INTO THE FOLD: EVALUATING DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ PROGRAMS TO DE-RADICALIZE ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS AND ISLAMIST TERRORISTS

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Abstract

Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country’s efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success.

This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects that country’s level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state’s official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious re-education or on social re-integration.

The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country’s level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country’s de-
radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong.

Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists—as a practice and concept—is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context.

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Introduction

“Releasing prisoners without a comprehensive rehabilitation programme ‘is like releasing 30,000 political bombs.’”

Countries pursue de-radicalization programs to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism. With the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), countries around the world, including the United Kingdom (UK), have entertained de-radicalization schemes aimed at Islamist extremists returning from Iraq and Syria. Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway currently run or have run such programs.

Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Denmark, and various other countries initiated de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists after the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as this event brought the reality of Islamist terrorism to the forefront of every country’s collective conscience. Although Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism have existed since before September 11th, de-radicalization has become increasingly relevant as foreign fighters return home equipped with the know-how to carry out terrorist attacks in their own backyard.

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2 Tom Whitehead, The Telegraph, “British jihadists to be forced to attend deradicalisation programmes, says Cameron,” (published September 1, 2014) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11068878/British-jihadists-to-be-forced-to-attend-deradicalisation-programmes-says-Cameron.html (accessed March 18, 2015). The article describes some programs that the UK already has to de-radicalize Islamist extremists, including Al Furqan, where imams attempt to moderate the beliefs of Islamist extremist prisoners “through religious teaching.”
To evaluate de-radicalization programs in different countries, the paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as a state’s developmental capacity, the strength of its political institutions, and a state’s ability to build national consensus around its de-radicalization efforts, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim-majority countries. I hypothesize that countries with more successful de-radicalization programs will experience fewer Islamist terrorist attacks. The dependent variable is the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country, and the independent variable is each country’s degree of success with de-radicalization. The study reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de-radicalization efforts increases, the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country increases significantly.

The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state’s level of repression affects Muslim-majority countries’ success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. I hypothesize that more repressive states will have more successful de-radicalization programs. The dependent variable is the success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts, and the independent variable is each country’s level of state repression. As state repression increases, the success of de-radicalization programs increases, although not significantly.

Thirdly, I examine the effect of religious characteristics on what de-radicalization approaches various Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries pursue. I explore whether the percentage of the country’s population that is Muslim; a state’s official religion; and constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses affect whether states focus their
de-radicalization efforts more on religious re-education or on social re-integration. I hypothesize that countries with greater Muslim populations; countries with official religions; and countries that place greater constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses are more likely to focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists on religious re-education. I find that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. All 3 relationships, however, are not significant.

**Islamism, Islamist Extremism, and Jihad**

This paper engages the concepts of Islamism, Islamist extremism, and jihad. Islamism is a radical ideology that seeks a return to Islam the way it was practiced by its ancient forefathers, with strict adherence to Muslim Shari’a law and the Qu’ran. Islamism encompasses several movements, including Salafism, Wahhabism, and national movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Salafism calls for the establishment of an Islamic state, the expulsion of non-Muslims from Muslim lands, and the renunciation by Muslims of Western influences. The global Salafist movement

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encompasses groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Al Qaeda, and ISIS.\(^6\) Wahhabism follows strict adherence to Shari’a law, and is practiced today in Saudi Arabia with laws denouncing teachings in Saudi schoolbooks that are in conflict with Wahhabist dictates.\(^7\) For groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, the EIJ and others, Islamism is their raison d’être.

Regarding Salafism, Cordesman (2006) believes that the West’s most critical terrorism threat stems from “neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism” specifically: “The struggle is religious and ideological, not military or driven by secular values. It is a struggle for the future of Islam, and it is not generic, global or focused on political or economic systems.”\(^8\) Al Qaeda, and now ISIS promote themselves as being Sunni, and Osama bin Laden has publicly ridiculed Shia Muslims by referring to Shia heads as “traitors.”\(^9\)

Integral to the understanding of Islamism is jihad, which many Islamists use to legitimate violence against non-believers or “infidels.”\(^10\) There is a distinction between two forms of jihad: the “greater jihad,” which involves the individual, non-violent struggle to live a righteous Muslim life, and the “lesser jihad,” which involves fighting an external enemy of Islam, often involving physical combat.\(^11\) Although mainstream

\(^6\) Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 171. The EIJ is also known as the Islamic Jihad (IJ) or al-Jihad. See Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 55.


Muslims commonly accept the greater-lesser jihad concept, violent Islamist extremists only associate jihad with the pursuit of violent action. The Egyptian Islamic Group (IG), for example, equated jihad with violence, as the group believed that negotiation and other softer measures would not accomplish the ultimate goal of instituting an Islamic caliphate.12

**Radicalization, Counter-radicalization, De-radicalization, and Disengagement**

Radicalization can be conceptualized as an ideological process or transformation that individuals or groups experience: “radicalization is the development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict.”13 It does not necessarily amount to violence, but, as in the case of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, may lead to violent behavior. In conceptualizing efforts to combat radicalization, Brandon and Vidino (2012) see counter-radicalization as a “sort of catch-all term that includes three types of initiatives, each with a specific objective: de-radicalization, disengagement, and radicalization prevention.”14 In contrast, the “United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism” views counter-

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radicalization along the lines of preventing radicalization, while de-radicalization is about social re-integration, or convincing terrorists to abandon violence.15

Whereas de-radicalization may entail a change in thinking, disengagement refers to terrorists changing their behavior, or “getting individuals and groups involved in terrorism to give up their participation in such activities – often referred to as disengagement, desistance or exit processes.”16 Specifically, “physical disengagement” can involve “apprehension by the security services, perhaps with subsequent imprisonment;” “forced movement into another role as a result of disobeying orders;” or ‘decapitation,’ when a country’s security services target terrorist leaders for execution.17

Although Braddock and Horgan (2010) recognize that de-radicalization “implies change at the cognitive level” and disengagement is behavioral, de-radicalization programs may address problems associated with detainees returning to terrorism: “[De-radicalization is] the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.”18

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16 Tore Bjørgo, Strategies for Preventing Terrorism, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 87. Bjørgo identifies disengagement as a terrorism prevention strategy. Regarding disengagement, Bjørgo describes the preventive mechanism as making individual or group terrorist campaigns cease to exist, so that terrorism cannot continue.
prevent recidivism, for instance, countries’ security services may monitor released
individuals to help ensure that they do not take up terrorism again.

While Dechesne (2011) claims that disengagement is tactical and de-
radicalization is “strategic,” with de-radicalization making dialogue possible, Ashour
(2009) argues that de-radicalization can be tactical and strategic. Acknowledging that
de-radicalization is about an extremist or terrorist group disavowing its radical ideas, he
nevertheless claims that de-radicalization can simply be behavioral, without any
accompanying rejection of radical ideology. De-radicalization is “comprehensive”
when a terrorist group successfully de-radicalizes at the behavioral, ideological, and
“organizational” level, where the “armed units of the organization” peacefully disband.
The IG’s de-radicalization process was comprehensive, as the group disarmed with the
full backing of the IG’s leadership.

De-radicalization does not always follow from disengagement, as some individuals
pursue terrorism without first developing a radical ideology: “Individuals do not always
join extremist groups on ideological grounds; many acquire extremist views after they
join. And some lose their ideological views as a consequence of leaving the group, rather
than leaving the group because they have lost faith in the ideology.” An individual may
choose to join a terrorist group because of the promise of financial compensation by the

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid, 6. The author also argues that de-radicalization can be substantive, where de-radicalization takes place successfully in terms of changing behavior and ideology, but not organizationally. Additionally, de-
radicalization can be pragmatic, where de-radicalization occurs successfully at the behavioral and organizational levels, but lacks an ideological component.
23 Ibid, 51.
group’s leadership or because a family member convinces them to join, for example, as opposed to joining because the ideology is appealing.

Similarly, terrorists may wish to abandon violence but are unable to do so, as “a person can remain deeply disillusioned and even have profound remorse for his or her activity, but remain ‘stuck’ in the terrorist group because of an absence of available opportunities for disengagement. A terrorist can thus be de-radicalized but not necessarily disengaged.”25 Today, ISIS threatens the lives of British jihadis wishing to abandon terrorism and come back to Britain.26 ISIS expects foreign fighters to declare their loyalty to the group, so that if an individual defies the Islamic State by refusing to execute a martyrdom operation, ISIS can penalize the individual by killing them.27 Although these British jihadis may be disillusioned by ISIS’ radical agenda, they may be forced to continue terrorist operations against their will.

Involuntary Versus Voluntary Disengagement

Regarding disengagement, terrorists can abandon violence either voluntarily or involuntarily: “Involuntary disengagement might result from the death or imprisonment of a terrorist or by his or her expulsion from the terrorist group. Voluntary disengagement, on the other hand, entails that an individual out of his or her own volition has turned away from terrorism.”28 One terrorist who voluntary disengaged is Morten Storm, a Danish convert to Islam who abandoned violent Islamist extremism in 2006 out

27 Ibid.
of anger at the idea of killing innocent civilians simply because they did not share the same fundamentalist views. Storm was an Al Qaeda mole, helping Danish counterterrorism efforts and assisting the Central Intelligence Agency capture the American Al Qaeda spokesman Anwar al-Awlaki.

Involuntary disengagement, on the other hand, may occur when an “individual’s [terrorist] organization decides it is going to call a cease-fire, or when an individual member is apprehended and incarcerated.” Additionally, terrorists may be encouraged to disengage from terrorism “if a government offers them amnesty or reduced prison sentences,” or if a government ensures “employment and financial support” for abandoning violence.

Collective Versus Individual Disengagement and De-Radicalization

Collective disengagement or de-radicalization occurs when most or all members of a terrorist group abandon violence, or the underlying extremist ideology. These processes require strong leadership to encourage group members to reform, as well as a hierarchical structure, as it is more difficult to hold sway over a decentralized network. Egypt’s IG collectively de-radicalized between 1997 and 2002 as a result of state repression and religious re-learning, where the government supplied incarcerated group

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30 Ibid.
31 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 140.
32 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2010), 16-17.
34 Ibid.
members with “books and other religious texts and gave them free access to materials that allowed them to expand their religious knowledge.”

Through exposure to new religious texts, IG members realized that violent historical mobilizations against non-Muslims—including Ibn Taymiyya’s “calls to mobilize” against Tartars trying to bring down “the Islamic state”—were not relevant to contemporary society.

In Singapore, by contrast, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainees are treated individually during de-radicalization: “JI detainees were never jointly counselled and they were kept apart from one another in detention.”

In 2002, believing that detainees’ spouses were influenced by the extremist ideology perpetuated by their husbands, the Singapore Government began offering “financial assistance” to detainees’ family members, in the form of funding for their children’s education, and job coaching and financial literacy instruction for detainees’ spouses. Such inducements are not commonly found in collective de-radicalization, since the focus is not on individuals and their families.

**Characterizing De-radicalization and Related Terms for This Paper**

For the purposes of this paper, I apply the characterizations of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization that El-Said (2012) uses, with counter-radicalization being about “preventing further radicalisation,” and de-radicalization having more to do

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36 Ibid, 469. The Egyptian Government also supplied religious texts to the terrorist group Islamic Jihad, whose members de-radicalized in 2007.
38 Ibid, 433-434.
with “rehabilitating and counselling those who have already become radicalised.”

Moreover, I apply his idea of disengagement as falling within the realm of de-radicalization: “The process [of de-radicalization] can include a cognitive change (change in ideology and attitudes), simple disengagement (behavioral change to abandon violence while remaining radical), or both.” Additionally, I concur with El-Said (2015) that de-radicalization can entail any one individual or combination of various elements, namely “religious rehabilitation, education, vocational training, social training, family programs, physical programs and post-care or release programs,” all of which “facilitate the reintegration of released detainees” into society.

Furthermore, I distinguish Islamist extremists from Islamist terrorists, as not all extremists employ terrorist tactics. Consequently, some de-radicalization programs may center on extremists who do not practice violence. Saudi Arabia, for example, gears its Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC) program toward “radicalized individuals who have not yet taken violent action and attempts to reintegrate them into Saudi society.” However, in some instances throughout the paper, I use the term violent Islamist extremists to refer to Islamist extremists who have employed terrorism.

Another point of clarification is that although I may refer to the whole of a country’s de-radicalization efforts aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists as a

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41 Ibid.
42 J. Scott Carpenter, Michael Jacobson, and Matthew Levitt, “Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 3 (2009): 315. Although Saudi Arabia may target individuals for de-radicalization simply based on their extremist beliefs, the country has also de-radicalized former terrorists, including individuals affiliated with AQAP.
de-radicalization program, some countries may have multiple de-radicalization programs. For instance, Malaysia’s Kamunting program is reserved for those Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists who may pose less of a threat to the state with regard to “intention and capabilities,” while the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) place a smaller number of “hard-core detainees” in a more intensive program.\(^{43}\) Still, I bundle these initiatives together to avoid confusion when describing a country’s de-radicalization efforts.

Notwithstanding the diversity among different states’ de-radicalization programs, it is worthwhile to study them together to draw conclusions about why some programs have been more successful than others, as well as to examine why states have selected the mix of de-radicalization approaches they have chosen to pursue.

Chapter 1. A Recipe for Success? Examining Whether Political Stability, Developmental Strength, Civil Society Participation, and Other Factors That may Favor Successful De-radicalization Lead to Less Islamist Terrorism

This chapter uses a cross-country comparison to determine how certain factors that may favor successful de-radicalization, including political stability; developmental strength; civil society involvement; new government leadership; countrywide support for de-radicalization; significant involvement of religious authorities; unilateral abandonment of Islamist extremism or terrorism; and a lack of Western influence will affect the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Muslim-majority countries.44 I posit that states exhibiting features favorable to successful de-radicalization will experience fewer Islamist terrorist attacks. A new state leadership that coincides with the initiation of de-radicalization efforts, for example, may make such efforts more effective by pursuing Islamist terrorists and Islamist extremists more aggressively.45 Consequently, I expect that such states will be more effective at reducing Islamist terrorism.

My study uses information from case studies of de-radicalization programs in Muslim-majority countries, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.46 Using data analysis, I measure the total number of Islamist terrorist attacks for each country during the core years in which each country’s de-radicalization programs take place, against a numeric ranking of each country’s

44 While both the de-radicalization of the IG and IJ in Egypt was started by IG and IJ members themselves, the Egyptian Government did facilitate prison-based conversations between IG and IJ heads, their followers, as well as other “secular and political prisoners.” See Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 18.
success.\textsuperscript{47} The results show that de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the factors that may be favorable to successful de-radicalization will produce more Islamist terrorist attacks. In my analysis, I explore whether other explanations, such as International Organization (IO) membership, religious freedom, and regime type may help to understand why states experience more or less Islamist terrorism.

\textit{Evaluating the Success of De-radicalization Programs Targeted at Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists}

In examining the success of de-radicalization efforts aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, El-Said (2012) focuses on the programs of 8 Muslim-majority states: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.\textsuperscript{48} The report identifies factors that contribute to success, including civil society; the use of family members to encourage participation in de-radicalization; the “role and quality” of the clerics and scholars that the state brings in; and the role of “popular support” for de-radicalization in tandem with dynamic government leadership.\textsuperscript{49}

Also important are the “political and developmental strength of the state,” external aspects, such as police crackdowns on terrorist groups or military interventions, and the “relationship between national counter-radicalization and de-radicalization efforts.”\textsuperscript{50} The author finds that national consensus and “the support of the government” are crucial for effectiveness, and that the help of civil society organizations is critical to winning

\textsuperscript{47} I establish the core years as the years for which information on each country’s de-radicalization efforts is widely available. See Appendix A, Core Years of Country De-radicalization Programs.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
over individuals and groups who may be most susceptible to become radicalized or pursue terrorism.\textsuperscript{51}

Using the same set of countries, El-Said (2013) establishes a series of hypotheses regarding the factors that he argues may be more favorable to successful de-radicalization.\textsuperscript{52} For instance, “states with dynamic and active [civil society organizations] CSOs are in a better position to enact effective Counter-derad programmes than those without dynamic CSOs.”\textsuperscript{53} In Algeria, CSOs played a crucial role in encouraging the general public as well as families of individuals who fell victim to terrorism to back President Bouteflika’s de-radicalization efforts.\textsuperscript{54} These organizations helped to build trust among victims’ families by explaining what they were entitled to as a result of their loss, including financial compensation, as well as by having the president meet with family members to get their unique perspective on how they believed they should be compensated.\textsuperscript{55} By pursuing a ‘whole-of-society’ rather than simply ‘a-whole-of-government approach,’ states can overcome the distrust with which some citizens view the authorities, making de-radicalization more attractive to the public.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 45.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. On page 3, the author uses “counter-derad programmes” as a blanket term to indicate that countries may have either counter-radicalization programs or de-radicalization programs, or both types of programs.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 37-40.
Most recently, El-Said (2015) re-visits the hypotheses that he lays out in his previous work regarding factors that may favor successful de-radicalization. In addition to macro level considerations such as political stability and developmental strength, “religious rehabilitation” can make de-radicalization more successful, as learning that Islam does not condone suicide can “delegitimize” terrorists’ reasoning behind suicide attacks. Regarding Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), “Muslim scholars and religious leaders” have been effective in getting ‘ethnic and religious communities’ to cooperate with the government on combating Islamist extremism and terrorism, as religious authorities have rallied the public around the idea of defending themselves against a shared adversary.

Similarly, Boucek, Ghez, Pettyjohn, and Rabasa (2010) find that elements such as offering militants access to Muslim religious texts while undergoing rehabilitation, as well as and providing de-radicalization program participants with emotional support and assistance in connecting to others who disavow extremism, can encourage Islamist extremists to develop a more moderate worldview.

Other more micro level characteristics that may be important for successful de-radicalization are: the role of families in convincing radical individuals to participate in de-radicalization programs; humane handling of prisoners to stop them from radicalizing further; the promotion of religious education based on extremists’ general lack of

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57 Hamed El-Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs*, 17-26. In contrast to his past works, the author focuses in this book on Muslim-majority as well as non-Muslim-majority states, including Australia and Singapore.
58 Ibid, 27.
59 Ibid, 171-172.
60 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 43.
knowledge regarding Muslim law and precepts; and post-release observation and assistance to help ensure that detainees do not pursue terrorism again.\textsuperscript{61}

While the majority of the literature on de-radicalization programs uses qualitative analysis, El-Said and Harrigan (2011) measure the total number of terrorist attacks in 34 UN member states with de-radicalization programs, to gauge whether de-radicalization programs reduce terrorism.\textsuperscript{62} De-radicalization may not necessarily decrease the number of terrorist attacks, as in many Arab states, governments have used counterterrorism laws to exaggerate their authority, and resultant “repression, social and political exclusion, abuse of state coercive powers and increased corruption” may incite more terrorism rather than restrain it.\textsuperscript{63}

Also, the authors find that none of the countries in the study possessed ‘post-release programmes’ to assess what individuals have successfully reformed versus those who need additional assistance to successfully re-integrate into society.\textsuperscript{64} By tracking individuals once they are released from a de-radicalization program, a country can potentially reduce the number of terrorist attacks by continuing to monitor those individuals who may still possess violent Islamist extremist sympathies.

One debate in the literature on the success of de-radicalization concerns whether countries should use statistics such as recidivism rates to gauge how successful such programs have been at re-integrating extremists and terrorists into society. Chowdhury

\textsuperscript{61} Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El-Said, “Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism,” International Peace Institute (May 2011): 17-20. The assistance that governments may provide after detainee release from de-radicalization programs includes financial and employment assistance and other related incentives.


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
Fink and El-Said (2011) suggest that the UN use data on recidivism, or the rate of violent extremists returning to terrorism, to devise a system by which different countries can assess their de-radicalization efforts. Other scholars, including Sim (2012) are not as quick to rely on recidivism rates, arguing that with regard to US-initiated de-radicalization in Afghanistan, the criteria used for measuring recidivism may not be robust enough to account for some former detainees who have returned to fighting. Additionally, countries that are especially eager to advertise success in their counterterrorism efforts may purposely develop recidivism criteria that conceals a higher number of individuals who have resumed violence.

Recidivism also does not factor in individuals who may be supporting a terrorist group within the confines of the law, such as by promoting the group’s internet presence, as well as those individuals who, rather than continuing their involvement in terrorism domestically, engage in terrorism-related activity in other countries. This phenomenon is relevant to de-radicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia, as although the country has boasted about low recidivism rates, many Islamist militants have crossed the border into Yemen to fight for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

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65 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El-Said, “Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism,” 27.
67 Ibid.
68 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 41.
Challenges in Studying De-radicalization Initiatives Aimed at Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

There are many challenges associated with studying de-radicalization initiatives, which apply to all 3 chapters of this paper. One key challenge concerns the shortage of data available on the characteristics and outcomes of such programs: “there is not one single book on the causes of de-radicalization processes. Nor is there a comprehensive study about the conditions under which de-radicalization can be successful.”\(^{70}\) De-radicalization data may also be limited because many such programs are fairly new.\(^{71}\)

Consequently, perhaps because such programs are so new, having been established after 9/11, “there is no consensus on what constitutes success in reforming a terrorist, let alone what even constitutes reform in this context.”\(^{72}\) Without any definitive answers, it is difficult to determine, for example, if an extremist has successfully reformed by not returning to terrorism, or if an extremist has reformed by disavowing jihadism in the context of a religious dialogue program.

Additionally, obtaining data on de-radicalization programs can be a challenge, as some countries may choose to keep this information close to the vest. In Malaysia, which has disclosed little about its de-radicalization experience, detainees can be charged with “violating the terms of [their] release” if they publicize any information about the program they are going through.\(^{73}\) Thus, out of fear of being reprimanded, many

\(^{73}\) Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 105-106.
individuals may choose not to volunteer information about their de-radicalization experiences to the broader public.

Scholars may also encounter difficulty when evaluating multiple countries’ de-radicalization programs at once, as these programs vary broadly according to context.\textsuperscript{74} For instance, Pakistan has directed much of its de-radicalization efforts at the Taliban, who has overtaken large swathes of the country, perpetuating its Islamist extremist doctrine wherever it rules.\textsuperscript{75} Whereas the Taliban pose a formidable challenge to the Government of Pakistan, having attempted to overrun the country, in countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists do not pose the same kind of existential threat.

Despite the challenges that exist, I think that my study overcomes these hurdles. By using common characteristics—including the role of civil society in de-radicalization efforts, developmental strength, and political stability—I can standardize my assessment of de-radicalization success across the 7 countries.\textsuperscript{76} While each country’s de-radicalization efforts may be shaped by certain political and socioeconomic circumstances and cultural mores, I can easily determine the presence or absence of factors such as political stability, strong developmental capacity, and the unilateral

\textsuperscript{74} Lindsay Clutterbuck et al., UK Home Office, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, “Individual disengagement from Al-Qa’ida-influenced terrorist groups: A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing terrorism,” (November 2011): 15.

\textsuperscript{75} Tariq Parvez, “Challenges of establishing a rehabilitation programme in Pakistan,” in \textit{Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism}, ed. Rohan Gunaratna, Jolene Anne R. Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 125-132. According to Parvez, Pakistan does not have a formal terrorist rehabilitation or de-radicalization program, but an informal program was initiated in 2009 in the Malakand region, as well as the Sabawoon Rehabilitation Center, specifically targeted at Taliban militants.

abandonment of violence by terrorist groups in all countries, either from individual
datasets or from the case studies.

Regarding the influence of religious interlocutors, for example, El-Said (2013)
finds that de-radicalization in Yemen may not have been successful because the
program’s leadership “failed to galvanize the support” of a great number of religious
clerics, and as a result, the country failed to achieve the “national consensus” needed to
allow the Dialogue Committee (DC) to succeed.77 Alternatively, Saudi Arabia was the
only country that El-Said (2013) studied in which the government was able to involve a
considerable number of objective, well-respected, and authoritative religious officials,
ultimately contributing to the success of the country’s program.78 Thus, despite
contextual differences among each country’s de-radicalization efforts, it is still possible
to make observations across all of them based on certain relevant features.

Furthermore, I believe that my paper addresses the shortcomings in previous
studies, as with the exception of El-Said and Harrigan (2011), the literature on success of
de-radicalization relies primarily on qualitative analysis.79 Whereas these previous works
simply assess certain success factors such as political stability and developmental
capacity through narrative case studies, I provide a more substantial base for comparison,
as I assign each country’s attributes a value. Additionally, for the factors that may not
already be measured in an existing dataset, including civil society involvement and the

77 Hamed El-Said, “Conclusion,” in Deradicalizing Violent Extremists: Counter-radicalization and
deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states, ed. Hamed El-Said and Jane
Harrigan (London, Routledge, 2013), 266.
78 Ibid.
role of religious authorities, I can also assign each country a value based on the presence or absence of these characteristics.

Although El-Said and Harrigan (2011) use data on terrorist incidents, they organize the data by year and not by country.\(^80\) While the authors draw general conclusions about the high incidence of terrorism across different countries, such as the absence of ‘post-release programmes,’ my study enables policymakers to observe what de-radicalization elements have or have not worked to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism in specific countries.\(^81\)

Despite the fact that literature on measuring de-radicalization success has grown in recent years, the question at the heart of my research still remains unanswered. While certain scholars have evaluated the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists based on narrative descriptions, no study has developed a coding scheme to quantitatively evaluate the success of these efforts across different countries. Also, to date, no study has attempted to measure the success of different countries’ de-radicalization programs against the number of terrorist attacks in each country. Through this chapter, I hope to inform policymakers as to what variables—including civil society involvement and national consensus around de-radicalization—may be favorable to successful de-radicalization, and in turn may lead to less Islamist terrorism.

\(^{80}\) Ibid.
\(^{81}\) Ibid.
**Data and Methods**

The study includes 7 Muslim-majority countries that Hamed El-Said (2012) examines: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I use quantitative analysis to determine the effect of de-radicalization on the number of Islamist terrorist attacks. I use a scatter plot to analyze the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and I code the independent variable based on a numeric scale. This type of analysis is appropriate for my research question because I can assign each piece of information a value, and quantify the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

**Hypothesis**

Muslim-majority countries with more successful de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists will experience fewer Islamist terrorist attacks.

**Unit of analysis**

I examine how Islamists behave in response to de-radicalization programs intended to combat Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists.

**Dependent Variable: Number of Islamist Terrorist Attacks in Each State**

The dependent variable is the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. To operationalize the dependent variable, I calculate the total number of Islamist terrorist

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83 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.
attacks for each state during the core years that each country has de-radicalized Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. I measure the number of Islamist terrorist attacks during the period that each country’s de-radicalization programs have occurred, as I was not able to find any evidence in the literature that states may experience less terrorism only after they have carried out successful de-radicalization programs.84

By separating out the terrorist incidents that were committed by Islamist terrorist groups, I can gauge the effect of de-radicalization efforts on reducing Islamist terrorism, distinct from terrorism in a broader sense.85

To measure the number of Islamist terrorist attacks for each country, I use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).86 The GTD classifies a terrorist attack based on the following criteria:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism.87

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84 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 263. The authors suggest that terrorism may decrease while a de-radicalization program is in progress.
85 Using the “perpetrator group name” (gname), and “perpetrator sub-group name” (gsubname), I determine if the terrorist attacks for each state were carried out by Islamist terrorist groups. See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” (August 2014): 41-42. See Appendix B. Islamist Terrorist Groups.
86 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), (2013), Global Terrorism Database [Data file], retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
87 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database, “Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” 8. Additionally, 2 of the following 3 factors are mandatory for an incident to be listed in the GTD: “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;” some “evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims” must be present; and “the attack must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.”
Independent Variable: Success of De-Radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority Countries

The independent variable in this chapter is the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists in Muslim-majority countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I cannot measure the success of such programs directly, as there is not a universal set of standards by which to gauge this.88 Given the subjectivity of factors such as recidivism, directly “measuring and quantifying” success poses a “recurring problem.”89 Thus, unlike programs to encourage individuals to give up alcoholism, which different governments or organizations can measure the success of in terms of how many individuals have become sober, there is no obvious outcome to indicate the success of de-radicalization programs.

However, despite the difficulty of directly measuring success, I selected the countries that El-Said (2012) uses because “certain key factors” can be identified with regard to de-radicalization across all Muslim-majority countries.90 The presence of religious authorities, including scholars and clerics, for example, may be more germane to Muslim-majority countries because these governments are more likely to have established official relationships with Muslim leaders than in non-Muslim-majority countries.91

To operationalize the independent variable, I ask a series of yes or no questions, to determine the presence or absence of certain features in each state’s de-radicalization

91 Ibid, 27.
efforts that may be favorable to successful de-radicalization. I developed the proxy variables in Table 1 based on conditions that El-Said (2012)\textsuperscript{92} and El-Said (2013)\textsuperscript{93} find as being favorable to successful de-radicalization. For example, “de-radicalization is more effective and durable when ceasefire is called for by violent groups themselves, not the state.”\textsuperscript{94} To account for this factor, I ask for each country, “has the country’s experience been one in which de-radicalization has occurred through extremist groups denouncing violence unilaterally?”\textsuperscript{95} If the answer is yes, that country earns 2 points, and if the answer is no, the country earns 1 point.\textsuperscript{96} A country that earns a total of 8 points has a program that is least successful, while a country that earns 16 points has the most successful program.

The 8 proxy variables that I use are: a \textit{state’s developmental capacity}, \textit{strength of political institutions}, \textit{national consensus around de-radicalization}, \textit{personnel required for religious dialogue}, \textit{role of civil society}, \textit{unilateral condemnation of violent action}, \textit{new leadership at the state level}, and \textit{de-radicalization funding}.\textsuperscript{97} El-Said (2012) identifies the characteristics that he uses to determine the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs:

\begin{quote}
By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the report identifies certain key factors which can be considered as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes. These include the following: the role of popular support combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership; the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and developmental strength of the state is also important, as is the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{94} Hamed El-Said, “Conclusion,” 267.
\textsuperscript{95} See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid. There is no such ranking scheme that currently exists in the de-radicalization literature.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors and interventions on the other.\textsuperscript{98}

To determine a state’s developmental capacity, I use the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index, which scores each country based on “life expectancy at birth,” “mean years of schooling,” “expected years of schooling,” and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita purchasing power parity.\textsuperscript{99} For the first question in Table 1, I consider a state to have a strong developmental capacity if it falls into either the “very high human development” or “high human development” category.\textsuperscript{100} As the UNDP collects human development data from 1980 to 2013, I refer to the year(s) closest to which each country’s de-radicalization efforts have taken place.\textsuperscript{101} Since the core years of Algeria’s de-radicalization efforts were from 1997 to 2000, I use 2000 data, seeing as from 2000 to 2013, the country went from the medium to high development category.\textsuperscript{102}

For the second proxy variable, strength of political institutions, I measure each state’s ‘fragility’ to determine whether each state is politically stable or not.\textsuperscript{103} A ‘fragile’ state may be characterized by “the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services” and the failure to “interact

\textsuperscript{98} Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 2.
\textsuperscript{99} United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2014, “Technical notes: Calculating the human development indices—graphical presentation,” (2014): 1. The life expectancy, education, and living standards measures are factored into, respectively, the life expectancy index, education index, and GNI index. These three indexes comprise the Human Development Index.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, 3. Human development is very high if it is 0.800 or above, high if it is 0.700 or above, and human development is at a medium level if it is 0.550 or above. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
with other states as a full member of the international community.”

For the second question in Table 1, I consider a country to be politically stable if the Fragile States Index determines that it is in the ‘stable’ or ‘sustainable’ category. ‘Stable’ or ‘sustainable’ states, unlike those in the ‘alert’ or ‘warning’ category, are less susceptible to “collapse or conflict.”

For the rest of the proxy variables in Tables 1 and 2—national consensus around de-radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, role of civil society, unilateral condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state level, and de-radicalization funding—I draw the answers from El-Said (2012), El-Said (2013), Harrigan (2013), Barrett and El-Said (2013), and El-Said and Harrigan (2013).
The questions that I use in Table 1 regarding the role of civil society, unilateral condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state level, strength of political institutions, and a state’s developmental capacity very closely resemble the hypotheses that El-Said (2013) lays out. Concerning the role of civil society, new leadership at the state level, strength of political institutions, and a state’s developmental capacity, he argues the following:

Hypothesis 1: Counter-derad programmes require political will and trust. This is achieved more easily when new, charismatic leadership that has weak links with powerful domestic groups opposed to reforms arrives. Hence, Counter-derad programmes associated with new, charismatic leadership at state level have more chance of success than those linked to the same old regimes whose policies were largely responsible for radicalizing large segments of the population.

Hypothesis 2: Developmental states, that is, states with the ability to achieve sustainable growth rate, create jobs, improve equity, reduce corruption and manage relations with their ethnic groups are not only less exposed to violent extremism, they are also more able to fashion effective Counter-derad programmes when faced with the phenomenon of terrorism.

Hypothesis 3: States with strong political capacity, that is, states capable of defending their borders and societies, maintain law and order, and set the rules of the game for all members of society, are more capable of fashioning effective Counter-derad programmes than weak states. This is especially the case when such programmes are accompanied by reforms to address some or all of the existing socioeconomic and political grievances.

Hypothesis 4: Civil society organizations (CSOs) have resources to create and multiply social networks in ways that the state cannot. They thus have the ability to reach even the most recalcitrant corners of society. Therefore, states with dynamic and active CSOs are in a better position to enact effective Counter-derad programmes than those without dynamic CSOs. This is especially the case when CSOs are invited by the state to take part in the delivery of Counter-derad programmes.

113 Ibid. For Question 7 in Table 1, which corresponds to the author’s first hypothesis, I only focus on whether a state’s leadership is new versus whether they are both new as well as charismatic. I only examined the case studies to gauge if the leadership was new, as new leaders may not necessarily always be
Additionally, El-Said (2013) posits that unilateral condemnation of violent action may contribute to more successful de-radicalization:

Hypothesis 6: Counter-derad programmes have a better chance of succeeding and enduring when ceasefire, renunciation of violence and call for peace is initiated unconditionally from violent extremist groups and not the state.114

For the questions that I devised regarding national consensus around de-radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, and de-radicalization funding, I rely on arguments that El-Said (2012)115 and Barrett and El-Said (2013) put forward.116

For Question 3 in Table 1, I reason that national consensus will contribute to more successful de-radicalization efforts: “First, national consensus behind such [de-radicalization] policies is vital for their effectiveness.”117 Although national leaders may devise de-radicalization policy, effectively enforcing such policy requires a common desire to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism.

Regarding religious influence in Question 4, I argue that a greater number of qualified religious authorities will favor more successful de-radicalization, as religious charismatic, and charismatic leaders may not always be new. Additionally, I did not want Question 7 to be too similar to Question 3, regarding national consensus around de-radicalization.

114 Ibid. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs. I do not use Hypothesis 5 in my paper regarding the timing of de-radicalization programs because the variable may not be conducive to a “yes” or “no” answer. While El-Said posits that countries executing de-radicalization programs in a positive regional or global environment will be more successful, it is difficult to contextualize what is a negative versus a positive external environment. While there may be relative peace in a region where a country is performing de-radicalization, an interstate conflict in another part of the world may undermine that region’s ability to financially or materially support de-radicalization efforts in the aforementioned country.


authorities can earn the respect of Islamist extremists and terrorists especially if they share a common heritage: “Indeed, one of the most notable features of the Saudi deradicalization programme is the participation of distinguished scholars, scientists and clerics.”¹¹⁸ If religious authorities are able to relate to the detainees, they may stand a better chance of convincing them that their radical or violent interpretation of Islam is distorted and in need of revision.

Lastly, for Question 8 in Table 1, de-radicalization programs that are free of Western influence may be more successful because these programs may reflect a better understanding of a country’s specific social, political, and cultural context: “While counter-radicalization and deradicalization cannot be isolated from the external-global environment, success at the end of the day must be achieved internally, derived from and dependent upon the cultural, financial, mores and traditional ‘tool kit’ of each country.”¹¹⁹ By posing a series of questions, I can further substantiate the success rankings for each country’s de-radicalization efforts.¹²⁰

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¹¹⁹ Ibid, 221.
¹²⁰ See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria.
Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ALG</th>
<th>BAN</th>
<th>EGY</th>
<th>JOR</th>
<th>MAL</th>
<th>SAU</th>
<th>YEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the country possess a strong developmental capacity (is the country high-performing in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment, and standards of living)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the country possess strong political institutions (is the state politically stable)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Has the state been able to build national consensus in support of its de-radicalization efforts?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Has the state been able to bring together a substantial number of qualified religious advisers, clerics, messengers, and scholars to facilitate religious dialogue as part of the state’s de-radicalization program?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Has civil society played a role in helping to accomplish the goals of de-radicalization (such as by helping to promote policies of national reconciliation)?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Has the country’s experience been one in which de-radicalization has occurred through extremist groups denouncing violence unilaterally?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Have de-radicalization programs coincided with the arrival of new state leadership in the country?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Have the country’s de-radicalization efforts not relied on Western economic or technical assistance to run such programs, or have such efforts been otherwise free of Western influence?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>ALG</th>
<th>BAN</th>
<th>EGY</th>
<th>JOR</th>
<th>MAL</th>
<th>SAU</th>
<th>YEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUESTION 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>QUESTION 4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUESTION 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 12 11 10 10 10 12 8


Note: ALG=Algeria, BAN=Bangladesh, EGY=Egypt, JOR=Jordan, MAL=Malaysia, SAU=Saudi Arabia, YEM=Yemen.

Data Analysis

I calculated descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. The sample size for each variable is 7, for the 7 Muslim-majority countries. As Table 3 illustrates, the minimum number of Islamist terrorist attacks is 0, as Malaysia did not experience any Islamist terrorist attacks during the years that I study its de-radicalization
efforts, from 2001 to 2010. Algeria, alternatively, had the maximum number of Islamist terrorist attacks, with 256 from 1997 to 2000.\textsuperscript{121}

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Islamist terrorist attacks)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(success of de-radicalization efforts)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Analysis of Relationship Between the Independent and Dependent Variables

As Figure 1 demonstrates, the dependent variable, number of Islamist terrorist attacks, has a positive relationship to the independent variable, success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts. The more successful that each country’s de-radicalization efforts are, the greater number of Islamist terrorist attacks each country will experience. The relationship between the two variables is strong, as the correlation is 0.536673299.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{121} See Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success.

\textsuperscript{122} See Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success. After testing the relationship between the dependent and independent variable without Algeria, I came up with a very similar correlation value, 0.517697104. Thus, de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the factors that may contribute to success actually result in more Islamist terrorism, even when this country is not included.
One country that fits my hypothesis well is Saudi Arabia, as its de-radicalization efforts have been relatively successful, at 12 out of 16 points, while experiencing only 19 Islamist terrorist attacks. One reason that Saudi de-radicalization efforts may have been so successful is because the country has been able to attract many religious clerics to encourage Islamist extremists to moderate: “In these [religious dialogue] conferences, Saudi authorities work closely with key religious figures from inside and outside the Kingdom to undermine the militant’s narrative, expose their limited understanding of religion and highlight their deviant behaviour and practices.”

Saudi Arabia’s security services have also used religious clerics in investigating suspected terrorists: “Religious figures have successfully been used to encourage suspected Islamist militants to confess or to urge defendants to cooperate with

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123 Ibid.
authorities."

Perhaps Saudi Arabia has experienced less Islamist terrorism because religious clerics have earned the respect of detainees in the country’s de-radicalization program, who view these clerics as possessing the religious upper hand.

Additionally, it is possible that Saudi Arabia has been more successful at de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists as its de-radicalization efforts have not been molded by the West: “Saudi Arabia has developed effective counter-radicalization and deradicalization policies not only without Western financial and technical support, but also by distancing itself from Western leaders.”

Scholars and other Muslim authorities who help lead de-radicalization efforts have the advantage of coming from a similar sociocultural background to the detainees, sharing their same grievances against the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization success suggests that detainees view the program’s non-Western leaders with greater legitimacy, as they are not doing the bidding of Western governments.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, one country that does not fit my hypothesis well is Algeria, as although its success ranking was relatively high, at 12 out of 16 points, the country experienced 256 Islamist terrorist attacks between 1997 and 2000. Despite achieving a relatively high success ranking, the country may have experienced such a high number of Islamist terrorist attacks due to a resurgence of some terrorist groups, such as the Armed

128 See Figure 1. Success of De-radicalization Programs and Islamist Terrorist Attacks.
Islamic Group (GIA), as well as the emergence of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC). 129

While the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) was undergoing its de-radicalization process during those years, the GIA and GSPC were becoming more radical: “The further radicalization of some members of the GIA led to the birth of a new, more radical splinter group in September 1998, the Groupe salafiste pour la predication et le combat – GSPC.” 130 From 1997 to 2000, nearly a quarter of all Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria were carried out by the GIA. 131 During the same period, the AIS was not responsible for any terrorist attacks in the country. 132 As the AIS was de-radicalizing, it appears that the heightened activity of other Islamist terrorist groups helps to explain the high incidence of Islamist terrorist attacks.

Islamist terrorist groups such as the GIA and GSPC may have also carried out terrorism in response to the government’s inability to provide adequate social services, resulting in a ‘failed educational system, sub-standard healthcare delivery system, and widespread poverty’ that ‘significantly weakened political legitimacy.’ 133 Without jobs to occupy their time and sustain them financially, many Algerians joined the Islamist cause against the state: “the phenomenal and surprising expansion of the Islamist movement in the 1980s and early 1990s ‘and its ability to acquire a mass base should be understood in terms of the alienation of many young Algerians from a state which seemed no longer to

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130 Ibid.
131 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Approximately 22.7 percent of terrorist attacks in the country from 1997 to 2000 were carried out by the GIA.
132 Ibid.
offer them prospects.”\(^{134}\) Such dire socioeconomic conditions enabled the GIA and GSPC to thrive, as these violent Islamist groups provided ordinary Algerians with a greater life purpose.

*Alternative Explanations*

As my results demonstrate, the proxy variables that I use based on what El-Said (2012) originally determined may be favorable to successful de-radicalization may not fully explain why states have more or less Islamist terrorist attacks.\(^{135}\) Perhaps it is the case that quantitative factors such as the number of terrorist incidents do not completely capture how successful or unsuccessful de-radicalization programs are.\(^{136}\) A country may experience more Islamist terrorism because, for example, there is a decrease in security personnel; surveillance equipment may be outdated and unable to effectively monitor militants; or because a country is unwilling to use force to deter terrorist activity.\(^{137}\) Thus, de-radicalization programs, including those that are more successful, may not fully explain why a country has more or less Islamist terrorism.

Additionally, although some countries may have more successful de-radicalization programs because such countries have more terrorism to begin with, more successful de-radicalization efforts may not necessarily result in less terrorism. Algeria, for example,

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Hamed El-Said, “De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States,” 2. See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.


\(^{137}\) Ibid, 260-261.
has experienced an extremely high rate of terrorism since the 1990s, especially compared to other countries.\textsuperscript{138}

While El-Said (2013)\textsuperscript{139} argues that the country’s de-radicalization program has been effective, given the prominent role of CSOs in galvanizing public sentiment around such policies and the arrival of new, dynamic state leadership to reinvigorate de-radicalization efforts, Algeria nevertheless experienced 256 Islamist terrorist attacks during the core years of its program.\textsuperscript{140} This figure was much greater than the number of Islamist terrorist attacks that other countries in my study experienced, as the next highest was Bangladesh, with 26.\textsuperscript{141} Evidently, despite having an allegedly effective de-radicalization program, a country may still have more terrorist incidents than others while de-radicalization is occurring, if there is more terrorism in that country in the first place.

While some countries may be more prone to terrorism in general, more successful de-radicalization programs may actually lead to a greater number of Islamist terrorist attacks because despite the relationship described in the literature, there may be no such relationship in the real world. Although El-Said and Harrigan (2011) posit that de-radicalization may affect the number of terrorist incidents in a country, more successful de-radicalization programs may not actually produce less terrorism.\textsuperscript{142} Perhaps it is that certain proxy variables for success, such as high socioeconomic development, do not relate to the number of terrorist attacks. Alleviating poverty, for example, may not deter an individual from pursuing terrorism because they are compelled by feelings of social or

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, 41.
\textsuperscript{140} See Figure 1. Islamist Terrorist Attacks and De-radicalization Success.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 264-265.
cultural alienation. Likewise, the participation of qualified religious authorities in de-
radicalization efforts may not convince the most hardened Islamist extremists to not pursue terrorism, as these most committed individuals may be so dedicated to their radical beliefs that they will carry out terrorism at any cost.

While more successful de-radicalization programs, based on the proxy variables that I use, do not correspond to less Islamist terrorism, other considerations may better account for why different countries experience less Islamist terrorist attacks. First, IO membership may be related to the number of terrorist attacks, as Europol, for example, enhances regional counterterrorism efforts by facilitating the exchange of best practices among national police agencies.\textsuperscript{143} As a result of support from Europol, Belgium and France established a “joint investigation team (JIT) to counter Islamist terrorism.”\textsuperscript{144}

Perhaps Malaysia has not experienced any Islamist terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2010 because the country “engage[s] with its neighbors on issues related to counterterrorism and transnational crime,” and has trained “Malaysian security officials” on terrorism through its “Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT).”\textsuperscript{145} By exchanging best practices with its neighbors, Malaysia has enabled its own security forces to better fight terrorism, leading to less attacks. IO membership, therefore, may better explain the absence of Islamist terrorist attacks, given Malaysia’s only moderate success with de-radicalization, at 10 out of 16 points.\textsuperscript{146}


\textsuperscript{146} See Figure 1. Success of De-radicalization Programs and Islamist Terrorist Attacks.
While the IO membership explanation for less terrorism may be compelling, so too may be a state’s degree of religious freedom. Specifically, Saiya and Scime (2014) find that “with a few exceptions, religious terrorism increases dramatically as the level of religious restrictions also increases.” In Algeria and Egypt, they find, “the suppression of religion had the effect of driving religious discontent underground, where it became radicalized and ultimately confronted the state through violence.” The authors include Islamist terrorist groups in their definition of religious terrorists, as they mention the GIA and Egypt’s Takfir wal-Hijra.

Perhaps Bangladesh experienced the second highest number of Islamist terrorist attacks among the countries in my study, 26, in part because of the government’s significant restraints on religious practice. For instance, the country’s High Court banned all fatwas, or “legal rulings based on Shari’a,” so that “village religious leaders” and other individuals could not arbitrarily establish their own religious rulings. Religious restrictions may have motivated Islamist terrorists in Bangladesh to respond with violence, as the issuing of fatwas, especially regarding jihad, is a major point of contention between Islamist terrorists and the states in which they operate.

Thirdly, as I elaborate on more in Chapter 2, regime type may influence the number of terrorist attacks in different countries. Specifically concerning Islamist terrorism,

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148 Ibid.
149 Ibid, 7.
150 Ibid, 6.
Windsor (2003) contends that countries in the Middle East can curb this phenomenon by introducing democracy: “democratic institutions and procedures, by enabling the peaceful reconciliation of grievances and providing channels for participation in policymaking, can help to address those underlying conditions that have fueled the recent rise of Islamist extremism.”

In Egypt, a lack of democracy contributed to the IG’s “insurgency” against the state in the mid to late 1990s, as “a response to the Islamists’ exclusion” from politics. The IG began its campaign of terrorist attacks, including against national leaders, to express its agitation at the government influencing the country’s “electoral law” to diminish the power of Islamists, namely the MB. Perhaps alternative factors such as Egypt’s lack of democracy can help to explain the incidence of Islamist terrorist attacks there, as the country’s de-radicalization success ranking was not very telling, at 10 out of 16 points.

Conclusion

As the results enumerate, de-radicalization programs that exhibit more of the factors that may be favorable to success result in a greater number of Islamist terrorist attacks. Although the relationship between de-radicalization success and Islamist terrorism is

154 Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Terrorism and the Middle East Democratic Deficit: Political Exclusion, Repression and the Causes of Extremism,” Democratization 13 (June 2006): 518. The IG is also known as the Gamaa Islamiya.
155 Ibid. The IG also carried out terrorist attacks against Egypt in the mid to late 1990s as a result of state repression. I focus specifically on the relationship between state repression and de-radicalization in Chapter 2.
156 See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria.
significant, other variables, including IO membership, religious freedom, and regime type may better illustrate why countries experience less Islamist terrorist attacks.

There was an especially high number of Islamist terrorist attacks in Algeria, as at the time, several other Islamist terrorist groups beside the AIS were still active. By contrast, the presence in Saudi Arabia of certain factors that may be favorable to success, including a large number of religious authorities to support de-radicalization and a lack of Western influence, may explain its lower incidence of Islamist terrorism.

I believe that comparing success across Muslim-majority countries is advantageous because certain factors, such as the ability to attract a large number of religious authorities, are more relevant to a Muslim-majority state. Alternatively, it may be difficult to adapt the same factors that may be favorable to success to non-Muslim-majority countries, as I would not expect these states to have as close or as established official relationships to the Muslim community. In future research, perhaps I could examine the factors that may be contribute to successful de-radicalization in non-Muslim-majority countries. However, I believe that it is too early to undertake such a study, as de-radicalization for Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists has not existed for that long.

Also, I could re-test my hypothesis in the future by examining whether a more nuanced measure of Islamist terrorist attacks would make a difference in my results. Instead of simply using the number of attacks, I could measure the rate of Islamist terrorist attacks per 100,000 people to more easily compare how much Islamist terrorism various countries experience. Otherwise, it is difficult to make judgements about how much Islamist terrorism each country has experienced compared to others since the totals vary so widely. By using a more nuanced measure, perhaps I could find that de-
radicalization programs with more factors favorable to success do produce less Islamist terrorism.

In examining how Islamist terrorism is affected by political stability, developmental strength, and additional features that may be favorable to successful de-radicalization, I wish to help policymakers become cognizant of certain de-radicalization elements that may reduce Islamist terrorism within their own country settings. By assessing what factors may have been more conducive to certain countries’ de-radicalization success, policymakers can try to adapt these practices, such as civil society involvement, to their own efforts. Although no de-radicalization program can achieve perfection, certain factors may favor more successful de-radicalization efforts, which in turn can potentially mitigate Islamist terrorism.
Chapter 2. Holding Down the Fort? Government Repression and the Success of De-radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority States

Getting Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists to de-radicalize is no easy task, and occasionally, states will employ repressive measures such as arrests, torture, and harsh prison conditions to compel these individuals to renounce terrorism or renounce their extremist ideology. The state has used repression to try to convince Islamist terrorists and Islamist extremists to de-radicalize in the Algerian and Egyptian contexts, and in the Egyptian context especially, terrorists realized that the costs of continuing terrorism were much too high. In this vein, terrorists may choose to no longer pursue terrorism as the persistent application of repressive measures may diminish their will to fight.

This chapter, through a cross-country comparison, asks what the effect of state repression is on the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists in Muslim-majority countries. I use the same countries that I do in Chapter 1, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I posit that Muslim-majority countries with more state repression will have more successful de-radicalization programs. State repression can contribute to more successful de-radicalization in Muslim-majority countries, for example, by making Islamist terrorists reappraise their violent behavior in response to harsh prison conditions, arrests, detention, torture, and other repressive methods.

To examine the relationship between state repression and the success of de-radicalization, I use the same scheme as I do in Chapter 1 to determine how successful countries’ de-radicalization programs have been based on certain factors. To measure state repression, I use each country’s level of freedom. I find that as a country’s level of
state repression increases, the success ranking of each de-radicalization program also increases, although there is not a strong relationship. Subsequently, I examine whether alternative explanations such as charismatic leadership and incentives, including the release of terrorist prisoners, more effectively illustrate why some de-radicalization programs may be more successful than others.

State Repression and De-radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

Although the literature does not explore the relationship between state repression and de-radicalization as much as the relationship between state repression and radicalization, Ashour (2009) examines how repression may lead de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and terrorists to be more successful.157 State repression, which involves violating or restricting political rights and civil liberties, includes ‘actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.’158 The term bundles together a number of different violent and non-violent activities that authorities can initiate, including physical sanctions, arrests, illegal detention, torture, assassinations, mass killings, political surveillance, and domestic spying.159

159 Ibid.
Some scholars, including Ashour (2009) examine how state repression has played a role in causing certain terrorist group leaders to initiate de-radicalization programs. By imposing a high cost on Islamist terrorism, repression purportedly disincentives terrorists, as “de-radicalization demonstrates that the individual is not willing to accept the high costs to pursue his ideological goal (because he is morally against the method or because the goal is not as important)” Ashour (2009) identifies “state repression directed against the armed movement” as one factor necessary not only to the initiation but to the “success of a de-radicalization process within armed Islamist movements.” As Egypt experienced several unsuccessful attempts at de-radicalization, the first successful attempt was made by the IG from 1997 to 2002. Although the IG initiated the ceasefire internally, the state put its full support behind the de-radicalization effort, referring in the media to the ceasefire as the Initiative for Ceasing Violence (ICV). Before the IG’s 1997 ceasefire, there were at least 14 attempts to stop the violence between the IG and Egypt.

State repression led to de-radicalization in the IG’s case because “repression forced the IG leadership to reassess the costs and the benefits of violently confronting the Egyptian regime. They have found that the costs of the confrontation outweigh the benefits.” IG detainees recognized that violent jihad was antithetical to Islam, and that

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163 Ibid, 50-51.
164 Ibid, 51.
confronting the Egyptian regime through such violent means was too costly. Responding with severe punishment can deter violent action by terrorist groups, by conveying the message that continued terrorism can come with undesirable ramifications.\(^{167}\)

In a repressive state such as Egypt, where severe punishment for participation in terrorism is the norm, the prospect of being incarcerated or executed, or of being forced to undergo de-radicalization, can convince terrorist groups that continuing terrorism is not in their best interest. IG leaders in particular were subjected to “extreme physical, mental and psychological pressures.”\(^{168}\) Given the “long, indiscriminate, and more intense” state repression starting in 1992, in the form of harsh prison conditions such as malnutrition, and beatings that sometimes resulted in death of prisoners, IG members saw the revision of their extremist ideology as a way to extricate themselves from such austere circumstances.\(^{169}\)

Contrary to the notion that highly repressive states can facilitate more successful de-radicalization programs, some scholars assert that more democratic states lead to less terrorism.\(^{170}\) Electoral participation may reduce transnational terrorism by mitigating citizen grievances, preventing recruitment of terrorists, and by promoting public awareness of national counterterrorism strategies and related policies.\(^{171}\) Less democratic participation, in contrast, can create a political impasse, and can increase friction among marginalized groups, which may lead to violence.\(^{172}\) Democratic societies may not


\(^{169}\) Ibid, 100-101.


\(^{171}\) Ibid, 294.

\(^{172}\) Ibid.
experience as much violent extremism as authoritarian ones, as citizens’ ability to participate in government and air their concerns through elected officials diminishes the usefulness of violence to achieve substantive political, social, or economic ends.

The literature also contends that newly democratic states may experience more terrorism than established democratic states, as the “transition period to democratic governance” is characterized as being one of the greatest periods of instability for new democracies.\(^ {173}\) While India and South Africa are considered to be democracies, both countries have a high incidence of international terrorism, as they are considered “nations in transition” economically and politically.\(^ {174}\) Gause (2005) develops the democracy-terrorism argument further by arguing that regime type is not the ultimate determinant of terrorism, as ISIS and Al Qaeda are “not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state.”\(^ {175}\) This reality is currently playing out in Iraq, where ISIS has shown that it is willing to establish a state governed by Shari’a law at any cost.

As Dugan, Korte, and LaFree (2009) suggest, heavy-handed state responses to terrorism can occur in democratic as well as authoritarian contexts.\(^ {176}\) Studying various British police and military responses to terrorism by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from 1969 to 1992, the authors find that in some cases, the use of hard power has resulted

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\(^ {174}\) Ibid, 52-55. The study finds that newly democratic countries have a strong relationship to the incidence of international terrorism in these countries. Alternatively, the relationship between new democracies and domestic terrorism, the study finds, is relatively small. Democracy scores are measured using the Polity index. International terror attacks, in contrast to domestic ones, “emanate outside the target state.”


in “backlash,” or “net increases in these [terrorist] attacks.” In the “Gibraltar incident,” where British authorities executed 3 IRA members “as part of a planned military operation,” there were “positive increases in terrorist attacks 36 months after it occurred.” Given Great Britain’s disproportionate show of force, the IRA was able to rally greater support for its cause by casting its fallen members as “martyrs.” As the British military reaction against the IRA proves, state repression can incite more terrorism by encouraging greater support for a radical cause, rather than diminish it by forcing terrorists to re-assess their actions.

State repression has also fueled radicalization and terrorism in the case of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) against French colonialism in Algeria. When Algerians engaged in peaceful protests “demanding an end to fascism and colonialism,” the French responded by executing tens of thousands of protesters and orchestrated “mass arrests and detentions.” The FLN was able to capitalize on the anger that Algerians were feeling as a result of the French massacres: “By this point, the die had been cast for an uncompromising, and indeed violent, anti-colonial struggle, which took the form of the increasingly desperate and bloody Algerian War for Independence.” Today, North African regimes have applied similar “repressive practices” such as torture, which has contributed to “violent radicalization among North Africans” and has led some to “join...

179 Ibid, 36. Specifically, the authors say that the “republicans” were able to represent the fallen IRA members as “martyrs.”
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid, 1019-1020. Some of the largest massacres occurred from 1945, when Algeria and France signed an armistice, to 1955.
other foreign jihadis in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{183} Perhaps these contemporary torture practices also help to explain support among North Africans for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has been responsible for attacking Western interests in Algeria and other North African states.

Despite the existing scholarship, the question at the heart of my research still remains unanswered. Although scholars have recently focused on the success of de-radicalization programs in Muslim-majority countries, the effect of state repression on the success of such programs has not been systematically measured. Today, there is no dataset that measures state repression against a numeric measure of different countries’ success with de-radicalization. Through my research, I can advise policymakers as to whether state repression matters in the success of de-radicalization, and if so, to what extent it has helped Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists to reform themselves and re-enter mainstream society.

\textit{Data and Methods}

This study includes the same countries that I examine in Chapter 1, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. I use quantitative analysis to determine the effect of state repression on the success of de-radicalization programs in these countries. To test the dependent variable, I use the same scheme to measure the success of each country’s de-radicalization efforts that I do in Chapter 1.\textsuperscript{184} For the independent variable, I use a numerical measure of each state’s

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid, 1022-1023.
\textsuperscript{184} See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs, and Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria.
level of repression.\textsuperscript{185} I use a scatter plot to illustrate the relationship between the independent and dependent variable.

\textit{Hypothesis}

Muslim-majority countries with greater state repression will have more successful de-radicalization programs to combat Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism.

\textit{Unit of Analysis}

I will examine how \textit{Muslim-majority countries} behave in terms of the success of de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists, in light of state repression.

\textit{Dependent Variable: Success of De-Radicalization Programs in Muslim-Majority Countries}

The dependent variable is the success of de-radicalization programs in Muslim-Majority countries. To operationalize this variable, I use the same Chapter 1 proxy variables, which are: \textit{a state’s developmental capacity, strength of political institutions, national consensus around de-radicalization, personnel required for religious dialogue, role of civil society, unilateral condemnation of violent action, new leadership at the state level, and de-radicalization funding}.\textsuperscript{186}


\textsuperscript{186} See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.
Independent Variable: State Repression in Muslim-Majority Countries

The independent variable is state repression in each country. To operationalize this variable, I use data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report to measure the mean freedom score for the core years during which I study each country’s de-radicalization program. Freedom House measures each country’s political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 indicating the most free, and 7 indicating the least free. I measure the freedom rating, or the average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, against the dependent variable to gauge the extent to which state repression affects de-radicalization success.

Data Analysis

I calculate descriptive statistics for both the independent and dependent variables. The sample size for each variable is 7, for the 7 Muslim-majority countries in the study. The minimum for the dependent variable, success of state programs, is 8, as Yemen received the lowest success ranking for its program, lacking all of the 8 characteristics that may be conducive to de-radicalization success. Alternatively, the maximum for the dependent variable is 12, as Algeria possessed the greatest number of characteristics that may explain de-radicalization success, including the unilateral disarmament of

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188 “Freedom in the World 2013 Methodology Summary.”
189 Ibid. The freedom rating is coded as follows: free (1.0 to 2.5), partly free (3.0 to 5.0), and not free (5.5 to 7.0).
190 See Table 1. Questions Regarding Conditions Conducive to Success of De-radicalization Programs.
extremist groups in the country, national consensus in support of de-radicalization efforts, and a civil society presence in facilitating de-radicalization.\textsuperscript{191}

Table 4 illustrates that for the independent variable, state repression, the minimum is 3.9, since Bangladesh is a partly free country.\textsuperscript{192} By contrast, the maximum for the independent variable is 6.8, as Saudi Arabia is not free, and has the highest level of state repression among the 7 countries in the study.\textsuperscript{193}

<p>| Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression |
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<th>N</th>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>(success of state de-radicalization programs)</td>
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<td>Independent Variable</td>
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<td>(level of state repression)</td>
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\textit{Analysis of Relationship Between the Independent and Dependent Variables}

As Figure 2 demonstrates, the dependent variable, success of state de-radicalization programs, has a positive relationship with the independent variable, level of state repression. As state repression increases, the success of de-radicalization programs increases. The relationship between the two variables is not strong, however, as the correlation value is 0.250266257.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{191} See Table 2. Rankings of State De-radicalization Programs Based on Success Criteria. Saudi Arabia also achieved a score of 12 for the success of its de-radicalization efforts.
\textsuperscript{192} See Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression.
With regard to Figure 2, Saudi Arabia aligns with my hypothesis well, as its level of state repression is 6.8 or “not free,” and its success ranking is 12 out of 16, above the mean for the variable, 10.4.\(^{195}\) In response to AQAP-led terrorism, especially between 2003 and 2007, Saudi authorities executed several AQAP leaders, while “other senior leaders surrendered or were captured.”\(^{196}\) Although Islamist terrorists in Saudi Arabia have been motivated to violence mainly out of a desire to establish an Islamic state rather than because of grievances against the regime, Saudi authorities have nevertheless been able to combat jihadism with repression, co-optation, and by appeasing the opposition through inducements.\(^{197}\)

\(^{195}\) See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression, and Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression.

\(^{196}\) Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 57.

Perhaps Saudi Arabia has been able to stop extremist and terrorist detainees from re-offending at a rate of nearly 80 percent because “the government is the legitimate entity entrusted with the ability to exercise force and make determinations about what constitutes religiously acceptable behavior.”198 Saudi Arabia may partially owe its de-radicalization success to AQAP members realizing that the costs outweigh the advantages in terms of continuing terrorism, given state repression.

By contrast, one country that does not fit my hypothesis well is Jordan, as it was ranked at 5 for its freedom rating or “not free,” and the success of its program was 10 out of 16, below the mean for the variable.199 Repression by Jordanian authorities may only fuel radicalization in Jordan further, as new laws prohibiting speeches in mosques, more stringent controls on charities and the media, as well as limits on the activities of professional associations have led to a rise in the number of jihadist Salafists, who are not willing to cooperate with the regime, and will use violence to achieve political ends.200 The jihadist Salafists are openly opposed to the MB in Jordan, as the MB is an Islamist social movement that has “increasingly associated with the Jordanian regime and its policies.”201 The MB’s alignment with the Jordanian regime has caused mainstream

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199 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression, and Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: De-radicalization Success and State Repression.
201 Ibid, 20-21. The MB in Jordan can be viewed as a social movement, as it has been able to influence citizens to support its cause, but has not effectively been able to transform itself into a political opposition force capable of confronting the authoritarian regime.
Islamism to weaken, and has fostered support for more radical Islamist groups, including the Salafi jihadists, in recent years.\textsuperscript{202}

Whereas the Jordanian Government believes that Islamist terrorism is a security issue borne from Islamist radicalization, the MB and other politically-affiliated Islamist groups contend that the government’s consequent measures to repress political freedoms have been counterproductive.\textsuperscript{203} Furthermore, Jordanian scholars such as Ibrahim Gharbiya argue that the government’s anti-extremist message has not penetrated into the more radicalized communities, as the government’s strategy has not involved “reach[ing] the sources of violence and crime.”\textsuperscript{204} Jordan’s de-radicalization approach of countering extremist ideology can triumph only if authorities address factors that underlie radicalization, such as unemployment and political disenfranchisement.

The country that refutes my hypothesis the most is Yemen, as while it is “not free,” with a freedom rating of 5.4, it has also experienced the least success in terms of its de-radicalization efforts, with a score of 8 out of 16.\textsuperscript{205} Perhaps the “Yemeni Government’s lack of financial resources,” as well as its failure to “provide adequate after-care for released detainees” can help to explain how the country’s de-radicalization program has not been a success.\textsuperscript{206} Without the financial capacity, for example, the Yemeni

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid, 21. Although the MB has recently sided with the policies of the Jordanian regime, there are also more radical elements within the MB, and siding with the regime by the moderate forces within the MB may have further aggravated the radicalized forces within the movement.


\textsuperscript{204} Ibid, 67.

\textsuperscript{205} See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression. As the mean freedom score for Yemen from 2002 to 2005 is 5.4, I characterize the country as “not free” since “not free” ranges from 5.5 to 7. See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology (accessed March 10, 2015).

Government could not stand up a formal system to help ensure that detainees do not return to terrorism, such as through regular payments to former detainees, employment help, and psychological and material assistance to detainees’ families.

Also, repression backfired, as rights abuses inflamed the detainees: “For the participating detainees, and for many observers, it was this image of the laws being sidelined that was the most remarkable aspect of the dialogue project and which overshadowed the aspects of religious debates.” In addition to not being “informed about their legal rights” and being counselled by Yemeni officials to not seek legal representation, detainees suffered “beatings with electric wires,” and “received threats that their female family members would be arrested if they did not confess to the accusations made against them.” Instead of aiding the de-radicalization process, repression by the Yemeni Government only fomented the detainees further, leading to the program’s eventual demise.

Alternative Explanations for Success of De-radicalization Programs

It appears that state repression alone may not be able to explain why some countries’ programs are more successful than others at combating Islamist extremism and terrorism. Other factors, including dynamic leadership by terrorist or extremist group leaders, may foster successful de-radicalization, as a charismatic leader can more easily sway group members into believing that extremism is not the answer. With charismatic

208 Ibid, 11-12.
leadership, group members are less likely to continue to support extremism, because “doing so would involve opposing their social network.”

In Algeria’s case, although the country’s freedom rating is 5.5 or “not free,” and its de-radicalization success ranking is 12 points out of 16, charismatic leadership may further illustrate why the country’s de-radicalization efforts were successful. In contrast to the GIA, the de-radicalization of the AIS was successful because of charismatic leadership within the group that encouraged members to abandon terrorism and extremism. Perhaps because the ultimate call to end violence came from the top, AIS operatives were convinced that continuing violence was not in their individual best interest, as it was not in the best interest of the group as a whole.

In addition to dynamic leadership in extremist and terrorist groups, another factor that may help explain the success of de-radicalization is selective inducements. Although both state repression and charismatic leadership were present in the de-radicalization of the AIS, selective inducements proved to be another important factor in the group’s de-radicalization. ‘Carrots’ not only “attract the attention of the members of armed organizations after periods of repression,” but also lend greater credibility to the organization’s leaders who advocate for de-radicalization over those who do not.

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211 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 167.
212 See Figure 2. De-radicalization Success and State Repression.
215 Ibid, 125-127.
217 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, 140.
One way that the Algerian Government incentivized AIS members was through employment assistance, resulting in several AIS leaders finding work as “successful business entrepreneurs.”\textsuperscript{218} The Algerian Government also released political prisoners, as one of the AIS’ main demands was the release of all of its detainees. As a result of the prisoner release, the de-radicalization process was strengthened, as more militants were willing to moderate their extremist behavior.\textsuperscript{219} The role of selective inducements can also be seen in the IG’s de-radicalization in Egypt, as the Egyptian government permitted IG members to participate in religious study together in prison, and prisoners could engage in debate on Islamic interpretation. By keeping the IG cohesive, the government was better able to facilitate the moderation of extremist ideology within the group, and drive support for the initiative to end violence.\textsuperscript{220}

\textit{Conclusion}

As the findings of this study illustrate, although as state repression increases, the success of de-radicalization programs increases, there is not a strong relationship. Other variables, such as charismatic leadership within Islamist extremist and Islamist terrorist groups, as well as selective inducements provided by the state to encourage such groups to abandon terrorism and extremism may also contribute to the success of de-radicalization.

\textsuperscript{218} Omar Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: The Case of the Islamic Salvation Army and Affiliated Militias,” 19.
\textsuperscript{219} Omar Ashour, \textit{The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements}, 126.
In future research, I could explore in more depth the alternative explanations that may account for change in the dependent variable, including dynamic leadership within Islamist extremist and Islamist terrorist groups and selective inducements. I could include these other two explanations as control variables, to examine the degree to which they interact with state repression, and affect de-radicalization success. As Algeria, for example, illustrates evidence of state repression, charismatic leadership, and incentives as part of its efforts to de-radicalize the AIS, I can use data to quantitatively test if together, these variables yield a statistically significant relationship to de-radicalization success.

This study makes an important contribution to the practice of counterterrorism, as policymakers can gauge the extent to which state repression does or does not make de-radicalization more successful. As my results show, state repression may not play a major role in making de-radicalization more successful, at least in isolation, as dynamic leadership within extremist or terrorist groups and incentives for group members to de-radicalize are also important.

As this study illustrates that government repression may only further fuel Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism, these same repressive tactics failed to quiet pro-democracy protesters in the wake of the Arab Spring. Despite beatings, detentions, and other forms of repression by Egyptian authorities, the protests became progressively larger, and interestingly, “the Islamist movement joined the protests.” Thus, state repression, instead of wearing down the resolve of those who are being repressed, may only make pro-democracy protesters demonstrate with greater vigor, and may only make

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221 Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, “To Repress or Not to Repress — Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring, Terrorism and Political Violence,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 0 (2014): 11-12.
222 Ibid, 11.
Islamist terrorists fight harder. As Islamist terrorism and Islamist extremism continues to be a major issue, especially in Muslim-majority countries, it will be interesting to observe whether the presence of state repression drives Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists to de-radicalize to avoid continued subjugation, or if state repression will prove to be a catalyst for increased radicalization and violent activity.
Chapter 3. You can Have it Both Ways: How a State’s Religious Characteristics Affect Whether States Focus on Religious Re-education or Social Re-integration Approaches to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

Most states with de-radicalization programs for Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists apply a combination of methods to re-integrate these individuals back into mainstream society, including social initiatives such as vocational training, help finding employment, financial assistance, and mental health counselling; as well as religious initiatives to help extremists moderate their radical interpretation of Islam. While some countries place particular emphasis on social re-integration rather than religious re-education or vice versa, other countries place relatively equal weight on both approaches.

This chapter investigates whether states with a greater percent of Muslims per total population tend to place more importance on a religious re-education approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, versus an approach aimed at social re-integration. I posit that states with a greater percentage of Muslims will tend to focus on religious re-education, as since Muslims are not the minority in these states, authorities will not view social integration as being the primary catalyst for extremism.

Second, I hypothesize that states with an official religion will tend to place more importance on religious re-education, as the lack of any church-state separation can give the state greater justification for trying to reform individuals’ religious views. Also, I believe that governments, and the religious organizations they sponsor, will have more credibility among the religious population in religious states than in secular states.

Thirdly, I posit that states with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not follow the state’s religious interpretation will tend to emphasize a
religious re-education approach, as the state may view any alternative interpretations as a threat to its authority.

I study 8 countries chosen at random from a total of 16 countries that have de-radicalization programs meant to combat Islamist extremism and terrorism. The countries that I randomly selected are Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, the US (in Iraq), Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, and Denmark.\textsuperscript{223} My research uses data on the percent of Muslims per total population of each country; the presence or absence of official religion; and the level of government constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not comply with the religion interpretation that the state endorses. To determine the extent to which the 8 countries apply religious and social approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, I rely on case studies of each country’s programs, from books, scholarly journal articles, news articles, and government reports.

The findings reveal that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, the relationships are not strong. I then explore whether alternative explanations, including a state’s social welfare spending, compulsory learning in the majority religion, and constraints on formal religious organizations that are not political parties affect a state’s approach to de-radicalization.

\textsuperscript{223} I include Morocco in this chapter because although it may be difficult to assess the success of the country’s de-radicalization efforts, since they were just initiated in 2011, there is enough information for me to gather whether the country has focused its de-radicalization efforts more on religious re-education or social re-integration.
Different countries will often emphasize either religious or social approaches to de-radicalization, depending on the regional context. In contrast to de-radicalization programs in “South East Asian and Middle Eastern” countries, European programs traditionally concentrate on social initiatives including “practical and economic assistance” and “psychological counseling,” rather than religious ideology.

While “Egypt was the first Islamic country to experiment with a dialogue program for imprisoned Muslim extremists,” every de-radicalization program is based on the common principle that “a shortage of social capital needs to be addressed.” Egyptian authorities acknowledged the need for social development by facilitating the issuing of pensions to IG prisoners upon their release from detention. Many de-radicalization programs also have other characteristics in common, including using friends, family members, or “repentant terrorists” as “go-between[s] who can influence the terrorist [or extremist],” and relying on friends and family members to encourage terrorists or extremists to stay on track through their de-radicalization process.
Religious Education and Radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

While Muslim-dominated countries may have a vested interest in ensuring that Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists adopt a non-radical form of Islam, European countries tend to place less emphasis on encouraging Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists to amend their violent view of the religion: “European approaches are shaped by the fact that Muslims are a minority in secular, nominally Christian-majority countries. As a consequence, European governments recognize that they cannot directly challenge an ideology based on Islam.”

Although Islamist radicalization is a growing concern in secular countries such as the Netherlands, the “division between church and state” precludes the government from taking part in conversations regarding moderate versus extremist Muslim views.

Furthermore, in secular states, leaders may have little leverage in reforming Islamist extremists’ mindset, as “limited capability and credibility constrain authorities’ ability to influence ideology.” Malaysian leaders, for example, may be able to sway militants by re-assuring them that Malaysia is an Islamic state and that “sharia law is gradually becoming parallel to the secular legal system.” However, with respect to the UK’s Prevent program and similar radicalization prevention efforts by the US, Rascoff

229 Christopher Boucek, Jeremy J. Ghez, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, 39.


232 Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” 152. One of Jemaah Islamiah (JI)’s central goals is to establish an Islamic state.
(2012) suggests that “the government lacks credibility within Muslim communities and
lacks expertise regarding the relevant religious issues.” He proposes that the
“legitimacy gap” may be greatest in Western countries, as Muslims may not take
seriously or refuse to cooperate with religious organizations—“however ‘radical’” they
are—if they are sponsored by a secular government.

Despite these concerns, the Solas Foundation program in Scotland, which seeks to
prevent radicalization through “formal Islamic education,” has received accolades from
past participants. Run by respected Muslim scholars who “were born and educated in
Scotland” and “studied in the Muslim world with some of its leading theologians,” they
‘understand the needs of the community.’ Despite being a secular country, Scotland
has been able to make its de-radicalization program relevant by involving credible
religious figures who are able to relate to European Muslims’ theological struggles.

While Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia may employ a combination of social,
‘religious, psychological, and cultural’ initiatives, participants are “engaged all the while
in a program consolidating the ‘correct notions and concepts’ of Islam.” As Saudi
Arabia is primarily concerned with “regime security,” it has tried to avert the influence of
Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism in the region by giving “Egypt $4 billion to
shore up the fledgling post-Mubarak order, and to prevent its further radicalization.”

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236 Ibid, 4-10. The quote here is taken from a testimonial of one of the program’s participants.

Saudi Arabia also continues to monitor the volatile political situation in Yemen, especially given Saudi Arabia’s concern over AQAP.
Uzbekistan, which purports to be a secular country, the government limits “the exercise of Islam to a single state-supported form.” President Islam Karimov, convinced that “radical Islamists and fundamentalists threaten to destabilize the state,” has suppressed “leaders of radical Islamic groups which openly criticized official Muslim administration or did not demonstrate explicit loyalty to the state.” Fearful that more radical Islamist groups may try to subvert the existing religious-political order, the Karimov regime has blamed “the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir, in all incidents of political violence in Uzbekistan.” Evidently, the Government of Uzbekistan wants to ensure that its own brand of Islam is not subsumed by a more fundamentalist strand.

One of the justifications for Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization program is that “certain mosques remain sources of radicalism,” urging mosques to “promote moderate Islam.” Furthermore, worrying that teachers might “radicalize their students,” the Saudi Arabian Government “removed approximately 200 [teachers] to administrative positions.” Mosques have also been a source of radicalization in non-Muslim-majority countries, as Dzokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended a radical Boston mosque that promoted “a narrative of Muslims around the world being under attack alongside a duty to aide them.” In response, moderate imams in US mosques are using the internet to

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241 Ibid. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a violent Islamist extremist organization operating in Central Asia. The author describes Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) as an “extremist Islamic political organization.” (See 371-373, 376).


243 Ibid.

244 Anne Speckhard, “The Boston Marathon Bombers: the Lethal Cocktail that Turned Troubled Youth to Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (June 2013): 70-71.
engage Muslims, based on the notion that fostering a sense of community can inoculate Muslims from extremism.²⁴⁵ Whereas Saudi Arabia sees radical Islamism as a threat to its stability, enforcing measures such as firing teachers to ensure that its influence does not spread, US efforts to combat Islamist extremism are more suggestive in nature, as radical Islamism is not perceived as a threat to the existing political administration.

Other secular countries, including Tajikistan, fear radical Muslim influences in the political realm, as the “Tajik government continues to view Islamism as one of the main threats to national security.”²⁴⁶ As “public infrastructure has continued to deteriorate” in Central Asian countries since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Tajikistan views the “growth of Islamic communities and charities” that provide social services as a “political threat.”²⁴⁷ Similar to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan associates any government opposition with radicalism, and “assume[s] that any regime opponents are connected to the IMU.”²⁴⁸

In terms of its youth counter-radicalization efforts, whereas Uzbekistan’s program centers on “creat[ing] a youth base that is loyal to the regime and inculcated with the mainstream values of the official state ideology,” Tajikistan’s program is concerned more with “extra-curricular, skill-based development opportunities” for “disenfranchised youth.”²⁴⁹ Additionally, while in Uzbekistan, young people are “constantly monitored so

²⁴⁶ Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror,” 379.
²⁴⁸ Ibid.
²⁴⁹ Farhod Yuldashev, “Countering Terrorism in Ferghanan Valley: A Comparative Analysis of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik Youth Policies as a Measure of Success,” in Counter Terrorism in Diverse Communities, ed. Siddik Ekici (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011), 297-298. Uzbekistan’s state ideology that is described here is more political and cultural than religious in nature, and is tied to the post-Soviet youth organization called Kamolot. The Government of Turkmenistan has a similar position, as both governments indoctrinate
that they don’t join radical groups and terrorist organizations,” Tajikistan is more hands-off in this regard, focusing more on improving social integration than on ideological indoctrination.250

Despite some countries’ efforts to moderate the Islamist extremist ideology, Borum (2011) suggests that ‘moderate Islam’ may be false, as ‘no school of Islamic jurisprudence [exists] that does not teach the necessity to work toward the political dominance of Islamic law and the subjugation of unbelievers under that law.’251 In other words, it may not be possible to moderate Islamist extremism if there is no moderate form of Islam to base de-radicalization on. Likewise, the absence of a “central power structure” from Islam may challenge the “ability of Islamists to demonstrate their commitment to embracing moderation.”252 Furthermore, “moderation may have little to do with religion and everything to do with historical power struggles and local contexts,” as “religious authority” is more about protecting a regime from being taken over by more radical elements.253 Regardless, many countries continue to incorporate the moderation of religious ideology, especially through religious dialogue, into their de-radicalization efforts.

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Social Integration and Radicalization of Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

From the standpoint of social integration, individuals who are better assimilated into society are not very susceptible to becoming radicalized, while individuals who are not as well assimilated are more susceptible. The “exclusion perspective,” which the European Union (EU) promotes, “links terrorism to social exclusion, unemployment, a lack of integration, a breakdown in common values, the dissolution of civil society and also the war on terror itself.” According to Neumann (2006), “second- or third-generation Muslim immigrants” living in Europe are more vulnerable to becoming radicalized, because they feel conflicted by “the traditional values of their parents (which they often resent) and the demands and promise of Western society (which they find hard to access).”

Muslim immigrants frequently fail to identify with their adopted European culture as Western values of capitalism, materialism, and hedonism may be complete anathema to the socially and religiously conservative culture they are accustomed to. As Denmark identifies radicalization as resulting in part from “inadequate social integration,” its de-radicalization program seeks to “find constructive social alternatives to extremist groups” by, for example, ensuring that extremists have the necessary encouragement from “families and social networks” to successfully abandon their extremist ties.

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255 Ibid, 327.
One debate surrounding social explanations for radicalization concerns whether unemployment is important to radicalization. Regarding AQAP members, Hegghammer (2006) argues that “socioeconomic” considerations such as unemployment do not tell the whole story, as although a large number of AQAP members did not hold jobs, of those who did, “very few were significantly overqualified.” As such, there are “fewer reasons to believe that unfulfilled ambitions or a sense of relative deprivation fueled their social alienation.”

In contrast, Al-Hashimi and Goerzig (2015) cite unemployment as a factor in violent riots that occurred in 2005 in Muslim neighborhoods outside of Paris, as a lack of “prospects for upward social mobility” fomented Muslims to take a stand against the French Government. Although the riots were initially spurred by “police brutality,” Muslims used the protests to call attention to the ‘racial and social’ prejudice by French authorities that precluded many Muslims from finding jobs.

Alternatively, Staun and Veldhuis (2009) contend that “many radical Muslims” are “well integrated and indistinguishable from the general population,” and are “born and raised in the relative prosperity and freedom of a modern, democratic country.”

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259 Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 13 (Winter 2006): 45. The author also found that only a small number of AQAP members had a criminal history prior to their radicalization.
260 Ibid. The author finds that AQAP members have a common history of terrorism involvement, acquired mostly during time spent fighting in Afghanistan.
262 Ibid. Discriminatory comments against Parisian Muslims by President Sarkozy, as well as the recommendation by Sarkozy that the French Government monitor the funding of Muslim religious institutions also contributed to the grievances that played out in the 2005 protests.
main operative in the London subway bomb attack in July 2005, Mohammad Siddique Khan, cited the UK’s anti-Muslim “foreign policy,” especially in Iraq, as a key catalyst for his radicalization and subsequent pursuit of terrorism.\textsuperscript{264} Likewise, Shehzad Tanweer, an associate, claimed that the attack was not inspired by ‘poverty, unemployment and emptiness as some of the mercenary media try to portray it to us.’\textsuperscript{265}

Further exploring the relationship between socioeconomic influences and terrorism, Stern (2010) asserts that although “there is no direct correlation between low GDP and terrorism,” impoverished individuals “in countries with high levels of unemployment” are at greater risk of being recruited into terrorism.\textsuperscript{266} In Saudi Arabia, the majority of participants in the country’s de-radicalization program “are men in their 20s from large lower- or middle-class families.”\textsuperscript{267} By setting up vocational “training courses,” Saudi Arabia hopes to “qualify [released detainees] for better, more substantive, employment upon their release than they previously had.”\textsuperscript{268}

Within democracies, and specifically within the EU, the literature describes how societies that promote multiculturalism versus those that promote assimilation treat Islamist radicalization.\textsuperscript{269} The UK and US execute the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or multicultural approach, as they actively promote freedom of speech and believe that democracies

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid, 101.
\textsuperscript{269} Alejandro J. Beutel, “Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America,” Minaret of Freedom Institute (August 2007): 2.
should “tolerate a degree of extremism.” While Neumann (2013) describes the role of police officers in the UK as mainly to stop crime, Davies and Spalek (2012) see law enforcement there as having a stake in “the ideologies circulating within communities, particularly where those ideologies endorse violence.”

Another point of contention in the literature concerns whether law enforcement treat Muslims in Western democracies as part of a ‘suspect community,’ pursuing security measures that stigmatize a country’s Muslims. The stigmatization of Salafis and Islamists by authorities has jeopardized UK law enforcement’s ability to fight Al Qaeda’s hateful message, as the more conservative Salafis and Islamists are generally better attuned to signs of Al Qaeda-inspired behavior than their more moderate Sufi counterparts. Challenging this “distinct communities” concept, Ragazzi (2014) contends that “counter-radicalization policies” actively seek to “manage” diversity through ‘policed multiculturalism.’ The “management of diversity” can be seen in the UK and US’ ‘stakeholder approach’ to counterterrorism, where citizens are encouraged to ‘self-regulate’ by ‘report[ing] suspicious activity.’ ‘Policed multiculturalism’ seeks to make minorities feel empowered as equals in combating terrorism, as opposed to bearing the brunt of “repressive measures.”

271 Ibid.
274 Ibid, 659-660. Recently, the UK Government has engaged with the more moderate Sufis in an attempt to counter Islamist extremism.
276 Ibid, 166-167.
277 Ibid, 162-164.
On “managing diversity,” Moghaddam (2012) argues that both multiculturalism and assimilation threaten “collective identity,” often leading to ‘defensive’ actions including “radicalization and terrorism.”\(^{278}\) Omniculturalism, alternatively, can address “the challenge of threatened collective identities,” as its “universalist” view banishes group differences.\(^{279}\) As Moghaddam (2012) perceives radicalization to be a “group defense mechanism,” omniculturalism can address this inter-group alienation that leads individuals to radicalize.\(^{280}\) In Britain, multicultural policies have served to marginalize minority groups such as Muslims, breeding radicalization in response to the uneven allocation of “political power and financial resources,” for instance.\(^{281}\)

Despite the existing scholarship, the questions at the heart of my research remain unanswered. Although the connections among a state’s religious nature—including its religious makeup and posture vis-à-vis Islamist extremism—and de-radicalization programs have been the focus of recent scholarship, factors affecting what specific de-radicalization approaches states choose to pursue has not been systematically measured. This chapter will shed light on the range of approaches that countries use to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, and will hopefully help policymakers who are considering or actively developing de-radicalization programs in their own countries to determine the mix of religious and social approaches that they would like to implement.

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\(^{279}\) Ibid, 320-322.

\(^{280}\) Ibid, 319.

**Data and Methods**

This study includes a representative sample of countries that have government-led or government facilitated de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, including Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, the United States (in Iraq), Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, and Denmark.\(^{282}\) I selected the countries based on a random drawing, where I chose an even number of countries from 4 different geographical regions representing different religious contexts: Middle East and South Asia; Southeast Asia; North Africa; and Europe.\(^{283}\) I use quantitative analysis to determine the effect of percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses.

For the dependent variable, I examine the literature to determine whether states emphasize either religious or social approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, or if states feature aspects of each approach relatively equally. I measure the independent variables using country-level data on percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses. To determine a relationship between the independent and dependent variables I use scatter plots.

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\(^{282}\) The 8 countries that I did not select are: Germany, the Netherlands, Thailand, Indonesia, Libya, Algeria, Israel, and Pakistan.

\(^{283}\) I selected 2 countries each from Southeast Asia; North Africa; Europe; and the Middle East and South Asia.
Hypotheses

a.) States with a greater percentage of Muslims will focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists more on religious re-education rather than social re-integration.

b.) States with an official religion will focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists more on religious re-education rather than social re-integration.

c.) States with greater constraints on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses will focus their efforts to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists more on religious re-education rather than social re-integration.

Unit of Analysis

I will examine how countries with de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists behave in response to the percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses.
Dependent Variable: State De-radicalization Programs Aimed at Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

The dependent variable is state de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. To operationalize this variable, I examine case studies to determine which countries emphasize religious re-education versus social re-integration to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Table 5 illustrates the aspects of each country’s approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists based on the literature.284

Although no existing study explicitly lays out different countries’ de-radicalization efforts according to religious versus social approaches, El-Said and Harrigan (2011) examine the counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs of 37 UN member states, in which all 37 countries were invited to “provide information on their non-coercive policies and initiatives designed to address radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism.”285 The UN then organized aspects of each state’s efforts by category, including “rehabilitation,” “engaging civil society,” and addressing “economic-social inequalities.”286

Similarly, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2010) uses a table to outline various European and North American countries’ de-radicalization efforts according to “factors in radicalization”: divisions, grievances, narratives, and means.287 To address

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284 See Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists.
285 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “In Search of a De-Radicalisation Strategy,” 238. Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries participated, including Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Russia, Iceland, and others.
286 Ibid, 239-240.
287 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalisation,” 4. PPN in this publication refers to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s “Policy Planners’ Network on Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation.” Comprised of the “UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Spain and Canada,” the PPN serves as a forum for
grievances, and specifically to “improve labour market outcomes,” the ISD indicates that certain PPN countries have made promoting “professional networks” and “training and employment projects” part of their de-radicalization programs.288

Similarly, the UK Home Office (2011) describes different countries’ de-radicalization programs, using a table to denote such categories as country and program title, what groups the program is directed at, “activities and techniques,” as well as “measures of success.”289 Rather than explicitly categorizing de-radicalization programs by their religious versus social aspects as I do in Table 5, the Home Office records de-radicalization initiatives in list form, such as “education focused on moderation” and “dialogue with leaders” for Egypt.290

Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGIOUS RE-EDUCATION VS. SOCIAL RE-INTEGRATION</th>
<th>STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Program Based Primarily on Religious Re-education</td>
<td>YEM, SIN, MAL, EGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasizes any of the following: religious dialogue; religious counselling; religious instruction; counter-ideological approach; correcting aberrant interpretations of Islam; relationship between the state and Islam; role of Muslim leadership; definition of jihad; discussing appropriateness of fatwas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few mentions of initiatives aimed at social re-integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Relatively Equal Weight Given to Both Approaches</td>
<td>USA (in Iraq), MOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Religious re-education and social re-integration are both central to de-radicalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Program Based Primarily on Social Re-integration</td>
<td>DEN, AFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasizes any of the following: finding social alternatives to extremism; employment for former militants and/or their families; restoring former militants’ previously held jobs; loans and/or grants to encourage entrepreneurship; vocational training; continuing education; psychological counselling for former militants and/or their families and/or mentorship; support groups; financial assistance (e.g., tuition assistance, incentives for rejecting violence, compensation to families of former militants); obtaining housing; organized sports and/or other organized recreation; pardons or decreased jail time for former extremists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Few mentions of initiatives aimed at religious re-education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


288 Ibid, 5. ISD’s table does not specify which countries have pursued which initiatives.
290 Ibid, 110. See Table 5. State Approaches to De-radicalizing Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists.
Independent Variables: Percent of the Population that is Muslim; Official Religion; Restrictions on Adherents of the Majority Religion who do not Agree With the Religious Interpretation that the State Endorses

To test my first hypothesis, I use the percent of the country’s total population that is Muslim for the independent variable. To operationalize this variable, I measure each country’s percent of Muslims per total population against the dependent variable, to gauge the extent to which percentage of Muslims affects whether a state pursues an approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists that emphasizes religious re-education or social re-integration, or if a state focuses on each relatively equally. For each country, I collect data from Pew Research Center on the percentage of Muslims from 2010.291 The percent of Muslims per total population is an appropriate measure, as being that Muslim immigrants are minorities in Western countries, especially in Europe, they often have difficulty integrating into a society that may be at odds with the traditional, religiously conservative values they are used to.292

For the second hypothesis, I use each country’s presence or absence of official religion as the independent variable. To operationalize this variable, I measure official religion against the dependent variable, to gauge the extent to which the independent variable affects whether a state focuses de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists on religious re-education or social re-integration, or if a state focuses

291 Pew Research Center, “Table: Muslim Population by Country,” (published January 27, 2011) http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/ (accessed February 28, 2015). 2010 is the most recent year that Pew supplies data for this measure. Pew measures this data every 20 years. From 1990 to 2010, Malaysia was the only country in my sample to have experienced a significant population increase (approximately ten million from 1990 to 2010). This may help to explain the increase in the country’s Muslims from 49 percent in 1990 to 61.4 percent in 2010. See World Bank, “Population, total,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=4 (accessed February 28, 2015).
292 Peter R. Neumann, “Europe’s Jihadist Dilemma,” 73.
on each relatively equally. I take the mean score for official religion from the Religion and State Project for the core years of each country’s de-radicalization program, 1 being no official religion, and 3 indicating that the state has one official religion.293 According to Fox (2011), a religion is official when a state specifies a particular religious affiliation in its constitution.294 The presence or absence of official religion is an appropriate measure, as Rascoff (2012) contends that Muslims in Western countries may not be as apt to cooperate with the country’s religious organizations if they are backed by a secular government.295

To further evaluate how a state’s religious nature impacts a country’s mix of approaches to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists, I measure a state’s restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the religious interpretation that the state endorses, for my third hypothesis. To operationalize this variable, I measure the extent to which “the government restricts or harasses members and organizations affiliated with the majority religion but who operate outside of the state sponsored or recognized ecclesiastical framework” against the dependent variable, to determine its effect on whether a state focuses de-radicalization of Islamist

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293 Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org. See also Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), “The Religion and State Project, Round 2,” http://www.thearda.com/archive/files/Codebooks/RAS2012_CB.asp (accessed February 28, 2015). I re-coded the variable to range from 1 to 3, as the ARDA measures the variable from 0, no official religion, to 2, one official religion. ARDA measures the variable (sax) from 1990 to 2008. The RDA has a more nuanced variable, Official Government Involvement in Religion (GIR), sbx, with 15 categories, but it would be more difficult to draw a correlation as the categories measure specific characteristics of the state’s relationship to official religion, e.g., “state controlled religion, positive attitude.”


extremists and Islamist terrorists on religious re-education or social re-integration, or if a state focuses on each relatively equally.296

I take the mean score for this Religion and State Project measure for the core years that each country has operated programs to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists.297 While 1 indicates “no restrictions,” 4 indicates that “operat[ing] outside of the state sponsored or recognized ecclesiastical framework” is “illegal.”298 Furthermore, a score of 4 may also denote that, regarding placing limits on or harassing those who do not comply with the state’s religious interpretation, “the government engages in this activity often and on a large scale.”299

This measure is appropriate to my study, as in Malaysia, for example, “Muslims who deviate from accepted Sunni principles may be detained and subjected to mandatory ‘rehabilitation’ in centers that teach and enforce government-approved Islamic practices.”300 In other words, individuals who espouse a radical ideology that the Malaysian Government believes threatens its own interpretation of Islam may be forced to undergo de-radicalization as a result.

The last section of my data analysis involves a table comparing 2 countries that have emphasized social re-integration as part of their de-radicalization efforts:

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{296} “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.”}\
\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{297} Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org.}\
\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{298} “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” I re-coded the variable to range from 1 to 4, as the ARDA codes the variable from 0, “no restrictions,” to 3. This variable, no5x, is available for every year from 1990 to 2008. A value of 1 (which I re-coded to 2) indicates “slight restrictions including practical restrictions or the government engages in this activity rarely and on a small scale,” while 2 (which I re-coded to 3) indicates “significant restrictions including practical restrictions or the government engages in this activity occasionally and on a moderate scale.”}\
\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.}\
Afghanistan and Denmark. First, a state’s degree of social welfare may help to explain why some countries emphasize a social approach to de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. At the same time as welfare states have consistently delivered basic social services to citizens, including education and healthcare, states that are Islamic have not been as successful in doing so. In Muslim countries such as Pakistan, for example, while government-funded madrasas have long “provide[d] free education, shelter and food to its students,” from the 1970s on they have fueled radicalization and turned out terrorists to fight in Afghanistan’s war against the former Soviet Union. If Pakistan provides little social capital to its people outside of madrasas, then Pakistan, unlike welfare states such as Denmark, may not have the same capacity to de-radicalize Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists through social initiatives such as employment assistance, education, and mentorship.

To determine each country’s degree of social welfare, I use the International Food Policy Research Institute’s “public spending in social protection,” measuring both the percent share of each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the percent share of each country’s total expenditures.

Another alternative explanation that I examine is “mandatory education in the majority religion.” Saudi Arabia, which includes religious re-education and promoting

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301 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid, 55-56.
305 International Food Policy Research Institute, “SPEED Data visualization tool: Public Spending in Social Protection,” http://www.ifpri.org/tools/speed (accessed March 4, 2015). This data is available through 2011 for Denmark, but only through 2010 for Afghanistan. For Denmark, I calculated the mean score from 2009 through 2011 for both measures.
306 “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.”
a right version of Islam as significant components of its de-radicalization efforts, constitutionally mandates that children learn Muslim values in their school curriculum.\textsuperscript{307} Similarly, I evaluate the impact of “\textit{restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties}” on states’ de-radicalization approaches.\textsuperscript{308} In Singapore, which emphasizes religious re-education in its de-radicalization efforts, religious organizations, or ‘specified societ[ies]’ must register with the government, enabling the government to “proscribe religious groups that are deemed to be ‘prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order.’”\textsuperscript{309}

I measure “\textit{mandatory education in the majority religion}” and “\textit{restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties}” using data from the Religion and State Project for 2008.\textsuperscript{310} A score of 0 indicates “not significantly restricted for any” and “no restrictions” respectively, and 3 indicates “the activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all minorities” and “the activity is illegal or the government engages in this activity [of restricting formal religious organizations] often and on a large scale,” respectively.\textsuperscript{311}


\textsuperscript{308} “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.”

\textsuperscript{309} Eugene K. B. Tan, “From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore,” \textit{Law & Policy} 31 (July 2009): 359. A ‘specified society’ is an organization that affiliates itself with religion. Such organizations that fail to register are considered illegitimate.

\textsuperscript{310} Jonathan Fox, Religion and State dataset, 2011, http://www.religionandstate.org. See also “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” I use 2008 data because this is the last year that the data is available for, and because it is the closest year to when both Denmark and Afghanistan’s de-radicalization programs started (Denmark’s started in 2009, and the US turned over control to Afghanistan of its program in 2013).

\textsuperscript{311} “The Religion and State Project, Round 2.” The mandatory education variable is mo9x, and the restrictions on religious organizations variable is no6x. I did not re-code these variables to 1 through 4 (as opposed to 0 through 3) because I do not calculate descriptive statistics for these.
Data Analysis

I calculated descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables, illustrated in Table 6. The sample size for each variable is 8, for the 8 countries in my study that possess de-radicalization programs targeted at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. The minimum for the dependent variable, de-radicalization program type, is 1, as Denmark and Afghanistan both have de-radicalization programs that focus on social re-integration more than religious re-education, highlighting job creation, financial assistance, mentorship, and other aspects of social development. Alternatively, the maximum for the dependent variable is 2, as Singapore, Yemen, Egypt, and Malaysia have de-radicalization programs that emphasize religious re-education more than social re-integration, focusing on religious dialogue and advisement, and other initiatives to moderate Islamist extremists’ radical ideology.

For the first independent variable, percent of a country’s total population that is Muslim, the US has the minimum percentage of Muslims per total population at 0.8 percent, while 99.9 percent of Morocco’s total population is Muslim. For the second independent variable, official religion, the US and Singapore have no established religion, while Denmark, Malaysia, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Morocco all reported having 1 official religion.

Regarding restrictions on adherents of the majority religion, the third independent variable, the US, Denmark, Singapore, and Yemen all cited no restrictions, while in

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313 Ibid.
Afghanistan, the government forbids acting outside of the state-supported interpretation of Islam, and the government may actively constrain or intimidate those who do not follow the state’s religious edicts.315

Table 6. Descriptive Statistics: State De-radicalization Approaches and State Religious Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>(state de-radicalization approach)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (percent total Muslim population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (official religion)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (restrictions on adherents of majority religion)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Analysis of Relationships Between the Independent and Dependent Variables

As Figure 3 illustrates, the dependent variable, de-radicalization approaches, has a positive relationship with the first independent variable, percentage of Muslims per total country population. The greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country’s de-radicalization efforts will focus on religious re-education. However, the relationship between the two variables is not strong, as the correlation value is 0.167660484.316

315 Ibid.
316 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population.
One country that fits my first hypothesis well is Yemen, as Figure 3 shows that its de-radicalization program emphasized religious re-education, and the majority of its population is Muslim, at 99 percent.317 Under Yemen’s 2002 to 2005 “Committee for Religious Dialogue,” Hamoud Abdulhameed Al-Hitar, a judge and Yemeni Government Minister, engaged detainees in “religious dialogue” on the basis that “every act of terrorist activity is borne out of a distorted ideology.”318 Through discussions with Al-Hitar and other Muslim clerics, detainees cast aside their previously held criticisms of the state’s interpretation of Islam in favor of a more moderate stance. In response to the

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317 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population.
detainees’ contention that members of the Yemeni Government were not selected by respected educators, politicians, or other well-revered individuals, the Committee clarified that the country’s policy of allowing citizens to vote for their leadership was indeed in accordance with Shari’a law. As a result of the dialogue, detainees “conceded that the political system in Yemen does follow the Shariah” by allowing its citizens to have a stake in determining who runs the country.

In contrast to Yemen, Singapore does not fit the first hypothesis well, as its de-radicalization program focuses on religious re-education, yet it is only 14.9 percent Muslim. Perhaps Singapore has pursued a de-radicalization program aimed at religious re-education because JI leaders have radicalized individuals in the country through religious indoctrination. Hoping to compensate for their past misdeeds and change their lives around, many detainees in Singapore’s de-radicalization program gravitated toward religious advisers who could spiritually bring them closer to Islam. As a result of their religious indoctrination by JI heads, the detainees adopted an ‘extremist interpretation of Islam imbibed from Afghanistan that included a strong, anti-American, jihadist streak.’ It is conceivable then that Singapore devised the RRG to challenge the “virulent, adversarial worldview” that JI was propagating.

319 Ibid, 7.
320 Ibid.
321 See Figure 3. De-radicalization Approaches and Percent of Muslims per Total Population.
322 Kumar Ramakrishna, “The ‘Three Rings’ of Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Ideological Work in Singapore a Decade on,” 428.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid, 429.
Regarding the second hypothesis, Figure 4 shows that the dependent variable has a negative relationship with the second independent variable, official religion. Countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education. However, the relationship between the variables is not strong, as the correlation value is -0.174077656.\(^{326}\)

One country that fits the second hypothesis well is Malaysia, as the Malaysian Government uses its designation as an “Islamic state” to justify its religious re-education efforts targeted at JI detainees.\(^ {327}\) Through conversations on “the concept of jihad,” for

\(^{326}\) See Figure 4. De-radicalization Approaches and Official Religion.

example, Muslim scholars aim to show detainees that “militant struggle is not the only means to obtain desired ends.”

Alternatively, the US does not correspond as well to my second hypothesis, as it has no official religion, yet has pursued a de-radicalization program in Iraq that placed relatively equal significance on religious re-education and social incentives. The US implemented the Islamic Discussion Program (IDP), aiming to confront the ideology of “moderate” to the “most extreme detainees” by using Muslim clerics to contest detainees’ extreme interpretation of the Qur’an, for example. More moderate detainees underwent a shorter duration program, while the most radical, who may have provided support for or carried out terrorist acts, were kept in the IDP longer. The US may have been motivated to initiate the IDP in response to “radical teachings” perpetuated by Iraqi detainees that highlighted the “injustice of detention,” namely, the absence of “legal proceedings” and lack of any “hope for release.”

328 Jane Harrigan, “Malaysia: a history of dealing with insurgency and extremism,” 152.
329 Ami Angell and Rohan Gunaratna, Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2012), 230-231. The IDP was originally known as the Religious Enlightenment Program when it began in August 2007. Moderate detainees were taught basic Muslim principles in a 4 day IDP, while already radicalized detainees who had or had not pursued terrorism were kept in the IDP for 3 to 6 weeks, depending on their level of extremist involvement.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid, 53.
Lastly, concerning the third hypothesis, Figure 5 illustrates that the dependent variable has a negative relationship with the third independent variable, restrictions on adherents of the majority religion that do not align with the state’s religious interpretation. The more restrictions a state has on adherents of the majority religion that do not align with the state’s religious interpretation, the less likely a country’s de-radicalization efforts will focus on religious re-education. However, the relationship between the variables is not strong, as the correlation value is -0.161627046.332

One country that affirms my third hypothesis is Egypt, as its de-radicalization efforts have focused on religious re-education, with the country placing significant constraints on adherents of Islam who do not agree with the state’s religious interpretations.

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332 See Figure 5. De-radicalization Approaches and Restrictions on the Majority Religion.
interpretation. In 2007, Egyptian security forces arrested individuals for their involvement in a group that interprets Islam according to the Qur’an with little regard for “other sources of Islamic law,” as the Egyptian Government views Shari’a as the country’s “primary source of legislation.” Additionally, Egypt has been known to arrest Shi’ite Muslims due to their alternative religious interpretation, and has subjected them to torture, as well as “administrative detention without charge or trial.”

In contrast to Egypt, Yemen does not affirm the third hypothesis, as while its de-radicalization efforts focused on religious re-education, the country demonstrated no constraints on adherents of Islam that do not align with the state’s religious interpretation. The US Department of State (2005) reported that the country’s Muslims “are free to worship according to their beliefs,” and Yemeni Government “military force” against certain Muslim sects has been “politically, not religiously, motivated.” Starting in 2004, the Islamist terrorist group ‘Shabab al-Moumineen,’ which follows a different strand of Shia Islam than the majority “Zaydi-Shi’as,” attempted to take over the Government, prompting the Yemeni military to topple the uprising.

Comparative Case Study: Afghanistan and Denmark

Two countries that warrant further examination are Afghanistan and Denmark, as they have both pursued de-radicalization programs that focus on social re-integration.

334 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
Perhaps there are other explanations besides the percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses that account for why these countries both emphasize the same approach. In Table 7, I explore alternative explanations to see if they can better explain why both countries have focused on social re-integration rather than religious re-education.

Table 7. Comparative Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De-radicalization Approach</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total population that is Muslim (2010)</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official religion? (2008)</td>
<td>3 (1 official religion)</td>
<td>3 (1 official religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on the majority religion? (2008)</td>
<td>4 (operating outside of state’s religious interpretation is forbidden, or government heavily constrains actions of adherents of majority religion who do not agree with state’s religious interpretation)</td>
<td>1 (no restrictions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Explanations

| Mandatory education in the majority religion (2008) | 1 (slightly restricted for some minorities) | 0 (not significantly restricted for any) |
| Restrictions on formal religious organizations other than political parties (2008) | 0 (no restrictions) | 0 (no restrictions) |
| Social protection (percent share in total GDP) (2009-2011) | 0.5% | 25.2% |
| Social protection (percent share in total public expenditures) (2009-2011) | 2.5% | 43.6% |


Based on Table 7, social welfare may help to explain why Denmark has highlighted social re-integration in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists. The country’s

337 I do not mention Islamist terrorists here as Denmark has been known more to de-radicalize Islamist extremists who may not yet have pursued violence.
social protection as percent share in total expenditures is especially telling, as it accounts for nearly 44 percent of its total public expenditures. In welfare states such as Denmark, membership in society is ultimately characterized by joining civil society organizations and being employed. Denmark’s scheme fits this description well, as due to the country’s de-radicalization efforts, several foreign fighters who have returned from Syria “are now back in school and have a job.” Also, the country’s de-radicalization efforts involve civil society, as “youth club leaders” can refer individuals to the country’s program in Aarhus, if they exhibit certain extremist sympathies.

Regarding Afghanistan, the measures listed in Table 7 are not as telling, as, for example, despite the fact that the country’s de-radicalization efforts emphasize social re-integration, its social spending as percent share of total public expenditures is low, at 2.5 percent. Afghan authorities have suggested that as many of the individuals being detained “joined the Taliban because they had no jobs,” rather than being influenced by a “radical ideology,” detainees “will benefit more from learning to use a sewing machine” over “religious counselling.” Therefore, as extremist ideology was not the main motivator for terrorism in Afghanistan’s case, the country’s de-radicalization efforts have

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338 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study.
342 See Table 7. Comparative Case Study.
focused more on re-integrating detainees through employment creation and vocational training rather than on moderating any extremist viewpoints.

Conclusion

Although scholars have recently examined the percent of the population that is Muslim; official religion; and restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the specific religious interpretation that the state endorses vis-à-vis de-radicalization, these variables may not be helpful in determining whether states pursue de-radicalization programs that either emphasize religious re-education or social re-integration. Perhaps other factors, such as social spending, may explain why a country might concentrate on social re-integration as opposed to religious re-education as part of its de-radicalization efforts. As my findings suggest, Denmark may concentrate on social re-integration in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists because it is a welfare state, which emphasizes job creation and involvement in civic life as part of its core values.

By examining the different approaches that countries emphasize in their de-radicalization programs, policymakers can attempt to determine what mix of approaches they may wish to pursue within their own country contexts. Although the independent variables that I selected for my study are not significantly related to de-radicalization approaches, perhaps other factors, such as public spending on social services, may be. If in the future I find that states with higher social spending as a percentage of total expenditures are more likely to emphasize social re-integration in their de-radicalization programs, then other social welfare states may be more inclined to incorporate vocational training, mentorship, and other social aspects into their own de-radicalization schemes.
In future research, I could examine whether there may be a significant relationship between the independent variables and de-radicalization approaches that countries emphasize by making the dependent variable more nuanced. For example, I could devise a question scheme to account for whether the literature describes a country’s de-radicalization program as emphasizing a religious re-education approach, but describes religious rehabilitation as being compulsory versus voluntary. This way, I may be able to observe whether mandatory participation in a religious re-education scheme is more closely correlated to restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not agree with the state’s religious interpretation than voluntary participation may be.

Also, it may be worthwhile in the future to study whether the different ways that Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists became radicalized or involved in terrorism affect what approaches countries choose to focus their de-radicalization efforts on. For instance, if a majority of Islamist extremists or terrorists may have been radicalized through madrassas, then a country may choose to emphasize religious re-education more in its de-radicalization approach. Likewise, if a great number of Islamist terrorists in a country turned to terrorism because they did not have any other job prospects, then a country may choose to emphasize social re-integration, with a focus on creating jobs.

To review, the first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country’s de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country’s level of state repression increases, the success ranking of each de-radicalization program increases, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has the more a country’s de-
radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state’s religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong.

As Chapter 1 finds, more successful de-radicalization programs do not necessarily result in less Islamist terrorism. The number of terrorist attacks in a country may be affected by other variables besides de-radicalization, including the number of security personnel, the availability of effective surveillance equipment, and state repression. Also, allegedly successful de-radicalization programs may not lead to less Islamist terrorism in countries such as Algeria, as this country has experienced an inordinate number of terrorist attacks compared to other states. Similarly, while factors including high socioeconomic development and participation by qualified religious authorities may favor successful de-radicalization according to the literature, such proxy variables may actually not be indicative of less Islamist terrorist attacks.

Other influences, including IO membership, may decrease Islamist terrorism, as collaboration with regional and international partners to share information and communicate best practices on this type of activity can enable governments to more effectively reduce the number of Islamist terrorist attacks. For Chapter 2, other variables beside state repression, including selective inducements, may make de-radicalization more successful, as compliance with conditions such as prisoner releases can compel Islamist terrorists and Islamist extremists to reform their ideology and relinquish terrorism. Lastly, for Chapter 3, factors such as social spending may better explain a
country’s de-radicalization approach than religious characteristics, as states with higher expenditures on social programs may emphasize a de-radicalization approach that is oriented toward social re-integration.

Whether de-radicalization programs compel Islamist terrorists to abandon terrorism or convince Islamist extremists or terrorists to moderate their radical views, de-radicalization has ultimately succeeded if formerly radical or violent individuals are re-integrated into society. Although some countries’ de-radicalization schemes focus more on religious re-education rather than social re-integration, the fundamental goal of governments is to bring those individuals who may have deviated from a moderate, non-violent path back into the mainstream.

As de-radicalization programs aimed at Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists are still a novelty, many of them having been established after 9/11, scholars must undertake further research to explore what makes some programs more successful than others, as well as what makes each country’s de-radicalization efforts unique.

Perhaps now more than ever, it is high time for governments to consider de-radicalization in the context of Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism, as ISIS radicalizes and recruits fighters through its toxic message on a daily basis. Regrettably, as Al Qaeda and ISIS-influenced individuals and groups have recently committed terrorist attacks in countries as diverse as Canada, Tunisia, Australia, and France, governments must come to grips with re-incorporating violent Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists so that they ultimately renounce terrorism and contribute to the greater good of society.
Also, for those individuals who may have adopted Islamist extremist views but may not have yet acted on them, countries must consider de-radicalization to bring such individuals back into the mainstream before they take violent action. Truly, there is no more critical time for countries to pursue de-radicalization programs to bring Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists back into the fold. If we fail to do so, then we allow the odious narrative of Islamist extremism and Islamist terrorism to win the day.
Appendix A. Core Years of Country De-radicalization Programs

Afghanistan: 2013-2014
Algeria: 1997-2000
Bangladesh: 2005-2011
Denmark: 2009-2014
Jordan: 2004-2013
Malaysia: 2001-2010
Morocco: 2011-2014
Singapore: 2003-2010
(US in) Iraq: 2007-2010
Yemen: 2002-2005

Appendix B. Islamist Terrorist Groups

Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
Algerian Islamic Extremists
Algerian Moslem Fundamentalists
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)
Al-Haramayn Brigades
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq
Al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qa’ida in Yemen
Al-Qa’ida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Believing Youth Organization
Huthis
Islamist Extremists
Jadid Al-Qa’idah Bangladesh (JAQB)
Jaish al-Mukhtar
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Jihad Islamic League Front
Muslim Extremists
Muslim Militants
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Squadrons of Terror (Katibat El Ahoual)
Sympathizers of Al-Qa’ida Organization
Takfiri wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)
Wahhabi Movement

Sources: Global Terrorism Database 2013, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium 2015.


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