Abstract

The intent of this thesis is to analyze failures in the United States (U.S.) military instrument of national power during interventions and occupations. Insurgencies, terror organizations, and emerging near-peer geopolitical competitors are asserting influence to undermine U.S. influence and geopolitical dominance. U.S. policymakers and Department of Defense (DoD) commanders lack the ability to consolidate gains into political endstates through current policies and planning methodologies. This thesis analyzes issues from tactical to strategic echelons and delivers a conceptual framework to effectively operationalize the military instrument of national power. DoD doctrine for planning focuses on mission and operational variables through the Joint Planning Process (JPP) or the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Both methodologies enable commanders and staff in creating courses of action and are successful when solely massing effective combat power. Consequently, JPP and MDMP are ineffective tools to create plans for military democratic intervention strategies and efforts. This thesis additionally focuses on continued disconnects between policymakers and commanders, the lack of understanding critical mission and operational variables, and flaws in the military instrument of national power, which degrade long-term stability in warfare. This topic is vital to conceptualize solutions and improve the understanding of ongoing terror network challenges and emerging near peer threats in multi-domain operations. These issues degrade the ability to consolidate tactical and operational gains into grand strategy objectives, which ultimately lead to stagnation and recession of the democratic state.

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Making the world safe for democracy has been a guiding creed for America since Woodrow Wilson uttered the words, “a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations” in 1917 to Congress at the brink of the nation’s entry into World War I.¹ Today though, failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, the spread of terrorism worldwide, and emerging near-peer threats of China and Russia have led to a deterioration of democracy worldwide. This thesis questions why the U.S. is failing in military democratic intervention and why there is a democratic recession. The Congressional Research Service said, “Analysis of data trend-lines from two major global democracy indexes indicates that, as of 2017, the level of democracy around the world has not advanced since around the year 2005 or 2006.”² This research is further backed by Democracy Studies scholar and American political sociologist Larry Diamond in arguments that global trends confirm a “democratic recession” since 2006 in both the Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” report and the Economist “Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index”.³

Specifically, this thesis addresses three questions in-depth: 1) can the DoD operationalize effective military governance; 2) does the U.S. effectively take

¹ Wilson, Woodrow GPO, “Address of the President of the United States,” 65th Congress, 1st Session, April 2, 1917.


sociocultural factors into account while planning for an occupation; and 3) is military
democratic intervention effective. The capability to consolidate sustainable political
order during democratic transitions is the most fundamental question. Failures and
developments in this context come at a heavy cost in blood, separate societies politically,
and create deep financial burdens on the U.S.

With proxy wars in Syria and Yemen enabling the spread of terrorism; the
revisionist state of China’s economic influence and building up of military bases in
aggressive strategic positions; Russian aggression and the use of hybrid warfare to
undermine the legitimacy of democratic structures; Venezuela’s democratic collapse into
an authoritarian dictatorship; Iran’s use of Unconventional Warfare (UW) to destabilize
the Middle East; proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in North Korea;
the U.S. cannot afford to neglect lessons learned from historic events. These areas of
conflict and authoritarian regimes stand as imminent threats to the U.S. and its military,
borders, sovereignty, and western liberal democratic values. Threats include the fall of
democratic institutions, further development of nuclear weapons by rogue dictators and
regimes, radical Islamist terror organizations, and the annexation of democratic allies.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the importance of “marshalling
will and capabilities” in the effort to prevent “unfavorable shifts.”4 It highlights that
democratic republics are “sustained by a free, proud, and unified people.”5 It continues
by identifying the threat of U.S. rivals utilizing propaganda to discredit democracy and

5 Ibid. Pg. 2.
“spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.” ⁶ The NSS focuses U.S. efforts on advancing American influence as a commitment to “liberty, democracy, and the rule of law” globally. ⁷ It additionally focuses efforts to improved planning and better assessments of threats. ⁸ Most importantly, it features a key statement that is the most validated requirement for a sustainable democracy. The NSS outlines the fact that, “A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation”. ⁹

A substantial part of global populations today questions the structure of liberal democracy and its effectiveness. As an example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, and Venezuela displayed a lack of resiliency within population centers to stand up against insurgencies, illiberal ideologies, and reemergence of autocratic rulers threatening growing or standing democracies. A lack of resiliency in the population centers led these democratic societies to deteriorate. Not only in these governments, but the U.S. additionally faces rising threats looking to create “military and economic spheres of influence”, “weaken democratic institutions”, and “diminish Western dominance”. ¹⁰

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⁶ Ibid. Pg. 3.
⁷ Ibid. Pg. 4.
⁸ Ibid. Pg. 14.
⁹ Ibid. Pg. 14.
Rising threats have rapidly developed since 2008 and are moving quicker within this digitized age. Growth in technology has enabled near-peer threats of China and Russia by expanding full spectrum warfare into cyber and space domains leading to the multi-domain warfare threat. Jones and Taussig argue, “ineffective governance, economic inequality, and sociocultural upheaval” are at the root cause of the democratic recession.\footnote{Ibid. Pg. 2.} China and Russia have become masters in “digital authoritarianism” conducting “cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns” and use “powerful digital tools to control and surveil its domestic populations.”\footnote{Ibid. Pg. 3.} Russia’s cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns have reached the U.S. and led to social and political chaos within U.S. borders. Digital authoritarianism will only become more dangerous with the increase of artificial intelligence and has led the DoD to conceptualize and practice new strategies to counter the multi-domain threat.

Jones and Taussig argue four lines of effort to preserve the prospects of democracy. Those lines of effort include “Democratic renewal: A shared international agenda”, “Detoxifying identity politics and migration debates”, “Defending democracy in Europe and Asia”, and “Deepening cooperation with non-Western democracies.”\footnote{Ibid. Pg. 4.} Democratic renewal moves away from liberal democracy promotion and leans towards attracting nondemocratic states by developing and showing a shared agenda of domestic renewal. Detoxifying identity politics removes the ties of migration to terrorism and attempts to extend open and healthy debates on migration integration. Defending liberal
democracy in Europe and Asia degrades authoritarian influence. Lastly, deepening cooperation with non-Western democracies joins “aid, infrastructure, governance support, and crisis management” to undermine authoritarian support and influence.

The first chapter of this thesis researches the lack of capability to consolidate military gains into strategic political endstates. Failures are deep rooted into two fundamental issues. The first fundamental issue being, U.S. policymaker’s failure to acknowledge the DoD as a political wing of the U.S. government. This does not mean the DoD is a voted political member, but instead, the DoD often serves as a political arm of the state conducting governance operations while deployed. With this lack in acknowledgement, the DoD, and more specifically Special Operations Forces (SOF), is ill prepared to conduct governance operations during partner nation training events such as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), conducted with partners worldwide, and in much more robust occupations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This lack of acknowledgement develops the second fundamental issue, which is a lack of training that develops a credible capability. To resolves these issues, first U.S. policymakers must acknowledge the fact that the DoD manages governance operations continuously. In doing so, a validated requirement for the capability develops and leads to formal training that solidifies capabilities in an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). It is necessary to acknowledge counter-governance is as important as governance, as there is a valid requirement needed to counter aggressive authoritarian and illiberal democratic influence.

The next chapter researches if the DoD takes sociocultural factors into account while planning for military democratization during an occupation. Issues arise with the current method to study a nation since it is at a macro level. Macro area studies is
acceptable for massing effective combat power to win battles, but it does not consider layered and dispersed population centers and how each of them has diverse cultures that drive values, beliefs, and decision making uniquely. With the lack of understanding values and beliefs of populations centers, victory and military democratization become unattainable, as populations never buy into nation building efforts and insurgencies develop. Restated from above, the NSS displays the importance of a deep understanding of population centers stating, “A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation.”

Moreover, when it comes to informed and engaged citizenry and effective governance; the U.S. must understand the people fully before entering a nation to fully understand how to change the behavior of a population in the effort to institutionalize democratic values and beliefs.

The third chapter asks the simple question of whether military democratization is the answer. The center issue in democratization is that it does not happen overnight. Even in the best democracies, they are not without years of progression and government accepted and influenced discrimination and crimes against humanity. The intent of this chapter is to determine for one, if the U.S. should continue military democratization and if the answer is yes, determine if there are better ways to create sustainable democratic structures. This chapter additionally argues that conventional wisdom of democratization is flawed. Lastly, this chapter looks at the current measurements of democracy, with the intent to determine if the indicators of democracies can be redefined or reformulated into

a less difficult method to quantify democratic nation effectiveness. After three decades free of superpower conflict the U.S. and other democracies worldwide face imminent threats to their form of government. The threat of China, Russia, and radical Islamist continues to cultivate a climate on the threshold of another World War. The U.S. and other democratic nations maintain the upper hand currently, but it is not without persistent engagements to undermine the legitimacy of democratic state.

Political, economic, and social instability in democratic states has compounded these issues furthering the threat to liberal democratic survival. Authoritarian states and “illiberal democracies” are manipulating the foundation, norms, and abilities of democratic state influence and dominance. Illiberal democracies focus on an effective playbook the U.S. must counter. That playbook guides simple steps to undermine the structure of liberal democracies. It includes the following steps, “tyranny of the majority” to introduce constitutional change, targeting judiciary and independent oversight, placing loyalist in influential positions, using financial resources against democratic institutions, slowly changing democratic laws and norms, discrediting voices against them, shaping civil discourse by manipulating history, and playing on the fear of the populace to reimplement “traditional values.”15 This thesis ultimately serves to develop a better strategy to counter authoritarian states and the illiberal agenda.

CHAPTER I: WAR AND POLITICS: CAN THE DOD OPERATIONALIZE EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE POST-CONFLICT
Introduction

Politics shape warfare and operationalizing effective post-conflict governance is the most arduous task of warfare. The U.S. continues to fail at consolidating tactical gains into desired political endstates.\textsuperscript{16} The outcome of this failure is long wars, unnecessary loss of life, trillions in national debt, and massive loss of support by the people.\textsuperscript{17} These failures are developed from the lack of institutionalizing governance education and training within the construct of military occupational skills. As a result, the U.S. military is capable, yet ineffective in operationalizing post-conflict governance. Political and military leaders have long denied the direct ties between military and political affairs. Denial continuously results in the inability to consolidate U.S. desired political endstates. The National Defense Strategy highlights the importance of readiness and effective combat strength in a multi-domain environment to deter and degrade rogue regimes and the reemergence of revisionist powers. Technology evolved, changing and complicating warfare. However, one key aspect of warfare stays unchanged in U.S. foreign policy; the U.S. will continue to use military intervention as a method to promote democracy worldwide. Consequently, the National Defense Strategy neglects to underline the innate role of post-conflict democratic governance operations.

Typically, DoD is not the lead agency in assisting foreign governments in post-conflict governance operations.\textsuperscript{18} Department of State (DoS) exercises the lead in


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. Pg. 272

assisting foreign governments in post-conflict governance.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, DoD consistently finds itself in the middle of conducting governance activities through Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Stability Operations, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). For DoD, there are six phases of operations that are distinct, but there is not a required order, yet they consistently overlap to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy.\textsuperscript{20} The six phases are: shape (0), deter (I), seize initiative (II), dominate (III), stabilize (IV), and enable civil authority (V).\textsuperscript{21} DoD exercises the lead and is the Subject Matter Expert (SME) during phase 0-III operations, including preparing for, closing in, and destroying the enemy to topple regimes that undermine human and natural rights of its citizens or neighbors. However, being great at preparing for and destroying a regime does not make DoD great in governance, stability, or phase IV-V operations.

When DoD becomes involved in governance, the U.S. Army has historically taken the lead in the reestablishment of political and economic order.\textsuperscript{22} This is not to say the Marines, Airforce, or Navy are incapable of reestablishing political and economic order, as there have, and are many joint and individual efforts. Rather, the U.S. Army has the operational capacity to acquire, hold, and stabilize territory for an extended length of time while reestablishment of political order is underway.\textsuperscript{23} The current term used for

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\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, Pg. 201.
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\textsuperscript{20} Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington Dc. ”JP 3-0, Joint Operations.” 2017. Pg. 128.
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\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, Pg. 128.
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\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, Pg. 15.
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military governance is Transitional Military Authority (TMA) through the Civil Affairs (CA) core task SCA.\textsuperscript{24}

Reestablishing political order through TMA is a historical task for DoD, yet U.S. political and military leaders have actively avoided the institutionalization and preparation of providing stability, structure, and sustainable post-conflict governance.\textsuperscript{25} Studies prescribe there is a lack of fundamental understanding in the history of warfare creating gaps in needed skills and knowledge leaving the formally educated ill-prepared.\textsuperscript{26} Consequently, a lack of preparation combined with a lack of the true fundamental understanding of TMA, for those whom do contain formalized education, facilitates failures in effectively applying post-conflict governance during phase IV stability operations.

Each environment in warfare poses a different problem and needs a different strategy in combat operations. Yet, effective governance has traditional structures regardless of the type of government but must be shaped to meet the sociocultural factors of the host nation government. For this reason, the U.S. Army must have competence to manage governance operations. This level of competence requires education, training, and in-depth strategic planning pre-conflict to facilitate a thorough understanding of the


\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, Pg. 14.

\textsuperscript{26} Schmidt, Benno C. Governance for A New Era for a New Era, A Blueprint for Higher Education. 2014. Pg. 1.
Operational Environment (OE). Sun Tzu summarizes strategic planning in a logical manner:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

As a result, by knowing yourself and knowing your enemy pre-conflict through education, training, and planning there is no need to fear a loss of battle or reestablishing stability post-conflict.

Executive decision-makers and congressional policymakers, national security agencies, and senior DoD leaders continually struggle finding common terminology and fail to agree on policy to stabilize post-conflict environments. The results are ill planned ad hoc post-conflict governments, driven from the top-down, which creates a lack of confidence from the civil populace in their established leaders. One failure of executive and congressional policymakers, and senior DoD leaders is to realize the shift in effective governance and counter-governance in the 21st Century. Historically, governing structures are driven from the top-down. In today’s society a major transition in the institutions, rules, and culture worldwide formulate and shape practical governance in all parts of society. With that, supported governance today begins with

understanding civil populations and is most successful when supported from the bottom-up, as democratic societies are meant to be. Soldiers interacting with the civil populace must understand not only the culture but also governance and politics for effective TMA.

Mao Tse Tung said, “War is the continuation of politics. In this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action”.\(^{31}\) Warfare is a political action. The DoD continues to manage governance operations in post-conflict arenas unilateral to DoS. A DoS / DoD multilateral effort is ideal and more effective due to DoDs command and control and logistical capabilities.\(^{32}\) An effective multilateral effort requires, but is not limited to the reestablishment of, “providing quality public services, quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.”\(^{33}\) Without providing the fundamental foundation of effective governance, governments will lack the six democratic governance indicators, which are “voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, Rule of Law, and control of corruption.”\(^{34}\) Yet the question of how can one claim the capability to conduct governance or stability operations effectively in a credible manner must be asked when there is a lack of training

\(^{31}\) Yuen, Derek M. C. Deciphering Sun Tzu: how to read the art of war. London: Hurst, 2014. Pg. 28.


\(^{34}\) Ibid.
and education for those who are tasked to conduct governance and counter-governance operations.

Still, governance in warfare remains an integral part of American warfare and the success in war rests on the reestablishment of political order.\(^{35}\) Reestablishment of political order requires control of territory and the rebuilding of local governmental institutions.\(^ {36}\) Over the last 18 years the U.S. has physically controlled Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has neglected the application of necessary resources, planning, training, education, and attention to implement effective political order.\(^ {37}\) The failed application of necessary resources, planning, training, education, and attention to implement effective political order led to an endless Global War on Terror “GWOT” or “Long War.” The history of World War II (WWII) could have served as a tool in preparation for post-conflict governance and stability operations, but it did not. Instead, post-WWII resulted in multiple warfare failures caused by the lack of capability to “consolidate combat successes into a desired political endstate.”\(^ {38}\) Governance operations are a key element to all warfare yet, political, and military leaders of the U.S. have failed to operationalize and resource requirements needed to “consolidate political gains in war.”\(^ {39}\)

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\(^{36}\) Ibid, Pg. 2.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, Pg. 2.


\(^{39}\) Ibid. pp 272.
It is equally necessary to specify the role DoD has in preparation of post-conflict governance. Secondly, it is necessary to determine successes and failures in operationalizing post-conflict governance. Next, through successes and failures a framework can be determined tied to resources necessary to shape pre-conflict operations, into combat operations, and then transfer to successful post-conflict stability operations with validated experts in governance. By doing so, one can justify the importance of not only knowing DoD strengths and weaknesses during conflict, but additionally understand the operational approach and resources necessary; to include training and education, needed to be successful before conflict ever begins.

Success is unreachable without understanding the history of post-conflict governance and the successes and failures within it. This chapter looks at DoD roles in post-conflict governance during several military occupations, to include WWII (Germany), Korea, and the GWOT to determine successes and failures. In addition to justification, measuring successes and failures will help determine a framework for future success.

The U.S. Army CA has taken the lead in governance and counter-governance operations, as the SME in governance. A SME is defined as,

A person with bona fide expert knowledge about what it takes to do a particular job, superior incumbents in the same or very similar positions and other individuals with current and thorough knowledge, and former supervisors or incumbents with recent experience; as long as they have bona fide expert knowledge about a particular job.  40

Therefore, in theory a CA soldier is a SME in governance and counter-governance, TMA, and Support to Civil Administration (SCA). However, this thesis argues a lack of educated and trained governance and counter-governance SMEs within CA, due to the lack of institutional training and education required to become a SME. This by far is one of the greatest issues in conducting successful governance during any military campaign. CA lacks institutional training and education and therefore the branch tasked with conducting governance and counter-governance operations needs a solidified program that provides advanced education and increases the capability to conduct governance and counter-governance operations.

Having an understanding and knowledge base of politics and governance and counter-governance during occupation is the precondition for operationalizing effective democratic governance. Yet, “the greatest difficulty is that most of the requisite skills of CA are not those which the soldier acquires in his or her ordinary training and experience.”41 What is needed is, “political, economic, and technical skills—the skills of civilian more than of military life.”42 This understanding and knowledge base of political, economic, and technical skills requires training and education which are not currently available in the CA branch. Bona fide expert knowledge is authentic, legitimate, legal, or certified. Just because individuals name themselves as a SME, does not necessarily mean they have certified “expert knowledge”. Proper education and training supply certifications necessary to receive expert knowledge and enhance the current level


42 Ibid, Pg. 3.
of former education. Currently, the CA Branch has a massive gap in training developed to address governance and counter-governance operations. For this reason, the CA Branch depends solely on contracted training and outsources academic professionals to enhance its capability and knowledge of governance and counter-governance. The results within CA is a branch with insignificant knowledge of what governance and counter-governance operations are and how to operationalize it before, during, or after conflict. Currently, there is not one formal school within the CA Branch in its entirety that trains governance or counter-governance for an occupation or conflict environment.

This paper looks to determine DoD capabilities of conducting effective governance during occupations or in conflict. A framework can guide and measure historical and current factors to answer the question, can the DoD operationalize effective democratic governance post-conflict. Additionally, this paper looks at historical themes and trends, basic characteristics, and problems associated with democratic governance. A display of successes and failures focuses the eye toward consensus, potential change, and missing elements to create effective governance and counter-governance operations. In conclusion, there is a review of first findings, which in chapter three will set up a way ahead.

Governance Verses Democratic Governance

There are many definitions of governance. Perhaps the most accepted defines governance as the “application of rules and processes which authority and control are exercised in a society, political decisions are made, the rules for the scope of actions of state and society are structured, and resources for economic and social developments are
Democratic governance can be traced as far back as fifth century B.C. Athens, Greece and is derived from the Greek words “demos” and “Kratos” translated to “people” and “rule” meaning “ruled by the people.” Yet, democratic governance within the U.S. is not mature in actuality. However, within democratic governance there are characteristics and features holding fundamental values, practices, and attitudes dependent on the culture or society in a democracy. Regardless of culture or society, there are core characteristics which develop true democratic governance and include the following:

- Democracy is government in which power and civic responsibility are exercised by all adult citizens directly or indirectly through their freely elected representatives.
- Democracy rests upon the principle of majority rule, which means that decisions are made by majority and do not have to be accepted by all, but minority viewpoints are respected and protected.
- Democracies guard against all-powerful central governments and decentralize government to regional and local levels, understanding that all levels of government must be as accessible and responsive to the people as possible.
- Democracies understand that one of their prime functions is to protect such basic human rights as freedom of speech and religion; the right to equal protection under the law; and the opportunity to organize and participate fully in the political, economic, and cultural life of society.
- Democracies conduct regular free and fair elections open to all citizens of voting age.
- Citizens in a democracy have not only rights, but also the responsibility to participate in political systems that, in turn, protect their rights and freedoms.
- Democratic societies are committed to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise.

The key to understanding the difference between governance and democratic governance is lack of rights verses inherent responsibility. Any dictator distributes rules and processes that instill authority and control. Democratic governance delivers power to

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45 Ibid, Pg. 3.

46 Ibid, Pg. 3.
the populations as a civic responsibility, with majority rule, while holding elected officials accountable, delivering freedom and fair elections, through the commitment of its citizens.

Foundation for Post-Conflict Democratic Governance

There is no painless way to describe the aftermath of conflict. But attempt to imagine a land that is no longer sovereign; without institutions, government, or jobs; unable to access resources, provide services or communicate, little to no economy; and absent of law and order.\(^{47}\) To western civilization this is inconceivable, yet many countries around the world are overwhelmed with suffering due to lack of effective governance in post-conflict environments. But between 1900 and 1987, the devastating effects of conflict included the deaths of 170 million people.\(^{48}\) Without political order and essential services, violent conflict is increased, which in turn “undermines or weakens governance capacity.”\(^{49}\) Therefore, post-conflict governance begins by establishing a capable policymaking apparatus or transitional political authority that provides security, stability, and essential services to the civil populace.\(^{50}\) In place of “transitional political authority” in post-conflict areas, TMA is best served to create stability. By doing so the “mechanics of achieving a stable, reconstituted, and sustainable society after conflict” develops the foundation for success.\(^{51}\)


\(^{49}\) Ibid, Pg. 5.

\(^{50}\) Ibid, Pg. 5.

Securing the population is the primary task. Yet, there are issues within setting up security as well. Historically, the question is: does security in post-conflict governance mean security to prevent the reoccurrence of war or to secure the people? A common misconception is preserving nationality. Nationality is less important than culture and good governance in all nations preserves law, order, justice, and removes fear from the populations. Nationality, religion, ethnicity, and culture within Afghanistan and Iraq did not allow for security of the people. Consequently, the protection of nationality, religion, ethnicity, and culture in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a focus in prevention of the reoccurrence of war, which left civil populations vulnerable to national divide by ethnicity, religion, and culture leading to an insurgency. If civil populations are vulnerable to ethnic, religious, and cultural differences, democratic governance is not truly effective and promotes a lack of human and natural rights, which is counterproductive to effective democratic governance.

During the democratization of Japan, American military power “reformed and reconstructed virtually every institution of Japan.” A key factor in this reformation was “reforms were not entirely top-down affairs.” As argued above governance is not top-down driven and requires support from the lowest level, the civil populace. Subsequently, neither “government” nor “governance” are effective when formalized and

52 Ibid, Pg. 17.
55 Ibid, Pg. 551.
forced from a top-down approach. Effective governance takes active cooperation and often the initiative of a much larger group of supporters. Mitigating national divides in religion, culture, and ethnicity by empowering the people as the decision-makers of who will govern them degrade a chance of insurgency. There must be support from the majority regardless of religion, ethnicity, and culture through democratic representation enabling population participation and prove a “reliable and effective link between the government and the governed”.  

Setting up a constitutional government develops a reliable and effective link between government and governed following security, which includes implementing, amending, and reforming a constitution. However, a democratic constitution does not resolve discontent amongst populations. In fact, discontent may be more visible as democratic governance allows public discontent, which “can be demonstrated via open debates, popular demonstrations, and elections.” Yet, open debates, popular demonstrations, and elections give populations a sense of ownership of the government under which they reside. Autocracies are much more vulnerable to conflict and when challenged risk insurgency or being overthrown by way of coup d’état. For this

56 Ibid, Pg. 551.
60 Ibid, Pg. 14.
purpose, democratic governments which gain credibility of the civil populace can establish a transitional political authority with an interim civil administration whom can serve to establish rules, a realistic agenda, build a constitutional commission, and enable technical and legal advice during the constitutional drafting process.61 This is enabled and supported through CAO, SCA and TMA post-conflict. The implemented, amended, or reformed constitution presents commitment to the people and creates a safe, free, and open environment where power rests in the governed.

Addressing public needs and reestablishing essential services post-conflict further strengthens the government. Effective governance in the sense of providing essential services is a key factor within the foundation of post-war recovery.62 Addressing public needs and reestablishing essential services will not only increase the flow of essential goods and services, but will additionally serve to provide psychosocial stability within the civil populace deepening the credibility of the governing.63 Delivery of essential services and establishing or re-establishing viable economies is essential to achieving long-term stability, but requires civilian skills.64 The problem remains, there is a lack of formalized institutional training and education within the CA Branch weakening the probability of success in current and emerging global governance and stability challenges.


62 Ibid. Pg. 7.


In summary, successful democratic governance has a familiar foundation and structure regardless of national, religious, ethnic, or culture dynamics. But those sociocultural dynamics factor into the ability to successfully govern a population. Not one pillar within the foundation can stabilize a democratic government in post-conflict alone, which confirms that all parts of a government foundation are equally vital for success. First, there must be a capable policymaking apparatus put into place. It must be capable of providing security, stability, and essential services. Security is a primary task to protect the civil populace and counter ongoing conflict and corruption. Next, a transitional political authority can be voted in by the civil populace to maintain credibility and begin implementing, amending, or reforming a constitution that provides commitment to the people simultaneously establishing and enforcing a safe, free, and open environment in which power rests in the governed by an elected governing authority in preparation for a democratic election. During this critical time, addressing public needs and reestablishing essential services creates psychosocial stability within the civil populace enhancing the credibility of the governing apparatus. Case studies provide failures and successes in post-conflict governance. They serve as a catalyst and provide an in-depth understanding of primary needs to effectively operationalize and enhance future success in post-conflict governance operations.

Case Study Methodology

Below case studies show historical successes and failures in post-conflict governance. First, each case study research determines if there was a strategic plan in place to conduct TMA. Next, military mandates or directives find what the political and military relationships and endstates between the U.S. and the occupied country were.
Then, this chapter illuminates efforts to reignite economic stability along with an analysis of which parties controlled the government. Lastly, the overall length of the occupation will be determined. In doing so, successes and failures find and measure necessary functions to operationalize and resource the requirements needed for success. Ultimately, this chapter provides lessons learned in efforts to consolidate gains for desired political endstates.

Germany

Germany serves as one of the greatest examples of CA forces conducting TMA. The War Department was tasked to conduct roles outside tradition to reestablish political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs in post-conflict Germany. In order to complete such a task, DoD, which at the time was named the War Department created the CA Division to provide for, “military, political, and economic activity on every level—from the job of rebuilding a village bakery to that of rooting out and replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions.”

Long before the surrender of Nazi Germany, DoD planned to operationalize post-conflict governance. The U.S. knew Germany would not only be disbursed amongst allies but would need political and economic order reestablished. JCS 1067 defined

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65 Ziemke, Earl. The U.S. Army in The Occupation of Germany, 1974, history.army.mil/books/wwii/Occ-GY/.  
harsh mandates for the American occupation in post-conflict Germany. JCS 1067 included, Germany was to be seen and treated as an enemy state, fraternization was strictly prohibited, and denazification was to be achieved by terminating all Nazi organizations to include all of the members.  

Germany was not treated as a liberated nation, but instead, as a defeated enemy nation.  

During this time, Germany was demilitarized by the War Department. In addition, the CA Division managed significant efforts to develop domestic industries to balance the economy. The industries included coal, agriculture, and infrastructure.  

CA developed economic plans to balance the economy but only allowed for a basic subsistence levels through deindustrialization in the beginning of the occupation.  

In addition to providing security and reestablishing essential services for survivability, plans were put in place to provide public goods by distributing large quantities of basic relief efforts in the form of supplies to prevent disease and unrest.  

U.S. troop levels in Germany began to rapidly decrease during the occupation, and Germany went through intense demilitarization and disarmament. After Germany lost the war, U.S. troop levels were decreased and replaced with general demilitarization

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69 Ibid.


72 U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany, and Japan Compared. 2006. Pg. 4.

and disarmament.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, CA forces surged into Germany in concentrated in administrative governing positions. Positions that had less than 100 service members in the beginning were filled with more than 500 to enable strict governing.\textsuperscript{75} It was the establishment of a democratic parliamentary system, “the Federal Republic of Germany” in 1949, coupled with the reformation of the constitution that finally validated German readiness to assume responsibility of governing its reconstructed nation.\textsuperscript{76}

In preparation for this transition, the CA Division ran every element of governance for Germany. The Office of Military Government was established and the Seventh Army G-5 divided itself into two branches of Economics/Industry and Internal Affairs.\textsuperscript{77} The Economics/Industry branch was further divided into Economics and Industry.\textsuperscript{78} The economics branch was responsible for labor, transportation, supply, food and agriculture, and trade.\textsuperscript{79} The Industry branch was responsible for oil, public utilities, building materials, construction, housing, forestry, industrial control, machinery and equipment, metals, electrical equipment and instruments, chemicals, consumer goods, and coal and nonmetallic mines.\textsuperscript{80} Internal Affairs was responsible for civil government, public safety, posts, telephone, telegraph, education and religious affairs, legal and

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. Pg. 2.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid. Pg. 3
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. Pg. 396
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. Pg. 396
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. Pg. 396
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. Pg. 396
prisons, finance and property control, displaced persons, refugees, public welfare, public health, monuments, fine arts, and archives.  

The Office of Military Government controlled every aspect of Germany and resulted in success through TMA. Transition and retrograde took place in increments. As soon as 1946, only four functions remained in Military Government control to include legal, public health and welfare, public safety, and civil administration. Perhaps the greatest burden of Transitional Military Governance was the legal system and responsibilities. Thousands of cases were taken on by the CA Division ranging from stolen artifacts of the German invasion of neighboring nations in Europe to the Denazification cases placing thousands in internment camps. The U.S. Army government occupation continued until 1949, but security forces stayed until 1955.

Korea

During WWII, even as an ally at the time, the U.S. found itself in competition with the Soviet Union making the Korean Peninsula a strategic location. Korea was a focal point for strategic positioning and Korea’s location was seen as a staging and planning area for the occupation of Japan. However, Korea posed a much more complex situation and environment for military governance and the U.S. was far from

81 Ibid. Pg. 396
82 Ibid. Pg. 425
83 Ibid. Pg. 428
84 Ibid. Pg. 426
prepared to conduct effective military governance following the unforeseen collapse of Imperial Japan, because the U.S. military was stretched thin with the continued the occupation in Germany.\textsuperscript{86} Even so, as early as 1943 the Department of State had “considered a U.S. military occupation of Korea.”\textsuperscript{87}

While Germany was seen as an enemy nation that must be controlled in every aspect, Korea was seen as needing to be liberated from the many years as a Japanese Colony.\textsuperscript{88} Yet, when it came to the liberation of Korea there were no clear political objectives outside of Korean independence and countering Soviet domination in the region.\textsuperscript{89} Korean liberation was a move that would follow the fall of Japan but, the U.S. additionally lacked the appetite and operational capacity to govern Korea, Germany, and Japan simultaneously leading to a half drawn plan for both countries to run on “existing governmental machinery.”\textsuperscript{90}

The Baker-Forty directive mandated U.S. forces to establish the military government in Korea to liberate and occupy any Japanese controlled political, military, and private institutions.\textsuperscript{91} In addition to the liberation of Japanese control in political, 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Schadlow, Nadia.  War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory. Georgetown University Press.  Pg. 133.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid. Pg. 133.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Schadlow, Nadia.  War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.  Pg. 133.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Ibid. Pg.134.
\end{itemize}
civil, and military areas it was mandated to provide security to Koreans, disarm any remaining Japanese, and counter any aggression against U.S. occupying forces.\textsuperscript{92} However, U.S. forces were not prepared for Japan to surrender as early as they did, coupled with only a directive to liberate Korea and no operational plan to execute and enforce military governance.\textsuperscript{93}

Upon entering the Korean peninsula, forces consisted of “Sixth, Seventh, and Fortieth Infantry Divisions, with no CA Division service members.”\textsuperscript{94} Once Korea was occupied, the TMA for Korea was staffed by war-weary combat officers who had no formal military governance training.\textsuperscript{95} In command was General Hodge, who made the critical mistake of allowing Korean political parties to form. This decision resulted in no less than 205 separate parties, which ultimately caused political chaos and polarization.\textsuperscript{96} In addition to this critical mistake, General Hodge added fuel to the fire by “dumping” the Korean leader Yo and declaring, “there is only one government in South Korea—the U.S. Military Government,” which developed a sense that Americans had only replaced Japanese colonialism.\textsuperscript{97} Any attempts to provide effective democratic governance

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. Pg.134.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. Pg.135.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. Pg.135.


\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, Pg. 253.

through SCA came with difficulty as Koreans were less capable of governing themselves from decades of colonialism.

The U.S. occupation of Korea found difficulty in establishing Korean political legitimacy, security, essential services, and stabilizing the economy.98 As a result, “political violence, labor strikes and general antipathy toward the occupation” occurred.99 Nevertheless, in time General Hodge played a vital role in securing and governing South Korea. General Hodge immersed himself into politics and was able to reintegrate exiled Koreans to “establish order and undermine Communist elements in the South.”100 The main occupational roles CA played in Korea was the establishment of the Bureau of Justice, developing the national defense force, restructuring property rights for economic growth, creating an agricultural department and a financial division, and a new central agency for public health.101

The greatest failure in the occupation of Korea can be seen as the failure to reach agreements with the Soviet Union, leaving the Korean peninsula in a much weaker state than other occupied countries.102 While the fighting in Korea ended in 1953, the Korean peninsula is officially only at a cease fire today with political tensions still running high.

98 Ibid. Pg. 36-37.

99 Ibid, Pg. 36.


101 Ibid, Pg. 139-141.

102 Ibid, Pg. 141.
and North Korea consistently pushing the limits of South Korea and the U.S. with its ballistic missile program to test its nuclear capabilities.

GWOT (Afghanistan)

The GWOT began after Osama bin Laden planned, trained, and orchestrated 9/11, killing 2,996 men, women, and children and injured more than 8,500. Less than a month later, operations began in Afghanistan to kill or capture Osama bin Laden while simultaneously launching attacks against al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban military installations.\textsuperscript{103}

The result is an on-going, now 18-year battle against terrorists and insurgents. The GWOT and the occupation of Afghanistan have presented the most complex environment U.S. military forces have ever faced. The plan for intervention in Afghanistan did not name political endstates for warfare and combat operations.\textsuperscript{104} Initial planning looked to strike with accuracy to defeat bin Laden and affiliates only. The retaliation and eradication of bin Laden and affiliates quickly shifted to reconstruction of the Afghan government to prevent the possibility of reemergence of the terror networks.\textsuperscript{105}

Initially, the plan to defeat bin Laden did not account for an occupation. With the shift in planning to supply military governance efforts, U.S. forces found difficulty in implementing the strategy nationwide due to remote tribal areas disenfranchised from any

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, Pg. 221.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, Pg. 220.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, Pg. 221.
institutional government since biblical times. When entering these remote tribal locations, the best way to describe the civil populace is “biblical” and “not aligned with any government.”106 However, an interim government was established and three lines of effort were established and directed, “political, security, and reconstruction”, led by over 20 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO allies.107 Reconstruction was led by civilians and sought to reestablish the “afghan Army and police, the judiciary, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of the Economy, and the Ministry of Education.”108

From on the ground experience with conducting SCA at the Tribal, District, and Provincial level a governing disconnect proved clear and created some of the greatest issues in Afghan governing operations. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at national and provincial levels supported by civil and military elements did not fund and set up essential services for district and tribal regions. Conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) that lacked seniority, education, and training to enable proper and adequate governance and essential services supported tribal regions. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) developed projects. PRTs typically consisted of U.S. Army Reserve CA to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan by rebuilding schools, digging wells, and reconstructing other damaged infrastructure.109

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108 Ibid, Pg. 221.

109 Ibid, Pg. 229.
PRTs lacked the necessary training and education to operationalize governance and essential services. This resulted in the misuse of funding in the billions towards unsustainable projects that continually fell flat without outside support. The lack of capability to supply proper essential services to populations was additionally complicated by a lack of rotating U.S. military commanders who agreed on common goals and concepts for governing operations.\textsuperscript{110} The result was a red to green chart to measure stability. Every command leaving Afghanistan left with a green chart only to have the replacing command turn the arbitrary chart back to red. There was zero unity of effort in the stability and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

The issue of multiple members in the coalition created a lack of unity of effort, which was counterproductive, as each allied force had its own agenda for governance operations. Nonetheless, in just two months post-invasion there was a road map “agreed upon” and signed for the creation of a new constitutional order and national elections were held in 2004; millions of Afghanis turned out for the democratic elections.\textsuperscript{111} Security was one of the primary issues. The U.S. believed it was still fighting a war on terror, but instead found themselves caught in the middle of a political war of, “tribal and ethnic tensions and competitions among rival warlord organizations.”\textsuperscript{112} There was no cooperation or agreeance between U.S. executive leadership, congressional policymakers, or senior DoD leaders of what the issues truly were in Afghanistan. To add fuel to fire, President Bush was wholeheartedly against using the military as a nation building force,

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, Pg. 222. \\
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, Pg. 223. \\
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, Pg. 224. \end{flushright}
as he believed the military was for “fighting and winning wars, and not to engage in
nation building.” Even after a change in policy, the greatest difficulty was establishing
essential services in the tribal areas. This lack of setting up essential services and
effective governance continued to circulate tribal and ethnic tensions from the bottom-up
increasing violence from within and against the U.S. as the occupying force.

GWOT (Iraq)

In 2003, the U.S. expanded the GWOT by invading and toppling Saddam and the
Baathist regime in Iraq. The U.S. established the Coalition Provisional Authority to serve
as the interim government and began its primary mission to de-Baathify Iraq. Although there was over a year of planning before invading Iraq the planning was seen as
“disconnected and ad hoc” resulting in the emergence of violent political actors. From
experience, the emergence of the insurgency can solely be charged in the lack of
transition from phase III operations to phase IV and President Bush’s lack of
understanding in the importance of military governance and nation building. The U.S.
military effectively engaged and destroyed Saddam and the Baathist regime. However,
directives stopped commanders to transition into stability operations. The directives
given were to “liberate, not occupy or control” and begin “economic and political
reconstruction” while getting rid of any WMD and terrorist safe havens.

113 Ibid, Pg. 225.

114 Isakhan, Benjamin, ed. The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the 'Islamic State'. Edinburgh:

115 Schadlow, Nadia. War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political

116 Ibid. Pg. 241.
The effects of “liberating” Iraq without simultaneously restoring security and basic order fed into the creation of the IS. De-Baathification further complicated the possibility of effective governance. Every person who was an experienced bureaucrat, administrator, or person who once secured Iraq under the Baathist regime was blocked and marginalized from helping to stabilize Iraq and consequently lived in poverty without a chance to work or provide for their families. In January of 2005 Iraq voted in its first democratic election, but it was highly boycotted by the Sunni population as there was a lack of perceived legitimacy and a visible sectarian divide. A constitution was additionally drafted in late 2005 and hundreds of reconstruction projects were created while reestablishing essential services. Reconstruction efforts were led by a “hybrid organization” of civilians working with DoD but lacked capabilities and resources to reestablish essential services. Like Afghanistan, lack of unity of effort and a multi-command structure developed contentious policy objectives. In Iraq sectarian divide fueled by stalled reestablishment of governance were main sources of counter-productivity in establishing effective governance. Although the occupation of Iraq has ended, sectarian divide and consistent fighting still exist today.

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117 Ibid. Pg. 240.


120 Ibid, Pg. 246.

121 Ibid, Pg. 239.

122 Ibid, Pg. 239.
Successes and Failures of Post-Conflict Governance

The U.S. maintains successes and failures in post-conflict governance. The greatest success occurred during the occupation of Germany, where the U.S. meticulously planned, trained, and educated delivering an intense operational framework to effectively apply democratic governance. As harsh as it may be, treating Germany as an enemy nation combined with the demilitarization and disarming of Germany supplied security and set the stage for no resistance to a TMA. The lack of resistance enabled trained and educated CA soldiers with civilian skills to govern Germany, to include political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs. One of the greatest successes to take note of during the occupation of Germany was the establishment of institutional training for CA in military governance operations.

Conversely, the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan are the greatest failures in nation building and military governance operations. An inexistent plan to occupy either Afghanistan or Iraq set the first stage for failure. Next, civilian personnel took the lead in reconstruction to include political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs but lacked the capability and resources required for such demanding tasks. Another issue quickly added to the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. CA soldiers lacked institutional training and education in civilian technical skills required to be successful in political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs. Iraq and Afghanistan faced difficulties in setting up security, as there was no demilitarization and disarming; liberation was the mission in both nations. Disarming or demilitarization the population in Afghanistan would have proven difficult, due to the remote tribal areas. Disarming or demilitarization Iraq would have served helpful but failed when the DoD invaded Iraq. Storage facilities
filled with munitions were left behind to secure later. Upon return, the storage facilities were empty. This enabled the insurgency after the U.S. ousted all support to Saddam, which marginalized the Sunni population fueling one of the most robust insurgencies known in warfare. The insurgency created is known today as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

While every nation had a new or rewritten constitution, a lack of credibility depreciated the view of legitimacy in Korea and Iraq. In Afghanistan, a constitution was ineffective due to tribal and ethnic divides in remote areas that had governed themselves since in existence. Even if there was an effective constitution in Afghanistan, a lack of capability to supply essential services enabled the disenfranchised tribal rule. Failure to plan, failure in unity of effort, and failure to train and educate are common themes coupled with a lack of operational links to political endstates created contention between congressional policymakers and lack of effort to institutionalize or formalize military governance operations.

Conclusion

Post-conflict military governance is an inherent task required during the occupation of any nation regardless of the enemy situation. While not the sole responsibility of the U.S. Army, CA soldiers handle and require training and education in civilian technical skills, which unfortunately are lacking in today’s military. Effective post-conflict military governance requires civilian skills outside of normal military training. To be effective, military governance operations or TMA requires institutionalization and formalization through training and education programs within DoD. The training must teach the foundation of governance and counter-governance
operations. It must define how to effectively manage governance from political, economic, financial, social, and cultural affairs.

There are key factors in measuring effective democratic governance to include the reestablishment of a government by the people and securing the population. Additionally, personnel within overthrown regimes are useful and can enable the reestablishment of security, essential service, and public goods. All democratic governments are successful only when held up and supported by the civil populace and civil society. Democratic governance does not cease discontent but promotes voice and accountability, which can decrease or increase violent conflict. History serves as a map for successes and failures during post-conflict governance operations. There is a saying of “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice shame on me.” The U.S. executive and legislative branch and senior military leaders have failed continuously to effectively plan and resource nation building. Stability operations required for successful TMA lack support from the highest level of the U.S. government. Consequently, the U.S. military is capable, yet ineffective, due to being hamstrung, in managing post-conflict governance operations.
CHAPTER II: DOES FAILING TO UNDERSTAND SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS RESULT IN A FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY DURING AN OCCUPATION?
Introduction

Successful resolution in conflict and warfare today is not purely based on the capability to mass effective combat power. Clausewitz said, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” Instead, warfare today is challenged with a greater understanding of the human domain and the complex social systems within it, making all conflict highly subjective and case by case. As General David Petraeus said, “there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan.” This statement stands true for all operating environments. The argument of this chapter is that the desired stability of an intervention requires a thorough understanding of actions, beliefs, and desires that make up the sociocultural dynamics embedded into population centers. This is because population centers are not identical even within a nation’s borders. Borders are nothing but arbitrary lines where many different ideologies merge. With this, each area of operation has different sociocultural factors that drive actions, beliefs, and desires. Social scientists maintain “actions, beliefs, and desires” within population centers remain relatively unchanged to those specific areas. PMESII-PT is a tool used to identify variables in warfare but lacks cultural depth, delivering only broad strokes of the social system with a greater focus on the enemy


situation. This chapter develops a more thorough method DoD planners can use for future conflicts to prevent another “Long War”.

Underestimated sociocultural factors lead to occupations such as the “Long War” in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. Executive leadership, congressional policymakers, and the DoD neglect consideration of sociocultural factors and lack a true understanding of what type of war they are going to be fighting before they arrive.

Clausewitz warned, “first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Failure to account for the type of war results in further instability, as it has in nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. In today’s conflicts, a true understanding of how to achieve stability and security is rooted into the sociocultural factors that create the EO.

There is no doubt that conflict continues to spread worldwide. The Institute for Economics and Peace reports in the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2018 only 13 countries are at peace out of 163 rated. Of those 150 nations not at peace, there are 24 areas which have critical or significant impacts on U.S. interests. With this rating, the U.S. involvement and intervention is at a staggering number. U.S. involvement in conflict

126 Clausewitz, On War, Pg. 100.
extends past a stated number for strategic security purposes. However, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen are a few known U.S. involvements in conflict today. With consistent conflict in these areas and U.S. interests at risk, there is no end in sight of current and potential conflict. In fact, the GPI 2018 reported, “Deteriorations in peacefulness occurred in all three GPI domains”.

Conventional wisdom delivers a stance that “inequality triggers conflict and violence.” In addition, conventional wisdom maintains, “malign actors and terrorists organizations train, recruit, and equip in areas of limited governance.” This chapter does not question either of the conventional wisdoms as a root cause of conflict or the ability to recruit from such areas. Instead it preserves these conventional wisdoms and asserts that peace and stability is unattainable without a keen understanding of sociocultural factors where an intervention or occupation takes place.

Clausewitz additionally argued, “every war must be conceived of as a single whole, and that with his first move the general must already have a clear idea of the goal on which all lines are to converge.” This implies that wars are much more than a chess game of two players. There are a range of factors at play which degrade or improve the


133 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (New York: Knopf, 1993), Pg. 582-583.
ability to be successful. These include, friendly and antagonist populations, ruling elites, and outside actors. To all intents and purposes, it is imperative to show all aspects at play pre-intervention, with continued updates, or the intervening nation will fail to achieve peace and stability.

This paper argues that a failure to understand sociocultural factors as part of an intervention or occupation will lead to a failure to consolidate military gains into political endstates resulting in further instability. The Vietnam War is the example. This paper additionally argues that sociocultural factors in warfare are of the highest importance, but then again, the most overlooked aspect of warfare.

Literature Review on Vietnam

In all wars political factors shape the environment acceptable for conflict to start. In addition to political factors, fear shapes an environment acceptable for conflict. The world is by and large occupied with anarchic military powers that are perceived as a threat to national security and interests of other nations, which leads those nations to have no choice but to fear one another. These statements bare true to the commencement of the war in Vietnam as well. The historical accounts of Vietnam serve as a good case of how discounting sociocultural factors and fear of power expansion created an ill planned, underestimated, and unwinnable war. During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese people did not care to accept outsider political goal’s and they were torn


from years of French colonization, but the U.S. feared an expansion of communist rule, as they have for decades.

The inaccurate look at the mission in Vietnam is that the U.S. was a liberating force providing a nation with “freedom and democracy.”

Truth be told, the mission was comprised of a much higher objective, which led to not accounting for sociocultural factors of the Vietnamese people. Aggravating failures compiled as the Vietnamese were not willing to accept outsider political goals and the U.S. had little interest in building “freedom and democracy” for the Vietnamese people at first. The true mission was to “contain the expansion of the Communist bloc”.

The mission of halting the expansion of communism was a mission to contain the expansion of a power greater than the U.S. out of fear of a decline in democratic influence.

Mearsheimer argues, “states seek to gain advantage at each other’s expense” as a result of “fear of power”. While the strategic endstate was sound in offensive realist theory, it dismissed the sociocultural factors within Vietnam. Consequently, dismissing these sociocultural factors is nothing new by U.S. policy makers during warfare and was merely another critical mistake with devastating effects, which led to thousands of unnecessary deaths and years of instability within Vietnam and south east Asia.

Many scholars of realism argue these critical failures to include Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer argues, “the ruling elites in Washington have believed that the best way to

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137 Ibid. Pg. 6.

protect the U.S. is to dominate the world and remake it in America’s image”, but “trying to dominate the globe and push democracy on other countries does not work.”\(^{139}\) This goes back to society, culture, and nationalism. The ruling elites do not realize that the foreign countries values, beliefs, and culture outweighs the Unites States critical and significant interests. This creates an explosive contest of national identity or a societies culture verses interests and power. Consequently, national identity and sociocultural factors are highly underestimated in warfare.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 states, “war is a human endeavor - a fundamentally human clash of wills often fought among populations.”\(^{140}\) If war is a human endeavor and clash of wills, it is better to understand the human behavior of a society and exploit the human domain as a strategic endstate to achieve political gains. ADRP 3-0 additionally states, “all war is about changing human behavior”.\(^{141}\) One cannot change human behavior if there is not an in-depth understanding of the sociocultural dynamics. ADRP 3-0 continues with, “commanders and Soldiers alike must understand the human context that reinforces the enemy’s will”.\(^{142}\) The “will’ includes societal norms or customs. If not, resistance appears, malign actors gain support, and peace and stability are inexistent. As said above, sociocultural factors are

\(^{139}\) Mearsheimer, John J., “What is America's Purpose? “National Interest No. 139 (September/October 2015), Pg. 34.

\(^{140}\) Army Doctrine Reference Publication, (ADRP) 3-0 Operations, 2016. Pg. 14

\(^{141}\) Ibid. Pg. 14

\(^{142}\) Ibid. Pg. 14
highly underestimated in warfare. As a result, there is a lack in merging military gains, which are imperative to reach strategic endstates.

Failure to account for sociocultural factors enabled conflict and instability in Vietnam to spiral out of control and prepped the U.S. for failure before they ever stepped foot on Vietnam.\textsuperscript{143} The Vietnam War came at a time when the Vietnamese people were searching for an identity following decolonization by the French.\textsuperscript{144} This was a time of transformation and struggle in every aspect of the Vietnamese society. This transformation and struggle came because of French colonization. Yet, before the Vietnam War and before colonization by the French, the Vietnamese people as a society were not known as conquerors, but instead, a people who could “resist and survive.”\textsuperscript{145} With French colonization, as with all French colonized countries, the French disregarded the society and culture while fiercely enforcing the French agenda. However, while the French toppled the state, they were never able to destroy “the confluence of ideas.”\textsuperscript{146} The Vietnamese ideologies were hardened which waged an inner conflict searching for the social identity and the correct form of state post-colonization and pre-Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{147}

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\textsuperscript{143} FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake. Little, Brown, and Company. Pg. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. Pg. 5.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. Pg. 8.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. Pg. 314.
\end{flushleft}
During the Vietnam War, Americans never realized their failures and continued to neglect understanding the sociocultural factors entrenched into Vietnamese culture and society. This included the true meaning of land, religion, and politics to the Vietnamese people. One of the greatest catastrophes was a strategically planned mass creation of refugees in an effort to overcome the communist expansion. The result was a mass separation of the Vietnamese people from their spiritual grounds passed from generation to generation. In Vietnamese society, owned land stands as “the place where people come together to worship the spirits” and “the source of life.” Citizenship to land is “personal and un-transferable” and without the land the Vietnamese people “were without social identity.” The land was the spirituality, the governing entity, and center of family for generation past, present, and future. The result of losing the land was a people who had their land, religion, and government ripped away from them with no regard.

To add fuel to fire, the conflict already raging within Vietnam was one highly misunderstood by Americans. American policy makers perceived the conflict as just another civil war between fractioned groups with different agendas. The conflict within Vietnam was one much more complex and attributed to “the whole structure of

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149 Ibid. Pg. 10.

150 Ibid. Pg. 10.


152 Ibid. Pg. 309.

society”. This structure of Vietnamese beliefs is ingrained and irreversible within the society. The structure was simple in nature, yet complex when interrupted. It included only “the family, the village, and the state”.154 Americans could not understand the unwillingness to coexist and meet in a middle ground. This was another critical fiasco in the overlooking of Vietnamese sociocultural factors, as Americans were blinded by their “pluralistic world” in which they were brought up in.155 Peace to the Vietnamese was achieved not through “compromise”, but instead by “restoration of a single, uniform way of life.”156

This literature review is only a snapshot of the failures to understand sociocultural factors in Vietnam which led to failure to consolidate military gains into political endstates. Yet, it lays out the importance of understanding the human domain, as “societies are circumscribed by culture.”157 Moreover, it resonates that wars are not won through weaponry alone, but through a “battle of wills”, to change human behavior. If the human domain which inhabits an area of intervention does not support the mission, insurgency is certain to arise. To change human behavior, consideration of sociocultural norms imbedded into the population’s beliefs help an operational approach in all commander’s operational frameworks. It is imperative to understand most interventions are host nation conflicts that the American people are supporting while simultaneously

154 Ibid. Pg. 15.
155 Ibid. Pg. 16.
looking to secure strategic interests. Occupations are not American wars, but instead the host nations way to democratic independence. Fear is and will always be a factor, which not only leads to wars, but keeps them ignited.

The Vietnam War is a solid example of not understanding social cultural dynamics and a fear of opposing political beliefs colliding in warfare. Paul Reynaud, vice-premier of France in 1953 stated, “The war must stop being a French war supported by Vietnam and become a Vietnamese war supported by France.”158 Today conflict, war, and intervention are fought with an intervening commander’s intent out of fear of loss of hegemony. Little regard goes to what the population needs to achieve stability and instead focus is on U.S. strategic interests. The tactical level of operations has the greatest effects within the human domain. While many SOF put sociocultural factors at the forefront, Coalition Forces (CF) become blinded by fighting a war and disregard populations at large as the enemy. The PMESII-PT can outline sociocultural factors as a framework to better enable all soldiers in all tactical, operational, and strategic strategies.

Current Methodology

The most current method to analyze the OE is PMESII-PT. PMESII-PT is an acronym that enables commanders to break down the OE into operational variables.159 Those operational variables are “political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT).”160 These

158 Paul Reynaud, vice-premier of France in 1953.
160 Ibid. Chapter 1, 1-10.
operational variables are closely interrelated, and when used correctly facilitate in the development of the commander’s Common Operating Picture (COP). ADRP 3-05 defines PMESII-PT as a core enabler for planners and commanders that uniquely facilitate SOF Partners. SOF Partners utilize PMESII-PT during FID operations, Stability Operations, Phase 0 (Shaping Operations), in the analysis of human behavior, and to develop, maintain, and fuse the civil COP.\textsuperscript{161}

DoD and SOF Partners at large utilize PMESII-PT. However, CA soldiers specialize through formal training in PMESII-PT area studies. This formal training has enhanced CA individual and collective capabilities to develop a deeper understanding of the OE through a political - military assessment of the operational variables.\textsuperscript{162} This political - military assessment of the operational variables is known as an area study and can be exercised in either offensive or defensive operations.

During offensive operations the mission is to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy decisively.”\textsuperscript{163} The secondary effort during offensive operations is “military – to - civilian contacts.”\textsuperscript{164} A major factor to support a PMESII-PT analysis is identifying the “Center of Gravity (COG) within the Area of Operation (AO) based on the civil component analysis.”\textsuperscript{165} In nearly every offensive operation, defensive operations will be a major factor as well. The mission of defensive operations

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{162} Field Manual (FM) 3-57 CA Operations, 2014.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. Chapter 3-86.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. Chapter 3-86.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. Chapter 3-86.
\end{flushright}
is to “defeat attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks”. There are multiple factors to support a PMESII-PT analysis in defensive operations. They include identifying and advising “culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO, COGs within the AO based on civil component analysis, gaining civil information to develop the civil component, and advising the commander regarding civilian movements. All of this can be achieved through a thorough area study utilizing PMESII-PT.

To further define PMESII-PT for a follow up discussion on the weaknesses within it and a suggested improvement to the method, a step by step break down of PMESII-PT is necessary.

It is as follows in Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Overall strategic political situation in the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political leadership and type of government within the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key aspects of the commander’s OE, such as political boundaries and centers of the Foreign Nation government, including strengths, weaknesses, role in society, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IGOs present in the AO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• CAO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces available in the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Potential influence of the military situation within the AO on the current mission requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effect of the current military situation on stability, government security, and the populace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Role of the military and, as applicable, paramilitary security forces in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degree to which indigenous security forces are resourced, accountable, and capable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166 Ibid. Chapter 3-87.
167 Ibid. Chapter 3-87.
- Level of border security.
- Degree of trust and cooperation between elements of the indigenous security apparatus.

**Economic**

- Strengths and weaknesses of the economic systems along with the HN’s plans for economic development.
- Economic goals and objectives affecting the military mission.
- Shortages affecting the operation or the commander’s ability to use FN supplies, including the ability of the FN to supply enough food to meet the need of the civil populace.
- Agricultural calendar, including harvest, planting, and spraying seasons.
- Economy fiscal calendar.

**Social**

- Current social climate in the AO.
- Key civilian communicators inside and outside the AO and their link to the population. The most important identifications are of various faction leaders in the population, including—
  - Figureheads.
  - Clerics.
- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) associated with the operation of critical civil infrastructure (water production and treatment, communications, electrical generation, transportation, health services, and so on).
- Role of religion in society and the various religious and fraternal groups.
- Key events that can affect the commander’s mission, such as elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time).

**Information**

- Status and ability to transmit and receive information within the AO.
- Legitimate government’s ability to inform its population.
- Locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies and programs in the AO (IGOs, NGOs, UNHCR, World Food Program [UN], OFDA, governing bodies, health services, judicial and law enforcement, and community organizations).

**Infrastructure**

- Civil infrastructure in the AO. The analyst concentrates on how the state of the infrastructure assists or hinders the commander’s mission.
- Condition and location of key structures including—
  - Government facilities.
  - Medical treatment facilities.
  - Cultural sites, such as monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so on.
- Facilities with practical applications, such as detention facilities and warehouses.
- Power generation and transmission facilities.
- Transportation grids and port, rail, and aerial facilities.
- Water purification and sewage treatment plants.
- Emergency management facilities, equipment, and response capabilities.
- Radio and television production and transmission facilities.
- Agricultural and mining regions and other significant geographic and economic features.

**Physical Environment**

- Man-made structures, particularly urban areas.
- Climate, weather, and significant reoccurring weather events (for example, floods).
- Topography.
- Hydrology.
- Environmental conditions and hazards.

**Time**

- Friendly forces.
- Adversary forces.
- Interagency timeline comparison.  

Figure 1.

Limited Results

Many scholars argue, as does this paper, that the social analysis is lacking in PMESII-PT to supply enough analysis. In addition to lacking to supply enough analysis, when it comes to an analysis in the social area of PMESII-PT, two things serve as facts. One, societies are an imperfect system and two, due to imperfection, conflict is a normal part of all societies.  

Restated from the introduction, a failure to truly understand sociocultural factors as part of an intervention or occupation will ultimately lead to a

168 Ibid. Chapter 4: 31-39

failure in consolidating political gains and result in further instability. Moreover, the
greatest failure in planning sociocultural factors, is the narrow linear focus of PMESII-
PT. In the greater planning efforts, the focus is significantly towards the enemy and
disregards the population at large while additionally lacking the “so what” or why the
information is important, overall. Consequently, the results are detrimental to the success
of the mission, as the “so what” of the OE is a priority to understand why the
environment is acting as it is.

In a PMESII-PT analysis, when the social area becomes a primary focus the lack
of depth shows its narrow linear approach. A more thorough and comprehensive look
into the social area of PMESII-PT would supply a more successful holistic strategy for
commanders in any area of operation. The result would be a greater understanding of the
why human behavior is, as it is. To do so, “PMESII-PT” must turn into a holistic
sociocultural analysis. The reason being, wars are not won on the battlefield alone and
the current method only delivers facts and lacks a “so what”. Wars are won by
understanding a populations psychological stance that drives the behavior, and the land in
which they are “innately tied to”.

If conducted correctly an intervening nation can build trust within that society and
then undermine enemy forces that have become experts in blending in and exploiting that
same population through insurgencies and Irregular Warfare (IW). Therefore, successful
warfare results from thorough understanding of a societies psychology and culture

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combined. With that, PMESII-PT methods require improvement and is necessary for success.

Redefining the PMESII-Pt Methodology

PMESII-PT is only a linear macro social analysis at best. To become more thorough, Elwell said, “sociocultural systems consist of three types of phenomena: material, structural, and ideational”.171 His theory, combined with actions, beliefs, and desires of a population center develops an in-depth holistic sociocultural analysis. The holistic analysis will need to look at “readily observable materials”, “human groups and organizations”, and “values, norms, ideologies, religious beliefs, and other symbolic items” as well.172 Redefining PMESII-PT must take the linear look and then further drill down into a holistic approach through a narrative.

At times, a crosswalk of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) merge to conduct a linear micro analysis. Yet, it is still insufficient for understanding a society and its culture in-depth. In the social analysis of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE a crosswalk would begin with showing the social area, followed by the social structure, social capability, social organizations, social people, and social events. During the study, a linear narrow look is achieved leaving numerous underlying factors hidden.


172 Ibid, Pg. 13.
In addition to only a linear narrow view of the social aspect of the PMESII-PT methodology it is argued that only the “what” is answered leaving the “why” uncovered. Therefore, it becomes transparent that the “why” or “so what” is necessary in the analysis as well. Below is a proposed framework to use during future analysis of a conflict area for an in-depth and holistic sociocultural analysis. It serves as an alternative to looking at the narrow linear view of social area, structure, capability, organizations, people, events only.

The more in-depth holistic approach requires much more research and analysis by creating a running estimate in a linear fashion and continues to utilize ASCOPE cross-walked with Social, Technology and Material Culture, Racial, Influential Power Groups, Cultural, Taboos, Ethnic, Rituals, Influential Power groups, Family Structure, and Values (STRICTER-FV). However, to be complete the above requires the creation of a narrative that is the “so what”.

It as is follows in Figure 2.

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Previously, the analytical results were limited to a linear result of current social climate, key civilian communicators inside and outside with their link to the population, figureheads, clerics, subject matter experts in infrastructure, role of religion and various groups, and events that affect the commander’s mission, such as elections, school events, fiscal schedules, and holidays. This approach serves as a broad overview but visually lacks enough information, which is critical to a policymaker’s or commander’s decision-making process.

With the STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE crosswalk, executive and congressional policymakers and DoD commanders will have an adequate amount of information in what developed the sociocultural dynamics of a population center. Thus, the analysis becomes a more comprehensive approach and developed further upon the completion of a narrative. Accordingly, the above policymakers and DoD commanders will make better informed decisions on how to conduct an occupation and why it is important to do so. More importantly and restated, while the new method begins with a linear approach it must
Robert Tomes said, “although linear methodologies of defining an environment may capture the “knowing” aspects of the system, observers must ascertain a deeper understanding beyond facts to truly find “meaning” in their observations.” With this, step one of the STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE approach only serves as a fact-finding method. Step two is organizing those facts and answering why it is important in a narrative. Additionally, executive leadership, congressional policymakers, and DoD commanders serve under various time constraints and as a result must have a bottom-line up front that can gain and hold their attention throughout an analysis of this depth. The bottom-line up front serves to gain and keep the attention for the duration of the analysis. The “so what” concludes the analysis. In doing so, the above leaders stay engaged throughout, waiting for the end results.

Discussion

Put into full motion the STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE narrative method plugs many information gaps. In the current linear method of the PMESII-PT / ASCOPE method there is evidence showing a lack of successes. The success rate overall of policymakers preparing for conflicts is mixed to say the least. Many experts have concluded that the current methodology is “no longer sufficient when it comes to prevailing in identity-

\[174\] Tomes, Robert R. "Toward A Smarter Military Socio-Cultural Intelligence and National Security." Pg. 54.

related, ideological conflicts of the future.”176 And so, the more holistic approach towards the sociocultural factors is necessary to be effective with future operating environments.

PMESII-PT not only serves as an approach which is too narrow but is also to linear obstructing true creativity. The comprehensive approach can more thoroughly outline underlying issues within an OE. It does so by creating a narrative from the linear method and answering the “why” or “so what”. With a narrative, one can better determine, “authentic feelings, beliefs, and actions and ultimately a more authentic sense of life” which drives population centers to act as they do.177 Tomes states that, “users of PMESII-PT are inundated with apparent casual relationships that may or may not indicate the root cause of a problem within the environment.”178 By not filling these gaps correctly, “analysts using PMESII-PT may then attribute militia activity to an incorrect cause and consequently misinform actions.”179

Today, IW complicates the OE. Thus, the enemy has become an expert at blending into population centers. Many times, those enemies are foreign fighters. Those foreign fighters who return home pose the added risk of creating more instability within their homes upon their return. This is done through the “sharing of their experiences,

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176 Tomes, Robert R. "Toward A Smarter Military Socio-Cultural Intelligence and National Security." Pg. 52.


178 Tomes, Robert R. "Toward A Smarter Military Socio-Cultural Intelligence and National Security." Pg. 52.

179 Ibid, Pg. 52.
their promotion of the ideology, and their proliferation of IW tactics.”180 With the enemies’ ability to use UW and IW by blending into populations it is necessary to have a holistic understanding of the environment as the CF is working to undermine the instability efforts which are at hand.

Another issue is that CF are seen as an occupying force that looks to undermine and destroy the national identity and culture embedded into a society. Enemy forces, foreign or domestic, will use tactics to exploit weakness in those CF and make their own military and political gains. Those weaknesses are typically a disregard to the populations and the true underlying issues within them. James Wright said with a combination of “protractedness, IW, and ideological motivation – one can more precisely examine military effectiveness within a specific context.”181 Nonetheless, military effectiveness ultimately lies in the effective understanding of sociocultural factors and why population centers are driven to act, as they do.

Conclusion

Today’s underestimated sociocultural factors lead to occupations such as the “Long War” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Policymakers and planners today historically do not consider sociocultural factors and lack a true understanding of what type of war they are going to be fighting before they arrive. One of the greatest failures in understanding


what type of war they are going into is a lack of understanding the “why” or “so what” of the OE.

The Vietnam War served as a concrete example of how fear led the U.S. into a war without understanding or caring about the OE, they were intervening in. With this, the “why” or “so what” was missing leading to a catastrophic failure within the understanding of that OE. The “why” or “so what” was the sociocultural dynamics embedded into that population for centuries and the decades of abuse thru French colonization.

As a result of decades of misunderstanding sociocultural factors, the U.S. must take a more comprehensive approach to understanding population centers. Failure to follow a more comprehensive approach leads to risks and future catastrophic loss to the U.S. position as the world’s greatest superpower. This is even more prevalent as there are continued studies of deteriorations in peacefulness in all three GPI domains. With the fact that nations continue to deteriorate, the U.S. must be careful not to over extend its combat power.

Peace and stability cannot materialize without a keen understanding of sociocultural factors where an intervention or occupation takes place. In all warfare political factors are at stake. Nations are looking to achieve their own interests and various sociocultural factors are at play, which degrade or improve the ability to be successful.

To be successful in understanding sociocultural factors the PMESII-PT – ASCOPE methodology can be improved by digging deeper into the social area and
combining it with cultural factors. This can be completed by using the STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE methodology. The STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE methodology outlines linear facts followed by a narrative combination of the facts, with a so what. If time is taken and the methodology is completed correctly this paper argues peace and stability during an occupation can be achieved. If not, it is only a matter of time before the U.S. losses the seat as the world’s greatest superpower.
CHAPTER III: IS DEMOCRATIZATION THE ANSWER
Introduction

U.S. democratization is a new concept and policy. As a fact, it is only a little more than 100 years in progress. U.S. democratization began at the onset of World War I in 1917 when President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the U.S. would enter the war with the endstate to “make the world safe for democracy.”182 President Woodrow Wilson viewed himself as the enforcer of this new world order concept. He began implementing progressive reform and asserted international influence in the attempt to look out for the general interests of the U.S. people.183 And thus, the political agenda of democratization began in U.S. political goals. U.S. as a democratic run institution is not much more mature itself in its progression.

Research indicates 34% of democracies since 2014 have deteriorated.184 Furthermore, since 2006 democracy advancement worldwide has stagnated.185 The result has been named the global “democratic recession.”186 Even though quantitative and qualitative data identifies the democratic recession, U.S. foreign policy continues to stand and carry out its democratization agenda worldwide. An ongoing argument exists of should this U.S. policy continue and is democratization sustainable. One way to conduct


183 Ibid.


democratization is through military intervention. This form of democracy promotion characterizes as “democracy imposition, with military force”. Consequently, arguments support that democracy imposition, with military force continues to prolong conflict, creates political violence, civil wars, and insurgencies. This chapter argues that democratization by way of military force, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, to name a few, is flawed and must take on a historical approach to achieve stability.

Historically, the U.S. was not a democracy in the inception of 1776, but instead democratic governance was introduced in July of 1788 after the Constitution was ratified. George Washington peacefully transitioned at the end of his term, which earmarked a moment of success for a democratically run governmental institution for the U.S... The significance is that democratically ran institutions did not take place over night for the U.S... For fact, it took 12 years after gaining independence just to take the first step towards a true democratic government in the U.S... The reason this is important is that the U.S. government has implemented policy of democratization worldwide. The dispute is that continued policy of democratization faces significant challenges, which has resulted in ongoing conflict worldwide in addition to once solidified democratic governments backsliding to other forms of government. Statistically, 29% of democracies since 2014 have broken down and when influenced by nonwestern

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democracies, the statistic rises to 34%. This develops the question of, “is democratization the answer”.

Looking further into U.S. history, the U.S. as a democratic government institution has undergone continuous challenges since the Constitution ratified and is not without innumerable blemishes and embarrassments throughout history. Examples include the facts that a little over two hundred years ago, the U.S. ordained the largest genocide known to humanity, and supported and spread slavery, racism, and sexism. In addition, the ongoing bi-partisan system lacks the ability to compromise on anything due to personal hatred of the other sides view. The point being and argument, democratic progress takes time and is imperfect. With that, even the best-known democracies in the world are not without a decline or on a sliding scale. However, with consistent progress the U.S. has maintained liberty and provided security while continuing to improve equality for the civil populace. But, even today there is much work to complete.

While democracy has maintained in the U.S., international relations and political science scholars around the world continue to debate the question of, “is democratization the answer.” This is an interesting question, as on one end of the argument scholars recite statistics and deliver quantitative data that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another and use cases such as Germany and Japan to offer case and point references to the success of democratization after totalitarian and authoritarian rule has been overthrown. As a result, the argument supports democratization has a duty to endure in U.S. political goals. On the other end of the argument, scholars argue

\[189\] Ibid. Pg. 102.

This chapter dives into the theory and conventional wisdom of democratization with the intent to determine if the U.S. should maintain the political approach of democratization and determine the sustainability after democratic transitions. This will further determine the effects of democratization on a nation state and introduce solutions to degrade the potential for political violence, civil war, and insurgencies. This paper could find that democratization is not the answer but understands the U.S. policy of democratization will not likely cease to exist. As a result, the U.S. must find new methods to implement democratization as it continues to intervene or occupy countries using nation building and warfare. Arguments will not cease to exist that democracy overall, is in decline. Two specific examples to support the argument can be attributed to Venezuela’s and Russia’s descent back into an autocracy.\footnote{Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F. and Rice, Condoleezza. Democracy in Decline? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. \url{https://muse.jhu.edu/} Pg. 4.} This important topic of discussion amongst scholars will facilitate in answering the above question in anticipation of understanding, is U.S. nation building and democratization more destructive to a once run autocracy than beneficial.
Democratization Conventional Wisdom

Conventional wisdom argues three key points in democratization. First, “the principal challenges to the building of peace and democracy are essentially rational and structural”. The theory is that a solidified governmental structure with laws, rules, and norms will supply checks and balances and drive functional elected democratic government institutions. Next, “conventional democracy-promotion and good-governance programs are typically rooted in Western liberal-democratic principles that stress the competitive dimension of democratic societies.” Meaning, open dialogue of what the people need and want through a multi-party system provides competition but through a means that reduces the potential of violence with being heard without fear of repercussion. Lastly, “traditional approaches to peace and democracy-building take, as an article of faith, that moral and political pressure, combined with the threat of legal sanctions, is the most effective means of deterring bad behavior.” Essentially, those who are committing violence within an authoritarian government would not do so under a democratic government for fear of being brought in front of international criminal tribunals.

There is one large problem within the conventional wisdom. The problem is that the people must accept democratization first. Democracies do allow for competition but require competitive cooperation amongst the civil populace to be successful and

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193 Ibid. Pg. 138.

194 Ibid. Pg. 139.
sustainable. As a result, this then turns into the question of Chapter II of this thesis portfolio when it comes to interventions and occupations, “Does Failing to Understand Sociocultural Factors Result in a Failure to Achieve Peace and Stability During an Occupation?” As concluded in Chapter II, underestimated sociocultural factors degrade the ability to be successful in warfare. Therefore, the first question to ask before democratization begins, should be, will the sociocultural factors support or degrade the sustainability of democratization. In addition, sociocultural factors include the values of the civil populace. The fact is, as in the case of Afghanistan, societies are at times completely divided within the nation-state itself. This means at times; community ties are stronger than national identity, and as a result community ties will dominate national identity leading to political violence, civil war, and insurgencies. As said in chapter II, “borders are nothing but arbitrary lines where many different ideologies merge”.

Imperatives of Sustainable Democratization

Wolpe and Mcdonald argued four imperatives of sustainable democratization. One, “a way must be found to transform the pervasive zero-sum, winner-take-all mentality that is both the cause and the product of conflict.”195 In essence, even though democratic societies are divided, leaders must put aside personal issues with one another and seek out the common interests for the common good. The issue here, is that in many cases of middle eastern and Asian nations there is a lack of deterrence of secular divide for the common interests of the people. This is much more of an ideology issue, deep rooted in the values of the people. The only way to sustain democratization in this case is

to not hold elections in the beginning but instead occupy and mediate the common interests for the common good from an unbiased party. Political scientist Mark Peceny said: “In by far the most successful application of this policy (democratization), U.S. occupation governments transformed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan into liberal democratic allies in the wake of WWII.” This was not done through holding democratic elections and introducing a new democratic constitution, as was stated throughout Chapter I of this thesis portfolio. Instead, the successful democratization of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan began through an intense occupation. An intense occupation controlled and implemented government and governance through DoD SMEs. DoD SMEs exterminated imperialist and Nazi ideologies, put rule of law into practice, secured the populace, and restored essential services. The above findings support Chapter I and determines Japan and Germany should serve as a guide in how to conduct democratization through occupations.

In addition to the above findings, Wolpe and Mcdonald argue “the relationships and trust among key leaders that have been fractured by their conflict must be restored.” This task is challenging and is seen in, to name a few, Mali, Rwanda, Iraq, and even Ukraine. Relationships fractured are those typically fractured from ethnic divide and led to economic divide creating the us against them mentality. Consequently, the continued result is civil war. To degrade ethnic divide there are multiple factors to focus on. They include answering legitimate grievances and protecting human rights,

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environmental conditions, secularization, territory, and the capability to communicate. In order to complete this challenging task mediation is a must and that mediation must come in the form of a leader in a neutral and unbiased capacity.

Next, “a new consensus must be forged among key leaders on ‘the rules of the game’, e.g., on how power will be shared and organized, and how decisions will be made.” Lacking the ability as leaders to create, agree on, and follow the rules that support the populace will quickly lead to political unrest and eventually an insurgency, civil war, or a coup d’état. A thoroughly developed constitution and Bill of Rights supports ‘the rules of the game’. They allow a once divided populace, validation that all citizens of the nation are equal. Stephen Breyer in “Making our Democracy Work” stated, “Maintaining public acceptance requires a Constitution that works well for the people today”.

Continuing, “the leaders of the formerly belligerent parties need to learn (or relearn) how to hear each other’s concerns and how to express their own views in ways that encourage a search for common ground and for solutions, rather than invite further confrontation and endless blame-throwing.” This area is summed up to the ability to negotiate and communicate without a narrow self-interest. The challenge is that during

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201 Ibid. Pg. 140.
current attempts of democratization the hierarchal systems are still at play and typically
the presidency, congress, and highest of political positions are immovable on position and
agenda through the elitists positions held. This is a current and ongoing problem within
the U.S. as a democratic government itself, which has been determined to be in decline in
the most powerful of democracies known to the world. Namely, this is the rigid stances
between originalist and progressives. This solidifies the need of a judiciary that can use
some subjectivity in determining the facts of a Constitution to protect personal liberties
through mediated and workable democratic solutions.

Current conventional wisdom and imperatives are flawed. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed on seven variables for sustainable democratization.
The seven variables include accountability, effectiveness, political stability and absence
of violence, democratic control of Armed Forces, corruption control, Rule of Law, and
mutual beneficial regional security frameworks.\textsuperscript{202} The primary objective of effective
post-conflict governance is securing and stabilizing the population. Securing and
stabilizing the population takes intense crisis management as interventions and occupied
states are those that have inherent divides amongst the populations. Securing and
stabilizing the population is identified but lacks depth. Entrenched inherent divides
develop from a long history of ethnic and religious disputes. Sustainable democratization
disregards the single most influential factor. The single most influential factor is the
sociocultural values that drive the beliefs of a population. As a result, conventional

\textsuperscript{202} Belardetti, Giuseppe. "NATO’s Role in Democratization Processes: Lesson Learned and Way
wisdom and imperatives in democratization are on the right track but lack the foundation to support sustainability.

Ineffective Democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan

There are conventional wisdom constants in effective democratization. They are identified as the “stages of democratization.”\textsuperscript{203} The stages of democratization include “preparation, liberalization, transition, crisis, re-equilibration or breakdown, legitimation, consolidation, deepening, and improving quality and survival.”\textsuperscript{204} Coppedge breaks these constants down into three distinct phases, to include “preparation, transition, and survival” for simplicity.\textsuperscript{205} He underlined these phases by “culture and leadership, economy and society, the state and institutions, and international influences.”\textsuperscript{206}

With Iraq, the Council on Foreign Relations named six reasons that justified the invasion. They included, “the possession of WMDs; the threat Saddam posed to the Middle East; Iraq’s links to al Qaeda; Saddam’s harsh treatment of the Iraqi people; Iraq’s lack of democracy; and the example a free and democratic Iraq would set for authoritarian regimes in the region.”\textsuperscript{207} This plan was not supported like the intervention into Afghanistan by allies. There was much criticism upon the entry into this sovereign


\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. Pg. 78.

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. Pg. 78.

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. Pg. 79.

\textsuperscript{207} "Iraq: Justifying the War." Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-justifying-war.
autocracy. Nevertheless, through military intervention the U.S. put boots on the ground and toppled the regime.

Larry Diamond discussed necessary political and societal changes for Iraq. He outlined the need to bring back basic services, repair infrastructure, get the people back to work, and rid the fear, distrust, and brutal dominance held over the population. In addition, programs to train, assist, and protect citizen interests and democratic education was to rebuild the communities. Unfortunately, he does not identify the importance of understanding the population and security issues posed for the DoD. Not including the fact, it took the U.S. one-year post-invasion to operationalize democratization efforts.

Following the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi civil populace received the U.S. military with open arms and minimal fighting took place during the invasion. However, the U.S. did not operationalize democratization strategies and requirements and an insurgency began with a lack of security and governance. A political vacuum developed and by the end of 2004, a full insurgency began, to include the rise of the Islamic State (IS), which continued to grow into today’s most dangerous worldwide radical Islamist organization, known as ISIS. The rise of insurgency was due to the lack of an effective government structure and governance support to the civil populace. Without government and governance, Salafi-jihadist ideology spread across Iraq and the insurgency grew rapidly.

The U.S. never planned on an occupation of Iraq. Due to this, there was no preparation for effective democratization. Preparation would have illuminated a better


209 Ibid. Pg. 10.
understanding of the political and sociocultural factors of Iraq, as it began to secure the population. This includes understanding the importance and challenges of religion imbedded in the region, nation, and people. Not planning for an occupation in Iraq left the U.S. ill prepared for operationalizing democratization. In the beginning the U.S. focused solely on massing effective combat power to topple the Baathist Party and kill or capture Saddam Hussain solely. Iraq may have served as a model for a successful democratization if there was a keen understanding of the sociocultural factors imbedded into Iraqis preintervention. A keen understanding coupled with standing up WWII like post-conflict governance, essential services, and security following the fall of Saddam would have decreased the probability of the rise of the Islamic State. This requires a well formulated pre-invasion plan ready to implement directly following the “shock and awe” and fall of Saddam. Unfortunately, the world only saw a shock and awe.

For Afghanistan, the U.S. neglected to account for one standing factor within the civil populace. That factor goes all the way back to Alexis De Tocqueville findings. Tocqueville found “the gradual decay of religious faith” as a determining factor to set up democratic liberty.\(^{210}\) This does not mean becoming a nation not founded in religious faith but instead being secular in nature and separating church and state. Unfortunately, the U.S. disregarded religion and ideology during the intervention and occupation into Afghanistan. The result is the lack of support from Afghans, as religion is deep rooted in Afghan political decisions and the values and beliefs of the civil populace.

\(^{210}\) Tocqueville, Alexis De. Democracy in America, Volume I and II. Pg. 171.
In Afghanistan, ideological differences towards democratic governance verses Sharia Law and environmental conditions, to include terrain, serve as key factors in the lack of consolidating military gains to further democratization. Research from the University of Chicago found three factors directly undermining conditions that would have made a democracy sustainable in Afghanistan. One, there must be an acceptance of democratic rights. The fact is democratic rights in Afghanistan are inexistent and plagued by corruption even if a democracy on paper. Two, the populace must be able to govern themselves through regular elections. Afghanistan is highly tribal in divided regions where tribal leaders uphold and managed government and governance at a village level. Three, there is a state a law in which all authorities adhere to. The issue here is that Sharia Law and the increase of Salafism drives strict beliefs and values that develop ideologies rejecting acceptance of western culture or democratic governance. Sharia Law and the increase of Salafi jihadists additionally promotes a purification of the outside world.

Ideological differences complicated with environmental conditions cut many Afghans off from larger populated societies willing to accept westernization or democratic governance. As a result, the only state of law adhered to is that of tribal and religious beliefs outside of highly dense populations. In Afghanistan, there is a border with a ‘democratic government’, but the environment segregates the populations making


212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.
security impossible. Terrain and environmental conditions additionally obstructed the ability to supply essential services, maintain accountability of corrupt authorities, and bring the people together under a uniting national identity. Due to the above, Afghans result back to religion, the Talban, and Sharia Law as the single governing law to abide to. This additionally results in a lack of national identity and develops the national religious Islamic identity.

The Enemy of Democratization

Failures in democratization are much more than a lack of consolidating political gains from tactical successes and failures in identifying sociocultural factors. Other factors include blatant attempts to undermine democratization. The greatest enemies to democratization are China, Russia, and illiberal democracies. To simply answer “why” they are the enemy; China, Russia, and illiberal democracies view the weakening of democratic foundations as a means of increasing or developing their individual state standing.214

Two of the primary enemies of democratization (China and Russia) have combined powers through consistent cooperation in addition to joining military forces as staunch allies. China and Russia sought to exemplify their presence and relationship on the world stage by conducting the largest military exercise jointly since the Cold War in

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September of 2018. This was a clear message that western democratic influence is on the attack and China and Russia are leading the offensive.

Beyond multilateral cooperation and military exercises, the revisionist authoritarian regimes of China and Russia are using another major tactic. That tactic is diaspora influence. Russia today counts approximately 30 million Russian speakers outside their borders while China’s diaspora numbers reach upward to 60 million.

The goal of China according to research completed by Timothy Heath’s findings in the United Front Department Research Office is to “safeguard the state’s core interests, maintain the long-term stability of Hong Kong and Macao and complete the unification of the motherland.” These goals send a different message than that of Russia. China looks to extend influence to support and continue the country’s economic development. The endstate is to be the global leader with maximum global influence. How better to do so than by embedding millions of Chinese across the world to extend the Chinese influence and reunite the citizens who had fled under other conditions. This is not a goal to take land but instead to gain the greatest economic capability worldwide.

Russia on the other hand maintains a different objective. The objective rests in the ability to regain territory and dominance throughout eastern Europe for economic improvement. The Balkans, Ukraine, Crimea, Moldova, Poland, and the rest of eastern


217 Ibid.
Europe are just the beginning of Russian influence. Russia has infiltrated eastern Europe with ethnic Russians. As seen in Crimea, ethnic Russian populations threw up snap elections to undermine the legitimate government and led to the annexation of Crimea. Crimea was the primary target of Russia as it delivered a strategic position for their Naval forces to control the Black Sea and most of the Mediterranean. Russia continues to struggle economically, but if it can “reunite” the Soviet Union, the economic capability will revive Russia’s power and dominance to move into central and western Europe.

Bottom line, China must keep over $12 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or it faces definite collapse. Russia must increase its $1.5 trillion GDP, or it risks failing as a nation. While China and Russia focus on influence and information operations, ignoring the dangers of their militaries displays a lack of readiness. With that, even though Russia, as an economic power is insignificant, the nuclear capabilities and hybrid warfare aggression and the buildup of Chinese military bases coupled with their economic capabilities pose a direct threat to U.S. national security.

Russia currently uses influence and information operations combined with conventional methods known as hybrid warfare, as their own form of ‘democratization’. The above research describes Russia’s democratization tactics as throwing up “legitimate” elections to gain territory. If the U.S. or NATO steps in, Russia and illiberal democracies will quickly portray the U.S. and NATO as hypocrites who undermine their own democratic values, laws, and norms. This is how Russia continues to undermine democracy in eastern Europe. Russia is using coercion and subversion tactics to

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destabilize the region so they can gain control to increase their economic capability. Consequently, if the U.S. or NATO was to respond militarily, China would quickly back Russia drawing on the dangerous potential of World War III.

Discussion

Democratization is a complex solution to even more complex issues. Moreover, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) further the complexity with prevailing economies combined with questionable slippage back to or continued authoritarian and revisionist state institutions. The BRIC are projected to hold and be the four most dominate economic powers by 2050. Not coincidentally, these countries known as the BRIC have increased political cooperation to embrace capitalism. This generates concern for the rise of authoritarian capitalism with the continuous decrease in democratic capitalism. These countries and more specifically Russia and China continue to lead assertive investments in foreign countries that many times look past human rights violations and rule of law. The result is organizational powers, making competitive authoritarian regimes, as seen across the continent of Africa. Bogaards and Elischer describe outside influence as a dark element putting democracy at risk if not confronted. They conclude without outside influence democratization cannot exist. The result is authoritarianism developed from organizational power. They additionally conclude that when there are both factors of democratic influence and organizational


220 Ibid. Pg. 28.

power a struggle will develop.\textsuperscript{222} This supports the argument from above that democratization develops a greater possibility for political violence, civil wars, and insurgencies.

Democratic states offer the greatest venue for political violence, civil wars, and insurgencies, as they additionally offer the greatest venue of rights to speak up without fear of reprisal. Sun-Chul Kim points out in “Democratization and Social Movements in South Korea: Defiant Institutionalization” that “there is nothing strange about increased protest and social movement activities after democratic transition” and in fact “democratization facilitates social movement activities”.\textsuperscript{223}

Studies support successful democratic transition from the uprising of social movements. However, there is a lack of data finding uprisings during democratic transition and the violent aftermath of said uprisings. This brings up a powerful question. Were the insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam a result of ill preparation and lack of understanding sociocultural factors or a result of unwanted democratic transitions? In the case of forced democratic transitions it would seem to fit as a conceivable effect.

Kim additionally said, “the increase of social movement activities does not necessarily result in greater instability and disorder”.\textsuperscript{224} But, Kim does not reject and systematically accepts the theory that democratization at times does result in greater

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid. Pg. 8.

\textsuperscript{223} Kim, Sun-Chul. Democratization and Social Movements in South Korea: Defiant Institutionalization. London: Routledge, 2016. Pg. 2.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. Pg. 4.
instability and disorder. In fact, Kim along with other scholars argue a process is needed to institutionalize cooptation, professionalization, and bureaucratization in an effort to create collective action towards rules, procedures, and norms.\footnote{Ibid. Pg. 4.} Unfortunately, the key to institutionalization is willingness by the civil populace to accept the terms of a democratic transition and the rules, procedures, and norms that come with it. Kim solidifies this argument by stating “democratic change, or any kind of movement success, represents a compromise between political challengers and rulers.”\footnote{Ibid. Pg. 4.} For that reason, any form of successful government is a result of the acceptance of the type of government by the civil populace through the willingness to compromise.

Now, when it comes to democracy imposition by force, history reveals that the U.S. is nothing less than unsuccessful post occupations of WWII. Foreign Policy published a thought-provoking article named “Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries” by Stephen Walt. Walt outlines three failures of democracy imposition. They are as follows:

Stephen Walt said, “First, successful liberal orders depend on a lot more than a written constitution or elections: They usually require an effective legal system, a broad commitment to pluralism, a decent level of income and education, and widespread confidence that political groups which lose out in a particular election have a decent chance of doing better in the future and thus an incentive to keep working within the system.

Second, using force to spread democracy almost always triggers violent resistance. Nationalism and other forms of local identity remain powerful features of today’s world, and most people dislike following orders from well-armed foreign occupiers. Moreover, groups that have lost
power, wealth, or status in the course of a democratic transition (such as Sunnis in post-Saddam Iraq) will inevitably be tempted to take up arms in opposition, and neighboring states whose interests are adversely affected by a transition may try to stop or reverse it.

Third, foreign occupiers rarely know enough to pick the right local people to put in charge, and even generous and well-intentioned efforts to aid the new government tend to fuel corruption and distort local politics in unpredictable ways.227

Accordingly, if democracy imposition maintains these critical structural flaws a framework or methodology can be developed based off the standing factors. To support successful democratization in all cases, by way of partner nation building or an occupation, consideration of specified variables is critical.

The first critical variable or structure in addition to a constitution and elections, is a nonbiased legal system or judiciary must mediate grievances and enforce laws to promote pluralism within the divided population. In doing so confidence of a legitimatized governing body will develop amongst the population. In addition to a legal system essential services must meet the acceptable living standards of the population. This is dependent of the historic living standards but increasing that standard even slightly will support economic development and boost credibility of the government and the will of the population. Conversely, essential services and living standards are a double-edged sword. If essential services and living standards are rapidly increased dependency on an unsustainable standard develops. This further confirms the argument

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227 Walt, Stephen M. “Why is America so Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2016.
of understanding sociocultural factors are of the utmost importance preoccupation or in nation building.

Next, democracy building did not trigger violence in the case of Germany or Japan. Above, Walt assumes triggered violence based from states engulfed by terrorist activities and substandard living conditions. However, in both Germany and Japan strategic planning for democratization enabled reestablished government and governance promptly. The leading efforts required extensive administrative control, ran by the military, with a slow transition back to German and Japanese institutions. As a result, facts and lessons learned in the cases of Germany and Japan discredits Walt’s argument. Regardless, what is known is that extensive administrative control, ran by the military, with an eventual transition back to civilian institutions is a necessary in occupations.

Subsequently, is the factor of ill planned leader emplacement. Ill planned leader emplacement for both Afghanistan and Iraq led to insurgencies. A structure to follow returns to the above answer. Extensive control in the beginning will reduce the chance of ill planned leader emplacement. The U.S. during the reconstruction of Germany controlled the government, governors, and governance fiercely while destroying any residual Nazi ideologies. With the above supporting information, the U.S. proper successful methods of democracy imposition are through extensive administrative control, ran by the military, with a slow transition back to restructured, closely monitored, and validated host nation institutions. This develops the question of, when is transition ready and how is that government continuedly measured over time.

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Suggested Methodology

Throughout this chapter of the thesis several factors stand out. The first being time. Another factor includes measurements of democracy are on a constant sliding scale between “democracy and autocracy”. This develops the need for a percentage-based scale measured over time. Figure 3 serves as an example scale for ease of use that depicts percentage-based measurements for worldwide use.

This method allows for a straightforward depiction of where each nation stands over time. But it does not depict the primary indicators that quantify percentage-based findings. For this reason, a second scale will break down primary indicators of a constitutional democracy. The Center of Civic Education broke down a constitutional democracy into four primary indicators. They include a “constitutional government, protection of individual freedoms and personal freedom, legal and judicial protection, and distributive justice”.229

The above primary indicators further break down into subcategories. To accurately weigh each category the value of 100 enables quantifiable data of each individual main category. Dividing the main category by the number of subcategories determines the weight factor. For example: main category divided by number of

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subcategories equals the weight factor \( \frac{100}{8} = 12.5 \). Dividing the first example by eight subcategories generates a weight factor of 12.5. If there are 16 subcategories it would be as follows \( \frac{100}{16} = 6.25 \) giving each subcategory a weight factor of 6.25. The subcategories are then determined if they exist within the government or not. If it does, the mathematical weight factor develops. If not, a weight factor of zero is the result.

Next, adding weight factors determines the primary indicator weight factor. For example: if six subcategories of eight are determined to be in place of the government the main category weight factor would be 62.5 or \( 12.5 \times 6 = 62.5 \). The primary indicator is 25% of the total weight factor towards a true constitutional democracy. For example: since there are four primary indicators they are totaled for a sum. Dividing that sum by four determines the final democracy percentage. For example: \( 62.5 + 87.5 + 72.8 + 100 = 322.8 \) \( \frac{322.8}{4} = 80.7 \). The final democracy percentage is 80.7%. Figure 4 displays an effective constitutional democracy and Figure 5 displays an autocracy. Measuring these factors annually finds what the constitutional democracy percentage is of a country. Finally, using a democratic index determines how each country compares to one another. See figure 6.

Picking the countries in Figure 6 was deliberate. The countries include Japan, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Korea, Syria, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Yemen. What is interesting is the preparation and training that was in place during each occupation. In the case of Japan, Germany, Italy, Panama, and Korea there were in depth plans in place to control the government by military intervention and implement new democratic methods of government. Panama stands out slightly different
due to a lack of a developed military capability “to conduct governance-related tasks”.230
This led to ad hoc operations to fill the gap. Looking at the Dominican Republic, Iraq, Vietnam, Yemen, Libya, and Syria two failures clearly existed. The failure in capabilities to conduct governance-related tasks and the failure to plan to understand the sociocultural dynamics linked the outcome of those countries.

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Figure 6
Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter first looked at the history of the U.S. as a democracy and the onset of democratization. It expressed that the U.S. is a young democracy itself. In addition, it affirmed that the political agenda of democratization is immature at barely 100 years in progress. Moreover, it expounds on the fact the democratization does not happen overnight. It takes time and is a progressive form of government. With that, while democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, an autocracy transitioning to democracy is vulnerable to political violence, civil war, and insurgencies.

This chapter then discussed democratization conventional wisdom. Findings included democratization conventional wisdom is flawed. Conventional wisdom in short, states democratization challenges are rational and structural, democratization is rooted in Western liberal-democratic principles, and political pressure and legal sanctions are the most effective means of deterring unruly behavior. Consequently, the critical flaw in conventional wisdom is that the civil populace must accept democratization first and foremost. Therefore, the first question to ask before democratization begins is; will sociocultural factors support or degrade the change to and sustainability of democratization. Populations, such as the hundreds of different tribes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, divides the nation-state within itself making community ties stronger than national identity. The result is that community ties will dominate national identity causing political violence, civil war, and insurgencies.

Following, this chapter discussed imperatives of sustainable democratization and weaknesses of the argument. Imperatives include; differences must be set aside for the common interests and common good of the people. To achieve this, it is imperative that
healing of formerly broken relationships takes place. Once the above has been rectified, rules must be put in place to protect organizational decisions and how they will be made. Finally, it is imperative to understand that differences will exist even after the above is complete. Articulation of those differences is political and care not to demean the other sides opinion is critical. However, typically there are historical divides entrenched in a long history of ethnic and religious disputes, which will continually challenge the above imperatives. This chapter used case and point data from Afghanistan and Iraq to support pinpointing these weaknesses. Afghanistan and Iraq both show a telling story of secular and ethnic divide which resulted in insurgencies and pushback of western liberal democracy ideas.

After that, this chapter discussed the enemy of democratization, being the current threat of China, Russia, and illiberal democracy agendas. It was determined that China looks to extend influence to continue the country’s economic development and undermine democratic institutions. It was additionally determined that Russia is looking to extend influence to regain lost territory of the Soviet Bloc and regain a foothold as a world superpower. Finally, it was determined that both China and Russia are using a tactic of diaspora influence to increase their influence outside of their borders.

In discussion, predictions of the BRIC, all autocracies, will dominate economic powers by 2050. Achieving his is through authoritarian capitalism. Neglect to account for human rights violations and rule of law is enabling the spread of authoritarian capitalism. Unfortunately, conclusions state without outside influence democratization will not exist and autocracy is the proven replacement. In addition, when there is an organizational power influencing a country that is under democratization, political
violence and civil wars are a known commonality. Political violence and civil wars increase with the acceptance of social movements that can turn into violent insurgencies. What was determined is that successful democratization is rooted in extensive administrative control, ran by the military, with an eventual transition back to civilian institutions.

Finally, this chapter investigated a methodology to support democratization and democratic transition. The methodology considers two known variables. The first being, democratic governments are on a continuously sliding scale between democracy and autocracy and the second being time. With that, a scale developed a process to measure the percentage of democracy over time per country. Still, there was need for further analysis. That analysis solidified in a percentage-based scale of four primary indicators of a democracy. Accordingly, subcategories of the primary indicators name and then weigh the percentage-based scale. The result is an annually measured constitutional democracy percentage-based scale. That scale rates and stacks all countries statistically. The final scale used scores from the Freedom House to rate and stack countries of U.S. occupations. It is determined if the U.S. conducted in depth plans, had solidified governance training, and placed strict control over the government by military intervention, the current democratic percentages were high. Consequently, when ill prepared to conduct governance operations and plans to conduct governance were ad hoc, the percentage rating was low.

It is now credible to assess “if democratization is the answer”. Democratization is the answer but the methodology to success is not political in nature. Successful democratization relies on strict military interventions that controlled the government
completely. It resembles the autocracy dismantled but slowly implements democratic values. It exterminates undesired ideologies, differences, and forces restructure of the institution. Bottom line, without doing so, democratization will fail.
Thesis Conclusion

The strategically vital takeaway from this thesis is that future successes in warfare strategy develop through institutional training of imbedded sociocultural factors. A strategic lesson learned is democratization and partner nation capacity building does not mirror U.S. governmental and political structures. Successful governmental and political structures rest on the host nation’s capability to sustain itself long-term. Therefore, operationalizing successful governance rests on the U.S. analytical ability to conceptualize what an occupied nation can sustain preintervention and building sustainable governmental structures during and post-conflict. This cannot be achieved without understanding centralized failures of U.S. executive decision-makers, legislative policymakers, and foundational issues within the DoD.

This thesis displayed three fundamental issues effecting why the U.S. is failing in democratization and why there a is democratic recession. Research determined critical flaws that degrade the ability to consolidate military gains into political endstates during occupations and military impositions over the last half century. The thesis focused on three lines of questioning including; can the DoD operationalize effective democratic governance post-conflict, does not understanding sociocultural factors result in a failure to achieve peace and stability during an occupation, and is democratization the answer.

First, executive decisionmakers, legislative policymakers, and DoD leaders do not acknowledge the U.S. military is a political arm of the U.S. that conducts governance and counter-governance operations. Absenteeism to acknowledge this fact results in three catastrophic failures during occupations. They include the failure to develop trained and educated soldiers prepared to conduct governance and counter-governance operations. In
addition, the absence of planning for governance and counter-governance operations preintervention leads to ill prepared ad hoc operations. With that, an inability to consolidate military gains into political endstates is the outcome.

Two actions will resolve the first failure. Congress must develop authorities and directives to conduct governance and counter-governance operations. Authorities and directives create requirements for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop institutional training for CA soldiers. Institutional training culminates with an ASI solidifying the capability to conduct governance and counter-governance operations. In doing so, the U.S. takes the first step towards future successes during interventions and occupations. Policymakers and military leaders alike must recognize the fundamental tie between governance, counter-governance, and military imposition in U.S. warfare strategy.

Secondly, failure to plan for and understand sociocultural factors results in a failure to achieve peace and stability during occupations and interventions. The intent of democratization is three-fold. Democratization looks to create political allies that enable influence. Democratization looks to builds military alliances that enhance U.S. National Security. Lastly, democratization looks to generate economic partners to increase U.S. prosperity. The above protects U.S. National Security interests and increases the possibility for prosperity and a better way of life. With that, democratization supports strategic political, military, and economic goals. Unfortunately, democratization neglects sociocultural factors. Therefore, defining and planning for imbedded sociocultural factors for readiness during military imposition and TMA lacks importance. The failure
to deliberately plan for sociocultural and civil considerations complicates and diminishes the probability for successful democratic transitions.

PMESII-PT / ASCOPE are historical tools to conduct area studies and determine social factors. PMESII-PT are military operational variables that shape a commanders COP. ASCOPE is a subcategory of civil considerations within mission variables. Mission variables include mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). During the analysis of this thesis these tools were determined to only give a macro view of sociocultural factors. A more thorough micro analysis is necessary.

STRICTER-FV analyzes social, technology and material culture, racial, influential power groups, cultures, taboos, ethnicities, rituals, influential power groups, family structures, and values within a population. It is a crosswalk analysis similar to the PMESII-PT / ASCOPE tool. The crosswalk becomes STRICTER-FV / ASCOPE and conducts a thorough analysis of all sociocultural elements and culminates with a “so what” to define the human terrain. Commanders historically want the “so what” or “bottom-line up front.” Placing the “so what” or “bottom-line up front” results in a lack of truly knowing what the above sociocultural factors are that drive beliefs and values. For this reason, the “so what” must be the culmination of the Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). This thorough micro analysis of the human terrain enables a clear understanding of the many values and beliefs that shape behavior within a civil populace. In doing so, commanders are better prepared to change behavior for successful democratic transitions.

The third fundamental issue is the challenges and enemies of democratization. Democratization is immature, is a progressive form of government that takes time, and is
vulnerable to political violence, civil war, and insurgencies. Democratization is not rational or structural and political pressure and legal sanctions are not the most effective means of deterring unruly behavior during democratic transition. Conventional wisdom is flawed as it implies a civil populace is socially and culturally willing to accept broad and open-minded change. It omits facts that community ties are stronger than national identity for many countries. It additionally does not account for historical divides deep-rooted in long history of ethnic and religious disputes. In addition, China, Russia, and illiberal democracies look to extend influence and undermine democratic institutions to dominate as world superpowers. There is a rise of authoritarian capitalism leading predictions that autocracies will be economic superpowers by 2050. Autocratic governments and illiberal democracies are actively extending influence to increase the probability of political violence, civil wars, and insurgencies during democratization. Finally, there is a challenge to measure democratic variables. A continuously sliding scale between democracy and autocracy measure governments over time. With only four categories, further analysis and subcategory measurements will better quantify democratic indicators.

Before defining solutions and implications, there is a clear understanding between democratization through host nation partner building and occupations. For this thesis, democratization through occupations is the method of discussion. With that, democratization is the answer but the method to success is not political in nature. History tells a story of strict military interventions that controlled governments completely, led to successful democratization. It resembles the autocratic government at first but dismantled and implements democratic values slowly. Successful democratization
eradicates threatening ideologies and eases sociocultural indifferences and restructures institutions to what the developing government can sustain. Effective democratization takes extensive administrative control, ran by the DoD, with a gradual transition back to host nation institutions. These tasks are essential to sustainable democratization during occupations and proven through lessons learned in Germany, Japan, and Korea.

Democratization implementation must not create an insurgency. This means knowing the operational environment and more importantly sociocultural values and beliefs that drive the behavior of the population. Doing so will reveal any outside influence looking to undermine the democratic transition. Once revealed, a head on approach will deter any further outside influence. Lessons learned from Iran’s influence in Iraq serve as an example of what not to do. Iran supported the insurgency in Iraq by supplying foreign fighters, weapons, and equipment. The U.S. fight focused on the insurgency but never dealt with the arterial bleed of Iranian influence. For Iran, a weak Iraq shifted the focus of the U.S... Iran was able to undermine U.S. political aims to degrade Tehran’s enrichment of uranium by generating regional conflict. Facing Iranian influence in Iraq at once would have served as an example of how to undermine counter-governance and counter-democratization.

Solutions to the issues and failures that this thesis defined follow a simple agenda of training and education. But first, the solution begins with the end of partisan politics by executive level decision-makers and legislative policymakers when it comes to warfare strategy authorities and directives. Executive level decision-makers and legislative policymakers must work together to write authorities and directives that mandate short-term governance and counter-governance to SOF CA and long-term
governance to CF and Reserve CA. It is imperative to exclude Reserve CA from counter-governance operations. Reserve CA is not specially selected and trained to conduct IW, UW, or counter-hybrid warfare tactics. Reserve CA is better fit and has gained civilian skills through their full-time jobs to conduct long-term governance, stability, and Humanitarian Assistance operations only. SOF CA and CF CA are specially selected and trained soldiers maintaining analytical and tactical capabilities for IW, UW, and counter-hybrid warfare tactics serving in multi-domain environments. The directives must give legal authorities and dictate governance operations to defeat reemerging near-peer threats that conduct multi-domain and hybrid warfare, such as Russia. In doing so, the first step in future capabilities to consolidate gains is achieved.

The above authorities and directives create requirements within SOCOM and TRADOC to set up prerequisite competences to organize and manage governance and counter-governance operations. Authorities and directives force SOCOM and TRADOC to develop and administer training culminating in an ASI. A school in this capacity requires two portions of academics. One in governance teaching structures that establish accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, Rule of Law, and control of corruption while reestablishing essential services. This first academic part must be available for SOF, CF, and Reserve CA alike and culminate in an ASI. A second secured, SOF, and CF CA specific counter-governance part would focus on UW governance tactics and counter-hybrid warfare. This training would result in a second ASI.

While writing authorities and directives and creating a SOF school of governance and counter-governance, TRADOC needs to set up a two-part sociocultural analysis
school as well. This TRADOC school needs to focus on planning and preparing for population centers preintervention or preoccupation. A short broad stroked course in HTA will further develop a commander’s knowledge and the value of CA and better prepare them for the real and unquestionable battle to victory in all warfare strategies. The course would be a requirement for all commanders and senior enlisted advisors. A second part would focus deeply on a STRICTER-FV analysis in the social, technology and material culture, racial, influential power groups, cultural, taboos, ethnic, rituals, influential power groups, family structure, and values that make up the human terrain. The course could take real world countries to deep dive and supply continuous updates to Combatant Commanders and subordinate commanders for planning purposes.

The final solution is training in democratization. If democratization is a U.S. strategy, the most powerful and internationally interactive members of the U.S. should require training and education in it. Congressional policymakers need to fund and require DoS or United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to deliver training and education for DoD Commanders and Senior Enlisted Advisors. The theory and practice of democratization is complex and strenuous. DoD commanders and Senior Enlisted Advisors require a basic understanding of the continuous efforts by DoS and USAID to enable multilateral efforts even while working unilaterally. This training would name another sphere within multi-domain operations and how to consolidate military gains to achieve desired political endstates.

Unfortunately, this research and the recommendations comes late to have a changing effect in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two decades of conflict continue to challenge strategic level and academic experts. Training in governance and counter-governance,
sociocultural analytics, and democratization theory supports developing flexibility for the
armed forces to adapt to nonstandard and unconventional methods of warfare. The not
formally educated combined with ill planned ad hoc operations result in accelerated
conflict, which may disrupt an entire region. Lessons learned of the Sunni-Shia conflict
serve as a playbook of failures to steer the importance of understanding sociocultural
factors. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam teach lessons of how warfare execution is
intended to go one way, but sociocultural factors can quickly lead it in another direction.
This lesson should not be taken lightly when it comes to near peer threats of China and
Russia. If the U.S. ever confronted China or Russia in a near peer war, the population is
the inevitable link to victory or defeat. Lack of education, training, and analytical
capabilities would quickly result in the end of the western way of life for all.

These failures to plan and weaknesses in capabilities have not gone unnoticed
within the CA Branch. At this time, the voices of SOF CA have reached the United
States Special Operations Command (USASOC). As a result, USASOC has accepted the
role of SOF CA. The commander of USASOC, Lt. Gen. Francis Beaudette, published
the “ARSOF Fact Book 2018”. Within it he defined SOF CA capabilities. They are as
follows:

“The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) operates through an indigenous approach in order to
understand and wield influence within populations, enable precision targeting and provide
governance and counter-governance capabilities. The 95th is prepared to rapidly task organize,
fight, and win as part of a combined special warfare team in response to crisis.

The 95th maps and analyses the human terrain in order to understand networks of influence and
the competition for control of populations. This understanding allows the 95th to detect emerging
threats and identify potential partners to deter or control the escalation of crisis.

The 95th enables military commanders and U.S. Ambassadors to achieve national objectives by
countering adversary control and improving a partner’s control over populations in complex and
dynamic environments worldwide. The 95th accomplishes this as an integral member of the
special warfare team and through its special relationships with the U.S. Department of State, government and non-governmental organizations, and local populations”.231

While training is lacking and outsourced through organizations, such as Quilliam International, acknowledgment directs the CA proponent to build initiatives for more formalized institutional training. Unfortunately, contradictions and attempts to terminate the capability of CA, as a Branch, are at the highest of DoD levels. The Secretary of the Army has recommended cutting the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations capabilities and leaving these mission critical tasks to the DoS.232 These attempts further frustrate the ability to institutionalize CA governance and counter-governance capabilities.

More competing factors arise from resourcing and training requirements within USASOC. SOF maintains three branches that include CA, Phycological Operations, and Special Forces. Assad Razza and Jerritt Lynn published an article in Small Wars Journal defining the ongoing struggle of training and resource requirements. They said:

“Within each service, Civil Affairs units must compete with other military units for funding and resources to support training requirements. Yet, Civil Affairs units are usually struggling to secure the resources necessary to train effectively. With limited resources and funding, Civil Affairs units are left to train at a subpar level compared to other SOF partners. The reason behind this may be because component commanders assume risk on not training Civil Affairs units to a higher standard because their capability is difficult to measure compared to traditional military units.”233

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If SOF CA capabilities is difficult to measure compared to traditional unit capabilities, it further reinforces the need to institutionalize capabilities through fundamental training requirements. This requires new manning of CA proponent. USASOC must drain the Training, Doctrine, and Development of retired CA Staff that lacks the knowledge of new and innovative SOF CA capabilities exercised in today’s complex environments. Current staff in Training, Doctrine, and Development continuously hinder the ability to institutionalize training and development. To be blunt, the days of soccer balls and digging wells are long gone and CA Training, Doctrine, and Development requires a fresh set of eyes to solidify CA core capabilities. In doing so, the U.S., DoD, SOCOM, USASOC, and CA will better be prepared for the most complex and uncertain environments imaginable.
Appendix A

Acronyms / Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Additional Skill Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Centers of Gravity</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operating Picture</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Conventional Forces</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>GPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>JPP</td>
<td>Joint Planning Process</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>Mission Variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>Military Decision-Making Process</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>Operational Variables</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Support to Civil Administration</td>
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<td>TMA</td>
<td>Transitional Military Authority</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS

Goal-oriented team player with 15 years’ experience as a leader in an array of military leadership positions. Possesses the ability to effectively articulate desired endstates, then manage organizations through all steps of planning and performing while building employees’ confidence and creativity. Trusted and empowered subordinates in developmental mission roles, boosting individual’s personal experiences and capacity, and strengthening the team. Ability to coordinate, manage, and execute a plethora of high visibility tasks occurring simultaneously; capacity to analyze complex issues and processes and develop courses of action to overcome the issues or improve the processes. Emulates the highest standards of conduct and selfless service and unimpeachable integrity. Always finds a way to accomplish the mission and readily volunteers for additional opportunities to support the higher unit’s intent.

MILITARY SERVICE

Company First Sergeant - Fox Company, 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operation) (Airborne)
Fort Bragg, NC. July 2018 – present
Serves as the Senior Enlisted advisor and Master Trainer of a 32 Soldier Civil Affairs Company; executes Civil Affairs Operations in support of the Combatant Commander's theater objectives and regional engagement strategies; advises the Commander on all matters pertaining to the unit mission and Soldier development and readiness; responsible for unit administration, personnel actions, individual training; family support, morale, welfare, and professional development for all Soldiers assigned to the Company; supervises and synchronizes all administrative and operational functions within the Company; coordinates Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action projects; provides Companies and Battalion Headquarters staff with operational medical, logistical, and administrative support in order to deploy Companies and the Battalion; monitors training schedules and training management resources; coordinates and resources all missions with external requirements; responsible for the maintenance and accountability of equipment.

- Rated as number 1 of 16 First Sergeants and Master Sergeants in my Battalion.
- Consistently maintained the highest of readiness statistics in the Brigade.
- Developed 32 soldiers and led planning and training efforts in preparation for Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

Battalion Operations Sergeant, 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operation) (Airborne)
Fort Bragg, NC. March 2018 - July 2018
Responsible for the training, morale, welfare, and tactical employment of a regionally-oriented, globally-deployable, seven company Battalion. Responsible for assessing, coordinating, and executing all aspects of Civil Affairs Operations.
- Rated as number 1 of 6 noncommissioned officers in my battalion serving in the same rank.
- Advised a Battalion Commander, Command Sergeant Major, and a 200 Soldier Battalion on training and resource requirements, building interagency relationships, partner nation capacity building, and the utilization of resources accessible by both non-government and government organizations.
- Directly supported and advised main effort missions while working as a Sergeant First Class in a Senior Master Sergeant position.

Civil Affairs Planning Team – Team Sergeant, 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion
Fort Bragg, NC. May 2016 – March 2018
Oversees and integrates long-range planning efforts for future Battalion operations supporting worldwide deployments to all Geographic Combatant Commands. Provides input to doctrine reviews and conducts planning sessions with multiple higher-echelon organizations.
- Rated as number 1 of 49 noncommissioned officers in my battalion serving in the same rank.
- Consistently interacted with and addressed General Officers and other senior ranking officers with ease and confidence while acting in a position slated for someone of higher rank and more experience.
- Led planning efforts while the battalion underwent major changes to mission sets; ensured tasks and projects received the required amount of oversight to ensure success while providing analysis to emerging requirements.

Senior Detachment Sergeant, Special Warfare Training Detachment (Special Operation) (Airborne)
Fort Bragg, NC. January 2016 – May 2016
Responsible for the training, morale, welfare, of more than 400 students. Responsible for assessing, coordinating, and executing all aspects of Civil Affairs education, teaching, and training.
- Selected to serve as the Senior Detachment Sergeant over 36 over Sergeant First Class’s to serve in a Master Sergeant position, managing and coordinating training and education for more than 400 students.
- Fostered daily relationships with students while providing training and operational advice and assistance regarding specialty skill sets.
- Interacted with national-level advisors for the writing and implantation of Civil Affairs doctrine within the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS).

Company Operations Sergeant, 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operation) (Airborne)
Responsible for the training, morale, welfare, and tactical employment of a regionally-oriented, globally-deployable, six team company. Responsible for assessing, coordinating, and executing all aspects of Civil Affairs Operations.

- Advised government officials and general officers on real-world Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, building interagency relationships, partner nation capacity building, and the utilization of resources accessible by both non-government and government organizations.
- Fostered a team environment resulting in continued forward progress while communicating from a distance in support of a multiple deployed mission sets.
- Directly supported and advised main effort mission while working in the as a Sergeant First Class in a Senior Master Sergeant position.

**Team Sergeant, 91st Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operation) (Airborne)**
**Fort Bragg, NC, Afghanistan. March 2012 – January 2014**
Responsible for the training, morale, welfare, and tactical employment of a globally-deployable, four Soldier team. Responsible for teaching and mentoring tactical and technical skills while assessing, coordinating, and executing all aspects of Civil Affairs Operations.

- Rated as number 1 of 5 noncommissioned officers in my company serving in the same rank.
- Advised Afghan government officials on Foreign Policy, Support to Civil Administration, Rules of Engagement, building Partner Nation Capacity, and utilizing Afghan resources and budget accessible within the Afghan government.
- Fostered a team environment resulting in continued forward progress while communicating from a distance in support of a deployed mission set.

**Civil Affairs Qualification Course**
**Fort Bragg, NC. February 2011 – March 2012**
Studied and practiced planning, executing, and leading a Civil Affairs Team through all phases of operations. The course included the Military Decision-Making process, general problem solving, the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework, and interagency coordination. Other topics included six months of French language training, regional studies, and cultural classes for Africa.

- Selected by cadre to serve as the Course Platoon Sergeant due to demonstrated initiative and dedication.
- Chosen to brief an operations order to a General Officer whom was the highest-ranking officer in Civil Affairs.

**Infantryman, 1st Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment**
**Fort Bragg, NC. July 2008 – February 2011**
Responsible for the training, welfare, and combat effectiveness of 36 Soldiers in Garrison and Combat environments. Provided daily support operations within the company, enabled company operations through ensuring all company sections provided support requirements to the subordinate line platoons in order to effectively accomplish their training missions.
• Rated as the top Staff Sergeant in the Company; evaluated as performing within the top 10% of all Staff Sergeants in my Company Commander’s experience.

• Deployed a company of 143 Soldiers and over eight million dollars of equipment to conduct combat operations in Iraq.

**Recruiter, St. Louis Recruiting Battalion**
**Farmington, NC. June 2006 – February 2008**
Responsible for establishing and maintaining contacts, conducting interviews, and advising civilian personnel to obtain qualified applicants for enlistment into the Army. Contacted representatives of schools, public officials, personnel managers, parents of prospective applicants, religious and civil leaders, and others to present the Army as an employment and career opportunity. Presented formal and informal presentations on advantages of the Army at civic and service organizations and student bodies.

• Established liaison with local radio, television, and newspaper agencies.

• Wrote, edited, and presented recruiting material for use by local communications agencies.

• Conducted interviews and counseled prospective enliees. Discussed individual aims and goals to include security, personal aptitudes, training opportunities, job satisfaction and stability, advancement, prestige, and military life.

• Explained Army benefits including medical care, dependent allowance, housing, reenlistment bonus, retirement program, military/civilian educational opportunities, travel, recreational benefits, and all similar programs.

**Infantryman, 2nd Battalion 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment**
**Fort Bragg, NC, Iraq. October 2003 – June 2006**
Responsible for the training, welfare, and combat effectiveness of four Soldiers in Garrison and Combat environments. Provided daily support operations within a platoon, enabled platoon operations through ensuring all support requirements were met in order to effectively accomplish training missions.

• Rated as the top soldier in the Platoon.

• Deployed a Battalion of 500 Soldiers and over 50 million dollars of equipment to conduct combat operations in Iraq and support the first free election in Iraq.

**EDUCATION**

**JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY**, Baltimore, MD…………………MA Candidate
• Master of Arts in Government with a Concentration in Security Studies (2019)

**AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY**, Charles Town, WV………………3.78 GPA
• Bachelor of Arts in International Relations with a Concentration in Africa Studies (2017)
• Magna Cum Laude
• Golden Key International Honor Society
• Pi Gamma Mu Social Science Honor Society
UNITED STATES ARMY SCHOOLS

- ARSOF Fundamentals Course
- Master Leaders Course
- Senior Leaders Course
- Advanced Leader Course
- Warrior leaders Course
- Network Development Course
- Advanced Airborne School (Jumpmaster School)
- Airborne school
- Basic Tactical Communications Course
- Battle Staff Course
- Tactical Combat Causality Care
- Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape, Level (SERE C)
- SERE
- Recruiting School
- Special Operations Language Course (French)
- Civil Affairs Qualification Course
- Combat Lifesavers Course
- One Station Unit Training (OSUT)

LANGUAGES AND SPECIAL SKILLS

- Studied French for six months by Defense Language Institute certified instructors (2011).
- Volunteered for 20 weeks at Parks and Recreation as a basketball coach.
- Hobbies outside of work include running, lifting weights, reading, general fitness, hiking, and playing guitar. Completed multiple 25k marathons to include two, nine months after spinal fusion in 2015.

MILITARY AWARDS

Bronze Star Medal, Army Commendation Medal (6 Medals), Army Achievement Medal (4 Medals), Valorous Unit Award (2 Medals), Meritorious Unit Citation, Army Superior Unit Award, Army Good Conduct Medal (5 Medals), National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal (1 Campaign Star), Iraq Campaign Medal (3 Campaign Stars), Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, NCO Professional Development Ribbon (Numeral 4), Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon, NATO Medal, the Combat Infantryman Badge, Combat Action Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Senior Parachutist Badge, Parachutist Badge, German Parachutist Badge (2nd Award), Gold Recruiter Badge (3 Sapphires), and Driver W-Badge.