AN ANALYSIS OF POST-COLD WAR CONCEPTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

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Abstract

This thesis investigates post-Cold War concepts in US foreign policy. At the end of the Cold War, prominent political scientists and commentators argued, for various reasons, that the strategic environment was so dramatically different that the United States would no longer be able to engage the world as it had in the past. In an attempt to understand the ramifications of the evolution of the strategic environment, this thesis asked the question: Have the three post-Cold War presidents, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama, continued to engage the world in ways consistent with previous administrations or have the broken from traditional concepts in American foreign policy? To answer this question, declaratory foreign policy as articulated in national security strategy documents and key foreign policy engagements were analyzed and compared to nine traditional concepts in American foreign policy identified by prominent historians and political scientists. The post-Cold War administrations continued to develop foreign policy consistent with the concepts identified by historians and political scientists suggesting a measure of consistency in the way the United States engages the world. Additionally, each president developed foreign policy that exhibited unique characteristics inconsistent with the traditional concepts. These policies were characterized by the importance placed on multilateral consensus; an emphasis on multilateral agreements and alliances to foster a stable international order; and the reliance on international organizations to address regional and global issues. This emerging concept in US foreign policy, termed multilateralism, supports both Kenneth Waltz’s argument that a unipolar environment incentivizes other states to attempt to challenge a polar state and Robert Pape’s assertion that soft balancing against the United States has begun to emerge. The emergence of multilateralism in all three post-Cold War administrations examined also supports the argument that despite ideological polarization in the American political system, administrations draw upon similar means of engagement to address similar situations or crises suggesting a measure of consistency across administrations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Nineteen eighty-nine marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War: Communist regimes fell in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; the Berlin Wall became, for the first time, a permeable border. Two years later, Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, marking what most leading commentators deemed the end of the Cold War.¹ The end of the Cold War brought significant changes in the security environment: a reinvigorated United Nations (UN); an economically strong reunified Germany; a lifting of the Cold War patterns of alliances; the emergence of a non-communist Russian ally; and a reduced incentive for superpower intervention.² The United States was uniquely positioned to shape the course of events.³ George H.W. Bush sought to establish a new world order based on collective security, open economic and political systems, and rule of law, while leaving the vestiges of allied containment and American global hegemony in place.⁴

Foreign policy experts argued that the United States (US) had entered an era of “unprecedented absolute and relative power” and was considered a nation “first among unequals.”⁵ According to Theodore Sorensen, “the touchstone for our nation’s security concept—the containment of Soviet military and ideological power—is gone.”⁶ To many, this time of uncertainty afforded an opportunity to define a new strategic vision for American foreign policy unencumbered by the constraints of super-power competition and to define a new role for the United States in a changed world.⁷ The still unsettled policy debates of the post-Cold War era have centered less on whether and more on how the United States should engage the world. Before a new strategic vision could be created, US policy-makers had to wrestle with key issues that had not been seriously debated since before the Cold War. Debates centered around defining how and to what extent the United States would commit its newly expanded power and significant resources to secure

¹ Events leading to and during the Cold War are not directly addressed in this thesis. Instead, the effects of the end of the Cold War, which drove scholarly and political discussions about the future of US engagement, are summarized.
³ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "New World Order or Hollow Victory?" Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (1991): 53.
its interests, or how to frame the priorities of a post-containment foreign policy, and which instruments of power would be most effective toward those ends.8

Francis Fukuyama was one of the first scholars in the new era to reframe the strategic issues when he argued that the end of the Cold War ushered in the “end of history.”9 The triumph of Western liberal democracy over communism marked the end of mankind’s “ideological evolution.”10 Fukuyama was not arguing that the world had reached the end of politics, but that the “end of history” validated—after a century of often-bloody struggles—the universal appeal of liberal democracy and the repudiation of communism’s legitimacy. Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy put things bluntly: “[i]nternational communism has now plainly lost its missionary appeal” and while “individual communist tyrants can still oppress their own people… communism as a worldwide political movement died in 1989.”11 There were some cautionary voices amid the triumphalism. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer argued that even if “there is no evil world empire on the loose… the world is in ideological repose… such a time is not necessarily peacetime.” While Fukuyama’s conception of the post-Cold War environment suggested repose from large-scale conflict and permitted a return to historic American quasi-isolationism, Krauthammer was convinced that international stability is never guaranteed and thus necessitated continued US engagement.12

Underlying that discussion was a debate as to the very nature of the new strategic environment. For neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz, “any great concentration of power threatens other states and causes them to take action to restore balance,” suggesting the demise of the bipolar system (i.e., global balance of power) would naturally give rise to a multipolar system with the pre-Cold War regional balance of power

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10 Fukuyama, "The End of History?", 2.
reasserting itself as the key driver in international relations. 13 In contrast, Krauthammer asserted that a stable unipolar environment had already succeeded the bipolar environment. 14 He argued that a nation’s role in the world could not be “invented” (or chosen, as implied by Fukuyama), but rather, was a natural response to a nation’s perception of the world structure. Given the critics’ concept of a unipolar world structure, Krauthammer saw the United States at “the apex of the industrial west,” a leader that not only led but defined where followers should not go. 15 Furthermore, Krauthammer did not envision the United States engaging in “true multilateralism,” which involves a coalition of coequals; rather, he envisioned the United States using “pseudo-multilateralism” to cloak its unilateral action in a domestically acceptable veneer. 16 Still while others acknowledged the “unipolar” moment, as described by Krauthammer and others, they predicted it would quickly give rise to new great powers and a multipolar environment. 17

Despite the disparate perceptions of the future strategic environment initially described by Waltz et al. (i.e., a multipolar system) and Krauthammer et al. (i.e., a unipolar system), proponents of both systems expected the United States to engage the world differently than it did during the Cold War. The real debate at the end of the Cold War focused on how the United States should engage the world. Since 1776, American policy-makers developed concepts that shaped the nation’s foreign engagement. These concepts, discussed in greater detail below, form a framework for understanding how policy-makers harness means and ways when implementing US national security strategy. Understanding the concepts that influence foreign policy is the first step to understanding national security doctrine.

After two-and-a-half decades, it is evident the end of the Cold War did not yield a simple, stable unipolar international structure, but one that has evolved into a far more complex system. Is the strategic environment so dramatically different from the periods during and before the Cold War that the United States can no longer engage the world with the concepts it has in the past? Does the United States profess to or try to engage the world differently than it did in the past? With respect to national security, has

14 “… the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world, brought sharply into focus by the Gulf crisis: a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West.” Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 24.
15 Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” 23, 24. “Where the United States does not tread, the alliance does not follow.”
American foreign policy evolved new concepts in response to the end of the Cold War or do the concepts developed during the first 200 years of American foreign policy continue to assert their influence?

Initially, this thesis hypothesized that despite the evolution of the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War, a review of the foreign policy developed and employed by the post-Cold War administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama would show their foreign policy continued to align with the characteristics of traditional concepts. The analysis documented in this thesis suggests that the characteristics of these traditional concepts in American foreign policy were evident in foreign policy developed by the three post-Cold War administrations analyzed. Additionally, these administrations also broke from the traditional concepts. This thesis documents and begins to characterize the emerging concept of *multilateralism*, the emergence of which supports the idea of continuity across administrations and has implications related to the debates surrounding US decline, foreign balancing, and the appearance of a multipolar environment.

**Methodology**

Prominent historians and political scientists have identified multiple enduring concepts in American foreign policy. Analysis of these works yields the following nine major American foreign policy concepts:

- Defensive Expansionism
- Exceptionalism
- Maximalism
- Regional Hegemony
- Progressive Imperialism
- Liberal Internationalism
- Smart Power
- Global Meliorism
- American Realism

These foreign policy concepts, which provide a framework for understanding in hindsight how the United States engaged the world, not for informing policy development, are defined below. The author understands the limitations of providing definitions. For example, concepts are malleable and continue to evolve.

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19 For the purposes of this paper, global meliorism is the belief that the world can improve and that a state or actor can aid in this betterment. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "Meliorism," Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meliorism.
Furthermore, foreign policy of different administrations exhibit different subsets of a single concept’s characteristics. Additionally, the author understands that nomenclature is arbitrary: two different analysts can and have codified the same concept in different way with different names. However, the author asserts the nomenclature and definitions provide a useful summary of policy preferences and facilitate this policy analysis.

To determine whether post-Cold War foreign policy continued to be characterized by the traits of enduring concepts or developed along new lines, this thesis examined US foreign policy reflective of US national security issues during the first terms of three post-Cold War presidents: William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama. This thesis analyzed both declaratory policies (i.e., what an administration intended to do) and employment policies (i.e., what an administration actually did). The two types of policies are not developed independent of each other; the former often informs and shapes the latter. However, both types of policies were analyzed, not for the sake of a direct comparison or to determine consistency within an administration, but because, for myriad reasons, individuals and administrations do not always act as they intend to. Notably, the realities of bureaucracy and interagency deliberations can accelerate or halt policy implementation or shift policy goals. Not discussed in this thesis are these realities or the internal policy debates that shaped the final decision that defined each administration’s foreign policy statements and actions. This is not to negate their importance, but rather to limit this paper’s scope to outcomes that can be qualitatively compared to traditional concepts in US foreign policy.

Additional reasons why individuals and administrations do not always act as they intend are structural constraints either unrecognized or unacknowledged when a policy is developed, cultural biases, and misperceptions of the strategic environment *writ large*. For example, if an administration judged the strategic environment to be relatively unchanged, it might fall back on tried and true means of engagement, but be compelled to devise a new approach when confronted by realities. Conversely, an administration

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20 The administration of George H.W. Bush (1989–93) was not analyzed within the body of this thesis for two reasons based on the fact that the end of Cold War is not specified by particular date, but rather is defined by a transition period, which began in 1989 with the fall of several communist regimes and culminated the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. First, an analysis of the entire administration would include Cold War, transitional Cold War, post-Cold War policies, which would be a qualitative difference from the administrations of William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama. Second, an analysis of only the true post-Cold War period would limit analysis to a quantitatively different period of time as compared to the administrations analyzed.

21 For a discussion of how internal policy debates as well as public opinion affect foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy behavior, see Cristian Cantir, Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (2012).
might perceive changes in the strategic environment that compel it to develop a new means of engagement, 
when in fact structural constraints, or even cultural biases, constrain the administration to more traditional 
means of engagement. This is not to suggest that policy-makers actively identify theories within political 
science or lessons learned from history and directly apply them when developing policies. It is more likely 
that these theories and lessons subconsciously inform the options they develop and the choices they make. 
This thesis looks at both declaratory and employment policies in order to more completely answer the 
underlying question of this thesis: How dramatically has the strategic environment evolved since the end of 
the Cold War?

This paper presents three case studies of the post-Cold War foreign policy of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and 
Obama. In each case, the main foreign policy concepts that defined the US national security strategy (i.e., 
its declaratory policy) and the key foreign policy actions that shaped the world’s perception of US 
engagement (i.e., its employment policy) are identified and described. These concepts and actions are then 
deconstructed to determine alignment or lack thereof with any of the enduring concepts in American 
foreign policy identified most notably by John Lewis Gaddis, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Walter McDougall, and 
Walter Russell Mead. Concepts and actions that do not align with enduring themes are characterized in 
order to identify any emerging trends in US foreign policy.

To provide a common basis for comparison, each case examines US foreign policy developed in the first 
terms of each post-Cold War president: Clinton, Bush, and Obama. This thesis relied heavily on open 
source documentation of declaratory policy; however, when interpreting the intent behind foreign policy 
statements and foreign policy actions, it relied heavily on interpretations of contemporary scholars rather 
than original administration documentation (e.g., internal policy papers, strategy memoranda), because, in 
many cases, the full range of official papers is not yet accessible.

**Definitions**

Because terms can be applied in various ways, it is important to define those that are ambiguous. Below are 
a few definitions to frame the reader’s understanding of this thesis.
Declaratory Policy; Employment Policy

According to Dr. Robert Worley in his examination of the US national security system, national security strategy is expressed in four ways: *declaratory policy, employment policy, force development policy*, and *force deployment policy*. *Declaratory policy* is what an administration says it will do regarding a national security issue and is captured at the highest level in the National Security Strategy Report. *Employment policy* is what an administration does, specifically as actions relate to the threat or “use of force to achieve strategic objective.”

For the purposes of this paper, employment policy will be expanded to include military, economic, and political activities undertaken to achieve a strategic objective. This paper will not examine force development policy or force deployment policy *per se*.

**Interests**

National security, and thus foreign policy, is driven by the idea that the state must protect and/or promote its interests. These interests can be divided into two types: vital and national. Vital interests are existential and a measure of the survival of the state; whereas national interests, while important, are concerned with power (e.g., military, alliances); peace (e.g., diplomacy, international institutions); prosperity (e.g., economy, trade); and principles (e.g., morality, democracy, human rights). Since President Ronald Reagan published his first National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) in 1987, each administration has provided a similar list of interests based on language in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States: “provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty.” Rather than define the interests themselves, each administration defines their scope. For example, *maximalists* and *American realists* narrowly scope US vital interests to limit engagement beyond national borders, because they approach foreign policy from a zero-sum perspective; whereas, *liberal...
internationalists and global meliorists broaden the scope of US interests beyond national borders, because they both approach foreign policy from a globalist perspective. In every case, the underlying basic interests remain the same.

**Multilateralism**

This paper identified an emerging concept in US foreign policy, termed *multilateralism*. The United States publicly supported NATO and international institutions such as the UN and the World Bank even before the end of the Cold War; however, the end of the Cold War saw a shift in how these institutions were employed. As seen in the foreign policy of the three post-Cold War administrations examined in this thesis, *multilateralism* is characterized by the importance of multilateral consensus, with administrations often yielding to that consensus, an appreciation for the importance of multilateral agreements and alliances to foster a stable international order, and an increased reliance on international organizations to address regional and global issues. This emerging theme in US foreign policy may not be unique to the post-Cold War period; however, it has not been formally described by historians and political commentators before. So while I do not suggest the United States did not rely on *multilateralism*—as defined above—before the end of the Cold War, I do suggest it is an increasingly important concept of US foreign policy.

**Literature Review**

Because the enduring foreign policy concepts identified most notably by John Lewis Gaddis, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Walter McDougall, and Walter Russell Mead serve as the basis upon which this paper examines the first three post-Cold War administrations, this literature review is organized around their definition and place in the literature of American foreign policy.

**Defensive Expansionism**

*Defensive expansionism* is the traditional concept within American foreign policy that expands “the scope and exercise of national power” in response to an unwarranted or unexpected attack upon the nation. In *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, John Lewis Gaddis argued Americans “have generally responded to threats—and particularly to surprise attacks—by taking the offensive, and if possible
overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them.”

He noted three cases in particular: the response to the burning of Washington during the War of 1812, Pearl Harbor, and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Gaddis postulated that when confronted with unexpected dangers, the United States expands rather than contracts the scope and exercise of national power, which manifests itself in concepts such as preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. Like Gaddis, Michael Desch argued that attacks perceived as “existential threat[s] to the American way of life” compel the United States to expand national power at the expense of liberal ideals in domestic (e.g., restriction of civil liberties, support for “enhanced interrogation”) and foreign policies (e.g., pursuit of global hegemony, launch of preventive wars). Desch postulated that existential threats to national security compel the United States to “spread their values around the world,” which may entail war “employing illiberal tactics.” In Special Providence and Power, Terror, Peace, and War, Walter Russell Mead noted many defensive expansionist tendencies were a part of the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy. In the face of a clearly defined threat to national security, Jacksonian tradition calls for aggression, supports the idea that the United States, at times, must fight preemptive wars, and shows the least regard for international law.

Exceptionalism

Exceptionalism is the traditional concept in American foreign policy that shapes the world around it by acting as a model to be emulated. Walter A. McDougall, in Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776, wrote that exceptionalism drove the Founding Fathers to envision a uniquely good society that would be a shining example for the rest of the world. Defined as “a set of universal, liberal-democratic values,” American exceptionalism has propagated the belief that “US foreign policy should substantively reflect the liberal political values that define the United States as a national political community and meaningfully distinguish it from others.” This exceptionalism was generally

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27 For the purposes of this discussion, preemptive action describes an action upon an adversary with both the intention and capability to strike.
29 For the purposes of this discussion, preventive action describes an action upon an adversary with the intention to strike before the adversary gains the requisite capabilities to strike first.
defined through domestic policy, but did influence foreign policy. This was due to the belief that the object of American foreign policy was to “defend, not define, what America was.”\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, Mead highlighted the belief within the Jeffersonian tradition of foreign policy that argues the United States could better serve the cause of universal democracy by setting an example rather than imposing a model upon the world.\textsuperscript{34} The concept of \textit{exceptionalism} stands in sharp contrast to that of \textit{defensive expansionism}, though both developed during the earliest periods of US history.

\textbf{Maximalism}

\textit{Maximalism}, defined by its goal to maximize US freedom of action, is a broad concept that includes and reinterprets isolationism. Historically, isolationism strongly resisted US involvement in world affairs. This translated into a reticence to engage in free trade, military alliances, and nation-building or to focus on non-security issues.\textsuperscript{35} Adherents to isolationism cite President George Washington’s farewell address as justification.\textsuperscript{36} Mead points out that this tendency is more than rhetorical, noting that Thomas Jefferson’s contribution to this debate was to define US interests as narrowly as possible, which would in turn limit the need for US involvement abroad.\textsuperscript{37} However, Gaddis noted that the first president wanted “… to avoid commitments to act in concert with other great powers against future contingencies which no one could foresee,” in order to maintain freedom of action at a time when the United States was the weaker in any potential alliance, rather than to isolate the United States.\textsuperscript{38} Today, \textit{maximalism} espouses restraint rather than a total retreat from world affairs; opposes multilateral institutions and agreements that impinge on state sovereignty, reducing policy flexibility; and supports unilateral action even in the face of opposition by its allies.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{Regional Hegemony}

\textit{Regional hegemony}, the traditional concept in American foreign policy that strives for American dominance in a given region, captures the essence of two of McDougall’s characterizations of American

\textsuperscript{34} Mead, \textit{Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World}, 182.
\textsuperscript{37} Mead, \textit{Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World}, 192.
\textsuperscript{39} Dietrich, \textit{The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary}, 11, 12.
foreign policy traditions: the *American system* and *expansionism*. These concepts are related in their purpose to prevent foreign powers from exerting influence over the United States, but differ in where they expect foreign power to be exerted. McDougall’s reading of *expansionism* (also referred to as *manifest destiny*) argues that the United States initially focused on expanding within North America to prevent foreign states from gaining footholds that could adversely affect its interests. He notes that US leaders in the nineteenth century sometimes found it necessary to expand into the near-abroad to “preempt European bids for influence over the vast unsettled lands that remained in North America.” Upon the complete settlement of the continental United States in the early 1800s, this concept was broadened to prevent foreign influence beyond the North American continent.

Gaddis points out that throughout the 1800s, the United States guaranteed its security “by making certain that no other great power gained sovereignty within geographic proximity of the United States.” Similarly, the *American system*, which captures the thinking of the Monroe Doctrine, stressed the need to prevent European states from expanding into the Western Hemisphere and its oceanic approaches and exerting influence on the United States. The next logical step in securing *regional hegemony* was a willingness to use preemptive action. While the United States “would never be able to anticipate all of the possible places, times, and ways by which another attack might come,” it may need to secure its interests at home and near-abroad through preemptive action.

**Progressive Imperialism**

*Progressive imperialism*, the traditional concept in American foreign policy that protects US interests by direct territorial acquisition, is often cited as an anomalous period in American history. The late 1800s and early 1900s were marked by the global expansion of power in terms of colonies and protectorates as well as evangelical zeal to share religious, economic, and political ideals. In terms of the expansion of power, the foreign policies of the United States were akin to those of Great Britain, France, and other great powers of

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40 McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776*, 77–78. For the purposes of this discussion, the near-abroad describes an arbitrary, but immediately proximal, region to a nation.
the time that seized foreign lands for profit and prestige. According to McDougall, *progressive imperialism* was “the sum of initiatives deemed necessary to defend America’s traditional posture” and resulted in acquiring myriad bases and ports, which, it was argued at the time, if possessed by imperial rivals would have threatened American shipping lanes.\(^{45}\) *Progressive imperialism* grew out of the concepts that rationalized *regional hegemony*, but was not limited to the United States’ immediate region and was characterized by US occupation after securing a foreign land from a power vacuum or an insurgency.\(^{46}\)

**Liberal Internationalism**

Theorizing that a global system of stable liberal democracies is less prone to war, *liberal internationalism* relies on nations cooperating and stresses that the United States is not only a member of the global community, but that it has a destiny to make the world safe for democracy.\(^{47}\) Thus, it is characterized by a willingness to engage in free trade, establish military alliances, promote nation-building in order to establish democracy, and to focus on non-security issues.\(^{48}\) Joseph Nye, Jr. argues that this concept was, in fact, Woodrow Wilson’s failed attempt to establish a set of international institutions to enable the spread of democracy in the wake of World War I.\(^{49}\) Others argue that the concept created a world order built on rule of law that continues today.\(^{50}\) Relying heavily on diplomacy, *liberal internationalism* focuses American foreign policy on advancing platonic abstractions rather than material self-interest.\(^{51}\) By the end of World War II, this policy broadly defined US national security to include “the security of friends and allies, and even abstract principles,” because Americans had come to believe that “their own well-being depend[ed] fundamentally on the well-being of others.”\(^{52}\)

**Smart Power**

Coined in the late twentieth century, *smart power* refers to the much older concept of combining hard power (e.g., military, economic) and soft power (e.g., the example of ideals) in executing a nation’s foreign

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policy.\textsuperscript{53} Smart power combines a nation’s military, economic, and political might to coerce (i.e., compel or deter) with its ability to “attract” (i.e., encourage desired behaviors) through legitimacy (e.g., “framing the international agenda [to] make another country’s preferences irrelevant, illegitimate, or unfeasible”).\textsuperscript{54} The theory of smart power relies on the idea that hard and soft power are mutually reinforcing.\textsuperscript{55} In his review of transformational leadership and US grand strategy, Joseph Nye identified the combined use of hard and soft power under Theodore Roosevelt as an unsuccessful American foreign policy concept.\textsuperscript{56} However, this concept produced more fruitful results almost three decades later when recast by President Truman’s National Security Advisor, George Kennan, as containment in the context of the Cold War. Cold War containment was not a single concept, but rather an evolving policy closely coupled with a coherent strategy. Kennan perceived the Soviet threat as primarily political, thus containment called for the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force” in terms of economic pressure and psychological warfare. In contrast, President Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor, Paul Nitze, deemed the Soviet threat to be primarily military; as such, the primary “counter-force” was applied through military power.\textsuperscript{57} Regardless of the policy’s interpretation, containment was a strategic approach to the challenges addressed by Wilson’s \textit{liberal internationalism} and focused on peacetime alliances and defending the balance of power in Europe and Asia.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{53} Hard power relies on commanding or ordering others to do as one wants, whereas soft power relies on the power of attractive ideas, the ability to set the political agenda, and the ability to determine the framework of a debate in order to shape the preferences and influence the actions of the coerced actor or state. Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," \textit{Foreign Policy} 80(1990): 166; The Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, "Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, Chapter 3: Responding to Change: Hard, Soft, and Smart Power," London, UK: UK House of Lords, 2014 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/id201314/ldselect/ldsoftpower/150/15007.htm. Political power can be an instrument of hard or soft power depending on the context. The importance of soft power was originally pointed out by Joseph Nye who wrote, the “proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of states.” Nye, "Soft Power," 155. In his discussion of transformation leadership, Joseph Nye provided the US freedoms of speech and worship and the US freedoms from want and fear as examples of soft power. Nye, "Transformational Leadership and US Grand Strategy," 141–142.


\textsuperscript{55} Nossel, "Smart Power," 138.

\textsuperscript{56} Nye, "Transformational Leadership and US Grand Strategy," 141.


\textsuperscript{58} McDougall, \textit{Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776,} 174.
**Global Meliorism**

For much of US history, the idea that “the principles underlying the American regime might have universal applicability” coexisted with the idea that “the United States had neither a right nor a duty to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.” This commitment to noninterventionism was based on the same logic as the United States’ commitment to religious tolerance.\(^{59}\) In contrast, the foreign policy concept of *global meliorism* asserts that the world can improve and that humans should facilitate that improvement.\(^{60}\)

According to Walter McDougall, *global meliorism* is the “socio-economic and political-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place.”\(^{61}\) This concept goes beyond making the world safe for democracy to challenge American foreign policy to make the world democratic. With a vision of the world united by devotion to liberty and detestation of war, *global meliorism* promotes the idea of a global human community where all people of all races and nations possess equal and unalienable rights.\(^{62}\) This concept emboldened the United States to provide aid for those in need and to spread democracy abroad.\(^{63}\) One exemplar of *global meliorism* is the post-war Marshall Plan, which, though developed within the context and supported by the goals of containment (i.e., *smart power*), also grew out of the belief that the United States had a mission to transform foreign societies for the better.\(^{64}\)

**American Realism**

*American realism* is the traditional concept in American foreign policy that rejects impractical and visionary ideals in favor of the economic interests of the United States as its guiding principle. “American diplomacy has consistently concerned itself with opening markets since the Revolutionary War.”\(^{65}\) This commercial orientation is the key attribute of the final American foreign policy concept discussed here. US national interests are often defined in terms of trade; hence, challenges that threaten freedom of the seas or freedom of the skies are considered direct and immediate threats to US national interests.\(^{66}\) While not originally conceived as a natural corollary to opening foreign markets to American goods, the concept of

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\(^{60}\) Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "Meliorism."

\(^{61}\) McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776, 173.


\(^{63}\) Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, 173.

\(^{64}\) Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, 174.


free trade and globalization (even of foreign goods in the American market) have become part of this concept.67

Paper Structure

This thesis is made up of five chapters: Introduction, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack H. Obama, and Concluding Remarks. This introductory chapter sketched the strategic context of the underlying question, articulated the hypothesis statement, described the data and the methodology applied to that data, defined a few key terms, and reviewed the literature relevant to this discussion of post-Cold War concepts in American foreign policy. The next three chapters test the hypothesis through case study evaluation. Each chapter compares the foreign policy statements (i.e., declaratory policy) and engagements (i.e., employment policy) of one administration to traditional concepts in US foreign policy. Chapter two documents the Clinton case study; chapter three documents the Bush case study; chapter four documents the Obama case study. The final chapter summarizes and characterizes the case study findings, discusses what these findings suggest about the strategic environment, introduces some of the implications related to US national security, and offers future avenues of research.

Chapter 2: William J. Clinton

William Jefferson Clinton, the 42nd President of the United States, was the first president born after World War II and the first president elected after the end of the Cold War. Clinton entered office arguing that the end of the Cold War did not signify the end of international threats to the United States; rather, it promised to shift the relative utility of military and economic power deployed in response to danger. Recognizing the inseparable nature of domestic and foreign policy, Clinton promised not to make the “false choice” between the two during his first presidential campaign stating, “[i]f we’re not strong at home, we can’t lead the world we’ve done so much to make.”68 This argument clearly supported Clinton’s priorities as he came to office: strengthen the healthcare system, improve the school system, bolster the economy, and create jobs.69 Many scholars argue that Clinton lacked a foreign policy strategy or did not intend make foreign policy a priority per se. Like all administrations, Clinton attempted to preemptively define its foreign policy through several early speeches and strategy documents but, as is often the case, the Administration’s reaction to several foreign policy crises in the first term set the tone. This chapter will test the level of continuity vice change in American foreign policy by deconstructing the major declaratory policies (what the United States intended to do) and employment policies (what the United States did) related to US national security during President Clinton’s first term in terms of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy. It will also identify and begin to characterize emerging concepts.

Clinton’s Declaratory Policies

This section examines the declaratory policies of the Clinton Administration during its first term as defined through speeches and three National Security Strategy reports. This section is broken into four subsections, Interests, Engagement, Enlargement, and Dual Containment. After an overview of the Administration’s declaratory foreign policy (specifically related to national security), each sub-section will


discuss the policy’s alignment with historic US foreign policy concepts or it will describe how the unique attributes of Clinton’s policies may indicate the emergence of a new concept.

**Interests**

In the introduction to *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (1994 NSSR), President Clinton wrote, “The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America’s security imperatives.” That change, the end of the threat of communist expansion, meant that US national security strategy would need to shift focus to a “more diverse” set of security threats: ethnic conflict, regional instability due to rogue states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, national instability exacerbated by rapid population growth, and environmental degradation. However, the 1994 NSSR went on to assert that the end of the Cold War did not alter the “mutually supportive” interests (termed *central goals*) that were the basic objectives of any US national security strategy:

- to credibly sustain US security with military forces ready to fight,
- to bolster America’s economic revitalization, and
- to promote democracy abroad

Clinton described these interests as those “developments that could affect the lives of American citizens.” In an October 1992 campaign speech, then-Governor Clinton gave the first indication of how he would scope US interests when he said, “Our national interests oblige us to join in building a just, enduring, and ever-more democratic peace in the world.” He expanded upon this idea in his preface to the 1995 edition of the NSSR,

> Nations should be able to expect that their borders and their sovereignty will always be secure. At the same time, this does not mean we or the international community must tolerate gross violation of human rights within those borders.

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According to Robert Kagan, Clinton foreign policy was dominated by the idea that the well-being of America depended “fundamentally on the well-being of others” and asserted that “in almost any imaginable scenario in which the United States might deploy troops abroad, the primary purpose would be the defense of interests of more immediate concern to America’s allies…”  


These sentiments parallel those of liberal internationalism: the United States’ destiny is to make the world safe for democracy, and the well-being of the United States is tied to that of the rest of the world.

The end of the Cold War opened a debate, in both conservative and progressives circles, regarding how to scope an expanded set of objectives for the United States to pursue in the world. The Administration chose to scope US interests in terms of protecting and promoting US security, providing leadership as a new global economy unfolds, and fostering democracy and human rights around the world. With US interests broadly defined, the Administration needed to determine how it would shape the strategic environment to attain its goals. The Administration provided two related and, at times, opposing doctrines to guide American foreign policy: Engagement and Enlargement.

**Engagement**

The Clinton policy of engagement focused on maintaining and strengthening key strategic relationships. President Clinton justified this policy by writing,

> Never has American leadership been more essential—to navigate the shoals of the world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals, and above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our engagement…

Political critics argued, at the time, that the Administration’s multilateralism was overly dependent or deferential to the United Nations. However, according to some contemporary scholars, “The White House multilateralism had little to do with the United Nations, but was primarily a matter of economic policy.”

In fact, policy of engagement subscribed to the tenets of economic liberalism and emphasized relations in key geographic regions, e.g., Russia, Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Secretary of State Warren Christopher encouraged Clinton to “elevate trade and economics as foreign policy instruments” and to “emphasize diplomacy and sanctions, rather than military action.” The logic of Christopher’s arguments rested on two points. First, continued engagement was “strongly in our economic interest.” In an interconnected world, how could the United States enhance its prosperity if it did not work to open up and expand international markets? Second, American engagement in regions where US interests were at stake was considered essential for US security as the United States was considered “the fulcrum on which peace and security rest[ed].” Clinton’s policy of engagement, as described by Christopher, framed US interests in terms of economics and neatly aligned itself with the foreign policy concept of American realism.

The policy of engagement also captured the debate over US reliance on unilateral action vice multilateral consensus. Given how the Administration broadly defined US interest, one would think it intended to rely heavily on unilateral action. However, while it was less so in practice, the Administration as a matter of policy intended to focus on multilateral consensus: “The United States will voluntarily decline to act—except in circumstances where US interests are immediately at risk—unless multilateral consensus can be achieved.” Was Clinton’s multilateral consensus the “cooperation among nations” called for by liberal internationalists or something altogether new? Liberal internationalists called for multilateral consensus as a means to end (i.e., advancing platonic abstractions over material self-interest); however, the

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79 For example, Pat Buchanan argued the United States should distance itself from and not remake itself in the image of the United Nations: “… Clinton’s goal of turning America into a Xerox copy of the United Nations needs to be debated… because the United Nations is a cacophonous disaster area.” Patrick J. Buchanan, "Who Voted For Clinton's Revolution?，“ Smethport, PA: Patrick J. Buchanan—Right from the Beginning, 1997 http://buchanan.org/blog/pjb-who-voted-for-clintons-revolution-378.
81 Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 5.
Administration seemed to be advancing multilateral consensus as an end state. This aligns with an emerging, if still loosely defined, concept in American foreign policy—multilateralism.

Enlargement

The Clinton policy of enlargement went beyond active engagement within existing relationships. Like engagement, enlargement subscribed to the tenets of economic liberalism, but it was also based on the belief that American “security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes,” and thus the doctrine had a “globalist, moralistic, and interventionist thrust.”

Framing US interests in terms of expanding the world’s democracies instead of containing Soviet expansion gave enlargement its globalist thrust. The assumption that American values were universal provided a moralistic, almost evangelical, hue to the policy of enlargement. Finally, relying on democratization and market economics to promote peace, stability, and prosperity, enlargement justified American intervention in failing and failed states by suggesting that, in practice, enlargement promoted an interventionist attitude.

As defined by the Administration, enlargement comprised four elements: (1) “strengthen the community of major market democracies,” (2) “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies,” (3) counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy and markets, and (4) provide economic aid to help “democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” These elements closely parallel those of the foreign policy concept of global meliorism. For example, “Global meliorists named poverty and oppression as the real sources of instability…” Similarly, the Administration refocused American foreign policy on “the social, political, and economic conditions within [the] borders” of peripheral powers, rather than on the “powerful and

87 The emerging concept of multilateralism is characterized by an insistence on multilateral consensus and multilateral action.
88 Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 5.
89 Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 5.
potentially dangerous members of the international community.” 92 Martin Indyk, when describing the role of the United States in the Middle East, reiterated the doctrine of enlargement when he asserted that the United States had a duty to make a “genuine and responsible effort over time to enlarge and strengthen the community of nations committed to democracy, free markets, and a peaceful and stable Middle East...” 93 Not surprisingly, Walter McDougall considered the Administration to be the quintessential global meliorists: “President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy team pronounced the purest global meliorist agenda to date in the belief that the end of the cold war meant that its time had come...to create stability where there was chaos.” 94

Dual Containment

Enlargement, when applied to so-called “backlash” nations, first required neutralization and containment. 95 Broadly speaking, the United States sought to “neutralize, contain, and through selective pressure,” transform such countries as Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea into “constructive members of the international community.” 96 This first step, termed dual containment in reference to its application to Iran and Iraq, was formally announced on 24 February 1994, and comprised two distinct strategies: one tailored specifically for Iran, the other tailored specifically for Iraq. 97

Iran’s promotion and sponsorship of terrorism and pursuit of conventional (e.g., ballistic missiles) and non-conventional weapons (e.g., nuclear weapons, chemical weapons), as well as its efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process were considered by many in the Administration a threat to US interests. 98 The goal of this policy was to influence Iranian policy-making and behavior, not Iranian regime change per se. 99 While not going so far as establishing a quarantine on Iran, the United States discouraged allies from

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92 Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," 17.
95 “Backlash” nations were described by Anthony Lake as recalcitrant nations that chose to function outside international norms and assaulted the value system shared by those who adhered to those norms, but did not have “the resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten the democratic order created around them.” Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash Sates," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 45.
96 Lake, "Confronting Backlash Sates," 45, 46.
supplying Iran with dual-use technologies that could be used for its suspected nuclear and chemical weapons programs, and it sought to dissuade states from extending new credit to Iran.100

Together, Iraq’s sponsorship of terrorism, its ongoing refusal to fully cooperate with the UN Security Council resolutions resulting from the 1991 Gulf War and Western intelligence services’ belief that Iraq was attempting to retain weapons banned under the resolutions, as well as the country’s human rights violations, were considered threats to American interests.101 The goal of this policy was to deter Iraq from threatening its own people, its neighbors or world peace.102 The strategy included maintaining a strong international consensus backed by UN Security Council resolutions (e.g., Resolution 687, 3 April 1991; Resolution 715, 11 October 1991), UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, and economic sanctions. The United States was also working unilaterally and multilaterally to restrict Iraq’s ability to develop or reconstitute its military and technological capabilities.103

While neither strategy ignored the balance of power in the Persian Gulf region, the “dual” nature of the approach rejected the most common US strategy when dealing with issues of balance of power: build up one side against the other. Instead, the Clinton Administration favored containing the hostile policies of both countries and relying on regional allies to provide the balance.104 Contemporary scholars saw dual containment as the “culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct American strategic role in the gulf” and a continuation of the Carter Doctrine that “formally committed the United States to preventing any ‘hostile power’ from dominating the area.”105 In fact, dual containment combined certain aspects of the regional hegemony, progressive imperialism, and smart power traditions.

Dual containment was similar to regional hegemony, in that it sought to secure US interests in the Middle East through US influence over European and regional allies to modify their behavior toward Iran and Iraq. This approach was designed to exert US regional hegemony in so far as it prevented either Iran or Iraq from

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103 Lake, "Confronting Backlash Sates," 46.
exerting significant influence in a region where critical US interests lay. Progressive imperialism, characterized by the American occupation of foreign lands in the wake of a power vacuum or an insurgency, was exemplified in the establishment of US military bases in the region after the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The establishment of these bases was cited as one of the key strategic environmental factors that enabled the Administration to enact its policy of dual containment.106

The similarities between smart power, coined containment by the Truman administration, and dual containment, as defined by the Clinton Administration, are striking. Similar to the Cold War concept of concerted effort along multiple avenues (e.g., economic, military, political) to varying degrees, Clinton’s dual containment policy applied economic, military, and political pressure to varying degrees. In addition to political and economic pressures, the policy was backed up by the explicit threat of US forces stationed in the region.107

**Clinton’s Employment Policies**

According to Mary Stuckey, President Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric was dominated by power politics. While the Administration stressed the importance of continued US engagement in world affairs, the dominant rationale was a practical, not moral, one.108 Stuckey’s argument suggests the United States would not engage the world to advance platonic ideals as in the liberal internationalism tradition or attempt to make the world a better, more democratic place as in the global meliorism tradition, but would act with a decidedly realist bent. However, this section highlights the diverse set of characteristics that defined American foreign policy actions during Clinton’s first term, including defensive expansionism, maximalism, smart power, global meliorism, American realism, and multilateralism. The next five subsections explore some of the key US foreign policy actions that align with these concepts. The discussion of each event includes a review of its historical context and a summary of Clinton’s relevant actions and statements.

106 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," 49.
107 The United States applied political pressure on European and regional allies to exert economic pressure on Iran. In parallel, the United States directly applied political and economic pressure on Iraq, through UN resolutions and sanctions. Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 203–209.
Defensive Expansionism

IRAQ

US engagement with Iraq during Clinton’s first term exemplifies the traditional concept of defensive expansionism. During a 14–16 April 1993 visit to Kuwait by former President George H.W. Bush, Kuwaiti authorities arrested 16 people allegedly involved in a car bomb plot to kill the former president. Based upon evidence gathered during the subsequent investigation, the US Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded the plot had been directed by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). On 26 June, the United States fired 23 cruise missiles into Baghdad, targeting the IIS headquarters. Two days later, US delegate to the United Nations Madeleine Albright provided evidence to the UN Security Council linking Iraq to the assassination attempt.

Much of the commentary at the time of the US strike related to the legality of the strike under international law. The US argument relied on Article 51 of the UN Charter that proclaims the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” in the event of an armed attack. President Clinton explained that the strike had been undertaken “to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectations of civilized behavior among nations.” UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright went on to argue that the strike had been designed “to damage the terrorist infrastructure of the Iraqi regime, reduce its ability to promote terrorism, and deter further acts of aggression against the United States.” While acknowledging


112 Teplitz, "Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?," 570.


114 Albright, "Raid on Baghdad; Excerpts from UN Speech: The Case for Clinton's Strike."
the claim of self-defense as legitimate, critics were less convinced that the strike could deter future
threats.\textsuperscript{115}

The legality of the strike was called into question for three reasons: (1) the broad interpretation of self-
defense under Article 51 in the UN Charter, (2) the unilateral nature of the strike, and (3) the lack of
coordination between the United States and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{116} Regarding the broad interpretation of
self-defense, one contemporary scholar warned of the dangers of expanding the definition of self-
defense.\textsuperscript{117} Some critics argued the strike was in fact an act of reprisal, or punishment, which is
incontrovertibly illegal under international law.\textsuperscript{118} However, the lack of “significant disapproval by
politically relevant actors” reinforced the potential lawfulness of the act.\textsuperscript{119} Whereas speculation that target
selection and timing of the strike were designed to “send an ancillary message to North Korea” regarding
its commitments to the IAEA further complicated the legal issues surrounding the strike.\textsuperscript{120} The general
consensus regarding the potential illegality of the strike suggests the Administration did not defer implicitly
to international law.

The strike was both unilateral and preemptive. While the strike was unilateral, it was inconsistent with the
goal of maximalism: to avoid multilateral commitments. Rather, the strike was the result of bypassing the
expressed desire for multilateral consensus. Reprisal for losses during the 1991 Gulf War is often cited as
the Iraqi motivation behind the assassination attempt on a former US president.\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, while the
strike was preemptive, it was not consistent with goals of regional hegemony. The strike was not borne of
the desire to prevent non-American influence within geographic proximity of US interests; influence was
not Saddam Hussein’s intention. Rather, the US air strike on the IIS headquarters perfectly exemplified
defensive expansionism, marked by unilateral and preemptive action and a blasé disregard for international
law.

\textsuperscript{117} Surchin, "Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad." 496.
\textsuperscript{118} Quigley, "Missile with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters."242.
\textsuperscript{119} Reisman, "The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and Implications."125.
\textsuperscript{120} Reisman, "The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and Implications."133.
\textsuperscript{121} Philip H. Gordon, Martin Indyk, Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Getting Serious About Iraq," \textit{Survival: Global Politics and Strategy} 44,
Maximalism

SOMALIA

While at the outset, Somalia provided an example of the Administration’s tendency for global meliorism, in the end, it exemplified the narrowing of interests seen in the traditional concept of maximalism. After the overthrow of the Somali government in January 1991 by a chaotic collection of warring clans, the nation “plunged down a spiral of anarchy and disintegration.” President George H.W. Bush authorized the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the form of food supplies beginning in August 1992. These supplies were subsequently hijacked or diverted by local warlords and bandits. In November 1992, President Bush called for a US-led, UN multinational force to safeguard food distribution and medical supplies. Following early successes (e.g., the delivery of 146,000 tons of food, a dramatic drop in the death rate), the United States pulled all but 5,000 US troops out of Somalia and transferred command of the international force to the United Nations in May 1993. As the United States was disengaging, the United Nations began pushing for greater involvement in Somali affairs (e.g., pacification of Somali warlords, nation-building). While the post-election George H.W. Bush Administration (hereafter, the first Bush Administration) did not support the broad mission endorsed by the UN Secretary General, the Clinton Administration did. For President Clinton, Somalia offered the first opportunity to expand the US mission abroad beyond previous narrower scoping of American interests: “Human suffering such as that now being endured by the people of Somalia may not threaten our shores, but still requires us to act.” He went on to justify the expanded mission in Somalia by noting that the post-Cold World environment required “a change in our security arrangements.”

Following the May transition of leadership from the United States to the United Nations, President Clinton declared,

This, the largest humanitarian relief operation in history, has written a new chapter in the international annals of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance...You have demonstrated that the world is ready to mobilize its resources in new ways to face the challenges of a new age. And you have proved yet again that American leadership can help to mobilize international action to create a better world.129

The desire to “create a better world” aligns with the belief, characteristic of global meliorism, that the United States has a mission to make the world a better place.

In order to create this “better world,” the mission in Somalia expanded to include not just food delivery and the security for medical supplies, but the pacification of Somali warlords, a prerequisite for nation-building.130 After months of security sweeps to round out members of the various local warlord factions, US forces entered the Bakara Market district of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993. Their objective was to capture local warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, whose faction remained a “disruptive political and military force.”132 The ensuing 17-hour military operation, soon dubbed “The Battle of Mogadishu” was “the most violent US combat firefight since Vietnam,” and resulted in 18 Americans dead and 84 Americans wounded.133 Despite its stated policy of enlargement, within two weeks of the battle, President Clinton announced the near complete withdrawal of US troops from Somalia.134 This action suggested the limits of the Clinton policy. Somalia indicated that unless an interest is deemed vital, as defined in the narrowest sense, it may not warrant US intervention or engagement. In the end, US policy fell back to the maximalist tradition and limited the scope of US interests, thus limiting US foreign engagement. So while the US intervention in Somalia is considered the first in a string of similar foreign policy disasters,135 it still provides insight into Clinton Administration thinking regarding the United States’ role in the world. Somalia highlights the limited scope of US interests despite contradictory rhetoric from those in the

133 Frontline, "Ambush in Mogadishu—Synopsis.”
Administration. This interpretation is reinforced by Clinton Administration actions surrounding the crisis in Rwanda.

RWANDA

In the months following the 6 April 1994 assassination of Rwandian President Juvenal Habyarimana, Hutu extremists slaughtered approximately 800,000 of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates.136 Rwanda presented the Administration with another humanitarian crisis in Africa to which it could not turn a blind eye. Although President Clinton suggested the United States had an obligation to act, the United States did not engage in Rwanda as it had in Somalia. In early May 1993, President Clinton argued:

_We see brutal human rights abuses from Haiti to Rwanda... In the face of so much promise and trouble, we have a chance, a chance to create conditions of greater peace and prosperity... if the world’s leading nations stay actively engaged in the effort._137

Yet the United States did not act. Instead, during the first three months of the crisis, the Administration limited its involvement in the Rwandan crisis to public statements and aid packages.138 If the Administration was applying the principles of _global meliorism_, the United States would have intervened to end the violence. In late July 1994, after most of the violence had subsided, President Clinton ordered 2,000 US troops to Rwanda and Zaire in support of Operation SUPPORT HOPE, with a limited humanitarian mission similar to the initial one directed in Somalia by President Bush.139 The limited US intervention suggests the ghosts of Somalia led to re-evaluating priorities or narrowing the Administration’s definition of US interests. Similar to the traditional concept in American foreign policy of _maximalism_, US engagement in Rwanda demonstrated a narrow definition of national interests that would limit the need for US

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involvement abroad. This response was brought on, at least in part, by the American public’s reaction to Somalia, US casualties there, and the continued violence despite the presence of US forces.¹⁴⁰

Smart Power

UKRAINE

The disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the political diffusion of its nuclear arsenal, increasing the threat to international security represented by nuclear proliferation.¹⁴¹ No longer was nuclear nonproliferation an issue limited to preventing the spread of nuclear materials and knowledge; nuclear nonproliferation now dealt with who owned and controlled existing nuclear weapons and manufacturing complexes.¹⁴² The dissolution of the Soviet Union instantly created the nuclear states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Significantly, Ukraine became the owners of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.¹⁴³ Looking back, Secretary Christopher describes the denuclearization of the former Soviet states as a “key element of [US] policy”;¹⁴⁴ however, except in passing, little was said on the matter by President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, or Secretary Aspin before the fall of 1993.¹⁴⁵

Multilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which began in early 1992, culminated in the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I Treaty). This treaty, among other things, secured a commitment from the Ukrainian government to give up all of the nuclear weapons in its territory.¹⁴⁶ Although the Ukrainian government repeatedly reassured the United States of its commitment to be a non-nuclear weapon state, by early 1993, there were some within the

¹⁴⁰ Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 468.
¹⁴⁴ Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 92.
¹⁴⁵ This was determined after a review the Presidential Public Papers (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=PPP&browsePath=3&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse= false&ycord=0), the State Department’s Dispatch (http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/), and the Secretary of Defense Speech Archive (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/SecDefArchive.aspx). Two noted exceptions were (1) a 13 April 1993 address before the Third UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto, Japan by James E. Goode, the US Negotiator on Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, (2) a 24 June 1993 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary on the New Independent States.
Ukrainian parliament who brought into question the legitimacy of those assurances. With Russian-Ukrainian bilateral talks stalling, Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested, in a sidebar meeting with President Clinton at the Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in Tokyo (July 1993), that the United States, Russia, and Ukraine begin trilateral talks. The inaugural meeting took place a month later in London.

Early in the Administration, the United States pressed Ukraine to commit to deactivating its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and offered Nunn-Lugar assistance to subsidize its denuclearization. Initially, Nunn-Lugar assistance hinged on the Lisbon Protocol being ratified and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. To accelerate the process, the United States lowered the standards for Nunn-Lugar assistance and began deactivating Ukraine’s ICBMs. The United States then convinced Russia to forgive Ukrainian debt in exchange for Ukraine returning to Russia the highly enriched uranium that had been in Ukraine’s stock of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads.

On 18 November 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified—with conditions—the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. The conditions rejected key provisions of the two documents and called into question Ukraine’s commitment to becoming a non-nuclear weapons state. Once again, trilateral negotiations began, this time in earnest. The United States engaged both parties separately and together throughout the fall of 1993 to finalize the Trilateral Accord, signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994. As a result of the Trilateral Accord, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the START I Treaty—without conditions. In November, the

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149 The Nunn-Lugar Program was created for the purpose of securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in the former states of the Soviet Union. By 1993, the program had expanded its assistance to non-Soviet states. Justin Bresolin, Sam Kane, Kingston Reif, "Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program," Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_the_cooperative_threat_reduction_program/.
Ukrainian Parliament ratified the NPT as a non-nuclear state. In June 1996, Ukraine completed transferring or destroying its entire nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{153}

From the US perspective, the debate over how to address Ukrainian denuclearization “centered on whether to use more carrots or sticks and how to put this issue in the context of a broader approach to Kyiv [Ukraine].” The Administration concluded that the United States “should seek a broader relationship with Kyiv and engage on a range of political, economic, assistance, and security issues, progress on which would be tied to progress on the nuclear question.”\textsuperscript{154} The United States provision of Nunn-Lugar assistance in exchange for a change in Ukrainian behavior or thinking provides an example of hard power tactics (i.e., inducement through payments). Nuclear non-proliferation has long been on the international agenda and a stated objective within US policy and, as such, the United States helped shape international norms related to nuclear proliferation. If Ukraine wanted to become a respected member of the international community, it would have to give up its nuclear arsenal and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. This co-option of desires further aligned Ukrainian objectives with US intentions and exemplified US employment of soft power tactics.\textsuperscript{155} The use of both hard and soft power tactics to affect change in the strategic environment and to influence Ukraine’s actions are characteristics of the concept of \textit{smart power}.

CUBA

On 19 August 1994, President Clinton began to reverse a 28-year-old American policy toward Cuban refugees. The United States would henceforth treat any Cuban national that attempted to enter the United States by raft or small boat but was detained outside the United States as an illegal alien; these aliens would only be permitted into the United States after individually qualifying for refugee or immigrant status. The policy change followed a rapid increase in Cuban refugees after Fidel Castro’s government stopped preventing Cubans from leaving.\textsuperscript{156} Nine months later, the Administration hammered the final nail in the coffin of the old policy. Although the Administration had already admitted into the United States 21,000 Cubans—administratively detained at Guantanamo Bay since the August 1994 policy change—it would


\textsuperscript{156} “Clinton Reverses Policy on Cubans,” \textit{Migration News} 1, no. 8 (1994).
henceforth return to Cuba any Cuban national intercepted at sea.\textsuperscript{157} The Administration’s immigration policy toward Cuba provides little insight into how it hoped to engage the world. Because of the long-simmering tensions between the two countries and the domestic political influence of the Cuban-American community, these actions do not appear to have been the result of strategic foresight, but rather a practical solution to an immediate problem.\textsuperscript{158}

The Administration’s immigration policy toward Cuba was developed in response to latter’s attempt to influence US policy-makers to ease the political and economic isolation of the island nation. In mid-August 1993, Cuban President Fidel Castro began allowing Cubans to leave Cuba for the United States in the apparent hope that the influx of refugees would force the United States to relax its economic sanctions and political isolation.\textsuperscript{159} The United States, on the other hand, hoped to induce Castro to open Cuba’s political system, respect human rights, and offer compensation for property expropriated during the revolution. One contemporary scholar described the American approach of using sanctions, trade embargos, and travel restrictions directed toward Cuba as stuck “in a Cold War time warp.”\textsuperscript{160} The isolation policy flew in the face of international disapproval. European trading partners, Latin American neighbors, and the United Nations favored engagement and trade with Cuba in order to achieve the desired reforms.\textsuperscript{161} The United States’ refusal to amend its foreign policy to conform to international consensus was unilateral, but did not conform to the traditional concept of \textit{maximalism}, which, in its attempts to avoid commitments with other powers, defines US interest as narrowly as possible, but is willing to act unilaterally when those interests are threatened. This unilateral action does not appear to be the result of a perceived threat to narrowly defined US interests. Rather, the policy harkens back to the US containment strategy, now referred to as \textit{smart power}. The economic sanctions are examples of coercive (i.e., hard power) tactics to induce Castro to change his behavior. The United States also employed soft power tactics such as Voice of America/Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba.\textsuperscript{162}

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\item[\textsuperscript{157}] Steven Greenhouse, ”How the Clinton Administration Reversed US Policy on Cuban Refugees,” \textit{The New York Times}, 21 May 1995. Administrative detention is a forward-looking mechanism, distinct from formal incarceration, that detains an individual prior to the actual breaking of a law.
\item[\textsuperscript{158}] Greenhouse, ”How the Clinton Administration Reversed US Policy on Cuban Refugees.”
\item[\textsuperscript{159}] ”Clinton Reverses Policy on Cubans.”
\item[\textsuperscript{160}] Wayne S. Smith, ”Cuba's Long Reform,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 75, no. 2 (1996): 110.
\item[\textsuperscript{161}] Smith, ”Cuba's Long Reform,” 104–105, 110.
\end{itemize}
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American Realism

CHINA

When President Clinton came to office, China’s human rights record was abysmal.\(^{163}\) During his presidential campaign, Clinton argued that “no American foreign policy can succeed if it slights our commitment to democracy” and he admonished the first Bush Administration for its ambivalence regarding international freedom, democracy, and rule of law.\(^{164}\) Candidate Clinton had voiced a belief that the United States had “a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and stand aside from the global movement toward democracy.”\(^{165}\) Once in office, the Clinton Administration reiterated these sentiments, rejecting the notion that human rights vary with culture.\(^{166}\) At the June 1993 World Human Rights Conference, Secretary Christopher stated that the Administration had “made reinforcing democracy and protecting human rights a pillar of our foreign policy—and a major focus of our foreign assistance programs.”\(^{167}\) A month later, President Clinton called out China’s poor record on human rights and non-compliance with international agreements as a roadblock to its ability to fully engage the international community.\(^{168}\) He went on to tie democracy in Asia to US security priorities.\(^{169}\) Two months earlier, President Clinton had announced that future extensions of China’s most favored nation status would, among other things, be contingent on progress made with respect to human rights.\(^{170}\) However, despite this strong humanitarian position, Clinton conceded in a July 1993 speech that isolating China was not a US foreign policy objective, which left open the door to a later reversal of the Administration’s policy toward China.\(^{171}\)

Ultimately, the Administration gave precedence to establishing a stable and comprehensive strategic partnership with China over advocating for human rights when it delinked human rights conditions from


\(^{169}\) "Our final security priority must be to support the spread of democracy throughout the Asia Pacific;” Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, 10 July 1993," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1993, 1056.


\(^{171}\) "But we also are prepared to involve China in building this region’s new security and economic architectures. We need an involved and engaged China, not an isolated China.” Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, 10 July 1993," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1993, 1055.
the criteria for China’s most favored nation status. Academics acknowledge that at least part of the reason for this change in foreign policy stemmed from economic priorities. It did not take long for domestic economic imperatives to make clear that “China, with its large population and growing trade surplus with the United States represented an opportunity to improve American economic prosperity.” Pressure on the Administration from American business groups and several major American corporations further influenced Clinton’s thinking on the issue. That these economic factors weighed so heavily on Clinton Administration thinking regarding China and that they competed with human rights suggests the US-China relationship exhibited attributes that align with American realism. This balancing act between trade and human rights did not go unnoticed. Noam Chomsky took the Administration to task regarding its double standard regarding human rights violations in China, citing where profits would go—to the Chinese state or US firms—as the distinction between calling China out for unsafe labor practices or not. This further substantiates the alignment of the Administration’s China policy with American realism, which defines US interests in terms of trade.

### Multilateralism

#### BOSNIA

While US engagement during the crisis in Bosnia provided an example of the traditional foreign policy concept of global meliorism, it was also an example of the emerging concept of multilateralism. The end of the Cold War was marked by several major changes, including the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to formally declare their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, following free elections the previous year. These declarations resulted in varying levels of military conflicts between the newly independent states and the Yugoslav federal army. Following these events, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held its first multi-party elections in November 1991. The resulting coalition government was made up of three parties.

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representing each of the three major ethnic/religious groups in the republic: Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Bosnian Serbs, and Roman Catholic Bosnian Croats. Tensions between the divergent goals of the three coalition partners eventually led to civil war.

In April 1991, following the example set by Serbs in Croatia, several regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina with large Serbian populations declared themselves to be “Serb Autonomous Regions.” Later that year, two Croat communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina also declared themselves autonomous. The next year, Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats formed a tactical alliance to out-vote Bosnian Serbs in an independence referendum. When the United States and the European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence in April 1992, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces began firing on Sarajevo, thus beginning what came to be called the Siege of Sarajevo.

All-out war erupted with a complex set of alliances: Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs allied against Bosnian Croats in Herzegovina; rival Muslim forces fought amongst themselves in north-west Bosnia; and Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs allied against Muslim Bosniaks in central Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing was widespread in areas controlled by each of the three warring factions, which led to the UN Security Council calling for an end to the “forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population.” By late 1994, Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Croatians had allied their forces against the Bosnian Serbs who, supported by the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic, had declared themselves the Republika Srpska.

Upon entering office, the Clinton Administration reviewed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and consulted with “friends and allies” on a way forward. On 10 February 1993, Secretary Christopher announced the Administration’s six-part plan that relied heavily on a negotiated peace agreed to by all three

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177 The Bosnian population aligned itself along ethnic and religious alliances: Bosniaks identified with Islamic Turks and wanted a centralized independent Bosnia; Serbs identified with Russia and the Orthodox East and wanted to remain part of Yugoslavia; whereas Croats identified with the Catholic West and wanted to join the independent Croatian state. BBC, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile: Timeline."; Cody R. Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The United States Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995–2004 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), 8.
178 BBC, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile: Timeline."
180 BBC, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile: Timeline."
182 BBC, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Profile: Timeline."); Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "Bosnia and Herzegovina."
183 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, "Bosnia and Herzegovina."
warring factions, not one imposed by external forces. To induce parties to negotiate earnestly, the United States would tighten the enforcement of economic sanctions and apply political pressure on Serbia.\(^{185}\)

In May 1993, believing the Bosnian Serbs were not committed to a peaceful resolution, the Administration proposed what became known as lift and strike. The lift referred to a relaxing of the arms embargo that would benefit the Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Croatians and level the playing field. The strike referred to authorizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to launch air strikes to protect Muslim forces while they rearmed. According to Secretary Christopher, “President [Clinton] recognized that the United States could not unilaterally implement this policy…lift and strike would require both NATO and UN support.”\(^{186}\) However, strong opposition to the plan in England, France, and Russia, and weaker opposition in Germany and Italy once again reinforced a shift in Administration thinking away from intervention.\(^{187}\)

By mid-1995, with peace negotiations repeatedly interrupted by violence and the British and French signaling they would leave Bosnia by year’s end, President Clinton “decided that the United States should take a stronger hand, diplomatically and militarily.”\(^{188}\) At a conference of Allied nations convened in London, Secretary Christopher said the time for empty threats and half measures was over.\(^{189}\) Following the Serbian-led massacres in Srebrenica (July 1995) and in the Sarajevo Marakale (August 1995), NATO, under the existing UN Security Council resolutions, launched a series of precision air strikes against Serbian forces (August–September 1995). This air campaign, combined with a large-scale Bosniak-Croat land offensive, convinced the Bosnian Serbs to participate in the November 1995 US-sponsored peace talks.\(^{190}\)


\(^{186}\) Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 345.

\(^{187}\) Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 345, 346.

\(^{188}\) Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 347.


US involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplifies two US foreign policy concepts: one old, one new. The first concept, *global meliorism*, is exemplified in the justification for US involvement throughout the Bosnian crisis. From the outset, the Administration cited the humanitarian crisis as a justification for US involvement. When introducing the Administration’s way ahead with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Secretary Christopher said, “We cannot ignore the human toll…Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting brutality.” In this statement and others made during the next three years, the Administration reaffirmed its duty to make the world more democratic—one of the defining marks of *global meliorism*. While the first Bush Administration determined that securing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a vital US interest, the Clinton Administration reasoned the opposite to be true. In fact, Secretary Christopher provided three reasons why the Bosnian conflict endangered US interests. First, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a newly recognized UN member state, challenged the principle that internationally recognized borders cannot be altered by force. Second, the conflict threatened to spill-over and become a greater-Balkan war. However, while Clinton wanted to be a great humanitarian, the Administration couched its arguments in terms of vital regional interests to ensure Congressional support. Clinton Administration rhetoric suggested US actions were influenced by the fear that refugees escaping the conflict would threaten the political and economic vigor of Europe or that a greater-Balkan war could threaten the very stability of Europe.

The second concept, *multilateralism*, is characterized by an insistence on multilateral consensus and multilateral action. Although Clinton originally endorsed the May 1993 idea of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosniaks, he backed away from it as soon as it met with Allied opposition. Later, aligning himself

191 Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*, 347.
192 While contemporary scholars doubted the validity of this second rationale and considered it to be a “refurbished domino theory,” it does not lessen its import in driving US actions. Ted Galen Carpenter, "The Domino Theory Reborn: Clinton's Bosnia Interventions and the 'Wider World' Thesis," in *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 42* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996).
193 Warren Christopher provided a generalized description of the Clinton Administration’s fears related to displaced refugees from the Bosnian conflict in his address to John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University in Cambridge, MA on 20 January 1995: “Mass movements of refugees now pose immediate threats to emerging democracies and to global prosperity.” Warren Christopher, "Principles and Opportunities for American Foreign Policy," *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no. 4 (1995). In describing Central Europe’s legacy of unresolved historical resentments, ambitions, and territorial and ethnic disputes, in his statement before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 April 1995, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke said, “If any of these malignancies spread—as they have already in parts of the Balkans and the Transcaucuses—general European stability is again at risk.” Richard Holbrooke, "The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security Landscape," *US Department of State Dispatch* 6, no. 16 (1995).
194 Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*, 345–347.
with Allied thinking, Clinton vetoed legislation that would have unilaterally lifted the embargo in 1995.\textsuperscript{195} Furthermore, the Administration tied US security to its ability to cooperatively resolve the tensions in the Balkans. As one commentator noted, “[the United States’] ability to work with these European countries on every other security issue—reducing the nuclear threat, fighting terrorism, you name it—depends on our partnership here.”\textsuperscript{196} From the outset, when dealing with Bosnia, Clinton chose a multilateral approach over the unilateralism that characterizes both defensive expansionism and maximalism. While the United States has incorporated aspects of the emerging concept of multilateralism into its foreign policy in the past, it had never been the key shaping force in US foreign policy.

HAITI

Haiti’s colonial period ended in 1804, but this merely marked the start of nearly two centuries of repressive governments and political upheaval. Haiti held its first free election on 16 December 1990, electing Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide with two thirds of the vote. But just eight months after Aristide was sworn into office on 7 February 1991, he was ousted in a coup d’état led by BG Raoul Cedras.\textsuperscript{197} In response, US President George H.W. Bush issued Executive Orders 12775 and 12779, which declared the de facto regime in power to be illegal, blocked the transfer of Haitian government property, and prohibited all but humanitarian transactions with Haiti.\textsuperscript{198} When Clinton took office, the Haitian crisis was not among his Administration’s priorities. According to Representative Major Owens (D-NY), it was the Administration’s desire to foster a positive relationship with the Congressional Black Caucus, and because this key constituency considered the Haitian crisis a priority, that prompted the Administration to focus on Haiti.\textsuperscript{199}


During the next 18 months, the Administration repeatedly issued empty threats, reversing its position time and again.\textsuperscript{200}

As evidenced by the cases in Somalia and Bosnia, the Administration did not take the maximalist “view that the United States has no interests in the world that warrant the use of force.”\textsuperscript{201} Public rhetoric out of the White House, in fact, suggested US involvement in the Haiti crisis, and the promotion of “American values,” was vital to US interests.\textsuperscript{202} In a September 1994 address, President Clinton asserted the Haitian government was guilty of “human rights atrocities,” which was causing a refugee problem, which in turn threatened US interests (i.e., border security).\textsuperscript{203} And while the Administration did not argue a moral obligation to Haiti,\textsuperscript{204} it did assert that “within practical bounds and with a sense of clear strategic priorities, we [the United States] must do what we can to promote the democratic spirit… that can tip the balance for progress well into the next century.”\textsuperscript{205} In defense of the decision to send military forces to Haiti in October 1994, the Administration argued that autocratic rule in Haiti was an “assault on the progress toward democracy that has been made throughout the hemisphere,” suggesting that US interests were at stake if a larger conflict broke out.\textsuperscript{206}

Working within the construct of the United Nations, the United States rallied multilateral support for its agenda, applied pressure on the Cedras regime to step down peacefully vis-à-vis embargos and economic sanctions, and facilitated indirect negotiations between Aristide and Cedras. When the use of force finally came under consideration during the summer of 1994, the Administration applied to and received approval from the UN Security Council, before announcing on 15 September its intention to launch a peace enforcement operation.\textsuperscript{207} Concurrent to the deployment of the peace enforcement forces, President Clinton sent former President Jimmy Carter, recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin

\textsuperscript{200} Hendriksen, "Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States," (1999), 23–27.
\textsuperscript{201} Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," 32.
\textsuperscript{202} Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," 17.
\textsuperscript{203} Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti, 15 September 1994," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1994, 1558, 1559; Stuckey, "Competing Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids After the Cold War," 224.
\textsuperscript{204} Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," 22.
\textsuperscript{205} Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 1 April 1993," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of William J. Clinton, 1993, 374.
\textsuperscript{206} Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," 22, 25.
\textsuperscript{207} This authority was provided by UN Security Council, Resolution 940, UN Mission to Haiti (New York, NY: United Nations, 31 July 1994).
Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) to Haiti to resolve the crisis diplomatically. Just hours before the invasion was scheduled to begin the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement was signed and the US-led invasion became a peaceful intervention. One month later, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was reinstated as president of Haiti.

Contemporary scholars suggest that President Clinton’s reliance on diplomacy and multilateral action was an attempt to avoid US military casualties in the context of a situation that did not truly threaten US interests. A key objective of the American expeditionary force in Haiti was to leave as soon as possible, with as few casualties as possible, rather than to do whatever was necessary, for as long as necessary, to make peace. Regardless of the motivation, the United States again deferred to multilateral consensus to justify US action, suggesting that Haiti may provide another example of multilateralism.

NORTH KOREA

During the post-Cold War period, halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction became a key objective in US security policy. Its importance was reinforced by official statements and documents such as the Annual Report to the President and the Congress presented by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in January 1994, which stated the preeminent goal of US non-proliferation efforts was “the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the first place.” Falling under this rubric was the North Korean nuclear program.

North Korea has a mixed history on non-proliferation agreements. Despite joining the IAEA in 1974 and signing the NPT in 1985, North Korea refused to sign the IAEA full-scope safeguard agreements until January 1992. Following ratification of the safeguard agreement, the IAEA conducted six rounds of inspections between May 1992 and February 1993. As a result of these inspections, the IAEA believed there was a “discrepancy between declared and actual volumes of plutonium extracted from reprocessed...

208 Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 141–142; Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, 175–183.
fuel.” The IAEA subsequently requested a special inspection of two suspected nuclear waste sites. North Korea denied IAEA inspectors access to the sites and announced that, in accordance with the treaty, it intended to withdraw from the NPT, effective 90 days later. Although North Korea later agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT the day before deadline, another 16 months would pass before the United States and North Korea could find common ground and sign the Agreement Framework, which included a provision to allow IAEA inspections to resume.215

During a television interview, President Clinton stressed his resolve to halt North Korea’s nuclear program when he stated that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.”216 The Secretary Aspin characterized this statement and the Administration’s position with respect to the North Korean nuclear program as an “ultimatum.” However, shortly after these public statements, a CIA estimate revealed North Korea likely already had at least one nuclear weapon. The Administration quickly backed away from language implying the threat of force, which would likely have required unilateral action, and focused instead on the threat of steadily tightening economic sanctions.217 Employing an approach that coupled incentives and punishments within a UN framework, the United States attempted to bring North Korea into compliance with international norms. However, the United States came up against opposition from key allies for its chosen form of punishment, economic sanctions, and was forced to campaign among allies for their support or at least to temper their dissent. China, Japan, and South Korea all considered further isolation of North Korea, as proposed by the United States, as counter-productive, and either actively blocked UN sanctions or abstained during UN Security Council votes.

According to one scholar, in its approach to North Korea’s nuclear program, the Clinton Administration “seemed caught between its embrace of an ambitious objective and the imperatives of multilateralism.”218 Ultimately, good relations with China, Japan, and South Korea were more important to US national security than the achievement of strategic objectives in North Korea that the Administration believed


economic sanctions would ensure. This suggests President Clinton was again allowing multilateral consensus to shape US foreign policy, a hallmark of the emerging concept of multilateralism.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

The US response to the debate over NATO enlargement is another example of the multilateralism Clinton Administration foreign policy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War raised serious questions regarding NATO’s future. Should the organization, established in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, be disbanded upon the demise of that threat? Should the organization seek to maintain some new status quo? Or should NATO enlarge its membership and broaden its mission to include a range of collective security issues? The Administration regarded NATO as the centerpiece of US commitment to European security. As such, President Clinton supported NATO enlargement and, in turn, transforming NATO from a military alliance into what was described as “an extended political-security family.” The Administration justified this stance by arguing that NATO enlargement, in terms of mission and membership, enhanced US security and economic interests. In terms of security interests, the Administration argued that “[i]f democracy in the East fails, the violence and disruption from the East will once again harm us and other democracies.” A kind of “creeping instability” in Central and Eastern Europe would eventually threaten American interests. In making this claim, the Administration explicitly tied US security interests to American prosperity by arguing that “[w]e now must pursue a shared strategy, to secure the peace of a broader Europe and its prosperity… through three sets of bonds: first, security cooperation; second, market economics; and third, democracy.” President Clinton justified an American role in European integration as an exceptional cause. More broadly, the Administration advanced the notion that the cause of peace and freedom around the world is “a mission rooted in both our ideals and our interests.” The policy the Administration hoped would shape

219 Rubinstein, ed. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary, 77.
220 “NATO is and will remain the centerpiece of America’s commitment to European security.” Warren Christopher, "NATO: Extending Stability in Europe," US Department of State Dispatch 5, no. 48 (1994).
US engagement in Europe suggested an underlying belief within the Administration that said the United States was more secure when engaged multilaterally than when it limited its multilateral engagements. The Administration was redefining how it preferred to engage the world. This type of engagement could also be categorized under the emerging concept in American foreign policy—multilateralism.

In Europe, the Clinton Administration more consistently acted as its rhetoric indicated it would. At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, President Clinton announced the Partnership for Peace (PFP). The PFP would be open to European states, former members of the Warsaw Pact, former Soviet Republics, and other non-NATO aligned states. The Administration saw the PFP, as a first step on “a path to full NATO membership for some and a strong and lasting link to the alliance for all.” In his 1995 article, “A Plan for Europe,” Zbigniew Brzezinski noted that the Administration had clearly defined the question of NATO expansion not in terms of whether NATO will expand but when and how that expansion will occur. In an October 1996 campaign speech, President Clinton defined the when, if not the how by articulating the goal that “by 1999…the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO.”

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott summarized US foreign policy regarding NATO expansion as “rooted in American self-interest.” He went on to justify, in general, US foreign policy actions that expanded engagement beyond the periphery of NATO by declaring, “We are engaged in the former USSR, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the Middle East because what happens there matters to us. It affects our safety and our prosperity.” The repeated use of self-interest to justify US support of NATO expansion and other multilateral connections suggests US actions were shaped by liberal international motivations, which place the advancement of platonic abstractions (e.g., democracy) above material self-interest. Furthermore, the US response to the debate surrounding NATO’s future exemplified a shift in strategic thinking from one focused on threats to one focused on opportunities.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed declaratory and employment foreign policy during President William Jefferson Clinton’s first term. No one foreign policy concept defined either his declaratory policies or his employment policies. In fact, the Clinton Administration has been described as one in which “foreign policy has been made more in response to pressing, practical problems, [rather] than on the basis of longer-term strategies or strongly held beliefs.”230 Taking President Clinton’s nonproliferation policy specifically, one scholar described the policy as “a series of ad hoc reactions to specific problems that are felt to affect the United States,” rather than “a coherent element of international cooperative action.”231

This paper’s review of the strategy documents and key speeches found that no one foreign policy concept defined President Clinton’s declaratory policies (see Table 1). The documents demonstrated characteristics of several foreign policy concepts, such as regional hegemony, progressive imperialism, liberal internationalism, smart power, global meliorism, and American realism. However, the Administration did develop some declaratory policies that broke with these traditional concepts, namely, the policy of engagement. At least in part, the policy of engagement suggested that it was only through multilateral consensus that the international community could ensure security and prosperity. This sentiment, as will be seen in the next two chapters, continues to evolve into a new US foreign policy concept, that of multilateralism.

Table 1. President Clinton’s Declaratory Policies

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<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Regional Hegemony</th>
<th>Progressive Imperialism</th>
<th>Liberal Internationalism</th>
<th>Smart Power</th>
<th>Global Meliorism</th>
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This paper’s review of President Clinton’s major foreign policy engagements found that his employment policies also exhibited a distributed alignment with US foreign policy traditions (see Table 2). Clinton’s employment policies demonstrated attributes from multiple traditional concepts in US foreign policy, such

as defensive expansionism, maximalism, liberal internationalism, smart power, global meliorism, and American realism. Although the Clinton Administration’s actions clearly relied on traditional foreign policy concepts, several foreign policy engagements deviated significantly from these norms, most notably in Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, and the US support for NATO enlargement. In accordance with its engagement policy that noted the need for multilateral consensus, the United States yielded to that consensus when shaping its foreign policy actions in Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea. US support for NATO enlargement took the concept of multilateralism a step further when the Clinton Administration tied US security to that of its allies, arguing that unless US allies were secure and prosperous, the United States would not be secure and prosperous.

Table 2. President Clinton’s Employment Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defensive Expansionism</th>
<th>Maximalism</th>
<th>Smart Power</th>
<th>Global Meliorism</th>
<th>American Realism</th>
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Chapter 3: George W. Bush

George Walker Bush, the 43rd President of the United States, was the second president elected after the end of the Cold War. The centerpiece of his domestic agenda was a platform called “compassionate conservatism,” which focused on improving education, providing tax relief, and encouraging volunteerism. President Bush did not believe the federal government could address the “real suffering in the shadow of America’s affluence.” Instead he declared that his Administration would be “squarely on the side of America’s armies of compassion.” In support of non-governmental efforts, Bush signed Executive Order 13198. This order created Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, submitted to Congress the Blueprint to Rally the Armies of Compassion, proposed legislation that would ensure religious institutions could apply to participate in federally-funded social service programs, and spoke out extensively in support of these initiatives.

In terms of foreign policy and national security, President Bush’s major priority was the Americas: “Building this hemisphere of freedom will be a fundamental commitment of my administration.” In fact, during the first three months of President Bush’s first term, nearly fifty percent of his individual foreign leader engagements centered on the Americas. While the events of 11 September 2001 irrevocably refocused the Bush Administration’s foreign policy and drastically altered the risk calculus that would shape policy choices, the principles that guided President Bush’s foreign policy decision-making remained consistent with those expressed in pre-9/11 statements.

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236 Based on a review of President Bush’s public papers: Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush. He met with the Canadian Prime Minister (on 5 February 2001) and the Mexican President (on 16 February 2001) before meeting with the British Prime Minister on 23 February 2001.
This chapter will test the level of continuity vice change in American foreign policy by deconstructing the major declaratory policies (what the United States intended to do) and employment policies (what the United States did) related to US national security during President Bush’s first term in terms of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy. It will also identify and begin to characterize emerging concepts.

Declaratory Policies

This section examines the declaratory policies of the Bush Administration during its first term, as defined through speeches and strategy documents. Both formal policy documents—the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001 QDR) and The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002 NSSR)—were significantly influenced by the events of 9/11. While both documents focused on the strategic response to the terrorist attacks and codified, in policy terms, actions already underway, certain concepts evident in these documents are consistent with pre-9/11 thinking within the Administration.237 The major policy concepts in these documents will be discussed and, where possible, tied back to pre-9/11 policy statements. The intent here is not to downplay the policy impact of 9/11 but rather to avoid burying important underlying concepts by conflating them with the Administration’s reactions to the attacks. This section is organized into four sub-sections: Interests, Preemption, Multilateralism, and Unilateralism. After reviewing the Administration’s declaratory foreign policy (specifically related to national security), each sub-section will discuss the policy’s alignment with historic US foreign policy concepts or will describe how the unique attributes of the Bush policy may indicate the emergence of a new concept.

Interests

While the Administration did not articulate US interests in the 2002 NSSR per se, it alluded to what the 2001 QDR called “America’s goals”—to promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage prosperity238—that align with US interests defined by previous administrations.239 During the campaign, then-Governor

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239 See the definition of interests in the introductory chapter.
Bush expressed the view that US foreign policy should seek to promote its values and interests abroad:

“Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American interests…but that choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political freedom—and gains the most when democracy advances.” In the same speech, he suggested American foreign policy should be driven by a goal to “turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.” 240 Once in office, President Bush stated, “the cause of freedom rests on more than our ability to defend ourselves and our allies. Freedom is exported every day, as we ship goods and products that improve the lives of millions of people.” 241 This language suggested that the spread of democracy and human rights depended on or was naturally the by-product of the spread of open markets and free trade.

According to Walter Russell Mead, President Bush entered office promoting the idea that the United States should “lower its profile, walk more ‘humbly,’ and move back to a narrower and more restricted view of national interest.” 242 It was not in the objectives pursued but in the means employed to achieve them that Bush sought to curtail US actions. Bush wanted to focus American efforts, “replace uncertain missions with well-defined objectives,” and “be selective in the use of our military.” 243 Scholars have interpreted this statement as suggesting a policy that would prevent employing the US military for purely humanitarian and nation-building missions as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia in the previous decade. 244 So while these statements do not narrowly scope US interests abroad, they do begin to restrict the employment of force in their pursuit and defense, similar to the traditional concept of maximalism. However, in the 2002 NSSR, the Administration again widened the aperture when it asserted that the only “sustainable model for national success [was] freedom, democracy and free enterprise” and vowed “to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe… defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all peoples everywhere.” 245 These aggressive policies supported and were motivated, at least in part, by US counter-terrorism efforts. However, while President Bush consistently linked the spread of American ideals to the spread of open markets and free trade, he noted “trade along is not enough. Wealthy nations must also work

245 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (September 2002), i, ii.
in true partnership with developing countries to help them overcome obstacles to their development, such as illiteracy, disease, and unsustainable debt.”

Furthermore, long before the events of 11 September 2001, then-Governor Bush wrote, “Our greatest export is freedom, and we have a moral obligation to champion it throughout the world.” In doing so, the principles of global meliorism, e.g., making the world a better place through the spread of democracy, can be seen in the way Administration scoped its national interests.

Preemption

One of the most controversial foreign policy declarations in recent decades was the Administration’s announcement that preemptive force would no longer be a foreign policy choice of last resort for the United States. In his preface to the 2002 NSSR, after acknowledging the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, President Bush stated “as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed… The only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

The document went on to assert that the United States “must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they can threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our allies, and [our] friends.” Suggesting the limited effectiveness of deterrence as a defense against terrorists, the Administration declared that the United States would shift from a reactive to proactive posture and prevent enemies from striking first. Despite the post 9/11 association, these sentiments are consistent with pre-9/11 thinking within the Administration. In the run up to the election, then-Governor Bush hinted at the lack of distinction between terrorists and state sponsors of terrorists when he said, “Every group or nation must know, if they sponsor [terror] attacks, our response will be devastating.”

He went on to clarify how his Administration would defend the homeland from

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248 Daadler, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 14.


terrorism: “Focusing on human intelligence and early detection of terrorist operations both here and abroad… when direct threats to America are discovered, I know that the best defense can be a strong and swift offense.” While it asserted the United States’ right to act preemptively, the 2002 NSSR limited the application of preemptive force. To know when and how best to employ preemptive force, the Administration intended to (1) improve and coordinate intelligence capabilities, (2) “coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats,” and (3) transform the US military. The renewed willingness to act preemptively is consistent with defensive expansionism: it both acknowledges the potential need to act preemptively but also limits the application of preemptive action.

**Multilateralism**

In the preface to his first national security strategy, President Bush stated his commitment to multilateral action through international institutions and long-standing alliances to further US objectives. The 2002 NSSR went on to identify four key strategies for ensuring American interests:

- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power

Together, these key strategies suggest the Administration’s intention to rely on multilateral consensus and institutions to achieve its goals. In its efforts to defeat the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations, the Administration noted the United States needs “support from our allies and friends.” It would be through strengthened alliances that the United States would “encourage our regional partners to take up coordinated efforts that isolate the terrorists” and “work with our allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism.” In its efforts to defuse regional conflict, the Administration said it would “work with friends and partners to alleviate suffering and restore stability.” This effort would be realized through investing

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255 “… no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances… In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically, to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.” *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (September 2002), v.
“time and resources in building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.” In order to “unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations,” the Administration stated its intention to continue to rely on international institutions such as the World Bank and other development banks, albeit reformed. Finally, “to promote a balance of power that favors freedom,” the Administration proposed to rely on the cooperative action of such international institutions, such as NATO. Defending this point, the 2002 NSSR stated, “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in this world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends…”

Altogether, these strategies align with the emerging concept of multilateralism.

Unilateralism

While the 2002 NSSR espoused the importance of multilateralism, it also noted that there were instances when unilateral action could be considered a viable option. Noting the United States would “respect the values, judgment, and interests of our friends and partners,” it was also “prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.” While critics, such as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, assert the Administration thought the United States should not be constrained by other nations or by international agreements when addressing threats, this is an over-statement of the policy. Notably, this insistence, though made with caveats, that the United States holds, in reserve, the right to act unilaterally when threatened is consistent with assertions made by previous administrations. For example, in its NSSR, the Clinton Administration wrote the United States would “do whatever it takes to defend those interests [e.g., interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of our national entity], including—when necessary—the unilateral and decisive use of military power.” The acceptance that there may be instances in which the United States must act unilaterally is characteristic of defensive expansionism.

263 Daalder, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, 13.
Bush’s Employment Policy

This section highlights the diverse set of characteristics that defined American foreign policy actions during the first term of the Bush Administration, including defensive expansionism, maximalism, liberal internationalism, global meliorism, American realism, and multilateralism. The next six sub-sections explore some of the key US foreign policy actions that align with these concepts. The discussion of each even includes a review of the historical context and a summary of Bush’s relevant policy statements.

Defensive Expansionism

Afghanistan

On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes, flying two into the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City and a third into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth crashed into a field in western Pennsylvania.265 In the aftermath of these attacks, the United States began to lay the foundation for an international coalition against terrorism. The first battle in the global war on terror was the invasion of Afghanistan.266 US-led coalition forces entered Afghanistan in October 2001, targeting al-Qa’ida terrorist bases of operation and Taliban military installations.267 This section examines the decision to invade Afghanistan in the wake of the events of 9/11. During the weekend of 15–16 September 2001, President Bush convened the National Security Council to decide the strategy that would shape the American response to the attacks.268 The policy debate within the Administration framed the discussion in terms of law enforcement (punishment) or military action (prevention).269 Three options were considered: (1) strike al-Qa’ida targets only; (2) strike al-Qa’ida and Taliban targets; or (3) strike al-Qa’ida, Taliban, and Iraqi targets.270 According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, President Bush considered the 11 September attacks an act of war and wanted a response that amounted to more than mere punishment. Despite this, President Bush limited the initial strikes to al-

269 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 51.
270 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 48.
Qa’ida and Taliban targets in Afghanistan and deferred a broad, sustained effort against international terrorists and the states that support them, which would include Iraq, until a later date.271

Following this decision, President Bush identified “a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-Qa’ida” as the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks.272 After asserting al-Qa’ida leadership influenced and supported the Taliban regime that controlled much of Afghanistan, President Bush demanded the Taliban deliver al-Qa’ida leadership hiding in Afghanistan to US authorities, close all terrorist training camps within its borders, and turn over “every terrorist and every person in their support structure” or be held responsible for al-Qa’ida’s actions.273 President Bush had previously proclaimed the United States would “make no distinction between the terrorist who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”274 This officially set US sights on al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Administration spent the next two weeks building a broad coalition for military action in Afghanistan. In the end Britain, Canada, Germany, Australia, France, Japan, Italy, and 25 other nations contributed personnel, equipment, or services to the effort.275 On 7 October 2001, coalition forces entered Afghanistan and targeted al-Qa’ida training camps and Taliban military installations.276

The US response to the events of 11 September 2001 aligns with the concept of defensive expansionism, which in the face of a clearly defined threat to national security (e.g., al-Qa’ida network, terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Taliban support for al-Qa’ida) called for aggression (i.e., the invasion of Afghanistan). This traditional concept even allows for the employment of illiberal foreign policy tactics, such as launching a preventive war.277 According to Feith, the Administration “believed that the purposes of US military action after 9/11 went beyond striking at the perpetrators [i.e., punishment or retribution]. We felt compelled to choose a more ambitious goal—to prevent further attacks that would kill Americans

271 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 58, 52.
275 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 90.
and compromise our security.” 278 Defensive expansionism also compels administrations to “spread their values around the world.” This is evident in President Bush’s explanation as to why the Taliban were targeted. Not only did he believe it was the responsibility of the United States to “to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil,” 279 but he also suggested that “history has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.” 280

Iraq
US policy toward Iraq between the two Gulf Wars was initially defined by Bush’s father in National Security Directive (NSD) 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf, dated 15 January 1991. This document, among others, stated that American and coalition military objectives in Iraq included (1) precluding Iraqi launch of ballistic missiles against neighboring states and friendly forces and (2) destroying Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities. 281 At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States, as one of the five permanent member of the UN Security Council, helped shape Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), which demanded that Iraq would, among other things, give up its chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programs. 282 In the absence of compliance with Resolution 687 and later UN Security Council resolutions, the UN Security Council endorsed the continuation of economic sanctions on Iraq. 283 In addition to constraints directly imposed by the United Nations, the United States and several allies instituted two no-fly zones over the northern and southern regions of Iraq. 284 During the next decade, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq attempted to stall or bypass the UN weapons inspection regime and to dismantle the overall containment strategy that included the UN sanctions and no-fly zones. 285 On 31 October 1998, President Clinton signed House Resolution (HR) 4655, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which explicitly called for regime change in Iraq. Despite signing the bill into law, President Clinton stated the United States would continue to pursue its objectives through the active application of all relevant UN Security

278 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 67.
285 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 14.
Council resolutions—which did not include regime change.286 Upon taking office, President Bush broadly continued the US containment strategy toward Iraq as his Administration debated its finer points.287

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States began waging what was termed a global war on terror. The first battle in this war on terror was in the form of the invasion of Afghanistan.288 The second battle was to be in Iraq. The “official road to war [with Iraq] began on 17 September 2001 when [President] Bush signed a secret order to invade Afghanistan that included a plan to soon attack Iraq.”289 According to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, US concerns regarding Iraq intensified immediately following the terror attacks on 11 September 2001. Members of the Administration argued that Saddam Hussein would eventually free Iraq of the shackles imposed by UN sanctions and take aggressive action toward one of its neighbors, again drawing the United States into conflict with Iraq. The American assessment that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction granted Saddam Hussein the means to “deter the United States from interfering.”290 The Administration decided that Iraq (with its presumed, vast terrorist network and presumed stash of weapons of mass destruction) was an imminent threat to the United States. Subsequently, and because “all free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks,” President Bush ordered US military forces to invade Iraq on 19 March 2003.291

The war in Iraq was a defensive action according to the Administration. As stated in the 2002 NSSR, the United States would “deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed.”292 Hence, the United States could defend itself not only against overt aggressive action but also the threat of aggressive action. The preemptive nature of the war in Iraq, the expansion of the scope and exercise of national power, suggests alignment with the concept of defensive expansionism.

287 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 199–200.
290 Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, 215.
Maximalism

Missile Defense

Signed on 26 May 1972, the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Treaty barred the United States and Soviet Union from deploying nation-wide missile defense systems, leaving both states open and vulnerable to attack. The intended purpose was to control the nuclear arms race by reducing the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome defenses deployed by the other.\(^{293}\) With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became successor states to the treaty.\(^ {294}\) However, the end of the Cold War also fundamentally changed the strategic threats faced by the United States, calling into question the continued relevance of the ABM Treaty. President Bush summarized his argument for abrogating US commitments to the ABM Treaty and building a missile defense system during a speech at National Defense University on 1 May 2001:

> Today, the sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet Union... Yet, this is still a dangerous world, less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons, and still more have nuclear aspirations... Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least responsible states. Unlike the cold war, today’s most urgent threat stems, not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states... To maintain peace, to protect our citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us... We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces... We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we much move beyond the constraints of the 30-year old ABM Treaty.\(^ {295}\)

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Russian officials consistently and repeatedly insisted the 1972 ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability and any changes to the treaty risked (1) undermining international stability, (2) upsetting the nuclear balance, and (3) interfering with Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. While Russia acknowledged the world had changed as had the nature of the relationship between the United States and itself, it said it valued “the predictability and formality offered by arms control agreements” and preferred to keep some form of the ABM Treaty in place. Furthermore, Russian officials disagreed with the US assessment of the perceived threat posed by “rogue” states (e.g., North Korea). Russia argued the threat was neither significant nor immediate and, even if it were real, could be deterred with conventional forces.

Despite international opposition, President Bush announced the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on 13 December 2001, effectively paving the way for the development and deployment of national and theater missile defense systems. Four days later, President Bush announced he had instructed the Secretary of Defense to begin fielding a ground-based missile defense system that would achieve initial operational capabilities in 2004. Russia called the withdrawal of the United States from the treaty a “mistake” and China repeated its opposition to the proposed missile defense system. US abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the subsequent authorization for missile defense systems flew in the face of international opposition and was an example of a maximalist engagement strategy. The United States sought to nullify a formal commitment that would constrain its ability to defend itself and its interests against threats posed by “rogue” states vice its traditional adversaries (e.g., Russia, China).

Climate Change

Since the early 1980s, a robust international consensus about the reality and seriousness of climate change has emerged. At the UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio, Brazil in 1992, three international treaties were adopted, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC sought to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system… within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change.” While the document did not set mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions or have any enforcement mechanisms, it did provide for updates that would set mandatory emission limits. One such update was the Kyoto Protocol. As a legally-binding agreement adopted in December 1997 and entered into force in February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol committed nations to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. The rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol were established in 2001 in the Marrakesh Accords. The United States under President Clinton was a signatory to these documents; however, they were never ratified by Congress.

During his first six months in office, President Bush repeatedly declared his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, citing the economic harm (in terms of layoffs for workers and price increases for consumers) the protocol would cause to the United States. President Bush justified this stance by stating the protocol (1) exempted top emitting developing nations, (2) failed to address black soot and tropospheric ozone, and (3) set unrealistic and arbitrary targets “not based upon science.” While President Bush proposed a joint venture with the European Union (EU), Japan, and others to develop “state-of-the-art climate modeling,” the Administration tended to invest in research over direct regulation.

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of federal regulations with mandatory compliance measures to address climate change, only “voluntary change programs” were enacted during Bush’s first term.  

By stating that he would “not do anything that harms [the US] economy” and that “the people who live in America” were his priority over global issue such climate change, President Bush was defining US national interests as narrowly as possible. Furthermore, President Bush was reluctant to accept internationally mandated regulations that would constrain domestic policy and the US economy. Both are characteristics of the traditional concept of maximalism.

Liberal Internationalism

Latin America

During the campaign, then-Governor Bush advocated for an elevation of Latin America within the schema of US interests when he stated, “[t]hose who ignore Latin America do not fully understand America itself. And those who ignore our hemisphere do not fully understand American interests…Should I become President, I will look to the South, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency.” This commitment was most evident in President Bush’s economic relations with foreign states, in which he advocated for economic integration broadly, with Latin America specifically. Upon taking office, President Bush installed, according to one contemporary commentator, a team “presenting a seemingly united determination to advance trade liberalization” that included Robert Zoellick.

The Bush Administration sought “security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope” in Latin America. In support of these objectives, the Administration fought for and gained trade promotion authority from Congress in 2002. Before gaining trade promotion authority, President Bush announced his commitment to beating the January 2005 deadline to conclude Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations.

308 Abate, "Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States," 373–374.
With trade promotion authority granted, the Administration began negotiations related to the FTAA with the other 33 democratic nations of the Americas.\textsuperscript{314}

Through the FTAA, the United States sought to “promote good governance by creating obligations for transparency in government and adherence to the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{315} Because the Administration linked international trade with social, political, and strategic objectives,\textsuperscript{316} it perceived social, political, and strategic implications for economic integration of Latin America with the United States. In terms of the intertwined socio-political implications, “trade spurs improvements in education.”\textsuperscript{317} Furthermore, “economic freedom creates the habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy.”\textsuperscript{318} Finally, “trade fosters political cooperation.”\textsuperscript{319} However, the strongest argument for economic integration of Latin America stemmed from the strategic implications to US national security:

\textit{As Latin America grows, the United States benefits... Continued US vitality is linked to the success of its hemispheric neighbors... Troubled neighbors export problems... Healthy neighbors create stronger regions... If the Americas are strong, the United States will be better positioned to pursue its aims around the world. But if our hemisphere is troubled, we will be preoccupied at home and handicapped abroad...}\textsuperscript{320}

Even this justification was linked to a higher objective: “At the dawn of a new century, we have a fresh opportunity... It is up to us to champion the values of openness and freedom, to honor the vital linkages among economic liberty, free trade, open societies, successful democracies, individual opportunity, and peaceful security... We can set a new course of peace and prosperity for the Americas and the global system...”\textsuperscript{321} In this, the Administration was suggesting that while economic integration of Latin America was a logical path in terms of material self-interest for the United States, there was a higher purpose driving


\textsuperscript{317} Zoellick, ”Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,” (2001).

\textsuperscript{318} George W. Bush as quoted by Zoellick, ”Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,” (2001).

\textsuperscript{319} Zoellick, ”Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,” (2001).

\textsuperscript{320} Zoellick, ”Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,” (2001).

\textsuperscript{321} Zoellick, ”Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope,” (2001).
this pursuit. Specifically, the advancement of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, which demonstrates an alignment of the Administration’s foreign policy posture with liberal internationalism.

Andean Region

The Andean region and its stability were strategically important to the United States during the 1990s and 2000s for two reasons. First, the region contained Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, where nearly all of the world’s cocaine, and 60% of the heroin seized in the United States, was produced. Second, the region also contained two major oil-producing countries (i.e., Ecuador and Venezuela) that supplied significant quantities of oil to the United States. 322

Colombia was considered a serious destabilizing influence in the Andean region and one of the chief security problems in the Western Hemisphere, greater even than Cuba. 323 According to the Clinton Administration, drug trafficking activities in Colombia added fuel to the fire in the internal conflict between paramilitaries and traffickers, government corruption, and economic malaise that were spreading beyond Colombia’s border and had “implications for regional peace and security.” 324 Plan Colombia was the Clinton Administration’s remedy for these regional security issues. Designed to address the increase in coca and poppy cultivation, and resulting cocaine and heroin production, in Colombia, Plan Colombia provided funding and training for the creation of a Colombian Army counter-narcotics brigade, as well as funding assistance for eradication and alternative development programs, 325 ensuring efforts were levied against narco-trafficking and political terrorist funding sources. 326

The Bush Administration recognized that Plan Colombia’s success threatened to spread drug trade-related problems to neighboring countries. Hence, President Bush expanded the initiative by launching the Andean Regional Initiative in 2001. 327 Ensuring the United States had relations with Andean nations that went

beyond drug eradication, the Andean Regional Initiative provided funding for social and economic development programs in Colombia and six regional neighbors (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela) that were affected by Colombia’s attempts to counter its guerrillas and drug traffickers.328 Goals for the Andean Regional Initiative included developing “healthy, licit economies and strong, democratic governments.” In support of these goals, the Administration requested funding levels that reflected “a necessary 50/50 balance between ‘carrots’ of social and economic development and ‘sticks’ of eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement programs.”329 Critics of the program suggested the “three-legged stool of eradication, military assistance, and alternative development” was military-assistance heavy with “only perfunctory interest in alleviating rural poverty,” one of the underlying causes of the guerrilla conflict and drug trade.330

Before his departure for the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, Canada, President Bush outlined his goal for the summit (to “build a hemisphere of liberty”). He then linked progress toward this goal to a broad “commitment to human freedom”; the “tearing down” of the barriers created by “poverty, disease, and ignorance”; “new efforts against illegal drugs”; and “renewed commitment” to open, integrated trade in the Americas. This direct connection between counter-narcotics efforts, predominantly in the Andean region, and the expansion and strengthening of democratic values throughout the Americas in the Administration’s Andean Regional Initiative aligns with the characteristics of liberal internationalism.

Global Meliorism

Africa

Despite campaign statements that Africa “doesn’t fit into [US] national strategic interests,” once in office, President Bush committed the United States to several initiatives that targeted Africa, most notably the

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the African Millennium Challenge Account, and the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.331

Because President Bush linked increased trade with the ability to lift people out of poverty, he supported
the AGOA, initially signed into law by President Clinton on 18 May 2000.332 Twice during his first term,
President Bush extended AGOA: first on 6 August 2002, then on 12 July 2004.333 President Bush hoped to
“build[d] through trade and markets… a continent of peace, where the people of Africa obtain education and
medical care and live in freedom.”334 As such, AGOA provided reforming African nations “the most liberal
access to US markets available to any country or region with which the United States [did] not have a Free
Trade Agreement.”335 He justified the US commitment to AGOA by stating, “The principles in the African
Growth and Opportunity Act are important for Africa, but they’re also important for the United States…
because] strong African democracies with strong economies and healthy populations will contribute to a
world that is more peaceful and more prosperous for all.”336

President Bush also directed funds from the African Millennium Challenge Account to “nations that
encourage economic freedom, root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people.”337 Through the
African Millennium Fund, the Administration funded constructing physical infrastructure (e.g., roads,
canals, bridges), developing education and health systems, and implementing governmental reforms (e.g.,
anti-corruption, rule of law) to facilitate economic growth in Africa and to “provide people in developing
nations the tools they need to seize the opportunities of the global economy.”338 In exchange, the United

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-jan-june00-bush_02-16/.
335 International Trade Administration, "African Growth and Opportunity Act: Summary of AGOA I.
Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2003, 54; Bush, "Remarks at the Inter-American
Development Bank, 14 March 2002," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush,
2002, 411.
States expected participating nations to adopt reforms and policies that would “make development effective and lasting.”

The Administration asserted that countries that lived by these standards would eventually need less aid because they would attract foreign investment.

President Bush justified these commitments as a moral obligation when he stated, “We cannot accept permanent poverty in a world of progress.”

In the spring of 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed establishing a “war chest” to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which, in 2000, had killed 6 million worldwide.

By July 2001, President Bush made American support for *The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria* the centerpiece of his Administration’s fight against infectious diseases.

Committed to “lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases,” President Bush signed into law the *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002*, which provided up to $100 million to the Global Fund.

According to President Bush, US commitment to providing “emergency life-saving drugs” to those suffering from HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, and other infectious epidemics was a “moral obligation.”

Each of these programs sought to improve the well-being of African citizens through creating and expanding open markets, fostering democracy and rule of law, and establishing education and health initiatives for more than the mere economic benefits that define *American realist* policies or the mere advancement of platonic ideals that define *liberal internationalist* policies.

President Bush’s assertion that the United States had a moral obligation to help Africa and its citizens to the benefit of Africa, the rest of the world, and the United States aligns most closely with *global meliorism*, which is defined by policies that aim to make the world safe through the creation of stable, democratic, capitalist states.

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American Realism

China

Historically, the United States has been a leading proponent of the idea that “foreign policy should involve attention to the human-right record of other countries.” With US-Chinese relations reestablished in 1979, the United States took only intermittent notice of China’s human rights record; this notice dramatically increased after the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. Since the early 1990s, the idea that security and human rights protections were not mutually exclusive, but rather complimentary, has taken root. In fact, the protection of human rights is now built into the policymaking frameworks of many democratic states and multilateral lending institutions, and influences an array of UN deliberations.

While many issues sparked contention between the United States and China (e.g., missile defense, Taiwan, Tibet), during the Clinton Administration, human rights remained inextricably but not always successfully linked normalizing Chinese trade relations. During his first term in office, President Clinton unsuccessfully attempted to link improvements in China’s human rights record with most favored nation (MFN) trading status. Soon afterwards, the Clinton Administration sought voluntary compliance with a code of conduct for US businesses operating in China. Under pressure from the United States, China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in October 1997; a year later, China also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The US-China Relations Act of 2000 established a mechanism to—

monitor the acts of the People’s Republic of China which reflect compliance with or violation of human rights...maintain lists of persons believed to be imprisoned, detained, or placed under house arrest, tortured, or otherwise persecuted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China...monitor the development of the rule of law... [and encourage] bilateral cooperation.

348 Foot, "Bush, China, and Human Rights," 175.
US monitoring aided the Clinton Administration in its efforts to win support for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Congressional support for China to receive Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.  

During a 1999 campaign speech, then-Governor Bush admonished the Clinton Administration’s stance on China when he declared, “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner.” The Clinton Administration’s China policy was considered by those in the newly inaugurated Bush Administration as “as generally weak.” However, despite President Bush’s assertion that the United States must engage “China with patience and principle and consistency” and his support for neo-conservative calls for a tougher China policy, the Bush Administration did not generally push democracy promotion and improvements in human rights to the point of jeopardizing American commercial interests. In fact, President Bush defended enhancing trade relations with China through granting PNTR status and support for its entry into the WTO. The Administration clearly defined its interest in China in terms of trade and allowed the goals of opening the Chinese market and free trade to overshadow other stated interests (e.g., spread of democracy, human rights). The Administration’s China policy clearly demonstrated the principles of American realism.

Sudan

When Sudan gained independence from Anglo-Egyptian co-rule in 1956, the Arab-dominated Khartoum government in northern Sudan that replaced colonial rule almost immediately reneged on its promise to grant full participation in government to non-Muslim, non-Arab southerners. Two periods of prolonged conflict (1955–1972 and 1983–2005) resulted in thousands of dead and displaced individuals. Tensions between the northern and southern Sudan were only exacerbated when oil was discovered in the Abyei area.

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350 Foot, “Bush, China, and Human Rights,” 175. The legal designation Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status was changed to Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status in 1998; the two designations are equivalent.
in 1979. The Abyei area falls along what is now the border between Sudan and South Sudan and was a point of contention between Arabs in the north and non-Arabs in the south.\footnote{US Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis: Sudan and South Sudan," Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration, 2013 http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Sudan/sudan.pdf.}

The US foreign policy objective in Sudan during the Clinton Administration was “clear and unequivocal: to isolate Sudan and to contain its support for insurgents and terrorists [in South Sudan].” This policy manifested as mild unilateral sanctions against Sudan after characterizing it as a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1993 and in imposing more stringent UN sanctions two years later.\footnote{Huliaras, "Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration's Policy Toward Sudan," 710.} In contrast to the Clinton Administration’s isolationist policy toward Sudan, the Bush Administration pursued “a high-profile ‘constructive engagement’ policy.”\footnote{Huliaras, "Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration's Policy Toward Sudan," 711.} The Administration’s first action was to appoint a special humanitarian coordinator to ensure that American aid was distributed to “the needy without manipulation by those ravaging that troubled land [Sudan].”\footnote{Bush, "Remarks to the American Jewish Committee, 3 May 2001," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2001, 488.} However, it was not until September 2001 that President Bush’s “constructive engagement” policy went into effect with the appointment of John C. Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace to the Sudan.\footnote{Bush, "Remarks Announcing the Appointment of John C. Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace to the Sudan, 6 September 2001," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2001, 1077–1078.} US-brokered talks ultimately resulted in the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which was facilitated by the Sudan Peace Act.

In June 2001, the \textit{Sudan Peace Act of 2001} was introduced as HR 2052. While President Bush supported the resolution—which aimed to “facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan”—he opposed Section 8, which “prohibits business entities engaged in commercial activities in Sudan from trading their securities in any US capital market unless they make public disclosure of their activities in Sudan.” President Bush opposed the section for economic reasons; specifically, because it had “the potential to damage US and international capital markets.”\footnote{Rep. Thomas G. Tancredo (R-CO-6), House Resolution 2052—Sudan Peace Act to Facilitate Famine Relief Efforts and A Comprehensive Solution to the War in Sudan (Washington, DC: 107th Congress (2001–2002), 5 June 2001 (Introduced)); George W. Bush, "Statement of Administration Policy: HR 2052—Sudan Peace Act of 2001," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley — American Presidency Project, 13 June 2001 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24841.} When resubmitted in October 2002 as HR 5531, without the offending language, it was signed into law.\footnote{Rep. Thomas G. Tancredo (R-CO-6), House Resolution 5531—Sudan Peace Act to Facilitate Famine Relief Efforts and A Comprehensive Solution to the War in Sudan (Washington, DC: 107th Congress (2001–2002), 21 October 2002 (Enacted)).} The \textit{Sudan Peace Act} condemned
human rights violations perpetrated by the Sudanese government, while at the same time attempted to “promote and encourage a peace process in Sudan.”

While on the surface American foreign policy toward Sudan appeared to be driven by humanitarian goals, contemporary analysts suggested that the driving influence in the Administration’s Sudan policy was aligning humanitarian and counter-terrorism security priorities. Others argued that in addition to security issues, the Administration’s Sudan policy was also influenced by economic interests (particularly the oil lobby) and by American evangelicals who sought religious freedom for Christians in southern Sudan. Although President Bush often remarked that the United States had a moral obligation to “stand for human dignity and religious freedom wherever they are denied, from Cuba to China to southern Sudan” and considered counter-terrorism a priority, it is particularly telling to note which committees the Sudan Peace Act debated its merits: the House Committee on Financial Services and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. This along with the Administration’s preoccupation with the economic issues, such as eliminating section 8 of the 2001 act and US investments in the region, suggests the policy exhibited American realist principles.

Multilateralism

Middle East Peace

Historically, the United States has had three objectives in the Middle East, which at various times have come into conflict with each other. These conflicts have forced the United States to either balance the competing objectives or temporarily choose one over the others. The historic objectives are (1) to preserve Israel as a strong and independent state, (2) to build ties with moderate Arab governments, and (3) to prevent regional or outside powers from dominating the region. The one policy that has consistently

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promised long-term progress on all three goals is negotiating peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  

During the early months of the Bush Administration, there was the perception that the President wanted to “step back from constant involvement...in the [Middle East] conflict and in the peace process.” President Bush pushed back against this perception when he argued in 2001 that he and his Administration “have been fully engaged in the Middle East.” According to the President, the major difference in tack from earlier administrations stemmed from the belief that “it takes two willing parties to come to the table to enact a peace treaty that will last.” As such, the Administration hoped to “facilitate the parties’ work in finding their own solution to peace” rather than to “force the adoption of a mechanism on which both parties did not agree.”

Official statements out of the White House indicated President Bush was taking a hardline regarding the Palestinians. In a 4 April 2002 speech, President Bush defined “a just settlement” as “two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security” but placed significant responsibility for failures to progress on Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. In fact, he held Chairman Arafat responsible for inciting the recent Israeli military actions by failing to control Palestinian terrorist activities. Two months later, President Bush called for “new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born,” suggesting current leadership was “compromised by terror.”

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371 During the Q&A session following a news conference, a reporter asked President Bush, “For a couple of months, both you and officials in your administration have indicated you wanted to step back from constant involvement of the US and the President in the conflict and in the peace process.” Bush, "The President's News Conference, 29 March 2001," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2001, 330.
376 Bush, "Remarks on the Middle East, 24 June 2002," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2002, 1059. However, the United States did not make Palestinian statehood explicitly contingent on Palestinian leadership change; rather it was contingent on the engagement by Palestinian leadership "in a sustained fight against terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure." Bush, "Remarks on the Middle East, 24 June 2002," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of George W. Bush, 2002, 1060.
In parallel, but not fully aligned with US statements to date, the Middle East Quartet (made up of representatives from the United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russian Federation) also developed and issued a framework for peace in the Middle East. With two member organizations that were often more critical of Israel than Palestine, the group represented a different perspective to Middle East peace than that articulated by the Bush Administration.\(^{377}\) A Quartet communique, issued on 10 April 2002, was less critical of Chairman Arafat’s lack of opposition to terrorism and instead focused on his role as the Palestinian Authority leader. The Quartet de-emphasized the need for Arab states to end their support for terrorists, and more forcefully called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied areas prior to a cease-fire.\(^{378}\) Despite variance between the policies, the Middle East Quartet became was the body through which the United States worked toward its goal of peace in the Middle East.

The roadmap for Middle East peace, developed in summer 2002, was not formally released until 30 April 2003.\(^{379}\) Before its release, President Bush proclaimed the Quartet framework as an outgrowth of his 24 June speech and committed US support to its vision.\(^{380}\) Upon the release of the Quartet framework, the Palestinian Authority accepted all of the conditions contained within it. In contrast, Israel held off accepting the document in hopes of negotiating changes; however, Israel capitulated in May when President Bush refused to alter the framework.\(^{381}\)

The Administration’s shift in policy to conform to the multilateral consensus reveals the Administration’s willingness not only work within a multilateral organization but to allow US foreign policy to be shaped by external pressures, consistent with the emerging concept in US foreign policy of \textit{multilateralism}.

\textbf{North Korea}

Following the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) signed the Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994. Under the Framework, North Korea agreed to (1) freeze and dismantle its plutonium-based nuclear program (i.e.,

\(^{377}\) In the past, the United States had hesitated to involve others in the Middle East peace process for fear that broad involvement would constrain US negotiating and policy influence. Dietrich, \textit{The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary}, 241.


close an existing graphite-moderated nuclear reactor and cease construction of a second), (2) engage in North-South dialogue, (3) remain a party to the NPT, and (4) implement the NPT’s Safeguards Agreement. In exchange, the United States agreed to (1) organize an international consortium to finance and supply two (proliferation-resistant) light water nuclear reactors (LWR) to North Korea and (2) provide North Korea with interim energy alternatives until the first LWR was completed.382

Upon taking office, President Bush ordered a review of US policy toward North Korea. On 6 June 2001, President Bush announced his Administration would continue the previous administration’s policy of engagement but would broaden the agenda under discussion to include improving the implementation of the Agreed Framework, adding verifiable constraints, banning missile exports, and creating a less threatening North Korean military posture.383 However, US-North Korean relations began to break down when, in the aftermath of the September 2001 terror attacks, President Bush accused North Korea of “arming [itself] with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens” and being an “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq.384

In October 2002, the United States accused North Korea of secretly pursuing a uranium-enrichment program. While the program was distinct from the plutonium-based program North Korea had agreed to freeze in 1994, the United States argued that North Korea had violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement.385 The United States called for an unconditional end to the program.386 While North Korea admitted to the existence of the program, Pyongyang refused to freeze or dismantle the program.387 Without renouncing the Agreed Framework, the United States applied pressure by suspending heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea in November 2002.388 In response, Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT, turned off IAEA monitoring equipment, sent inspectors home, reopened its plutonium reprocessing plan, turned off IAEA monitoring equipment, sent inspectors home, reopened its plutonium reprocessing plan, and opened two nuclear reactors.

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387 Frontline, "Kim's Nuclear Gamble: Chronology."

and restarted a graphite-moderated reactor, making the threat of a nuclear North Korea real and imminent.\textsuperscript{389} In March 2003, North Korea tested two short-range missiles and announced it would pull out of armistice talks with South Korea, further escalating the crisis.\textsuperscript{390}

The US response was one that unequivocally conformed to the emerging concept of \textit{multilateralism}. According to one commentator, the United States “talked tough, but took little firm action.” Specifically, while the United States officially left military action on the table, it unofficially removed military action from consideration due to a lack of international support. The United States also considered temporarily halting US food shipments to North Korea but was “roundly criticized by allies” and did not carry through in the end. Finally, despite North Korean calls for bilateral talks, the United States pressed for UN action and multilateral talks.\textsuperscript{391}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter reviewed the declaratory policies and employment policies during President George W. Bush’s first term. Both sets of policies demonstrated the characteristics of a mix of traditional US foreign policy concepts as well as the attributes of the emerging concept of \textit{multilateralism}.

In contrast to President Clinton, President Bush was far more consistent in his declaratory policies (in so far as a given policy usually only aligned with a single concept). A cursory review of Bush’ strategy documents and public speeches leaves a general impression that President Bush was a \textit{defensive expansionist}, relying on unilateral and preemptive or preventive actions when engaging with foreign powers; however, these policies were provided with specific caveats. A closer review of Bush’s strategy documents suggests his intentions were far more multilateral in nature. Although, this is not conveyed by the number of policies that align across the various concepts (see Table 3), a review of the section on \textit{multilateralism} in the declaratory policies section will show that many of the individual policies identified

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{389} Frontline, "Kim's Nuclear Gamble: Chronology."; Dietrich, \textit{The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary}, 122. North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program was considered nearly three years away from producing bomb-making material; however, the threat posed by North Korea’s halted plutonium-production program was more immediate. Given the size of its store of spent fuel rods from its graphite-moderated reactors, North Korea was thought capable of producing enough plutonium for five nuclear weapons within six months. Additional plutonium for three weapons in the first two years and ten weapons per year thereafter could be produced if the graphite-moderated reactors were restarted. Joel S. Wit, "A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," \textit{Arms Control Today} 33(2003).

\textsuperscript{390} Frontline, "Kim's Nuclear Gamble: Chronology.

\textsuperscript{391} Dietrich, \textit{The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary}, 122.}
within the 2002 NSSR did in fact depend on *multilateralism*. In addition to *multilateralism*, President Bush’s declaratory policy aligned with *defensive expansionism* and *global meliorism*.

**Table 3. President Bush’s Declaratory Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defensive Expansionism</th>
<th>Global Meliorism</th>
<th>Multilateralism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preemption</td>
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The collective consciousness in the United States characterizes the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in terms of the unilateral action taken in 2003 Gulf War. This misrepresents the Administration’s foreign policy and abjures an informed understanding of US engagement by defining an administration by a single action. While the 2003 Gulf War outsized almost every other foreign policy engagement, it was only one of many engagements. This paper’s review of President Bush’s major foreign policy engagements during his first term demonstrated a distributed alignment of his engagements with multiple traditional concepts in American foreign policy (see Table 4). Foreign policy actions during President Bush’s first term demonstrated the characteristics of several traditional concepts in US foreign policy, including *defensive expansionism*, *maximalism*, *liberal internationalism*, *global meliorism*, and *American realism*. However, his foreign policy engagements with respect to the Middle East peace process and North Korea exhibited the attributes of *multilateralism*.

**Table 4. President Bush’s Employment Policies**

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<tr>
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<th>Defensive Expansionism</th>
<th>Maximalism</th>
<th>Liberal Internationalism</th>
<th>Global Meliorism</th>
<th>American Realism</th>
<th>Multilateralism</th>
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Chapter 4: Barack H. Obama

Barack Hussein Obama, the 43rd President of the United States, was the third US president elected after the end of the Cold War. When he entered the White House, President Obama inherited a global economy on the precipice of the Great Recession, two on-going foreign wars, and the lowest international favorability rating for the United States in its history. Chief among his priorities were domestic issues, such as strengthening civil liberties, rebuilding the economy, and reforming healthcare and social security. His immediate foreign policy goal was to improve US relations with the major powers (i.e., Europe, China, and Russia) and with those smaller states with whom the United States had had recent, contentious relations (e.g., Iran, Venezuela, Cuba), to “refurbish” the image of the United States abroad, and to restore American primacy. According to the Obama-Biden Foreign Policy Plan developed during the transition, the Obama Administration would “end the war in Iraq responsibly, finish the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, secure nuclear weapons and loose nuclear materials from terrorists, and renew American diplomacy…” This chapter tests the level of continuity vice change in American foreign policy by deconstructing the major declaratory policies (what the United States intended to do) and employment policies (what the United States did) related to US national security during President Obama’s first term in terms of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy. It will also identify and begin to characterize emerging concepts.

Obama’s Declaratory Policy

This section examines the declaratory policies of the Obama Administration during its first term as defined by speeches and two significant strategy documents: the National Security Strategy (2010 NSSR) and Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century (2012 Defense Strategy). This section is organized into four sub-sections: Interests, American Leadership, Collective Action, and International Order. Each sub-section provides an overview of the declaratory foreign policy related to national security
and discusses its alignment to traditional concepts in American foreign policy or describes unique attributes that may indicate an emerging concept.

**Interests**

The Obama Administration scoped the standard set of US vital interests (i.e., security, prosperity, liberty) in both traditional and non-traditional ways. As described in detail below, the Administration’s emphasis on rebuilding partnerships and support for collective action in support of security interests were influenced by the principles of *multilateralism*. However, its scoping of national prosperity did not align with any of the traditional or emerging concepts in US foreign policy. Finally, with respect to liberty, the Obama Administration chose to implement solutions steeped in *exceptionalism* and *multilateralism*.

**SECURITY**

In the 2010 NSSR, the Obama Administration declared the United States would “continue to underwrite global security” but warned that even a powerful nation cannot “meet global challenges alone.”\(^{396}\) It then described six policy objectives designed to protect and promote US security interests: (1) strengthen security and resilience at home; (2) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat violent extremist organizations; (3) reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction and secure nuclear materials; (4) advance peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Middle East; (5) invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners; and (6) secure cyberspace. All but two of these objectives (strengthen security and resilience at home; secure cyberspace) rely heavily on international cooperation, multilateral action, or international organizations.\(^{397}\) For example, in its effort to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” violent extremist organizations, the Obama Administration stressed the need for a “broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applied ever tool of American power… as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions.”\(^{398}\) The Administration went on to state the focus of its “efforts to contain [weapons of mass destruction] are centered in a global non-proliferation regime…” and that “success depends upon consensus and concerted action.”\(^{399}\) Finally, the Obama Administration noted that US engagements in the greater Middle East should not be limited to near-term security issues, rather should

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\(^{398}\) *National Security Strategy*, (May 2010), 16.

\(^{399}\) *National Security Strategy*, (May 2010), 23.
be “comprehensive and strategic” in nature. These security objectives demonstrate attributes of the principles of *multilateralism*.

**PROSPERITY**

The Obama Administration suggested US prosperity was a prerequisite for American leadership in the global community and linked US prosperity to global prosperity. In fact, commentators asserted that “healing the nation and repairing the world were two sides of Obama’s coin.” However, when developing prosperity objectives, the Administration was decidedly inward-looking: strengthen education and human capital; enhance science, technology, and innovation; achieve balanced and sustained growth; accelerate sustainable development; and spend taxpayer monies wisely. It appears that the global side of the prosperity coin was an effect of domestic policy and not a result of significant policy efforts on its own. A review of these objectives suggests that this vital interest does not reflect any of the traditional or emerging concepts in American foreign policy. For example, although the Obama Administration narrowly scoped the vital interest of prosperity, similar to *maximalism*, the Administration did not prioritize this over efforts to broaden alliances and partnerships. Additionally, while prosperity interests could be defined in terms of trade, similar to *American realism*, the Obama Administration’s policies in this area were not specifically designed to open foreign markets to US goods, open US markets to foreign goods, broaden free trade, or enhance globalization.

**LIBERTY**

In contrast to the Bush Administration, which promoted free elections as a metric for policies designed to promote democracy, the Obama Administration preferred “supporting the more abstract notion of ‘universal human rights’—freedom of speech and assembly, equal rights for women, rule of law, and accountable government.” It defended the shift in means by arguing, “[e]lections alone do not make true democracy.” In support of liberty, the Administration’s policy strove to promote democracy and human

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401 Indyk, *Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, 3.
403 Indyk, *Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, 15.
rights abroad by strengthening the power of the American example.\footnote{National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 23–39.} In fact, it repeatedly made statements that suggested “the most effective way for the United States of America to promote [its own] values is to live them.”\footnote{National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 2.} This desire to teach by example is the hallmark of exceptionalism. Efforts to promote democracy that went beyond serving as an example to be emulated relied on “strengthening key [international] institutions” such as those responsible for democratic accountability.\footnote{National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 37.} The Administration also chose to promote dignity by meeting basic human needs. The best example of this was the Administration’s support for the UN Millennium Development Goals and “working with others in pursuit of the eradication of extreme poverty.”\footnote{National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 39.} These latter two examples illustrate features of multilateralism.

**Primacy**

According to the Obama Administration, US national security depended upon American primacy (i.e., strength, influence, and leadership within the international system). Without primacy, the Administration argued, the United States would not be able to “effectively advance [its] interests in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.”\footnote{National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 1. This concept was consistent throughout his first term as is evidenced by his statement in the preface to the January 2012 strategic priorities document: his goal was to “emerge even stronger in a manner that preserves American global leadership…” Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, January 2012), i.} Chief among the reasons why US strength, influence, and leadership had eroded, by the time President Obama took office, was the perception among many in the international community that the Bush Administration was “unilateralist and too quick to use force.”\footnote{Indyk, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, 4.} Another major contributor to the erosion was the global financial crisis that grew out of the collapse of the US housing market and the high-risk mortgage securities developed in American banks. This crisis quickly spread to other markets across the globe leaving many wary of the US economic model of free markets and so-called “too-big-to-fail” banks. Furthermore, there was a perception of a growing gap between American values and American actions, especially after the disclosure of Bush-era “enhanced interrogation” policies at secret prisons around the world and unbounded surveillance of private communications at home.

President Obama understood that American leadership is built on a mix of three elements composed of both hard and soft power. First, as stated in the preface to the 2010 NSSR, it is US military superiority that has
secured the United States and underpinned global security for decades.\textsuperscript{411} Second, the Administration recognized that the US economy was the “wellspring of American power” because it “pays for our military, underwrites our diplomacy and development efforts, and serves as a leading source of our influence in the world.”\textsuperscript{412} The final source of US strength and influence in the world, as stated in the 2010 strategy report, is “America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{413} Given this emphasis, it is not surprising that the Administration centered its national security strategy on the idea that “national security begins at home.”\textsuperscript{414} This commitment to rebuilding both hard and soft powers in order to ensure US national security is characteristic of \textit{smart power}.

\textbf{Collective Action}

Arguing that the world was interconnected and no longer a zero-sum game, the Obama Administration chose to pursue its interests through the “active participation of the United States in relationships beyond its borders” with “nations, institutions, and peoples around the world on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.”\textsuperscript{415} The Administration’s concept was to use engagements to allow the United States to “shape outcomes.” In support of this idea the Obama Administration pursued “close and regular collaboration with our close allies the United Kingdom, France, and Germany on issues of mutual and global concern.”\textsuperscript{416} The Administration also worked toward “deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence [e.g., China, India, Russia] and increasingly influential nations [e.g., Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia].”\textsuperscript{417} Successful engagement would, according to the Administration’s formula, require the “effective use and integration of different elements of American power.” The elements of power enumerated included diplomacy, development capabilities, military strength, shared prosperity, and cooperative action between US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{418} This combination of hard and soft powers as the key to effective collective action demonstrates the characteristics of both \textit{smart power} and \textit{multilateralism}.

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{411} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), ii.
  \item \textsuperscript{412} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 2, 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{413} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{414} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{415} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 3, 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{416} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{417} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{418} \textit{National Security Strategy}, (May 2010), 11.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
International Order

One of the outcomes President Obama hoped to “shape” through US leadership of collective action was a “just and sustainable international order” that would “confront common challenges.” President Obama sought to realign national actions to be more in concert with those international institutions with which the United States had shared interests. He acknowledged that international institutions alone would be insufficient; mutual interest needed to be underpinned by bilateral, multilateral, and global strategies that addressed the sources of insecurity that can undermine cooperation. The Administration developed four policy objectives in support of this goal:

- Ensure strong alliances with traditional partners
- Build cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence
- Strengthen institutions and mechanisms of cooperation
- Sustain broad cooperation on key global issues

Each objective relied on international cooperation, multilateral action, or international organizations to be effective. For example, arguing the merits of ensuring strong alliances—a clear rejection of maximalist principles—the Administration wrote, “We will continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances.” In fact, the Obama Administration believed alliances were force multipliers; the sum of US and multinational cooperation and coordination is always greater than if any one state acts alone. The Administration also recognized the need to capitalize on the opportunities for partnership afforded by the emergence of new regional powers, even when some of those states did not meet so-called democratic standards. The Administration argued that the United States should continue to rely on international institutions to address issues stemming from changes in the strategic environment, rather than scrapping the entire system. Finally, the Administration emphasized that broad and effective global cooperation was the only way to deal with issues that cross international borders, such as violent extremist organizations, nuclear proliferation, promotion of global prosperity, climate change, and pandemics. These issues and policy preferences drove President Obama to seek broad cooperation on these and other global challenges during his first term. As a category, these policy objectives clearly align with multilateralism.

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419 National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 12, 40.
422 National Security Strategy, (May 2010), 43; Indyk, Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy, 15.
Obama’s Employment Policy

This section highlights the American foreign policy engagements during Obama’s first term and their alignment with traditional and emerging concepts, including defensive expansionism, liberal internationalism, smart power, American realism, and multilateralism. In addition to aligning actions to foreign policy concepts, this section also reviews the historical context and summarizes the president’s relevant actions and statements for each engagement.

Defensive Expansionism

PAKISTAN

While not called the war on terror, as in the Bush Administration, US counter-terrorism efforts under President Obama were based on and in some cases expanded upon policies put in place in support of President Bush’s global war on terror. On 29 June 2011, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism, announced the release of the Obama Administration’s National Strategy for Counter-terrorism. The document formalized the approach pursued and adapted by the Administration during the previous two-and-a-half years to prevent terrorist attacks, at home and abroad, and to ensure the demise of al-Qa’ida. In Pakistan, US policy focused on eliminating al-Qa’ida safe havens and degrading al-Qa’ida’s leadership structure, command and control, organizational capabilities, support networks, and infrastructure faster than they could be replaced. In his discussion of the need for tailored responses when executing this counter-terrorism strategy, Brennan euphemistically acknowledged the use of drone strikes and perhaps future raids in Pakistan when he said, “In some places, such as the tribal regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will deliver precise and overwhelming force against al-Qa’ida.”

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While the Obama Administration spoke of engagement and the execution of counter-terrorism strategy in consultation with Pakistan, it was generally understood that the United States lacked the “incentives to induce” Pakistan to effectively deal with Taliban and al-Qa’ida forces. This was especially true in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan border. Furthermore, the United States was unwilling to use more robust coercive sanctions that might force cooperation due to the Pakistani government’s political instability and possession of nuclear weapons. The gap between means and ends meant that drone strikes were “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt al-Qa’ida leadership,” according to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.

The drone program, started by the Bush Administration in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was expanded under the Obama Administration. The scope and legality of which has drawn much domestic and international criticism. Because the United States has not declared war on nor has the United Nations authorized the use of military force in Pakistan, many critics argue the strikes violate Pakistani sovereignty and international law. This argument is, at least partially, rebutted by defenders of the Obama Administration’s policy who assert that while the Pakistani government professes anger over the strikes, they have provided tacit approval to the United States. The Administration’s legal justification for drone strikes stands on two points: the right to self-defense and the characterization of the relationship between the United States and al-Qa’ida as the practical equivalent of war. If one accepts that the United States is at war with al-Qa’ida, its allies, and its affiliates, then the United States is justified in “striking its enemies wherever they are found.” Early in Obama’s first term, strikes focused predominantly on ranking leaders within al-Qa’ida thought to be actively plotting attacks against the United States. As strikes decimated al-Qa’ida’s top ranks, additional strikes began targeting “militants whose main battle is with the Pakistani authorities or who fight with the Taliban against American troops in Afghanistan” and shifted from

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433 Shane, "Election Spurred a Move to Codify US Drone Policy."
“personality strikes” to “signature strikes.” In practice, this evolution in the implementation of the strategy further muddled the Administration’s argument for the legality of the strikes; nevertheless, the United States continued and still carries out targeted killings in Pakistan using drones.

In describing the principles that guided the development of the strategy and the pursuit of its ultimate goal, the Obama Administration noted the need to balance “near- and long-term CT [counter-terrorism] considerations” to ensure the “exercise of American power against terrorist threats [is] done in a thoughtful, reasoned, and proportionate way that both enhances US security and delegitimates that actions of those who use terrorism.” This suggests the Administration acknowledged a potential conflict between American ideals and its actions (i.e., violations of Pakistani sovereignty during drone strikes), further suggesting an expansion of scope and exercise of national power. The Administration’s continued use of drone strikes well into its second term despite vocal international and non-governmental criticism suggests a unilateral bent to Obama Administration thinking. Furthermore, the Administration continues to characterize al-Qa’ida leadership and operatives as enemy combatants, justifying the drone strikes as “defensive measures.” Such declarations, which view terrorism through a counter-insurgency lens, run counter to traditional approaches to terrorism that approach it from a law enforcement perspective (i.e., act after a crime is committed, collect evidence, and prosecute). This combination of sentiments aligns with the concept of defensive expansionism in continuing and even expanding the Bush Administration’s use of drone strikes in such places as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

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434 Shane, "Election Spurred a Move to Codify US Drone Policy." Personality strikes target named personalities; whereas, signature strikes target groups of suspected but unknown militants.


437 Khan, "US Drone Strike Kills 6 in Pakistani Tribal Area."


Liberal Internationalism

LIBYA

On 14 February 2011, three days after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down from power following peaceful protests in the country he had ruled for 30 years, human rights activists in Libya called for peaceful demonstrations in protest of Moammar Qaddafi’s 42-year rule. The arrest the following day of Libyan human rights activist Fethi Terbel led to rioting in Benghazi, which turned violent when security forces interceded. In the days that followed, protests and riots erupted in cities across Libya. The Human Rights Council included “indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, [and] detention and torture of peaceful demonstrators…” among the human rights violations attributed to the Qaddafi regime following the initial protests. On 21 February, Ibrahim Dabbashi, the deputy permanent representative at the Libyan mission to the United Nations confirmed that the Qaddafi regime had used mercenaries to quell demonstrations. Five days later, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which called for the “immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfill the legitimate demands of the population,” referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Courts, enacted an arms embargo, imposed a travel ban, and froze Libyan financial assets. Shortly thereafter, anti-Qaddafi rebels organized themselves into the Interim Transitional National Council and declared themselves to be Libya’s legitimate government. What had been a rebellion soon erupted into civil war. While calling for an immediate ceasefire, the UN Security Council also authorized the use of force, including a no-fly zone, and strengthened previous sanctions against Libya. Two days later.

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442 CNN Wire Staff, "A Timeline of the Conflict in Libya."
later, NATO forces targeted pro-Qaddafi forces and Libya’s air defenses in air strikes and began enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya.\textsuperscript{447}

A review of the literature on the international response to the Libyan crisis suggests the concept known as responsibility to protect (RtoP) played an important role in shaping the international perception of events in Libya and the response to them.\textsuperscript{448} The RtoP concept makes humanitarian concerns and basic morality a justification for international interference in a nation’s internal affairs. The concept is characterized by “a three pronged responsibility—to prevent, to react, to rebuild.”\textsuperscript{449} While contemporary commentators asserted “Libya is not vital to US strategic interests,”\textsuperscript{450} President Obama argued that, if left unchecked, the atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime would cause a humanitarian crisis that could destabilize the entire region, endangering American allies and partners. He went on to state that if the United States did not intervene, “[t]he democratic values that we stand for would be overrun.”\textsuperscript{451} This argument reflected a long-term view, a broader interpretation of US interests in Libya, and suggested his belief that the United States had a responsibility to protect.

The concept of RtoP grew out of the debate surrounding how the international community should respond humanitarian crises: “[i]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”\textsuperscript{452} While the term was not coined until 2001, when viewed through the lens of American foreign policy, the responsibility to protect harkens to the traditional


\textsuperscript{449} Weiss, "RtoP Alive and Well after Libya," 287.


\textsuperscript{452} United Nations, "Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect."
concept of *liberal internationalism*, which touts the advancement of democracy, rule of law, and universal human rights over material self-interest. Thus, President Obama’s argument that the United States “cannot stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy, and his forces step up their assaults on cities… where innocent men and women face brutality and death at the hands of their own government,”\(^{453}\) was an assertion that the United States had a responsibility to protect, which is characteristic of *liberal internationalism*.

Additionally, the US role within the coalition of allied and partner forces that implemented the Libyan no-fly zone was clearly in keeping with the emerging concept of *multilateralism*. The part played by the United States was characterized by journalists and contemporary commentators alike as markedly different when compared to previous NATO humanitarian missions. The United States, which traditionally dominates behind-the-scenes, was “eager to hand off responsibility and will have more limited roles.” This resulted in the early transfer of command of the UN-mandated operations from the United States to NATO on 25 March 2011.\(^{454}\) Furthermore, it was argued that the mission was a “true alliance effort” between 14 NATO members and 4 partner countries. For example, the United States flew only one quarter of the sorties in Libya vice 90 percent of them in Kosovo, demonstrating the distributed burden across the coalition.\(^{455}\)

### Smart Power

#### CHINA

Shortly after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, discussions between US and PRC representatives regarding American recognition of the PRC broke down when Chairman Mao Zedong announced his intention to “lead toward the side of the Soviet Union.”\(^{456}\) The United States did not formally recognize the PRC government until nearly two decades later.\(^{457}\) The Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 began the process of normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC.
government. By December 1978, the process was complete: full diplomatic relations had been established, with the United States recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China and affirming Taiwan as part of China. In 1980, China launched massive economic reforms that included opening the Chinese markets to foreign investment and business. By 2011, the Chinese economy was the second largest in the world and US-China relationships encompassed an array of global, regional, and bilateral issues.

With US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the growth in economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and the expansion of military capabilities and the increased assertiveness of the Chinese military posture, President Obama announced in November 2011 that the United States would shift its attention to the Asia-Pacific region: “As a Pacific nation,” President Obama declared, “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.” To do so, the Administration intended to “raise the region’s priority within US military planning, foreign policy, and economic policy.” In terms of military planning, the strategic shift, as well as the Obama Administration’s military response to the strategic environment in general, was formalized in the 2012 Defense Strategy. The document identified four policy objectives in support of the shift toward the Asia-Pacific:

- Strengthen existing treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand
- Expand cooperation with emerging partners [not specifically identified]
- Invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India
- Maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely as required by treaty obligations and international law

463 Barack H. Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament," Speech at Parliament House in Canberra, Australia (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 November 2012). The shift in focus, originally described by the administration as a "pivot," evolved into a "rebalancing" by the January 2012.
The shift toward the Asia-Pacific region was widely viewed as an attempt by the United States to counterbalance China.\textsuperscript{466} This was especially true in China where US attempts to strengthen its alliances, both old and new, was viewed with consternation. Alliance strengthening almost immediately led to American diplomatic interventions in disputes between China and its neighbors.\textsuperscript{467} The shift to the Pacific also came with military implications; for example, American efforts to advance an anti-ballistic missile system in the region and to develop an advanced warfighting concept known as “Air-Sea Battle” raised questions in Beijing regarding “the true motive behind all these moves.” Despite questions about the relative scale of the US shift, the new strategy and actions in support of it became a source of friction between the two nations.\textsuperscript{468}

A March 2012 Congressional Research Service report described the shift in focus as “more of a change in means (i.e., the level of resources and leadership attention devoted to this part of the world) than a change in policy goals.” The report asserted that US interests in the region (e.g., stability, freedom of navigation, the free flow of commerce, the promotion of democracy and human rights) remained unchanged. The report went on to note that the shift in focus was a manifestation of the Obama Administration’s attempt to manage US-China relations while deepening China’s integration into the international community.\textsuperscript{469}

In a statement before the House Armed Services Committee, authors of an assessment of US force posture strategy described the American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region as designed to build “a relationship with China that makes conflict virtually unthinkable and cooperation mutually attractive.” The authors of the Congressional Research Service report argued that the Administration’s strategy would require a broad range of instruments of national power, beyond military forces alone to include trade, diplomacy, and broad regional acceptance of American values.\textsuperscript{470} This suggests that the so-called “Asia-pivot” strategy was in line with the traditional concept of \textit{smart power}, which employs a mix of hard and soft power tools to shape the strategic environment and protect and promote US interests.

\textsuperscript{467} Kirk Spitzer, "The South China Sea: From Bad to Worse," \textit{Time}, 15 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{469} Manyin, "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's 'Rebalancing' Toward China," (2012), 4.
NORTH KOREA

Following the collapse of the Agreed Framework in the fall of 2002 and North Korea’s provocative actions throughout 2003 (described in the previous chapter), North Korea spent 2004 through 2008 building and demonstrating its nuclear weapons capabilities. All the while North Korea continued to engage—off and on—in the Six Party Talks with China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.471 Despite the Republic’s numerous provocative actions, President Bush’s second term saw a period of relative calm as North Korea began dismantling its Yongbyon plant in late 2007 and gave the United States extensive details of its nuclear program in mid-2008. The Bush Administration responded by easing sanctions and removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, with the Six Party Talks deadlocked, North Korea again barred IAEA inspectors and restarted its nuclear program in December 2009.472

President Obama entered office poised to engage North Korea with the goal of eventually normalizing relations.473 Instead of waiting for US engagement, North Korea chose to aggressively enhance its missile program, and on 5 April 2009, launched a rocket designed to propel a satellite into space.474 Many in the international community, including the United States, viewed the launch as a demonstration by North Korea of its growing capability to eventually launch a long-range missile mated with a nuclear warhead.475 President Obama described the launch as “provocative,” stating it “demands a response from the international community.”476 The United States worked with allies and members of the UN Security Council to develop an appropriate and coordinated response, which included a statement of condemnation

472 Bajoria, "The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program."
473 During her confirmation testimony, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton noted the Administration’s intention to work toward normalizing relations between the United States and North Korea. Committee on Foreign Relations, "Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session," Hearing (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 13 January 2009), 127, 164. Additionally, President Obama in his Inaugural Address indicated willingness to engage adversarial leaders when he stated the United States would “extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” Obama, "Inaugural Address, 20 January 2009," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of Barack H. Obama, 2009, 3.
from the President of the UN Security Council. Following this, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and declared its intention to abandon the Six Party Talks, openly restart its nuclear program (including a uranium enrichment program), and conduct intercontinental ballistic missile tests.

On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test in violation of the NPT and North Korea’s status as a non-nuclear state. The subsequent UN Security Council resolution, “expressing the gravest concern [over] the nuclear test and missile activities by the DPRK,” reiterated and strengthened sanctions on arms sales, luxury goods, and financial transactions initially declared in Resolution 1718 (2006). According to a contemporary commentator, North Korea used the sanctions “as an excuse to walk away from all its international nuclear obligations and to restart its nuclear program.” By September 2009, North Korea was believed to be in the final stages of uranium enrichment.

Relations between the United States and North Korea remained tense into 2010. The 26 March 2010 sinking of the South Korean Navy corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea south of the Northern Limit Line raised the specter of a North Korean attack on South Korea or large military response by Seoul. Because of North Korean threats, the American response was measured to avoid escalation. Again, President Obama worked through the United Nations. In May, the US Department of Defense announced a new set of naval exercises designed to detect the type of submarine suspected of sinking the Cheonan and to deter North Korea from acting provocatively in the future.

480 UN Security Council, Resolution 1874, Non-Proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea (12 June 2009).
481 Hecker, "Lessons Learned from the North Korean Crises," 50.
482 Hecker, "Lessons Learned from the North Korean Crises," 47.
November 2010 saw tensions between the United States and North Korea escalate to crisis once again. During a mid-November visit by US nuclear experts, North Korea revealed the extent of its nuclear program, followed several days later by the shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. Washington condemned the attack calling on North Korea to “halt its belligerent action.” Noting the US alliance with South Korea as one of its “most important alliances,” the Obama Administration worked to “rally the international community once again to put pressure on North Korea.” Specifically, the Administration sought Chinese cooperation in “managing” North Korea. To “pressure China to constrain North Korea” and as a “show of support for South Korea,” the United States chose to deploy, as previously scheduled, the USS George Washington for combined exercises with the South Korean Navy in the Yellow Sea.

The influences that shaped US engagements with North Korea in this period are not clear cut. The interplay of the Obama Administration’s use of hard power, demonstrated by military exercises and economic sanctions, and soft power, demonstrated by political maneuvering within the UN Security Council and in coordination with the Chinese to “manage” North Korea, is characteristic of the smart power concept. However, the US preference for indirect engagement with North Korea via the United Nations demonstrates policy attributes that align with those of multilateralism.

**IRAN**

US-Iranian relations have been strained since the 1979 Islamic Revolution brought a clerical government to power. Iran’s sometimes aggressive efforts to become a regional hegemon have only worsened relations since the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided Iran the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence to the newly independent republics in Central Asia. The United States viewed this as a threat and tried to exclude Iran, in favor of its long-standing ally Turkey, from playing a

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greater role in the region.\textsuperscript{492} Iran, in turn, looked to Russia and Armenia for support, strengthening the “broad pattern of competition” between the United States and Iran.\textsuperscript{493} Additionally, Iran’s support for radical groups in the Middle East (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah), its establishment of an Iranian-Syrian partnership, its sabotage of the Middle East peace process, and its demonization of Israel only further complicated relations between the two nations in the ensuing decades.\textsuperscript{494} However, it was the August 2002 revelation that Iran had developed a uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy-water reactor in Arak that sparked the crisis already brewing when President Obama took office in 2009.\textsuperscript{495}

American efforts during the 2000s to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and missile technology, to Iran were caught in a cycle of progress in one area followed by setbacks in another. Following the release of satellite confirmation by the United States of Iran’s previously secret nuclear program, Tehran declared its program peaceful and agreed to allow IAEA inspections. During an October 2003 visit, British, French, and German foreign ministers requested Iran to stop enriching uranium, suggested it sign a new NPT protocol, and pledge to cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors in exchange for economic incentives. Although Iran announced in November 2003 that it had suspended the most worrisome parts of its program, the United States continued to insist that Iran’s ultimate goal was producing nuclear weapons. In the fall of 2005, Iran resumed uranium production in Isfahan and, in January 2006, broke IAEA seals on its Natanz facility.\textsuperscript{496} In response, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1696 and 1737, which placed sanctions on Iran’s import of “any items, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.” In addition, the resolutions demanded that Iran (1) terminate “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,” (2) cease “work on all heavy water-related projects,” and (3) allow IAEA inspectors to verify compliance.\textsuperscript{497} When Iran did not comply with Resolutions 1696 and 1737, the UN Security Council on 24 March 2007 adopted Resolution 1747, which gave Iran 60 days

\textsuperscript{495} Ozcan, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Future of US-Iranian Relations," 123.
\textsuperscript{496} Ozcan, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Future of US-Iranian Relations," 122–124.
to suspend uranium enrichment.\footnote{UN Security Council, Resolution 1747, Non-Proliferation (New York, NY: United Nations, 24 March 2007).} Iran again did not comply; instead, it asserted its right under the NPT to develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Not surprisingly, the United States, and many in the international community, remained unconvinced.\footnote{Ozcan, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Future of US-Iranian Relations," 124.}

The US-Iranian relationship—characterized by what one commentator called a “psychotic mistrust”—was on the brink of open hostilities as President Obama took office.\footnote{Roger Cohen, “The US-Iranian Triangle,” The New York Times, 28 September 2009; Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Democracy Promotion versus Engagement with Iran," Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 3 (2011): 470.} The Obama Administration believed Iran was “one of the key national security challenges facing the United States.”\footnote{Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses," Report (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 March 2011), 21; Katzman, "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses," (2010), 16–17.} The President chose to break from his predecessor’s Iran policy and “extend a hand” to Iran in the hopes of restarting US-Iranian relations.\footnote{Obama, "Inaugural Address, 20 January 2009," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of Barack H. Obama, 2009, 3; Akbarzadeh, "Democracy Promotion versus Engagement with Iran," 470.} Even when pro-democracy protests broke out in Tehran following disputed Iranian presidential elections in April 2009, the Obama Administration stayed relatively mute. This approach, while consistent with the attempt to change the tone of the relationship, sacrificed the long-held policy stance in the Middle East: promoting democracy. In addition, the Obama Administration “downplayed discussion of potential US military action against Iranian nuclear facilities” and “insisted that the United States did not directly or materially support the domestic opposition movement.”\footnote{Katzman, "Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses," (2010), ii.} Foreign policy realists generally agreed with the Administration’s approach and pointed out that US goals in the Middle East to promote democracy and liberalize economies are properly subordinate to security goals such as securing oil and gas supplies, countering terrorist organizations, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining Israel’s existence.\footnote{Ozcan, "Iran's Nuclear Program and the Future of US-Iranian Relations," 125; Akbarzadeh, "Democracy Promotion versus Engagement with Iran," 470–482.} The US response to Iran’s nuclear program has included diplomacy, sanctions, and efforts to strengthen American and Southern Gulf forces and deterrent capabilities in the region because, while the United States has reiterated its preference for a negotiated solution, throughout its first term it kept “military options on the table.”\footnote{D'amato, “US Strategic Competition with Iran: Energy, Economics, Sanctions, and the Nuclear Issue,” (2011), 3, 4.}

The decision to subordinate the advancement of democracy and human rights to other strategic interests is a marked contrast to the liberal internationalist bent to US policy toward Libya. The policy did not limit
engagement by limiting the scope of American interests as would characterize policies influenced by \textit{maximalism}; rather, the policy, based on a combination of positive and negative incentives in its use of soft and hard power, aligns with the concept of \textit{smart power}. President Obama’s lofty sentiments in his inaugural address regarding extending an open hand to Iran, statements clearly downplaying US military threats, and the US decision not to weigh in on Iranian domestic protests are examples of the Obama Administration’s use of its soft power. Hard power, to the extent it was deployed, was generally an indirect application through UN sanctions.

\textbf{American Realism}

\textbf{VENEZUELA}

The United States has traditionally maintained close relations with Venezuela; however, after the 1988 election of Hugo Chavez as President, Venezuela transformed politically, progressively straining relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{506} Notable among the political changes was the new Venezuelan constitution, which eliminated the Senate and established a unicameral National Assembly while it expanded presidential terms from five years to six.\textsuperscript{507} During his second term as president, Chavez announced a number of measures designed “to strengthen his power and move Venezuela toward his vision of 21st century socialism,” including a series of constitutional “reforms” and “nationalizations in key industries.”\textsuperscript{508} The Obama Administration, “concerned about the persistent erosion of democratic institutions and fundamental freedoms,”\textsuperscript{509} chose strategic engagement with Venezuela, characterized by principled bilateral diplomacy, rather than direct confrontation.\textsuperscript{510} This sentiment was articulated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during a July 2009 interview when she said “there needs to be a dialogue between the United States and

\textsuperscript{509} Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela, "US Policy Toward the Americas in 2010 and Beyond," Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives at US Congress in Washington, DC (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 10 March 2010).
Venezuela on a range of issues. However, the US-Venezuelan relationship has been characterized by both interdependence and antagonism, which are at odds with each other.

Venezuelan oil represents the strongest interdependence between the United States and Venezuela. In 2012, Venezuela exported 960,000 barrels of total crude oil to the United States, accounting for approximately 9 percent of US imports. While that percent declined throughout Obama’s first term, Venezuela remains the fourth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States. Furthermore, the US market represents 40% of Venezuela’s crude oil exports. In contrast to the one-dimensional nature of interdependence, US-Venezuelan antagonism focuses on many issues. Notable among the causes of Venezuelan antagonism is the history and perception of imperialist ambitions in the region. During President Bush’s second term, this perception resulted in a series of ambassadorial expulsions from Latin American states and a breakdown in formal US-Venezuelan relations. In the midst of growing civil unrest in Bolivia’s eastern regions, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled US Ambassador Philip Goldberg, accusing him of supporting the rebels. Pledging solidarity with the President Morales, Chavez expelled the US Ambassador to Venezuela Patrick Duddy and accused the United States of backing military officers plotting a coup against him. Upon taking office, the Obama Administration, in accordance with its policy of general strategic engagement, worked to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Venezuela. After high-level opening discussions between President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and their Venezuelan counterparts at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in April 2009, the United States and Venezuela agreed to resume full diplomatic relations.

Notable among the causes for US concern were Venezuela’s human rights record, military arms purchases, relations with Cuba and Iran, support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Hezbollah. Venezuela’s efforts to “export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries,” and its declining cooperation with US and regional anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts were significant concerns late into the

Obama Administration’s first term. Venezuelan actions, if not the provocative rhetoric of its iconic leaders, generated criticism from the Administration but did not precipitate escalatory behavior. In fact, despite the concerns listed above and a lack of common goals, Secretary Clinton noted the United States is “always looking for ways to work with the Venezuelan people…” and asserted “there is opportunity for everyone to work together on common goals.”

According to a US government report, American interests in Venezuela principally lie with “ensuring the continued flow of oil exports.” This statement, in addition to the lack of fundamental change in relationship despite significant concerns regarding regional security issues, such as strengthened Venezuelan relations with Cuba and Iran, suggests that US relations with Venezuela were driven by trade and economic priorities, a hallmark of American realism.

Multilateralism

GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

As the housing market bubble expanded in the late 1990s and into the mid-2000s, banks and mortgage brokers securitized mortgages as mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, reselling them to capital markets. The incentive for scrutiny during the individual loan application process was nearly negated by the transfer of risk once loans were bundled and sold. As the demand for these high-yield mortgage-based securities increased, banks were motivated to sell mortgages to individuals who would not be able to afford the terms when the housing bubble evaporated or interest rates rose. Following the peak in the housing market during late 2005 and early 2006), adjustments to mortgage terms triggered a cascade of defaults in most major US housing markets; thus began in mid-2007 the subprime mortgage crisis. As one commentator pointed out, “[t]he economic collapse and threat of worse things to come…though largely…American-made, quickly became global in its economic effects…” By the time of the 2008 presidential election, the United States, as well as much of the rest of the world, stood in the midst of a

518 Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, "Interview with Juan Carlos Lopez of CNN en Espanol," Interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 15 October 2011).
521 Indyk, Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy, 8.
financial crisis that was fast becoming a broad economic crisis that would become a vast unemployment crisis.

While President Obama’s recovery plan focused predominantly on domestic policies, such as the *American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009*, there was also a foreign policy component to the Administration’s plans. Historically, the United States addressed issues of global impact within international forums, such as the Group of Eight (G-8, comprising the EU, US, UK, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Canada) and its predecessors (G-7 and G-6). Instead of addressing the global economic crisis in the G-8, President Obama worked through “the larger, but nascent [Group of Twenty] G-20, in which all emerging economic powers [including China, India, and Brazil] were represented.” He considered the G-20 Summit “a historic and essential meeting,” and acknowledged that “we [the nations of the world] have a responsibility to coordinate our actions and to focus on common ground…” President Obama went on to state “[h]istory has shown us that when nations fail to cooperate, when they turn away from one another, when they turn inward, the price for our people only grows.”

According to Lawrence Summers, Director of the National Economic Council, President Obama insisted on adding the restoration of global economic growth to the agenda for the April 2009 London G-20 Summit. Having already passed the *American Recovery and Reinvestment Act* on 17 February 2009, Obama encouraged other member states to provide similar stimulus packages at home. He also worked with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to triple resources available to the International Monetary Fund. Out of the London summit came “an unprecedented set of comprehensive and coordinated actions,” according to President Obama. The group developed a “$1.1 trillion programme of support to restore credit, growth, and jobs in the world economy.” Following the summit, President Obama announced that regulatory

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reforms proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner “informed and enabled the coordinated action that we will take with our G-20 partners.”

Leading up to the September 2009 G-20 Summit, President Obama reiterated the need to continue to develop a coordinated global response. Of importance to the Administration was addressing the need for raising capital requirements in order to restore confidence in a shaky global banking sector. Out of the summit, G-20 members resolved to “launch a framework that lays out the policies and the way we act together to generate strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth… [ensure] regulatory system[s] for banks and other financial firms rein in the excesses that led to this crisis… reform the global architecture to meet the needs of the 21st century…”

During the next three years, President Obama attended four G-20 Summits and his Administration continued to work through the G-20 to develop and implement economic policies with a global reach. President Obama’s approach to the global economic crisis relied on multinational forums, such as the G-20, and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, to develop and implement economic strategies—parallel attributes of the emerging concept of multilateralism.

SOMALIA

The rise in piracy off the Horn of Africa stems from the overthrow of Somalia’s President Mohammed Said Barre in 1991 and the country’s steady decline into anarchy. In the power vacuum following the loss of centralized government there, rival warlords carved out territories of influence. The loss of an effective central government also increased lawlessness and gave rise to armed fisherman (modern-day pirates) who began robbing foreign vessels to make up for lost income. Land-based warlords then expanded their

regional influence to the sea co-opting the spoils of piracy and expanding their businesses into a multi-

million dollar hostage industry. Somali piracy, now endemic in the region, flourished due to this nexus of many conditions, but the most formative were the county’s unique position along a highly strategic global shipping lane and a central government nearly devoid of power.

Before 2006, few in the international community were interested in addressing piracy off the Horn of Africa. However, by 2008, the problem had drastically escalated—increasing from 7 attacks by Somali pirates in 2000 to 111 in 2008. The threat posed by Somali pirates, and those elsewhere in the world, to maritime shipping and the delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees and internally displaced persons was broadly acknowledged with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 on 2 June 2008. Specifically, the resolution noted the Security Council’s concern regarding “the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe, and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes, and to international navigation.”

When President Obama took the oath of office on 20 January 2009, much of the framework for his Administration’s policy related to Somali piracy and its implementation had already been laid out during the Bush-Obama transition. In December 2008, the Bush National Security Council published Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan, which articulated the desire “to involve all nations, international organizations, industry, and other entities that have an interest in maritime security to take steps to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa” and articulated how to “prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of Somali” piracy. The United States also drafted, promoted, and voted in support of two UN Security Council resolutions designed to facilitate the prevention, disruption, and punishment of Somali piracy, which were adopted in December 2008. UN Security Council Resolutions 1846 and 1851 together authorized “[s]tates and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at

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sea off the coast of Somalia” to pursue pirates from the open seas into the Somali territorial waters and onto land.\textsuperscript{538} On 8 January 2009, the Bush Administration established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with a mission to “disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity to improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”\textsuperscript{539} Soon thereafter, the United States chaired and hosted in New York City the first meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which included 34 stakeholder countries and organizations.\textsuperscript{540} Finally, on 16 January, the United States and Kenya signed a memorandum of understanding in which Kenya agreed to put suspected pirates captured by the United States through its judicial system.\textsuperscript{541}

President Obama endorsed his predecessor’s overarching strategy to leverage collective and coordinated efforts to prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of Somali piracy. However, his Administration developed its own implementation plan.\textsuperscript{542} The Obama implementation plan drew on many of the pieces put in place by the Bush Administration, in particular, the Obama policy objective related to a “coordinated federal response” was described in terms of implementing the December 2008 counter-piracy Action Plan and participating in the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. In terms of “actions by naval forces,” the Obama Administration continued to utilize CTF-151, the US-led multinational naval force that coordinated with NATO Operation OCEAN SHIELD, EU Operation ATALANTA, and unilateral naval forces in the area.\textsuperscript{543}

To improve the December 2008 counter-piracy Action Plan, the Obama Administration expanded material assistance to the Somali Transitional Federal Government to bolster on-shore security.\textsuperscript{544}
Administration also pursued additional memoranda of understanding to lessen the growing burden of pirate prosecution on any one state, namely Kenya.\footnote{Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "United States Actions to Counter Piracy off the Horn of Africa."} Although no additional memoranda of understanding were negotiated related to the prosecution of suspected Somali pirates, a trust fund was established to offset prosecution costs incurred by Kenya.\footnote{Ploch, "Piracy off the Horn of Africa," (2011), 18.} Finally, on 12 April 2010, President Obama signed Executive Order 13536, \textit{Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia}. This executive order authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to identify and block “all property and interests” under US jurisdiction of individuals that “have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia… obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia… supplied, sold, or transferred [arms or any related material, or technical advice, training, or assistance] to Somalia…”\footnote{Barack H. Obama, “Executive Order 13536—Blocking Property of Certain Individuals Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia,” 12 April 2010 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-concerning-somalia.}

In his remarks on accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama asserted that “America’s commitment to global security will never waiver. But in a world in which threats are more diffuse and missions more complex, America cannot act alone. America alone cannot secure peace… This is true in failed states like Somalia, where terrorism and piracy is joined by famine and human suffering.”\footnote{Obama, "Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, 10 December 2009," in \textit{Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Administration of Barack H. Obama}, 2009, 1801.} These remarks along with the multinational bent of the policy endorsed by President Obama and implemented by his Administration suggest alignment with the emerging concept of \textit{multilateralism}.

**Conclusion**

This chapter reviewed declaratory and employment policies during President Barak Obama’s first term. No single foreign policy concept defined his administration’s foreign policy; rather, it was a mixture of old and new concepts in US foreign policy. According to one review of President Obama’s first term, “what Obama ultimately offered, as forty-fourth president, was less a completely post-American approach embracing the wholesale rejection of the controversial Bush doctrine, than a promise of its more competent execution.”\footnote{Singh, \textit{Barack Obama's Post-American Foreign Policy: The Limits of Engagement}, 185.}
As such, President Obama continued or expanded upon the policies put in place by President Bush, such as those related to the global economic crisis and Somali piracy. Where he broke from President Bush’s policies lay in their execution, such as in Iran, where the United States emphasized diplomacy and a combination of positive and negative incentives vice brute force and strong rhetoric.

This chapter reviewed President Obama’s strategy documents and key speeches. The analysis suggests President Obama’s declaratory policies aligned with *exceptionalism*, *smart power*, and the emerging concept of *multilateralism*. The alignment of the major declaratory national security policies with the concepts in US foreign policy are summarized in Table 5. Unlike the policies developed to protect and promote US security and liberties, the policies developed to protect and promote US prosperity do not align with any of the US foreign policy concepts identified in this work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Exceptionalism</th>
<th>Smart Power</th>
<th>Multilateralism</th>
<th>Unaligned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Leadership</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Order</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Rhetorically, the Obama Administration defined itself as the anti-Bush Administration, but there were many instance, such as engagements in Somalia dealing with counter-piracy and in Pakistan dealing with counter-terrorism, that were less influenced by domestic political ideology and more by the previous administration’s approach to the conflict or crisis. This chapter reviewed key foreign policy engagements during President Obama’s first term. The analysis suggests President Obama’s means of engagement varied across the events but predominantly exhibited the attributes of *multilateralism* and *smart power*. Table 6, which summarizes the alignment of President Obama’s employment policies with concepts in US foreign policy, also notes the characteristics of *defensive expansionism*, *liberal internationalism*, and *American realism* among them.
Table 6. President Obama's Employment Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defensive Expansionism</th>
<th>Liberal Internationalism</th>
<th>Smart Power</th>
<th>American Realism</th>
<th>Multilateralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Economic Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks

More than 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States still sits, somewhat precariously perhaps, atop a unipolar world. It might be a bit surprising that many of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy continue to be relevant despite the dramatic shifts in the strategic environment. As demonstrated in this analysis of declaratory and employment policies of three post-Cold War administrations, changes in the strategic environment have driven the United States to also rely on a newly emerged concept—multilateralism—as an approach to global engagement. What follows is a review of the findings across three case studies and the implications of those findings: (1) there is a measure of continuity across administrations and (2) multilateralism has emerged as a new concept in America foreign policy; and a discussion of potential future avenues of research.

Findings

As one scholar noted, despite the debate raging at the end of the Cold War among academics and policy analysts, “[t]he actual content of US foreign policy has not necessarily changed radically as a result of the clamour outside the government.”550 In fact, all three post-Cold War administrations developed strategy to guide American foreign policy and engaged other nation states in ways that were generally unchanged from prior generations. This finding was demonstrated through the deconstruction of declaratory and employment policies and the alignment of those policy with the characteristics of traditional concepts in US foreign policy, confirming the hypothesis that the three post-Cold War administrations would continue to engage the world much as they had in the past, suggesting there is a measure of continuity in how administrations address similar situations regardless of political leaning. All three administrations examined also provided examples in their declaratory and employment policies that broke from the traditional concepts. These non-conforming examples exhibited similar characteristics, which suggested the emergence of a new concept in US foreign policy, dubbed multilateralism. Because the characteristics of multilateralism were observed in all three post-Cold War administrations, its emergence adds weight to the

assertion that there is continuity across administrations. For an aggregated summary of findings sorted by administration and foreign policy concept, see Table 7.

Table 7. Aggregated Policies by Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Expansionism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptionalism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximalism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Hegemony</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Imperialism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Internationalism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart Power</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Meliorism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Realism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaligned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, the characteristics of defensive expansionism, defined by an expansion of the scope and exercise of national power, were observed in the Clinton Administration’s response to Iraq after the assassination attempt on former President George H.W. Bush; in Bush’s declaratory policies regarding preemption and unilateralism and his administration’s decision to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq; and in the Obama Administration’s actions in Pakistan. The desire to lead by example, the hallmark of exceptionalism, was seen in President Obama’s scoping of US interests, specifically that of liberty. Maximalism, characterized by narrowly scoped interests in order to limit foreign engagement, aligned with the Clinton Administration’s decisions regarding Rwanda and Somalia and with the Bush Administration’s decisions regarding the anti-ballistic missile treaty, missile defense, and climate change.

The attributes of regional hegemony, defined by the desire to prevent foreign influence by limiting nation states from gaining sovereignty within geographic proximity to the United States, and progressive imperialism, characterized by the desire to prevent foreign influence by limiting nation states from gaining sovereignty in proximity of any area in which the US has interests, were observed in Clinton’s policy of dual containment in the Middle East. Liberal internationalism, characterized by a devotion to the advancement of democracy, rule of law, and human rights over material self-interest, were exhibited in
Clinton’s scoping of US interests; the Bush Administration’s actions in the Andean Ridge region of South America and elsewhere in Latin America; and in the Obama Administration’s actions in Libya.

Smart power blends the use of hard and soft power in relations with other nations. This characteristic is evident in Clinton’s dual containment policy and his administration’s actions regarding Cuban refugees and Ukrainian nuclear disarmament; and in Obama’s policies regarding American leadership and collective action and his administration’s relations with China, Iran, and North Korea. Global meliorism is characterized by the belief that the United States has a mission to make the world better and that this mission goes beyond just making the world safe for democracy and calls for making the world democratic. These characteristics were observed in Clinton’s policy of enlargement and his administration’s actions in Bosnia and Somalia; and in Bush’s scoping of American interests and his administration’s actions in Africa. The attributes of American realism, defined by the scoping interests in terms of trade, were observed in Clinton’s policy of enlargement and his administration’s relations with China; in the Bush Administration’s relations with China and actions in Sudan; and in the Obama Administration’s relations with Venezuela.

While this thesis did not attempt to quantify continuity or change, the frequency with which characteristics of the various traditional concepts were observed provides insight into a concept’s continued relevancy. The review of the policies sorted by concept above suggests that while some—defensive expansionism, maximalism, liberal internationalism, smart power, global meliorism, and American realism—continue to characterize policies within and across the post-Cold War administrations, others were less relevant or only relevant in very specific instances. Specifically, the attributes of exceptionalism, regional hegemony, and progressive imperialism are observed far less frequently in foreign policy than in decades past. These findings, taken together, illustrate a measure of bipartisan continuity across the post-Cold War administrations and their attempts to address a range of foreign policy issues. The explanation for this apparent continuity in the concepts of global engagement are complex but would include such factors as structural constraints in how policy is formulated, political biases of the policy-making elite, and logical perceptions of strategic risk based on history and geography. And while this paper does not attempt to
address why, in particular, an administration developed or employed policies that align with various traditional concepts in US foreign policy, it is important to understand that these forces are at play.

Of the concepts that remain relevant, for whatever reason, smart power is particularly so; in fact, the most recent administration relied heavily upon the concept. During her confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton noted the need to use and integrate “the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.”551 Throughout President Obama’s first term, Secretary Clinton avowed the importance of smart power.552 Furthermore, she implicitly acknowledged the limitations of soft power alone or hard power alone, in arguing the importance of smart power within the US foreign policy toolbox.553 This means of engagement was observed repeatedly in President Obama’s first term as it developed and executed policies toward China, Iran, and North Korea.

In addition to demonstrating many of the characteristics of past concepts in American foreign policy, all three post-Cold War administrations analyzed in this thesis developed policies and engaged nation states in a way that did not conform to previously identified concepts. However, for the most part, these unaligned declaratory and employment policies shared a set of characteristics, which have been termed multilateralism. The attributes of multilateralism include a dependency on multilateral consensus, with administrations often yielding to that consensus; an understanding that multilateral agreements and alliances are required to foster a stable international order; and a reliance on international organizations to address regional and global issues. For example, the characteristics of multilateralism were observed in President Clinton’s policy of engagement and in his administration’s actions in Bosnia and Haiti, in relations with North Korea, and in its support of the redefining of NATO’s mission and NATO enlargement. President Bush developed many individual policies that aligned with and required multilateralism for success: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks

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against the United States and its friends; working with others to defuse regional conflicts; expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; and developing agendas for cooperation with other main centers of global power. Furthermore, US relations with North Korea during President Bush’s first term and his administration’s efforts to advance peace in the Middle East provide exemplars of *multilateralism* in action. Finally, the characteristics of *multilateralism* were observed in President Obama’s scoping of American interests (specifically security), collective action, and international order and in his administration’s approach to advancing the Middle East peace process and US relations with North Korea.

**Implications**

Insights can be drawn from two points evident in the data: (1) there is a measure of continuity across administrations and (2) *multilateralism* has emerged as a new concept in America foreign policy. Regarding the first observation, given rhetoric, the casual observer would suspect Democratic and Republican administrations to act very differently. In fact, Francis Fukuyama recently noted “[t]he two dominant American political parties have become more ideologically polarized than at any time since the late nineteenth century.”\(^{554}\) Despite the ideological disparity between the three administrations, similar situations were often addressed in similar ways suggesting there might be an “American way” of doing things. For example, US relations with China, as demonstrated in the Clinton and Bush case studies, highlighted the need for the United States to balance economic interests against defending human rights. Both administrations developed polices in which economic interests won out over defending human rights—an example of *American realism*. In contrast, the Obama Administration, according to the mini-case presented, did not directly choose between these two conflicting interests. This cross-case analysis is not wholly uniform but supports the argument that administrations do address similar situations in similar ways regardless of where they fall on the domestic political spectrum (see Table 8).

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Another exemplar of consistency is the war on terror, which spanned two of the three administrations—Bush and Obama—and resulted in protracted engagements in multiple countries. The engagements related to the war on terror analyzed in this thesis included Iraq and Afghanistan during the Bush Administration and Pakistan during the Obama Administration (see Table 8). Rhetorically, the Obama Administration defined itself as the anti-Bush Administration, but it is evident that domestic political ideology was not the guiding force in the development of the Obama counter-terrorism strategy. The decisions to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq under President Bush and the expansion of the “drone war” in Pakistan under President Obama demonstrate characteristics that closely align with defensive expansionism. The final example of consistency across administrations can be seen in the multilateral approach the United States took under all three administrations to address the North Korean nuclear weapons program (see Table 8). Although multilateralism only emerged as a concept in American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, its emergence illustrates continuity in how the United States engages the world across administrations. While not tested over time in the same way as the traditional concepts, it may prove to be as enduring. The results of these three cross-case analyses suggest policymakers should not limit their historical review to ideological “mentors” when searching for foreign policy solutions. Instead, or at least in addition, policymakers should review how other administration, regardless of political leanings, addressed similar situations or crises in the past.

The second observation—the emergence of multilateralism—brings to the fore the debates surrounding American decline, international balancing, and the development of a multipolar environment. Speculation
by Frances Fukuyama, Charles Krauthammer, Kenneth Waltz, and others regarding the implications of the end of the Cold War on US foreign policy were like most predictions, neither entirely correct, nor entirely wrong. Where Fukuyama argued that the “end of history” would bring a “peace dividend,” intra- and international conflicts have continued to erupt. As Krauthammer predicted, the United States has dominated the international system as the unipolar power and it has yet to yield stability. While Waltz argued the unipolar environment was inherently unstable and would quickly give way to a multipolar environment, competitors to the US position remain unbalanced in comparison. However, all were correct in suggesting the United States would need to develop new means of engagement to account for changes in the strategic environment. Despite the continued relevance of traditional concepts in US foreign policy, the emergence of multilateralism as a viable new option, or in some cases requisite, within the US foreign policy tool kit acknowledges the reality that the end of the Cold War was a watershed moment and the strategic environment evolved. This raises questions regarding how best to promote and protect the nation’s interests in this new environment. Regardless of the final answer, the question requires an understanding of the relationship between multilateralism and the strategic environment.

One interpretation of the emergence of multilateralism relates to what Josef Joffe describes as “the false prophesy of America’s decline.” Joffe states, “[e]very ten years, it is decline time in the United States.” He goes on to refute each period of professed decline and argue that the present perception of US decline is a false one. 555 Adding to the misperception school of American decline, Charles Krauthammer describes the emergence of multilateralism, as defined in this thesis, as “a fiction or a farce.” He states the idea that the international community could “enforce norms and maintain stability is absurd” and merely a “metaphor for a world run by a kind of multipolar arrangement not of nation-states but of groups of states acting through multilateral bodies, whether institutional… or ad hoc.” Krauthammer likens the emergence of multilateralism in the Clinton and Obama Administrations to a renunciation of primacy by the United States. He goes on to suggest that this renunciation, and the resulting decline, is a choice; one the United States does not have to choose. 556 In this light, multilateralism is an option the United States can ignore and not so much a function of changes in the strategic environment as a function of choice. The idea that

decline is a choice is supported by the fact that the Obama Administration developed declaratory policy in which regaining US primacy was a goal. Other evidence presented in this thesis, particularly President Clinton’s policy in Bosnia and President Bush’s Middle East peace policy, disputes this interpretation.

In contrast to the Joffe-Krauthammer school of thought, Kenneth Waltz asserts, in a 2012 conversation with James Fearon, that a unipolar environment incentivizes other states to raise themselves to a “level that would return the world to a bipolar condition.” Ultimately, the challenging state does not have to equal the polar state, rather, it merely has to be strong enough to challenge the polar state. This would, in turn, limit the polar state’s ability to “pursue pointless interventions…” Waltz goes on to quote Alexander Hamilton who said, “‘History records no incidence in which a dominant power has disposed of its capabilities responsibly.’” From this he gleaned that “[w]hat one thinks may be good for one’s own country and at the same time good for others is not going to be looked upon by other countries as serving their interests but rather as serving the self-defined interests of the dominant power.” 557 In relation to the findings of this thesis, it can be argued that multilateralism is a result of the forcing function, which, according to Waltz, is inherent in unipolarity. While China has not yet grown in strength to be a second pole, it has begun to assert its strength as have other countries when working in combination. These challengers are limiting the options from which the United States develops its foreign policy, thus indirectly influencing decision-making.

According to Robert Pape, European, Middle Eastern, and Asian powers have been using soft balancing techniques to contain US military power since as early as 2002. In contrast to hard balancing techniques, such as “military build-ups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to US opponents,” soft balancing includes “actions that do not directly challenge the US military preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies.” Likewise, T.V. Paul notes the rise in “bandwagoning, buck-passing, and free-riding” by second-ranking states to constrain American power and maintain their security and influence. 558 Furthermore, he asserts that “[s]oft balancing has become an attractive strategy through which second-tier major powers are able to challenge

the legitimacy of the interventionist policies of the United States and its allies…”559 While the legitimacy of soft balancing as a coherent theoretical concept, or merely an ad hoc explanation of actions, remains under debate,560 that balancing in some form is occurring is supported by the data presented in this thesis regarding defensive expansionism, maximalism, and multilateralism (specifically, attempts, whether successful or not, by states, individually or collectively, to influence US decision-making). If the international system is indeed balancing against the United States this begs two questions for policymakers. What does this kind of transitional international environment mean for US national security? How can the United States best protect and promote its interests abroad? Which, if any, of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy will continue to be relevant?

In terms of national security, Pape states that while soft balancing may not be able “to prevent the United States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, it will increase the costs of using US power, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future US military adventures, and possibly shift the balance of economic power against the United States.”561 The United States has two options given the development of balancing within the international system and the potential rise of other poles. It can either work within the constraints that exist and continue to increasingly rely on multilateralism as a means of foreign policy engagement or it can attempt to change the constraints. The former option leverages what the United States is already doing in terms of multilateralism. The key to success lies in doing so to US advantage, or at least to minimize US disadvantage. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski suggests the United States should act as the “promoter and guarantor of greater and broader unity in the West” and the “balancer and conciliator between the major powers in the East.” The guarantor role could be established

by, among other things, maintaining close ties with Europe, continuing the US commitment to and expanding NATO, and guaranteeing the West’s geopolitical relevance. Brzezinski argues that failure to do so will prevent the West from competing with China for global relevance. On the other hand, the United States could attempt to regain a measure of primacy by changing the constraints within the international system. One method to accomplish this would be by pursuing a less activist foreign policy, which, according to Barry Posen, would minimize balancing against the United States. Another way would be to redefine international constraints by pursuing multilateral foreign policy on less important issues in order to increase US freedom of choice on more important issues and vital interests.

This thesis hypothesized that despite the evolution of the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War, a review of the foreign policy developed and employed by the post-Cold War administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama would show the concepts underlying their foreign policy continued to align with traditional concepts. The analysis documented above suggests that while the characteristics of traditional concepts in American foreign policy were evident in many of the policies developed and employed, the post-Cold War administrations of Clinton, Bush, and Obama also broke from these traditional concepts. This thesis documented and began to characterize the emerging concept of multilateralism, the emergence of which demonstrates the continued evolution of American approaches to foreign policy and suggests that, following another great shift in the strategic and security environment, another new concept in American foreign policy will emerge. This will not negate the importance or applicability of the concepts that came before (just as the emergence of multilateralism does not negate the importance or applicability of the traditional concepts described in this thesis), rather the emergence will confirm yet another paradigm shift in the strategic environment.

**Future Research**

While this research provides insights into how the United States conducts its foreign policy and lessons for policy-makers, it leaves many questions unresolved. As noted above:

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• If the international system is indeed balancing against the United States, what does this mean for US national security?
• How can the United States best protect and promote its interests abroad in a system that is balancing against it?
• Which, if any, of the traditional concepts in American foreign policy will continue to be relevant?

The final question is perhaps the easiest to answer. All of the concepts in American foreign policy will continue to be relevant to varying degrees. This analysis demonstrated that, without exception, the characteristics of all of the concepts in American foreign policy described in this thesis (old and new) can be seen in the strategy documents that guide foreign policy engagements and in the engagements themselves. While some concepts are employed (consciously or unconsciously) in only very discrete circumstances, others have broader applicability. A broader, longitudinal study executed in a more systematic way could provide additional insights. The study could broaden its inputs by considering how bureaucratic constraints and interagency deliberations influenced the execution of foreign policy. The study could lengthen its timeframe to include HW Bush, the first term of the next administration, or to include the second terms of Clinton, Bush, and Obama. In terms of structure, the study could be conducted more systematically by reviewing recurring events across all of the cases, e.g., the Middle East peace process, the North Korean nuclear program, NATO).

Additionally, the research brings to light three avenues of research still unexplored. First, this research did not address why an administration developed or employed policies that align with specific concepts. What factors informed policy options that were developed? Second, this research did not address the effectiveness of various concepts in American foreign policy, either in terms of a specific type of crisis, conflict, or set of situational criteria or across various types of events. What factors lead to the effective employment of a given concept? Finally, this research did not directly address the specific root causes driving the emergence of multilateralism. Is it a doctrinal response or an inevitable outgrowth of the post-Cold War security environment?
Appendix A. References


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### Appendix B. Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRA</td>
<td>American Recovery and Reinvestment Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<em>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Organization of the Americas</td>
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<td>G-6</td>
<td>Group of Six</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>House Resolution</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>IIS</td>
<td>Iraqi Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>Light Water Reactor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most-Favored Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NSSR</td>
<td>National Security Strategy Report</td>
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<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PNTR</td>
<td>Permanent Normal Trade Relations</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>RtoP</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Appendix C. Personal Statement

*Per angusta ad augusta.* My time at Johns Hopkins has not been brief. I began my coursework for a Certificate in National Security Studies in the fall of 2007, long before Hopkins even offered a Master of Arts in Global Security Studies. Eventually, I transferred into the MA program and slowly completed my coursework (one class at a time) in May 2010. All that remained was to write a thesis. Over the next year, I found excuse after excuse not to start writing. By the spring of 2012, I could find no more excuses. Sadly, the draft I submitted in January 2013, which broke down and compared the Bush and Obama national security strategy documents, did not meet Dr. Ariel Roth’s expectations. After a brief period of despondency, I started all over; this time looking at the foreign policy of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations (in terms of both declaratory and employment policy) and compared them to historic concepts in US foreign policy.

It should come as no surprise that I could not have completed this thesis without the help of others. Foremost, I am eternally indebted to Dr. Kevin Woods who, throughout the entire process, provided me with sound advice, critical comments, and much-needed motivation. Without his guidance, this thesis might well be devoid of any merit. Yet, still, I wandered aimless at times. For a much needed swift kick in the ass, I would like to thank Gillian Savage who shamed me into asking for a formal deadline. Ultimately, it was the deadlines set by Dr. Mark Stout that provided my roadmap to completion. For what seemed, at the time, to be his unrealistic expectations I am very grateful. However, completing my thesis in the timeframe set would not have been possible except for the accommodation of time provided by those I work with, especially Dr. Kevin Woods, Laura Odell, and Aundra Campbell. I would also like to thank Carolyn Leonard for her editorial review of my thesis, Dr. Ariel Roth for caring enough to say he didn’t want to see me fall off the side of the world a second time, and Jim Kurtz and Karl Lowe for asking for status updates literally every time either of them saw me walk down the hall.

On a more personal level, I want to thank my mother, my father, and my brother for their love, support, and faith in me and my ability to finish. I also want to thank some friends. Dr. Juliet Fuhrman was my professor, my undergraduate adviser, and my first boss. But more importantly, she is an amazing role
model, mentor, and friend. Mary “Hawkrad” Hawkins made me laugh when I wanted to cry, calmed me down when I wanted to scream, and always had time for a coffee break, a bathroom break, or a stroll around the floor. Tony Johnson was my shield against the catty comments made by those jealous of my long tenure at Hopkins. Mike Caunedo, despite the distance, was always there for me and helped me weather all of my storms. Finally, I want to thank Chetna, Kristina, Liz, and Sarah who rolled their eyes each time I responded to an invite with “I have to work on my thesis” but stood by me nonetheless. At times I doubted I would ever finish, but, as Nelson Mandela so famously said about ending Apartheid in South Africa, “It always seems impossible until it’s done.” Well, this thesis is finally done! Who’s up for a gin and tonic?
Appendix D. Curriculum Vitae

ANA MARIA VENEGAS

PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS

2902 10th Street, NE
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EDUCATION

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<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>Global Security Studies, concentration in Strategic Studies, summa cum laude, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
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POSITIONS HELD

- Research Associate, Joint Advanced Warfighting Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA (2009–Present)
- Biologist/Lab Manager, National Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD (1997–2009)
- Research Technician, Research Center for Genetic Medicine, Children’s National Medical Center, Washington, DC (1996–1997)
- Research Technician, Department of Biology, Tufts University, Medford, MA (1994–1996)

HONORS AND AWARDS

- Summa Cum Laude, Johns Hopkins University (2014)
- Five-Year Service Award, Institute for Defense Analyses (2014)
- Ten-Year Service Award, Department of Health and Human Services (2007)
- Five-Year Service Award, Department of Health and Human Services (2002)
- Dean’s List, Tufts University (1994)
- Varsity, Track and Field, Tufts University (1994)
- Varsity, Track and Field, Tufts University (1993)

MEMBERSHIPS IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

- Women in International Security (2009–Present)
PUBLICATIONS

Peer-Reviewed Publications


* Co-First Authors

Books


Reports


VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

Fundraiser, raised over $4000, Avon Foundation for Women, New York, NY (2014)

POST-COLLEGIATE RACES

2013 DC Diva Dash, 5K Race, Frederick, MD
2011 DC Hot Chocolate Run, 5K Race, Women’s Open, Oxon Hill, MD
2002 Bay State (Olympic) Triathlon, Women’s Team, Bike Leg, Medford, MA
2001 Falmouth Sprint Triathlon, Women’s Open, Falmouth, MA
2000 Falmouth Sprint Triathlon, Women’s Open, Falmouth, MA
1999 12 Hours of Hollywood Farms, Mountain Biking, Women’s Sport, Fredericksburg, VA
1999 24 Hours of Canaan, Mountain Biking, Five-Person Open Team, Team Ballot, Davis, WV
1994 Bay State Games, Track and Field, 200m Sprint, Woburn, MA