THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION

by

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Abstract

This dissertation asks how American identity was formed, contested, and manifested through its interaction with two significant Others — the European empires and the Native Americans — during the country’s formative era in order to understand the origins of American liberal internationalism and popular imperialism. I argue that American identity was constituted in two different ways: as a transformative state against the Westphalian system, and as a civilizing force over “barbarian” natives. Two of the main US foreign policy orientations — the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian traditions— result from these formative encounters. I demonstrate that a hierarchical, tripartite model of the “standard of civilization” in American security discourse emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century: the USA was at the top, as the revolutionary vanguard of human progress; European international society, which would be eventually reformed in America’s own image, is in the middle; and at the bottom are non-white Others who need to be removed or assimilated.

By examining plural and contested American identities and their contending foreign policy traditions, this study offers a new perspective on several important historical and contemporary features of American foreign policy. With the constructivist prism of identity–interest–policy contestations and mixtures, the United States’ contradictory and differentiated attitudes towards the West and the “Rest” can be explained. Underlying my academic interests is an ethical concern about the trajectory of inter-civilizational relationship in modern global politics. This project sheds light on the exclusivist form of American exceptionalism that is obsessed with the representation of “inferior” Others, as well as a desire to reconstruct them in the American image. By engaging this normative question about dialogues among different civilizations, this research explores alternative options for US grand strategy in the age of the War on Terrorism.
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I. Introduction

This dissertation asks how American exceptional identities were formed, contested, and manifested through their interaction with two significant Others, the European empires and the Native Americans, during the United States’ formative era (circa. 1754/56~1823/31).

I argue that, in the wider systemic context of hegemonic rivalry between Britain and France, US identity, informed by its European discursive heritage–Republicanism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment–and entangled with two negative Others, was constituted in two different ways: as a transformative state against the Westphalian system and as a civilizing force over “barbarian” natives. Two of the main US foreign policy doctrines or contending conceptualizations of the national role with American characteristics, the Madisonian/Jeffersonian tradition (the origin of liberal internationalism) and the Jacksonian tradition (the origin of popular imperialism), were produced by these ambivalent American Selves.

In this context, a hierarchical, tripartite model of the “standard of civilization” in American foreign policy discourse emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century. First, it defines the nature of the international system as well as the place of the nation in the world. Second, it produces a particular American attitude toward the outside: the USA at the top as a revolutionary vanguard of human progress, European international society that should be negotiated and reformed in the American own image later in the middle, and at the bottom, the “Rest,” non-white Others that need to be removed or assimilated.

My study aims to offer an alternative hypothesis on US foreign policy by constructing a causal/constitutive mechanism between American exceptional identities, interests, and practices. It is a competing argument against the conventional structuralist/materialist understanding of US diplomacy in that America’s foreign behaviors will be illustrated as the outcome of its socially constructed identities not as the logical products of a pregiven anarchic international structure. Furthermore, the
examination of the multiple, contested American identities and, consequently, their contending foreign policy traditions will offer a new outlook on a variety of important historical junctures in American foreign affairs. Through the prism of identity–interest–policy contestations and mixtures, the United States’ contradictory, differentiated attitudes towards the West and the “Rest” will be explained.¹ The sharp contrast between America’s non-liberal approach to the non-European world and its liberal internationalist posture to the Atlantic world can be understood as a legacy of its two-faced original identity.

I demonstrate this argument by reconstructing the intercommunal² history between Euro-American colonizers (and later American citizens), native inhabitants, and the three European empires (Britain, France, and Spain) from the mid-eighteenth century to the early-nineteenth century and by showing how the two categories of Others, Europeans and Native Americans, defined the ideational boundaries of America through successive stages of conflict and nation-building.

Concerning the research materials, this research relies mainly on two revisionist readings of US history. Both “republicanism” and “the New Western History” are against the dominant liberal-nationalist consensus that depicts the trajectory of America as an ongoing march of liberal values or a triumphalist monologue of a Lockean Self that has few interactions with the outside world. Indeed, these two intellectual rebellions attempt to restore various dialogues between the American Ego and Alter and reveal the

¹ For a conceptual history of the distinction between the West and the “Rest,” see Hall (1996b).

² Here, we need to note that the modern Europe-oriented term inter-“national” is inappropriate to describe what happened between empires, English colonies/states, and native tribes in early modern North America. That is, we should consider “the sovereign territorial states that are associated with the Westphalian settlement of 1648 as only one type of polity” in world history so as not to fall into the error of Eurocentrism or presentism (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1997, 22). Xavier Guillaume’s (2011, 2) caution that the conventional conceptualization of “the international” presupposing the territorial state system is too limiting “when one is concerned with either non-Western, postcolonial or pre/postmodern experiences” is crucial in this sense. We might coin such new terms as “inter-communal” (Grosvogui, 1996) or “inter-polity” relations to accurately understand our historical context. Even when we habitually use the term “international,” this contextual caveat needs to be noted. See also Kupperman (2002).
discursive (re)production of the US. First, the so-called “germ theory,” which argues that almost all American cultural characteristics are merely transplants of the European Enlightenment, was a prevailing interpretation of American political thought. Therefore, what makes America exceptional is its socio-economic condition as a “born liberal” state, which was conducive to building a liberal society *par excellence* (Hartz, 1991). By contrast, republican revisionists seek to dissect American exceptional identity by illuminating America’s multiple relationships with historical and contemporary Others, ranging from Rome to the British Empire.

Second, the New Western History movement (along with the frontier-borderlands approach) notes that early modern America should be reread in the context of transnational/inter-imperial relations on the continent, as opposed to the dominant nationalist narrative that has regarded present US borders as being constant and sacrosanct. The movement particularly emphasizes that the interior of early modern North America was the genuine transnational sphere in which a variety of European empires, Euro-American colonies, and native nations competed and allied in both equal and hierarchical manners. Relations between Europeans and Amerindians are reconsidered not as part of US domestic development, but as part of early American foreign or imperialist policy (Citino, 2004, 202–203). The manner by which racialized American identity was constructed through (violent) encounters with native Others is brought into relief in this alternative narrative.
II. The Analytic Framework

1. The “Domestic Politics Turn” in IR

The reason I focus on the national identity variable is that it is a critical link mediating interstate structure and state interest/policy in the social sphere (Jepperson et al., 1996, 59). This approach is in opposition to the conventional understanding of state behavior in the discipline of International Relations (IR) and deeply engages with a broader debate between systemic and domestic-political theories of foreign policy (Fearon, 1998; Carlsnaes, 2012). In mainstream neorealist (and neoliberal) accounts, the anarchic, self-help structure of the international system (the “third” image) overwhelmingly determines national interest and foreign policy, and the question of national identity is bracketed because all states are functionally undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979, 93-97; 127-128). In other words, as all countries are exposed to a hostile international environment to the same degree, peculiarities of each state-agency/character can be ignored and exclusive attention can be given to the game among “billiard ball-type (= like units)” modern nation-states. It is simply assumed that states are rational, utility-maximizing actors who pursue “self-interest” objectively defined in material terms, such as power, survival, and economic welfare (Wendt, 1992, 391-392; Ruggie, 1998, 6-9).

However, even within the paradigm of microeconomics on which Kenneth Waltz and other structuralist heavily rely, a theory of the firms who are principal actors in the economic sphere is indispensable to construct a theory of markets. Especially when the market is not a perfect competitive one but an oligopolistic or monopolistic one, similar

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3 On the rationalist-materialist-economist conversion between neorealism and neoliberalism or the “neo-neo synthesis,” see Baldwin ed. (1993) and Waever (1996). Basically, they are founded upon the individualist rational actor model (RAM) originated from microeconomics (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 13-75). Although ideational variables, such as identity and norm, are increasingly mentioned in contemporary liberal theorization, Ole Waever (2002, 21) points out that “these are only factors which intervene between the self-help seeking state and the ensuing state action, not factors which change state identity itself.” In this regard, Alexander Wendt (1999, 35) criticizes, “Neoliberalism concedes too much to Neorealism a priori, reducing itself to the secondary status of cleaning up residual variance left unexplained by a primary theory.”
to actual major power politics, we should analyze the internal characters of each conglomerate to understand the specific dynamics of the market (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 407n18). By analogy, we need to examine the domestic context of contemporary leading powers or hegemons to grasp a particular moment of world order.4

Interestingly, Juliet Kaarbo (2015) highlights that there has been a “domestic politics turn” in recent IR scholarship. Neoclassical realism, some variants of liberalism, and unit-level constructivism represent this “trend toward incorporating domestic and decision-making factors… across IR theories” (2, emphasis original).5 I will briefly introduce the contending approaches in the “domestic politics turn” (unit-level constructivism, neoclassical realism, liberal theory, and role theory) and explain how my study will eclectically benefit from all of them, although it is mainly predicated on the constructivist research program.

First of all, reflectivists have persuasively insisted that national identity, which is socially constructed and not deductively, exogenously given, constitutes the historically contingent content of the national interest.6 After the Cold War ended, the sudden

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4 Waltz (1996, 57) stubbornly stuck to his division of labor between IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) later, stating that “economists get along quite well with separate theories of firms and markets. Students of international politics will do well to concentrate on, and make use of, separate theories of internal and external politics.”

5 Additionally, we note here that eminent game theorist Bueno De Mesquita (2002, 7) shares the same conclusion on the arbitrary demarcation between “internal” and “external” spheres in IR: “when we examine international affairs through the lens of domestic decision making we provide a way to think about how properties of the international system are shaped by local considerations as part of the larger strategic fabric of politics… International politics are not given to us as some predetermined exogenous fact of life, wholly formed and shaped independent of our choices. International politics are formed by the aggregated consequences of our individual and collective decisions.”

6 In fact, Hans Morgenthau, in contrast to Waltz, acknowledged that the state’s interest was to “protect [its] physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations” (1952, 972, emphasis mine). He also argued that “the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (1978, 8-9, emphasis mine). Thus, in the classical realist paradigm, the way one state defines its non-material Ego is also important to determine the content of national interest, which cannot be deductively presupposed without empirical inquires in specific contexts.
collapse of bipolarity exposed the explanatory limitedness of a prevailing “actor-general” theory solely based on system-level variables. Instead, domestic variables in foreign policy analysis came to be stressed to explain system change, and the need for an “actor-specific” theory fully emerged (Hudson, 2012, 30). In particular, various strands of constructivists have signaled the “return of culture and identity in IR theory” (Lapid and Kratochwil ed., 1997), and a large amount of empirical study showing the powerful co-constitutive relationship between the interests of states, the national identities on which those interests depend, and state behaviors has been accumulated within the constructivist research program.7

Constructivist theory is based on a fundamental philosophical assumption that “collective expectations can have strong causal effects” (Katzenstein, 1996, 7). The existence of “social facts”8 or an “intersubjective reality” is stressed in constructivist IR because “(a) human interaction is shaped by primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or ‘intersubjective’ beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, 392-393). Of course, this ontological (and epistemological) orientation comes from a group of philosophers and sociologists after the so-called “linguistic/cultural turn.”9 According to Hopf’s (2002, 5) brief summary, this new trend in philosophy teaches that individual’s choices are restricted by the intersubjective social structure. Peter Berger and

7 For instance, see Katzenstein ed. (1996); Weldes et al. ed. (1999). The content of the constructivist research program is briefly illustrated in Finnemore and Sikkink (2001); Hopf (1998).

8 Social facts “exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, 393). They “depend, by way of collective understanding and discourse, on the attachment of collective knowledge to physical reality” (Adler, 2013, 121).

9 Bonnell and Hunt (1999, 5-11) provides a succinct overview of the broad paradigm shift in the late twentieth-century sociological and historical analysis. The linguistic or cultural turn, fueled by the rise of (post)structuralism, problematizes the utilitarian, materialist understanding of the social in the dominant “scientific/positivistic” paradigm and focuses instead on culture as a “symbolic, linguistic, and representational system.”
Thomas Luckmann’s “social stock of knowledge,” Michel Foucault’s “discursive formation,” Pierre Bourdieu’s “habitus,” Clifford Geertz’s “web of meaning,” and Edmund Husserl’s “life world” all indicate the existence of an overarching cognitive framework or “a particular sociohistorical temporal space within which particular intersubjective meanings predominate.” In this theoretical plan, the concept of identity is privileged since it acts as a cognitive grid that helps to determine what outside information one should accept and use. In particular, the acts of assigning an identity to Others determines one’s attitude to the outside groups and generates one’s decisions and responses to Others (Hopf, 2002, 6).

In explaining foreign policy, constructivists along with other branches of reflectivists argue that the reigning rationalist approach or “neo-utilitarianism” lacks any “analytical means for dealing with the fact that the specific identities of specific states shape their perceived interests, and, thereby, patterns of international outcomes” (Ruggie, 1998, 14). According to Peter J. Katzenstein, who edited the seminal volume, The Culture of National Security, that laid the groundwork for constructivist models of national security, “sociological institutionalism” problematizes the state interest that neorealists and neoliberals take for granted and focuses on “the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors on the other.” The main purpose of their collective work was to establish a causal-constitutive mechanism between social factors (such as norms, identity, and culture) and national security policy (Katzenstein, 1996, 1-5).

Regarding identity in particular, contributors to the edited volume emphasize that “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity affect the national security interests or policies of states” (Jepperson et al., 1996, 60). As a relational concept,

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10 The so-called “ideational turn” was a broader, trans-subfield movement in the late twentieth-century political science. The theoretical shift basically challenged the rational choice theory’s notion of exogenously given, materially derived self-interest and focused instead on the role of ideas giving content to interests in specific historical settings (Blyth, 2003).
identity implies “definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies” (Katezenstein, 1996, 18-19). States decide what their interests are after they represent what their Others – often enemies – are.11 That is, the sources and content of state security interests should not be treated as something “out there” deduced by the material structure, such as anarchy and balance of power (as rationalists do),12 but as dependent variables that should be explained by a focus on the interplay between the material and cultural contexts including norms and identity which are, in turn, not essential to actors but “emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international” (Katzenstein, 1996, 24). Thus, both national identity and its attending interest “must be investigated empirically in concrete historical settings” (Katzenstein, 1996, 24).

Hopf (2002) and Weldes (1999) go deep into the domestic process of the ideational construction of state identities and interests not only against the Waltzian materialist rationalism but also against the Wendtian focus on the systemic level of analysis.13 Delving into his own original slogan, “anarchy is what states make of it,” Alexander Wendt (1999, 246-312) focuses on the dynamics of collective identity formation among states and the categorization of systemic cultures (“three cultures of anarchy”) in world politics. According to Wendt, a culture of anarchy is “the deep structure of an international system” that is “formed by the shared understandings governing organized violence” (313). Then, three ideal type cultures of anarchy are

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11 Jutta Weldes also argues that “the interests of the state are already entailed within the representations in which the identities of and relations among the relevant actors or objects are established… Once a situation has been described, that is, the national interest has already been determined; it emerges out of the representations of identities and relationships constructed by state officials” (1999, 14, emphasis original).

12 Although Waltz (1979) also uses terms such as “socialization” and “imitation,” these are actually simple conceptual devices to delineate the birth of undifferentiated pregiven state actors under anarchy. His theory of international politics is asocial. In his theoretical schema, “the processes determining the fundamental identity of states are exogenous to the states’ environments, global and domestic” (Jepperson et al., 1996, 41). See also Blaney and Inayatullah (1997, 68-69).

13 From the beginning, Wendt (1999, 11) clearly declares: “Like Waltz, I am interested in international politics, not foreign policy.”
advanced such as “Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian,” which are “based on and constitute different role relationships between states: enemy, rival, and friend” (313). In each culture, states have shared ideas and common identities to some degree and those unit-level characters, in turn, constitute the culture of structure. First, the Hobbesian culture, resonating with offensive neorealism in IR, is characterized by enmity among states, and “to kill or to be killed” is the central logic of anarchy. This is the world of *bellum omnium contra omnes* with little institutional or normative constraint (259-278).

Second, the Lockean culture is similar to a defensive neorealist or a neoliberal description of anarchy. Although competitive rivalry is pervasive among states, sometimes partial cooperation does occur. Also, the rule of coexistence or the norm of sovereignty is respected in this anarchical “society” in an English School’s sense (279-297). Last, in the Kantian culture, the Westphalian system is radically transformed. States regard each other as friends, and friendship between them is a common social phenomenon. Although this culture is not a cosmopolitan community under the one world government, the collective security system is established to promote interstate military cooperation (297-308). To differentiate distinctive cultures of anarchy is important, for “many state interests are constructions of the international system” (234). In other words, we should first dissect what culture of anarchy or shared notion embedded in the collective identities of state exists in order to explain what states’ identities and interests are in a particular historical setting in Wendtian system-centric theoretical schema: states are destined to “internalize” the given, outside culture of anarchy.

The structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which of our three roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate those systems, and state will be under corresponding pressure to *internalize* that role in their identities and interests (259, emphasis mine).

In contrast, Hopf (2002, 288) criticizes Wendt’s concentration on the systemic level of analysis on the grounds that it profoundly “simplifies, categorizing complexity away and making a priori assumptions about the nature of its units and their interactions that may do so much violence to empirical reality as to cast doubt on the utility of the project.” Also, Weldes (1999, 9) points out that “Wendt’s ‘anthropomorphized’
understanding of the state” is the same as realist characterizations of the state as a “black box.” In this reified assumption, domestic dynamics are ignored in the production process of state identities and interests (Neumann, 1999, 33-34). Although coming from different traditions of social theory, Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Castoriadis (1987) respectively, both Hopf and Weldes agree that uncovering the social origins of identities embedded in the major states’ cultural foundation or symbolic universe is most consequential to understanding their “security imaginary”\(^\text{14}\) or “social cognitive structure”\(^\text{15}\) that, in turn, constructs foreign policy “at home.” Hopf’s (2002, 288) slogan “bringing societies back in” mainly assumes:

Every foreign policy decision maker is as much a member of the social cognitive structure that characterizes her society as any average citizen. Charged with the daily responsibility of understanding other states in world politics, she is most unlikely to be able to escape from this structure. Her understandings of these other states rely on her own state’s Self. In large part, understandings of Self are constructed domestically out of the many identities that constitute the discursive formations that, in turn, make up the social cognitive structure of society (37).

Weldes (1999, 9) shares the same level of analysis to find out where national interest is constructed:

[S]tate officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate onto which meanings are only written as a result of interactions among states. Instead, they approach international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of international politics, and of the place of their state within the international system. This appreciation, in turn, is necessarily rooted in collective meanings already produced, at least in part, in domestic political and cultural contexts.

Thus, the task of constructivist approaches to foreign policy is defined as “to find

\(^{14}\) A security imaginary means “a structure of well-established meanings and social relations out of which representations of the world of international relations are created.” Therefore, the imaginary offers “the cultural raw materials out of which representations of states, of relations among states, and of the international systems are constructed. National interests, in turn, emerge out of these representations” (Weldes, 1999, 10).

\(^{15}\) In Hopf’s (2002, 6) formulation, a social cognitive structure “establishes the boundaries of discourse within a society, including how individuals commonly think about themselves and others. It establishes intersubjective reality, a more fundamental domain of social action than the objective world.”
out what is on that slate that decision makers are bringing with them into their interaction with external Others’” (Hopf, 2002, 290).

The present study’s theoretical framework draws heavily on the assumptions of unit-level constructivism to understand the deep, cultural foundation of American exceptionalism. For instance, Trevor B. McCrisken (2002, 78), against a rationalist claim that American exceptionalism is policymakers’ political rhetoric or manipulative tool to mobilize public support, finds that American presidents and their advisers “use arguments couched in exceptionalist language during private meetings and in personal memoranda.” Thus, he concludes in line with Hopf’ and Weldes’ theories on the social cognitive structure or the security imaginary:

It appears to be automatic for American public officials to conceive their policies in terms that represent some notion of the exceptional nature of the United States. They do so not simply because it will be politically advantageous but also because those terms form a natural part of the language they use to understand the world around them. American exceptionalism exists deep within the American belief system, and many of its assumptions are shared by the public and officials alike. It therefore provides the framework for much of the discussion of foreign policy, its presentation by officials, and its realization. (78, emphasis mine)

Second, neoclassical realism aims to explain why states often respond

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16 Although Michael H. Hunt (2004, 224) is an historian, his emphasis on foreign policy ideologies as “sets of beliefs and values…that make international relations intelligible and decision making possible” or ideas “that give structure and meaning to the way policy-makers see the world and their country’s place in it” dovetails with the abovementioned unit-level constructivist approach to foreign policy. Similar to Hopf and Weldes, Hunt also thinks that key decision-makers are the products of socialization and “get their keys to ‘reality’ in the same ways that others in their culture do” (221). Thus, interpretivist diplomatic historians should quest for the broader literature dealing with the cultural and intellectual context of policymaking to understand foreign policy (224-225) in contrast to old-fashioned realist historians who overlook “the constructed nature of people’s outlooks” (238).

17 Wesley Widmaier (2007) also describe how American exceptionalism held by key US foreign policymakers fundamentally provides the framework for discourse in American diplomacy and conditions the foreign policy agenda/practice in several contemporary cases.

18 Gideon Rose (1998) first coined the name for this nascent school led by Randall Schweller, Thomas Christensen, Aaron Friedberg, William Wohlforth, and Fareed Zakaria. For updated surveys of the neoclassical approach, see Lobell et al. eds. (2009); Ripsman (2011).
“irrationally” to systemic imperatives, including “underbalancing” (Schweller, 2004), pathological overexpansion (Snyder, 1991), and persistent failing interventions (Taliaferro, 2004) among others. The neoclassical realist answer is marked by its emphasis on unit-level factors (e.g. elite debates, autonomy of leaders, national identity etc.) as intervening variables between international structure factors (placement and relative power of the state) and state behaviors. Rejecting Waltzian system-centric arguments that IR theory should be separated from foreign policy theorization, the neoclassical school focuses on how domestic politics and decision-making process filter the imperatives from international structure: “One of the main contributions of neoclassical realism is that it has brought back in the warp and woof of domestic politics, which was expunged by Waltz’s theory” (Schweller, 2003, 347).

Yet, Schweller also stresses that the structural-systemic level should be prioritized in explaining foreign policy: “Only when behavior and outcomes deviate from these structural-systemic theories’ expectations should unit-level variables associated with neoclassical realism be added to these theories to explain why” (2003, 346, emphasis mine). In this theoretical schema, the “scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities” (Rose, 1998, 146). This is why the school is still called “realist.” Nevertheless, as neoclassical realism regards the domestic as the place/process whereby system-level factors are “translated” to real foreign policies, the impact of systemic pressure on foreign policy is “indirect and complex.” This is why the school’s name has the adjective, “neoclassical” (Rose, 1998, 146).

Unlike neorealism that focuses parsimoniously on how anarchical structure generally constraints state foreign policy behavior and produces identical state actors and grand strategy across space and time, neoclassical realists tend to analyze particular cases of foreign policy decision-making and prefer “detailed historical analysis” (Rose, 1998, 167) as their methodology in order to explain varied responses to similar systemic environment.
States assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structure and political situations. More specifically, complex domestic processes act as transmission belts that channel, mediate and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes in relative power). Hence, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their response may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones (Schweller, 2004, 164).

Such a pragmatic approach to IR theorization moving back and forth between the divides, such as the material/ideational and the systemic/domestic, echoes an emerging consensus on “analytical eclecticism” in contemporary social science. According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 412), their analytic eclecticism has three unique characteristics: a. “pragmatist ethos” bypassing metatheoretical debates in favor of solving substantive issues in the real world, b. recognition of “complexity and messiness” of reality beyond the narrow analytical frames arbitrarily demarcated by contending research traditions, and most of all c. production of “complex causal stories” across disparate domains and levels of reality that describes the “interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analyzed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions.” By applying the logic of this pragmatic eclecticism to IR theorizations, we can develop more complex stories of multiple causal mechanisms in world politics, transcending “restrictive assumptions about which aspects of social reality are more fundamental” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, 425) held by contending major IR theories. Thus, in our concrete researches, “features of analyses in theories initially embedded in separate research traditions can be separated from their respective

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19 Derek Beach (2012, 64) notes that the students of neoclassical realism exploit “theories as heuristic tools and in a very pragmatic fashion.” They do not hesitate build “Lego-like theoretical models that put together parts from different theoretical toolkits.” While firmly started from the neorealist assumptions, neoclassical realists sometimes use liberal state-level variables, such as the interest group competition, and another times mobilize constructivist variables including ideas and identities in order to open up the “black box.”

20 Of course, as Christian Reus-Smit (2013) points, we cannot simply bypass or ignore metatheoretical debates in the last instance, because “bracketing” metatheoretical issue cannot free our work of metatheoretical assumptions that fundamentally shape the knowledge we produce. Thus, we need to note that “analytical eclectics” fail to see how their project is deeply structured by specific (usually positivistic) epistemological and ontological assumptions.
foundations, translated meaningfully, and recombined as part of an original permutation of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics (Katzenstein and Sil, 2008, 110-111). For instance, we can assume, whereas (neo-)realist variables, such as the international material structure and relative power, shape the basic parameters of foreign policy, various factors in the domestic sphere specifically define the way actors respond to the incentives and constraints created by the world environment.

In this theoretical schema, Christopher Layne (2006, 10), analyzing the history of US foreign policy through the interplay between structural and domestic forces, concludes that “precisely because the competitive pressures of the international system press the United States only weakly, domestic factors play a much greater role in explaining U.S. grand strategy.” Likewise, to explain the “broad change from exemplarism to vindicationism” in the American foreign policy doctrine, Jonathan Monten (2005, 115) primarily focuses on “a massive increase in relative power” as a structural explanatory variable. That is, as the United States increased its material capability and enhanced its world position, it came to rely more on aggressive vindicationism in the twentieth century. However, he investigates in a domestic, immaterial variable to explain the change in US grand strategy as well. It is argued that long-term variation in American foreign policy was also caused by “subtle but significant ideational shifts in the doctrine of liberal exceptionalism” due to debates among competing elite groups in domestic politics.22

21 See also David Lake (2011) who calls for building “contingent, mid-level theories of specific phenomena,” instead of consolidating academic “sects” that stick to “self-affirming research” and perform “theological debates between academic religions.” In contrast, Henry Nau (2011) criticizes that Lake’s suggestion ultimately privileges rational choice theory and eradicates “big questions” raised by various “higher-level” research traditions.

22 From a more structural position, Michael C. Desch (2007, 9) privileges the environmental causal arrow. Exploring the origin of the Bush administration’s “illiberal” and “overreacting” foreign policy doctrine, he argues that the end of the Cold War and the coming of the unipolar moment liberated the potential “excesses of U.S. Liberalism,” as a historical constant variable, from physical constraints. This explains why “American illiberalism has become a more acute problem both at home and abroad” in the post-9/11 era.
My study will follow this pragmatic and eclectic trail to examine the complex dynamics between structural pressures and the internal identity/interest formation in the trajectory of US foreign policy.

Yet, it should be also highlighted that the neoclassical realist approach to the origins of ideational variables, including perceptions, beliefs, and motives, is “critically underdeveloped” (Kaarbo, 2015, 205). On the one hand, the School has no its own analytical tools to explore the process of identity formation although it has investigated the role of ideational elements, such as nationalism and strategic culture, in explaining foreign policy.23 However, it is noteworthy that constructivism can be incorporated into the neoclassical realist framework to examine such an identity formation process. Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s (2009) article, challenging the neoliberal interdependence/peace dividend thesis, is an outstanding example of using constructivist theories of identity construction, i.e. the relational dynamics between the Self and Other, within a broader neoclassical realist schema. Realism, in fact, implicitly assumes “Metus hostilis or the fear of enemies” as a fundamental axiom to explain the binary logic of “identity\difference” (Connolly, 2002) in international life. Tribalism or the existence of conflict groups as an “immutable aspect of the human condition” in realist ontology leads to basic assumptions, such as the “centrality of in-group/out-group discrimination, intergroup comparison, and competition in political life” (Taliaferro et al., 2009, 24). The problem is that usual realist theorization simply presupposes this type of group formation as a given, natural reality in the transhistorical human estate and does not delve into specific processes of identity construction in different historical settings.

In this context, Sterling-Folker (2009, 103) tries to use the tribalism assumption as a docking point between neoclassical realism and constructivism in order to incorporate the complex “dynamics of national collective identity formation” into the traditional realist analytic framework. Thus, she advances a “realist-constructivist

position” as an alternative approach:

[R]ealist structural patterns are an essential starting point for analysis. Yet realist structural expectations are so broad that most of the heavy explanatory lifting must be done by constructivism… To understand how history evolves… it is essential to examine how groups construct their identity via differentiation (Sterling-Folker, 2009, 111).

On the other hand, neoclassical realism, following the European tradition of *raison d’état*, still privileges the state executive apparatus and decision making elites by assuming that they are “distinct from society.” It is maintained that “although state leaders are drawn from society, their attitudes and preferences change when they experience ‘the view from the top,’ as the privileged information they receive and the *raison d’état* culture they become imbued in make state actors more than simply representatives of their social coalition” (Ripsman, 2011). Consequently, it is claimed that the “national security executive has interests which transcend any class or sector, namely the national interest” (Taliaferro et al., 2009, 27).

In contrast, my research draws on the unit-level, social constructivism as a theoretical framework to understand the formation of American exceptional identities in the societal level, since I focus on the persistent role of American exceptionalism or the American standard of civilization in US foreign policy. As we will see, American elites were not entirely “socialized” by the European *realpolitik* culture but secured their own exceptionalist ethos drawn from parts of American society against international structural exigencies. Whereas neoclassical realism, as a “direct descendant of structural realism,” tries to secure the primacy of the international material structure as the independent variable by regarding domestic factors as “auxiliary” or “intervening” variables (Ripsman, 2011), this dissertation affords causal/constitutive primacy to cultural *innenpolitik* in order to understand the anomalous American case.

Third, a liberal theory of international politics, distinguished from system-level-centric neoliberal institutionalism, has traditionally been interested in the shaping of national preferences through domestic political coalitions. Indeed, liberal IR theory is the “most logical and expected place to find domestic political factors” (Kaarbo, 2015, 196).
Opening the “black box” was the main slogan of liberal theory, although Robert Keohane (1984) and his neoliberal colleagues came to accept the assumption about the unitary actor to challenge neorealism on its own logics. According to Andrew Moravcsik (1997, 513), a distinctive insight of liberal IR theory is that “state-society relations… have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.” More specifically, he maintains, “Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences” (513). As the state is conceptualized not as an autonomous actor but as a “representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actor” (518), state foreign policy preferences are mainly formed as an aggregated product of the competing preferences of rational social actors channeled through the domestic political system (518-520). Inspired by Robert Dahl’s (1971) polyarchical models of democratic politics, this liberal school focuses on the domestic competition between various societal forces and intragovernmental actors, such as public opinion, media, interest groups, and bureaucracy, over shaping the national interest and foreign policy (Beach, 2012, 63).

Such a liberal theory’s insight on the role of domestic competing social groups in defining the national interest and foreign policy goals dovetails with my dissertation’s focus on the contribution of the contestations between the East-Coast elites and the Western frontiersman to the politics of identity\difference in US society and the resulting emergence of contending visions of American grand strategy in the nineteenth century. I agree with liberal theory that, contra the Waltizan “like-unit” thesis, states are “functionally differentiated” and that they “pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups” (Moravcsik, 1997, 519). In this sense, I am also exploring a theory of domestic preference formation, or how “societal pressures transmitted by representative institutions and practices alter ‘state preferences’” (Moravcsik, 1997, 519) in the early American case.

However, the liberal school sometimes does not sit comfortably with the constructivist approach in the sense that, as a variant of rationalism, it pays little attention
to the “intersubjective” factors of the domestic sphere (Hayes, 2013, 5n10). Michael Williams (1998, 214), tracing back to the early modern origin of liberal philosophy, points out that conceptual categories in liberalism are “in significant ways constituted by unwillingness to ask the question of identity” because the theoretical recognition of an identity/altery nexus should acknowledge the prevalent state of war in human society against the liberal desire. Thus, one of contemporary liberalism’s three core assumptions still posits that “boundedly rational” individuals and private groups, as the primary actors in world politics, are simply “assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare” (Moravcsik, 1997, 517) without referring to the role of national identity. Accordingly, Moravcsik (1997, 525) simply confesses that liberal theorists “take no distinctive position on the origins of social identities.” As long as mainstream liberal theory of international politics possesses “no theory of collective identity that acknowledges difference as an essential, enduring component of identity” (Sterling-Folker, 2009, 108) and presupposes thin rational actor model, it is not an appropriate theoretical tool to analyze the construction of American standard of civilization and its persistent role in US foreign policy.

Nevertheless, one subset of liberalism identified by Moravcsik (1997, 525) as “ideational liberalism” has “tangency” with constructivist approaches. This strain of liberalism regards the “configuration of domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant of state preferences and, therefore, of interstate conflict and cooperation.”

24 As a significant exception, a “strong” liberal theorization exemplified by neo-functionalism deals with the possibility of fundamental changes in national interests and identities beyond the rationalist-statist assumptions. That is, neo-functionalism spearheaded by Ernst Haas in the mid-twentieth century focused on the ways participation in international institutions by states can profoundly transform the states’ interests and identities from egoistic individualism toward a more transnational, cooperative conception, which results in the paradigm shift in the very nature of international relations (Beach, 2012, 83-86). For instance, by investigating the process of postwar European integration via “spill-over” effects, Haas (1958, 16) holds that “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community.” Relatedly, it is a notable fact that Wendt (1999, 299-308) heavily relies on strong liberal theory, especially on Karl Deutsch’s notion of “pluralistic security community” to explain the logic of Kantian anarchy.
While arguing the importance of “fundamental social purposes each state seeks” in understanding international relations, Moravcsik (2003, 162) searches for a sophisticated synthesis and recognizes a possibility of “liberal constructivism” or “potential complementarity between rationalist and cultural explanations” to examine the sources of social preferences:

Neither the assumption that individuals pursue their preferences instrumentally (shared by many “constructivists”), nor the assumption that the formation of such preferences is exogenous to interstate politics (in any given round of interaction), implies that individual preferences are atomistic. Cultural or sociological arguments that privilege collective social beliefs, either domestic or transnational, as sources of such social preferences, are not excluded (emphasis mine; see also Wolf, 2011, 196).

Last but not the least, a long (and relatively less known) tradition of “role theory” in the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) should be discussed in addition to the three competing theorizations involved in the “domestic politics turn” in IR discipline. While FPA in general has increasingly turned to the variable of state identity and the significance of ideas, following the broader trend in IR, Kaarbo (2003, 160) emphasizes that the current identity-focused approach to foreign policy “could benefit by more directly building on previous developments regarding role theory.” Role theory focuses on the way a nation views itself and its role in world politics shapes national behavior.25 This theory was first systemically suggested by K. J. Holsti (1970, 243) to argue that foreign policy results “primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends.” His original definition of national role conceptions is stated as follows:

the policymaker’s own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional system. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in the external environment (1970, 245-6).

Also, Holsti (1970, 243) clearly prioritizes the domestic sources of national role

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25 Contemporary overviews of role theory are provided by Thies (2010) and Harnisch et al. eds. (2011).
conceptions, by insisting that “self-defined national role conceptions… take precedence over externally derived role prescriptions.”

Recent role theorists try to situate “role theory under the broad intellectual umbrella of social constructivism” (Breuning, 2011, 16). Marijek Breuning (2011, 22), for instance, recognizes that constructivist works on “identity, self-images, culture, and even norms shares a close kinship with the literature on national role conceptions” because they have a common research questions that desire to “move our understanding of foreign policy decision making beyond material imperatives” and to focus on the “collective self-understandings” of decision makers in the context of national culture (Breuning, 2011, 20). In addition, as with the unit-level constructivist assumption on the social cognitive structure (Hopf, 2002, 37), it is posited that a “nation’s leaders rise in part because they articulate a vision of the nation’s role in world affairs that corresponds to deep, cultural beliefs about the nation” (Hudson, 1999, 769). Thus, constructivists and role theorists agree that foreign policy elite’s leadership relies not only on understanding the culture and identity of a state, but also on “translating both into a national role conception that resonates domestically” (Breuning, 2011, 24). Key concepts in constructivism and role theory can be used interchangeably as well. While identity corresponds to role conception, the notion of agency is akin to role performance (Breuning, 2011, 21-22). From that perspective, role theorists today mobilize various methods (e.g., the discourse analysis, interpretative textual analysis, and process-tracing techniques) in order to examine how “decision makers form their conceptions of their state’s role on the basis of both their understanding of the state’s place and possibilities within the international system” (Harnisch, 2011, 8) in line with the unit-level

26 From the opposite direction, Wendt (1999, ch. 6) relies heavily on role theory, when it describes three distinctive roles (enemy, rival, friend) in three respective cultures of anarchy (i.e., Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian).

27 Holsti (1970, 239) originally highlighted the ideational factors such as, “perceptions, values, and attitudes” of policy makers. Therefore, it can be argued that he anticipates the advent of constructivism quite early (Breuning, 2011, 19).
constructivism.

Given that my dissertation aims to show how America’s exceptional identity and role conception has constructed its distinctive “standard of civilization” and designated its world-historical position as the vanguard of human progress, role theory provides invaluable insights and conceptual categories. For example, Haans Maull’s (2011, 168-169) analysis that American exceptionalism has deeply shaped the United States’ “remarkably stable foreign policy role conception” (e.g., America as leader, internationalist power, ego-centric maximizer of national interests, enforcer, and democratizer) and consequently, produced a “distinctly ‘American’ approach to foreign policy” (i.e., pragmatic internationalism) fits squarely to the present study’s key concerns. Yet, whereas Maull (2011, 168) maintains that America’s missionary role perception “defining its purpose in the world” and “its approach towards realizing its ambitions” was consolidated since the early twentieth century, I will go back to the mid-eighteenth century to trace the historical formation of American exceptional identities or its competing role conceptions, the “revolutionary” state and the “civilizing” state.28

Against this theoretical backdrop, we may now proceed to discuss why the “domestic politics turn” in IR theorization should be emphasized to understand the trajectory of US foreign policy. After tracing the mixed outcomes of America’s “worldwide struggle for democracy,” Tony Smith (2012, 397) criticizes that the mainstream structuralist and materialist schema “accords little importance to the domestic base of the state in its concern to explain the pattern of international relations.” Indeed, revolutionary states that “have plans totally to reorder world affairs in a way incommensurate with their ‘objective’ capacities” are ignored as “irrational” actors that would soon perish under the structural pressure of brutal anarchy (397). Thus, the American exceptionalist tradition is categorized either as “‘idealistic’ or ‘utopian’

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thinking that is a key barrier to overcome in order to pursue the essential goal of national security,” (395) or as an “ideological mask for the projection of state power,” (398) according to a realist caricature of American foreign policy.29 In this vein, Walter Russell Mead (2001, 34-35) argues that the American legacy has been unappreciated because of continental realism that defines “the approaches and ideas emanating from the Continental powers of nineteenth-century Europe” as the reality of international relations.30 For a long time, realists have tried “to ‘normalize’ America, urging it to act like other great powers do” (Ruggie, 1998, 216). Even today, for example, John Mearsheimer admonishes that “disciplining” immature US foreign policy is needed: “What's happened over the past 23 years is that the distribution of power—call it unipolarity, American primacy, or whatever you want—has left the US free to misbehave. There's no discipline!” (2012, 5-6. emphasis mine)

Perhaps, we can concede that typical powers have been historically assimilated to the normal real-state model and have succumbed to the logic of structural anarchy or the necessity of survival. Similar to neorealist that assumes the dynamics of “emulation” in international anarchy, even English School scholars traditionally emphasize the socialization effect of international society. As its theoretical framework is rooted in theorists of “balance of power” against Napoleon’s ambitious trial to build a universal empire over Europe (Keene, 2002, 11), the English School highlights the paradox that modern revolutionary states having tried to transverse the boundary of modernity had a significant role in strengthening and consolidating modern international society. For instance, the French Revolution, initiated under the banner of universal fraternity, produced an inverted result of the beginning of modern nationalism and its diffusion

29 For instance, see Morgenthau (1952), Kennan (1984), and Kissinger (1994).

30 Stefano Guzzini (1998, 1) also notes that Morgenthau’s work paradigmatically translated “the maxims of nineteenth-century European diplomatic practice into more general laws of an American social science.” More radically, Jim George (1994, ix) argues that the orthodox IR theorizing as a “discursive regime of exclusion, silence, and intolerance” relies on a “particular representation of post-Renaissance European historical experience.”
across Europe. The Russian Revolution also showed a similar pattern of socialization (Cantir, 2011). As the slogan of “World Revolution” deteriorated into the theory of “socialism in one country,” the movements of “International” and “Council communism” with post-national characteristics were subsumed into the liberal-nationalist modernization project under the pressure from the world capitalist system. Namely, revolutionary states or transnational movements for a universal cause were socialized to the modern standard that has placed absolute trust in the sovereignty principle of international society (Bull, 1977; Armstrong, 1993; see also Wallerstein, 1995).

However, to explain why a particular state usually chooses policies that diverge from our habitual prediction on the basis of system-level factors, we ought to doubt that state-level variables are still effective. In this sense, I argue that a unique and ambivalent American self-image, as both revolutionary and imperialist, has not been socialized by systemic imperatives. Indeed, America’s exceptionalist identity or a revolutionary project31 has progressed for over two hundred years despite the homogenizing effect of modern international society that defeated the transformative ideals of the French and Russian Revolutions.32 Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze the domestic foundations of American external behavior and to give serious attention to the identity/agency of the United States that has changed the modern international order and constructed a new world order with American characteristics.

For instance, Michael Lind (2006, 7) argues that realists “who dismiss the idea of ‘American way of life’ and focus on ‘vital interests’ as the basis of US foreign policy are guilty of a profound philosophical and political error.” Lind suggests that the “American

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31 “The American liberal international project has an agenda that is revolutionary to a Westphalian version of world order and to the types of states traditionally associated with this order.” (Deudney and Meiser, 2008, 27, emphasis mine)

Creed”\(^{33}\) as the national philosophy should be examined to understand the “American way of life” that has guided US grand strategy from its inception. Following Anatol Lieven (2012), I add that the “Anti-American Creed” is another factor explaining the ambiguous trajectory of American foreign policy that has oscillated between liberal internationalism and illiberal unilateralism.

2. The Politics of Identity\(^\text{Difference}\) in Early Modern America

The main goal of my dissertation is to demonstrate that singular American identity constituted by the United States’ specific international/domestic experience is important to explain America’s exceptional understanding of its interest and the history of US foreign policy, which is not well analyzed by the reigning IR paradigm on the basis of rationalism and structuralism. One of the important reasons we ought to overcome the neorealist “anarchy problematique” (Ashley, 1988) is that the most powerful, unipolar state organizing the liberal international order cannot be captured by the Waltzian “like-unit” hypothesis, setting aside all the other epistemological/ontological issues surrounding the so-called “third debate” in IR (Lapid, 1989).

In terms of time period, although standard approaches to the US foreign policy traditions are confined to the twentieth-century American experience,\(^{34}\) this study agrees with Hunt’s (1987, 17) observation that “a treatment of the rise of the core ideas in the ideology of US foreign policy… takes us back to the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, when the American political elite moved toward a consensus on the fundamental issues of international affairs”. His advice means that we are required to carry out a historical inquiry into the Founding era to understand the formation of American political identities and its unique attitude toward foreign affairs.

In terms of analytical focus, although numerous internal/external factors shape

\(^{33}\) The term “American Creed” was first introduced by Gunnar Myrdal (1944) and then popularized by Samuel Huntington (1981).

\(^{34}\) For instance, see Legro (2005), Ikenberry (2011), and Smith (2012). A notable exception is Mead (2001).
national identities, I seek to concentrate on the process of Ego- and Other-casting. US nationhood will be analyzed as a social construct in relation to various types of alterity, which is against essentialist conceptualizations of national identity. There are several established approaches to the dynamics of identity formation that can contribute to frame my dissertation on the origins of American exceptionalism. Before the IR discipline came to be interested in the question of identity as a relational concept, social psychology and sociology have traditionally explored the issue, and there has been an interdisciplinary consensus that the self-identification and categorization of the Other are two main factors of a “continual process through which individuals, groups, and nations come to define themselves by what they are and by what they are not” (Hancock, 2010).

Psychological approaches to identity start from the fundamental dichotomy between Self and Other and highlight the “dual, inner/outer nature of the identification process” (H Hancock, 2010). The discipline provides us with the cognitive and psychological underpinnings for how and why group identities emerge in human life. To be specific, social psychology has long focused on intergroup relations or intergroup conflict and its social-psychological bases. According to Marilynn Brewer (2007, 695-706), there are three fundamental propositions in the social psychology of intergroup relations. First, people tend to partition diversity among individuals into discrete groupings to reduce the complexity of the social world and to regulate/structure their interactions with Others. Such a “social categorization” dividing the social world into ingroup and outgroup is the base structure of intergroup relations in human life, which influences both perception of and behaviors to distinct category members. Second, preference for one’s ingroup is the primary driver of relations between groups. After dividing individuals into in-/out-groups, on the one hand, people tend to have positive feelings and evaluations toward the ingroup and increase emotional ties and cooperation with ingroup members. On the other hand, this “primacy of ingroup identification” or “ethnocentrism” can arouse intergroup discrimination or tension through mechanisms

35 The term is introduced by William G. Sumner (1907) as a “universal” character of human intergroup
of ingroup bias and prejudice. Third, although ingroup favoritism is a universal phenomenon, relationships between the two groups can vary, ranging from zero relationship to competition to conflict, and that the specific characters of intergroup relations are defined by a particular social context. “Outgroup prejudices” contribute to the maintenance of or justification for the existing pattern of intergroup relations.

In particular, “Social Identity Approach (SIA)” originally developed by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel ed., 1978; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel ed., 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1985) is a dominant theory for understanding the relationship between the intergroup dynamics and the processes of identity formation, which has had a crucial impact on the studies of identity beyond the disciplinary boundary of psychology (Spear, 2011, 202). Using the “minimal group paradigm” to demonstrate the power of social categorization in experiment, SIA seeks to understand the nature of group formation and the creation of prejudice and ethnocentrism under the most rudimentary conditions. In the laboratory study, participants are randomly divided into two groups according to a trivial criterion, and then they are asked to distribute some rewards between pairs of other participants. What is striking in this experiment is that participants show a “persistent tendency to give higher rewards to another (unknown) in-group member than to another (unknown) out-group member” (Hewstone and Cairns, 2001, 322). Such a result indicates that social categorizations predicated on very small differences can often produce social prejudice/discrimination and subsequent intergroup conflicts with few other intervening variables, such as intimate interactions with fellow ingroup members, history of competition between the in- and out-groups, and conflicts of material interests between the two groups, among others. The political implication of the minimal intergroup relations: “Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it… Each group nourished its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders” (quoted from Brewer, 2007, 698).

Besides, as more existential threats to social identity exist in complex social life than in minimal, experimental contexts, arguably more virulent antagonistic strategies of differentiation would prevail in the real world (Spear, 2011, 205).
experiment would be that nationalism can be easily mobilized by “symbolic manipulation” that arbitrarily demarcates “us” and “them” because, to some extent, ethnocentric loyalty and bias can be autonomous from an extensive history of intercommunal relationship (Brewer, 2007, 698).

In this context, one key independent variable of SIA that reflected throughout other disciplines is suggested by the controversial self-esteem hypothesis,” i.e., a theory of individual’s intrinsic desire for positive distinctiveness. The hypothesis explains why humans try to maintain boundary between ingroup and outgroup by proposing that we naturally strive for a sense of positive self-evaluation, and that the method of enhancing positive self-esteem is to belong to a group through social categorization (Tajfel and Turner, 1985, 16-17). The problem is that creation and maintenance of boundary give rise to an ethnocentric attitude among group members and serve as explosive points for intergroup conflict.

It is often suggested that the theoretical implication of SIT is useful to explain the “behavior of those whose identity is perceived to be threatened and whose behavior might otherwise seem quite irrational or pointless,” as in particular cases of ethnopolitical warfare (Hewstone and Cairns, 2001, 323). In contrast, importing the SIA to International Relations, Jonathan Mercer (1995) argues that the psychological theorization provides firm support for realist predictions on the transhistorical inevitability of interstate conflicts in general. Twisting both neorealist and constructivist explanations on national identity and anarchy, his SIA-based analysis posits that egoistic state identity and international competition characterize world politics, because of cognitive or psychological—rather than structural or cultural—reasons: “Anarchy is not what states make of it. Self-help is not one of a multitude of plausible institutions in anarchy; instead, it is a consequence of intergroup relations in anarchy” (Mercer, 1995, 251). From another

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37 Both within and without the social identity school, it is often criticized that the self-esteem hypothesis is too reductionist and individualistic to understand the intergroup level of analysis by exclusively focusing on personal, quasi-biological esteem-seeking agendas (Spears, 2011, 205).
different perspective, Shannon and Kowert ed. (2012, 7) hold that political psychology and constructivism are “ideational alliances” because they share a core common thread, i.e., “the focus on ideational factors and process, the importance of identity, and the importance of understanding how agents view the world rather than assuming or imputing the analyst’s presumptions,” against the prevailing rationalist/materialist IR theorizing. In particular, one contributor in the edited volume, Deborah Welch Larson (2012, 57) tries to “supplement” constructivism that has been less successful in explaining the “origins of the practices that produce and reproduce state identities” with SIA by mobilizing its group of hypothesis on “the microfoundations of categorization and social comparison, the role of status and hierarchy considerations, and strategies adopted by lower-status groups to improve their relative position.”

Sociological approach to identity is to treat the notion of identity as “socially produced, socially embedded and worked out in people’s everyday social lives” (Lawler, 2014, 19). In other words, sociology pursues a relational and collective analysis of identity in contrast to the “individualistic and psychologistic perspectives” that view identity as belonging within the person (Lawler, 2014, 3) and seeks to explain the role of symbolic boundaries in “creating, maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized social differences” (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, 168). There are two main reasons why identity increasingly became a central focus in the late-twentieth century sociology (Lawler, 2014, 3-4). Initially, the stability of modern subjects around nation, gender, family, and the like has recently collapsed, and a “crisis of identity” emerged, due to the rapid social change in “late-modernity” or “globalization” (Hall, 1993). Thus, increased fluidity and concomitant “insecurity” around the modern subjects make identity as “the loudest talk in town, the burning issue on everybody’s mind and tongue” (Bauman, 2004, 17). In this sense, sociology now faces a genuinely new challenge, for the “spiritual fathers of sociology” (Bauman, 2004, 16), including Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Émile Durkheim, have few meaningful answers to the question of identity. It is our problem we should analyze and theorize, which did not prominently stand out in their late nineteenth century/early twentieth century world when the modern social and
symbolic boundaries seemed stable and natural.38

Therefore, what is often called the “linguistic turn” – “a turn to attention given to language as something that does not simply carry meaning, but makes meanings” – in sociology, which involves various theoretical innovations from post-Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism/queer theory, cultural studies, and post-structuralism, has contributed to “problematic” the question of identity from alternative perspectives (Lawler, 2014, 3). In this context, “theorists of difference,” (Jenkins, 2008, 19) such as Seyla Benhabib39, Paul Gilroy40, and Joan Scott (1992)41 among others, who are usually from the fields of feminist or cultural studies, have foregrounded difference as the central factor in the processes of identity formation and discussed inequality and discrimination in society by investigating the oppositional “politics” of identity/difference. Against essentializing or naturalizing tendency in the master narrative of identity, they highlight that identities are socially constituted or performatively enacted within representation/discourse.42 Stuart Hall’s (1996a) concept of “constitutive outside” succinctly represents this theoretical approach to identity, which prioritizes and politicizes the role of the Other:

38 Certainly, this statement does not mean that the question of identity had not been theorized in sociology before the advent of the “linguistic turn.” For prominent examples, Charles Cooley, George Herbert Mead, Nobert Elias, and Erving Goffman, in contrast to the mainstream tendency treating identity as given, also analyzed identity “as process, as something achieved rather than something innate, as done rather than ‘owned’” (Lawler, 2014, 5).

39 “Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference” (Benhabib, 1996, 3).

40 “Above all, identity can help us to comprehend the formation of that fateful pronoun ‘we’ and to reckon with the patterns of inclusion and exclusion that it cannot but help to create. This may be one of the most troubling aspects of all: the fact that the formation of every ‘we’ must leave out or exclude a ‘they’, that identities depend on the marking of difference” (Gilroy, 1997, 302).

41 “[D]ifference and the salience of different identities are produced by discrimination, a process that establishes the superiority or the typicality or the universality of some in terms of the inferiority or atypicality or particularity of others” (Scott, 1992, 14-15).

42 On the difference between essentialism and social constructionism in identity studies, see Calhoun (1994, 12-20).
Identities are… produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion… This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus is ‘identity’ can be constructed (Hall, 1996a, 4-5, emphasis original).

Likewise, the recent literatures on nationalism in sociology have defined national identity relationally and focused on the role of “common categorization systems to differentiate between insiders and outsiders,” which create the symbolic national community (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, 182). Moving forward the research agenda initiated by Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983), national identity scholars have analyzed how national borders not only naturalize a notion of duality between the domestic and the foreign but also drive a “process of mirror imaging” (Borneman, 1992a, 17) in which the “construction of otherness constantly takes place on both sides of the border” (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, 183). Also, they claim that the “production of different nations was a precondition” (Borneman, 1992b, 45) to justify nationhood, as with “theorists of difference” who privilege the role of differences in the processes of identity formation.

Influenced by these extra-disciplinary works, constructivist approaches (both mainstream and post-structuralist) and the Copenhagen School in IR have analyzed the process of the state identity formation through discourse/speech act analysis in order to dissect sources of the national interest and subsequent foreign policy. Initially, Wendt (1999, 332), following George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionist tradition, emphasizes that “the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other” because the Self-Other image is “the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave.” Thus, “understanding how Self and Other are represented” (260) is crucial to

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43 For updated surveys of the topic, see Berenskoetter (2010); Kowert (2010).
explain and predict social phenomenon. More specifically, Hopf’s (2002) explanation of discourses of national identity represents a conventional constructivist approach to the topic. After examining his Russian case, Hopf (2002, 238) empirically finds that Russia’s great power identity has been constructed through its interaction with other external powers: “Interaction with the US and Europe produces, reinforces, and counteracts the discourses of Russian identity at home.”

Next, following the lead of William E. Connolly’s celebrated work *Identity/Difference* (2002[1992]), post-modernist constructivists, such as David Campbell (1998) and David L. Blaney & Naeem Inayatullah (2004), have concentrated on the process of “Othering,” or the act by which difference is constructed as an inferior Other as the main mechanism of creating and maintaining identity. Tracing the genealogy of a Christian dichotomy of good and evil and the history of imperial encounters between Europeans and Amerindians, Connolly (2002, xiv) recognizes that identity is basically a relational and collective concept, which echoes the aforementioned “linguistic turn” in contemporary sociology. An identity is socially constructed in relation to a series of differences or alterities. The problem is that there is a strong, dangerous tendency “to constitute a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical – as other” (65). This powerful drive is raised in order to secure oneself “as intrinsically good, coherent, complete or rational and in order to protect itself from the other that would unravel its self-certainty and capacity for collective mobilization” (65-66). In this binary fixation, all

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44 According to Ruggie (1998, 35-36), there are three variants of constructivism that have different underlying philosophical bases: a. *neoclassical* constructivism rooted in the classical tradition of Durkheim and Weber, b. *post-modernist* constructivism based on the writings of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and c. *naturalistic* constructivism grounded in the philosophical doctrine of scientific realism.

45 For overviews of the literature on critical/poststructuralist discourse analysis and foreign policy, see Waever (2002), Hansen (2012), and Rowley and Weldes (2008).

46 “Built into the dynamic of identity is a polemical temptation to translate differences through which it is specified into moral failings or abnormalities” (Connolly, 2002, xiv).
differences come to be “both essential to the truth of the powerful identity and a threat to it” (66). Thus, it becomes common that violence is inscribed in the dichotomized relationship between “us” and “them,” and “repression of otherness” would be the normal practice in the politics of identity (66). Connolly (1995, 194) concludes that such a Manichaean logic, finally, lays the cultural foundation of “the politics of fundamentalization” in our times.

Based on Connolly's philosophical meditations, Campbell (1998, 51) claims that the ideational content of a state is delimited by the concrete enemies of the state. Representations of international war and foreign policy against Others are inextricably intertwined with the construction of state identity. Put another way, the state is “the effects of discourses of danger that… employ strategies of otherness,” while foreign policy, in terms of representation practices, is an “integral part of the discourse of danger that serves to discipline the state” by demarcating lines between a Self and an Other, an inside and an outside and a domestic and a foreign. Therefore, American foreign policy can be interpreted as a “political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of American political identity” (Campbell, 1998, 8).

In order to understand the colonial legacy of IR that has failed to treat “the problem of difference,” Inayatullah and Blaney (2004, 9) pay attention to the historical “contact zone” in modern world politics which was a “space of colonial encounters” infused with “inequalities of power.” With the rise of the Westphalian system and its early modern imperial expansion, the “discovery” of alterity gave rise to a common pattern: Tzvetan Todorov’s “double movement” that either designates the Other as inferior and justifies its exploitation/enslavement or ignores existing differences and demands violent assimilation. These two responses – which are actually one and the same violent ignorance of difference founded on egocentrism – alternated and constructed typical colonial relationships between Western Europeans and non-Europeans in the modern world (10-11; 48-49; see also Todorov, 1984, 127-129). In this type of contact zone, “boundaries are rigidly drawn, carefully policed, and mapped onto the difference between
good and evil” (11). What was missing here was “the possibility of recognizing the other as both different and equal” (11).

In a similar vein, the so-called Copenhagen School led by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver has developed “securitization theory.” The notion of securitization was first introduced by Wæver (1995), and then it was systematically formulated as the “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al., 1998, 23). The theory, in a nutshell, regards security as a self-referent practice and explains how threats to the national security are constituted through speech acts or the “discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential threat to security” (Emmers, 2007, 112) by dominant securitizing actors, which have real effects on state foreign policy. It is another way of describing the discursive politics of identity/difference on the international scene, which constructs boundaries between “us” and “them” and triggers a dynamics of Schmittian conflicts among antagonized actors.

In this theoretical schema, there are no obvious pre-given and objective threats to the state. Rather, by declaring that “a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object’s survival” (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). In other words, a threat from the Other

47 The name was popularized by Bill McSweeney (1996) in a review essay on Buzan, Wæver, and their collaborators’ works.

48 According to Hayes (2013, 14), there are three core texts in the Copenhagen School: Wæver et al. (1993); Buzan et al. (1998); Buzan and Wæver (2003).

49 “Securitizing actors” are defined as “actors who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998, 36). They are usually “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups” (Buzan et al., 1998, 110).

is socially constructed when audience is convinced by elite groups that “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)” (Buzan et al, 1998, 24, emphasis mine). In this sense, the Copenhagen Schools can be interpreted as a variant of constructivist approach to the security issue defined as an intersubjective, social fact (Emmers, 2007, 113-114).

There are two interesting recent works expanding on the Copenhagen School. By combining securitization theory with societal constructivism, Jarrod Hayes (2013) seeks not only to theoretically examine the “role and significance of broader social context for the securitizing move” (37) but also to empirically explain “how the democratic peace has come to exist at the societal level” (x). Assuming the social and political nature of security, Hayes argues that democratic identity constructs dichotomizing images of Others, democratic vs. undemocratic, and both “facilitates and inhibits securitization by empowering and undermining the claim of an existential threat” (1). To be specific, through the cases of the US-India and U.S-China dyads, Hayes shows that democratic identity among the public audience makes it difficult for securitizing actors to construct other democracies as existential threats, leading to policies involving negotiation and reconciliation. In contrast, he also finds that the same democratic identity enables securitizers to securitize external non-democracies as archenemy, generating aggressive and often violent policy outcomes.

Jonas Hagmann’s (In-)security and the Production of International Relations (2015), focusing on the societal “production and appropriation of notions of national and international danger” (4), seeks to reformulate the concept of securitization as a “mechanism of international subjectification and subject-positioning” (10) in order to “address its world ordering functions” (9). Following Foucauldian discourse analysis, Hagmann advances that security narratives are basically competing “truth claims” that

51 “The presence of threat or the state of security are meanings imparted onto a situation or object by social cognition rather than the manifestation of a natural characteristic” (13).
posit particular readings of international dangers and thereby condition states’ foreign policies. In other words, notions of security and foreign policy are not naturally given by material international structure, but are outcomes of continuous negotiations and struggles among various contending social forces. The reason (in-)securitization functions as “quasi-structural conditions for foreign affairs strategizing” (9) is related to the identity/alterity nexus as well.52 Initially, the identification of a danger entails a “definition of enemies, friends and other actors in international politics and thus a distinct positioning of the home nation in a recognized web of antagonistic international relations” (7). Next, these basic definitions prescribe an imaginary of world politics policymakers should act upon.

Connecting local politics to supranational level of analysis, Hagmann illustrates how transnational Self (or international insecurity communities) can be epistemically created by convergent identifications of dangerous Others among several nation-states. By identifying who threatens and who is threatened in world politics, securitization can project “shared security concerns across borders, defining who beyond the own nation is challenged by the same threat” (8). Consequently, international cooperation emerges, resting on the “epistemic construction of transnational insecurity communities” (5). Through the case studies of postwar France, West Germany, and Switzerland, Hagmann (59-182) empirically shows how West European societies have produced various insecurity discourses that epistemologically endangered, ordered, and systemized the international. In this context, a series of “transnational” securitization against the Soviet Union, migration, and terrorism “consistently projected larger insecurity communities on to world politics” (187).

To be sure, the abovementioned theoretical discussions do not signify that all

52 However, Hagmann notes that his analysis of securitization is different from a poststructuralist one in the sense that his understanding of international systematization is arguably more complex: “Instead of requiring an existential pitching of a singular Other against a singular Self, the social theory underpinning this book here includes the possibilities of coexistent, varied and differently antagonistic frameworks of the international” (197). We will discuss this dividing issue shortly.
intercommunal relations, cultural and political, should inevitably be founded upon the antagonistic Self-Other dichotomy. In social psychology, results from both laboratory experiments and field researches demonstrate that “variations in ingroup positivity and social identification do not systematically correlate with degree of bias or negativity toward outgroups.” Thus, it is noted that ingroup preference should be “conceptually and empirically distinguished from the presence of active hostility, distrust, and hate for outgroups” (Brewer, 2007, 701). Indeed, the oppositional, dyadic mode of identity constitution is merely one mechanism among many other possible relationship between “us” and “them,” and that the Self has various types of Others (positive, negative, historical etc.) as well as multiple numbers of Others. Thus, we should understand the complexity of identity formation and recognize a variety of different roles that Others can play in reality. Wæver (2002, 24) notes that “most identity will need complex, multidimensional systems to make sense, and difference only collapses into opposition in special situations.” Therefore, he holds that we need to pay more attention to “non-antagonistic systems of differences” than the previous exclusive focus on Self/Other dichotomy in poststructuralist theorizing. In other words, a “dialogical” or “processual” approach to the politics of identity and alterity that moves beyond the dangerous binary of good and evil is needed (Guillaume, 2011; Hopf, 2002). Accordingly, this study also acknowledges that a dichotomized relation between Self and Other discovered in some historical cases ought to be viewed as a “historically and contextually bound mechanism” (Guillaume, 2011, 3) and not a universal truth.

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53 For example, Annika Bergman (2007) empirically shows that Sweden has a social democratically inspired identity and internationalism that does not exclude other states to define its Self but that aims to develop transnational solidarity across the demarcation line between Ego and Alter.

54 Richard Ned Lebow (2008, 473), based on the reading of Homer and the recent findings of social psychology, argues that “identities generally form prior to construction of ‘others’” (emphasis original. See also Brewer, 2007, 701). In a similar vein, Daniel Deudney (1997) emphasizes the fact that a topophilia, which does not rely on the existence of Other, also defined the American “ground” identity.

55 “Othering is but one possible mechanism participating in a more general process of identity formation, performance and transformation, even though it might predominate in certain historical-intellectual
Still, an antagonistic relationship between Ego and Alter is important to understand the original constitution of US identity in its own particular spatio-temporal setting. As G.W.F. Hegel\textsuperscript{56} and Carl Schmitt\textsuperscript{57} captured in philosophical terms, the politics of identity\textbackslash difference in the context of modern nation-building and nationalism mainly rested upon the “friend” and “enemy” binary (Lebow, 2008, 474-478). The long dialectic between war-making and state-making in the Westphalian system (Tilly, 1985) constituted the historical seedbed of the exclusionary and dichotomized logic that demarcated the boundary between the orderly inside and the dangerous outside through the principle of sovereignty (Walker, 1992). Blaney and Inayatullah (2004, 43) consider “Westphalia not only as a deferral of the problem of difference, but also as directing us down a path of theory and practice deeply suspicious of, if not actively hostile toward diversity.” Hence, we are still “bound to a narrow understanding of difference as disorder, perpetuating the ‘wound’ of difference by failing nearly altogether to appreciate the opportunities and resources accompanying engagement with others” (45). By the same token, Hagmann (2015, 8) notes that the antagonistic logic of securitization “forms a particularly dominant such practice in modern international affairs.”

Since the founding era, the United States has also been situated in this turbulent period of modern international relations marked by a series of interstate and colonial wars – from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812\textsuperscript{58} and of revolutions such as its own and the French Revolution. Thus, the process of the American identity formation was no

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\textsuperscript{56} “Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another” (1977, 112).

\textsuperscript{57} “[T]he substance of the political is contained in the context of a concrete antagonism” (2007, 30).

\textsuperscript{58} On the relationship between war and state formation in America, see Higginbotham (2005).
exception to the logic of negative Othing or “splitting.” From the beginning, the United States has possessed roughly two different Others that define the ideational boundaries of America, as Thomas Bender (2006, 182) summarizes:

An essential part of American national identity is based on difference, on a tendency to define America as distinct from, even separate from all that is foreign, whether Europe or those parts of the world Americans unself-consciously called “uncivilized or savage.”

Put differently, how “the Old World” and “barbarian” Others shaped, by counterexample and antithesis, a distinctive self-image of American civilization is the focal point. In relation to the “Westphalian system,” the United States intended to flee from the European balance of power arrangement, quagmired in permanent bloody wars and its corollary absolutism, through the invention of a new interstate order, “the Philadelphian system” (Deudney, 2007). On the other hand, America’s imperial encounter with the aboriginal inhabitants produced a colonial process of policing the boundary between “civilization” and “barbarism,” and removing or assimilating the inferior non-European Others. Thus, it seems clear that the history of US identity formation was based on a unilateral monologue between hierarchical actors, instead of a multilateral dialogue between equal participants. Nevertheless, this study will not easily dismiss the complexity, fluidity, and hybridity of identity construction and various differentiated roles Others play over time.

Furthermore, as analyzing the discursive constitution of American identity/difference, I will not assume that there exists unanimous representation of Self

59 According to Jessica Benjamin (1988, 63), in splitting, “the two sides are represented as opposite and distinct tendencies,” and “one side is devalued, the other idealized, and each is projected onto different objects” (cited in Blaney and Inayatullah, 2004, 11).

60 In a similar vein, K. J. Holsti (2011, 397) argues, “The major theme running throughout American history is the perfection of the American political and economic experiment and its contrast with others’ institutions and social habits. The underlying assumption is not just one of difference, but also of superiority. It has historically provided the foundation of the belief that the United States has not only an obligation but also a right, to lead other nations.”
and Other in the national community. Rather, I will give particular attention to contested production processes of national identities and concomitant security imaginaries. As Katzenstein (1996, 19) highlights, “for most of the major states, identity has become a subject of considerable political controversy. How these controversies are resolved… will be of great consequence for international security.” Thus, it should be noted the existence of “knowledge politics” in foreign policy-making process. The direction of a nation’s security strategy is fundamentally shaped by “which political faction within a given country succeeds in advancing and popularizing its own reading of world politics” (Hagmann, 2015, 2).

Especially, I will not only focus on the elite intellectual discourse but also on the area of “common sense” embedded in popular communities. The conflict between elite ideas and popular beliefs in the process of national identity formation will be an important site to be investigated. Following both Berger and Luckmann’s (1966, 15) claim that “commonsense ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge” and Antonio Gramsci’s (1971, 421) notion of “common sense,” i.e., the “the spontaneous philosophy of the multitude,” Hopf (2013) calls for a neo-Gramscian “common-sense constructivism” that focuses on the contestation between popular habits of thinking and elite ideas, and policy outcomes as its product. In this new theoretical schema, it cannot be naturally assumed that a “discursive fit” between the elite discourse and people’s traditional conception of the world exists all the time. Although the ruling group pursues the establishment of hegemony, there is always a possibility that common sense in civil society would resist and defeat the elite hegemonic project.61

Deudney’s statement that almost every aspect of “American foreign policy has been contested within the United States” (2013, 19) can be understood through this neo-

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61 See also Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) who criticize role theory’s conventional assumptions on shared role conceptions across elites and masses by privileging elites and on a consensus among elites concerning national roles by black-boxing the group. Instead, the authors highlight that foreign policy is often “contested both vertically (between elites and masses) and horizontally (among elites)” (5).
Gramscian theoretical perspective. To be specific, he notes, the conflict between “liberal internationalism” and the alliance of “imperialism and military adventurism” has marked the key debates surrounding the major wars of aggression, such as the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War (Deudney, 2013, 19). The opposition provided by Lieven (2012) between the “Thesis” and the “Anti-Thesis” in the American Creed, the distinction by Bruce Cumings (2009) between “Atlanticism” and “Continentalism,” and the comparison made by Hendrickson (2009) between “Unionist paradigm” and “nationalist/imperialist paradigm” point to the same issue: the great bifurcation in American identity and foreign policy discourse based on different social groups. Thus, we need a pluralist notion of America that has multiple, competing traditions and continuing tensions against the dominant unitary, singular view of liberal America that emphasizes the existence of a broad consensus on core norms and essential identities (Katzenstein, 2012a; Smith, 1997).

Along the same line, my study will demonstrate the origins of a contestation over the construction of a hegemonic consensus on American national identity and foreign policy between liberal internationalism of the East Coast intellectual elite and Jacksonian imperialism of the anti-intellectual frontier people. Indeed, this schema stresses the existence of the two antagonistic social forces, the two different symbolic universes and, as a result, the two contending identities/interests/foreign policies from the earliest years of the United States. How the contrasting European discursive heritages and experiences with Others shaped the two distinct groups’ social stock of knowledge or security imaginary will be traced through their successive historical developments.

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62 The term, the “Jacksonian” tradition in American foreign policy was popularized by Mead (2001).

63 For a classical description of the struggle between the Atlantic intellectual elite class and the inland anti-intellectual folks in the United States discursive landscape, see Hofstadter (1963).
Table 1 Bifurcation of the US Foreign Policy Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social force</th>
<th>Identity/Other</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Coast Elite /Intellectuals</td>
<td>Revolutionary State vs. Old World</td>
<td>Transforming Westphalian System &amp; Globalizing Philadelphian System</td>
<td>Liberal Internationalism (Madisonian/Jeffersonian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier White Populations</td>
<td>Civilizing State vs. Savage</td>
<td>Removal/Colonization Regime Change</td>
<td>Popular Imperialism (Jacksonian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Caveats

Before we move onto my dissertation’s main empirical analysis, two caveats should be marked. One is the problem of ontology, and the other is the distinction between description and explanation. First, to focus on the ideational and unit-level sources of American foreign policy does not mean that material and structural dimensions will be entirely discarded. Mearsheimer’s (1994, 44) blunt caricature of constructivism as “wishful thinking” that negates the power of material and structural factors misunderstands the gist of the constructivist challenge. The theory is not a delusive argument that “subjective” ideas determine reality. Rather, paraphrasing Thomas Risse-Kappen’s (1994) words, constructivist tenets “can be read as arguing, not that the world is populated with floating ideas, but that guns and bombs are ontological hybrids” (Allan, 2014). That is, we should realize that “ontologically incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts of the human world” (Deudney, 2013, 16), and that we need to go beyond a simple dichotomy between “material” and “ideational” variables.

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64 See also Wendt’s (1995, 73-74) direct response to Mearsheimer: “[S]ocial structures are real and objective, not ‘just talk.’ But this objectivity depends on shared knowledge, and in that sense social life is ‘ideas all the way down’ (until you get to biology and natural resources)… Ideas always matter, since power and interest do not have effects apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such.”

65 In a similar vein, post-Marxist theorists highlight “the material character of every discursive structure.” It is argued that “the very classical dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought” should be resisted. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 108, emphasis original).
As almost all social science domains are actually complex ontological hybrids, a “mixed ontology” (Deudney, 2013) is needed to understand this complexity.

In addition, a sort of “stage-complementarity” logic (Jepperson et al., 1996, 70) can help us to understand the relationship between material structure and ideational domestic variables: while realist argument provides underlying conditions for events, the real process of history is shaped by social, cultural facts. For instance, when explaining the end of the Cold War, a realist argument based on a material shift in balance of power and the existence of nuclear deterrence can offer “a plausible starting point of a more fully specified causal chain” (Jepperson et al., 1996, 70). However, domestic ideational factors, such as the rise of the “New Thinking” (Wendt, 1999, 76; 129; 375) and Reagan’s abolitionist turn (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2011, 525-526), should be incorporated to examine the specific process of the great historical juncture in the late twentieth century. According to a multilevel or multistep model in FPA or the abovementioned neoclassical realism, system-level theories describe the “context within which foreign policy choices are made,” that is, system-level variables “act as a ‘first cut’ that determines the range of policy options available” (Beach, 2012, 33). In order to explain why different states confronting similar structural environment sometimes adopt different foreign policies, however, we should analyze internal variables in particular historical situations, for domestic-level factors shape the contours of specific outcomes.

Likewise, in my case, a variety of material structural variables, such as the global hegemonic rivalry between Britain and France, the rise of power imbalances between Euro-Americans and the native tribes, the breakdown of the British Empire’s hierarchical order, and the emerging balance of power system between thirteen independent states and their geographical isolation after the American Revolution, can delineate a basic foundation or a parameter of possibilities of our story. However, as Mark Blyth (2003) metaphorically summarizes, “structures do not come with an instruction sheet.” To be specific, Risse-Kappen (1994, 214) insists,

[A] power-based analysis using the model of egoistic utility maximizers is
underdetermining in the sense that it leaves various options as to how actors may define their interests in response to underlying structural conditions. The role and impact of ideas must then be conceptualized as intervening variables between structural conditions and the definition of actors' interests and preferences. Studying ideas does not offer alternative accounts to structural explanations, but the latter are notoriously insufficient if we want to understand the way actors define and interpret their interest (emphasis mine).66

For example, one can ask a series of hypothetical questions regarding my case study: why did the colonial Americans rise up against the British Empire when imperial oppression was much weaker than other places such as Ireland and the metropole itself? Why did the thirteen states construct a federal order instead of a balance of power system under anarchy? As we shall see, these questions can be answered only when we take account of the prevalence of a distinctive ideology, republicanism, among the colonial Anglo-Saxon elites. Due to the belief system that triggered enormous fear against the two extremes of tyranny and anarchy, Euro-Americans not only (over)reacted to the British Empire’s readjustment after the Seven Years’ War (Bailyn, 1992) but also materialized the novel “peace pact” (Hendrickson, 2003) transcending the European international system.

Also, one can continue to ask why the United States did not constitute an extended federal republic with Amerindian nations,67 and then why it abandoned the coexistence policy inherited from European empires and pursued assimilation or a removal policy toward Native Americans. Surely, the US colonial expansion was possible, because of “the absence of effective external balancing against the Union” (Deudney, 2007, 172) after France, Britain, and Spain were kicked out of the Continent as well as of the British Royal Navy’s domination of the Atlantic sea lane. It is also certain that the

66 In the same vein, Hopf (1998, 173) argues, “Determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the distribution of material power or the structure of authority. One will need to know about the culture, norms institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the structure alike.”

67 In fact, a Delaware tribe tried to negotiate a treaty with the revolutionary army general Lachlan MacIntosh in 1778 to create an independent Native American fourteenth state, but the Continental Congress refused to accept the treaty (Jennings, 1985, 58).
fundamental imbalance in “demographic, technical, and organizational factors” and the rapid American expansion troubled Amerindian’s effective resistance (Deudney, 2007, 341n60). However, Wendt (1999, 267) points out that even the archetype “Hobbesian First Encounter” (exemplified in many historical cases of colonial conquest) is a “social” phenomenon as well, because the real process of the encounters are “based on ideas about the Other that each side takes into account.” He elaborates:

Neorealists would like anarchy to play an important casual role in explaining these Encounters, but in fact its role is only *permissive*.

If the conquistadores had brought other meanings with them, like the Federation’s ‘Prime Directive’ of non-interference in the television show Star Trek, the results would have been quite different. There is nothing in anarchy as such that forces these situations to be Hobbesian, even if they often do take on such a structure; one can imagine Lockean and Kantian First Encounters as well (Wendt, 1999, 267, emphasis mine).

Blaney and Inayatullah (1997, 82) also share the same notion that “first contacts” without preconceptions of Others cannot exist: “each culture brings to the interactions (changeable) images of itself and others that are prefigured by myths, texts, and traditions.” As a result, we are required to study “a comparative and historical analysis of how cultures conceptualize others.” Anarchy itself needs to be analyzed as an ontologically hybrid object that is represented and interpreted through the specific cultural lens in a particular spatio-temporal setting.

Especially, what happened in the early modern intercontinental encounters was not fully determined by simple material-structural situations. As Siba Grovogui insists, “the pathologies of the violence of religious and civil wars in Europe conditioned some of the behaviours displayed in the New World and Africa during conquest and enslavement.” (2013, 6, emphasis mine)

Therefore, my study will situate America in the context of early modern Eurocentric colonial thinking and practices that originated from the medieval Christian binary

68 Neoclassical realists also view anarchy as only a “permissive” condition, not as an overriding causal force in world politics (Taliaferro et al., 2009, 7).

69 Neoclassical realists also agrees with the important roles of cognitive grid that filters the material reality: “if power influences the course of international politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who makes decisions on behalf of the states” (Wohlforth, 1993, 2).
cosmology and Enlightenment thought on civilization and barbarism.

In sum, material-structural explanations are underdetermining or insufficient to explain simultaneously how the United States came to be a revolutionary state against European international society by constructing an alternative federal interstate order (Deudney and Meiser, 2008) and how the same country became a racist empire in the global inter-imperial society by colonizing native peoples (Gould, 2012). In order to understand this apparent contradiction, we need to pay attention to the cultural dimensions, including ideas, representations, and identity. Without examining complex processes such as the co-constituting mechanism of identity\difference and interest based on the prefigured European heritages, we cannot grasp how the US came to possess exceptional identities that are both similar to and different from the modern European nation-states and foreign policy doctrines that apply differentiated norms to the West and the “Rest.”

Some social “science”-oriented critics would argue that if my project is limited to the formation of American identities and foreign policy traditions, it is merely a description of what happened and not a scientific explanation. In a canonical positivist “textbook” on social scientific methods, to name one example, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 37) insist that “understanding” or “constitutive theory” is descriptive inference as opposed to causal or explanatory inference. Such a dichotomized separation between description and explanation has a profound consequence for our sociology of knowledge, as Wendt (1998, 108) notes:

[I]n disciplines worried about their epistemic status as ‘science’ the incentive to distinguish one’s work as explanatory, and to distinguish it in particular from history—often seen by social scientists as being ‘mere’ description—will be a powerful force. As long as such worries exist, scholars, and perhaps especially younger ones, will face strong disciplinary pressures not to treat descriptive inference as an end in itself, but to go ‘beyond’ description to causal inference… [I]n the social sciences today the connotations of having one’s work characterized as ‘descriptive’ are so negative that almost all scholars want to be seen as engaging in ‘explanation’, as even a cursory survey of most dissertations and our leading journals will attest. Even if coupled with an effort to change these perceptions, therefore, at least in the short run treating constitutive theory as
descriptive inference will inevitably have the effect of reinforcing the prejudice that it is
second-best, inferior, and not fully ‘science.’

However, basic constructivist questions, such as “What makes the world hang
together?” (Ruggie, 1998) and “how are things in the world put together so that they have
the properties they do?” (Wendt, 1998, 103) do not constitute simple descriptions because
“understanding the constitution of things is essential to explaining how those things
behave and what causes outcomes” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 10). Indeed,
constitutive questions allow us to “unearth some socially constructed deep background
conditions to certain actions” (Parsons, 2007, 30). To be specific, Neumann (1999, 37)
claims that to IR, which “has had notorious problems with pinning down its subjects and
has often defined them in terms of their alleged and abstract ‘interests’,” the study of
collective identity formation provides the chance “to theorize the genesis and
maintenance of the human collectives of world politics.” In particular, interrogating the
Self-Other relationship leads us to understand “who ‘the actors’ are, how they were
constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under which preconditions they may
thrive” (Neumann, 1999, 37). Thus, we have two fundamentally disparate and equally
important types of research question in social science: whereas rationalists usually ask
“why”/“causal” problems, social constructivists concentrate on “what or how-possible”/
“constitutive” issues. Constitutive theory should be elevated to an “autonomous, co-
equal status relative to causal theory, worth doing in its own right, rather than treating it
as something we have to go beyond before we will really be doing science” (Wendt, 1998,
117).

In this regard, understanding how the identity of United States was socially
constituted allows us to hypothesize about and explain the behavior of America and the
effects it has on international relations. Especially, in light of the enormous role America

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70 Roxanne Doty (1996, 4) also notes, “Why questions generally take as unproblematic the possibility that particular policies and practices could happen. They presuppose the identies of social actors and a background of social meanings. In contrast, how questions examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude others.”
has played in shaping the contemporary world order (Ikenberry, 2011), analysis of the American identity formation is crucial for various IR theoretical questions. This is my second caveat.
III. The New World vs. The Old World: The Revolutionary State against the European International System

The figure below delineates in a schematic way how material features of the East Coast and the frontier areas had shifted in early modern North America. The main body of my dissertation will explain how both structural shifts and ideational changes shaped the two faces of American identity while the thirteen colonies (and then the USA) interacted with European empires and Native nations. From now on, how the idea of America (a collective notion identifying Americans against all non-Americans, or the idea of exceptionalist American identity as a superior one in comparison with all non-American peoples and cultures) was constituted at the turn of nineteenth century will be chronologically investigated.

![Diagram of Material Structure on the Continent]

**Figure 1 Evolving Material Structures in Early Modern North America**

\[ H = \text{Hierarchy}, \quad A = \text{Anarchy}, \quad N = \text{Negarchy}^{71}, \quad Nu = \text{Nullarchy}^{72}. \]

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71 Deudney (2007, 48) coined the term “negarchy” as the third structural ordering principle in political thought distinct from the conventional realist dyad of anarchy and hierarchy in order to “capture the
This chapter examines how America’s transformative identity, informed by radical republican interpretations of world history, was constituted against the European Other over time. I argue that the American Revolution was triggered by republican cultural identity, which sought to distance America from a “degenerate” Europe. The debates at the Constitutional Convention thus emerged as a clash between competing identities, with both the Federalists and the Anti-federalists making a set of claims about external and historical Others, ranging from the Roman Republic to the British Empire. The ambition to escape from interaction with the European balance-of-power system created “the Philadelphian System” as an alternative to the Westphalian world order. In addition, I explore the controversy between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton during the French Revolutionary period as a struggle over the extent to which the international anarchic system demanded American emulation and imitation. Hamilton’s approach to foreign affairs represented a “realist” vision, while the Jeffersonian posture formed an initial vision of “liberal internationalism” based on multilateralism and the export of democracy.

1. The European Heritage I: Republicanism and the American Revolution

Before analyzing the relationship between republican ideology and the American Revolution, we need to deconstruct one historical myth: that the sheer political and economic oppression imposed by the British Empire caused the Revolution, which is symbolized in the contemporary popular slogan, “No taxation without representation.” However, recent findings suggest that even right before the crisis, “British subjects in America, excepting of course the blacks, were then the freest people in the world…. They argued and they fought not to obtain freedom but to confirm the freedom they already had

primacy of full and rounded restraints, or negatives, in republican political associations.” In negarchies, actors are “authoritatively ordered by relations of mutual restraint.”

72 “Nullarchy” refers to “the relationship between actors or units with absent violence interdependence” (Deudney, 2007, 40).

73 This concept of “historical Other” is introduced by Hopf (2002).
or claimed” (Morison, 1972, 235). An irony here is that if “the colonists had been truly oppressed, it would have been reined in, quickly and physically, like any English village that defied London’s authority” at that time (Nau, 2002, 64). Accordingly, it was not the objective reality that ignited the independence movement among thirteen colonies in 1776. Rather, we can infer that there was something intersubjective that forced the colonial people to feel much more anxious than necessary.

A group of republican historians, including Bernard Bailyn (1992), Gordon S. Wood (1969), and J. G. A. Pocock (1975), unearthed the existence of a unique ideology in colonial society and altered the conventional liberal perception of the origins of the American Revolution. The core argument of these revisionists was that republicanism existed as a cognitive grid prevalent in the eighteenth century Atlantic world, and it was this weltanschauung that defined the problematic of Americans toward British modernization in its development into world hegemony.

In conventional world history narratives, the eighteenth century is the period when Great Britain emerged as a world power during the hegemonic struggle with France. However, the “British standard of civilization” was not just the rise of another powerful state, but was a fundamental transformation of human history. At this conjuncture, “modernity” in political economy surfaced, and the British standard, which developed the state-capitalism system or “fiscal-military state,” became the ideal type of modern state apparatus across Europe (Brewer, 1988). This indicated the creation of a new political economic paradigm that mobilized massive social resources on the basis of strong taxation institutions, the national bank, and the accumulation of public debt. The paradigm was invented to cope with increasing wars among incipient modern states through a powerful standing army at the start of the modern capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1980; Tilly, 1985). The birth of the modern state also went hand in hand with domestic social changes. The status of a financial capital class escalated, and class

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74 Even regarding the hot issue of tax, the American colonists were “the least taxed in the Atlantic world” before the Revolution (Bender, 2006, 83).
stratification intensified. At the same time, the slow process of industrialization and urbanization began.\textsuperscript{75}

The republican idea that originated in classical Greek and Roman political thought was innovated by Niccolo Machiavelli and later matured into a fully anti-modern problematic through the works of James Harrington.\textsuperscript{76} The “Neo-Harringtonians”–also known as the country, the opposition, and commonwealth men–provided the radical opposition with republican intellectual tools to interpret the modernization of Britain engineered by Walpole’s cabinet. They were the leftist section of the anti-court forces who criticized epochal changes in British society. Their central concern was the anticipated catastrophic consequences of the extinction of liberty and the rise of tyranny that would be generated by the aforementioned modern developments, such as a standing army, national debt, increase in tax and luxury, and the reinforcement of the administration (Bailyn, 1992, 34-42).

In particular, the republican philosophy of history that was derived from the Machiavellian dialectics between “power and liberty” or “virtue and corruption” made the Neo-Harringtonians consider contemporary transformations in British society as disastrous (Wood, 1969, Ch.1). In this ideological framework, the establishment and maintenance of the republic to secure the liberty of \textit{homo politicus} was the pivotal question, and republican theorists reinterpreted human history in accordance with this imagined scheme. To republicans, human history was a cyclical process where the liberty and virtue of a republic had always been threatened by and eventually succumbed to power and corruption. World history was described as an unstable equilibrium between the power that threatens the liberty of people through constant conspiracies and the struggle of citizens to confront this challenge (Bailyn, 1992, Ch. 3).

\textsuperscript{75} Still, a paradigmatic explanation of the socioeconomic change in the early modern capitalist British society is offered by Karl Marx (1981).

\textsuperscript{76} On the genealogy of republicanism, see Pocock (1975).
In the Whiggish view of history, Britain was in an unrivaled position in global history. From the viewpoint of republicans, the British constitution after the Glorious Revolution was the only base of liberty in the world. They believed that liberty in Britain was preserved by the most significant outcome of the revolution in 1688—a “mixed government” that was admired as the best polity since Aristotle, Livy, and Machiavelli (Bailyn, 1992, 70-74; Wood, 1969, 31). The problem was that liberty in Britain was encroached upon by pervasive power after Walpole led the state. Neo-Harringtonians assumed that this encroachment resulted from the degeneration of virtue and rampant corruption in modernizing British society. From this perspective, the republic was facing another “Machiavellian Moment” (Pocock, 1975, vii-viii).

Along the same lines, the colonial American intellectuals in the latter part of the eighteenth century thought that the corrupted British Empire was transplanting modernity to threaten the virtue of the uncontaminated colonies. A series of policies designed to consolidate colonial governance in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War was perceived as a formidable signal and “conspiracy” (Wood, 2011, 81-123) by Americans who already doubted modernization in Britain through the republican lens. This perception made Americans accept the dissident discourse and the critique of British society as proposed by Neo-Harringtonians more ardently than the metropolitan elites did (Pocock, 1975, 509). Eventually, the power that destroyed the liberty of the Empire seemed to begin exerting its evil influence on the North American colonies (Bailyn, 1992, 141-143).

More importantly, the historical analogy between Rome and Great Britain was crucial in “Othering” the metropole from the eyes of the colonial American literati.

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77 For example, the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Townshend Acts of 1767, among others.

78 While the modernist Court won in England, the anti-modern Country or Jeffersonians prevailed in the US. On the historical comparison of “Court” versus “Country” debates in England and America and its “inverted” historical outcomes, see Murrin (1980).
In analyzing the Roman republic, which was an ideal historical Other in republican ideology (Wood, 2011, 57-79), the tradition concentrated on what Deudney called “the second iron law of polis republicanism” that attributes the fall of the Roman republic to its geographical expansion. The imperial overreach of Rome “had the effect of altering the interior balance of power toward the few at the expense of the many. This process of constitutional deformation entailed interrelated processes of both socioeconomic and political-military changes” (Deudney, 2007, 110). To be specific, the expansion through continuous wars brought about increased social stratification because of the concentration of wealth in the aristocratic class as well as the collapse of the free peasantry. It also produced a large standing army due to the decline of the citizen-soldier system and the rise of a military class. As a result, the Roman republic, a mixed government on the basis of relative social equality and a strong militia tradition, came to an end by autonomous generals, such as Caesar, Anthony, Pompey and then Octavian at last (Deudney, 2007, 110-112).

From this historical perspective, the modernization or the rise of a “fiscal-military state” in Britain seemed to follow the negative example of the fallen Roman republic through indiscreet expansion and constitutional deformation. As Britain had won the hegemonic rivalry with France and aggrandized over the globe, its invaluable liberty and mixed regime had been encroached by a series of developments predicted in “the second iron law,” such as intensified socioeconomic polarization and the establishment of a massive standing army. This anxiety against British modernization was combined with another philosophy of history, translatio imperii, which suggested that “the Westward cycle of world history culminates in America” (Pocock, 1975, 511).⁷⁹ According to this then-popular discourse, the beacon of civilization moved Westward in human history from Greece to Rome, from Rome to Britain. However, as the British Empire became corrupt, America as “the millennium or Fifth Monarchy” (Pocock, 1975, 513) was

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⁷⁹ On the intellectual history of the “heliotropic myth” that holds Western civilization moved from its birthplace in the Middle East westward through Greece, Rome, Britain, and finally to America, see Schulte Nordholt (1995).
required to play its historical role of saving liberty in the world. The last stanza of George Berkeley’s *Verse on the Prospect of the Arts and Learning in America* (1752) clearly shows this notion:

“Westward the course of empire takes its way;  
The four first acts already past  
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;  
Time’s noblest offspring is the last” (cited in Pocock, 1975, 511).

As a consequence, only one path remained for Americans to choose under this paradigm. A resolute rupture, or a revolution was needed to confront the formidable conspiracy to contaminate the pure colonies at a time when Britain, once the only land of liberty in the world and the ideal Other, had degenerated into a corrupt empire following the historical trail of Rome.

To sum up, the American Revolution, on the basis of republicanism, was the culmination of an anti-British, or an anti-European US Ego embedded in a variety of historical analogies from the classical age. The American elites or Founding Fathers securitized a British Other (a modern avatar of Rome and the global standard of modernity in the late-eighteenth century) as an existential threat to their republican Self. The colonial securitizing actors defined the development of the British fiscal-military state, the growing institution of the British executive, and their social effects not as historical progress (as we do today) but as “corruption.” Therefore, Americans decided to flee from British Alter and secure or construct its own revolutionary Ego, i.e. the New World.\(^{80}\) The American Revolution signaled the birth of American distinctive identity or American exceptionalism.\(^{81}\) The eloquent speech delivered by Richard Henry Lee (1776),

\(^{80}\) The Great Seal of the United States of America adopted by the Continental Congress in 1782 and printed today on the back of one-dollar bill symbolically expresses the Founders’ self-understanding of this historical rupture. The Latin motto NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM below the pyramid suggests that the birth of the US was not just a founding of another country but an emergence of a novelty in world history. The US “portended the future – ‘a new order of the ages,’ a decisive break with the past” (Nash, 2013, 104).

\(^{81}\) “Our beliefs in liberty, equality, constitutionalism, and the well-being of ordinary people came out of the Revolutionary era. So too did our idea that we Americans are a *special people* with a *special destiny* to lead
a Virginian delegate, after the passage of famous “Lee’s resolution” in the Second Continental Congress that led to the Declaration of Independence can be read as a summation of such politics of identity\difference situated in early American social imaginary. In Lee’s argument for the Revolution, both “polluted” Europe and recently “withered” England are contrasted with the American republic that would provide an “asylum” for “all the unfortunate of the human race.”

It should be added that there was a puritan strain of American exceptionalism from the beginning of North American colonization as well exhibited in John Winthrop’s “City upon a hill” speech. Religious settlers as God’s elect or chosen people, after having experienced a “perilous exodus across the seas,” tried to build an “American Israel” and a “New English Jerusalem” (Smith, 2003, 137-138). The various European colonizers expressed a powerful desire “to reorder some aspects of the existing European world, to reverse some social, political, or economic trends they found worrisome, or to restore some imagined lost and less threatening world” (Greene, 1993, 58).

The prevailing doctrine among students of American history insists that the founding era, sandwiched between “two great awakenings” in US history, was a worldly era when the influence of liberalism and republicanism was predominant and puritanism was in decline (Dreisbach, 2013, 57). However, the ecclesial version of anti-European sentiment was another source of American exceptional identity pervaded in American folk community distinguished from the secular republican tradition prevalent among the intellectual class (McCrisken, 2002, 66-67). In fact, even the Founding Fathers usually known for their rationalist Enlightenment philosophy often mobilized the rhetoric of Christian theology or the idea of Providence (Dreisbach, 2013, 69) to securitize the British Other by successfully convincing their audience. The religious public opinion could easily accept the discourse of republican security, because its revolutionary (or apocalyptic) rhetoric assuming decisive breaks in human history well resonated with their the world toward liberty and democracy. The Revolution, in short, gave birth to whatever sense of nationhood and national purpose we Americans have had” (Wood, 2011, 2-3, emphasis mine).
millennialist belief system. According to Donald S. Lutz (1984), the Bible was the most frequently cited reference in American political literature from 1760 to 1805 over any other secular European canons. In *The Federalist Papers*, for instance, which is famous for its distinctive inclination to Enlightenment rationalism, James Madison opined, “It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution” (Hamilton et al., 2001, 228, henceforth *Federalist*).

2. **The Federalists vs. Antifederalists Debate: Inventing the Philadelphian System**

From the colonial era, Americans lived in a unique and complex order of sovereignty that was different from the orthodox modern international system. As “a complex, extended polity,” the British Empire system was “a kind of embryonic world order” and offered “a template for American federalism” (Onuf, 1998, 76; Onuf and Sadosky, 2002, 178). This experience in the system of complex pooling sovereignty (*imperium in imperio*), in which colonies possessed partial sovereignty embodied in their own parliament and recognized the royal prerogative, left Americans unattached to the Westphalian order as the sole choice among various inter-state ordering principles (Bailyn, 1992, 198-229).82 They viewed the relationship among the colonial states, mainland Britain, and other European states across the Atlantic via the concept of the “federal.” The term, then, referenced domestic constitutionalism and diplomacy alike in eighteenth century signification. For example, the federative powers were those powers of war and peace along with treaties and alliances that the commonwealths had a need for in transactions with other states. Also, European publicists could speak of the “federal constitution” of Europe as actually existing, and they meant by the term the web of

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82 On the common practice of a “divided sovereignty” enacted between the metropole and colony during the early modern times, see Keene (2002, 67-68). The settler colonies of the British Dominions “developed complex mixtures of formal dependence, internal self-government, and international personality” distinguished from the Westphalian sovereignty practice (Strang, 1996, 24).
treaties and restraints that was to govern the relations of civilized states. Today’s concept of “multilateralism” is similar to it (Hendrickson, 2003, 22-23). From that perspective, Americans could imagine an alternative concept of federation when they debated how to manage the relationship among thirteen states in terms of war and peace.83

Although conventional interpretations of the Founding and the making of the Constitution over the twentieth century have usually seen the major events in eighteenth century North America through domestic socioeconomic and ideological lenses, such as class conflicts, liberalism/republicanism and the like, revolutionary Americans actually reflected on the politics among thirteen states within the framework of international war and peace (Gibson, 2009, 96).84 As Luther Martin noted, “the separation from [Great Britain] placed the 13 States in a state of nature towards each other” (Storing, 1981, 13, emphasis mine). Antebellum America was “a state-system within a larger international system” (Totten, 2012, 79-80) and security and diplomacy problems, involving thirteen states, Indian tribes, and European empires, defined a variety of important (and often fiercely contested) decisions made by the Founding Fathers.85 Above all, how to maintain peace was the most crucial issue in the fledgling US, for war was regarded as the key factor causing a deformation of political institutions in the republican worldview. James Madison succinctly advanced the view as follows:

Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the

83 In this respect, revolutionary Americans exploited their founding moment to demonstrate that their own version of imperial constitution theory was workable through the establishment of the United States of America (Hendrickson, 2003, 137).

84 For a survey of recent literature in both history and political science associated with an international and diplomatic approach to the American Founding, see Cutterham (2014).

85 “Because North America in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods was brimming over with geopolitical rivalries, Americans tended to see both intra-state and inter-state relations within the larger diplomatic context of the Atlantic states system as a whole” (Onuf and Sadosky, 2002, 181).
discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and in the degeneracy of manners and of morals engendered by both. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.\footnote{“Political Observations” (1795) cited in Hendrickson (2015, 27).}

During the Confederation era (1781–1789), the thirteen states still enjoyed high degree of sovereignty and acted almost like sovereign modern states in Europe: “they clashed over commerce and territory, formed economic ‘pacts’ with one another against other parts of the union, gathered their own armies, chartered their own navies, and pursued separate foreign policies, often entering into agreements with American Indian nations on their own accord” (Totten, 2012, 97). In this quasi-anarchical context, the diplomatic crisis of the Articles of Confederation in the mid-1780’s urged a new security solution in a pressing manner (Marks, 1987). There were three possible sources of interstate war in the Confederacy. First, larger states could use their militias to settle disputes with neighboring smaller states (Deudney, 2007, 165). Second, the Confederation could have broken into several small confederacies and these contending parts allying with foreign powers could go to war. Third, insurgencies that were prevalent in the frontier areas could be escalated into a whole scale armed conflicts between sections (Totten, 2012, 96-97).

In particular, the two events that triggered a decisive skepticism of the Confederation were Shays’ Rebellion and Jay’s Crisis in 1786. This year was a major watershed in early American history, for the turmoil convinced the Federalists that the present interstate system had seriously limited capability to settle the conflict among thirteen states and to prevent potential foreign interventions to America (Hendrickson, 2003, 195-196). In this context, it can be understood that “the Federal Convention of 1787 was an international meeting consisting of envoys from the thirteen states” (Totten, 2012, 79, emphasis mine) aiming to devise a multilateral solution to diplomatic and
security crises. As Madison wrote to Edmund Randolph before the Convention, a new union was needed to prevent the states from becoming “subserv[ent] to the wars and politics of Europe.”

Certainly, the process of making a new constitution was not uneventful. According to Hendrickson (2003, 33-35), when the representatives from each state gathered in Philadelphia in 1787, they stood atop a ridge, on either side of which laid a dangerous abyss. On one side was “empire-consolidation-despotism-centralization,” and “anarchy-dissolution-chaos-disintegration” on the other. The debate between the Federalists and Antifederalists was conceptually situated in these two extremes and essentially related to the politics of identity/difference, i.e., defining the major negative Other or danger to avoid.

To those who were against the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the principal Other was still the danger of “empire” that was historically exemplified in the collapse of the Roman republic and contemporarily represented in the degeneration of the British Empire (Hendrickson, 2003, 252). In line with the justification for the American Revolution, the Antifederalists, “men of little faith” insisted that establishing a strong

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87 Quoted in Totten (2012, 90, emphasis mine).

88 More comprehensively, Deudney (2007, 46-47) insists that republican security theory captures four different insecurities resulting from “the extremes of both anarchy and hierarchy, both of which can manifest themselves internally and externally, thus producing four situations of gross insecurity”: a. stasis & civil war (inside anarchy), b. total war/annihilation (outside anarchy), c. tyranny/despotism (inside hierarchy), and d. imperial conquest & subordination (outside hierarchy).

89 “For the Antifederalist world view was profoundly shaped by their abhorrence of "empire"-that is to say, the rule of a vast territory by a strong, consolidated government. In rejecting the Federalist dream of a glorious American empire, they challenged the notion that the confederated states had to mimic European empires to safeguard their independence” (Marshall, 1980, 233).

90 The Antifederalists were called “men of little faith” because they did not trust in the new Constitution. However, they should be called “men of strong faith” in the sense that they stuck to “the ancient faith so fundamental a part of the ideological origins of the Revolution, from which, they argued, the Constitution departed” (Bailyn, 1992, 331). To the Antifederalists, the Federalists entirely missed the point of the American Revolution by seeking to “replace the British Empire with an American copy” (Marshall, 1980, 248).
and extensive federal government would pose a danger to the republican mixed regime as the British Empire had been to the colonial society, for such a government would found the basis of an aristocracy and a monarchy and reduce the liberty of common people (Lind, 2006, 48). In this sense, the Antifederalists possessed a fundamentalist anti-European identity while believing that the Federalists had “fallen sway to the tastes of Europe, and to have contemplated sacrificing liberty for national glory” (Marshall, 1980, 252, emphasis mine). Patrick Henry’s antifederalist speech at the Virginian ratifying convention succinctly pointed out the opposition between historical “empires” in old Europe and “liberty/republicanism” in new America, and warns the danger of the proposed Constitution that would “consolidate” the government:

Shall we imitate the example of those nations who have gone from a simple to a splendid government? Are those nations more worthy of our imitation? What can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss they have suffered in attaining such a government- for the loss of their liberty? If we admit this consolidated government, it will be because we like a great, splendid one. Some way or other we must be a great and mighty empire; we must have an army, and a navy, and a number of things. When the American spirit was in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir, was then the primary object… by that spirit we have triumphed over every difficulty. But now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire. If you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of one great consolidated empire of America, your government will not have sufficient energy to keep them together. Such a government is incompatible with the genius of republicanism (quoted from Marshall, 1980, 248-249, emphasis mine).

In addition, as the Antifederalists adhered to democratic peace and commercial

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91 “The fear of a conspiracy against the fragile structure of freedom, the same fear that had lain at the heart of the resistance movement before 1776, pervaded the thought of the antifederalists” (Bailyn, 1992, 333). “Ultimately, the Antifederalists insisted, empire could be achieved only at the expense of their most cherished and hard-won prize: liberty” (Marshall, 1980, 233).

92 The most elaborate version of this argument was presented by James Monroe: “The causes of half the wars that have thinned the ranks of mankind, and depopulated nations, are caprice, folly, and ambition: these belong to the higher orders of governments, where the passions of one, or of a few individuals, direct the fate of the rest of the community. But it is otherwise with democracies, where there is an equality among the citizens.” Quoted in Hendrickson (2009, 35, emphasis mine).
peace theories, they had an optimistic picture of American security under the Articles of Confederation against the pessimistic/realist vision of the Federalists. Thus, the Antifederalists believed that the potentially anti-liberal centralized government or “empire” would not be needed to maintain peace among thirteen states (Hendrickson, 2009, 35-40). Basically, the Antifederalists doubted that the projections of war between states or sections was a “hobgoblin” or “imaginary-mere creatures of fancy” that were forged by “the deranged brain of Publius, New-York writer.”

In contrast, the Federalists, on the one hand, criticized their opponents for brooding on “groundless fears” of empire (Bailyn, 1992, 352) and proposed a famous Madisonian “extended republic” solution (Federalist, No. 10) to the pessimistic “second iron law” in traditional republicanism, in order to allay antifederalist fears of the Federal Union. In this new theoretical breakthrough in republican security theory, the more factions/sections exist, the less the danger of corruption of the majority power would be. Thus, the continental expansion of the United States would be beneficial to the preservation of the republic (Deudney, 2007, 166-167; Pagden, 1995, 114-115).

Additionally, Publius privileged another dangerous extreme, i.e., “anarchy,” by studying several historical Others, such as weak unions in the European past, which were...

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93 To name one example, Agrippa or James Winthrop contended, “All the states have local advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are, therefore, in a situation to supply each other's wants. Carolina, for instance, is inhabited by planters, while the Massachusetts is more engaged in commerce and manufactures... The most friendly intercourse may therefore be established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces friendship.” Quoted in Storing (1981, 24-25, emphasis mine).


95 Hamilton bluntly wrote: “In reading many of the publications against the Constitution a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale or romance which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes – forgons, hydars, and chirmeras dire – discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents and transforming everything it touches into a monster.” Cited in Bailyn (1992, 352).

96 Publius is a pseudonym used by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in writing Federalist.
doomed to collapse. The Federalists strived to invent a novel world order that would produce security and peace on the continent through case studies of ancient Greece, the early modern confederations of Germany, Holland, and Italy. In addition, the emerging new balance of power system in contemporary Europe was also examined as another negative Other to avoid. First, the ancient Greek example represented the anarchic situation after the disintegration of a confederation, which result in internal civil wars and the intervention of foreign powers (Federalist, No. 18).

Similarly, modern Germany, Holland, and Italy were usually cited to show how loose confederations were beset with the domestic and international troubles due to structural weakness. For instance, Italy – initially pacified in the wake of the 1454 treaty among Milan, Florence, and Venice – was driven into catastrophe in 1494, for each signatory invited French intervention to hold each other in check. The Federalists in America were especially concerned about the fact that the Italian experience resembled their own situation from 1786 to 1787. The disunion of the confederation made Italy the center of the European-wide balance of power system that brought about the militarization of each state and the spread of despotism (Hendrickson, 2003, 48-52).

The negative appreciation of the balance of power system that had recently surfaced in modern Europe was also a decisive factor that made Americans examine an anti-European remedy for interstate order in America. No. 41 of Federalist authored by Madison indicates that Publius perceived modern European international relations in the same manner that structural realists do today. According to the international narrative, each modern state pursues individual security against the expansion of a hegemonic state that desires the establishment of a unified European empire, which consequently results in the phenomenon of a security dilemma and balance of power: i.e., essential practices of the Westphalian system. This is the genesis of modern balance of power system.

97 In 1786, before the Annapolis convention, for instance, James Madison asked Jefferson who was the United States Minister to France at the time to “comb the bookstores and send him everything he could find about previously existing federations” (Tomasi, 2002, 220).
understood by the Federalists:

If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch” (Federalist, No. 41, 258).

The pivotal issue was the dreadful prediction that a European-style international order must be transplanted if the Confederation of American states collapsed. Such failure would lead to the debacle of a republican government because of the arrival of a military state characterized by a large standing army and heavy taxation, as Europeans, the negative Others, had already degenerated into:

The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. …… The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. …… The face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes (Federalist, No. 41, 259, emphasis mine).98

Indeed, the crisis of the Confederation system in the mid-1780’s made a gloomy impression on the Federalists, who feared that the thirteen states would be split into two or three confederacies due to several conflicts and fall into a state of war.99 It was seen as inevitable that this disunion would invite the intervention of European powers,100 and

98 See also Deudney (2007, 165-166).

99 In No. 7 of Federalist, Hamilton suggested that the problem of western territories, the competition of commerce, and the public debt of the confederation might give rise to the break out of interstate war in America.

100 Contemporary European leaders also entertained a hope that the Confederation would collapse and be divided into weak sovereign sub-confederacies “allying with foreign state for protection, thereby allowing them to be played off one another like pawns on a chessboard” (Totten, 2012, 103).
anarchic turbulence would be copied on the American continent, while the republican regime of America would be destroyed.\textsuperscript{101} As a result, the Federalists had to create an alternative interstate order distinct from the European modern international system in order to preserve their nascent republican identity.

To break through this historical predicament, the Constitution of the United States was proposed as a “new science of politics.” The phrase, “new science of politics” was originally coined to stress the novelty of the Constitution in the field of domestic political mechanisms, such as the principle of checks and balances, the separation of legal, administrative, and judicial powers, among others (Wood, 1969, part 5-6). And yet, these mechanisms had already been invented and applied to some governments in Europe in the name of liberalism or Enlightenment political science. In contrast, it was the creation of a federal system beyond the Westphalian system that was genuinely American, i.e., the American “new political science” that fled from European modern political science (Hendrickson, 2003, 28-29). The creation of the United States of America, or “the Philadelphian system”, was “the climax of early modern republican security theory” and “an alternative to the European Westphalian system as a ‘negarchic’ interstate political order”\textsuperscript{102} (Deudney, 2007, 161; Hendrickson, 2009, xii). The US constitution not only presented a new peace project among nations by pooling and binding sovereigns beyond

\textsuperscript{101} “America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league... would by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts, into which she was divided would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all” (Federalist, No. 7, 40, emphasis mine). “But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe – our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.” (Federalist, No. 8, 46, emphasis mine).

\textsuperscript{102} Deudney contends that the Constitution, as an anti-European institutional blueprint, was invented “to design and build a political order in North America that would not fall prey to these patterns of violent competition and conflict, to avoid the Europeanization of North American politics” (2007, 161, emphasis mine). On the detailed comparison between the Westphalian and Philadelphian systems, see Deudney (2007, 179-181).
the balance of power system, but also marked the start of the authentic post-European identity of America.\(^{103}\)

**Table 2 Antifederalists vs. Federalists**

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3. **Hamilton vs. Jefferson: a Normal State or a Revolutionary State?**

In this section, I examine the subsequent phase of the American revolutionary republican security tradition and its conflict with the modern interstate structure by concentrating on the debate between Jefferson and Hamilton in the late eighteenth century. Although “the international and material contextual circumstances of the American founding period were particularly conducive to republican constitutional success” (Deudney, 2010, 304),\(^ {104}\) the United States of America had to cling to its ways while responding to various external influences. Among the challenges that conditioned the early American experiment, the modern international society placed structural

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\(^{103}\) However, the establishment of the Constitution could not fully resolve the disagreement between the Federalists and Antifederalists. The clash between Daniel Webster and John Calhoun in 1833 reignited the constitutional debate, and the South later attempted to translate Calhoun’s (and Jefferson’s) doctrine of secession based on the theory of compact into practice, leading to the outbreak of the Civil War (Forsyth, 1981, 117-132).

\(^{104}\) It can be called “the happy circumstance” because “the United States was relatively isolated and thus could pursue a foreign diplomatic and military of relative isolationism” (Deudney, 2007, 305). However, America’s isolated position was literally relative. Since Independence, Americans had to deal with enormous foreign affairs, such as the French Revolution, the hegemonic war between Britain and France, and the frontier conflict with the Native Americans in order to secure their revolution and national boundary.
pressure upon the Revolution and continuously functioned to domesticate an America’s post-Westphalian line of flight. From the beginning, the US was forced to either transform or be transformed by the Westphalian system. The fierce dispute between the two Founding Fathers clearly exemplified the ordeal of the early American exceptional identity.

In this regard, I read the policy debate between Hamilton and Jefferson in the context of the French Revolution as a political struggle over the (re)construction of American national identity and strategic interest.\(^{105}\) The question of how to evaluate and identify two European Others–status quo Britain and revolutionary France–shaped the contestations between the Federalists and Republicans over American exceptionalism (Campbell, 1998, 126). As Jefferson and Hamilton pursued different American self-images against different alterities, they, in turn, proposed contrasting foreign policies (Nau, 2002, 67; Armstrong, 1993, 54). Using the famous distinction made by Robert Cox (1981), it can be interpreted that Hamilton was a problem-solving theorist who took the modern world and its Westphalian framework as granted and focused on certain specific problems, such as balance of power and national security. In contrast, Jefferson was a critical theorist who questioned main assumptions of European power politics and was concerned with transforming the existing structure of international politics as a whole.

Indeed, it was Hamilton who recognized external socialization pressure as a given global standard and professed himself as a staunch European modernist. Regarding the contemporary European standard of civilization (including the sovereign state model, the mercantilist political economy, and the balance of power system) as the future goal of American statecraft, he wanted to abandon the American exceptional approach toward the world. In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton explicitly demonstrated that his *problematique* was predicated on the European realist analysis of the modern international system.\(^{106}\) In

\(^{105}\) Campbell (1998, 125) notes, “Above all else, it was the advent of the French Revolution and its subsequent course of events that shaped how the question of identity was handled in the 1790s.”

\(^{106}\) Felix Gilbert (1961, 111) argues, “eighteenth-century power politics had an effective advocate on the
particular, he consistently criticized the revolutionary viewpoint of world order widely accepted among the American public. As later American realists were critical of idealists in the interwar period, so did Hamilton define the exceptionalist approach to world politics as fantasy, and suggested the realist notion of international relations – anarchy and the state of war among nations – as the permanent truth of world affairs. In the same vein, Hamilton noted that both democratic and commercial peace theories represented this illusion of American exceptionalism. In other words, he intended to disprove contemporary liberal internationalist theories that claimed that the transformation of a regime or the increase in economic interdependence could overcome the logic of Hobbesian anarchy: both the democratization of states and the intense linkage among nations through commerce would not change the perennial state of war in the modern international system.

107 “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” Federalist, No. 6, 27. It is noteworthy that Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of neorealism, references this quote in his classic, Man, the State and War (1959, 237) to prove the old wisdom of the “third image” approach in international relations.

108 “[T]here are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific… Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter?... Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals?... There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State” (Federalist, No. 6, 29-31).

109 “Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other?” (Federalist, No. 6, 30).
His critique of the democratic/commercial peace theories implied a fundamental issue. Hamilton was skeptical about the exceptionality of the American Revolution and the possibility of world revolution. Of course, Hamilton also sincerely believed that a new federation created by the Constitution, or “the Philadelphian system,” would provide thirteen states with a novel security order beyond the precarious Westphalian system in line with republican security theory, as the entire Federalist mainly argued. However, he rejected the republican belief that the achievement of the American Revolution could diffuse throughout the world. Indeed, Hamilton declared that the American Revolution ended, and the US should reconcile itself to the balance of power system as a normal member of the modern international society.  

Paraphrasing Joseph Stalin, Hamilton almost sounds like claiming, “Republicanism in one country.” That is, Hamilton seemed to believe that the American republic could be secured only by building a strong nation-state because the country was encircled by hostile European monarchies (and their Native American alliances).

Thus, Hamilton suggested that America should be a strong and centralized nation-state that must occupy a higher position in the international order. While abandoning the revolutionary agenda of transforming the modern international order, he adopted a more practical position that aimed to assimilate America into the Westphalian paradigm. To be specific, Hamilton claimed that strengthening the US naval force could make America function as a balancer in the Atlantic world.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties… By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate” (Federalist, No. 11, 64-65).

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He also envisioned the U.S as a future world hegemon. By adopting several measures to enrich his nation on the basis of the English “fiscal-military state” model, Hamilton hoped that America would overtake the then-hegemonic state of Britain and the rest of Europe.

Hamilton’s approach to the French Revolution and its revolutionary war was founded on his abovementioned realist perception of the modern international politics. In principle, he did not share the Jeffersonian view on the French Revolution, such as the responsibility of solidarity with revolutionaries in France and the desire to propagate revolutions over Europe. Rather, Hamilton “dreaded” chaotic disorder created by the ideological radicalism and the excess of the mob in the midst of the Revolution. In a letter to Marquis de Lafayette (Oct. 6, 1789), his critical viewpoint on the contemporary situation in France was evidently expressed:

I have seen, with a mixture of pleasure and apprehension, the progress of the events which have lately taken place in your country. As a friend to mankind and to liberty, I rejoice in the efforts which you are making to establish it, while I fear much for the final success of the attempts, for the fate of those I esteem who are engaged in it, and for the danger, in case of success, of innovations greater than will consist with the real felicity of your nation. If your affairs still go well when this reaches you, you will ask why this foreboding of ill, when all the appearances have been so much in your favor. I will tell you. I dread disagreements among those who are now united (which will be

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111 On the close relationship between the Hamiltonian state-building project and the English “fiscal-military state” model, I am indebted to Wood’s (2006) interpretation: “Hamilton and other high-toned Federalists… wanted to create a centralized fiscal-military state that would eventually rival the great monarchical powers of Europe on their own terms” (49). “It was Hamilton who sought to turn the United States into a powerful modern fiscal-military state like those of Great Britain and France” (165).

112 “The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit…It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!” (Federalist, No. 11, 68-69).
likely to be improved by the adverse party) about the nature of your constitution; I dread
the vehement character of your people, whom I fear you may find it more easy to bring
on, than to keep within proper bounds after you have put them in motion; I dread the
interested refractoriness of your nobles, who cannot be gratified, and who may be
unwilling to submit to the requisite sacrifices. And I dread the reveries of your
philosophic politicians, who appear in the moment to have great influence, and who,
being mere speculatists, may aim at more refinement than suits either with human nature
or the composition of your nation (Hamilton, 2001, 521).

Hamilton approached the French Revolutionary war from the perspective of
realism or the calculation of balance of power, which was opposed to the Republican
position founded on the project of world revolution. He defined the Revolutionary war as
a war of aggression initiated by France harboring an ambition to construct a universal
empire over the continent. In his analysis, the anti-French coalition established by other
European dynasties was lauded as a legitimate act to restore the balance of power. In this
context, it needs to be emphasized that his proposal for the US to adopt a neutrality
policy was predicated on his realist calculation – What is the national interest? – not on
his indiscreet “pro-monarchist” propensity as Republicans often accused of at the time

In Hamilton’s thought, the Republicans’ error came from their misconception
that America was as great a power as the British Empire (Hendrickson, 2009, 50-51).
However, international society had taught the hard fact that the U.S was a mere weak
new-born nation, which meant that America must assume a cautious attitude on
international affairs. Accordingly, Hamilton supported American neutrality, whereas the
Republicans lured the nation with “fallacious” propaganda. It was his position that
America was required to build more national power and to wait patiently for the
opportunity to mature in the near future (Staloff, 2005, 112-114).

In contrast, Jefferson, one of the most radical Founding Fathers, wanted not only
to accelerate the experiment of the American republican revolution, but also to prevent
contemporary American exceptional identity from being assimilated into the modern
normal state standard. He believed that this could only be achieved by protecting the US
as a revolutionary state that could transform the Old World by presenting an alternative
standard of civilization. Jefferson’s central question on world politics embodied the American exceptionalist approach toward foreign affairs. Jefferson, adhering to the transformative identity created by the American Revolution, argued that America was at the apex of human progress and that all of humanity should follow its trajectory in the future. By the same token, Jefferson believed that the entire world would evolve into a federation of sister republics, an extended version of the United States of America; that is, he envisioned the proliferation of the “Philadelphian system” over the globe.

It was the realist interpretation of world politics based on the theory of *raison d’état* that Jefferson mainly criticized. He was a genuine universalist founded on the discourse of the law of nature and the notion of “New Diplomacy” against European “Old Diplomacy” (Armstrong, 1993, 69-70). Thus, in Jefferson’s symbolic universe, the

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113 His letter to Joseph Priestly (Jun. 19, 1802) demonstrated this belief in plain terms: “[W]e feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members.” Quoted in Tucker and Hendrickson (1990, 11). On departing the presidency in 1809, Jefferson said the same faith in American exceptionalism: “Trusted with the destinies of this solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights, and the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible of its benign influence” Quoted in Tucker and Hendrickson (1990, 7).

114 In his 1790 public speech to his neighbors (the citizens of Albemarle) after a five-year-duty in France, Jefferson (1984, 491) explicated his expectation to propagate republican Revolutions over the earth. “We have been fellow-labourers and fellow-sufferers, and heaven has rewarded us with a happy issue from our struggles. It rests now with ourselves alone to enjoy in peace and concord the blessings of self-government, so long denied to mankind: to shew by example the sufficiency of human reason for the care of human affairs and that the will of the majority, the Natural law of every society, is the only sure guardian of the rights of man. Perhaps even this my sometimes err. But it's errors are honest, solitary and short-lived. -- Let us then, my dear friends, forever bow down to the general reason of the society. We are safe with that, even in it's deviations, for it soon returns again to the right way. These are lessons we have learnt together. We have prospered in their practice, and the liberality with which you are pleased to approve my attachment to the general rights of mankind assures me we are still together in these it's kindred sentiments. Wherever I may be stationed, by the will of my country, it will be my delight to see, in the general tide of happiness, that yours too flows on in just place and measure. That it may flow thro' all times, gathering strength as it goes, and spreading the happy influence of reason and liberty over the face of the earth, is my fervent prayer to heaven.”
assumption of the autonomy of the state from society or the realist understanding of national interest should be refuted. His revolutionary vision is well demonstrated in his statements arguing the cosmopolitan ethics against the doctrine of reason of state, which emphasized the indivisibility between individual and state ethics.

We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction, that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties (Jefferson, 1984, 518).

I have but one system of ethics for men & for nations – to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements and under all circumstances, to be open & generous, promotes in the long run even the interests of both; and I am sure it promotes their happiness (Jefferson, 1984, 865).

An exceptionalist, revolutionary project required some specific instruments to transform the European balance of power system. To Republicans, commerce and democracy were two pivotal tools to construct a new world order. Commercial/democratic peace theories originated from the age of Enlightenment and were designed to subvert ancien régime through reason and progress. There were two main themes in the theories: First, they strived to remove causes of conflict by destroying the established mercantilist trading system and to promote mutual interest in a peaceful manner via global free trade. Second, they tried to liberate humankind from the permanent state of war by the spread of democracy that would replace warlike monarchy with peace-loving people’s self-rule (Gilbert, 1961, Ch. 3; Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990, 44).

On the one hand, Jefferson regarded commerce as a novel instrument that can resolve international conflicts without military intervention. He expressed his wish that America would propose an alternative way of foreign policy: the US would not rely on war to confront international disputes, rather, it would resolve disputes by peaceful coercion, such as sea blockade. In his letter to James Madison (Mar. 24, 1793), Jefferson’s initiative on the commercial peace was elaborated:

The idea seems to gain credit that the naval powers combined against France will prohibit supplies even of provisions to that country. Should this be formally notified I should suppose Congress would be called, because it is a justifiable cause of war, & as
the Executive cannot decide the question of war on the affirmative side, neither ought it to do so on the negative side, by preventing the competent body from deliberating on the question. But I should hope that war would not be their choice. I think it will furnish us a happy opportunity of setting another example to the world, by shewing that nations may be brought to do justice by appeals to their interests as well as by appeals to arms. I should hope that Congress instead of a denunciation of war, would instantly exclude from our ports all the manufactures, produce, vessels & subjects of the nations committing this aggression, during the continuance of the aggression & till full satisfaction made for it. This would work well in many ways, safely in all, & introduce between nations another umpire than arms (Jefferson, 1984, 1006-1007).\footnote{In practice, during his presidency, Jefferson made efforts to resolve international conflicts peacefully with the British Empire by the invocation of the Embargo Act of 1807. Yet, the outcome was disastrous in his era, for it only struck a serious blow to the American economy and brought about the War of 1812 later (Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990, Part 4).}

On the other hand, Jefferson subscribed to the theory of democratic peace and thought that the French Revolution and its diffusion would prove the theory. By identifying the French Revolution with the American Revolution, contemporary Republicans believed that what occurred in France would lead to a series of democratic revolutions throughout Europe (Jefferson, 1984: 965-966). As an ardent republican, Jefferson viewed the causes of the French Revolution from the most radical perspective. He stretched the importance of the French Revolution in holding that the fate of the international revolution in the Atlantic world would be determined by the success or failure of the Revolution:

I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new government in France, being perfectly convinced that if it takes place there, it will spread sooner or later all over Europe. On the contrary a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other countries. I consider the establishment and success of their government as necessary to stay up our own, and to prevent it from falling back to that kind of Half-way house, the English constitution (Jefferson, 1984, 971-972).

Later, when the apprehension for the radicalization of the French Revolution after the “Reign of Terror” by Jacobins prevailed in the American public sphere, Jefferson still insisted that the revolutionary tasks could not be achieved without bloodshed and professed his rather extreme position in his well-known letter to William Short (Jan. 3, 115
The tone of your letters had for some time given me pain, on account of the extreme warmth with which they censured the proceedings of the Jacobins of France… In the struggle which was necessary, many guilty persons fell without the forms of trial, and with them some innocent. These I deplore as much as any body, and shall deplore some of them to the day of my death. But I deplore them as I should have done had they fallen in battle. It was necessary to use the arm of the people… The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam and an Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be better than as it now is (Jefferson, 1984, 1004).

In the midst of the French Revolutionary War, Jefferson desired for the victory of the French army and supported the democratization of European countries through active “regime change.” In his letter written in 1794, he showed his expectation that the march of the French Revolutionary army would trigger internal insurgencies and overthrow dynasties across the European continent.116 Furthermore, Jefferson once calculated the possibility of the occupation of Britain by France, and expressed his wish that he and the Commander of the Northern French Army, Jean-Charles Pichegru, would celebrate the coming of liberty and republicanism in Britain by having dinner together in London (Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990, 52). Moreover, in one of his letters written in 1798, he insisted that the regime change imposed by foreign powers could be an effective foreign policy under inevitable circumstances (Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990, 270n69).

This hopeful expectation regarding the French and European Revolutions was geographically extended to South America as the wars of independence culminated in the region from the 1810s to 1820s. In his letter to Alexander Von Humbolt (Apr. 14, 1811), Jefferson hoped that the success of independence movements in Latin America would

116 “I am convinced they (the French army) will triumph completely, & I cannot but hope that that triumph, & the consequent disgrace of the invading tyrants, is destined, in the order of events, to kindle the wrath of the people of Europe against those who have dared to embroil them in such wickedness, and to bring at length, kings, nobles, & priests to the scaffolds which they have been so long deluging with human blood. I am still warm whenever I think of these scoundrels, tho I do it as seldom as I can, preferring infinitely to contemplate the tranquil growth of my lucerne & potatoes” (Jefferson, 1984, 1014).
result in the founding of republican governments similar to the United States (Jefferson, 1984, 1247-1248). In the same context, he sent a letter to then-president, James Monroe (Oct. 24, 1823):

Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom (Jefferson, 1984, 1481-1482, emphasis mine).

This statement succintly demonstrates that Jefferson’s support of the Monroe Doctrine was based not on the realist logic of balance of power, but on his own politics of identity/difference that aimed to revolutionize the whole hemisphere by disentangling the two Americas from the European Other. Even when the prospects of European and Latin American revolutions became gloomy, Jefferson emphasized his conviction that world revolution would be achieved in the future in his letter to John Adams (Sep. 4, 1823):

The generation which commences a revolution can rarely compleat it. Habituated from their infancy to passive submission of body and mind to their kings and priests, they are not qualified, when called on, to think and provide for themselves and their inexperience, their ignorance and bigotry make them instruments often, in the hands of the Bonapartes and Iturbides to defeat their own rights and purposes. This is the present situation of Europe and Spanish America. But it is not desperate. The light which has been shed on mankind by the art of printing has eminently changed the condition of the world. As yet that light has dawned on the midling classes only of the men of Europe. The kings and the rabble of equal ignorance, have not yet recieved it's rays; but it continues to spread. And, while printing is preserved, it can no more recede than the sun return on his course. A first attempt to recover the right of self-government may fail; so may a 2d. a 3d. etc., but as a younger, and more instucted race comes on, the sentiment becomes more and more intuitive, and a 4th. a 5th. or some subsequent one of the ever renewed attempts will ultimately succeed. In France the 1st. effort was defeated by Robespierre, the 2d. by Bonaparte, the 3d. by Louis XVIII. and his holy allies; another is yet to come, and all Europe, Russia excepted, has caught the spirit, and all will attain representative government, more or less perfect. This is now well understood to be a necessary check on kings, whom they will probably think it more prudent to chain and tame, than to exterminate. To attain all this however rivers of blood must yet flow, and years of desolation pass over. Yet the object is worth rivers of blood, and years of desolation for what inheritance so valuable can man leave to his posterity?” (Jefferson, 1984, 1477-1478).
To be sure, it is a notable fact that Jefferson’s actual foreign policy during his presidency was seemingly not so different from Hamilton’s neutralism and isolationism. In this regard, some scholars have argued that Jefferson’s practice in foreign affairs also resulted from the traditional European logic of Realpolitik.\textsuperscript{117} However, we need to understand that his grand strategy truly originated from his exceptionalist approach to world politics or the binary understanding of the American “us” vs. European “them.” Jefferson’s another letter to Monroe clearly summarized his belief in American exceptionalism and its relation to the doctrine of isolationism:

I have ever deemed it fundamental for the United States never to take active part in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests are entirely distinct from ours. Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are foreign to us. They are nations of eternal war. All their energies are expended in the destruction of the labour, property and lives of their people (Cited in Armstrong, 1993, 66, emphasis mine).

Indeed, Jefferson’s isolationist policy did not mainly come from the realist consideration on the balance of power, but from a republican revolutionary worldview that tried to contain the pure American Self from the evil Old World’s contamination. Apparently, it seems contradictory that Jefferson adopted a dovish isolationist policy while he rhetorically demonstrated his support for hawkish interventionism. However, we can infer that these two opposing positions were founded upon the same principle: American exceptionalism and the belief in the post-Westphalian world order.\textsuperscript{118}

To summarize, the Federalist-Republican debate at the turn of the nineteenth century was an important “episode in the ongoing production and reproduction of American identity through the practices of foreign policy” (Campbell, 1998, 132).

\textsuperscript{117} See Bowman (1956), Kaplan (1999), Sofka (2000), and Cogliano (2014).

\textsuperscript{118} Armstrong (1993, 72-74) insists that there are two versions of Jeffersonian approach to foreign policy, i.e., “Jeffersonian Universalism” and “Jeffersonian Purism.” He defines that while the former aims to ignite a world revolution by direct interventions in international affairs, the latter takes a position to reform the world by setting a global model for humanity through isolation and moderate economic/legal tools. However, it should be stressed that both stances were on the basis of the notion of American exceptionalism against European power politics.
Hamilton identified the United States with Britain, which was the normal state model in the European international society. Thus, his approach to foreign affairs represented a hallmark realist vision that aimed to subsume and assimilate the American Revolution into the modern standard of civilization. The Hamiltonian foreign policy is a historical foundation that has checked and domesticated the two hundred-year-long American revolutionary project to change the world. In contrast, Jefferson possessed a strong American transformative state identity in opposition to the old European Other. The Jeffersonian attitude toward foreign affairs formed an initial vision of liberal internationalism that pursued the transformation of the Westphalian system into its own image (Armstrong, 1993, 54-69). As these distinctive traditions have contested to gain hegemony over American identity, a series of big swings that oscillated between the two extremes of realism and liberalism had defined the recurrent cycles of American foreign policy toward (especially) Europe.

Table 3 Hamiltonian Realism vs. Jeffersonian Liberal Internationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Policy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamiltonian Federalist</td>
<td>Normal State</td>
<td>Build strong nation-state</td>
<td>Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secure “national interest”</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain balance of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffersonian Republican</td>
<td>Revolutionary State</td>
<td>Secure republican regime</td>
<td>Liberal Internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Export American model</td>
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4. The Monroe Doctrine and After: Isolationism or Internationalism?

The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) marked a crucial watershed in

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Footnote 119: For instance, as a way of eradicating America’s revolutionary identity, a contemporary Hamiltonian realist, Michael Desch (2007, 43) uses an historical analogy from Stalin’s declaration on the end of Soviet’s world revolution project. He insists that the US should similarly adopt a doctrine of “liberalism in one country” to avoid America’s “imprudent vehemence” abroad.
the history of American foreign policy. As opposed to its assertive rhetoric—a warning against European imperial intervention in the Western hemisphere—, it signified an arrival of the so-called “isolationist” era, founded upon the “alliance with British sea power” (Nau, 2002, 68). As the Napoleonic War ended with the reactionary coalitions of ancien régime monarchies, the prospect of international revolution on the European continent was profoundly bleak, and the power of the US was never enough to turn the tide. Still, the Monroe Doctrine emphasized the opposition between America and Europe by noting that “the U.S. policy of noninterference in European affairs marked it apart from the imperialistic nations of the Old World” (McCrisken, 2002, 67). Therefore, the American decision behind the Doctrine was to secure its exceptional identity, “a city upon a hill,” from the contaminating influence of the Old World in a defensive way by both bandwagoning on British naval hegemony and relying on the natural fortune of geographic distance between Europe and North America during the nineteenth century. In this sense, isolationism did not mean the abandonment of American exceptionalism but, actually, another manifestation of it under the tutelage of benign international systemic environment.

Likewise, the difference between nineteenth-century isolationism and twentieth-century internationalism can be first explained by a shift in the variable of “violence interdependence” triggered by industrial internationalization (Deudney, 2007, 186-187) and the change in the global distribution of power, i.e., the fall of British power and the rise of Germany. However, this material-based explanation should be nuanced by neoclassical realist insights on the interplay between system-level variables and domestic variables in defining foreign policy goals at a given time (Rose, 1998). Thus, we should note that the double influences of the changing balance of power and violence

120 As a master variable in the history of world order, the term “violence interdependence” is defined as “the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another.” While anarchy combined with “intense” degree of violence interdependence is too dangerous not to create “some authoritatively binding arrangement of restraint” for security, in a situation of “weak” violence interdependence, like our case, actors cannot seriously harm each other (Deudney, 2007, 35). Thus, the United States could handle its security issues with European empires by relying on isolationism during the nineteenth century.
interdependence were interpreted through the lens of American exceptional identity or role conception. That is, liberal internationalism was adopted as the assertive continuation of the goal of isolationism by other means in a changed material context: as the United States could not hide behind the nature’s blessing or the Royal Navy any more, the European Other needed to be transformed to “make the world safe for democracy.”

Two caveats should be added here. Initially, isolationism toward the Old World should be juxtaposed with the US’s rapid expansion in its own New World during the same period. As Hilde Restad (2012, 101) warns, “only by assuming nineteenth century continental expansion was somehow part of domestic history, as opposed to acts of foreign policy, could US foreign policy be characterized as isolationist until the 1890s.” Relatedly, the historical existence of America’s (liberal) exceptional identity or revolutionary tradition does not mean that the US kept a distance from the contemporary European racist or colonialist standard of civilization. Indeed, the nineteenth-century United States “behaved much like the Old World powers, brutally suppressing Native Americans, neighboring Mexicans, and overseas Hawaiians and Filipinos” (Nau, 2003, 68). The next chapter will investigate this another face of the US experience hidden in the grand narrative of the (white) liberal consensus (e.g., Hartz, 1991; Kagan, 2006).
IV. Civilization vs. Barbarism: the White “Civilizing” State against the Red “Savages”

In his monumental work, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Frederick Jackson Turner (1994 [1896], 32) declared that “the true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West.” My dissertation agrees with part of the so-called “Turnerian thesis,” which emphasizes that Westward expansion built a true American character distinguishable from European experiences. Just as Todorov (1984, 5) holds that the conquest of the New World “heralds and establishes our present identity,” so the idea of the United States arguably began with its continental colonization. However, I analyze the American frontier not simply as the seedbed of Turnerian American democracy but as a “contact point” or an intercommunal sphere where various distinctive actors, such as European empires, aboriginal nations, and Euro-American squatters, (often violently) interacted (Nobles, 1997; Tyrrell, 2007, 75). Although the West has long been a symbol of American exceptionalism, it should be woven into a larger modern global fabric of empires and colonies. I will argue that processes of imperial encounters in the interior of North America generated the anti-elitist, anti-intellectual, and anti-East Coast ethos among the Euromerican frontier populations, which formed another aspect of American identity: the white “civilizing” state against the red “barbarians.” This American Self led to the creation of popular imperialism or the Jacksonian tradition against liberal internationalism in the discourse of US grand strategy.

Again, this chapter concentrates on a politics of identity/difference, i.e. the co-constituting processes of “White Europeans” and “Red Indians” at the turn of the nineteenth century. As we will see, European settlers actively mobilized their

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121 “American society was always, even before independence, constituted in relation to a frontier, the other side of which was inhabited by ‘savages’” (Ringmar, 2013, 274).

122 According to William Earl Weeks (2013, xxii), one distinctive character in the early American Empire is “the essentially popular nature of its imperial expansion.” Indeed, US continental colonization was mainly driven by frontiersmen and neither initiated nor controlled by the federal government.

123 In fact, the words Europeans and Indians are “dangerous shorthands” that unjustifiably presuppose the
traditional images of dangerous Others to apprehend and construct a stereotype of “Indians”\footnote{In this dissertation, following Robert Berkhofer, Jr.’s (1979, xvii) suggestion, the term “Indian” originated from Columbus’s erroneous geography will be reserved almost exclusively for the European image of natives in North America. That is, the idea of the \textit{Indian} will be regarded a “White invention” that deliberately classified various different peoples as one single entity (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 3).} as a cognitive process of domination. Nevertheless, as a “constitutive outside” (Hall, 1996a, 4), the “Indian” Other was not only subsumed by the European racist discourse but also actively constituted the American Ego in the West. These reciprocal procedures of identity/difference politics, following Nau’s (2002, 5-7) theorization that the degree of identity convergence is decisive in motivating violent competition between international actors, have a significant meaning in analyzing the relationship between American native inhabitants and European colonists on the Continent. The rise of racialized identities (or the divergence of ethnic consciousness), as well as the material imbalance of power between the two groups, fundamentally shaped the trajectory of the intercommunal conflicts.\footnote{“Merely noting the opposition of forces cannot interpret the clash of culture in all of its ramifications. Describing how it happened can, but a critical element in the description must be an analysis of the ideas that form so basic a part of the white man’s attitude toward the native population of America” (Sheehan, 1973, xi).} That is, whether Europeans viewed Amerindians as either common human beings that could be communicated with on an equal footing, or as inferior and dangerous Others that should be exterminated had a major impact on the historical relationships between the two racial communities.

Therefore, instead of a simple evaluation of relative material capabilities, I aim to investigate the causal mechanisms between idea/identity and attitude/policy. In particular, I will give an emphasis on the phased, related shifts in Europeans’ conception of Indians \textit{and} Amerindian’s perception of Europeans, so as to periodize the history of intercommunal relations in early modern North America.

To be specific, I seek to trace the successive stages of American borderlands existence of homogenous, monolithic racial entities. Noting this dangerousness in language usage, I will explore how these essentialized group identities hardened into a new reality in early modern North America.
history, explaining how the Lockean diplomatic regime of the “middle ground” (White, 2011) collapsed into a state of Hobbesian anarchy and then led to the establishment of hierarchical colonialism, due to the rise of hostile racialized identities (as well as the collapse of a balance of power) between Euro-Americans and Native Americans. The Seven Years’ War, the Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812 in the wider context of a global hegemonic rivalry between Britain and France denote the structural shifts that conditioned intercommunal relations on the Continent (Griffin, 2007, 12). On the one hand, the Amerindians lost their agency to play one European empire off another, as “foreign” powers one by one were kicked out of North America. On the other hand, the interactive construction of hostile racial identities was gradually consolidated because of intensified interethnic conflicts in the borderlands. Before moving onto this chronological inquiry, we need to understand European theoretical legacies that provided the various discursive repertoires for Euromerican representations of “Indians” in the first place.

1. European Heritage II: Medieval Christianity and the Enlightenment

White settlers brought a variety of preconceptions stemming from the past European experiences in internal/external Others to their contacts with the aboriginal peoples in the New World. In other words, Euromericans perceived America and its native inhabitants through the lens of their existing social stock of knowledge (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, 50). This “metaphysics of White Indian-understanding” was usually based on a dichotomy between “us” and “them” (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, xv; 4). Mainly in terms of the ecclesiastical binary between Christians and infidels, and later of the Enlightenment opposition between the civilized and the barbarian, Euro-Americans constructed the image of Native Americans as a separate and single negative Other that was alien and inferior to themselves. As a result, Westerners came to incorporate Amerindians into the modern world system and placed them at the bottom of the Eurocentric discursive order.

In turn, the recognition of the fundamental differences among peoples of the earth after the “Discovery Era” formed a collective identity of Europeans in contradistinction
to the colored aborigines, “in a way resembling that of a photographic negative” (Mason, 1990, 43). The European people used “counterimages of themselves to describe Indians and the counterimages of Indians to describe themselves,” and such a mirroring strategy could reaffirm “White superiority over the worst fears of their own depravity” (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 27). New modern ideas, such as the state of nature, the utilitarian theory of the land appropriation, the stage theory of history, and the standard of civilization, all reflected the imperial encounters in the Western hemisphere or the ideational amalgam of the medieval intellectual heritage and the new intercontinental contacts. In this sense, there is a big bifurcation between the abovementioned formation of the American revolutionary state identity and of the American civilizing state identity. The Euro-Americans inherited the European racist-imperialist tradition or the colonial discourse intact, whereas they made an important innovation in the republican tradition by inventing the Philadelphian system against the Westphalian order.

**Medieval Christianity**

According to Grovogui (1996, 8), European theology in the late middle ages constituted a particular form of discourse that “established hierarchical and exploitative relations between its Christian subjects and the other.” Since the “discovery” of America, the ecclesiastical logic established “the philosophical foundation for the totalizing cultural, political, economic, and legal systems of knowledge” (Grovogui, 1996, 8-9) that justified modern European hegemony over the “Rest.” Such logic assumed that Christians should bring salvation to infidels in the New World “through conversion and subsequent incorporation into the Christian order” (Grovogui, 1996, 21; Williams, Jr., 2012, 183).

In 1302, Pope Boniface VIII already proclaimed that all human beings, including both Christians and non-Christians, could be saved only by the Catholic Church. In his *Unam Sanctam*, Boniface VIII also claimed the universal sovereignty of Christendom over the entire world for the sake of human salvation (Grovogui, 1996, 19). In the same vein, Pope Alexander VI issued two papal bulls, *Inter Caetera* (1493), to declare that Spain and Portugal would divide and occupy the New World and that these two Christian kingdoms
should convert “Indians” to Christianity (Grovogui, 1996, 20). Even Bartholomew Las Casas, who championed for a humanitarian treatment of the Amerindians in the 1550-51 theological debate with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Spanish king’s right to conquer the Native Americans of the New World (“The Valladolid debate”), presupposed “the existence of a single true religion, which ineluctably leads him to assimilate the Indians to a previous (and hence inferior) phase of the Europeans’ evolution” (Todorov, 1984, 191).  

The rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century did not change the preceding epistemic distinction between the Christian Self and the heathen Other in the New World. Rather, Protestants placed more emphasis on the essential differences between Europeans and Native Americans and tried to segregate their group from that of the aborigines, whereas Catholics stressed the commonness between the two ethnic communities as equal humans and sought to convert the natives to Christianity (Todorov, 1984, 191). Especially, the English people were more obsessed with the medieval crusading tradition and its profoundly negative attitude toward pagans. For instance, in Calvin’s Case (1608), Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice for the Court of the King’s Bench, contended that infidels (=permanent enemies) had no rights and that there would be no peaceful coexistence between the Christian and the non-Christian:

[A] perpetual enemy (though there be no wars by fire and sword between them) cannot maintain any action, or get anything within this realm. All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies, (for the law presumes not that they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility), for between them, as with devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and can be no peace. (cited in Williams, Jr., 2012, 189).

126 Later, in his old age, Las Casas radically moved to a kind of “multicultural/pluralist” position. He did not privilege the Christian belief over the Native American religion and relativized the meaning of “barbarism” by inferring that “just as we consider the peoples of the Indies barbarians, they judge us to be the same, because they do not understand us” (Todorov, 1984, 190-191).

127 Pope Paul III’s 1537 papal bull Sublimis Deus, for example, recognized the natural law rights of non-Christian, non-European peoples as human beings, despite simultaneous European rights to conquer and convert them (Grovogui, 1996, 212n43).
In the same context, early English colonizers in America usually mobilized the militant rhetoric of Protestantism to justify their dispossession of the natives or “naked slaves of the divell” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 194). The Reverend Robert Gray hired by the Virginia Company preached that the European settlers had a religious duty to take land from “wild beasts” and “brutish savages.” He even insisted that it was sinful to leave the earth to keep in “the hands of beasts and brutish savages, which have no interest in it, because they participate rather of the nature of beasts than man” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 192-193). Moreover, Edward Waterhouse, who was commissioned by the Company to write a pamphlet supporting territorial expansion, went ever farther to agitate that the simple massacre was far better than a slow civilizing process:

Because the way of conquering them is much more easy than of civilizing them by fair means, for they are a rude, barbarous, and naked people, scattered in small companies, which are helps to victory, but hinderances to civility: Besides that, a conquest may be of many, and at once; but civility is in particular, and slow, the effect of long time, and great industry (cited in Williams, Jr., 2012, 195).

From the early modern stage on, the possibility of reciprocal dialogues between different but equal participants was significantly blocked by the Christian monologue. Early modernity was the “narcissistic moment” when the Christian theology “posited the European ego as the sole locus of intercommunal relations” and posed “the erasure of the other as requisite of self-interest” (Groivogui, 1996, 24).128

The Enlightenment

Even the advent of the new post-medieval philosophy movement, the Enlightenment, could not transform the Eurocentric discursive formation on “the idea of the savage” of the past centuries (Williams, Jr., 2012, 199). Although an assortment of philosophers, publicists, and politicians built a new structure of worldly narrative distinguished from the medieval religious theories during the eighteenth century, the kernel of the Christian and Universalist understandings of identity/difference was

128 See also Campbell (1998, 97-109).
basically preserved. Indeed, the secular turn in the European social stock of knowledge merely produced a “transmutation of the original ecclesiastical dichotomy of savior/fallen into one of civilized/noncivilized” (Grovogui, 1996, 41). Now, enlightened Europeans as the agents of progressive History should colonize the world to civilize (not Christianize) it, *philosophes* asserted.

First, the so-called “state of nature” concept in social contract theory was crucial in this ideological development. The discourse rested on the limited (and distorted) ethnography on the Native Americans written by European adventurers and settlers in the course of the intercultural encounter between Europe and America (Grovogui, 1996, 35). From the beginning, the notion of the state of nature was itself the product of a highly charged Eurocentric narratives (Jahn, 1999). The life of natives was exploited as “a living model of human development in its more savage, less civilized stages” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 202) that lacked the European “civilized” institutions, such as private property, civil society, and government. In his *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes (2008 [1651], 84) famously described that in the state of nature, human’s life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” To prove that such a terrible situation really existed in world history, he pointed to the case of Amerindian life:

> It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. (Hobbes, 2008 [1651], 85).

In other words, the aboriginal inhabitants were designated as inferior Others who were antithetical to the advanced European Self (Brandon, 1986; Jahn, 2000). In contrast, Europe was now regarded as the leading progressive force in human history, and the domination of the “Rest” was justified as the European *mission civilisatrice*. Thus, colonialism was viewed as a secular blessing for incapable natives (Grovogui, 1996, 26-27). The social construction of the European representational framework grounded in the dichotomy between civilized Europe and savage America simultaneously delegitimized
Amerindian sovereignty and legitimized European imperialism over the Americas (Strang, 1996, 25; Keal, 2003, 6).\textsuperscript{129}

Second, John Locke’s social efficiency/utility argument or the doctrine of \textit{terra nullius} exemplifies the paragon of the Enlightenment version of colonial justification (Boucher, 2006). His \textit{Second Treatise of Government} asserted, “in the beginning all the world was America” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 121). This illustrates that Locke’s entire thought on political economy was based on the contemporary Eurocentric, linear philosophy of history that divided the West and the “Rest” and assigned different progressive stages to each part of the world. In his famous chapter V, “Of Property,” Locke presupposed: “As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common.” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 113). This theory of property was linked to a “deplorable” situation in North America. In the hands of aboriginal nomads, Locke lamented, the vast land was not efficiently utilized and not individualized as private property. Amerindians were simply hoarding large uncultivated territories put to “idle” purposes, i.e., hunting, which explained why they still lived in poverty.

Several nations of the Americans… are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight ; yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy (Locke, 2003 [1689], 117-118).

This poor Native American condition was also against the will of God, Locke (2003 [1689], 114) argued, drawing on the Bible\textsuperscript{130}:

\begin{quote}
God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{129} Robert Lee Nichols (2005), using the case of the Iroquois Confederacy that sought resolution of a dispute between themselves and Canada at the League of Nations, shows how social contract theory, even in the twentieth century, represented indigenous peoples as non-sovereign forms, thus denying them the sovereignty to participate in international society.

\textsuperscript{130} “Fill the earth and subdue it” (Genesis I:28, NIV).
benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it).

Of course, “the industrious and rational” meant European settlers who landed on the New World. Therefore, non-industrious and ir-rational natives who deserved God’s punishment had no right to claim their unused territories, that is, North America could be legitimately deemed “empty” land (=terra nullius). As a result, Amerindian resistance to European intrusion was unjustifiable in terms of international law, as long as white colonists efficiently utilized those vast lands that “lie waste” or “still lie in common” (Locke, 2003 [1689], 119; Boucher, 2006, 174). Furthermore, their unjust resistance “constituted a just cause of war” by Europeans in legitimate self-defense (Boucher, 2006, 175).131

Robert Cushman, an early English promoter of migration to North America, shows how nascent European speculators readily applied abstract Lockean principles to their new business. He advertised that the new continent was an “empty” land because “animal-like” indolent aborigines did not use or commodify their land property in a proper sense:

This then is a sufficient reason to prove our going thither to live lawful: their land is spacious and void, and they are but few and do but run over the grass, as do the foxes and wild beasts. They are not industrious, nether have [they] art, science, skill or faculty to use either the land or the commodities of it; but all spoils, rots, and is marred for want of manuring, gathering, ordering, etc… so it is lawful now to take a land which none useth and make use of it (cited in Nobles, 1997, 31-32).

Last, the secularist turn in the Eurocentric worldview culminated in the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, 86-87).

131 It is a notable fact that Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) advanced an unorthodox theory of property that directly denied the prevailing principle of terra nullius. In his On the Law of Nature and Nations, Pufendorf insists that any land “should not at once be regarded as unoccupied and free to be taken by any man as his own, but it will be understood to belong to the whole people” (cited in Boucher, 2006, 169). Thus, the society of Amerindians as a whole still exercises property rights over the so-called “uncultivated” land, according to Pufendorf’s theory of community property rights.
Especially, Adam Smith’s theory (Brewer, 2008) was influential among the American Founding Fathers at the turn of the nineteenth century. It was assumed that History is divided into four successive stages: “1st, the Age of Hunters; 2dly, the Age of Shepherds; 3dly, the Age of Agriculture; and 4thly, the Age of Commerce” (Smith, 1978 [1763], i.27). In this linear progressive schema of world history, the simple Amerindian society on the lowest hunter stage without private property, law, and government was doomed to be dominated by a superior form of civilization, i.e., Euro-American agricultural/commercial society (Williams, Jr., 2012, 206-210). In this context, the Scottish philosophy of history became the basis of the East Coast elite discourse on “benevolent” assimilation, and Jefferson actively pursued the integration of the inferior Native American society into the advanced White society by propagating a new mode of economic life, agriculture (Sheehan, 1973).

Taken together, the European way of binary thinking derived from medieval theology and the Enlightenment invented “the bipolar or schizophrenic image” (Hobson, 2013, 40) of the world as divided by the sphere of civilization and the sphere of barbarism. As Max Savelle (1974, 141) shrewdly explains:

Out of the colonial situation, also there arose the “doctrine of the two spheres,” that is, the idea that Europe had its own system of international law and custom, while the colonial world beyond the “lines of amity”—the North and South lines of the treaty of Tordesillas and the Tropic of Cancer—was a new and distinct sphere of international law, and relations in which the international customary laws and international treaties (unless they specifically mentioned the New World) did not apply. As a corollary to this doctrine, the colonizing nations had earlier accepted the assumption that “might makes right beyond the line” and that “there is no peace beyond the line.”

The discourse of “standard of civilization” that demarcates these two areas and justifies European colonial practices emerged at this historical juncture and underlay “the genesis of the modern international society” (Gong, 1984, 4). An overarching Eurocentric

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132 In fact, the theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment themselves relied on contemporary reports from North America and constructed the conceptual distinction between civil society and primitive societies (Calloway, 2011, 207).
theory of world history that has dominated our global modern experiences finally came
into being.133

2. The North American Borderlands Diplomatic Regime: the “Middle Ground”
and the “Covenant Chain”

After the initial bloody conflicts in the early seventeenth century, such as the Pequot War (1636) and King Philip’s War (1675-1676), relative peace between the two ethnic communities arose in the Great Lake areas and the Ohio Valley from the late-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century. Of course, the Euromerican Christian-oriented binary way of thinking did not disappear, and deadly intercommunal combats remained prevalent. However, “two great systems of colonial-tribal alliance” (the New France composed of the French Empire and Huron/Algonquin nations134 vs. the New England including the British Colonies and the Iroquois League) emerged by the latter part of the seventeenth century (Jennings, 1985, 38). As the hegemonic competition between Britain and France became intensified in North America, the agency or autonomy of native nations also increased because European empires needed Amerindian alliances to win their hegemonic war. As indigenous peoples could play imperial rivals off against one another, more equal and hybrid relations within both military and economic spheres came to be established, which were cemented by “intermarriages and gift exchanges” across the ethnic lines (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 838).

Richard White (2011) coined the term “Middle Ground” to describe how the French and Algonquians “constructed a common, mutually comprehensible world in the region around the Great Lakes the French called the pays d’en haut” (xxv-xxvi). Against

133 See Bell (2011) for a succinct map of the imperial imagination in the nineteenth-century European political thought.

134 The meaning of the term “nation” in early modern English language was different from our usage that is firmly related to the rise of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe. According to Nancy Shoemaker (2004, 6), the word merely referred to “a vaguely defined body of people linked only by a common language and culture.” Later, the term “tribe” came to appear to exclude extra-European polities from modern international society.
the simple, dichotomized stories of assimilation and resistance, the middle ground showed the process of hybrid accommodation among diverse peoples that produced, through creative mutual misunderstandings, new shared meanings and practices in “the place in between” (xxvi). In others words, the “joint Indian-white creation” (xxx) was mainly defined by the existence of common cultural conventions: Both the French and Algonquians tried to “justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises… [T]hey had to convince people of another culture that some mutual action was fair and legitimate” (52). In this imperial periphery, even the European discourse of “barbarian” natives lost its power because white settlers “living alongside Indians of necessity developed a far more intimate and sophisticated knowledge of Indian peoples than did European savants” (xxvii-xxx).

In a similar vein, the “Covenant Chain” was forged not only as a “non-aggression pact” between the Iroquois League and the English colonies but also as a military alliance against the French-Huron allied force (Nobles, 1997, 75). Even before the coming of Europeans across the Atlantic, the five nations (the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca) in what is now upstate New York formed the Iroquois League to prevent conflicts among the tribes and maintain peace in the region. In Neta Crawford’s (1994, 346) account, the League was a primordial, “well-functioning security regime” among democracies that existed for more than three centuries (circa 1450-1777). Through the “democratic” institutions of the “Great Law of Peace (or the Great Binding Law)” and the “Great Council,” the inter-tribal regime succeeded in achieving cooperation and order among the five nations and facilitating collective security against external threats (Crawford, 1994, 354-355). Later, the League came to be part of a larger multi-ethnic alliance system between the Iroquois nations and English colonies, which kept peace in the Ohio valley region for three-quarters of a century, from 1677 to 1755. According to Francis Jennings (1985, 38), the Chain was similar to the “modern United Nations” in that all members retained their sovereignty and all key decision was reached by
“consultation and treaty.”

Based on several material infrastructures, involving the balance of power and economic interdependence (mainly fur trade) within and between the French “Middle Ground” and the British “Covenant Chain,” there emerged a new borderlands diplomatic regime (Sadosky, 2009; Adelman and Aron, 1999), in which a series of multicultural norms and tributary practices created an alternative Lockean anarchy. Although the story is usually simplified by describing that the lack of the mutual sovereignty recognition gave rise to the European genocide against Native Americans (Wendt, 1992, 415), in reality, there was a transition from the initial Hobbesian situation, in which only power matters, to the Lockean world of mutually recognized sovereignty (i.e., the North American borderlands security regime). Thus, instead of continuous mutual fear and wars, we can observe partial cooperation and coexistence in this particular historical setting, characterized by permeability/porousness of boundaries, or borders as “interstitial zones that produce liminality and creolization” (Lamont and Molnár, 2002, 187).

3. The British Imperial Frontier: The Royal Proclamation and the “Paxton Boys”

The year of 1744 marked an end of one era in North America. With the onset of “King George’s War” (1744-1748), the hegemonic rivalry between France and Britain spread to world-wide conflicts, and the relative stability enjoyed by both Euro-Americans and Native Americans broke down (Jennings, 1985, 47). Moreover, the end of the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763)–“the last great imperial war fought in North America, the final major frontier struggle among the European powers” (Nobles, 1997, 82)–heralded not the return of peace but another grave threat to Eastern Ameriindians. The British Empire that had expelled the French presence on the Continent tried to build a hierarchical

135 See also Calloway (2011, 202).

136 Echoing a constructivist approach to the cultures of anarchy, White (2011, 53n6) interestingly points out that the establishment of the middle ground can be an “example of what Anthony Giddens calls structuration.”
relationship of colonialism between the two ethnic groups, in lieu of the preceding borderlands rules. In response, Amerindians revolted against the British imperial plan to secure the borderlands regime through the waves of insurgencies called collectively as “Pontiac’s War,” which dangerously threatened the British authority in the newly acquired Ohio valley area (Nobles, 1997, 84-87).

After all, the Empire had to recoil from its new strategy of unilateral domination. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the result of this compromise between Britain and Native American nations, and the Lockean world of borderlands was restored (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 821-822). The Proclamation, echoing the legacy of the “middle ground,” recognized the partial sovereignty of the aboriginal peoples along with their land ownership, and sought to establish a positive law-based treaty relationship by granting de jure nationhood to Amerindian nations (Pagden, 1995, 83-85). From 1763 to 1768, a “comprehensive treaty system” was established between the Amerindians and the British (Jones, 1982, 36-92). Thus, the British royal court tried to establish “Pax Britannica in North America” (Calloway, 2006, 97) and to “conciliate the Affections of the Indian Nations, by every Act of strict Justice” as Lord Egremont, British Secretary of State for the Southern Department during the Seven Years’ War, pointed out (cited in Gould, 2012, 100). Especially, the Western part of the Appalachian Mountains was claimed as “Indian” territory, and land-hungry Euro-Americans were kept from making incursion into the native domain by the authorities in London. In the eyes of British officials, the frontiersmen were regarded as unnecessary troublemakers incurring aborigine’s hatred. Thus, they were often derisively “characterized as ‘scum,’ the ‘dregs of society,’ lawless ‘banditti’” (Nobles, 1997, 86).

Such a historical accommodation also reflected an ideational politics of identity/difference in the contemporary British thinking. The Spanish Empire, due to its brutal conquest of America, was regarded as a negative Other that the Enlightenment philosophers had long despised with repugnance. In particular, after the Spanish Armada’s attempt to invade England, anti-Hispanism became a deeply rooted part of
early modern English thought. British writers and pamphleteers attempted to arouse public sentiment by exaggerating, and sometimes inventing, notorious stories of Spanish cruelty in South America. Against this “Black Legend” (Maltby, 1971), the British imperial government aimed to construct its own image as a progressive force using more benevolent measures to promote civilization in the New World (Pagden, 1995, 86-89). In addition, the British ruling class possessed a historical analogy concerning the tragic consequence of the imperial expansion: “the collapse of the metropolis’s own political and moral culture, the dissolution of its ethical values, even... its final absorption by the very empire it had itself created” (Pagden, 1995, 106). Indeed, the republican fear of the Roman Empire as a historical negative Other haunted the British colonial policy. In this cultural context, we can understand why the Royal Proclamation aimed to control the disorderly settlement movement across the Appalachian Mountains as well as to restore the borderlands norms of intercommunal society, despite the material reality that the balance of power favored its unilateral colonization after France was expelled from North America (Pagden, 1995, 106-109).

Nevertheless, another crucial legacy was produced around the mid-eighteenth century, which would ultimately demolish the Lockean world; that is, the color divide in North American social imaginary was increasingly consolidated. In Shoemaker’s (2004, 129-130) account, Amerindians and Europeans rarely referred to each other’s skin color until the beginning of the eighteenth century. When they first encountered in early modern America, the abovementioned religious and civilizational distinctions originated from the preceding European thoughts were mainly mobilized. Namely, Euromericans perceived “Indians” as either non-Christians or savages in the first place (Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 10-18). However, the “categorization of peoples by simple color-coded labels (red, white, black)” (Shoemaker, 2004, 129) had become much popular by mid-eighteenth century.\footnote{Alden Vaughan (1982, 918) notes, “not until the middle of the eighteenth century did most Anglo-Americans view Indians as significantly different in color from themselves, and not until the nineteenth century did red become the universally accepted color label for American Indians.”}

Despite all the similarities between Amerindians and Euro-Americans based
on their common humanity, the two ethnic groups came to “construct new identities that exaggerated the contrasts between them” (Shoemaker, 2004, 3) during the eighteenth century. What caused this ideational paradigm shift in Amerindian-European relations?

Although the imperial authorities was willing to dispel the discontent of aboriginal allies by the Proclamation, it failed to pacify the new wave of violence in the western backcountry. On the contrary, the “Spirit of killing all Indians, Friends and Foes, [has] spread amazingly thro’ the whole Country,” as Benjamin Franklin observed in 1764 (cited in Vaughan, 1982, 937). In 1766, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs Sir William Johnson similarly reported to the London government that the white settlers in the frontier area “murder, Robb and otherwise grossly misuse all Indians they could find… and [are] treating the Indians with contempt, much greater than they had ever before experienced” (cited in Vaughan, 1982, 937).

In fact, the chaos in the western areas was mainly incited by no more than a few hundred lawless squatters who violated the Royal Proclamation, not the majority of Euromericans. However, only a small number of extremists could “hijack and considerably worsen intergroup relations” by committing violence across the borderlands (Silver, 2008, xxvi). According to Peter Silver’s (2008, 303-305) content analysis of a mid-Atlantic newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette, the number of its reports mentioning “white” people surprisingly increased during the Seven Years’ War, and the term was usually used to contrast European settlers with Amerindians. In a similar vein, Euro-Americans shifted their perception of Native Others from unenlightened but assimilable and “almost white” people138 to inherently inferior and unassimilable “red them” in the same period (Vaughan, 1982, 942).139 This epochal change reflected the historical fact

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138 In the seventeenth century, a sort of consensus emerged among European observers that Amerindians were originally white. Only because of their habit of body paintings and the burning heat of the sun, natives had come to have darker skins, according to the contemporary “environmental” explanations. Some early English colonists even advanced the “Lost Tribes theory,” i.e., Amerindians were descendants of the forgotten clans of Israel (Vaughan, 1982, 923-926).

139 “The exclusionary vision of the future that placed Native Americans outside an ever-expanding United
that some opportunistic politicians and publicists\textsuperscript{140} as securitizing actors (Buzan et al., 1998) started to stir up or conjure up contagious paranoia among the white frontiersmen, in the middle of intensified interethnic violence, in order to securitize the “Indian” Other as an existential threat to the emerging white racial identity and to form political coalitions for imperialist expansion.

The growing idea of threats, both real and imagined, reified racial boundaries and increased the polarization of identities into camps of “white us” and “red them.” In consequence, the long war with Amerindians brought a new style to popular commonsense (Hopf, 2013) filled with “rhetoric of victimization” or “the anti-Indian sublime” and eventually created a white nationalism that united ethnically and culturally fragmented European settlers.\textsuperscript{141} A new political discourse “that was genuinely worth calling racist” emerged, which was amplified through newspapers, pamphlets, and popular literature in the vortex of violent conflicts between the two ethnic communities (Silver, 2008, xix-xxi). A series of indiscriminate massacres committed by the “Paxton boys” and their conflicts with the pacifist Quakers of Pennsylvania reflected this rising interracial tension in the western backcountry. Most of the warlike clique were newly arrived Scots-Irish frontiersmen who had previous, violent colonial experiences back in Ireland, exterminating Gaelic Irish Catholic people there and bringing brutal attitude to warfare to America (Fischer, 1989, 605-782). And they accused the reigning Quakers of betraying the white people to the red savages in the mid-1760s (Kenny, 2009). As a result, States had its origin… in the resolution of the Seven Years’ War, when, instead of being recognized as a part of the new society being created in North America, Indians were placed outside it – beyond some frontier line” (Bender, 2006, 90).

\textsuperscript{140} Silver (2008, 318n11) stresses that it was “a few especially loud and skillful voices” that dominated the discourse of Indian-hating. The Rev. William Smith in the mid-eighteenth century and the partnership of Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Lancaster printer Francis Bailey were representative examples.

\textsuperscript{141} During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European settlers were usually categorized by their national origins, such as Englishmen, Frenchmen and the like, or by their religious denominations. It was rare to lump all of them together as the white people vis-à-vis the red American natives (Vaughan, 1982, 931).
the so-called “virtues of the frontier” cultivated in the middle of the horrible, violent clashes between Euromericans and Amerindians captured “invented notions of collective self” and “defined the character of American character” at the United States’ germinal stage (Griffin, 2007, 5).

In parallel, the Native American nations forged their own collective identity defined as the red people against the white invaders by the 1760s,142 which was distinguished from their traditional parochial/tribe-rooted identities (Shoemaker, 2004, 134-135; Dowd, 1992, xx). It was the beginning of pan-Indian revivalist movement, or “the Indians’ Great Awakening” (Dowd, 1992, 23-46) that led to Tecumseh’s War and the Red Creek insurgency in the early nineteenth century, as we will see later.

In sum, over the course of the eighteenth century, Amerindians and Euromericans “had together created new identities for themselves based on the fiction of irresolute difference” (Shoemaker, 2004, 11). The exacerbation of intercommunal conflicts due to the growth of illegal interlopers in the “middle ground” produced a racist discursive formation and established exclusive dichotomized group identities based on skin color as a social construction or as a collective imagination, which, in turn, worsen the chaotic situation over time. To illustrate, Franklin’s critique made in 1764 deplored that the pervasive massacre committed by Euro-Americans during the Seven Years’ War was caused by unjustifiable racist rationales:

The only Crime of these poor Wretches seems to have been, that they had a reddish brown Skin, and black Hair; and some People of that Sort, it seems, had murdered some of our Relations. If it be right to kill Men for such a Reason, then, should any Man, with a freckled Face and red Hair, kill a Wife or Child of mine, it would be right for me to revenge it, by killing all the freckled red-haired Men, Women and Children, I could afterwards any where meet with (cited in Shoemaker, 2004, 126).

Hence, we can argue that there emerged two separate kinds of anarchy in the post-Seven Years’ War America. One was the restored Lockean anarchy of mutual

142 Amerindian uses of “whites” or “white men” came to be prevalent at the turn of nineteenth century (Vaughan, 1982, 933).
sovereignty recognition between the colonial authorities and its native allies. The legacy of the “Middle Ground” and the “Covenant Chain” was respected by both the British Empire and the Iroquois League, and the norms and regime of the borderlands survived to some degree. The other was a reappeared Hobbesian anarchy of mutual fear and violence between the European frontiersmen and the aboriginal inhabitants. The Euro-American settlers rarely obeyed the central controls decreed in the Royal Proclamation and pursued their own “populist imperialism” against Amerindian resistances. The fundamental gap between the national effort to contain the flow of illegal occupancy and the unilateral expansion of the frontier mass would continue even after Independence (Hendrickson, 2009, 148-49). From this turbulent American interior, the Jacksonian tradition of militaristic adventurism and racism was gradually developed (Lieven, 2004, 96).

4. The Post-Revolution “Indian” Policy: Knox, Jefferson, and Jackson

The American Revolution and the Frontier

The British Empire’s effort to reassert its authority in the borderlands along with its continuous alliance with Amerindian nations frustrated white frontiersmen’s desire for the land and provoked their resentment against the natives. The famous sentence in the Declaration of Independence that accused George III of bringing “on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, & conditions of existence” reflected this hostile politics of identity/difference prevalent among the white colonists and anticipated/justified what would happen in the post-Revolutionary West (Hendrickson, 2009, 148; Vaughan, 1982, 942; Williams, Jr., 2012, 211). As soon as the Empire’s prohibition against the colonial westward expansion was abolished in the wake of Independence, a huge number of white squatters were poured into Amerindian territories and occupied them (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822).

The American Revolution marked another watershed in the history of White-
Amerindian relations on the Continent. The historical event was not only a republican departure from the Old World initiated by the intellectual East-Coast elites, but was also a bottom-up revolution of poor western settlers who were immersed in the process of securitization of the race question. Patrick Griffin (2007), synthesizing recent researches on the frontiersman and their ambivalent roles in the US founding, argues that the American Revolution “created a liberating and troubling legacy” concurrently. On the one hand, we can (re)discover a Turnerian, heroic image of common people during the Revolution. In the chaotic environment, they actively participated in the process of the upheaval and contended with eastern power-elites to gain several rights, including access to property, i.e., land (10). On the other hand, we can also find “the uncomfortable truth that victim could be victimizer” (14). The Euromerican commoners in the west achieved their rights “at the expense of other peoples” outside the boundary of the white US empire: “After all, the pressures that inspired Indian hating did not descend from the top down, but arose from the bottom up” (16). As Robert Young (2001, 79) noted, American “liberty” after 1776 “also meant the liberty to displace and exterminate native Americans.”

For the “American Leviathan” emerged from the Hobbesian anarchy in the interior, the borderlands diplomatic regime was gradually replaced by the nation-state’s pacification, and the sovereignty of Amerindians was radically reduced (Griffin, 2007, 14-16). The American Revolution was a “decisive moment in the shift from borderlands to bordered lands” (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822), i.e., from intercommunal relations among diverse (semi-) sovereign polities to hierarchical colonial relations. Although England and France could only gain a limited hold on the Continent until the eighteenth century because of the vast distance from their metropole, the American Revolution made crucial headway to overcome this material constraint and “established a dynamic national empire in the Ohio Valley” (Hinderaker, 1997, xiii). Through a series of (coercive) diplomatic maneuvers, such as the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784) and the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785), the new American nation swiftly forced Native tribes to leave the Ohio country and opened a huge chunk of land to white squatter families. Also, the Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that institutionally prepared for future
continental expansion (Nobles, 1997, 94). Thereafter, the borderlands diplomatic regime characterized by hybridity and pluralism was excluded from the grand narrative of modern state-building and the racist classification of peoples in the United States.\textsuperscript{143} John Jay’s definition of the “American” people, in his \textit{Federalist} No. 2, symbolically exemplified how the racial Others were totally excommunicated from the United States:

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs (cited in Vaughan, 1982, 936).

\textit{The Enlightenment Approaches to the “Indian” Question}

However, we should be careful not to regard all “Indian” policies of each US administration as having the same orientation. Actually, there were meaningful differences between the Knoxian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian paradigms in their basic assumptions and practices. Until 1830’s, the eastern elite groups, steeped in universal Enlightenment philosophy, took the lead in US “Indian” policy. They could “separate the practical horrors and violence of border warfare from the theoretical problems of Indian relations” and regarded the aborigines as equal human beings (Horsman, 1981, 106).

\textsuperscript{143} Since the Revolution, White (2011, xxxi) argues, Americans have viewed “the history of the colonial and early republican period through the prism of otherness.” Although Euro-Americans once created the “middle ground” of cultural mixture and diversity, they eventually “reinvented the Indian as other.” It sounds prophetic that in 1783 George Washington declared, “We will… establish a boundary line between \textit{them} and \textit{us}” in his letter to Congress on the Indian issue (cited in Bender, 2006, 91, emphasis mine).
The Federalists led by Henry Knox, the Secretary of War in the Washington administration, tried to preserve “the diplomatic norms of the borderlands in conducting Indian diplomacy” (Sadosky, 2009, 151). In his memorandum to President George Washington on the relations between the US and its Native American neighbors, Knox recognized the autonomy of Amerindian nations by stating: “The independent nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations not as the subjects of any particular state” (cited in Sadosky, 2009, 158). Also, he attempted to prevent the individual states and their citizens from intruding into Native American territory and violating existing intercommunal treaties, so as to eliminate the sources of persistent conflicts between the Amerindians and Euromericans. Instead, it was expected that the federal government would control and facilitate peaceful commercial intercourse between the two racial groups. Only the federal authority as “the general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all treaties on the execution or violation of which depend peace or war” (Sadosky, 2009, 157-158).

Basically, Knox and his Federalist colleagues regarded their Indian policy as a more humanitarian approach, which would define the new identity of the nascent US republic. In his letter to President Washington (December 29, 1794), Knox expressed his deep concern that what frontiersmen had committed to native peoples were more brutal
than what conquistadors, negative historical Others repugnantly described in the Black Legend, did in South America.

As we are more powerful, and more enlightened than they are, there is a responsibility of national character, that we should treat them with kindness, and even liberality. It is a melancholy reflection, that our modes of population have been more destructive to the Indian natives than the conduct of the conquerors of Mexico and Peru. The evidence of this is the utter extirpation of nearly all the Indians in most populous parts of the Union. A future historian may mark the causes of this destruction of the human race in sable colors (cited in White, 2011, 469).

The new nation should pursue a “noble liberal and disinterested administration of Indian affairs.” American identity should be distinguished from the past evil Others, Knox insisted: “Whatever may have been the conduct some of the late British Colonies in their separate capacities toward the Indians, yet the same cannot be charged against the national character of the United States” (cited in Sadosky, 2009, 158, emphasis mine). In this regard, President Washington (1783) recommended a policy of “peaceful” purchase of Native American lands in his letter to James Duane, instead of violent dispossession of Amerindians through unnecessary wars in the frontier areas:

I am clear in my opinion, that policy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country; which as we have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest which will return as soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape. In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense, and without that bloodshed, and those distresses which helpless Women and Children are made partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them.

Following his recommendation, Congress issued a proclamation that restricted illegal settlement on Native American territories in the West, which was similar to the 1763 Royal Proclamation (Williams, Jr., 2012, 213). Of course, this “accommodationist” Indian policy of the newly-born United States was related to the contemporary geopolitical reality that the British Empire maintained their posts in the Ohio Valley and had close connections with the Amerindian tribes there even after the Treaty of Paris.
The Empire’s official position that continued to treat its former Indian allies as quasi-independent sovereigns was an uneasy situation to the Washington administration (Gould, 2012, 199).

On the other hand, Jefferson and his Republican comrades perceived Amerindians through the intellectual grid of assimilationism based on the four-stage theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Calloway, 2011, 207). Although Jeffersonians often romanticized the Native Americans as the “noble savages”144 (Sheehan, 1973, 89-116), Amerindians were doomed to perish because of their backward way of life or the hunter-gatherer mode of production, according to the Scottish theorization of progressive history: “I consider the business of hunting as already become insufficient to furnish clothing and subsistence to the Indians” (Jefferson, 1984, 1115). Therefore, Jefferson declared the United States as a civilizing state with a special duty “to offer salvation to the tribes by encouraging them to adopt white civilization’s agricultural mode of subsistence” (Williams, Jr., 2012, 216). For instance, in a letter to Alexander von Humboldt in 1813, Jefferson (1984, 1312) clarified his mission civilisatrice:

You know, my friend, the benevolent plan we were pursuing here for the happiness of the aboriginal inhabitants in our vicinities. We spared nothing to keep them at peace with one another. To teach them agriculture and the rudiments of the most necessary arts, and to encourage industry by establishing among them separate property. In this way they would have been enabled to subsist and multiply on a moderate scale of landed possession. They would have mixed their blood with ours, and been amalgamated and identified with us within no distant period of time.

However, such an apparently “benevolent” assimilationism had an inherent anxiety or a compulsion to Others. In a fundamental sense, Jeffersonian philanthropy did not recognize the values of native Others as they were and treated them “as objects of commiseration whose sole purpose after the arrival of the white man should have been

144 In fact, identifying Native Americans as noble savages in the “state of nature” itself signifies that Europeans did not treat the native world on its own terms. The Amerindians “became merely a foil in civilized man’s constant efforts at self-examination. As a moral exemplar… the native served only the white man’s special needs” (Sheehan, 1973, 101). Ultimately, the notion of noble savages was linked to “a dead past” (Shoemaker, 2004, 143).
the speedy adoption of civilization” (Sheehan, 1973, 9-10). Above all, the goal of his “Indian” policy was “the termination of their history most happy for themselves” (Jefferson, 1984, 1118). It was another form of deep narcissism of the Euro-American Self that did not acknowledge the idea of a multicultural world. Consequently, an irony embedded in the Jeffersonian “Indian” policy was that its genuine goodwill to support the wellbeing of the Native Americans by transforming them into yeomen came to be “the seeds of extinction” with its kindness, which ultimately destroyed the aboriginal world (Sheehan, 1973, 11-12).

*The War of 1812 and the Rise of the Jackson Doctrine*

Although it can be interpreted as a small, local episode of the Britain-France hegemonic rivalry, the War of 1812 also reflected an ongoing unstable position of the US in North American geopolitics. Even after Independence and the establishment of the Federal Union, the specter of European presence in American frontiers around the Mississippi and Ohio Valleys and the maintenance of European alliance with the Amerindian nations in the same areas did not disappear until the Madison administration started. For instance, the state of Vermont led by Ethan Allen discussed the possibility of keeping it an independent state under the sponsorship of the British Empire. Similarly, some local settlers in “Franklin,” an ephemeral, post-Revolutionary “state,” sought independence and alliance with Spain (Nobles, 1997, 101-102). Even in the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase (1803), the vast area of the West was still a “contested ground” and the aboriginal nations there “remained free agents in the great game of interimperial rivalry” (Sadosky, 2009, 194-195).

Thus, the American “War Hawks” had a fundamental strategic reason to initiate the War of 1812: conquering Canada and Florida would destroy the encirclement by Britain and its Native American allies. It was the “second war for independence” to finally expel the British Empire from the Continent. In particular, Western folks were ardent supporters of the war against the British-Amerindian alliance. Tennessee Congressman Felix Grundy’s pro-war slogan exemplifies the contemporary warlike
mentality prevalent among the frontier mass: “We shall drive the British from our Continent – they will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbors” (cited in Lind, 2006, 60-61).

Andrew Jackson, the hero of frontiersmen and a son of a recently immigrated Scots-Irish farming family, stood with the removalist/revivalist western frontiersmen against the assimilationist/evangelist coalition of eastern elites, the eastern missionary movement, and the Native Americans (Haselby, 2012). From the mid-eighteenth century on, backcountry white farmers had developed their own political economic views distinguished from the eastern mercantile-intellectual class. They were deeply hostile to taxation imposed by central governments, both the past British and present American, and fiercely pursued their own political autonomy from “corrupted” power putatively wielded by the East Coast financial interests. The Regulators’ movement in the 1760’s and a series of agrarian insurgencies in the post- Revolutionary West (e.g., the Shays’ and Whiskey Rebellions) exemplify the consistent resistance from disaffected frontiersmen (Nobles, 1997, 99-101). A 1794 petition to Congress by the territorial assembly of Tennessee showed the frontiersmen’s persistent antipathy to the eastern ruling elites:

[C]itizens who live in poverty on the extreme frontiers, were as entitled to be protected in their lives, their families and little property, as those were in luxury, ease and affluence in the great and opulent eastern cities (cited in Horsman, 1981, 110).

Of course, the national policy to control the disorderly westward expansion was another important reason for popular unrest. For instances, Scots-Irish in Pennsylvania conflicted with pacifist Quakers, white land-grabbers in the valleys of east Tennessee criticized the North Carolina government that did not provide security against Amerindian attacks, and Kentuckians sought to obtain political autonomy as they felt neglected by Virginia (Horsman, 1981, 109). In these historical contexts, frontiersmen had constructed their own image of the “Indian” Others, which “contrasted sharply with the eighteenth-century intellectual transatlantic view” (Horsman, 1981, 109). As fighting against the East Coast financial class and their federal government in order to gain liberal access to the “virgin land,” Euro-American borderlands people further consolidated their
racist hatred view of “Indians.” On the basis of the land-hungry frontiersmen’s wishes, Jackson used the War of 1812 to lay out his uncompromising “Indian” policy doctrine that sought to “undermine the sovereignty of the Indian nations and render them dependent” and to contain the Amerindian nations from the “commercial and political networks of the wider European-Atlantic world” (Sadosky, 2009, 200).145

In parallel, the growing anger and unity among the new generation of Amerindians were mobilized by a group of nativist prophets who professed a radical pan-Indian vision. They conflicted with traditional chiefs who held an accommodationist position with the United States. The traditional, senior group (“the Red Gentlemen”)146 was based on an ancient form of parochial, tribal authority and was willing to collaborate with the Federalist US government, so as to restore the borderlands regime of peace and order or the “middle ground.” Both leaderships across the racial line shared core interests and assumptions, including a. state governments pursuing expansionist policy should be contained, b. the national government must be in charge of Amerindian-Euromerican relations, and c. the lawless white land-grabbers needs to be under control (Nichols, 2008, 9-10).

However, this interethnic alliance in the early US era soon came to be in peril because of their “unruly young men.” On the one hand, the Federalists (and their Knoxian plan) lost their power to the expansionists of the Democratic-Republican Party supported by land-seeking westerners. The junior group in Native American society, on the other hand, had gained their power from the rising collective wrath among native peoples against the increasing incursions into the interior areas by white frontiersmen (“the White

145 Thus, the “Jackson Doctrine” of 1814 and the 1823 Monroe Doctrine shared the same goal of constructing an autonomous US sphere of influence in the New World, isolated from the European imperial networks.

146 Negotiating with Amerindian chieftains, US officials often concluded that they were much more polite and sophisticated than “Christian white savages” (i.e., Euromerican frontier people as Benjamin Franklin called them). Many white commentators compared Indian delegates to classical orators and patricians (Nichols, 2008, 12-13).
Savages”\textsuperscript{147} and attempted to build a new trans-tribal identity against white populist imperialism (Nichols, 2008, 13). Young Indian prophets and their collective revitalization movement throughout the borderlands preached that one god created red and white races separately in the beginning and that recent contact with white intruders had contaminated and weakened Amerindians. Thus, only by severing relations with Europeans and restoring “traditional”\textsuperscript{148} lifestyles could Native Americans save themselves and regain their power. Such religious revivalism was gradually escalated into “federationism”: the political movement that called for the making of shared racial interests among Native Americans beyond intertribal conflicts and differences. The emerging pan-Indian union, “spreading the truly radical message that Indians were one people” (Dowd, 1992, xix), aimed to secure their territory and sovereignty from white encroachment on a continental scale (Nichols, 2008, 14).

This unification movement of religious coloring or “a spirited resistance” (Dowd, 1992) first emerged during the French-Indian War and culminated in the rise of the Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa in the north and the Creek “Red Sticks” in the south towards the War of 1812. They intended to found trans-tribal sovereign polities autonomous from the United States (Gould, 2012, 201). The war speech delivered by Tecumseh to the Creeks in 1811 shows the newly-invented, racialized and dichotomized logic of the pan-Indian campaign:

Let the white race perish. They seize your land; they corrupt your women; they trample on the ashes of your dead! Back, whence they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be driven. Back! back, ay, into the great water whose accursed waves brought them to our shores! Burn their dwellings! Destroy their stock! Slay their wives and children!

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{147} From the perspectives of US statesmen and rich landowners/speculators who wanted orderly expansion and lucrative land sales, these Euro-American squatters were commonly disdained as “white Indians” or “lawless banditti” (Nobles, 1997, 95) who disrupted interior peace and violated the right of private property.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{148} Gregory Dowd (1992, xxii) argues that the Pan-Indian “nativism” was neither a reactionary fantasy nor a fatalistic flight from reality into the romanticized past. Rather, nativists “self-consciously proclaimed that selected traditions and new (sometimes even imported) modes of behavior held keys to earthly and spiritual salvation.”}
The Red Man owns the country, and the Pale-faces must never enjoy it. War now! War forever! (cited in Bunn and Williams, 2008, 163, emphasis mine).

The advent of the hostile mirror image politics of identity between the Jackson Doctrine and the pan-Indian nativism\(^\text{149}\) induced the collapse of the cooperative effort to maintain a Lockean order in post-revolutionary America, which was shared by the traditional woodland Indian leaders and the Federalist administration. The co-constituting processes of antithetical identities formation between white frontiersmen and red prophets reduced the possibility of the Lockean coexistence in the “middle ground,” and only sheer power came to decide the course of history as it usually happens in the Hobbesian state of war. As a result, the Native American insurgencies in the eastern woodlands, despite their alliance with the British Empire (Gould, 2012, 183-187)\(^\text{150}\), was finally crushed, and the tragic road to “the Trail of Tears” came to be widely open.

Setting aside the imbalance of power between Amerindian tribes and the US, the internal divisions among native peoples hindered them from forming a united front. Not only did the northern and southern tribes fail to mount interregional deployments, the increasing struggle between young militant nativists and old accommodationists also thrust all regions into the vortex of civil war (Dowd, 1992, 181-183).

The process of diplomatic negotiation before the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which concluded final peace between Great Britain and the United States, demonstrates how the American official discourse on “Indian” affairs had dramatically changed. Even after the Paris Treaty of 1783, the British Empire viewed the Indigenous nations on the boundary

\(^{149}\) In a sense, this development of pan-Indianism among Native Americans in the early US anticipated what would occur in twentieth-century anticolonial movements in the nonwhite world. The European ideology of racism and its practice in modern colonial regions gave rise to “the further awakening of race consciousness” among the colonized peoples and the emergence of counternarratives defined in terms of race, such as “Negritude, African Personality, Afro-Asian solidarity, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism” (Le Melle, 2009, 82).

\(^{150}\) The Shawnee Brothers instructed their followers to regard the British as their “fathers and friends” and the Red Sticks displayed British symbols, such as peace medals from George III, drums embossed with the royal coat of arms, and the like (Gould, 2012, 201).
of the US as sovereign entities, not “conquered peoples” as Americans claimed. For instance, in 1793, Upper Canada Governor John Simcoe tried to mediate a peace treaty between the Iroquois League and the United States, which prompted Jefferson’s immediate refutation. During the War of 1812, the Empire officially treated its Amerindian allies as independent nations (Gould, 2012, 199). In this spirit, Britain’s envoys to the Ghent peace talks asked for the maintenance of the borderlands diplomatic regime that would guarantee the territorial rights and semi-sovereignty of native nations, as part of a grand geostrategic scheme to create “a so-called ‘Indian buffer state’ in the Great Lakes Basin” (Sadosky, 2009, 202) between the US and Canada. Henry Goulburn, a British diplomat, insisted that “the relationship of the Indian Nations to the United States was similar to that between Great Britain and Portugal – they were great and small powers, bound together by treaties of alliance and commerce” (Sadosky, 2009, 202). In other words, the British Empire hoped to restore its “old imperial, Atlantic system and its attendant borderlands diplomatic regime that had existed for a century” (Sadosky, 2009, 204). However, American diplomats ignored the old norms of the Lockean world and asserted that only the United States of America was the sole sovereign polity on the Continent.

Although the US failed to achieve its main goal of the War of 1812, i.e., the annexation of Canada, the country could eventually seize the opportunity to pacify its western frontier areas. With the end of the global hegemonic war and the final peace between the US and Britain, Native American nations’ “participation in the last remnants of the eighteenth-century borderlands diplomatic regime was now at an end” (Sadosky, 2009, 180) because they could not use other European empires against the United States any more. It was the last phase in the evolution of the “middle ground” from the

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151 Of course, it is also true that many Britons regarded natives as inferior savages in their hearts (Gould, 2012, 199-200). They had conveniently exploited the Amerindian allies since the Revolutionary War to contain the expansion of the United States and to defend Canada. However, Britain readily betrayed and abandoned its native partners whenever choosing to make peace with the US in 1783 (the Paris Treaty), 1794 (Jay’s Treaty), 1795 (the Treaty of Greenville), and finally 1814 (the Treaty of Ghent) (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 822-823).
intercultural borderlands to the national border pacified by the “American Leviathan” (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 839). As material conditions had radically shifted from a rough balance of power to a hierarchy with the British retreat to Canada, no barrier was left to the rise of the Jacksonian removalism that rested upon an exclusive dichotomy between civilization and barbarism.

5. The Paradox of Jacksonian Democracy: Removalism and the “Trail of Tears”

The victory of the Jacksonian doctrine in post-War of 1812 America meant that the sixty-year-long struggle of the Euromerican people from 1750s to 1810s to control the Trans-Appalachian West (Nichols, 2008, 1) and to construct the white American Self finally succeeded. At last, peace came to eastern America, “peace as the concept was understood by (Euro-) Americans” (Gould, 2012, 208), and the age of populist imperialism flourished. A series of events, such as Jackson’s invasion of Florida (1818) that eradicated the remnants of the Spanish Empire in the region, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) as an international “license” (Gould, 2012, 211) for continental expansion without any further European powers’ interference, the inauguration of President Jackson (1829) overwhelmingly supported by frontiersmen, Chief Justice John Marshall’s doctrine in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) decreeing that “an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state” but a “domestic dependent nation,” and, finally, the notorious “Trail of Tears” (1831) following the Indian Removal Act of 1830, all marked “the sundering of the final vestige of the eighteenth-century borderlands diplomatic regime” (Sadosky, 2009, 215).

In the dramatic case of the conflict between Georgia State and the Cherokee tribe, the previous “treaties” between the Cherokee nation and the US had virtually recognized the sovereignty of the native tribe as a foreign nation. In Worcester v. Georgia (1832), John Marshall defined the Cherokee nation as “a distinct community occupying its own

152 Although he excluded Amerindian nations from the sphere of international law, the fact that Marshall recognized “the privileges of self-rule and national integrity accorded tributary nations” was later used by Native Americans to protect their “tribal sovereignty” (Shoemaker, 2004, 102).
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force” (cited in Bender, 2006, 197). Moreover, the Cherokees had actively accepted the US government’s “civilization program,” such as private ownership, agriculture, the written constitution, and even the black slavery (Sadosky, 2009, 210-211; Bender, 2006, 193-195).

However, the guiding principle behind US “Indian” policy already shifted from the Jeffersonian assimilationism to forced relocation or militaristic imperialism. To the supporters of the Jackson doctrine, the existing treaties were merely deceptive devices that could be readily revoked. Echoing the conventional Lockean justification of colonization as well as the Old Testament, Georgia Governor George Gilmer represented such a Jacksonian approach to the Indian affairs:

Treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized people had the right to possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his formation-be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it (cited in Berkhofer, Jr., 1979, 161).

In his annual message to Congress on the Removal Act, President Jackson (1830) justified his brutal colonial policy by mobilizing the binary logic of civilized Self and barbarian Other:

What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization and religion? (emphasis mine)

And, in his Farewell Address, Jackson proudly boasted of his “Indian removal” as his first achievement: “The states which had so long been retarded in their improvement by the Indian tribes residing in the midst of them are at length relieved from this evil” (cited in Morone, 2014, 23-24). Therefore, the United States in the age of Jackson gained full membership to the European inter-imperial society that dominated the extra-European world and its racialized Others (Bender, 2006, 191; Gould, 2012). A new set of colonialist norms unilaterally imposed by Jacksonian America replaced the older “middle
ground” norms of accommodation.\textsuperscript{153}

One paradox in this ideological shift is that the democratization of American politics initiated in the Jacksonian age\textsuperscript{154} promoted the Westward imperial expansion. Although it was Jacksonian America that Tocqueville visited and wrote his masterpiece Democracy in America, the period was also “high noon of the white republic” (Smith, 1997, 197). As the Euromerican mass in the frontier regions increasingly participated in election politics and voted for the Jacksonian agrarians to secure more free land, the old philanthropist Jeffersonians, who partly defended Native American rights and advocated a gradual and voluntary purchase of Amerindian land, lost their voices in the political public sphere (Adelman and Aron, 1999, 828). From the perspective of contemporary politicians, protecting the natives was not politically advantageous at all. Offering land to white settlers “not only brought votes but was thought to ensure social stability through geographic expansion” (Bender, 2006, 197), which would be later formulated as “the safety valve theory” (Turner, 1994 [1896]). The previous hegemonic ideas of progress and assimilation, which stemmed from the European Enlightenment and were held by the East Coast intellectual ruling elites, were then “reshaped by the resistance and pressure of the frontier states and their inhabitants” (Horsman, 1981, 114).\textsuperscript{155}

In other words, the advancement of Turnerian American democracy was at the

\textsuperscript{153} Even Henry Clay, who led the opposition to Jackson's major policies by creating Whig Party, shared Jackson’s racist attitude toward “Indians.” He believed that Amerindians “were destined to extinction” because they were “inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race which were now taking their place on this continent” (cited in Bender, 2006, 197).

\textsuperscript{154} For a classic analysis of Andrew Jackson as the personification of frontier democracy, see Turner (1994 [1903], 85-87).

\textsuperscript{155} The federal configuration of the American state apparatus played an important role in strengthening the voice of the Western frontier as well. In addition, Deudney (2007, 168-69) points out that the decentralized military apparatus guaranteed by the Second Amendment—which was designed to secure republican polity against the danger of tyranny—undermined the capacity of the federal government to contain colonial excursions of frontiersmen, “enabling an unregulated populist imperialism to flourish.” See also Hendrickson (2009, 150).
expense of native peoples. Even Tocqueville, who celebrated the achievement of American democracy, could not but record this dark side of American liberal progress in a sentimental note:

One cannot imagine the frightful afflictions that accompanied these forced migrations. When the Indians leave their ancestral fields they are already exhausted and worn down… Behind them there is famine, before them war, everywhere misery… With my own eyes I have witnessed miseries [and] afflictions beyond my power to portray… The sight will never leave my memory (cited in Morone, 2014, 23).

The age of Jackson based on “the ethnic cleansing of the eastern United States” (Nichols, 2008, 202) marked the emergence of a white cultural autonomy. From the 1830s onward, the American exceptionalist double opposition, the white US republic against both the covetous European monarchies and the backward peoples of color, became consolidated in the American popular culture.
V. The Two Contending Traditions and the Three-Tier Model

The United States has developed two contrasting traditions of foreign policy tailored for each distinct space. American identity has been (re)produced and sustained by its original encounters with peoples of color as well as by its interactions with Europeans, thereby generating an opposition between the Madisonian/Jeffersonian liberal internationalism and the Jacksonian populist imperialism. Although these two extremes founded upon distinct social forces are distinguished from each other in terms of their respective understandings of American identity, strategic interests, and proper diplomatic polices, they share the same American exceptionalism that favors the superior American Self to the inferior Others (both Europeans and non-Europeans), and tries to transform the world in its own image, or the new American “standard of civilization.”

1. The Madisonian/Jeffersonian Tradition: the Origin of Liberal Internationalism

The ambition to prevent the “original sin of a balance of power from being committed in North America” (Ninkovich, 1994, 46) was a great part of the early “Unionist paradigm” (Hendrickson, 2003, 14–23). The East Coast intellectual elites that followed the Enlightenment/republican line of the Founding Fathers defined the ultimate national interest so as to transform the norms of the Westphalian international system into ones that are more compatible with internal principles of the “Philadelphian system” (Deudney, 2007, 185-189). In other words, the distinctive revolutionary American Self

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156 Through their empirical research, Page and Barabas (2000, 344) confirm that American elites and masses have fundamental disagreement on their national identity and foreign policy: “the most conspicuous gap between citizens and leaders is a familiar and longstanding one: more leaders than citizens tend to be ‘internationalists’.”

157 On the contrary, the realist tradition exemplified by Hamilton does not share American exceptionalism because it is a continental European import not based on the autogenous identity and experiences of America (Mead, 2001, 34-39). This might explain why American realists consistently fail to persuade key US decision-makers who are commonly immersed in the narrative of the US standard of civilization. Although realism is a prevailing paradigm in IR theory, America realists are mavericks who cannot dominate the discourse of US foreign policy.
was instituted in the form of the Federal Union, and that this experience formed the origin of American-style liberal internationalism against Realpolitik in Europe.\textsuperscript{158} Indeed, the United States has acted as a sort of “norm entrepreneur,”\textsuperscript{159} promoting its own world vision to alter core rules of international society. It is true that the Civil War ended the “inter-state” condition on the North American continent by consolidating “a federal state” (Deudney, 2007, 175). However, US liberal internationalists came to realize that the “Madisonian Moment” recurred all over again on a global scale after the First World War and the resulting debacle of the European balance of power system (Hendrickson, 2009, 304). In fact, Madison himself speculated on the possibility of world peace through “an ecumenical Council.” He commented in 1817:

> “Were it possible so to accelerate the intercourse between every part of the globe that all its inhabitants could be united under the superintending authority of an ecumenical Council, how great a portion of human evils would be avoided. Wars, famines, with pestilence as far as the fruit of either, could not exist; taxes to pay for wars, or to provide against them, would be needless, and the expense and perplexities of local fetters on interchange beneficial to all would no longer oppress the social state” (cited in Bradizza, 2011, 242, emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{160}

This “sense of déjà vu” encouraged American internationalists to invent a worldwide “union of some kind that would tame these malign forces of international anarchy and imperial despotism” (Hendrickson, 2009, 11). In this context, the US Constitution and its federal model “formed a template of the problems of world order” for Woodrow Wilson and his internationalist comrades (Hendrickson, 2009, 11). In an address to Senate for ratification of the Treaty of Versailles (July 10, 1919), Wilson confirmed that his

\textsuperscript{158} Michael Lind (2008, 182) also stresses that republican “fear” of European Realpolitik has defined a series of American grand strategies so far: “While many factors have influenced the details of US foreign policy, the fear that participation in an unending cycle of great-power rivalries would create a regimented American ‘garrison state’ has been the underlying reason for the successive adoption of the grand strategies that the US adopted to avoid balance-of-power politics.”

\textsuperscript{159} See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) for a groundbreaking work on “norm entrepreneurs.”

\textsuperscript{160} John Tomasi (2002) explores the lessons from the Madisonian “Universal Peace” plan for our post-Westphalian world. He argues that Madison can provide a political solution for our globalizing world, i.e., “something like a global federal constitution, along the original American lines” (226).
The stage is set, the destiny disclosed… We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed *at our birth* (cited in Hendrickson, 2009, 323, emphasis mine).

The League of Nations was an American civilizational solution “to make the world safe for democracy,” or to transform the globe in line with the Unionist problematique\(^{161}\) against the European standard of civilization. In this context, Herbert Hoover argued that the turmoil of the Versailles peace conference had indicated “a collision of civilizations that had grown three hundred years” (quoted in Nash, 2013, 122n13). Hence, so-called Wilsonianism was neither invented *ex nihilo* nor was American internationalism a product of the twentieth century, as conventional American narratives often explained.\(^{162}\) Rather, key elements of liberal internationalism were “drawn word for word from the script of federalism” (Hendrickson, 2009, 256). Almost all crucial principles of twentieth-century liberal internationalism were already expressed in the Madisonian/Jeffersonian exceptionalist discourse of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America.\(^{163}\)

To be sure, the United States could exert substantial power to reshape international relations in its image only after World War II.\(^{164}\) However, “the idea of the

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\(^{161}\) “Wilson had drunk deeply of the unionist paradigm. There is no objection to characterizing this as the projection of ‘American domestic values’ on the international system… or as a fulfillment of American ideals” (Hendrickson, 2009, 330). See also, Ruggie (1998, 206-217) and Deudney (2007, 185-189).

\(^{162}\) For instance, Walter McDougall (1997) insists that “the New Testament”, i.e., new traditions of a “crusader state” such as progressive imperialism and liberal internationalism suddenly arose at the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, it is assumed that there was a radical departure from “the Old Testament” of a “promised land,” that is, an isolationist or unilateralist tradition in the nineteenth-century American foreign policy.

\(^{163}\) On the Jeffersonian influence on Wilsonian democrats and Franklin Roosevelt, see Peterson (1960, 342-347) and Harper (1994, 43-47) respectively.

\(^{164}\) Hoopes and Brinkley (1997) and Borgwardt (2005) provide detailed analyses of FDR and his cadre of World War II planners’ liberal internationalist world vision and its practice in the construction of
order American internationalists wished to build was, in critical respects, previously formed” (Hendrickson, 2009, 8, emphasis original) through the experience in the politics of identity\difference that had separated a revolutionary American Self from European Other and created “the Philadelphian system.” Recently, Hillary Clinton (2009) echoed this America’s revolutionary desire by arguing, “It does not make sense to adopt a 19th century concert of powers, or a 20th century balance of power strategy.” Her statement confirms that rejecting the past European realist statecraft has continuously been a gist of liberal internationalism.165

2. The Jacksonian Tradition: the Origin of Popular Imperialism/Unilateral Militarism

The United States was, from the beginning, a “facing west” (Drinnon, 1997) empire, with its back turned against the European Old World and the East. Its continental expansion, which was glorified as “Manifest Destiny,” shaped a part of authentic American worldview. Cumings (2009, 39) argues that the dominance of “Atlanticism” or a liberal internationalist consensus among the Eastern foreign policy elites after 1941 made us forget the expansionist characteristics of American “continentalism” in the nineteenth century, which has been consciously mischaracterized as “isolationism” in a pejorative sense. However, isolationism of the interwar period was a novel reaction against direct interaction with European countries during and after the First World War, which is distinguished from the Continentalism or Pacificism. It is arguably a “form of exclusive continentalism” that shaped the imperialist tendency of America until Atlanticism emerged as a mainstream ideology of foreign policy. Before the Second international institutions and reforming of international norms. On the vicissitudes of the American-led postwar multilateralist system, including the United Nations, NATO, and the Bretton Woods regime, see Ikenberry (2011).

165 In addition, it is often argued that the model of antebellum US federal system is now copied in the European Union. The revolutionary post-Westphalian project of the United State of America has (arguably) succeeded in transforming/assimilating its Other in its own image. For comparisons of the Philadelphian system and the European Union, see Fabbrini (2007), Glencross (2009a; b), and Hendrickson (2006).
World War, Atlanticism in New England was merely a “regional and a minority phenomenon” in the United States (Cumings, 2009, 38-40).

Similarly, according to Restad (2012, 64-68), a new consensus among diplomatic historians today is that nineteenth-century American foreign policy was not “isolationist” at all. At the core of “old paradigm” of isolationism, one contradiction exists: it advances that the US both expanded dramatically and kept isolationist during the nineteenth century. Basically, the “old thesis of expansionism as isolationism” represents a “Eurocentric view of American foreign policy, a perspective that viewed US international relations as primarily faced toward the Atlantic Ocean” (Restad, 2012, 64). Rather, US foreign policy, based on the idea of American exceptionalism, was always expansionist from the beginning of the country. From an “offensive realist” perspective, Mearsheimer (2014, 238) also emphasizes that the nineteenth-century US was the most expansionist state in both North and South Americas that tried to establish itself as a regional hegemon. For example, “Henry Cabot Lodge put the point well”, Mearsheimer quotes, “when he noted that the United States had a ‘record of conquest, colonization and expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century’.” In this sense, the conventional interpretation that the year of “1898” was an aberration of American peaceful isolationism is a myth. Actually, the Spanish-American War was “a continuation of America’s ‘westward expansion’” (Bender, 2006, 219).

Put differently, there exists a genealogy of a racist/orientalist dichotomy between barbarianism and civilization vis-à-vis non-White peoples, including Indians, Mexicans/Latin Americans, Filipinos, and Muslims, in some parts of the American foreign policy discourse (Hunt, 1987, Ch. 3; Rowe, 2012, 222n117). This imperialist mindset stemming from a “mixture of a Scots Irish Calvinism and the Frontier experience” (Lieven, 2004, 99) and was crystalized in the Jackson Doctrine against the East Coast intellectual elites and their security imaginary. The Jacksonian tradition imagines the American Self “as a folk community bound together by deep cultural and ethnic ties” (Mead, 2001, 226), and that “a strong sense of White identity and violent hostility to
other races, was long at its core” (Lieven, 2004, 96). Self-imposed overseas missions of the US have been justified following the Jacksonian logics of a civilizing mission, which was once mobilized to rationalize the removal of Native Americans in the nineteenth century. Although the US encountered a variety of Others all over the world, “the figurations with which they were inscribed were drawn from the well-established narratives of otherness in American experience” (Campbell, 1998, 135).

In the late nineteenth century, when America’s maritime expansion got into its stride, the racist images of “Indian” and the discourse on mission civilisatrice were repeatedly recycled to justify US imperialism abroad. When the small, brief military conflict with Korea broke out in 1871 (Chang, 2003), the New York Herald named it “The Little War with the Heathens” (Bender, 2006, 203, emphasis mine). The Americans were simply convinced that they were trying to lead this isolated, “semi-barbarous and hostile race”\(^{166}\) to the light of civilization by “opening” Korea to international free trade. After the violent skirmish, Low expressed his racist view by comparing Korean soldiers with Native American warriors: for the Koreans “human life is considered of little value, and soldiers, educated as they have been, meet death with the same indifference as the Indians of North America” (cited in Bender, 2006, 206, emphasis mine).

The same analogy between “Indians” and foreign peoples of color was mobilized during the debate over the 1898 annexation of the Philippines (Williams, 1980). Assuming that “only the Anglo-Saxons can govern themselves” (William Allen White) and they are providentially meant to be “the master organizers of the world” (Albert Beveridge), leading imperialists asserted that the Filipinos “are not a self-governing race” (Benders, 2006, 210). Connecting the events of 1898 to America’s continental expansion, Theodore Roosevelt (1900, xii) wrote:

\[\text{At bottom the question of expansion in 1898 was but a variant of the problem we}\]

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\(^{166}\) Then-US minister to China, Frederick F. Low’s used this term in his letter to the secretary of state to condemn the Koreans’ resistance to an American contingent of 651 Marines, who landed on Ganghwado, an island in the estuary of the Han River, on the west coast of Seoul. (cited in Bender, 2006, 205).
had to solve at every stage of the great western movement. Whether the prize of the moment was Louisiana or Florida, Oregon or Alaska, mattered little. The same forces, the same types of men, stood for and against the cause of national growth, of national greatness, at the end of the century as at the beginning (emphasis mine).

Thus, the past colonizing process on the continent would be a good precedent for the annexation as well. Harry Pratt Judson, the Chicago University’s second president, insisted that Filipinos would maintain the “same status precisely as our own Indians… They are in fact, ‘Indians.’” (cited in Bender, 2006, 222). During the bloody, a decade-long counterinsurgency operation in the Philippines, the American soldiers clearly showed their “racial antipathy” originated from the memory of the previous “Indian wars.” According to a journalist for Harper’s, John Bass’s record, one expeditionary soldier from Kansas argued that the country could not be pacified “until the niggers are killed of like the Indians” (cited in Bender, 2006, 231).

In the first half of the twentieth century, both the Wilson and the Truman administrations, the two historical champions of liberal internationalism, adopted contrasting approaches to Europe and non-Europe. That is, the two presidencies applied unilateral or even imperialist doctrines to the “Rest,” as opposed to their sustained efforts to establish multilateral frameworks among major white powers, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. President Wilson’s internationalist principles were applied to the peoples of Asia and Africa very selectively. For example, the “Fourteen Points” including the right of national self-determination proclaimed at the Paris Peace Conference inspired the Korean people under the colonial rule of the Japanese Empire, who, in 1919, organized big rallies all over the country to appeal to the League of Nations for their independence (“The March First Movement”). Although Japan brutally cracked down on the independence movement, the Wilson administration kept silent.167 This is

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167 The State Department in April 1919 instructed the US ambassador to Japan that “the consulate [in Seoul] should be extremely careful not to encourage any belief that the United States will assist the Korean nationalists in carrying out their plans and that it should not do anything which may cause Japanese authorities to suspect [the] American Government sympathizes with the Korean nationalist movement” (US Department of State, 1947, 35-36).
because Wilson’s self-determination doctrine was designed to coordinate the post-WWI relationships among the European empires on Eastern Europe, “not between colonized and colonizers” (Bender, 2006, 244). The destiny of peoples of color outside the boundary of “civilized nations” was beneath his notice. Also, Wilson had no qualms in intervening in the affairs of South America. A series of military interventions, including Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), Mexico (1914, 1916), and in Cuba (1917) was justified by his idea of the civilizing mission. The United States, Wilson insisted, should send troops to repair “chronic wrongdoings” in Latin American countries who were “in the childhood of their political growth” (cited in Bender, 2006, 236; 237).

In a similar vein, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) analyze how the stark contrast between multilateralism (=NATO) in Europe and bilateralism, or the so-called “hub-and-spokes system” in Asia resulted from the differentiated constructions of US collective identity toward the two postwar regions. American decision-makers in the aftermath of World War II had a belief that the United States was a member of the North Atlantic community but that Southeast Asia was an alien political community. This difference in identity encouraged the US to adopt contrasting foreign policies in the two regions. To be specific, in his 1949 senate testimony, former US Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton explicitly connected his support of NATO to racial and cultural grounds: “my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom and that are composed of the white race.” Furthermore, the preamble of the NATO treaty mobilized the rhetoric of civilizational identity. The multilateral organization was “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples” (cited in Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002, 593). In contrast, the colonial mindset still remained strong among key US decision-makers, which prohibited them from creating multilateral institutions among equals. Franklin Roosevelt compared “the brown people of the East” to “minor children. . . who need trustees.” Similarly, Harry Truman’s private writings often spoke dismissively of “Chinamen” and “Japs” (cited in Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002, 598).
During the Cold War times, the rise of “modernization theory” as the ideational underpinning of US foreign economic policy toward the “Third World” echoed the imperialist tradition of “civilizing” force that shaped earlier American interactions with peoples of color. For instance, Michael Latham analyzes the ideology of the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy administration and concludes:

Proclaimed as a new, enlightened attempt to secure the advances that European colonialism had failed to provide, the alliance cast the role of the United States through an imperial discourse of its own. Presenting the United States as a transformative catalyst, it recycled an ideology that resonated with the nation’s previous Western expansion and overseas empire building. On the New Frontier, just as on the old, Americans emphasized their own historical road to progress and the duty and power of the United States to define and promote movement along it. Where expansionists once claimed that Providence ordained a continental Manifest Destiny, policymakers now turned toward social science to articulate a global vision (Latham, 1998, 229, emphasis mine).

At present, we are witnessing the most polarized US partisan politics, regionally divided between the “red states” of the South and Mountain West and the “blue states” of the North-East and Pacific Coast (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2013). In this context, the Jacksonian tradition, a maverick school from other American liberal creeds, has been exuberant in the “embittered White South” or “the Bible Belt.” In this region, the “socioeconomic anxieties of the White middle classes and rural populations often have fused with ethnic and racial fears” (Lieven, 2004, 93) and the exclusivist vision of Christian fundamentalism recently surged (Connolly, 2008, 44-59). Especially, “the ‘southernization’ of the Republican Party” after the late 1970s has provided the Jacksonian tradition with a new importance in the American domestic politics and consequently in the US foreign policy in our times (Lieven, 2004, 105; Lind, 2003).

A particular combination of the Jacksonian populism and the post-9/11 & the post-2008 economic crisis conditions has produced a twenty first-century version of American popular imperialism. The spiraling turbulences induced by the Bush Doctrine,

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the Tea Party and Donald Trump expressed the power of this new synthesis.\textsuperscript{169} Lieven (2012, 167-178) predicts how this jingoistic strain of American exceptionalism and its resulting foreign policy will create dangerous international dynamics between China and the US in our era of hegemonic transition and long-term economic recession. Lieven’s main practical concern is as follows: if an amalgam of the spirit of “America’s Mission” and the populist/fundamentalist anger, abetted by the fear of economic instability and the decline of American predominance, push for a hawkish strategy towards China, it will lead to the same confrontational response from Chinese militant nationalism that is still haunted by historical humiliation and resentment from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

A Schmittian politics of opposition between the two nationalisms would be set in motion in the near future, similar to the inter-war period situation when the massive mobilization of bellicose chauvinism across the European continent, in the context of the Great Depression and the decline of British hegemony, resulted in the Second World War. By situating American exceptionalism in the history of modern nationalism and international political economy, Lieven warns of emerging hegemonic rivalry in contrast to the optimistic prospect of continuing American predominance offered by the neoconservatives. More importantly, even though the neoconservative moment, the Tea Party movement, and Donald Trump themselves may disappear, the Jacksonian legacy, or the populist energy in US politics will persist (Mead, 2011, 34; Mead, 2016; Heilbrunn, 2016). Thus, the analysis of US grand strategy should always take impacts of this unorthodox tradition into consideration.

3. **A Tripartite Hierarchy of the American Standard of Civilization**

Since the foundational work by Gerrit W. Gong (1984), the English School scholars have debated on the meaning and evolution of the “standard of civilization” in modern international society. Traditionally, the concept was used as an analytical concept

\textsuperscript{169} The next two paragraphs are adapted from Cha (2015, 359).
to examine the historical expansion of European society in the past two centuries (Bull and Watson ed., 1984). In a new era of “the liberal ascendency” and unipolarity, however, we have witnessed a renewed academic interest in the notion of the “standard of civilization” in IR, for the rise of contemporary international norms and practices of discrimination and conditionality, usually associated with Western liberalism (e.g., human rights, democracy, environment, and neoliberal economic imperatives), can be regarded as the advent of an updated version of the “standard of civilization” (Fidler, 2001; Mozaffari, 2001; Bowden, 2004; Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, the security discourses around failed/rogue states and terrorism have implicitly revived the past dichotomy between “civilized” and “barbarian” that underpinned the term “standard of civilization” in the nineteenth century (Buzan, 2014a, 592).

The idea of the “standard of civilization” was rooted in the ancient distinction between civilization and barbarism, and played important role in gate-keeping membership of international society and justifying colonialism in the name of progress. It is usually known that the (classical) standard of civilization was codified in the nineteenth-century European international law and that it was defined by the contemporary forms of advanced European government, political economy, law, and culture (Buzan, 2014a, 577-581). Membership in international society granted full recognition of sovereignty to a state, whereas the system of unequal treaty (and then colonialism) was imposed on many non-European societies that could not meet the standard, under the banner of “civilizing missions” (Bowden, 2014, 617-619). The ultimate purpose of the standard was to create an international society of largely uniform

170 David Fidler (2000, 409) coined the term, “standard of liberal globalized civilization,” to describe this new trend.

171 Several papers presented at the 2013 annual Millennium conference offer a critical survey of the problematic concept, which was later published as a special issue, Millennium 2014, 42(3).

172 Fidler (2000, 389) summarized the idea as follows: “to engage fully in international relations, your behavior has to conform fully to expectations, policies, and rules established by the prevailing powers.”
states based on a Western ideal type. The philosophical rationale underpinning such a dream of a cosmopolitan world order was the modern European notions of progress and universal history, which is representatively manifested in Immanuel Kant’s celebrated essay, “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (Bowden, 2014, 619-626).

However, I aim to revise this common conceptualization originated from the English School by highlighting the singularity of the US case that developed its own version of the standard of civilization against the dominant European paradigm. In the Eurocentric thinking on modern international society, a dualistic nature of world order was assumed. The European interstate order or the sphere of “civilization” was founded upon the principles of sovereignty, equality, and toleration of differences. In contrast, the extra-European order or the sphere of the “savages” was designated as the place of backward, barbaric peoples, where European international norms could not be applied. Natives should be enlightened by European civilizing forces through colonization. Thus, there existed double “regimes of sovereignty” (Grovogui, 2002) that prescribed different standards of behavior for each region, the West and the “Rest,” in the hegemonic imaginary of modern international society (Keene, 2002).

As an aspiring member of Western powers, the early US also possessed an imperial identity and had hierarchically classified different foreign areas and peoples on the basis of expediency. The American Revolution was not only for Americans’ political independence, but also for “a struggle for dominion over others.” The process of the Revolution “reproduced key features of the European empires that they otherwise

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173 Browning and Lehti (2010) trace the construction of the “West” as a social imaginary. The West has four core characters: an essentially contested concept, a civilizational identity narrative, a clustered concept, and the crucial role of Other in constituting the West.

174 “Americans sometimes fell back on familiar, if old-fashioned, distinctions between Christians and non-Christians; on the other occasions, they drew on emerging notions of racial difference; and they frequently used the ideas of civil society and civility that were currently popular in Europe” (Gould, 2012, 12-13).
hoped to replace” (Gould, 2012, 4). This hierarchical categorization indicates that “different standards of treatment” are applied to “different kinds of subject” (Doty, 1996, 42). What is distinctive here is that the United States has tried to distinguish itself even from Europe, or the “Old” World, as demonstrated in the Madisonian/Jeffersonian tradition. Thus, the American classification of the world assumed three distinct spheres in terms of “the standard of civilization”: American civilization at the top, Western Europe in the middle, and the “Rest,” including the western/southern frontier of America and Asian peoples across the Pacific, at the bottom.176

![Hierarchical three-tier model](image)

**Figure 3 The American Standard of Civilization**

From the outset, the fusion of “the republican and millennial traditions” (Tyrrell,

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175 Pertti Joenniemi (2010) explains how Europe and America have historically constructed their identities by defining each other as both different and similar.

176 In a similar vein, Nayak and Malone (2009) differentiates American orientalism from American exceptionalism. In their understanding, both ideologies are based on the same politics of identity and difference that constructs superior American Self against Other. However, exceptionalism was developed in contradistinction to Europe, whereas orientalism resulted from American othering of the “Rest.”
1991, 1034) formed a discourse of American exceptionalism. Based on “millennialism” or “Christian Hebraism” that originally caused the immigration of Puritans to America, colonial Americans regarded themselves as the chosen people and believed that their New World, which was destined to be “the city upon a hill,” would be a sanctuary of liberty floating on the sea of corruption. They were reliving the Exodus story and rebuilding a New Israel on a new promised land. Euro-Americans had distinctive historical analogies from the story of Moses justifying their revolution and sanctifying the meaning of their founding in the providential history of humankind:

The political repression and religious persecution they had endured in England and from which they fled was their Egyptian bondage. The Stuart monarchs (and, later in the Revolutionary era, George III) were their intransigent Pharaoh; and the treacherous waters of the Atlantic Ocean, which they traversed in search of the promised land, was their Red Sea (Dreisbach, 2013, 63).

Moreover, the construction of the US federal interstate order, founded on an innovative version of republicanism, provided confidence to Americans that their political achievement is “the model, the vanguard, and at times vital facilitator, of a universally appealing and universally realizable way of life”: the United States is an embodied “vision of an eventual liberal republican end of history” (Deudney and Meiser, 2008, 25). To illustrate, John Witherspoon and Benjamin Franklin insisted that their creature, the Federal Union, would be the last stage of human progress in terms of world order. They thought that the history of human political systems evolved from “the disunited and hostile situation of kingdoms and states” (the first stage of Europe in the past) into “the enlarged system called the balance of power” (the second stage of Europe at the present), and lastly, into “the establishment of American Federal Union” (the third and the highest stage) which envisioned the future of humanity that would bring about perpetual peace (Hendrickson, 2003, 24-25; 142-143).

In this context, the republican worldview that was prevalent in the colonial and the Founding eras depicted English society or the Old World as “morally inferior and even decadent compared to America” (Campbell, 1998, 123). Western Europe, which was also included in the American list of Others, has played an important role in constructing
an American Self, a revolutionary identity. Europe itself should be negotiated with the American Creed, or reformed by a series of revolutions following the model of American civilization in the future when the US becomes strong enough to intervene. Therefore, liberal internationalism has been proactively applied to Europe to transform the Westphalian system in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.177

However, the US and other European states also have met “each other as equals, as part of the same cultural realm” (Cumings, 2009, 5). This situation was true when Americans and Europeans were jointly juxtaposed to peoples of color who were identified as “barbarians,” “savages,” “pagans,” and the like. In this context, “white Christians” were “reconfigured in a relation of similarity.” In other words, a “Western bond” was created, which not only erases differences between European countries and the United States, but also strengthens the inequality between the West and the “Rest” (Doty, 1996, 33). In this discursive economy, all non-Western actors — from Amerindians to Filipinos — were constructed as similar kinds of subjects, the “colonizable” (Doty, 1996, 45). These historical practices, in turn, resulted in the construction of binary international representations and identities between the global North and the global South, which are still influential even after the end of the official imperialism era. Indeed, the influence of “Pacific-facing expansionism” has been decisive when it comes to US relationships with the periphery, even after liberal internationalism became a dominant paradigm in American foreign policy to Western Europe. For example, George W. Bush’s neoconservative moment after the September 11, 2001 attacks marked a “return to the

177 From a Marxist perspective, David Harvey also pays attention to the dialectic of identity/difference between the US and Europe in the processes of the post-WWII international system-building. In order to establish a stable postwar hegemonic order, America had to “depict itself as the pinnacle of civilization” and initiated “the huge cultural assault upon ‘decadent’ European values and the promotion of the superiority of American culture and of ‘American values’” (Harvey, 2005, 55).
modus operandi of westward expansion and Pacific imperialism.” The Bush Doctrine and its deviation from the liberal American Creed can be analyzed through its link to the record of American imperialist aggressiveness in the non-West (Ringmar, 2009; 2013), which cannot be captured by the conventional views of liberal theorists who usually do not move beyond postwar Atlantic time-space.  

178 “[I]t was a reorientation and redirection to the world of the historic American unilateralism that has always characterized our relations with East Asia, an elaboration of a century-long practice of facing and moving west, with allies absent and little if any concern for the people in the path of that advance” (Cumings, 2009, 482).

179 See, for example, Ikenberry (2011).
VI. Conclusion

1. Some Contributions to Disciplines

   a. Revisiting the Intersection of IR Theory & US Foreign Policy

   Constructivism

   My dissertation opens a historical inquiry into the way in which the Hobbesian culture was constituted through early modern intercivilizational encounters, and how an imperial hierarchy rather than an international anarchy was established between Europe and the extra-European world. This study is a response to Wendt’s (1992, 404) suggestion that a “systemic empirical study of first contacts would be interesting” to understand “how self-regarding ideas about security might develop” in world history. In his own account, the “First Encounter” between Europeans and Native Americans was unique in the sense that “their interaction was highly structured by their beliefs about each other, beliefs that were rooted in pre-Encounter experiences and thus not shared” (Wendt, 1999, 158). Likewise, I also place an emphasis on the importance of preconceptions of alterity as a main factor that structures the Self-Other relationship. I argue that the European intellectual heritage, such as republicanism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment, and the European binary attitude to various Others had a grave impact on the formation of Euro-American identity and interest in early modern North America.

   The English School

   While Buzan (2014b, 169) recently mentioned that “the Americas generally and the US in particular are still only weakly represented in how the expansion story is told,” my research tries to participate in filling this regional gap in the English School. This

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1 More radically, Hobson and Sharman (2005) show “how hierarchies have always constituted significant political formations in the modern international system.” Moreover, Hobson (2014, 574) exposes that key postwar IR theories, ranging from dominant neorealism, to the English School, to world-systems theory, are commonly based on “civilization hierarchy” and “Eurocentric Western-centrism.” See also Lake (2009).
project engages with the English School in two main ways. First, I seek to provide a new understanding of the relationship between the United States and modern international society. The English school conventionally assumes that a “common dilemma” exists for revolutionary states; that is, “the belief system on which its revolution was founded and which legitimized the assumption of state power by the revolutionary elite is certain to run counter to the prevailing political doctrines of most other states” (Armstrong, 1993, 1) in the history of modern international society. Revolutionary states have usually responded to such a reactionary external environment by rejecting the reigning rule of the established powers, that is, by seeking to “avoid contamination by the outside world” in a negative manner or “by attempting to restructure it in its own image” in a positive manner (Armstrong, 1993, 1). The problem is that as soon as “a revolution assumes the form of statehood,” it is challenged by intensive pressures to observe the reigning norms of the existing international society and becomes “socialized” (Armstrong, 1993, 1).

Although the United States also possessed some features of a “revolutionary” state, this theoretical schema maintains that America had to be assimilated to international norms through the process of “socialization” in order to deal with the dominant European states and to acquire international recognition (Armstrong, 1993, 77). Furthermore, even after gaining its hegemonic status, the United States “has been unable to achieve more than the most marginal changes in the fabric of international society” (Armstrong, 1993, 78). In contrast, the present study emphasizes the original formation of

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181 Such as “a belief in the universal significance of the American revolution and a sense of mission imparted by this belief, an underlying suspiciousness, occasionally verging on paranoia, about the intentions of foreigners… a tendency to adopt a combative and self-righteous posture towards foreign rivals, a deep-seated distrust of traditional modes of conducting international relations, and a propensity towards doctrinal formulations of foreign policy, generally infused with ideological moralistic rhetoric” (Armstrong, 1993, 42-43). In a similar vein, Holsti (2011) also emphasizes that the United States shares exceptionalism as a foreign policy type with post-Revolutionary France and the Soviet Union. In his account, there are five core characteristics of exceptionalism: a. “Messianism and the liberation mission,” b. Exemption from international rules/norms, c. “Universalization of threats,” d. Invention of an enemy, and e. Portrayal of themselves as innocent victims.
American “revolutionary” identity and examines how its “Philadelphian system” (Deudney, 1995; 2007) or “Unionist paradigm” (Hendrickson, 2003; 2009) was constructed through its contentious politics of identity\difference. Considering the extent to which our international system has been reconstructed through the American postwar program of a liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2011), we need to distinguish the US case from other failures of the French and Russian Revolutions in terms of their transformative effects on international arrangements (Deudney and Meiser, 2008, 25).

Second, my study resonates with those revisionists who criticize the Eurocentrism that is inherent in the English School. Turan Kayaoglu (2010), Paul Keal (2003), Edward Keene (2002; 2014), and Sanjay Seth (2013) all share the notion that the English School’s problematic of the “expansion of international society” (Bull and Watson eds., 1984; Buzan and Little, 2010) inadequately presupposes the priority (and superiority) of the European interstate order and ignores the existence of a premodern intercultural relationship between Europe and Asia. In particular, the story of expansion is “incomplete” in describing the entirety of modern world politics because “the dispossession and destruction of indigenous societies” or “the dark side of the story of expansion” is invisible in the Eurocentric narrative of world history (Keal, 2003, 2). Thus, it should be noted that two profoundly disparate logics/spheres of international relations were established in the modern world: the “European order of toleration” predicated on the principles of sovereignty, i.e., equality and independence; and the “extra-European order of inequality” on the basis of the “hierarchical institutions through which colonial and imperial powers transmitted the supposed benefits of their civilization to the rest of the world” (Keene, 2002, xi). The new idea of “the standard of civilization” was the measure to divide these two spheres, the West and the “Rest,” and defined the historical role of Europe or “the civilizing mission” in modern times.

182 In his contemporary classic, Seymour Martin Lipset (1996, 31) declares, “Born out of revolution, the United States is a country organized around an ideology which includes a set of dogmas about the nature of a good society.”
As Michael Shapiro (1997, 209) emphasizes, we need to return to the early modern imperial encounters and reevaluate them in order to “unread the global histories and unmap the moral geographies that fix the violence of representation” in our era. Along these lines, my dissertation situates US history in the modern colonial division of the world and traces the formation of imperial/civilizing identity in the American Self through its own colonial project in the Western frontier.

b. The Rise of the Civilization Discourse in IR

Gregorio Bettiza (2014) maps out “the civilization turn” in both global strategy and the academic discourse of IR. In the wake of the Cold War, the politics of civilization has surfaced as a new focal point in strategic imaginaries. At a time of rapid transformation and uncertainty, people underwent “ontological insecurity” or “existential anxiety” and tried to find new stable identities that could offer clear answer to fundamental questions, such as “who are we” (Bettiza, 2014, 15; Kinnvall, 2004). These inquiries were especially important when the old archenemy, the Soviet Union, was gone. Identifying core threats in the “new world disorder” (Buzan, 2004, 137) was an urgent task in the inner circle of security experts. In such turbulent circumstances, Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* thesis (1996) powerfully contributed to shaping intersubjective knowledge about the definition/role of civilizations in global security politics. Now civilizational imaginaries frame people’s perception of international relations. International affairs pundits often categorize a variety of political actors in civilizational terms and talk about the imminent perils of intercivilizational conflicts (Bettiza, 2014, 14). In particular, the “Islamic civilization” has been constructed as the new “barbarian” Other (replacing the Soviet Union) in US grand strategy discourses since the September 11th (Mullin, 2015; Bettiza, 2015).

Over the past two decades, academic interests in civilization as a unit of analysis have dramatically increased as well. Against the prevailing Huntingtonian essentialist and confrontationist approach to civilization, some IR scholars have examined civilizational politics as a social fact from the theoretical perspectives of constructivism and critical
theory. First, *Civilization Identity* edited by Martin Hall and Patrick Jackson (2007) aims to offer a “non/post-essentialist” perspective to civilization, contributing to an emerging “fourth generation of civilizational analysis” (4). They point out that even many critics of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis tend to retain his essentialism by stating that a civilization is a “discrete object… a ‘thing-like entity’ with ‘an enduring essence’” and that the differences between distinct civilizations are “real” (6). Instead, Hall and Jackson (2007, 6) argues that civilizations should be defined as ongoing “power-laden” processes of (re)production of boundaries in their particular historical contexts. The edited volume as a unified project advances several post-essentialist arguments as follows: Civilizations are (a) weakly bounded, (b) contradictory, not coherent, (c) loosely integrated, (d) heterarchical, not centralized, (e) contested, not consensual, and (f) states of flux, not static. In this context, contributors mainly ask how civilizational identities are produced and maintained in practices (10).

Second, Katzenstein’s (2010) introduction to his outstanding trilogy (Katzenstein ed., 2010; 2012a; b) advances an image of “a world of plural and pluralist civilization.” In the wider context of one overarching civilization of modernity, plural civilizations coexist in the world and each civilization has internal pluralism originated in multiple traditions and vigorous contestations. Thus, civilization is described as “configurations, constellations, or complexes” that are “not fixed in space or time” and “internally highly differentiated and culturally loosely integrated” (5). Under some conditions (particularly when intercivilizational conflicts become fierce), civilizations are made “primordial” by a certain political project that seeks to establish a “taken-for-granted sense of reality that

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183 According to Edward Tiryakian (2001), there were three generations in the twentieth-century sociology of civilization. The first generation is represented by Weber, Durkheim, and Moss. The second generation scholars (Pitrim Sorokin, Norbert Elias, and Benjamin Nelson) tried to define civilization as a “dynamic entity, really as a process of actualization rather than as a finished entity” (286). In the third generation, Samuel Huntington and Shmuel Eisenstadt represent two contending perspectives on civilization.

184 Drawing on Shmuel Eisenstadt, Katzenstein (2010, 10) defines a civilization of (liberal) modernity as a “secular, technological social order based on a normative commitment to the expansion of human rights and the improvement of human welfare.”
helps in distinguishing between self and other and right and wrong” (10). As a result, the semblance of unity or homogeneity in a civilization is socially constructed whereas internal multiple traditions and disagreements are purposefully eradicated. However, civilizations are fundamentally characterized by “multiple types of actors, traditions, and practices” (23). Also, they are almost always embedded in transcivilizational engagements and intercivilizational encounters. Accordingly, Katzenstein insists that what we can observe from the empirical analysis of civilization is “the messy co-occurrence of sameness and difference” as “the defining trait of a world of plural and pluralist civilizations” (38, emphasis original).

Third, when referring to civilizations in the “plural,” civilizations are analytically defined as “distinct macro-cultural, macro-social, and/or macro-historical units” in world history, such as the Muslim civilization, the Chinese civilization, and the like. In contrast, the “singular” notion of civilization is a value-laden term that denotes the existence of the universal standard dividing the world into two separate spheres: the “civilized” and the “uncivilized” (Bettiza, 2014, 2n2; O’Hagen, 2007, 16-17). Mark Salter (2002; 2007) and Brett Bowden (2009; 2014) focus on this latter part of civilizational discourse, i.e., the genealogy of the discursive opposition between civilization (in the “singular”) and barbarism. This is in line with the analysis of the “standard of civilization” (Gong, 1984) in the English School discussed above.

The return of “civilization” in contemporary political discourse revives this singular notion of civilization. Civilizational rhetoric has been invoked by Western leaders to define the character of the September 11th and the subsequent Afghanistan and Iraq Wars.185 Thus, several scholars have paid attention to the rise of the politics of civilization or the binary opposition between civilization and barbarism in the international discursive landscape. Drawing on Foucault’s conception of “police/pastoral power,” Mark Neocleous (2011) tries to define the War on Terror as “civilizing offensive.”

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185 For the list of examples, see Neocleous (2011, 144).
From its late eighteenth-century etymological origin, the term civilization, as the Western bourgeoisie’s political project, has the notion of *police* – “the discipline and law necessary for an orderly society” (153) – at its heart. In order to *polish* barbarians who lack the social order, it was assumed that a civilized group (“police”) should intervene. Thus, the role of civilization in modern international law can be understood as the violent “fabrication of international order” (154) in line with the European standard. Imperial powers’ “civilizing process” (Elias, 1982) abroad was performed by brute force: “as much as civilization is a police process, it is also a war zone” (155). In this light, Neocleous insists that the civilizing *offensive* is a better term than the civilizing *process* in explaining the historical fact that “‘civilization’ presupposes violence and aggression against those considered ‘uncivilized’” (155). He concludes that the contemporary War on Terror is the continuation of the long tradition of the civilizing offensive or “‘civilization’ return, writ large” (156) in modern global politics.

In a similar vein, Erik Ringmar (2013) places the Global War on Terror in a historical context of fighting war against “savage tribes.” From the eighteenth-century onward, the question of *jus in bello* was discussed among law scholars, and then various kinds of (im-)permissible acts of war were officially codified by international agreements among “civilized nations.” In principle, warfare was gradually civilized in modern Europe, although armed conflicts themselves came to generate more casualties due to the rapid advancement of military technology. However, the same laws of war were not applied to wars against “uncivilized enemies.” Almost all nineteenth-century international law scholars explicitly distinguished wars in Europe from ones in extra-Europe. It was generally asserted, as “savage tribes” do not obey the civilized rules of engagement, war should be more brutal against them. Furthermore, these writers insisted that cruel methods would teach lessons: “the savages were to be taught that the Europeans are their masters” (269). From this historical perspective, a series of cruel methods—authorized

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186 Ringmar (2013, 264) illustrates, the US government under the Bush presidency “held suspects indefinitely without trial, tortured prisoners and subjected them to degrading treatment, or, in practice known as ‘extraordinary rendition,’ subcontracted the interrogations to assorted unsavory regimes.”
by the Bush administration during the Global War on Terror, which broke with both international and domestic laws, was “just another case of a small war” (276) against the “barbarians.” Although the United States has been a self-declared anti-imperial force, the country has also engaged in a variety of brutal “small wars” against Native Americans first and then the Asian/Latin American peoples in the twentieth century (Ringmar, 2009). And in the twenty-first century, the US forces invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to civilize and teach savage terrorists. Again, the Americans themselves employed barbarian tactics, “committing crimes against the laws of war” (Ringmar, 2013, 276).

Against this theoretical backdrop, I offer a case study of the construction of American civilization. Drawing on Katzenstein’s (2010) call for a “plural and pluralist view of civilizations,” my research seeks to situate America in the context of a plural world of civilizations and analyze the existence of multiple traditions in America’s political thought that makes it pluralist. As opposed to the essentialist, dispositional reading of American national identity that privileges and reifies the American Creed (Huntington, 2004), I try to explain how American civilization as a discursive complex was socially constructed through its interaction with both European and Native American civilizations. Moreover, it is emphasized that the two different identities have competed each other to define the place of the US in the world and shape the historical purpose of US foreign policy. In addition, I also ask an ethical question on the political implication of the monologic US standard of civilization in the historical context of Global War on Terror.

c. Rereading American History

“A Nation among Nations”

A new trend in American historiography questions the conventional nation-state-
centric understanding of the US past and argues for a transnational perspective as an alternative theoretical framework. For instance, Thomas Bender (2006, 3) points out that the “nineteenth-century nationalist ideology,” embedded in the discipline of American history and the school curriculum, was created to artificially forge and maintain national identity, and that it “obscures the actual experience of national societies and produces a narrow parochialism.” Therefore, we are required to deconstruct our national myth and to realize that “national histories, like nation-states, are modern developments” (Bender, 2006, 3). As the modern nation-state itself is a transnational product, the prevailing unit of analysis in the discipline of history, “the national,” should not be presupposed in our study without empirical interrogations (Tyrrell, 2007, 3). In this regard, American history should be incorporated into the global context (Bender, 2006, 6).

In particular, early modern America needs to be reread in the context of transnational/inter-imperial relations on the Continent, as opposed to the dominant nationalist narrative that has regarded the present US borders as prefixed and natural. Karen Ordahl Kupperman (2002) claims that we need to grasp the specificity of the early modern world order when even European polities were not close to the nineteenth-century version of the modern state, and various unique native political arrangements coexisted side by side. Thus, America was “international before it became national” (Kupperman, 2002, 105). Especially, the interior of North America was the genuine transnational sphere (Kupperman, 2002, 116) in which a variety of European empires, Euro-American colonies, and native nations competed and allied in both equal and hierarchal manners, as we saw in the “middle ground.”

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188 This new (rather, a return of) intellectual movement of international approach to the early American history got into stride from a discussion in Diplomatic History titled “A Call to Revolution: A Roundtable on Early U.S. Foreign Relations” (Rosenberg, 1998) and a forum in the American Historical Review on borders and borderlands (Adelman and Aron, 1999).

189 “Once in the nation, incorporated areas came to be viewed conventionally in relatively unproblematic ways as if they were always destined to be American” (Tyrrell, 2007, 1).
The challenge of “New Western History”190 or the “borderlands school” is also related to the revisionist efforts to suggest “a transnational history of the United States encompassing both the unique aspects of the American experience and a global, comparative context” (Citino, 2004, 195). Beyond the nationalist Turnerian assumptions, the frontier is now redefined as “a zone of interpenetration” or “a meeting place of peoples” that does not privilege the national unit of analysis (Citino, 2004, 196). More importantly, the relationships between Europeans and Amerindians should be reconsidered not as a part of US national development, but as a part of early American diplomacy (Citino, 2004, 202-203). Indeed, it is a notable fact that “the first use by the U.S. government of its treaty powers under the Constitution was with the Creek Indians” (Kupperman, 2002, 117). According to Emily S. Rosenberg (2004, 180-181), the mainstream tendency in the discipline of diplomatic history, which have left the issues of intercommunal relations on the Continent before 1850s to colonial or Western historians and ignored the “international context of imperial rivalry,” has worked to “inscribe the doctrine of Manifest Destiny into the field.” By the same token, she insists that America’s colonial conquest is “still often masked by the disciplinary structures that place ‘frontier’ history as a subdivision of ‘domestic’ rather than of ‘international’ history” (Rosenberg, 1998, 66-67). However, it should be stressed that not only the construction of the “Philadelphian system” among thirteen “states” (Deudney, 2007; Hendrickson, 2003) but also the more than two hundred treaties with Native American nations after the American Revolution were “diplomatic events within the purview of international history” (Rosenberg, 2004, 181, emphasis original).

Along these lines, my project also seeks to understand the formation of an ambivalent American Self and its foreign policy traditions in the early modern intercommunal context of the Continent. The emergence of American nation/civilization is treated as a transnational event than as a triumphalist national myth.

190 The movement of this new western history consciously distinguishes itself from the old (Turnerian) western history that viewed the frontier as the process of America’s democratic triumph (Wrobel, 2010, 148). For a comprehensive introduction of the new school, see Limerick et al., eds. (1991).
The new “frontier-borderlands approach” to world history has emphasized that “frontiers helped to shape the institutions and characters of burgeoning states” (Citino, 2004, 206) and that “borderlands have also been sites of identity formation” (Citino, 2004, 207) through the dialectic between Self and Other. Such an insight is linked with the recent discussion of the US state-building at the margins in the field of American Political Development (APD). The demarcation line between the inside and the outside, or us and them, has been (re)produced, and that brutal violence was often exercised against the Others to (re)establish the American Self (Morone, 2003). Although the activity of government at the center, or the inside, was usually “out of sight” in nineteenth-century US politics, “at or beyond the boundaries of the Union…the national authority was most pronounced” (Balogh, 2009, 5). In the colonizing processes of Westward expansion, various administrative and coercive activities, such as acquiring, exploring, surveying, and selling land, removing Indians, and protecting existing borders, were actively implemented by the federal army, which simultaneously promoted national economic development and strengthened the hegemony of national government over the states (Adler and Polsky, 2010).

Relatedly, Ann Laura Stoler’s (2006a, 1) call to “carve out a common ground of conversation between United States history and postcolonial studies” also echoes the new “frontier-borderlands approach.” A century ago, Fredrick Jackson Turner already admitted that US history was largely “colonial history” characterized by “the history of the exploration, conquest, colonization” (quoted in Bensel, 1987, 8). Although the colonial process of the US expansion “neither respect[s] the territorial transparency of the dichotomy between domestic and overseas nor conform[s] to the metropole/colony model” in classical European imperial terms, it was also a part of constructing a “U.S. imperial formation” (Stoler, 2006a, 8, emphasis mine) over other peoples, as opposed to a romanticized image of a heroic “national development” throughout the empty land.

Eric Cheyfitz (2002, 406) once lamented that “postcolonial studies have virtually
ignored the predicaments of American Indian communities.” Amy Kaplan (1993, 17) also criticized, the “absence of the United States in the postcolonial study of culture and imperialism curiously reproduces American exceptionalism from without,” in that the growth of American presence in the Continent is usually regarded as an “entirely separate phenomenon from European colonialism of the nineteenth century.” Such exceptionalism directly brought about the “American historiographical tradition of viewing empire as a twentieth-century aberration, rather than as part of an expansionist continuum” (Kaplan, 1993, 17).

By incorporating the history of the US frontier into the postcolonial framework, we can understand American “internal/domestic colonialism” (Kaplan, 1993, 12) in a wider context of the contemporary European colonial project. That is, postcolonial intervention would “draw students of North American history beyond the nation to a broader colonizing world” (Stoler, 2006b, 33; see also Nobles, 1997, 15).191 In a similar vein, Colin Calloway (2011, 201), in his presidential address to American Society for Ethnohistory, argues that Amerindian history should “go global” beyond the boundary of US history and be treated as “part of a global process of dispossessing and eliminating Native peoples in the Americas, Australia, Tasmania, the Pacific Islands, and elsewhere.” Therefore, my dissertation also traces the processes of US identity construction at the margins; that is, how the historical (often bloody) interactions of the US with outside “barbarian” Others constituted the American imperialist statehood and how this interaction defined its future behavior in the context of a world-wide colonialist landscape.

“Multiple Traditions, ” Sectionalism, and Contending US Grand Strategies

In the subfield of American political thought, there has been a series of intellectual revolts against the conventional wisdom of liberal consensus that follows

Alexis de Tocqueville and Louis Hartz (Stears, 2007). In his masterpiece, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, Hartz (1991, 27-29) aims to build a new theoretical problematic that overcomes the frame of “the progressive scholarship.” By reviving the so-called Tocqueville thesis – the “great advantage of the Americans is that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are born equal, instead of becoming so”\(^1\) – Hartz suggested the absence of feudalism as the material context of American exceptionalism and described the emergence of Lockean absolutism as the American *Absolute Geist* in a Hegelian term.

In contrast, William Novak (1996, 2-3) stresses that the dominance of liberal individualism is a significant pillar of “resilient myths about nineteenth-century America.” Although Hartz argues that nineteenth-century American discourse was predominantly Lockean liberalism on the basis of distinctive individualist values and free market ideology, Novak (1996, 6) refutes that there were “rich countertraditions in the American past committed to civic virtue, moral rectitude, and the public good.” Such dissent ideas contributed to the emergence of the “well-regulated society/governance” as opposed to the reigning picture of liberal discourse. Nineteenth century American socio-political culture was “pervaded by regulation, police, law, and powerfully anti-individualistic sentiments about social duties, public obligations, and restraints on private rights and interests” (8). Indeed, the early US was continuously secured and reproduced by “state police power,” or the pervasiveness of Foucauldian disciplinary power (13-14).

In a similar vein, James A. Morone (2003) ascribes American exceptionalism to a moral/religious approach toward otherness, which is traced back to the Puritans (and not to liberal absolutism). As the US “develops not from religious to secular but from revival to revival,” the frame of “vice and virtue define the American community” (3-4). That is, ethical discourses “set the boundaries around the liberal political process” (11) between the American, worthy “us” and the un-American, dangerous “them” with missionary zeal.

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looking for salvation. Consequently, although popular images or the boundaries between Self and Others have periodically changed, there have always been marginalized groups who “have faced repression simply for their ascriptive traits – their race, gender, ethnicity, or religion” (8), due to the Manichean framework inherited in the American cultural tradition. Indeed, the official grand narrative of American multiculturalism, enshrined in the slogan of the “melting pot,” could not fully recover the voice of the minority excluded by mainstream discourses.

Rogers M. Smith (1997) also rejects “the Tocqueville-Hartz Thesis” that mainly predicates on the relative egalitarian experience of “WASP men” and ignores the passion of Others who have been excluded by hierarchical ascriptivism in America. The history of American citizenship laws is the product of compromises among conflicting political factions, and the “civic myths” has constituted an American collective civic identity. Accordingly, Smith (1997, 18) advances that a “multiple traditions approach” is required to examine the complexity of American political culture. He argues that “an alternative account that gives full weight to America’s pervasive ideologies of ascriptive inequality” (30) is needed to contour a more complex image of American (non-)democracy. The Hartzian discourse of American political history romanticizing the march of more liberal and more democratic versions of politics against “unprincipled defenders of pre-liberal arrangements” (39) should be reconsidered because the American political trajectory actually demonstrates “struggles between opposing parties and movements that all also build support by endorsing various ascriptive themes” (39). Put another way, America’s illiberal and undemocratic traditions should be encompassed so as to explain the continuous existence of marginalized groups in American history and the serpentine path of American citizenship laws.

In this academic context, my focus on the militaristic-racist Jacksonian tradition and its sharp contrast to mainstream liberal internationalism can enrich Smith’s call for the “multiple traditions approach” in American political thought by connecting the discussion to another traditional analysis of sectionalism in American history. In
particular, attending to regional and class differences—the East Coast vs. the frontier and the intellectual elite group vs. the anti-Enlightenment folk community—residing in the two paradigms would help complete our understanding of the two big swings of American domestic and international history, namely, (a) between multicultural accommodationism and a great surge of paranoid to aliens and (b) between liberal internationalism and militaristic unilateralism.

Since Turner (1994[1925]) first identified the importance of sectionalism in US politics, a huge amount of historical writing has developed on its sources and impacts on American political trajectory (Wrobel, 2010). There are two prominent contemporary political scientists exploring the implication of sectionalism for US politics. First, Richard Franklin Bensel (1987, xviii) stresses that sectionalism has always been the “most significant and fundamental influence in American political development” and that other competing independent variables, such as party competition, institutional structure, and political ideology, are secondary in terms of explanatory power. Regarding interpretative framework, Bensel’s investigation into the distinction between the (industrial) core and the (agrarian) periphery is heavily indebted to Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world system model (Bensel, 1987, 17-21). The most important causes of sectional polarization in US history are the “regional division of labor” and the “relations of each section to the larger world-economy” (Bensel, 1987, 37). In this theoretical scheme, Bensel (1987, 22) argues that since 1880, the consistent sectional competition, fundamentally driven by the profound economic conflicts between the advanced northern core and the southern/western periphery, has shaped the US party system, ideological beliefs, and the development of modern political institutions. The

193 Drawing a parallel to European international relations, Turner (1994 [1925]) highlights, “The significance of the section in American history is that it is a faint image of a European nation and that we need to reexamine our history in light of this fact. Our politics and out society have been shaped by sectional complexity and interplay not unlike what goes on between European nations” (quoted in Trubowitz, 1998, 1).

194 On the evolution of the discourse on regions (New England, the South, and the West) and its implications for contemporary US identity, see Ayers and Onuf ed. (1996).
division between the “blue states” (core) and the “red states” (periphery) in the post-civil rights revolution era demonstrates the continuing influence of sectionalism on US political development (Bensel, 2011, 780).

Second, Peter Trubowitz (1998) applies insights from the domestic sectionalism literature to the explanation of international strategy. He mainly argues that patterns of economic interest conflicts among three great regions (the Northeast, the South, and the West) have shaped domestic debates over statecraft and spawned “pragmatic shifts in the definition of the national interest” (xiv) in the history of US foreign policy. The source of intersectional struggle lies in the uneven impact of the world economic interdependence on the three regions. As they have differing relations to the national/international economies and distinctive material interests, disagreements on the definition of the national interest are inevitable (xiii). In crucial watershed periods (the 1890s, 1930s, and 1980s), changes in international environment altered the underlying domestic structure of political/economic power and destroyed existing regional alliances and policy compromises, leading to intense interregional conflicts. Then, new consensus emerged as the result of “new political coalitions that united two of the country’s great regions” against the third: “Winners imposed their vision of ‘the national interest’” (xiv). In this sense, the national interest is constructed as a “product of politics” and has a “social base” defined in terms of geography (4).

To illustrate, by the mid-1940s, both the Republican North and the Democratic South came to have strong economic interests in the open world economy and interventionist grand strategy, due to the combination of rapid industrialization in the North and the rise of the military-industrial complex in the South (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2013, 123-124). Such an interregional convergence in material interest

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195 Trubowitz (1998, 29) argues that the sectionalism approach inverts realism in that it describes American domestic politics as a “fight for power, wealth, and hegemony” among the three sections. He basically follows Turner’s previous analogy that “politics in America bears a ‘shadowy image’ of European power politics.”
encouraged the major parties to establish the hegemonic “liberal internationalist compact.” However, this Cold War bipartisan consensus on liberal internationalism on the basis of a “North-South alliance” has been eroded from the late twentieth century. At present, we are seeing an “era of domestic polarization” and the “return of regional divides”, leading to the bifurcation of US statecraft into unilateralism (Republican) and multilateralism (Democrat). The uneven economic effects of globalization, the concentration of military spending and production to the “gun belt,” and recent immigration and domestic population movement all contributed to the emergence of the so-called “two Americas.” The one is multiracial and multicultural America in the metropolitan areas along the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and the Great Lakes, which are mostly liberal and Democratic. The other is white and middle-class America in the “big L” states in the South and the Mountain West, populated by conservative, Christian Republicans (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2013, 133-135). In this rigid regional-ideological complex, the impediments to bipartisan cooperation have been multiplied in domestic politics, and the ideational gap between the two parties has unprecedentedly widened. One commonly used index indicates that US Congress today is the most politically polarized in the last one hundred years (Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2013, 130).

While previous literature on regionalism commonly focused on the geographically uneven growth of economy and conflicts of material interests among sections that (re)define national policies from the late nineteenth century (Bensel, 1987, 4), I trace the dynamics of US sectionalism in the ideational sphere, i.e., the formation of two distinctive American identities against different Others from the mid-eighteenth century. To be sure, the struggles between the East-coast elite and the West frontiersmen in the Founding era was also related to bifurcating economic interests (e.g., industry-


Bensel (1987, xviii) expresses his doubt that a cultural explanation can have sufficient explanatory power vis-à-vis other traditional approaches. In a similar vein, Trubowitz (1998, 7-8) insists that ideational approaches are secondary because ideas are rooted in material interests: “as interests changed over time, so too did regional political ideologies.”
commerce vs. agriculture) amplified by a contentious two-party system (Trubowitz, 1998). However, I put more emphasis on the social construction of two differing national role conceptions, the “revolutionary” state and the “civilizing” state, in order to understand the birth of the contrasting US foreign policy discourses or security imaginaries. Even today, the fierce contestation between unilateralist/militarist vision of the “red states” and liberal internationalism of the “blue states” is on the basis of regional differences in strategic cultures as well as economic interests (Bensel, 2011, 783).198

2. Reflecting on Contemporary Practice

Following Shapiro’s (2006, xvii) advice, my study is “an attempt to open up rather than close off thinking about what America has been, is, and could be.” A normative goal of this dissertation is to call for a reflection on the exclusivist and monologic form of American exceptionalism that, lacking the proper understanding of differences, is obsessed with the representation of “inferior” Others and the necessity to change them in the American image. Certain critics of American exceptionalism already addressed this problem during the Cold War period. Hartz (1991, 12), for example, examines the relationship between the origin of the Red Scare/McCarthyism and “the violent moods of its mass Lockianism.” Hartz (1991, 285) then explains how the latter “hampers creative action abroad by identifying the alien with the unintelligible, and … inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce.” Robert A. Packenham (1973) also stressed how exceptionalism produced the distorted view and development policy debacles in the Third World.

In the same context, Smith (2012, 385) talks about the “irony of American liberal internationalism” today. The very intellectual tradition that had created American hegemony during the Cold War mainly contributed to its decline and disaster thereafter.

198 Recently, Bensel (2011, 762) also gives attention to the role of idea in his sectionalist approach to congressional development. It is argued that sectional competition generates “regional identities” that frame congressmen’s interpretation of the interests of their constituencies. Through these “interpretive frames,” a “commonality of interest” is established in each section.
Smith points out that during the 1990s, even before the 9/11 attacks and the coming of the neoconservative moment, liberal internationalism became a “hard ideology” that was not fundamentally distinguishable from Marxism-Leninism. The “neo-Wilsonian ideology” of the 1990s had pseudo-scientific logics that were “fully equivalent in complexity, coherence, and purposefulness to those that communism had come to possess decades earlier” (350).199

The September 11th was viewed by the neoconservatives not as a crisis but as an opportunity to capture the national security decision-making process and to materialize “America’s Mission,” i.e., liberating the world in line with American exceptionalism.200 The “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 2002) as a systemic factor dramatically broadened the parameters for revisionist (or revolutionary) US grand strategy due to the absence of a countervailing power (Jervis, 2011).201 The so-called Bush Doctrine, declared in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (The White House, 2002), was, in effect, “a doctrine of progressive imperialism,” (Smith, 2012, 358) or a unique mixture of liberal internationalism and Jacksonian unilateralism. The Iraq War was initiated under the banner of “democracy promotion,” and the US won the war despite the opposition of the “old” Western European alliances.202

The policy entrepreneurship by neoconservatives, while securitizing global

199 Similarly, Claes G. Ryn (2011) argues that neoconservatism has more in common with the radical Jacobinism, complete with universalist assumptions and the pursuit of aggressive intervention, of the French Revolution and regards “America as Revolutionary State.”

200 On the historical process of how the neoconservatives arose within the Republican Party and temporarily “capture” the US national security system in the aftermath of 9/11 to redefine American role conception and foreign policy, see Wolf (2011).

201 For a comprehensive overview of the contemporary debate on unipolarity and its impact on world politics, see Ikenberry et al. ed. (2011).

202 Deconstructing the contemporary debate on the “broken West” or the tension between America and Western Europe surrounding the War on Terror, Marko Lehti (2010) argues that the real motivation behind the struggle was an attempt to consolidate a Western heritage to legitimize Euro-American hegemony in world politics.
terrorism and the “axis of evil” (Emmers, 2007, 121-123; Donnelly, 2013), seized 9/11 as a chance to transform the character of world politics. They regarded the United States both as a “revolutionary” agent of world-historical progress toward permanent peace (Smith, 2012, 361-362) and as a “civilizing force” against “barbarian” terrorists (Bowden, 2009, 177-185). On the one hand, neoconservatives have long emphasized the distinction between old European Realpolitik and new American transformational approach. A neoconservative foreign policy analyst, Michael Ledeen’s (2000) phrasing is a notable example:

Whenever I hear policy-makers talking about “stability,” I get the heebie-jeebies. That is for tired old Europeans and nervous Asians, not for us. In just about everything we do, from business and technology to cinema and waging war, we are the most revolutionary force on earth. We are not going to fight foreign wars or send our money overseas merely to defend the status quo; we must have a suitably glorious objective. We are therefore not going to stick by a government that conducts foreign policy on the basis of Realpolitik. Without a mission, it is only a matter of time before public opinion will turn against any American administration that acts like an old fashioned European state. Just ask Henry Kissinger. That is why I find the realist position highly unrealistic (emphasis mine).

By breaking the norm of sovereignty that forbids external intervention, the Bush Doctrine “reflect the actions of a revolutionary power no longer attracted to Westphalian rules” (Hendrickson, 2015, 5, emphasis mine). In particular, the administration sought to promote democracy all over the world, violating the modern international norm of sovereignty. In his second inaugural address laced with teleological rhetoric and religious languages, Bush (2005a) declared that the US would champion the “cause of liberty… to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every national and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”

On the other hand, 9/11 was defined as a historical event in which “a group of barbarians have declared war on the American people” (Bush, 2001a, emphasis mine). He also stated, “There is a great divide in our time-not between religions or cultures, but between civilization and barbarism” (Bush, 2001c, emphasis mine). Later, the demarcation line between civilization and barbarism was extended to the entire planet:
“Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an **enemy of civilization**, and the **civilized world** will hold those regimes to account” (Bush, 2005b, emphasis mine). By representing Al-Qaeda terrorists as “heirs” to the totalitarian ideologies of the past century, the rhetoric of liberal internationalism and the “standard of civilization” was fused into a new imperialist project and propagated on a planet-wide scope. President Bush’s acceptance speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention illustrates how America’s revolutionary identity and civilizing identity was combined in the neoconservative rhetoric: “Our nation’s *founding* commitment is still our deepest commitment. In our world, and here at home, we will extend the *frontiers* of freedom” (Bush, 2004a, emphasis mine).

By identifying the US with “the Metatron—the voice of God—for all of human civilization,” (Jackson, 2004, 184), the Bush administration did not use the historical moment after September 11 as a chance to reassess the situation of the postcolonial world and the distress of the subalterns exposed to the structural violence in neoliberal globalization. Indeed, their analysis of the current state and its underlying cause failed to understand the deep antipathy toward America in the Third World and ended up reiterating a self-righteous American exceptionalism. According to Holsti (2011, 396), the United States was, in its monologic schema, portrayed as “the innocent nation” (Hughes, 2004, 153-189) that needed neither a self-examination nor a *dialogue* with Others. For instance, Bush stated in his address to a joint session of Congress right after 9/11:

Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber – a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (Bush, 2001b).

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203 “We have seen their kind before. They're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush, 2001b).

204 See also Monten (2005), Desch (2007), McCrisken (2009), and Schonberg (2009) for the ideational genealogy of the Bush Doctrine as one variant of American exceptional identity.
Later, he unwittingly confessed that his administration was not capable of understanding the “barbaric” Taliban: “These people were barbaric. It's hard for the American mind to comprehend how backwards and barbaric these people were” (Bush, 2004b). However, the victory of the US-led “world revolution” did not last long. After all, the imperial overconfidence of America in democratic peace and laissez-faire capitalism was set back by the global financial meltdown of 2008 (Smith, 2012, 387). The “one-legged Wilsonianism” (Deudney, 2007, 186), i.e., a dangerous combination of neo-Wilsonian liberal goals and unilateral strategy with an unrealistic calculation of available resources, not only undermined both the soft and hard powers of the United States as a hegemon (Hardt and Negri, 2009, 209-218) but also triggered the age of prevalent chaos in the Middle East. Although the US-led “politics of erasure” from the binary vision of the world tried to subsume the Islamic Other by converting it into the self-righteous American Self, it merely produced an unremitting violence of retaliatory spirals with the bleak prospect of peace (Agathangelou and Ling, 2009, 15-30).

The election of Barack Obama can be interpreted as a “late societal rejection of the Bush administration’s interpretation of the US global role” (Wolf, 2011, 209). President Obama thus adopted an alternative national role conception and a grand strategy that are less guided by unilaterality and militarism but significantly governed by multilateralism and diplomacy under the material imperatives of the weakened American power. On the first page of his new National Security Strategy, Obama (The White House, 2010, 1) admitted that the US was required to restore its international authority by restraining its ambition of unilaterality and by strengthening multilateral cooperation with other regional emerging powers: “We must recognize that no one nation – no matter how powerful – can meet global challenges alone… America must prepare for the future, while forging cooperative approaches among nations that can yield results.”

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205 Concerning the Obama administration’s moderated conception of (democratic) exceptionalism and its implication on US foreign policy in a “multipolar world,” see Streich and Marrar (2014), Zarefsky (2014), Edwards (2014), Valenzano III and Edwards (2013), and Menaldo (2013). However, Obama’s putatively “relativist” and “unpatriotic” approach toward American exceptionalism stirred up the rage of
One important caveat here is that we should not exaggerate the differences among the post-Cold War administrations from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama. As Maull (2011, 167) insists from a role theory perspective, these recent administrations actually performed “within one US foreign policy role conception, rather than pursuing different role conceptions” (emphasis original). Although there were differing styles, intensities, and subtle reconstructions of the US role conceptions across the three presidents, we can still observe the persistent continuity of the fundamental assumptions about America’s revolutionary and civilizing roles in the world, which is deeply rooted in its historical politics of identity/difference or American exceptionalism we have traced so far.

Then, what is to be done? The unilateral practice of eradicating “the axis of evil” through the strategy of “regime change” simply followed the past imperialist model of civilization and “the consequence of which is an almost inevitable backlash against such imposition” (Bowden, 2009, 5). Accordingly, we are required to explore a new global order to facilitate genuine dialogues among different civilizations, which is distinguished from the monologic discourse of the singular conception of civilization. A good starting point for this endeavor is to reflect on the historical limit of American exceptionalist identity and “to become conscious of the relativity (hence of the arbitrariness) of any feature of our culture” (Todorov, 1984, 254).

The United State is required to rethink the history of its relationship to Others thoroughly, so as not to reiterate the failure of the crusade by the neoconservatives that

conservatives and resulted in a series of fierce debate on the idea during the 2012 presidential election. This ongoing controversy can be read as a symptom of the American identity crisis or anxiety over the erosion of unipolarity. It represents the contestation of various national role conceptions suggested by different ideological camps (Cha, 2015).

John Lewis Gaddis (2008, 10) suggests an interesting historical analogy from Russia to explain the differences in style between the Democratic and Republican administrations: “The liberals, influential within the Clinton Administration, were content simply to let democracy triumph: If this was an inevitable outcome, why should the United States exert itself to bring it about? The neoconservatives objected to this passivity, calling for more aggressive action to speed up the process. In that sense the liberals were like the Mensheviks in 1917: Marx had shown that the forces of history were going to overthrow capitalism, so why not just wait for that to occur? The neoconservatives, in contrast, resembled the Bolsheviks: They wanted to jump-start the engine of history.”
weakened the global leadership of America. The United States’ historical role conception distinctively reflects a “dominance of ego expectations,” whereas “alter expectations were subordinated, if taken up at all” (Maul, 2011, 171). Hence, America should “learn to step beyond the limits of contemporary forms of self-other relations” (Blaney and Inayatullah, 1997, 78) in order to realize relatively peaceful intercivilizational dialogues. Fundamentally, this dialogical turn of the existing American monologic identity is related to Connolly’s call for an ongoing “pluralization of pluralism” and the civic virtues of “agonistic respect” and “critical responsiveness.” His “deep pluralism” carefully pays attention to “the persistent possibility that established lines of demarcation inflict unnecessary injuries and closures” as well as recognized “the ethical complexity of political judgment by adopting an ambiguous orientation to moral codes” (Connolly, 1995, 195). Accepting the contestability or relativity of identity is a fundamental condition of pluralism and pluralization. As Todorov encourages, we need to create an alternative global ethics that recognizes “equality without its compelling us to accept identity; but also difference without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority” (1984, 249, emphasis original) so as to construct a world-wide base of “polymorphic globalism” (Katzenstein, 2012b) or the “middle ground” (White, 2011).
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Taesuh Cha was born in Seoul on the 5th of January 1982. He holds a BA and an MA in International Relations from Seoul National University. He served as a full-time instructor at the Republic of Korea Air Force Academy and a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He has been a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University, Department of Political Science, Baltimore, Maryland, since 2010. As a Dean’s Teaching Fellow, he taught a seminar class on Competing American Exceptionalisms in spring 2016.