regime’s survival because those agencies and armed forces charged with balancing the internal threat lacked the force size and material to do so. Specifically, the alliance did not enhance the capacity of Afghan Army and Police forces to independently and consistently weaken actors threatening the regime’s survival.30

Despite obtaining one alliance strategy objective and growing the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) troops by more than 2,000 percent, by 2010 the ANA remained unable to consistently thwart insurgent challenges due to “chronic shortfalls in training personnel, faulty equipment, slow infrastructural development, poor logistics, and the crippling army attrition rates.”31 Not a single Army unit was assessed as “capable of conducting its mission” without U.S. assistance as of September 2010. The proportion of Army units

29 Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, December 8, 2009, 2.
30 Other assessments fault the U.S. for not deploying sufficient troops; and others argue that the (counterinsurgency) strategy was flawed from the beginning.
capable of conducting “independent actions” increased in 2012, though only to 7 percent of the total force. And according to a separate analysis “the majority” of Army units were by 2012 “unable to meet even the most basic operational benchmarks, particularly in the crucial areas of supply, logistics and air support.” Capacity shortcomings in turn “limit[ed]” the Army’s ability to “project force” beyond “large urban areas and logistical hubs.” Looking ahead, an assessment concluded it “highly improbable” the ANA would be able to alone safeguard the regime and balance insurgent threats.

Like the Army, the Afghan National Police (ANP) increased in size but most assessments concluded that it remained too small to extend control across Afghanistan and ineffective to consistently balance threats. By 2008, for example, not a single unit received a score/assessment of “fully capable” of ensuring stability and thwarting threats and roughly 60 percent of units received the lowest possible score. Toward the end of this period the Afghan Minister of Interior bluntly said: “the Police is supposed to get to grips with terrorism, criminality, and narcotics” but is simply “not up to the job.” The picture remained largely the same through 2012, when nine percent of Police were deemed fully capable of conducting “independent actions.”

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34 The assessment lists the following improvements: According to an assessment performed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, by 2012 the security forces had “proven more capable and better coordinated in responding to sustained high-profile attacks in Kabul…and improved their capability to secure roads and critical transportation corridors in the country’s north.”
36 For these figures and annual breakdowns see Table in Annex - Size of Afghanistan’s Security Forces and Annual Expenditures
capable of “independent actions.”\textsuperscript{40} Collectively, capabilities aggregated were insufficient to shift the balance in favor of the regime and weaken the threat to the point it no longer represented a core threat to their security.

APPENDIX 2.3

TABLES - THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES

Table 4.1: Level of Threat to Afghanistan and the U.S.: Force Size, Number of Attacks, and Control of Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Insurgent Forces</th>
<th>Number of Armed Actions</th>
<th>Insurgent Revenue from Opium (millions $USD)</th>
<th>Territory with Permanent or Substantial Insurgent Presence</th>
<th>Territory with Percentage of Afghanistan under substantial Taliban presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>(4000)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1000 (7000/0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>(9500)</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,000(12,5000)</td>
<td>5,475</td>
<td>$90-$160m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,000(17,000)</td>
<td>7,665</td>
<td>$90-$160m</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,125</td>
<td>$90-$160m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>12,775</td>
<td>$100-$500m</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>31,025</td>
<td>$100-$150m</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>32,850</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Table provides data that reflects the level of threat to the allies—both intensity and proximity. For specific years and as reflected by ‘-’ data were available for specific years. Due to the political nature of the conflict and associated reporting on these indicators—in particular the number of insurgent troops and attacks—where possible data from multiple sources are included. The sources used for the measure are as follows. Number of Insurgent Forces: The figures provided are drawn from the following sources and refer mainly to the Taliban yet also include other insurgent forces. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Columbia University Press: New York. 2008. Parentheses indicate estimates by author. In addition to the Taliban, the two other insurgency groups in Afghanistan that are commonly cited by experts are Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network. Regarding Hezb-i-Islami the numbers are listed as “unknown” by the START program at the University of Maryland. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Data: Hizb-I-Islam.” University of Maryland. (Accessed March 20, 2013); The Washington post lists both Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network as approximately containing 1,000 members each. (Tyson, Ann Scott. “A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan.” The Washington Post. June 15, 2008. However, Reuters lists their numbers as closer to 4,000. (Ferris, Rotman, Amie. “Haqqani Network Behind Afghan Attacks: U.S. Envoy.” Reuters. April 19, 2012.Number of Armed Actions: These data reflect the annual number of “enemy-initiated” attacks against Afghan- or non-Afghan forces including direct and indirect fire, IED attacks, kidnapping, and any other such attacks. Data for this factor varies widely depending on the source. The annual totals listed reflect the middle point between the range of total number of attacks provided by sources. United States Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. Washington. Government Printing Office. Jan 2011 Characterized as “Enemy initiated attacks “ without breakdown as to type (kidnapping, explosions, etc.); Territory with Permanent or Substantial Insurgent Presence: Permanent presence is defined as areas that have had an average of at least one insurgent attack a week-this include both lethal and non-lethal; Substantial presence is defined as areas that have had an average of at least one insurgent attack a month- also both lethal and non-lethal. Sources for this data include: International Council on Security and Development: “ICOS Maps.” (accessed January 28, 2013). Presence data determined based on public reports of level of daily insurgent activity/attacks. Gaps in the data exist between 2001 and 2006. This may be attributable to many things, including perceptions within the U.S. of a resurgence. According to the Government Accountability Office: “Security and
stability in Afghanistan have deteriorated in the past 3 years. In the first several years of the war, Afghanistan was relatively stable and secure and attacks by Taliban insurgency on U.S. soldiers were rare. However, since 2006, the insurgency has reasserted itself, resulting in an escalation of violence, especially against U.S. and coalition forces.” (Government Accountability Office. *Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.* (Washington, D.C. March 25, 2009), 11. According to Jane’s Defense and Security: “While initially offering only low-level opposition to the new government of President Hamid Karzai, since 2006 there has been a significant escalation in Taliban operations, with the group carrying out an intensifying asymmetric insurgency.” (Jane’s Defense and Security. “World Insurgency and Terrorism: Taliban” Accessed March 21, 2013.
Table 4.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Afghanistan for Use to Balance Internal Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Military Capabilities Aggregated</th>
<th>Total Economic Capabilities Aggregated</th>
<th>Total Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,420,000</td>
<td>25,360,000</td>
<td>28,780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70,310,000</td>
<td>3,964,428,000</td>
<td>4,034,738,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>417,920,000</td>
<td>618,750,000</td>
<td>1,036,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>627,260,000</td>
<td>1,512,233,000</td>
<td>2,139,493,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>823,840,000</td>
<td>1,569,780,000</td>
<td>2,393,620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,050,720,000</td>
<td>1,838,330,000</td>
<td>3,889,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,082,703,000</td>
<td>1,838,980,000</td>
<td>5,921,683,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,375,880,000</td>
<td>2,409,610,000</td>
<td>8,785,490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6,113,560,000</td>
<td>2,673,950,000</td>
<td>8,787,510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,868,130,000</td>
<td>4,253,160,000</td>
<td>11,121,290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27,433,743,000</td>
<td>20,704,581,000</td>
<td>48,138,324,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Military Capabilities Aggregated by Afghanistan to Alliance for Use to Balance Internal Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Expenditure</th>
<th>AFG Spending as Percent of GDP</th>
<th>Min. of Defense Forces Army and Support Staff</th>
<th>Min. of Interior Forces All Police Forces and Support Staff</th>
<th>Total Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>186,000,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>191,000,000</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>173,000,000</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>188,000,000</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>49,700</td>
<td>85,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>275,000,000</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>242,000,000</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>57,800</td>
<td>79,910</td>
<td>137,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>305,000,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100,131</td>
<td>94,958</td>
<td>195,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>576,000,000</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>149,533</td>
<td>116,856</td>
<td>266,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3. Lists expenditures by government of Afghanistan on its military as well as the force size of its Army and police over the course of the alliance. Data on military expenditures obtained from the following sources: (1) Military Expenditures, Percent of GDP: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Military Expenditures and Percentage of GDP for Afghanistan 2001-2010. (http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4). Figures tracked by the World Bank. (1) Afghan security force numbers (as of November/December of given year), Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index. Brookings Institute. May 16, 2012. Two notes: (1) Ministry of Defense Forces: refers to all forces under the control of this Ministry, which oversees the readiness and capabilities of the Afghanistan National Army. The operational arm of the ANA is divided into 5 corps, which is then further divided into several brigades. This arm comprises about seventy percent of ANA personnel and holds responsibility for different regions of Afghanistan. In support of these endeavors there are many institutions that sustain and support the Ministry of Defense including in the fields of logistics, communications support, regional military intelligence offices, training and recruitment, and Headquarters Support and Security Brigade. The figure provided seeks to capture all of these forces. (2) Ministry of Interior Forces: refers to all forces under the control of this Ministry, which oversees the protection of Afghan internal borders and enforces the rule of law. These forces include several police units all of which to some extent combat internal threats: Afghan Uniformed Police, assigned to police districts, provinces and regions, Afghan Border Police, providing law enforcement capabilities at international borders and entry points, Afghan National Civil Order Police, responsible with providing counter civil unrest and lawlessness, Criminal Investigative Division, leads investigations of national interest such as white collar crime, Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan, charged with reducing production and distribution of narcotics, and Counter Terrorism Police, charged with leading efforts to defeat terrorism and insurgency.
Table 4.4. Breakdown of Military Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,420,000</td>
<td>60,150,000</td>
<td>1,490,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>70,310,000</td>
<td>3,420,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8,420,000</td>
<td>225,090,000</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>171,470,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>417,920,000</td>
<td>70,310,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13,320,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>51,710,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85,100,000</td>
<td>4,660,000</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>441,520,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>17,250,000</td>
<td>243,540,000</td>
<td>83,800,000</td>
<td>823,840,000</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24,030,000</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>82,560,000</td>
<td>1,943,080,000</td>
<td>2,050,720,000</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28,100,000</td>
<td>1,193,000</td>
<td>250,760,000</td>
<td>3,802,650,000</td>
<td>4,082,703,000</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29,500,000</td>
<td>1,680,000</td>
<td>208,410,000</td>
<td>6,136,290,000</td>
<td>6,375,880,000</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>34,740,000</td>
<td>1,410,000</td>
<td>264,530,000</td>
<td>5,812,880,000</td>
<td>6,113,560,000</td>
<td>31,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>69,600,000</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>325,340,000</td>
<td>6,471,400,000</td>
<td>6,868,130,000</td>
<td>67,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Table lists the breakdown by funding category of military capabilities the U.S. aggregated as part of its alliance with Afghanistan for the period 2001 to 2012. Data obtained from following sources:
- Nonproliferation: Funding used to support a broad range of security related programs to reduce threats by targeting four arrears: nonproliferation, antiterrorism, regional stability and humanitarian assistance; Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Programs: Program provides grants to recipient countries for the purposes of funding the transfer of U.S. defense equipment and services and trainings. Though the program primarily funds arms transfers, it does include a significant amount of military training; International Military Education and Training: U.S program to provide training and education on grant basis to military students at U.S. military training institutions. Military Assistance Programs (MAP) Grants: Refer to the former system of grant aid distribution that allocated funds to country to allow them to obtain defense articles and services in support of U.S. National Security Policy without requiring repayment to the United States. Around FY 1982 these grant funds and programs and funds became part of the Foreign Military Financing program; Peacekeeping Operations: Funding to provide support for international peacekeeping operations and to promote increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution; Drug-Interdiction: Refers to all Counter-narcotics initiatives with a non-development component. It funds training of military and law enforcement to support drug interdiction operations; Transfer from Excess Stock: Refers to the sale of US defense articles no longer needed by U.S. forces; Afghan Security Forces Fund: an account under DOD appropriations, funds are to enhance the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to combat terror and support US operations in Afghanistan. Assistance given under this account include equipment procurement, training, supplies and services. Other sources are as follows:
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Patrick William Quirk was born on June 29, 1981 in Framingham, Massachusetts. He attended Bates College in Lewiston Maine, where he received a Bachelor of Arts with a double major in Interdisciplinary Studies and Biology. The first major was self-designed and titled “Comparative Third World Development.” He minored in Spanish. After graduation he worked as a newspaper reporter in Massachusetts before moving to Washington, DC, to attend American University—where he received his Master’s degree in International Affairs—and work for a small non-governmental organization focused on fostering social and political development in Latin America. Quirk worked for various organizations based in Washington, DC, designing, implementing, or evaluating democracy assistance, conflict management, or stabilization programs funded by the U.S. government. He attended Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, where he received both a Master’s degree and Ph.D. in Political Science. While completing his dissertation, Quirk served as a Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Washington, DC.