ABSTRACT

Emergency-level societal health risks are imminent for all of LA County as tens of thousands of its current residents are either housing-insecure or chronically homeless—a demographic which has increased by 28% in LA County in just the past year. Local governments’ ambitious steps to increase the supply of affordable housing is unlikely to significantly offset the rising homeless count, as citizens are falling into homelessness faster than housing is capable of sustainably increasing to meet the need. In this memo, historical and current federal, state, and local mitigation efforts are analyzed and contrasted with alternative policy solutions in order to produce an original policy recommendation. The result is a recommendation for the Garcetti Administration to support a California Affordable Opportunity Act (CAOA), to be passed through the California State legislature, which would codify local California governments’ right to incentivize economic emigration by expanding their Continuum of Care services to include emigration assistance for eligible residents who are at-risk of, or currently experiencing, homelessness. LA County’s tens of thousands of severely mentally ill, substance-addicted, and disabled homeless residents will not be effectively cared for as intended until its work-capable and low-income residents who have been priced out of the housing market pursue economic opportunity elsewhere, rather than fall into or remain in local homelessness, absorbing finite government resources intended to mitigate the crisis. Such economic opportunities exists currently in the regions of the U.S. offering livable minimum-wages and acceptable housing conditions, which Continuum of Care case workers should be assisting eligible applicants to obtain through programs such as the proposed American Opportunity Loan (AOL) program. In conclusion, California Continuums of Care are incomplete without programs designed to incentivize the movement of low-income workers away from unaffordable, impacted housing areas attributed to as the leading cause of homelessness, toward economic opportunity elsewhere, and LA County should be the first to implement an AOL program.

Advised by Paul Weinstein, Jr. — Director of the Graduate Program of Public Management at Johns Hopkins University
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## Curriculum Vita
To: Mayor Eric Garcetti of Los Angeles

Skid Row: Mitigating Los Angeles’ Infamous Human Crisis

Action-Forcing Event

The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority’s 2019 Homeless Count, released June 4th, confirms that homelessness has reached an all-time high in Los Angeles County as nearly 60,000 people seek temporary refuge in tent cities and tax-funded shelters within its borders.¹ In response over the following months numerous delegations of federal officials including President Donald Trump himself have made trips to Los Angeles with the stated purpose of touring the area’s homeless service facilities and improving their understanding of the crisis, which President Trump attributes to the local Democratic Party leadership’s shortcomings.² He warns that federal intervention will be imminent. The vague threat has stirred up significant concern among Los Angeles residents, both housed and unhoused, and all are looking to Mayor Garcetti for reassurance.³

Statement of the Problem

If all of the individuals comprising Los Angeles County’s homeless population were to merge into one unified camp, its population would rival that of some of the largest refugee camps on Earth.⁴ The United Nations has utilized the human crisis of Skid Row to exemplify the United States’ failure to provide access to basic human rights to all of its citizens, its representatives comparing the condition of Skid Row to that of Syrian refugee camps.⁵ Amongst this vulnerable population, the most dramatically expanding demographic is that of the chronically homeless—typically defined as those who are currently experiencing homelessness and have also experi-

enced homelessness consistently for at least a year. The chronically homeless have increased by 28% in LA County in just the past year. Local county and state governments’ ambitious steps to increase the supply of affordable housing is unlikely to significantly offset the rising homeless count, as citizens are falling into homelessness faster than housing is capable of sustainably increasing to meet the need.

The issue is rightfully gaining attention both domestically and internationally, while all eyes are on the Garcetti administration as it funnels billions of dollars into reactive methods to manage the crisis. Mayor Garcetti and Governor Newsom are unified in their efforts to increase the availability of temporary and transitional or permanently affordable housing, quite literally at all costs. Their efforts are extensive, yet many experts would argue that the existence of low-income housing within county borders is only one piece of a vast and complex puzzle of factors that contribute to the rising homeless count. Further, policy experts such as Paavo Monkkonen, Associate Professor of Urban Planning at UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, caution that centralized leadership’s ambitious goals to close the housing gap will be unlikely to succeed without building a new city altogether due to the county’s numerous infrastructural limitations.

The homelessness crisis’ negative externalities are pervasive throughout LA County. The most directly impacted people are, of course, the homeless themselves. Yet homelessness also affects all residents of LA in less obvious ways that can nevertheless be deadly. Most critically, the burgeoning homeless population perpetuates massive quantities of heaping waste piles that municipal waste management teams have been unable to keep up with. The waste infiltrates local water systems and attracts deadly pests, creating refugee camp-like conditions. For example, LA has forgone the use of second-generation anticoagulant rodenticides (SGARs) due to

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California’s environmentally protective pesticide restrictions and regulations, a choice which has allowed a burgeoning disease-borne rodent population to contribute to thousands of collective cases of typhus, hepatitis A, tuberculosis, staph, typhoid fever, and even the most iconic medieval disease of all time: the bubonic plague.\textsuperscript{14} No discernible rodent management policy or plan has been offered by local government at this time, outside of standard municipal waste management—a losing battle, according to most locals who watch as heaping piles of trash are regularly removed and then pile up again within days.\textsuperscript{15} Fecal-oral and flea-born illnesses, if allowed to proliferate amongst the homeless, are likely to impact all LA residents through food-service and rodent movement throughout the city.\textsuperscript{16} Many residents are calling for Governor Newsom to declare a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{17}

All of these externalities of homelessness are not only dangerous, they are expensive. Since the passage of Proposition HHH in 2016 and Measure H in 2017, the city and county have been spending billions of dollars to create new temporary shelters and additional subsidized public housing, as well as to provide a wide range of public services for those who need them.\textsuperscript{18} A 2017 RAND Corporation analysis of data collected during an experimental “Housing for Health” program in LA County, which put people with complex mental health issues into supportive housing rather than relying on only law enforcement and emergency room care, found that the county actually saved about 20\% of taxpayer money that would have been spent otherwise.\textsuperscript{19,20} In other words, by housing severely mentally ill homeless people the county actually saved taxpayers money. Unfortunately the efficacy and concrete nature of this study is the exception, not the rule. Due to the many nuances and differing needs of the numerous overlapping and diverse demographics within the homeless population, it is extremely difficult to determine an average cost to taxpayers for an average homeless individual. That’s not for lack of effort. The National Alliance to End Homelessness estimates that as of 2015, one chronically homeless per-


son in the US cost taxpayers an annual average of $35,578, a figure that has only risen incrementally since.\textsuperscript{21}

That figure intends to cover all fiscal externalities of homelessness. For example, lack of stable housing guarantees that individuals are cycled in and out of emergency rooms, hospitals, psychiatric centers, detoxification programs, and jails, all resulting in high public costs and poor health outcomes paid for by taxpayers.

There are also strong links between homelessness and crime and drug abuse. A conclusive study in Texas confirmed that not only is homelessness itself linked to criminal behavior, but that arrest and incarceration do nothing to break the cycle of homelessness-related crime, and actually exacerbate individuals’ chances of arrest for future criminal offenses.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, at least 15\% of 18-and-over homeless adults in LA County admit to substance abuse problems, a percentage that many experts expect to be wildly inaccurate due to under-represented drug-use statistics in government survey data.\textsuperscript{23,24} Law enforcement personnel in high-volume areas of homelessness can reportedly spend more than 60\% of their time on-duty mitigating issues caused by only the homelessness—the residual cost of which would increase the estimated cost of each homeless person, offered above.\textsuperscript{25}

Popular civil society discussions about policy intended to alleviate the homelessness crisis has trended towards language which refers to the issue as one of human rights abuse, socio-economic inequality, and racial disparity.\textsuperscript{26} The reality is that first and foremost the homelessness crisis in LA County has morphed into a very real health security threat to all LA County residents, housed and unhoused, rich and poor. Emergency-level societal health risks are imminent.

\textbf{History and Background}

Homelessness in LA County extends back to the Great Depression era, the impact of which set off a nation-wide westward economic migration in search of opportunity that left many men, usually seasonally unemployed or destitute, sleeping on LA’s streets and in its religious service institutions which had begun to spring


up around modern-day Skid Row.\textsuperscript{27} Prior to this time, public perception of homelessness had been more of concern that the increase in young male vagrancy had become a tangible example of American values shifting away from traditional family life, towards a more romantic pursuit of the “call of the road” and exploratory railroad culture—in other words, discussion amongst civil society of urban homelessness and vagrancy was that it was a choice made by irresponsible men, not a forced condition.\textsuperscript{28} The federal government had little involvement in poverty alleviation or caring for disabled citizens, which was perceived as mainly the responsibility of state and local communities, family members and institutions of faith.\textsuperscript{29} This changed once the Great Depression ravaged the US economy, and hundreds of thousands of displaced economic migrants suddenly contributed to an upward spike in chronic homelessness concentrated in urban centers around the nation, including Downtown LA’s Skid Row.\textsuperscript{30} Census data of individuals experiencing homelessness prior to the 1980’s is lacking—However, the indisputable shock to the nation of sudden widespread homelessness and destitution during the Great Depression contributed to massive social unrest and demands for policy reform.\textsuperscript{31,32}

Thus was born President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s federal social welfare system, termed the New Deal, which dramatically altered the landscape and public perception of government’s role in poverty alleviation, creating countless expensive programs that stimulated the economy and intended to safeguard against future crises of Great Depression proportions.\textsuperscript{33} The New Deal’s welfare programs, in addition to the second World War’s overwhelmingly positive impact on the economy, guaranteed that the experience of homelessness in LA and across the country shrank to insignificant proportions and stayed fairly low until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{34}


While poverty itself remained pervasive in the lowest-income demographics throughout WWII and in the years following it, the region’s poor were nearly always able to secure satisfactory and reliable low-income, publicly subsidized housing.\textsuperscript{35} This housing accessibility was largely due to the New Deal’s 1937 Wagner-Steagall Act which established the US Housing Administration, the federal entity responsible for building publicly subsidized housing.\textsuperscript{36,37} The Act requires that for each new public housing unit created, a unit of substandard quality must be removed—ensuring that the federal program would increase the quality of housing, but not necessarily the quantity. It also left operational decisions about the location of public housing up to local community authorities, ensuring that communities unwilling to offer public housing would be able to avoid it—a polarizing characteristic hotly debated today.\textsuperscript{38} Critics argue the USHA has actually exacerbated cyclical and chronic poverty, because low maximum income requirements for public housing residents, intended to prevent competition with private housing markets, have ultimately led to high concentrations of poverty inside public housing projects.\textsuperscript{39,40} However, a positive externality of WWII was that it stimulated the national and local LA economy to the extent that even the poorest demographics thrived, and any weaknesses in the Wagner-Steagall Act and other New Deal policies went unnoticed for decades as the country enjoyed a massive economic upturn.\textsuperscript{41}

Ironically, WWII’s positive economic impact also resulted in further mobilization and migration west, as tens of thousands of young, middle class families moved to LA in hopes of working in the booming industries of war.\textsuperscript{42} The LA metropolitan area grew faster than any other major metropolitan region in the U.S. during WWII—by 1943 the population of metropolitan LA was larger than that of 37 states, was home to one in every 40 U.S. citizens, and by the end of the war in 1945, had produced at least 17% of all of America’s war production.\textsuperscript{43} LA-based developers made fortunes selling homebuyers small, single-family homes with spacious front


and backyards in sprawling new suburban neighborhoods across the county. Car-dependent roads connected these suburban loops and cul-de-sacs with small local shopping centers and highways, designed with little consideration to urban planning or accessibility to public transportation. These events foreshadow today’s LA, known for its competitive housing market of unprecedented proportions spread over wide expanses of poorly utilized suburban space, entirely infra-structurally unprepared for today’s 10.1 million residents, many of whom require publicly subsidized housing to call themselves permanent residents.

Despite national wartime and post-wartime prosperity, technological media improvements ensured that the majority of the country was made aware of the struggles of the poorest US citizens. In response to public concern, President Lyndon Johnson declared an “unconditional war” on poverty in 1964, instigating programs such as The Social Security Amendments of 1965, which created Medicare and Medicaid and also expanded Social Security benefits for retirees, widows, the disabled and college-aged students, financed by an increase in the payroll tax cap and rates; The Food Stamp Act of 1964, which made the food stamps program, then only a pilot, permanent; The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which established the Job Corps, the VISTA program, the federal work-study program and a number of other initiatives, including the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which is the arm of the White House responsible for implementing the war on poverty and which created the Head Start program in the process; and The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, signed into law in 1965, which established the Title I program subsidizing school districts with a large share of impoverished students, among other provisions (ESEA has since been reauthorized, most recently in the No Child Left Behind Act). Supporters claim that stagnant wages since the early 1970s, a sharp rise in single-parent households, and benefits like employer-based health care and pensions have upended many of the assumptions that guided the Johnson administration, leading to unclear outcomes. Critics argue it was simply an extremely expensive policy.
cy failure, considering that over 50 years after its implementation the poverty rate remains the same as it did three years after its implementation, despite the government having spent roughly $9,000 per aid recipient.49

In the same spirit as Johnson’s war on poverty, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 created the Housing Choice Voucher program, also known as the Section 8 program, which provides low-income housing through rental subsidies paid to the private sector.50 This tenant-based form of demand-side rent subsidies allows families with a voucher to choose and lease safe, decent, and affordable privately owned rental housing, and marked the beginning of today’s demand-side federal housing assistance programs for homeless and low-income individuals and families. Arguably, Section 8 could be considered the dawn of all modern homelessness policy—all policy enacted since, federally and locally, has attempted to build on Section 8 by tweaking the ratios of housing subsidies, affordability, availability, accessibility, etc.

Unfortunately, all of the above-mentioned policy tweaks to compliment Section 8, each intended to eradicate homelessness, some of which include rent controls, minimum wage, welfare coverage increases and decreases, tax hikes and breaks, and varying degrees of criminalizing and legalizing activities associated with homelessness, have all failed to mitigate increasing numbers of homeless people in LA County. These policies’ failures can be attributed to a number of factors, including negative externalities from other policies (such as justice system crack-downs on crime and criminalization of drug-related activities), global and local economic turmoil, immigration patterns, world events, and social trends—in short, bipartisan and partisan supporters of each of these interventions insist that in a bubble, given the right factors, they would have worked. As we know, in reality, they did not.

The exponential rise of homelessness since the 1980’s to today is usually attributed by historians and analysts to over-regulation de-incentivizing new construction as well as private sector competition pricing out low-income families from the housing market. These factors are accompanied by perpetual vacillation of public opinion and federal policy regarding government assistance, the nation failing to come to a bipartisan consensus about when scaling back aid is negligent or necessary to foster self-reliance.51 Additionally, numerous important events took place within a short period of time to create a homelessness quagmire in the region which LA County is still sinking into.

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The above-mentioned economic boom enjoyed by the US and especially LA County during WWII began to reverse in the 1970’s and by the 1980’s had relapsed into what is now referred to as the “Great U-Turn”. The Great U-Turn raised national concerns about unemployment, poverty, and adversity for a shrinking middle class. Simultaneously, the national economy began to deindustrialize, moving away from manufacturing jobs towards service industry jobs. LA County was hit particularly hard by this shift—75,000 manufacturing jobs were lost between 1978 and 1982. The film industry began to shrink in the 1980’s, and the end of the Cold War catalyzed the disappearance of tens of thousands of defense related jobs in the area as well. Corresponding with manufacturing companies moving production overseas, and with an employment shift to service industries, the decline in union membership in the private sector contributed significantly to wage stagnation—In 1983, at least 24% of American workers in the private sector belonged to a union; today, that number has fallen below 7%. The decreased prevalence of private sector unions led to widespread reduction in wage bargaining power. Essentially, when the economy or a specific firm has excelled since the industry shift, low-wage workers no longer enjoy a proportional size of the growing pie, leading to a shrinking middle class. And, of course, the ever-increasing addition of low-skill immigrants into the job market, willing to compete for low-wage jobs, has given employers even more power to keep wages low.

In response to an increase in welfare recipients across the country, many of whom had become dependent on welfare for years and therefore deterred from seeking employment, President Ronald Reagan campaigned against welfare as a whole and in the early 1980s instituted numerous slashes and eligibility requirement reforms to catalyze a push towards independence from widespread government-sponsored financial aid. Consequently, federal programs targeted to the poor were reduced by $57 billion between 1982 and 1985, and due

to likeminded California reforms, 38,000 welfare recipients in LA were dropped from the program entirely, while
the benefits of 48,000 more were reduced. As a result of the industry shift, loss of unionization, influx of low-
skill immigrants, and welfare slashes, low-income LA County residents of the 1980’s suddenly found low-wage
jobs difficult to compete for and keep, their wages stagnant, and their welfare money reduced or retracted.
Poverty increased, and families who never considered they could be at-risk of homelessness found themselves
applying for housing assistance. Public assistance for housing efforts had also been reduced by the Reagan
slashes, and the mandatory household contribution towards Section 8 rents was increased to 30% of household
income, making assistance more difficult to obtain and more expensive when obtained. Critics of Reagan’s
public housing policies suggest that his funding curtailment drastically reduced the efficiency of housing relief
programs, because the programs were pressured into fragmented and competing rather than cohesive entities.
Supporters of Reagan suggest his policies were intended not to remove aid from those who needed it, but to re-
move aid only from those who were using aid as an enabler to remain stagnant rather than to pursue employment
opportunities that would allow them to become self-sufficient.

Other reasons for the failure of the above-mentioned policies to curb a rise in homelessness were less
predictable. The deterioration of traditional family structure and delayed age of milestones such as marriage and
children has resulted in a much higher demand for single-resident housing on all socioeconomic levels, outpacing
population growth. Additionally, the explosion of highly addictive drug use in the 1980’s led to roughly
400,000 cocaine addicts and 200,000 other drug addicts in need of treatment living in LA County alone by the
end of the 1980’s—an estimated 100,000 of these, either homeless or poor. While demand for treatment of
addicts skyrocketed, the number of public treatment slots fell, and by 1991 over 2,000 substance abusers were on
waiting lists for the 5,200 available treatment slots.

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Stricter sentencing for drug-related and other nonviolent offenses in the criminal justice system, as well as diminishing rehabilitation programs, which were intended to dissuade potential offenders, ensured that the prison population nearly tripled before the 1980’s came to a close. LA County ex-offenders often became caught in a loop of repeat offenses due to low job prospects and an unmet need for rehabilitation upon release. And by the early 1990s, rising costs of health care had resulted in 2.7 million people in Los Angeles County lacking health insurance, often facing a choice between paying for health care or for housing. In addition to a loss of job opportunities, bargaining power and welfare money, low-income LA County residents became significantly more likely to spend time in a jail, become introduced to drugs and participate in the illegal yet highly profitable drug industry, and much more likely to become homeless.

Lastly, the number of Californians in mental institutions had peaked at over a half a million inmates in 1959, and public concern about crowding, high costs and inhumane practices taking place inside such asylums became prominent. Doctors promoting new advances in the drug industry over-promised on medical solutions to mental disorders, and a coalition of well-meaning citizens succeeded in pushing for federal deinstitutionalization policies that would relocate patients, often heavily medicated by tranquilizers, to local, community-funded and community-run health centers. By the time Ronald Reagan became Governor of California in 1967, the population of mental institutions had been reduced by at least half and continued to drop—those who’d been removed had been relocated to what turned out to become disastrously under-funded community health centers, and shortly thereafter these patients often became both drug-addicted and homeless. Currently, roughly 25% of LA County’s homeless population has a severe mental disability.


By 1987, the poverty rate in LA County had grown to 14% from just 8% in 1969. Though it has wavered since then due to various policy and economic shifts, LA County’s poverty remains roughly 14.9% today. A TIME/CNN survey in 1994 found that 81% of respondents around the country wanted “fundamental reform” to the welfare system, and a slightly higher percentage believed that the system already in place discouraged needy people from finding work. As a result of overwhelming public disapproval of existing assistance programs, in August of 1996, President Clinton signed into effect the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as part of a federal effort to “end welfare as we know it.” TANF replaced AFDC, which had provided cash welfare to poor families with children since 1935. It put welfare distribution into state hands, and instituted a number of restrictive criteria that AFDC had not imposed—primarily intended to incentivize work while recipients are utilizing the program. States have broad discretion to determine eligibility for TANF cash assistance and its range of services. The basic TANF block grant was set at $16.5 billion for each year since 1996; as a result, its real value has fallen by almost 40 percent due to inflation—and critics argue that because TANF reaches so many fewer families than AFDC did, and imposes stricter limitations on eligibility, it provides substantially less protection against poverty. Today in California, less than half the number of poor families with children are receiving welfare assistance than they were in 1994, despite significant population growth.

Many local attempts at reforming homelessness policy have since fallen flat. The most significant failure was the Bring LA Home plan—initiated by LAHSA and the LA Coalition to End Hunger in 2002 under directives from the Bush administration, it took over four years to be released and included over 200 specific recommendations for mitigating the housing crisis. An estimated $10 billion would be needed to execute the plan over 10 years, and ultimately neither the county or city embraced it. Shortly after, in 2006 the LA County Board

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of Supervisors (BoS) approved its own ‘County Homeless Prevention Initiative’, attempting to allocate a one-
time $80-$100 million to create five homeless service centers in each of the five supervisors' districts, each con-
taining about 40 short-term beds, which intended to chip away at the tens of thousands of homeless people in the
county while caseworkers connect them with housing and other kinds of support. It quickly became clear to all
involved that not only would the plan only mitigate a minuscule fraction of the homelessness crisis, but it would
be diluted to the point of ineffectiveness by NIMBY’s—“Not in my backyard” community protestors who feroc-
ciously protect their neighborhoods from absorption of those experiencing homelessness or those at-risk of it.

BoS adopted a motion on October 27, 2015 to create an Affordable Housing Programs Budget Unit and
establish a multi-year plan to provide new funding for new affordable housing not already allocated to existing
LA County homelessness or housing programs. The motion also established an Affordable Housing Coordinat-
ing Committee to oversee the creation of an annual Affordable Housing Outcomes Report. The 2018 report
found that by investing locally controlled funding into affordable housing production, preservation, and rental
and operating subsidies, as well as promoting policies such as inclusionary zoning and density bonuses, the
County of Los Angeles and partner local jurisdictions have already helped developers and service providers
leverage State and federal resources sufficient to subsidize or create more than 111,000 affordable homes in the
county. While this growth is unprecedented, it is merely a fraction of what is needed.

Although the existing inventory of affordable homes and rental assistance programs in the County are
helping to stem the tide of homelessness and address the affordability crisis, they are not commensurate with the
need for affordable homes, which extends well beyond the 58,000 officially homeless—a figure that has risen by
more than 10,000 compared to 2017 statistics and shows no signs of slowing down. The Report finds that the
County needs to add more than 568,000 affordable homes to meet current demand among renter households.
Despite County attempts to reverse this trend, the 2018 Report further finds that nearly all lower income renter
households in the County are roughly as severely cost burdened as they were in 2017, meaning they spend more
than half of their income on housing costs and are in danger of becoming homeless—however it credits the fact
that severe cost burdens among these populations did not become markedly worse in the past year when market
rents have continued to escalate as a positive effects of existing County policies. Despite that, rising rents and

82 Wolch, J. Dear, M. Blasi, G. ENDING HOMELESSNESS IN LOS ANGELES. Inter-University Consortium Against Homeless-
homelessness-los-angeles.pdf


County-Outcomes-Report-with-Appendices.pdf

County-Outcomes-Report-with-Appendices.pdf
expiring restrictions have put the County at risk of losing approximately 11,400 existing affordable homes unless strong action is taken. 87% of these at-risk affordable homes in the County are located in transit-accessible neighborhoods, making them especially valuable to low-income families who may rely on public transit for work.

The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) owns and manages a citywide portfolio of 9,375 units and administers monthly housing assistance payments for more than 58,000 families—contributing to an existing affordable housing supply of over 83,000 units, most of which are subsidized through Section 8 Vouchers.\footnote{Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Fact Sheet. Revised on February 19, 2019. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://home.hacla.org/Portals/0/Attachments/Fact%20Sheets/2019/nHACLA%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2007.17.19.pdf?ver=2019-07-17-094350-743} The above-mentioned 11,400 units at risk of becoming unaffordable make up about 14% of HACLA’s existing stock of subsidized housing. Families in public housing still pay no more than 30% of their income for rent while HUD subsidies make up the difference. There are currently over 45,384 families on the waitlist to receive public housing in LA City alone.\footnote{Three Years And Zero Homeless Housing Units Later, LA’s Auditor Looks At Prop HHH Money. LAist Staff (Anonymous). LAist. October 8, 2019. https://laist.com/2019/10/08/prop_hhh_homeless_housing_audit.php} In short, while over 80 thousand units have been allocated to public housing, that number would need to nearly double just to meet the need of families who are attempting to utilize the existing public assistance programs to access affordable housing in the region—never mind the tens of thousands of homeless people who haven’t yet bothered with applying to the lengthy public housing wait list. This figure also assumes that HACLA’s 11,400 units at-risk of becoming unaffordable are salvaged, a fate that is by no means certain. Public skepticism that existing policies will mitigate this crisis is palpable.\footnote{Three Years And Zero Homeless Housing Units Later, LA’s Auditor Looks At Prop HHH Money. LAist Staff (Anonymous). LAist. October 8, 2019. https://laist.com/2019/10/08/prop_hhh_homeless_housing_audit.php}

In an effort to address the affordable housing shortage, Proposition HHH, a $1.2-billion bond measure that LA city voters overwhelmingly approved in November of 2016, set an ambitious goal to create 10,000 new housing units within a decade of its passing.\footnote{SUPPORTIVE HOUSING (PROP HHH). Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://hcidla.lacity.org/prop-hhh} As of today the city has already committed two-thirds of the bond to secure only slightly more than half of the units the measure was intended to subsidize, forcing officials to re-think their funding sources to make up the difference for the remaining duration of the project.\footnote{Smith, Doug. How close is L.A. to building 10,000 houses for homeless people? Here’s a breakdown. LA Times. April 21, 2019. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-hhh-spending-commitments-20190421-story.html} In 2018 LA City spent $442 million from Proposition HHH developing homeless and affordable apartments, but none of the projects have opened yet and the wait for permanent housing has stretched to an average of 215 days—as of this
past year its $77-million shelter expansion plan produced two facilities, with room for 147 people, less than 1% of LA County’s unsheltered population.\textsuperscript{92}

Similarly, 2017’s Measure H was passed by BoS to accompany Prop HHH and to raise an estimated $355 million annually for 10 years before expiring, projected to enable 45,000 families and individuals to escape homelessness in the first five years, while preventing homelessness for 30,000 additional families and individuals.\textsuperscript{93} A portion of the money aims to pay for the supportive services needed by the chronically homeless people who will live in the thousands of units to be built in the city of Los Angeles under Proposition HHH—Developers of those units can’t get bond money until they have service providers lined up, so passing Measure H was key to fulfilling the promises of Measure HHH.\textsuperscript{94} As these two new policy measures are still in their early stages, an assessment of their efficacy cannot yet be determined. Despite dramatically hopeful promises from policymakers, supporters and critics are typically in agreement that the new policies will not mitigate the issue entirely—they were designed to fractionally reduce the encampments of unsheltered homeless on the streets of LA County into a more manageable number, and to slow down the growing number of people falling into homelessness in the county each year by offering expensive supportive services to keep them housed.\textsuperscript{95} As mentioned, many analysts believe a much larger sum than originally determined will be necessary to complete the programs.\textsuperscript{96}

Measure H and Proposition HHH were reinforced at the State level as Governor Newsom’s revised 2019-2020 budget aims to double State spending on homelessness to $1 billion.\textsuperscript{97} Funded mainly by tax revenue, his plan will mostly impact Health and Human Service and Education budgets, attempting to mitigate the symptoms of homelessness and curtail it altogether with better health care options for California’s destitute residents,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{95} About the Homeless Initiative. The Los Angeles County Homeless Initiative. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://homeless.lacounty.gov/about/
\item \textsuperscript{97} SUPPORTIVE HOUSING (PROP HHH). Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://hcidla.lacity.org/prop-hhh
\item \textsuperscript{98} Three Years And Zero Homeless Housing Units Later, LA’s Auditor Looks At Prop HHH Money. LAist Staff (Anonymous). LAist. October 8, 2019. https://laist.com/2019/10/08/prop_hhh_homeless_housing_audit.php
\end{itemize}
as well as higher earning potentials due to increased access to education in high-risk communities. Both critics and supporters of the budget increases acknowledge openly that the number of people falling into homelessness is far outpacing these record housing placements and homelessness services, a phenomena driven primarily by high rents and a significant shortage of affordable housing units for low-income renters in LA County. Despite the overwhelming issue, the Garcetti administration, supported by the Newsom administration, has pledged to allocate the billions of expected funds to “build thousands of units of supportive housing, expand bridge (transitional) housing to help Angelenos transition off the streets, and hire an army of outreach workers, housing navigators, mental health experts, anti-addiction specialists and other professionals to be the heart, brains, and muscle of the movement to end the crisis on our streets.” This outlook is extremely consistent with the popular Continuum of Care model of caring for vulnerable and homeless populations, described below.

On a national level, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Grants program, also called the HEARTH Act, last reauthorized in 2009, is currently at the core of federal efforts to end homelessness. The reauthorization consolidated several existing programs for individuals experiencing homelessness, created a federal goal that individuals and families experiencing homelessness be permanently housed within 30 days, and codified the planning processes used by communities to organize into Continuums of Care in order to apply for homeless assistance funding through HUD. New definitions of “homeless,” “homeless person,” and “homeless individual” were expanded, based on Congress identifying a lack of affordable housing and limited housing assistance programs, and an assertion that homelessness is an issue that affects every community.

Each year, HUD awards Homeless Assistance Grants to communities that administer housing and services at the local level. HEARTH received $2.636 billion in fiscal year 2019, and “Dear Colleague” sign-on letters have already circulated in the House and Senate, attracting support for an increase to $3 billion from 171

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House Members and 39 Senators; the Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate are beginning to put bills together while waiting for an agreement between the two chambers on overall spending limits for FY 2020. The Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG) and Continuum of Care (CoC) programs fund the cornerstones of each community’s homeless system, though smaller federal sums are also annually allocated to other programs, such as those under the jurisdiction of Health and Human Services, as well as Veteran Assistance, for their own services for at-risk populations.

The CoC program alone is currently responsible for roughly 86% of the total federal budget of $124,362,797 for LA County’s homelessness initiatives, larger than federal support packages for any other state in the nation. Specifically, CoC is designed to promote community-wide commitment to the goal of ending homelessness; provide funding for efforts by nonprofit providers, allow State and local governments to quickly rehouse homeless individuals and families while minimizing the trauma and dislocation caused by homelessness; promote access to and effect utilization of mainstream programs by homeless individuals and families; and optimize self-sufficiency among individuals and families experiencing homelessness. As mentioned, the Garcetti and Newsom administrations have referred to this model as the cornerstone of their homelessness policy decisions, typically met with approval by a largely Democratic constituency. Housing Secretary of the Trump administration, Ben Carson, has shown continuity with the Obama administration’s funding of the Continuum of Care model, and has also followed the Obama administration’s lead by adopting a “Housing First” philosophy, meaning they have allocated significant funds to service providers that aim to move homeless people into housing first, then provide or offer further services and support once housing has been obtained.

Meanwhile, on June 25 of this year President Trump signed an execute order to establish a White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing. Shortly after, Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors submitted a report titled “The State of Homelessness in America”, finding that the recently signed executive order will seek to remove regulatory barriers in the housing market to reduce the price of homes.

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and reduce homelessness, and blamed the crisis on “decades of misguided and faulty policies.” Though all major policymakers are currently in agreement that removing regulatory barriers in the market will stimulate new constructions, the issue remains highly polarized in the media, and has taken on dimensions sparking new public conversations about environmental regulations, etc. Additionally, there is little bipartisan consensus regarding forcible encampment dispersion.

Trump has argued that “more tolerable conditions for sleeping on the streets” have exacerbated the issue, leading to concern among his adversaries that his administration will tolerate unjust or excessive use of law enforcement to manage the homeless population. His adversaries blame the issue of homelessness as a whole on conservative welfare cutbacks and privatization. Conservatives are pointing at over-regulation and over-dependency on state assistance, along with failed Democratic leadership of the most impacted areas as the true cause of the issue.

Policy Proposal

The Garcetti administration could opt to shift its policy goals to instigate an economic emigration of low-wage workers to willing partner regions, in an effort to reduce demand in LA County’s housing market by as much as 15%. A multi-faceted policy approach would involve the application of approximately 10% of one year of Measure H’s $0.25 cent sales tax revenue to fund a new task force and program involving state and local government partnerships, public-private partnerships, media campaigns, and the creation of a special low-interest county-operated re-location loan distributed to eligible individuals through the California Affordable Opportunity Act (CAOA). This could be signed into law as early as March 2020, and its loan program could be made available to the public as early as March 2021, with a primary intention to re-locate as many work-capable and work-eligible housing-insecure LA County residents as possible within the specified time frame in the law. “Work-capable” heretofore refers to adult individuals who are not suffering from a substance abuse problem, a severe mental illness, or a lethal disease—an estimated 33,803 (57%) of the current homeless

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population in LA County fall into the category of “work-capable”. Work-eligible heretofore refers to adults not suffering barriers to employment and housing such as criminal records which may deter potential employers or landlords. Considering that LA County houses the largest jail system in the nation, containing within its borders nearly 20,000 inmates, the number of work-eligible and work-capable individuals will be substantially impacted. Policy statisticians have suggested that as many as 25-50% of homeless individuals could also have criminal records—therefore conservatively, a minimum of 16,900 currently homeless individuals in LA County are both work-capable and work-eligible by our estimation. Housing insecure heretofore refers to residents who are either currently experiencing homelessness or seriously at risk of it, for example, spending over 50% of household income on housing costs. The program would be managed by a Special LAHSA Task Force and funded by approximately 10% of one year of Measure H’s LA County $0.25 cent sales tax revenue—costing roughly $35.5 million in total, as much as $28 million of which is expected to be repaid by AOL recipients in the form of low-interest loan repayments. By roughly 20 years after the last AOL is provided, the total cost of the program to taxpayers should be no more than $7.5 million.

Policy Authorization Tool:

The California Affordable Opportunity Act (CAOA) would build upon the existing federal McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act As Amended by S. 896 HEARTH Act of 2009, which codifies into law the Continuum of Care (CoC) planning process, a longstanding part of HUD’s application process to assist homeless persons by providing greater coordination in responding to their needs, and would further expand CoC’s application within California to include emigration assistance as a crucial aspect of care for housing-insecure residents. CAOA’s enactment would be necessary to establish a new low-interest Affordable Opportunity Loan (AOL) program to be funded and run by county governments with the intention of incentivizing and easing emigration to partner counties offering increased job and housing opportunities for low-wage workers. Modeled after existing student loan laws and most recently the federal 2010 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA), which revised student loan distribution to save administrative costs by flowing directly from the government to students, CAOA would mandate AOLs be distributed directly from their county task force; in the case

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of Los Angeles, a Special LAHSA Task Force (SLTF) would need to be created for this and other administrative purposes.\textsuperscript{119}

Policy Implementation Tool:

Both carrots and sermons would be heavily utilized to implement this policy shift. With the primary tool being a low-interest Affordable Opportunity Loan (AOL) program to be funded and run by county governments, intending to incentivize and ease emigration to partner counties offering increased job and housing opportunities for low-wage workers, the program would be marketed and accessible to any work-capable, work-eligible, housing-insecure LA County residents. The loan is intended to assist with the costs associated with obtaining employment and housing, to cover costs of travel and moving, and potentially contribute to a rent deposit and furniture. One of the only stipulations of eligibility to receive an AOL is that recipients must agree to a case worker (in our case, an SLTF case worker) assisting them by pairing them with willing employers and landlords in partner regions to optimize their likelihood of success, and occasional check-ins following their departure to best monitor the efficacy of the program. The program would be centered around a loan model to reduce its participants likelihood of becoming cyclically aid dependent, and to reduce costs for its funders. Loan re-payments would be reapplied to future AOLs, or, should the program be ended, applied to other CoC programs within LA County to ensure that all of Measure H’s revenue is applied as intended. Background or credit checks would not be conducted outside of eligibility confirmation—the program will be marketed as a “second chance”, indicating that so long as a participant is housing insecure, work-capable and work-eligible, they are eligible to receive the same size loan as any other recipient, regardless of credit or employment history. More specifically, AOLs would have an income-based repayment plan, zero interest for 3 years and provide a flat $1,500 to each accepted applicant. Awareness of AOLs as a viable option for housing insecure LA County residents would depend upon its support from supportive entities working closely with housing-insecure and homeless populations in LA County, the distribution of pamphlets, billboard and LA Times editorials and advertisements, and timely trainings to case workers.

To increase its effectiveness this policy may be accompanied by an increase in police-enforcement of existing laws that criminalize behaviors associated with homelessness, such as laws prohibiting loitering—sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks, as determined by ordinance Municipal Code (L.A.M.C.) section 41.18.\textsuperscript{120} A 2007 settlement in the case of Jones v. City of Los Angeles stipulated that the criminalization of loitering law can only be enforced in limited circumstances, such as when nearby shelter beds are readily


available. Following the enactment of CAOA, it may be determined that eligibility for—yet lack of application to—the AOL program may be considered a limited circumstance which indicates a criminal lack of reasonable effort to obtain housing accommodations.

Policy Implementation Process and Timeline:

Partnership with at least one State legislator to introduce CAOA for drafting would be necessary to its enactment due to California’s legislative process. The obvious target partner to sponsor this bill would be Senator Holly J. Mitchell. Mitchell represents the 30th Senate District, which includes Skid Row in Downtown LA as well as some of LA County’s most housing-insecure neighborhoods. She has an excellent track record with 80 bills passed, most of which concern mitigation of the affordable housing crisis and the expansion of human services. Should Holly choose to take on the bill, or should it be picked up by another legislator, it would take an estimated 90 days from its draft date to arrive on Governor Newsom’s desk—at that point, he has 12 days to either sign or veto it, otherwise it will become law without his signature. Conservatively, CAOA could become law as early as March 2020. The law would specify that local governments have a grace period of 1 calendar year to assemble task forces to manage the addition of emigration services and AOLs to their existing CoC programs, ensuring that no emigration services are mandated until March 2021.

Following the enactment of the bill, the LA County BoS would need to act quickly to assemble a Special LAHSA Task Force comprised of professionals with expertise in housing insecurity, homeless services, government loan distribution, and nonprofit marketing campaigns, in order to operationalize the law and guarantee its successful implementation. The Task Force would be overseen by LAHSA leadership and be required to publicly and regularly report on its progress on a variety of milestones. Within 3 months of CAOA being signed into law, the Special LAHSA Task Force should be determined and operational—their first official meeting should take place during or before June 2020.

Two of the most important goals for SLTF to prioritize would be the attainment of state and local government partners in order to guarantee smooth transition and variety of emigration options for potential economic emigrants, and the attainment of public-private partnerships to guarantee job availabilities and housing opportu-


nity in partner regions. CAOA’s impact will be determined by the strength of LA County’s partnerships, the communication and cooperation between local governments and private sector partners, and the variety of options available to ensure each program participant optimizes their chance of finding the right opportunity to draw them onwards with potential for a higher standard of living and housing security. Countless cities in the US are currently considering major infrastructural projects, agricultural production shifts, revitalizing manufacturing industries for improved competitive trade practices, crackdowns on illegal immigrant workers, gentrification of whole neighborhoods of vacant units, and combatting dwindling or reversing population growth—any of which may call for an influx of low-skill, low-wage workers looking for stable housing and opportunities for improving their standard of living. Communication and cooperation between SLTF and its partners will determine the success or failure of CAOA, and therefore securing these partnerships cannot be rushed. Assuming the Task Force is assembled and operational by June 2020, valuable partnerships cannot be expected to be solidified until December 2020. Due to standard winter recesses, core partnerships with local government and private sector partners in ideal opportunity regions can be expected to be solidified and approved by LAHSA Leadership and its BoS overseers during or before January 2021.

SLTF will need to quickly develop and distribute media campaigns promoting the new limited-time Affordable Opportunity Loans (AOLs), the centerpiece of CAOA’s policy shift, to ensure that as many eligible LA County residents are made aware of the program as possible. The marketing campaigns will target all supportive entities working closely with housing-insecure and homeless populations in LA County, the distribution of pamphlets and flyers in heavily-affected areas such as Skid Row and public housing communities, billboard and newspaper advertisements, and press releases by supportive elected officials. Timely trainings to case workers supporting low-income, housing-insecure and program-eligible LA residents would be critical to ensure that the program is made to be both accessible and desirable. Between January and March 2021, AOLs would be heavily marketed to the target demographic while SLTF works out logistical kinks in the program prior to its roll-out date.

“Roll-Out Date”: AOLs would become available to the public no more than 1 calendar year after enactment of CAOA as mandated by law, and would remain available until the 2 years of the program’s lifecycle are up, and/or until 20,000 AOLs are distributed to LA County residents. At this point a 3 month Policy Review Process would be conducted by BoS to determine if the AOL program should be renewed under CAOA, or if its purpose in re-locating eligible participants had been served and the burden on the strained housing market in LA County lightened, or if the policy had been altogether unsuccessful.


In conclusion, The California Affordable Opportunity Act (CAOA) would codify the addition of emigration assistance into existing Continuum of Care programming, and consequentially mandate that emigration assistance programming is eligible to receive funding from any revenue stream intended to strengthen California’s existing Continuum of Care as determined by McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act As Amended by S. 896 HEARTH Act of 2009. Costing LA County approximately 10% of one year of Measure H’s LA County $0.25 cent sales tax revenue, or roughly $35.5 million in total, CAOA would instigate the distribution of low-interest Affordable Opportunity Loans (AOLs) to incentivize emigration to partner regions who are able and willing to provide economic opportunities for low-skill, low-wage Americans. A Special LAHSA Task Force (SLTF) would be assembled by the Board of Supervisors (BoS) to manage partnerships and loan distributions, overseen by the BoS, with an anticipated roll-out date of March 2021.

**Policy Analysis**

Numerous positive and negative consequences may predictably result from the enactment of the California Affordable Opportunity Act (CAOA) and its corresponding Affordable Opportunity Loan (AOL) program, in addition to—but not necessarily including—its stated goal of prompting a minimum of 20,000 individuals in LA County homeless encampments, temporary shelters and low-income housing to migrate towards advantageous economic opportunity in partner regions. Firstly, four key underlying assumptions must be identified prior to the policy analysis: 1) The high demand and mediocre supply of low-income housing in LA County is a root

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<th>Start Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>March 2020</td>
<td>1- Build partnership with State legislators for drafting and sponsorship of CAOA; CAOA becomes law</td>
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<td>March 2020</td>
<td>June 2020</td>
<td>2- Special LAHSA Task Force is assembled</td>
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<td>June 2020</td>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>3- Secure state and local government partnerships to guarantee smooth transition and variety of emigration options</td>
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<td>January 2021</td>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>4- Secure public-private partnerships to guarantee job availabilities and housing opportunity in partner regions</td>
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<td>March 2021</td>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>5- Develop and distribute media campaigns promoting the new limited-time Affordable Opportunity Loans (AOLs)</td>
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<td>March 2021</td>
<td>March 2023</td>
<td>6- &quot;Roll-Out Date&quot;: AOLs become available to public 90 days after enactment of CAOA, and become unavailable after 2 years, or after 20,000 AOLs are distributed, pending BoS determination of optional renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2023</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
<td>7- Policy Review Process and Determination if AOL program should be renewed under CAOA in LA County</td>
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cause of the homelessness crisis, as individuals with low-wage, insecure or lost jobs are priced out of the housing market; 2) Existing policy efforts may potentially contribute to the solution, but the existing policies won’t be able to solve the crisis independently while housing demand continues to grow as anticipated; 3) Policy analysts are correct in their assertion that it will not be possible to accommodate or re-locate the nearly 60,000 homeless within the county borders as the county currently exists due to infrastructural limitations; 4) Conservatively, at least 16,900 of existing adult homeless residents of LA County are both work-capable and work-eligible—however, considering many of the greatest barriers to employment are experienced during, not before, homelessness, it is likely that the addition of all individuals in LA County who are not homeless but at high risk of homelessness, and are also both work-capable and work-eligible, would drive that figure up substantially.

Neither the assumption that all work-capable and work-eligible individuals are willing to do so in order to achieve financial independence from state assistance, nor the assumption that such individuals are likely to highly prioritize housing security are self-evident, and therefore their policy implications will be explored further through evidence offered below.

Though there is historically no similar policy to utilize for comparison, history has repeatedly demonstrated that emigration is the most organic process to occur when a region can no longer offer its residents economic opportunity or safe spaces in which to live and flourish. The market typically self-corrects in this regard, as struggling pursuers of opportunity tend to leave unsavory conditions for unknown potential elsewhere—in fact, sociologists consider this one of the most uniquely human qualities, and a key reason for our species’ resilience and longevity.

Numerous examples of successful economic migration within the US can be described to exemplify its commonality and effectiveness. As mentioned in the History/Background Section, the Dust Bowl and Great Depression catalyzed a massive economic migration westward as eastern cities became economically impacted. The westward migration was followed by the most successful financial upswing in modern US history, as the displaced citizens settled into the new booming war industry, the production of which took place consistently in newly populated and growing cities such as Los Angeles. Every generation since has seen a modest state-to-state migration, though the past decade has displayed a major trend of movement towards more


affordable and livable cities with increased employment prospects in what US demographers currently refer to as the Sun Belt—namely, affordable states like Florida, Texas, and Arizona. Additionally, LendingTree, the nation’s self-reported leading online marketplace for mortgage loans, recently created a Moving Popularity Score Index which analyzes destination states adjusted by existing population size. While California falls into the bottom five—meaning it is one of the least popular states to move to after adjusted for population size, likely due to its unaffordable and impacted housing market, southern states such as South Carolina, Florida, Delaware, Georgia and North Carolina top the list, confirming a nation-wide movement south to the Sun Belt in pursuit of economic opportunity. Emigrants with optimistic economic motivation are able to command wages more than 10% higher than individuals migrating for other reasons, according to a 1994 Austrian study—in other words, migrants are more likely to succeed in their new destination when they expect to do so, a statistic that may favor an emigration-based program which is conscious of promoting economic opportunity as a key motivator.

Thus, if the proposed program is able to successfully instill hope of prosperity within participants, they will actually be more likely to succeed and build prosperous lives outside of LA County.

Why the market has not self-corrected, and tens of thousands of work-capable, work-eligible individuals in LA County have become destitute and increasingly dependent on public services for basic necessities rather than pursue opportunity elsewhere as seen in other time periods and populations, may be attributed to the effects that welfare and housing assistance has had on public expectations and morale in general. The lack of progress in building self-sufficiency since the beginning of Johnson’s War on Poverty 50 years ago may indicate that welfare is responsible for breaking down the habits and norms that lead to self-reliance, generating a pattern of increasing intergenerational dependence; This dependency suggests that welfare begets welfare, and provides an explanation for the following paradigm: poor families spend on average $2.60 for every dollar of their reported income, because the Census Bureau doesn’t count state assistance when reporting on incomes of the poor.

This means that measured as a percentile over 60% of money spent by the poor is not made through reported income, but rather subsidized by state assistance or untaxed income. Despite $22 trillion in welfare spending since Johnson’s War on Poverty began, and Johnson’s promise that increasing spending would make “taxpayers out of tax-eaters” and would be an “investment” that would “return its cost manifold to the entire economy,”
an outlook that remains extremely popular today, statistically a significant portion of the population is now less self-sufficient than it was before Johnson’s war—and many of those who are self-sufficient may feel entitled to more assistance than they are getting, based on trends toward democratic socialism in recent polls.\textsuperscript{136,137} While CAOA would not amend any existing spending on poverty alleviation, but rather temporarily divert some to fund emigration opportunities through its AOL program, it could potentially disrupt popular sentiment that the government’s role is to provide for able families that are not currently providing for themselves. Its very existence could send a powerful message to work-capable and work-eligible citizens utilizing or seeking state assistance that their government seeks to support their efforts to pursue self-reliance and opportunity—but that it is the responsibility of the individual to seek self-reliance through AOL and other programs available. In other words, CAOA’s offer to assist residents with acquiring work and livable residences in more affordable regions will indirectly codify pushing emigration as an appropriate governmental response to an impacted housing and job market, rather than endless and, as we’ve seen thus far, fruitless cross-sector attempts to build out the county to make room for those who cannot afford to live in it comfortably without state assistance.

Due to the novelty of CAOA, a time-series model of forecasting is impossible for this policy analysis. Consequently, the only option is to utilize an associative model of forecasting with a similar government-run loan program—student loans. More specifically, AOLs will be modeled after existing student loan laws and most recently the federal 2010 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA), which revised student loan distribution to save administrative costs by flowing directly from the government to students.\textsuperscript{138} CAOA would mandate AOLs be distributed directly from their county task force; in the case of Los Angeles, a Special LAHSA Task Force would need to be created for this and other administrative purposes. An analysis of the effectiveness of HCERA would be useful in forecasting the effectiveness of CAOA. HCERA ended the process of the federal government giving subsidies to private banks to give out federally insured loans. Instead, loans are administered directly by the Department of Education. It also improved accessibility of loan forgiveness programs and lowered the percentage of discretionary income required to spend on loan repayment, much as CAOA would be lax in its repayment demands—though CAOA offers no loan forgiveness options as it is currently proposed. Quantifiable forecasting with HCERA offers some positive and some negative analytics. While the federal student loan program was originally designed to be a moneymaker for the government, as students paid back their debts with interest, under HCERA the direct loan program went from a $25 billion surplus in 2012 to less than $5 billion by 2015; simultaneously, federal student loan debt shot up from $154.9 billion in 2009 to


$1.1 trillion by the end of 2017. Critics attribute this policy failure to the liberty with which debt forgiveness is doled out by the policy—surveys of student borrowers by LendEDU found that half of them don't expect to have to pay back all their debts because the federal government would forgive them, and found that the rising expectation that loans wouldn't have to be paid back also had the perverse effect of making students increasingly indifferent to college costs—fueling tuition inflation. Should CAOA follow a similar pattern, rather than contribute to Measure H’s long-term revenue through low-interest repayments, the policy could cost LA County taxpayers as much as $35.5 million, rather than the anticipated $7.5 million. However, as debt forgiveness will not be offered for the loan, and as AOLs are 4% of the size of an average student loan debt burden, they are significantly more likely to be repaid.

One of the most useful methods of analyzing this policy would be a contingent valuation, which will clarify whether the demographic the policy is targeting will be incentivized enough to utilize the AOL program. In order to determine what amount of money and convenience would be able to motivate homeless or housing-insecure individuals to embark on an economic migration away from LA County, a survey needs to be conducted. As of now, only casually performed small surveys consisting of 10-20 participants have been conducted in areas of high-homeless concentrations, and none pertaining specifically to motivating factors. The vast majority of research on homeless populations has been focused on those suffering from debilitating mental and physical conditions, and substance abuse disorders—very little research has been conducted to determine why tens of thousands of work-capable and work-eligible individuals in LA County have not pursued opportunity elsewhere. Research results do indicate that the majority of this population verbalizes an eagerness to work and improve upon their circumstances—however, the same survey also indicates that common ties to local community can include nearby family, a sense of familiarity and belonging, and hope that local supportive housing

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options will become available, all of which would disincentivize an economic migration. Additional motivation-based surveys of the target demographic of work-capable, work-eligible and housing-insecure individuals are needed before a contingent valuation could take place, which would be extremely useful in analyzing CAOA.

Risk assessment can be quantified through a cost-benefit analysis of CAOA. Positive monetary consequences of the policy shift could add up to $574.5 million or more saved annually by local taxpayers, as well as intangible benefits such as the improved ability of law enforcement and service institutions to more effectively assist the remaining population in need; a reduction in the impacted workload of officers in highly impacted areas by as much as 60%; benefits to the national economy through improved national employment figures; the provision of low-wage labor for partner regions to benefit their local economies; lastly, the passing of CAOA would improve upon the existing CoC framework and expand its reach to programs that support emigration policies—as there is currently no law in California that mandates right to housing, it would not infringe upon any existing laws, yet could monetarily save an untold amount on future poverty alleviation programs by setting a new standard for assisting work-capable citizens with emigration rather than perpetuating the cyclical partisan welfare debate. Quantifiably, the $574.5 million figure includes a reduction in strain on the subsidized housing market by as much as 20%, saving local taxpayers up to $488.5 million annually; a reduction of as much as one-third of the population of unsheltered homeless encampments, saving local taxpayers as much as $58 million annually; and a return of as much as $28 million to fund other Measure H programs.

Conversely, direct negative monetary consequences may add up to as much as $35.5 million of tax revenue, assuming that all 20,000 possible AOLs are applied for, received, and go un-repaid. Serious intangible consequences can be predicted as well, including an unfavorable outlook from the BoS and LAHSA, who will need to divert a great deal of administrative and technological capacity to tracking and facilitating AOLs, and whose participation would be crucial to the success of the program; gained market efficiency would come at the price of social equality as vulnerable local citizens are prompted to move away, which could have unintended negative effects on moral, as well as local and state government public relations; partner regions may struggle with problems amidst the influx of low-wage, low-skill workers, many of whom may have histories with trauma, substance abuse, or mental illness, and may blame California governance for unforeseen policy consequences.


that they then must mitigate themselves; and lastly, should the marketing of the AOL program fail to attract enough participants to meet CAOA’s goals, taxpayers would still be out $7.5 million of unrecoverable funds intended for Measure H. Prompting an economic migration through incentives such as AOLs would, at best, be effective in mitigating the homelessness crisis, yet would come at the expense of efficiency—it would be significantly more efficient to attempt to promote emigration without spending millions on a new law and supportive programming. The structure of CAOA and AOL programming is designed to maximize partner-region participation, applications from desired individual AOL recipients, and repayments—yet cannot guarantee these three necessities for success will take place without further surveys of the target demographic to determine likelihood of success.

In conclusion, the novelty of CAOA could potentially lead to a beneficial disruption of the cyclical system of homelessness which has been a blight on LA County for decades, in addition to as much as $574.5 million saved annually by taxpayers after the 2-year AOL program has been fully implemented. However, its novelty also leaves much of its analysis to guesswork, and could cost taxpayers not only $35.5 million should loan repayment plans default, but also intangible consequences such as loss of faith in local government, lowered moral, and deteriorated relationships with other major counties and municipalities. The policy could indirectly codify pushing emigration as an appropriate governmental response to an impacted housing and job market, a bold shift from current policy that demands space must be made for those who cannot afford to live in the county comfortably without state assistance—setting a standard for future policies. With a strong emphasis made to applicants on the necessity of repayment, and the small loan amount of only $1,500 per recipient, there is a strong likelihood of repayment. Of greater uncertainty is whether the target demographics of ideal partner regions and housing-insecure individuals will elect to participate willingly in the AOL program, which is of pivotal necessity to the success of CAOA. Surveys for a contingent valuation should be conducted locally in order to determine what amount of money and convenience would be able to motivate homeless or housing-insecure individuals to embark on an economic migration away from LA County, as well as what demands partner regions may have, prior to the implementation of the policy. Ultimately, the policy offers relatively few monetary or policy consequences upon failure compared to its huge potential for gains from success, however its chance of success is contingent upon further analysis.

**Political Analysis**

Democratic Party Leadership:

CAOA’s promulgated values do not fit squarely within existing Democratic, nor Republican, rhetoric about mitigating the homelessness crisis. This is both a benefit and weakness of the bill. Partisan tension now exceeds race, gender, religion or level of education in its divisiveness amongst Americans, according to the Pew

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Recent studies have shown that the partisan divide between legislators has steadily grown and has reached unprecedented levels in recent years with regard to bill co-sponsorship and attempts at reformatory social and economic policymaking. For this reason, elected officials in the Democratic party are increasingly cautious about endorsing policies that may be perceived by their constituents as reflective of a Republican agenda, or based on “Republican talking points”, and vice versa. Due to CAOA’s novel and unique policy, it could potentially be accepted or rejected by leaders of both parties, depending on party spin. CAOA would need to be endorsed by the Democratic leadership of California in order to be adopted and successful—and historically, an endorsement from the Garcetti administration would go a long way in its favor to develop support from other influential California Democratic party leaders and policymakers such as Governor Newsom, whose approval will be needed.

The Democratic party has built a fiscal platform based primarily on economic fairness and equality, embracing policies that improve human services. CAOA aims to expand upon existing human services available to vulnerable members of the community, leveling the playing field for those who may not be able to move to a different region without an AOL. Politically, this could be considered a progressive and characteristically left-wing solution. However, the service is obviously intended to incentivize migration within the US, more specifically, emigration, encouraging those living in LA County who cannot afford its prices without financial assistance to move elsewhere and find a low-wage, low-skill job. Not only is this idea of moving to pursue the potential for opportunity elsewhere rather than becoming welfare-dependent a conservative one, but it directly addresses a recent Republican talking point blaming the left-wing for stagnation of movement in the US in general. This association could be lethal to the bill, due to the above-mentioned partisan divide. However, it could also potentially be an attractive bill for Democrats to champion—CAOA address a Republican talking point head-on,namely, that immobility and a lack of willingness to take personal responsibility for one’s future should not be rewarded with financial assistance. Yet instead of exacerbating partisan tension, the law would

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attempt to solve the problem using only tools in the Democratic party’s playbook—the expansion of existing human services for some of our most vulnerable members of society, in order to make the process of economic migration smoother, easier, and more equitable through emigration assistance and government-provided loans. It is conceivable that Democrats could adopt an uncharacteristically exclusionary policy such as this given the state of the crisis. However, political values of inclusivity and strong community pride may run too deeply in the Democratic party to muster support for any bill that suggests supportive emigration services as an appropriate government response to an impacted market. The language that CAOA’s advocates would need to use in order to persuade Democratic party leadership would need to build on, rather than negate, Democratic ideals of inclusivity, and demonstrate that only the most compassionate of states would assist its residents with moving elsewhere. If CAOA proponents cannot persuade Democratic party leaders that it is an innately progressive and left-leaning bill despite its somewhat exclusionary principals, it will likely fail.

California State Senator Holly J. Mitchell:

Partnership with at least one State legislator for the drafting of CAOA would be necessary to its enactment due to California’s legislative process. Senator Holly J. Mitchell represents the 30th Senate District, which includes Skid Row in Downtown LA as well as some of LA County’s most housing-insecure neighborhoods. She has an excellent track record with 80 bills passed, most of which concern mitigation of the affordable housing crisis and the expansion of human services. Mitchell’s primary issue has been to reduce pressure on LA County’s subsidized housing market, as well as to mitigate its homelessness crisis, and she would be the most obvious choice to sponsor CAOA in order to maximize its chances of becoming state law due to her prestigious and respected reputation in the State Senate. However, her political platform has been endorsed by some of the most progressive members of the Democratic Party, and polling suggests that a majority of her constituents share her far-left focus on equality and inclusivity, making CAOA vulnerable to criticism due to its potential for association with Republican talking points perceived by her constituents as “exclusionary”. In order for Mitchell to support and spearhead CAOA, she would need strong conviction that its codification is not only warranted but necessary due to the state of emergency her district is experiencing as a result of the homelessness crisis.


crisis—She would also likely request to see convincing evidence that Measure H will not be able to mitigate the crisis on its own, without a simultaneous emigration of low-income earners. In other words, Mitchell would champion CAOA only if she perceived it as a last resort in mitigating homelessness.

A recent Yale study supports an assessment that Mitchell’s endorsement of CAOA could cost her credibility with other far-left Democratic party leadership, should it be dismissed as a product of Republican talking points, exclusionary, or otherwise failing to represent progressive values due to its emphasis on personal responsibility for socioeconomic movement. Likewise, her relationship with her constituents, many of whom are members of the target demographic intended to be incentivized by CAOA to emigrate elsewhere, is even more greatly risked by her endorsement of the bill. The study asserts that public perception of homelessness has become far more compassionate and liberal over the past two decades, finding that Americans are more likely than they were 20 years ago to attribute homelessness to external factors like the economy, rather than internal factors such as laziness or irresponsibility. Should Mitchell’s constituents become disenchanted with her involvement with the bill, and foster resentment that the bill’s solution involves their own exit from the community for any reason other than their own best interest, it could be devastating for her otherwise unmarred political career.

However, should communications and marketing of CAOA roll out effectively, Mitchell’s constituents may view it as a new available service and loan opportunity in their arsenal of options to escape poverty, avoid homelessness and secure employment, and may see movement assistance as compassionate rather than exclusionary. In this case, the adoption and success of the bill could win Mitchell even further support among her constituents and potential voters, as well as earn her a reputation as a revolutionary with novel and unconventional solutions to human problems in her district. She has much to gain and to lose from her decision to champion CAOA.

California Governor Newsom:

Should Senator Mitchell choose to take on the bill, or should it be picked up by another legislator, it would take an estimated 90 days from its draft date to arrive on Governor Newsom’s desk—at that point, he has 12 days to either sign or veto it, otherwise it will become law without his signature. Still in his first year of his first term as governor, Newsom has a clean slate politically. Though Newsom is not up for re-election until 2023 and has many years left to deliver on his campaign promises, he has yet to establish a Secretary of Home-


lessness as promised during his 2018 campaign—he has, however, approved in the last few months at least 13 new bills designed to speed up shelter construction and to facilitate other solutions, and his new budget includes an unprecedented $650 million in one-time funds designated to build and expand "emergency shelters and navigation centers, rapid rehousing, permanent supportive housing, job programs, and for innovative projects like hotel/motel conversions," adding up to at least $1 billion of state funds going specifically to mitigating the homelessness crisis.\textsuperscript{164} A Public Policy Institute of California survey released in October found that 15\% of respondents cited homelessness as the state’s biggest problem, tied with the economy for top problems overall—indicating that Newsom’s constituents are watching his actions on the issue extremely closely, and expect him to deliver visible and tangible solutions.\textsuperscript{165}

Newsom could only benefit politically from adopting an experimental bill such as CAOA. Stating that “State government is now doing more than ever before to help local governments fight homelessness, expand proven programs and speed up rehousing,” Newsom has not yet publicly entertained any bold or innovative policy solutions compared with policies that have demonstrated efficacy in other States.\textsuperscript{166} However, his relatively middle-of-the-road, yet left-leaning policy decisions could benefit from a novel and experimental bill such as CAOA so long as his constituents consider the homelessness crisis an emergency-level first priority.\textsuperscript{167} The trade-off should the policy fail is minimal for Newsom, as it would be an inexpensive policy mishap compared to the billions he intends to spend on various other proven programs.

LA County BoS:

The LA County Board of Supervisors is currently comprised of five elected officials: Hilda Solis representing the First District, elected in 2014; Mark Ridley-Thomas representing the Second District, elected in 2008; Sheila Kuehl representing the Third District, elected in 2014; Janice Hahn representing the Fourth District, elected in 2016; and Kathryn Barger representing the Fifth District, elected in 2016.\textsuperscript{168} The BoS’s adoption of the AOL program following the enactment of CAOA would be essential to it’s being rolled out in LA County.


Their approval of the bill is highly likely given their policy histories as individuals and as a Board. The stated priorities of all individuals comprising BoS include expanding access to affordable health care, protecting the environment, and improving the lives of working families. Given their focus on the expansion of services and novel job training programs for vulnerable populations, the Board is potentially open to services expanding to include emigration opportunity pairings and AOLs. Less than one quarter of LA County residents polled consider their region to possess desirable employment opportunities, access to affordable health care, access to affordable quality housing, or sufficient reduction in homelessness, according to data collected by Loyola Marymount University between 2014-2019.

Second District’s Ridley-Thomas has been and continues to be one of Measure H’s most active and vocal proponents, though his last term will be coming to an end this coming June 2020. In a report on LA County’s homelessness crisis which he authored and posted on his official website, Ridley-Thomas states that “in spite of all our great strides, which [depend] on intense collaboration among multiple public agencies and nonprofit organizations serving vulnerable and housing-insecure populations across the County, we still saw an increase in the homeless population this January. For every 133 people we house every day, an entirely separate group of 150 people fall into homelessness each and every day. Regretfully, we are losing the battle at this rate.” In addition to citing existing Measure H programs as the most potent solutions, Ridley-Thomas also calls for “other innovation and interventions” through local empowerment and accountability—a call that many of his constituents may respond to with support for CAOA. Considered by his constituents to be the foremost advocate of neighborhood participation in government decision-making, he founded the Empowerment Congress, the region’s most successful 24-year experiment in neighborhood-based civic engagement, which led to the region’s infamous Neighborhood Council movement. Running unopposed for his last term, broad consensus in the Second District is that Ridley-Thomas has been an excellent leader for his constituents, stepping up on addressing the homelessness crisis with measures such as H. Much like it did with Measure H, his endorsement of CAOA would go far in fostering support from the other Board of Supervisors.

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Ridley-Thomas asserts in his report that the main cause for homelessness is the 32% increase in monthly rent since 2000, with a typical renter’s monthly income having decreased 3% during the same period after adjusted for inflation—and also references the California Housing Partnership’s estimate that LA County would need over half a million more affordable rental homes in order to meet current demands in addition to an average income increase of over three times that of minimum wage in order to afford a median rent of $2,471. This policy analysis has demonstrated that the above goals are unattainable without additional intervention, as LA County cannot physically support over half a million new homes, even with the most ambitious of infrastructural expansion plans—in other words, given the impending end to his last term and pressure to ensure a legacy of action, and given his stated openness to expanding funds to more innovative programs intended to mitigate homelessness, Ridley-Thomas and his constituents would likely be extremely open to CAOA and its AOL program.

State-Wide Public Opinion:

John Snook, the Director of the bipartisan Treatment Advocacy Center, which researches solutions for mentally ill people and advises states on mental health and homelessness policy, has oft been referenced by experts and policymakers about steps necessary to solve the homelessness crisis. He recommends that policymakers should first focus on the homeless demographics requiring the most extreme interventions, before turning funds to focus on the homeless who are not mentally ill or suffering from debilitating conditions. This opinion is shared almost unanimously by most Americans, regardless of party affiliation. Despite this popular belief, and the billions of dollars pouring in to mitigate the crisis, a majority of LA County voters say taxpayer money on homelessness isn’t spent effectively. And though no clear consensus has emerged on how voters would balance an emergency response to homelessness with measures that would take longer but provide perma-


nent solutions, a very small majority tended to favor long-term solutions; other polls indicate that at least half of the country considers homelessness to be a structural and societally-imposed issue rather than necessitating a behavioral shift, a number that polls highest in liberal areas.\textsuperscript{180} These polling trends paint a picture of an LA County population that narrowly prefers long-term, systemic solutions to short-term emergency response, prefers policies that assist the most incapable demographics of the homeless first, is unhappy with existing policy efforts, and considers homelessness a high-priority and systemic issue. Though outside of academia there is no information available to determine public opinion on incentivizing economic migration through policy, the above-mentioned trends suggest that Californians could be receptive to such an initiative.\textsuperscript{181}

As mentioned above, a minority of voters in LA County, especially those who are sensitive to exclusionary policies due to their own or their loved-ones’ position within the target demographic intended to utilize CAOA, could create opposition for the bill through negative media and electoral consequences for its proponents.\textsuperscript{182} However, outside of the San Francisco Bay, the vast majority of Democrats in California consider themselves either Moderate or Conservative Democrats.\textsuperscript{183} Moderate or Conservative Democrats are far more likely to support policies that recommend emigration as a government-sponsored crisis response than their loyal liberal minority Democratic counterparts, based on the tenants of progressive ideology.\textsuperscript{184} In summary, support for the policy will come down to whether influential Democratic party leaders such as “civil justice warriors” Senator Holly J. Mitchell, Governor Newsom, and Supervisor Ridley-Thomas are willing to present CAOA to their colleagues and constituents as one of many necessary emergency-level responses to the homelessness crisis. Though skepticism of leadership in LA County persists, Democratic Leadership's constituents predominantly want to see services expanded and the crisis resolved at all costs.

Political Strategies/Tactics to Reduce Costs:

Numerous strategies could be implemented in order to reduce the political costs of CAOA. Firstly, broad consensus amongst Democratic leadership must be reached as a “safety-in-numbers” attempt to stave off


any skepticism that the bill represents conservative values before liberal ones. Broad support for the bill should be fostered prior to its arrival on Governor Newsom’s desk. Secondly, progressive and pointed marketing campaigns leading up to the roll-out of AOL will not only expand the program’s reach and promote its utilization, optimizing its chances of success, but will also provide elected officials championing CAOA the opportunity to speak directly to their constituents and assuage any concerns. CAOA’s proponents should host numerous Q&A panels about the AOL program, not only to raise awareness of its existence and its potential for homelessness mitigation, but also to speak to expected criticism.

In order to further optimize CAOA and AOL’s chances of success, the Task Force assigned to designing the AOL program and securing its partnerships should be well-prepared and well-organized, with clear intent to match applicants with high-quality minimum-wage job opportunities in regions that undoubtedly offer affordable housing. The most damning circumstance to pose political threat to CAOA’s advocates is the possibility that AOL applicants could arrive in their new community and find that the jobs they were promised do not afford them the ability to live comfortably nearby. The Special LAHSA Task Force must cover all of their bases to ensure the work and living opportunities in partner regions are legitimate, decent, and have reasonable expectations of their employees and tenants as advertised. This should minimize any negative political fallout from CAOA for its proponents.

**Recommendation**

Many might argue that there are too many cons to make the suggestion of pursuing a pro-emigration policy in a blue state worthwhile—including the potential for refusal of Democratic leadership to champion a policy that could be viewed as exclusionary, the potential for back-lash from the Democratic base, and/or the potential for failure to recruit enough participants to the AOL program if implemented, which would render the policy fruitless. However, the minimal negative repercussions of these circumstances cannot outweigh the huge potential for alleviating a significant portion of the homelessness crisis should the policy succeed. For this reason, we strongly recommend that the Garcetti administration consider championing CAOA by ensuring that it is pushed through the California state legislative process immediately, with as much support from Democratic leadership as possible, and with plentiful resources in order to allow marketing of its AOL program to succeed once CAOA is passed.

Until today, two divisive ideologies have created stagnation regarding the mitigation of homelessness: a coalition of liberal lawmakers and constituents who feel compelled to crowd-fund programs that will ease the experience of homelessness by protecting the rights of vulnerable populations to remain in encampments and by expanding their access to public and health services, focusing on decriminalization and higher subsidization of living costs at the government’s expense in the name of equality—policies which statistics presented in this
memo have proven to have contributed significantly to the current health security crisis, and have made it far
easier for those at risk of or currently experiencing homeless to remain so rather than emigrate; and, a coalition
of powerful conservative influencers who have pushed the Trump administration and other powerful governmen-
tal entities preceding it to cut funding to health services, holistic case management, rent and living subsidization,
all cushions that currently keep tens of thousands of LA County residents afloat, as well as to criminalize home-
lessness, and generally reduce the existence of government-funded social safety nets, all in the name of responsi-
ble fiscal governance, leaving hundreds of thousands of low-income LA residents destitute and perpetuating a
cycle of underserved and at-risk individuals—policies which statistics presented in this memo have proven to
have also contributed significantly to the current crisis. Neither party has ever publicly acknowledged the poten-
tial to use policy to incentivize work-capable at-risk residents of LA County who are experiencing housing and
income insecurity to move elsewhere. However, both left-wing and right-wing policies have dramatically con-
tributed, both directly and indirectly, to the homelessness problem over the decades, demonstrating that home-
lessness in LA County is a bipartisan problem, and now, a bipartisan epidemic of epic proportions. It will, there-
fore, require a bipartisan and novel solution.

CAOA does not fit on any existing political platform—yet. It utilizes the best of both parties’ ideolo-
gies to promote conservative values such as economic movement, self-reliance and self-determination, fiscal
responsibility, and efficiency, and promotes liberal values such as governmental responsibility for assisting un-
dererved communities, compassionate governance, expansion of services in the CoC spectrum, the assurance of
dignified transitions for those in need, social justice, and equity. More apropos, it could incentivize, quicken, and
ease the emigration of tens of thousands of work-capable, work-eligible LA County residents who are already
homeless or likely to become homeless in the near future, freeing up finite government resources to be spent on
those LA County residents who are truly disabled and incapable of self-reliance. Popular opinion has until now
valued primarily allocating resources to this neediest of homeless demographics. However, CAOA would set a
new precedent and codify that not only is policy-driven emigration necessary during a state of emergency caused
by impacted markets, but that the neediest demographic requires it in order to be properly attended to. This bi-
partisan and revolutionary policy idea may not make too many political waves if Democratic leadership champi-
on it as one more program in the CoC arsenal, which is likely what would need to occur in order for its sur-
vival—but its ripples could expand to have lasting, long-term effects on the relationship between policymakers
and their constituents when the survival of their egregiously impacted region depends upon emigration. Such is
the case in LA County today. CAOA is immediately actionable and could, if successful, dramatically improve
the efficacy of existing policy efforts to reduce both causes and symptoms of homelessness in LA County.
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