THE LEGACY OF BRAZIL'S PEDRO I: MEMORY AND POLITICS DURING THE EMPIRE AND REPUBLIC

by
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Abstract

The long-term historical legacy and place in national memory of Brazil’s Pedro I has not been sufficiently analyzed in the historiography centered on the nation’s first emperor and the ways in which successive political regimes approached remembering the past. Yet, Pedro I provides a fascinating case study in memory because of his complicated relationship to Brazil. The Portuguese prince who declared Brazilian independence but was forced into exile, Pedro I became the subject of Brazil’s first public monument. Located in Rio de Janeiro, the equestrian statue of Pedro I serves as a touchstone for how the ruling political elites of different eras viewed the nation’s founding historical figure, its past, and the legitimacy of their own societies and regimes.

The methodology of this study serves to explain how the Brazilian people, represented in the writings of their intellectual elite, remembered their first emperor on the occasion of his statue’s inauguration in 1862 and after an incident involving the covering of his statue in 1893. Because the former took place during the imperial era of Brazilian history and the latter during that of the Republic, the examination of those moments will shed light onto the ways in which the concepts of history, memory, politics, and sovereignty intersected in the public square in Rio de Janeiro.

This dissertation argues that the historical standing of Pedro I was constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed in the public sphere throughout the first century of Brazil’s national history, and that contested legacy was being continually impacted by the dueling forces of acclaim and repudiation as well as political change and tradition. The thesis is argued through an analysis of public perceptions of the Emperor and his statue amidst moments of larger reflection on the nature of Brazil’s national origins and
identity. The discourse surrounding the moment of the statue’s inauguration in 1862 establishes the imperial definitions—and critical refutations—of Pedro I as the founder of both the nation and its constitution while similarly establishing competing narratives regarding his abdication, exile, and *portugalidade* (Portuguese-ness). The discourse surrounding the statue’s controversial covering in the incipient years of the Republic shows not only contested views of the nation’s past and traditions but also the profound tensions between the disparate groups who constituted the new republican elite.

Ultimately the statue of Pedro I kept its place in the public square in Rio de Janeiro despite calls for its removal. The statue’s perseverance amidst contestation mirrors the ways in which Pedro I’s place in national memory would be both challenged and perpetuated in the observance of Brazilian civic tradition.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Today in Rio de Janeiro, a statue of an emperor stands in the middle of a public square named after a republican martyr. Passers-by do not pay much mind to the cognitive and historical dissonance of the square. When I would stop and ask them what they thought of the statue, many assumed that it was a monument depicting that praça’s namesake, Tiradentes. After stopping and truly looking at the statue, though, those same Cariocas, or inhabitants of Rio, shook their heads immediately and readily conceded that they were mistaken. The iconography simply did not fit. Almost to a person, they pulled their right hands across their necks and upwards to make the sign of a noose. Tiradentes had been hung and then dismembered. The figure on the statue before them sat triumphantly atop a noble steed with his right hand extended to offer them a charter (see Figure 1). This man was a leader, not the martyr. Some Cariocas instantly recalled his
name. Some offered the name of his son. One offered the name of the subject of another
equestrian statue located in a different part of the city. Thus, despite the impressiveness
of the statue, this leader had been rendered to some extent anonymous by the
denomination of his statue’s location.

Pedro I of Brazil is a perfect subject for a study of long-term national memory and
historical legacy precisely because of the complicated nature of his own personal identity
and place in history. He was a Portuguese prince who joined the Brazilian independence
movement and participated in the iconic declaration of his adopted homeland’s political
separation from Portugal, the land of his birth. His family’s move to Brazil when he was
a child is the only example in history of a European sovereign transferring a royal court
to a colony, not to mention an American colony. Although he self-identified as Brazilian,
his Portuguese roots drove a wedge between himself and his Brazilian subjects, and his
perceived foreignness eventually became a factor in his being forced from power after
less than a decade on the throne. He was liberal yet autocratic, approachable but cruel. He
was the nation’s first leader crowned and then deposed for being a tyrant who
constitutionally abdicated power to his Brazilian-born son without a fight. His story ends
with a transformation from an exile from Brazil into a Portuguese military hero who
secured the throne of his daughter and preserved constitutional liberty in Portugal.

Pedro I was all of these things, and his political actions in two separate nations
and worlds have created a fascinating legacy of both acclaim and disdain. That legacy is
complicated even further in Brazil by the fact that the nation’s changing political
circumstances have impacted how its people view their past and their first emperor. His is
an historical standing that has been constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed by
different political and intellectual elites and different political regimes. Yet his role in proclaiming Brazil’s independence makes him a fundamental figure in the nation’s origins and thereby its collective identity. The study of Pedro I’s legacy is important, therefore, because it is the study of how Brazilians perceive the origins of their patria. The fundamental goal of this study is to explain how the Brazilian people, represented in the writings of their intellectual elite, remembered their first emperor on the occasion of his statue’s inauguration in 1862 and after an incident involving the covering of his statue in 1893. Because the former took place during the imperial era of Brazilian history and the latter during that of the Republic, the examination of those moments will shed light onto the ways in which the concepts of history, memory, politics, and sovereignty intersect in the middle of Praça Tiradentes.

**My Study in Relation to the Historiography**

No one has yet written a comprehensive study of Pedro I’s legacy in Brazil across time and political regimes. His story is a popular subject for biography and serves as a vital component to any study of Brazilian independence. His role in the founding myth of the nation earns him a place in discussions of identity formation. As the nation’s first public monument, his statue in Rio de Janeiro inspires inclusion into any study of memory, posterity, and the public representation of the power of the state. Despite this popularity and new emphasis on the intellectual aspects of the construction of a nation’s identity and political legitimacy, there is no focused and detailed study of how Pedro I is remembered and how that legacy provides insight into the intersection of politics and memory.
The complexity and richness of Pedro I’s life as discussed above is precisely why his life and times are popular topics for a wide range of historians representing different eras in the historiography of the field. The most recent scholarship on Pedro I has been in the form of biography, but those publications have generated a very specific debate over the question of how Pedro I should be defined by today’s historians. Thus, their connection to this study is tangential but nevertheless informative. In her 2006 work entitled *D. Pedro I: Um Heroi sem nenhum carâter (A Hero with no character)*, Isabel Lustoso presents the traditional biographical points of Pedro’s life but recasts her subject as an anti-hero and a man without morals. She uses the same stories and the same sources as other historians but uses them to advance her revisionist labeling of Pedro. Her book made a momentary splash because of its provocative title, but it offered little beyond that. It did trigger a response by Francisco Alambert who wrote an alternate biography with a much different label: *D. Pedro I: O Imperador Cordial*. His book is a short response of only sixty pages, but it specifically seeks to address the theme of memory and historical interpretation precisely because of his taking issue with Lustoso’s work. He uses his chapter on memory in order to refute what he considers the overly-simplistic approach of Lustoso towards a complicated and contradictory figure. Throughout his biography, he engages on that issue of character privileged by Lustoso, so *O Imperador Cordial* ends up being more about the personal descriptive traits Pedro I could be labeled by rather than any actual primary source discussion or synthesis on how Brazilians have actually defined Pedro I. His main concern is how today’s historians should characterize the first emperor, so his work remains outside of the purview of this study.  

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1 Isabel Lustoso, *D. Pedro I: Um Heroi sem nenhum carâter* (São Paulo: Companhia Das Letras, 2006); Francisco Alambert, *D. Pedro I: O Imperador Cordial* (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado do São
The biographical studies that serve as the cornerstones of any analysis of Pedro I’s life are those of Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa and Neill Macaulay. Tarquinio’s three-volume study is the definitive and comprehensive Brazilian treatment of Pedro I while Macaulay’s is the go-to biography in English. Both are impeccably sourced, conceptualized and written and contribute greatly to the historiography as well as provide secondary source context to this study.  

There are various other published general biographies of Pedro I as well as curiosity biographies such as Sérgio Corrêa da Costa’s *As Quatro Coroas de D. Pedro I* which presents Pedro I’s life with international relations, geopolitics, and his royal sovereignty at the center of the analysis. The work was originally intended to mark a commemorative date in Portugal but was included in the cultural production of the Sesquicentennial celebration of Brazil’s independence in 1972. Various books on Pedro I and his mistress, the Marquesa de Santos, round out the biographical treatments available on the emperor.  

Historians have also looked extensively into the contours of Brazilian independence, a topic in which Pedro I figures prominently. Discussions of his role in independence range from those penned by stalwarts in Brazilian historiography such as the foundational study by Varnhagen and the five-volume work of José Honório Rodrigues to children’s books on Pedro I and his declaration of Brazilian independence.  

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4 José Honório Rodrigues, *Independência: revolução e contra-revolução* (Rio de Janeiro: F. Alves, 1975); Mariângela Bueno and Sonia Dreyfuss, *Pedro, O Independente* (São Paulo: Callis, 1999); Marcelo Duarte,
Since my study is not a retelling or analysis of Brazil’s achievement of independence in the early 1800s, these works connect to my topic (although not to this particular study) through what they reveal about each historian’s approach to the telling of the founding narrative of the nation.

On the topic of the formation of Brazilian nationality and identity, there is one main publication that is greatly informative to this study. The work of Noé Freire Sandes, *A invenção da nação: entre a monarquia e a república*, provides great insight into the theory and context involved in memory construction, and it is the closest thing to a sister study for this doctoral thesis since it delves into the theoretical constructs of nationalism through the lens of understandings of September 7 and Ipiranga as Brazil’s founding myth. Sandes provides a sophisticated analysis of the systematic approach that the imperial elite took in their deliberate efforts to construct a common history and origins for the nation and its people. He does this by taking a detailed look at the specific construction of the September 7 founding myth in order to comment on the evolution of national memory as it related to Brazil’s Independence Day. His study begins by tracing the construction of the civic understanding of Independence Day from the very first accounts of the moment of the *Grito* in 1822 to the iconic Pedro America painting of the *Grito* myth that in 1888 became the definitive image and interpretation of Pedro I and independence. Having explained the construction of that founding narrative, Sandes then focuses the rest of his book on a thorough and nuanced discussion of how intellectuals

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involved in the centennial celebration of independence in 1922 engaged with that narrative and civic understanding. While I will similarly use the commemorations of Independence Day in Rio de Janeiro as a means through which I can gauge public perceptions of the nation’s past, the sources I look at, especially in the chapters focused on the 1890s, are relatively normal, seemingly insignificant years rather than the officially orchestrated production of commemorating the centennial. These sources allow me to explore the everyday conceptions of September 7 and glean insight into the discussions and contestations taking place over day-to-day things in the public sphere of the new Republic. My study also diverges significantly from this wonderful work of Sandes by moving away from the approach that makes his study heavily sourced and focused on the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro and other contributors to the official centennial project. My sources and research topic allow for an analysis more about the ways writers engaged with the larger topic of identity and memory in the daily public sphere rather than behind the scenes of the professional institutions of the day.

Moving forward, Sandes’s work will continue to inform my research and analysis as I look to expand my study of Pedro’s legacy into the twentieth century. His study of the 1922 centennial celebration will be an invaluable resource in understanding Pedro’s legacy in that commemoration as well as the sesquicentennial one of 1972.5

This thesis has also benefited from and will seek to add to the contribution of several seminal studies on the symbolic representation of state power. In various topical treatments, historians have provided historical discussions of Pedro I and his legacy. One key work is that of Iara Lis Carvalho Souza in her exploration of the concept of the

Brazilian “body politic,” the public square, and national memory in *Pátria Coroada*. Her topic is the public elaboration of royal sovereignty and power in all its forms and facets. Her work is impeccably researched, and in her efforts she thoroughly details the construction of the public’s understanding of royal power by looking through the lens of the public square and the plans and efforts that went into paying tribute to Pedro I. While her study is centered on the period of the First Reign, Pedro I’s rule from 1822 to 1831, her focus on the public memorialization of Pedro I subsequently includes a very detailed analysis of the conceptualization, inauguration, and reaction to the state of Pedro I inaugurated in 1862. As part of her larger discussion of Pedro’s construction of symbolic authority, the statue’s inauguration serves as the culmination of the visible representation of Pedro I and royal sovereignty.⁶

Souza’s work in analyzing the 1862 inauguration of the statue is one of several different treatments on that subject. Because of this, there already exists a very detailed understanding of how the statue was conceived and created. There is a very clear picture of the logistical and symbolic nuts and bolts that went into its symbolic representation of Pedro I. This aspect of analysis in terms of the statue needs no further elaboration. My study does not seek to contribute to this historiography. I also do not delve into the complex political and social landscape of the Rio de Janeiro of 1862. That also is a topic well-researched and articulated by previous scholars. For example, Maria Eurydice de Barros Ribeiro in her chapter entitled “Memória em Bronze: Estátua Equestre de D. Pedro I” provides a detailed description of the statue’s creation much like Souza’s, but she approaches it with the different objective of looking at the topic of monuments and

patrimony in Rio de Janeiro. The work of Gisele Cunha dos Santos and Fernanda Fonseca Monteiro as well as James N. Green both provide informative articles exploring the imperial landscape and political reception of the statue’s inauguration. By being able to reference their work, I was able to give context to what was, after all, the intent of my study’s chapter on 1862 Brazil: the ways in which writers specifically defined the historical legacy of Pedro I. In addition to Ribeiro’s contribution to the topic of monuments and patrimony, there are also other publications that provide specific information on the public squares and statues of Rio de Janeiro. These works are mostly sponsored by municipal institutions in order to provide the public with the history and facts behind the landscape of the city. I owe all of these writers and organizations a debt of gratitude for the research and synthesis they have provided for the context of my chapter.\footnote{Maria Eurydice de Barros Ribeiro, “Memória em Bronze: Estátua Equestre de D. Pedro I” in Cidade vaidosa: imagens urbanas do Rio de Janeiro, ed. Paulo Knoss, (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1999); Gisele Cunha dos Santos and Fernanda Fonseca Monteiro, “Celebrando a fundação do Brasil: A inauguração da Estátua Equestre de D. Pedro I,” in Revista Electrônica de História do Brasil, 4, no. 1 (January-June 2000); James N. Green, “The Emperor and His Pedestal: Pedro I and Disputed Views of the Brazilian Nation, 1860-1900” in Brazil in the Making: Facets of National Identity, eds. Carmen Nava and Ludwig Lauerhass, Jr., (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006); Roberta Oliveira, Praça Tiradentes (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, Prefeitura, 2000); Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, O Rio de Janeiro e Suas Praças (Rio de Janeiro: RIOTUR—Empresa de Turismo do Município do Rio de Janeiro S. A., 1988); Sergio A. Fridman, Posteridade em pedra e bronze: história dos monumentos e estátuas da cidade do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Publicação Independente, 1996).}

Iara Lis Carvalho Souza’s exploration of the construction of power and sovereignty is the imperial equivalent of what José Murilo de Carvalho does for the study of the early Republic, and both of these works have had considerable influence on this study.\footnote{José Murilo de Carvalho, A Formação das Almas: O Imaginário da República no Brasil, 17th ed. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007).} Maria Eurydice de Barros Ribeiro also relies on José Murilo for her discussions of the shared space between Pedro I and Tiradentes. In his seminal study of the symbolic and intellectual construction of the republican state, José Murilo devotes a chapter to the
complex contours of the Republic’s process of hero-making in the figure of Tiradentes as well as the contestation for national hero status playing out specifically in Praça Tiradentes where the dueling national narratives of the martyr and the first emperor would intersect. The bandstand incident, which I detail in a chapter of its own in my study, is covered in just a paragraph by José Murilo, but it is used as a moment to reflect on the more specific debate over the selection of Tiradentes as Brazil’s national hero. José Murilo’s conceptualization of the intellectual construction of republican legitimacy and sovereignty is the seminal work done on the topic and the era, and it serves as the building blocks of my three chapters on the 1890s. What this doctoral thesis does is flesh out those sources that José Murilo consulted for that chapter reference and re-contextualize them in order to focus on the impact of that intellectual process on views of Pedro I. His focus is more on the importance of the new republican elites’ object of affection—Tiradentes—than their target of derision—Pedro I. It focuses more on what they attempted to do in the creation of the republican narrative whereas my work is more interested in the republican elite’s engagement with the preexisting imperial narrative. Where there is change and attempted agency with the deliberate actions in the larger national project of the Republic, Pedro’s statue is one ultimately of inertia. Yet its visibility made it a part of this important discussion, and I hope to add to the already sophisticated understanding of the time and the place articulated by José Murilo.

**Description of Methodology and Sources**

1862 Discussion of the Imperial Era

My overall approach in this chapter and topical discussion is to scrutinize very closely the rhetoric surrounding one specific moment in the memorialization of Pedro I:
the inauguration of his equestrian statue in 1862. Secondary works do provide a broader context to that moment, but all of the primary source documents analyzed are strictly related to that act of inauguration. In the secondary works discussed previously as analyzing public rhetoric of the inauguration, most historians typically draw from the three most visible writers at the time, most notably Luiz Vicente De-Simoni, Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre, and Alfredo de Tuanay for their comments articulating the elements of the Imperial State’s project to construct an historical narrative based on a collective notion of the Empire’s origins and founder. The writings of those men are key examples of the discourse of the day, but as a small sample they cannot substitute for the analysis of all of the inaugural odes published for the inauguration of the statue. Only in looking at all thirty-eight celebratory inaugural publications can a true sense of the dominant themes and definitions of Pedro I’s historical identity and legacy emerge. For this chapter, I analyzed each of the thirty-eight odes and cite thirty-two. Twenty-seven different writers are represented in those odes cited, with four separate submissions being the work of De-Simoni (who submitted seven in total). The list of those writers represents a Who’s Who of the Empire’s intellectual and cultural elite. It includes founders and members of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro as well as the Academia Brasileira de Letras who by the end of many of their careers had been awarded every imperial distinction of honor that existed. Several of those analyzed at some point also held the position of private tutor to the royal family. They were every bit the Empire’s elite and part of that literary effort to richly and artistically define the nation’s origins. A careful analysis of those extensive inaugural primary source documents, many of which have not been referenced in previous studies, was undertaken to identify the specific
ways in which those writers remembered and defined the achievements and legacy of Pedro I. There existed an emerging consensus on the facets of Pedro’s historical identity, and those definitions of him in 1862 are used to establish a starting point from which to contextualize and explore how Brazil’s change in political landscapes would affect elite perceptions of the nation’s first emperor.

In contrast to that large sample of discourse celebrating the statue’s inauguration, I rely primarily on the one publication that was most prominent as a public criticism and repudiation of the statue and the imperial narrative. That source is the pamphlet written by Teófilo Otoni, an active and vocal political opponent of the monarchy. The pamphlet is an incredibly rich text and serves as the definitive counter-narrative to that advanced by the imperial elite. For every single one of the ways in which Pedro I was positively identified by the other source group, Otoni meticulously disputed that characterization. He instead articulated a republican-themed narrative that would reemerge in increasingly visibility with the end of the Empire. While Otoni’s work is the go-to source for any and all who write about the reception of the statue’s inauguration, my synthesis of its point-by-point refutation of the celebratory definitions provides new insight into the relationship between the two historical narratives.

1890s Discussion of the Early Republic
The change made in Brazil’s political system accompanies a requisite change in methodology and type of primary source documentation as well. In Chapter Three, which is the first of three chapters exploring the republican elites’ approach to the nation’s memory and history, secondary sources will still be used to accurately describe the background of the changed political landscape after the proclamation of the Republic in 1889. But after that effort, I then turn to a small sampling of Rio de Janeiro newspapers
and how their writers discussed the statue’s existence in the public square in the context of the Republic’s early commemorations of Tiradentes Day and Independence Day. After that, I turn specific attention to the main focus of the chapter: an analysis of the public discourse surrounding the bandstand incident in which a republican civic club triggered a public outcry when it covered the statue of Pedro I with a bandstand. I analyze the news accounts, editorials, and publicized letters from the public throughout a wide range of Rio de Janeiro newspapers in order to reconstruct the details of the incident and the response in the public sphere to it. Those eleven newspapers are the Diário de Notícias, the Gazeta da Tarde, the Gazeta de Notícias, the Jornal do Commercio, the Jornal do Brasil, Novidades, O Apostolo, O Brazil, O Paiz, O Tempo, and the Revista Illustrada. These sources provide a wide range of perspectives on the incident and the larger issues of history, memory, and tradition after regime change and between the years of 1890 and 1895. The discourses contained in them provide a sophisticated and nuanced insight into how and why the covering of the statue was criticized as well as how defenders of the covering and the group behind it justified their actions and responded to that criticism. Lastly, this public debate that took place as a result of the incident and that played out in the newspapers provides first-hand commentary on the ways in which the early republican elite perceived that Republican State as well as how the members of different elite factions perceived each other.

Chapter Four similarly employs aspects of the discussions found in the newspapers listed above, but it also adds a broader range of Rio newspaper sources and reaches as far back as 1889 and forward into 1894 to provide insight into the changing nature of how Rio de Janeiro observed royal commemorative dates and viewed the
monarchy and its monarchs. In order to trace that changing rhetoric and views of the past, this chapter uses the lens of the commemorative date write-ups in the newspapers for the historical dates of September 7, the day Pedro I declared independence; April 7, the day of Pedro I’s abdication of the throne; April 21, the day Tiradentes was martyred; and May 13, the day that slavery was abolished. The additional newspapers analyzed in this chapter are *A Notícia*, the *Correio da Tarde*, *O Fluminense*, and *The Rio News*. A special commemorative publication that marked the final celebration of September 7 during the Empire called the *Estatua Equestre de D. Pedro I* publicizes the texts of speeches given during the day’s celebration, and it provides invaluable insight into the civic topics and themes preoccupying the city’s elite just months before the Empire’s fall. All of these periodicals shed light on how Pedro I and those important national dates associated with the imperial past were constantly being redefined. No comprehensive primary source captures this process more than a book written privately but adopted by the Republican State for the civic education of its children. In *Festas Nacionaes*, Rodrigo Octavio fully articulates and advances a series of new historical narratives for the nation’s civic holidays, and they represent the historical interpretations of the radical faction of the republican elite and pointedly attack the person and legacy of Pedro I.⁹

Chapter Five returns our focus to the specific subject of Pedro I by tracing the four proposals to remove the statue of Pedro I from Praça Tiradentes as well as the public reaction to them. The approach to this part of the study shifts from using a large number of commentators and sources as were used in the two previous chapters to very detailed analyses of the highly-developed and articulate arguments for and against the proposals found in what was a narrow number of commentators. I analyze the 1890 proposal of

Miguel Lemos whose text was published in the newspaper *O Brazil* and then commented on in that same paper as well as its coverage in the newspaper *O Cruzeiro*.

The discourse provided by the writers for those two papers reveal a wide range of reasons the authors opposed the moving of the statue, and they stand out for their insight into comparative history and the specific lessons of the French Republic and other modern nations. Since the second proposal to remove the statue was merely a reprint of Lemos’s previous 1890 proposal, there was no discernible intellectual response despite the fact that it occurred just after the bandstand incident in 1893. The *Gazeta de Notícias* printed a letter that included the text of the old proposal, but that is as far as this discussion went. While there was no new proposal to move the statue in between these proposals in the year of 1892, the erection that year of a statue memorializing Deodoro da Fonseca did prompt another writer, this time for the *Diário de Notícias*, to wax philosophical and historical on the significance of regime change on memorials to the past thus adding one more commentary on the subject of the statue’s possible removal. The petition made to the National Congress in 1894 by Lúcio de Mendonça was the third of its kind and published in various newspaper accounts of the legislative action of the day, but it was the petitioner’s prior journalistic relationship with the newspaper *O Paiz* that made it the focal point for supporters writing letters in support for the proposal along with a modest editorial response on the part of the paper. *O Paiz* was also the best source through which to track the progress of the petition through the bureaucratic process before it died a quiet legislative death that was commented on in the *Correio da Tarde*. While these articles evidence a very limited response to Mendonça’s petition despite the ways that the Naval Revolt (which is contextualized with background information in its own section) was
changing elite perspectives, there was one highly critical response to the proposal in the
form of a published pamphlet written by André P. L. Werneck and titled *D. Pedro I e a
Independencia (A proposito da demolição da estatua da Praça Tiradentes).*
Meant to inform the intellectual and legislative deliberation of the petition, Werneck’s pamphlet is
valuable as an example of a very public and unapologetic re-articulation of the imperial
narrative of Pedro I and independence that was uncommon in the climate of the day. I
then leave behind Werneck’s work but turn my attention back to the Naval Revolt and its
impact on how writers for the *Gazeta de Noticias, Don Quixote,* and the *Diário de
Noticias* conceptualized new meanings for and perspectives on September 7 and
Brazilian history in general. Much like the bandstand incident, the revolt stimulated new
discussions of how to view the nation’s past. The chapter concludes with various
references to the possible removal of the statue, including a debate between the *Gazeta
de Noticias* and *O Paiz* over some of the physical transformations of the city and a
passing reference in the newspaper *Cidade do Rio* of an upcoming proposal to be made
by Senator Antonio José Caiado to remove and replace the statue. That work is most
likely satirical in nature, so it provides a unique glimpse into the ways in which the
statue’s removal had become a rhetorical tool.

**Chapter Conceptualization**

My first content chapter, Chapter Two, will establish a baseline of understanding
of the identity and historical legacy of Pedro I as defined during the Empire. It explores
the discourse—both celebratory and critical—surrounding the inauguration of his

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equestrian statue in 1862. Those opposing viewpoints are explored as examples of dueling narratives of the nation’s origins and the first emperor’s historical identity. In terms of the celebratory narrative, I identify and discuss the five components of that identity that appear consistently throughout the sources and that hinge on popular notions of the roles that the First Emperor played: 1) the icon of independence and the founder of the Empire of Brazil; 2) the giver of law; 3) the soldier; 4) the hero of two worlds; and 5) the magnanimous father who bequeathed the throne to his son. Within the discussion of each of these components, I end by also including the point-by-point refutation against those celebratory elements of Pedro I’s identity made in the discourse critical of the statue. Thus, I trace the contours of the counter narrative also present in 1862. In it, Pedro I was the following: 1) the antagonist and usurper of the independence movement; 2) the autocrat who illegally violated democratic principles; 3) the valid military defender of Portuguese constitutionalism; 4) the hero only of Portugal, *not* Brazil; and 5) the tyrant valiantly driven out by patriots. This analysis of how Brazilian intellectuals remembered Pedro I in 1862 lays the foundation for the discussions in the subsequent chapters on the impact that the fall of the Empire and the proclamation of the Republic had on public perceptions of his legacy, his statue, and the general importance of the public representation of the nation’s history. The overall discussion will demonstrate the ways in which history and memory become part of the contestation between elites over claims to legitimacy and power in the deliberate construction of the nation-state.

Chapter Three expands the previous chapter’s discussion of how imperial commentators defined Pedro I and his statue to include the larger debate amongst the new republican elite over their views not just of the first emperor and his statue but also
Brazilian history, tradition, and each other. Underlying the entire chapter is the profound impact that the proclamation of the Republic had on the nation’s political and intellectual landscape. I explain the characteristics of that regime change, paying particular attention to how the new republican elites conceptualized political legitimacy and the transfer of sovereignty from the Empire to the Republic. With that context provided, I then provide a comprehensive account of the incident involving the covering of the statue by a bandstand that was part of the civic commemoration of Tiradentes Day. The public debate that was triggered by this seemingly minor event provides a fascinating glimpse into how the process of national identity formation responds to political change in the context of highly contentious relationships between elite factions. To address these topics, this chapter explores the different reasons that the covering of the statue was criticized. Those reasons involved the role of “the people” in judging the treatment of the statue to be an insult to Brazil’s past, the role of art as a marker of a people’s culture and degree of civilization, and the importance of history in the affirmation of a nation’s greatness and self-awareness. Noticeably absent is any full-throated endorsement of Pedro I as a reason in and of itself to criticize the bandstand. The aftermath of the incident also provides insight into the human toll of regime change. I explore how the fear and anxiety that accompanied the new elites’ attempts to establish the Republic’s political legitimacy determined how they perceived their newly formed state and each other. I will show the depth of their fears of both restoration and internal republican betrayal. Ultimately, the rhetoric surrounding the bandstand incident will reveal a growing elite sense of disunity and antagonism to the point that criticism of the statue’s covering becomes a litmus test for “true” republicanism.
While Chapter Three did involve specific discussions centered on how the republican elite viewed Pedro I’s statue in the context of its covering, it did not specifically address their views on his legacy. Chapter Four will turn our focus back to that very topic and look at the ways in which Pedro I and his legacy were being redefined. The articulation of those views of the Empire’s first ruler was part of a larger reimagining of the imperial past to serve the Republic’s new historical narrative. The first part of this chapter discusses the various perspectives advanced in the newspapers of the city over how the imperial past—including its monarchy and monarchs—should be viewed. The practical matter of constructing a republican-themed civic calendar precipitated changes to commemorative traditions and the understanding of royal historical moments, and these changes sparked commentary in the local papers. That discourse reveals an awareness of and uneasiness with the supplanting of the national holiday of September 7, Independence Day, with the celebration of the founding of the Republic on November 15 instead. Part of this changing commemorative landscape also involved the cooptation of Abolition Day, May 13, as a marker in the republican evolution of the nation. The write-ups marking the commemorations of these two civic dates, as well as that of April 7 which was the day that Pedro I abdicated, also allow me to return once again to the specific question of Pedro I’s legacy. Just as certain themes and elements of identity emerged in the discourse in 1862, in the first few years of the Republic writers similarly were coming to a new consensus. A common practice became comparing Pedro I to his father and his son as a means to evaluate and judge him as deficient as an historical figure and a man. They specifically attacked Pedro I’s legacy as it related to his role in independence and the nature of his abdication. They challenged
and qualified every accomplishment previously credited to him to continuously chip away at his historical and political standing.

This desire to ultimately remove Pedro I from history and memory translated into various proposals being made to have his statue physically removed from the Republic’s public square. Chapter Five examines very closely the arguments made for the statue’s removal and the public responses that those proposals provoked. The chapter begins with a description of the proposal made by Miguel Lemos in 1890 and republished in 1893 in the context of the bandstand incident. He called for the statue’s removal and replacement with a republican-themed monument. The criticisms of this proposal illustrate a level of sophistication similar to those of the covering of the statue discussed in Chapter Three. The writers use historical comparisons and a deep understanding of the implications of eradicating symbolic representations of the nation. This sort of response is true as well for the proposal in 1894 to remove Pedro I’s statue and replace it with one of Tiradentes. Finally in 1898, there was reference, perhaps satirical, to a federal senator’s plan to ask that the statue be demolished and replaced by a bust to an obscure Rio figure. This last proposal did not elicit any sort of response, and none of these four proposals ever succeeded in spurring action on the part of the municipal or federal governments. Yet this chapter will pointedly show how their presence in the public and political imagination became an ongoing rhetorical tool for elite discussions of the Empire’s past and the Republic’s present. Chapter Five ultimately pulls together all of the previous discussions about history, memory, tradition, and sovereignty in its resolution of the imperial statue remaining in Praça Tiradentes.
Chapter Two: 
Defining the Historical Legacy of Pedro I in 1862

In March of 1862, Dom Pedro II presided over the inauguration of Brazil’s first official public monument which honored the memory and accomplishments of his late father and imperial predecessor, D. Pedro I. It was not merely a son’s tribute to his father. Nor was it simply a nation memorializing its past. Instead, it signified the very deliberate attempt on the part of the empire’s elite to affirm the Imperial State on the domestic and international stages. The decision to erect the statue was just one part of the empire’s “national project” to revitalize the past and construct an imperial national identity based on collective memory.¹¹ That larger project saw the full weight and power of the Brazilian imperial elite brought to bear on the academic and artistic production of

¹¹ Noé Freire Sandes, A invenção da nação: entre a monarquia e a república (Goiâna: Ed. Da UFG: Agência Goiana de Cultura Pedro Ludovico Teixeira, 2000), 27; Santos and Monteiro, 53.
the time with the express intent of establishing a historical narrative that defined and glorified the nation’s monarchical and imperial past.

Such a symbolic construction of nationality through the cultivation of historical memory was not new. As Iara Lis Carvalho Souza points out, Brazilian intellectuals had been discussing the importance of the idea of the *patria*, of defining Brazilian identity, and of constructing an historical past beginning in the 1830s.\(^{12}\) The need for this national sense of self took on greater import in the mid to latter 1850s because of two factors. First, a growing number of the group of elites driving the national project and their intended audience were not members of the generation that actually witnessed or participated in the independence effort that culminated in 1822 with Brazil’s political independence from Portugal. As a result, this effort to establish the historical record was no longer about simply remembering Pedro I through first-hand experience but by actively constructing a national past through written history and representations. Such representations had to be accessible and understandable to the general—and mostly illiterate—population, otherwise they would only reach the target audience of the lettered elite behind the project itself. The need to expand that audience created in turn the need for public art. In this case, the statue of Pedro I would serve as that monumental statement in the public square.\(^{13}\)

Added to this issue of the passage of time was also the context of the political landscape of the day when the statue became the visible expression of the national project. The imperial elites’ efforts were taking place amidst an emerging public perception and subsequent Liberal criticism that Brazil under Pedro II was failing to live

\(^{13}\) Ribeiro, 17-18; Santos and Monteiro, 56.
up to its political, economic, and cultural potential. In some ways, as a ruler Pedro II became the victim of his own success. Roderick J. Barman cites Brazil’s prior “decade of peace and prosperity” as having “removed fears of social unrest and of ideological conflicts.” This climate in turn led to a “resurgence in political Liberalism” and a new generation of opposition leaders who would become increasingly active and successful in Rio politics by using the rhetoric of federalism, individual rights, and reform. Those criticisms began to challenge the imperial institutions themselves, a step considered radical by many, given the tendency in Brazil for tinkering rather than institutional change. One such successful opposition figure would be Teófilo Otoni, who radically challenged the “concentration of power in the hands of the emperor” and whose writings will be analyzed in this chapter as a counterpoint to the version of D. Pedro I’s legacy enshrined in the statue. The imperial project and the national identity and pride it was meant to engender signaled those elites’ recognition of those critical sentiments and their need to buoy Brazilian pride and political cooperation rather than frustration.

With the erection of the statue, the historical engineers began at the beginning: the founding moment of the nation both in terms of its political independence and its constitutional and legal framework. Both accomplishments belonged to Pedro I. He was the hero of independence and the founder of the Empire and nation. He was also the promulgator of Brazil’s first—and in 1862 current—constitution. Both accomplishments were central to the construction of the Brazilian nation-state and laid the foundations for

later nationalistic sentiments and understandings. The fact that the imperial elite could make the direct connection between father and son, founder and consolidator of the Empire, certainly made the choice that much more useful for their attempt to reinforce the regime’s current legitimacy and power. As part of that “national project,” the *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (IHGB)*, which had been founded in 1838 and tasked from the beginning with delineating a unique profile for the imagined “Brazilian Nation,” looked to employ the “great deeds and great men” approach to history in order to begin establishing the bases of the country’s identity. Their “search for common origins” and a “common past” led them to eventually place the onus for that achievement onto one effective tool: “the myth of the founder hero.”

Consequently, the Institute in 1854 first called for a trinity of monuments to be constructed to honor Brazil’s maritime discovery by the Portuguese, its independence, and its founder. Thus, the person of Pedro I, because of the fact that his iconic role in declaring Brazilian independence would also be represented in the monument to independence, was set to be central to two of the three proposed first national monuments. Just two years prior, a Rio de Janeiro city council member’s proposal that the city oversee a collection of funds to build an equestrian statue of Pedro I fell on deaf ears and went absolutely nowhere. In contrast, when another councilman, Haddock Lobo, made the IHGB-backed proposal for the erection of the equestrian statue on September 7, 1854, the commemorative date of Brazilian independence, the city council approved the measure unanimously and began the work of organizing the efforts to oversee the statue’s design and construction. The local newspapers chronicled the opening and contributions to the popular subscription to raise

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16 Santos and Monteiro, 53-56.
the money for the project. The council ultimately selected French sculptor Luis Rochet to realize the design chosen that conflated those two aforementioned national accomplishments of Pedro I. In doing so, the government purposely focused not on the first emperor’s royalty or reign but on the two specific foundational moments for the nation.

The design used the generally accepted iconography of Pedro I’s role in Brazil’s declaration of independence, the “Grito do Ipiranga,” as the basis for the equestrian nature and posing of the statue. It then layered D. Pedro’s constitutional legacy onto the statue by placing in his right hand a document symbolizing the nation’s charter along with its independence (see Figure 3). The government added even more to this conflation by its choice of the statue’s commemorative inaugural date. The specific year of 1862 was selected in order to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the Grito and Brazilian independence while the day of March 25 (the original inaugural date before the weather forced a postponement) commemorated the anniversary of the promulgation of the first Brazilian constitution authored by Pedro I himself in 1824. The symbolic representation of Pedro’s figure also fused the two together by creating a variation on the traditional narrative and powerful imagery of Pedro I’s Grito do Ipiranga which served as the iconic declaration of Brazil’s independence. The choice of location for the statue was also related to the first emperor and the idea of constitutionalism, although not in the most direct way possible. The public square, or praça, chosen to be the historical space for the

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18 The “Grito” will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
equestrian statue was not the scene of the great moment when on March 25, 1824 Brazil’s constitution came into effect. Hendrik Kraay documents that no public ceremony was staged that day or in the years after. Instead, the reasoning behind the choice of that specific space came from the praça’s significance prior to Brazil’s nationhood. The name Praça da Constituição stemmed from the moment in 1821 when the Portuguese royal family—under public pressure and facilitated by Pedro himself—swore acceptance and observance of the upcoming constitution being formulated in Portugal. Such a multi-layered connection between Pedro, the constitution, and that historical space added significance to the statue’s symbolic representations and placement. In addition to the Grito symbolism represented in the statue which established the official narrative of Pedro as the founder of the Brazilian nation and the Empire, the establishment of Brazil—by Pedro I—as a constitutional monarchy was also symbolically represented in the statue.

Given this context of careful symbolism and imperial design, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. My first objective is to set a baseline of understanding of the identity and historical legacy of Pedro I as defined by the public discourse surrounding the inauguration of his equestrian statue in 1862. To gauge his standing in the nation’s memory forty years after independence, I analyzed the thirty-eight odes written to celebrate the statue and what it symbolized as well as the writings of the statue’s most vocal critic, Teófilo Otoni. Taken together, these sources provide a narrative and counter narrative on the ways in which contemporary writers defined the former emperor’s historical identity. The chapter is divided according to what I identify as the five components of that identity that appear consistently throughout the sources and that hinge
on popular notions of the roles that the First Emperor played: 1) the icon of independence and the founder of the Empire of Brazil; 2) the giver of law; 3) the soldier; 4) the hero of two worlds; and 5) the magnanimous father who bequeathed the throne to his son. These labels are clearly those present in the writing of the statue’s admirers. The counter narrative nevertheless engaged with these components but did so as a refutation of each. For those detractors, Pedro I was the following: 1) the antagonist and usurper of the independence movement; 2) the autocrat who illegally violated democratic principles; 3) the valid military defender of Portuguese constitutionalism; 4) the hero only of Portugal, not Brazil; and 5) the tyrant valiantly driven out by patriots. This analysis of how Brazilian intellectuals remembered Pedro I in 1862 lays the foundation for the discussions in the subsequent chapters on the impact that the fall of the Empire and the proclamation of the Republic had on public perceptions of his legacy, his statue, and the general importance of the public representation of a nation’s history.

Secondly, this discussion of the publically represented historical narrative and its respondent refutation provide insight into the ways in which history and memory become part of the contestation between elites over claims to legitimacy and power in the deliberate construction of the nation-state. By interlocking memorials to Pedro I to affirmations of Brazil’s greatness, supporters helped to begin advancing the macro identity of the nation through the definition of one historical figure’s micro identity. These building blocks of nationalism, of the “imagined community” that the imperial elites sought to foster, are clearly evident in the fact that the writings in 1862 showed a preoccupation not just with how Brazilians saw Pedro I but how they saw their own
They were defining themselves through their celebration or condemnation of the statue’s inauguration. That the celebratory odes far outnumbered and outshone, in terms of visibility, Otoni’s critical pamphlet also reveals the importance of the political elites’ access to power to drive public perceptions.

This chapter will also set the comparative scene for future discussions of the long-term viability of an important figure’s legacy as part of an historical narrative despite the nation’s change in political circumstances and regimes. It will help to show the difficulty in resolving competing perspectives, ideologies, and perhaps even more importantly, experiences of the past in defining the nation’s political organization. Yet the fact that this debate over how to remember Pedro I would continue from the time of the Republic and still be warranting discussion today also shows the ability of a people’s sense of self and nation to absorb those competing and contradictory ideas as the nation’s politics and society change. In addition, this chapter will lay the groundwork for understanding the significance of being “first” in the establishment of a narrative in terms of that narrative’s long-term viability. It will provide a construct from which to evaluate and contrast the construction or reinforcement of a narrative with the realities of attempting to deconstruct or replace an existing one. Finally, the discussions contained in this chapter and those to come will illustrate the recognition on the part of political elites for the need for public opinion and perception to buoy contemporary claims to power via the past. Whether it was imperial elites hearkening back to Pedro I and the nation’s origins or later republican

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19 Benedict Anderson, “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism” (London: Verso, 1991). Regarding Brazil specifically, historians Gisele Cunha dos Santos, Fernanda Fonseca Monteiro, and José Murilo de Carvalho note that the “Brazilian nation” of this time was indeed more imagined by the governing elite than real. In 1862 Brazil was still a slave society with a miscegenated population. That reality did not fit the mold or criteria of the European notion of civilization and therefore national identity. See Santos, 56.
elites looking even further back to the colony’s most famous insurrectionist and republican, those in the pursuit of power sought legitimacy in the present from the nation’s past.

The Icon of Independence and the Founder of the Empire

The writers celebrating the inauguration of the statue of Pedro I in 1862 overwhelmingly identified him with the independence movement and the founding of the empire—and thereby the nation—and made it the principal way in which they defined the legacy of their first emperor. Of the thirty-eight celebratory odes written, twelve ascribe to Pedro I the title of “Fundador” (founder) of the empire of Brazil in the very titles of the poems while the vast majority features the concept prominently in their first lines and throughout the discourse. The moment that defined Pedro I’s role in history was also the moment that defined Brazil’s march towards independence: September 7, 1822. On that day, Pedro I symbolically declared Brazil’s independence on the banks of the Ipiranga River when he famously said “Independence or Death! We are separated from Portugal!” This dramatic moment became known as the “Grito do Ipiranga,” and the Grito became the foundation of the identities of both Pedro I and the nation.

The “Grito do Ipiranga” as an Historical Moment

To understand the degree to which Pedro became the icon of Brazilian independence, it is necessary to look at the circumstances that fused the interests of a Portuguese prince to an American colonial independence movement. The creation of a revolutionary parliament or Côrtes in Lisbon in 1820, served as the catalyst for that process. By 1820, the Portuguese King, and Pedro I’s father, João VI remained in Brazil,
despite the fact that it had been six years since Napoleon’s general defeat and eleven years since British forces had driven the French out of Portugal. The role of the British military—specifically General William Carr Beresford—as administrative caretaker of Portugal during the King’s long absence loosened the Portuguese people’s ties to their distant absolute monarch and created an environment ripe for change. The revolutionary Côrtes recalled the King and began the work of writing a constitution that reflected the liberal ideals of popular sovereignty and representation to replace Portugal’s previously absolute monarchy. The metropolitan schism within the empire that resulted from the relocation of the monarchy to Brazil, though, created a complex reality of alliance and confrontation amongst the three principal actors of the period: the Royal House of Bragança, the Portuguese Côrtes, and the Brazilian people.

Alongside the inevitable tension that arose because of the new legislature’s assertion of political power at the expense of the monarchy in Brazil was another source of discord: the relationship between Portugal and Brazil. The trans-Atlantic move of the Braganças turned the imperial-colonial pyramid upside down, and the power asserted and exerted by the Côrtes profoundly affected the dynamics of imperial administration and set the two metropolises on a collision course with each other. A product of the volatile mixture of constitutionalism and the uncertainties of a metropolis left behind and seemingly forsaken by its sovereign, the Portuguese Côrtes would ultimately challenge Brazilian ascendance and royal authority in an attempt to reclaim Portuguese prominence and identity. However, in attacking both targets through the recall of the Braganças and legislative attempts to return primacy to Lisbon while re-subordinating Brazil to those Portuguese interests, the Côrtes committed a costly tactical error. It managed to fuse
Dom Pedro’s defense of his and his dynasty’s royal monarchical authority as Prince Regent of Brazil with the efforts of the Brazilian people around him who were similarly fighting to defend their rights and status as a kingdom. This unique dynamic set the Brazilian people at odds not with their imperial sovereign but instead solely with the revolutionary Côrtes in Lisbon intent on bending the former colony to its will. In the war over authority and preeminence, Dom Pedro would prove to be the most potent symbol of power in that conflict. His role as champion and protector of the monarchy, his dynasty, and Brazil placed him at the forefront of independence and at the center of the newly emerging Brazilian society.

By September of 1822, the Côrtes had already suppressed Brazil’s legal tribunals placing its administration of justice squarely under Portuguese dominion. It had also closed Brazilian military and academic institutions, introduced legislation to restrict Brazilian foreign trade back to its pre-1808 levels and limitations, and annulled the powers bestowed on Pedro as Prince Regent by his father.²⁰ The Brazilian—albeit Rio-centric—recognition of the continued authority of D. Pedro despite the actions of the Côrtes made it possible for the Regent to take measures to actively defend Brazil and himself against Portuguese hostility. In August of 1822 he issued dual decrees: one establishing the rhetoric of the independence movement—citing injustices done to Brazil—and one with practical actions to fortify Brazil against any Portuguese aggression. For example, the Regent ordered the fortification of ports, the prevention of supplies to Portuguese garrisons located in Brazil, and the prevention of juntas from accepting any officials dispatched from Portugal. Numerous provincial juntas responded to assert conformity to these instructions, demonstrating Pedro’s early legitimacy as

Brazil’s leader.21 The morning of September 7, 1822 found Pedro the Regent and his imperial guard on their way back from a successful trip to São Paulo to cultivate more strategic support for his leadership and the independence movement.

The traditional narrative of the events of that day, which developed over time from the circulating accounts by various witnesses to the event in 1822, is best represented in English by Pedro I’s biographer, Neill Macaulay. Upon receiving dispatches making clear that the Portuguese Côrtes was moving forward on criminalizing and stopping the independent political actions being taken by Pedro I and his ministers as well as letters from his chief advisor José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva and wife Princess Leopoldina counseling him towards action, Pedro I responded to Portugal’s intent to resubordinate Brazil under the colonial system thusly:

After a moment of reflection, Dom Pedro declared: “The time has come. Independence or death! We’re separated from Portugal!” Then he mounted his pretty bay mare, rode to the top of the hill [on the banks of the Ipiranga River outside of São Paulo on his return journey to Rio de Janeiro] and addressed his honor guard: “Friends, the Cortes persecutes us and wants to enslave us. From this day forward our relations are broken.” He tore the blue and white insignia of Portugal from his uniform and his soldiers followed suit, shouting vivas for independence and for Dom Pedro. The prince drew his sword and swore: “By my blood, by my honor, and by God: I will make Brazil free.” After everyone had taken the same oath, Dom Pedro stood up in his stirrups, looked in all directions, and announced, “Brazilians, from this day forward our motto will be—Independence or Death.” Then he took off at a gallop toward São Paulo.22

This portrayal of the Grito by Macaulay represents what Noé Freire Sandes calls the “classical version of independence” because it includes all of the iconic components typically associated with that moment: the receipt of the letters, the gesture of throwing


away the Portuguese insignia, the raising of the sword, and the cry of “Independence or Death!” (see Figure 4 for the iconic painting that represents this interpretation).

![Figure 4: Pedro Américo, Independência ou Morte! (O Grito do Ipiranga), 1888, Museu Paulista da USP, São Paulo, accessed through Wiki Commons, April 1, 2014.](image)

Following that immediate moment, the founding moment myth also includes Pedro I’s return to São Paulo where there were festivities and calls for Brazilian independence and Pedro’s kingship as well as the presentation of the national anthem Pedro had composed on his way back from the banks of the Ipiranga.23

The idea of a grito as a defining historical moment goes beyond this Brazilian experience, therefore it is important to place the “Grito do Ipiranga” within the larger memorial context of independence in Spanish America. The commemorations and civic celebrations that mark the seminal and foundational moments in Mexico and South America reveal the longstanding power of the idealized grito and even a competition to be the first to have asserted American sovereignty and courage. For example, today

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23 Sandes, 31.
Ecuador lays claim to being the site of “el primer grito de la independencia” in Latin America for what took place on August 10, 1809 in Quito. There a group consisting of Creoles, landowners, and military rebels relieved the president of the Royal Audiencia of his administrative charge and formed a Junta Suprema to rule until King Ferdinand VII could reclaim the Spanish throne from French control. Thus, it was not so much of an “Independence or Death!” moment but a “we’ll administer ourselves until the King is back” one. The fact that the junta did function as an autonomous local government is the basis for Ecuador’s claim. However, that claim is based more on this moment’s placement in the larger sequence of events that led to eventual independence from Spain rather than the moment’s own revolutionary content. What would have been the radical seizing of self-government in the Americas was instead tempered by the insurgents’ continued loyalty to the Spanish Crown. This using of the creation of temporary governing juntas as “gritos” and moments of national origins is further complicated by the fact that localities throughout Spanish America were independently forming similar juntas. Because of this reality, Bolivia also lays claim to being the “first of firsts” because of the efforts to create juntas in Chuquisaca and La Paz. The “revolution,” as it came to be known, that took place in Chuquisaca prior to Quito’s events inspired the claim of Chuquisaca being the site of the “primer grito libertario” or “first cry for freedom.” If looking just at junta formation as being equivalent to the utterance of a grito or proclamation, then these others—as well as localities in Venezuela--would precede Quito. But the fact that the Quito’s junta succeeded with initial military adherence and actual exercise of power allows for Ecuador to celebrate this distinction as part of the nation’s—and the region’s—founding historical moments. The independence
bicentennial commemorative period of the past few years demonstrates both competition and cooperation in the South American nations celebrating these various “first” moments. For example, national leaders in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela stood together in Quito in 2009 to celebrate that supposed first *grito* while simultaneously touting each of their own nations’ equally important place in the history of the independence era. In turn, these separate and collective celebrations show just how important the idea of the *grito* is in the national and regional historical narratives. Most importantly, they demonstrate how the *grito* still resonates with the regimes and people of Latin America as indicators of their political, economic, and cultural sovereignty.  

Despite these various South American claims to *grito* prominence, the only other famous cry that has achieved the same singular proclamatory historical significance as Brazil’s “*Grito do Ipiranga*” is that of Mexico: the “*Grito de Dolores*.” Its recognition for being such is evidenced by the fact that it alone can typically be found as an index reference entry in an historical monograph on Latin American independence or even Latin American history in general. It too has the component of a rebellious leader receiving word that his enemies have moved against him, inspiring him to exhort those around him to rise up against those who would impose their illegitimate and unpopular rule. When Father Miguel Hidalgo uttered his call to arms on September 16, 1810, in the village of Dolores after receiving news of the betrayal and capture of his fellow insurrectionists in Querétaro, he successfully wove together religious obligation with that of political and military action. Before the day was over, an army marched out of Dolores.

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with the inspirational padre at its head. Despite the fact that within four months Father Hidalgo had already been relieved of his command due to incessant infighting amongst those in the army and rebel leadership when he was ultimately captured, tried, and sentenced to death, the combination of the drama and spectacle of his *Grito* in Dolores and his martyrdom made September 16 a potent symbol of defiance. According to William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey, it remains to this day “the most important public festival in the civic calendar and has bequeathed to Mexicans a rich tradition that is part creation myth, part official pomp, and part popular merrymaking.”

While the *Gritos* of both Ipiranga and Dolores share a similar commemorative and dramatic flair, there are important distinctions between the two that emphasize the different historical experiences of the two emerging nations in the nineteenth century. Father Hidalgo was a Creole priest. Pedro I was the Prince Regent of Brazil and the heir to the Portuguese throne. Father Hidalgo’s speech was one described by Isabel Fernández Tejedo and Carmen Nava Nava as more of a “harangue” to compel adhesion to his cause and inspire fighters to participate and join his army. His *grito* was an immediate call to arms for a rebel army bound for actual conflict and combat. He and the men who left Dolores were headed for a fight. Pedro I’s *grito*, however, reflects the curiosity of an independence movement led by royalty. It reflects Pedro’s decision that Brazil be free. This top-down aspect to that movement is even deepened by the sense that the royal “we” permeates his proclamation with an unspoken “let it be done.” He attended festivities after his *grito*. He wrote a song. And he never had to fight a battle against the Portuguese troops stationed in Brazil in order to achieve Brazil’s independence.
Despite these differences, both Ipiranga and Dolores would ultimately serve as the foundational moments of Brazil and Mexico. Their places in their respective nations’ identity would be challenged or redefined by new commemorative dates associated with subsequent political regimes and events. Yet both would persevere and become part of the common knowledge of their respective people’s histories and a myth where origins, community, and history could capture the imagination.\(^{25}\)

Nevertheless, in 1862 Brazil, the “Grito do Ipiranga” narrative was still in the process of coalescing into national myth. For our purposes, though, what is important is what popular notions of the *Grito* were at the time of the statue’s inauguration. With the exception of the prominent imagery of the raising of the sword, all of the other components were already in place in the Brazilian political imagination of the time.\(^{26}\) The poems submitted to celebrate the inauguration of the statue in 1862 provide insight into a consensus interpretation of the *Grito* moment. First, they emphasize the location: along the banks of the Ipiranga River outside of São Paulo. Second, they have a notion of a raised arm as a gesture that conveyed emotion and strength (albeit without a sword). Last,

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26 However, Macaulay’s footnote for the *grito* narrative demonstrates just how cobbled together the account was. For example, he cites four different first-hand accounts by Padre Belchior Pinheiro de Oliveira, Manuel Marcondes de Oliveira Mello, Francisco Gomes da Silva, and Francisco de Castro Canto e Mello. Those citations stem from sources presented in other publications which reprinted earlier pamphlets and accounts. Each account varied from each other in terms of exact wording and sequencing. In what is considered the definitive biography of Pedro I, Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa explores the variations of the accounts in his own attempt to reconstruct the scene. For this discussion, see *A Vida de D. Pedro I, Volume II* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1952), 433-436. According to Noé Freire Sandes, it is not until Canto e Mello’s account becomes widely circulated starting in the 1860s that the image of the raised sword takes hold. Padre Belchior makes no mention of the sword in his account. See Sandes, 29.
they emphasize Pedro’s vocalization of “Independence or Death” as the definitive clarion call for independence (see Figure 5 for an earlier visual interpretation).  

![Image of François-René Moreaux, A Proclamação da Independência](image)

**Figure 5:** François-René Moreaux, *A Proclamação da Independência*, 1844, Museu Imperial, Petrópolis, accessed from Wiki Commons: April 4, 2014.

**The “Grito do Ipiranga” as Used to Define Pedro I in 1862**

The narrative of Ipiranga was powerful in and of itself, especially as a vivid image conveyed in poetry. The fundamental aspects of the scene that occurred on September 7, 1822 in which Pedro unsheathed his sword and demanded “Independence or Death!” were tailor-made for national myth-making. The acclaimed Brazilian writer Machado de Assis commented on how the choice of that moment to mark Brazil’s origins served the nation well. He described the *Grito* as a moment “most concise, most

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27 For studies specific on the various political construction of commemorative dates in Brazil, see Cecília Helena de Salles Oliveira, *O Museu Paulista da USP e a memória da independência* (Cad.Cedes, Campinas, v. 22, n. 58, p. 65-80, dezembro/2002; Disponível em [http://www.cedes.unicamp.br](http://www.cedes.unicamp.br); Accessed via site [http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ccedes/v22n58/v22n58a05.pdf](http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ccedes/v22n58/v22n58a05.pdf) on 4/1/14), 67-68 for an article on the evolution of September 7 as an officially recognized date. See also the recent and very detailed monograph by Hendrik Kraay referenced earlier.
beautiful, and most generic” and therefore most useful as legend. For the famous author, that singular and discreet act was the perfect dramatic moment. The theatrical element that it possessed was far better than any reality could possibly be. After all, it was action—both physical and verbal. The gesture was also generic, romantic, and universal in its ability to spark the political and public imagination. Given this later perspective, the poets in 1862 predictably latched onto the *Grito* as the defining image of independence and thereby the defining image of Pedro I.

Yet that was not all. The celebration of Pedro as founder and independence icon existed within a much larger and supremely important context: the Brazilians’ need to establish their own identity and origins in order to stake their claim to membership in the community of self-aware and civilized nations. A celebratory canto was not merely an ode to Pedro I but was also “a hymn to the patria!” For Joaquim Norberto de Sousa Silva, a Rio-born writer and future IHGB president who would be acclaimed both for the quality and quantity (over eighty various writings) of his works of poetry, theatre, novels, biographies, essays, and literary / historical studies, the statue *homenagens* performed a national service in allowing Brazilians to “make sacred the foundation of the empire at the altar of the beloved patria!” Sousa Silva asserted that paying tribute to Pedro I sacralized Brazil’s origins.

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28 Sandes, 30. The comments of Machado de Assis came during a reevaluation of the veracity of previous historical accounts of the *Grito*. Questions arose over Pedro’s physical condition, his appearance, his mount, and his exact actions as they were typically portrayed. In his opinion, Machado favored the myth over whatever the reality was.

were so inextricably linked, the argument could be made that glorifying one necessarily cast glory upon the others. Rather than the “Bronze Lie” that the statue’s critics would label it, for the popular afro-Brazilian poet and novelist Antonio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa it was the “sacred bronze.” Echoing Sousa Silva’s call to sacralize Brazil’s origins and founder, Teixeira e Sousa proposed that the statue serve as a “sacred temple of undiminished glory” for the nation and the emperor.\(^\text{30}\)

On top of this pressure of honoring the nation internally, poem after poem reveal their writer’s sense that Brazil’s monumental recognition of its origins and founder had the world as its audience. The statue “attested” to the world, “affirmed” to the world, and “acCLAIMed” to the world the “greatest heroism” possible in the legacy of Pedro I. It served just as much as a “testament” to the nation’s “vibrant glory” as well. Beyond such domestic glory, Brazil could even be a model to that world audience.\(^\text{31}\) For one writer in particular, Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão, the “gifts” and “benefits” received from Pedro I’s “generous hand” were the very foundation for Brazil’s claim to standing amongst the world’s leading nations. Brandão, who was born in Minas Gerais, became


\(^{31}\) Domingo José Gonçalves Magalhães, “Cântico á inauguração da estatua equestre do Fundador do Império do Brazil” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paulo Brito, 1862); Porto Alegre; Dr. Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, “Cantico” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Sousa Silva; Neves.
one of the few prominent female artists and intellectuals during the reign of Pedro II through her well-known poetry which was published in various Rio newspapers. In her inaugural poem, she went on to assert that “the patria, liberty, glory, national honor, and dignity amongst the most conspicuous nations of the world, all emanated from you [Pedro].” This passage demonstrates well the overarching desire on the part of many to stake an international claim to glory and standing on the commemoration of Brazil’s origins via Pedro I.

Other writers also commented on the role of monuments in the public recording of history, noting that the statue would be a “canvas of bronze, where history recorded the renown of a people” and that “bowing before the statue” would be a means to acclaiming Brazil’s own existence. That use of the language of fealty was atypical in the poems, even though it was meant to celebrate Brazil as well. Instead, writers repeatedly defined themselves as free people, not subjects, who were demonstrating appreciation for the figure who secured their political liberty. They made the clear distinction between a people honoring “the memory of the brave” and an “enslaved people” laying incense at the “feet of a king.” In this view of the past and the present, Brazilians were not merely subjects, and Pedro I was no common king but a heroic warrior and founder of Brazil. Similarly, some poets called the statue a testament made by a “free people” for the world to see Brazil’s “vibrant glory,” calling the day of the

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34 Gomes de Sousa.
inauguration the “Brazilian Day.” They also gave credit to Pedro I for the origins of a “new horizon” for Brazil by ushering in its existence as a “free, independent, and vast empire.” For the prominent Bahian newspaper publisher Manoel Agostinho da Cruz Mello in particular, Brazilians were not just free but also living in their own self-identified golden age. He found the Grito to be the moment in which Pedro I awoke the “Giant of America” and made possible the “happy times” of his age. Along with freedom, one attribute overwhelmingly attributed to the Brazil of those times was unity. An “entire Brazil” welcomed the statue, and one writer even referred to unity as “the crown that rested” on Pedro I’s “brow.”

This theme of a unified Brazil also accompanied notions of popular acclaim. In 1862, Pedro I was being received by a “unified and free people” who celebrated the statue in an “explosion of love” with “not a single voice from a Brazilian breast lacking.” In addition, Domingos José Gonçalves Magalhães labeled that expression of the people as “free and spontaneous adulation.” His wording demonstrates the use of spontaneity as validation of true emotion rather than a function of coercion. In addition, he also employed the more fundamental use of “o povo” (or “the people”) as the ultimate measure of validation. In this rhetoric, the judgement of the people served as the final

37 Magalhães, also known as the Visconde de Araguaia (though spelled Magalhaens in the 1862 document according to the orthography of that day), was a medical doctor, diplomat, poet, dramatist, and member of the Academy of Letters from Rio de Janeiro. His Academia Brasileira de Letras biography also notes that he was a friend of Emperor Pedro II. See “Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhaens: Biografia,” Academia Brasileira de Letras, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.academia.org.br/academicos/goncalves-de-magalhaes/biografia.
arbiter of historical legacy. Magalhães asserted that the nation was “listening to what the people say,” and in his poetry, he established the people’s ability to define their own history by judging for themselves—a judgement that would be lasting—who and what would ultimately merit hate or love and a place of honor. In the end, such a democratic principle would lace multiple homages to Brazil’s royal emperor. Just as Pedro I himself strategically used constitutional and democratic rhetoric in the justification of his actions, four decades later those who glorified his statue employed those same themes.³⁸ It could certainly be argued that the generalized “o povo” referred to in the poems was bound to resemble more the members of the IHGB than the population at large when it came to such sentiments towards the statue. Yet the fact that unity and popular acclaim were a part of these writers’ interpretations of legitimacy and the public symbolism of the state adds yet another layer onto how they wished to portray themselves in their celebration of Pedro I’s statue.

Many writers viewed that aforementioned “undiminished glory”—of political emancipation and national beginnings—as deeds for which Brazilians owed their emperor the debt of gratitude. For them, the currency with which Brazilians could repay that debt was in the form of memory and monument. Such a notion of a monument as debt payment went back as far as the very first decade of Brazil’s national existence. The elites of the 1820s had a different approach, however, as evidenced by their cultivation of a French cultural mission replete with artists and a passion for the monumentalidade (or “monument craze”) of the era. Even Pedro I himself saw the importance of such public

and symbolic representations of power, and he actively sought ways in which to fuse his persona with them. Because of the intersection of these trends, a “Monument of National Gratitude” and other statues dedicated to Pedro I were proposed. The plan’s scale ultimately made it untenable at that time, and the first emperor’s eventual abdication in 1831 served to end the discussions of building such an homage.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, before the ceremony in 1862, that memorial debt had yet to be paid, and the writers of the time showed an acute awareness of this fact. This feeling was only deepened by the fact that twenty years had passed since Pedro I’s death with still nothing existing to publically honor his memory in Brazil or Rio. Haddock Lobo himself, in his speech to the city council in 1854 referred to the statue he was proposing as an effort to “pay a sacred debt.”\textsuperscript{40}

Perhaps this awareness drove some writers to see what many perceived as the overdue erection of the statue as taking on a religious quality, and they even employed hyperbolic deification rhetoric. Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhães asserted that the statue represented an ovação, or offering, up to the nation’s collective memory in much the same way that Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão called on Pedro I “to bless this empire that you founded” and to “receive the pure and sincere offering of a People whom you saved and ennobled.” Magalhães referred to the “divine impetus” to erect the statue while another poet asserted that there was “a fervid cult” dedicated to “the memory of the good things” that the people owed to Pedro I. They went further to say that the people do not just “exalt their hero” but “deify him” as well to the point that Pedro’s name should

\textsuperscript{39} Souza, 297-301.  
\textsuperscript{40} Ribeiro, 16.
be deified as an “emblem” for the nation.\textsuperscript{41} Even more writers referenced either veneration or outright deification for Pedro’s standing as it related to the statue. For Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre, whose far-reaching artistic and intellectual contributions to the Empire as a painter, caricaturist, poet, architect, writer, and diplomat earned him the esteem of Pedro II and the title of Barão de Santo Ângelo, the statue made permanent Pedro I’s importance by “stamping itself in the skies and deifying itself throughout the times.” One final writer, the scientist J. Barbosa Rodrigues known for his work in natural history and botany, combined this religious terminology with the very essence of \textit{monumentalidade} as it related to the imperial national project. He called the “pilgrimage” to the statue, where the people were to “reverently” come, a necessary “tribute to pay.”\textsuperscript{42}

The majority of the poets in 1862, however, were more concerned with the larger secular themes of memory and gratitude in their celebrations of the statue’s inauguration. They echoed Haddock Lobo’s proposal, stating that “the sepulcher cannot be the only tribute to a hero so great.”\textsuperscript{43} Antonio José Victorino de Barros went further, equating the Brazilian nation’s lack of any forms of tribute to its illustrious historical figures to its “forgetting” of its own history.\textsuperscript{44} For him, that forgetting was a “crime and insult” with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item [41] Magalhães; Brandão; Carlos Testa, “Perante a Estatua do Muito Alto e Muito Poderoso Príncipe Senhor D. Pedro I Imperador do Brazil” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862).
\item [43] A. J. de Araujo, “Saudação á Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio O Senhor D. Pedro I” (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia de F. de Paulo Brito, Praça da Constituição, 1862). The sepulcher referenced in this lament was not even located in Brazil since Pedro I died in Portugal after his Brazilian abdication. After his death in 1834, his remains were interred according to royal custom in Lisbon. As part of the 1972 sesquicentennial celebration of Brazil’s independence, Pedro I’s remains were returned to Brazil and entombed in the Monument to Independence in São Paulo.
\item [44] Antonio José Victorino de Barros was a Rio-born journalist, playwright, and editor of various newspapers on the arts, sciences, and religion who earned multiple distinctions in imperial orders. Both his high
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no possibility of “forgiveness.” Barros found the “arrogant ingratitude” demonstrated by that absence of tribute as in stark contrast with the example of Europe. He cited the fact that the “Old World” peoples had erected columns and trophies to denote their own accomplishments, all of which were to the amazement of the New World. That aforementioned ingratitude, though, and the lack of tribute in which it manifested itself, would be made right by the erection of the statue to the deserving figure of Pedro I. For this, the author congratulated the Brazilian people, calling them a “grateful people,” and proclaimed that the monument was proof that they “are a people who value yourself.”

Another poet, writing under the name of Pedro I’s venerated (and deceased) advisor and minister, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, also took up the idea of the nation forgetting its past. He condemned himself, alluding to the future as his judge, for the crime of having “forgotten his heritage” and offered his desire to stand “contrite and kneeling” before the statue in order to atone.

Others also addressed the New World aspect of Brazil but did so very differently from Barros’ comparative comments above. For them, Brazil was “a nation new and dignified” and “an empire so rich and so fertile, ” and this youthfulness accounted for the nation’s lack of commemoration. Despite not judging the nation and its people harshly, they did echo the mandate that Brazil not forget its past.

The act of remembering and commemorating was “for the good of the people,” the “glory

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46 Andrada Silva.
of the history of the patria,” and “a thought of eternal value.” Ultimately these writers each extolled the beauty and virtue of the sentiment of gratitude in its expression on inaugural day.

Woven into these ruminations on the tribute owed by the Brazilian nation to its founder was a related notion of generational debt and obligation. In speaking to the patria, Joaquim Antônio Hamvultando de Oliveira condemned Brazil for being populated by an “unjust people” who had left “to the new generation the debt of gratefully memorializing Pedro I.” This writer asserted his belief that people do not respect their past or themselves if they do not visibly demonstrate their appreciation for those who came before and left a mark on the nature and course of the nation. It is not enough to say that some of the generation of writers in 1862 reveled in their role in paying their nation’s memorial debt. Rather, they went further to pointedly chide the previous generation for its inability to act. For Oliveira, it was Brazil’s “children” who could say “Here it is! Here it is! In our capital we erect a glorious monument that eternalizes the venerable day and words of Ipiranga.”

Dr. Luiz Vicente De-Simoni echoed the sentiment of Oliveira. He described the statue as “this colossal bronze erected to the skies by a subsequent and just generation.” It would be his generation, therefore, who presented the monument “to the world” and out of the noble sentiment of “high gratitude.” For De-Simoni, the statue

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48 Magalhães; Porto-Alegre; Macedo; Sousa Silva; Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “Á Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Taunay, “Soneto.”
50 Oliveira.
explicitly represented the payment of that generational debt, one that “our age pays in metal.” An Italian-born medical doctor who had become a naturalized Brazilian citizen in 1855 and risen to great prominence in the Empire as the director of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia of Rio de Janeiro and the government’s Public Health initiatives, De-Simoni wholeheartedly embraced his distinguished standing in that Brazilian generation and their role to play in the national project, himself contributing a total of seven different inaugural works. One other writer touched on the theme of history and and posterity, but he did so specifically looking to the future generations rather than the present or the past. Joaquim Norberto de Sousa Silva cast the importance of the statue in this light, saying “Generation yet to come! Noble and sublime...contemplate the origin of your greatness!” For Sousa Silva, the glorification surrounding the nation’s first monument was centered on that idea of greatness and origins. He saw his nation in 1862 as a “flourishing and rich and beautiful and learned and blessed patria.” That greatness found its origins on the banks of Ipiranga and would thereby be represented for posterity in the statue of Pedro I.

This linking of the statue to the concept of generational awareness would also take on a didactic element. Contributors such as the playwright Joaquim Jacome de

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52 De-Simoni also founded multiple medical societies and served as editor of medical annals and the Imperial Academy of Science. He was recognized time and again by Pedro II with various imperial honors as well as the intellectual honor of being asked to teach Italian language and literature at the Imperial Colégio as well as to tutor the daughters of Pedro II. In terms of his contribution to the arts, De-Simoni is best known for his translations of Western classics into Portuguese. See Maria Rachel Fróes da Fonseca, “Simoni, Luís Vicente de,” Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico das Ciências da Saúde no Brasil (1832-1930), Casa de Oswaldo Cruz / Fiocruz, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.dichistoriasaude.coc.fiocruz.br/iah/pt/verbetes/simonil.htm#dados.
53 Sousa Silva.
54 This notion of generational historical appreciation and awareness will be discussed in more detail as it relates to the writers’ definition of Pedro as Father and Bequeathor to Pedro II. The writers purposefully
Oliveira Campos Filho and the aforementioned Domingo José Gonçalves Magalhães saw the inauguration as not just an opportunity to show deference to the past but also to glean lessons for the present. For his part, Campos Filho held up the statue as the means in which Pedro I could serve as a model to Brazil and the world. He said that through the statue Pedro was elevated as a “living emblem of noble deeds” to be forever venerated. This notion of the statue being a lasting influence is captured nicely with Campos Filho’s labeling of it as an “eloquent artifact” of Brazil’s past that could speak of those deeds and heroic origins to the present and future Brazil.\footnote{Joaquim Jacome de Oliveira Campos Filho, “À Inauguração da Estatua Equestre de D. Pedro Primeiro” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Andrada Silva.} Rather than an artifact, Magalhães saw the statue as a “distant echo” across time that would have the ability to reanimate or revive the exhausted or empty grandeur of the nation. His notion of time also conveyed a sense of cross-generational revival through the nation’s memorializing of its past. For him, a generation had allowed itself to fade away into historical and memorial oblivion. Yet with its new tribute, his era could be one of revival.\footnote{Magalhães; Kraay, 283.}

In the end, therefore, these writers remained mindful of the overarching themes of memory, the patria, and obligation. In speaking to “the patria,” Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre stated that “they will not say that you were ungrateful…because you erect for him an eternal monument.”\footnote{Porto-Alegre.} This author expressed the same sentiment as other writers in that recognition was owed to Pedro I. While Porto-Alegre did not specifically criticize the generation that came before as being ungrateful or self-aware—as others did—for not having erected a monument or homage, he did have a shared sense of being judged by
posterity for not adequately showing appreciation for the defining moments of the history of the *patria*. Thus the statue, for many, signified the payment of such a memorial debt.

It was on this layered tapestry of exalting Brazil through celebrating Pedro I and vice versa that the writers in 1862 defined Pedro I primarily as the hero of independence and founder of the nation. They portrayed him as the starring actor “at the front of the nation” as the “magnanimous founder of the empire” and the “royal author” of Brazil’s independence. Making his enemies yield and bringing greatness to Brazil in the form of political separation from Portugal often accompanied references to Pedro’s one unassailable characteristic: his virility. Along with the common thanks given to Pedro I for Brazil’s independence and law, there is noticeably an appreciation for qualities such as his dynamic “strength” and “attitude.” No matter the political or moral controversies swirling around the first emperor or his shortcomings that led to them, his personal vitality always stands out in the way that the writers bring his deeds to life.58 Consequently, no action or moment lent itself any better to that notion of vitality and charisma than the ultimate founding moment, a moment replete with action, drama, and decisiveness: the *Grito do Ipiranga*.

Not only did the inaugural writers for all practical purposes reduce Pedro I and his legacy to that moment, but they also simultaneously narrowed the Brazilian effort and achievement of independence to the *Grito* as well. Since there was no protracted, national military struggle required for Brazil to achieve recognition as an independent state, there is no other truly shared experience for Brazilians to draw from in the myth-making of

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their independence. Certainly there are strong regional and local experiences from that era that have shaped identities on those levels, some of which are based upon tensions and resentments towards the fledgling imperial government headed by Pedro I and seated in Rio de Janeiro. Yet for the people of that “unified” nation, their only climactic moment was the 7th of September. And because of this, Pedro’s standing is somewhat curious. His fame as the “hero” of independence comes not from him marshalling a revolutionary army and securing independence like Bolívar or Washington or articulating Brazilian grievances against the Portuguese attempts to re-subordinate Brazil into a colonial system, the latter which he actually did. Instead, Pedro’s claim to fame centers on the act of verbally proclaming independence.

This repeated identification of Pedro as Brazil’s “immortal Herald” (“immortal Arauto”) emphasizes the dynamic—and more specifically vocal—characteristics that the Grito do Ipiranga possessed by its very nature.59 The majority of inaugural odes employ not only allusions to the visual imagery of Ipiranga (Pedro on horseback alongside the shore of the river, right arm raised), but more often to the sound of his words, “Independence or Death!” In fact, this quotation appears fifteen times, sometimes in all capital letters for emphasis and sometimes multiple times in the same poem as a refrain. The many ways that writers could refer to Brazilian independence via Ipiranga made it such a useful and frequent device. This utility also explains why Ipiranga became so iconic and even preferable to future writers such as Machado de Assis. The poets in 1862

59 Porto-Alegre.
sanctified the *Grito* as “the supreme saying,” a “voice so holy,” and a cry that was both “heroic” and “powerful” at the banks of the river.\(^6^0\)

The authors used that “sublime voice” to not only symbolize Brazilian independence and liberty but also as a link once again between generations. While one author says that Pedro “raised his voice” for the Brazilian people in 1822, another asserts that through the statue, all of Brazil “still listens” to Pedro because the statue perpetuates his “Grito of magnetic influence.” The writers repeatedly give voice to the statue, for example saying that “once again the brado (or grito) rings out and the hero appears!”

There is even a reference to the statue “feeling the sensation of the rays of the sun upon it” so that “independence or death’ might echo in the bronze and the vast empire!” That the *Grito* could echo again in the hearts and minds of Brazilians—and throughout the world—made it powerful as well as interactive. The *homenagens* that the authors call for on the part of Brazilians are presented as *gritos* in their own rights. The authors describe Brazilian voices raised to glorify Pedro and independence as modern-day voices that call back to their first emperor and repeat the fundamental messages of liberty and freedom.\(^6^1\)

One poem brings all of these ideas together by discussing just three things in an ode to Pedro I: the *Grito*, liberty, and the eternalization of memory. In it, the *Grito* is a “prophetic voice, thunderous and strong,” and the author embellishes that traditional quotation by adding the words “Courageous Brazilians! Independence, liberty or death!”

From that point, he then portrays the *Grito* as spurring action, a casting of Pedro I as

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\(^6^0\) Macedo; Sousa Silva; Brandão; Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “À Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio.” It should be noted that in 1862 there lacked a consensus as to the phrasing used to label Pedro’s words, “*Independência ou Morte!*” Today it is primarily referred to as Pedro’s *grito* (cry) thanks in part to the notoriety of the painting done by Pedro Américo in 1888 originally titled *Independência ou Morte!* but which came also to be known as *O Grito do Ipiranga*. Nevertheless, the writers in 1862 seldom used the word *grito*; it appears only three times. Instead, they overwhelmingly used the word *brado* (shout). For the purposes of this study, I will use *grito* throughout.

\(^6^1\) Andrada Silva; Sousa Silva; Teixeira e Sousa; Oliveira; Taunay, “Ode”; Rodrigues; Mattos.
catalyst via the *Grito* that several other authors do as well. For one, Pedro is credited with “letting out, before all, the invincible *brado* [grito] that awakened Ipiranga, and lit the fire of enthusiasm in the citizens and gave rise to the Empire.” It is notable that this author privileges this awakening of Brazilian greatness over what he portrays as Pedro’s giving of independence and law previously in the stanza. His doing so reflects the popular perception of the *Grito* as being the impetus for Brazil’s nationhood. Similarly, another writer casts Pedro’s words as having “awakened the giant that slept the heavy sleep of the captive.” In the end, this view of Pedro unleashing Brazilian ascendancy through political emancipation from Portugal, all of which they trace back to that founding moment, places the *Grito* as meriting an eternal place in the country’s national memory. Because the *Grito* had “broken the shackles of slavery…and allowed the light of liberty to bathe Brazil in its glow,” it was imperative that “a grateful people today raise an eternal monument” to Pedro’s glory so that his “heroic deeds will not be forgotten by future generations.”

Similarly, another writer asserts that the statue retroactively averts Pedro’s death, making him immortal through remembrance and that the “bronze speaks to the present generation” as well as to the “centuries to come,” saying “Hear me! Hear me!”

One final writer attached even more than the didactic reminder of liberty and independence. For Joaquim Norberto de Sousa Silva, the statue would have a regenerative impact. He called for the “sun of Ipiranga, star of glory, of liberty and life to shine and inundate the bronze bust with light, and again light the fire of the soul! Ah!

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62 Please note that the current orthography of “Ipiranga” has been used in place of the typical spelling of Ypiranga in 1862. Januario Vaz de Carvalho, “À Memoria do Fundador do Imperio O Senhor D. Pedro I” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); J. A. (no additional identification available), “A Memoria do Fundador do Imperio. Soneto” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862)

63 Araujo.
Remember, *patria*, past days of fortune and belief!” For one last author, the statue itself was that generation’s own *Grito* “to the hero of Ipiranga.”

As the previous paragraph illustrates, embedded in the discussions of the *Grito* was the association of that moment—along with Pedro I—with the concept of liberty. In terms of what exactly they attributed to Pedro, the authors reflected different places on a continuum of understanding of what liberty meant to them. For some, it meant simply political separation from Portugal and Brazilian sovereignty. For this reason, authors could describe Pedro as the one who “gave” or “bequeathed to us liberty” and who subsequently merited the title of “king of liberty” or “hero of liberty.” Other authors went further to attach a popular notion to the liberty and historical standing associated with Pedro I. Alfrede de Taunay, just a military engineering student at the time but destined for literary and political renown in the decades to come, addressed the issue of the legitimacy of historical claims to glory, and he asserted that that legitimacy originates in popular recognition, not self-promotion. He stated that “The Caligulas, the Neros, the Tiberiuses, they manufacture their laurels, whereas the king who is father, the king who is just, receives his commendation from the people.” Another author discussed this notion of Pedro as the “king of the people” as being directly related to Brazil’s origins and giving the nation historical prominence and standing based upon its “glory, liberty, and royalty.” Similarly, Pedro was not just a monarch; he was more than just a crown. Instead, “Pedro *Primeiro* and a liberated Brazilian people are twin ideas” because Pedro

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65 Teixeira e Sousa; Manoel Jesuino Ferreira; Rodrigues.
was the “king of liberty!” At each turn in Pedro’s ascendance to power, he sought the legitimacy that came from the appearance of his acting upon the people’s will. Some of those who celebrated him in 1862 reinforced that image.

Related to the call and answer aspect of the Grito discussed previously, the journalist A. J. (Antonio José) de Araujo added one more layer: the transnational experience of Pedro I. While this notion of Pedro as the hero of two worlds will be discussed in greater detail in a later section, the words of Araujo demonstrate that the imagery and identification of Pedro I with the Grito were so powerful that this writer used them to discuss the shared and even mirrored legacies of Pedro I in Brazil and Portugal. Writing from Rio, Araujo used the demarcation of “here” and “there” for Brazil and Portugal, but he used them to assert their shared historical experience. His writing regarding Brazil’s independence employs the typical use of the Grito detailed above. Pedro “breaks the chains” of colonial servitude and “calls to the Brazilians: liberty!” Yet immediately following that, Araujo provides a parallel Grito for Portugal, having Pedro I call “O Portuguese, liberty!” Within this application of the Grito imagery to the Portuguese historical legacy, there is also the appropriation of the famous unsheathing of the sword (which in fact is more appropriate given Pedro’s role as actual military commander in Portugal) specifically for the “there” portion. The author then returns to

66 Andrada Silva; Taunay, “Ode.” The writer who simply signed his inaugural ode with a “T” was identified in notation as Alfredo de Taunay and known today with the title (and spelling) of Visconde de Taunay, Alfred (sometimes Alfredo) d’Escragnolle Taunay. He was born in Rio into the ultimate intellectual and cultural elite of the empire. His grandfather was a leader of the French Cultural Mission of 1818, and his father was the private tutor of Pedro II himself. In 1862, he was still a student in the Escola Militar and being trained for his future career as a military engineer. His later career would expand to include reknown as a teacher in his own right, an historian, a sociologist, a novelist, and a politician. Like many of the other writers referenced, he was awarded with the Empire’s highest distinctions and even helped found the Academia Brasileira de Letras. See “Visconde de Taunay (Alfred d’Escragnolle Taunay)” in the A Biblioteca Virtual de Literatura, accessed August 5, 2015, http://www.biblio.com.br/defaultz.asp?link=http://www.biblio.com.br/conteudo/ViscondedeTaunay/ViscondeTaunay.htm.
Brazil, saying that “here at the banks of the Ipiranga he [Pedro I] shouts: ‘Independence or death!’” For Araujo, this call receives an answer, saying that “the Amazon and the Prata repeat: ‘Liberty!’” While for Brazilians the Grito was the call and liberty the answer, over “there” in Portugal the call is instead symbolized by Pedro’s unfurling of Portugal’s flag (upon his arrival to carry out the military campaign against his brother Miguel’s absolute rule) and the river is instead the Douro. Yet the answer is the same: “the Douro says to Europe: “Liberty!”” This application of the Grito imagery to the Portuguese historical experience is one of the few examples of Pedro’s Brazilian identity bleeding over into an interpretation of his Portuguese exploits. As will be discussed later, the opposite was generally true, with notions of Pedro as Portuguese soldier and king infusing Brazilian perceptions of him.

Araujo’s side by side recounting of Pedro’s dual accomplishments offers more commentary on the reality of his being defined by a moment in Brazil versus a military campaign in Portugal. The poet deals with this contrast explicitly, saying that for Brazil Pedro’s legacy would always by measured by the Grito, what Araujo considered “a thousand works in only one day,” whereas for Portugal “your [Pedro’s] works are measured by victories.” The Grito was, according to him, Pedro’s greatest day in Brazil. Joaquim Manoel de Macedo, a prolific writer recognized as the nation’s first novelist, agreed with Araujo. He called Pedro I’s “heroic deed” as the one that “rises above all else in Brazilian history.” With only forty years of existence as a nation, it is not surprising that the inception of the nation would loom as the defining moment. Interestingly, though, Araujo chose the day of Pedro’s death in Portugal as the most significant day for

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67 Araujo. Pedro originally arrived in Porto, Portugal for that military campaign. The Douro River runs through Porto.
“there.” Despite his previous definition of Pedro by multiple victories, it is the loss of that leader in Portugal which he considered the most significant day. Nevertheless, the poet assuages that loss by noting how the statue in Rio would bring Pedro immortality.\(^\text{68}\) Other writers also echo the explicit reduction of Pedro to the *Grito*. Some do it by omission: they focus solely on Pedro’s heroic actions regarding independence with a one-dimensional representation of Pedro via discussions of Ipiranga. Others are as explicit as Araujo. The poet, playwrite, and journalist José Maria Gomes de Sousa articulates this reductionist view: “when the future asks who he [Pedro I] was...it is enough that we will say only this: he was the hero of Ipiranga.”\(^\text{69}\)

Along with immortalizing Pedro’s voice, the *Grito* also made famous his action, and it was that action—the gesture of raising his right arm in protest of Portugal and oath-swearing to Brazil—that was reinforced and celebrated in the composition of the statue. References to that gesture range from simple embellishing, such as it being a “strong” or “herculean arm,” to a much deeper meaning and connection to the nation’s founding. For the journalist and educator José Albano Cordeiro, the act meant that “with a wave of his arm, despotism falls, and heroism in Brazil awakens.” Cordeiro is but one of many who make Pedro the one to fell Portuguese despotism and who assert that the chronicles of the nation’s heroic figures begin with Pedro I and Ipiranga.\(^\text{70}\) The raising of the arm also came to represent the “raising of the Brazilian standard” as well as the “immortal

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\(^{68}\) Araujo; Macedo. Joaquim Manuel de Macedo was a trained medical doctor who never practiced but instead taught geography and history at the Colégio Pedro II. In politics, he was a provincial deputy. See João Marcos Cardoso, “Joaquim Manuel de Macedo (1820–1882): o início do romance no Brasil,” Biblioteca Brasiliiana Guita e José Mindlin, accessed July 17, 2015, http://www.bbm.usp.br/node/76.


standard of liberty…on the banks of the Ipiranga.” The militaristic connotation of the idea of the raising of a nation’s standard again emphasizes the proclamation aspect of Pedro’s role and the function of the Grito as the foundational myth of Brazil’s origins. In effect, it emphasizes such a militaristic style over any real historical substance. Lastly, some writers added a popular element to the symbolism of Pedro’s right arm. For one, it was the extension of the “hand of a true friend” while for another it was “the arm of the people.”

The attribution of all that the Grito set into motion into that one moment made it more and more powerful as an image and a myth. It is precisely because it came to symbolize Brazil’s unlimited potential and promise that the inauguration of the statue which captured and celebrated it became a moment in and of itself for Brazilians to reflect on their political and social reality forty years later. The result, according to Hendrik Kraay, was that the inauguration “became the lightning rod for criticisms of the imperial regime and indirect challenges to Pedro II himself.” Caricatures of the statue in the Rio press became not so much criticisms of the ways in which Pedro I was being defined but a critique of the empire’s and the nation’s shortcomings in fulfilling the promise of that idealized imperial past. New political groups vying for power and a place in the imperial regime found fault with the idea of the emergence of a unified, triumphant nation—“liberated” by Pedro I—which in 1862 was still based upon the institution of slavery and had an emperor who increasingly asserted his moderating power to appoint and dissolve ministries in order to thwart partisan agendas and political change. The

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71 Taunay, “Soneto”; Rodrigues.
73 Kraay, 146.
government of Pedro II in the years after the inauguration would be in turmoil, trying to deal with the consequences of the war in Paraguay, an emergent abolition movement, and an increasing republicanism in the new generation of military and civil leaders. Noé Freire Sandes calls the polemic regarding the statue a “dispute of memory” regarding the past and the present. Therefore, the majority of the later public discourse surrounding the statue was more about defining the empire’s legacy than it was the ways in which the nation specifically remembered its first emperor, whose rule accounted for less than one quarter of the empire’s existence.

The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as Opportunistic Antagonist to Independence

This intellectual and critical diversion was true except for one loud voice in the public sphere who felt compelled to refute the official imperial interpretations of Pedro I’s legacy which were represented in the statue’s symbolism. That figure was Minas Gerais-born Teófilo Otoni, a prominent political figure in his home state and Rio, businessman, and critic of the monarchy which he found to be authoritarian and undemocratic. Yet his concern for “the message that the bronze [statue] would pass on to Brazil’s posterity,” preserved in his pamphlet dated the day before the statue’s initial inauguration, did not engage the larger issues of the monarchy in general or the politics of the day. In his famous pamphlet, he has no axe to grind with Pedro’s father, Dom João VI or his son, Pedro II…the ruling monarch of the day. He does not rehash independence or the veracity of the Grito. What Otoni does take issue with is the ways in which the statue advances the historical attribution of independence and constitutionalism to Pedro

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74 Sandes 34-35
I. The bottom line for the critic is that Pedro’s transgressions as an opportunistic and autocratic ruler are so poisonous that they obliterate and negate any positive elements of his historical legacy. The first emperor’s legacy is solely that of tyranny, constitutional and moral transgression, and unadulterated self-interest. Otoni finds those qualities—rather than heroism or allegiance to Brazil—to be at the root of all of the actions for which Pedro I was being lauded in the statue. In Otoni’s eyes, none of those things being attributed to Pedro were legitimate or truly his doing. Very importantly, though, and at the core of these definitions of Pedro I, was the fact that Otoni himself took part in the political uprising that forced Pedro I’s abdication in 1831. As counter legacies to each other, Otoni felt compelled to delegitimize and indict Pedro in order to subsequently justify and legitimize his own participation in the events of April 7th that led to the emperor’s abdication. For Otoni, the stakes in 1862 were high, extremely personal, and with absolutely no middle ground. Since Otoni’s historical role was one of contraposition, the glorification of his political foe equates to the contemporary criminalization of himself. For these reasons, he refuted—point by point—the fundamental historical statements symbolically represented in the statue and its imperial vision of history. The first that he addresses is the definition of Pedro I as the hero of independence.

Otoni takes issue with all that the writers discussed above attributed to the Grito and to Pedro I. For him, the portrayal of independence as some sort of “donation” from a monarch was a false narrative of a super-imposed, top-down, royal elite driven

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76 Brasil Gerson goes so far as to call Otoni one of the “remanescentes” of the overthrow of Pedro I on April 7, 1831. In English, this translates best as being a holdover from a previous time. Gerson defines Otoni as such in his discussion of Otoni’s criticism of the statue. See Brasil Gerson, História das Ruas do Rio: E da Sua Liderança na História Política do Brasil, 5th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Lacerda Ed., 2000), 121.
independence. Instead, his historical reality centered on the organic, local, and decidedly
Brazilian bottom-up social and political movement that came to fruition based upon the
“efforts of more than one generation.”77 Rather than the reductionist view of Pedro, the
Grito, and independence, Otoni places the credit for independence in the figure of
Tiradentes, the executed leader of the Inconfidência Mineira. Arrested in 1789 and later
executed, quartered, and displayed throughout the southeast of Brazil, Joaquim José da
Silva Xavier, whose nickname Tiradentes followed him into the history books, took part
in a republican uprising during the reign of Pedro’s grandmother, Queen Maria. His
participation in what Otoni considered the “project of liberation” ended with martyrdom
and catapulted him into the role of “patriarch of the independence of Brazil” for
republicans and liberals like Otoni.78 That Pedro I could preempt that standing and
receive false accolades and credit over a man martyred for advancing the cause of
independence affected Otoni profoundly. Even more galling was the fact that the statue
was being erected on the supposed site of the martyr’s execution. An abomination in his
eyes, the statue of Pedro I on sacred historical ground would be met with a starkly
different public reaction, according to Otoni. There, instead of the inspiration and
sympathy that the witnesses to the 1792 execution felt, the “spectators” of the statue’s
inauguration would be there only out of “empty curiosity.”79 By comparing each
historical figure’s public reception on that specific ground, Otoni was attempting to
dismiss Pedro I and instead assert Tiradentes’ place in the public imagination.

Only one writer celebrating the statue discussed the shared space between
Tiradentes and Pedro I, and De-Simoni naturally did so in a way that glorified both

77 Otoni, 121-123.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 124.
figures and therefore undoubtedly drew Otoni’s ire. De-Simoni establishes Tiradentes’ claim to the praça’s sacred space as well as his historical legacy saying that “in this same place where one day he expired on the infamous gallows, who condemned by Portuguese justice, died for the Brazilian patria!” The poet then juxtaposes the experiences of the two figures of independence by presenting them as a study in contrasts. Where the people looked on in pain as Tiradentes moaned in terror, in front of the statue people rise in joy. De-Simoni asserts that this difference, these contrasts, come from “this Patriot avenging the honored fame” and “reestablishes his [Tiradentes’] dignity.” Linking the two even further, the poet says that Pedro made to flourish that which Tiradentes wanted: an independent homeland. Ultimately, De-Simoni finds that the statue honors the memory of Tiradentes by asserting, somewhat curiously, that the homage to the “Luso-Prince” could make right the execution carried out by “lusa justice.”\textsuperscript{80} Such a vision of history was in stark opposition to Otoni’s reverence of Tiradentes and enmity for Pedro I.

Otoni also vehemently refuted the notion of Pedro I as any sort of protagonist of Brazil’s independence. Instead, for him the prince regent consistently antagonized the efforts—efforts which matured despite him—through his continued vows of loyalty to his father and Portuguese rule in Brazil. Otoni gives no credit for Pedro’s change in allegiance, characterizing it as born out of self-serving political survival and necessity rather than any ideological adhesion to the tenets of liberty and independence or even any identification with Brazil. The writers celebrating Pedro could laud him as the bringer of liberty to Brazil because they defined liberty as political separation from Portugal whereas Otoni defined the idea of liberty as that which sustains representative

democracy. Pedro’s cooptation of the independence movement (after the Portuguese Côrtes effectively stripped him of any legal authority in Brazil) is characterized by Otoni as the basest of political opportunism. Ultimately regarding independence, Otoni judges Pedro I to be a liar, a deceiver, and even worse a betrayer of his father after having broken his vow of fidelity to the Portuguese crown and government. Given this view, Otoni is clear regarding whom he would prefer be celebrated as the “legitimate and selfless patriarchs” of Brazilian independence: Tiradentes and José Bonifácio.

Interestingly, the critic notes that “in place of thrones and statues, one met the gallows, the other exile” in a reference to the ignominious actual experiences of each figure. Yet in his own time, Pedro I was effectively sent into exile by Otoni himself. Similarly, José Bonifácio returned to Brazilian public service after his return from exile. Therefore, he takes issue with the short-term historical trajectory of Pedro’s advisor while then taking issue with the long-term reinstatement of Pedro into the Brazilian political imagination. Ultimately, the statue represents for Otoni Pedro’s continued self-aggrandizement and historical theft of credit and glory from those whom he considers the emperor’s memorial victims, who are permanently linked through their joint efforts towards independence—Tiradentes who planned and set independence into motion and José Bonifácio who realized that dream—as well as their political and ethical virtues and finally their victimhood.

This tension between infamy and fame, and how the two could be altered over time, are important components of how Otoni discusses the idea of sacralized space in his refutation of Pedro I. He contrasts the days that would come to mark the public moments

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81 Otoni, 127.
82 Ibid., 128.
in the Largo do Rocio: the execution of Tiradentes and the inauguration of the statue. He portrays the execution met with inspired sympathy on the part of the witnesses there, and he contrasts this with what he envisions as the “repressed…spectators” to view the spectacle of the statue out of “empty curiosity.”83 Again, Otoni purposefully compares a primary eighteenth-century experience with the secondary inaugural experience a century later. The original popular reception to the royal family’s swearing their oaths to the upcoming constitution, the origins of the Largo’s connection to Pedro, was indeed met with vivas and public acclaim. But Otoni is not taking issue with that moment in his discussion. Instead, he is dependent upon the idea of Pedro I and Tiradentes as counter narratives. He emphasizes the crimes the Crown committed against the memory of his martyred patriarch: the denial of a Christian burial for his body (owing to his dismemberment), the razing of his home, and the raising of a plaque that denoted the mark of infamy at that site. Such a treatment of Tiradentes was meant to cast him into infamy for perpetuity. That effort was thwarted, however, when the provisional government in the province of Minas Gerais had the plaque removed after independence. Ironically, the “shameful monument” that he considered the plaque to be is exactly what he described the statue to be. The infamy that Tiradentes was somewhat being lifted from was precisely the infamy that Otoni wanted Pedro I to experience in perpetuity. So while the easing of the historical condemnation of Tiradentes is for him the righting of wrong, the celebration of Pedro I is the wronging of what for Otoni was right in his actions to remove Pedro from power.84

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83 Ibid., 124-125.
84 Ibid., 125-126
Otoni’s discussion of sacred historical space also brings up an important point. As the writers celebrating the statue made abundantly clear, the truly sacred historical space for Pedro I was not the Largo do Rocío in Rio de Janeiro but the shore of the Ipiranga River in São Paulo. For example, one poet had São Paulo speak in his ode: “If your name shines on my immortal soil, then my soil shines on your immortal bronze.” Interestingly, the submission for Rio does not make reference to the other great act of authorship portrayed in the statue which was the writing of the constitution. Instead, Sousa, the author, uses that stanza to pay tribute to Pedro II. Using the father-son motif, Rio celebrates the statue by honoring Pedro’s “son who reigns” who is a “gift” from his father.85 The idea of Pedro’s “name accompanying the very land, sun, and water of Ipiranga” was embellished even more by adding the element of the Southern Cross hanging over Ipiranga and giving Brazil—and Pedro I—a place in the larger context of momentous events in the Americas.86 While the poets did not call for it, the project of raising a monument to the Grito in São Paulo had already been proposed in 1854 at the time when the proposal for a Rio statue was being made. The discourse surrounding the question of Rio or Ipiranga (or both) tapped into the ongoing tensions between Rio as the imperial capital and the other major cities and provinces of Brazil. Some in the press argued that if the monument to Pedro were to truly be national in nature, its logical location should be Ipiranga. The power and preeminence of Rio ruled out, however, and it was not until the 1880s that construction began on what would eventually become the

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85 Teixeira e Sousa.
86 Andrada Silva; Neves.
Museu Paulista and the Parque da Independência and memorial space to celebrate the *Grito* and Ipiranga.\(^87\)

In the end, Teófilo Otoni’s efforts to trace a decidedly *republican* rather than imperial historical legacy for Brazil fell short. The *Grito* was simply too powerful in creating the triad of “D. Pedro—independence—liberty.”\(^88\) The discussions of Pedro as the hero of Ipiranga and independence show clearly that by equating that moment, that act, with the independence of the nation, writers of the time made Pedro the defining figure of that defining moment. As Otoni found, it was impossible to divorce Pedro from that accomplishment, to lift his image from the scene at Ipiranga or try to replace it in the public and political imaginings of independence. The indelible image of the *Grito* won out as the primary way in which Pedro and the nation’s origins were defined, bearing fruit for the imperial elite’s attempt to spur a new appreciation of the monarchy’s past through the historical invention of the *Grito*.\(^89\)

**The Giver of Law**

That the drama and evocative imagery of the scenes and moment of Ipiranga dominated the poets’ imaginations and their pens is not surprising, especially given the systematic efforts of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro to construct a sense of nationhood and history on that narrative. Machado de Assis commented on the potency and attractiveness of that mythical beginning….the narrative of Ipiranga was tailor-made for poetry, parades, and performances. And it constituted one of the historical feats symbolically represented in the posing of the statue. Consequently, the vast majority of the lines of the celebratory odes focus on Pedro’s meriting the mantle of independence in

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\(^87\) Kraay, 151-152; Salles Oliveira, 73.  
\(^88\) Macedo.  
\(^89\) Sandes, 13.
his historical legacy. What is surprising, however, is the comparative paucity of lines written to celebrate the second historical feat conflated in the statue: the promulgation of the constitution created by Pedro. Multiple writers do refer to that aspect of the legacy captured in the statue, but they do so with single lines, passing references, and often homage placed more in the context of Portugal than that of Brazil.

There are multiple possibilities to account for this difference in historical treatments. First, the effort of the IHGB focused more on the issues of national origins and political history rather than constitutional or juridical origins and history. The effort was indeed shaping the intellectual discourse surrounding the inauguration, and the narrative of Ipiranga loomed in that discussion. A second possibility to explain the relative silence on the role of Pedro regarding the constitution is that the writers had such a basic level of acceptance for and internalization of that constitution as the basis of their political system—with Pedro II at its head—that they felt no need to talk up that attribution because it had not been contested and thereby needed no affirmation. These explanations center on the intentional ignoring or glossing over of the topic by the writers. Whether it was because of the controversial nature of the constitution’s arrival in 1824 with Pedro’s use of force to shut down the constituent assembly the year before or the political turmoil amongst a conservative party facing fracture and infighting as well as its opponents, writers celebratory of the monarchy in 1862 consciously limited their discussions on the subject matter.

Of the few specific references to the constitution in the inaugural poems, several were the work of one particular poet, Dr. Luiz Vicente De-Simoni. In one poem he described the first emperor as a “liberal prince” who was the giver of independence,
liberty, and law. In another submission, the same writer defined Pedro I as once again
the giver of law, liberator of an oppressed people, creator of a great empire, and securer
of independence and liberty. The constitution was typically just one of these noted
accomplishments that collectively authors used to justify the “merit and the great
heroism” of Pedro I. A different poet defined Pedro with a list that seemed to value
Pedro’s style as much as his substance. According to him, Brazilians owed their thanks to
their first emperor for four things: “strength, attitude, independence, and law.”
Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão’s tribute to Pedro follows in this same vein. She names
Pedro’s planting of three things in “this hemisphere” which were “the constitution, the
throne, and liberty.” Her triad differs slightly from the more typical ones presented above,
and it is interesting that she includes the throne, with more of an emphasis on the
establishment of the dynasty and the empire rather than Brazil as an entity separate from
that. The often-equated use of “liberty” to mean political freedom from Portugal still
places the mantle of independence in the triad, but the inclusion of the throne celebrates
the Bragança monarchy as much as the constitution. A possible explanation for this
emphasis lies in the author’s appreciation for the emperor’s—and thereby the
monarchy’s—role in maintaining the territorial integrity of the nation. She portrays Pedro
I as a combination of youth and royalty but emphasizes the “steady hand” of the young
ruler in “securing the integrity of the Empire of the Cross.” All of these references to
Pedro’s accreditation for the constitution use more of the laundry list approach to

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92 Testa.
93 Brandão. It should be noted that the reference to “this hemisphere” is reflective of the popular literary theme of the American empire.
homage.\textsuperscript{94} His meriting credit for it is always couched in the larger context of the other accomplishments of his reign.

One author distinguishes himself, though, from the typical vague reference to the constitution. Due to the prolific nature of De-Simoni’s contributions to the celebratory odes—seven sonnets in various languages—his writings reflect not only the overall norm of privileging Ipiranga and independence in most of his poems but also serve as one of the few examples of the constitution being discussed first and foremost and beyond just a passing reference. In his “Á Inauguração da Estatuá Equestre em Bronze do Imperador D. Pedro Primeiro. Fundador do Imperio do Brazil,” De-Simoni places the constitution first in importance as foundational to Brazil, saying that Brazil owed gratitude to Pedro for “giving to [the empire] a law from which all others are derived, a law that wisely secures and guarantees independence and liberty.”\textsuperscript{95} These lines are the only ones in all thirty-eight poems that go so far as to portray the constitution as establishing the imperial code for Brazilian society. And De-Simoni went further in another sonnet, one of his submissions in French, to describe that code as “the most beautiful” that safeguards “people, property, and lives.” One other poet, the acclaimed Bahian journalist, jurist, and the Empire’s Secretary of Justice, Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, labeled that code as coming from the “liberal constitution” that Pedro wrote.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{94} For example, Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre uses a different triad—a more decidedly Portuguese triad—calling Pedro I “King, citizen, soldier!” (Rei, cidadão, soldado) and couching a passing reference to the “law that he authored” under Pedro’s mantle of “great citizen” (grande cidadão) rather than calling him a “legislator” as others did. See Porto-Alegre.
\textsuperscript{95} “Dar-lhe uma lei de que as mais leis derivam, Que firme a independencia, e liberdade; Sábia garanta a quantos n’elle vivam.” De-Simoni, “Á Inauguração da Estatuá Equestre em Bronze do Imperador D. Pedro Primeiro. Fundador do Imperio do Brazil. Sonetto.”
\textsuperscript{96} De-Simoni, “Per L’Inaugurazion da Statua Equestre in Bronzo de L’Imperatô Don Péo Primmo. Fondatô de l’Impero do Brasî. Sonetto” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “Á Estatuá Equestre do Fundador do Impero.” For more information on Ferreira, see his entry in the
While De-Simoni takes the time to flesh out his homage to Pedro’s constitution based on its merit as the empire’s charter, two other very interesting thematic twists emerge in the lines other poets devoted to the topic of the constitution. The first is the rather ingenious way that Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre finds to celebrate the emperor’s forced abdication as a testament to his constitutional fidelity. Porto-Alegre’s sentiments echo the prevalent theme of Pedro I as father and progenitor of the nation and Pedro II, which involves the theme of inheritance and love. But they also associate the constitution with an interesting companion: abdication. The author paints a picture of a self-sacrificing constitutional monarch in the act of “descending from the throne, respecting his son and the law that he gave.” For Porto-Alegre, the emperor “ceded the empire” out of that respect and because of destiny, a destiny of the father to pursue his exploits in Portugal and of the son to rule by the law created by his father.97 This problem of abdication and Otoni’s participation in the revolt that precipitated it will be addressed in a separate section that expands further on this theme of abdication as generosity rather than ignominy.

The second interesting twist to some of the references to the constitution is the ongoing seepage that occurs due to the conflation of Pedro’s Brazilian and Portuguese historical legacies, in this case as they pertain specifically to perceptions of Pedro’s relationship to the constitution. Much like the issue of abdication, the first emperor’s portugalidade (Portuguese-ness) in the rhetoric of the inauguration is a much larger theme and will be discussed in further detail. Nevertheless, it is striking that for several of

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97 Porto-Alegre; “E nós o vimos, ao descer do throno, Feitura sua, respeitar o filho E a lei que dera, quando em noite irada Cedia o imperio á força do destino Que o chamava alem-mar a novas lides.”
the writers, the specific issue of the constitution leads them more and more to the Portuguese aspect and identity of Pedro I rather than the Brazilian one. There are specific references to the Portuguese law being violated by Pedro’s brother Miguel in his attempt to reestablish an absolute monarchy in Portugal and Pedro’s defense of that constitution after leaving Brazil. There are references to Pedro’s giving liberty and law to two worlds. However, most common is the theme that the emperor was a “legislator in peace, hero in war.” Many writers echo each other using this concept of Pedro based upon the dichotomy of peace and war, and it is precisely the issue of war and the notion of Pedro as a “soldier hero” that serves as code for the narrative being Portuguese-based. Whether it was Porto-Alegre, Araujo, or others, their mentioning of Pedro “giving laws to the world” as well as “justice” come in lines immediately preceded or followed by their defining Pedro as soldier and war hero. Because his soldier bona fides were purely Portuguese in nature, this blended identity of law-giver and soldier reveals the difficulty of filtering out one legacy from the other.

**The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as Violator of Constitutional Principles**

On a final note, those few references to Pedro and the constitution (most notably the passing references discussed previously) use language that reflects Otoni’s earlier problem with independence being portrayed as a “doação” of a monarch rather than the product of Brazilian agency and efforts. For most writers, the constitution was something Pedro gave and Brazil received. One particular writer, I. B. Κχλογεραδ, who

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98 Porto-Alegre.
99 Ibid.; Araujo; Testa.
100 The various verbs used were: *dar* (to give)—De-Simoni, “Á Inauguração da Estatua Equestre em Bronze do Imperador D. Pedro Primeiro. Fundador do Imperio do Brazil. Soneto.”; Araujo; *outorgar* (to author)—Porto-Alegre; *dotar* (to endow)—I. B. Κχλογεραδ, “Traduçção de um amigo.” “Á Imperial Estatua Equestre” (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Paula Brito, 1862); *plantar* (to plant, establish)—Brandão; *receber* (to receive)—Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “Á Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio.”
presented a poem in Greek before providing a “tradução de um amigo” in Portuguese, demonstrates this very notion. For him, Pedro not only “donated” or “gave” independence to Brazil but also “endowed” the nation with a “law most wise.”

The writer’s interpretation of the imperial constitution as an endowment—connoting something given freely and with generosity—is precisely one of the messages, or *arautos*, that Otoni felt compelled to refute in his pamphlet. The placing of the statue in the Praça da Constituição and the incorporation of the nation’s charter into Pedro’s pose signified to him—and most importantly to all posterity—“that the Constitution was, if not a concession of divine right, at least the spontaneous concession of the philosophy of the prince, and a document of his adherence to liberal ideas.”

Similar to Otoni’s argument regarding independence, the key is that this interpretation emphasizes the top-down aspect of the drafting of the constitution by an emperor who had, in Otoni’s judgment, usurped the drafting and thereby the mantle of having authored the constitution. Just as he considered the form of independence achieved by Pedro the “independence of the empire” rather than that of Brazil, he calls the 1824 constitution the “constitution of the monarchy.” That reality, when combined with Pedro’s act of violently dissolving the elected constituent assembly completely delegitimizes the emperor’s constitution.

That reality is also why a poet like Antonio José Victorino de Barros referring to the constitution as the “solemn pact” that Pedro made to the Brazilian people was so abhorrent for Otoni as well as other liberal writers at the *Diário do Rio de Janeiro*. For example, that newspaper noted its pleasure that the rains had forced the inauguration of the statue off of the date commemorating the constitution because, according to Hendrik

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101 Pedro “doou a independencia, e dotou-o tambem da lei mais sábia,” Ἐγκαρπαίος.
102 “Que a Constituição foi, senão uma outorga do direito divino, ao menos espontanea concessão da philosophia do principe, e documento de sua adesão às ideias liberais” in Otoni, 122.
Kraay, they found Pedro I to be “the man who least respected it [the constitution].” For the constitution to be celebrated and immortalized in the statue and in that way, the narrative *could not be* that Pedro I autocratically and illegally dissolved the constitutional convention thus violating the democratic rights of participation of the Brazilian people. The statue pointedly refuted that historical interpretation and subsequently whitewashed the process, valuing instead the product. After all, a nation would not celebrate a crime against its fledgling democracy, would it? Just as with independence, the attribution of credit for that constitution mandates a certain narrative. And Otoni was well aware that that narrative contradicted his position, refuted his criticism, and silently indicted him for his participation in the uprising that forced Pedro I from power.

**The Soldier**

When those authors describe Pedro I as a “legislator in peace, hero in war,” they are attesting to another prominent identity assigned to Pedro in 1862, which is that of the soldier. Pedro’s credentials as a soldier stem more from his post-Brazil time leading the military campaign against the troops of his brother Miguel who had seized absolute power from Portugal’s constitutional monarch Maria II, who was also Pedro’s daughter. Pedro’s Portuguese legacy did provide him with military glory. He raised an army, victoriously led those troops into battle, defeated his brother, restored constitutional rule to Portugal, and even died from the tuberculosis he contracted during the military campaign. He was every bit a Portuguese soldier and hero. His military legacy in Brazil, however, was more about his *not* having to fight, at least not directly. As Prince Regent

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103 Barros; Kraay, 162.
104 Testa.
of Brazil and later Emperor, his direct leadership was limited to facing down the Portuguese troops in Rio de Janeiro who eventually left without ever having fired a shot against him. That accomplishment did take military and strategic skill. Pedro time and again outmaneuvered the Portuguese commanders into unwinnable defensive positions, using the limited resources he had to incentivize with money as well as threaten punishment with a swelling patriot militia. But the accomplishment of driving all Portuguese troops from Rio did not come with any privation or hardship. That sort of a struggle for independence took part in the Northeast of Brazil in the provinces of Bahia and Maranhão. The new emperor was decisive in asserting an imperial role through the participation of a Brazilian naval fleet in those conflicts far from Rio de Janeiro, but the ultimate victories had more to do with the leadership of Scottish admiral Thomas, Lord Cochrane and the local Brazilian militias than they did to Pedro I.

This historical reality of Brazil’s independence did not stop the Rio-centric writers in 1862 from giving Pedro credit for having steered Brazil into joining the society of independent nations “unstained by bloody national battles” and “without the pain of having to shed the blood of a companheiro.”¹⁰⁵ He could achieve independence and found the empire because before him, “enemies yield” and victory is won.¹⁰⁶ However, as was discussed in the section regarding the Grito, the celebratory writers focused on the independence effort through discussions of Ipiranga to the exclusion of any other aspect. Those enemies yielding and victories won in the case of Brazil were reduced to the moment of the Grito. It is this fact that makes the repeated references to Pedro as a

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¹⁰⁵ Rodrigues.  
¹⁰⁶ Macedo.
“Warrior King” or “Soldier King” compelling evidence that Pedro’s Portuguese legacy had decidedly transfused onto his overall identity in the Rio of 1862. The title of king was a purely Portuguese honorific and was a title that Pedro held officially for a mere ten days before abdicating to his daughter Maria. Manoel de Araujo Porto-Alegre goes even further than just using the Portuguese title to describe Pedro. He calls on Brazilians “to bow before the image of the immortal triad which the bronze brings to life: King, Citizen, Soldier!” Antonio José dos Santos Neves changes that triad to read “duke, citizen, soldier” in a move that uses specifically the title Pedro carried after abdicating his Brazilian throne and comes in the context of describing Pedro after his death. The choice to omit Emperor is still striking, especially given the specific call for Brazilian deference. Certainly, both titles—Emperor and King—connote royalty and power, but the choice to use Portuguese descriptors in lieu of one of Pedro’s distinctly Brazilian titles by those writers, who had the avowed intent of glorifying Brazil and Pedro’s relationship to it, makes their words curious. Another explicit reference to Pedro as a “Soldier King” went even deeper into that Portuguese legacy by defining the leader as one who made the ultimate sacrifice for liberty. He was the “soldier dying for liberty,” a king willing to sacrifice his body and his health and ultimately die in order to protect liberty in Portugal. This notion of Pedro as Portuguese soldier was a much stronger image than that of “cavalheiro” that was often used in reference to perceptions of him during his Brazilian reign. This power came from the reality that his role as soldier was a fatal one. The war and combat in Portugal was real. It was deadly, gritty, and full of sacrifice. It put him in direct physical danger through his active participation in the Battle of Ponte Ferreira, the

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defense of Oporto, and the defense of Lisbon. It ravaged his body through his contraction of tuberculosis and caused his death, which one writer referred to as his “sleeping in Lysia.” This layer of sacrifice mixed with the notions of debt and gratitude and grief expressed previously by the writers.¹⁰⁸

There are some non-Portuguese specific references to Pedro as a soldier. For example, the journalist Carlos Testa refers to Pedro as a “soldier liberator” who was the “son of kings,” which illustrates a common practice of linking his role as monarch and soldier. Antonio José dos Santos Neves, whose military background spawned various

¹⁰⁸ Magalhães; Brandão; Neves.
patriotic poems and books dedicated to Emperor Pedro II, similarly and generically defines Pedro as “the highest, most generous and brave, invincible and noble warrior.”

Other writers do attempt to link this soldier identity with the Brazilian legacy. The titles of “brave warrior” and “tireless hero of a thousand glories” are linked to the specifically Brazilian title of Pedro as a “celebrated Emperor.” Cordeiro refers to Pedro as the “immortal warrior” and links that identity with the language of Brazil and independence. He states that Pedro, “then fighting for liberty, in majesty made himself first.” While Pedro’s exploits in Portugal loom over this identity, here the author links that title, that legacy, to Pedro’s making himself first, as in his historical title as first Emperor of Brazil. The author also follows this passage with a celebration of the *Grito* which allows for a reinterpretation of Ipiranga and independence through the perspective of Pedro as a fierce warrior.

The discussion of Pedro I as a soldier was an integral part of his larger identity as a transnational figure. The writing of Antonio José dos Santos Neves illustrates this very point by describing Pedro as the “first hero,” alluding to his standing of Pedro the First and shortly thereafter referring to him as “the illustrious and Lusitanian Prince Dom Pedro.” For Neves, Pedro I could be many things: the founder of Brazil, the hero of

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109 Neves; Testa. See the entry for Antonio José dos Santos Neves in the *Diccionario bibliographico brasileiro*, digitized by the Biblioteca Brasiliana Mindlin, accessed August 5, 2015, http://www.brasiliana.usp.br/bbd/handle/1918/00295710#page/257/mode/1up.
110 Mattos; Cordeiro.
111 Neves.
Ipiranga, illustrious, and Lusitanian. But the one thing that he was not, according to this author’s omission, was Brazilian.

As the “illustrious hero of the old and new world,” the legacy of Pedro I had to walk the fine line of being a Portuguese prince who declared Brazilian independence from Portugal, renounced the Portuguese and then Brazilian thrones, and finally saved his daughter’s rule in Portugal from his own brother’s homegrown tyranny. I assert that it is the intertwined complexity of all of those feats combined that shed light on Pedro’s ambiguous *portugalidade*. Fundamental to the articulation of identity is its being forged in opposition to someone or something else: the classic us versus them demarcation. During the era of Brazil’s independence, the Portuguese became an increasingly distinct “them.” It was the Portuguese metropole that emerged as the clear villain in the movement for independence, being portrayed by the writers in 1862 as the source of “the rages of the tyrants” and “despotism.” The prism through which the writers discuss such tyranny is just through the lens of the independence effort. Therefore, the only oppressor and villain persecuting Brazil is Portugal. While he had given up his Portuguese citizenship and self-identified his nationality as Brazilian, Pedro’s allegiance to the Brazilian cause and its origins translated into a larger view of him in 1862 as more of a Luso-Brazilian. In essence, he had become a leader of both and citizen of neither. Ironically, it is Pedro’s being cast out of Brazil by Otoni’s uprising on the grounds of tyranny and his deeds in Portugal that followed that effectively flip the narrative and the definition of Portugal as the villain. Facing tyranny at the hands of Miguel’s absolutist coup, Portugal achieved victimhood in the eyes of the writers in 1862, and that

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112 Brandão.
113 Oliveira; Brandão; Macaulay, 293.
victimhood served to elevate Pedro’s ultimate legacy. It became a narrative of Pedro redeeming Portugal—and vice versa—following the Duke of Bragança’s exile from Brazil.

Although never defined as being Brazilian himself by the writers, Pedro was claimed for having “adopted the patria” of Brazil, for understanding “the hopes and destiny of Brazil,” and for being that nation’s “champion” who “confronted for us the tyranny of the despots of Europe.”¹¹⁴ In standing up to that “tyranny,” Pedro earned for himself the title of “Liberator” of two peoples. The authors used similar phrasings to describe this role. He was the “soldier liberator,” the “hero liberator,” or simply “liberator” for “two peoples” as well as their “giver of light.” Yet the writers also distinguished between the methods used by Pedro in securing that liberty for Brazil and Portugal, sometimes disagreeing on those differences and what they signified. For example, Porto-Alegre equates Pedro’s role in Brazilian independence as securing liberty for that nation while comparing that accomplishment to Pedro’s role in restoring constitutional rule to Portugal. Domingo José Gonçalves de Magalhães, however, distinguishes the two legacies as such, describing Pedro as the “famous Man who two times gave liberty to a country, first with the quill and later with the sword.” Magalhães’ words represent the less common definition of liberty as being akin to representative government rather than political separation and sovereignty. For him, it was Pedro’s authorship of Brazil’s constitution that secured liberty for that nation. This idea holds true for Portugal as well since Pedro authored that nation’s constitution, too. But it was in Portugal where Pedro picked up the sword to restore the constitution, marking the divergent constitutional experiences between the two worlds. One final writer, Joaquim Oliveira; Testa.

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Jacome de Oliveira Campos Filho, portrays Pedro’s link to the two worlds in a way that could echo either Magalhães or Porto-Alegre because of the ambiguity of his words. Campos Filho approaches the issue through the idea of oath-taking, saying that Pedro was “a monarch two times, in two worlds swearing to liberty.” While after these lines he alludes to Pedro liberating Brazil, the fact that he swore an oath at Ipiranga as well as to uphold the constitution on different occasions complicates a definitive interpretation. Nevertheless, what binds these historical interpretations together is their repeated vision of Pedro I as a transnational hero who fuses royalty and liberation in one figure and shared experience.

Despite this overwhelming sense of shared histories, Magalhães also felt the need to reassert Pedro’s Brazilian legacy over that of his Portuguese one. In his cantico, he attempts to reclaim Pedro from Portugal by way of the statue being a “marble tomb” for the former emperor. He alludes to Pedro as a shadow and says that the statue makes it possible that that shadow “might leave behind the Tejo [River in Portugal] as the Janeiro [a reference to Rio and the nonexistent river that the city was mistakenly named for] invokes it.” While there existed no call at this time for the repatriation of Pedro’s remains to Brazil from his interment in the São Vicente church outside of Lisbon, this recasting of the statue as tomb and the image of Pedro leaving behind Portugal was certainly a metaphorical repatriation.

Antonio José Victorino de Barros takes this two worlds motif and adds a new identity onto it. In speaking of the statue, he says that it is “of the king, of the

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115 Magalhães; Porto-Alegre; Andrada Silva; Barros; Manoel Jesuino Ferreira, “À Estatua Equestre do Fundador do Imperio”; Campos Filho.
116 Porto-Alegre.
117 Magalhães.
emperor...to show that he was the father of two peoples and the liberator of both.”

While other writers routinely used the father-son dynamic to speak of Pedro I and Pedro II, Barros is the first to explicitly call Pedro I the father of Brazil. Nevertheless, the leap from founder to father for Brazil is not as great as it is for Portugal. Given the long national history of that European nation, the assertion that Pedro was the father of that nation is more reflective of his role as father to Queen Maria II. Antonio José dos Santos Neves lends credence to this interpretation, calling Pedro the “conqueror of two august thrones” and the “antecedent of two ruling children.” Only sparingly was Maria II placed in the context of her brother’s rule in Brazil. Typically, the emphasis on Pedro’s heirs and the continuation of the Bragança line was articulated just in references to Pedro II and his reign. Nevertheless, these statements reflect just how much writers such as Barros sought to link Pedro’s accomplishments on both sides of the Atlantic, making them a common Luso-Brazilian experience. Barros demonstrates this clearly, saying that both Brazil and Portugal were made greater by Pedro’s deeds. The interpretation of Pedro I as father of the nation is a rare one. Overall, the majority of writers are content to consider him the Liberator while leaving the familial language only to the relationship between the nations’ two rulers.

The Counter Narrative: Pedro I as the Hero of Only Portugal

While it was previously the intent of Otoni to challenge emphatically the idea that Pedro I was in any way a hero, in a display of nuances he clarifies that his refutations address only the notions of the former emperor as a specifically Brazilian hero. In a surprising move, he readily concedes Pedro’s legitimacy as a hero and icon of Portuguese

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118 Barros.
119 Neves.
history, stating that “the equestrian statue would signify justice and truth if, located on Portuguese territory, it would commemorate the courage and heroism with which the Senhor Duke of Bragança defeated the absolutist government and restored the constitutional system.”

This statement shows that while Pedro’s “crimes” of usurpation during the independence era and tyranny during the closing of the constitutional convention and beyond disqualified him in Otoni’s eyes for Brazilian praise, the vociferous critic of the first emperor is willing to give Pedro I credit for his deeds in Portugal. And Otoni is able to do this without any sense of irony or sarcasm given his earlier definition of the Primeiro Reinado as a “dictatorship” or the fact that Pedro I had, after all, declared his allegiance to Brazil’s independence against Portugal. It is striking that Otoni can praise Pedro for defending the Portuguese people against the absolutist regime of Miguel after he has spent the vast majority of his pamphlet establishing that Pedro was himself an absolute ruler and a scourge on democratic participation. This interpretation of constitutional royal authorship and defense of royal rights show a much more nuanced view of Pedro’s historical standing in Portugal than in Brazil. It also shows the complex layers that went into memorializing Pedro I. Otoni’s ultimate message is that for Brazil, Pedro’s legacy is permanently poisoned, leaving no room for redemption.

What allows Otoni to look differently upon Pedro’s Portuguese legacy is the omnipresence of the emperor’s glaring “Portuguese-ness” throughout Otoni’s indictments. Otoni portrays Pedro as always loyal to Portugal and always looking out for those Portuguese interests if not solely his own. Rather than the traditional narrative of Pedro breaking from the land of his birth and royal title, the critic asserts a counter-

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120 Otoni, 131.
121 Ibid., 128-129, 131.
narrative of the Portuguese prince remaining doggedly committed to maintaining his Portuguese claim to power and thereby using Brazil as a stepping stone to that end. Otoni reduces the Brazilian Empire that others credited to Pedro I as founding to a “simple strategy of war” towards a Portuguese end.¹²²

While the many writers celebrating the statue emphasized the transnational legacy that Pedro I had, Otoni makes it a point to refute that notion further. He actually praises those Portuguese in Brazil who contributed their “valuable donations…undoubtedly born out of noble and honorable sentiments that I respect and applaud” to the public fund for the Rio statue, calling them “good and loyal Portuguese.” Nevertheless, he labels those donations as ones that “without doubt denationalize the monument.”¹²³ Certainly today we would call such participation by Portuguese citizens residing in Brazil and contributing to a statue located in Rio and depicting Brazilian historical achievements as truly transnational. However, Otoni labels the situation as de-nationalism since for him there was absolutely nothing of merit in Pedro’s status in Brazil. That interpretation hemmed Pedro in as a one-dimensional, one-country ruler. Accordingly, Pedro was a un-national hero, not a transnational one.

While there are many differences between Pedro’s exploits in Brazil and Portugal, the fact that he occupied the role of spearhead allows that prominence to mark the historical definitions of Pedro I made by those celebrating his statue. The fact of the matter was, however, whether he was the true driving force behind Brazilian independence or constitutionalism or not, he was the most prominent figure and thereby visible leader of it. With this reality, perception trumps intent or actual accomplishment.

¹²² Otoni, 128.
¹²³ Ibid., 131.
And it is precisely such a perception that shapes collective memory. Critics such as Otoni could try to build a wall between Pedro’s two transatlantic historical legacies in order to distinguish the one from the other and prevent any transference from the Portuguese legacy into a larger and more general historical memory of Pedro in the Rio of 1862. Yet that was precisely what had already taken place in the political imaginations of many residents in Rio de Janeiro.

**The Magnanimous Father Who Bequeathed the Throne to His Son**

What can you do with a general
When he stops being a general?
Oh, what can you do with a general who retires?

Who's got a job for a general
When he stops being a general?
They all get a job but a general no one hires

They fill his chest with medals while he's across the foam
And they spread the crimson carpet when he comes marching home
The next day someone hollers when he comes into view
"Here comes the general" and they all say "General who?"
They're delighted that he came
But they can't recall his name

Irving Berlin, *White Christmas*
(1954 Movie Soundtrack)

The writers celebrating Pedro I’s statue inauguration had to deftly navigate precisely this question of what to do with their emperor when he stopped being an emperor. After all, the only reason that Pedro was in a position to accomplish those heroic feats in Portugal was because he had been forced from power in Brazil. How did they celebrate a leader who was basically run out of town?
They cast it in a positive light. Instead of using directly related words such as abdication, uprising, or rebellion, they used euphemisms as well as omissions. All but one lone writer completely avoided discussing Pedro’s reign in totality, the period in Brazilian history known as the *Primeiro Reinado*, or First Reign. That choice of omission was based on the fact that aside from the glory of Ipiranga and the success of the constitution in maintaining Brazil’s territorial integrity under a stable government structure, the First Reign was viewed historically as an increasingly contentious period that more and more pitted Brazilians versus Portuguese for social, economic, and political power as well as democratic participation versus the emperor’s tendency for unilateral executive decision-making. Only one writer, Beatriz Francisca de Assis Brandão, specifically addresses the period and whitewashes the historical record and Pedro’s contested rule. She calls the First Reign a “grandiose epoch,” an epoch in which Pedro, “the American monarch,” was given by history “the holy imprescriptible right of sanctioning the law and reigning under it.” While most would have to concede that Pedro I certainly *ended* his rule under the law and in observance of the constitution and its protocol for the passage of power in abdicating to his son Pedro II, it was precisely the perception that Pedro I no longer *ruled* under the law that inspired the conflicts and uprising that drove him from power.\(^{124}\)

The vast majority of the other writers are content to simply avoid the issue of the First Reign in general and focus instead on Pedro’s act of abdication. That act of leaving is described as a “heroic abnegation.” This label is striking in two ways. First, it is important to note that many other writers similarly attached a level of heroism to the emperor’s leaving Brazil. His heroism was two-fold. He was heroic in sparing a conflict

\(^{124}\) Brandão.
in Brazil in an attempt to suppress the uprising against him as well as for joining the conflict in Portugal to defend constitutional rule. Clearly many writers found it incredibly admirable that their nation witnessed such an orderly transfer of power in an historical context that was rife with bloody power struggles and political instability. That an emperor with long royal credentials would simply leave in 1831 without a fight to hold onto power is truly remarkable. Second, the careful use of the word “abnegation” paints his exile as an act of self-denial or self-sacrifice. Pedro was a king who “renounced” conflict “for the sake of maintaining harmony among his people.”

By attributing the qualities of choice and sacrifice to the exile, the writers were able to give Pedro agency even in his loss of power. Porto-Alegre characterizes the events of April 7, 1831 as Pedro’s “stepping down from the throne as your own doing, respecting the son and the law which you had given, when in the excited night you ceded the empire to the force of destiny that called you away to new struggles. [You were] Great on the throne and in the extraordinary separation.” Such a representation of Pedro’s abdication as respectful of the law, magnanimous, and graceful assuaged the impact of abdication on his legacy and not surprisingly would serve as a personal affront to Teófilo Otoni and those who instigated that exile.

Porto-Alegre’s words reveal another crucial element of Pedro’s legacy: abdication as a royal act bequeathing his throne and Brazil to his son. The poet José Ferreira de Mattos adds to this idea by asserting that Pedro I demonstrated “love and loyalty” because he “delegated to your [Pedro’s] son the power of the monarchy for our felicity.” This portrayal of abdication as “delegation” done for the happiness of his subjects

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125 Barros; Porto-Alegre.
126 Porto-Alegre.
emphasizes the historical standing of Pedro II and his father’s legacy of patrimony in leaving the nation independent and under the rule of Pedro II. The latter Mattos even calls one of Pedro I’s two accomplishments, ranking the transfer of power to Pedro II as second only to the freeing of Brazil from colonial rule.\(^\text{127}\) It is almost as if the relationship between father and son is funneled exclusively through that transfer of power on April 7 in 1831. While one writer cites Pedro I’s “paternal love” in having “entrusted” Pedro II to Brazil, another describes this bestowal as having a redemptive quality for the ex-emperor. Antonio Gonçalves Teixeira e Sousa calls Pedro II a “gift” and in doing so defines Pedro I as the giver of that gift. For those observers in 1862 who used the opportunity to laud their current monarch just as much as their first one, the sense of gratitude they felt towards the founder of the Empire and the father of the Emperor served as another important mitigating factor in the issue of abdication. It did this by casting the father’s abdication as the positive event that made way for the young, Brazilian born monarch to assume the throne.\(^\text{128}\) But power was not Pedro II’s only inheritance. Barros cites the “fire of liberty lit in whirlwinds” by Pedro I and to which “Dom Pedro Segundo attests.”\(^\text{129}\) This quotation is representative of a larger theme of Pedro II having inherited liberty—as well as the constitution under which he governed— from his father as a Bragança and an American monarch.

While often linking the nation’s two emperors together in their discourse, the writers of the celebratory odes also drew clear distinctions between their respective historical legacies. Pedro I is portrayed clearly as a hero, a liberator, and a soldier while, for the same author, Pedro II is the “model for the Kings.” Another author states “Glory,

\(^{127}\) Mattos.
\(^{128}\) Teixeira e Sousa; Brandão.
\(^{129}\) Barros.
glory to the nation on whose throne after Pedro I succeeds the Emperor Pedro II: the father creates the nation: the son brings it prosperity; one made free citizens out of vassals: the other happy men out of citizens.”\textsuperscript{130} These different places that the two emperors could occupy in the nation’s memory and historical narratives made it easier for the writers to both link them together and delineate them. In addition, Pedro II’s presence on the throne provided the imperial government with a direct connection to the subject of the nation’s first public monument.

As exemplified in a previous quotation that he was “called away to new struggles,” what Pedro did after abdication directly impacted how writers in 1862 perceived the emperor’s abdication. The result ended up fusing Pedro’s aforementioned choice to leave Brazil with the legacy of fame and glory he achieved in Portugal. Several writers place great importance on the idea of the ex-emperor not just leaving but going to something else. Porto-Alegre alludes to this theme, describing Pedro as “stepping down from the throne to martial lines [in military service]” and calling him the “decorated soldier of liberty.” Embedded in that view of military service is the notion that Pedro left Brazil directly for the battlefields of Portugal.\textsuperscript{131} While it did take over a year in exile to raise and organize his forces before Pedro stepped foot onto Portuguese soil at Oporto to engage his brother’s army, the historical narrative that emerges in 1862 has Pedro leaving with an immediate purpose. This sense of purpose—often portrayed as a sacred or noble quest to secure liberty—casts his leaving in a completely different light than the reality of his actual exit. In this narrative, Pedro left Brazil behind voluntarily and steps immediately into an act of great heroism.

\textsuperscript{130} Magalhães; Oliveira.

\textsuperscript{131} Pedro I’s death from tuberculosis contracted on the battlefield within just three short years from that Brazilian exit only adds to that sense of immediacy and sacrifice.
Pedro’s exploits in Portugal succeeded in securing for him an indisputable standing in that nation’s history. They also went a long way in rehabilitating and redeeming his legacy in Brazil. For example, Campos Filho describes Pedro as “stripping himself of crowns and scepters” while also “risking his life to secure them.” By using the plural, the author is able to invoke both abdications: Pedro’s renunciation of the Portuguese throne after the death of his father King João VI in 1826 and his 1831 Brazilian abdication. Campos Filho is also able to tie Pedro’s identity as soldier and liberator to those acts of abdication. Andrada Silva also references Pedro twice recusing himself from power, and he also elaborates on his vision of the abdication in its larger narrative, and that narrative allows for redemption through Pedro’s liberation of Portugal. He is the only one to use the terms “disgrace” and “exile” in terms of Pedro’s power and throne to discuss the complications that April 7 spelled for Pedro’s legacy. The author never uses any word related to rebellion. Instead, he describes the events as the “storm that surrounded him,” yet that storm “passes.” What remains for Pedro’s legacy, according to Andrada Silva, are two titles: Soldier and Emperor. He sequences those titles chronologically out of order. This ordering represents the understanding, however, that without Pedro as soldier, Pedro I could never historically reclaim the title of Emperor in the hearts and minds of the Brazilian people. The glory that he achieved as a soldier allowed him to lay claim to being Brazil’s emperor in memorium again. Silva even links the phrase “the heart of the people” to Pedro’s imperial title. One other writer, Testa, also recognizes and deals with Pedro’s complicated legacy as well as the idea of his redemption. Testa reconciles Pedro’s forced abdication with his status as

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132 Campos Filho.
133 Andrada Silva.
celebrated icon precisely through the idea of his memorialized redemption and even restoration. For him, Pedro found restoration and only “crowns of laurel” upon death: “in Lysia the throne is restored.” Two other writers even go so far as to use the former emperor’s ruling title of S. M. I., or Sua Majestade Imperial, in the titles of their odes. Brandão and Mello both refer to Pedro I in this way.

The question of which title to use along with which name to use was in many ways a proxy war for the larger issue of Pedro’s overall place in history. With abdication, Pedro I lost his title of Emperor, and thereby S. M. I. No longer emperor, his official title changed to that of the Duke of Bragança. For his critics, that new title was a badge of shame (of his demotion and being neither emperor nor king), and they used it with great disdain and pleasure. The idea of Pedro recovering the title of S. M. I.—of it being restored to him—and the status that went along with it certainly angered those who played a role in stripping him of them. Testa himself deals with the most fundamental question that placed observers of the inauguration as either in celebration or opposition to the statue. That question is whether or not Pedro’s accomplishments outweigh the shortcomings that forced him into exile. In sum, is his legacy redeemable? For Testa, that answer is clearly yes as he states that paying tribute to Pedro is a just act and that “March would extinguish the dissentions of April.” Ultimately, Brazilians’ conscious decision to pay tribute to Pedro I with the erection of his statue in March on the anniversary of the constitution had the power to wash away any stain on Pedro’s legacy. And that reality was abundantly clear to Otoni.

134 Brandão; Mello.
135 Testa.
The Counter Narrative: Abdication as the Just Consequence for Tyranny

Otoni’s concern and dismay over the historical oblivion into which the specific circumstances surrounding Pedro I’s abdication and the First Reign writ large—what happened after Ipiranga and before the military glories in Portugal—seemed to have faded is evident in every line that he wrote in his pamphlet. That conscious forgetting, or omitting as evidenced above, of the grievances lodged against Pedro I and the conflicts that ensued and ultimately resulted in his exile gave rise to what Otoni considered a blatantly false narrative. The consequence of the “bronze lie” and the false narrative it advanced was not just that a leader Otoni didn’t think deserved acclaim was being paid homage to. The previous sections detail how he refuted basically every definition of Pedro I as a Brazilian hero. There was more than even that at stake. Otoni makes it clear that the statue signifies that “the 7th of April in 1831 was a crime of rebellion for which Brazil must contritely ask amnesty, nullifying as unjust the sentence [abdication] that was carried out on that day against the first reign.” The fundamental question of what is crime versus justified rebellion is one that is at the heart of Otoni’s personal and historical dilemma. He defends his participation in what he calls an “act of popular virility” and a “popular cause” by labeling Pedro’s reign as one of “persecution.” As a result, the statue’s inauguration “slanders his past” in which he risked everything to rise up against the sitting emperor, thinking it truly the will of the people against a foreign (Portuguese) tyrant.

To witness a statue to that very tyrant erected decades later was tantamount to seeing the Brazilian people restore Pedro I to his imperial throne. Otoni even referred to the statue’s supporters as “restorationists” saying that they achieved after his death what they were never able to do during his lifetime. Not only does he portray the statue as a
form of restoration of Pedro I after his abdication and death, but Otoni also takes that	onotion even further with his invocation of the macabre yet dramatic likening of Pedro I’s
legacy to that of Ignez de Castro. The fourteenth-century queen consort of the very first
King Pedro of Portugal, Ignez de Castro was posthumously crowned following a round of
fatal political intrigue, and Otoni equates this act with that of the statue’s erection. The
statue was “the new coronation of Ignez de Castro.” This metaphor reveals the extent of
Otoni’s insecurity about how his insurrection would be newly defined through the
statue’s contemporary—and historically retroactive—meaning. The “dictator” against
whom he rebelled was being restored in prestige after exile and even death. Since Otoni
does not use the inauguration event to indict the monarchy as a whole, it is not the
restoration of a monarch that he finds so offensive. It is the restoration of Pedro I’s
political and royal legitimacy in Brazil that offends him to the point of equating the
inauguration of the statue to the historical experience of Ignez de Castro.

Such a supposed restoration cut to the very core of Otoni’s own sense of historical
place by questioning who out of that conflict of 1831 deserved credit or condemnation in
1862. For him, Pedro I cannot merit that statue and be the tyrant he forced into exile.
There is no room for redemption. Consequently, the statue vindicates Pedro I—in
everything, not just the two aspects of his rule portrayed in the statue—and thereby
criminalizes Otoni. His is a zero-sum game: the legitimation of one necessitates the
invalidation of the other. After he asks what possible Brazilian motive could exist to
explain the statue, he answers that it is the statue’s supporters’ desire that it symbolize
“an atonement” for their generation and the nation. Such an interpretation emphasizes
Otoni’s sense of being historically judged and condemned rather than himself being
celebrated as “the son of liberty” and the “veteran” of April 7 who turned imperial persecution into liberation.\(^{136}\)

**Conclusion**

Since Teófilo Otoni’s self-perceived legacy was conversely related to that of the emperor whom he deposed, the issues surrounding the statue’s inauguration remained black and white for him and the stakes remained high. This dynamic serves as an important glimpse into how a broader historical narrative is comprised of the stories of individual, every-day people who participate in—and contend with—the events and elite of their day. More importantly, it is a reminder of how all participants have a highly personal and invested stake in how those events are remembered. In what Sandes calls the “dispute of memory” represented in the contest between those who would glorify the 7\(^{th}\) of September and those who would the 7\(^{th}\) of April, the public discourse in 1862 demonstrates that the official imperial vision of history that sought to ingrain the *Grito* as the narrative of the nation’s founding was succeeding and loomed much larger in the political and public imagination.\(^{137}\) Pedro I’s identity as the hero of Ipiranga, the giver of the constitution, the father of Pedro II, and the valiant champion of liberty in Brazil and Portugal was being advanced by a multitude of writers and becoming part of the nation’s collective memory.

At the same time that the imperial elite were succeeding in their attempt to craft and inculcate this royal version of Brazil’s national origins, the nation was nevertheless changing. While a certain part of the population may have espoused the owing of a

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\(^{136}\) Otoni, 122, 131-132.

\(^{137}\) Sandes, 34-35.
generational debt of gratitude to the Empire’s founder, another part—that radical Liberal part—was beginning to emerge as a source of generational tension. Thus the empire’s elite could achieve a consensus on the historical and memorialized moment of the nation’s origins without any sort of guarantee for how that imperial narrative would play out in the future. In terms of the theme of the passage of time and its impact on a people and how they interpreted the past and themselves, that sense of the raising of the statue in the public square as overdue could coincide with a new belief that institutional reform was similarly coming due. While elites before were content to challenge for power within the existing system, this new generation was contemplating radically altering the very cornerstones of Brazil’s political, economic, and social structures: slavery, the monarchy, and the political organization of the state. Keep in mind that this change was not looming on the immediate horizon when the statue of Pedro I was inaugurated. Slavery would not be abolished for another twenty-five years. Similarly, Pedro II would rule for almost three more decades. Yet neither that continuity nor any continued national projects carried out by the ruling elite could stop the inevitable passage of time and process of change. Because of this reality, change is a fundamental aspect of identity, whether it is one’s personal sense of self or a nation’s larger identity adjusting to new circumstances. Yet there is no denying the power of those foundational experiences, myths, and beliefs, especially regarding one’s origins, on the core components of an identity. And when we are speaking of the state, there is also no denying that those in power have the benefit of the control of the means of state-sponsored public representations of power in terms of shaping that core. Yet public perception—or reception—of political and historical narratives offered up by the state does not always matter in the real exercise of power.
Both the imperial elite and the upcoming republican elite that came into power in 1889 would end up bearing witness to this fact.
Chapter Three: An Imperial Statue in a Republic’s Public Square

In 1893, the statue of Pedro I in Rio de Janeiro remained the same: a bronze colossus in a public square of the capital city testifying to Brazil’s imperial origins. What had changed dramatically was the political landscape of Rio and the nation. That empire which the statue glorified no longer existed. Gone was the parliamentary monarchy established by the constitution written by Pedro I in 1824 and ruled by his son Pedro II for almost half a century. What stood in its place was a fledgling republic ushered in on November 15, 1889 in a coup d’état instigated by the army garrison in Rio. The change in government was sudden and unexpected and received by an “indifferent” and even “bestializado” or “stultified” general population that basically went about its business while the newly empowered elites contested each other and Brazil’s past in order to reshape the political landscape of the Republic.138

In this period of the first few years of the republic known for the passivity of Rio’s onlookers, it is striking that “o povo” took it upon themselves to tear down the wooden framework of a bandstand being built to cover the statue of Pedro I in preparation for the celebration of Tiradentes Day, the new civic holiday honoring the republican martyr. Certainly it was not the sort of mass popular protest that characterized the “Vaccine Revolt” of 1904 and that sprung out of the state’s intrusion into the homes and personal sovereignty of the urban poor in Rio.139 Rather, the “bandstand incident,” as

138 The Portuguese term for “stultified” was “bestializado,” a term used by multiple commentators in the Rio press in 1890 and the title of the seminal work by José Murilo de Carvalho, Os Bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987).
139 The revolt that occurred in 1904 in Rio was a response to the modernization attempts of the administration of President Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves. Following the protocols of the obligatory smallpox vaccination program that was part of the larger public health campaign directed by Dr. Oswaldo
it was referred to in the press, was a truly minor conflict. It involved small groups of people and resulted in very little property damage and injury. Those involved even reportedly cheered when the police arrived. Yet, just as the inauguration of the statue of Pedro I in 1862 revealed contested views of the nation’s history within the context of the empire itself, the public rhetoric in 1893 reveals the even more complicated discussion of how an incipient republic deals with its imperial past. For supporters of the monarchy and the imperial government in 1862, Pedro’s statue served as an homage to the nation’s and the monarchy’s origins as well as to the accomplishments of their first emperor. For critics of that emperor like Teófilo Otoni, the statue was a symbol of an historical lie and misappropriated accolades. For critics of the monarchy and the state of Brazilian society and politics in general, Pedro’s statue became a symbol of the nation’s unfulfilled promise.

It was this notion that Brazilians could do better in the increasingly modernizing world around them that motivated the different groups involved in the proclamation of the Republic and its immediate state-building period. And just as the imperial political and intellectual elite made a concerted effort to not only construct a national narrative that glorified the empire and its figures but to also indoctrinate that historical vision into the public imagination, the republican elites sought to do the same for their own regime. For the imperial imagination-makers, it was relatively easy to draw the distinction

Cruz, public health workers could forcibly enter homes with the help of the police and administer the vaccine against the patient’s will. An opposition made up of groups identified by Jeffrey Needell as “militant republicans, politicized army officers, and opposition journalists” actively and publicly held mass meetings to mobilize workers and the general public against the policy and the administration. Those meetings translated into hostility, violent police repression, and riots which in turn led to an attempted military coup against the government. Rodrigues Alves’ administration survived but effectively had to lay siege to the city to reclaim control and was forced to put aside the obligatory vaccinations. See Jeffrey Needell, “The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904: The Revolt against “Modernization” in Belle-Époque Rio de Janeiro,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* Vol. 67, No. 2 (May, 1987): 233-238.
between Brazil’s colonial and independent eras. Nationhood involved a clear break from the past, and it involved a foil completely foreign in the form of Portuguese rule even if Pedro I carried his portugalidade with him into the First Reign. Despite that fact, and despite his abdication, the previous chapter’s discussion of how Pedro I was ultimately defined in public perceptions makes clear that his standing as the hero of Ipiranga and the proclaimers of independence had been cemented—or bronzed in this matter—by 1862. His actions had become an integral part of Brazil’s founding myth and historical narrative. His Brazilian-born son had ruled for almost fifty years and steered Brazil away from the turbulent experiences of many Nineteenth-Century Latin American nations which involved territorial fragmentation, political and constitutional instability, and the armed struggles that resulted from caudillismo. The fact that Brazil had avoided such internal conflict and destabilization during the First and Second Reigns served to secure the monarchy’s place in the nation’s history. Given this reality, the republican intellectual and political elite faced a much more complicated task of constructing a republican narrative for a country with a codified monarchical history.

With Pedro II and the rest of the royal family exiled in Europe, the most visible symbol of that imperial past and monarchical rule was the statue of Pedro I. However, the statue would never serve as a rallying point for monarchists. It would never advance any imperial designs to undermine the republic. Neither Pedro I nor his statue held that sort of power in the Rio de Janeiro of 1893. Nevertheless, the leaders of the fragile republic still trying to organize the government and exert control over all of Brazil’s

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140 The journalists in the 1890s whose writings will be analyzed in this and the following two chapters were acutely aware of the different political and territorial trajectories of the Spanish American republics. For more on this, see the section entitled “The Naval Revolt and New Perceptions of September 7 and Brazilian History” in Chapter Five.
territory did not know this. For many of them, that statue posed at the very least a symbolic threat, a menacing taunt to their work and power, and at worst an actual existential threat of mutiny and revolt. Because of this habitual threat perception, the fuss over a torn-down bandstand could escalate into very heated public discussions regarding whether or not the new Republic should carry on the traditions began during the monarchical era, whether a statue to the first emperor merited a place in the public square of a republic, and whether those who criticized the covering of the statue were patriots or traitors. All in all, this is a chapter about how the uncertainty of the new regime created opposing viewpoints over what in its past the nation should celebrate and how it should do so in order to honor its changed ideological base. It is a study of how the process of national identity formation accommodates political change.

There is much to tell of this story of the covering of Pedro I’s statue and its aftermath. The current chapter serves as part one: an examination of the new political situation in Brazil after the proclamation of the Republic as well as the public discussion about the covering of the statue leading up to and immediately after its demolition at the hands of vigilantes. After some basic background information on the origins and characteristics of Brazil’s new republican government, I will return my focus to the public square and the statue of Pedro I. The change of the square’s name to Praça Tiradentes to honor a decidedly republican historical narrative will be discussed, as will the change’s relative lack of significance in the public sphere. The club responsible for the bandstand construction that sought to erase the statue, Club Tiradentes, will be introduced, and the conflict and destruction of the bandstand will be recreated from newspaper accounts. I will explore the different reasons that the covering of the statue
was criticized. Those reasons involved the role of “the people” in judging the treatment of the statue to be an insult to Brazil’s past, the role of art as a marker of a people’s culture and degree of civilization, and the importance of history to affirm a nation’s greatness and self-awareness. In order to understand the political aftermath of the incident, I will document just how high the stakes were at the time for supporters of the Republic. For many, their fears dominated how they perceived that Republic…fears of a lurking monarchical threat as well as fears of an internal betrayal by republicans of a different ideological affiliation. That sort of climate turned the public responses to the tearing down of the bandstand into a “True Republican” litmus test and a significant moment of reflection on the state of the nation’s political construction.

The Proclamation of the Republic: The New Political Landscape

As a nation and a people, Brazil had undergone many changes since the inauguration of Pedro I’s statue thirty years prior. As discussed in the previous chapter, a new and increasingly critical Liberal voice was emerging. In addition, the existence of new loci of economic power outside of Rio as well as within it precipitated new and coalescing calls for reforms of the government’s slavery and immigration policies as well as reforms to the very nature of the government itself. By the 1870s, São Paulo’s emergence as a powerhouse fueled by the lucrative coffee trade in particular and an ever-expanding economy in general increasingly made that province a rival to Rio de Janeiro’s standing as the region’s—and nation’s—seat of power. To serve their needs, the Paulista elite certainly sought to exert more influence in the national government, but they also sought the decentralization of power in the federal system in order to achieve a greater degree of self-governance and autonomy. Along with this impetus for political structural
reform, the need for labor on new plantations along with a growing and diversifying urban population that wanted greater opportunities and became increasingly associated with an abolition movement saw various interest groups coalesce to push for immigration and slavery reforms. The republican party of the 1870s and 1880s offered access to these advocates and interests in the pursuit of decentralization and abolition despite the fact that those dual purposes put the constituent groups at odds with each other in terms of whose interest was being served. Regardless of this growing agenda, the Republican Party affected little political representation or change. There was no swelling Republican presence or ascendancy. The overall opposition to the monarchy was ultimately fragmented and disorganized outside of hotbeds such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul. Those locations saw a more radical opposition take form in their urban areas with the focal point being the capital of Rio de Janeiro.\footnote{Suely Robles Reis de Queiroz, “Reflections on Brazilian Jacobinism of the First Decade of the Republic (1893-1897),” The Americas Vol. 48, No. 2 (Oct., 1991): 181-183.} In contrast, the historically entrenched landed class in the southeast of Brazil that did not include the progressive-leaning Paulista or Minas Gerais planters remained favored by the monarchy with titles of nobility and political power and thus remained defenders of that monarchy. That support held until the Crown failed to compensate those same planters—especially the older generation—for the slaves who were freed in 1888 by the Golden Law of abolition. Similarly, Pedro II’s defense of royal authority beginning in the 1870s against the Roman Catholic Church had also alienated some of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus while the emperor was losing longstanding historical allies, he was also missing out on the opportunity to make new ones. According to E. Bradford Burns, the emperor was “reluctant to recognize the increasing importance of the merchants and industrialists” and
even “ignored the restless military officers” rising up from the middle classes. The result for the monarchy was a diminution of its elements of support at precisely the time that the political and social climate was witnessing increasing “indifference or even hostility” being directed toward the monarchy.\(^\text{142}\)

Therefore while there was no triumphant republican ideological swell in the 1880s, there was nevertheless a political power vacuum which was the result of Pedro II’s inability to govern because of his declining health and increasing age as well as the lack of a male heir and the perceived lack of legitimacy for Princess Isabel as a regent or future sovereign. While her role in securing the passage of that Golden Law of abolition in 1888 endeared her to the abolitionists and urban poor, it did not legitimize her in the eyes of many of the male-dominated groups of elites outside of the monarchy’s remaining supporters. The political vacuum that resulted provided just the kind of opportunity a small clique of junior army officers was looking for. Without Pedro II’s attentiveness to deftly mediate their demands and de-escalate their radicalization as had been customary in the past, that group seized the moment to claim a place for themselves in the government.\(^\text{143}\)

The proclamation of the Republic was therefore not the culmination of some great democratic movement but a spur-of-the-moment action that met no resistance. Its lack of coordination and suddenness allowed for a disparate group to achieve regime change through that coup, but the fact that those different groups had competing ideologies and leaders meant that there were corresponding cleavages within the elite from the very beginning of the republic. Lt. Col. Benjamin Constant led the positivist strain and exerted


tremendous influence from his role as Army Academy instructor. Positivism’s growing influence on Brazilian thought and policy stemmed from its perception as an ideological roadmap that, if followed, would allow Brazil to progress in its development to the levels of material wealth and technological and industrial advancement of the nations considered the leaders of the Western world like Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. The way in which the French philosopher and sociologist Auguste Comte connected the ideas of observation, hypothesis, and experimentation—the scientific method—to the concept of a society’s ability to advance and better itself struck a chord with many Brazilian and Latin American elites looking for ways to emulate and achieve a status comparable to those model nations. As interpreted by those elites, the State should ideally take over the role of promoting capitalism and directing that material and technological progress. Political stability and social order were perceived as prerequisites for any of those societies to begin adopting what Burns calls the “outward manifestations of progress” seen in those envied north Atlantic civilizations.

In Brazil, these ideas came to be most popular in the emerging middle class that included those coming out of the technical and military schools, especially those in the engineering field, which were primarily centered in Rio de Janeiro. These new graduates would be actively seeking a means to improve their social and economic prospects. Burns notes that the Brazilian positivists advocated for “the abolition of slavery, the establishment of a republic (albeit not a democratic one), and the separation of Church and State.” By the time of the bandstand incident, all of these “advancements” had been achieved, as had the introduction and expansion of technology such as steam engines, steel production, railroad transportation, and telegraph communications. Over the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the tenets of this Brazilian positivism coincided with the overall desire of urban and economic groups for a similar level of progress not expressed in any formal ideology. Amidst this general climate in favor of development, Benjamin Constant de Magalhães, an engineer himself, emerged as Brazil’s most influential positivist. Burns cites the popularity of the mathematics professor and his key placement at one of those schools, the military academy, as the reasons for his ability to inculcate the nation’s young cadets. Constant went further than most Brazilian positivists in his advocacy for the republican form of government, and the students he taught came to see that type of political organization as their “their best hope for the future” and for improving their prospects.¹⁴⁴

Those positivists often allied themselves with the Jacobins. Brazilian Jacobinism was born out of the local republican clubs and patriotic battalions (like the Club Tiradentes which would play a central role in the bandstand incident) that had sprung up immediately prior to and after the proclamation of the Republic. Radicalized in response to what they perceived as the failure of the republican movement to live up to their vision of ideological purity, the most visible Jacobins in Rio were the newspaper editors Anibal Mascarenhas and the ultra-radical Deocleciano Martyr who was later implicated in the assassination attempt of President Prudente de Morais in 1897. Their readership was small and their publications short-lived, but their vitriol would serve to challenge any concessions made in the formation of the republican state. Their eventual cultish devotion to future President Floriano Peixoto and the continuation of military control of the Republic drove them to violently oppose civilian leadership and ultimately led to that

¹⁴⁴ Burns and Charlip, 126-128; Burns, *A History of Brazil*, 207-209.
assassination attempt.\textsuperscript{145} Despite these realities, both the Jacobins and the positivists valued the role of policy in social evolution, both rejected the need for representative bodies for governance, and both disliked professional politicians. They shared these characteristics because they both attracted the new class of “technocrats” looking for power in order to bring about Brazil’s transformation into the modern world. They envisioned a “civic cult” that would achieve that great end, but they also felt the need for political legitimacy in the form of party affiliation. The military upstarts brought in the Republican Party in order to legitimize their actions and create the appearance of a political end to the coup’s beginning.

The coup’s most senior military participants, themselves brought in to legitimize the actions of the junior officers, would end up being the republic’s first two presidents, a testament to the continued military nature of that new republic and the stark reality that the military was the one institution that possessed the required level of organization and strength to administer the state. Those leaders sought to replace the previous political elite whom they considered hostile to the interests of the army. Feeling that their service to the nation during the Paraguayan War had been slighted and their deserved influence on the government’s policies thwarted, those frustrated military men sought a new political system that would advance their specific interests. The result was that they allied themselves with whichever group seemed best able to serve those interests. Eventually, the liberal republican vision won out, and the apparatus of the state was finally consolidated by 1894 and lasted until 1930 as an oligarchy protecting the traditional export agricultural interests. The same structures of inequality and hierarchy from the time of the empire still existed, but the leadership had changed. Perhaps this is why the

\footnote{Queiroz, 181-183.}
military parade held to declare the Republic’s existence was met only with silent stares from the onlookers in Rio.

Echoing José Murilo de Carvalho, Francisco das Neves Alves uses the term “great ideological confusion” to describe the period after the republic’s proclamation, with the so-called liberals who followed the American model, Jacobins modeled after the French, positivists, and other groups such as the coffee barons and Portuguese merchants vying for power and trying to assert themselves in the incipient republic. In addition to the intra-republican jockeying for power, there also existed tensions between the civil and military apparatuses that arose given the intention for a republican democracy alongside the actual military control of power through the figure of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, the older army generation figurehead coopted for the republic’s proclamation. While his cabinet may have been civilian, Deodoro’s government left no doubt that the army and its leadership was the ultimate decision-maker. The nation’s first republican leader ruled as a dictator until the government was formed and he was officially elected Brazil’s first constitutional president. However, his practices remained denounced by his civilian critics as dictatorial and his choices for the government’s ministry became suspect for their own anti-democratic intentions and practices. Those critics revealed an anxiety that they had horizontally traded imperial and monarchical rule for that of a military dictator. Deodoro’s response to an economic downturn and the obstructionist Congress was to simply dissolve the National Congress in November of 1891. The backlash against that act was the first president’s undoing, and he resigned the government to his vice president and political rival, Marshal Floriano Peixoto.\footnote{Carvalho, \textit{A Formação}, 9; Francisco das Neves Alves, “O golpe de estado de Novembro de 1891 e as repercussões na cidade do Rio Grande,” accessed April 28, 2014,}
In the end, the “crisis of identity” resulting from the contestations for power in the first decade of the republican regime did not bring about the republic’s demise. Instead, E. Bradford Burns finds the period as exemplifying the “conciliation and reform” theory of José Honório Rodrigues, the acclaimed twentieth-century Brazilian historian who contributed greatly to our understanding of that nation’s rich historiography and methodology, which asserted that Brazil could go through major changes peacefully. The bottom line was that even with the different groups on the republican spectrum trying to operate the government and carve out a path for the new republic, it was able to maintain order and keep its territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{147} Yet, as Suely Robles Reis de Queiroz reminds us, the early moments of the Republic were anything but tranquil, and “years of civil disorder” took their toll on the psyches of the members of those groups.\textsuperscript{148} As a result, those republican operatives were very well aware of their own “crises” of identity, economy, and political consolidation. In 1893, many were still on edge when a festival bandstand set them off.

The Statue of Pedro I in Newly Re-named Praça Tiradentes

According to José Murilo, despite the intra-elite contestations for power discussed above, the intellectual and political elites of the 1890s were nevertheless operating under a republican ideology with utopian elements that idealized “popular involvement in political life.” Because of this belief, it was incumbent upon those republican elites to


\textsuperscript{148} Queiroz, 181.
reach out to the “*mundo extra-elite*” in order to cultivate in the populace a shared vision of what the Republic was and should be and thus inspire greater political participation. It was precisely this intent to express and justify their ideology to that non-elite world that made their “manipulation of the social imagination” particularly important in those early days of the Republic. José Murilo makes this statement because he defines those days as “moments of political and social change” as well as “moments of the redefinition of collective identities.” Given this context, the Brazilian republicans of 1889 took their cues from those of 1789 France in attempting to create a new society and a “new man” along with their new political system.

Ludwig Lauerhass, Jr., similarly discusses the importance of the French “prototype” of nationalism in the introduction to his study of Brazilian national identity formation, *Brazil in the Making*. That model was one characterized by “the demands of a more modern form of urbanized, industrial society in league with a secular, national state” which would work “in concert to turn peasants into Frenchmen and Frenchwomen.” Lauerhass, Jr. identifies those specific state mechanisms of the creation of nationalistic sentiments as “the school system, the army, improved transportation networks, new communications media, and the bureaucracy.” The new regime’s elite would set to work using this blueprint to make those new “Brazilians” with what E. Bradford Burns calls a “piecemeal approach” that saw limited success. Nevertheless, the fundamental legacy of Revolutionary France that “political legitimacy was based on the people and the nation rather than on loyalty to a monarch” remained ever-present in the Brazilian republican elites’ conceptualization of their claim to power. It was precisely Brazil’s unique historical experience in the nineteenth century as an independent
American monarchy, rather than a republic, that complicated this element of collective identity formation. Lauerhass, Jr. distinguishes between that Brazilian experience and those of the eventual Spanish American republics by noting that their national identity formation was necessary in the early 1800s in order to “legitimize their claims for separation from each other as well as from their former colonial masters.” However, with Brazil’s continuation as a monarchy despite political separation from Portugal, he asserts that the “political imperative to replace dynastic with national identification” did not happen as early in Brazil. And as we saw in the previous chapter, imperial elites in the mid nineteenth century actively worked to fuse the nation’s identity with the monarchy for that designedly imperial narrative and identity advanced by the statue’s inauguration. Lauerhass, Jr. does indeed concede a concern on the part of those imperial elites with “the identification and construction of their own culture,” their imperial culture I would add, but he does not qualify the experience as being representative of that Western concept of national identity formation.\footnote{Ludwig Lauerhass, Jr., “Introduction: A Four-Part Canon for the Analysis of Brazilian National Identity,” in Brazil in the Making: Facets of National Identity, eds. Carmen Nava and Ludwid Lauerhass, Jr. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 4; Burns, A History of Brazil, 240.} That process would only begin in 1889, and it is why the reeducation of the populace with the objective of wining and transforming the hearts and minds…the very souls…of the people became a priority of the new Republic.

Therefore, just as important as their gaining control of the actual mechanisms of state power was the new republican need to infuse the popular imagination—especially of those non-elites—with republican values. They needed to put a republican ideological stamp on not only those “souls” of the people but also their “aspirations, fears, and hopes.” And for an uneducated and still mostly illiterate populace, José Murilo notes, the new regime required more accessible and universal means to inculcate those ideas. They
needed to construct and employ images, allegories, symbols, rituals, and myths in order to define that new republican society. As part of that process of articulation, they subsequently needed to define everything from the specifics of what the Republic’s identities and objectives should be to who its enemies were. Ultimately all of these things went into the republican intellectual effort, reminiscent of that earlier imperial national project, to “organize its past, present, and future.”

The first step in this existential endeavor was an easy one. On February 21, 1890, the council of the Intendencia Municipal mandated changes, en masse, to the names of the public squares, streets, and lanes in Rio de Janeiro. Gone were any references to the royal family or the imperial past in the names. They were instead replaced by names commemorating the new republic. Showing a recognition of the symbolic importance of the public square, the council listed four royal historical spaces at the top of its list (see Figure 7). The Praça da Aclamação, where both Pedro I and Pedro II were acclaimed as Emperor, became the Praça da República. Pedro II’s

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150 Carvalho, Formação, 9-11.
square became that of the 15th of November, and his daughter’s square—which had given her the honorarium of the title “Isabel the Redeemer” for her role in the abolition of slavery—became the Largo da Lapa. Finally, while it could do nothing to address the existence of Pedro’s statue, the replacement of the square’s name of the Praça da Constituição with the name of Tiradentes did clearly signal the authorities’ desire to eradicate the empire in name and plant republican civic reminders in their place. As discussed in the previous chapter, the renaming and the association of that historical space with the death of Tiradentes, the leader of the 1789 rebellion against Portuguese rule, allowed the new elite to symbolically replace the Portuguese prince with their republican martyr…at least on paper.

The change in the name of the square in which Pedro I’s statue was located came as part of a general visual reorganization of the capital city. During the same week that the name changes were decided upon, the city intendancy also held sessions to approve the reconstruction of palaces and theaters and the construction of buildings for industries. The public works continued with the construction of new walls, bridges, viaducts, and sluices. Overall, the council articulated an emphasis on the works reflecting new visions of hygiene, security, and art. Yet, if the campaign’s intent was to stimulate a public reception to all of these efforts, it clearly failed. While the list of denominational changes were publicized three separate times in just the Jornal do Commercio alone and at least once in O Paiz, the notices generated no editorials or letters or discourse of any kind in the month following the announcement. Even on the occasion of the republic’s first celebration of Tiradentes Day in April of 1890, the significance of the change in the name of the public square to honor that historical figure did not rate an appearance in the
discourse of the day. There were simply other matters more pressing in nature, things that had real—rather than imagined—implications for the state of the republic. The letters published in the newspapers show a special interest in the financial security of the country, with several letters discussing the state of Brazilian banks and the decisions facing finance minister Rui Barbosa. In addition, writers were concerned with the public works projects, education, the upcoming constitution, and the workings of the Republican Party.  

As an indication of just how indifferent the public was to the symbolic renaming of the statue’s public square, most writers never even used the new name when referring to that site. For that matter, many never did when the city government during the Empire changed the name to Constituição. That square had had many different names throughout the history of the city, some of which stuck more in the public memory than others. The first name was the generic “Largo do Rocio” meaning “large square.” Then the square was named to reflect the gypsy presence there. When the Portuguese royal court arrived in 1808, the square took on the name of “Campo da Polé” due to the stone pillory placed there in the intendant’s public order campaign. Finally, in 1822 the square took on the moniker of “Constitution” reflecting the royal family’s public oath-taking there. All in all, the locale had a very fluid denomination depending usually upon its function and inhabitants. Therefore, it is not surprising that writers often reverted back to one of the pre-republican names for the plaza. Even with the celebration of Tiradentes Day in 1890, writers often used the Rocio name or felt compelled to add in the Constitution name to

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151 *Jornal do Commercio*, February 22-March 17, 1890; *O Paiz*, February 22-March 17, 1890.
152 Green, 183.
help the participants in the festivities navigate their way around the city.\footnote{O Paiz, April 18, 1890, “Tiradentes.”} By the time of the bandstand incident in 1893, the Tiradentes name homage had still not fully taken hold in the public imagination. A quantitative survey of the incident reports and editorials regarding the bandstand in the various Rio newspapers reveals basically an even split between those writers who used the name Tiradentes for the praça and those who did not. Those writers who used other names more often than not referred to the praça as Rocio, but several also used the imperial name of Constitution. This scattering of alternate names served to decrease the visibility of the name change and demonstrated again the difficulty of affecting change when it came to the locals’ use of place names. Two examples of this reality in the survey stand out. First, in one newspaper, the Diário de Noticias, a writer used the imperial constitution designation when describing the permit shown to them that gave the right to erect the bandstand. The language of the permit itself used Praça Tiradentes. Secondly, and much more strikingly, the mayor of republican Rio de Janeiro himself, Barata Ribeiro, referred to the bandstand’s location as the “largo do Rocio” in his letter to the Club Tiradentes informing them of the city’s decision to require the removal of the bandstand.\footnote{Diário de Noticias, April 21, 1893, “O incidente da estatua”; Gazeta de Noticia, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua”; O Tempo, April 20, 1893, “Parece” and April 26, 1893, “Um patriota.” Note that the letter of Ribeiro referenced above can be found in the April 20th edition of O Apostolo (“Vandalismo,” page 2).}

In terms of the public perceptions of specifically the statue of Pedro I in that newly renamed square, there was remarkably little discussion of what would later be termed the “incoherence” of the statue existing in Tiradentes’ square.\footnote{O Paiz, May 17, 1894, “Gratidão Nacional.” This article includes the text of a proposal made to the National Congress to move Pedro I’s statue to a museum. It is that proposal which refers to the “incoherence” of Pedro I’s statue in the public square. That proposal, and others like it, is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.} There is only one reference to the possible destruction of the statue in 1890, and the editorial response was
a clear repudiation of such a proposal. Such an idea of physically removing the statue would have been in line with the prior act of erasing the obelisk pillory from that very square in order to alter its identity and mark the commemoration of the constitution.

James N. Green refers to the work by historian Pierre Nora regarding social memory, noting that “temporal and topographical memory sites and monuments emerge at those times and those places where there is a perceived or constructed break with the past.”

The statue had been a memorial to Brazil’s break with its colonial past. A growing call in the early 1890s would have been understandable given this tendency. However, it would not be until 1894 that a proposal to move the statue from the republic’s city square would gain any traction in the public sphere, and even then it was eventually rejected, as I discuss in detail in Chapter Five.

Before the bandstand incident ignited commentary, Pedro I and his statue only rated passing references in miscellaneous columns in the newspapers. While there were some mentions of the role of the statue in the commemorations of September 7 and its incongruity in the Republic, there was no follow-up or discussion. Similarly, when the Gazeta da Tarde in 1890 commemorated the anniversary of the uprising that drove Pedro I out of Brazil, it only reprinted critical words made by a republican in 1862 to protest the inauguration. That reprint did not trigger any public response in 1893. The other references to the statue involved an art world high society function honoring an artist involved in the statue’s creation, a reference to the statue’s pedestal, a criticism that for the September 7 commemoration the statue of José Bonifácio should be lit along with Pedro I’s, and finally in 1891 a blurb that a man was arrested for climbing onto the horse.

\[156\text{ O Brazil, May 31, 1890.} \]
\[157\text{ Green, 184-199.} \]
The police report published for the latter made clear that there was no grand monarchical symbolism at play, quoting the man arrested as saying he wanted to “ride the horse of the deceased monarch” to get to “an unknown land.” Such an arrest would take place later in 1895 as well. What these anecdotes show is that the public certainly did not latch onto the statue for any political protest and that the republican regime did maintain order regarding the statue by policing its trespass. There was one later commentary made on the statue in 1899 in which a cartoon artist portrayed the figure of José Bonifácio, whose statue is located just a block away from Pedro I’s, visiting the emperor’s statue and offering him a stool to get down from his horse. The symbolic dismount captured the significance of the end of the empire, but it did not foretell any actual consequences for the statue’s continuation in the public square.

In fact, in a survey of the public discourse surrounding the commemorations of Tiradentes Day on April 21 of 1890-1892, there is not a single mention of the statue being perceived as an affront to the memory of the martyr or the republic’s festivities to honor him. This absence is especially notable given that one editorial did in fact make note of the discord the writer and many others felt with those who did not participate in the commemorations. That the editorial writer would note that lack of unanimity but not care about the statue points to the prevailing wariness not of symbols of the past but of sentiments of the present. Not only was the statue not a lightning rod for criticism, but Praça Tiradentes itself was not even a focal point in terms of the celebration of historical space. The papers note that the commemorative procession did pass through that praça.

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158 O Paiz, December 14, 1890; Gazeta de Noticias, March 28, 1890 and September 9, 1891; Gazeta da Tarde, April 7, 1890; Novidades, September 8, 1890 and February 12, 1891; Gazeta da Tarde, November 6, 1895.
159 Green, 198.
160 Diario de Noticias, April 28, 1890, “A semana passada.”
and that a twenty-one gun salute rang out there, but the main attractions for the festivities were located in the largos de S. Francisco de Paula and Carioca. Those two locales had bandstands erected and held public ceremonies. Another newspaper emphasized the Rua do Ouvidor as the site for ornamentation and illumination and a commemorative base area rather than the statue’s praça, which the writer, by the way, referred to as Rocio rather than Tiradentes. An alternate historical site related to the execution of Tiradentes also took greater prominence in the celebrations in 1890: the “Old Jail” where Tiradentes was held before his execution. The chroniclers of O Paiz gave the Tiradentes Day celebrations much greater visibility with its own section on multiple days before, during, and after the holiday and by trumpeting the civic and historical narrative associated with the martyr. That greater space and detail put the inclusion of Praça Tiradentes in the procession as being en route to the larger commemoration at the old jail.

For the next year’s observance of Tiradentes Day, Praça Tiradentes was equally inconspicuous. By the time that the 1892 anniversary came around, the public was already being notified of the historical reevaluation of the precise site where Tiradentes was executed. In a six-part series coordinated to end on the day before Tiradentes Day, Miguel Lemos, writing under the moniker of the “Apostolado Positivista do Brazil,” asserted that the sacred site of the execution was instead on the Rua Visconde do Rio Branco rather than the public square where Pedro I’s statue stood. In the lead-up to the next year’s commemoration, this issue would be brought up again and disputed. In a letter published in the Gazeta de Notícias, Alvaro Caminha refuted the conclusions of Miguel Lemos that placed the execution site at #38 Rua Visconde do Rio Branco.

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161 Jornal do Commercio, April 21, 1890, “Gazetilha. Homenagem a Tiradentes.”
162 O Paiz, April 18-21, 1890, “Tiradentes.”
Caminha said that Lemos erred in his attempt to reconcile the old and present street names and layout of the city and in his overlooking of the use of the word “campo” in descriptions in 1792 that noted the large amount of space needed for the regiments of troops present who reportedly witnessed the execution. Given those clues, Caminha insisted that the correct memorial site would be the Campo de Santana (see Figure 8 and note that Praça Tiradentes and the statue would have been located at # 17, the location of the Royal Theater). He noted the significance of solemnizing the death of Tiradentes in the wrong place and offered his own findings for the consideration of accurate future commemorations.163

Given these alternate conceptions of sacred historical space, it would have seemed as though the incongruity of the statue in the public square named for another would have been lessened. After all, in the centennial celebration rhetoric published for the 1892 Tiradentes Day festivities, there is no mention of the presence of Pedro I intruding onto that stage. The square bearing the name of the figure being celebrated is again noted as having only a small role in those festivities, and the descriptions of the day showed no

163 Diário de Notícias, April 22, 1891, “Tiradentes”; Jornal do Commercio, April 18 and 19, 1892, “Publicações a Pedido,” “Apostolado Positivista do Brazil, Determinação do Lugar em que Foi Supplicado o Tiradentes, Parte V”; Gazeta de Notícias, April 21, 1893, “O Local da Execução de Tiradentes.” Please note that the precise location of the site of Tiradentes’ execution remained a historical question. Roberta Oliveira, in her book Praça Tiradentes (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, Prefeitura, 2000), refers to the work done by Milton Teixeira in fixing a location for the gallows according to a map of the Biblioteca Nacional and dated 1758-1760. On this map, the precise location coincides with the present-day corner of the Avenida Passos and Rua Buenos Aires, some hundreds of meters away. Regardless, the path of his last journey and the site of his death do make the area important by proximity. In addition, Oliveira also notes that Tiradentes attended his last mass at the Igreja e Nossa Senhora da Lampadosa, also near Praça Tiradentes. In the write-ups for the Tiradentes Day ceremonies from 1890 to 1893, no one mentioned the church as having any particular memorial significance. In the end, none of those sacralized places coincided with the praça location. Regardless, the understanding that the place had some important connection to the execution remained.
epic state effort at commemorating such an important anniversary. Instead, a civic club, the Club Tiradentes, took the lead and in doing so seemed to make themselves as visible as the martyr himself.\footnote{Diário de Notícias, April 23, 1892, “Tiradentes”; O Tempo, April 21, 1892, “Commemoração Patriótica.”}

Club Tiradentes was a civic cult devoted to the memory and lesson of its namesake. \textit{O Tempo} did a little write-up on the club the day after Tiradentes Day in 1892, the centennial commemoration that saw the group actively cultivating an official state cooperation and participation. The article described the club as being founded during the empire twenty years prior “by a group of republican and patriotic young men” who were “few…but resolute.” The group is portrayed as being antagonistic towards the institutions of the empire but always respectful to the royal family and the members of that
government. Since just after Tiradentes Day in 1890, Club Tiradentes had been led by Sampaio Ferraz, whom José Murilo de Carvalho describes as a radical propagandist and Jacobin. He also held the position of Chief of Police in Rio de Janeiro for a short time, as noted in an 1890 newspaper.\footnote{O Tempo, April 20, 1892, “Festas ao Tiradentes”; O Tempo, April 22, 1892, “Echos da Cidade por Maximo Job”; Carvalho, Formação, 69; Jornal do Commercio, February 27, 1890, “Gazetilha,” “Hospederias”; O Paiz, April 25, 1890, “Secção Livre,” “Club Tiradentes.”} By 1893, the year of the bandstand incident, Club Tiradentes had made a conscious effort to make itself the most visible and influential civic club in the public sphere. There were various other Clubes Republicanos that took part in some manner going back as far as the first Tiradentes commemoration in 1890. One Club Republicano, the chapter out of Niteroi, even claimed primacy as the first political society in Rio de Janeiro to propagate the idea of the Republic, perhaps attempting to assert itself in 1894 following the over-exposure of Club Tiradentes the year before.\footnote{O Tempo, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes.”} The bottom line in 1893, however, was that the Club Tiradentes and its commission were the ones in charge of that year’s commemorations of April 21. And they were the ones who decided to cover the statue of Pedro I.

The Bandstand, Its Critics, and Its Demolition

On April 14, 1893, the Club Tiradentes quietly obtained a license from the municipality of Rio giving them permission to “tapar” (cover up) the statue of the Praça Tiradentes.\footnote{Jornal do Commercio, April 21, 1890, “Gazetilha. Homenagem a Tiradentes”; O Tempo, April 2, 1893, “Publicações”; O Tempo, May 29, 1894, “Secção Livre.”} The officials found the request unremarkable and certainly not controversial and thus approved the construction in that public square of a bandstand that would rise high enough to conceal the figure of Pedro I. By April 18, many students from the National School of Fine Arts had taken notice of the work, realized its objective, and
written a letter to the editor of *O Páiz* to protest the covering of the statue and call for the authorities to stop the construction. That letter was published the next day in the newspaper along with an editorial piece criticizing the erection of the bandstand and similarly calling for its cessation. By around 9 a.m. that same morning, some authorities met and decided to put an embargo on the raising of any more of the structure around the statue and ordered that the planks already reaching Pedro’s figure be sawed off. At around 5:30 that evening, a group of people, including a National Guard captain and a police brigade captain, gathered at the site and began to pull down the boards of the bandstand. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived but did nothing to stop the partial demolition of the bandstand. They kept the peace, but they did not stop the group.

Around 11 p.m., the highest city officials such as Mayor Barata Ribeiro and his chief of police met and decided that all construction works around the statue should be stopped and the bandstand completely demolished the next day. Ribeiro withdrew the police force and notified the Club Tiradentes commission and Sampaio Ferraz of his decisions. When that next morning came and the statue was still covered by boards, a similar group tore down the bandstand until nothing stood (see Figure 9).\(^{168}\)

The idea of covering the nation’s first public monument with a bandstand was roundly criticized even before the first board was ripped down. In its editorial alongside the protest made by the art students (which will be discussed in greater detail), *O Páiz* called the protests of the students and others “personal reclamations” against the act and

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described them as “persuasive and just” and the *coreto*, or bandstand, itself “misplaced and “a bad idea.” On the next day, before protestors took the final demolition of the statue into their own hands, that same newspaper editorialized that the *coreto*’s continuation violated “the most rudimentary good sense” and came from a “demagogical spirit.” It called the construction “disgraceful” and went so far as to assert that the Club Tiradentes did it with the “deliberate intent to incite.” Given this interpretation, the same editorial portrayed the demolition of the *coreto* as “a disarmament,” basically describing the outcome of the protests as having thwarted the club’s intentional instigation. The attack on the club went further, labeling the act as “irrational” and the “epithet of the proudly ignorant.”\(^\text{169}\)
While the condemnation of Rio’s well-known conservative newspaper could be dismissed by some as ideologically and politically opportunistic, the fact that the coreto was immediately criticized by four other newspapers lends evidence to the fact that it was widely unpopular. The Diario de Noticias called “the eclipsing of the statue of Pedro I” a “discordant and regrettable note” as well as a “disgraceful or unfortunate incident” that became an “impediment of the festivities that the Club Tiradentes has held for twelve years.” The fact that this newspaper even had a front page section titled “The Incident of the Statue” shows the public notoriety of the disturbance. The Gazeta de Noticias was more understanding in terms of the club’s motivations. Its editorial referred to the statue’s covering as “an exaggeration of convictions” but nevertheless an idea “outside of good reason.” In contrast, the Revista Illustrada was one of the few periodicals to actually name Club Tiradentes as the party at fault and call them out publicly. In an editorial labeled “Justified” to describe the public protest of the coreto, the Revista called the statue covering an “idea so cheap, so foolish that there is no way it would ever find support in public opinion.” They went further to characterize the plan as one in which the club had attempted, with the initial “agreement of the highest representatives of the city,” to “bury the statue of Pedro I, erected there in the Largo do Rocio.” The word choices are striking in this statement. The idea of burying the symbolic representation of the deceased first emperor is of itself telling of what the journal considered the true motivations of the club. Secondly, their conscious choice of referring to the site as the Rocio came to be a way to further repudiate the increasingly perceived radical identity of Club Tiradentes.

While the Revista Illustrada might have called the act “so messed up, so foolish,” the

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171 Gazeta de Noticias, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua.”
editor of *O Apostolo* called it an outright “profanation” of the nation’s past, and the title of his article, “Patriotism,” pointed to the larger issue of how loyalty to the *patria* would be judged in the public sphere.\(^\text{172}\) These general criticisms are reflective of the wide spectrum of political thought and discourse present in the early Republic. That so many organs could agree that the building of the *coreto* was wrong is striking, and they did so for various reasons. For some, it was the presence of popular reaction and involvement that delegitimized the *coreto*. For others, it was either a question of respecting art as a marker of a society’s civilization or of a people’s self-awareness of their own past. All in all, these factors were more generalized in nature and large in scope. The outrage over the covering of the statue was not grounded in some deep-seated adoration of Pedro I himself and the need to personally defend him and his statue. It was quite the opposite. How the writers at this time specifically defined their first emperor given this context will be discussed in the following chapters. Yet those notions of Pedro and the imperial past he was a part of were no more important than what had become a larger fundamental question. That larger question was how a divided new political elite dealt with each other as they tried to construct a coherent historical narrative out of contested views of the past. All of these issues come together to provide a fascinating look into the memorial psyche of Brazilians in 1893.

**Defending the Statue: The Popular Element**

From the very beginning of the backlash against the covering of the statue, there was a clear portrayal on the part of editorial writers that a large part of the Rio population was against the *coreto* and supportive of those who acted to remove it. Just as the imperial elites writing in 1862 invoked the acclamation of an undefined yet unified

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“people” as an element of legitimation for the statue’s inauguration, here we see a similar rhetorical practice. One writer cited the “general reclaims” of “the people” that were the true inspiration for the incident’s coverage and were simply being echoed in the press. That same writer asserted that the idea to completely cover the statue “repelled a great part of our population” while another noted that “a population protested” as one. The editorial of another paper went further, emphasizing the public nature of the statue as being at the root of the “popular indignation” that resulted and eventually led to the statue’s demolition at the hands of the public. While this writer similarly referred to the protests as being the “reclamations of the people,” he also commented on the significance of an act committed in the public square. In just the initial report of the incident, he portrayed the bandstand as “concealing from the eyes of the public…the statue of Pedro I.”

Underscoring this appreciation for the statue’s place in the public eye and imagination was the prevailing yet incorrect notion before the altercation that the construction surrounding Pedro’s statue was actually preparatory work being done in order to ship the statue to Chicago for that year’s World’s Fair. This interpretation of the events reveals that those members of the public considered the statue to be a legitimate representative object of Brazilian society. To then learn that the purpose of the scaffolding around the statue was actually to hide and denigrate it rather than exhibit it as a symbol of Brazilian greatness for other nations to see was certainly a jolt, and it led to such vitriolic speech as the covering being the degradation and “vandalism” of a monument of “art, history, and patriotism.” This same writer applauded the “unanimous”...
alerting of the people by the press and the public’s resultant protest.\textsuperscript{175} While this quotation shows that there was some dispute between what the driving force of the protest was, the papers or the people, the critics of the bandstand could all agree on how to label the group responsible for its demolition: “a group of \textit{populares}, or simply, “the people.” Those “\textit{populares}” included Captain Martinho de Moraes of the National Guard and Captain Hyppolito Coutinho of the Police Brigade, a point which will be analyzed further in a discussion of the perceived republican-on-republican-crime and “purity” witch hunt that followed the incident. There is no specific information on just how organic and spontaneous the grouping would have been, but given the presence of two commanders, the “popular” aspect of the group can certainly be debated. The fact that the \textit{Gazeta de Noticias} described that group as having “invaded” the square and responded to the \textit{coreto} as “demolishing it with extraordinary rapidity” lends a certain level of organization and purposefulness to the actions. The nature of the \textit{vivas} given by that group as their “work” was “interrupted at times” also reveals a less than subversive nature. They gave cheers “to the Republic, to Marshal Floriano Peixoto [the nation’s President], and to Liberty.” The reporting that the police allowed the group to continue the demolition after they arrived was greeted with approval by the \textit{coreto’s} critics for having “agreed that the people were right. Very well.”\textsuperscript{176}

While the police who arrived on the scene displayed an unambiguous solidarity with the protestors, overall in the papers there was also a distinct awareness of a significant divide between the people who were protesting and the higher city authorities responsible for the debacle. For the writers of \textit{O Paiz} in particular, the incident became

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Revista Illustrada}, April 1893, “Justo”;
  \item \textit{O Apostolo}, April 21, 1893, “Vandalismo.”
  \item \textit{Gazeta de Noticias}, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua”;
  \item \textit{Jornal do Commercio}, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I”;
  \item \textit{Revista Illustrada}, April 1893, “Justo.”
\end{itemize}
an issue of law and order. The editor said that “in a country of laws and authorities, the citizens, when they are prejudiced or offended must appeal to them.” He continued by saying that while the paper “will never advise the people to acts of reprisals or to take vengeance into their own hands,” he reaffirmed that “the public protest of the extravagant and foolish coreto was opportune, just, and worthy of respect.” The paper did, after all, seem to have a vested interest in the outcome of the confrontation. In its editorial, it so much as called for the people to act, saying that the lack of progress on the part of the municipality on removing the coreto by that day’s morning “will obligate the demolition on account of the municipality.” The Gazeta de Notícias added to the expectations that morning, making it clear that 9 a.m. was the target time for the subsequent demolition of the coreto. The heightened expectations and timetable explain why the people went from being referred to as a “natural spectator” of the dismantling of the bandstand to an active governmental proxy. It was natural for the people to have a presence on the scene and play a role in the demolition. Yet this notion of a call to action because of a lack of faith in the authorities can be seen in their account saying that “o povo” “knew” or had a sense that the coreto would not be taken down by the authorities and that a “group less calm attacked the condemned construction” the second time when the boards still stood around the base of the statue that next morning. The “public unrest” had no “capricious” element to it because, for O Paiz, the protestors were left with no alternative. While the vigilante aspect of the intervention was not something they desired (they make it clear that they would have “reproved it”), the necessity of it stemmed from the municipal powers not addressing the issue forthwith and as a result of that, responsibility returned “to the people.”

The Revista Illustrada similarly validated the intervention of the people. Its

editor cited an ongoing “lack of confidence” on the part of the people towards the
“enforcers of the law” if not the laws themselves. The editor made it clear where the
blame should lie: the “Jacobinism of half a dozen imbeciles.” Given this, when the
people’s peaceful demands and their “just protest” were not met by the authorities, their
“rightful indignation” led to their “gathering in mass.” The result was the destruction of
the coreto in two minutes.\textsuperscript{178} There is a possible other incendiary factor in the events that
only one journal included in its account of the incident. The Jornal do Brasil added the
presence of a rival group to the scene where the aforementioned “enormous group” came
after hearing that only Pedro I’s head was showing above the concealment. This
newspaper cited that “other group” meeting in the square to “reconstruct the same
coreto” and described them as “working with enthusiasm.” This assertion of the active
reconstruction of the coreto is not present in the other papers’ accounts, but it would go
towards explaining the intensity of the subsequent demolition leaving “not one scrap of
wood remaining.”\textsuperscript{179}

The Club Tiradentes adamantly denied any attempt on their part to reconstruct the
coreto after the municipal order to halt construction. In general, their response in the form
of a letter written by their leader Sampaio Ferraz and published in all of the papers
asserted the club’s innocence in its actions and indignation for the public reaction. It is a
fascinating example of both victimhood and naked aggression. The letter specifically
refuted the coverage of O Paiz, and Ferraz affirmed that he did recognize the gravity of
what transpired while simultaneously he sarcastically and indignantly rebutted the
interpretation and condemnation of that newspaper. In his writing, there is a sense of

\textsuperscript{178} Revista Illustrada, April 1893, “Justo.”
\textsuperscript{179} Jornal do Brazil, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I”; O Tempo, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes.”
incredulity on his part about the response to the coreto’s construction. He “did not attach any great importance” to the planned construction and did not foresee any backlash. The primary reason for that ease of mind was the practical existence of the club’s license from the prefeitura to construct the temporary edifice. He asserted the city’s complicity in allowing the “abominable offense” in their granting of the license. He seems to assert that while they had a license to completely cover the statue, they had not in fact done so intentionally out of response to the protests which he blamed for interrupting their construction. Putting sarcasm aside, Ferraz painted an inoffensive little picture of the club’s effort, which was basically finished, with paint even being applied to the “modest stage of wood where the music of the brilliant naval battalion would be played.” Given this portrayal of the innocence of the club’s coreto, Ferraz indicted the intervention and its destruction as an “assault” and a “premeditated crime,” defiantly turning around the charge made by O Paiz of the coreto itself being a premeditated instigation. Rather than a “group of populares,” to Ferraz the public interventionists were “a half dozen senseless people” who were the pawns of “enemies of the Republic” and “fervent Pedro I worshippers.” To that gullible group, the club offered no provocation by continuing to cover the statue, and its president affirmed their responding to the protests with “prudence and moderation” in contrast to the heated zeal of the others. That sense of victimhood stemming from the “attack” they suffered would be echoed by a letter writer several days after the incident who lamented that the “affront in all of this was that which the historic Club Tiradentes suffered” and whose members, “all of the propagandist and ardent republicans,” were expected to “take down their own work.” That letter-writing member was especially indignant at their not even having enough planks left to make a
proper bandstand afterwards, perhaps providing some insight into the one of the reasons
the club nixed all of its commemorative festivities. The club-as-victim theme would be
on full display again when they met afterwards to address the incident, and as will be
discussed in a following section, the meeting became more about identifying and
punishing the club’s perceived enemies. After all, it is not surprising that the club would
not take kindly to the idea that its actions were an affront to the very statue it considered
an affront.¹⁸⁰

Interestingly, some writers noticed the irony of the statue’s prominent public
visibility after Club Tiradentes’ attempt to cover it. One writer described the praça as a
magnet for curious onlookers, the number of which required patrols and policing to
manage the scene. Such a large public interest or curiosity for the statue was in stark
contrast with its virtual invisibility before the incident. Before, a few inhabitants might
pass by the statue, but all basically ignored it. That past differed greatly with the presence
of many people in 1893 purposefully visiting the site, and when there, “contemplating it.”
The same writer went so far as to call the people’s visiting of the square a “pilgrimage” in
which the pilgrims could be seen “all looking above, to the monarch of bronze giving the
charter atop a horse.” The writer ends his commentary by saying that there was a “public
for everything,” thus calling into question whether such hyperbolic description was
simply tongue-in-cheek or sincere but with a sense of dismissal for those “public”
proclivities. Either way, his commentary certainly revealed the irony of the bandstand’s
consequences and was seconded by another commentator. That writer grappled with the
significance of the public reaction by positing that maybe the real reason that the

Jornal do Commercio, April 26, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
bandstand was demolished was that the statue had finally won over during the Republic “the glorification of the people” that it lacked before since it had been met with “popular indifference during the times of the monarchy.” Adding to all of this irony is the reality that there was virtually no public discourse showing the subject of the statue—Pedro I—getting any love from the people in all of this. If anything, such discussions revealed a grudging recognition that the statue of him had a place in history and the public’s imagination even if its subject did not.\footnote{O Tempo, April 25, 1893, “Irreflexão e Imprevidencia”; Diário de Notícias, April 20, 1893, “Os Factos de Hontem”; Diário de Noticias, April 23, 1893, “Coisas.”}

**Defending the Statue: Respect for Art**

Commentators also defended the intervention and demolition of the bandstand on the grounds of the statue’s status as a national work of art. In fact, the earliest and most proactive critics of the construction were the students of the National School of Fine Arts. Their letter was what triggered the newspapers’ scrutiny of the covering of the statue. As students of art, they felt compelled to criticize those responsible for the structure built around the statue (without naming the club by name) as disparagers of art. They condemned the bandstand as “the construction of an ugly mass of pine and multi-colored rags,” an indictment that showed their interest in the aesthetics and appreciation for art rather than any political or ideological partisanship. In fact, the students made it a point to make that distinction clear, saying that they came “not to discuss politics or whether or not the historical fact of the independence of our country is or is not well represented in the person of the first emperor: to others we leave this task.” Therefore from the start, the students sought to avoid any participation in any debates about the statue’s historical value or legitimacy. As such, they attempted to insulate themselves from any charges of
being secret monarchists or Pedro I admirers or restorationists. Their criticism of the 
coreto could not be misconstrued as an attack on the standing of Tiradentes because it 
was never a defense of Pedro I. They stood up to protect only the statue because it was, in 
their eyes, an “incredibly important artistic monument” that merited respect. That reason 
alone was enough for them to take a public stand and call on the authorities to stop and 
remove the construction. They were not calling for vigilante action. Their motive was to 
raise public awareness of the coreto and create public pressure on the city government to 
act.\footnote{O Paíz, April 19, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I.”}

The students’ argument struck home with several of the editorial writers of the 
time. Multiple writers noted the work as a product of the statue’s artist, Louis Rochet. 
The editor of the Revista Illustrada supported the students for having “energetically” 
protested against what that paper called the “desecration” of Rochet’s acclaimed work. 
On a similar note, the editor of the Gazeta de Noticias noted that Club Tiradentes had 
been asked to reduce the size of its bandstand so as to not hide or “prejudice” the 
“beautiful monument of Rochet.” Such a recognition of the statue as a work of art opened 
up the discussion to the larger topic of the relationship between art and a nation’s 
standing, culture, and history. While the bandstand had immediately been “destroyed for 
the love of art,” for some it was also done out of “respect for the traditions of the 
formation of the patria.”\footnote{Revista Illustrada, April 1893, “Justo”; Gazeta de Noticias, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua”; O Tempo, 
April 25, 1893, “Irreflexão e Imprevidencia.”} The students themselves contextualized the appreciation of 
art and monuments as a marker of civilization. What was especially important to them 
was the appreciation of a people for its own art, an appreciation and a self-awareness that 
indicated what level of civilization or savagery a culture had attained. The Revista
Illustrada added to this point by making note of the singularity of Pedro I’s statue in the nation’s monumental art scene. The writer there justified the public action against the coreto by asserting the statue was “the only monument worthy of a modern civilization that we possess” while another writer for the Diário de Notícias called it “one of the few good monuments of our capital.”¹⁸⁴ That linking of the concepts of modernity and civilization in the quotation above reflects the larger Brazilian intellectual tendency to define “civilization” by those model societies of Europe, a point which will be explored further in the following paragraph. An editorial in O Paiz similarly called for the public to put politics aside to consider the situation being more about “our customs and our degree of civilization” while another article in that paper the day before reinforced that relationship between art and society. The editor said that he and his colleagues would act because they did not want the “Brazilian people to be exposed to the stigma of the less educated.” He went on to say that “everywhere that is known for having even rudimentary principles of civilization and good customs, statues are objects of cultured respect, be it for their historical value or…through the veneration of art.”¹⁸⁵ This charge by O Paiz served multiple purposes in that it advanced the importance of the appreciation of art, but it also served as a way to insult the club on the grounds of culture and education. It also showed that the editor could take something as innocuous as the defense of art and use it to offend in the sensitive climate of the day.

The art students and the journalists were very well aware of the comparative value between Brazil’s new experience with plotting a republican course after a history of monarchical rule and that of France, one of those European societies which served as an

¹⁸⁵ O Paiz, April 19, 1893 and April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I.”
exemplum of civilized nations. After all, the Brazilian Republic consciously chose Bastille Day, July 14, as one of the Festas Nacionais for the nation to honor, crediting it for the “Republic, liberty and independence of the American people.” The fact that the bandstand critics could point to the most rabid republican experience in history and in essence say, look, even France had respect for art and monuments and never did these types of things, provided them with kind of a republican radicalism gauge for the question of art.\footnote{There is the one example of the French destruction of monuments: the Commune’s destruction of the columna Vendôme. This radical act was roundly condemned with the foundation of the Third Republic. That destruction’s lesson is further explored in Chapter Five.}\footnote{Rodrigo Octavio, Festas Nacionaes (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguiet & C., 1893), 43; please note that in Octavio’s work, the French Republic is also credited for the 1891 Brazilian constitution; O Apostolo, April 21, 1893, “Vandalismo”; O Paiz, April 19, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I.”} The students actually used the opportunity for a not-so-veiled critique of the Brazilian elite constantly aping the French in all things cultural. If they could not convince the public that all statues should be “esteemed, even venerated, solely for their artistic value,” then they would settle for pointing out the cultural guide of the French that modeled respect and even veneration for a nation’s own monuments even when they were from a period cast aside and repudiated.\footnote{There is the one example of the French destruction of monuments: the Commune’s destruction of the columna Vendôme. This radical act was roundly condemned with the foundation of the Third Republic. That destruction’s lesson is further explored in Chapter Five.}\footnote{Rodrigo Octavio, Festas Nacionaes (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguiet & C., 1893), 43; please note that in Octavio’s work, the French Republic is also credited for the 1891 Brazilian constitution; O Apostolo, April 21, 1893, “Vandalismo”; O Paiz, April 19, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I.”}

The defense of the statue based on these ideas of art did not challenge the symbolic or historical meaning of the statue. They intentionally divorced Pedro I from his statue in the question of its covering. But in doing so, they were also advocating for his statue having greater security in the public sphere. Not surprisingly, Sampaio Ferraz refuted the disrespect of artwork argument. And he considered the students’ labeling of the coreto construction an “ugly mass of wood and rags” an affront. He then turned the argument around by mocking Pedro I. He said that he was replying to those decrying their “fervent love of art” by clarifying that the real offense taking place in the praça was
the “excoriation that had been practiced against the bronze” in defiling the metal to create a statue to such an odious figure. For Ferraz, it was the bronze that had been wronged and needed the students’ protection.

Defending the Statue: Respect for History

Not only did journalists link the idea of art and a nation’s “traditions” to the idea of a civilized society, but they also placed the statue of Pedro I in the context of a nation respecting its past. They grappled with what the implications of repudiating a historical figure would mean, and many worried that it was equivalent to the repudiation of the nation’s own history and in some ways, the nation itself. As will be discussed in detail in this section, some saw the covering of the statue as an example of a hatred for history while still others signified that Brazil would have no history. That idea of a nation without a past was a troubling one since it tied into so many other ideas regarding collective identity and Brazil’s desire to stake its claim to a glorified and exceptional past. It seemed to many that the war between Tiradentes and Pedro I for national iconic primacy in that public square threatened Brazilian history in general.

In one of the *Gazeta de Noticias* articles, the statue was described as a “work of art that adorns the plaza and a monument erected to the memory of one of the instigators of the independence of Brazil.”\(^{188}\) This writer condemned the act committed by Club Tiradentes by validating the statue on several levels. First, he echoed the writers in the previous section by affirming the statue as a work of art. Secondly, he noted that it was raised with the objective of memorializing one of Brazil’s most important historical moments. Lastly, he established Pedro’s historical credentials as having played a role in that moment. A writer for the *Diário de Noticias* wrote similarly, stating that the statue

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\(^{188}\) *Gazeta de Noticias*, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua.”
“reminds Brazilians of the historical fact of the proclamation of the independence of Brazil, the beginning of its national life, succeeding in that which the well-deserving catalysts of the aborted revolution of 1792 dreamed of.”

This 1893 writer once again affirmed Pedro I as the proclaimer and his proclamation, the Grito, as equal to Brazilian independence. This portrayal carved out memorial space for Pedro I by narrowing his legacy down just as they did in 1862. Despite the fact that the legitimacy of Pedro’s role in independence would be strongly contested by others, this type of defense of the statue serves as a good example of how a monument could possess multiple layers of legitimacy and importance as the statue of Pedro I had become a piece of history itself.

The greatest evidence of this complexity can be found in the comments of a journalist for the Diário de Notícias writing a week after the incident. There he noted how different groups will sacrifice and sell the symbols of other groups in order to glorify their own symbols. He provided a hypothetical scenario of the monarchy being restored and selling all the positivist goods to remake the statue to illustrate his point. Because he saw the casting out of statues in the attempt to repudiate the past as a vicious and pointless cycle, he recommended that those offended by Pedro I’s statue raise “a monument to the Republic [and] make it huge in order to obfuscate the other, but leave what is there, there, that never did harm to anyone. And don’t be giving to this statue the importance that the man that it symbolized never had in life.” That he could dismiss Pedro I as an historical figure yet defend the perpetuation of his statue in the public square shows the interplay of ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy in remembering the past. His warning to the republicans that their portrayal of the statue as a threat to the government only served to elevate Pedro I’s importance was an indictment of what he

189 Diário de Notícias, April 21, 1893, “O incidente da estatua.”
perceived as their weakness born out of their fears and actions. His desire that they not empower Pedro’s legacy by empowering his statue, alongside his desire for the statue to be left in the public square, certainly reflected a multi-layered vision of national memory.190

The contestation of Pedro I’s legacy made these discussions tricky for most writers. Another journalist for the same newspaper as just above made the point that the statue was much more than a mere representation of the first emperor. After prefacing his topic with a reassurance of his republican virtue, a common occurrence before any criticism was uttered against the bandstand, this writer said that “the statue of d. Pedro I, founder of the Brazilian nationality, is not a monument meant to perpetuate the glory of a man or of a dynasty; it is something more elevated and noble: it is the eternalization of national glory.” That the monument had been erected to commemorate a national glory (as discussed in the previous chapter) rather than just a personal one for Pedro I or an imperial one for the monarchy meant that for this writer the events that took place during the monarchical past could not and should not be repudiated or excised from the nation’s perceived past. This writer based this assertion upon the idea that the 7th of September “as a great date” should be “consecrated and respected” as a celebration of the “emancipation” of Brazil. Pedro’s role—on that day—secured for him a place in that celebration. In the writer’s eyes, the statue covering was an act that marred “the brilliance of this memorable date [September 7]” even though it was in the service of another “equally glorious” date. Again, his concern was not with the covering as an insult to Pedro I. Instead it was out of the insult being done to the symbolic representation of Brazil’s independence. The writer went on to discuss how a nation treats its monuments

190 Diario de Notícias, April 23, 1893, “Coisas.”
by saying that “there are examples of monuments attacked out of the fervor of political passion” and that the “multitude” has acted “against its own glory” in the attempt to “injure individuals or combat principles.” Here he makes the point again that the attempt to erase Pedro I or monarchism from the plaza was almost like an act of self-mutilation. Where this writer saw a nation acting against itself by covering the statue, another commentator found it to be an act of denying one’s own history. In a letter calling for the Brazilian public to learn its history, a writer made a call for “new” republicans to respect history even if it included monarchical symbols and representations. He used the example of the military group known as the Voluntarios da Patria, which earned distinction beginning in the Paraguayan War in the 1860s, to make the point that the emblem of the crown that they wore on their uniform was part of the group’s own history, not just that of the monarchy’s. Telling that venerated group to change its emblem would be akin to telling it to deny its own history and identity during the empire, which to these writers was tantamount to a crime against themselves. In addition to self-harm or denial, “the idea of covering a national monument to honor the memory of a patriot” was at odds with “the feelings of the people.” A colleague agreed with this point and similarly condemned the “unfortunate idea of commemorating the proto-martyr of the Republic in a means so prejudicial to one of the glorious traditions of our homeland.”\(^{191}\) While the latter writer argued that casting aspersions onto the statue unwittingly did the same to that year’s Tiradentes Day, the former emphasized that prevailing notion of popular will and validated the vigilantes, making the case for a more inclusive sense of history and national commemoration.

\(^{191}\) Diário de Notícias, April 20, 1893, “Os Factos de Hontem”; Jornal do Commercio, April 23, 1893, “O Coreto do Rocio” in “Publicações a Pedido.”
The editor of *O Apostolo* repeated the definition of Pedro I as the “founder of the nationality of Brazil,” given that the first emperor helped achieve political separation and statehood for Brazil as a nation. In his comments regarding the statue’s visible presence on Tiradentes Day, he also revealed those “ideological cleavages” that José Murilo de Carvalho identified. He noted that “the republicans would not like to see the statue” or have it there in the plaza along with the festivities. This distinguishing of the *republican* problem with the statue shows the different ideologies at play. The positivist writer did not find the statue as a symbol of the monarchy to be threatening. In the positivist view of society following a line of progress, evolution did not allow for a reversion to the past state of that society. There was no need to eradicate the past to secure some sense of the present. With that in mind, he ended his commentary by saying “make your carnival, but don’t profane our tradition.” He reduced the republican need to construct their *imaginário* as a spectacle that had no business undercutting a previously established tradition. Another writer similarly reduced the covering of the statue as a “manifestation of hatred of the past.”

This question of how republicans viewed monuments and tradition was also taken up in the *Diário de Notícias*. According to their journalist,

> the best republicans are not those who hate the statues because they make them remember the institution against which they fought, forgetting that their hatred will mainly injure dear national traditions: they are those who know to offer an owed homage—free of political preoccupations, under the influence of the greater democratic spirit—to the great figures and the great events of our homeland.

Like the proponents of the statue as art, this writer advocated for an apolitical approach to national memory that would emphasize the *patria* and its defining moments rather than

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193 *Diário de Notícias*, April 20, 1893, “Os Factos de Hontem.”
any one particular regime. He countered the radical view of national memory and advocated for an integrated vision of Brazilian history that could still recognize the 7th of September and be self-aware and gracious enough to acknowledge all historical figures, even imperial ones.

The mayor himself, Barata Ribeiro, spoke of the importance of history for a people in his statement issued on the night that he ordered the bandstand stopped. In an attempt to allow Sampaio Ferraz and the club to keep some level of control and agency of the situation, Ribeiro asked/demanded that the club’s president intervene before he and the authorities had to. He said he did that because he was “convinced that in his spirit [Ferraz’s] will be a profound conviction that a people without traditions is a people without history and therefore without moral value.”

This justification of the municipal intervention to stop the covering of the statue—and the indignant responses it engendered by the likes of Ferraz—provides a glimpse into the intensified duel over how to honor national history when many notions of the past were disputed. Ribeiro argued that there was a moral component to honoring the nation’s tradition and history. This assertion is not in dispute. In fact, the moral aspect of the incident is what made it so volatile for those who considered the statue of Pedro I to be an ever-present affront to the memory of Tiradentes. For them, the statue was the symbol of all that Tiradentes opposed and died for. It was the anti-symbol of the Republic as much as Tiradentes was the chosen symbol. It represented a regime repudiated and therefore deserved no place in perpetuity. At the heart of the issue was the ongoing debate as to whether symbols of the venerated and repudiated could co-exist in national public consciousness. Ribeiro called for that

coexistence. The incident showed that many people were actually more attuned to coexistence than the idea of casting out one for the other. The covering of the statue was privileging Tiradentes while, as previously noted, “prejudicing” Pedro I. But in the eyes of the radicals, protecting the statue was privileging Pedro by interfering with their plans to commemorate Tiradentes Day.

The incident led to more than just interference in the commemorations. On the night of April 20, the club met to discuss their circumstances, and their response to the public actions and discourse taken against them was to protest by cancelling their observance of Tiradentes Day. While one newspaper just gave a small blurb about the group “suspending” and then “annulling” all of the festivities they had planned, the *Jornal do Commercio* actually published the club’s statement. Club Tiradentes informed the paper that they had “decided to abstain from celebrating the anniversary of the death of Tiradentes…in view of the events of yesterday.”

195 This new development, leaving Tiradentes Day to be virtually unobserved, added a new twist to Ribeiro’s words about tradition and history. A commentary made in the *Gazeta de Notícias* on April 22 even quoted the mayor, whom he called an “eminent republican above suspicion,” regarding the absences of tradition and history corresponding to a moral absence to describe the lack of observance of Tiradentes Day. For this writer, the “respectful and enthusiastic consecrations made to the martyrs of the democratic idea by a grateful posterity are worthy testimonies of a people who respect themselves and attempt to affirm their own vitality.” The absence of that celebration, then, would show ingratitude and a lack of self-respect. The incident and aftermath showed a people going back on their traditions and

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therefore having no history, and while this writer never stated it explicitly, the responsibility born by the Club Tiradentes in reinforcing that negative image that Barata Ribeiro warned about was clear. Ultimately, the decisions to cover the statue and then cancel the festivities both came to be viewed as errors in judgment. An editor for the *Diário de Notícias* called the decision to not hold the commemorations for Tiradentes “no less unfortunate” than the bandstand idea and blamed it on the “stubbornness” of those who called off the festivities. He charged that “shame” had taken the place of “fraternity.” He also warned that it was time that “each citizen take his role seriously. For the glory of the homeland and the greatness of the Republic.” The writer Paschoal in *O Tempo* conceded that it was the club’s “incontestable right” to nullify the festivities, but he lamented “that for a motive so frivolous” the “golden date” was not being celebrated, which he called another “undeniable right.” Comments like this underscored the growing image of the Club Tiradentes putting their desire to retaliate against the municipal authorities ahead of carrying out their homage to Tiradentes. The fact that the club was originally asked—but refused—to simply reduce the size of the bandstand so as not to hide the statue revealed the club’s dogmatic and defiant approach to the conflict. In essence, their war against Pedro I, his statue, and the authorities who went back on their license mattered most, and this stance communicated to many in the public that the club’s protest was more important than their namesake. After all, in the statement that the club released, there was not even a hint of paying homage to Tiradentes, only a focus on themselves. Another writer in the *Diário de Notícias* specifically called the club out for what would today be called taking their ball and going home. The editorial described the club’s resolution to abstain from holding any festivities as one of “indignation, spite or
misunderstanding of the scruples of dignity” stemming from the conflict. The writer was the first to also note the irony that the club refused to carry out their preexisting program to honor their patron. He demeaned their indignation by calling the incident just a “little trouble” and mockingly said it was a “good way to honor the immortal memory of the great citizen” for which they were named. This writer was just one of many who criticized Club Tiradentes for allowing pettiness to carry the day instead of civic duty and commemorative tradition.  

For these critics, the bandstand incident revealed the need to reaffirm the past. For the members of Club Tiradentes and their ideological compatriots, the continued public criticism they were forced to endure confirmed their need to scrutinize the present. They were a club and ideology under assault at a time that the long-term survival and consolidation of the Brazilian Republic were far from certain. Rather than adorers of art or appreciators of history, they saw enemies of the Republic. And that sense of vulnerability and threat affected what that group did before, during, and after the bandstand brouhaha. Before we investigate how the writers at that time specifically viewed Brazil’s imperial past as a whole and the legacy of its first Emperor in particular, which will be the subject of the next chapter, we must first understand how they viewed their republican present. An analysis of what Brazilian writers were saying about the relative strength and nature of the Republic they were forging reveals considerable disagreements about how safe the Republic was and how “pure” were the sentiments of the republicans running it. Explaining this volatile and contested political landscape will explain why the covering of a statue mattered to so many people.

The Perceived State of the Republic

How supporters of the Republic perceived their newly founded state had everything to do with the level of threat they perceived as facing it. There were those who did not see the Republic as under perpetual assault and facing mortal danger from without or within at every turn. There were those who did believe in a conservative/monarchical “permanent conspiracy” against the government and its agenda. And there was a wide range of people somewhere in between. These differences, which were often perceived as diametrical opposition, played a tremendous role in how Brazilians responded to the bandstand incident because those differences determined their level of ideological or political fear and outrage. The public conflict over the covering of Pedro’s statue, therefore, triggered a reaction based on those resultant world views. If they perceived the threat level to the Republic to be low or at least manageable, then the statue brouhaha was an irrational overreaction to a small occurrence blown way out of proportion. For those on the other end of the spectrum, the incident was evidence of that ongoing conspiracy and the need to purge the government and the Republican Party of anyone who was suspect. Such a view left no room for any middle ground. The public debate that resulted reflected the contestation over the very nature and composition of the Republic, between moderates and radicals. The statue incident certainly did not lead to any definitive resolution of this conflict, but it did provide a fascinating glimpse into it.

From the very beginning of the Republic’s existence, there was a palpable sense of both optimism and uncertainty regarding the new government’s future. A writer’s comments in 1890 illustrated this duality: “the discontented with the Republic will never seriously threaten the order and the peace that reigns in Brazil.” They might stir up
“apprehensions and intrigues,” but they would “never be able to undo the work of the patriots that made the United States of Brazil.” Comments in the same newspaper, *O Paiz*, just one year later indicated the toll that a lack of political consolidation had taken. They show a stark contrast between the optimism associated with the Republic’s first celebration of Tiradentes Day with the circumstances of 1891. Where there was “enthusiasm” before, one editor finds only “disillusionment.” A contributing factor to that disillusionment was the growing perception of Deodoro da Fonseca’s presidency as authoritarian and even imperial. In terms that will sound distinctly familiar to those used to describe Pedro I by past critics, one editor for the *Diário de Notícias* equated Deodoro with his right-hand minister, the Baron of Lucena, and indicted their rule’s “crown” as well as their “corruption…disobedience to the law…violation of the Constitution…and all the public powers [being] in the hand of only one.” This portrayal of the Republic’s first president as the usurper of singular, authoritarian power and violator of the constitution sounds more like the Pedro I that Otoni criticized than the venerated proclaimer of the Republic. The same editor even used the term “official lie” to describe Deodoro’s “imperialist” rule, a label quite reminiscent of Otoni’s “bronze lie.” Overall, the writer defined Brazil’s current period as one of “political comedy” for which he feared a “tragic end” and placed ultimate responsibility with the president. In April of 1891, Deodoro had officially been president for only two months, but his control of the provisional government before the government apparatuses had been created by the 1891 constitution had already soured many to his style of rule. It did not help his image, notes José Murilo de Carvalho, that the old general even looked to Brazilians like their exiled emperor Pedro II. The presence of Lucena was especially problematic for the president.
and the public. The public view of him as a monarchist due to his position in the imperial
government made him suspect and the figure the republicans directed the majority of
their ire towards. They perceived the “Baron” as being opposed to the showing of respect
to Tiradentes for the commemoration in 1892. One writer charged that the “present
government” was “making the people forget the liberal traditions of this country.” The
writer J. R. for O Paiz previewed this sentiment back in 1891 and lamented the larger
implications of the diminished commemoration of Tiradentes Day amidst the political
instability of the day. He described the day as evidence of an

unhappy people [who] do not have the cult of devotion to their heroes, nor have
the exaltation of their ancestors: without a past in time, without a point of human
support in history, a human island…without inheritance…or connection to
another generation. You say that the monarchy had no traditions here: and I ask
what is the republican tradition that we should foment and develop from now on?

In place of that cult or civic awareness, J. R. found only “indifference…vulgar
contentment… and monotone happiness.”\footnote{O Paiz, April 26, 1891, “Sete Dias.”} This finding of public indifference was
typically an indictment of the level of civic engagement during the empire but it
increasingly became a republican self-criticism as well. It was also an indication of the
“disillusionment” noted above. While the writer referenced previously did in fact make
clear that President Deodoro da Fonseca was responsible for the current political
situation, that same writer nevertheless addressed all of his charges to the “Baron” rather
than the President. In an interesting twist, Deodoro would use the pretext of a monarchist
plot to justify his dissolution of Brazil’s National Congress in November of 1891, a move
that would force his resignation and his replacement by Floriano Peixoto, who would be
the president at the time of the bandstand incident.\textsuperscript{198}

In the end, all of these fears of monarchists and authoritarians subverting the
society and government of the Republic from within created a perpetual perception of
threat. On top of that, an economic contraction added to that year’s public perception of a
republic in crisis. The result was that earlier grandiose notions of Brazil’s “innate
predisposition for democracy” based on the idea that “the Latin race is Republican” were
coming up against the reality of the difficulty in organizing the new state and its
society.\textsuperscript{199} In the \textit{Diário de Notícias} on the day after Tiradentes Day in 1891, an account
of the public discourses held at that commemoration pointed to “the uncertainties of the
present and to the period of struggle that Brazilian liberty faces.” Included in the
speeches was the belief that there was a “conspiracy against the Republic” that had not
been uncovered yet but that existed “latent.” This reporter also noted the participation of
one Sampaio Ferraz in this discourse. Such a deep-seated sense of undisclosed threats and
uncertainty provides a context to the club president’s point of view and sheds
considerable light on the seriousness with which he and the Club Tiradentes personally
responded to the repercussions of the bandstand incident.\textsuperscript{200}

\textbf{The Fear of the Silent Plotting of Monarchists}

The theme of lurking enemies was a common one, even before 1891. An earlier
account of the 1890 Tiradentes Day celebrations juxtaposed what the article called the
“most sincere patriotism” of those who participated and showed their civic engagement

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Diário de Notícias}, April 20, 1891, “A Semana Passada”; Carvalho, 56; \textit{Diário de Notícias}, April 21,
1891, “Vinte e um de Abril”; Burns, 237.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{O Paiz}, February 25, 1890, “A Republica” and April 20, 1891, “Chronica Politica”; \textit{Diário de Notícias},
February 22, 1890, “A Raça Latino é Republicano.”
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Diário de Notícias}, April 22, 1891, “Tiradentes.”
with what it labeled a “profanation” and even a crime in the absence of any commemorations at the royal palace. The writer attempted to minimize its significance by saying that “happily those who are spiteful are few and the intrigues they are behind will unmask them, so that all will know them as enemies of the Republic.” This perceived monarchical slight added to a sense of conflict and standoff in the new political landscape. It is not clear what exactly occurred at the palace or its extent, but it clearly was important enough to earn its participants the title of “enemies of the Republic.”

Such a fear of the republic’s enemies and the threats they posed to the fledgling state existed immediately after the proclamation and would shape the view of commentators in 1893.

That fear centered most notably on the originally Portuguese concept of *Sebastianismo*. Robert M. Levine succinctly defines that idea as “the belief that Portugal’s King Sebastian had not died in battle at Alcácer Quibir against the Moors in 1578, but had gone into hiding, awaiting a triumphal return.” While the idea had a religious and Messianic element to it from the start, Levine also notes how it ultimately took on an element of political liberation from the unwanted rule of a new power, giving the Portuguese nation a vehicle through which it could maintain its “will to survive as a nation” under Spanish control. Sebastianism repeatedly popped up in the Portuguese political imagination following political ruptures, and it did so across the Atlantic in Brazilian minds as well. In the context of the first few years of the Republic, Francisco das Neves Alves describes *Sebastianismo* as having a “restorative character” that reflected a desire for the return to the way things were under the empire. While the

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201 *Diário de Notícias*, April 28, 1890, “A Semana Passada.”
people often labeled as Sebastianists did not self-identify as such, their opposition or criticism of the policies of the new state earned them that designation. As Alves points out, that opposition to the regime came not out of any real desire for the monarchy to be restored but rather the desire for the reinstatement of practices like the freedoms of expression and the press that existed during the imperial era. According to Alves, there were mere “traces” of any monarchist identification instead of the ever-present “bogeyman” feared by the more radical republicans.203

Nevertheless, conspiracy theorists in Rio de Janeiro dating back to early 1890 warned of “Sebastianist conspiracy” efforts and described a climate of subversive aspirations and political intrigue that had the potential for real threat. Some discourse surrounding the nation’s observance of September 7 in 1890 also debated the monarchical presence and threat to the Republic. A letter by the Visconde de Taunay, the very same Taunay who as a young man contributed inaugural odes in 1862, in the Gazeta de Notícias asserted that “the monarchical party exists and will always exist…numerous…and throughout Brazil” but that as a party they did and would not “conspire” against the Republic. Rather, they were watching events unfold. A writer for the newspaper Novidades refuted that idea in his own article. He responded that no legitimate monarchical party existed and that instead monarchists cloaked themselves under the false flags of other groups like the Catholic Party and the moderate faction of the Republican Party. This writer wanted those hiding monarchists “unmasked” and exposed.204 The radical fear of Sebastianist plots skyrocketed after the news of Pedro II’s

204 O Paiz, February 28, 1890, “Conspiração”; Novidades, September 8, 1890, “Monarchists.”
death in France reached Rio in December of 1891 and generated a significant public response. Such an outpouring of affection and grief was interpreted by radicals like the Jacobins within the Club Tiradentes as a climate ripe for restorationist opportunism. In response, the club organized a “great civic march” to glorify all Republican figures, and even more strikingly decided to create the “Batalhão (Battalion) Tiradentes” to serve as a funded and armed civic militia. The club named those they considered “political figures of the extinct monarchy” as Sebastianist plotters since those suspect figures were using the “pretext of funeral rights for the ex-emperor” to set the scene for a restorationist scheme. To combat that and any other threat to the Republic, the Battalion would be made up of around four hundred “republican citizens” armed through a public subscription. While there was some push back in the press the next day questioning why the club did not instead fund and join the National Guard rather than create their own militia, the Battalion Tiradentes became a visible and powerful arm of the core group that made up the club.205 As will be discussed shortly, the battalion would serve republican interests in a wide range of services from taking up arms and fighting against a naval insurrection to monitoring what was said in the press on an everyday basis. The battalion’s watchful eyes were not the only ones trained on the press. For example, in 1892 O Apostolo reported in a section that can best be translated as “Say What?,” “that in S. Paulo books and pamphlets having the imperial crown as their emblem had just been published.”206 A small little blurb like that would be noticed by all readers in Rio and serve to validate the notion of some that monarchists were still a threat to be reckoned with. Groups like the Club Tiradentes and its Battalion paid particular attention to the

205 *O Tempo*, December 15, 1891, “Club Tiradentes.”
presence of royal symbolism like the anecdote above, so not surprisingly they reacted
with great suspicion when their covering of the ultimate symbol of the monarchy in Rio
led to public criticism.

An *O Tempo* writer led the charge against those lurking monarchists in an article
devoted to Tiradentes on his commemorative day just days after the incident in 1893. The
writer asked the “high powers” of the government to “not allow these monarchists to
occupy the higher and lower jobs.” This writer was particularly concerned with jobs in
the capital city, saying that such infiltration was against “the highly sacred” constitution.
In terms of detecting those monarchists, he affirmed that they “would be incapable of
portraying themselves as republicans” and therefore would be noticeable as “our political
enemies” by “their silence.” Writers of this vein had to deal with a vexing problem. There
was no uprising at all carried out by monarchists after the incident, not one single peep
about bringing back the empire. In fact, writers tripped all over themselves to affirm their
republican sentiments. Fitting with their world view, though, the absence of any
Sebastianist plot actually served to reinforce the idea that the enemies of the Republic
were acting strategically silent and were still a threat, albeit a secret one.207

Speaking of republican sentiment, the same newspaper found the incident guilty
of producing harm. It said that in terms of “political relations, the brutality that injured
the republican sentiment” could not be compared to the perceived injuries to the “adorers
of the work of art that attests to a historical fact that never provoked any sense of national
enthusiasm.” This writer clearly dismissed the call to respect the statue as a piece of art,
instead taking the opportunity to claim republican victimhood and present the argument
as a lie upon a lie…that the statue was art and that it represented history that mattered to

207 *O Tempo*, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes.”
Sampaio Ferraz displayed a similar sense of incredulity about the public’s response to the statue’s covering. In his published letter, he said that he “did not attach any great importance” to the plan or the construction and certainly did not foresee any backlash. To him, it was simply a “temporary edifice” approved by the municipality in the form of the license for what he sarcastically referred to as the “abominable offense.” Ferraz was also incredulous due to his own sense of the world in which he lived, the world ushered in by the proclamation of the Republic. He stated that he “had lamentably deceived his soul into believing” that “after the 15th of November, the bitter traitor of D. João VI might not have in this land so many and so fervid worshippers.” He likened the criticism to an “anger suppressed that conspires in the darkness, finds its way, and its explosion feeds off of everything.” Those involved wanted the “perturbation” of the Republic. By translating the criticism directed to the club as an attempt to throw the entire state into disorder, Ferraz confirmed that he saw himself and his club as indistinct from the Republic and vice versa. Such a grandiose sense of self-importance would indeed rub many commentators of the day the wrong way, and they would take the opportunity to challenge that Jacobin vision of the Republic and their role in it.

**Criticism towards Municipal Authorities**

The reason that radical republicans were so fixated on the ideological predisposition of their government’s officials was because of the role that municipal officials played in the conflict and the subsequent (self-perceived) humiliation of Club Tiradentes in the public sphere. Those figures involved in the demolition of the bandstand demonstrated a wide range in terms of their level of complicity or blame—indirect to direct—and in terms of their political prominence—license-approving functionary to the...

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208 *O Tempo*, April 25, 1893, “Irreflexão e Improvidencia.”
mayor of Rio de Janeiro. The most immediate and obvious officials who drew the ire of Club Tiradentes were Captain Martinho de Moraes of the National Guard and Captain Hyppolito Coutinho of the Police Brigade. Reports of the taking down of the bandstand on the evening of the 19th of April placed those two men at the head of the “grupo de populares” responsible for the demolition. In their account of the incident, the *Diário de Notícias* made note that the group was led by the two leaders “known as republicans” and “who occupied honored positions in our society.”209 In addition, when the Police Brigade cavalry unit arrived, multiple papers reported that Captain Moraes “thanked the police for having given time to the people in order to complete their work” of demolishing the *coreto*. This perception of the consent, acquiescence, or even participation of municipal authorities became a major point of contention with Club Tiradentes and fueled the idea that there was a municipal conspiracy against them.210 Their indignation grew over the comments of the head of the municipal government, Mayor Barata Ribeiro. The mayor’s decision to stop the construction, his order to demolish the bandstand, his public criticism of the club for its disrespect to Brazilian traditions, and his portrayal of the club as having in essence pulled a fast one on the city in obtaining that license all came together to earn him both praise and condemnation in the press. And while Sampaio Ferraz would attribute all actions critical of his club as coming from Pedro I “worshippers,” the fact of the matter was that that betrayal more accurately reflected republican on republican—even Jacobin on Jacobin—crime rather than any Sebastianist opportunism. After all, José Murilo defines Ribeiro as a republican and even a “prominent leader of Jacobin

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209 Please note that a deeper discussion of their status as “pseudo-republicans” takes place later in this chapter. See the section titled “The Bandstand Incident as “True Republican” Litmus Test.”
tendencies.” The reported *vivas* shouted during the incident provide more evidence to the incident and its aftermath being more of an internal republican dispute. The vigilante demolishers of the *coreto* were credited with giving “acclamations and *vivas* to the Republic, to the army, to the armada [navy], to the police, and to Marshal [President] Floriano.” No one shouted *vivas* to the monarchy or to Pedro I.211 Barata Ribeiro himself never even referred to Pedro I by name in his publicized letter to Ferraz (or Tiradentes for that matter…even calling the site the Largo do Rocío).

The way that Mayor Ribeiro communicated his decisions and ideas to Sampaio Ferraz made the relationship between the two clearly public and decidedly antagonistic. The mayor did indeed include in his letter a face-saving gesture towards Club Tiradentes and its leader, giving them the courtesy of allowing them to call off their own works before the prefecture did. Technically, Ribeiro was “soliciting the intervention” of Ferraz to carry out the “politeness of acting” in order to remedy the “inconvenient” situation. This façade was recognizable to most observers since the letter was published after the public had already torn down a large part of the bandstand and made its reconstruction untenable. Had the offer to have the club resolve the issue themselves been done in private and subsequently heralded as being of their own initiative and sensitivity, then it would have saved face. However, the escalating tension between the two negated any possibility of that scenario, and instead antagonism ruled the day. Multiple times in his very short letter, Ribeiro made reference to the club’s intent to “cover” and “conceal” the statue as indicative of their over-the-top carrying out of their licensed construction. His argument centered on the prevailing notion that the club went way too far in blatantly covering the statue. He even cited a rumor of the construction that he dismissed as being

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preposterous. In terms of his and his officials’ lack of scrutiny of the details of the plan, Ribeiro excused them both based on the assertion that he never anticipated that Sampaio Ferraz would fail to put on a tasteful commemoration worthy of Tiradentes. He couched this blame in the terms of honoring Tiradentes, but in reality the issue was the creation of the public controversy. In what could be the most cutting and humiliating aspect of the letter in terms of republican on republican criticism, Mayor Ribeiro chided Ferraz and the club for creating a scenario and incident on the commemorative date that was beneath that which their namesake and the date should inspire. That the mayor of Rio would criticize the president of the Club Tiradentes and the commander of the Battalion Tiradentes in this way underscores the tensions and conflicts within the republican regime.212

The public discourse praising or at least defending the actions of the mayor was minimal. *O Paiz* congratulated him for making the right decision while the *Diário de Notícias* called the actions of the authorities “perfectly justifiable.” Both the latter paper and the *Gazeta de Notícias* were relatively charitable in saying that the city granted the license without understanding the club’s intent for the “complete eclipsing of the statue with the superimposition of the base structure of the bandstand.”213 The vast majority of the discussion of the mayor’s conduct, however, found various degrees of fault and served more as an indictment of his overall municipal legacy rather than for just that one statue incident. Some of the criticism came after Club Tiradentes showed all of the newspapers the bandstand construction license granted by the city. The terms of the license were clear: the covering of the statue was approved. Given this, the municipality

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212 *Jornal do Commercio*, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
should not have been surprised by the construction. Rather, it was shocked by the public
reaction, and according to the editor of O Paiz, the mayor “recognized the
inconvenience” brought by the scandal and decided to effectively void the club’s
license.\footnote[214]{O Paiz, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua de Pedro I”; Gazeta de Noticias, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes.”} Other writers seized the opportunity to conflate the statue scandal with a
polemic involving Barata Ribeiro just months prior. In January, his administration had
demolished the slum named the Cabeza de Porco, displacing more than 2,000 people in
the name of sanitation and city planning and leaving them with no resources or recourse.
This type of urban reform demolition earned the nickname of the “bota-abaxo,” or
“tear-down.” While Sophia Beal notes that the nickname held “both positive and negative
connotations,” in April of 1893 it was purely negative for Barata Ribeiro. While
previously some journalists had praised the demolition of a place that “sheltered
murderers,” the displacement of so many desperate people, the disorder that followed,
and the growing sense of the state’s intrusion into the private and personal space of the
inhabitants of the slum all came together to add another dimension to the “demolition” of

As a result, one prominent writer commenting on the bandstand incident came to
refer to Mayor Barata Ribeiro as “D. Bota-Abaixo I.” This naming of Ribeiro is
significant on several levels. First, the taking of the nickname for the city’s urban reform
project and the demolition of slums in its public health and redevelopment plan and its application to the mayor shows that the public backlash against Ribeiro was as much about his previous decisions as it was about his decision to have the coreto demolished.

Secondly, the writer consciously manipulated that nickname to approximate the subject of the statue, “D. Pedro I.” The “Chico Reporter” who coined the phrase changed it thus to make it an even greater badge of dishonor. In his initial commentary on the incident in O Tempo on April 20, the writer charged that “D. Bota-Abaixo I remains very satisfied with the explosion of anger [in Portuguese cólera, a possible play on the public health metaphor] in the group in the largo do Rocio that tried yesterday to demolish the bandstand around the statue of Pedro I.” While he did not refer to Pedro as “D. Pedro I” as many writers did to accentuate Ribeiro’s new title, he did repeat the title more than once in order to associate the two figures and malign and mock the mayor. That mocking continued in his column after the Club Tiradentes made their rounds to show their construction license. In reference to that, he hypothesized that “His Omnipotence D. Bota Abaixo yelled out at seeing the license published for the bandstand that botaram abaixo [they tore down] in the Rocio.” The showing of the license headed off any further attempt on the mayor’s part that his office approved the construction because it was not made aware of the scale of the bandstand. The ensuing criticism of “His Omnipotence” revealed the public awareness of the mayor’s attempt to deflect all of the criticism onto the club. After using the nickname to refer to the demolition of the slum and the bandstand, the author also used the related nickname in conjunction with whom he thought the mayor’s next victim would be. According to the author, “D. Bota Abaixo I will demolish the Battalion Tiradentes.” On this prognostication the writer was partially
right. Nothing happened to the battalion itself, but its leader, Sampaio Ferraz, did shortly resign his command (while keeping his position as president of the club). One final rant against Ribiero took place two days later, with the writer accusing the mayor of “usurpation” in his demolitions. He charged that “He and only he and no one else is the general in chief of the army of crowbars and pickaxes…He came to the world for two ends: to exasperate it and to tear it down.”

On top of the nickname slur, “Chico Reporter” also referred to Ribeiro as the “provisional mayor,” a qualification of his position that made him that much weaker in the public eye. A writer for the Diário de Notícias explained that the government had just named Ribeiro as mayor and that he faced Congressional confirmation or rejection soon. This writer stated directly that he found the mayor to be “incapable of discharging the duties of his position” and his appointment without the people’s vote to be a violation of the constitution. Whether or not all writers held this same view, most would concur with one writer’s column on the subject: “municipal disorganization.” Later in that month of May, the Brazilian Senate would in fact invalidate Ribeiro’s nomination, a move that would ironically be criticized by the same newspaper as being a result of Ribeiro’s “numerous enemies and adversaries” who stemmed from his “scrupulously honest” time as an “honorable civil servant” who refused to take bribes and play ball in Rio’s corrupt political system. That writer blamed the vested interests of the corrupt for the Senate’s rebuke of Ribeiro rather than any popular protest against the mayor.216

The writer of the column “Coisas” in the Diário de Notícias had a very interesting metaphor for public opinion of Barata Ribeiro at the time of the incident. He likened the

mayor’s political trajectory to a fireworks show. At that fireworks show, there are plenty of “oohs and ahs” when they go off, but what is left afterwards is smoke and smell…what he calls “devil air.” The writer equated Ribeiro’s rise in politics to the beautiful show. At that time in the public’s eyes, “he was the man for the task, he had talent and was honest, active, and an excellent creature.” But after public campaigns against carne verde, the demolition of the slum, and now the events of Praça Tiradentes, the mayor went from being considered by the Club Tiradentes commission for Tiradentes Day commemorations as “one of them” to “being called a Sebastianista.”

The Bandstand Incident as “True Republican” Litmus Test

The perception of betrayal by republicans against fellow republicans resulted in a general questioning of fidelity to the republican spirit and ideology. As stated before, Sampaio Ferraz defined those republican values in his own image and therefore defined anyone who disagreed with him as unfaithful to those beliefs and the Republic itself. The public reaction to the bandstand incident provided a sort of laboratory for radicals such as Ferraz to test their fellow republicans based on whether their subjects supported or criticized the club and/or the covering of the statue.

Ferraz drew the figurative line in the sand saying that the removal should stab at the soul of any republican. For him, no real republican could ever privilege the memory of Pedro I over that of Tiradentes, so he condemned the “committed and loyal republicans who preferred the falsified legend of the first emperor to the festive and lofty remembering of the stoicism” of Tiradentes. The sarcasm clearly dripped from his words in calling his critics “committed and loyal” in their republican sentiments, and soon after he dropped such games and called those he held responsible “the Pharisees of the

\[217\] Diário de Notícias, April 24, 1893, “Coisas.”
Republic.” He attacked those figures, those he equated to the powerful, hypocritical, and hostile to Christian truth Biblical Pharisees, for their “incomprehensible timidity” and their “feigned sensibility” in allowing public perception to force the coreto’s demolition. Such a charge was common in the radical criticism of the “acts of cowardice and humiliating brutality” and “hysterical sentimentalism” shown by city authorities in being cowed by a handful of troublemakers. This specific attack also revealed the radical tendency to criticize using religious analogies. Previously, the monarchy had been damned as the executors of the Christ-like Tiradentes. Likewise, his betrayer was equated with Judas. All in all, the tactic reflected and fueled their sense of righteousness and unassailability. In addition, Ferraz refuted the portrayal of those involved in the bandstand’s demolition as “populares” and instead labeled them as “half a dozen hotheads” who were rounded up by “enemies of the Republic.” This delineation of the bandstand’s destroyers as enemies and brigands only accentuated that righteousness.218

Using terms to qualify and judge someone’s republican-ness went back as far as the very beginning of the Republic. In an article in the Jornal do Commercio in 1890, there is the use of the terms “true republicans” and “republiquistas” (part republican, part monarchist) to distinguish between those representing the new era and those “slavocrats” who wielded power during the empire and sought influence in the new government.219 The bandstand backlash in 1893 unleashed a similar need to distinguish political friend from foe, and no group was more active in doing so than the Club Tiradentes. They immediately came out swinging in their protest statement after the coreto’s destruction. Their statement to the press read:

219 Jornal do Commercio, March 4, 1890, “Revolução de 15 de Novembro” in “Publicações a Pedido.”
The dedicated and pure republicans, residents in this capital, …protest against the illegal, violent, and arbitrary attitude of the Chief of Police and the Mayor of this district, pseudo-republicans; and manifesting to the public powers their immense sorrow, make a sincere appeal to all of their co-religionarios of the territory of the Republic in defense of the republican cause, so unjustly attacked by two well remunerated public authorities of this capital.²²⁰

The us versus them or “pure” versus impure republicans delineation made in this statement demonstrated how the identities of republicans were being further cleaved in the aftermath of the incident within that group’s own political landscape. A detailed account of that Club Tiradentes meeting that approved the statement above sheds further light onto the club’s immediate priorities. The account mentioned that more than 400 people attended the meeting and that they unanimously agreed to five things. The first was that they would abstain from the other Tiradentes Day festivities to protest “the conduct of the authorities.” The second was to expel Lt. Col. Luiz de Oliveira e Souza for being “disloyal” and not fulfilling his obligations during the “attack on the bandstand.” Thirdly, they voted to consider Capt. Martinho de Moraes as a “traitor.” The fourth was to notify the National Guard of the disloyalty of the two officials named in the decisions referenced above. The last vote approved was that casting suspicion on Mayor Barata Ribeiro. The publication of what basically was the club’s enemies list along with their abstention notification is what drove several commentators to criticize their privileging political retaliation over civic commemoration.²²¹

Capt. Martinho de Moraes took to the papers as well to make his rebuttal. His tactic was to take on the label of traitor in order to refute it, and he did so by establishing his own republican and Tiradentes-honoring credentials. For him, his self-awareness of

²²⁰ O Tempo, April 22, 1893, “Tiradentes.”
²²¹ O Tempo, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes”; Jornal do Commercio, April 26, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
the greatness of Tiradentes was a large part of his republican credentials. He even went so far as to assert that he was recognizing and paying homage to Tiradentes before the Club Tiradentes was, thus placing him above the club in terms of the proof of his patriotism.

His letter read

There is nothing to see—I am lost!! I am a traitor to the Republic, the Republic that I always, always defend! I who before, much before, of the Senhores of a Club had thought on the Great Martyr of Liberty…I had in S. Fidelis a newspaper titled “For the Proto Martyr, Sacrosanct for My Homeland!!”

Moraes ended his letter similarly by saying that he desired only “Progress and Order for the Republic and nothing…nothing…for the Monarchy!” In the papers at this time, the writers remained more concerned with the larger issues of the political tensions and did not comment on this individual response or question. When *O Paiz* responded to the Club Tiradentes, it did so with more sweeping statements such as this when they took on the notion of the litmus test and its significance on the republican landscape. The editor wrote that “the best republicans are not and will never be such that they would display such intolerance and exaltation; the patria and the Brazilian people will deserve much more, they will achieve a bond of much greater relevance than those who would inspire…aggression and disharmony.” Where *O Paiz* valued “common sense, moderation, and order,” radical proponents such as the letter-writer “a patriot” defined “the tranquility of the country and the well-being of its institutions” as being directly related to the “adhesion and loyalty to the Republic” shown in the newspapers in the discourse on such hot-button issues like the bandstand and the conflict in Rio Grande do Sul.²²² That conflict, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, dominated the headlines because the Carioca reading public realized the larger implications of the

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contest for power taking place in that state. It pitted positivists backed by the president himself, Floriano Peixoto, against a liberal opposition fighting over the state constitution, namely whether the political system should be a parliamentary one more akin to the previous imperial model as backed by the liberals or a positivist system that allowed more control by the federal state and President Peixoto. With successive coup attempts and ongoing armed conflict, the politics of Rio Grande do Sul captured headlines and everyone’s attention in Rio.

The writers in the public sphere were well aware from the very beginning of the conflict over the bandstand that being labeled a fake republican or traitor was a potential consequence for criticizing the club and its actions. The fear was so palpable that almost every single writer felt compelled to preface any criticism of the statue’s covering by asserting their republican-ness. Many described themselves as “insuspeito” or “above suspicion” because of the “sincerity of their republican convictions” that were “firm and most sincere.” They had to affirm their “pure, sincere and fervent republican spirit” in order to inoculate their statements against the Club, so in some ways they were validating the Club Tiradentes belief that criticizing them was akin to questioning the Republic. As a curiosity, though, it is interesting to note that while criticizing Club Tiradentes was an act of impure republicanism, apparently not using the new name of the praça to honor Tiradentes was acceptable. Even some of the most fervid defenders of the club and its actions in their letters and editorials repeatedly referred to the largo do Rocio instead of

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Praça Tiradentes. It would appear that the use of the site’s new name was not one of those republican litmus tests.\textsuperscript{224}

While for many of the writers quoted above the statue incident was a matter of republican life or death, many observers considered it an insignificant occurrence blown incredibly out of proportion. In an example of one newspaper, the \textit{Diário de Notícias}, mocking the hyperbolic treatment of the incident in another paper, in this case \textit{O Tempo}, a writer commented on the ways that \textit{O Tempo} had made Pedro I seem alive and a threat again. He did so by joking that in response to that paper’s reporting, the government of the Republic had decided to decree that they needed to besiege the statue and oversee Pedro I’s embarkation back to Lisbon. According to the joke, the government had even decided to keep the praça in Rio under a perpetual state of siege to deal with any chance of the first emperor’s return. To end his column, this writer even called for public prayers to the “Lady of the Afflicted” since many republicans were so traumatized by the occurrences.\textsuperscript{225} A writer for the \textit{Revista Illustrada} used humor in a “nocturnal dialogue” imagined between Pedro I and one of the Indians from his statue’s pedestal to comment on the events. In that conversation, Pedro I wondered aloud if he was being sent to Chicago. The writer’s response was to have the Indian laugh and reply: “don’t kid yourself…the festivities of the Republic are drawing near…so we can’t have Your Majesty offending the republican opinions of your former subjects.” The defining of the parties involved in the incident as the emperor’s “former subjects” is striking as is the Indian’s perspective that the Republic’s festivities required Pedro’s obfuscation to avoid insult. The writer further commented on that idea by ultimately having Pedro I come to


\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Diário de Notícias}, April 22, 1893, “Coisas.”
the conclusion that the republicans must be teasing him by the building of the bandstand. The writer reveals the ex-emperor’s reasoning by having him continue his conversation with the Indian, but this time about their witnessing previous republican infighting…a reason that seems far more significant than him. A writer for the *Gazeta de Notícias* similarly used mocking humor to comment on the rumor and fear-mongering that blew the incident so out of proportion. He cited “grave consequences” for “anyone opening their mouth about anything about that bandstand” in the form of “conspiracies, dissentions, and explosions” as gossip about the statue spread throughout the city.

Mocking the alarmists, he described feeling compelled to arm himself after hearing of the “serious events” in the praça and then waking up the next day and being shocked to find that no one had died and nothing had really happened overnight. When he went to the scene of the drama, he found only the statue and some curious onlookers on Tiradentes Day. His point was that only one day after two days of hubbub, the praça had returned to normal. In an homage to Shakespeare, this writer began his column translating the “words, words, words” line from Hamlet into “boatos, boatos, boatos” (rumor-mongering) and ended it with the line “All is well that ends well.”

The apocalyptic portrait drawn and then debunked served as a tempered commentary on the actual human experience in this turbulent time in the city. And it was in stark contrast with statements such as the one made by a letter writer who called himself “a patriot,” who warned Brazilians to hope and pray that those “humble planks

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not transform themselves into the instrument with which the head of Christianity [God] purifies the sands of time.” There were some notices of injury and violence at the praça and afterwards. The police had to disarm a young man who kept threatening all who came by him, one young man broke his leg after falling from a position up on the bandstand, and finally “an individual of Portuguese nationality” was injured after being clubbed.\textsuperscript{228} All in all, the lack of widespread mayhem and destruction noted above certainly gave a different perspective to the impact of the incident on the city, and another writer took up this issue of perspective but did so placing the statue covering in a national political context. The \textit{O Tempo} writer put it succinctly by asking if one situation was equal to the other: “the question of lumber and rags, raised to the height of manifestation of monarchical sentiment and of the weakening of the enthusiasm for republican traditions, is equal to the other more important, heavy work of the government reaching an accord with those revolting in Rio Grande do Sul?”\textsuperscript{229} By boiling the issues down and placing them side by side, this writer did a great deal in putting the bandstand incident into perspective. He did validate it as a symbolic slighting, but he also compared it to the open repudiation by a province of the Republic’s authority and territorial control. The question of what to do to reunite all of Brazil under federal control and democratic participation also was highly visible in the newspapers of the time. The writer’s desire was the same as many others: for the government and the political elite to focus on truly pressing issues.

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Gazeta de Noticias}, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua”; \textit{Diário de Noticias}, April 20, 1893, “Os Factos de Hontem.”

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Jornal do Commercio}, April 26, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I”; \textit{O Tempo}, April 25, 1893, “Irreflexão e Improvidencia.”
The Post-Incident Sense of Ideological Disunity and Antagonism

For many commentators in Rio, the aftermath of the statue incident created a moment of reflection on the nation’s internal republican disunity and the impact it had on the functioning of the state. In that same letter from “a patriot,” the writer warns that as a result of the incident, “the institutions will suffer a profound shock” and that there will be “more than deplorable consequences.” The “patriot” kept referring back to Floriano Peixoto, saying that the president must be “impressed” with the “diatribes” found throughout the Rio press and that he “must recognize or at least could hear the profundity and the sincerity of republican convictions of the majority” of the public discourse of the capital. As a Jacobin writer, he touched on all of the most prevalent radical issues: the existential threat to the Republic, the identification of the “majority” sentiment with his own, and the preoccupation with the leanings of the city’s and the nation’s leadership. For writers such as “a patriot,” their rhetoric was only heating up in the days after the bandstand’s demolition.\textsuperscript{230}

Borja Reis, in an article titled “Republican Disunity” in \textit{O Tempo}, also addressed the idea of republican division through the prism of Tiradentes Day commemorations over the last two years. Noting the lack of organized tribute to the martyr as due to “this or that reason,” Reis asserted that the absence “proved itself, however, one more time of the disunion of the republican camps, where all are leaders and none are soldiers.” With so many of strong convictions and the desire to lead, the cacophony of voices resulted in rudderless division, which he called “our disgrace.” He pointed to the events of the 19\textsuperscript{th} (of April) as the product of advantage taken of the “different opinions, ideas, passions, and recriminations” that perpetuated a lack of “homogeneity in the party” as well as a

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Jornal do Commercio}, April 26, 1893, “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
“lack of political direction.” For him, though, the answer would not be found in the purging of the party—as called for by the Jacobins. That group he called “parasites” and “speculators that have robbed” the nation. Reis advocated for a party strengthened by unity instead of ravaged and weakened by radicalism. Ultimately, he found the Republican Party’s “intrigues, treasons, or lack of tact” responsible for the absence of the sort of commemoration they “owed” the martyr of the *Inconfidência Mineira*. On the larger question of Brazil’s political trajectory, Borja Reis also made disunity his primary concern. He took the typical republican historical talking point about the “revolution” of the 15th of November ushering a time of Brazil for Brazilians and used it to further his point. Reis said that “if it is true that Brazil had not been on the side of the Brazilians until today, it is much more certain that the Republic has not been on the side of republicans.” His vision of the Republic was one of a political system hijacked by the Jacobins, leading to a party fractured and perpetually fighting itself. He criticized his party for not being about the greatness of the Republic and the nation but rather their own ideological squabbles.\footnote{O Tempo, April 22, 1893, “Republican Disunity” in “Livres Chronicas.”}

Other writers similarly placed much of the blame for the party’s tensions at the feet of the Jacobins. In *O Apostolo*, a column about patriotism attributed the statue covering incident to the Jacobin desire to hide it from “the view of the people” on Tiradentes Day because it “offended the prudishness of the demagogues of the era.” Another linked the statue covering to the “political intransigence” of the time. A writer for the *Cidade do Rio* noted how the Republic itself adopted the 7th of September as a national holiday, thus establishing the *Grito* as an important commemorative date. Why then, would republicans feel so much repugnance for a statue that symbolized a moment
they consciously chose to embrace? The answer for this writer was fear. The republicans’ fear had given rise to Sebastianism, which in turn had given rise to the idea that the statue was the “incarnation of the restorationist ambitions of the time.” He found all of that political psychology to itself be the result of the “political intransigence” of the time. Because the statue had no way to act or respond to the events, he completely discounted the statue as a threat—symbolic or otherwise. And he cautioned all against finding monarchism in their observance of the past.232

Nevertheless, fear and reactionary politics still marked the Brazilian exchange of ideas. By 1893 journalists knew very well that there were indeed consequences for offending the radical values of groups like Club Tiradentes and the Battalion Tiradentes. Just the year before, controversy in the press also marred the Tiradentes Day commemorative discourse. The conflict began over an article written that discussed the level of freedom of expression enjoyed in Rio. According to the author, his purpose was to point out that he had been able to criticize the monarchy without being retaliated against by the Guarda Negra, a political militia that was formed of black capoeira fighters after abolition in 1888 who held a cult devotion to Princess Isabel and were known for their punitive responses to criticisms of the monarchy. The author publicly hoped that the same would be true under the Republic. He set the Battalion Tiradentes off, however, by also hoping that he would not have to worry about that group responding to his criticism of the republican government. The Battalion took that comparison to mean they were being equated with the Guarda Negra, whom they considered thugs, so they protested and called for a boycott of the newspaper that published the article, O Paiz. In an editorial response, that newspaper characterized the

Battalion’s protest as based upon a mischaracterization of the original article and an intrusion into the inner workings of the newspaper. It cited the rights of the press to publish opinions from a wide range of views. Interestingly, though, the editor called the Battalion “patriots” and a civic organization in an effort to assuage their indignation and avoid a polemic. The result was pure irony nevertheless. The Battalion’s response essentially made the writer’s original point. He hypothesized such a potential role for the group as, in essence, the republican thought police, and they responded by entering the discussion and demanding punitive measures against the author and the paper. This exchange showed the existence already of that perceived role of the Battalion Tiradentes in the new republican society as well as the awareness of possible censorship through potential targeting and repercussions. While the Battalion clearly had a right to their indignant response, they succeeded in affirming that perception of them as the Jacobin ideological police. The example of this interventionist role in the press towards those who criticized the government and were thusly deemed unsupportive goes a long way to explaining all of those “true republican sentiments” affirmations proffered before any bandstand criticism just one year later.

**Republican Infighting amidst Popular Indifference**

While all of these intra-elite contestations over the nature of the nation’s history and system of government were taking place, a theme which emerged immediately in 1889 with the proclamation of the Republic (and which I referenced in this chapter’s very first paragraph) also became a point of concern in the elaborated context of the bandstand 233

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rhetoric in 1893. At the same time that this heated debate over the actions of Club Tiradentes was taking place, some writers delved once again into the larger implications of a populace that was bestializado and indifferent. They passionately asserted their ideas and refuted those of other elites while simultaneously lamenting the “dull and apathetic indifference of the population” that manifested itself in the public reaction—or non-reaction—to the incident. Like the many other writers before him, a writer for the Gazeta de Noticias used the occasion of the incident’s interference with commemorating Tiradentes Day to comment on the roots of Brazil’s problems. He defined the overarching problem as the result of “a conviction on the part of the people that the change to the Republic was a detriment rather than a benefit to the country.” In turn, the root causes of that indifference and conviction were many: “inexperience, atrophy of character, and lack of political education for the Brazilian people.” Despite that list, he felt that all could be remedied with time. Yet he still linked what he called the “criminal inertia” of the empire with the “morbid indifference” shown in the passing of Tiradentes Day without any “resurrection of the spirit.” The writer Paschoal in O Tempo also commented on that “disinterest” shown on Tiradentes Day that year and what he considered to be its greater political implications. After finding the canceling of those 1893 commemorations to have been based on a motive “so frivolous,” he ruminated on the nature of the Republic’s beginnings and its effect on people’s behavior. Commenting on the ease with which the Republic was proclaimed, he asserted that an “individual easily abandons that which cost him nothing to acquire.” This not having a stake in the game was what worried him in his observations of the bandstand incident fallout, not things like political enemies and reprisals. Paschoal’s points touched on an issue previously discussed: the tendency of the
political disunity to create a distraction from dealing with the issues that truly mattered. Was the frivolity or pettiness of the club’s recusing itself from seeing that Tiradentes was honored a function of their relative ease in achieving regime change and assuming prominence? Paschoal did not specifically answer that question, but the fact that he felt compelled to ponder the impact of the Republic’s origins on its citizens reveals a great deal.\textsuperscript{234}

**Conclusion**

Clearly, the political backdrop to the bandstand incident in 1893 was a complicated one. It was hard enough to navigate the republican scene, much less deal with the remnants of an imperial past that loomed so large over Brazil’s national existence. The ideological cleavages present in the new ruling class combined with the uncertainty and organizational pains of any new regime combined to create a period of high expectations but also fear and at times disillusionment. In a way, it was rather reminiscent of the backdrop to the statue’s inauguration in 1862. At that time, some in the country sensed that their society had not lived up to the grandeur that the nation’s origins promised and that the statue sought to symbolize. Consequently, the statue of Pedro I became a touchstone for how to view the nation’s imperial present as much as it was for the past deeds and legacy of Brazil’s first emperor. Thirty years later, the statue again served as a touchstone, only this time it provided a glimpse into how the new political actors on the scene saw themselves, their Republic, and the nation’s generalized past. I have analyzed how the republicans in power perceived the statue in the context of its covering. The next chapter, Chapter Four, will explore how they defined the statue’s

\textsuperscript{234} *Gazeta de Notícias*, April 22, 1893, “Tiradentes”; *O Tempo*, April 22, 1893, “Bonbons: Lamentações-Ultimo Echo.”
subject. There I will explore how the writers in 1893 viewed their monarchical past and struggled over the redefinition of the identity and legacy of Pedro I. That process remained inextricably linked to the statue present in Praça Tiradentes. While this chapter dealt with one group’s attempt to deal with Pedro I’s statue and legacy by covering it, Chapter Five will examine the multiple proposals to either destroy or relocate the statue. Those efforts to remove Pedro I from the public square and their ultimate rejection by the authorities and the public reveal Brazil’s continued struggle to honor its history amidst conflicted notions of the past.
Chapter Four:
A Republic Debates How to View Its Imperial Past

As the previous chapter showed, there were many levels of contestation taking place in the Rio de Janeiro of the Republic in 1893. My previous discussion of the bandstand incident with the statue of Pedro I focused on the specific reactions to the incident regarding the statue’s place in the public eye and the discussions on the very nature of the government and the past that as a result took place amongst the disparate groups politically cobbled together in the new regime. The purpose of this chapter is to look within that same new political landscape and rhetoric of the early 1890s and delve more deeply into the intellectual negotiations taking place over how the Republic’s citizens should view their past monarchy as an institution and past monarchs as historical figures.

The writers in 1893 were demonstrably concerned with the bigger question of the monarchy’s legacy and place in Brazilian history as a whole. But the covering of the statue and its aftermath also caused many to reflect on—and argue over—the specific historical standing of Pedro I in the nation’s new era. In the end, the competing views of the present, as detailed in the previous chapter, spilled over into similarly varied views of the past just as they did in 1862. Only this time, the situations were reversed. Republican adherents and monarchical critics held political sway and dominated the discourse while defenders of that imperial past existed as a small minority, limited in voice and public presence. Yet the fundamental arguments over Pedro I remained the same. Was he the protagonist or antagonist of Brazilian independence? That depended upon how writers
viewed the relationship between that independence and the new Republic. Did he deserve to be remembered as the hero of Ipiranga, the proclaimer of Brazil’s break with the colonial past? That depended upon whether or not the imperial period was perceived as any such break with foreign rule. Should his statue remain in the public square despite the fall of the monarchy? That question remained a point of contention for years after the incident. But as we saw in the previous discussions about respecting the nation’s past and traditions, the myth of the nation’s imperial origins had taken on a power and an acceptance that was independent of its principal actor. Regardless of how much Jacobins detested Pedro I and rejected him in their historical narrative of the nation’s inherent republicanism, that statue still stood. And it stands there still today. Its physical perseverance in the public square, despite multiple calls to either destroy or remove it in the 1890s, succeeded during a time of perpetual redefining and qualifying of Pedro I’s historical legacy. This discussion of the public and historical implications of the bandstand incident on the statue and Pedro’s ultimate legacy will be concluded in the next chapter with a detailed analysis of those calls—and their rejections—to move the statue.

This chapter will focus on the public rhetoric regarding the observation and commemoration of significant historical dates in Brazil’s past in order to explore how writers in the early Republic navigated the necessary transfer of sovereignty from the monarchy to the people and their nation following the rupture with the imperial past. The complexity of that orchestrated transfer will be front and center in the discussions over what from the past was to be incorporated into the Republican pantheon and what was to be cast off into anachronistic oblivion. Located within these discussions were debates
over how to view the nation’s imperial past in general and Pedro I’s legacy in particular. This analysis will show that republican writers, not surprisingly, held an overall negative view of the imperial past and lamented the monarchy’s role in interrupting and delaying what would have been a much earlier implementation of republican rule in Brazil. The over-arching awareness of historical and political transition—from a national identity marked by loyalty to the Emperor to a Republic legitimized by popular identification with the nation and the state—taking place colored discussions of what had previously been imperial holidays such as Independence Day and Abolition Day. The republican reinterpretation of the past comes into focus in this rhetoric, showing how royal figures were excised from the public imagination and replaced by republican or military themes and images. In terms of redefining Pedro I, these writers also used the issues of his role in independence and his abdication in order to chip away at his legacy by qualifying the substance of his historical contribution to Brazil and by judging him—and finding him wanting—against the historical experiences of both his father and son. All in all, this chapter will show a political and ideological climate that was ripe for the removal of an imperial statue in the public square. The following chapter will explain why that did not come to pass.

**Perspectives on How to View the Imperial Past**

Given the popular idea circulating in the public sphere that “the Latin race is Republican,” the new regime’s literary elite correspondingly portrayed the totality of the nation’s past, including its imperial era, through the simple theme of the Republic,
interrupted. At the core of that interpretation was the national story of a republic, not an empire. As Emilia Viotti da Costa describes in her seminal study *Da Monarquia à República: momentos decisivos*, the republican view of Brazilian history began with the assertion that the nation was always destined to be a republic. That fundamental aspect was always contextualized with the adversarial presence of monarchical rule. The deeply-held belief that the republic “was always a national aspiration” drove the sister narrative that the monarchical era was “an anomaly in America, where there existed only republics” (notwithstanding the short-lived rule of Emperor Augustin I in Mexico in the early 1820s). Da Costa succinctly sums up that republican view that Pedro II—as well as his father before him—dominated and divided Brazil’s government through an arbitrary and relentless use of the *Poder Moderador*, or Moderating Power, granted to them in the 1824 constitution. In addition to the inclusion of the prevailing concept of the three branches of government, the executive, legislative, and judiciary, the constitution written by Pedro I also articulated a fourth moderating power which gave the emperor the final say in resolving disputes involving those three branches and/or political factions. In essence, Pedro I had dealt himself and his monarchy a permanent trump card. Not surprisingly, the *Poder Moderador* became a tremendous point of contention with the monarchy’s critics and a facet of the imperial system most despised by the republican elites before and after the emergence of the Republic. Da Costa notes that “to their eyes the Monarchy was the regime of corruption, of arbitrariness, of violence and of injustices and all about the government of Personal Power, discretionary and foreign to the interests

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235 *Diário de Notícias*, February 22, 1890, “A Raça Latino é Republicano.”
of the People.” At every turn, according to such an interpretation, the monarchy stepped into the decisive moments in Brazilian history to interrupt, thwart, and postpone the people’s ushering in of its predisposed state of republic. Not only did the Crown thwart popular will in suppressing the *Inconfidência Mineira* and executing the martyr Tiradentes, but it also robbed Brazil of republican opportunities in 1808, 1822, and 1831 (in addition to numerous other insurrections along the way).

While the narrative advanced during the imperial era celebrated those moments listed above as important steps in the political evolution of Brazil, the republican narrative denounced them as the Crown opportunistically snuffing out what would have otherwise been the nation’s earlier transformation into republican rule. The transfer of the royal court to Rio in 1808 prevented what should have been a republic born out of Napoleon’s conquest of Portugal and deposition of the Bragantine royal line. Instead the monarchy’s escape to Brazil perpetuated their rule and transformed Brazil into a coequal kingdom. Pedro I’s cooptation of the independence movement in 1822 prevented what should have been a nationalist, republican push for political separation from the metropole. Even again in 1831 when the nation rid itself of one perceived despot, the monarchists secured the perpetuation of imperial rule through the continued reign of Pedro II, thus preventing yet another moment that should have ushered in the destined Republic. With these perspectives, imperial accomplishments became repeated betrayals of popular and republican will, and much like the view of Otoni in 1862, those realities completely poisoned any and all of the empire’s legacy. They also made the monarchy foreign and even “parasitic.” Even Pedro II was stripped of his *brasilidade* and

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considered by radicals to represent a European rather than Brazilian monarch. In order to try to renounce and dismiss imperial traditions deepened by the sheer length of his rule, this re-characterization of Pedro II was necessary. It was much more simplistic for those republicans like Rodrigo Octavio, whose work articulating the historical significance of the new Republic’s national holidays was labeled “the true Bible of good citizenship” by a Battalion Tiradentes soldier in 1893, to separate Pedro II from Brazil and thus attach him to the Portuguese Crown. With that disqualification accomplished, they could dismiss and attempt to expunge all imperial historical traditions as “traditions of the colonial prepotencia” and “Portuguese dominion.” A clean slate was much easier to deal with than the complicated interplay of a republican and imperial past inextricably woven together. In this interpretation centered on newness, Brazil in 1889 constituted a “new country…without traditions” since none could come from the discredited monarchy. Historian Pedro Calmon describes the republican perspective on that change and political rupture as one of “a spiritual insurrection against the past and its consecrated values.”

A good lens through which to see this “spiritual insurrection against the past” and its shaping of the republican historical narrative is the way in which the new Republic was forced to grapple with the civic standing and legacy of September 7 as Brazilian Independence Day. While the nature of commemorations of this date will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, an analysis of one major literary work’s reimagining of the civic meaning of September 7 provides an illustrative example of just how radically different some elites in 1893 viewed that iconic founding moment from its definitions in

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1862. The new regime’s decision to include the date in the civic pantheon of the Republic met significant resistance from those intellectual and historical “insurrectionists.” One such writer was Rodrigo Octavio, who was a prominent lawyer and magistrate who would rise to the ultimate position of minister of the *Supremo Tribunal Federal* of the Republic. Octavio took on the literary memorialist task of creating a new narrative for each of the commemorative dates chosen as national holidays. Labeled “the true Bible of good citizenship” by a Battalion Tiradentes member and a “handbook on the new national holidays for the civic education of the people,” *Festas Nacionaes* was required reading for primary schools after the *Conselho Superior de Instrução* ordered its adoption.\(^\text{238}\)

Whether it was in the foreword by Raul Pompeia or the actual text of Octavio, the official republican spin on Independence Day was aggressively anti-monarchical and anti-Pedro I. For example, Pompeia referred to the date as the “sophism of our liberation through the simple and low cunning of a brutish autocrat.” Independence was qualified because of the tyranny and absolutism of Pedro I as well as the recognition treaty clause that indemnified Portugal for the loss of Brazil “secretly” snuck in by Pedro to show his allegedly lurking allegiance with Portugal. Pompeia agreed with many writers of his time that it was actually José Bonifácio who gave to the Brazilian people “a new patria,” but this holding up of the imperial “Patriarch” did put Pompeia at some odds with Octavio who made it a point to indict José Bonifácio as complicit in the burdening of Brazil with the continuation of the monarchy in 1822. Pompeia instead blamed José Clemente Pereira, not Pedro I’s chief advisor (who was José Bonifácio) but one of his most

\(^{238}\) *Jornal do Commercio*, April 27, 1893, “Estatua de Pedro I” in “Publicações a Pedido”; *Correio da Tarde*, April 28, 1894; *The Rio News*, April 25, 1893, “Publications Received.”
versatile ministers, for “the implantation of absolutism that governed us and the predominance of the Portuguese party that still harasses us.” Pompeia thus took blame away from the Brazilian-born José Bonifácio and instead placed responsibility for Pedro I’s continuation of Brazil’s “colonial servitude” on another Portuguese figure. Octavio’s indictment of José Bonifácio, who would nevertheless increasingly take on the moniker of “Patriarch” of independence, was indeed more of an outlier with the vast majority of writers of the time choosing to applaud his actions and importance in the larger effort to have him supplant the role of Pedro I as the true leader of independence.\(^\text{239}\)

In his own text, Octavio went much further to vilify Pedro I, his father D. João VI, and the entire Portuguese royal family and court than did Pompeia or most writers of the day, especially when it came to portraying D. João. *The Rio News* even noted this discrepancy, saying in its review of *Festas Nacionaes* that “on some historical parts the author is not wholly in accord with the accepted authorities of the day.” Yet the publication nevertheless judged Octavio’s exposition of the national dates to be “timely and well-written.” In Octavio’s narrative revision, Pedro’s grandmother, Maria I (who ordered Tiradentes’ execution), was stark-raving mad and fanatical. D. João was a lazy glutton.\(^\text{240}\)

Even among this family of degenerates, though, Octavio singled out Pedro I for being “weak…ignorant…self-indulgent…and ambitious.” Such an indictment of Pedro’s person was then placed in the context of a Brazil that was “already like a nation…with an ever-present desire to rid itself of the Portuguese throne.” Amidst this preexisting

\(^{239}\) Octavio, v-x

\(^{240}\) These two revisionist characterizations of Queen Maria I and King João VI are ones that have historically persisted because they have generally been accepted as accurate regarding the two rulers’ personal shortcomings.
nationalism and separatism, Octavio assigned the role of the “biblical serpent” to José Bonifácio whom he blamed for the nation “subordinating itself” to Pedro I. Given this perspective, the 7th of September signified only “the separation of the Kingdom of Brazil from the Kingdom of Portugal” rather than the nation’s origins while at the same time the date “celebrated the pact of its enslavement to an autocratic offshoot of the House of Bragança.” He found the reasons for that Brazilian “self-subordination” to be the result of the “ambitious and violent prince” as well as “the generous complacency of the temperament” of the Brazilian people themselves in accepting his “authoritarian” rule until their “deposition” of him on April 7, 1831. He ultimately described this superimposition of Portuguese royal rule as thwarting “the republic that would have come naturally” to Brazil as “the deplorable error of 1822” in the allowing of continued Bragantine rule despite having rid itself of direct Portuguese rule. Precisely because of that continuation, Brazil did not have historical traditions. It only had ongoing foreign dominion. And that dominion he saw as illegal and illegitimate, as it “usurped the rights of the people” and “constituted treason” on the part of Pedro I “against his father and his nation.”

The nation that he ascribes to Pedro is, of course, Portugal.

This definition of Pedro I, the historical significance of September 7, and the monarchy served as some of the building blocks of the radical republican vision of the past in the new intellectual contest over the present. The fact that the fervent republican, Pompeia, asked to write the foreword offered alternate interpretations of that past lends evidence to the apparent difficulty in reconstructing a universally accepted republican narrative. It also shows that there was no one monolithic elite republican narrative. The discussions in the press in the first decade of the Republic would reveal that

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241 Ibid., 100-101, 118, 123-124, 178-179; The Rio News, April 25, 1893, “Publications Received.”
reconstruction effort as an ongoing process with a variety of ideas and perspectives. They would also show the inherent tensions between the ramped up criticism of Pedro I and the continued recognition of Independence Day. The commemorations for the 7th of September allow for a fascinating glimpse into this process and will be discussed shortly. This previous discussion matters here, though, because it perfectly illustrates one end of the rhetorical spectrum. What will become apparent throughout the rest of this study, however, is that many writers in the Republic would challenge this overly simplistic dismissal of the past and its traditions. As the previous chapter teaches, the reality of public discourse in Rio was much more complicated and nuanced than one extreme view.

As for the other end of that spectrum occupied not by radical republicans but by monarchists and their sympathizers, da Costa informs us that “the voice of the monarchists was stifled by the euphoria of the republicans,” and that singularity of the republican voice in the public space was “reinforced by the chorus of the adherents, those pressured to demonstrate fidelity to the new regime.” This phenomenon we witnessed in the previous chapter with the protestations of fidelity to the Republic that preceded those bandstand criticisms and the resultant labeling of those critics as “impure” republicans. The actual monarchists were therefore squeezed into the muted public space of those “disillusioned” with the Republic or even worse of those considered Sebastianists. That monarchist view of the imperial past was one that also pointed to the singularity of Brazil in the nineteenth century, but it looked upon that distinction as a mark of the accomplishments of the region’s only monarchy and not its faults. That the nation maintained its territorial integrity from the colonial period and achieved a level of internal stability made it a power in the hemisphere that had both long-term security and
liberty. From this perspective, the proclamation of the Republic was the product of raw opportunism on the part of the military class, upstarts chafing at the structured order of the regime that made their security and ambitions possible in the first place.\textsuperscript{242} Very few writers made any full-throated attempt to advance this narrative, however. Instead, most navigated the republican public mood, strategically challenged the afore-mentioned dismissive republican narrative, stimulated conversations that delved into the nuances of national memory, and negotiated for compromise and a middle ground on remembering the past.

Preceding the bandstand incident, an awareness existed on the part of the Rio press that the nation was in a transitional phase between those two narratives of the conflicting ends of the spectrum, and that idea was interestingly often conveyed through the use of the metaphor of Lazarus. Early on the theme of equating the monarchy to the biblical figure of the dead man brought back to life emerged. In 1890, one writer warned those republicans working to reorganize the government and society that they must keep the “lazaros” of the empire from “coming back to life” and “contaminating” a Brazilian society in the state of “regenerating” itself. This writer defined those “lazaros” in the context of the initial years of that reorganization as “men of ill repute” who had been the courtesans of the empire but who were also “collaborating” in the work of the Republic. That collaboration, however, was suspect because of what he called the “impure hands” of those former courtesans.\textsuperscript{243} This passage reveals the anxiety surrounding the idea of the possible contamination of the nation’s new political body by its old, and that idea was inextricably linked to the question of whether or not previous imperial administrators and

\textsuperscript{242} Costa, Monarquia à República, 249.

\textsuperscript{243} O Paiz, March 1, 1890, “Os Lazaros do Imperio.”
officials should be allowed to similarly take part in the Republic. The writer continued, warning of the consequences of the “contaminated evils from the monarchical virus” that was already present in the Republic itself because of the “incapacity of its leaders.” Such disillusionment with the new era’s political leadership was certainly nothing new. Nor was the assertion that “continuing the imperialist customs in the republic is a vice worse than the monarchy itself.” What was different was the same writer’s almost contradictory stance on the best means to prevent that nefarious monarchical influence. Rather than just making a total break with the past and feigning that the empire did not belong to Brazilian history, to protect the health of the Republic’s future all involved in its organization needed to instead study the imperial past as a cautionary tale for the present. Another writer would later echo this approach to dealing with the imperial past by advocating that republicans not “turn off the memory of those historical periods that were the catalysts for the present and for the realization of our ideas.” While on its surface this call seems like the even rarer example of a writer calling for a fully integrated Brazilian historical narrative, it is more likely that it is more of a moderate variation on the idea above that a republican could find value in what came before because of a sense of linear connection to their own time and life. The monarchical past could be related to the present and worth understanding, but virtually no one would assert that it should be embraced or celebrated.

In a play on the idea of classical imperial “Caesars” historically governing the “living dead,” the lazaroś author also likened Brazilians under the imperial regime—with the emperor’s will as law—as “the deadened living” since the political customs of the day “persecuted virtues as crimes” and had a deleterious impact on the Empire’s citizens.

244 Ibid.; Gazeta de Notícias, April 20, 1893, “A Estatua.”
That “obedience” to their sovereign set the scene for the empire “to die from its own vices” but also record the “painful pages of our history.” This article was another example of a writer viewing the imperial past not as an aberration to be discredited and subsequently wiped into oblivion but as a vital cautionary tale and didactic source for the Republic of what *not* to do. He cited the “social work of the empire as a lesson and as advice to the republic.” He called on the new generation to “take advantage” of the empire’s historical record since from its “decomposition…the tree of liberty feeds.” It is striking that this one writer could advance multiple aspects of the republican view of the past. At the same time that he was warning of the threat of monarchical contamination, he was also calling upon the new elite to better familiarize themselves with the source of that threat in order to learn from its historical example. That it could be repudiated and valued simultaneously echoed the previous chapter’s arguments about Pedro I’s statue. 245

Two years later in 1892, a writer for *O Paiz* described the present by noting that Brazil was still “between history and the future,” and he took the opportunity to discuss his view of the empire on the anniversary of Pedro I’s forced abdication on April 7. He did so by again using the monarchy as the dead metaphor.246 While the actions taken against the first emperor on that day in 1831 were described as a “popular revolt against an untimely change in ministry,” the current actions being undertaken by the new republican elite in 1892 were described as the “snuffing out of the last vestiges” of the empire. The writer called it a “cadaver of the past” that Brazil looked to cast the last stone upon and move on from. This sense of being stuck in limbo, with the monarchy dead but

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246 *O Paiz*, April 7, 1892, “Sete de Abril.” This article was the first example of a republican commemoration of April 7 and Pedro I’s abdication in the newspapers. The writer made it a point to note that it was the “61st” anniversary but there was nothing in the papers the year before to commemorate the 60th anniversary.
still present, could explain why the writer would start the effort to commemorate that date in an effort to denigrate the nation’s first monarch and retroactively connect the republican narrative to the royal moments in Brazilian history. It also shows the desire to rid the Republic of any lingering presence or reminder of the imperial past. This sentiment also fed into the previously discussed psyche of figures like Sampaio Ferraz and into their interpretation of a perceived reemergence of imperial proclivities.

Despite these negative portrayals of the imperial “walking dead,” the rhetorical climate did allow for some calls for republican magnanimity towards their former emperor and his family. After all, in the various portrayals of the origins of the Republic there existed a wariness towards referring to that moment as an act of deposition against Pedro II. The nature of those origins allowed for this since the end of Bragantine rule was euphemistically characterized as the fading away and ultimate fall of the empire. The actual final image was of the royal family sailing away, never to return. There was once again no fight or any attempt to return. Given this benign characteristic of the regime change plus the shared experience of generations of Brazilians living their lives with woven in commemorations to their royal family, there could still be a public soft spot for the nation’s most recent monarch, albeit those who demonstrated it would probably be labeled a Sebastianist. For example, in 1890 at the same time that the Republic notified the newspapers of the name changes for public spaces, writers were also penning articles to honor the memory of the former Empress of Brazil, D. Teresa Cristina. They, as was typical, felt compelled to assert their absolute and complete respect for the Republic first, but they simultaneously also felt the need to note the nation’s loss. In an article devoted to remembering their Empress, one writer made it a point to link both her and Pedro II to
the current and newly acclaimed Portuguese King D. Carlos. The writer referred specifically to the familial ties between the exiled royal family and the Portuguese monarchy, noting that Pedro II was the brother of the King’s grandmother. That same writer even went so far as to define Pedro II as Pedro I’s son in order to emphasize the Portuguese identity of the latter and therefore the bonds of family with the Portuguese monarchy. In this context, Pedro II was “the only surviving son of the glorious D. Pedro IV, whose memory is so respected in Portugal.”

The use of Pedro I’s Portuguese royal designation (as the fourth rather than the first) reinforced yet again his portugalidade, but it did so as a means to bring the constituencies together rather than to divide them. The writer defined Pedro I in this way in order to discuss the exiled royal family in general and in a way that did not touch onto any of the contested notions of Brazil’s own imperial past. The occasion of Dona Teresa Cristina’s death also made some writers comment on the republican government’s treatment of Pedro II. Based on what it called a confidence in the inevitable success of the republic, another article suggested that the new government could show its own strength not in punishing Pedro II further in exile but in acting “generously” and “magnanimously” to help the failing former leader. He urged the “Brazilian nation” to show that “magnanimity” to “the citizen who was for more than half a century your leader” by making sure that he had sufficient money to avoid suffering “privations” in his exile in Europe.

This writer for O Paiz was the first to really distinguish between the Republic he saw as being born out of “love for the patria” instead of out of “the rancor to persons.” For him, “the Republic is strong and should be generous.” Such an extension of mercy and consideration to the situation of the former emperor revealed a rare ability to see the

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247 O Paiz, February 26, 1890, “A Imperatriz do Brasil.”
people of the imperial government not as just some evil abstraction, as present in the Lazarus metaphor, but as people worthy of generosity. Yet it also revealed that consideration’s limitations since the writer could not actually bring himself to use the title of emperor in conjunction with Pedro II and instead had to couch his respect in the use of labels and terms such as “citizen” and “leader.” Ultimately, though, the writer’s call advanced the perception of strength as being shown through not demonizing the empire, its monarchy, and the past.²⁴⁸

For some commentators like the one above, that unfair demonization of and hostility towards the empire and its symbols stemmed from a lack of public education and the subsequent ignorance of history on the part of the general public and the new political classes in particular. It is not surprising that public assertions of the need for “civic education” to create a reasonable citizenry that understood proper “comportment in public life” and how to participate in the Republic followed shortly after its proclamation. What was notable was a public push back against the specific ignorance of history and its resultant spread of misinformation given the context of the push for a republican mythology and narrative. The writer “G. B.” of the Diário de Noticias recounted two incidents in 1890 that caused him to advocate loudly for greater emphasis on the population’s accurate understanding of the past. The first incident had to do with his carriage driver discussing history with him, prompted by the sight of the bandstand in the largo de S. Francisco being built as part of the preparations for the Republic’s first commemoration of Tiradentes Day. The driver sought confirmation that “they killed Tiradentes because he was republican, right?” to which the writer responded in the

affirmative. The driver’s next comment was what set the writer off: the driver said “it was in the time of Pedro I, wasn’t it?” Already you could see the conflating of the two historical events and figures in the public imagination because of the renaming of the square and its resultant juxtaposition of Tiradentes and Pedro I. As the only royal figure located there by means of the statue, the historical experiences of both figures had symbolically been fused. Because of his singular visibility and that confusing linking of Tiradentes and him, Pedro I had quietly become a sort of surrogate for the actual historical monarch who did condemn Tiradentes to death and dismemberment: his grandmother Maria I. The imperial project had ironically achieved its goal of creating a monument that came to symbolize much more than its subject. But rather than representing the nation as those in 1862 intended, it had come to symbolize in this instance only the monarchy. Therefore in that particular historical space, it meant that he took on the responsibility for the Crown’s actions against Tiradentes which took place before he was even born. This writer found the historical falsehood at the center of this anecdote to be troubling in and of itself, but he also questioned the viability of a republican vision of the past buoyed by misdirection and misunderstanding.

G. B. went on to say that his indignation was only exacerbated further with another discussion, this one overheard by him on the street between two men he did not know. The topic was again regarding the circumstances of Tiradentes’ execution. And again, the story served to highlight the overall misconceptions held by the average Brazilian with level upon level of inaccuracy regarding the fate of the Republic’s number one icon who was captured, tried, and executed in Rio and whose dismembered body parts were displayed in the areas of the insurgency (most notably his decapitated head in
Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais). According to G. B.’s account, one speaker was informing the other that it was D. João VI who had had Tiradentes killed and that the martyr had been held in Rio and then sent off to be executed in Ouro Preto. The other man argued that he was executed in Vila Rica (the earlier name for Ouro Preto, the old capital of Minas Gerais). The writer says that he was himself “condemned” to listen to the conversation but unable to reach the men to set the historical record straight. They went on to argue whether or not it was in fact D. João on the throne or not, with one arguing that it must have been D. Manuel (a 16th century king). The writer ultimately ended his recounting of the two anecdotes with one sentence: “the government must open many schools and require the teaching of much of the patria’s history.”

What these accounts reveal is the difficulty for the brand new republic in constructing new symbols and historical narratives. Republican elites attempted to discredit previously held historical interpretations of facts, but as the writer noted, those efforts were coming up against a lack of specific and internalized historical knowledge on the part of the populace, what Graeme Morton refers to as “History You’ll Remember,” which is a heading meant to connote what becomes common knowledge of a people’s history. Morton stresses the importance of myth-making to the creation of a national identity that the masses can indeed “remember.” At the same time, he also concedes the reality of a people collectively getting history wrong as also being important to identity formation. This characterization of this process as messy and often stumbling provides added insight into precisely what G. B. felt compelled to comment on. The anecdotes demonstrate that the new republican stories of the past—namely that of Tiradentes—were

249 Diário de Notícias, April 23, 1890, “Rapidamente.”
being propagated to a public that was latching onto just the big idea of Tiradentes’
execution for his republican principles while missing the factual historical context. In
some ways, that rebranding of history could have been facilitated because of that
ignorance of specifics. The statue misdirection of responsibility, the inaccurate
understandings of the details of the execution all show that the basic, most fundamental
message the republic wanted to get out there was succeeding: Tiradentes was executed by
the monarchy because he was a republican. Did it really matter at the end of the day
which monarch and where? And wouldn’t it be all the better to alienate the people from
the figure of the statue by allowing them to advance the idea that it was in fact Pedro I
who killed Tiradentes? The commemorations were achieving the inculcation, at least, of
that very basic idea of Tiradentes even if the people were in the end still getting it wrong.

The public response to the Tiradentes narrative also shows, though, that there
wasn’t a clear notion of the republican importance of that square beyond the fact that it
now carried his name. The lack of knowledge about that square having sacredness
because of the fact that the martyrdom took place there shows that that particular message
had not been successfully communicated. The anecdotes described before led the authors
to one conclusion: the new republican government had to make public education a
priority. This idea fits in with the other discussions of the civic need for public education
in order to create knowledgeable citizens in the new republic. The fact that the writer
found that the country needed “a lot of schools and a lot of history” reveals an elite
wariness of the implications of the new political and social reality. After all, according

251 Ibid.

251 Ibid. 

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The Changed Commemorative Landscape of Royal Moments during the Republic

As much as a new republic needed a new type of citizen, the 1890s elite also needed a new civic calendar to advance their legitimizing narrative. As the previous analysis of Rodrigo Octavio’s *Festas Nacionaes* shows, they were also aware of their own lack of consensus. Given the documented wide range of the ideological affiliations of the elite, this is not surprising. In addition, the process of determining how to deal with the royal-driven moments that had traditionally been perceived as fundamental to the nation’s history and identity was complex by nature. It demanded that those seminal dates not be just reexamined but reimagined, reconstructed, and rearticulated into the new republican civic understanding as well. Pedro I’s role in the *Grito* moment made that effort difficult for the new regime and resulted in debate, disagreement, and an attempted official redefinition of the first emperor’s legacy. The role of Princess Isabel in ushering through the Golden Law of abolition in 1888 posed a similar problem. In both cases, republicans made a conscious effort to discredit, diminish, or simply ignore those royal figures in the new republic’s commemorations while they simultaneously transformed the moments in order to align them with an interpretation of the past which validated their republican claims to legitimacy and standing in the nation’s political and social development.

Before the Republic was even proclaimed, the ways in which the Rio elite observed Independence Day had already changed as had the social and institutional landscape of the nation. The popular fascination with the recent passage of the abolition law influenced the discourse of the last celebration of the 7th of September under the monarchy of Pedro II, and it correspondingly diminished the commemorative presence of
Pedro I and his statue before the republicans ever took over. Even in a commemorative publication for Brazilian Independence Day from 1889, just two months before the proclamation of the Republic, and titled *Equestrian Statue of D. Pedro I, Founder of the Empire of Brazil*, (see Figure 10), the vast majority of the discourses included were singularly focused on the topic of abolition. Aside from the first page of the publication being a photo of the statue and the statue’s plaza being one of the important locales for
festivities (along with the statue of José Bonifacio, the Campo da Aclamação, and the Camara Municipal), there was no effort to privilege the statue, the *Grito*, or Pedro I in the various included discourses. The festivities for the day did include the performance of Pedro’s Hymn of Independence by school children and the playing of music by three military bands seated on bandstands next to Pedro’s statue. And there were portraits of both Emperors Pedro I and Pedro II displayed in Constitution Plaza. Yet in terms of the rhetoric found in the commemorative publication, some speeches contained not a single reference to Pedro I. While the statue served as the surrogate historical place for the commemoration in Rio, the 7th of September in 1889 was not really a moment for significant comments on the statue or to rehash independence. The date was instead used for the contemporary celebration of abolition. In terms of the statue, it was clearly central—in theory—to the festivities as the name of the publication shows. There are, after all, intermittent references to the *Grito* and Ipiranga that echo the rhetoric of 1862.

For example, Candido Alves Pereira de Carvalho recounts the *grito* thusly:

> On September 7, 1822, a Magnanimous Prince, sincere and loyally devoted to the cause of the liberty of the people, proclaiming on the margins of Ipiranga, …the independence and liberty of our precious patria, constituted with the unanimous agreement of the Brazilians of this historical era a vast and flourishing empire, in America Meridional.\(^{252}\)

While this representation of the past and the other speakers’ reliance on the imagery of the *Grito* were typical, the 1889 introduction of a link between the moment of independence and the passage of the Golden Law added a new element and evidenced the desire on the part of the imperial elite to connect accomplishments and generations once

again. That new element involved a greater sense of a direct line linking Pedro I to his son and his granddaughter and thereby linked royal lineage with the fundamental historical moments of the nation. Carlos Eustaquio da Costa, in the *Equestrian Statue* publication, defined abolition as the truest testimony to Brazil’s progress, and he connected May 13 to September 7 by saying that the latter was “like a greeting and a brado [grito] of alert to the progress of Brazil.” Independence Day could be the “primogênito,” or first born, “whose finishing touch on the glorious work of liberty Providence saved for almost 66 years later, being carried out by the August Granddaughter of the Indelible Prince.” Similar to the sense of generational debt found in 1862, these speakers in 1889 also wanted to recognize the actions of 1822 as “the planting of the tree of liberty” by Brazil’s figurative grandparents to which her children in 1888 had brought liberty to fruition through abolition.²⁵³

A survey of the conceptualizations of “Sete de Setembro” in the various newspapers in Rio adds some additional context to the ideas prevalent in the special publication referenced above. The various writers for the *Diário de Notícias*, the *Gazeta de Notícias*, *Gazeta da Tarde*, *O Fluminense*, *O Paiz*, and *Novidades* did not show the same level of preoccupation with abolition that the contributors to *Estatua Equestre* did. Instead, what they show is a multiplicity of approaches to commemorating the day. For those journalists who advanced the traditional narrative celebrating the monarchy, some latched onto May 13 like those discussed above while others made absolutely no mention of the date. Similarly, some of the writers who attacked that imperial narrative in their articles used the nature of Brazilian abolition as a means to further repudiate the monarchy, and others remained focused solely on the meaning of September 7.

²⁵³ Ibid.
For example, the “Sete de Setembro” write-up in the *Gazeta da Tarde* towed the imperial line all the way through but never brought up that empire’s most recent political accomplishment. It could have easily been an article written any year before abolition. A journalist for *O Fluminense* and a discourse by the president of the Sociedade Comemorative da Independencia published in the *Gazeta de Noticias*, however, did link the two dates together in their larger celebrations of Independence Day and the Empire. Pedro Augusto, the president of that commemorative society, referenced abolition both directly and indirectly in his speech. He emphasized the peaceful nature of the Brazilian nation’s achievement of both independence and abolition, noting that the accomplishment of May 13 was characterized by the “same tranquility” as that associated with September 7. The latter date he called the “liberation of a nationality” and the “starting point of our luminous trajectory.” Aside from the direct reference to that shared “tranquility,” Augusto also connected abolition to the notion of national trajectory by commenting on Brazil’s “ascendant path to perfectibility.” With the 7th of September as the starting point and the 13th of May as the most recent coordinate added to that line of progress, the president’s message was one of accomplishment and optimism.254 The journalist for *O Fluminense* also commented on abolition, but he did so more in passing in his patriotic and nationalistic/imperialistic accounting of the many accomplishments of Brazil’s empire. He customarily called the 7th of September the “greatest day for the *Patria*” and cheered on everything Brazilian from the land’s rich mineral resources to the military’s victory in the Paraguayan War. In terms of his comments on abolition, this writer similarly made note of the peaceful nature of the two moments in Brazilian history.

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by referring to September 7th as having “made our national emancipation in the middle of flowers,” which was an idiomatic expression used to convey the complete absence of conflict. He then immediately connected his version of tranquility to the abolition of slavery and went further to label it an act “decreed by the same system” as that which initially liberated the nation.255

On the other end of the ideological spectrum, writers for O Paiz and the Diário de Notícias aggressively repudiated the 7th of September as a civic date which perpetuated a “polluted history” full of imperial “falsities.” The O Paiz article labeled Pedro I an “ingrate and traitor” who got what he deserved on April 7 when a popular insurrection forced him to abdicate. Therefore this writer held up that latter date as the one more representative of the “American spirit, democratic spirit, frankly republican sentiment” which infused all of the actions that had “affected Brazil’s social and political constitution.” He made no mention of May 13 in his indictment of the date which glorified only the “independence of the Empire” rather than the nation, a (dis)qualification used by other writers for the Gazeta de Notícias and Novidades as well.

The writer for the Diário de Notícias, however, did in his devastating take down of the 7th of September and Pedro I. Like the monarchy’s journalistic supporter who linked independence and abolition together, this writer did place the two dates on the same continuum of history, but he did so in order to articulate a long-term condemnation of the monarchy across time and generations. He affirmed that “every great national revolution, in this country, has its imperial counterfeit, fixed in place with the intent of grasping for the crown the victories of the people.” That phenomenon he called the “palace lie,” and he labels the imperial interpretations of various dates as components of that larger lie.

255 O Fluminense, September 6, 1889.
The 13th of May reflected what he calls “the redemptorismo isabelista”: a lie. The 7th of April as the “voluntary abdication of the Emperor” and the 7th of September as “the generous spontaneity of Pedro I”: all lies. The truth, instead, was that the 7th of April was “the act of international emancipation of the patria.” And as for the statue of Pedro I? It was no more than the “glorification of the despot.”256

Thus Rio de Janeiro witnessed the last imperial celebration of September 7. As can be seen, Pedro I’s standing and the intellectual elites’ understanding of civic dates had already begun their plunge into disarray and disagreement. The new regime after the proclamation of the Republic nevertheless felt compelled to include the date of September 7 as a national holiday and historical moment, but it struggled to commemorate the day without honoring Pedro I and the empire or betraying its own emerging sense of republican identity and history.

Perceptions of the celebrations and the significance of the statue of Pedro I on the day celebrating independence varied in those first few years of the Republic just as they did in 1889. In most cases, though, the literary public was not particularly preoccupied with either Pedro or his statue. For example, one writer in 1890 writing about “the first 7th of September after the Republic!” found incongruity not with the imperial/royal aspect of the date but with the fact that while the authorities illuminated Pedro’s statue, they did not do similarly for José Bonifacio’s statue. Rather than criticize the honoring of Pedro I, he lamented the contrast with the patriarch’s statue which he described as “obscure,” “sad,” and a “black ghost.”257

257 Novidades, September 8, 1890, “Echos & Factos.”
A year later, writers for the *Gazeta de Notícias* noted the effects of the new regime’s revamping of the nature of the date’s public commemoration. One journalist cited the government’s decision—in formal decree—to continue the observation of the date as a national holiday, but he also described how the new regime had turned the commemoration of Independence Day into just an “exclusively military” event. The day’s festivities centered almost exclusively on a parade of troops, and the writer repeatedly referred to the “martial” nature of the exhibition and commemoration. The writer lamented that the day was not the “patriotic holiday” Brazil was accustomed to and asserted that the people witnessing it probably thought it to be a parade for Deodoro rather than the civic celebration of independence. As we saw in the previous chapter, this writer used republican France as a point of comparison with the new somber and militaristic approach to public commemoration. He compared the celebration of September 7 in 1891 to that of Bastille Day and came to the conclusion that if a holiday is “truly popular” in nature (rather than separate and militaristic), then there would be visible public pride, enthusiasm, and participation like that of the French observation of Bastille Day. The writer did not delve into the complicating issue of imperial-centric versus republican-centric historical moments. Instead he remained focused on the Brazilian date and its traditional observance in the past. Echoing the warnings of those other writers discussed in the previous chapter who feared the loss of tradition in the Republic, this journalist almost wistfully looked to the past, and he emphasized how the statue’s plaza had been a focal point where the people met to commemorate the date and where the authorities had orchestrated decorations, poetry, music, salvos, and general festivities. He described these efforts as not a great deal but something. In contrast, the
military parade conducted away from the newly renamed plaza had turned it into an “abandoned spot.”

In another article on the same day and in the same newspaper, that notion of the people as *bestializado* was used to comment on the commemorations of Independence Day that year. This author took on the issue of the incongruity of the statue head-on, referring to it as representing he “who cried Independence or Death on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of September” but who now has been judged to merit scorn “because naturally in a republican regime it would be bad to allude to he who personally originated the holiday with festivities, for his actions for an oppressed people, since that someone was emperor.” He went on to cite the people’s “total and absolute indifference” to the military parade and the holiday as evidence of their continued “*bestializado*” condition. These critiques of the observance of the 7\textsuperscript{th} of September in 1891 provide more evidence to the palpable unhappiness that some felt towards the republican change in approach in commemorating Brazil’s past, most notably the emerging tendency to completely break with tradition and deny the past because of its imperial aspect. They also emphasize the absence of the people in the public sphere of the Republic and a corresponding wariness towards the recasting of civic commemoration with a military slant.

All of these observations stem from the characteristics and very nature of the government at this time, and they call into question the degree of legitimacy the militaristic regime possessed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Republic existed not because of any ideological or revolutionary groundswell but because the military leaders of the coup controlled the army as an institution. They could then translate the

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258 *Gazeta de Notícias*, September 9, 1891, “Coisas do dia.”
259 Ibid.
army’s national organization and strength into control of the apparatuses of authority. At
that time, the idealized Republic envisioned by many was restricted purely to the realm of
the intellect and imagination. Deodoro’s rule was a military one. The early
commemorations of the civic calendar had little choice but to reflect that.

Years later, a journalist’s discussion of the 7th of September’s fade into
commemorative obscurity sheds light onto the success of the government’s efforts to
replace imperial national dates with republican ones. In this case, the supplanting of the
7th of September by the 15th of November in the national imagination caused some to
reflect on the long-term relationship between the two dates. One writer in particular, of
the newspaper A Notícia, declared that “this date [November 15] killed the old, and, like
the younger, more beautiful, more refined, monopolized all the flowers, all the
illuminations, all the fireworks, and all of the salvos of artillery.” He went on to refer to
past commemorations for the 7th of September as the “festive music that greeted the
glorious date of our emancipation” and described the Brazil of 1822 as “young, ardent,
impassioned, and drinking in its first hours of liberty, throwing itself into political life
with the fanatical ardor of a hero.” Alongside this fervor, he also described the
simultaneous political preoccupation of the government, in words reminiscent of the
characteristics of the early Republic, in “organizing the state, fending off Portugal,
dealing with the envy of neighboring countries, and snuffing out internal uprisings.”

Despite these distractions, those commemorations of Independence Day during that first
generation are fondly remembered as being “enthusiastic, raucous, [and] magnificent.”
Similarly, the author recounted his fond memories of the commemorations of his own
generation in the 1870s in which “all of the people spent the night there dancing and
singing” near the statue until the nearby battery fired volleys to culminate the “great
day.” The journalist then compared these experiences to the “dampening” of the date’s
celebrations and their eventual replacement by the civic prominence of November 15. To
add to this point, just the advertisements themselves for the September 7
commemorations published in the papers showed the complexity and even schizophrenic
nature of the republican efforts to simultaneously celebrate both 1822 and 1889 on the
date of independence. For example, in 1893, the Diário de Noticias published an
invitation to celebrate the “anniversary of the separation of Brazil from the Metropole at
the exhibition of the Municipal Republican Hymn, and its composition, in the theater of
S. Pedro de Alcântara.”

These articles also shed light onto the ongoing debate in the Rio press over
whether or not the 7th of September was a “suspect” day in the pantheon of republican
national holidays. Responding to an article that was published on Independence Day
itself and that made just this assertion, the writer for A Notícia refuted that notion and
articulated his hope that the commemorative date could be “rehabilitated.” He couched
his reasoning and his analogy for comparing the 7th of September with the 15th of
November in generational and family terms as well. He equated the latter date with the
role of the “young grandchild” that should be “celebrated with enthusiasm” while the
“sacred, old grandparent” must not be forgotten either. His discussion then turned to the
role of radicalism in that relationship:

The red and feverish Jacobism judged, during some time, that it was an easy thing
to wipe away traditions, amputating History, spewing out hatred and disdain
towards the memory of what came before. But this fever passed. Rio is not a city
that was reborn new and ready for the bosom of the 15th of November: it is an
ancient city that cannot tear from its soul the religion of the past.260

260 Diário de Noticias, September 6, 1893, “7 de Setembro”; A Notícia, September 8-9, 1897, “Chronica.”
This quotation is valuable for its insight into the long-term conflict over the radical and conciliatory approaches to the past already documented in the previous chapter. The radicalism criticized by many in 1893 in the context of the bandstand incident still lingered in 1897, yet so did the criticism of that radicalism. The idea of the Jacobins “amputating history” is a striking metaphor for the repudiation of the imperial era and the disdain that that group felt for the past. Also striking is the writer’s evocation of the idea of Rio having a right to its own history as a city rich in historical tradition. This is the first writer to make this point that trying to eradicate the imperial parts of the nation’s and the city’s pasts would be to deny Rio’s singular past. Inextricably part of this argument is the fact that the city’s history did not begin with the Republic’s proclamation. The statue of Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes testified to this fact. And it continued to be a nuisance for the very same reasons that existed in 1893.

While the 7th of September had been stripped down to a commemorative military parade and systematically eclipsed by November 15 in the civic imagination, the Republican approach to observing May 13 and abolition was an act of cooptation rather than supplantation. Much like the writers in the last year of the Empire, republican writers were particularly interested in exploring the implications of abolition for their emergent national narrative. Chronologically, the celebration of the end of slavery on May 13th shortly followed the April 21st celebration of Tiradentes. By the time that some journalists finished their accounts of Tiradentes Day, it was time for the commemoration of Floriano Peixoto’s birthday (by 1893 the President of the Republic) on April 30. Then, beginning with the early days of May, writers prepared for, discussed, and reflected on May 13 throughout the first half of that month. Beyond this chronological
commemorative continuum, the conceptual linking of republicanism and liberation on multiple levels became evident as early as April of 1890. Writers observing Tiradentes Day in that year labeled those celebrations the “first republican festivity” and May 13 as the second such national holiday. One year later, Sampaio Ferraz himself would comment further. In a discourse published to commemorate Tiradentes Day in 1891, he referred to Brazilians having been the “slaves of irrationality,” and he singled out “the two golden dates” of abolition: May 13, 1888 and November 15, 1889.261 This discourse demonstrated the new regime’s ability to coopt what had been perceived as Princess Isabel’s Golden Law for its ending of chattel slavery and link it to the proclamation of the Republic for its ending of Brazil’s perceived political slavery to the empire. Through the omission of September 7 as an important date, Ferraz could connect Tiradentes to abolition and abolition to the Republic, thus cutting Pedro I and the monarchy out of that historical line by denying royal attribution for the achievements of 1822 and 1888.

Other writers similarly cut the monarchy out of the historical narrative but did allow for the continuation of September 7 as a legitimate fundamental date. It was what one writer called “the most glorious date for our patria” because it commemorated the moment in which Brazil “broke free from the prison in which the metropole had held us.” For another, September 7 was the first “step” in the trajectory of Brazilian nationality with May 13 being the second step and November 15 being the “culminating point and the third.” For him, “in 1822 the foundations of a free patria were launched; in 1888 the odious dominion of one human over another was put to rest in our land; [and] in 1889 it all ended with the ultimate privilege, self-government.” The same author emphasized the popular notion of abolition as a “struggle of those lower to rise above” and the “first

261 O Tempo, April 20-May 15, 1894; Diário de Notícias, April 28, 1890, “A Semana Passada.”
victory of the people of Brazil.” The commemoration, described as the “party of the people,” saw Praça Tiradentes decorated as part of the festivities and with no reference to the statue in the square.262

It was one thing to omit references to the monarchical roles in those notable dates. It was quite another to dispute and refute those roles head-on, and that is what several authors did regarding Pedro I (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section) and perhaps surprisingly Princess Isabel. For these writers, abolition was the culmination and achievement of a longer process that could be traced back to prominent republican historical figures. That process was “outside of the Third Reign” (the name given to Isabel’s regency) and outside of the “guileful dominion” of the Princess’s court. Rather than seeing her as the “Redemptora” or Redeemer that Brazilian history and culture would eventually define her as, republican writers in the 1890s emphasized her use of warships to put down a slave revolt prior to the Golden Law in order to discredit her abolitionary standing. The Brazilian “Day of Redemption” with abolition was the triumph of republican-led liberation and achieved with the martyrdom of those slaves at the hands of the Princess Regent.263 In line with this thinking, abolition was a “great revolution” and their “grandiose social rehabilitation” that stemmed from neither the “benevolence nor favor of the reigning dynasty,” but was instead “the popular will that overcame absolutism.” The military and the nation’s young minds were the “vanguard” of the abolition movement, and it was precisely their work, not Isabel’s, that made abolition the “pedestal” for the Republic by creating racial equality, which some viewed as the necessary precursor to political and democratic equality. For many writers,

262 Diário de Notícia, September 7, 1894, “7 de Setembro”; Gazeta de Notícias, May 13 and May 14, 1894, “13 de Maio.”
263 Diário de Noticias, May 13, 1894, “O Dia da Redempção.”
abolition was inextricably linked to the proclamation of the Republic because of the prevailing sense of how incongruent a republic with slavery would be. After all, a republic needed “free people, liberty, equality, [and] fraternity,” thus abolition was a necessary prerequisite to the existence of the Republic.\textsuperscript{264} And the discrediting and removal of Princess Isabel as a figure in that achievement was a necessary part in the advancement of the republican narrative.

\textbf{Commemorations and the Redefining of Pedro I}

In many ways, the wide range of public responses in the 1890s to Pedro’s historical role and his statue reflected the complex limitations placed on the Republican re-imaginings of the nation’s history by the nature of that history and the presence of the statue itself. The different approaches to dealing with the statue and its subject articulated in the press—before, during, and after the bandstand incident—reveal a wide range of emotions and nuanced intellectualism. For most of the radical ideologues of the Republic, much of the 1890s would be spent in anger and attack, manifested in diatribes against the first emperor and different proposals to either destroy or move the statue from the public square. In the end, though, the nation’s first statue would persevere. It would remain and endure in Praça Tiradentes through equal parts choice and inertia. Pedro I’s legacy, however, continued to be a work in progress, newly qualified by the nation’s republican landscape.

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{O Tempo}, May 13, 1894, “A Redempção.”
Comparative Definitions of Pedro I through the Lenses of Independence and Abdication

Clearly evident in the 1890s Republican criticisms of Pedro I was the tendency to judge him harshly in comparison with the other two (male) monarchs in Brazil’s past. Those writers showed much more interest in reevaluating and reinterpreting Pedro’s standing based on his perceived relationships with his father, the Portuguese King João VI, and his son, Pedro II, the second Emperor of Brazil. This Republican reinterpretation hinged on recasting both the independence moment and Pedro I’s abdication in new, devastatingly unflattering lights in an attempt to replace the identity of the hero of Ipiranga with that of the haughty traitor of the Braganças. The fact that the most virulent critics of Pedro I went so far as to make him appear foreign even to his father and his son—fellow monarchs—reveals the singular ire that he aroused in the contest of memory.

Immediately following the proclamation of the Republic, the 7th of April, the date of Pedro I’s abdication in 1831, emerged as a counter-date and narrative that refuted the first emperor’s definition as historical hero. While those imperial writers of the inaugural odes of 1862 intentionally and necessarily glossed over that moment, republican writers could directly use it as a memorial weapon. The Gazeta da Tarde in 1890 commemorated the day as “the day of the people!” and extolled the “honor and glory to the revolution of the 7th of April” as the date on which Brazilians reclaimed their “liberty and constitutional rights.” This 1890 column went further to tackle the question of the statue, asserting that “in the Brazilian heart there is a moment greater than that of the statue of Sr. d. Pedro I.” Simultaneously calling for Brazilians to respect “the memorable traditions of the past,” the author called for the “sun of the 7th of April of 1831” to shine down on
the artifice and “symbol of a lie” that was the statue. These were strong words spoken against Pedro I and his statue, namely that the emperor should be more defined by his last national act than by his first, but they reveal an interesting aspect of republican criticisms. This column in 1890 was merely a reprint of the words of Republican Party President Bocayuva spoken against the statue’s inauguration in 1862. Rather than a new discussion of the viability of the statue in the plaza of the new Republic of Brazil and a fresh critique of the first emperor, this republican writer—and many others like him—chose to rely on the 1862 historical narrative and the actual words of the 1862 critics. Despite these strong recycled words, the commemorative visibility of April 7 never took off to really capture the public’s or the newspapers’ attention.

The observance in 1893 of April 7 and Pedro’s abdication just shortly before the bandstand incident was consistent with the limited interest shown in the years prior when journalists were understandably more focused on the more pressing political issues of the day to the point that they made no reference to the date at all the year before. In O Tempo in 1893, the date rated only a small blurb, but that in and of itself indicates an intentional—albeit small—attack on the standing of Pedro I. The comment stated only that “the seventh of April is a notable date in the history of Brazil because it was on that day in 1831 that the 1st emperor abdicated, seeing himself forced to flee from our territory.” In just one sentence, the author did manage to employ three of the most common Republican slights to Pedro I: the omission of his name as an intentional slap (which Sampaio Ferraz did repeatedly in referring to Pedro’s statue as “the statue of Praça Tiradentes”), the elevation of the date of his abdication as a celebratory moment for

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265 Gazeta da Tarde, April 7, 1890, “7 de Abril.”
266 O Tempo, April 7, 1893, “7 de Abril”; Jornal do Commercio, April 22, 1893, “Publicações a Pedido,” “A estatua da praça Tiradentes.”
Brazil, and the portrayal of his abdication as “fleeing.” While the writer emphasized Pedro’s abdication, he also minimalized the date simultaneously, seemingly for effect, by placing the event of 1831 with other “notable” historical events on the 7th of April such as the death of Carlos VIII of France in 1498 and the departure of St. Francis for India in 1541. This effort to deny Pedro’s standing by affirming the importance of his abdication speaks to the larger tension such writers felt in wanting him to slip into historical oblivion but feeling compelled to publically discuss him in order to attack his standing and achieve that goal. It was what made them memorial deniers and bargainers at the same time in how they dealt with him.

The dust-up over the bandstand just days later triggered a renewed interest in reevaluating the historical narrative associated with Pedro I’s abdication. A letter-writer calling himself “A Patriot” fused the Republican perspective on that abdication with the political purity litmus test generated by the bandstand incident. He wrote that “we guarantee…that no self-respecting puritan republican would have considered the raising of a bandstand around the feet of the statue of the largo do Rocio as an affront made by the Club Tiradentes against the memory of this libertine and wimp of the 7th of April.”

Like the previous quotation, this portrayal advances the typical republican view expressed in the indignant responses to the public criticisms in 1893. Club Tiradentes could never dishonor the nation’s history through dishonoring the statue in any way simply because Pedro I merited no respect. The first emperor was dismissed as a “libertine,” which was a tactic used previously by Teófilo Otoni in 1862 as a means to show the contrast between the virtue that characterized republicans and the vice that characterized Pedro I. Ferraz himself labeled Pedro as “haughty…perverse…[and] lax.”

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267 *Jornal do Commercio*, April 26, 1893, “Cartas,” “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
But the “Patriot” writer went further, insulting Pedro for not fighting his exile. While Pedro himself and the writers who celebrated his statue at its inauguration cloaked his leaving Brazil in the language of sacrifice and constitutional observance to avoid conflict, this republican writer in 1893 portrayed it only as weakness and a function of the emperor’s lack of moral and ethical principles. This personal repudiation of Pedro I translated into the complete dismissal of his historical significance and therefore that of the statue as well, and it was part of the attack frequently used by Sampaio Ferraz in his responses to the public criticism of the bandstand. He vehemently mocked those he called the “adorers of Pedro I” for their adoration for a figure expelled from the nation, saying that the “perverse and weak” emperor was “dispatched to the old continent” out of an act of “national dignity” in throwing him out. He added that the ship spiriting Pedro away left “to the sound of popular fanfare” and a collective sense of good riddance.268

This reinterpretation of the 1831 abdication flew in the face of that aforementioned previous imperial narrative, advanced during the imperial historical project and codified long after by Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa in his seminal biography of Pedro I. Drawing on those previous imperial narratives, including Pedro I’s own accounts of his abdication, Tarquinio de Sousa did label the events of April 7 a “revolution,” but he resoundingly portrayed Pedro’s leaving as the benevolent and liberal self-sacrifice referenced in the odes of 1862. Where Ferraz found jeering celebration, he found solemn respect and a “melancholic withdrawal” of a dignified ruler rather than the fearful flight described above. Similarly, the traditional characterization of the impetus for Pedro’s decision to abdicate focused on the emperor’s royal honor rather than any ignominy.

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Tarquinio de Sousa presented abdication as Pedro’s placing his honor, the observance of the constitution, and the avoidance of a possible civil war between Brazilians and Portuguese ahead of his retention of the throne. This narrative accentuated the support that existed in place in Rio had Pedro I wanted to fight for his throne as a means to deepen his perceived sacrifice and morality.\textsuperscript{269}

In an ironic twist, this debate over abdication as a mark of shame or sacrifice would itself play out in the aftermath of the bandstand scandal when Sampaio Ferraz felt compelled to step down as commander of the Battalion Tiradentes. That same “Patriot” who called Pedro a “wimp” for the way in which he abdicated lauded Ferraz’s resignation as an act of “selflessness and self-denial of this true Spartan of the Brazilian republic.” For this not to be dismissed as radical cognitive dissonance, the republican distinction had to be made that abdication was a virtuous act only when one was unjustly targeted. Since the official republican view of April 7 was that of a righteous revolution and Pedro I as anything but a victim, there could be no credit or esteem granted him for that act of withdrawal.\textsuperscript{270}

Ferraz went further in using abdication to condemn Pedro I by interestingly drawing a comparison between what he perceived as the exit of the contemptible father in 1831 and that of the sympathetic son in 1889. Rather than the haughty Pedro I justly and jubilantly sent packing, Pedro II, Pedro’s “son, good and compassionate, because of the strength of our aspirations and owing to the inexorable fate of events, had to depart, breaking his loving heart in front of his homeland, to die in bitter exile, and to which only

\textsuperscript{269} Tarquinio de Sousa, 925-926, 932, 933, 936.
\textsuperscript{270} Jornal do Commercio, April 26, 1893, “Cartas,” “A Estatua de D. Pedro I.”
cowards would rise to celebrate in the face of his agony!” This portrayal of Pedro II as merely a victim of circumstances—namely the inevitable Brazilian evolution to republican government—and a sympathetic and melodramatic figure reaffirmed Ferraz’s singular hatred for Pedro I rather than any Jacobin ire directed at the Bragantine monarchy in general. In the Club Tiradentes’ identification with Pedro II, he even went so far as to liken that afore-described sad scene of abdication in 1889 to the public affronts made against the Club in 1893, referencing the “inexplicable assent of the powers that be” in the maltreatment of the two. In a rather surprising linking of dates, Ferraz portrayed them as such:

> two dates that confront and repulse: the 17\textsuperscript{th} of November of 1889—the last goodbye of D. Pedro II to the land that had cradled him since birth—when the \textit{Riachuelo}—the awesome battleship parted the waters of Guanabara [Bay], having an entire family of outcasts to the side of its walls of iron; and the 19\textsuperscript{th} of April of 1893, when the enemies of the Republic found half a dozen hotheads to violate the veneration of the glorious martyr of the \textit{Inconfidência}, creating a pretext for the irreverence to the dead, who old Portugal itself hated and condemned!\footnote{271 Ferraz.} \footnote{272 Ibid.}

Within this defense of the Club Tiradentes against the resultant public scorn in 1893 was that sad image of Pedro II leaving his homeland, which ironically should have been a cathartic and triumphant date for a radical republican such as Ferraz. Yet he used it to lament what he saw as the re-victimization of Tiradentes (and his club and himself) by modern enemies of the Republic.

Not only did Ferraz use a comparison to his son to denounce Pedro I, he also used the latter’s historical relationship to his own father, King João VI, in the context of Brazilian independence to condemn him for his role in that political separation from Portugal. Calling Pedro I a traitor for leading Brazilian independence against the
Portuguese rule of his father was no new condemnatory tactic. Otoni made that charge in his 1862 pamphlet. Ferraz simply reiterated the line of attack in 1893, saying that Pedro’s actions leading up to September 7 of 1822 were “the usurpation originating from the vile perjury against his own father—old and stooped—friend of this unhappy country—reduced, since then, to a land of slaves.” This one characterization of Pedro I held every possible republican slur against Pedro I. He had enslaved Brazil under his rule, betrayed his old and weakened father, and lied to that same father when he made a declaration of continued fidelity to Portuguese rule. This line of attack required a positive historical legacy for Dom João in order to make Pedro’s perfidy that much more malignant. Therefore the Portuguese king became Brazil’s “friend” who fled “the European tyranny of Bonaparte” and found “safe shelter” in a magnanimous and welcoming Brazil. Another writer for O Tempo similarly used his column discussion of Tiradentes to slam Pedro I for “betraying his father in the hour most critical to his dynasty.” Again, critics of Pedro I drew a distinction within the house of Bragança by victimizing D. João, the Portuguese king, and villainizing the son, the figurehead of Brazilian independence. In a case of making decidedly strange bedfellows of the 1893 Jacobin and two of the three monarchs most intimately associated with Brazilian history, Ferraz was attempting to reintroduce a perspective on independence and Pedro I that had roundly been rejected or at least ignored before on the grounds that it distorted the events and manner of Pedro’s treatment of his father. For most, the historical reality was that Pedro never stopped showing his father deference, explaining his protestations of fidelity to his father’s authority, and the Brazilian press and later historians had drawn the clear

273 Ibid.
274 Diário de Notícia, September 7, 1894, “7 de Setembro”; O Tempo, April 21, 1892, “O Tiradentes.”
distinction between whom Pedro and Brazil were declaring independence from: the Cortes. But here, Ferraz and his supporters advanced the narrative of familial betrayal to fuse the traditionally sympathetic interpretation of D. João VI with that of the conniving Pedro I.

**Definition through Qualification**

In addition to redefining him by comparing him unfavorably to his family and fellow monarchs, Pedro I’s critics in the 1890s also attempted to minimize his legacy by qualifying his role as *Fundador*, albeit grudgingly since many would have preferred his complete exorcism from the history books rather than this minimization. Even those journalists who did not typically advance that more aggressively anti-imperial narrative began to qualify Pedro’s historical role because of the new political reality. And in some cases, it becomes apparent that they themselves were learning to navigate in this way day by day during the public debate over the covering of the statue. For example, on April 19, the editorial in *O Paiz* referred to Pedro I as the “founder of the empire” in that paper’s ongoing criticism of Club Tiradentes’ actions. Just one day later, though, Pedro’s title became “the founder of the *extinct* empire” [emphasis my own]. This immediate qualification and titular course-correction speaks volumes towards the political and rhetorical climate that generated this new self-censorship and historical reinterpretation. The editor of the *Revista Illustrada* showed the learning of this same lesson on the need to distinguish between historical eras when labeling Pedro I. That journal delineated the past from the present by calling Pedro “the founder of the ex-empire of Brazil.”

While these writers, who stood out for their criticism of the statue’s covering, qualified Pedro’s standing by articulating a rupture in the Brazilian historical narrative,

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others directly attacked that standing by either qualifying or contesting his historical achievements. Rather than the hero of Ipiranga or the founder of the nation, Pedro became the “pseudo founder of the empire,” and a “falsified legend.” Echoing the “bronze lie” assertion of Otoni decades before, another writer described the statue as “the vile bronze that the [imperial] court raised” and later used the exact label of Otoni himself as did multiple others. A writer who called himself the “Positivist Apostle of Brazil” stated that the statue of Pedro I “does not represent true history” because it “is excessively exaggerating” what was in reality the first emperor’s “secondary role despite his official primacy…in the effort of our national independence.” That false narrative, according to him, was advanced and immortalized in the statue through the “cortezanismo” of the past. This qualifying of the statue’s founding meant to de-popularize it for the Brazilian public. With this interpretation, the nation didn’t raise that statue…nor did the people or even Rio for that matter. It was the work of the court, and for this reason it was the representation of a lie and what amounted to an inside memorial job. For many of these writers, the true “preeminent role” belonged to either José Bonifácio or Tiradentes before him, and not to Pedro I. Revealing the true symbolic meaning of Pedro’s statue—“the usurpation of the liberty and rights of the Brazilian people” by its subject—became the mechanism for the “just reclamation of republican sentiment.” By similarly labeling him as merely the “founder of the monarchy and supposed author of the independence of Brazil,” critics could simultaneously question his credited role in independence and limit his founding to that strictly of the monarchy and not the nation and not Brazil. These writers conceded that Pedro created an “independent empire” because September 7 achieved the “separation of Brazil from the metropole” or
“the end of [Brazil’s] colonial life,” but they expressly limited it as such in order to give credit for the founding of Brazil’s nationhood to the “revolution” of November 15 and the Republic. Even the credit for establishing the empire came to be qualified by some writers. For example, the Masonic Grand Master Antonio Joaquim de Maceda Soares earlier affirmed that Pedro I would have been just a “vulgar adventurer” without the efforts of Tiradentes and José Bonifácio rather than any sort of fundador.276

These sorts of discussions of the Brazilian independence movement in the specific context of commemorating September 7 typically advanced two themes previously discussed: royal usurpation of a decidedly popular Brazilian movement and the replacement of Pedro I by José Bonifácio as the real patriarch and icon of independence. At the core of these historical redefinitions was the fundamental idea that Brazil would have been just fine without any royal participation in those decisive moments. There was an effort published in 1893 to redirect the celebration of independence day by going to the statue of “the eminentíssimo figure of the patriarch of independence, the great José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva” to witness “the laying down of a crown at the feet” of the statue “as a single symbol of national recognition.” While it was not surprising that Pedro I was commemoratively replaced by his esteemed Brazilian advisor on this date, it was certainly striking that an organization like the Centro Artístico would create a “patriotic work of remembering” for the date that privileged royal imagery as a means to honor and recognize the authority and contribution of José Bonifácio.277


277 Diário de Notícias, September 5, 1893, “7 de Setembro.”
Such an effort showed that there were many different levels and nuance to attempting to replace an emperor with an imperial advisor and stalwart in historical memory during the Republic. The use of a crown to pay homage in a time that, as I have already noted, was preoccupied with extirpating royal iconography indicates a lack of consensus on how exactly to pay tribute. However, there existed strong consensus on the primacy of José Bonifácio over Pedro I as well as on the understanding that Pedro’s role in independence was inconsequential and merely opportunistic. This example also sheds light onto what appears to be a habitual need on the part of the elites for a multi-layered Brazilian reclamation of sovereignty. When it came to attempts to strip Pedro I of power, the mechanism that allowed for the greatest degree of separation between Brazilians and his royal person and what he as a national figure stood for was always his *portugalidade*. It can be seen in the forced transfer of the throne to the Brazilian-born Pedro II in 1831. I would argue that the nation avoided that “inevitable” republican rupture in that year precisely because of the way that the abdication effectively transferred sovereignty in both royal and administrative terms to Brazil and Brazilians. It was enough of a shift to mitigate any call for more extreme change. In the anecdote involving the patriarch, we see the desired transfer of the mantle of leadership of independence from Pedro I to José Bonifácio, from the Portuguese royal to the Brazilian-born Paulista (albeit imperial) elite. The handing over of status to José Bonifácio regarding September 7 commemorations represented one more degree of separation and reclamation for the date. These steps represented a sort of middle ground and transitional phase. For the idealized Republic, the ultimate transfer of power—symbolic and real—would be represented in the new
system of government as the popular sovereignty claimed by the citizenry on November 15.

In addition to shedding light on the themes of sovereignty and legitimacy, this anecdote involving the issue of paying tribute to a statue (in this case José Bonifácio’s) and the State’s public representations of power is also akin to that of the World’s Fair controversy present in the perceptions of the statue’s covering by the bandstand. The belief of some at the time of the incident that Pedro I’s statue was being prepared for exhibition at the Chicago World’s Fair, noted in the previous chapter, made the reality of the covering that much more disturbing since it transformed what they believed to be an act of ultimate respect into one of incivility. After all, in the late nineteenth century, being chosen to represent Brazil in the high stakes world of international exhibitions was the highest honor because it reflected the valuation of an object as meriting a place in the carefully crafted national identity projected to the world and the Western arbiters of civilization. The 1889 world’s fair in Paris had attracted more widespread participation from Latin American countries precisely because of those elites’ desire to prove themselves on the soil of the French nation and people who served as the era’s and the region’s “cultural point of reference.”

Given this context, the exhibits in the world’s fairs ultimately reflected how elites formulated the concept of the ideal modern and progressive nation. The new republican elite did indeed send some of the nation’s greatest artwork to Chicago in 1893, but it would be paintings made by famous Brazilian artists rather than a statue of a Portuguese prince made by a French sculptor. In their construction of a unique national

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self, the elites of the late empire and early republic had to walk a fine line of conformity and individualism. The “transformation, re-creation, and invention of tradition” that went into that construction had to fit in with Western ideals of beauty and merit while at the same time purposefully being outside of that model in order to accommodate the simultaneous Western fascination with the exotic. In deciding just how “other” they could be as Latin Americans, Brazilian elites—like their counterparts throughout the region—used that opening to latch onto the intellectual and artistic cooptation of the native as part of their distinctly American identity. As the nation’s fair commissions “stressed the vastness and exotic nature of Brazil,” its artists responded with Indianista novels and depictions. This trend would continue to influence Brazilian notions of national identity and those objects selected for exhibition.279

However, in the late nineteenth century the selection of artwork was secondary to the real purpose of those cosmopolitan gatherings. That purpose was as much a product of the preoccupation with modernization and progress present in the intellectual climate in Brazil as the 15th of November was. In his study *Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation*, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo notes how elites throughout Latin America sought the public display and validation of their modernization programs at those international sites in order to “present in impressive fashion both the economic and the human resources of the nation for the world to see” to in turn attract foreign capital and European immigration. Thus, their self-awareness of progress was what drove their desire

for international awareness of their nation’s modernity and economic attractiveness.\textsuperscript{280}

Brazil’s exhibition in Chicago in 1893 reflected that desire, and the key component to the first projection of the new Republic’s image was coffee. The “Brazilian building” that represented the nation (see Figure 11) in the foreign structures category served to promote Brazilian coffee with its first-floor exhibit of “every kind” of coffee (but was dominated by that from São Paulo), which was served “to thousands daily.”

![Image of the Brazil Building](image)


American commentary spoke to Brazil’s success on that cosmopolitan—though inherently American—stage in Chicago. A local writer considered Brazil’s architectural

\textsuperscript{280} Tenorio-Trillo, xii-xiii, 1.
offering to be “one of the most beautiful” of the fair because of its domes, impressive
French Renaissance style, sculptured artifice, medallions, spiral staircases, and summer
garden. Even the fair’s Director-General referred to the nation as such: “Brazil, possessed
of all the wealth of products incident to her perfect clime, has set aside $600,000 with
which to display the exhibits and resources of that young and growing republic.” In terms
of the resources displayed, Brazil contributed to exhibits on forestry/woods, leather,
mining, and fisheries (displaying fishing boats). It sent a representative of the nation to
the “Woman’s Building” and followed requested protocol of having Brazil’s female-
comprised committee develop statements on women’s “industrial interests” rather than
“politics, suffrage, or other irrelevant issues.” It contributed in some way (not detailed) to
ethnological and anthropological exhibition and collection, depicted as “the objects that
show how the rude forefathers of a thousand tribes delved, dug, and builded” and
included “many interesting tribes of living Indians…quartered near the building.” In the end, Brazilian participation in Chicago did indeed live up to the current Western
models of modernism, sexism, and racism.

As seen in the previous chapter’s discussion of the intellectual and political
climate that came to be associated with positivism, elite perceptions in 1893 of the very
nature of nationality hinged on their society’s ability to publicize “its own possession of
the universal truths of progress, science, and industry.” In the end, their objective at the
world’s fairs was the same as on the streets of Rio de Janeiro and across Brazil: “to
consolidate their national and international integrity.” In terms of elite understandings
of political legitimacy, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo asserts that those world’s fairs also

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281 Truman, 112, 201, 262, 283, 345, 366, 422, 543.
282 Tenorio-Trillo, 3-5.
demonstrated the era’s conceptualization of freedom and democracy through that lens of the modern model nation. Accordingly, he cites the terms republic, nation, and democracy as “fundamental to the concept of modern freedom.” Whether it was an understanding of equality, popular representation, or what he calls the “modern republican freedom” as defined by the “political and social rights granted by the French Revolution,” Tenorio-Trillo ultimately concludes that in the international exposition context freedom was a fundamental philosophical principle, not an indispensable practice. Thus democracy, without a fixed meaning, was conceived by special, and often nondemocratic, adjectives—authoritarian, conservative, socialist, liberal, caesarean. The need for an economically or militarily strong state and the heavily nationalistic environment made democracy and its inherently ambivalent liberty dispensable though valuable components of the model modern nation. Economic and productive laissez-faire was at the core of the late-nineteenth-century’s pride in freedom.283

The practical results of these beliefs included government-created commercial commissions in order to best take advantage of the opportunities for the “civilizing effects of commerce.” What a nation needed to attract that commerce was order. All of these interplaying factors lead Tenorio-Trillo to conclude that “freedom as a political virtue was understood as peace.” This distinction is important since it underscores the wariness of the republican writers for the state of their nation, evidenced in their commentary regarding the statue controversy and the conflict in Rio Grande do Sul, and what it was representing to the world. The Latin American intellectual understanding by that time of democracy being equivalent to a republican form of government informed their views on the legitimacy of their government. Thus, Brazil had achieved the ultimate marker of republicanism while still struggling, as any new regime dealing with what

283 Ibid., 3-5.
Tenorio-Trillo calls the “ungovernability of democracy” would, to achieve the peace and order viewed as markers of a nation’s progress.²⁸⁴

What these discussions of world’s fairs, national identities, and statues seemingly boxed up for display show is just how complex and messy it was for those elites in the early Republic to decide how to think and what to do. They also reveal why one writer would feel compelled to advocate for the recognition of José Bonifácio as the true icon of Independence Day and others to continue to more generally but vehemently seek the disqualification of Pedro I from that accomplishment and their version of nationality. We return, then, to the more specific topic of what the observations of September 7 during the 1890s reveal about those disqualification efforts and their impact on the historical legacy of Pedro I.

A commemorative write-up for the 7th of September in 1894 emphasized the political recognition on Pedro I’s part for the movement—referred to as the “aspirations of the Brazilian people”—already afoot well before that moment on the banks of the Ipiranga River. For this author, that political calculus taken by Pedro to join the movement made his role reactionary rather than characterized by any sort of leadership. Seeing Pedro as never truly intent to “shake off the yoke of Portugal” like the Brazilians were, the author places him apart—and only perceiving—from the “desires of the entire nation” for independence. Ultimately, the main point of this qualification of Pedro is that without his political opportunism in injecting himself into an already swiftly moving current of independence, the result would have been in 1822 a “revolution” that would have been republican in nature and would have decisively won Brazilian independence without Pedro I. The author presents it as historical certitude that if Pedro had returned to

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 5.
Portugal when ordered to do so by the *Cortes* or had resisted Brazilian independence in an effort to preserve his father’s and Portugal’s control, then the republic would assuredly have come into being in 1822. In the end, then, Pedro I’s cooptation of that preexisting effort subverted that very effort and denied and delayed the coming Brazilian republic. This same author continued to challenge the notion of Pedro as the leader of independence by emphasizing the popular nature of the Brazilian independence movement. For him, the people were the true force of the movement, and Pedro merely acceded and tapped into it. Correspondingly, Pedro had not been acclaimed by the people but had “acclaimed himself emperor of Brazil,” and his ability to do so stemmed from his success in capturing the moment with the “memorable phrase independence or death” and creating an image and a catchphrase. The *Grito* allowed him to fuse himself onto that preexisting movement and leach standing and authority to the point of effectively creating a brand for himself. In a final criticism and qualification of Pedro's independence legacy, the author also asserted that royal aspect of the way Brazil achieved its political independence cheapened that victory. He found that the roles of Pedro I and D. João VI in the process “stained” Brazilian independence because it was a “negotiation between father and son” as opposed to the ennobling popular movement that was the groundswell behind Pedro’s negotiating position. The bottom line for this author was how that royal participation masked the real force of the movement, the Brazilian people, who would have gained their freedom “with the prince or without him.”285

Another way that critics qualified Pedro’s legacy was to cast him as more foreign and thereby define him more by his otherness and incongruity. Using Pedro I’s *portugalidade* against him as a means of attack went back to the first emperor’s own

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285 *Diário de Notícias*, September 7, 1894, “7 de Setembro.”
time. It was, after all, one of the driving factors in the uprising against him in 1831. Even those celebrating him back in 1862 defined him more by the land of his birth and death—Portugal—than the land in which he lived and self-identified with the majority of his life—Brazil. This being a monarch of two worlds and of neither was a reality that Pedro himself found difficult. In his biography, Tarquinio de Sousa discusses Pedro I’s surprise at being labeled in his own time as a Portuguese and a foreigner by quoting the Emperor’s own words on the matter at the time of his abdication: “I would imagine that twenty-three years of existence in this land, of which ten were dedicated to the public cause, they could have extended me the right of being Brazilian.” Historically, that foreignness had most to do with whether or not there loomed a more foreign foil than Pedro I for Brazilians. In 1822, Portugal and its Cortes occupied that spot rather than Pedro I. Even writers in 1894 echoed this reality, describing the Brazilian people back in 1822 as “neither tolerating anymore the authority of the foreigner nor the direct intervention of the metropole in the political business of the country.” In this instance, this writer did not choose to segue into Pedro’s own foreignness, but he did take the opportunity to stress the emperor’s monarchical identity and thereby still qualified him and made him that much “other.” Other writers did often use that label of foreign to challenge Pedro I’s legacy, and some went a step further to tie that foreignness to Pedro’s perceived vice, opportunism, and authoritarianism. It was simply part of the well-used critical playbook, such that a writer discussing the topic of “national gratitude” to Pedro I would make the argument that

the foreigner glorified by the statue is not the author of our political independence. He sold it to Brazil for the certain and very high price of two

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286 Tarquinio de Sousa, 927.
287 Diário de Notícias, September 7, 1894, “7 de Setembro.”
million pounds sterling and even more the onus of the terms as emperors from the descendants of the House of Bragança, when it is indubitable that the belief in civic duty held by our grandparents would have in little time achieved our emancipation from the metropole and founded on this soil in America the appropriate government that was implanted only sixty-seven years after the Revolution. Given this, what does the statue signify? An homage of gratitude to the founder of the monarchy.²⁸⁸

This indictment of Pedro as the foreigner who used Brazilian independence, interrupted the inevitable republic, and condemned Brazil to monarchy ultimately ended with the common qualification on what it was that Pedro actually founded in 1822. Again, it was distinguished as the monarchy, and not Brazil. Sampaio Ferraz himself would drive home this interpretation of Pedro’s otherness, but he would do so by emphasizing how his royal and imperial tendencies served to separate him from the people of Brazil and qualify how his 1824 constitution should be remembered. Ferraz called Pedro the “first monarch” and denigrated the statue’s symbolic representation of that constitution, describing the act captured in bronze as Pedro I “bestowing upon his vassals his constitutional charter.”²⁸⁹

By labeling the Brazilian people as mere “vassals” to Pedro I, Ferraz sought to clearly define Pedro by his authoritarian royalty and his relationship of separateness to the people. Neither the hero of independence and the nation nor the author of the Brazilian people’s constitution in these eyes, Pedro I faced the steady chipping away of his historical place.

There was, curiously, one chronicle of the bandstand confrontation that flew in the face of this tendency to back away from Pedro I’s traditional historical legacy. The write-up on April 20 in the Diário de Notícias regarding the events of the day before, when the bandstand was pulled down, included the first and only reference to something

²⁸⁸ O Paiz, May 17, 1894, “Gratidão Nacional.”
²⁸⁹ Ferraz.
different reported in the accounts of the words exchanged in the plaza. The account had
the typical attribution that one of the captains thanked the police for their “having given
time for the people to perform their patriotic duty.” But this one chronicler also added a
new line to what the speaker said: “if Tiradentes was a great patriot, then so was d. Pedro
I on the day of the 7th of September of 1822.”290 This account is the only one that
reported that particular exchange of words, and it was certainly an outlier at its time for
further affirming not only Pedro’s status as the icon of Ipiranga and independence and
that imperial founding narrative but also a comparable historical standing with
Tiradentes. Given the charged rhetorical atmosphere in the aftermath of the bandstand,
you would expect that this particular account would have kicked up a firestorm and been
highlighted in the Club Tiradentes denunciations of the captains singled out for their
participation. Yet it remained confined to this one account and that one small line. The
rest of the account lined up with those in the other papers. The vivas exclaimed on the site
and reported in the Diário de Notícias still excluded any pro-monarchy elements; they
were strictly limited to the Republic, the army, the navy, President Floriano Peixoto, the
police, and the National Guard. In terms of the question of vivas, there existed a sort of
flip side of this story of unique reporting on what was said in the streets. Only one
account in O Tempo on the 21st of April mentioned bandstand supporters shouting calls of
“down with the monarchy” as “some groups roamed the main streets of the city giving
vivas to the Republic, to Tiradentes, etc., and death to (morras) the monarchists, the
traitors, to Pedro I and others.” This account was commented on by a writer for the
Diário de Notícias the next day who said that the other paper’s coverage brought “to his
mind a ghost,” and this notion of a renewed public presence for Pedro I giving the dead

290 Diário de Notícias, April 20, 1893, “Os Factos de Hontem.”
emperor new life as a ghost and/or a statue is one that has already been discussed. Nevertheless, this reporting of information in the context of outlier stories provides a different slant on the significance of that reporting. There was only that one account of explicitly anti-Pedro I rhetoric in the streets. Similarly, the only explicitly pro-Pedro I language registered at the demolition site remained confined to that other one paper with its one account.²⁹¹

On a humorous note, and from a much different time, the only other example of a verbal affirmation of Pedro I taking place at his statue came in 1916 with a newspaper description of an incident involving the statue and playfully titled “Symbolic Nudity.” The blurb described the actions of one Serafim Dias who got drunk, got nude, and climbed the statue in Praça Tiradentes. The report stated that he yelled from the statue “I was always a monarchist and admirer of Dom Pedro I who gave liberty to this land!” After that, the reporter noted that the crowd applauded, as they would do for “all patriotic discourses” and mocked Dias a bit more by calling him both a “citizen” and a “national symbol.” Ultimately, the incident was labeled an “excess of monarchism and wine” and left at that. There had been other shenanigans involving the statue that were reported in the papers as far back as 1895, but they did not involve any sort of understood affirmation of the statue or its subject. Instead, one was a simple police blurb about a man being arrested for climbing the statue. The blotter included no reference to any proclamations by the climber. The second incident that year was reported widely in multiple newspapers since it escalated to the point of potential mob violence. In his look back over the week past, a writer for the Gazeta de Noticias commented on how a disturbed Italian man had climbed onto the statue late at night and begun speaking loudly

²⁹¹ *O Tempo*, April 21, 1893, “Tiradentes”; *Diário de Notícias*, April 22, 1893, “Coisas.”
though unintelligibly since the passers-by did not understood Italian. According to this account, the climber drew a crowd of people trying to get him to come down. Eventually the authorities succeeded in getting the “poor madman” to come down. The man’s mental health concerned the writer as did the fact that the situation escalated into the nearby crowd wanting to “lynch” the man. The writer did not explain their justification for such an extreme response to the incident. He only responded to the events asserting that the man had not committed any serious crime except that of “owing respect to the monument.” In concluding the account, the writer made clear his relief that the man received help in the form of admittance into the mental hospital rather than mob punishment.  

While more details that could better explain the dark turn that this incident took are not available, the incident does show the continued keeping of law and order when it came to the public monument as well as the underlying sense that respect for the statue was part of that order. The public aspect of the man’s and the crowd’s confrontations seems to have made the statue a mere incidental backdrop to the drama. In the end, both the Italian and the imperial statue survived public threats against them…Pedro I quietly and the un-named Italian anonymously.

The fact that a search for any other incidents involving the statue after the bandstand incident and those few moments mentioned above turned up nothing—until 1916 and Mr. Dias—is telling. If the statue was in fact a symbolic affront to many hardline republicans, then one would expect some targeted acts of vandalism or protest after the bandstand turmoil. For example, it would not have been surprising to see the likes of what occurred in Porto, Portugal in 1911 when a group of republicans identified

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as “vermelhos” ripped the crown off of the statue of Pedro V, the son of Maria II and thereby Pedro’s grandson, who ruled Portugal from 1853 to 1861. This symbolic attack on the statue took place just one year after Portugal’s First Republic came into existence and almost three years since the Carbonari act of regicide that killed then-king Carlos I and his son Luis.293

Conclusion

In light of these occurrences in Portugal, Rio’s absence of violence surrounding the proclamation of the Republic and any symbolic attacks on Pedro’s statue outside of the construction of an over-sized temporary bandstand certainly stands out. Instead, the elites of the time, who represented the entire political and ideological spectrum, were basically content to contest the prior legitimacy and history of the empire on an intellectual level. Driving that contestation was their need to legitimize their own new control of the State and usher in popular civic participation in order to consolidate the transfer of sovereignty from the royal line of Bragança to the Brazilian people that was initiated on November 15. The legacy of Pedro I and his historical sovereignty were placed squarely in the crosshairs of this intellectual and memorial endeavor. 1890s elites grappled with how to remember him and the nation’s other imperial figures. While perspectives on Pedro II could soften with exile and time, for many the only way to remember Pedro I was to at least qualify his legacy and at most wholly repudiate it as foreign and opportunistic.

Brazilian attempts to remove the bronze reminder of the monarchy in Praça Tiradentes did occur. But they would be contrastingly tame compared to that example in

Portugal and only within the political process of making appeals to the government for its destruction or removal. Those efforts—and their ultimate failures—will serve as the focus of the final part of this chapter in a discussion that will follow the ongoing debate over the monarchical past during the republican present.
During the first decade of the Republic’s existence, critics of Pedro I and his statue made four separate proposals to remove the statue. To be more precise, there were actually only three requests articulated in the Rio press that the government rid Praça Tiradentes of its imperial statue, but the fact that one of them was proposed on two separate occasions brings our tally to four. The first call came in 1890 to remove Pedro I’s figure from atop the pedestal and replace it with a republican-themed monument. This exact same proposal was published again in 1893. A year after that came an entirely different call to relocate the statue to a museum and construct a new monument to the martyr Tiradentes. Finally in 1898, there was a reference, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, to a federal senator’s plan to ask that the statue be demolished and replaced by a bust to an obscure Rio figure.294 None of these proposals ever gained much traction in the public or legislative spheres, where they ultimately played out. Yet their continuing presence throughout the years speaks to the recognition of the power of monuments as memory both in those advocacies for change and the decisions against them.

Of these multiple suggestions to remove the statue from Praça Tiradentes, the very first occurred just six months after the Proclamation of the Republic. In May of 1890, Miguel Lemos sought to remove the statue of Pedro from its massive pedestal and

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294 There is a reference to a possible fifth discussion of removing Pedro’s statue. Sergio A. Fridman, in his independent publication on Rio’s monuments, refers to an unidentified group who had “thought of selling the statue of D. Pedro I” with the intent of “paying Brazil’s external debt.” I have found no primary sources—or alternate secondary source for that matter—to substantiate or provide any additional details to this assertion. See Sergio A. Fridman, Posteridade em pedra e bronze: história dos monumentos e estátuas da cidade do Rio de Janeiro (1996), 12.
place a new monument to the Republic atop the bronze base as its replacement. The public reaction to that idea revealed an overall wariness of symbolically expunging history and turning monuments into transitory markers of the nation. The criticisms found in the Rio press included strong anti-positivist rhetoric as well as repeated comparisons to the European approach towards regime change and public memory. This first proposal did not precipitate any concrete action being taken by the government to achieve its ends, but it did reemerge from public discourse oblivion in 1893 when a supporter of his ideas submitted Lemos’ original proposal—word for word—for publication in the context of the commemoration of Tiradentes Day of that year. That attempt to revive the call to remove Pedro’s statue fell on deaf ears as well and generated no public response or discussion. It would not be until one year later and after Rio had been scarred by the naval revolt that transpired in its harbor against the republican administration of President Floriano Peixoto that a new proposal would gain enough support to warrant being formally proposed in the nation’s legislative body.

That flirtation with civil war and the fallout over Portugal’s perceived role in aiding the escape of the rebels reignited anti-Portuguese sentiments along with Brazilian fears of instability and threats to the sovereignty of the nation. In turn, these changes had an impact on how Pedro I and his statue were viewed yet again. The first emperor’s *portugalidade* came to the forefront again, and this time found its way into new justifications for his statue’s removal from Praça Tiradentes. Lúcio de Mendonça spearheaded the new proposal and succeeded in having the issue taken up by a congressional committee. Ultimately, the petition died quietly in the legislature, but together with the earlier Lemos effort, it did manage to cement the question of the
The only example of a debate in the public sphere immediately following the proclamation of the Republic occurred in May of 1890. The writers of two newspapers, O Cruzeiro and O Brazil, responded directly to a proposal made by Miguel Lemos, known as “O Apostolado Positivista,” to remove the statue of Pedro I from its pedestal. Originally published on May 19 in the periodical Democracia, the proposal itself is unfortunately not available through the archive. Yet thanks to Carlos de Laet of O Brazil directly quoting Lemos in his paper’s response, the record still remains. This commentator introduced the topic by complimenting Lemos and asserting his own habit of “reading all that o Apostolado Positivista publishes,” but he also stated clearly that his
paper must “explain to the readers the reasons for our divergence from such a venerable newsman.” As for Lemos’s proposal, it made the following points, all of which will sound strikingly familiar. The first centered on the premise that “the equestrian statue of D. Pedro I, erected in the Largo do Rocio, today Praça de Tiradentes, does not represent historical truth, excessively exaggerating the secondary role that truly fits, despite his official primacy, the first emperor in the work of our national independence.” In light of this diminishing of Pedro’s actual role, Lemos’s second point sought to establish that the “preeminent role” in “our evolution belongs to José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva.” According to this view, it was the Portuguese royal regent’s connection to the venerated patriarch and his subsequent adherence to the cause of independence that loaned to Pedro prestige and elevated his standing in Brazil, both of which the author insinuated were leached rather than earned by the first emperor. He asserted lastly the need for addressing the monument in order to correct the historical public record. For him, the need existed to “reestablish in our respective monuments the historical truth and justice falsified through cortezanismo, without exaggerating or diminishing the real services of each one of the aforementioned figures of the prince and of his immortal minster.”

Given these perspectives on Pedro I and the expression of national memory, Lemos made two specific proposals and then followed those up with clarifications. First, he desired “that keeping the respective pedestal, the equestrian statue of D. Pedro I be removed and substituted with a monument symbolizing the Brazilian Republic.” He called secondly for the addition of a “sculpted medallion with the bust of D. Pedro I” to one of the sides of the pedestal of the statue of José Bonifácio, already raised in the largo de S. Francisco. Thus ended the proposal. It did not, in fact, call for the “destruction” of
the statue as would be characterized by two writers responding to it, but rather that it be removed, or retirada, and replaced with a republican statue. Perhaps the statue’s destruction was implied by the fact that Lemos consciously left off any mention of what to do with the removed statue. Other proposals would specify the intent to relocate the statue to another location, but not this one. Nevertheless, it is significant that Lemos was not calling for the complete obliteration of Pedro I from public memory. Instead, he was pursuing what he considered an homenagem that was proportional to his perception of Pedro’s role and standing: clearly subordinate to José Bonifácio.

In addition, the Apostolado Positivista clarified that he was not proposing that the government substitute a statue for Tiradentes for that of Pedro I. He stated that “the monument destined to glorify the proto-martyr of our independence must be erected on the spot where, on another occasion, his gallows were raised.” This addendum reflected the emerging idea that Tiradentes was not actually executed in the praça named after him. Lemos himself had been asserting an alternate location, as discussed in Chapter Two.\textsuperscript{295} In his proposal, he encouraged the government to acquire the land and set the new monument’s construction in motion. By questioning the veracity of the claim to Praça Tiradentes being sacred historical space for its namesake, Lemos certainly complicated any early republican plan to advocate for the obvious move of replacing Pedro’s statue with one of Tiradentes. Nevertheless, his overall objective of replacing an imperial statue

\textsuperscript{295} In Chapter Two, see the section entitled “The Statue of Pedro I in Newly Re-named Praça Tiradentes.” Please also note that de Laet, the O Brazil writer, refers to this new theory of Lemos but notes that he had not been privy to the author’s sources or specific assertions regarding the reappraisal of the execution location.
with a republican one still fit squarely within the goals of recasting history and reshaping the city’s cultural landscape.\footnote{O Brazil, May 20, 1890, “O Brazil,” “Monumental!”}

In this first article engaging in the topic of Lemos’s proposal, the editor of O Brazil disagreed with his esteemed colleague on several different aspects related to memory and the public expression of it. He first addressed the idea that José Bonifácio, rather than Pedro I, was the true “protagonist of national independence.” The response was a sympathetic “Very well! It is a sustainable opinion.” He thereby did not take issue with that part of Lemos’s argument, but he did disagree with how that historical view should be reflected in dealing with Pedro’s statue. He found that “justice and logic demand that in the place of the cavalheiro of bronze be placed the old patriarch, and not another monument symbolizing the republic, since clearly, it was not the republic that shook off the yoke of the metropole in 1822.” His argument to keep the monument dedicated to independence yet void of any reference to the Grito or Pedro I reflected the growing tendency to diminish or even expunge Pedro’s role in that accomplishment. It also served to represent yet again that Brazilian reclamation of sovereignty discussed in the previous chapter. Yet it was not a wholesale adoption of the new regime’s efforts to recast the public sphere in republican terms. He made this clear by addressing the existence already of a statue to honor the “patriarch,” José Bonifácio, saying that “it would be worth more to glorify the same hero two times than to substitute one for the cold symbolism of a form of government.” To put an homage to the republican figures of the day atop what he called the “monarchical pedestal” was to attempt to show “prehistoric democracy,” an ahistorical overlay onto a monument meant to show the nation’s gratitude for the “timeless era” and “notable services” provided in 1822. De
Laet’s fundamental message to his readers was that the nation’s posterity would not be best served by “the metal of the republic being placed atop the pedestal of the monarchy.” Such an action, predicated on men such as Lemos “not wanting to accept” the statue, he found to be more out of animosity and anger, warning that the “decapitated monument” replaced by one denoting the 15th of November would not alter the people’s understanding of the development of the “Brazilian patria” nor their appreciation of a “commemoration [September 7] already imprinted on popular imagination.” Furthermore, the “young and lovely” republic would not be well suited for the pedestal of “the old monument.” The O Brazil writer concluded his argument with an analogy. He referred to a fountain located on the street of Matacavallos which had an inscription that said “the king for the good of his people commanded that the police do this work….” He then ended his article saying “if history, if truth, if the Apostalado requires that everything be changed” then the inscription must be changed to read that “it was Sr. Glycerio [a minister in the new Republic] who commanded its doing through Sr. Sampaio Ferraz [then chief of police for Rio]”. This simple extension of the logic in Lemos’s proposal powerfully captures the fundamental element of the attempt to rewrite the history of the nation and the city. Observers such as Carlos de Laet were simply unwilling and unable to deny such an imperial history for the purposes of the republican present.  

By the next day, the reaction in an article in O Brazil to the proposal had grown decidedly confrontational and fixated on the positivist influence perceived in Lemos’s ideas. The writer, not signed as de Laet this time, specifically criticized the emergence of “the positivist fury” lurking behind the proposal as well as that group’s identity as

\[297 \text{Ibid.}\]
“destroyers” (as well as “the enemies of true progress” and “traitors”). He characterized the proposal for the “demolition and mutilation of the monumentos patrios” as being in line with positivism’s desire “to spoil the pride of Brazil, forcing it to deny its traditions to bow down reverently to the Phrygian cap [or liberty cap] of the neighboring republiquetas.” Such a diminution of those so-called republicans was a direct attack against their standing in the government, and his sensationalized use of the terms “demolition and mutilation” to describe the statue’s proposed fate intentionally sought to raise the stakes and implications of any carrying out of such a proposal. Rather than following the path of radicalism and intransigence he saw in the positivist ideology, his message centered on the need for republicans to carry themselves “with dignity” and a certain level of moderation. He found it to be hypocritical to deny history by “tearing down the statue of the first hero of our political emancipation” out of some misguided “mixture of salaam and servilism...and a supposed scientific truth.” Instead, it would be an act of “ingratitude, of ignorance, lacking in common sense…mental backwardness, and doctrinaire intolerance.” Like the writer for O Cruzeiro would also do, this writer asserted a Brazilian debt of gratitude towards Pedro I for the nation’s liberty. While he conceded that it “might have been personal ambition, desire for glory, [or] the result of inevitable events” that underscored his participation, it was nevertheless “he [Pedro I] who authored national independence. The monument of the Rocio is a testimony of the gratitude of the Brazilian people.” Similar also to what was written in O Cruzeiro on the same day, this O Brazil writer accounted for the republican criticisms and attempted dismissals of the historical standing of Pedro I by emphasizing as well the bottom line of the historical reality: his role in independence via Ipiranga. Therefore, he defended the
statue as capturing an important Brazilian moment, but he also added national significance to the statue beyond that aspect by making it as much about the Brazilian people themselves as it was about Pedro’s historical legacy. While Ipiranga was the act of the prince and future emperor, the raising of the statue was a deliberate act of the Brazilian people. The writer was effectively introducing the existence of national gratitude in 1862 as an incontrovertible historical fact. The existence of that sense of gratitude is well documented in Chapter Two. Whether or not that gratitude was directed at the correct historical figure was debatable. By specifically distinguishing the statue as a “testimony” to that gratitude and not necessarily to Pedro I, this writer created an even more multi-layered analysis of memory. In the end, for him, destroying the statue would be akin to attacking the actions of the people in that regard. Therefore, he roundly rejected the notion that the statue was solely the product of that cortezanismo referred to in the proposal. He also later made the point that following the logic behind the radical push to destroy a monument of the former regime, any successor to the current regime could follow suit and erase those raised for the Republic, which was an argument notably premised on the idea that the Republic might not last. This potential act of making monuments meant to be permanent into transitory symbols raised and torn down brought him to the French historical example of the columna Vendôme. He used an allusion to the history of that monument as a cautionary tale against duplicating the French experience. After all, it was the perfect example of impermanent memory. When the short-lived Paris Commune in 1871 pulled down the Romanesque column topped by a statue of Emperor Napoleon I (see Figure 12), its radicals were destroying the symbolic representation of both the First and Second Empires since it had been Napoleon III who in 1863
inaugurated the new statue that sat atop the original column of 1810. They were also attacking a monument described as having “marked the very center of Paris since 1810.”\(^\text{298}\) While Praça Tiradentes would certainly never be described in that manner in terms of its importance to Rio, the column Vendôme comparison did have relevance and value to the discussions taking place in republican Brazil. The \textit{O Brazil} writer’s plea, as a result of that lesson, was to “leave the monuments in peace” and respect the sovereignty of the preceding groups that put them there. The author reiterated this ultimate message to those positivists whom he blamed for the statue “destruction” proposal: “tearing down today that which they venerated yesterday” would mark the positivists as “intolerant and ungrateful.”\(^\text{299}\)

This same writer also, and not surprisingly, disagreed with Lemos on the latter’s dismissal of Pedro I’s legacy by addressing the typical attack—albeit not present in this

\(^{298}\) Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, \textit{Paris as Revolution: Writing the Nineteenth-Century City} (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1994), accessed on August 15, 2015, http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/t296nb17v/, 195-196. It is interesting to note that the column went even further to demonstrate the Brazilian writer’s point. According to Ferguson, the statue at the top of the column when it was torn down was actually the third rendition of Napoleon I put atop the column. In addition, the original Napoleonic monument inaugurated in 1810, which was forged out of the metal of captured enemy cannons and meant to commemorate Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz, was itself a replacement for a previously standing monument. A 1699 equestrian statue of Louis XIV (also using Roman imagery) had been the target of the French Revolution, whose participants tore down that statue in 1792 and used its metal to make cannons for the revolutionary army.

\(^{299}\) \textit{O Brazil}, May 21, 1890, “O Brazil,” “Monumentos patrios.”
specific proposal—on the prince and emperor’s foreignness. In this article, Pedro may have been “an illustrious foreigner,” but he was also a “figure who collaborated in the independence of this country which he adopted as his own.” Reflecting the common practice of contextualizing these Brazilian debates with comparisons to their Western equivalents, the writer then used another and very interesting allusion to France. He did so by looking at the memorial legacy of Lafayette in the United States. The writer likened Pedro’s role in Brazilian independence to that of Lafayette in the American Revolution and affirmed that in the U. S., no one would act against a statue to Lafayette because of his foreignness. He went so far as to also assert that in the U. S. “fanatics have neither voice nor vote in the national questions” of that country and instead are the inhabitants of “comfortable psychiatric hospitals.” Such a statement made clear this strain of Brazilian disdain for the radical tenor of the time and those perceived ideologue’s roles in the creation and organization of the state. Included in this article was also the atypical reference to the conservation of monuments in England rather than France. The author pointed to the existence of the “figure of the usurper Cromwell amongst the lines of statues of the kings of England” at Westminster. In addition, he held up the English practice of maintaining in the Tower of London “the most ignominious instruments of torture, of perversity, and of enslavement” as a reminder of that nation’s path towards “tolerance, charity, and liberty.” While this author did not use this example to argue that Pedro’s statue was itself a memento of Brazil’s sordid past, he did advance it as yet another European counter-example to the proposed destruction of the statue in Rio. On top of that, he drew yet one more historical parallel, this time to the Catholic Church. In

300 It must be noted, however, that the United States as any sort of cohesive political entity had never been held under French colonial rule or sovereignty as Brazil had been by Portugal.
making a general point about the practice of museums keeping objects “in complete antagonism with the ideas of the collectors,” he held up the Vatican practice in particular of safeguarding “pagan and idolatrous art” in its collections. On a comparative note and under these circumstances in 1890, this writer for *O Brazil* also made the same argument that others advanced three years later amidst the bandstand controversy (and that was discussed in Chapter 3): that the statue of Pedro I was the “only monument that we possess worthy of this name.”

The author ended his article as he began it: taking a shot against the positivist ideology he opposed. To conclude, he drew a portrait of acts previously made by Brazilians—and denounced by the current positivists—in deference to the Crown. Noting their contempt for such displays of deference and subjection, he then contrasted that avowed rejection of royalty with the same group’s “taking a knee before the dentista mineiro [italics of original writer], as the martyr of the past and the glorification of the future.” This attack on the new cult emerging around the memory of Tiradentes is the only example that I encountered in all of my research of such an insult. Certainly many criticized the Club Tiradentes for its actions and perceived intransigence, but in all of the rhetoric elicited by the incident in 1893, the growing public importance of the martyr was strictly respected and supported. The notion of replacing one type of subservience for another struck at the very core of the prevailing radical ideology, and the author used this moment to take his shot across their bow.

On the front page and the first topic of the newspaper *O Cruzeiro* on the same day in 1890 as the article discussed above, another writer similarly and singularly blamed

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301 *O Brazil*, May 21, 1890, “O Brazil,” “Monumentos patrios.”
302 Ibid.
positivism for the proposal to “destroy” the statue. The first line of the article read “positivism is on the scene,” and the author began his argument against that positivist interpretation of national memory inherent in the proposal by stating unequivocally that “d. Pedro, whether they like it or not, is considered a hero of our two worlds, and only the ingratitude of contemporaries will forget that to him we owe the foundation of the *Patria*.” He delved further into the question of denying the legacy of the empire and asserted that “it would be easy to melt all the bronze of the praça do Rocio, but we consider it difficult, if not impossible, to rip out the pages of history and erase from the memories of Brazilians the deeds of this great man who made amends for some faults through unsurpassed patriotism proven on the solemn occasion [of Ipiranga].” It is striking that this defense of the statue’s continuation in the square is made on the grounds of both historical standing and personal redemption. While the writers in 1862 and the defenders of the statue in 1893 (and discussed in Chapter Three) either ignored or conceded Pedro’s perceived faults, this author in 1890 attached a retroactively redemptive quality to Pedro’s role in the *Grito*, adding a new power and characteristic to the iconic moment in history. He also incorporated some of the qualifications on Pedro’s historical identity mentioned in the previous chapter with his concession of the emperor having “faults” that could arguably taint his legacy, but his assertion in totality allowed him to stake out some middle ground between the dueling historical interpretations that either celebrated Pedro I or repudiated him.

Regarding Ipiranga, the *O Cruzeiro* author posited that “Ipiranga is there, in the brilliant state of S. Paulo, to record that grandiose scene in which the founder of the dynasty, banished today, was the protagonist. Will the majestic monument that was raised
on the banks of the Ipiranga also be razed? We cannot believe it. We do not want to believe it.” From these earliest of moments of the Republic, there existed an acute awareness of the long-term implications of taking down this first statue. Just as de Laet scornfully imagined a city with a completely rewritten public record, his colleague at *O Cruzeiro* called into question whether or not those who proposed the Rio statue’s removal would feel similarly compelled to remove the one located at Ipiranga itself. Because Lemos specifically refuted Pedro I’s role in independence as part of his justification, this writer’s question appears valid as the extension of that logic would indeed lead such critics to all public representations advancing the view of Pedro as the hero of Ipiranga and independence. In addition to posing this uniquely Brazilian question of statues, this author also turned to the familiar rhetorical tactic of using France as an historical guide. The article noted that “the government that succeeded” what he called the “monarchy of the Napoleons,” rather than erasing those monuments like the column of Vendôme, instead “conserved” them “as a historic relic.” He then went further by contextualizing the Brazilian proposal towards the statue, asking if “the Brazilian Republic will be more intransigent than the republic of Thiers, J. Ferry, and Gambetta?” He then pointed to Brazil’s own historical past, reminding his readers that the “Brazil-Imperio” did not erase the vestiges of the colonial past after that change in regime. Ultimately, the author’s rhetoric sought to warn the Brazilian Republic that such intransigence as evidenced in the

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303 This reference is to Adolphe Thiers, the founder and first president in the 1870s of the French Third Republic (and the leader who violently put down the Commune), Jules Ferry, the anticlerical and imperialistic prime minister in the 1880s of the Third Republic, and Léon Gambetta, who was similarly a founder of the Third Republic and prime minister in the early 1880s.
removal of a national monument would only belittle them historically and in the eyes of other nations.  

In the end, this 1890 proposal by Miguel Lemos gained no traction either in the press or the new government. Other than the two responses discussed above, there exists no evidence of a larger debate taking place. Three years later and shortly after the commemoration of Tiradentes Day in April that witnessed the bandstand incident, Lemos’s proposal attempted—and failed—once again to turn public sentiment against the imperial statue in Praça Tiradentes. The *Apostolado Positivista* had taken the opportunity of the anniversary of the death of the martyr to publish his new theory on the exact location where Tiradentes was executed. In response, the *Gazeta de Noticias* ran a multi-part analysis of Lemos’s argument beginning on Tiradentes Day itself, April 21, and running throughout the following week. It was within this moment of increased visibility for the positivist’s historical viewpoints that someone referred to as “a sincere adherent of the 15th of November” sent in Lemos’s 1890 proposal, word for word, to be published in the aforementioned *Gazeta de Noticias* in the “Publicações a Pedido” section. This time around there was no engagement on the part of the editorial board and no response to the re-publication of the proposal in that newspaper or others. Yet it did show that the topic continued to be considered and offered to the public.  

In the interim between the first and second publication of Lemos’s proposal, the topic of removing the statue nevertheless appeared on the radar of some intellectuals for a different reason. The writer named “Somel” provided a sophisticated commentary on the
topic that was strikingly similar to those in *O Cruzeiro* and *O Brazil* two years prior. He advanced the exact same historical argument centering on the French (Commune’s) decision to destroy their column of Vendôme in a discussion generated not by another proposal to tear down Pedro I’s statue but to erect one for Deodoro in another completely separate location. The *Diário de Notícias* published that news item in 1892, and the occasion inspired Somel to reflect on memory, history, monuments, and specifically the statue of Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes. He pledged his full support for the proposal made to erect a bronze statue to the memory of General Deodoro da Fonseca and the proclamation of the Republic in the Praça da República (formerly the Campo do Santa Anna). Somel asserted the importance of gratitude as guiding a people’s raising of monuments “to the memory of their heroes,” and he addressed the complicating factor of regime change on that memorial necessity. He noted that “the right of tearing down its impressive column of Vendôme did not fall to republican France,” thus criticizing the act, and immediately related the Brazilian republic’s similar situation. He stated that “to us, the revolutionaries of November 15, the right of destroying the statue of the first emperor” similarly “does not fall.” Rather than such an act of destruction, Somel “applauded with enthusiasm” that idea of the Republic raising its own monuments rather than destroying those of the past. He also warned that taking away the statue of Pedro I would not take September 7th and the nation’s history from the “povo brasileiro.”

This reality of a people’s collective memory and internalization of what had been one of the defining moments thus far in Brazilian history was powerful, and it was based on the understanding that a people’s patriotic identity and sense of national memory were built upon more than just the existence of one statue. Yet the ongoing effort to construct a public sphere that

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306 *Diário de Noticias*, August 27, 1892, “Sala D’Armas.”
legitimized the Republic at the expense of the imperial past was precisely why the effort to remove Pedro I’s statue from the public square would continue.

1894: The Proposal to Remove and Replace the Statue

While the Lemos proposal offered first in 1890 and then reprinted in 1893 failed to generate a strong public reaction or outcry, the political climate in Rio in 1894 had changed so dramatically that a new proposal did in fact gain some traction, to the point that it was presented before and considered by the National Assembly. The event that made the proponents of removing Pedro I’s statue bolder and the public more receptive was the naval revolt in Rio’s own harbor that began on September 6, 1893, and lasted until March 11 of the next year. The fact that for six months the nation’s navy was in open rebellion against the administration of President Floriano Peixoto fundamentally altered the trajectory of the early Republic. Historians cite the president’s victory as the circumstance which allowed him to become the triumphant “consolidator of the Republic.”

The conflict turned an administration increasingly opposed and perceived as operating outside of its constitutional parameters into a victim of outright—and more importantly monarchically sympathetic—rebellion. In the discussions presented in previous chapters, the threats of restoration and the fall of the Republic had remained entirely imagined, a lurking monarchical bogeyman that never took shape. And while the naval revolt began with the avowed intent to restore the constitution of the Republic rather than the monarchy, its locus in the navy, which was historically aristocratic and favored by the emperor, plus the eventual participation and leadership of Admiral Luís

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307 Bello, 135.
Filipe de Saldanha da Gama who openly advocated for a plebiscite to return the nation to monarchical rule came together to paint the rebellion with an imperial brush. The resultant restorationist identity was one that the republican government relentlessly exploited and that cast a new, menacing light on the security of the nation.

**Historical Context: The Naval Revolt**

The naval revolt in Rio came, in many ways, out of an earlier factional split that arose in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The contest for power there between the positivist Júlio de Castilhos, backed by the government in Rio, and the liberal Gaspar da Silveira Martins, who had previously been an imperial senator and provincial governor, became an example of a local power struggle that had far-reaching national implications. Silveira Martins’ attempt to have the state’s constitution thrown out because of its positivist elements and replaced by one based on a parliamentary system and viewed as a step towards restoration directly challenged the constitution’s author, Castilhos, and his backer, President Floriano Peixoto. In what José Maria Bello describes as the emergence of caudillism in post-imperial Brazil, the political chaos in Rio Grande do Sul evidenced in successive coups to either depose or reinstall Castilhos to power also served to add to tensions between the navy and army. The two branches of the military had already begun to stake out their roles in the new political reality. The army not surprisingly served as Floriano Peixoto’s power base, and from its young officer corps, the same group that instigated the Republic’s proclamation, he seeded the local and state governments throughout Brazil and oversaw the quashing of localized rebellions after the empire’s deposition. Contrastingly, naval officers had been active in forcing President Deodoro da Fonseca to resign (as discussed in Chapter Three) and were perceived by many—including Floriano himself—to still have the potential to force the president into policy
change. Ultimately the conflict in Rio Grande do Sul over the rule of Castilhos became a proxy war for similar conflicts between the nation’s president and his opposition. Those opponents began to seek his impeachment over what they considered his move towards dictatorship as the “Iron Marshal” evidenced by his dismissals of functionaries, threats to jail Supreme Court justices, holding of Pernambuco in a state of siege, and intervention in Rio Grande do Sul to consolidate his power and central authority. Floriano Peixoto might have faced a fate very similar to that of his presidential predecessor if not for two things: the perception of the naval revolts in Rio Grande do Sul and later Rio as monarchic and restorationist and the absolute disunity and lack of coordination between the various insurgent groups. Despite the fact that the rebellion began strictly as an act against Castilhos and not for the monarchy or against President Peixoto, its savvy recasting as both of those things similarly recast the president as the defender of the Nation State of Brazil rather than its aggressor and violator. It spelled the revolts’ eventual defeat, and it accomplished for the first time a true fusing of the state and the nation in the new Republic.

When Admiral Custódio José de Melo, the navy’s highest ranking official, resigned his post over Floriano’s “personal policies” in provoking and maintaining the civil war in Rio Grande do Sul, he soon spearheaded the revolt that began in Rio’s harbor on September 6, 1893. His original plan to “restore the Constitution” hinged on the faulty assumption that Floriano Peixoto would buckle under as Deodoro da Fonseca had in terms of giving up political power and included the ambitious goals of taking over Santos in São Paulo and joining up with the insurgents in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. None of these plans worked out, and Custódio de Melo remained awkwardly in Rio with
his rag-tag vessels. Admiral Saldanha da Gama’s joining the revolt later in December only served to confirm earlier suspicions of the revolt being an attempt at restoration. While the revolt failed in all of its original objectives, it did unintendedly succeed in alleviating the nation’s—and the capital’s—negative views of Floriano’s regime by making the insurgents the enemy to the point that the Congress granted the president state of siege powers wherever in Brazil he thought it necessary. The interference by the vessels of foreign countries in Rio’s harbor during the revolt in order to maintain Rio as an “open city” for trade only served to deepen the resentment and hostility that many Cariocas felt towards the revolt for creating such an embarrassment and violation of Brazilian sovereignty. With a failed attempt by the insurgents to take Niteroi in February and the imminent arrival of a fleet loyal to Floriano in March, the rebels accepted the negotiating help of Portuguese naval officers. When those efforts failed, they then accepted refuge and exile aboard Portuguese vessels. Bello cites “Jacobinic passions and cries for vengeance” as the driving force behind the Brazilian government’s refusal to agree to those terms of surrender, and the unapproved spiriting of the rebels away on the part of the Portuguese led Floriano to break off diplomatic relations with the European nation and inspired an even higher level of xenophobia at home.\(^\text{308}\)

With Floriano triumphant in Rio and able to begin mopping up the remaining resistance in the southern states, the result of the naval revolt greatly altered Brazil’s political landscape. The president had succeeded in establishing the contours of presidential and central authority and creating a government which could transcend the

\(^{308}\) Ibid., 97-138. The diplomatic stand-off between Brazil and Portugal only worsened when those overloaded and inadequate vessels carrying the 500 Brazilians could only stagger into port in the Argentine la Plata region. The perception was that the Portuguese were consciously aiding and abetting the insurgents by allowing them to disembark and rejoin the rebellion in the south, which some did in fact do.
militaristic characteristics of the first few years, and he would hand over that control peacefully and constitutionally to his civilian successor, Prudente de Morais, in 1894.

More important to this study, however, was the revolt’s impact on the political psyche of the political and intellectual elite in Rio. Bello articulates the nature of the political climate and the revival of Jacobinism after the revolt’s defeat, saying that “the memory of the danger the Republic had been in and concern over those who might still threaten it exacerbated the passions of the most ardent republicans, especially the young men in the military and civil academies.”

It is not surprising that the revolt reignited the passions and fears already chronicled in previous chapters. It is also not surprising that within two months after the rebels’ defeat in the Rio harbor a small group of prominent lawyers, journalists, and government officials sought to have the statue of Pedro I removed from the Republic’s public square.

The Petition
On May 16, 1894, Lúcio de Mendonça read a petition to the nation’s Congress on behalf of himself and four others: Manoel Timotheo da Costa, Raul Pompeia, Rodrigo Octavio, and João Ribeiro. Part of the new juridical and intellectual elite in Rio, they ranged from the older republican stalwart of Mendonça, who had great credibility as part of the initial cadre of organized republicans dating back to the 1870s and who had immediately been asked to serve in the Ministry of Justice after the proclamation of the Republic, to Pompeia, whose biography on the website of the Academia Brasileira de Letras describes him as a “florianista exaltado” whose positions of prominence came and

309 Ibid., 135-136.
310 For the previous discussion of the historical views of Pompeia and Octavio, most notably in the work Festas Nacionaes, see the section entitled “Perspectives on How to View the Imperial Past” in Chapter Four.
went with the administration of his presidential patron.\footnote{“Lúcio de Mendonça,” Academia Brasileira de Letras, accessed September 17, 2014, http://www.academia.org.br/abl/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=729&sid=152; and “Raul Pompéia,” Academia Brasileira de Letras, accessed September 17, 2014, http://www.academia.org.br/abl/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=827&sid=306. These two figures plus Octavio all became members of the Academia, moving in the same—but at times oppositional—circles as Rui Barbosa and Machado de Assis.} Thus, they varied ideologically but nevertheless all signed their name to a petition to remove and replace Pedro’s statue with one of Tiradentes. Their specific call to erect that statue of Tiradentes in the square diverged from the earlier proposal made by Lemos, who was driven by his own preoccupation with the question of the execution’s location. However, they did continue forward his indictment of Pedro I with the familiar designation of him as the “founder of the monarchy and supposed \textit{[italics mine]} author of the independence of Brazil.” The petition then went further than Lemos, arguing that

the foreigner glorified by that statue is not the author of our political independence: he sold it to Brazil for the right and steep price—two million pounds sterling and more so the onus of the terms as emperors from the descendants of the House of Bragança, when it is indubitable that the belief in civic duty of our grandparents would have in little time achieved our emancipation from the metropole and founded in this soil in America the appropriate government that was implanted only sixty-seven years after the Revolution. Given this, what does the statue signify? An homage of gratitude to the founder of the monarchy.\footnote{The petition was published in its entirety the following day in the newspaper \textit{O Paiz}, a newspaper for which Mendonça had previously served on the editorial board. See \textit{O Paiz}, May 17, 1894, “Gratidão Nacional.”}

This repudiation and attempted nullification of Pedro I’s role in independence echoed Ferraz Sampaio’s line of attack a year earlier in the aftermath of the bandstand incident. Mendonça also reiterated the incongruence of the statue to the current generation, stating that “the generation of the 15\textsuperscript{th} of November of 1889 can neither affirm nor comprehend this monument” still existing in “a public plaza of a capital of a republican nation.”
Owing to this reality, they asked that the Congress “end this strange incoherence…kept only through the inertia of political sentiment.”\footnote{O Paiz, May 17, 1894, “Gratidão Nacional.”}

This is the first appearance of the concept of “inertia” as being the culprit behind the statue’s persistence in the public square. While Sampaio a year earlier accused defenders of the statue as essentially Pedro/monarchy-lovers, this assertion of inertia harkened back more to the parallel idea of popular apathy or the bestializado populace. The statue’s continuation was not a choice being made. Rather, it was a choice not being made to turn the page out of what the petition called some misguided attempt to maintain Brazil’s “tradition of friendship with the Portuguese nation” evidenced in the keeping of the statue. According to the authors, that tradition continued only through the sacrifice of the current generation’s “sacred convictions.” The post-revolt context and this new take on generational memory shed light onto such a new interpretation of how Pedro’s statue came to be woven into the nation’s traditions and history. Pedro I’s portugalidade was front and center, making his foreign-ness that much more overwhelming to his identity and standing. A quick scan of just this one page of one newspaper on this one day (Page 1 of O Paiz on May 17, 1894) makes the climate perfectly clear. “Conflicto Luso-Brazileiro.” “Revolta Restauradora.” “A Desaffronta (The Affront Avenged).” These are the section headings for the day, and they reinforced the notions of conflict and threat on a regular basis. They also showed how Pedro’s perceived portugalidade served him even worse in that climate, since it added the current Brazilian hostilities towards Portugal to his separation from his adopted country. Rio’s relationship to the statue would serve as a microcosm for the larger, more looming question of Brazil’s relationship to Portugal.

This new conflict and confrontation certainly did Pedro I’s legacy no favors.
In addition to repudiating the statue based on their assertions of Pedro’s false historical standing regarding independence and the ongoing hostility towards Portugal, Mendonça and his colleagues also called into question the validity of the statue’s very erection. The argument in the paragraph above involved their making Pedro’s statue seemingly a Portuguese rather than a Brazilian one. The next argument similarly labeled the decision to erect the statue in 1862 as also foreign. The writers of the proposal asserted that “if the Republic is in reality our *Patria*, it is absurd to conserve in a public square of its capital the statue of the founder of the monarchy, whose inauguration was made with false delegates of the Nation, the courtesans of the empire, and the protests of the liberals of the time.” Just as in the instances of its assertion before, such an attribution of the statue’s creation attempted to delegitimize it by separating those who funded and celebrated it from what can only be described as the real *povo Brasileiro*. What made Brazilians real in 1894 for writers such as Mendonça was the same thing that made Republicans real in 1893: “the purity of our republican sentiments and the absolute justice that it inspires.” The petitioners concluded by asking that the Congress decide to make into law “the cessation of the anomaly against that which we represent.”\(^\text{314}\) As seen multiple times before, the statue served as a proxy for the empire, and those in the Republic threatened by either or both felt compelled to attack them, invalidate them, and remove them from public view. The logic begged the question, though, of how the statue could truly be a threat if it was met and sustained only with inertia. That question’s answer, I would assert, had more to do with the image-making of the Republic than it did with the public message of the statue. Yes, the proposal refuted the historical foundations of the statue’s symbolism. But ultimately the most fervent lines revolved around the idea

\(^{314}\) Ibid.
that there were things that a republic simply could not have because they cut at the very foundations of legitimacy. On that list appeared to be an imperial statue standing in a republican square.

The vast majority of the ideas that undergirded this 1894 proposal centered on these questions of legitimacy and identity. Yet one small part of the proposal also connected to the different question of appropriate public space for the statue. While Lemos in 1890 had called only for the statue’s removal from the square, Mendonça’s proposal specified that the statue should be “removed from Praça Tiradentes and taken to the national museum.” He justified this aspect of the petition by arguing that “as a work of art it is not there” [the public square] that the statue should be located. Rather, works of art belonged in a museum of fine arts, and that was precisely where he proposed the statue be relocated. Embedded in this argument were two things that were deeply related. The first was the acceptance of the statue as in fact a work of art. That argument met with a certain level of pushback in the discourse the year before, and it would so again in 1894. The second was that in reducing the statue down to a mere work of art, the proposal sought to effectively strip Pedro I of any historical or political agency. And it was saying that only those figures that deserved and retained such agency had the right to be enshrined in the public square.315 On a final note, the petition is surprisingly void of any direct connections to the anti-monarchism fueled by the revolt. The rabid Jacobinism and anti-monarchism alluded to by José Maria Bello in the wake of that conflict would be expected to infuse this proposal. Yet it did not. The revolt’s influence was more subtle in the prevalence of anti-Portuguese sentiments instead. There was no denunciation of the statue as a rallying point for monarchical threats to the Republic of the day. In fact, there

315 Ibid.
was no mention in the petition of the revolt at all. The revolt certainly did factor into the new proposal being made, but it did not seem to add any new level of vitriol from the Lemos proposal of 1890. This 1894 petition did not even include the rancorous notes of the post-bandstand incident rhetoric the year before. In the end, there was a great deal of continuity to these calls for change.

Responses to the Proposal
Not surprisingly, given the newspaper’s prior relationship to Mendonça, O Paiz served as the main organ of public support for the proposal. While others like the Gazeta de Notícias and the Correio da Tarde referenced the proposal in their covering of Congress, Mendonça’s old publication served as the rallying point for supporters from various parts of the Sudeste, or southeast region of Brazil. The response began, however, in Rio itself with the O Paiz editorial board’s take on the proposal published on page one. The preface to the publication of the text of the proposal briefly discussed the basic ideas put forth. The article considered the statue “a great piece of art cast in bronze, a product of a popular subscription, and made in an era very different from today.” That evaluation agreed on the fundamental premise of the statue having significance as a work of art, but it also found a way to somewhat agree at the same time that it somewhat disagreed with the proposal’s invalidation of the circumstances behind the statue’s raising. In that short line, the editorial’s take did in fact distance the Brazil of 1862 from that of 1894, but it also reminded the paper’s readers that the funding for the statue came from a popular subscription. Even after undercutting a certain level of the courtezanismo denounced in the proposal, the editorial nevertheless appeared sympathetic overall to the petitioners’ request. It reiterated how the “permanence of the equestrian figure” in the praça was an idea “repugnant to the present generation.” And while it concluded that the idea of the
petition was “not misplaced,” it did caution and state unequivocally that the statue should not and must not be destroyed. Thus, the petition’s lead-in certainly was no ringing endorsement, but it also did not condemn the argument’s ultimate aim.  

Ringing endorsements did find their way onto the pages of O Paiz, yet they were in the form of letters to the editor rather than editorial articles themselves. All also came from outside of Rio, most notably the state of Minas Gerais, which happened to be the home state of Tiradentes as well as the state where Mendonça spent his childhood. In fact, the “Constitutional Republican Party” of S. Gonçalo do Sapucahy, Mendonça’s hometown, was the first to write in to “sincerely applaud” their native son’s “beautiful idea of the substitution of the statue of Pedro I for one of Tiradentes.” The party’s letter cited other “illustrious republicans” who also subscribed to the petition. In addition to affirming the statue’s substitution as an act of good republicanism, Mendonça’s hometown party did take the opportunity to refute one aspect of the petition. It vehemently refuted the notion of Pedro I’s statue being a valid work of art. The letter challenged that “in fact, what does that monument represent, defective as a work of art, according to the opinion of those who understand, other than the usurpation of the liberty and rights of the Brazilian people?!” They went on to once again call the statue “that bronze lie that only makes us relive a past of utterly sad memory” and contrasted it with the proposed statue to Tiradentes that would represent not only the “just reclamation of republican sentiment” but also “good art.”

Other than the mineiro preoccupation with a statue in Rio, two things stand out in this short letter of support in terms of the ongoing back and forth over Pedro’s standing.

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and the statue. First, the phrase “according to the opinion of those who understand” to attest to the credibility of the statue’s critics brings us back to that republican notion that they singularly refused to have the wool pulled over their eyes by false histories and lying statues. They saw through the false imperial historical narrative, and as a result they also had the sense of that “reclamation of republican sentiment” as being served by the public square’s reclamation from the imperial statue. Where defenders of the statue in 1890 found Pedro’s redemption in Ipiranga and the statue, these 1894 writers sought only that historical and public reclamation for the Republic, adding a republican-specific element to previous notions of Brazilian reclamation related to the statue. With the capital’s security only recently reclaimed from the insurgents’ presence in the harbor, such a preoccupation was understandable.

Letters of support for Mendonça’s proposal also came in from another Minas Gerais organization and an individual from São Paulo. *O Paiz* noted its reception of a letter from the municipal council of Campina, Minas Gerais but explained that the paper would not publish that particular letter owing to limited space. Several days later, there was room for the publication of a letter from Sr. Dr. Antonio Luiz dos Santos Werneck, a lawyer, *fazendeiro*, and public official in the Republican government. Rather than coming directly to the newspaper from its author, the letter was sent in by Lucio de Mendonça himself to be published. This note of support he received affirmed the historical and political significance of the statue swap and congratulated Mendonça for a petition that Werneck described as all of the following words: beautiful, profound, elevated, energetic, and just in its understanding of that significance. A few days later, Mendonça also had published a letter he received from similar supporters in Ouro Preto. A group of twenty-
six professors of law sent him a telegram stating that “as republicans, we enthusiastically applaud the substitution of the statue of D. Pedro I for that of the glorious proto-martyr of Brazilian liberty. Long live the Republic!”

*O Paiz* continued to track the proposal’s progress in the Camara dos Deputados, updating its readers on June 19 that the “Project of the demolition of the statue of D. Pedro I in Praça Tiradentes” had been sent to the Commission of Justice in the Camara and was soon to be introduced again for the members’ deliberation. Thanks to its continued coverage in *O Paiz*, the petition to remove and replace the statue had a certain level of visibility and support as discussed above, but it never managed to gain any real momentum. No rhetorical groundswell of support rose up, even with the charged post-revolt climate. Mendonça’s proposal was not even enough of a polemic to generate much of a response from those writers who had roundly criticized the statue’s covering just a year earlier. Instead, it met with the very political inertia condemned in its text. In the coverage of the Camara dos Deputados in the *Correio da Tarde*, that paper referenced the attempt in the legislative session by Rio’s congressional representative, Thomaz Delfino, to justify the proposal to “destroy” the statue and came to the conclusion that many did not consider the matter of any pressing importance. In terms of space afforded in the papers and vitriol, Brazil’s suspension of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the public’s reaction to the government’s actions dominated the discourse at this time, not the statue or the proposal. In fact, the *Correio* asserted that the Congress “gave indications of wanting to take up more serious matters” than the “destruction of the statue of the

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319 *O Paiz*, June 19, 1894.
founder of our independence.” In this case, such a dismissal of the petition and the political viewpoints underlying it went hand in hand with a defense of the traditional narrative of Pedro I’s contribution to Brazilian independence. Bucking the previous trends, this writer’s labeling of Pedro employed no qualifications or diminution. In fact, it was just the first example of several writings that unapologetically reaffirmed Pedro I’s historical standing relative to independence.

The most visible work that took on the republican reinterpretation of Brazilian history in general and the “proposal for the demolition of the statue in Praça Tiradentes” in particular (and part of the work’s title page) was André P. L. Werneck’s *D. Pedro I e a Independencia*. An eleven page royal-centered account of Brazil’s independence written in July of 1894 and published in pamphlet form the following year, Werneck presented his own “historical truth” that would have fit right in with the dominant rhetoric in 1862 rather than his own time. The author made very clear his intention: to dispute the discrediting of Pedro’s role in independence and to reestablish the emperor’s historical identity as leader. In contrast to the republican portrayals of a pre-existing and free-standing Brazilian movement for independence that predated and had no need for any royal cooptation, he defined Pedro as the “true political leader of the epoch” after the Prince Regent made his famous *Fico*. And he did so not just by asserting Pedro’s leadership but by also challenging the notion of a competing Brazilian counter-leadership. He attacked the typical Brazilian figures constantly lauded by republicans as

the true driving forces of independence, asserting that they actually were fighting for the status quo of Brazil’s co-equal status within the Portuguese imperial system while Pedro I sought true separation and independence.

Werneck also refuted the political opportunism charge often levied against Pedro I by describing his swearing of allegiance to the upcoming Portuguese constitution in 1821 in a letter to his father. The author emphasized that this oath was born out of Pedro’s “conviction” rather out of the fear generated by the forcing of the oath by the Portuguese troops stationed in Rio and led by General Jorge de Avilez. To demonstrate that good faith, Werneck cited Pedro’s oath and subsequent reorganization of his ministry and creation of the elected provisional junta and presents them as proof of the Prince Regent’s active and competent leadership in the face of mounting Portuguese pressure. It was during that time of “such important crisis” that “beyond any doubt” Pedro showed himself to be “a young man full of resolution, of courage, and of will” and up to the challenges before Brazil and himself. Werneck went on to discuss the attacks of the Cortes on the legitimacy of Pedro’s regency and their efforts to bring him back to Portugal, bringing back the imperial narrative codified in the 1860s. He described the Brazilian people’s calls for Pedro to remain and his resultant decision to stay “for the good of all,” called the Fico. He established Pedro’s strategic savvy at outmaneuvering the Portuguese troops in Rio and his steadfastness and courage in forcing their embarkation from the city.

Rather than the royal opportunist, Werneck defined Pedro as the popularly acclaimed champion of Brazilian interests who worked hard to quell the “anarchy” in some provinces. This narrative, which concluded with the traditional account of the Grito
refuted the notion of a coalescing organic Brazilian independence movement often cited in the 1890s. Werneck made Pedro I once again the founder and the hero of Ipiranga. He again connected that moment to “the realization of the idea of liberty” and stated definitively that “Independence was made” and “a new *Patria* created” with those actions, thus reclaiming for Pedro I that historical credit and standing. Interestingly, Werneck’s singular focus on Pedro’s historical actions up to and including September 7 also put his account in line with the celebratory rhetoric of 1862. The overwhelming identification of Pedro with Ipiranga served as the cornerstone of his identity and legacy.

*D. Pedro e a Independencia* sought to return the focus and the glory back to Pedro I and that moment.

While the proposal continued to go nowhere in Congress, the topic of it did resurface once again in the Rio newspapers. Only this time writers were discussing it in the context of the publication of André P. L. Werneck’s pamphlet. Being only a year and a half removed from the experience of the naval revolt, one might think that the advancement of an openly imperial and monarchy-centered interpretation of the past would kick up a firestorm of criticism and Jacobin vitriol. Yet it did not. Instead, it met with approval from multiple writers. The *Gazeta de Notícias* referred to the publication and called it “a succinct, impartial and clear exposition of the events that led up to the memorable day of the 7th of September in 1822.” The review board of that paper even thanked the author “for the exemplar.” A review in the periodical *Don Quixote* also acknowledged Werneck’s work on D. Pedro I, calling the author an “effective writer” and

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322 Ibid.
323 *Gazeta de Notícias*, September 16, 1895.
his study “supported by historical documents.” According to this review, the work made patently clear the flagrant injustice that would be committed “if the idea of a hysterical group to demolish it” came about. In terms of the level of political sway that the “hysterical group” possessed in September of 1895, the reviewer concluded that “happily” the proponents of the statue’s demolition were “without real influence in the direction of public affairs.”

The Naval Revolt and New Perceptions of September 7 and Brazilian History

While André Werneck and imperial critics such as Lucio de Mendonça were essentially having the same argument over the statue and legacy of Pedro I that had been going on for the majority of Brazil’s national existence, there is no denying that the recent revolt did color Brazilian perceptions of the past and the commemorations of it. As has been documented in previous chapters, commemorative dates such as that of September 7 often provided a window through which to see how Brazilians perceived themselves and their nation’s current state as much as it did to show how they defined the past. In this case of what the intellectual elite of Rio wrote about on the anniversary of the nation’s independence in light of the trauma that the revolt wrought onto the city, it is possible to gain a better understanding once again of their larger notions of history, identity, and memory. Their preoccupation with this big national picture meant that any real discussion of Pedro I and his role on that date was noticeably absent. Yet since these discussions spoke to the very core of Brazilian memory during the early Republic, they are valuable to this study partly because their lack of interest in discussing Pedro in

324 Don Quixote, September 21, 1895, “A Nossa Estante.”
particular is informative and partly because their interest in those larger compelling topics inevitably shed indirect light onto their views of the Empire and Pedro I.

An analysis of the post-revolt discourse surrounding the observation of September 7 reveals an interesting tension between the two separate visions of Brazil’s past and overall historical experience. On the one hand, there was the long-standing republican criticism that the Empire was at fault for the current citizenry’s political incapacity. On the other was the aforementioned Brazilian self-awareness of the revolt’s introduction of caudillism into Brazilian politics and culture after a history marked by stability and the prior absence of such a destructive force. Accordingly, that previous singular status in Latin America offered Brazil unique claim to its place in the community of nations, so the revolt’s aftermath cast a shadow not just on Rio but the nation’s international standing as well. In this complicated context, it was easy to blame the Empire for current ills at the same time that it was also artful to discuss Brazil’s past stability without assigning any credit to that previous regime.

Regardless of which theme a writer on September 7 felt compelled to explore, all could agree that the government’s defeat of the revolt would serve as a defining moment for the nation. They saw themselves “in a very serious and critical moment in our political life” which demanded that they “think not of our own interests” but of “raising up the image of a great nation, respected, full of strength to be placed among those most important in the world.” Multiple writers shared this concern with the respect Brazil had earned and that the revolt had damaged. In one writer’s description of the nation’s past, he proclaimed that Brazil had “made itself a nation deserving of the respect of all.” Thus, with the stakes having been the survival of the Republic and the conflict visible to all
visitors and of political concern to governmental emissaries, the revolt served as a symbol of disorder and a Brazilian inability to keep its own house in order. It was a blemish that stabbed at the ideals of order and peace being the markers of a modern nation. As a result, those in Rio felt that the world was watching intently, and that reality factored into how the regime acted during and after the conflict. For these writers, ultimately the government’s victory was indeed something to celebrate, but the loss of standing and embarrassment that resulted from that exhibition of vulnerability and disunity necessitated a governmental show of consolidation and strength that was for foreign consumption as much as it was for domestic. One journalist condemned the rebels and described their current situation as “utterly sad…that they slaughtered us in the interior and humiliated us in front of foreigners.” A second writer similarly found it “painful” to commemorate the date of September 7th on account of the nation not having fully realized its greatness. His article about Independence Day proposed that the nation needed to consolidate its institutions and federation to achieve its goals of “conquering our aggrandizement, placing us beside the United States, through progress and material development.” It is important to note that the term “aggrandizement” (engrandecimento) became the dominant refrain during this time. This preoccupation with achieving national greatness and maintaining a seat in the community of nations as an equal stemmed from the positivist and modernization leanings of the new regime discussed in detail in previous chapters. Another author referred to the day as “Sad September 7!” and used the moment to contrast what the day’s festivities should be with the reality of the tensions left over from the revolt. They should have been “hearing festive salvos for the commemoration of our independence and the formation of this vast State, that, after
passing through periods of agitation, little by little came to develop its vital strengths and prosperity” which accompanied and helped evolve its progress. They should have witnessed parties and the “hymns of joy.” Instead, there was only “our population, worried and terrified, spending the day gazing upon the brutish attitude of a part of their fellow citizens” who acted “against the constituted and legal government.” A day negatively notable for the questions of the nation’s “sovereignty and confidence” was how that author viewed September 7.\textsuperscript{325}

It was therefore the specter of Brazil not measuring up to those defined societal markers—order, progress and material development—that loomed after the revolt’s defeat. A year prior, and one day into the revolt, a different cloud hung over the date of September 7\textsuperscript{th}. Understandably, the revolt dominated the news of that day rather than any observance of the holiday, and what was written was infused with apprehension, uncertainty towards the outcome of the revolt, and concerns over the future of the Republic. One year later with the rebels defeated, writers turned again to questions of progress rather than survival. Overall there was a general concern for Brazil being a nation worthy of respect, a nation with “greatness… opulence…character.” Some found hope in the aforementioned consolidation of the nation’s institutions and found a way to link all of these themes together with the commemorative date of independence. One reflected that “if today we cannot commemorate the 7\textsuperscript{th} of September as we would like to, we have faith that soon we will make it so that our country, in just a few years, will be attracting to us the attention of the entire world.” This same writer who said that it was

\textsuperscript{325}Diario de Noticias, September 8, 1894, “Pela Patria”; Diario de Noticias, September 7, 1893, “7 de Setembro.”
painful to commemorate Independence Day given the situation in the country nevertheless had absolute confidence in the trajectory of Brazil.\textsuperscript{326}

Another writer was also optimistic given the restoration of public order. He affirmed that Brazilians “should not fear neither the future nor that perturbation would continue in our country,” but he also conceded that the “ashes were still hot from this formidable fire” lit by a band of “reckless exploiters…promoting revolutions and disturbing public order.” The peace he envisioned would be one that reestablished republican institutions despite efforts against it and that was based on the people’s growing “understanding of their duties and recognition of their rights, loving the law…and respecting the legally constituted authority.” Of note is the portrayal of the maturation or awakening of the citizenry. Brazilian notions of an uneducated populace hemmed into subservience by the imperial government have already been presented in prior discussions. That preexisting line of thought simply continued in the post-revolt context. One writer used his “7 de Setembro” article on that day in 1894 to indict once again the imperial governmental apparatus as being a hindrance to the creation of a citizenry capable of governing itself and responding to the unexpected, i.e. a revolt, in the new Republic. In his words, Brazil had to overcome its past as an “empire, unitary and subservient to the stratagems of the emperor, who intervened in everything and commanded everything.” Hearkening back to the idea of the Republic, delayed, this author laid the blame for the nation’s instability at the feet of the empire asserting that Brazil would be better off in 1894 had its political and material progress not been “stymied” by the system of the past.\textsuperscript{327}

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid.
While these writers thereby typically took a dim view of the empire and the people’s political preparedness for democratic participation and national ascendancy prior to the revolt, some also wistfully looked back at the nation’s past, albeit while denying any credit to the monarchy, for the level of political stability that it enjoyed. With the revolt, all of that had changed, and those same writers referenced above shared a sense of Brazil being on the precipice of caudillism. The same authors who condemned the empire for the monarch’s unrelenting dominance simultaneously characterized Brazil’s past as a “triumphant march” of stability. And they were well aware that their past was in stark contrast with the experience of the rest of Latin America. One journalist cautioned against “abandoning the calm life to always follow [the next] military uprising that has so profoundly wounded and stymied the progress of the nation located in the Plata and all of those who live also in South America.” Another writer similarly referenced Brazil’s history, but he did so conceding the nation’s periods of agitation but describing the past as overall marked by “a long period of peace allowing us to always be moving forward, placing us side-by-side with the most respected nations of the world.” For him, it was through “the stability of the government (note that he did not say imperial government), the public riches…, the punctuality of our fulfillment of our commitments” that Brazil achieved such status. That stability mentioned above also gave Brazil the ability to “resolve serious questions” and “maintain its honor” and unity, thus serving as the backbone of the nation’s standing and its attainment of those markers of society. Like many before him, this writer also credited the abolition of slavery for propelling Brazil along in the fields of “industry and work” and for creating the preconditions necessary for a “beautiful future” of “wealth and expansion.” He concluded this vision by hitting all of
the high notes of positivist theory, stating that it was “certain that the nation’s evolution demanded in its political order” the fostering of the development of industry as well as “conquests in the arts, letters, and all the greatness that civilization has.” The same writer also noted the singularity of Brazil in the region for possessing those characteristics of stability and greatness: “sadly for the others in Latin America, Brazil was the exception to its brothers, and by chance only Chile and later the Republics of the Plata could place themselves alongside it.” That avoidance of the caudillism prevalent in Spanish America had previously averted the attendant crises associated with that instability. Ultimately the author credited Brazil in general with achieving that unusual stability while at the same time laying blame for the instability generated by the revolt at the feet of the empire in particular. What is of particular interest with this portrayal of the past is that there is absolutely no blame assigned to monarchists or monarchism for the revolt itself. There is a complete absence of any polemic in that regard. In an article focused on the nation’s day of independence historically centered on the royal action taken at Ipiranga, these authors focused exclusively on caudillism and not restoration as the driving force behind the revolt. They found “neither political ideal nor lofty thoughts” but instead only “individual concern and desire to disturb the peace, in the hope of seizing power from the government and imposing his will on the nation.” Ultimately, they defined the revolt as the attempt by caudillos to establish themselves in Brazil. That was the message on September 7.⁴²⁸

One last important theme that emerged from some of the discourse surrounding the Independence Day after the naval revolt’s defeat was the new tendency to link that effort and success to those of 1822. We have already looked at evidence showing the

³²⁸ Ibid.
earlier republican efforts to draw a direct line backwards into history from the
proclamation of the Republic of 1889 to the achievement of political independence in
1822 (and with May 13th in between). The purpose of these attempts was as much to
legitimize the new regime as it was to try to circumvent the imperial historical period.
Into this backdrop of contested historical lineage entered the government’s victory over
the revolt. That struggle came to be perceived as the testing ground that forged in battle
Brazilian understandings of citizenship and consolidated the Republic. The relative ease
of achieving independence and the complete absence of any fight to implant the Republic
in 1889 had meant that very few Brazilians had ever done battle to usher in a political
regime, a reality some writers previously pointed out. In some ways, the naval revolt
became a surrogate for that missing struggle, and it also became another means of
connecting the Republic back to the origins of the nation and independence.

For the authors analyzed, the popular struggle to consolidate the Republic in the
face of insurrection and political destabilization was akin to the Brazilian independence
movement that achieved political liberation from Portugal. The Republic succeeded in
overcoming the rebels’ “political ambitions and the anarchists of all types who infest our
country.” Again, it was not the monarchists who were to blame for the attack against the
government, nor was it the monarchy they noted in their depictions of Brazil’s fight for
independence. Both the Republic and the organic Brazilian independence movement that
pre-dated Pedro I faced existential outside threats, and both overcame them to continue
Brazil on its path. Only for them, that path followed a direct line from independence to
the Republic with blips like the empire and the revolt along the way. It was a powerful
rhetorical tool to be able to “give honor to the patriots of 1822” while holding up the
patriotism of everyday Brazilians standing against the rebel invasions of Niteroi. The revolt had afforded the Republic an opportunity to further the construction of both the state and the nation. Floriano Peixoto’s victory over the navy—and any antagonistic leader in the provinces—exalted the state over its constituent institutions. More importantly, it allowed the president of the federal government to assert his centralized authority in the name of the Brazilian people. This reality legitimized sovereignty in the people of Brazil and, in essence, made the new democratic republic governable. Thus, amidst a great deal of wariness and insecurity over Brazil’s loss of standing and internal stability stood also a palpable desire—and characteristic Brazilian optimism—for a return to greatness and confidence.329

Later Media References and the Final Proposal for Removal

Apparently, no one publically considered the removal of the statue of Pedro I to be part of that path to reclaimed greatness. The topic of the statue’s future disappeared from the pages of the Rio newspapers again until 1895 when a writer for the *Gazeta de Noticias* referenced it in a commentary on an impassioned point made in that paper’s ideological sparring partner, *O Paiz*. One writer for the latter, signed as “A. A.,” used the paper’s “Palestra” section to rail against the literal whitewashing of the Aqueducto da Carioca. Angered by the painting white of the “friendly old marble” of the city’s historic aqueduct for a lowly cognac advertisement, A. A. longed for a public outcry. He pointed to prior public outrage born out of an attempt by the authorities to demolish the historic fountain at the Largo da Carioca and lamented that there had been no such similar response to the aqueduct’s whitewashing. Such a call to protest struck the *Gazeta* writer

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329 Ibid.
as odd and hypocritical. He commented on A. A.’s indignation, saying that “this sacred love for archeology and for historical monuments” was “well placed in a culture of art.” This praise quickly turned to confrontation, however. Speaking to (or at least at) that writer, he asked whether his “colleague could not communicate” that “love” or appreciation “to some of his co-believers who carry the Iconoclast furor up to the demolition of the statue of Pedro I?”

This writer’s commentary reiterated many others’ warnings about the slippery slope involved in one group imposing its vision of historical or political correctness on a historical monument as well as how messy and complex history, memory, and tradition could be. The pointing out that a member of a group who advocated for the erasing of Pedro’s statue from the public square could rant about how the aqueduct looked shorter and less picturesque after the whitewashing captured that very complexity. This commentary also revealed that the proposed threat to the statue’s continuation in the square remained on some journalists’ minds, and it remained a point of contention in the battle over sovereignty, history, and memory.

The statue and its proposed destruction did not reemerge in Rio’s journalistic sphere again until 1898 when two separate individuals wrote in to smaller publications with very distinct agendas. The first was published by O Apostolo in May from a reader referred to as a “collaborador” commenting on the topic of instructional reforms in Brazil’s schools. The writer found the current social, political, and educational questions in 1898 to be similar to earlier ones dating back to 1890 and the “birth” of Brazil’s “new form of government.” He even quoted from some of his own writing at that earlier time, in which he indicted the changes instituted by the new regime as “the most absurd reforms, the clumsiest innovations, [and] the most insane resolutions.” He found the

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330 Gazeta de Notícias, July 15, 1895, “Os Jornais de Hontem”; O Paiz, July 14, 1895, “Palestra.”
efforts to construct “the new republican pavilion” and transform the nation decidedly malevolent, articulating that each of the targets of those reforms and innovations had become the “victim of the evil of destruction.” Within this early republican context, the author noted that “the idea of the destruction of the statue of D. Pedro I appeared” and specifically referred to the Mendonça proposal of that time. He engaged Mendonça’s and his cohorts’ historical view of the statue, characterizing it as the viewpoint that the monument “flaunted” being out of step with the “new republican form” and served as an affront to “national decorum.” The author described the statue as having “escaped” from being “washed down the drain” in what he perceived to be the casting off of Brazilian history and tradition in 1890. These early contests over national memory—both general and specific to the statue—are what came to this author’s mind in 1898 in the context of proposed educational reforms. The “collaborador” wrote in response to the journal’s published accounts of the government’s reform of curriculum, most notably and controversially the removal of religion from that curriculum. He found the idea of “instructing without religion” to be “repulsive” and warned of the impact on Brazil’s society that the “nullification of faith” and an undeveloped “conscience” would have.\footnote{O Apostolo, May 29, 1898, “Religião e Nova Escola.”} That a writer would protest the secularization of education in Brazil in a letter published in a Catholic publication is not particularly notable. But the fact that that writer would employ the example of the statue’s proposed destruction eight years prior in an argument against continued government reform is. It shows that by later in the 1890s the statue and its survival in the public square had become…in some quarters… a symbol of republican overreach.
Thus the Mendonça proposal continued to pop up here and there in Rio’s public discourse despite the fact that it had died a quiet death in the nation’s legislature. Perhaps that fact drove one more politician to give the idea another try. Or, perhaps it was just the means by which a journalist could sarcastically poke fun of a disliked politician. In July of 1898, the publication *Cidade do Rio* noted in its “Varias Noticias” section that a Senator Caiado would soon present a project to “demolish” the statue of Pedro I and raise money to replace it with a bust of Lombriga Canivete in appreciation “for the relevant services [he] rendered to those who frequent the Largo do Rocío.”\(^{332}\) This politician named in the article was Senator Antonio José Caiado who represented the state of Goiás in the nation’s legislature after a prominent history of service in his home state. Several factors lead me to the conclusion that the “news” of this proposal was most likely an act of what is referred to today as “trolling.” First, the location of the notification of the proposal was in the “Cidade Nova” section known for its use of satire to comment on the politics and society of the day. Senator Caiado was a frequent subject of this section, appearing in various anecdotes seven different times in the span of a year. He appeared in a book review (For example, how do you know a book is good? Because it made Senator Caiado feel..), a lunch-time anecdote, various “overheard” conversations, and this proposal.\(^{333}\) The *Cidade do Rio* was not even the only newspaper to single him out in that way. The *Gazeta de Noticias* commented on the senator’s request for a two month leave of absence from the legislature in Rio on the grounds that he was “ill” by saying that

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\(^{332}\) *Cidade do Rio*, July 25, 1898, “Ciadade Nova,” “Varias Noticias.”

\(^{333}\) An obituary for Senator Caiado in *O Paiz* notes that he had helped found the liberal party in Goiás, had been a vice president of the province during the Empire, had been elected president of the state after the Republic’s founding, and served Commandante Superior of the state’s National Guard. See *O Paiz*, August 9, 1899. For the senator’s appearances in “Cidade Nova,” see *Cidade do Rio*, 1897, August 30, September 3 and 23, November 19, and December 4 and 22.
what had him infirmed was the upcoming elections in Goias. This newspaper provided
updates on many of Caiado’s actions, from challenging and replacing the previous
directory of the Federal Republican Party, to getting an official in Goias fired because of
his party affiliation, to playing a role in linking Catholic and dissident republican groups
together to oppose anticlerical policies. The last reason for skepticism towards this
supposed news item is the statue’s proposed replacement. There is no known figure
named “Lombriga Canivete.” And worse, by this time in the city’s history, the “sordid
and shady side” of Praça Tiradentes was well-known for being a place “frequented” often
by prostitutes. The “services rendered” included in the write-up could very well be an
allusion to those very specific frequenters of the praça. All in all, this 1898 proposal
reference appears to be a thinly veiled inside joke and insult to Senator Caiado. There is
no indication that any similar proposal was mentioned in any other publication, and it
certainly did not generate a public discussion. Instead, it faded into oblivion as well and
the newspaper lost its frequent target when the senator passed away a year later.
Nevertheless, this example does shed insight once again into the ways in which the
statue’s removal had become a distinct rhetorical or even satirical tool used by Rio
writers to comment, often critically, on the ideas of others. After this instance of the use
of that rhetoric, no more proposals calling for the statue’s destruction seem to exist.

Conclusion

Pedro I’s statue had won that war of attrition, but it nevertheless ended up being
part of a discussion six years later triggered by the city authorities’ ongoing efforts to

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334 *Gazeta de Notícias*, 1897, April 6, May 18, June 2, June 12.
reshape the capital’s physical and monumental landscape. In a protest that will again sound decidedly familiar, a writer signed “A. V.” again wove the issue of the statue of the emperor into the debate over another structure’s proposed removal in 1904. The statuary in question this time was the fountain designed by Grandjean de Montigny during the Empire and located in the Praça Onze de Junho of that time. In part of his protest against the removal of that fountain, the writer defended the importance of the conscious and historical placing of the city’s monuments and made clear that he was wary of them “losing their place” in the city and its historical record. This wariness towards the setting of such precedence is evident in his assertion that “tomorrow someone will be reminded to move the statue of Pedro I for another point in the city.” His trepidation went beyond just the city’s first and controversial statue to include the warning that the future could see “those of José Bonifácio, José de Alencar, Osorio, Caxias, etc.” moved as well. Many writers before him felt just as strongly about the implications of making what was to be permanent transitory instead, and he also included those Republican monuments in his warning to help make his point that removing imperial structures would inevitably make the current regime’s memorials vulnerable as well. A. V. concluded his piece by using another common refrain. He pleaded for the government of the Republic to leave the fountain “in peace” and think of “things more useful” to do.\(^{336}\)

By 1911 there was more evidence that both the public and the politicians had moved on from the question of removing imperial statues. The passage of time and the approach of the nation’s centennial celebration had begun to affect both of those groups. Rather than discussions in the papers about the statue of the first emperor, the details and lead-up to the inauguration of a new statue honoring the second emperor in Petrópolis

\(^{336}\) *A Notícia*, November 30-December 1, 1904, “Sito Restaurado.”
dominated the discourse of the day. In creating—rather than destroying or removing—an homage to Pedro II and thereby the empire, the powers-that-be were signaling that in some ways they and the nation were moving on. And they were ultimately leaving the original imperial statue in Praça Tiradentes in peace.

Figure 13: Shared historical space made permanent in Rio de Janeiro. Photo by author.

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337 *A Notícia*, February 6-7, 1911, “A estatua de D. Pedro II.”
Chapter Six: Conclusion

I set out in my research to explain how a nation remembers a controversial yet fundamental historical figure. At the time that I began this study, political pundits and presidential historians were frequently being asked on television whether George W. Bush would be remembered as the worst president in United States history. With my prior experience studying Brazil’s Pedro I, I began to look on that topic of discussion in a new way. What if the founding political figure of the United States had been as much George W. Bush as George Washington? How would that have affected our national identity and sense of history? While we as historians typically shun “what if’s,” it was precisely this contextualization that set me on the path of this study.

As an historical figure, Pedro I is a mixed bag. As the figurehead of independence and the first Emperor of Brazil, he has a legitimate claim to an iconic level of fame and standing in the history of that nation. As a political leader perceived as foreign and despotic and run out of town, he has a stain on his record which adds a level also of infamy and calls into question the legitimacy of that historical standing. This complicated legacy has existed since April 7, 1831 when Pedro I abdicated his throne, and Brazilian intellectuals and politicians have been grappling with it going back even further than that date. At stake in this contestation of memory and history is the fundamental question: what historically makes Brazil, Brazil? This study, through the lens of the legacy of Pedro I and his statue in Rio de Janeiro, provides new insight into the components that go into answering that question, namely how a people understand their nation’s origins and history and how that understanding informs the process of the construction of national
identity amidst notions of nationalism, the articulation of the nation-state, and the pursuit of the idealized modern nation.

No comprehensive study of the historical legacy of Pedro I exists. There are multiple biographies of the first emperor to represent every historiographical generation of scholars, but those biographies are naturally limited to perceptions of him during his lifetime. Many Brazilian scholars are similarly engaged in a detailed examination of the First Reign. Because of its notoriety as the nation’s first public monument, the statue of Pedro I has generated many articles and chapters within larger works looking at topics such as the public display of state power and contested views of the past and the construction of political and social legitimacy in both the contexts of the Empire itself and later the Republic. In many cases, the statue and Pedro I end up being a relatively small part of the larger discussion and analysis taking place in these studies. Since this study looks across time and regimes, it can provide more extensive and additional primary source research and synthesis to begin to provide that missing long—term exploration of Pedro I’s legacy while at the same time informing the continuing work on those larger theoretical and conceptual topics.

**Research Questions and Summative Findings: the Imperial Era**

The fundamental research question that drove the analysis of the rhetoric of 1862 was how writers originally defined the legacy of Pedro I at the time of his statue’s inauguration and in the context of the imperial rule of his son. The answer was that Pedro I was overwhelmingly defined by the Empire’s supporters as the proclaimer of Brazil’s independence and the author of the nation’s constitution, just as the imperial project and the careful selecting of the statue’s imagery intended in order to glorify the nation and its
origins. The rhetoric shows that his exploits in Portugal heavily influenced Brazilian notions of Pedro I as a soldier, a hero, and a magnanimous father.

Secondly, I wanted to understand what the public discourse surrounding the statue inauguration showed about how the elites conceptualized the legitimacy of the imperial regime and how it impacted the construction of a national founding narrative. For the empire’s elites, the legitimacy of the state stemmed from the people’s acclaim for their royal sovereign and his accomplishments and stewardship of the Empire. That was the driving force behind the “national project” undertaken by the intellectual elite and the reason why the statue was conceived of to glorify specifically the nation’s origins. On the other hand, critics refuted each of those celebrated identities and presented a counter-narrative that emphasized a bottom-up and thoroughly Brazilian interpretation of history, a vision that would be advanced after the proclamation of the Republic amidst the need to assert a new popular and decidedly Brazilian sovereignty. From this perspective, Pedro I was a conniving royal opportunist and tyrant who thwarted the will of the people by superimposing himself onto a preexisting independence movement. Similarly, Pedro II was an out-of-touch old monarch out of sync with the world of modern republics. The negotiations between these two extremes would play out throughout the latter decades of the Empire’s existence and the first decade of the Republic’s.

Lastly, the 1862 sources analyzed led me to one other question regarding the Brazilian imperial definition of Pedro I. The overarching presence of references to his exploits in Portugal prompted an investigation into the impact that Pedro I’s dual legacies in the national trajectories of both Brazil and Portugal had on how writers in Rio de Janeiro defined him. I find that Pedro’s role in defeating the absolutist army of his brother
Miguel and reinstating the limited and constitutional rule of his daughter Maria II rehabilitated and redeemed interpretations of his Brazilian legacy. It provided him a second act and a way to prove himself over again after being forced from power in Brazil. His sacrifices on the battlefield in Portugal earned him military credentials and sympathy, neither of which would ever have been a part of his memorial legacy in Brazil if his story ended as simply an exile.

**Research Questions and Summative Findings: the Early Republic**

The political rupture that occurred on November 15, 1889 allows for many of the questions above to be reformulated to explore the impact that the proclamation of the Republic had on how people remembered Pedro I and how they approached his statue. The first question addressed was how did republican elites after the proclamation of the Republic respond to the public and civic representations of imperial sovereignty in general and the existence of the statue in the public square in particular. The sources analyzed show that some attempted to eradicate the imperial presence in the public sphere by replacing imperial denominations, dedicated space, and civic narratives with republican ones, but they were confronted with the difficult reality of the massive statue’s presence in the public square and at most a pre-existing sense of a national collective identity and at least a sense of national history and tradition. The covering of the statue on Tiradentes Day generated a great deal of criticism for a wide range of reasons while the lack of success on the part of proponents of moving the statue from the public’s eye ultimately reveals the government’s complete lack of will to remove the nation’s first monument. All in all, the republican backlash against the presence of an imperial statue in their Republic’s public square as evidenced in the proposals to remove the statue was
relatively tame and consistent in nature. So was the government’s and public’s rejection
of those calls.

The second research question focuses primarily on the aftermath of the statue’s
covering. In light of the bandstand incident, how did writers publicly view the Empire’s
legacy in general and Pedro I’s in particular? In addition, what were the different views
on how to remember the imperial past? The evidence shows that some considered the
Empire’s legacy a dangerous one and sought to extirpate all vestiges of it, up to and
including the removal of the statue from the square. Some considered the traditions of the
past to be indicative of a people’s sense of self and history and sought to preserve some
elements of it. The discussions reveal an increasingly sophisticated view of Pedro I.
Writers could engage with the questions of his political and personal shortcomings
without necessarily feeling compelled to repudiate his role in history in full. While there
was some evidence of wholesale repudiation of his standing in the pantheon of the nation,
the larger discourse points to many in the elite intellectually coming to terms—in one
way or another—with a past that included important civic moments marked by royal
participation.

The final question that drove my analysis of Brazil in the 1890s focused on what
we can learn about how republican elites conceptualized the legitimacy of their new
regime and how those ideas impacted previous understandings of nation’s past. The
answers to these questions lie in the rhetoric involved in those discussions of the past, the
statue, and commemorative dates from the imperial era. For the more radicalized
members of the republican elite, their political legitimation was a zero-sum game. There
was either total republican political legitimacy and its requisite popular sovereignty, or
there was a menacing and lingering imperial institutional threat with ongoing royal sovereignty and popular subordination (or stupefaction). For the moderates, however, a sense of a middle ground existed in which the Empire could be acknowledged without it posing an existential threat to the viability of the republican nation-state.

**Overall Conclusions and Perceptions**

What this study repeatedly brings to light is the inherent anxiety that political actors feel in times of political change. It is this anxiety which drives new leaders and regimes to raise monuments commemorating prior figures or moments that lend legitimacy and glory to the nation and the state. Thus, the erecting of statues and other symbolic representations of power is as much, if not more, about the living as it is the dead. Specifically, it is about the elites who raise them and the political landscape at the moment as much as it is about the figures or moments memorialized. This reality is why a study of Emperor Pedro I’s legacy resulted in three chapters involving the first decade of the Republic.

That political and intellectual climate of the 1890s was also ripe with lessons greater in scope than that one decade. It shows that ideological questioning and purity tests can—and do—occur anywhere, anytime, and over anything. That the covering of a bandstand and the public response to it could initiate a litmus test for republicanism speaks loudly to this point. Similarly, the study shows that there are no easy answers when it comes to acknowledging the past without offending contemporary sensibilities. This negotiation is timeless, as evidenced by this study being completed at exactly the same moment that public institutions across the United States are trying to decide what to do with relics of their Confederate past. Yet what the writers in the 1890s showed, so
often eloquently, was that even amidst a tense political context, intellectuals are ever-ready to engage in the larger meanings of events, no matter how seemingly small, and show a remarkable level of nuance and depth on the issues of memory and tradition.

**Future Scholarship**

Brazilian history does not end in 1898. Therefore, the long-term legacy of Pedro I requires further study. My ongoing research is prompting me to look at the intriguing question as to why the remains of the first Emperor were asked for and received by a Brazilian government in 1972 but not 1922 when the remains of Pedro II were brought back and enshrined in the city of Petrópolis. Just as the regime change that occurred in 1889 provided a charged political environment surrounding civic remembrances and commemorations, a study of 1972 will shed light onto the impact of the military dictatorship on the sesquicentennial celebration of independence and the particular vision of the nation that the regime sought to project to its people and the world. It also will provide the opportunity to explore the relationship between Brazil and Portugal as it relates to those two dictatorships’ ties to each other and their approach to public imagery and memory. I also intend to investigate how, of all places, the nation would decide to house a museum to honor the reign of the nation’s first emperor (and empress) in the residence of his mistress. The shift in focus will allow me to use that issue of the repatriation of Pedro I’s remains to continue these discussions across more political cleavages as his statue became less provocative of commentary in the public sphere. There are considerable holdings in the National Library and National Archives that will provide a wide range of sources to analyze.
The peregrination of the mortal remains of Pedro I across all parts of Brazil in the lead up to his entombment in the Monument to Independence in São Paulo on September 7, 1972 will allow me to begin to redress the Rio-centric nature of this study. I additionally plan on exploring how the different regional identities and historical experiences within Brazil impacted those societies’ perceptions of the nation’s first emperor. The historiography has documented a distinct sense of internal colonialism on the part of the government and society seated in Rio de Janeiro towards those localities, so this will be an important aspect of my future research. I also want to expand my research into whether or not Pedro I’s historical experience in Brazil similarly influenced how Portuguese commentators defined him in 1866 at the time of the inauguration of his statue located in Portugal.

Ultimately, this study of how Pedro I was remembered in moments of symbolic importance for the nation during both the Empire and Republic will serve as an important starting point for this future scholarship and will help to provide greater evidence and insight into the ways that national memory becomes highly politicized in the search for identity and legitimacy. The imperial statue that perseveres in Praça Tiradentes to this day testifies to the contestation over and eventual resolution of the historical space and standing of the fascinating and complex Pedro I and his most famous monument.
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