“THE MAKING OF THE CAPITALIST MILITICIAN”

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A dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Baltimore, Maryland
March 2020

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ABSTRACT

Corruption is frequently regarded as the single greatest obstacle preventing growth and development in Nigeria. In explaining this challenging condition, scholars have consistently applied descriptors like endemic, crippling, rampant, and destructive to characterize its extreme presence. Despite wide-ranging literature on the subject, corruption’s puzzling persistence in Nigeria is seldom directly explained or completely understood. When pursued, scholarship has been exceedingly divided as Nigeria’s corruption condition is either evaluated by internal variables such as culture or assessed through external factors like global demands for resources. This dichotomous tendency has placed corruption analyses in competing corners. Consequently, unified methods are missing in the literature. To address this gap, I explain the development of corruption by integrating internal and external analyses of Nigeria’s political economy from 1970 - 2015. Through my integrated approach, this dissertation introduces the concept of The Capitalist Militician™, a new institutional actor and arbiter of state power in Nigeria that represents the melding of military agent, political agent, and capital agent. I explore the evolution of this figure by utilizing a synthesized framework built on four exogenous variables and four endogenous conditions. The exogenous variables are related to external global capital and include (1) Twentieth-century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, (2) Globalized development policies, (3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, and (4) Multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, and natural resources. The endogenous conditions represent internal institutional characteristics such as (1) Underdevelopment, (2) Incoherence, (3) Political materialism, and (4) Capital consciousness. Taken together, these eight
elements are constitutive of TCM’s formulation, and thereby explain the evolution of corruption in Nigeria. Based on archival research, surveys, and personal interviews with over 60 military officials, this dissertation evaluates the rise of corruption through the rise of TCM and challenges two widely held divergent conclusions: corruption is either rooted in the internal cultural residue of colonialism, or corruption is externally caused by economic dependency of resource exploitation. Instead, I argue that the development of corruption is more clearly understood by pursuing a synthesized analysis of both internal and external variables, which in Nigeria’s case surrounds the emergence of TCM. This study is part of an underutilized but growing body of multi-method research on corruption that demands further attention. My findings reveal that the synthesis of singular methods presents new pathways of understanding and can offer significant contributions to future corruption scholarship. Furthermore, when internal and external variables are analyzed in concert, not competition, more comparative opportunities arise to better examine the development of corruption across time and space.

Defense Committee:
Angus Burgin
Erin Chung
Michael Degani
Michael Hanchard
Robbie Shilliam
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project came to fruition through the impactful role played by multiple people on two continents and across four academic institutions. I would like first to acknowledge all the assistance I received through the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. I am particularly appreciative of the early stage organizing that facilitated my research program abroad. Many thanks to all of the participants, agents, facilitators, staff members, archivists, and fellow researchers involved in the data gathering process both in the United States and Nigeria. In particular, special thanks goes to Ahmed Yousef and Joseph Musa for their coordinating efforts in Nigeria concerning the aggregation of military and civilian participants, respectively.

I am grateful to Northwestern University for not only shaping my early academic pursuits in comparative politics as an undergraduate student, but for welcoming me back years later to the Herskovitz Library of African Studies to conduct archival analysis. I would like to additionally recognize Stanford University, specifically the Hoover Institution. Through their generosity, I was able to conduct research that proved crucial to the completion of this project. I remain honored and grateful to have been chosen as one of Hoover’s doctoral research fellows. Finally, I am forever grateful to The Johns Hopkins University. My gratitude extends from my time as a Master’s student in DC, where I began to refine my intellectual interest in corruption, and through my most recent years in the doctoral program. I value all the experiences shared with professors in the department and amongst members of my cohort that have contributed to the completion of this Ph.D.

This project is the culmination of years of research, writing, revising, writing, editing, and writing even more. While the impetus for tackling an issue like corruption began decades ago as a child living in and traveling to Nigeria, this endeavor was more proximately influenced, shaped, and nurtured by several people. I would like to recognize Adam Sheingate and Daniel Scholzman for helping to establish my evaluative foundation of political development for this project. I also am grateful to Jane Guyer and Sara Berry for their early guidance in helping me grapple with and travel through the interdisciplinary landscape of African scholarship on corruption effectively. Special thanks to Angus Burgin, whose course on the History of Capitalism proved invaluable in the methodological construction of this project. I am
additionally grateful for his advice and counsel through my time at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. To my co-chairs, Michael Hanchard and Erin Chung, who have individually read more drafts and pages on TCM than anyone, without their unwavering support, this dissertation may not have been possible. I sincerely appreciate Mike’s guidance over the years. As a freshman in his classroom at Northwestern until now, I hold dear all of the many discussions that have brought me here. I am deeply indebted to Erin’s tireless efforts in coordinating and managing this dissertation and defense process. However, more than that, my intellectual identity was discovered and fully formed in her course on the Political Economy of Development. Without which I may not have been equipped with the adequate analytical apparatus that has helped define my research and writing throughout this dissertation.

I extend all of my gratitude to my inspiring parents, Irene and Eric, and to my supportive siblings, Nesochi, Chizzy, Lou-Lou, and Ody, who have each been a persistent and consistent source of encouragement and love. My family has been central to my intellectual development, mainly, my mother, who has always challenged me as a thinker and pushed us all towards academic excellence. I am grateful to each of my family members, as they have all individually helped me navigate the challenges of graduate school in one form or the other. Lastly, I have an overabundance of endless gratitude to my fiancee, Jade Faulkner, who, amongst several things, has been a willing and intelligent reader of my many, many essays, drafts, and chapters. She has been my copy editor at times, my conversation and ideation partner, my soundboard, and my staunchest critic. However, I remain most sincerely grateful for her caring friendship, timely humor, endless love, and unshakeable support, all of which have sustained and uplifted me throughout this process. Without her, this Ph.D. journey could not have been the same. -- One doc down, one doc to go!
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT**

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

**INTRODUCTION**

**CHAPTER 1 CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP: AN OVERVIEW**
- Situating TCM within extant corruption literature
- Connotations of corruption: Sliding scales and subjectivity
- Disciplinary diversity in the landscape of corruption scholarship
- Dichotomy within Africa’s corruption scholarship
- Comparative cases for unified corruption frameworks
- Unified methods in Africa corruption scholarship
- Conclusion

**CHAPTER 2 TCM, CAPITAL, AND CORRUPTION: HISTORICAL LINKS**
- Nigeria’s contemporary corruption condition
- History and development of Nigeria’s political economy
- TCM: Description and definition
- Corruption’s presence in Nigeria over time: 1970 - 2015
- Conclusion

**CHAPTER 3 EXOGENOUS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION**
- Transnational expansion of capital: A call to development
- Capitalism and corruption link
- Contemporary views on global capitalist development
- Four exogenous variables of global capital
- African and Asian comparative cases
- Conclusion

**CHAPTER 4 ENDOGENOUS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION**
- Nigeria’s internal institutional configuration
- TCM in Nigeria’s contemporary political history
- Military and/in democracy: A blurred line
- Four endogenous institutional conditions
- TCM, foreign capital, and Nigeria’s development projects
- TCM, foreign direct investment, and Nigeria’s oil
- Conclusion

**CHAPTER 5 CORRUPTION AND THE CO-EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY OF TCM THROUGH MILITARY AND NON MILITARY VOICES**
- Introduction
- Methods
- Results
- Discussion
- Conclusion

**CONCLUSION**
APPENDIX A: MAPPING AND TRACKING A CO-EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK 277
APPENDIX B: QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION: MILITARY INTERVIEWS 281
APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION: PUBLIC SURVEYS 290
APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA COLLECTION 295
BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
CURRICULUM VITAE 310
INTRODUCTION

“YOU MUST PAY THEM!” The booming voice of a soldier bellowed from the front seat. The base of his rifle brushed my right knee as I angled forward. I stopped to briefly gaze at his green and brown camouflage uniform, puzzled that the soldier sitting inside the car so closely resembled the rugged man standing outside. They wore the same uniform; he, too, was a soldier. I saw his face through the window. He leaned in and muttered, "So what do you have for me?" I was eight years old sitting next to two of my sisters in the dusty backseat of a gray Volvo in the dead of night. Our family was traveling from Lagos to Enugu, and there I watched corruption unfold -- one soldier inside the car, paid to guard our passage; the other soldier standing outside, paid to allow it.

There was stark silence as the soldier outside eagerly reached into his left chest pocket to pull out his growing stack of bills. "Yes, it is complete" he said, barely glancing up as he added our Naira to his collection. The image of that soldier dwindled into the night as we drove away; however, that moment never receded from my memory. At an early age corruption appeared to me, and seemingly others, as the norm in Nigeria. Driving with hired armed security, roadside military checkpoints, police bribes, and political payoffs were simply business as usual. One didn’t look away or balk, for it was not only accepted, but expected.
NIGERIA’S PUZZLING STATE OF CORRUPTION

In 1960, the year of Nigeria’s Independence, renowned Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe warned, “The government is ‘they’, and they have nothing to do with you or me. It is an alien institution and people’s business is to get as much from it as they can without getting into trouble.”¹ Later, in 1983, Nigeria was notably described by African scholar Yusuf Bangura as, “The government of the contractors by the contractors and for the contractors.”² By 1991, the corruption I encountered on that late-night drive was merely a fraction of the abuses occurring throughout Nigeria. This included the mismanagement and siphoning of nearly 3 billion dollars from a single Gulf oil project that year alone.³ Cases of corruption and state profligacy in Nigeria abound. The numbers are too vast to count and the offenses are too staggering to believe. From 1960 to date, several measures to eradicate and contend with corruption have been employed. Despite these efforts to curtail corruption, it has continued unabatedly in Nigeria.

In the midst of Nigeria’s post-independence era of endless political transition, there have been two constants: a steadfast military presence and unbridled corruption. Comprehending the degree to which they both associate, correlate, or are causal, propels this research. Corruption is consistently the explanation for Nigeria’s seemingly unsolvable problems of development, yet it is seldom explained. Corruption is argued to have, “Degraded the moral values and apparatuses necessary for Nigeria’s socio-economic and political development.”⁴ Corruption has further been identified as, “The most prominent element that mitigates against the proper marshaling of

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
resources in a country that is simultaneously Africa’s largest economy, and the poverty capital of the world.”⁵ Nigeria’s recent issues of terrorism have equally been blamed on corruption, as contemporary scholarship contends, “We need only point to corruption to understand the Boko Haram insurgency that has overtaken Nigeria.”⁶ Despite the extensive acknowledgement of corruption, there has been minimal investigation of when and how corruption became an integral part of the political landscape in Nigeria. That is, who are the “they” that Achebe warned us about in 1960? Who are the contractors Bangura described in 1983? Who were we paying on that dark road traveling to Enugu, late at night in 1991? To better understand corruption and its ubiquity, the primary question of this study becomes: How did political corruption develop and manifest in Nigeria between 1970 and 2015? The answer, I argue, surrounds the evolution of what I term, The Capitalist Militician.™

THE ARGUMENT FOR THE CAPITALIST MILITICIAN AND CORRUPTION

The Capitalist Militician (TCM) represents the melding of military agent of security, state agent of political power, and economic agent of capital accumulation and distribution in Nigeria into one institutional actor and arbiter of state power. TCM exists as a singular triumvirate public figure and operates at the nexus of politics, economics, and state institutions. Or as directly expressed in an interview with a retired colonel in the Nigerian Army, “We [the military] are trained to kill, if you motivate us, we can do anything. If the job is to guard the country, run the country, or guard the economy, we must do it. Don’t you know the military built the economy of


Nigeria? Not to mention the political system in Nigeria, which has long been established, and is still influenced by the military today.”

In exploring the making of TCM, my postulate explaining discriminate levels of political corruption in Nigeria is anchored by economic liberalism, global capital, and the exogenous and endogenous consequences of their proliferation. The ubiquity of corruption in Nigeria has traditionally been examined in two ways. First, through single internal variables rooted in post-colonial histories, such as social capital, cultural/primordial traditions, tribalism, or local institutions. Second, Nigeria’s corruption condition has otherwise been examined through single external variables rooted in resource exploitation and economic dependency analyses. Rather than employing a divided approach, I unite both internal and external analyses of Nigeria’s political economy to explain corruption. This study represents a direct pivot away from the dominant corruption scholarship that looks to explain the phenomenon in a distinctly internal or external mode of analysis.

My work reveals how Nigeria’s insertion into an external landscape influenced by transnational capitalist interest and economic liberalism had disastrous internal consequences. The liberal capitalist development doctrine of the mid to late twentieth century instructed state participation in economic policy, and thus activated state agents that combined military might, political influence, and economic capital capacity in a singular vessel of power and decision making in Nigeria. Although the external capital processes that led to the making of TCM can be observed across other developing regions, TCM, I argue, is unique to Nigeria’s political

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7 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Colonel (Retired), Years of Service - 35+
8 See chapter 1 literature review for a detailed explanation of “internal-based” literature.
9 See chapter 1 literature review for a detailed explanation of “external-based” literature.
economy. That is not to say parallel roles do not exist elsewhere. However, TCM is distinct and singular in construction. As TCM evolves in Nigeria, the stakes increase and global capitalism attenuates corruption.

The evolution of this figure in Nigeria, also reveals the broader nexus of capitalism, development, and corruption. Specifically, TCM symbolizes the institutional transformation that occurs when foreign capital expansion collides with local institutions in post-colonial African states in the name of economic development. In this sense, there are potential parallels of Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician across the developing world. The uniqueness of TCM however, lies in the figures specific interaction with foreign capital, its subsequent institutional development in relation to the incentives and constraints surrounding that capital, and the formalized corrupt activation and accumulation of capital.

This study aims to identify and explain how corruption developed in Nigeria from 1970 - 2015 through the making of TCM. The periodization for this study is chosen for specific reasons, both internally and externally. Internally, 1970 marks a turning point during Nigeria’s post-independence era that witnessed a structural change in the dynamics of political competition in the country. At that time, three diverse regions emerged: North, East, and West differing demographically, economically, socially, and educationally. Vying with one another in an increasingly hostile competition for power at the center, set the stage for decades of institutional tribal antagonisms and contestation for political and economic power. Post civil war Nigeria additionally marks the moment when state-building and political and economic institutional formation began to unfold in the country.

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10See chapter 2 for detailed discussion of parallel figures to TCM.
Externally, the 1970s represent a shift in the global economic landscape. Reconfigured international trade and monetary policies contributed to economic disasters in both the developed and developing world in the form of monetary, oil, debt, and capital control crises. Moreover, multinational corporate interests, neo-imperial resource pursuits, and foreign direct investments in Nigeria caused the abrupt rise and maturation of the country’s natural resources. The oil sector specifically was rapidly formalized, and Nigeria’s energy position became globally impactful post-1970. Therefore, the period of 1970 - 2015 denotes a pivotal era in Nigerian history where corruption was not only formally institutionalized, but where it further became a phenomenon of social, political, and economic relevance.

The internal and external considerations do not only order the epoch of this study, but they also order the analytical framework that follows. In realigning the paradigm through which corruption is understood and examined, I have identified a constitutive link to both exogenous and endogenous inputs by exploring the evolution of TCM. Through the examination of the figure’s emergence both internally and externally, this study will reveal causal elements of corruption’s development in Nigeria. As corruption’s ubiquity is well established, the intended task of this dissertation is not designating a specific point of origin, but rather delineating how political corruption became so widespread in Nigeria over a specific period of time against the backdrop of the capitalist world economy.

With regard to TCM, this dissertation will explore how the role of the military acts upon the presence of corruption in the political economy of Nigeria’s development. This study is significant as it first reframes the analyses of corruption as non-normative and context-reliant. Second, it unifies varied monocausal methods of corruption that align with either distinctly
internal or external causality, by providing a renewed paradigm of analysis. Finally, it identifies a new conceptual object of analysis that serves as the fulcrum for studying the political economy of development in Nigeria and further informs an innovative approach to examine political and economic phenomena, such as corruption, in other potentially comparative regions.

**EXOGENOUS/ENDOGENOUS CO-EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK**

To further explain the ascent of TCM, and the subsequent political economy of corruption in Nigeria, this study puts forth an exogenous/endogenous co-evolutionary framework. Specifically, I argue that a combination of exogenous and endogenous variables instigated a new political actor in Nigeria. This figure emerged within the context of a set of incentives and constraints that existed with respect to the relationship between global capital and Nigeria’s internal political institutions.

The exogenous analysis examines global markets, liberalism, capitalist development in the twentieth century, and the making of the contemporary world economy. My work aims to analyze the intersection of mandated state economic coordination in the twentieth century, the renewed orthodoxy of economic liberalism, and the promotion of free market development policies. I investigate how global economic statecraft and policy mandates, through both statist and liberal models, were promulgated and institutionalized throughout the twentieth century in the name of a new economic liberal world order. This shift in the economic landscape resulted in unforeseen capital flows and economic exchange, which together caused specific local political and economic conditions in Nigeria. The resulting institutional transformation directly led to the restructured power position and formation of TCM and, ultimately, to increased corruption. This process defines the relationship between global capital and the four primary exogenous variables.
through which TCM is examined. They include 1) Twentieth-century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, which serve as the foundation for global capitalist transformation and produced free market economic models that instigated notions of twentieth century development. 2) Globalized development policies, which represent tangible applications and examples of liberal ideology in practice. 3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, which illustrate the effects of development policies and the consequences of activating liberal economic models. And 4) Multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, and natural resources, which represent another channel of global capital flows into Nigeria. Each of these variables provide a specific incentive or constraint for political leaders in Nigeria, and together create an external verticality of power, whereby internal political agents are directly influenced by external global capitalists interests.

The interrelation of exogenous variables lead to my second explanatory segment, the endogenous, which examines the political and economic modalities of post civil war Nigeria through an internal institutional analysis that focuses on the military’s direct integration into politics, policy, and state institutions. In this pathway, TCM is analyzed through the relationship between four primary endogenous conditions of political institutions in Nigeria; they include, 1) Institutional underdevelopment, which represents the military’s insertion into politics and Nigeria’s subsequent delayed state building pathway. 2) Institutional incoherence, which illustrates the inverse relationship of the military and political nexus, whereby the latter also began to influence the former. 3) Institutional political materialism, which depicts the evolutionary relationship of politics, the military, and capital. And 4) Institutional capital
consciousness, which represents the heightened institutional awareness of capital accumulation and the diffusion of this awareness to society more broadly.

Together, the four endogenous conditions exist and function in conjunction with the four exogenous variables to explain how external capitalist interests constructed a new public actor in Nigeria, TCM. As TCM ascended, so too did the accumulative actions of the position. This shift resulted in new methods of capital exchange and capital transfer within the public-private dialectic in Nigeria’s political economy.

EXAMINING INFLUENCES AND FOUNDATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP

My hypothesis is grounded in a Marxist tradition of scholarship that links capitalism to corruption and identifies the political power negotiations and exploitative relationships that are activated from capitalist pursuits. I build upon components of Marx’s interpretation of industrial capitalism that views the export of capital to underdeveloped regions as a form of imperialism, and distinguishes capital accumulation from profit maximization. As further argued by Lenin, imperialism revolves around the systematic exploitation of poor economies whereby their value is extracted by global capital based principally in rich economies, and in part involves the exportation of capital from the latter to the former.¹¹

Furthermore, the expansion of transnational capital is designed towards capital accumulative ends, not local social demands.¹² When foreign capital is deployed in a country like Nigeria, although it is administered through public institutions that are designed to provide local public good, that capital is installed with foreign interests in mind. This points to the inherent


tension amongst public power, social interests, foreign capital, and private wealth, linking
capitalism to corruption and capital exploitation to political struggle.

My hypothesis is also grounded in Samuel Huntington’s work on modernization and
instability. Huntington observed,

“It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it that produce political
disorder…In the modernization of the non-western parts of the world, however, the problems of
the centralization of authority, national integration, social mobilization, economic development,
political participation, and social welfare have arisen not sequentially but simultaneously. If poor
countries appear to be unstable [corrupt] it is not because they are poor, but because they are
trying to become rich.”¹³

The global call to modernity, as explained by Huntington, is a pilot switch that ignites a
process of destabilization, whereby would-be developing countries are forced to operate within a
system that they are not institutionally equipped to manage. Without such external interference,
developing nations might have the chance to progress differently. Instead, the external call to
modernize has meaningful internal consequences for development, which, in this case, is
corruption. Therefore, liberal capitalist outputs, both external and internal (capital flows), is the
independent variable. TCM is the intervening variable, and corruption stands as the dependent
variable in this study.

My conception of TCM further builds upon Huntington’s argument that the rapid
mobilization of new groups into politics during periods of development and modernization,
coupled with lagging construction of institutions, creates instability. Similarly, TCM was
mobilized into Nigerian politics as a direct result of economic policy mandates to promote
Modernization and economic development in largely the same manner outlined by Huntington.
He further contends, “Modernization also contributes to corruption by creating new sources of

¹³ Huntington, Political Order
wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined.” Huntington astutely points to Modernization’s contribution to corruption through several other mechanisms including, public moral shifts and political transformations through government laws and regulations. Whereas Huntington reveals these elements individually, this study combines them through the examination of TCM. Additionally, Huntington intimates a foundational characteristic of TCM as he describes elements of Africa’s political economy, “In Africa, corruption threw a bridge between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart during the initial stages of African nationalist governments, to assimilate each other.” This study, however, suggests a link that goes beyond assimilation and argues that through TCM, such features were fully combined in Nigeria.

Finally, my hypothesis is informed by the work Jean-François Bayart who, when explaining corruption, places primacy on the global economic landscape. Bayart understands corruption only in the context of a dominant international economic network of institutional criminalization. Bayart affirms,

“The increasingly evident interaction between the formation of the state, the primitive accumulation of capital, war, and illicit economic activity has its origin in the specific experiences of societies as much as in the degree of contact with the international economy of crime.”


15 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Here Huntington also makes reference to the military’s role in politics during modernization and claims, in what he labels “praetorianism” that such interventions are an inseparable part of the process, whatever the continent and whatever the country. Huntington’s military argument is not included as foundational to TCM because he also argues that the causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political, and therefore reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society. Contrastingly, TCM’s development in Nigeria is not primarily due to the role or internal logic of politics. Rather TCM’s construction results from the role of external capital and economic logics acting upon internal political institutions AND specific characteristics of Nigeria’s military establishment. A more detailed discussion of this process with respect to TCM appears in chapter 4.

In linking the formation of state institutions and the accumulation of capital within a larger international economic community, Bayart argues towards the similar interplay of exogenous and endogenous variables as proposed in this study. I also examine the critical role that international economic development and global capitalism have with regard to the expansion of corruption in Nigeria. Specifically, I argue the dialectic of local and global economics created TCM by producing and motivating action, power, and position. Bayart is more Gramsci than Marx in that the international network he describes is less a new dominant class in terms of production, and more a hegemonic formation in terms of international oligarchic structures. Likewise, I extend an exogenous argument that places the starting point to understanding political corruption, not in the internal cultural consequences of British colonization in Nigeria during the nineteenth century, but rather, principally, in the external ideological evolution of global capitalist development in the twentieth century. In hegemonic terms, I adopt elements of neo-Gramscian analysis that deconstructs the various ideological and practical superstructural agencies that have been created by neoliberal principles.17

The exploration of TCM bridges these three traditions in the following ways. First, the global economic landscape as reviewed with a neo-Gramscian lens like Bayart’s international economy of capital accumulation and crime, places TCM as the state agent through which economic mandates of hegemonic superstructures such as the World Bank and IMF, are implemented. Then, the Marxist capitalism to corruption link is reflected in TCM as well. If industrial capital and the export of capital to underdeveloped regions occurs as a form of

imperialism, then TCM becomes the primary intermediary of transnational capital and its accumulative design in Nigeria. Finally, TCM also exemplifies the outcome of Huntington’s model of modernization as a form of development, whereby new sources of wealth and power interact with state politics in new undefined ways, often resulting in instability and corruption.

CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION

The most widely used definition of corruption today is offered by the World Bank and Transparency International. They each define corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain.” Although this classification aims to be all-encompassing it is quite vague and results in the attachment of various connotations, and consequently, a lack of clarity across scholarship. The American Heritage Dictionary is more expansive and defines corruption as

“A lack of integrity or honesty (especially susceptibility to bribery): use of a position of trust for dishonesty: in a state of progressive putrefaction: moral perversion: impairment of virtue and moral principles: inducement (as of a public official) by improper means (as bribery) to violate duty.” In the Nigerian context, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act defines corruption as, “actions that include bribery, fraud, and other related offenses.”

General definitions of corruption denote the act very differently, contrasting moral-ethical considerations with public-private dynamics of structure and agency.

The concept of corruption is one that proves both real and illusory. On one hand, corruption can be openly and visibly manifested through real acts such as bribery and embezzlement. On the other hand, observing less obvious occurrences of corruption that have more to do with power reciprocities than a direct monetary exchange, like cronyism and clientelism, can be more troublesome. Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins describe corruption’s

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18 Nigeria Corrupt Practices Act 2000
complicated nature arguing, “It is frustrating to try and write, one’s phrases wrapped in a cocoon of ambiguity, about something which everybody knows, which no one dares openly acknowledge, which can rarely be proved.” Similarly, Anecharo and Jacobs declare, “Corruption is neither a single form of behavior nor an obvious species of conduct; corruption is the name we apply to some reciprocities by some people in some context at some times.” These scholars aim to illustrate the confounding nature of corruption, and in doing so make several observations. As an object of analysis, the phenomena of corruption makes its study extremely complex. The complexity is further exacerbated as accurately assigning a definition for the term, and consistently identifying or classifying its presence, is equally problematic. Perhaps most challenging, however, is deciphering how the term corruption is thrown around and applied indiscriminately.

While there is no commonly used definition of corruption, the following frequently cited studies serve as examples that reflect the simultaneous variability and overly vast application of the term. While Rose-Ackerman defines corruption as a behavioral shift that concerns individual action as objectively violating public rules, Gould defines corruption collectively, as

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21 Complex in this sense mirrors Yuen Ang’s discussion of complex systems in How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press 2016), which describes complex systems as comprising of many moving parts that interact with one another and change together, triggering outcomes that cannot be precisely controlled or predicted in advance. Human bodies are an example of complex systems. Political economies, comprising many players, many institutions, and many interactions, are complex.

that which describes a society or state that has lapsed from a standard of goodness. Rotberg conversely, views corruption as discrimination at the input stage of the political process. While Krueger frames corruption within institutions as reflective of principal-agent relationships in government and the rent creation that follows from a set of controls. Rose-Ackerman points to agency and rational choice drivers of individual action that occur against the intended objectives of public office. Rotberg and Krueger both denote corruption in an institutional sense and point to structural distortions and subsequent abuses of power and resource. Gould contrastingly suggests corruption is a moral failure where actions are perpetrated against authority and a universal standard of behavior. These definitions can more broadly be grouped as behavioral typologies (Rose-Ackerman and Gould), or institutional typologies (Kruger and Rotberg).

Despite their variance, what these definitions share in common, is a reference to corruption in terms of deviation from an assumed inherent standard system or mode of behavior. Even if such a presumption is taken as a consistent baseline for corruption, the definitions remain problematic because departures from a particular value system, be it political or social, do not necessarily constitute corruption in a strictly normative sense.

For example, if a system inherently limits human potential or stratifies people socially through race, ethnicity, caste, or religion, and such “lower” persons become socially mobile via corrupt acts like bribery or power negotiations, have they engaged in corruption? They have certainly violated their societies’ systems and established framework. Or are their actions, which are in defiance of an immoral system, allowable and therefore not corrupt? Can the system in question be justifiably deemed moral or immoral in the first place? And if so, who decides what
direction the compass of universal morality should point? Who becomes the umpire of social action?

Corruption is steeped in subjectivity. It is both moral and legal, both structural and individual. Further, how is the relationship between private gain and public good designated within the given definitions of corruption? Where Rose-Ackerman describes a relationship-driven by the expectation of the state institution, Gould explains corruption as an intersection of private immoral action perpetrated against public moral good. This relationship becomes even more tenuous when applying Weber’s argument on corruption. Weber points out that public office was historically regarded as a source of income to be exploited for rents, and only in modern times has the expectation of public office shifted. As Weber argues,

“In exchange for the rendering of certain services, as was normally the case in the Middle Ages. It is decisive for the modern loyalty of an office that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person, like the vassal’s or disciple’s faith under feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes.”

Corruption, as an act and as an identifiable construct, is therefore non-normative as standards of behavior shift across time and space. Additionally, corruption can be equally multiple within a specific region at separate points in its historical development. As argued by Huntington,

“Political life in eighteenth-century America and in twentieth-century America, it would appear, was less corrupt than in nineteenth-century America. So also political life in seventeenth-century Britain and in late nineteenth-century Britain was, it would appear, less corrupt than it was in eighteenth-century Britain?”


24 Samuel Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies, (Yale University Press, 1968), 59.
Corruption’s variability is further evident in the manner in which it has been studied and explained. Paul Heywood asserts,

“The complexity of the phenomenon makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the causes of political corruption. However, some central analytical issues can be outlined. A question which inevitably arises is why some countries appear more prone than others to political corruption: are there cultural causes of corruption, or does the emergence of political corruption depend upon more institutional factors?”25

Thus, if the mechanisms of corruption, namely the public-private dynamic, can change over time, how have static meanings or classifications come to affect corruption scholarship? There are two primary consequences. The first consequence has been the reductionist nature of both the term and the analysis. Specifically, most examinations of corruption intend to discuss drastically different things in different moments in different regions, all using a single term.26 The second consequence has been the dichotomous grouping of frames of analysis that examine corruption singularly, in “either-or” terms. For example, corruption has been analyzed from an internal vantage that explores a nation’s historic consequence or cultural predisposition. Corruption has also been examined from an external vantage that investigates economic outcomes, global capital, or global political ideology. In either case, corruption scholarship has

\[\text{Paul Heywood, “Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives” Political Studies, 45 issue 3, (1997)}\]

\[\text{Acts of corruption are seldom uniform across time and space. Consequently, the meaning continues to shift with its user or its observer, potentially creating a variety of scholarly inquisition that analyzes vastly different phenomenon under a singular umbrella term, resulting in analytical misinterpretation, misjudgment, and mismatching. In fact, Pippidi argues, what we label corruption in these [developing] countries is not the same phenomenon as corruption in developed countries. In the latter, the term corruption usually designates individual cases of infringement of the norm of integrity. In the former, corruption actually means “particularism”—a mode of social organization characterized by the regular distribution of public goods on a non universalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power within such societies. (Pippidi p87)}\]

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become increasingly mono-causal as works tend to pursue only one explanatory frame of analysis at a time.\textsuperscript{27}

Given the variety of corruption, whether clientelism, patronage, cronyism, or embezzlement, coupled with the wide-ranging geographical and temporal applications, along with the often binary explanatory framing of internal or external, corruption scholarship is often condensed into a single theoretical box, with a single definitional classification, all investigated through a single frame of explanatory analysis. Therefore, although universally established in human and social consciousness, corruption cannot be universally determined or diagnosed. Rather the study of corruption should be more context-specific and targeted, complete with designated parameters for time, place, and extended environment. As argued by Pippidi,

\begin{quote}
“Corruption can therefore only be understood in conjunction with the stage of development of a particular state or society; it makes little sense to discuss corruption in relation to a patrimonial or absolutist state, as the norm that applies within such societies is certainly not universalism. Only after the modernization of the West European state was completed—and government became firmly based on the assumption that public goods (from law and order to jobs in the public sector) would be distributed equally and fairly as a norm—can we meaningfully begin to discuss corruption in Europe.\textsuperscript{28}”
\end{quote}

Ultimately, corruption is not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted universal norms as it is the deviance of norms from established patterns of behavior at different points in a state’s development. The definitional contestation of corruption makes the alignment of scholarship on the subject equally confounding.

\textsuperscript{27} Corruption can take many different shapes in many different contexts. For example if the research topic is a late twentieth century study of clientelism and cronyism in East Asian nations, or a late nineteenth century analysis of US political machines and electoral rigging, should the title under which they are each identified accurately be classified as corruption? Unfortunately, the practice of reducing all varieties of corruption into one term, has become dominant. Further when attempting to explain corruption, studies typically incline either towards internal frames of analysis that look at the historical construction of state’s institutions, cultural and social legacies, or other endogenous factors. Or external frames of analysis that highlight the world system, globalization, global capital, or other exogenous variables acting upon a state.

\textsuperscript{28} Alina Mangiu Pippidi, “Corruption Diagnosis and Treatment” \textit{Journal of Democracy, 17 no.3} (2006), 87.
ALIGNING CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP

Corruption scholarship is largely interdisciplinary, cutting across Political Science, Sociology, History, Economics, and Anthropology. This variability makes aligning studies of corruption very difficult. However, the methods of study can be best identified and placed in certain containers of analysis, which include the following mechanisms of exploration: 1) Identification: Definitional, Descriptive, and Measurement Studies, 2) Conceptual: Explanatory, Theoretical Models, and Determinant Studies, 3) Outcome: Consequences and Effects, Prescriptions, and Solutions Studies. A more fulsome review of the dominant mechanisms and the methods used to explore them, particularly concerning Nigerian corruption, will be provided in later chapters. But in order to best situate the intended study of corruption for this research project, a brief evaluation of each of the above mechanisms is necessary.


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causation, exploring the origin, antecedents, and development of corruption, both in a general sense or in specific contexts.\textsuperscript{30} Outcome analysis explores the residue of corruption. And while it may overlap with conceptual or identification analyses, outcome research is less concerned with why or how corruption evolved and is far more interested in its consequences.\textsuperscript{31}

Amidst the veritable carousel of meanings and interpretations of corruption, this study builds upon several elements presented above that point to the tension among private wealth, public power, and self-interest. Particularly, this study incorporates Pippidi’s argument towards more distinctive definitions of corruption that incorporate a region’s stage of development.


Additionally, acknowledgment is given to Johnston’s assertion, “in studying corruption we should be aware that our definitions may vary according to the questions we wish to ask and the settings within which we ask them.” Further, this study’s investigation of corruption in Nigeria focuses primarily on political acts of corruption. As “most of the corruption in developing and post-communist countries is inherently political”, this focus is considered most apposite.

The dissertation operates with the following definition of corruption: The misuse or improper use (meaning a use counter to what is expressly intended or designated) of public office and positions of power for private gain in terms of monetary allocation and/or distribution of non-monetary favors, promises, considerations, and reciprocities during a designated period of development in a specified region. Corruption is, therefore, not only about the country or locality but also reflects the historical timing identified and how certain kinds of behavior are not necessarily always uniform. This is not to say corruption is all relative. Rather, the definition implies that corruption can be variable. Acts that are deemed improper can and will shift across spatial and temporal contexts so that acts designated as “corrupt” must be defined in specific relation to the time and space in which the term is being used.

This particular discussion of corruption in Nigeria relates to distinct actions that concern the exchange or transfer of capital away from the intended use and management of that resource as was expressly understood within the context of Nigeria’s political institutions. Such actions include monetary inducements, bribes, embezzlement, misappropriation, laundering, kickbacks,


\[33\] Pippidi, “Corruption Diagnosis and Treatment”

\[34\] i.e. promotion of public good and welfare of its citizens. See Constitution of Nigeria; First Republic, Second Republic, Third Republic, Fourth Republic.
inflation of contracts, facilitation payments, resource reallocation or gift-giving. If such capital flow occurs in the context of the public-private dialectic, by or between the position of power identified and occupied by TCM, corruption is present. This includes monetary transactions within public service, modes of public procurement, state and federal administrations, allocation and management of natural resources, and drafting and designing of law and legislation. My goal is not to go through the entire definitional scholarship of corruption. Rather, I have highlighted the preceding definitions and parameters to distinguish the particular notions of corruption relevant to this study. The aim is to proceed with corruption analysis rooted in carefully defined parameters, for any alternative framing falls victim to the aforementioned ambiguities.

AFRICAN AND NIGERIAN CORRUPTION

Although corruption is ubiquitous throughout the world, its forms are variable and highly divergent. According to the Transparency International 2018 Corruption Perception Index, Western European nations continue to rank as least corrupt, when compared to Sub-Saharan African countries that rank as most corrupt. Thus, while corruption in some form or another is known in every society, in Africa it appears exceptional. My dissertation attends to this exceptionalism by responding to the questions: What is so distinctive about corruption in Africa and Nigeria? What factors contribute to corruption’s historic and long-lasting presence in Nigeria? Are there specific conditions, both internal and external, that explain the development of corruption in Nigeria? The crucial task of this project is to uncover the key factors, both historically and contemporarily, that allowed and continue to allow corruption to be so inescapable in Nigeria.

But why Nigeria? Corruption has been a consistent theme surrounding the economic
development of African nations and is often regarded as the cause or consequence of
underdevelopment. Even within this oversimplified characterization of Africa as the land of the
corrupt, Nigeria is considered noteworthy. As a nation, Nigeria is less than sixty years old, yet
boasts as extensive a history of corruption as many much older countries around the world. The
extraordinary scope of corruption in Nigeria is described in many forms including massive
contract fraud, petty bribery, institutional embezzlement, and complicated money laundering
schemes. Additionally, reports and commentary about corruption are a staple of the country’s
vibrant media, and corruption similarly remains ever-popular in official and academic narratives.
As Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation, the remarkable incidence of corruption is
immense.  
Scholarship across the social sciences have long sought to explain how corruption
arose so drastically in Nigeria.

The Nigeria-based corruption literature can be divided broadly into two kinds of analysis;
those that explain corruption through internal mechanisms and those that explain corruption
through external mechanisms. Internal analyses investigate corruption through a historical
institutional lens that highlights elements of embedded culture and social capital derived from

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36 Page argues that Nigerians themselves view their country as one of the world’s most corrupt; it perennially
ranks in the bottom quartile of Corruption Indices. Narratives about corruption in Nigeria are expansive and
colonial and historical antecedents. Conversely, external analyses examine corruption from the perspective of economic dependency, which points to the exchange of resources flowing from an underdeveloped periphery of states to developed core countries in an interconnected world system.

Both strands of corruption literature offer invaluable insights that help explain the presence of corruption in Nigeria. Internal and external accounts each highlight a different piece of the grand puzzle of Nigerian corruption. There are internal cultural components like patrimonial politics that surely impact the increasing presence of corruption. Similarly, economic dependency legacies of natural resource exploitation that produce rent-seeking behaviors and patrimonial politics that surely impact the increasing presence of corruption. Similarly, economic dependency legacies of natural resource exploitation that produce rent-seeking behaviors and

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38 See Douglas A. Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa: oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon.* (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, 1996), Terry Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States.* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1997), and SADCC: *Prospects for disengagement and development in Southern Africa* edited by Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala and Ibbo Mandaza (London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Zed Books; Tokyo, The United Nations University; 1987), for examples of such external frameworks. Yates explains corruption through the condition of rentierism, a condition that occurs when a state is defined by the domination of substantial amounts of external rent for a singular resource, which in Nigeria’s case is oil. Rentierism focuses on the “rentier” who “acts as a social agent who does not actively participate in the production process yet still shares in the fruits of the product. Karl links the economic exploitative process of oil economies to the construction of a particular strain of social and political institutions that disallow proper state functionality. Part of this construction, especially in the Nigerian case, is revenue dispersal which is the breeding ground for political corruption. Amin describes how resource rich African nations like Nigeria are subjected to the consequences of the world system and the interplay of core and periphery which directly engineer the state of poverty, underdevelopment, and corruption.

other externally motivated pathologies of governance are undoubtedly relevant to comprehend the presence of corruption in Nigeria. Each form of analysis provides a different piece of the corruption puzzle that is essential. Yet, neither internal nor external analyses individually have fully revealed how existing puzzle pieces interact and aggregate to describe a more complete picture of Nigeria’s political economy of corruption. Both colonialism and democracy are great examples that each speak to such individual modes of analysis. Scholarship consistently supplies separate dichotomous elements of analysis to explain Nigeria’s corruption condition. These explanatory frameworks remain disconnected and uncoupled. A coherent picture of corruption in Nigeria becomes less and less apparent. In other words, extant scholarship offers pieces of the puzzle without solving the puzzle. This study aims to contribute a connecting piece to help demystify the complete picture of Nigerian corruption. I build upon the conceptual and analytic building blocks of internal and external analysis towards a more unified co-evolutionary framework. The aim is to move towards a more complete understanding of how internal and

40 Colonialism, and its residual conditions, are consistently a singular factor from which the development of corruption is attributed. In Nigeria, for instance, neopatrimonialism - a system of social hierarchy that vertically distributes resources - is often highlighted as the cause of corruption. However, can neopatrimonialism by itself be considered causal without also examining the broader system of socio cultural hierarchy implemented through various moments of colonialism and imperialism? Conversely, can colonialism alone fully describe the cause of corruption in Nigeria as there is a multiplicity of variables that combine towards various outcomes? The precolonial and colonial history of Nigeria differs from that of South Africa, the Congo, Algeria and so forth. If colonialism were wholly predictive, then wouldn't we observe similar forms of corruption reproduced all over the continent and throughout the world? Instead, the degree and forms of corruption are variable across the continent. A colonial past alone therefore may not sufficiently dictate a country’s susceptibility to corruption.

41 Democracy is another singular variable that raises similar questions when explaining corruption. Explanatory models centered on democracy tend to be overly generalist and speak of theoretical axes of causality without fully explicating specific underlying causal variables. The idea that corruption is reliant on a specific state ideology, or lack of, is a theme that is commonly employed and widely accepted. However, even if a correlation exists between democracy and corruption, can the duration and quality of democracy, combined with local conceptions of corruption, be synonymous or constitutive across nations? This sort of broad analysis, is certainly correlative and seemingly causal in a general sense. However can it completely identify key variables and explain how these variables are causally connected?

external variables interconnect and relate to explain how corruption developed and evolved in Nigeria over time.

This dissertation aims to follow a new integrative framework for examining corruption and requires that we rethink some of the foundations of traditional corruption analyses. Dichotomous and singular models are plentiful and offer tremendous insight into understanding corruption. For instance, an economic dependency model of corruption in Nigeria may identify world system logics, resource economics, and institutional inefficiencies with poor state leadership as explanatory variables. However, if internal institutional deficiencies and poor state leadership exist in combination with external economic factors and multinational interests, is it sufficient to identify their existence without explaining the connection amongst them? The degree to which these variables intersect and interrelate typically remains unknown or is left unrevealed. However, not all scholarship follows this dominant design. Multi-method analysis that synthesizes singular methods remains less established but offers an equally significant contribution to the study of corruption. 43

**METHODOLOGY**

To explore TCM, this dissertation employs an interview-based qualitative research design. My analysis confirms the presence of TCM position as a variable that pervades both the military and public perceptions of corruption in Nigeria. My research further confirms the association of TCM to corruption via historical case study and analysis. 44 My archival research

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43 Xin and Roudel present a framework for hybrid corruption analysis in The Context for Political Corruption (June 2004 Social Science Quarterly) where they argue for the theoretical combination of micro and macro scale causes of corruption. Specifically the authors contend that research should aim to link micro and macro scale causes together into a single multi-scaler model of corruption analysis.

44 See Appendix B
additionally links the externalities of the development of a contemporary capitalist world economy to the internal configuration of corruption in Nigeria vis-a-vis TCM.45

The research design of this study comprises three research methods: 1) Onsite archival data analysis, 2) Quantitative fieldwork, and 3) Qualitative fieldwork.46 The onsite archival data analysis draws on extensive archival research across three major regions in Nigeria; Lagos, Abuja, and Ibadan. I spent 2 years (2016 - 2018) in Nigeria traveling between these regions completing historical analysis and investigation of financial misappropriation of four primary sectors of public administration: National Electric Power Authority, Nigeria Communication Commission, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and The Central Bank of Nigeria. The materials reviewed included governmental, military, industrial and ministerial reports, dossiers, economic planning guidebooks, development notes, and meeting minutes examining the military’s influence and involvement in specific fiscal, budgetary, and appropriation histories.47

My fieldwork focuses on two primary modes of qualitative research: surveys and interviews. While in the field I administered written surveys and polls amongst a cross section of the Nigerian population. University graduates, business professionals, local market workers, traders, and general civilians comprised approximately 200 respondents. Participants were asked to complete a 10-15 question survey, including multiple-choice, true/false, fill in the blank, 

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
and ranking questions on corruption, capital, politics, and the military. Public recruiting for participants was initiated openly in social gathering places such as malls, marketplaces, churches, business centers, and banks. Age was the singular selection criteria; participants self-reported as being twenty-one years old and above. I intended to gauge the degree to which the public can 1) Understand and define the concept of corruption as it pertains to abuses of power and capture of capital in Nigeria; 2) Identify a correlation or connection between corruption, capital, politics, and the military to evidence the existence of a Capitalist Militician figure or position of power, both contemporarily and historically, and 3) Gauge the extent to which the public identifies a link between TCM and acts of political corruption.

The second mode of my field research was interviewing. I conducted 62 one-on-one interviews with military officials, both active and retired, assessing the nature of their non-military functions in politics and economics. Military recruitment for interviews was completed via internal personal contacts at division outposts and army barracks in Lagos, Abuja, and Enugu. All participants provided consent for interviews, were uncoerced and were assured complete anonymity. Through a series of questions and discussions that lasted between 20 and 40 minutes, I assessed three main themes; 1) the military’s understanding and definition of the concept of corruption as it pertains to capital capture in Nigeria, 2) the respondents’ capacity and inclination towards capital accumulation and distribution inside and outside the parameters of service, 3) the extent to which the respondents self-identify or acknowledge a link between the military, politics, capital, and corruption. These responses enabled me to evaluate the nexus of politics and economics within the military and examine the degree to which the “Capitalist Militician” is materially relevant in explaining corruption.
The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods employed in this study is intended to provide a more comprehensive framework allowing for further interpretive and subjective analysis to unfold and bring additional coherence to the research question. Both methods are applied iteratively to create a research outcome stronger than any singular research method might achieve. A purely quantitative measure of corruption would serve a minimal function as the cross-cultural nuance of the term and the wide-ranging application would most likely preclude objective measure or render any singularly quantitative model inapplicable.

Similarly, a purely qualitative study would rely too heavily on subjective interpretive analysis, which results in conclusions that can often shift temporally and spatially depending on intervening factors or alternate observable conditions. Furthermore, an interview-based analysis is particularly well suited for studying not only corruption, but the ascent of a figure like TCM that focuses on “Peoples understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their perspective on their lived world.”

The approach of this study is to guide and explain the presence of the phenomena of corruption in Nigeria via the proposed endogenous/exogenous co-evolutionary framework. My analytical framework will serve as a targeted formal analysis that identifies the combined causal structure where internal and external variables function together to explain corruption. Accordingly, rather than full affirmation or falsification of previously established theory or

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48 Kvale, 116 7 Stages of Interview Investigation
study, which this framework may achieve as a by-product, this work aims to develop a reimagined interdisciplinary theoretical framework for studying the causes of corruption.

The theoretical principles of the framework in this study represent a contingent comparative historical analysis that correlates options and outcomes, whereby development paths in the present are conditioned by historical actions of the past. It is a mode of understanding that attempts to reorder variables and integrate historical considerations to better recognize the innumerable stories and pathways of analysis that exist. It is not necessarily a mechanism to formally prescribe cause. Caution must be taken so as not to fall victim to the logical fallacy of history – “post hoc ergo propter hoc” – “after this, therefore because of this”. Additionally, this study is not meant as a sequential linear phasing argument. It is neither a universal conditional nor is it strictly reliant on path dependency. Primarily, this study’s methods reinforce a mosaic of history model. A collage of ever-moving, constantly shifting environments and landscapes must be studied and considered. Both individually and collectively offer exploratory insights towards uncovering eventual correlation, causality, and understanding of divergent paths of development, or, in this case, corruption.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The following chapter explores the wide-ranging literature on corruption. Corruption has been examined both as a generic object of analysis and a phenomenon peculiar to a particular

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49 The goal is not necessarily to verify or call into question the explanatory merits of internal or external corruption analysis. That is, internal explanations that focus on cultural antecedent conditions in Nigeria are not meant to be proven false. Neither are external explanations that highlight resource exploitative relationships between Nigeria and other Western economies meant to be falsified. Rather the methodological approach is intended to clearly and coherently combine internal and external variables into one cogent connected structure of corruption analysis in Nigeria.

50 The value of this kind of multi-method framework is to illustrate how once competing analyses can actually work in concert and be explained along side one and other in co-eveolutionary terms to bridge gaps and fill voids in corruption scholarship more broadly.
time, space, and institution. However, the majority of corruption scholarship is overly
dichotomous, segregating analysis in either internal or external based frameworks. For example,
Political Scientists have consistently emphasized internal historical institutional analysis, while
Economists have long explained corruption through external rational choice or dependency
models. Chapter 1 aims to outline dominant scholarship, identify their contributions, and
contend with the explanatory gaps by presenting a methodological framework that unites
exogenous and endogenous paradigms and unifies causal elements of political corruption in
Nigeria through the examination of TCM.

Chapter 2 examines a specific development history of corruption in Nigeria. That is,
before we can understand how Nigeria became so corrupt, we must first depict when Nigeria
became so corrupt, and connect this development timeline to capital, TCM and corruption.
Therefore chapter 2 focuses on historical moments of transnational capital flows and early
foreign capitalist interests in Nigeria. I present a thorough description of TCM, outlining the
figure’s features, the origination of power, and its specific role in Nigeria’s political economy of
corruption. The descriptions, historiography, and analysis are intended to preface the exogenous/
endogenous co-evolutionary model of corruption argued throughout the dissertation. Then I
connect the presence of TCM to several instances and appearances of corruption in Nigeria over
time. Broadly, this chapter is intended to lay the foundation for my analysis by presenting key
variables to be more thoroughly examined in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 explores the four features of external global capital that contribute to the rise of
TCM. In this chapter, I begin by clarifying the capitalism to corruption link and outlining the
schools of thought from which the exogenous analysis proceeds. This includes the Marxist
explication of capital as well as the Neo-Gramscian view on hegemonic ideas and international superstructures. The chapter continues by exploring how global capitalist interests directly informed economic policy, state formation, construction of political institutions, and the evolution of political agents (TCM). I examine four primary exogenous variables related to external global capital that explains the rise of TCM and the presence of corruption in Nigeria. 1) Twentieth-century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, 2) Globalized development policies, 3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, 4) Multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, and natural resources. The chapter concludes with comparative regional case studies that explore how external capital interests impacted internal institutions of other developing nations in Africa and Asia, to illustrate the distinct formation of TCM and corruption in Nigeria.

Chapter 4 coincides with Chapter 3 to form the dissertation’s co-evolutionary framework of analysis. This chapter investigates a set of four internal institutional elements that are equally significant pieces of Nigeria’s corruption puzzle and help explicate the rise of TCM. Specifically, this chapter examines the endogenous conditions of Nigeria’s political institutions that more thoroughly uncover TCM’s historical military, political, and capital antecedents. They include, 1) Institutional underdevelopment, 2) Institutional incoherence, 3) Institutional political materialism, and 4) Institutional capital consciousness. Additionally, chapter 4 investigates the internal history behind TCM’s evolution and identifies key moments that follow the figure’s initial emergence, subsequent development, and contemporary appearance in Nigeria. The chapter concludes with a more detailed exploration of specific instances of TCM’s abuse of power and corruption throughout different public sectors.
Chapter 5 presents both qualitative and quantitative data in a manner that more directly vocalizes my account of the making of TCM and the rise of corruption. Here I further unpack the construction of Nigeria’s combinational agent and delineate how TCM closely transformed corruption within the co-evolutionary internal and external paradigm. I incorporate research and data to connect the analytical dots that tie TCM to corruption, reinforce postulates and conclusions that drive this study, and more broadly exhibit findings that support the proposed reimagined theoretical framework for studying the causes of corruption as a combinational synthesized approach.
CHAPTER ONE
CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP: AN OVERVIEW

SITUATING TCM WITHIN EXTANT CORRUPTION LITERATURE

While corruption scholarship has dramatically expanded over the last few decades across disciplines within the social sciences, it can primarily be characterized by two prevailing themes; 1) the dichotomous nature of internal or external analysis, and 2) single mono-causal frames of investigation. To this end, Paul Heywood inquires, “Are there [internal] cultural causes of corruption, or does the emergence of political corruption depend upon more [external] structural factors?” 51 Two of the more dominant methods in corruption scholarship, Historical Institutionalism, and Rational Choice, epitomize this tendency as they are generally placed in the same kind of competing corners where one method is chosen over another. This work aims to contend with Heywood’s question directly. The dichotomous lens used in corruption scholarship tends to overlook significant explanatory features. Therefore, I challenge the very dichotomous nature of Heywood’s query and identify resulting gaps in present corruption scholarship.

In addition to the either/or orientation of corruption studies, I contend that the gap in literature further exists at the point of division where scholars employ single explanatory frameworks. 52 Moreover, explanatory models that attempt to bridge this gap are mostly inexact in their delineation, and therefore, limited in their application. 53 Instead, I argue for a more

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51 Paul Heywood, “Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives” Political Studies, 45 issue 3, (1997) 1-4. This work presents a layered discourse of dichotomy in corruption scholarship that explores both cultural vs institutional analysis and structure vs agency frameworks, which I extrapolate and interpret in the internal or external paradigm that has come to define corruption scholarship.

52 While this singular approach is not atypical in social scientific inquiry, when examining a phenomena like corruption, such a multitude of competing disconnected analysis results in an overabundance of explanations that often overlap yet remain disengaged from each other. The methodological intention is to begin to bring coherence and inclusivity amongst traditionally exclusive frameworks.

53 Hybrid multi-method models evidence great progress in scholarship by attempting to integrate explanatory frameworks but remain limited. Such models that present internal variables alongside external variables will be examined in more detail later in this chapter.
inclusive model that combines and synthesizes endogenous and exogenous factors in a co-evolutionary framework to explain corruption in Nigeria.

I introduce the concept of The Capitalist Militician in order to link exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. Accordingly, TCM lies at the center of this study. The actions and relationship of TCM to internal and external inputs reveal critical elements of corruption’s rise in Nigeria between 1970 - 2015. These inputs are significant as they are each formed, fashioned, and filtered in direct relation to TCM. The importance of TCM is, therefore, fundamental for two reasons. 1) TCM addresses a uniquely remarkable configuration of capital and its relationship to politics in a way not yet explored fully. 2) In presenting this capital arrangement, TCM allows for a more coherent analytical unification of endogenous and exogenous variables.

Specifically, I explain TCM’s consolidation of power. From an external view, TCM is a consequence of the conjuncture between geopolitical timing, the rise of the capitalist world economy, and transitionary state development in the mid-twentieth century. Development strategies of modernization, and later neoliberalism, were thrust upon Nigeria and enforced through supranational finance organizations such as the IMF. Development policy mandates, like SAP, resulted in significant political consequences, namely the dissemination of power upon newly inserted political actors, including the mediation of extreme amounts of external capital flows. Thus, TCM’s power and position were directly encouraged and fortified from external economic influences.

From an internal standpoint, TCM’s power position is nearly absolute as the figure dominates all aspects of the state, including; capital, military, and political. In this sense, TCM
emerged in Nigeria from a long history and independence story that tells of the forceful military siege of a nation from within. However, not until transnational capital stakeholders integrated Nigeria into the contemporary global economic landscape that was influenced by a global hegemonic mandate for development through homogenous economic policy, and hugely impactful state participation in economic policy-making and capital allocation, were Nigeria’s State agents transformed in their position as singular vessels of power. The dual internal and external configurations of TCM combine and construct a complete compilation of this figure’s role in the political economy of corruption in Nigeria.

Here is precisely where the distinguishing method of this dissertation becomes key. This study plugs the explanatory gap by first pairing down the examination of corruption to one region, Nigeria, and one epoch, post-independence. But more importantly, this study, through the examination of Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician, identifies an adhering anchor to bridge endogenous institutional factors and exogenous features of international economic and global capitalist interests, that together reveal a more connected study of Nigerian corruption than has been presented in extant scholarship. Finally, this study contributes to a generalizable framework for investigating corruption through its proposed integrated model.54

To fully understand the contribution and context of the co-evolutionary exogenous and endogenous model presented in this dissertation, this review chapter intends to achieve two main goals: 1) Demonstrate where the dominant internal (historical institutionalism) and external (economic dependency) approaches and have been impactfully applied to developing regions

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54 In my attempt to examine the development of Nigerian corruption, I present conceptual and analytic building blocks of a coevolutionary framework. This framework, I argue, may be broadly applied to other national and temporal contexts of corruption.
such as Africa, with a specific focus on Nigeria; 2) Identify leading works by African scholars that propose alternate multi-methods in response to the current single internal or external frameworks.

I draw on several different lenses to first, explore the landscape of Nigeria-specific corruption scholarship, and second, identify the contributions and deficiencies this dissertation builds from and speaks to. The major shortfalls amongst existing Nigerian theories of corruption are similar to that of the general corruption literature; they are typically dichotomous (frameworks are exclusively internal or external) and are mainly mono-causal (individually incline towards a single antecedent variable of analysis).  

I additionally draw upon cases where multi-causal models are suggested or attempted. Although relevant in that such methods speak to significant limitations of dominant corruption studies and attempt to unify internal and external variables, their execution ultimately betrays their design, as there is no clear continuation or correlation between the external and internal inputs they each present. This study looks to better incorporate an inclusive model for corruption analysis that emphasizes the power and exploitation dynamics of the external - capitalist interests

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in the global economic market, alongside the internal - political-institutional configurations, of Nigeria.

I commence by first evaluating definitional and measurement issues that problematize the study of corruption. I then examine the leading single variable or question-based scholarship on corruption. Next, I outline dominant debates of corruption across disciplines to reveal the nature of corruption scholarship and its limitations. Following, I explore the political economy of corruption landscape more specifically and review relevant regional comparative cases to contrast and evaluate how explanatory models have been applied across different regions. After revealing particular insights and identifying insufficiencies in these models, I highlight Nigeria-focused corruption scholarship formulated in contradistinction. Finally, I reintroduce this study’s theoretical pathway to address existing gaps in corruption scholarship.

CONNOTATIONS OF CORRUPTION: SLIDING SCALES AND SUBJECTIVITY

The study of corruption is undeniably interdisciplinary. However, it has been predominantly examined in Political Science and Economics. Heywood explains, “The meaning of corruption will vary depending on the nature of the political system in question. Thus, a wide-ranging generic definition can at best provide a starting point for identifying and analyzing different types of political corruption.” Nevertheless, this caution has seldom been heeded by academics and researchers. Instead, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the literature on corruption has defined and collapsed all versions of the term as singular. Therefore, most examinations of corruption debate drastically different things, motivated by equally contrasting

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57 Heywood, Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives
queries, all while incorporating one single term. Some corruption studies are conducted in different regions and settings. However, the majority of corruption scholarship inappropriately congeals as one form reflecting one distinct phenomenon.

At the same time, acts of corruption in Africa are interpreted distinctly, as there is a tendency to demonize practices on the continent. For example, African corruption is distinguished and consistently qualified as something more debilitating, more confounding, more extreme, and more endemic than its forms in other regions. African corruption is consistently connected to institutional dysfunction and state failure. However, corruption and state stagnation are often incongruent in development patterns, as the former can counter the latter. This characteristic of sliding connotations of corruption is most apparent in those African cases that commonly get observed from external vantages that impose foreign standards and expectations of functionality.

For instance, political lobbying in the United States and corporate clientelism in Japan are modes of rent-seeking corruption that exist in rich democracies. Conversely, ostensibly similar - albeit under different labels - acts in Africa are typically observed as causes of

58 Much of the scholarship on corruption has focused on elections in democracy or development. But the literature in African contexts focus either on internal cultural modalities or external economic conditions.

59 The state is central to any analysis of corruption in Africa. Indeed, there is virtually no subject that one considers in Africa without emphasizing the role of the state. This is so because the state not only leads, it also embodies the society in Africa. One fundamental fact to note from the onset is that the Nigerian State, like most African states and Third World countries is a product of colonialism. It is not surprising therefore that many theorists of African politics trace the problem of political corruption to the residue of colonial rule, thereby focusing almost exclusively on internal frames of explanatory analysis. See E.E. Osaghe Legitimacy Crisis, the Character of the State and social Mobilisation in Africa: An Explanation of Form and Character in SG Tyoden (Ed.): Democratic Mobilisation in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects (1988) and P.P Ekeh, Colonialism and the Two Publics: A Theoretical Statement. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17, 1 (1975)

60 The grease the wheels vs sand the wheels debate has been long standing in corruption scholarship. It is generally accepted that there are many indirect channels through which corruption lowers growth, and recently some formal models have been developed that link corruption directly to growth. See V. Tanzi and H. Davoodi, “Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth”, International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 97/139 (1997). See also J. Rodin, “The International Anti-corruption Crusade: Neo-liberal Institutional Structures, Moralization, and Social Capital.” Undercurrent Journal 7 (1): 12-22, (2010) for historical examples that illustrates that some forms of corruption may be beneficial to political development.
underdevelopment, economic stagnation, and political instability. However, how can political economy in the latter cases suffer so drastically from the same practices which have promoted and/or failed to impede growth and development in the former? The answer, and admittedly the question, is perhaps not that simple. However, that is precisely the issue with trying to apply a single label of corruption to multiple actions and behaviors.\footnote{Western-centric notion of corruption cause the definition of the act to become geo-specific. Take for example “pork barrel” spending in the United States. The practice involves the appropriation or re-appropriation of government spending for specific localized projects. Pork-barrel spending has been reinforced by an army of lobbyists and firms that specialize in securing budgetary earmarks for clients. This practice is not unique to the United States, as the rest of the world engages in similar budgetary bending. In Germany this kind of election benefaction is called \textit{wahlgeschenke}, whereby a concentration of funds is redirected to the home region of a candidate. Furthermore, in Eastern Europe such election alms are given the name equivalent of feeding or filling the local plate; The Polish refer to \textit{kielbasa wyborcza} - “election sausage”, Serbians speak of, \textit{podela kolača} - “cutting the cake”, the Czech call it \textit{předvolební guláš} - “pre-election goulash” or \textit{porcování medvěda} - “portioning of the bear”. Whatever the name given, the form and practice are similar. Earmarks have for decades been the safest, most secure, economical, and efficient forms of corruption practiced in the United States and the extended Western world. However when the same practices occur in other geographic locations, they are often labeled as corruption. The Philippines provides a useful example. Pork barrel politics has been historically identified as one of the most egregious manifestations of corruption and disorder. The Western world has accused the Philippines of utilizing pork barrel spending as a primary government mechanism of patronage and corruption. The practice has been lambasted internationally and continues to be a highlighted characteristic of the current and past regimes political failings. The same dynamic can be observed in Brazil where political officers and lawmakers are seen as scandal tainted legislators who engage in a free-for-all system of political profiteering via pork barrel politics. Brazilians call this practice “Jeitinho Brasileiro” or “The Brazilian Way” which loosely translates into “pulling some strings.” It is the belief “success should be desired and striven for regardless of the rules or laws broken.” In Brazil pork barrel politics is Jeitinho personified, yet the outside world deems such practices to be outright palm greasing and corruption. Why are such acts in Brazil and the Philippines, similar if not duplicate acts, regarded as dangerously corrupt, whereas, in Western contexts, these acts remain mostly ignored? Indeed, there may be varying degrees and levels at which the practice pervades, but at its most fundamental existence, we see acts identified as corrupt defined quite differently depending on geography and stage of development.}

In the United States, corrupt acts, like earmarking, are considered part of the political process and are referred to as appropriation. However, in the African context, similar acts are labeled as rampant corruption. How then should scholars and analyses proceed with comparative questions of corruption in securing an improved understanding of its practice? The answer has thus far been to standardize corruption through measurement mechanisms and metrics aimed at illustrating a cross-country comparative calculation.

The methodology behind corruption measurement reflects the same definitional inefficiencies and subjectivities. As noted by Zaman, “To try to measure ‘corruption’, without
having a clear idea as to exactly what corruption is, is merely an illustration of a confused thought process, and a desire to imitate science without having an understanding of what science is about.”62 Put another way,

“Conceptualization requires that the logic of classification precedes the logic of gradation…before we can speak of measuring a variable, we need to ask ourselves, ‘what are we measuring?’ This inherently requires one to define a concept by first deciding what should be included and what should not.”63

The international disagreement on the exact meaning of corruption has resulted in a level of ambiguity that has direct implications on international measurements and ranking systems. Zaman explains the problem of degree and variance:

“We need to distinguish ‘bribery’, which takes place with mutual consent, from ‘extortion’ which does not; and ‘petty’ corruption (typically between citizens and government) and ‘grand’ corruption, often involving heads of states and governments, multinational corporations, big business and top officials. Such distinctions make a tremendous difference in ranking of countries for ‘corruption’. Conventional measures, focusing on petty corruption would rank Nigeria and Bangladesh as more ‘corrupt’ than USA. If we focus on corrupt commercial behavior, then the trillion dollar Savings and Loan bailout in the 1980s, the spectacular Enron failure, and the recent failure of mortgage market would put the USA far ahead.”64

What exacerbates these measures further is that the accumulation of the data itself has error margins that lead to higher errors in the application. All of the leading indices on corruption measurement including, The World Bank Governance Indicator, The World Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, PWC Global Economic Crime Report, and the Global Integrity Report, all employ subjective perception measurement methods. The prevalence of perception indices has so dominated corruption scholarship that they are de facto regarded as

62 Zaman and Rahim, "Corruption: Measuring the Unmeasurable"


64 Zaman and Rahim, "Corruption, Measuring the Unmeasurable"
sound empirics. However, such studies have become self-correlating. Although each appears to reflect global instances of corruption accurately, they are, in effect, only accurately reflecting themselves.\textsuperscript{65}

In response, several studies attempt to assign objective metrics to corruption, but each is wrought with structural inconsistencies that produce empirics which are more approximate than exact.\textsuperscript{66} Overall, these sorts of empirical attempts do not measure actual corruption, but rather, measure the possibility of, or routes to, corruption. This serves as yet another example of how studies increasingly rely on subjective perceptions of corruption as real and accurate indicators.\textsuperscript{67} However, there are significant dangers in proceeding this way. One person’s patronage and

\textsuperscript{65} Ranking nations on a scale of corruption is an inexact and unclear exercise. Ultimately, certain elements are not objectively measurable. Practices such as cronyism, nepotism, and other intangible abuses of power, for example, remain largely unaccounted for, empirically. This inherently puts such measurement methodologies at a disadvantage.

\textsuperscript{66} See R.K. Goel and M.A. Nelson, “Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis.” Public Choice, XCVII, (1998) 107-20, who measure corruption on the basis of the number of convictions of public officials for corrupt practices. However, this method fails to account for variability in not only rule of law and the efficiency of a judicial system, but it also neglects to specifically contend with the question of what constitutes legal corruption.

See Miriam A Golden and Lucio Picci, “Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data,” which proffers an alternative calculus that assumes higher levels of corruption are associated with larger differences between the amount of public expenditures and existing physical infrastructure. This model is largely built on the assumption that inefficiency equals corruption. However, that equation does not necessarily follow. Drawing a straight line from spending to infrastructure simplifies a process that includes far more shifting parts than is acknowledged, parts that cannot simply be assumed to have been corrupted or abused. Inefficiency can be a sound marker in identifying the presence of potentially corrupt activities, but it does not necessarily equate to observable instances of corruption.

\textsuperscript{67} Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report is the leading subjective measurement of global corruption. For details see- http://www.transparency.org/. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country’s public officials and politicians. It is a composite index drawing on 17 surveys from 13 independent institutions that gathered the opinions of business people and country analysts. The scores range from 10 (squeaky clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). A score of 5.0 is the number Transparency International considers the borderline figure distinguishing countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem. Such indices and surveys are primarily based on polls and interviews where experts, locals, and business people may be asked to assess corruption in their state. Although the CPI is considered the best instrument available to measure the variability of corruption globally, there are several confounding issues that call into question its validity. Methodologically, it suffers from inconsistency in the nature and number of sources across nations. For example, countries deemed more corrupt incorporate 3-7 surveys, while countries deemed least corrupt include 9-15, on average. But the primary concern is that which is being measured or represented is perception and not necessarily reality. Although Transparency International correlates the latter with the former, there is a real danger in their representation of corruption. When analyzing the correlates of corruption, examining perceptions of corruption may lead to misleading conclusions. See Luminita Ionescu, “Corruption and Internal Control Weaknesses. Case study Romania”. Annals of Spiru Haret University Economic Series. 15. (2015), 137, which expounds on the hazards of relying on perception in place of experience or reality arguing, that the experience of corruption is less likely to influence perceptions of corruption, than perceptions are to bias the recall of corruption experiences.
ceremonial benefaction or gift-giving is another person’s bribery and malfeasance. One state’s rent-seeking and clientelism are identical to another state’s lobbying and campaign finance. What changes, however, are the user, the state, and the connotation. This results in decreasing conceptuality that occludes some of the insights that are crucial to exploring corruption studies in various respective regions. Furthermore, when considering the term corruption across political and economic time and space, some analysis can become ahistorical as practices, norms, and status quo behavior evolves and transform.

**DISCIPLINARY DIVERSITY IN THE LANDSCAPE OF CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP**

Within each discipline resides scholarship that has conceptualized the study of corruption in internal and external dichotomous frameworks. For example, there is an emerging segment of economic corruption literature that aims to examine and align internal factors that impact comparative levels of corruption and offers causal models based on small N or large N analysis. For instance, in their causal study of corruption, Ades and Di Tella implement an empirical economic analysis that argues that corruption increases in countries where domestic firms are shielded from foreign competition. Graeff and Mehlkop employ a similar economic approach and associate levels of corruption to national levels of economic freedom. Brunetti and Weder alternatively contend that press freedom is an external control mechanism for corruption and illustrate a strong correlation between the respective levels of each across countries. Finally, Van
Rijckegehem and Weder describe the causal link between the ratio of government wages to manufacturing wages and levels of corruption.\textsuperscript{68}

Looking briefly at these modes of economic inquiry provides several descriptive lessons that offer significant value in corruption scholarship. Such works have subsequently influenced a wave of statistical, econometric analyses that investigate corruption in a highly formulaic manner that identifies how specific variables correlate.\textsuperscript{69} As economic-based corruption literature proceeds from a quantitative standpoint to identify, correlate, and measure variables against each other, the resulting corruption analysis does not seek to explain the phenomena wholly. Rather, these studies investigate the correlative relationship of a specific variable, against changes in the incidence of corruption. That is, economic scholarship examines how a change in the quantity of one variable affects the amount of another. This differs significantly from corruption analysis in other disciplines. For example, studies in political science may evaluate corruption as an element of political institutions and state and social systems more broadly.\textsuperscript{70} However, the inherent structure of economic corruption analysis creates the same single variable and mono-casual frameworks that are consistent in corruption scholarship across disciplines.

For instance, several other disciplinary frameworks have also developed from a mono-causal-question-based single-factor formula for investigating corruption. For example, in his


\textsuperscript{69} This strand of literature follows Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” method of analysis with respect to rent seeking;

\textsuperscript{70} See Rose Ackerman, Corruption and Government, and James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, for examples of this brand of institutional analysis that primarily looks at the internal historical composition of political institutions.
causal investigation of corruption, Triesman presents separate single hypotheses that similarly point to one explanatory variable such as “democracy,” “regional propensity,” or “culture.”

This tendency is observed throughout other strands of new scholarship as well that examines corruption as a collective action problem, as a socio-cultural phenomenon, or through an anthropological ethnographic study. Collectively, the insights of the above bodies of work are numerous across disciplines. Nevertheless, whether economic, institutional, or social, the central insights across the theoretical landscape tend to exist in patchwork form, whereby each analysis operates individually, and absent connectivity.

Two dominant methodological approaches for corruption, Historical Institutionalism, and Rational Choice speak to this consequence. Historical Institutionalist models utilize institutions to provide historical perspectives rooted in sequences, changes, and behaviors across time.

Conversely, Rational Choice models assume that individual human behavior is motivated by self-interest, utility maximization, or goal fulfillment. The degree to which these sorts of general methods are applicable, or useful, to explain corruption decreases in country-specific

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71 See Triesman, Causes of Corruption, which presents fourteen hypotheses to examine causes of corruption. One hypotheses: “Corruption is contingent on the regional propensity of a state,” suggests that certain regions have an increased likelihood of being more corrupt than other regions. The argument directly pinpoints African corruption as a most probable regional proposition in comparison to other continents. Another hypothesis: “Culture causes corruption,” is a second such single variable-based hypothesis that fails. Although certain nations might display such extreme levels of corruption, that it becomes part of a national characteristic, there is limited evidence to support the claim that corrupt states are more likely to engage in corruption due to an innate part of their cultural past. See also Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, (New York Basic Books 1973) for further illustration. Specifically Geertz notes, “Nigeria, the Congo, and the greater part of sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by a prominence of this sort of primordialism. But so also are the nomads or semi nomads of the Middle East-the Kurds, Baluchis, Pathans, and so on; the Nagas, Mundas, Santals, and so on, of India; and most of the so-called hill tribes of Southeast Asia.”


73 See S. Lipset and S. Lenz, “Corruption, Culture, and Markets” (2000), and Mcrae, "Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption" for examples on rational choice approaches. See also M. McMullan, “A Theory of Corruption” he Sociological Review 9, no. 2 (July 1961) for example of hybrid methods evolved to attend to the limitations of existing singular frameworks.
contexts because the relationship amongst internal or external variables that aim to explain corruption, changes across region and environment. The following exploration of dominant, Africa-based corruption scholarship will illustrate how such discipline-based methods have been produced in the Nigerian context.

**DICHOTOMY WITHIN AFRICA’S CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP**

African corruption scholars incline towards internal institutional or socio-cultural models or external economic analyses rooted in dependency and international trade. Africa-based corruption scholarship is, therefore, rooted in two scholarly traditions, Historical Institutionalism, and Economic Dependency.

**Historical Institutionalism**

Ira Katznelson describes Historical institutionalism in the tradition of socio-political historians.74 The main goal of this theoretical outlook is to “identify and explain in relatively parsimonious ways the appearance and enlargement of the main features of the modern world.”75 These scholars point directly at the importance of historical perspectives and institutional variables in understanding the changing features of the modern world. Several African corruption scholars employ a Historical Institutionalist framework to address corruption. Richard Joseph presents one of the more prominent such theories as his postulations on politics and prebends in Nigeria remain equally relevant today as when written over thirty years ago.

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In *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria*, Joseph focuses on the Second Republic of Nigeria and employs a historical method to explain the link between Nigerian power politics and resource allocation. Like most Africa corruption scholarship, Joseph affirms a single dominant institutional cause as he argues,

“Anyone who understands and speaks perceptively about the struggle for economic and political power in Nigeria can be shown to be talking about prebendal politics.”\(^{76}\) He then relates this process to corruption in Nigeria, explaining, “One way of seeing the extensive corruption in Nigeria is as a constituting part of ‘the economic assurance of office’ which is presented as a fundamental part of the prebendal system.”\(^{77}\)

Throughout the work, Joseph describes the nature of the fundamental process of politics in Nigeria as one that has been erected on the pillars of prebends and patron-client relationships, which have constructed an environment ripe for exploitation and corruption. Joseph points to a particular historical trajectory that links the current political system in Nigeria to antecedent post-colonial moments of institutional development and continued struggle for equitable resource and revenue allocation. Joseph rejects individualist rational choice explanations and instead promotes the primacy of the group and community. For Joseph, while individual motivations exist, there is little separation of the singular and the collective, as group allegiance and resource allocation for the collective unit is viewed as paramount. This social dynamic reinforces prebendalism and clientelism and results in high incidences of exploitation and corruption. Joseph reveals this course more clearly as he describes,

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\(^{76}\) Richard Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria*, p2. Here Joseph defines prebendal politics as patterns of political behavior which rest in the justifying principle that such offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as their reference or support group. Official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern.

\(^{77}\) Ibid.
“When a state itself becomes a key distributor of financial resources all government projects become submerged by the intense pressures for the conversion of these projects into a means of individual and group appropriation…To obtain and keep clients, one must gain a prebendal office and to be sure that in the distribution of prebendal offices an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring one, clients must be gathered together to make their collective claims as well as to prove that the aspirant patron is a person of consequence whose co-optation would be rewarding.”

Joseph offers an enlightening historical look at social politics at work in Nigeria. Clientelism defines the nature of individual and group social interaction while Prebendalism reveals the functionality of this nature. However, where does Joseph’s process begin? That is, how, when, and why did the Nigerian State become a “key distributor of financial resources” in the first place? Joseph prioritizes the individual, which would appear to make him sympathetic to the Rational Choice method. However, he does so only concerning the subnational communities to which the individual belongs. Joseph simultaneously overlooks the international communities to which the State belongs. Overall, Joseph exclusively promotes internal variables, which he believes are rooted in historical social and institutional constructions. Although Joseph is not precise on the origins of the Prebendalism identified in Nigeria, his goal is decidedly singular. He has identified an internal variable from which he hopes to explain corruption directly.

In this sense, Joseph’s work typifies the Historical Institutionalist model of corruption analysis. That is, the rigidity of Joseph’s framing, his insistence upon the primacy and singularity of Nigeria’s social institutionalism and Prebendalism, does not allow for the explanatory possibility and probability of complementary external variables. For example, if prebendal

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78 Ibid., 73, 57

79 Ibid., 43, 54. Here Joseph repeatedly highlights the struggle for state power and resources in terms of clan, ethnicity, and subgroups that promote prebendal attitudes to the pursuit and exploitation of state power. However, apart from the historic effects of colonialism, he does not pay as close attention to the more contemporary external conditions that have shaped the economic position of the Nigerian State.

80 Ibid., 51
political, social history is the sole antecedent of corruption in Nigeria, then why do African
countries that share a similar history of social construction display diverse incidence of
corruption when compared to Nigeria? More importantly, how does Joseph account for the
imperial and colonial influence of Britain with regard to the social implications of the slave trade
and indirect rule? These historical variables, at a minimum, reproduced and constructed the
social configurations that he rightly spotlights as causal.

Building upon Joseph’s work, Obadare and Adebanwi share the singular mode of
Historical Institutionalist analysis in *Democracy and Prebendalism*. They affirm that specific
modes of political behavior are indeed embedded in the social, cultural history of Nigeria, central
to which is the patron-client dialectic and the struggle for state goods. Specifically, Obadare and
Adebanwi claim Neo-patrimonial politics constructed “networks of reciprocity and mutual
obligation,” in the modern State of Nigeria. They further argue these relationships were “forged
in the colonial and pre-colonial periods and encourage the use of public office for the benefits of
clients and supporters.” In other words, patrimonial (oppositional) politics that drive strong
notions of culture and identity are the precursor to the Prebendalism and clientelism described by
Joseph and are equally rooted in social expectations of transactional reciprocity of patronage
networks. These same expectations and reciprocal arrangements that defined patrimony
historically have progressed and developed into a process of Neo-patrimonial politics,
Prebendalism, Clientelism, and eventual systematic political corruption.

Whereas Joseph stops at the advent of prebendal politics, Obadare and Adebanwi reach
further back in Nigeria’s history and indicate the socio-cultural past of patrimonial politics.

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However, once again, the Historical institutionalist method invoked by these scholars is perhaps overly confined to internal inputs as they do not offer an explanation for understanding where the mode of social interaction they deem causal, began or accelerated. For example, Obadare and Adebanwi fail to contend with the strong nationalist Pan African movement in mid-century Nigeria that precipitated independence. Thus, Nigeria either had a pre-colonial patrimonial social history that abruptly concluded when confronted with national independence, and resumed immediately after that, or, the antagonisms of pre-colonial patrimonial society receded, was replaced by a new dynamic, and was eventually reconstructed or reshaped by more contemporary conditions and proximate variables. In any case, once more, one is left with a descriptive correlation without ample explanation in a Historical Institutionalist model.

Continuing down a similar historical path as Joseph and Obadare is Rotimi Suberu. His work attempts to bridge the historical process with present-day political, institutional corruption, and clientelism in Nigeria. Suberu suggests that as Nigeria was fragmented into centrally funded subnational states, local access points, and conduits for individual appropriation of power and resources, it became incompatible with its federalist ambitions. Therefore, in his view, prebendal politics, “pinpoints the flaw of the country’s contemporary federal governance, namely the absence of truly independent and resilient institutions that can effectively mediate the intergroup struggles for power and resources in the federation. These weaknesses have contributed massively to the depredations of prebendal politics.”82 Suberu illustrates the failures of Nigeria’s

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82 Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. 79
politics by exposing the incompatibility of a continued federal system and a social, political
process of prebendalism.\footnote{The line of argument offered here is clearly rooted in Joseph, \textit{Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria}, and is directly parallel to McMullan, who presents a “divergence of attitudes and aims”. See McMullan, “A Theory of Corruption” as a foundational work in historical institutionalist corruption scholarship as it was an earlier adopter of the internal framework that investigated a country’s history and cultural development to explain corruption.}

Suberu contends,

“Neo-patrimonial politics of Nigeria has encouraged intergovernmental over
centralization, subordinated the development of institutions of subnational self-rule to the
distributive politics of ethnic patronage, promoted a monopolistic unitary party system, eroded
the electoral foundations for federalist decentralization, undermined the arbitrative capacities and
roles of the upper judiciary, and entrenched a corrupt system of federal revenue allocation.”\footnote{Suberu \textit{Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria}. 85}

Thus, for Suberu, Prebendalism and federalism mutually constitute and reinforce the
distributive political landscape that defines the Nigerian State and results in extreme levels of
revenue allocation and corruption. While these past lessons extend the prebendal social politics
of Joseph, they also point to an ethno-distributional political model whereby the “neo-
patrimonial pathologies reflect negative historical legacies,” and fortify shared dysfunction.
While much of Suberu’s internal analysis that points to institutional incompatibility of federal
ambitions and actual capabilities has merit, Suberu does not fully connect how or why such
institutional inefficiencies exist. That is, why was Nigeria centrally fragmented in the first place?

Collectively, Obadare, Adebanwi, and Seburu expand upon the critical insights of the
Historical Institutional pathway of Joseph, but remain too distinctive, as none effectively engage
potentially relevant external variables as part of their explanatory framework. These studies
designate the characteristics of the contemporary Nigerian State as merely the historical residue
of colonialism, overlooking more proximate external conditions that can significantly impact
Nigeria’s internal institutional configuration. Historical Institutional frameworks have undoubtedly uncovered countless key insights in presenting thought-provoking ways to understanding corruption. However, in Nigeria-based literature, these contributions exist mostly in individual uncoupled ways, such that even when supplemented, as seen with Joseph and other Historical Institutional contemporaries, insights remain dissociated.

**Economic Dependency**

The second dominant strand of theoretical scholarship related to elevated instances of political corruption in Africa is Dependency. Dependency Theory developed in the 1950s from an economic and Marxist/Leninist imperial capitalist foundation to explain economic underdevelopment. Raul Prebisch, an Argentine economist, observed that capital infusion and economic expansion did not always foster growth and were not in fact beneficial to all. Rather, Prebisch argues that economic activity in developed nations causes economic deficiencies in developing nations due to asymmetrical export and manufacturing relationships. Dependency describes this relational divide as core versus periphery, where the developed former exploits the developing latter. This production relationship reflects the concept of imbalanced exchange. It combines external variables with internal constraints to form the focal point of Dependency Theory – that resources flow from a poor underdeveloped periphery to a core of industrial developed, wealthy nations enriching the latter and depressing the former in an integrated global economy. Therefore, Dependency Theory looks to the structural features of capitalism to explain relative economic underdevelopment and corruption.

Dependency Theory would not deem African underdevelopment, poverty and corruption as natural conditions, but rather as engineered positions, the result of a protracted capitalistic
dominance by the metropole. If underdevelopment is a process directly linked to that of
development, then the two are mutually constitutive movements operating in dynamic interaction
with each other. Therefore, the world system and the interplay of core and periphery directly
engineer the state of poverty, underdevelopment, and corruption. In his 1987 work on the future
of South Africa, Amin observes,

“Imperialists partitioned the countries in Africa and then forced the African peasantry into
reserves, deliberately planned to be inadequate for the purposes of ensuring the failure of
subsistence in earlier traditional forms. The discovery of the mineral riches of Southern Africa
(such as gold and diamonds in South Africa, copper in Katanga in Zambia) just when capitalism
was entering a new stage of monopolistic expansion inspired a particular form of colonization of
the economy of the reserves.”

Dependency Theory, therefore, presents a framework for understanding African
development as a zero-sum, core-periphery, power, and exploitation model. Thus, economic
dependency and the externalities of global capitalist actors are ascribed a key role in explaining
corruption in Africa. This mode of analysis is further expanded by several scholars that hope to
resolve questions related to corruption via resource dependency economics.

One such scholar is Douglass Yates, who presents a cogent illustration of oil economies
in Africa and the systematic corruption that results from oil dependency. The central question for
Yates in his work, The Scramble for African Oil, is why are oil-rich countries so poor? Implicit in
this discussion is corrupt rent-seeking practices that stagnate economic development. His
contention, broadly stated, is the oil curse or boom in Africa results in a state of dependency that
neglects human and social development, resulting in a “Rentier State and Economy”. His

---85 Amin, “SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development” 2

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findings build upon the Dos Santos dependency model.\textsuperscript{86} They show that, due to the history of
dependency and extraversion, former colonial imperial investments are simply replaced by
interests of modern multinational corporations and result in the same process of resource
pilfering and economic decay. Yates believes part of this decay, corruption, is the consequence of
bad institutional design that is the residue of rentier economics.

In his work, \textit{The Rentier State in Africa}, Yates further describes Rentier Theory as “theory
that posits that the conditioning factor of economic stagnation and political authoritarianism in
oil-dependent states is the corrosive effect of external rent.”\textsuperscript{87} Rentier theory distinguishes from
earned and unearned income and is premised on the assumption that an economy with such
actors creates a specific mentality and behavior. So how does a state that is dependent on and
controlled by oil produce a rentier economy that results in a rentier class ruled by a rentier
mentality, and culminates in kleptocratic governance?

Yates promotes a typology that examines not only disparate levels of development in
Africa but implicitly contends with corresponding levels of corruption by invoking external
conditions. The major consequence of large amounts of external rent is characterized by
significant inflows of foreign exchange. The abundance of foreign capital becomes a gateway to
corruption as reallocation becomes central to politics and economics. Yates illuminates this
process whereby a rentier economy exacerbates exploitation via increased satellites of capital
distribution and allocation. Yates argues, “So long as unearned income continues to flow from

\textsuperscript{86} See Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” \textit{American Economic Review} 60, 2 (May
1970): 231, describing dependence as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the
development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.

\textsuperscript{87} See Yates, \textit{The Rentier State in Africa}, 6., which defines the rentier state as a condition that occurs when
a state is defined by the domination of substantial amounts of external rent for a singular resource such as oil. It
focuses on the “rentier” who “acts as a social agent who does not actively participate in the production process yet
still shares in the fruits of the product.”
the petroleum sector in unprecedented magnitude, unprofitable but prestigious development projects may continue to enjoy government allocation.”  

For Yates, Nigeria is stricken with an exact progression of dependent rentier economics to allocation state. Yates explains,

“In 1959 a little under $3 million in states revenues came from new oil exports. By the early 1970s the countries increasing oil production provided its military regime with $3 million a day in rent. In 1975 the government rearranged the federal tax structure to increase tax rates. By 1979 oil production accounted for 93.4% of total exports and 89.4 % of total government revenues.”

Yates stops short of ascribing a chain of causality whereby a rentier mentality emerges from a rentier state and a rentier economy. However, the transformation is readily visible in the Nigerian context of oil dependency, capital accumulation, and allocation. In an approach dissimilar to his Historical Institutional counterparts, Yates’ Dependency framework is driven by external, not internal configurations of Nigeria’s economic position. Therefore, the dysfunctional mentality of corruption, a rentier mentality, is directly evident in the ascent of Nigeria as an oil-producing, rent-seeking state within a world economic system that was ill-equipped to absorb massive amounts of external rents, which subsequently produced corruption. Yates notes, “This dysfunctional mentality revealed a penchant for corrupt contracting procedures and a proclivity to spend on projects” in what he called “euphoric capitalism.”

Yates presents an immensely insightful analysis of corruption in Nigeria. However, the degree to which rentier theory proves explanatory for corruption’s historical development in

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88 See Yates, The Rentier State in Africa, 25 for discussion of rentier economies and the “Dutch Disease” – “A condition whereby new discoveries of favorable price changes in one sector of the economy, in this case oil, causes distress in other sectors i.e. agriculture.” – which further entrenches the state’s dependency relationships to oil and generates a complete allocation state.
89 Yates, The Rentier State in Africa. 117, 227
90 Ibid. 125
Nigeria is partial. While Yates provides an explanation that speaks to the ills of the external system of allocation and capital accumulation, his model does not adequately address the degree of corruption that arises as a result of a rentier state. That is, while Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola, for example, display symptoms of rentierism, the theory does not differentiate the varying presence of corruption from Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other oil-producing, rentier states. Yates uncovers an external condition for Nigeria but overlooks the internal configurations in Nigeria. Nevertheless, Yates’ discussion of dependency of development, and indirectly, political corruption in Africa based on rent-seeking economics, is a crucial element that imparts exogenous lessons for this study’s analysis of corruption\(^9\) and is further described by Terry Karl in *The Paradox of Plenty*.

Like Yates, Karl examines corruption through an external lens of economic dependency. She poses a similar question in trying to understand why, in the face of such wealth, most oil-exporting countries suffer from economic degeneration. Her primary contention is that specific incentive structures inform and define different development trajectories. As such, dependence on a specific export shapes the organization of political, social, and economic life and impacts government preferences. Therefore Karl believes that countries that share similar dependence on the same commodity - oil - will display a level of similar “Stateness.” This is precisely in line with rentier theory. However, where Yates prioritizes state actors and actions, Karl prioritizes the state itself. In this sense, Yates leans more rational choice, whereas Karl contrastingly recognizes the mutually constitutive nature of the state and economic development. In this framework, Karl

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\(^9\) This study greatly builds off of the external model of Yates, *The Rentier State in Africa*, particularly the elements focused on natural resource based satellites of external capital orbiting and reaching domestic markets in extreme abundant amounts. A more detailed discussion is provided in chapter 3.
regards the state as an allocation state and terms said allocation practices as the process of “petrolization.” Karl contends,

“Oil seems to petrolize the economy; thus the fate of oil-exporting countries must be understood in a context in which economies shape institutions and in turn are shaped by them. Specific modes of economic development, adapted in a concrete institutional setting, gradually transform social and political institutions in a manner that subsequently encourages or discourages productive outcomes.”

Karl, much like Yates, is linking the exploitative process of oil economies to the construction of a particular strain of social and political institutions that disallow proper state functionality. Part of this construction, especially in the Nigerian case, is revenue dispersal, which is the breeding ground for political corruption. In attempting to determine factors that influence “choices of public authorities and effectiveness of state policies,” Karl integrates the organization of international markets as a primary determining factor as compared to rational choice. Her methodological position prioritizes economic dependency, although she does subtly acknowledge a more institutional approach. Karl accepts that external economic conditions act upon the state in a meaningful way, but does not fully negotiate a complete connection between internal and external variables.

Karl advances a similar analytic proposition of economic dependency tied to resource exploitation, as does Yates. Her argument also becomes similarly limited as it fails to differentiate petro states from one and other. That is, in explaining the divergence of economic

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92 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, 73

93 Interestingly, this is precisely the condition identified by Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, and his internal Historical Institutional model. Joseph however, did not provide explanation as to how Nigeria became a revenue dispersing state.

94 Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, is nearly the exact methodological opposite to Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. Where Joseph promotes internal variables with a passive identification of external factors, Karl promotes external variables with a passive identification of internal factors. This point of dissociation is precisely where a more unified method of internal and external could be useful and beneficial.
outcomes and corruption, Karl packages resource-driven producers together and explains their predicament as symptomatic of their similarity. In what amounts to nothing more than tautological reasoning, she asks the question, “How are all oil-exporting nations similar?” and answers by essentially explaining that all oil-exporting nations suffer a similar fate of economic decay and corruption because all oil exporting nations export oil. This flaw in reasoning is one that often cripples dependency-inspired economic frameworks on development and corruption, as correlation and correspondence are used to group and insufficiently define state circumstances.

Karl and Yates both point to the economics of rent-seeking as the element that transforms economic systems and facilitates corruption. However, the most comprehensive argument of economic dependency and rent-seeking, in Nigeria’s case, is in the work of in S.I. Ebohon. In an essay titled “State and Rentier Capitalism in Nigeria,” he describes Nigeria’s transformation into a “distributive state.” Ebohon notes that local middlemen and government executives serve as proxies for foreign domination by implementing policy and legislation that suit the profitability of transnational investment regimes in which their interest is embedded. In this view, the state has fallen susceptible to rentier capitalism and, thus, in response to the logic of oil globalism, the comprador reacts to distributive politics through corruption and methods of capital accretion. Ebohon summarizes Nigeria’s descent by pinpointing how “the culture of poor governance unleashed by the political economy of rentier capitalism has created resource malgovernance… essentially a system of organized chaos to create room for corruption and abuse of power.”

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95 Ebohon, “State and Rentier Capitalism in Nigeria” 213.

96 Ibid., 229 This system of "organized chaos" however must have internal inputs that also shape corruption. That is rentier capitalism does not simply and directly create corruption, there are intervening, often internal institutional variables also at work.
The construction of Ebohon’s model on corruption is consistent with other prevailing Nigeria economic dependency arguments. His work, while exceedingly informative and insightful, shares similar limitations. Much like Karl, Ebohon acknowledges the presence of internal variables but fails to explicate their relationship to rent-seeking economic configurations adequately. Ebohon is unclear on how external international interests are embedded in Nigeria, offers little explanatory guidance, and neglects to explain how or what precipitate and result from the external conditions he regards as significant. Similar to Historical Institutionalist, Economic Dependency frameworks also present gaps in Nigerian corruption literature, primarily, as it related to scholars’ inability to fully identify how internal and external variables function in a cohesive, intelligible manner.

Comprehending different contexts in which corruption prevails can prove powerful in highlighting the contrasting elements of Historical Institutional and Economic Dependency analyses. To that end, I briefly offer the following comparative cases of Latin America and Asia, as they greatly inform the contemporary literature of corruption in the discipline of political science and political economy. We can see in comparing analyses of African corruption with other regional cases that more theoretical import is gained by considering internal and external factors together, specifically, the interaction of domestic political institutions and foreign economic markets.

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97 Ebohon insightfully identifies local middleman and government executives as proxies for foreign interests which is a step further than Yates and Karl. However, he does not go beyond identification into explanation of how the external (rentier capitalism) and the internal (government agents) interact and combine. Further, Ebohon falsely equates the capitalist interests of the exploitative core with that of the middlemen in the exploited periphery. This study largely argues the contrary: where capitalist interests are involved, although core and periphery interest may align, the logic of capital accumulation for actors in Nigerian institutions, also exists independent of the Dependency configuration. That is, there are more complex internal logics at play that function in combination with the external elements identified by Economic Dependency scholars.
A significant distinction amongst development regions is while African and Latin American corruption is predominantly equated to or presented as symptomatic of state failure and economic underdevelopment, Asian corruption is often aligned with economic growth and institutional development. The underlying queries that animate these differences are: How do rents and corruption so closely co-exist with growth and economic development in Asia? What do these consequences reveal about the underlying explanatory framework?

In *Crony Capitalism*, for example, Kang attempts to reconcile an efficient developmental state in Korea with its massive reports of corruption. Focusing on the exchange of favors for bribes between state and business, Kang argues that politics, not economics, drive policy choices. Moreover, he notes, with a balance of power amongst a small and stable set of government and business elites, money politics and corruption can reduce transaction costs and promote growth.\(^98\)

Using the Philippines as an example, Hutchcroft argues, similar to Kang, that the dynamics of crony capitalism, or booty capitalism, are contingent on the interplay between a patrimonial state and an elite oligarchy.\(^99\) Hutchcroft reveals that the developmental outcome of the Philippines is stagnant due to the predatory nature of the oligarchical elite and explains it through a rational choice model. Therefore, the diversity of Asian corruption, whether positive as seen in Korea, or negative as observed in the Philippines, is consistently tied together by the interlocking variables of internal political institutions and external economic markets.

Alternatively, put more simply, corruption in Asia can be viewed in parallel to that in Africa in

\(^{98}\) This of course presupposes a functional and formal institutional infrastructure that can execute and direct such policy choices. See Kang, *Crony Capitalism*.

\(^{99}\) See Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism*, where the main problem of the Philippines is the lack of a strong, reliable state apparatus to direct economic transformation, or to even carry out minimally defined socio-economic functions.
the sense that internal and external variables are more pronouncedly comprehensible when analyzed in concert with one another.

Adding further insight into the analysis of Asian corruption, Chalmers Johnson examines MITI in Japan. He identifies how a state can play an extraordinary role in development via economic intervention by directing the energies of businesses.\(^{100}\) Johnson credits the postwar Japanese economic ‘miracle’ to conscious and consistent governmental policies of economic business coordination, such as Keiretsu\(^{101}\) and Zaibatsu\(^{102}\). When Johnson describes Japan as an economy mobilized for war but never demobilized during peacetime, he is pointing to a particular top-down form of economic coordination that, in effect, resulted in development as Japan was able to turn corruption into an instrument of efficiency. Similarly, Kang would regard Japan in the same developmental light as Korea, where corruption is net positive for economic growth, achieved seemingly, as a result of the relationship between internal institutional configurations, external economic policy, and international market designs.

Khan presents the Thai model to illustrate this point further. He argues that government spending and the rents that result do not retard economic development, but rather, in some instances, facilitate it. Khan explains this paradox where, in Thailand, the openness and

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\(^{100}\) Chalmers Johnson. *Odyssey of a Concept.* in *The Developmental State.* Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1999.)

\(^{101}\) See Chalmers Johnson. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1982). Keiretsu describes a business network made up of different companies, partners, distributors, and occasionally financiers. They work together, have close relationships and sometimes take small equity stakes in each other, all the while remaining operationally independent. Translated literally, keiretsu means “headless combine.”

\(^{102}\) See Chalmers Johnson. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1982) Zaibatsu generally refers to the large pre–WWII clusterings of Japanese enterprises, which controlled diverse business sectors in the Japanese economy. They were typically controlled by a singular holding company and owned by families and/or clans of wealthy Japanese.

While state-sponsored, these practices of keiretsu and zaibatsu were, in effect, forms of corruption and government pathology. The reason they are not typically regarded as corrupt is because the result was economic growth and development, as opposed to stagnation and “backwardness”. 

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competitiveness of politics facilitate competitive clientelism, thereby allowing entry to the industry, which increased market capacity. Khan illuminates a clear contrast of politics where specific government actions can allow corruption to either construct or destruct growth environments. As a result, such high growth and high corruption countries, such as Korea, Japan, and Thailand, are quite significant in both development and theoretical discussions of corruption as they represent not outliers or aberrations, but rather, cases that challenge perceived normative patterns of corruption’s consequences and causes, while also reinforcing the internal-external approach to explaining corruption. Ultimately, Asian corruption scholarship spotlights models of corruption-led growth that focus on internal government coordinations, such as clientelism, in addition to external international factors such as economic policy, international trade, and global markets. Such insights are useful in the Nigerian case as they highlight the combinational relationship of internal and external variables that typically surround corruption analysis.

Corruption studies in Latin America further provide instructive cases that illuminate the interplay between internal state institutions and external foreign markets. Latin American corruption scholarship is more closely aligned to African studies as they both mainly regard corruption as a destructive element for development. Scholarship in the former, however, is far more inclusive with regard to internal and external variables of analysis. For example, Economic Dependency scholars such as Cardoso, inject state-level considerations and internal configurations of political institutions to pair with multinational corporations and external infusers of capital to explain the center-periphery dynamic of exploitation and development in
Latin America. This is an essential methodological cue that could benefit corruption scholarship in all regions, but specifically in Africa.

Further building on this strand of Latin American Dependency corruption scholarship is O’Donnell, who suggests a direct link between advanced industrialization in the form of modernization and a breakdown of democracy, forming what he terms “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.” In particular, O’Donnell links the military as the authoritarian group that emerges. He contends that the military develops an institutional logic “with a range of political and economic interests, rather than being a collection of individual rulers seeking powerful positions.” While Dependency scholars, such as Cardoso, attempt to pivot the causal arrow to include state institutional variables alongside external economic exploitative dynamics, African economic dependency frameworks for corruption remain mainly limited, as most literature ineffectively presents and incompletely details, the interaction between internal institutional conditions and external economic factors.

UNIFIED METHODS IN AFRICA CORRUPTION SCHOLARSHIP

Africa-based scholarship on corruption has, thus far, been dichotomously pursued using internal or external models and has additionally been rooted in single frames of analysis. Jean Francois Bayart’s insights, however, serve as a critical exception and foundation from which the framework of this dissertation is built. Bayart is part of a strand of scholarship that has followed

103 See Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Translated by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)


105 O’Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, has identified many foundational elements of TCM that is presented in this study. His view is in direct contrast to fellow Dependency scholar Ebohon in that O’Donnell expresses the notion of political rulers possessing a range of economic interests. This characteristic is deeply extrapolated in this study’s analysis of corruption and TCM. Later chapters will further unpack the development of TCM in relation to internal and external capitalist interests.
the cues of Asian and Latin American corruption literature. Bayart endeavors to combine elements of Historical Institutionalism with Economic Dependency in joining internal and external methods together to investigate African corruption better. His work provides a stimulating conceptual integration of the socio-cultural history and economic dependency that allows for a vital entry point into this branch of corruption analysis.

In *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Jean-Francios Bayart identifies a phenomenon he terms “la politique du ventre” (The Politics of the Belly). Bayart distinguishes the criminalization of politics from other forms of “classic” corruption, whereby global criminal networks intersect and implement violence as an instrument of wealth accumulation. For Bayart, the criminalization of the African State occurs in an international environment that is shaped by liberal economic mandates and reforms. He notes, “Africa is linked to the rest of the world by a complex web of informal political, commercial and financial relations which generally have strong ethnic, corporatist, and communal elements.” In this way, political corruption in Africa is viewed as distinct because it is the direct residue of economic globalization and the international criminalization of its politics that is best understood when analyzed against historically relevant social institutions.

Bayart further explains, “In Africa, the interaction between the practice of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities of various types, forms a particular political trajectory which can be fully appreciated only if it is addressed in historical depth.”

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106 Bayart, *The State in Africa*. 25

107 Here is one of the first attempts to meaningfully combine internal and external logics to explain corruption in Nigeria. Bayart introduces a complimentary historical institutionalist and economic dependency framework for explaining corruption.

108 Bayart, *The State in Africa* 26
Bayart erects the foundation of his analysis by linking political corruption (criminalization) to both endogenous and exogenous factors – the respective socio-cultural histories of African states and the international economic system in which they are inserted. By indicating critical variables in both endogenous and exogenous levels of analysis, Bayart intends to resolve questions of state criminalization and corruption in Africa. This study extends Bayart’s model by pinpointing a connective subject of analysis, TCM, through which a co-evolutionary framework of endogenous and exogenous variables emerges. Before fully expounding on the co-evolutionary model presented in this study, a brief look at the merits, contributions, and limitations of Bayart’s combinational framework is worth mentioning.

On the endogenous level, Bayart proposes that each state develops from a specific historical trajectory that molds a particular sort of social capital which he describes as an ensemble of configurations and textures of relationships that are productive, not determinative. From this internal standpoint, Bayart echoes Joseph, who similarly suggests that historical repertoires are signifiers of present cultural and social behavior patterns that contribute to the extreme brand of corruption observed in Nigeria. More specifically, Bayart notes, “The criminalization of the political societies and economies of the sub-continent, if indeed it comes about, can occur only as the product of specific historical experiences and of the social capital which these have created.”

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109 Both Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics*, and Bayart, *The State in Africa* look to historical configurations that stem from colonial pasts to explain present cultural predispositions to corruption in Africa.

110 See Bayart, *The State in Africa*, 33 for explanation of cultural repertoires that dominate the social capital explanation.

111 Bayart can also be read through Scott’s analysis where he describes east African peasants: “The winners games are by no means always the rulers. The African peasant is hardly a hero in the light of current development thinking, but by using his deceptive skills he has often defeated the authorities.” See James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. (Yale University Press, 1985) 31.
Though innovative in integrating internal and external frameworks, Bayart’s internal social capital position, like Joseph’s, is overstated. That is, what is valid for one region in Africa, or even within a sub-region such as Nigeria, does not necessarily follow for all populations within that grouping. However, even if Bayart’s historical assumptions are taken as fact, and African social capital is viewed as distinct from other world traditions in that the former promotes craft and graft as a means to survive and thrive in much higher doses than does the latter. Bayart’s contention remains questionable. Indeed, Bayart contributes to building a framework for understanding corruption. However, his internal analysis contains similar limitations as do the internal historical institutional social capital models from preceding discussions. Nevertheless, Bayart’s framework provides a solid foundation to build upon and connect internal and external variables when explaining corruption.

From an exogenous viewpoint, Bayart believes that the insertion of African states into the global world economy has created a system whereby rents can be extracted and resources controlled. Whether through the trade of gold, ivory, and slaves in the age of colonialism, or

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112 Bayart, *The State in Africa* classifies corruption as the byproduct of a specific historical experience and cultural repertoire that is common across Africa is more than just an oversimplification. This is a problematic view. The innate individualism that he assumes and describes is directly counter to the written and expressed communal traditions of many African populations, including Nigeria. For example, the ancient Igbo of Eastern Nigeria developed a consensus decision-making system which was the foundation of their society. The design was intentional to keep individualism at bay, promote the community as primary, and facilitate the fair sharing of resources. Although there were regions in West Africa, particularly during the time of the slave trade, where individual rule led to the monopolization of resources and social stratification, the socio-cultural history presented by Bayart is far too broad.

113 The culturally historic brand of “heroic criminal” Bayart depicts cannot be deemed a uniquely African characteristic. Scott, too, provides a rich analysis that identifies similar hero figures in Malaysia and East Africa alike, demonstrating that several cultures, particularly those that do not display similarly extremes of corruption, possess a comparable brand of historical social capital. For every African Anansi spider tale is one of the Brazilian Saci, the Norse Loki, or the European / Western Puck and Robin Hood. For his part, Geertz additionally captures the disparate nature of culture over time, in his Interpretations of Culture. Geertz intimates, historical culture, as a form of social capital, may not be accurately applicable when explaining contemporary conditions. He asserts, “Today's Ghana, today's Indonesia, or even today's Morocco, have but the most distant of relations with the institutions of the Ashanti Confederation, the Javano-Balinese theatre-state, or that motley collection of bodyguards and tax farmers, the Magrebine Makhzen. See Clifford Geertz. *The Interpretation of Cultures*: Selected Essays. (New York: Basic Books, 2000)
through more modern modes of exchange that include diamonds, oil, and drugs, Bayart highlights the economic dependency that has resulted and led to the criminalized state of political corruption.

Although traditional Dependency theory holds that certain societies have been rendered subject to core capitalist countries' policies that directly impact economic development, Bayart invokes a post-Prebisch dependency argument that moves past the classic center-periphery resource exchange model and into a Dos Santos Dependency framework that shifts analysis beyond state actors and identifies social groups and multi-national capital considerations as fundamental units of analysis. This study then builds upon this transnational capitalist Dependency model. It highlights the Caporaso and Zare understanding of Dependency that focuses on external factors of a world economy where less developed countries are incorporated into a system of global capitalism that dictates declining terms of trade and leaves countries in a constant cycle of capital drought and underdevelopment.

Insightfully, Bayart points out the irony that the fiscal freedom and economic growth that should have resulted from the World Bank, IMF, and foreign donor investments further stunted African economies. This notion is foundational to the exogenous pathway explored in this dissertation and will be expounded in later chapters. As Bayart notes that financial liberalization can lead to the plundering of economies in the form of privatization and the development of

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117 See J. Caporaso and Zare, From Dependency To Development: Strategies To Overcome Underdevelopment And Inequality, Ch 3  An Interpretation and Valuation of Dependency Theory. (1981)
criminal and corrupt activities, he astutely recognizes the prominence of external variables when explaining corruption. Here Bayart’s external economic dependency analysis surpasses that of Yates, Karl, and Ebohon, in that Bayart actively identifies the coupled relationship of external and internal variables. Where Bayart’s framework is limited, however, is that it only peripherally connects and links variables coherently. That is, Bayart’s description of structural factors driving financial liberalization and interacting with the local country-specific institutional conditions to produce corruption is limited.\footnote{The critique here is direct. While Bayart presents internal social capital variables stemming from historical institutional analysis AND external international criminalization variables stemming from economic dependency analysis, he does not connect how, why, and when these modes of analysis interact and combine.}

Bayart unquestionably makes an essential contribution to Africa’s corruption scholarship in moving the needle towards a more combinational mode of analysis. He perceptively provides a framework that begins to identify the way key variables can combine to explain phenomena. Although other economic dependency scholars of African corruption, such as Yates and Karl, acknowledged the association of internal and external variables, Bayart more directly exposes the internal/external causal binary. Specifically, Bayart traces a historical pathway through which external economic factors act in relation to particular socio-cultural institutional configurations, so that specific origins and roots of corruption may be better observed.

There is a multitude of other diverse Africa corruption scholarship similarly influenced by various blends, mixtures, or combinations of frameworks across several disciplinary traditions. One such prominent study is that of Joseph Inikori. Inikori primarily invokes a Historical Institutional method that examines the middle passage and Trans Atlantic slave trade. For Inikori, the slave trade was profoundly impactful and generated adverse outcomes with
respect to the economic development processes in Africa. He argues that the slave trade precluded the growth and development of normal international trade practices between Africa and the rest of the world and concluded, “Atlantic economies that developed between 1451 and 1870, did so at the expense of the African economies.”

Inikori’s analysis does not explicitly mention corruption, but it intimates its presence through his investigation of the negative institutional and economic outcomes of Africa. Further, although he employs an obvious institutional method, he also incorporates a less obvious economic one. In a sort of Pre-Dependency framework, Inikori implements a zero-sum calculus of development, where Africa’s economic advancement is won or lost in direct correlation to the Atlantic economies. Inikori further describes this unified method arguing, “My analytical task has been to show how the internal and external factors operated and interacted to shape the structures within the units, at one point, and at another point, the character of the international economy.” Similar to Bayart, Inikori identifies the internal and external interplay but does not entirely reveal how the variables relate and influence each other.

John Mbaku likewise invokes a relational evaluation of Africa and the West with regard to explaining corruption. Mbaku identifies colonial institutional arrangements as the primary instruments of exploitation. That is, Africans and their resources were exploited for the specific benefit of Western economies, creating a comparative advantage that allowed Europeans to impoverish Africa. Consequently, the configurations of corrupt social elites in Africa are a direct

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119 Inikori, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, 80

120 Pre-Dependency in this sense represents the same exploitative relationship of core-periphery, but occurring in a less connected matrix of international economic markets centuries before the formal expression of word systems took hold.

121 Inikori, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, 82
result of the historical institutional imperial design of Europe. While most economic dependency models focus on contemporary, or neo-imperial, capitalist formations, and rents, Mbaku highlights a more nuanced and historical view of Dependency that identifies the same dynamic formations between Western states, MNC’s, and African governments. However, once again, although Mbaku’s work locates where internal institutions and external economics intersect, it fails to explain how their intersection arose.

The majority of this kind of combinational scholarship on corruption, including Bayart, Inikori, Mbaku, and to a lesser extent, Karl and Yates, recognize the causal importance of linking endogenous and exogenous inputs. These works identify the relationship between external and internal factors but were less concerned with explaining that relationship thoroughly.122

The scholarly push towards a hybrid method for analyzing corruption, where internal variables, be it historical, institutional, cultural, or social, directly entwine with external causal components like dependency, international economics, and global capital resource incentive structures, is evident. Here is where the analysis of TCM in Nigeria’s case of corruption becomes most relevant. This work attends to existing limitations by examining TCM along with the internal and external logic that comprise the figure’s construction and instigate corruption. That is, understanding the development of corruption in Nigeria requires a synthesized approach of both exogenous economic dependency analysis and endogenous historical institutionalism, whereby TCM serves as the constitutive link.

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122 Such models are ineffective in part due to the boundless nature of examination in attempting to contend with corruption in Africa as a whole, the more critically salient omission is the missing connective component that conjoins analysis with the external variables in corruption analysis.
On the one hand, certain Nigeria corruption scholars such as Yates, Karl, and Ebohon trace the transformative process that exploitative economics of dependency played in Nigeria. However, the transformation, where Nigeria is altered and changed into a petro/rentier/distributive/comprador/allocation state, does not fully explain the rise of corruption. On the other hand, scholars such as Joseph, Obadare, and Suberu invoke institutional analysis contending that social capital and patronage/patrimonial configurations/political group dynamics fomented a certain institutional status quo that is the embodiment of a state’s cultural and historical legacy. While both methods add insight, individually, they remain limited. This is where scholars like Bayart, Inikori, and Mbaku hoped to fuse exogenous and endogenous variables as an interwoven thread of investigation and understanding. Although they successfully present more encompassing frameworks, the construction of their models is not wholly precise, as the multilevel analysis they each pursue stands disconnected, failing to combine external and internal analyses with one and other coherently. This point of discontinuation, this failure to connect internal/external dots of analysis, represents the gap in corruption scholarship that makes this study relevant.

CONCLUSION

The preceding endogenous and exogenous analyses of the extant literature on corruption have demonstrated how theories of Economic Dependency and Historical Institutionalism inform the discourse on political corruption in Nigeria. Independently, each mode of analysis offers significant insight into understanding Nigeria’s corruption condition. For example, from an internal historical institutional viewpoint, Joseph provides a critical contribution in identifying the social structure of prebendal politics in Nigeria. His study offers a direct explanation of the
behaviors and motivations of those occupying public positions and has served as a critical launch pad for subsequent institutional corruption scholarship. Conversely, from an external vantage that examines corruption through economic dependency, scholars like Yates perceptively situate Nigeria within a broader international economic context to explain how rents and other government pathologies arise from the process of resource exploitation. Such scholarship has revealed equally important lessons about external corruption factors surrounding international patron-client relationships. Each method, however, has mostly existed separate from the other.

Additionally, similar to most analyses on the subject, the underlying methodological approaches to understanding corruption remain inconsistent across disciplines. Political Scientists and Economists have dominated the study of corruption. However, extant theories prove equally limited in explaining the variety and variance of corruption and its consequences in not only the Africa region but, more importantly, the Nigerian State. Corruption scholarship need not be dichotomous in framing nor singular in its causal proposition. Preferably, further insights can be gained by uniting exogenous and endogenous frames of analysis and explicitly defining their constitutive and co-evolutionary explanatory relationship.

My postulate for explaining political corruption in Nigeria, therefore, is anchored by the synthesized framework that examines exogenous/endogenous variables and conditions collectively. Specifically, I build upon the interlinking premise of Bayart, as well as the many economic dependency models, as I aim to show how Nigeria’s insertion into a landscape influenced by a global hegemonic mandate for liberal economics had disastrous consequences. The liberal capitalist development doctrine instructed state participation in economic policy. It
thus activated state agents that combined the military, the political, and the economic in a singular vessel of power and decision making.

The following chapters will extrapolate the internal and external evolutionary pathways of TCM and corruption in Nigeria from 1970-2015. TCM’s rise to power and position was not solely a deliberate quest for domination in Nigeria’s political arena but was more so the consequence and byproduct of how external economic factors and influences impacted internal institutional configurations. I argue throughout the dissertation that TCM was not necessarily a sought out role of absolute power, at least not at first. Instead, TCM arose and was mostly externally engendered from demands of the contemporary world economic development landscape, which, together with internal political modalities, fomented a foundation for corruption that continued to compound and multiply.

This review has aimed to first contend with extant theories’ interpretations and justifications of corruption in Nigeria and decipher their explanatory merits. It also seeks to proffer a new mode of analysis that can reveal new explanatory pathways. After careful examination, classical theories of political science and economics that invoke distinct exogenous and endogenous analyses prove independently inexact for contending with the phenomenon of corruption, thus demanding a more comprehensive framework. Although internal and external insights abound, they are mainly explored independently of each other. How can the lessons of historical institutional and economic dependency analyses be explained concomitantly? My research aims to address such explanatory gaps by melding the lessons of each classical theoretical model together to engender a new framework from which new insights on political corruption in Nigeria may be uncovered. In realigning the paradigm through which corruption is
understood, examined, and compared, this study can, moreover, contribute to alternate methods
of analysis, allowing scholars to more completely construct analytical frameworks to establish
new comprehensive evaluations of corruption.
CHAPTER TWO
TCM, CAPITAL, AND CORRUPTION: HISTORICAL LINKS

NIGERIA’S CONTEMPORARY CORRUPTION CONDITION

During the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria was widely considered to be the most visibly corrupt nation in the world. Corruption had so embedded itself into the foundation of both the public psyche and political system; it was seen as an inherent natural condition in Nigeria. One military interview respondent extrapolated: “By that time, the law of corruption became the law of Nigeria. And still, until today, we cannot resign from power because through the military came power and money in government anyway. The motivation must still remain to continue to evade all the laws to cover up all those indecencies of the past.”

Understanding the emergence and role of the TCM in relation to Nigeria’s corruption condition requires assessing both the historical trajectory and present forms of corruption existing in the country. Specifically, in order to analyze how Nigeria became so corrupt, it is

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123 The predominance of corruption statistics on Nigeria for this time period include mainly subjective indices and metrics offered by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) and The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator (WB CCI) for example, both of whose merits have been discussed in chapter 1. Beyond perceptions of corruption, the following serve as evidence of acts of corruption identified and/or convicted in Nigeria: (1) Since the late 1980s, U.S. drug enforcement authorities estimated that Nigerian networks transported as much as 60 percent of the heroin available in the United States. (2) In addition, fraudulence in money laundering and corrupt activities (known colloquially as “419” letters, from the Nigerian criminal code for fraud) began to blanket the United States and many European and Asian countries toward the end of the 1980s, supplemented recently by e-mail messages. By some estimates, these scams defraud credulous respondents of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. (3) The proceeds from fraud, drug trafficking, oil smuggling, and other illegal activities naturally create a large need for money laundering through numerous banks and other businesses. See Peter M. Lewis “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria”. (Washington DC Center for Global Development, 2006) (4) The first Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, reported that more than $440 billion in national revenues had been stolen since 1960. More recently, during Goodluck Jonathan’s five year term as President, the Presidential Committee on Arms Procurement discovered that more $15 billion were diverted from the state treasury under fraudulent weapon exchanges. See Nuhu Ribadu. “Nigerian’s Struggle with Corruption”. A paper Presented at the Congregational House Committee on International Development (Washington, DC 2009). (5) The Federal Ministry of Finance has reported more than $180 million worth of funds have been recovered by the EFCC since opening in 2016. See EFCC Corruption Conviction Archives, 2013 with EFCC Establishment Act 2004 (6) A UN Nigeria country study estimates $4.6 billions in bribes paid annually. See UNODC Report: Corruption in Nigeria “Action against corruption and Economic Crime” July 2017, O. Stople. “Corruption and Anticorruption in Nigeria and beyond”. A Paper presented at one day workshop on Reporting corruption in Nigeria Organised by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), in collaboration with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 2008.

124 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Major, Years of Service - 30
essential first to outline when Nigeria became so corrupt. Foreign capital was always externally connected to Nigeria’s formation and political and economic development. TCM, however, signifies the moment when capital becomes activated in the most interior way, resulting in significant national political, economic, and military consequences. Capital activation, in this sense, is further described by an officer in a separate interview: “Back in those days, [during the Babangida regime of the 1980s] the military would dispense money to the state. If military gave a job, they gave it with fear, complete control, and supervision. Now there is no force, no supervision, and everyone behaves as they wish without consequence.”

Beyond highlighting the severity of corruption and the prominent role the military played in facilitating corruption, this description most significantly identifies a structural model of capital allocation that reflects institutional attributes of Nigeria’s military and corruption.

The rise of corruption in Nigeria, I argue, is, therefore, not solely the result of some innate selfishness or immediate political egoism. Nor is corruption primarily the residue of Nigeria’s colonial or socio-cultural past. Rather, the rise of corruption revolves around the construction of TCM and the figure’s relationship to external global economic markets and internal political, institutional change. Before fully exploring this link in subsequent chapters, this chapter focuses, more generally, on the presence and evolution of TCM and corruption, in Nigeria, over time.

The investigation begins with a short history of Nigeria that illustrates the development of the independent nation and prefaces its integration into the contemporary world economy of the twentieth century. Namely, I highlight significant moments of transnational capital flows and

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125 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Captain, Years of Service - 33
early foreign capitalist interests. Following, I present a more detailed description of TCM, specifically concerning the figure’s emergence, its origination of power, and its specific role in Nigeria’s political economy of corruption. Next, I briefly illustrate the appearance of corruption in Nigeria from 1970 - 2015 to reveal the magnitude of corruption’s presence via TCM and lay the foundation for the importance of this study. Finally, I outline a brief account of the study of development and corruption in Nigeria.

This chapter is designed to respond to questions of “when,” “what,” and “how”: When did corruption become so extreme in Nigeria? What were the internal and external conditions that accompanied this process? How are these internal and external conditions connected? In responding to these questions, this chapter broadly lays the foundation for my analysis by presenting key variables to be more thoroughly examined in later chapters. The descriptions, history, and analysis here, therefore, prefaces the endogenous exogenous co-evolutionary model of corruption argued throughout the dissertation.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY

By the end of the slave trade, African rulers began to receive growing resistance in the region leading the British to establish a permanent colony at Lagos and a base at Lokoja where the Niger and Benue rivers meet. Initially, there was little thought of colonizing that region of Africa altogether. However, by 1865 a British parliamentary commission advocated phasing out all British activity along the Nigerian coast. The subsequent European geopolitical situation then changed everything. The 1870s were a tumultuous time in Europe whereby the newly unified Germany and Italy disrupted the balance of power that had been so carefully carved out after the

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126 Chapters 3 and 4 will more closely examine the four external economic capitalist variables and the four internal institutional conditions respectively.
Napoleonic Wars earlier that century. The pressures of maintaining power led Europe to Africa in a scramble for territorial control. In 1884, the German government summoned the International Berlin West Africa Conference to try and regulate the carving up of Africa that was already well underway.

Palm oil was the prize of the time, as British industrialization required alternate sources of lubricant for its machinery. Competition grew amongst Europeans over who would control the palm oil-producing region of the Niger Delta. The British company, United Africa Company, was formed to promote the industrial interests on the foreign continent, establishing numerous trading posts in the region and garnering an advantage over other would-be colonizers. The company received a royal charter to administer the Niger Delta and all surrounding areas, which enabled it to both monopolize the land and dictate trade. Shortly thereafter, indigenous groups in the Niger Delta region launched a series of raids against The Royal Niger Company, including a violent attack at its headquarters. In response, the company slaughtered hundreds of indigenous opposers. Due to the growing instability in the region, the British Crown revoked the royal charter, forcing the Royal Niger Company to sell its holdings to the British government for nearly one million pounds. Therefore, the founding of the territory now known as Nigeria was
essentially a business deal, a capitalist venture between the British government and The Royal Niger Company, which presently operates under a different name, Unilever.  

Nigeria was now under the colonial rule of the British Crown, who conducted its conquests from existing enclaves in Lagos. The British, led by Governor-General Frederick Lugard, launched a series of pacification campaigns to destroy the power of local leaders and strip power from the provincial peoples, making any kind of unified resistance impossible. By 1893, the British took over the western region and established a protectorate in Ibadan. By 1906, the British had effectively taken control of Eastern, Western, and Northern Nigeria, proclaiming a government for these regions. The British dependencies in Nigeria were merged into a single territory in 1914, and a legislative council was created in 1922. Though the British created a single Nigerian colony, they administered the regions separately until the very end of the colonial period. In the North and West, the British borrowed from its implementation policies in India and employed a system of indirect rule where the Crown would use select local leaders to carry out colonial regulations and laws. Direct contact with the people was therefore minimized, reducing opposition to policies and preventing the intrusion of a foreign authority. In the East, they established a traditional colonial regime in which expatriate British officials governed directly.

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127 The United Africa Company Ltd was a merchant company originally trading in the West African colonies of the British Empire, namely Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), Gambia, Sierra Leone and, especially, Nigeria. Its predecessors had been trading in the region since the late eighteenth century. Until the early twentieth century this trade consisted of the exchange of African agricultural produce, in particular palm oil, groundnuts and cocoa, for manufactured goods of every sort, especially textiles; metal goods, such as pots, cutlery and tools; and provisions, such as salt. It was this need to secure a supply of palm oil for the manufacture of his soap that led William Lever to buy the Niger Company Ltd in 1920. On 3 March 1929 the Niger Company merged with its rival, the African and Eastern Trade Corporation Ltd, to form The United Africa Company Ltd, and as a result Unilever, also created in that year, acquired a large, complex and practically autonomous subsidiary devoted to African trade. The United Africa Company Ltd was incorporated on 29 April 1929. (See Unilever Art, Archives, and Record Management, United Africa Company Collection, GB1752.UAC. Online database: http://unilever-archives.com/Record.aspx)
The British subjugated the territory, creating regional differences within the colony. As a result, people began to consciously define as Yoruba, Igbo, or Hausa. That sense of self-identification was especially pronounced in the North, where its inhabitants began to fear the socio-economic mobility of Easterners in Nigeria, who more fully integrated into British culture and administration. The growing number of Nigerians and the dwindling physical presence of the British proved to be a critical factor in the ruling dynamics on the ground. With too few British to administer the colony, the British educated some of the locals to do so. In a process known as Nigerianisation, “The British trained and posted Nigerians in administrative and public service roles once occupied by expatriates throughout the country.”\(^{128}\) However, the British "civilizing" mission, led Nigerians not just to read, write, and pray to the Christian God, but also to learn the British social and political values, virtues that included freedom and democracy against the British crown.

The British imposed heavy taxes on Nigeria and drafted several Nigerians into the British army during the international conflict. The war and the reasons the British gave for fighting had little effect on the soldiers but resonated with the newly educated Nigerian elite. This small faction saw the contradiction between the colonizers' democratic principles and the harsh realities of their colonial rule. All the while, the outnumbered British found they had to rely on Nigerians more and more in continuing the system of indirect rule. By the 1920s, the British began implementing indirect rule through tribal chiefs, and if a chief did not exist, they had to create one. Thus, the British created tribes and ethnic divisions where no such formal organization had existed before, further segmenting an already regionalized nation. For example,

the practice of Nigerianisation morphed into Northernisation, whereby political leadership in the North prioritized Northern representation in senior public and Federal service. Northernisation created a formalized political method of division that drove regional populations farther and farther apart. Mackintosh identifies this dynamic specifically, noting,

“Western education was not considered very important in the North. Political leaders in the region felt that the number of Northerners in the service was minimal in comparison to their counterparts in the South. Due to political considerations, leaders in the region limited the recruitment of Southerners into the Northern regional service and found ways to push up the ranks of northerners in junior and senior positions.”  

The 1920s additionally saw the advent of pan-Africanism, as the first purely Nigerian political movement emerged with the formation of the Nigerian National Democratic Party in 1923. A decade later, support for Nigerian political groups broadened with the formation of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). Then in 1938, the NYM issued the Nigerian Youth Charter, which was the first actual call for self-government. Though the British largely ignored the document, it galvanized and radicalized the educated elite even further.

As the prospect of independence grew, World War II made its arrival inevitable. The British enlisted nearly one hundred thousand Nigerians into combat, and upon their return, these soldiers reemerged with a heightened desire for independence, democracy, and equality; all the things they supposedly had been fighting for on behalf of the British Crown. Therefore, a wave of political change permeated society with support for independence championed by the elite and commoners alike. For this analysis and this study of the emergence of TCM, the British, in effect, instigated the military and political nexus. First, the crown converted Nigerians to

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promote democratic and political ideals, then later enlisted them into service. Therefore the British transformed politically aware civilians into politically-minded soldiers. The effects of this embedding would be seen in full force decades later as military officers would dominate the political arena. Soldiers were therefore transformed back into political actors, defending tyranny in Nigeria’s independence moment. Later, following the civil war, Nigeria converted soldiers to politicians and politicians to capital agents of accumulation. Nigeria’s development history illustrates where historical moments of colonial influence reflect post world-war linkages of military and politics and served as a harbinger of further linkages to come for Nigeria.

Post-WWII, Nigerian nationalists continued to demand extended political rights and called for direct elections. The Nigerian National Council was formed in 1944 in response to the colonial administration's refusal to consider such nationalist demands. The abrogation of the 1947 constitution and the introduction of a ministerial government followed in 1951. The British began to yield to Nigeria's nationalist movement and postwar pressure for decolonization. By 1953 the London Conference produced a constitution for an independent Nigeria, which called for the creation of a federation with a stable centralized government and regional administrations led by Nigerian-born premiers and ministers. The federation became self-governing in 1954 as steps were taken to "Nigerianize" the civil service, democratize the local legislatures, and expand social services. Significantly, the independence movement in Nigeria made no mention of military rulers or military leadership, and certainly put forth no integrated model of military governance. While there may have been seeds of a military and politics fusion pre-independence, the first republic of Nigeria showed very little evidence of military-run

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130 A fulsome discussion of the military politics link will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
government or political agents of that kind. The movement specifically called for Nigeria’s civil
service and state administration to be composed of by its common citizens. The massive military
entry into politics would only occur many years later.

Among the prominent instigators for independence in the country was Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe. Dr. Azikiwe provided compelling arguments in favor of an autonomous Nigeria and
roused national independence sentiments by exclaiming, “We who live in this blessed country
know that until we are in control of political power, we would continued to be the footstool of
imperialist nations. We are fed up with being governed as a crown colony. We are nauseated by
the existence of an untrammeled bureaucracy which is a challenge to our manhood.”

Nigeria finally became an independent nation within the British Commonwealth of
Nations on October 1, 1960, with Tafawa Balewa as prime minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe as
governor-general. Three years later, Azikiwe became president when Nigeria declared itself a
republic in 1963. By this time, the dominant nationalist political party had split, and the major
problem confronting the federal government was an internal threat to federal unity. The
formation of various political groupings and political alliances followed. By 1967, the Eastern
parliament gave the Eastern leader Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu authority to declare the
region an independent republic. On May 30, Ojukwu proclaimed the independent Republic of
Biafra, and in July, fighting broke out between Biafra and Nigeria. After three years of suffering,
Biafra capitulated on Jan. 15, 1970. The secession ended, and Nigeria began its path towards
regional integration.

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83

The series of consecutive military takeovers, coups, and counter-coups defined the 1970s. Nigeria was repeatedly denied the democratic transition promised to its people and instead was plagued with one violent military power transition after another. By 1978 a new constitution was written, and Shehu Shagari was named the new president in the 1979 elections. He was ultimately re-elected in 1983, which marked the first successive democratic elections in the country. As Nigeria seemed to be gaining some political continuity, Shagari was deposed in a bloodless military coup, and Muhammadu Buhari was named the new leader. Buhari’s reign, however, was short-lived as yet another coup took place on August 27, 1985, by Babangida. As a leader, Babangida plunged the already sinking nation into the depths of political and economic futility and corruption. After several failed coups against Babangida, Nigeria held elections in 1993, and Moshood Abiola was declared the winner. However, Babangida immediately annulled the results engendering further political crisis and social unrest. Babangida eventually surrendered the presidency, and Ernest Shonekan would then be appointed Nigeria’s first civilian president in over a decade. However, he was deposed after three months in office by Sani Abacha, Babangida’s defense minister. Sani Abacha’s rule exacerbated the economic conditions of Babangida. Abacha completely dismantled state institutions and eventually looted over four billion dollars worth of Nigeria’s assets. All takeover attempts and coups proved unsuccessful, and Abacha reigned for half of a decade until his untimely death in 1998. After Abacha died, Abdulsalam Abubakar took his place and set up a democratic transition program. In 1999

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132 Between 1966 and 1999, nine successful coups d’etats occurred in Nigeria with at least a dozen more failed attempts arising during that same period. See Ahmed Bako, “Military and Politics in Nigeria”, Issues on Nigerian Peoples and Culture, Chapter: 9, Publisher: Ahmadu Bello University Press Limited, Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria, Editors; Murtala Muhammad, Yusuf Isma'il, Murtala Ahmed Rufai,(2014)

133 Key note in this transition from Babangida is that Shonekan was appointed, not elected and served less than 3 months as president.
Obasanjo was elected as president. He was succeeded by Yar’Adua and Jonathan after him. In 2015, Nigeria elected Mahammadu Buhari, who was re-elected in 2019. He serves as president to this day.

Nigeria’s historical period of political transitions from colonialism to an independent republic thrust the nation into an equally trying transition period towards civil self-government. S.G. Ikoku extrapolates upon the problems of transition in his evaluation of Nigeria stating,

“All along Nigerian politics has been modeled on Western Democracy. The first experiment was the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy; it failed because Nigeria is not a nation-state, it had to be replaced. The British tradition was replaced with the United States presidential system. There was concentration of power without the political culture that provided the built-in restraints on the exercise of that power. Above all, the political superstructure of economically advanced, culturally homogeneous, imperial nations of the West proved wholly inadequate to the circumstances of a newly emerged, economically dependent, and culturally mosaic multi-ethnic community like Nigeria.”

Civil war and added political, regional, and ethnic fragmentations, impeded the liberalization of the Nigerian State. The creation of a tri-partitioned system that reinforced an already ethnically antagonistic political environment followed. Specifically, according to Claude Ake, within one year of independence, Nigeria’s political structure was primarily defined by a collective “politics of anxiety,” as the three political parties that emerged following independence were mostly tribal or regional associations. Furthermore, according to Orizu, the 1959 election preceding independence signified that there were three self-contained leaders rooted in tribal, religious, or geographical anchors.

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135 The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was a predominantly Igbo party in the East, The Action Group (AG) was a predominantly Yoruba party in the West, and The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was a Hausa/Fulani party, which held sway in the North. See. Claude Ake, “Indigenization: Problems of Transformation in Neo-colonial Economy” in Ake (ed) Political Economy of Nigeria. (Longman 1985), 11-15

Nigeria’s modern development era culminated in the last thirty years, where promised
democratic transitions were spurned by two of Nigeria’s most despotic and exploitive rulers.\(^{137}\)
The constant creation and recreation of the state republic stimulated an extreme ebb and flow of
dictatorial regimes and repressive governments leading up to the most recent transition towards
democracy. Throughout these exchanges of power in Nigeria, corruption unfolds, becoming
more and more extreme in form and funds. In summary, corruption in Nigeria can be observed
pre-independence, however, the rise of TCM and the formalization of corruption took shape
beginning in the 1970s, and reached its most blatant levels in the 1980s and 1990s. Extremes of
corruption in Nigeria continued to worsen over time, so when Nigeria began democratic power
transitions of government at the end of the twentieth century, corruption had become fully
institutionalized. In order to best conceptualize the progression of corruption across Nigeria’s
contemporary history, a more thorough delineation of TCM’s evolution is necessary.

**THE CAPITALIST MILITICIAN: DESCRIPTION AND DEFINITION**

The importance of TCM in explicating the massive modes of corruption in Nigeria cannot
be emphasized enough. TCM is the analytical connective tissue that adjoins the internal and
external corruption framework throughout this study. However, who, or what, is the Capital
Militician? Surely capital, military, and politician immediately factor into explaining this
concept, but what this agent represents is far more than a mere enmeshing of words and their
connotations.

TCM is the hybridized melding of economic control agent of capital accumulation and
distribution, military security officer, and political agent of the state. Imagine for example that

\(^{137}\) Babangida in the 1980s and Abacha in the 1990s.
General David Petraeus - a four-star general in the US Army and former head of the CIA, Bill Clinton - former US president, state governor, and political leader, and George Soros - investor, businessman, and capitalist of the highest order, were the same person, with unified axes of power, occupying a singular public position at once. In America, that sounds like the sort of creative fiction best sellers are made of. However, in Nigeria, that figure exists and persists as a singular triumvirate public agent who operates with all autonomy and impunity, at the nexus of politics, economics, and military institutions.

In the nearly fifty years since emergence, TCM has transformed the level of corruption in Nigeria to a remarkable and seemingly permanent presence. The reasons for this are multiple and layered. For example, the public power axis and position of influence occupied by TCM are dramatically singular. Meaning, all aspects of the state, be it markets and economic functionality, domestic and foreign policy, or defense and national security, are all managed, maneuvered, and made by a unitary actor. Consequently, amidst the rise of this public figure, abuses of power and resource have been the natural consequence, and corruption remains the unsurprising conclusion for Nigeria. Although TCM in the Nigerian case is specific and distinct in its formation, there may be significant similarities with other political actors in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, in terms of composition and power distribution.

Notwithstanding, TCM is NOT wholly synonymous with a dictator, tyrant, authoritarian ruler, despot, oligarch, autocrat, or warlord. Although TCM may share observable tendencies and promote power similarly, this figure distinctly occupies a unitary tripartite position of power internally. Therefore TCM represents a dangerous combination of business elite, political elite,
and military elite in Nigeria, synthesized as one. If TCM is NOT a dictator, tyrant type, then what defines the figure? Here are the two clarifying characteristics:

1) **TCM has a distinct relationship to capital.**

TCM is as complex in its perception of power and authority as it is in composition. When contrasted to the many African states with military rulers, the latter can be more accurately defined as military politicians, or simply, “Militicians,” which represents the intersection of military and politics only. Militicians are defined as “a politician who, though maintaining an outward display of democracy, is strongly associated with or actively supported by a military establishment, and typically gained power through military force.” Militicians are not unusual or uncommon in governance structures of developing regions. However, they are typically observed in Africa. Where this Militician differs in Nigeria’s case, is the relationship to capital.

We know corruption exists everywhere, in every nation, within every government. Historically, corruption has served two primary purposes. 1) To extract rents from the state, which includes embezzlement, bribery, nepotism, and cronyism, among others; and 2) To preserve power which includes electoral manipulation, political patronage, and judicial influence. When considering most of the world’s leadership, particularly in African cases, corruption predominantly serves the second purpose by utilizing elements of the first. That is, the political accumulation of capital is typically utilized primarily, and almost exclusively, for political influence. In other words, acquisition and maintenance of power and position are the customary motivators of abusive acts in government, where political agents act to either safeguard the institutional status quo or disrupt it. Such was the case with Mobutu in Zaire, Dos

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Santos in Angola, Stevens in Sierra Leone, and Idi Amin in Uganda. The list of military politicians in Africa extends beyond the few mentioned. However, the critical similarity amongst them is their respective pursuit and preservation of power and the accumulation of capital designed to do so. Santos managed to maintain control in Angola for nearly forty years, and Mobutu lead Zaire for over thirty, in large part due to the massive wealth secured through corruption. Nigeria’s case is unique and nuanced.

While dictators and rulers throughout development regions brandish power and exercise corruption for rational reasons of political preservation, the relationship of capital to the military leadership in Nigeria evolved and progressed a bit differently. Indeed, capital was a political weapon in Nigeria as it was in Angola and Uganda. That is, capital accumulation was undoubtedly part of the power pursuit of Nigeria’s military leadership. Capital accumulation as a source of wealth creation was also equally a motivating component across African regions. However, in Nigeria, capital became something much more. Its accumulation developed far beyond a need to exert political influence. For military leadership in Nigeria, capital accumulation became an impulse as profit maximization began to define politics. TCM regarded capital not only as a utility for politics alone but primarily as an element of social and economic advantage. Thus, the flows of transnational capital and foreign direct investment helped transform TCM’s relationship to, and use of, capital. It evolved from a means of political maneuvering, back to its traditional economic value of profits and surplus. These economic considerations were not attained from labor and production, but rather, from the corruptibility of the state. The surfeit of resources engendered a new functionality of capital, transferring political
power into economic power.\textsuperscript{139} Nigeria’s militician, therefore, became capitalist by engaging in accumulation and consumption methods, which leads to the next point of differentiation between TCM and other military politicians in Africa.

2) TCM’s power is diffuse, not concentrated in one or a few political actors.

TCM does not represent one ruler or ruling party. Nor is TCM specifically gendered, belong to a single tribe, ethnicity, social class, or religion. TCM is neutral to these sorts of identifying characteristics because TCM is less the person of power, as much it is the position of power. TCM is, therefore, diffuse in its composition, power, and presence. A quick comparison can fully illustrate this characteristic.

Consider Mobutu in Zaire. Mobutu was a military officer who rose to power and ruled Zaire for decades. One may argue that Mobutu’s power was also considerably imbued from external influence. Mobutu controlled state security, economic policy, and political power in Zaire, so what is the difference? Why isn’t Mobutu a capitalist militician? A key difference is Mobutu reigned for 30 years. His power was absolute and concentrated to his particular position of authority. Although other officers may have also engaged in corruption as well, the institutional constitution of power in Zaire was constrained to Mobutu primarily. Whereas, in Nigeria, TCM is diffuse and diverse. It is not a singular perception of one man’s power; it is a diffuse position of power occupied multiply. For example, TCM was produced, then consistently and quickly, reproduced over and again. Here lies a critical point of distinction, TCM does not reflect the man in power that wrought corruption, as much as it represents the positions of power, as mediators of capital, and beneficiaries of corruption. In the same 30 years that Zaire had a

\textsuperscript{139} This process will be explored in more detail in chapter 3 and 4 during discussions of the internal and external variables that contribute to the transformation of institutional politics leading to the rise of TCM.
solitary ruler, Nigeria had a dozen, each advancing and evolving in terms of corruption capability. The progression of TCM is not due to individually instigated power but is the result of a collective institutional composition of politics, military, and capital. TCM is not one, TCM is many. Chapters 3 and 4 will each provide a more fulsome discussion of TCM’s specific construction, function, power, and position relating to the respective exogenous and endogenous variables identified for this study. However, the discussion of TCM here illustrates the figure's primary characteristics and moment of emergence post-war. The crucial role of TCM in Nigeria’s corruption condition can be observed further through a temporal examination of corruption’s contemporary advancement.

CORRUPTION’S PRESENCE IN NIGERIA OVER TIME: 1970 - 2015

By the end of the twentieth century, Nigeria sat firmly in the center of the global corruption discourse and consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt nations across several measurement metrics. For example, the Worldwide Governance Indicator regarding control of corruption found that levels of corruption in Nigeria have remained alarmingly high over the past few decades. Similarly, Nigeria continues to score poorly on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.\textsuperscript{140} Clearly, from a subjective measurement standpoint, corruption in Nigeria has been persistent and extreme over the past few decades. However, aside from global measurements, corruption in Nigeria has been clear and present when observing for specific acts and manifestations. Recall this study defines corruption primarily as an act of capital exchange,

\footnote{\textsuperscript{140} In 1996 Nigeria ranked as the most corrupt nation in the world on the index. By the 2018 assessment, the country continued to rank in the bottom quartile, among the 36 most corrupt countries in the world. (TI CPI www.transparency.org)}
distribution, or accumulation. The following discussions expressly represent such acts of corruption in Nigeria from 1970 - 2015.

**Specific Acts of Corruption**

1) **Rent-Seeking**: Throughout Nigeria's history, military officers, politicians, members of government, and public officials have taken advantage of their positions to extract as much as possible from the state through profiteering from private individuals and companies, as well as from the economy at large, particularly from oil reserves and other natural resources. One retired Colonel described the military and resource rent-seeking as follows: “The problem was fuel and petroleum was seen as so rewarding, the money was too sweet. So we abandoned all public works and civil structures… Ask the common man on the road, anyone will say it. The fuel economy is still number one. And the rewards from it, the money is still too sweet. Whether you wear uniform or suit and tie.” Rent-seeking, primarily from Nigeria’s energy resources, created the ultimate opportunity for corruption. TCM transformed the State into an institutional venue for capital accumulation and allocation.

2) **Embezzlement**: Both individual and institutional embezzlement of public funds has been the case in Nigeria for decades. Studies suggest that Nigerian public funds of between $300 and $400 billion have been lost to this form of corruption since Nigeria became independent in

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141 This study proceeds with the following definition of corruption: The misuse or improper use (meaning a use counter to what is expressly intended or designated) of public office and positions of power for private gain in terms of monetary allocation and/or distribution of non-monetary favors, promises, considerations, and reciprocities during a designated period of development in a specified region.

142 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Colonel, Years of Service - 36.

143 Rent Seeking is the foundation of several economic studies of corruption, from Kreuger, Rent Seeking to Karl, Paradox of Plenty. Rent seeking activity in Nigeria has been tracked by several studies as steadily increasing from 1970 - 2006, reaching its zenith in the 1980s. See C.G. Nwaobi. *Corruption and bribery in the Nigerian economy: An empirical investigation.* (Abuja, Nigeria: Quantitative Economic Research Bureau, 2009). Other various studies present similar empirical data on corruption, rent seeking, and oil. This dissertation engages in a more detailed discussion of rent seeking statistics in an examination of the capital component of TCM in chapter 4.
1960. As to the military’s involvement, one interview participant explicitly explains: “Yes, the military was able to embezzle, but by very few heads. We have the power after all, so there must be impact. Whether economical or whatever, but Nigeria was quickly growing, everything was just moving so fast.” This form of power abuse became standard for the TCM in post-war Nigeria, as political and economic institutions started to overlap.

3) Bribes: Large scale corruption in the form of bribes or kickbacks paid to political and public officials in exchange for large contracts has also become a high activity area for corruption in Nigeria. A World Bank study showed that over 45% of the businessmen questioned expressed an expectation to make informal payments or give gifts to public officials in order to secure government contracts in Nigeria. The majority of business conducted for and by the state was surrounded by individual profit-seeking behaviors of bribery and illicit payments. During the era of military rule that included complete control of Federal ministries, bribes and payments were the most frequent and consistent form of corruption occurring at both high and low levels of government. For example, in 1982, an expose on corruption and business in Nigeria explained, “Ostensibly, the roadblocks are there to help the government uncover arms and other smuggled goods. In reality, their purpose is to enable the local military militia to participate in one of the country’s most flourishing businesses: bribery and corruption.”

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144 Transparency International conducted a study using Nigerian Government published official documents on military expenditure where billions of dollars (in the range of $2.1–15 billion) were reportedly stolen by various government officials using false procurement contracts for weapons that were never delivered. See E. Anderson and M.T. Page. Weaponising Transparency: Defence Procurement Reform as a Counterterrorism Strategy in Nigeria (Transparency International: London, 2017)

145 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Sergeant, Years of Service - 19


component of TCM corruption as evidence shows its pervasiveness across all strata of the military institution, allowing for broader capital participation and further indicating the diffuse nature of TCM figure.

4) Cronyism and Nepotism: There is much evidence that familial ties and personal connections play a critical role in the assignment or appointment of individuals to public positions, as well as in regard to promotions and remuneration. In Nigeria, government institutions have historically been filled according to ethnicity, religious, and political affiliation, rather than merit and professional qualification. There is further evidence that well-connected individuals attain public positions without ever working, as several public jobs are created simply to accommodate ethnic and political groups, or to reward officials who turn a blind eye to such irregularities. With regard to TCM, military officials were consistently placed in leadership roles in ministries and other public parastatals without any prior experience in public administration or bureaucratic management. Such positions, therefore, served the blatant purpose of capital management and allocation. For example, in 1988, the military government used Decree No. 25 for accounting for profit and loss to push for the commercialization of NITEL (Nigeria Telecommunications Limited) under the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization. Successive military governments further mobilized similar accounting measures to conceal cronyism and subvert accountability in the undervaluation and sale of most assets at giveaway prices to military cronies.  

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5) Political and Electoral Corruption: The issue of political and electoral corruption in Nigeria is widely discussed in the available literature.\textsuperscript{149} This form of corruption, among other things, is used to preserve power and gain political support. Accordingly, election processes have been flooded with irregularities since Nigeria became a democracy in 1960. As recently as the 2019 presidential election, primaries remained vulnerable to corruption due to the election oversight bodies, with their limited legal authority or disinclination to regulate party matters. Further, Nigeria contains a class of political “godfathers” who are defined as those men who have the individual power to determine nominations and election outcomes. In using their long-reaching influence, these godfathers manipulate society and often dictate ballots as well as elections. Albert explains,

“The contemporary godfatherism in Nigeria is one of the ruinous legacies of the Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha regimes (1993-1998). The two regimes commercialized politics and made it difficult for people to get anything in Nigeria simply through hard work. Many of these godfathers were military men that took over power during the 1999 elections in Nigeria. They were the ones that released Chief Olusegun Obasanjo from prison and made him the president of Nigeria.”\textsuperscript{150}

Albert further describes a direct nexus of Nigeria’s “godfathers,” and TCM examined throughout this study, particularly concerning capital accumulation and corrupt practices. He concludes,


“What is wrong with the Nigerian system is that the godfathers have turned politics into a money-making business under which elections are rigged with a view to forcing predetermined candidates into office. The officeholders are in turn subjected to all forms of indecent manipulations by their mentors. The godfathers in Nigeria see their support to their godsons as an economic investment that must yield superlative dividends by all means.”  

6) Service Sector and Industrial Corruption: Many studies have analyzed the risks, forms, causes, and consequences of corruption taking place in specific sectors outside of government or energy, such as health, agriculture, banking, and financial services, and manufacturing sectors. This form of corruption is more readily identifiable as a current venue for TCM and corruption as several of these sectors are currently managed and administered by this agent directly or within the agent’s power matrix. Ironically, even anti-corruption agencies serve as a platform to either disguise the corrupt practices of those being investigated or participate in corruption themselves. As one soldier commented during an elite interview:

“The country wants to blame military for corruption. They talk about Abacha and IBB [Babangida], but lets talk about all the names with EFCC. In fact even inside EFCC and Central Bank, they are all corrupt. If soldier is bad, then ordinary man became worse.”

Together, these six manifestations of corruption only begin to encapsulate those acts that have been observed and associated with the practice in Nigeria. In providing a historical

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151 Ibid.


154 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Warrant Officer, Years of Service - 33
perspective on the presence of corruption in Nigeria, it is imperative to remember that corruption has always been present in the country, as it has been throughout the history of all societies. However, by the twentieth century, Nigerian corruption began to take a more advanced and pernicious form. To attain a more comprehensive understanding of corruption throughout Nigeria’s history, I highlight the following instances to show when corruption, in the forms discussed above, became increasingly pronounced. This trajectory is critical as it identifies not only historical instances of corruption, but more notably, highlights specific moments where transnational capital interests manifested alongside corruption and political and economic development in Nigeria. Accordingly, each of the following created conditions for subsequent moments and modes of corruption to persist and advance.

Specific Eras of Corruption

1) Colonialism and Corruption

Colonial rule into the early twentieth century witnessed the unrestrained autocratic hand of the British crown usurps both Nigeria’s resources and sovereignty. Recall the formation of Nigeria as a territory was the result of a business transaction between a trading company and the British government. Foreign colonial influence was underpinned by specific modes of capital production, appropriation, and accumulation, which were dominated by the monopolistic interests of major European trading firms.¹⁵⁵ Thus, colonial authorities and their coalitions instituted a fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system that included low-level bribery, and high-level exploitation practices in Nigeria. The system was rooted in the trade of peoples and products, such as slaves and palm oil, and generated a crisis of accumulation that bore both

social and economic implications. That is, if to be British was to be rich and to be Nigerian was to be poor, then the result were tensions, first, between British colonial rulers and the ambitions of a would-be Nigerian bourgeoisie, and second, between local Nigerian elites and their national counterparts. Together, these tensions resulted in social and economic modes of exchange that bifurcated individuals, communities, ethnicities, and societies. There is evidence, therefore, of a material capital component that acted upon Nigeria’s early social and political institutions in corrupt ways.

The Colonial moment of corruption is reflected in the scholarly tradition that examines certain social and cultural norms that dictate behavior in politics and society. This strand of scholarship highlights society’s engagement and relationship to corrupt behavior, by tracing specific cultural prototypes that have been produced and reproduced over time. That is, as new public and community roles formed during colonialism, specific cultural and social modes of behavior resulted. For example, among the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, the institution of Oyo-mesi, the king making body, acted as a check against the abuse of power by the Alafin (the Oba), or the King of Oyo. Further, in Igbo society, the absence of any form of an overarching...
authority, by itself, placed leadership in the hands of the people, the very epitome of accountability and good governance. However, colonialism disrupted such collective social arrangements by prioritizing the individual above the community. Therefore, this literature argues that indirect colonial rule turned Nigeria's leadership into a corrupted enterprise. Where instead of collective power and trust in the community, rulers wielded power in trust for outside colonial authorities, authorities that were principally motivated by their external capitalist interests. Consequently, Nigeria’s government became an antagonistic platform for forcefully extracting resources from the land and obedience from the people.  

2) Decolonization, Neocolonialism, and Corruption

While Nigerian nationalist sentiments surged by the 1950s, British capitalist interests were safeguarded through a specific power-sharing arrangement in Nigeria. As decolonization advanced, the British progressively transferred formal authority to their Nigerian surrogates in a manner that enabled their continued management of the existing structures of capital and resource accumulation. Coker explains, “Nigeria is a creation of the British. Precisely, her neocolonial foundation explains her situation, even independence as “business” outfit: an international investment by the British, whose primary purpose was to invest as little as possible, but reap as much as possible as “profits.” Further, new roles in the public domain of a newly independent Nigeria opened the doors to new avenues of corruption that included the transfer of substantial capital amounts to prominent members of the Nigerian ruling class. There was now


159 Ejovi et al. Corruption in Nigeria, Historical Perspective
a level of open exchange that created a new Nigerian elite class that gave the British more direct access to corrupt accumulation methods in Nigeria.

Decolonization and Neo-colonial moments of corruption are typically analyzed through a specific scholarly lens that highlights characteristics of a patrimonial or neopatrimonial state, where power flows from a leader, a legal-rational institutional logic, or a combination of both. Specific forms of this framework include: (i) Presidentialism, the systematic concentration of power on the hands of one individual; (ii) Prebendalism, the use of state resources for political legitimation; (iii) Rent Seeking, the culture of acquiring economic gain linked to the private appropriation of resources by a particular group; and (iv) Clientelism, the system where power is maintained through a structure of patronage such as the awarding of personal favors, contracts, and licenses, among others. All of these forms of corrupt behavior can be simplified as patron-client relationships, whereby power is negotiated through personal connections. Nigeria has seen an abundance of literature fall under this research group that attempts to explain corruption by looking at the residue of colonialism, specifically, through the association of capital, patrons, and clients.

3) Independence and Corruption

As a Nigerian elite ruling class formed and took power in 1960, scholars argue that the prior period of shared partnerships with the British resulted in a state of capital famine, which profoundly affected their ability to use state power and state resources during the 1940s and

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161 See Joseph, Prebendalism in Nigeria, which looks to connect corruption to a colonial configuration of public institutions, patrons, and clients.

162 As discussed in chapter 1, this sort of singular analysis leaves much for interpretation with regard to the multitude of contemporary transnational capital interests.
Therefore, at the time where Nigeria’s leadership ascended to supreme political power, just before, and at independence, its leaders could now attempt to solve the central problem of capital famine by broadening their accumulative base through exploiting the public wealth of the state, which was previously unavailable to them. Essentially, institutional actions that safeguarded capitalist interests of the British served as instructional lessons for Nigeria’s local ruling class. They were thus, able to diversify their activities into new dubious and fraudulent forms of accumulation and corruption, including rent-seeking profiteering, towards their political ambitions. Specifically, the sharing of power and position with the British profoundly affected the attitudes of Nigeria’s political elite with regard to the use of state power and resources. So much so, that the initial coup of 1966 is often explained as a direct response to the abuses of political power and economic resources that resulted from the British inspired Westminster styled government that was inserted in a newly independent Nigeria. The military politics nexus evolves from this moment when the line between the two institutions is blurred, and the military’s insertion into politics becomes visible. The full military politics nexus would evolve from here.

This Independence moment of corruption has been investigated through a Rational Choice tradition based on a particular concept, whereby, an individual makes a rational decision

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163 Ejovi et al. Corruption in Nigeria, Historical Perspective
164 Ibid
165 There are several contrasting explanations for the military’s initial involvement in Nigerian politics ranging from an ethnic and tribal motivation for power, a patriotic nationalistic response to an ineffective government structure, and the rescuing of a political administration from the hands of a British controlled political elite. For example, see Jawan and Osinakachukwu, “The Electoral Process and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria”, Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 4, No. 2; (September 2011).
that leads to a predetermined outcome. In Nigeria’s case, the individuals are members of the post-independence political elite who decide whether or not to act corruptly towards an outcome that benefits their political position or advances that of their political group. Put simply, this form of analysis argues that public officials in Nigeria are corrupt because the perceived benefits of their corrupt action, exceed the potential cost.

4) Military Rule, Natural Resources, and Corruption

By the conclusion of Nigeria’s civil war, military rule transformed the social and institutional relationship to corruption. As did many Latin American countries in the 1960s, military rule modified Nigeria. It subsequently developed an abusive corrupt system of rule, or what Akinrade referred to as “a political space that served as the plaything for one messianic military group or the other.”

Nigeria’s past relationship to external capital and external capitalist interests, proved instructional, as new political actors (TCM) built upon prior institutional conditions to advance new forms of corruption, such as crony capitalism and high-level embezzlement. The oil boom of the 1970s further prioritized Nigeria as a venue for foreign investment and multinational capital interests. The following decades witnessed some of the most extreme, egregious, and blatant abuses of power in Nigeria, if not the world. Capitalist Militicians such as Babangida and Abacha began the formalized practice of political corruption in Nigeria, as fiscal abuse and resource allocation became rampant. Military rule, transnational capital, and resource allocation became rampant.

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166 See Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, which looks to individualize the practice, as primarily a cost benefit calculation of risk and reward.

exploitation congealed, resulting in an environment of corruption unique to Nigeria, thus solidifying the arrival of TCM.

These moments of military rule and exploitative resource-based corruption have received much attention across scholarly analyses. Extensive literature focuses on the impact oil revenues and foreign capital interests that drive its production, had on Nigeria’s institutional functionality. Other studies have shown that oil dependency has real economic and social implications that impact Nigeria’s position in the broader economic world system. For example, Nigeria has been grouped with other resource-rich countries as a Rentier State, the condition where the political and ruling class seek to dominate and control the state in order to capture the rents generated from natural resources for their enrichment. The literature examining post-civil war moments of Nigerian corruption delves further into the excessive centralization of power. It combines the extreme dependency cycle of capital accumulation and allocation that leads to greater political instability, and greater reliance on capital networks, to gain and maintain access to power.

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5) Twenty-First Century Democratic Rule

If military rule in the late twentieth century formalized corruption, then democratic rule institutionalized it. Although TCM was not as overtly visible, as the more blatant examples from the 1980s and 1990s portray, TCM remained an active participant in political corruption and engineered its institutionalization. By the twenty-first century, corruption defined Nigeria as the pursuit of capital was unified internally and externally. Transnational capital and foreign capitalists’ interests were now directly aligned with national capital accumulation and domestic capitalist interests. By the early 2000s, Nigeria was a full-fledged kleptocratic state engaging in some of the most advanced forms of government pathology and corruption that included financial crimes, money laundering, institutional appropriation of funds, and capital flight. This era can also notably be characterized as the military’s political resurgence as TCM reappears when former military heads of state re-enter democratic government as civilians, serving in prominent political and institutional positions, including the presidency.

The contemporary Democratic moment of corruption in Nigeria has been predominantly explored through various analyses of Nigeria’s institutional composition. For example, some historians have focused on state formation, which includes war and the role of armies.\textsuperscript{169} Corruption in the state has also been examined through the lens of citizenship and identity. These studies argue that the absence of a defined unified sentiment of nation and citizen has precluded Nigeria from instituting reforms and enforcing social discipline, thereby creating a soft state, a condition where the legal apparatus for social control is unproductive and ineffective, so that

laws and obligations are not credibly enforceable. The institutional analysis of corruption can also be seen in scholarship that investigates the origins of Nigeria’s criminal networks and communities of organized crime, that marked opportunities for extraversion and kleptocracy in a formalized sense.

The above moments and forms of corruption in Nigeria should not be regarded in isolation, or in a manner that separates one era of corruption from another. Rather, I argue that the various moments of corruption throughout Nigeria’s development history are evolutionary and composite. That is, on one hand, as corruption has steadily evolved from one century to the next and certainly across decades, its development has been diverse across economic and political institutions. However, at the same time, Nigeria’s manifold corruption growth has occurred as a compounded phenomena where each form of corruption instructs, orders, and prepares the next.

CONCLUSION

The supply of resources, whether slaves, spices, or in the case of the early twentieth-century, palm oil, has always connected foreign interest and external capital to Nigeria. This relationship, however, evolved throughout Nigeria’s development in the early to mid-twentieth century. Foreign economic interests and transnational capital impacted social and cultural


171 An example of international criminalization can be seen in chapter 1, See. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. See also F. Ogbeche, Harvest of Corruption. (Suleja, Nigeria: S. Danjuma Printing Works. 1997)

172 Although I order the development of corruption over a specific time frame, I am not arguing that corruption in Nigeria is a perfectly sequential occurrence. Rather I argue that as external capitalist interests evolved from slaves and palm oil, to crude oil, loan payments, and market access, the evolution of corruption has followed. In this sense the form of corruption observed is more significant than the degree or amount perceived, so that bribery and embezzlement can be seen through the same external context of foreign capitalist interests as clientelism, rent seeking, and fiscal appropriation for example.
configurations and influenced political and economic institutions. I have outlined the above
transitional history and historiography to illustrate where each moment proved instructive to the
next, namely, concerning the manner transnational capital interacted with national
configurations.

This overview of corruption in Nigeria’s history additionally illustrates the extreme
divergence of opinions within the literature. This variety notwithstanding, two elements appear
to run through most approaches. Corruption is almost entirely singular and rooted in colonialism,
and corruption seems to focus on internal or endogenous variables of analysis primarily. This is
both alarming and paradoxical as this chapter has explicitly illustrated how external transnational
capitalist interests have consistently impacted corruption in Nigeria throughout its modern
development history. Therefore, in reimagining the paradigm through which corruption in
Nigeria is analyzed, this study is focused not only on Nigeria’s colonial past, or solely on its
internal variables. Instead, this study brings attention to the political economy of Nigeria’s more
recent post-independence history in investigating how external capital directly transforms
internal institutions and multiplies corruption.

My general contention is that the critical point of examination in understanding
corruption in Nigeria, lies not in the cultural antecedents of colonization in Africa during the 19th
century as is traditionally postulated, but rather, more principally, in the ideological and practical
dictates of global capitalist development in the 20th century. More specifically, the rise of
corruption in Nigeria from 1970 - 2015 can be generally attributed to the rise of TCM, an agent
formed as a result of the dominant capitalist ideology that underpinned the making of the
contemporary world economy during this period. However, before I can begin to position the
entire argument explaining corruption’s rise, I must first outline the importance of contemporary capitalism. I begin the next chapter by presenting the capitalism and corruption link to explain how this study intends to proceed with the external analysis of a contemporary world economy, as it relates to Nigeria, TCM, and corruption. I then conclude with a more detailed exogenous analysis of Nigeria’s political economy and the external variables that influence the making of TCM.
CHAPTER THREE
EXOGENOUS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION

TRANSNATIONAL EXPANSION OF CAPITAL: A CALL TO DEVELOPMENT

"Of all developing regions, Africa has done the worst; bad government, unexpected sovereignty, backward technology, inadequate education, corruption, bad climate, overpopulation — a plague of plagues."[173] Africa’s contemporary position in the world economy has typically been regarded as such; failing. As a giant of Africa, Nigeria’s corruption condition naturally stands out. However, this sort of knee jerk perception examines the internal outcomes of Africa’s developing regions without fairly considering the external outputs of the developed world. In other words, in Nigeria’s case, while there is a general acknowledgment of when adverse outcomes like corruption appeared, minimal attention is given to explore what sorts of external conditions precipitated such negative consequences.

In the last chapter, I presented a history of corruption in Nigeria that highlighted the impactful role external transnational capital interests have played, pre-colonialism to present. I have additionally argued that Nigeria's current corruption predicament is symptomatic of twentieth-century capitalism, specifically relating to the influence and impact of twentieth-century global development policies and their aftermath. Therefore, in order to fully grasp how Nigeria became so corrupt, one must understand the nature and construction of the contemporary economic world system, its influences on Nigeria’s political and economic institutions, and the

ultimate shaping of TCM. Within this context, this chapter explains how corruption in Nigeria emerged from the mediation of the contradictory tendencies of twentieth-century capitalism and the advent of liberal development policies in the contemporary economic world system.

Capitalism evolved in the twentieth-century. Profit maximization expanded as capitalist pursuits were now predominantly shaped, formed, and developed across nations and interconnected free markets. Although capital has been internationalizing for over half a millennium, the twentieth century witnessed a more fully-fledged process of capitalist globalization, notably, after WWII, when capital’s mobility increased and its geographic reach expanded. The transnational expansion of capital and global capitalists interests, therefore, remade capitalism into a fully connected global political and economic world system.

Additionally, of capital development in a broader sense, scholars like Arrighi believe the evolution of global capitalism and state formation are inherently tied. Nigeria, therefore, is not necessarily backward, or corrupt, because it is poor or “underdeveloped,” Nigeria’s condition persists because it was eagerly trying to answer the contemporary capitalist call to become rich(er) within the global system of integrated state markets. This international cry for

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174 The baseline from which economic liberals argue for the commercialization model of capitalism is rooted in free trade and man’s natural entrepreneurialism. See Karl Marx, Das Kapital, a Critique of Political Economy, (Chicago :H. Regnery, 1959) and Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations Edited, with Notes, Marginal Summary, and Enlarged Index by Edwin Cannan. (New York :Modern Library, 2000)

175 See Kotz and McDonough “Global Neoliberalism and the Contemporary Social Structure of Accumulation”. In Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises (2010). The expansion referenced points more to 20th century globalization than to transnational trade which had existed centuries prior with the exchange of goods, services, and products.

176 Kotz and McDonough Global Neoliberalism and the Contemporary Social Structure of Accumulation

177 See. Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London Verso 1994). For Arrighi the logic of “capitalism” is that of accumulation of capital and of “territorialism”. They do not refer to the “accumulation of power and capital within states, but to the accumulation of power and capital in an evolving system of states. Global capitalism expands in the system of states and thereby follows the formula MTM” (money – territory – more money). Consequently, for capitalists, territory is a means to accumulate additional capital.
capitalist development stems first, from the emergence of statist economic policy and Modernization, and subsequently, with the rise of free-market ideology and Neoliberalism.\footnote{178 Modernization theory is a post WWII international economic development strategy that was promoted by Western governments and major finance institutions, and forced upon developing regions. Ultimately, as Modernization, industrialization, marketization, and economic maturation notions of capitalist development were conceptualized, promulgated, and executed throughout the twentieth century, their implementation revealed more failures than successes. Neoliberalism in a basic sense is the revival of Economic Liberalism which is the belief that states ought to abstain from intervening in the economy, and instead leave as much as possible up to individuals participating in free and self-regulating markets. A complete discussion of both Modernization and Neoliberalism and their contribution to contemporary economic development will follow later in this chapter. For more foundational elements of international development in my analysis, See Jeremiah I Dibua, Modernization and the Crisis of Development in Africa: the Nigerian experience. (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006) 315} Under closer examination of Nigeria’s political economy, this chapter explores how global capitalist interests directly informed economic policy, state formation, construction of political institutions, and the evolution of political agents (TCM).\footnote{179 Reference to “Global Capitalist Interests” or “Transnational Capital Stakeholders” is a reference to NeoGramcian identification and analysis to a contemporary “TransNational Capitalist Class” of global actors. See William Robinson, “Globalization and Transnational Capital Class”, Science & Society Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring, 2000) 11-54. The new transnational bourgeoisie or capitalist class is composed of the owners of transnational capital, that is, the group that owns the leading worldwide means of production as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions. This class is transnational because it is tied to globalized circuits of production, marketing, and finances unbound from particular national territories and identities, and because its interests lie in global over local or national accumulation. The TCC therefore can be located in the global class structure by its ownership and/or control of transnational capital. What distinguishes the TCC from national or local capitalists is that it is involved in globalized production and manages globalized circuits of accumulation that give it an objective class existence and identity spatially and politically in the global system above any local territories and polities. As the agent of the global economy, transnational capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a world scale, that fraction which imposes the general direction and character on production worldwide and conditions the social, political, and cultural character of capitalist society worldwide.} I proceed by examining four primary exogenous variables related to external global capital that become of critical importance to understand the rise of TCM and the presence of corruption in Nigeria; 1) Twentieth-century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, 2) Globalized development policies, 3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, 4) Multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, and natural resources. I conclude this chapter with comparative regional case studies that explore how external capital interests impacted other developing nations in Africa and Asia, respectively. The four linkage points identified in this chapter converge to explain
corruption in Nigeria ultimately. However, their connections begin at the nexus of capitalism and corruption more generally.

**CAPITALISM AND CORRUPTION LINK**

My contention is as follows; it is not just corruption, it is first capitalism, and later the national political power negotiations activated from its transnational pursuit. Therefore, corruption is not a sovereign and autonomous phenomenon. Rather, it is highly symptomatic of capitalism and global capitalist development in a largely political context. Corruption is the residue of the collusive system in which states, institutions, and their respective agents mediate the contradictory claims of capitalism toward their ends. In this sense, corruption’s link to capitalism undergirds the political economy arguments and analyses to follow.

I explore the capitalism and corruption paradigm invoking Marx’s economic view of capitalism and his definition of a capitalist. Marx first explains capitalists as,

> “The possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts and to which it returns. The expansion of value becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. The restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he aims at.”

Distinct from Marxist political philosophy, his view on capital and economics focuses on the crisis of capitalism, the role of distribution and surplus, and exploitation in global economic systems. Moreover, Marx suggests that capitalism activates corruption, as the former is based on the principles of private property, which he defines as the surplus value that is secured by

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180 An aspect of the Marxian view most apposite here is not just surplus and profit-making, but the continued maximization of the accumulative potential of capital. See Karl Marx. Das Kapital, a Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1959.

181 John Eatwell, Marxian Economics. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1990)
capitalists from laborers. This study proceeds with the Marxist economic definition of the capitalist as one who prioritizes the expansion of value and the appropriation of “more” as a primary motive for operation. That is, capitalists are interested in the continued increased accumulation of capital, and not necessarily in the value of underlying commodities themselves. Marx continues,

“I have proven, in dealing with value, that every labor must leave a surplus; so that in supposing the consumption of the laborer to be always the same, his labor should create, on top of his subsistence, a capital always greater. Under the regime of property, the surplus of labor, essentially collective, passes entirely, like the revenue, to the proprietor. The consequence of that usurpation is that the laborer, whose share of the collective product is constantly confiscated by the entrepreneur, is always on his uppers, while the capitalist is always in profit … and that political economy, that upholds and advocates that regime, is the theory of theft.”

For Marx, the words ‘fraudulent’ and ‘theft’ directly link capitalism and corruption. If theft from labor is the very foundation of the capitalist system, then its primary principle is how best, and most expediently, the capitalist can maximize profits. That is, in pursuit of profit maximization, capitalism inherently becomes a venue for corruption.

In a similar view, Proudhon famously contends, “Property is theft!” He levies this objection at propertied capitalists who earn income from the labor of others. Proudhon aligns with Marx in this sense, whereby the capitalist, by virtue of his capitalism, activates corruption and rents. That is, when a capitalist reaps the benefits of their workers’ productive capacity without themselves contributing to labor, they are engaging in what Proudhon observes as theft, and what Marx more clearly defines as corruption.

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182 Ibid. In the context explored here, TCM is driven primarily by the need and desire to accumulate and control capital to his ends for his own specific needs, and not towards a rational end of production or market function alone. This dynamic of capital accumulation promoted by TCM is the foundational feature of the political economy of corruption in Nigeria, and further, distinguishes TCM from other comparative authoritarian actors.

The definitions that Marx provides, and that Proudhon references are starting points for understanding corruption in terms of profit maximization and capital distribution. The corruption referenced throughout this study is not immediately related to surplus secured from direct labor in a private property sense, but rather, is more closely related to the pursuit of profits and the fraudulent usurpation of communal goods, whereby the capitalist engages in theft. My analysis of corruption further parallels the expansive nature of capitalism, as it shifted from the private property and labor context to the transnational configuration of profit and allocation that impact local political institutions.

Several Marxists scholars point to the dialectic of transnational capital power, local political structures, and corruption. Although Samuel Huntington does not apply the same Marxist lens, he does speak to a parallel dialectic of capitalism [vis a vis Modernization and development] and corruption. Huntington affirms,

“Acts defined as corruption by some observers are an inevitable part of the Modernization process as Modernization creates new wealth and power whose relations to politics are undefined [and] corruption [subsequently] occurs in the process of using wealth to secure political power or in the process of using political power to procure wealth. Finally, Modernization breeds corruption because it changes and multiplies the laws by which a state is governed…placing some group[s]…at a disadvantage, creating a potential source of corruption. This understanding of corruption reveals it as an inevitable by-product of the Modernization process.”

Huntington’s description identifies Modernization theory as an approach promoted to stimulate economic growth and capital accumulation. As a byproduct, Modernization resulted in local political power negotiations that activated corruption as a means to secure wealth for

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185 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 6,17.
political goal fulfillment. Therefore, corruption is economically tied to capitalism as a means to maximize profits, as well as politically, as a method for power procurement. It is from these perspectives of capitalism’s corruptive impact on political economy that I conduct my investigation in the Nigerian case. But first, a brief point of clarification on capitalist development in the twentieth century is required.

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS ON GLOBAL CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The traditionalist view on capitalist development points to the natural logic or evolution of markets and economies towards equilibrium.\(^{186}\) The line of thought, “conceived of the capitalist market as a mechanism which automatically harmonized the selfish actions of individuals without intervention by the state.”\(^{187}\) That through the ebb and flow of ideas and punctuated moments of change, a natural market function followed, shifting its rationalities away from the interference of state and government interventions. In this narrative, capitalism’s development path was an organic one, and the shift away from state-centric modeling and back towards free markets and free trade was natural. Specifically, the contemporary return to Liberalism occurred from the natural progression and corrective logic of free markets.

Furthermore, the Liberal shift in the twentieth-century is seldom recognized or articulated as originating in the 1930s. Instead, the majority of scholarship on free-market capitalism and contemporary liberal economic ideology argue that the Neoliberal turn began in the 1970s.\(^ {188}\)

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\(^{186}\) This is mostly in sync with classical liberal principles of inherent market logic of self correction.


\(^{188}\) The accepted contention is that neoliberalism begins with the refashioning of industrialized state’s relationship to markets during the 1970s when Keynesian policies fell apart, and economic crisis ensued. This understanding of neoliberalism alleges its principles and ideas entered the mainstream during this period of economic turmoil and fully solidified with privatization and deregulation of the 1980s as seen with the conservative administrations of Regan and Thatcher. See Kotz and McDonough “Global Neoliberalism and the Contemporary Social Structure of Accumulation” and Daniel Stedman Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)
However, this version of ideological development obfuscates the powerful presence of Neoliberalism throughout the mid-twentieth century. Neoliberalism as an idea and ideology not only originated well before the 1970s but was pervasive throughout economic and policy circles decades before it's universally acknowledged presence.\footnote{See Adam Tooze, “Neoliberalism’s World Order” Dissent 65(3) (University of Pennsylvania Press 2018) 132. for an example that argues that advocacy for free trade and the liberalization of capital movement goes back to neoliberalism’s founding moments in the wake of the First World War.}

Neoliberalism, it seems, became embraced and popularized in the 1970s. However, it was developed as an ascendant capitalist ideology over a much more extended period.\footnote{See Philip Mirowski, “The Political Movement that Dared Not Speak its Own Name: The Neoliberal Thought Collective Under Erasure”. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 23. (September 2014)} There was an awareness and intention to reinvent and reestablish a new form of classical liberalism as far back as the 1930s, beginning with the Walter Lippman Colloquium of 1938.\footnote{See Oliver Marc Hartwich, Oliver Marc. “Neoliberalism The Genesis of a Political Swear Word”, Center for Independent Studies. 2009} Neoliberalism as a term, in fact, is thought to have been coined at this venue by Rustow.\footnote{Ibid. Operating within the economic context of transitional Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Rustow elaborated upon a system of a market economy under the rules of law and limited government which he deemed as “neoliberal.”} The roots of Neoliberalism emerged in the early twentieth century and marked the early stage establishment of organized intellectuals who purposefully calculated and premeditated an international program to revitalize, renew, and institutionalize tenets of economic liberalism.\footnote{It is important to differentiate the diffusion of ideas and the creation of state policy. Here I highlight the ideological roots of Neoliberalism and the policy intentions existed decades prior to policy implementation.}

My analysis of twentieth-century Liberalism and Neoliberal ideology focuses on both liberal ideas and the international institutional economic structures that propagate and promote those ideas. To that end, in addition to Marxist economic theory, my analysis here also incorporates the neo-Gramscian framework that aims to uncover the nature and designed
direction of the contemporary world economic system through the exploration of the hegemonic capitalist liberalization project. My analysis borrows from the work of scholars like Mark Rupert, Robert Cox, and Kelley Lee. They believe Liberal and Neoliberal economic ideologies have been promoted and legitimated through a series of interconnected agencies, that have, “A combination of material, cultural, institutional or political attitude, which each seeks to contribute and consolidate the overall ideological structure.”

Gramsci’s analysis of the role of ideas in fomenting structural change in a hegemonic sense is useful here. When supranational structures activate ideas, they serve as tools used to enhance and consolidate an over-riding hegemonic order. Neo-Gramscian scholars draw on Gramsci’s analysis and insightfully theorize that Liberal ideology played a critical role in the construction of such new economic structures. For example, Cox argues, “A structural concept of power wherein the constitution of a stable order is the result of manufactured compatibility between dominant ideas, institutions, and material capabilities.” Cox contends that all dominant structure is the result of interaction amongst these three variables that achieve order when a regime of capital accumulation motivates capable institutions that are informed by

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194 For full summary, see Owen Worth. “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics”. Review of International Studies Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2011)


196 Ibid. Mark Rupert is referenced within this text and argues that a historic bloc is thus being constructed via institutions (GATT, World Bank) founded in the aftermath of Bretton Woods, but have taken greater emphasis since the end of the cold war and have been strengthened by new institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Thus by adapting institutions, that emerged from Bretton Woods under nouveau free trade institutions, the hegemonic world order is being transformed towards a more economically liberal set of social norms, that can be seen to promote ‘globalisation’. The notion of structures promoting hegemonic order from dominant ideas is what relates NeoGramscian scholars to this line of argumentation.

dominant ideas. Worth argues that ideology is a critical element of economic policy formation, “Neo-liberal economic globalization has been legitimated through a series of interconnected agencies, that have either or a combination of material, cultural, institutional or political attitudes, which each seeks to contribute and consolidate the overall ideological structure.”

The Neo-Gramscian view of hegemonic ideas and international structures, therefore, helps explain how Liberalism became a program that was intentionally calculated and purposefully remade. More specifically, it clarifies the formation of a hegemonic process of international structures and global ideology that relates directly to the external variables that order capitalist development strategies in Nigeria and ultimately shaped TCM.

The advancement of global capitalism, therefore, is a story that primarily involves countries deliberately interconnecting their markets via the development of technological and organizational structures, and the web of power politics that surrounds this process. Unlike Adam Smith, who thought to naturalize capitalism as the order of human interaction and trade, I contend that the contemporary capitalist world economy is an unnatural purposefully ordered, directed, and shaped endeavor. That is, capitalism in the twentieth century was deliberately directed towards dominant ends of hegemony.

This dissertation, therefore, argues that the primary mode of understanding corruption in Nigeria stems from comprehending the evolution of TCM and the manner through which the figure emerged. The emergence, I contend, is most prominently influenced and instigated by the making of a contemporary world economy: a capitalist world system that includes a specific

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198 Ibid., 77
199 Worth, Making Sense of Globalization.
brand of hegemonic economic ideology and imperialist capitalist philosophy that has been globally promulgated throughout the twentieth century. The system subsequently produced development policies and programs along with other external institutions that impacted national, local capacities. It formed conditions which resulted in a seismic shift in the power dimensions of Nigeria’s political actors. These articulations of power are directly reflected in the evolution of TCM and the four aforementioned exogenous variables that influence the development of the figure.  

FOUR EXOGENOUS VARIABLES OF GLOBAL CAPITAL

(1) Twentieth Century Liberal Economics and Neoliberal Ideology

The rise of economic Liberalism in the twentieth century brought about an incontrovertible clash between the statist economic ideology practiced in Nigeria during the immediate post-war period, and the economic ideology instructed for Nigeria from the mid to late twentieth century. The resulting incongruence created ideological constraints for Nigeria’s political actors and institutions. On the one hand, state leadership was directly involved in economic policy, development, and industrialization programs. On the other hand, Neoliberal ideology later instructed the state away from such significant involvement. However, these instructions were disseminated both through Nigeria’s underdeveloped institutional system, and Nigeria’s undefined political actors. The result was the evolution of political agents in Nigeria that were simultaneously directed to engage and disengage in economic development policies.

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200 The dissertation identifies the following Four variables as developmentally impactful for TCM and corruption: 1) Twentieth-century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, 2) Globalized development policies, 3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, 4) Multinational corporations, foreign direct investments, and natural resources.

201 In terms of periodization and the rise of TCM, there is an overlap. The period of analysis, 1970 - 2015, also takes into account the post WWII era and the global economic policy and ideological landscape that preceded it.
and capital accumulation practices. The agents were further propped and pushed by external capitalist interests and the international ideological stakeholders that safeguarded those interests in maintaining global free market capital conditions rooted in the principles of economic Liberalism.  

The ideological shift toward Liberalism in the early twentieth century is most clearly represented by two variables, each equally crucial to understanding the subsequent development outcomes of Nigeria, particularly the rise of TCM and corruption. The first is the evolution of the leading Liberal intellectual community of the twentieth century, The Mont Pelerin Society, and the second is the construction and function of new international financial institutions such as The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF). Liberalism's and Neoliberalism's impact on corruption in Nigeria, therefore, is best understood through the history of transnational capitalist development, explained through the constitutive development of these related institutions of ideology and policy.

The rise of Liberal economic thought and the importance of Neoliberal policy in the twentieth-century is the direct result of the decline of classical Liberalism in the nineteenth-century and the subsequent post-war arrival of statist Keynesian economics. As the Keynesian model arose in response, a network of economic experts, thinkers, and policymakers launched designed plans to reify a new liberal economic world system to be managed and mandated across

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202 Principles of Liberalism relate to classical Liberalism characterized by a global laissez-faire characteristic that holds the market to be sacrosanct, self-regulating, and entirely rational.

203 At the time, liberalism was a discredited set of beliefs, an anachronism from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a failed ideology. After WWI a drastic contraction of free trade, free migration, and the free market occurred. An entirely new central planning model under autocratic rule emerged in Eastern Europe. By the late 1920's the world entered into the Great Depression which saw the further increase of tariffs, and a more extreme imposition of raised import quotas. More importantly, during this economic downturn, the volume of world trade shrank by one-third and the value of world trade contracted by nearly one half. These economic factors, along with the overall negative impact of The Great Depression, absolutely shattered global confidence in the classic liberal economic model. The intellectual mood by this time was decidedly anti-liberal.
developed and underdeveloped nations alike. Several factors contribute to the construction of the contemporary global liberal economic system. However, the focus here is on the creation of the Mont Pelerin Society, the evolution of international economic institutions, and their combined efforts to organize, manage and shape a liberal directed capitalist world system in the twentieth century.

*The Mont Pelerin Society*

The 1947 formation of the Mont Pelerin Society marked the inaugural meeting of liberal minds across the world and provided the ideational infrastructure through which institutions were developed to propagate Neoliberal orthodoxy. The Mont Pelerin Society was designed with two main objectives towards achieving a singular purpose. The first was to redefine the function of the state concerning individual market freedom and private property rights. The second was to counter competing ideological movements with intellectual arguments and institutional policies that emphasize the free competitive market. Together these two objectives promoted a singular purpose; the establishment of an international Liberal economic world system. Thus, the charge for the Mont Pelerin Society was to not only found liberalism all over again but to systematically

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204 State controlled economic policy was considered the primary and preferred method to secure a nation's path to new or renewed economic prosperity. This theoretical shift in economics was championed by John Maynard Keynes. Keynes responded to the complexities of the interwar and post war global economic environment by arguing that government had to actively intervene to pull the economy out of the depression and restore full employment. He analyzed economies in aggregate terms as far as aggregate demand, aggregate savings, and aggregate investment; thereby inventing the macroeconomics scope of economic analysis. Specifically, Keynes believed that aggregate demand must be boosted by fiscal measures (i.e., tax cuts and government spending) and by monetary measures (i.e., lowering interest rates and printing money by the central bank) alike. For Keynes, these measures intrinsically necessitate the active role of government in economics.

205 Despite evidence to the contrary, the Mont Pelerin Society formally dismisses any notion of aspiring to conduct propaganda or influence public or policy perception. Instead, they describe their objective as facilitating the exchange of views among minds inspired by certain ideals held in common to contribute to the preservation and improvement of a free society. However, my research of The Mont Pelerin Society revealed a decidedly different aim.
implant its tenets in institutions that governed the world economy towards a new orthodoxy of Liberal economic hegemony.206

Mont Pelerin Society membership quickly grew considerably from 36 to over 500. By 1954, society members had written 800 publications, and from 1974 to 2002, eight had been awarded Nobel Prizes in Economics.207 During this growth period, its members became highly influential agents of change in the international, political, and economic landscape. The Mont Pelerin Society created a network for not only the espousal of liberal thought but, more importantly, established a framework and system for the dissemination of liberal policies. “It is at the secret Mont Pelerin Society meetings that many of the economic policies of the international financial oligarchy get disseminated to the bankers and government bureaucrats who will carry them out.”208

206 This is the epitome of the neo-Gramscian argument for hegemonic ideas aligning with influential superstructures and is further reflective of Robinsons argument for a Transnational Capital Class. See William Robinson. “Globalization and Transnational Capital Class. He classifies this ruling class: At the level of agency, the TCC, as represented by its inner circles, leading representatives, and politicized elements, is class conscious. It has become conscious of its transnationality. It has been pursuing a class project of capitalist globalization, as reflected in its global decision-making and the rise of a transnational state apparatus under the auspices of this fraction. The TCC is represented by a class-conscious transnational elite, made up of an inner circle of transnational capitalists, along with transnational managers, bureaucrats, technicians, and leading ideologues and intellectuals in the service of the TCC. The transnational managerial elite, based in the centers of world capitalism, is at the apex of the global economy, exercises authority over global institutions, and controls the levers of global policy-making. The TCC is increasingly a class-in-itself and for-itself.

The following quote from a member during the drafting of the groups statement of aims that speak to this dynamic directly: “If we want a world economy where liberty is permanently assured, then we must found liberalism all over again...We must prepare ourselves for an epic which may not begin for some decades yet.” -Miksch - Hoover Archives, Mont Pelerin Society Collection

207 Several others rose to hold numerous influential leadership positions worldwide including senior government ministers (such as Sir Geoffrey Howe of the United Kingdom, Antonio Martino of Italy, Ruth Richardson of New Zealand, and George Shultz of the United States) or senior officials (such as former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns). Presidents or prime ministers (udwig Erhard of Germany, Luigi Einaudi of Italy, Václav Klaus of the Czech Republic). Hoover Archives. Mont Pelerin Society Collection

208 Nicole D. Hoplin, Funding Fathers: The Unsung Heroes of the Conservative Movement (Regnery Publishing 2008)
The Mont Pelerin Society became the prototype for all Neoliberal think tanks that arose in the decades following WWII towards a singular goal, remaking liberalism all over again. Given this overarching purpose of Mont Pelerin to establish a hegemonic revival of Liberalism towards a unified free-market economic orthodoxy, development policy became a critical topic of discussion. Namely, in comprehending, how upcoming states like Nigeria would be incorporated into the redesigned liberal economic world order in which they held nearly no access or connection.

Evidence suggests the Mont Pelerin Society and its liberal thinkers regarded the developmental economies of Africa with apathy, antipathy, or only as a venue for capital exploitation.

“I think we can take it as axiomatic that if the various nations of the developing world are able to achieve economic advance in freedom, this will be of benefit to the United States and the West, and to the kind of world in which we want to live. It also means that political leaders of developing countries find themselves pressed as never before to produce tangible evidence of economic progress.”

The purpose is clear. Evidenced by these instructions proposed during an early meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, developing nations should strive for industrial evolution and capital accumulation.

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209 Subsequent groups that formed from MPS Included Institute of Economic Affairs in London and The Bilderberg Group.

210 Through the early years of the Mont Pelerin Society, myriad discussions were conducted at the annual meetings that included paper submissions and general discourse on economics, markets, and state politics as they relate to a new liberal orthodoxy. The focus here however will be specifically on Mont Pelerin Society discussions of development economics and the integration of newly independent nations into the liberal world order.

211 Collectively, Mont Pelerin members had very little understanding of how development policies would impact developing economies. Beginning with the founder and first president, Hayek, it is clear that the topic of developing economies is one where there was minimal interest held and even lesser knowledge applied. Hayek, the groups inaugural president describes capitalism as the first system in human history to harness this desire to the peaceful supply of man’s abundance and freedom.” Here Hayek advocates for Liberalism, but also encouraged economically backward societies to quickly adopt Liberal methods to liberate man and his desire towards capital accumulation and private property. This kind of messaging about the economic development of foreign regions is consistent throughout the Mont Pelerin Society records.

212 MPS 1961 Meeting notes. Hoover Archives. Mont Pelerin Society Box collection
formation towards a participatory market economic system guided by free-market tenets of Liberalism. Further, the task was to fall squarely upon political leaders in developing regions, which not only speaks to a specific development strategy mandate but also triggers a specific political actor.

Through decades of development discussions, the Society recommended free marketization and economic capitalization; however, there is minimal mention of prerequisite institutional abilities or structures to order such ideological shifts in said regions. Indeed, Liberal policy calls for decreased government control in economic planning. However, it does not function with the complete absence of government or institutional capability whatsoever. Whether oversight or disinterest, the apparent disregard of Africa’s institutional composition speaks volumes about the true nature of Western development intentions in non-western developing regions.  

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213 My exploration of Mont Pelerin meeting minutes provide further evidence that reveals how its members were convinced that neoliberal policies could be uniformly applied in any context, without regard for function or fallout. For example, during a society meeting in 1950 when the topic of development economics arose, Mises expressed “The notion of their backwardness and their well being is secondary to continued imperialism.” Valesco echoes this sentiment at the same meeting and asserts, “The shocking poverty of much of the greater part of the world’s population is not a result of capitalism, but the absence of capitalism. The people of Africa and Asia are poor because they lack the ‘rugged individuals’ of the exploiters.” Dr. Covisa also argues in the 1951 society meeting, “To develop these countries require therefore to increase capital formation. A uniform market economy is at least as vital and indispensable to developing as to developed countries.” Similarly, Davenport describes his position on developing African economies in the 1958 society session, “Underdeveloped nations are caught in a ‘vicious cycle of poverty,’ and this circle can only be broken by the adoption of the underdeveloped countries of domestic market economies. Meaning, foreign economic aid is made into an instrumentality of socializing the rest of the world.” To which Professor Frankel responds in his speech, “As I see it underdeveloped countries are merely poor, which have a possibility, a good chance, of becoming less poor.” The same message of the primacy of Liberalism in developing regions was again argued as late as the 1968 Mont Pelerin Society session where Covina asserts, “To develop, these countries must: increase capital formation and improve qualitative features of population and productive resources.” See. Hoover Archives, Mont Pelerin Society Box Collection

214 Though dominant, the majority position of society members did not appear without dissent. Benham for instance contends, “The view that all underdeveloped countries should now develop their manufacturing is wrong, being based on a false reading of economic history or on the naive belief that because the few wealthier countries of the world are mostly manufacturing countries, then the others have only to develop manufacturing to become wealthy. This is rather like saying that because most millionaires smoke cigars, you have only to smoke cigars to become a millionaire.” Discussions of African economies also included a minority position of caution. Hartnell for example argues during an annual session, “Liberalism and free markets cannot simultaneously promote capitalism and guard against some of its consequences such as income / wealth inequality.” Therefore there were alternate voices that questioned the merits of blind Liberal economic, philosophical applications throughout the developing world. However, these voices were notably in the minority. See. Hoover Archives, Mont Pelerin Society Box Collection
By the mid-twentieth century, the Mont Pelerin Society began institutionalizing their ideas as several members were active in key international financial institutions. Schmelzer expounds on this process that he calls the marketing or relevance making of ideas, arguing,

“Mont Pelerin Society activities focused on establishing core principles and an internal consensus on key policy questions and strategic options in order to build the foundations for advancing the neoliberal cause in key academic fields, and on building up the network and a first set of powerful think tanks. Society members were key advisors to President Nixon when he dismantled the Bretton Woods monetary order. Mont Pelerin Society trade economists like Gottfried Haberler were key players in the early negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and other Society members were instrumental in making competition policy a core priority of the European Community.”  

And according to Mirokowski,

“We can thus observe both a widening and deepening of neoliberal networks of intellectuals and advocacy think tanks, a considerable increase in reach and scope around the globe as well as specific national and supranational arenas and discourse areas.”

Correspondingly, Harvey succinctly states, “In practice, the philosophy developed at Mont Pelerin is little but an elaborate disguise for a wealth grab.” Monbiot similarly believes that the tenets of Liberalism had become a vehicle for not only ideological supremacy but more materially for capital and wealth domination. In this sense, free-market ideology became the bedrock of the new contemporary transnational capitalist class. To promote unbridled capitalism, their stakeholders planned and constructed an architecture of global economic control through Neoliberal policy, in response to ideological threats from competing forms of government and economies.

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216 Mirowski, “The Political Movement that Dared Not Speak its Own Name

217 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
Through this process, Neoliberal development economics created local conditions in Nigeria that ultimately facilitated corruption.\textsuperscript{218} Nigeria's conditions were manifested through development policy imposition that went on to define how external capital stakeholder’s interests transformed the internal power arrangement of Nigeria’s political agents. The result was the evolution and emergence of all sorts of opportunities for corruption to transpire. Specifically, Mont Pelerin was instrumental in developing and propagating ideas with a direct material character concerning global wealth redistribution and capital accumulation. Furthermore, in Nigeria, their “renewed” Liberal program of development economics was constructed without regard for local consequences. Rather, the program created a vertical power dynamic whereby external capital interest constructed constraining conditions for Nigeria’s political actors within Nigeria’s political and economic institutions. As a result, these political actors found themselves in a new and undefined relationship to external capital and internal power. These variables ultimately coalesced and enabled an environment ripe for the emergence of TCM and corruption.

For example, as an emerging Third World nation after independence, Nigeria began to take direct responsibility for its economic development. Nigeria based its efforts on state-led development models influenced by post-war statist thinking promoted by the US and Western Europe. As with other typical post-colonial governments, the Keynesian method of state planning and regulation heavily influenced Nigeria. Accordingly, because its new leaders in politics had been educated in the UK and Europe, the influence of socialist and social democratic programs was evident. The downside, however, was that Nigeria began its economic life with an imprinted

\textsuperscript{218} See Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, George Monbiot, “How Did We Get into This Mess?” Politics, Equality, Nature (London: Verso, 2016), and John Perkins. New Confessions Of an Economic Hit Man. (San Francisco, CA Berrett-Koehler, 2016), for criticism on how the implementation of neoliberal capitalism became disruptive to developing regions.
set of rules that precluded its entrepreneurial class from contributing or leading modes of economic development. While Nigeria had done well to mobilize a nationalist and independence movement to gain political autonomy, the country was never able to organically develop an economic growth program that reflected its internal market logic. As a result, Nigeria concentrated on large grand scale modernization projects that served more as showpieces for government action, than actual development measures that could spur economic growth.

For instance, Uzigwe clarifies, “The first development era in Nigeria lasted from Independence through 1966 and saw the adoption of a market-oriented approach to economic management with strong government planning and control throughout the 1970s and 1980s.” 219 Among the decades of development and economic policy in Nigeria, the one central theme and mainstay is unquestionably the extreme presence of government in economic planning and market control. It remained an organizing feature, sewn into every single iteration of Nigeria’s development policy from 1966 through 1999, and coincided with the period of direct military rule. More importantly, during the first development period, Nigeria embraced import-substitute industrialization to mobilize national economic resources and deploy them among contending projects as a systematic attempt at industrial development. The period of this action plan witnessed the commissioning of energy projects such as the Kanji dam and the Ughelli thermal plants, which provided a vital infrastructural backbone for the nascent industrial sector. Other crucial industrial infrastructure was developed during this period, which was considered

crucial for meeting international economic development criteria by catalyzing industrial take-off in Nigeria. It included an oil refinery, a development bank, a mint, and a security company.220

On the surface, Nigeria’s political leaders were fully engaged in economic development and industrialization. However, the forms industrialization took in Nigeria did not resemble other forms in the developed and developing world. Developed Western nations adopted economic policy measures of development on a more extended time horizon that existed far before Nigeria’s inclusion in the world economy. Moreover, comparatively, developing Asian economies were integrated into a world-system of commerce and adapted markets nearly one hundred years prior. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s leadership initiated policies to manage its economy irrespective of the postulated and visible adverse effects.

The confounding role of government in development economics was further evident during the on-site elite interviews conducted in Nigeria. One soldier commented,

“Soldier does not need to understand economy, we understand order and power. Even before oil came, we had to develop our country. Today they tried to learn from us, but they do not have that order or power, so economy breaks down. All of our public enterprises are no more there. There are no more government projects and no more government development in our country. So no need to wonder why the Naira always continues to devalue.”221

Evidently, large scale industrialization projects were believed to be in service of economic growth. Further, that growth was thought to firmly be the responsibility of Nigeria’s political-military actors at the time. Of course, as most of the leadership at this juncture were Capitalist Militicians, their short-term policy improvisations showed the sheer lack of macroeconomic expertise or understanding and eventually proved extremely damaging. For

221 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Staff Sergeant, Years of Service - 28
example, Peter notes, “Due to the early military-economic approach, 45% of foreign-exchange profits were venturing into the debt servicing, and there was almost no development.” Moving into the 1970s and 1980s, as Nigeria benefited from capital inflows due to booming energy reserves, the government doubled down on industrial policies launching projects across various sectors such as iron, steel, cement, sugar, and rice. Such initiatives, however, would prove costly as Nigeria’s fell deeper into economic stagnation. Richards comments, when evaluating the economic developmental role of the military,

“One cannot help but be absolutely flabbergasted by the gap between formal responsibilities and actual capacities as government regimes have been incapable of framing and sustaining a coordinated package of economic policies to facilitate economic diversification and capital formation. The ability of the state to effectively manage its resources, to plan for long-term development or to ensure compliance with its directives, has progressively declined.”

Furthermore, Nigeria’s industrialization projects were funded by foreign direct capital investments, including massive loans from banks, export credit agencies, or international development institutions such as the World Bank. Thus, one can directly begin to trace the influence of the newly reformed Liberal economic orthodoxy to Nigeria’s development. On the one hand, statist policies were entrenched. On the other hand, Nigeria was instructed and incentivized to pivot away from post-war Keynesian coordinated markets to mid-century mandates towards liberal free markets. This policy variance produced direct, impactful actions and conditions, particularly, the solidification of a unitary power player in Nigeria.

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If the Mont Pelerin Society sparked the liberal thought revolution that ultimately changed the internal political-institutional configuration in Nigeria, international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF fully ignited Nigeria's transformation. As a firm believer in free-market capitalism, the World Bank has been an unapologetic advocate of Neoliberalism. Its belief in open and free markets is driven by the notion that economic forces in this system will result in such large amounts of overall economic growth, enough capital will ultimately trickle-down to the masses and effectively combat poverty and spur development. Many have pointed to deep flaws in this logic, including Picketty, who showed through exhaustive analysis of long-term trends how such models can congeal in this system. Furthermore, there is enough evidence, as illustrated with Perkins and Harvey, to argue that the self-interest the World Bank promotes, does not ensure a fair system that addresses the well being of the masses. But instead, results in a set of rules and policies that are rigged in favor of a tiny elite and are detrimental to poorer developing countries.

The new cohort of Liberal economists, in part, formed the twentieth century transnational capital stakeholder whose interests were squarely on developing regions. For example, John

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224 The World Bank and International Monetary Fund were Bretton Woods economic institutions created to establish a postwar economic order based on notions of consensual decision-making and cooperation in the realm of trade and economic relations. The IMF would create a stable climate for international trade by harmonizing its members’ monetary policies, and maintaining exchange stability. The World Bank, on the other hand, would serve to improve the capacity of countries to trade by lending money to war-ravaged and impoverished countries for reconstruction and development projects.


226 Foreign aid facilitated through IMF and WB have actually intensified the suffering of the poor in recent times. Over the past three decades, sixty of the worlds poorest countries have paid $505 billion in principal and interest on loans of $540 billion, yet they still owe a whopping $523 billion on those same loans. Therefore the cost of servicing such debt is more than these countries spend on health care or education, and is actually twenty times the amount they receive annually in foreign aid. Therefore the world bank motto of global development seems nothing more than subterfuge. See Perkins, New Confessions of an Economic Hitman.
Perkins describes such economically motivated geopolitical power hordes in what he labels as “global economic corporatocracy.” Perkins also contends, “No nation on earth has been able to resist; or have been able to escape the structural adjustments and conditionalities of the World Bank, the IMF, or arbitrations of the WTO. These international financial institutions still determine what economic globalization means, what the rules are, and who are rewarded.”

Neoliberal economic policy promoted by the World Bank encouraged governments to adopt a particular free-market logic by increasing foreign direct investment and capital. For every dollar of wealth created in developing regions, most of that wealth flows back to the global north. This highlights a crucial element in the relationship between Nigeria’s institutions and transnational capital as certain constraints become clear. Namely, international financial institutions played a significant role in defining the dominant economic orthodoxy that triggered the evolution of the TCM.

Furthermore, according to Ladha,

“The World Bank’s cyclical rebranding belies the fact that it continues to strong arm countries into pro corporate, anti poor, neoliberal policies through new mechanisms such as the Doing Business Rankings and the Enabling the Business of Agriculture Project, which force countries into a race to the bottom, cutting environmental and social standards, slashing corporate taxes and eliminating trade barriers protecting local industries. Although development

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227 Ibid. p38. Perkins specifically describes this group as, “A close-knit fraternity of few men with shared goals whose members moved easily and often between corporate boards and government positions. For instance, one time President of the World Bank McNamara is a perfect example. He had moved from a position as president of Form Motor Company to Secretary of Defense under Kennedy and Johnson, and now occupied the top post at the world’s most powerful financial institution.”

228 Ibid.

229 For every dollar of aid that trickles into poor countries, eighteen dollars flows out. Poor countries are losing about $2 trillion a year due to explicit, pro corporate policies of rich countries and the World Bank. See Jason Hickel, “Aid in Reverse: How Poor Countries Develop Rich Countries,” in The Donors' Dilemma: Emergence, Convergence, and the Future of Aid, Andrew Sumner, ed. Global Policy. (2014)

230 In Nigeria, the misuse of capital and debt programs by international financial institutions ultimately derailed development and stagnated economic growth. The form and fallout of such programs will be analyzed later in the chapter.
policy is couched in new language such as “public-private partnerships” and “shared value,” the logic remains the same; the privatization of wealth and socialization of loss.”

There is a multitude of evidence further supporting these sorts of negative claims. Adams states, “the physical assets of African peoples - their forests, air, land and water resources - were placed at the disposal of development planners and crony capitalists, bringing about a speedy economic demise.” Additionally, Hiatt also argues,

“International enforcement of the Neoliberal model was put into the hands of the IMF and the World Bank via the structural adjustment loan program that indebted developing countries and caused them to abandon domestic state led economic developing policies. Third World countries are caught in a web of control: finically, politically, and military. Because a stranglehold of debt that gives First World governments, institutions, and corporations control of Third World economies, corruption and exploitation are at the heart of these power relationships.”

Ladha, Adams, and Hiatt collectively explain where external capital constraints establish a specific dynamic or verticality of power whereby developing nations like Nigeria are relegated to the bottom. Economist Ha-Joon Chang further exposes the root of this power dynamic, explaining,

“The First World transformed their own economies from a base on traditional agriculture to urban industry by using an arsenal of protectionist tariffs, subsidies, and controls. But the First World has kicked away the ladder prohibiting Third World countries from using the only economic development strategy proven to work. Ghana was forced by the IMF to abolish tariffs on food imports. The result was a flood of imported food from EU that destroyed local farmers. Zambia was forced by IMF to abolish tariffs on imported clothing which had protected a small industry of local textiles of some 140 firms that were all eventually driven out of business. These countries, unlike the US do not control the world’s reserve currency and so must meet IMF conditions. If this were any other country, the US would right now be a prime candidate for structural adjustment and would have the IMF at our doorstep telling us to create a recession, get


foreign accounts back into balance, consume less, invest more, and save more. If this has not been good medicine for a developed United States, why is it such good medicine for everyone else?\textsuperscript{234}

The short answer; it is not and has never been. Ake similarly concludes, “The problem is not that development has failed, its that it was never really on the agenda.”\textsuperscript{235} Moreover, Bayart further describes the dynamic of African governmentally as one where Africa states fail to achieve autonomy from the international system, since “It is by managing the transfer of resources between domestic and external political arenas that it acquires a critical part of its working capital.”\textsuperscript{236} It is precisely in negotiating these sorts of external economic power relationships navigating the constraints presented by transnational capitalist stakeholders, that Nigeria has been so negatively impacted internally. The US and Western-led loan debt strategies were implemented in attempts to integrate countries such as Nigeria into the liberal free-market economy. The integration was explicitly aimed to assimilate the assumed elite in Nigeria into a capitalist mindset by injecting both capital and capitalist ideologies. The result, unfortunately, was the emergence of entirely new venues for abuse and corruption. Hiatt explains,

“The large sums flooding in could be useful in winning the allegiance of the new Third World elites who were under pressure to deliver prosperity to their political followers, allies, and families. The possibilities for corruption were seemingly endless and would provide further opportunities for enmeshing the leaders in a relationship with the West while discouraging them from striking out on their own on what would only be a more austere much more dangerous path.”\textsuperscript{237}

Therefore the effects were twofold. First, the loan-based industrialization development projects initiated by the World Bank and IMF policies ushered Nigeria into the global liberal

\textsuperscript{234} Ha Joon, Chang, \textit{Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective}. (London: Anthem, 2002)

\textsuperscript{235} Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa.

\textsuperscript{236} Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly

\textsuperscript{237} Hiatt, A Game as Old As Empire
fraternity of free-market capitalism. The financial institutions were thereby injecting and
emphasizing a particular liberal philosophy that highlighted individualism, entrepreneurialism,
and accumulation. Second, capital and investments were delivered to Nigeria’s doorstep in
massive quantities in the name of development and industrialization projects. These projects
endeared the leadership in Nigeria to promote specific development programs and general
economic development philosophies that established a particular power dynamic between
Nigeria’s political leadership and transnational capital stakeholders like the World Bank and
IMF.

The power relationship that Hiatt alludes to, becomes specifically relevant to
understanding the exogenous link of Liberal economics and Neoliberal ideology to the rise of the
Capitalist Militician and corruption in Nigeria. Hiatt goes on to say,

“If global empire had a slogan, it would be free trade. As their price for assistance, the
IMF and World Bank insist in their structural adjustment programs that indebted developing
countries abandon state led development policies including tariffs, export subsidies, currency
controls, and import substitution programs. The new approved model of development focuses on
export led economic growth using loans to develop new export industries for example to attract
light industry to export processing zones. Where membership in the WTO also requires
adherence to the IMF free trade economic orthodoxy, debt keeps Third World countries under
control. Dependent on aid, loan rescheduling, and debt rollovers to survive, never mind actually
develop, these countries have been forced to restructure their economies and rewrite their laws to
meet conditions laid down by IMF structural adjustment programs and World Bank
conditionalities.”238

To fully illustrate the nature of this dialectic of power, the method, and manner in which
the IMF and the World Bank used capital and debt instruments in Nigeria must be explored
further. Specifically, what were the globalized development measures promoted, first, as liberal
development ideology by Mont Pelerin Society members, and later, as existing economic

238 Ibid., 21, 23.
development policy, by international financial institutions like the IMF? Additionally, how were these policies developmentally impactful to the rise of TCM and to the exacerbation of Nigeria’s condition of corruption? To explore these issues, I present the second exogenous variable of transnational capital.

(2) Globalized Development Policies

By the mid to late twentieth-century transnational capital stakeholders helped transform the tenets of economic Liberalism into implemented global development policies. Initially introduced post-war as development templates for “economic take-off,” Modernization policy, which included the infusion of external capital to promote growth and the simultaneous abandonment of natural agricultural production processes, later evolved into more draconian economic development measures. Moreover, in Nigeria, such policies were introduced without proper institutional capacities to manage the fiscal requirements and associated monetary pressures effectively. Consequently, TCM became both the direct implementor of economic development policy and the primary mediator of economic development capital.

At this juncture, Nigeria was devoid of proper institutional safeguards to regulate the damaging effects of its severe industrialization policies. Therefore, as there were little to no material consequences, the promotion of economic state-led policy imbued the military leadership with a sense of absolute control that otherwise may not have arisen. The forcible pressure to act and adjust to global market mandates amplified the policy and, thus, the political reach of those in positions of leadership. Accordingly, this directive placed economic policy planning in the hands of military-minded men who transformed their newfound mantle of power

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into an alternate form of military conquest. Therefore, the power position of TCM shifted drastically to include both political power and economic power. The shift was the direct result of exogenous capital constraints in the form of development policies.

Nigeria’s economic development was directly ordered by a particular set of external incentives (foreign aid) and external constraints (SAPs), each of which evolved as a result of a distinct set of free market-based development policy requirements. To fully explain the process where external development policies impacted Nigeria’s internal political institutions, I carefully examine two of the most prominent global development policies of the twentieth century; Modernization and Neoliberalism. My exploration of each will reveal various policy conditions that reflect exogenous capitalist interests. Significant political institutional changes resulted in Nigeria and ultimately led to the arrival of TCM, along with the figures heightened expressions of corruption.

Nils Gilman explains, “The goal of development was growth, the agent of development was the state, and the means of development were macroeconomic policy instruments.”

Gilman’s argument that Modernization was not a solely economic enterprise, but rather, an instrument of the state, is crucial to comprehending the complete compliment of consequences that resulted from its application. Modernization, in this sense, marked a return to imperialism without being outwardly and materially imperial. Modernization represented a form of paternalistic neocolonialism. The United States conquered not by forceful land seizure, but by

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241 Modernization theory was imposed for both ideological and material reasons by the West. As one of the earliest and most dominant theories of capital development, Modernization combined political social ideology with economic development philosophy. Inherent in its practice, is the Keynesian inspired direct government intervention model of market function.
promoting a certain social way of life, i.e. capitalism and democracy. Modernization was to propel the world out of poverty. Instead, it represented the intellectual equivalent of hitting the gas pedal on a skidding car in an attempt to accelerate out of the problem. Modernization policy, in several instances, resulted in the destruction and stagnation of Africa’s growth enterprises. However, in Nigeria, especially, these policies stifled economic development and produced corruption as a consequence of a newly formed political-institutional logic ordered by a newly formed institutional actor.

Modernization’s theoretical maxims and foundational elements are primarily found in both Seymour Lipset and W.W. Rostow. The crux of Modernization’s assumption is that pre-modern societies will pass through the same evolutionary stages as postmodern societies and similarly transition into development. Specifically, as underdeveloped/backward/poor nations in the third world are traditional, and Western/European nations are modern, the former must eschew their cultural identity in favor of the social values of the latter, in order for development to ensue. To this point, Dibua asserts, “African peculiar and cultural realities had been disdained in the advocacy for the replication of Western spatial and temporal experiences in the political, economic, and technological spheres, and this explains the epic failure of Nigeria in these areas.” Modernization theory, therefore, largely ignored spatial and temporal factors,

242 Gilman, Mandarins of The Future

243 See S. Lipset “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959) 69-105. for the concept of sound economics precipitating sound politics where correlates economic prosperity with sustained democracy. Lipset is actually pointing to a series of necessary social changes that economic development supposedly generates, (urbanization, industrialization, education, technology) which, it is argued, results in functioning democratic political institutions and democracy.

See also Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. Rostow segments the economic development process into – The Traditional Society, The Preconditions for Takeoff, Takeoff, The Drive to Maturity, and The Age of High Mass Consumption. He uses the story of Western society as a template for development, contending ALL societies, must eventually, experience EACH of these ORDERED stages to mature and transform into industrialized states.

244 Dibua, Modernization and the Crisis of Development in Africa, 315
geopolitical positioning, and internal state characteristics in Africa. Ultimately, the goal, and the process of Modernization in Africa, proved contradictory and counterproductive. The discussion of local consequences born from external global capitalist development initiatives does not stop with Modernization. Neoliberalism largely factors into Nigeria’s corruption condition as well.

A seismic philosophical shift, primarily led by economic thought leaders from the Mont Pelerin Society, saw state-centric Keynesian inspired Modernization policies supplanted by a return to free-market liberal economic notions of limited to no state intervention. Ultimately identified as Neoliberalism, capitalist development was suddenly personified, not by state control or coordinated markets, but by laissez-faire policy and limited state planning. This shift would prove to have additional long-lasting consequences for still developing Nigeria, who had spent decades implementing and promoting an aggressive statist model of economic development.

In contrast to Modernization’s collective ordering, Neoliberalism is individually focused. Additionally, where the state is supremely active in Modernization, Neoliberalism calls for a relatively uninvolved state apparatus that cannot override, supersede, or dictate market signals. Harvey describes Neoliberalism as that which,

“Proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free market and free trade. The role of the state is to preserve and create an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. It must set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights by force if need be and to guarantee the proper functioning of the markets. State intervention must be kept


to a minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second guess market signals.”  

By the late twentieth century, Neoliberalism was widely promoted as the new economic development orthodoxy. The IMF and World Bank served as emissaries of the ideology insisting that states collectively seek and negotiate the reduction of barriers to the movement of capital across borders, along with the opening of markets to global exchange. More importantly, the opening of capital markets became a strict condition of membership to the IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which meant developmental states found themselves increasingly drawn into the Neoliberal fold. The IMF also ensured that all countries that took advantage of debt forgiveness were also required to swallow the poison pill of Neoliberal institutional reforms. During this process, developing nations got induced, incentivized, and coerced into passing Neoliberal policies that bore significantly detrimental outcomes. For instance, Neoliberalism insisted on limited state interference but also demanded that the state create institutional structures that facilitate open market conditions. Neoliberalism required that the state apparatus be simultaneously absent and present. For newly independent and highly transitional states like Nigeria, such nuanced and ambiguous policy demand proved treacherous to local outcomes and conditions.

In Nigeria, the political consequence of Modernization was the activation of state power and control, which resulted in the arrival of new political economic agents and institutional

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247 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism

248 In South America, neoliberalism was forcefully accomplished in Chile, Guatemala, and Argentina with a military coup backed by the United States Government. It causes one to question if Nigeria’s power-broking and coup making had similar international ideological and material influences as well. Nevertheless, the new institutional arrangements of economic liberalism now defined the rules of world trade.
actors. As Neoliberal policies were subsequently adopted, the resulting political consequences compounded. The same agents and actors would now be directed in a completely different non-statist way. The problem, however, was the redirection from state-run economic development to free-market development was misinterpreted by Nigeria’s political leadership. As Neoliberalism ascended as the dominant development policy prescription, TCM in Nigeria had already committed decades to a staunch government-led, state-coordinated industrialization strategy. The idea that a free-market economy was now the panacea was improperly received, and TCM adapted free-market ideas to suit their local purposes and brought little attention to the policies’ intentions of emphasizing capitalism and industrialization. TCM either ignored or abruptly decreased Nigeria’s state-led initiatives, feigning IMF compliance. TCM used Neoliberal policy shifts to justify their leveraging of abandoned prospective industrialization projects towards personal capital gains.

In this sense, the removal of state interference towards natural market function was received in Nigeria as the removal of state regulations for abusive capital acquisition. Or as expressed by one interviewee,

“Military had no checks and balance or legislature. For what? We are in control and so we do as we pleased to do. Oil block, building contracts, whatever, we are there. Nigeria was too young you understand? If we don’t know who will know? So you must leave economy and security and all these things to us.”

Neoliberalism, as Modernization before it, activated a particular position of power that is central to Nigeria’s development trajectory, and antecedent to the internal institutional consequences that resulted from adopting development policies in the first place. For example, in

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249 The pivotal aspect to note during this era of economic policy development and project initiatives in Nigeria is the role of the public sector was paramount, and the position of the military in these sectors was absolute.

250 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Sergeant, Years of Service - 22
his work “The Changing Structure of the Nigerian Economy,” Mordi asserts the following on early industrial development in Nigeria. “The Nigerian government held firmly to the belief that it had to take the lead in guiding the structural transformation processes on the economy by investing in a wide range of production and distribution activities.” This notion of “taking the lead” and managing the economy is not one that is indigenous to Nigeria but rather is one that was imported. Compound that reality with the continued emphasis on industrialization, and Nigeria, from an economic policy perspective, was bequeathed an identity that was ill-fitting and inappropriate. When factoring the transformed power position of Nigeria’s military-political agents, in conjunction with the drastic shift to free-market capitalism, the economic policy mismatch morphs from one that is ill-fitting or incompatible, to one that is volatile and potentially calamitous. The result in Nigeria was the transformation of political agents, which included their expansion and abuse of power and position, or what we consistently point to as corruption.

Thus, whether statist or liberal, the creation of a uniform world economic orthodoxy for developing regions, resulted in long-lasting institutional consequences and political conditions. Both state coordination through Modernization policy and free-market programs of Neoliberalism are extremely relevant in the story of Nigeria’s institutional development. A closer examination of SAP policy in Nigeria, therefore, will reveal how the compounded consequences of implementing contradictory development policy mandates shaped the emergence of TCM and the evolution of corruption.

Structural Adjustment Policy and Consequences

During the late 1970s, after the second oil crisis, many African countries were severely affected by balance payment defaults, increasing external debts, and internal economic crises as a result of substantial trade deficits. Nigeria was no different. As raw material prices on the world market decreased, Nigeria was fully confronted by budget deficits and was no longer able to finance the development projects implemented through Modernization years prior. In response, the World Bank and IMF implemented the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Typically, SAP is described as conditions affixed to loans recommended by international banks to assist developing countries amid economic crisis. The core of SAP, however, not dissimilar to the core of liberal economics more generally, was market liberalization.

In Nigeria, SAP was designed to effectively alter and restructure the production, exchange, and distribution patterns of the Nigerian economy as well as eliminate price distortions and its heavy dependence on exports of crude oil and imports of consumer and produced goods. The policy of decontrol and deregulation replaced the old philosophy of tariff protection, import restriction, and exchange control management. At the same time the strategy of export promotion became pursued in place of import substitution. The post loan SAP program in Nigeria was also meant to create foreign exchange to service foreign debt and balance of payment deficits, as well as to enhance the private sector’s role in supply-side

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252 This basic definition does not fully uncover the meaning and intention of SAP. It can more thoroughly be described as the following: “the general concept structural adjustment intuitively means the adjusting of a given economy to a highly advanced economy. In other words, those countries which apply SAPs must adjust their economies to the needs of the international capitalist system. All the instruments of SAPs will inevitably compel those countries that apply the program to either neglect or suppress the needs of their societies and create favorable situations to the capitalist system of the west.” See Fekadu Bekele, ReExamining Structural Adjustment: The Fallacies of the IMF Policies - Theoretical Reflections, (Berlin 2016)

production. Specific economic policy tools were employed to achieve these goals. They included the devaluation of the Naira, deregulation, liberalization of foreign trade, elimination of subsidies on petroleum-related production and fertilizers, downsizing of the public sector through privatization and rationalization, and tight monetary and fiscal policies. However, these policies were employed in the most extreme and perverse ways creating considerable constraints for Nigeria’s institutions. For example, Nigeria had neither the financial institutional infrastructure nor the administrative capability to justify such extreme economic action. Consequently, the implementation of SAP’s policies were half-baked, uncoordinated, non-transparent, and downright dishonest. It was, therefore, not surprising that by the end of the 1980s, SAP had spiraled the Nigerian economy downward.

The most destructive aspect of SAP in Nigeria was unquestionably the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM). Under this scheme, the Nigerian Naira went into free fall in the 1980s so that instead of the 60% devaluation planned initially, the currency of the nation was devalued up to 500%. The continued devaluation of the Naira had several socio-economic consequences. The purchasing power of Nigeria’s consumer class declined, general standards of living were reduced, the middle class was eliminated, and education decreased, causing brain

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255 The destruction caused by SAP was twofold. First the passing of the conditions themselves marked a return to state intervention that had only recently been replaced by lassez faire policy. This caused further destabilization of Nigeria’s political economic institutions. Second, because SAP conditions could not properly be implemented, policies were put forth fragmentally, further complicating an already inappropriate strategy program. SAP was implemented in Nigeria without regard for the internal configuration or institutional capability to support its processes. This blatant disregard for context and country is neither accidental nor coincidental. Recall the discussions uncovered at early sessions of the Mont Pelerin Society during the 1940s and 1950s, where cautions of development economics were disregarded as immaterial to the growth and expansion of liberal economic philosophy. Those notional abstract discussions ultimately morphed into reality, as the same liberal ideals were pushed onto Nigeria’s development economy without sufficient knowledge of its function, and with no regard for consequence.

drain to increase. The Nigerian State was evolving into a political-economic system based squarely on capitalism and market liberalization without the appropriate institutions to guide such an economic course of development. The consequence of this externally motivated economic shift was the further stratification of wealth into the hands of Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician. Omoyibo hints at this exact formation. He argues,

“SAP has ironically fostered greater integration of Nigeria economy into international capitalism. As part of this incorporation package, the supremacy of market forces is emphasized, which is determined by supply and demand mechanism, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, and subsidy removal were intensified.” 257

The accumulative and allocative form of capitalism that emphasizes surplus and acquisition became rampant in Nigeria. Omoyibo concludes,

“SAP transferred money from government and the populace to usury capitalists at home and abroad and the process of “primitive capital accumulation” that is, the process (consisting of the totality of sub-processes) by which would be capitalist acquire the initial substantial capital and obtain the labor of others with which capitalist enterprises are started.” 258

Harvey refers to similar ongoing processes of accumulation by dispossession, which highlights global institutional arrangements and power structures that privilege certain actors and values. Harvey additionally describes some of these transnational capitalist accumulative processes associated with SAPs, capital, TCM, and corruption. 259

The incentives and constraints produced from international economic institutional loans, and structural policies placed TCM squarely at the center of not only Nigeria’s economic


258 Ibid.

259 See David Harvey The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession (2009) for detailed discussion of accumulation by dispossession as an aspect of the accumulation of capital that concerns the relations between capitalism and the non-capitalist modes of production which start making their appearance on the international stage. Accumulation by dispossession by the global extractive industry has been taking place within the context of corporate globalization and will be further explored in variable (4) of the Four exogenous variables that impact the rise of TCM presented later in the chapter.
development program but of the accumulative capital process more generally. As this process concludes, understanding the subsequent outcomes and specific consequences of capitalist development policies in Nigeria will further highlight the significance of external capitalist interests.

(3) Economic Outcomes of Uneven Capitalist Development

Unsurprisingly, IMF development measures failed in Nigeria, leaving significant gaps for political and economic abuses of power to arise. Nigeria’s institutions were incapable of enforcing and sustaining the structural policy requirements behind international development loans. Correspondingly, Nigeria’s political agents were equally unprepared to manage economic development in Nigeria as the position was never constituted to command and control capital so closely. As economic downturns arose, the political and economic power of Nigeria’s public agents expanded as the position holders were left to manage the administration of foreign loans, the implementation of SAP, and all of the economic aftermath that followed. As a result, TCM began to encounter capital, both internally and externally, in a completely different way.

There are three significant consequences of development loans and SAP in Nigeria as it relates to corruption. When foreign capital via loans was rushing in, an unprecedented quantity of flight capital, including a substantial portion of the loan proceeds themselves, headed for the door as TCM utilized capital for personal purposes, not development purposes.260 A three-part cycle is thereby created, explaining in closer detail, how SAP loans directly impacted TCM and corruption in Nigeria. The first consequence of SAP and the first element of the cycle of corruption is economic destabilization. The loans helped destabilize the economy of Nigeria by

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260 Doug Henwood, “After the New Economy” (2005) and post interview with Ellen Augustine, on January 21, 2006
providing more capital than the economic system could reasonably absorb in a short period, given the institutional and administrative limitations. Thus, the rate of capital far outpaced Nigeria’s fiscal management capabilities. The second consequence of SAP in Nigeria and the second element of the corruption cycle is, as SAP loans provided quick and abundant capital, they now additionally provided for a massive source of government revenue that did not fall directly under taxpayer oversight or fiscal regulation. Since the immense capital flows were seldom entirely accounted for or accurately measured, incredible opportunities for waste were generated. The final consequence for Nigeria and the last element in the cycle of corruption is with all this new capital on hand, capital that is mostly unaccounted for and unallocated, SAP laid the foundation for a new highly efficient global offshore banking network to originate from Nigeria. Consequently, capital flight became much simpler and cheaper for leaders in power, i.e., the Capitalist Militician. Nigeria’s ruling agents were now able to divert funds to places that include the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, Panama, and the Isle of Man. Flight capital landed in banks that operated under the same liberal philosophy as the global financial institutions that led the way in syndicating lending to Nigeria in the first place.

Amongst the many consequences of uneven capitalist development that contributed to the rapid economic collapse in the corruption cycle described above, the most significant outcome in Nigeria was the transformation of state institutions into the sole source of resource generation, capital accumulation, and capital distribution. As TCM now occupied a public position that unified political, economic, and military state power, the figure began to manage the state as a resource reservoir distinctly. One military interview participant proudly proclaims, “Nigeria’s economy was far better under the military, a time when soldiers were properly taken care of, no
questions asked. Most of the new soldiers today are not even here to do work, they are here for wealth and money that comes from our positions in government, thats all. In a separate interview, a retired officer further expands on TCM’s relationship to the state as a venue capital accumulation. He responds; “You see, being in military makes connecting to business much easier, at all points of business, we are there. As a soldier you get that exposure and most soldiers would agree. We are in charge of the country and so we must manage everything, especially the money.”

Management of capital became synonymous with Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician. Moreover, with the State serving as a primary source of capital, manufacturing, and production severely declined. In response, Nigeria’s civilian capitalist class gravitated to TCM-led State as a source for capital accumulation through government contracts and other nonproductive services. The result was an even more dramatic increase in TCM’s access to and mediation of capital.

Nwozor best characterizes the direct infusion of external capital into the hands of Nigeria’s ill-equipped leaders.

“The effective entrapment of Nigeria in the cesspool of debt peonage was achieved via the imposition of a Structural Adjustment Program. The jump loans were contracted in large part to maintain the ostentatious lifestyle of the elites, funded through their easy access to state resources.”

On this potential for abuse of power and the cycle of redistribution of capital, Adam also concludes,

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261 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Second Lieutenant, Years of Service - 28

262 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - General (Retired), Years of Service - 35
The majority of soldiers interviewed reported active participation in non-service related capital building business activities, and those that did not participate, confirmed a strong interest. The desire, ability, and practice of capital accumulation of military service men was clear and consistent. One interviewee specifically identified the military’s position in politics as an institutional venue for business.

263 Nwozor, Echoes of Divergence, 25.
“The massive expansion of the state with SAP also provided the necessary vehicle for corruption and capital flight, leading to the accumulation of private assets and public debt. The structural adjustment money makes a round trip: from the World Bank in Washington to Africa and then back to the World Bank and other creditors as repayment for old debts.”

SAP, therefore, offers a tangible example of how liberal economic philosophy championed by early century intellectuals of the Mont Pelerin Society was subsequently diffused through international regulatory institutions like the World Bank and IMF. These policies were imposed upon Nigeria, but directly mediated by Nigeria’s State leadership, and thus, influenced the action and power position of leaders locally in a manner that increased and reproduced modes of corruption. That is, in effect, a critical formation of power of TCM as it relates to acts of corruption is derived directly from external inputs of the contemporary world economy, and more specifically, from the outcomes of development loans and the conditional economic policies that accompanied them.

The uneven result of capitalist development and the extreme adverse economic outcomes born from its implementation should not come as a surprise. Several scholarly discussions point to corruption as a potentially disastrous consequence of Modernization, economic development, and global capitalist uniformity, revolving around the notion of improper state-led economic policymaking and market planning. Two works in particular caution against the brand of scientific planning that Modernization, as a form of capitalist development, promotes.

Although the two have ideological and methodological differences, both Hayek and Scott express suspicion of state intervention in human social endeavors. Hayek condemns transnational economic planning outright, stating, “To imagine that economic life of a vast area comprising

many different people can be directed or planned by democratic procedure betrays a complete lack of awareness of the problems such planning would raise.”

Whereas Hayek warned of central scientific planning, Scott specifically advises against that which many of the most tragic episodes of state development in the late nineteenth and twentieth-century originate; in a particularly lethal combination called high modernism. While not as strong a proponent of complete individualism and free-market rationality as Hayek, Scott is very much in sync with Hayek’s argument against central planning. In Seeing Like a State, Scott argues against modern statecraft and similarly cautions of the result.

Scott proclaims,

“The progenitors of such plans regarded themselves as far smarter and farseeing than they really were and at the same time, regarded their subjects as far more stupid and incompetent that they really were. A great many nations, some of them former colonies, have built entirely new capitals rather than compromise with an urban past that their leaders were determined to transcend. Most were built following the plans of western architects. They convey an impression of hegemony and domination.”

The symbolism here is profound, building capital (city) and moving social bodies, as a sort of imagery to building capital (economics) and moving social customs. For Scott, the critical distinction to make, one that he does not outright reveal, is that while Utopian plans derail the state, the crucial questions are; Whose Utopia? Whose plans? On who’s mandate? Upon whose supplication? Both Hayek and Scott offer a clear caution, scientific-based statecraft, and social

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266 Most importantly for Scott, is the disjunction between those governing and those being governed. High modernism, as he describes, is, “A particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied – usually through the state – in every field of human activity; high modernism implies a truly radical break with history and tradition.” Modernization is a direct articulation of Scott’s high modernism. For Scott, high modernism further reflects a particular optic of power that reveals an incongruence between social engineering and social realities. There is, in effect, a paradox. For Scott, “It seems at odds with the experience of modernity in general, trying to jell a social world seems rather like trying to manage a whirlwind. (Scott p88- p93)

engineered planning are not only doomed to fail, but will more likely than not result in a series of unforeseen and unintended consequences socially, economically, and otherwise. It is these potential outcomes and consequences that are of immediate importance in a modern historical context of capitalism.  

In Nigeria’s case, the direct consequence of external capitalist interests was the reconfiguration of political power and increased corruption. Huntington is critical of Modernization’s claim that economic development is the primary causal link to stable political institutions. “Not political development but political decay dominated the scene…it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.” Nigeria, thus, factors significantly into Huntington’s discussion, as the country experienced this exact phenomenon. The rapid social change - civil war, and the mobilization of new groups into politics - military, coupled with the slow development of institutions - in Nigeria’s case institutional erosion, resulted in political decay, which Modernization and capitalist liberal development policies only exacerbated. There is, however, a final exogenous component that contributes to the development of TCM and corruption in Nigeria. The uneven outcomes of capitalist development in Nigeria were also profoundly shaped and ordered by a separate lot of transnational capital interests surrounding Nigeria’s natural resources, and the foreign capital deployed towards its exploitation.

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269 Huntington, Political Order, 4.

270 This dynamic will be more fully explored in Chapter 4 discussion of internal institutional conditions that contribute to the rise of TCM and corruption.
No discussion of transnational capital and capital flows in Nigeria is complete without discussing its natural resources. Oil, notably, the capitalist interests of multinational corporations that converged around it, plays a significant role in TCM’s power construction. By 1970, oil became central to Nigeria’s economic performance, and with this new resource base came specific external capital constraints and incentives. As oil revenues grew, Nigeria’s political and economic institutions were inundated with petrodollars. Nigeria’s political actors were incentivized by external capital stakeholders who paid a hefty price per barrel during the oil boom of the early 1970s. The massive transfer of foreign wealth to Nigeria reached exponential heights when foreign capital was directly deposited into Nigeria’s central bank. Oil revenue and other foreign investments within the energy sector provided an additional stream of external capital into Nigeria’s economy. The reservoir of capital enjoyed by Nigeria’s leadership multiplied and was now wholly controlled by a singular agent, TCM.

The convergence of resource discovery and capital infusion has been shown to stagnate a country’s economic development. This is precisely what occurred in Nigeria beginning in the late 1960s. In an economic analysis of Nigeria’s resource curse, Auty explains that newly resource-rich countries like Nigeria may squander their resource advantage as a result of overly optimistic production estimates, which in turn leads to lax or inappropriate economic policies. Further analyzing Nigeria’s resource position in the 1970s, Ilorah argues that Nigeria did not contain the proper labor requirements to support the kind of resource-rich environment that a resource-rich

\[271\] See Brian Pinto, World Bank Economic Review, Nigeria Before and After Oil Boom: A Policy Comparison 1987. Had the capital accrued to private citizens and had it been deposited in commercial banks, then an increase in the money supply would occur through the money multiplier. This, unfortunately, did not transpire, resulting in an unchanged monetary base. A more fulsome discussion of the role of oil in the making of TCM and corruption will follow in chapter four.
energy economy demanded. In practice, most policy responses by authorities during this era generated adverse effects on other competing sectors, mainly agriculture. Auty and Ilorah both show how incongruent policy practices in Nigeria further disrupted development due to its incapable institutions and mismanaged resources.

Generally, industrialization requires substantial, sustained capital investments typically secured via the earnings of foreign exchange exports, international borrowing, or deregulated open foreign direct investments. For Nigeria, however, earnings from energy exports proved to fluctuate downward in the long term, resulting in a debt crisis that made international lending unattainable. According to Uzigwe, foreign direct investment was an unsupported industrialization thesis, as the Nigerian economy at the time was characterized by inadequately skilled labor, low levels of technological innovation concentrated private domestic capital and insufficient business literacy and capacity for sound economic infrastructure to support such capital. Therefore, Nigeria was never in a position to succeed with any core industrialization policy. However, that is precisely the policy course informed by the international economic environment, and ultimately taken by Nigeria’s military-led government during the post-war period, and into the late-twentieth century.

Nigeria’s leadership never had sufficient expertise to steward development, let alone undertake it. Furthermore, its political leaders operated under the “do as we say, not as we have done” model, with respect to the West. In other words, Western countries developed industries behind substantial policy protections like tariffs and quotas, yet only called for global

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273 Ibid.
liberalization after developing their comparative advantage. Here is the material manifestation of
development policy strategies discussed at Mont Pelerin Society meetings. The external
imposition of Liberal economic policy was designed with foreign capital interests at the
forefront, without regard for its consequences in developing regions. Nigeria’s development
project was misguided and misbegotten from the onset; oil merely accelerated the downturn.

With the advent of oil, transnational capital stakeholders were now more committed than
ever to ensure Nigeria’s economic policy and political processes remained consistent with
Neoliberal ideology to continue to facilitate their capital advantages in Nigeria. As a result of the
enormous waves of investment capital landing in Nigeria, the nation was deeply inserted into
global energy value chains. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) looked to safeguard and
promote free market economic policies, which, amongst other consequences, directly assured
their economic position, and indirectly, contributed to TCM’s ability to pursue abusive actions of
economic self-interest through new modes of capital exchange and accumulation. TCM now had
to contend with both institutional development policy conditions of the World Bank and IMF, as
well as free-market policy pressures from MNCs. Moreover, capital flows from oil combined
with capital flows from foreign loans, so that TCM became the mediator and allocator of massive
inflows of foreign capital twice over.

The impact of MNCs on local political institutions is discussed at length by Diercksens,
who reveals how Neoliberal ideology was touted by states, supranational bodies, and
transnational multinational corporations alike. He contends,

“The nation-state is thus subordinate to the TNC’s [trans-national corporation] interests,
which paradoxically results in a state that is both more circumscribed and authoritarian...The
conditions and possibilities for sovereignty, a national agenda, national emancipation, and
institutional reform are now determined by the needs of multilateral global institutions, organizations, and corporations existing over and beyond nations.  

The intention of TNCs and MNC’s was to advance Neoliberal policies to directly shape geopolitical and geo-economic zones towards their own capitalist agendas. For example, several MNCs in the oil and energy sector have allegedly had a hand in molding Nigeria’s economic reality from the outside. Tales of political tampering and state intimidation abound. In one instance, Perkins describes how Shell infiltrated the Nigerian State to promote its private interests and push for a capitalist free-market state.  

By the end of the twentieth century, MNC activity in Nigeria was immense, mainly in the energy and telecom sectors. As the emergence of global value chains and the expansion of activities of MNCs continued to increase, so too did the value of uniformity and homogeneity concerning Liberal economic policy in Nigeria and throughout the world economy. These policies resulted in predominantly adverse domestic effects. For example, the economic reforms passed in Nigeria, particularly as of 1999, have prioritized globalization, liberalization, and free marketization, which ultimately proved to be beneficial to foreign investors and foreign capital, instead of to the indigenous population.

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275 See Perkins, New Confessions for detailed account of Shell, its subsidiaries, and its contractors maintaining extremely close contacts with several layers of government and military. Specifically where the US State Department in conjunction with Shell, planted operatives within the government to influence domestic and foreign economic policy to suit its agenda.


MNCs created another satellite of foreign capital to flow into Nigeria. As MNC’s economic interests increased, so too did their political and institutional influence, which significantly impacted the institutional environment of corruption over time. For instance, between 1994 and 2002, an investigation revealed that Halliburton Co-executive, Albert Jack Stanley pleaded guilty for orchestrating more than $200 million in bribes to top Nigerian government officials after failing to push legislation in order to secure lucrative government contracts. This form of corporate bribery, along with countless other policy-shaping maneuvers implemented by MNC capital agents, further facilitated not only their business interests by promoting specific economic policies to increase access to the Nigerian markets, but also allowed for the establishment of more liberal economic policies throughout the region.

The establishment of wide-reaching economic liberal and capitalist networks also resulted in specific local conditions in Nigeria that were directed and sustained by TCM. TCM served as a wholesale custodian of state power and incoming state capital. Due to the glaring incongruence between free-market liberal capitalist activity in and around Nigeria, coupled with Nigeria’s historically rigid statist economic policy history, and the massive amounts of foreign direct investment entering the country, TCM ascended to an intersectional position of power that allowed them to dictate the pace and direction of cash flows in and out of Nigeria’s sectors and throughout the Nigerian economy. In their own words, “The military was able to impact in so many ways. Talk of oil we are there, trading we are there, any kind of national business, we are there.”

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279 Momoh, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Corruption

280 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Sergeant, Years of Service - 19
Otherwise, there was a system. Whether you were soldier or not, you must respect that system.”\textsuperscript{281}

Within the described system of TCM-managed State, foreign investments and transnational capital flows further shocked the already fragile political economy of Nigeria. Moreover, as there were no infrastructures or designed institutions in place to absorb these capital shocks, TCM then controlled, accepted, urged, allocated, or was persuaded to consume in mass. Post consumption, the capital flowed out of the state just as fast as it flowed in, causing consumerism and import dependency to rise, leaving the Nigerian economy stagnant and TCM thriving. Several respondents echo the capital to military link, while others more directly describe the relationship of soldiers to business and capital accumulation. For example, during an interview, one soldier remarked,

“When I joined the military it was a noble profession but presently you see armed forces and it is used for business. Those soldiers at the top have much influence. The younger ones see the big money they keep abroad and believe they too must chop.”\textsuperscript{282}

Correspondingly, a separate interview participant concluded likewise stating,

“At least 50% of the military engages in some sort of business while in service. I myself am open for more business but have no chance yet. I joined the military because there was no job in the country at that time. At least in military one can develop himself and link into business. My being a soldier makes business very easy. By the time I retire, if I have climbed the ranks properly, I will surely be a rich man.”\textsuperscript{283}

\textsuperscript{281} Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Brigadier General, Years of Service - 31

Such responses are consistent and reveal an order to corruption and resource abuse military as power was concentrated at the top. The interviewees further report a specific capital mindset to military rule. Whether seen as a means to an end or simply an any means necessary proposition, the military controlled Nigeria’s entire political economy.

\textsuperscript{282} Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - General, Years of Service - 34. Note that “chop” as used by the interviewee is local parlance and colloquial for “get money or acquire capital / resources for personal gain”

\textsuperscript{283} Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Lance Corporal, Years of Service - 15
Lastly, another officer similarly expressed,

“Most of us have the ambition to enter politics. Especially the high ranking officers. The lower ranking has less interest because they do not have same connections to money and power. But those that have, it makes things so easy. Any connection they make they can use, and since many of their mates are greatly involved in government and economy, things become very simple.”

The evolution of the relationship between capital and military officer is clear. And upon realizing this new station of power with regard to FDI and external capital, TCM’s economic position evolved once more. The condition in Nigeria by the 1980s-1990s exemplified Yates’ Rentier class and allocation state. In many ways, TCM represents the rentier that Yates alluded to, and his position transformed Nigeria into an allocative state void of production. The importance of the figure is again evident as the comprehension of TCM’s rise allows the analytical dots left open by scholars of corruption to be filled in and connected. The long lasting residue of FDI and capital flows was the establishment of Nigeria as an international economic rest stop or terminal for capital accumulation. That is, the growth of internal manufacturing had been stifled, and the process of industrialization had been so hastened that the implementation of actual mechanization and construction was bypassed. Instead, Nigeria became the land of economic middlemen whereby foreign investments, structural loans, and credit facilities were all regarded equally as avenues for capital accumulation and allocation, therefore expanding TCM’s perception of the state apparatus as a resource reservoir and a venue for capital creation and capital distribution.

Because local manufacturing and production were primarily precluded from Nigeria’s economic development process, goods and services were equally regarded as an afterthought. In TCM-led Nigeria any and everything could be readily solicited, procured, developed, and just as

284 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Captain , Years of Service - 32
easily disregarded. Nigeria’s ministries became replete with gatekeepers and facilitators of access, and TCM was primary amongst them. Managing unchecked amounts of development loan capital became the norm and the corruption of bribes and kickbacks to grease the wheel of foreign capital access became increasingly commonplace. At every level of government, at any economic access point, TCM held the master key to the gates for the rest of the world to enter one of Africa’s primary markets. So for admission, they would learn to charge a hefty fee.

Nigeria, with the stewardship of TCM, transformed into a middle man economy of corruption that enforced and reinforced the notion that production and development were not immediately significant. Rather, granting access and controlling entry for would-be developers and foreign industries took precedent. In the process, those in the proper positions of power would levy their fee and apportion their cut, all while producing nothing. Nigeria lost any long term economic foresight. Instead, the economy and the economic landscape became fertile ground for connecting and interlocuting on behalf of external actors and foreign capital interests. The middle man economy of corruption degenerated into a battle royale for service fees, commissions, and intermediary compensations in supply and investment chains throughout the world.

By 1970, Nigeria’s political agents had been transformed by the incentives of foreign capital and the constraints of exogenous capital stakeholders, their liberal economic ideology, and the development policies they promoted. By the end of the twentieth century TCM had led the evolution of an institutionalized and systematic corruption torrent that engulfed the Nigerian State and defined Nigeria’s contemporary political economy of development. Here, one can immediately recognize the alignment of foreign capitalist interests and local capitalist interest of
TCM. This evolution produced and reproduced abusive behavior of capital exchange, capital allocation, and resource distribution across Nigeria’s public institutions.

However, how do the evolution of TCM and Nigeria’s corruption condition compare to other transitioning developing African nations that were similarly subject to the exogenousities of external capitalist interests in the form of liberal economic ideology and development policy? To fully comprehend the contours of Nigeria’s corruption puzzle, a brief comparative look at the path of developing nations in Africa and Asia will prove extremely useful.

AFRICAN AND ASIAN COMPARATIVE CASES

Given the ubiquity of SAP throughout Africa, one naturally wonders what makes its application in Nigeria so distinct. In other words, why did economic policies of the World Bank and IMF that were equally discordant throughout Africa, impact corruption in Nigeria so radically? A brief comparative analysis of two similar cases (Zaire and Sierra Leone) can further explicate disparate outcomes in Nigeria.

Ostensibly, Zaire’s development under Mobutu is a case directly parallel to Nigeria. However, a closer examination reveals that the internal and external negotiations of power and influence in these respective nations were vastly different. After Belgian rule in the Congo, Mobutu, an army officer, ascended to power due in large part to his public anti-communist stance. His rejection of communism and the embrace of western ideology facilitated the acquisition of large amounts of foreign aid and capital, which he pilfered for personal gain. Reports estimate that Mobutu was individually responsible for consuming nearly 20 percent of Zaire’s annual budget.285 His mode of consumption also trickled down to other members of the

Zairean armed forces who sold military resources and equipment for private gain. This disorganization led to unpatrolled and uncontrolled borders, which allowed for smuggling and other forms of capital extractions to occur. At first glance, Zaire seems to embody a similar military-political agent to capital to corruption link. However, the external logic of capital flows varied greatly.

Where the effects of foreign capital flows differ in Zaire versus Nigeria is in the distinct form of foreign capital entry. According to a debt study on the Congo, Mobutu apparently "Relied heavily on external resources to maintain his grip on political power and thereby on Congo's internal economic resources. Loans came both from private bankers and public-sector bureaucrats of the official bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. These were complemented by outright gifts and military aid from Western governments, doled out in the name of national security."  

Mobutu’s allocation habits eventually caused Zaire’s debt to soar and ultimately led to international creditors refusal to lend. “By the early 1980s, Mobutu’s loan facilities dried up, and he was untouchable in client terms. By this time, the country was virtually bankrupt after massive inflows of foreign exchange were siphoned off.” Herein lies the most significant divergence when contrasting Zairean and Nigerian capital flow models. Although both countries were similarly regarded by the World Bank and IMF marketization programs, Zaire was almost entirely dependent on external capital. Meaning, Mobutu was only able to extract government funds in a corrupt sense when loans were provided externally.

Further, the facilitation of external lending and capital flows were almost exclusive to one singular man over three decades, Mobutu. Conversely, in Nigeria, capital flows were multiple.

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287 Ibid.
and spread across several foreign stakeholder interests. Additionally, the allocation of foreign capital in Nigeria was not relegated to a single person or office; rather, TCM is a diffuse power position replicated and reproduced throughout Nigeria’s institutional framework. Thus, although foreign capital flows existed in both Zaire and Nigeria, the configuration of power and capital from the external to the internal was substantially dissimilar.

How did foreign capital from SAP linked loans and FDI impact development and corruption in a resource-rich nation like Sierra Leone, that, like Nigeria, appeared to have multiple foreign capital flows? By the end of the Cold War, the nature of relations between patron-client politics in Africa and significant powers outside of Africa fundamentally changed. In Sierra Leone, the ruling class looked to foreign creditors and loans to fund armed missions to reduce threats to their internal security and finance defense campaigns against hostile insurgencies. Sierra Leonean national security was highly dependent on external capital during this period, and all resources were mobilized towards this security purpose. In the 1970’s and 1980s, Sierra Leone leadership, “built a network of loyal politicians organized along commercial logics, especially illicit diamond mining opportunities, that were financed with profits from state-run diamond operations.”

With the aid of foreign traders that directly linked Sierra Leone to international markets, diamond smuggling became the countries largest source of trade income. Reno describes this era of Sierra Leonean development as reconfigured political authority based on international methods of dependency exploitation. That is, capital flows from SAP loans and diamond industry foreign direct investments (FDI) in Sierra Leone were predominantly

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289 Ibid.
solicited by rulers who engaged in an exploitative model to maintain power and position. The
result was corruption, clientelism, and cronyism.

However, there is a stark difference in the manner or logic of capital flow observed in the
two countries. Sierra Leone actively pursued foreign capital for its specific security ends.
Additionally, leadership in the country further leveraged its prime natural resource, diamonds,
and established a largely informal mining process. Conversely, Nigeria’s landscape of foreign
capital flows emerged far differently to create an extraordinary brand of corruption. Put another
way, Nigeria’s mode of capital accrual more closely epitomized capitalist accumulation
principles as its primary motive was aggregating surplus wealth and gathering excess profits.
Contrarily, Zaire and Sierra Leone each appeared more critically motivated by security
rationalities and self-preservation logics, to which capital accumulation was necessary.

Therefore, SAP imposed by international financial institutions, in effect, undermined the
autonomy of the state and made it exceedingly necessary for desperate African rulers to divert
the funds provided by such programs into the all-important struggle for political survival. To
reiterate, the external variable of foreign capital influenced corruption in Nigeria, Zaire, and
Sierra Leone, namely through the distinct internal and external power negotiations of each
respective nation. Notably, the verticality of power in Nigeria’s case, was predominantly
externally motivated, meaning the outputs arose from the outside in, or top-down. Whereas the
vertical power relationships in Zaire and Sierra Leone, were mostly internally motivated,
meaning the outputs arose from the inside out. Put simply; external capital stakeholders solicited
Nigeria as a venue for capital infusion towards ideological development aims and resource
exploitation goals. Conversely, Zairean, and Sierre Leonean leadership solicited external capital as a means to fulfill internal security requirements or maintain political power structures.\textsuperscript{290}

Indeed, international vertical power relationships imbued military statesmen throughout Africa with access to capital. After all, if elites in power always try to preserve their position of power, they will utilize any means, including the apparatus of government, to accumulate wealth and resources for themselves and their group. As such, “there is not one single African leader who does not hold big money abroad.”\textsuperscript{291} There is a certain logic that explains foreign capital flows and proves useful in comprehending the diverse power negotiations and divergent development outcomes in Africa.

The relationship between internal political power and external economic power is most instructive. Neither colonialism nor culture thoroughly explain divergent development outcomes. Clapham argues, “Answers must rest on something more than the ready assumption in much of the Africanist literature that, since the state was a colonial imposition, its deficiencies could simply be ascribed to colonial rule. Such claims do nothing to distinguish African states from equally postcolonial states which, as in Malaysia and Singapore, have proved capable agents of development.”\textsuperscript{292} Clapham continues, “Is it therefore plausible to suggest that there is some continent-wide African 'political culture', presumably deriving from the interaction between colonial statehood on the one hand and embedded social structures and values on the other, that

\textsuperscript{290} This is not to meant to denote either instance of capital flow, top down or bottom up, as exclusive or singular to any of the regions being analyzed. Nigeria saw modes of solicitation of capital from the inside out just as Zaire and Sierra Leone experienced external capital's unsolicited arrival. The point here is that the overall logic of foreign capital flows, the logic that went to define the power dynamic of external capital and internal institutional change, was distinctly top down or bottom up respectively.


may help to account for African exceptionalism\textsuperscript{293}\textsuperscript{?} Clapham’s supposition is precisely the sort of analytical trap that much of the African development and corruption scholarship falls victim to. There is no unitary internal variable such as culture that accounts for divergent outcomes in Africa countries. Nor is there a singular external cause such as colonialism or economic imperialism. Rather, in order to fully comprehend outcomes, an interlinked framework of internal and external rationalities must be examined together, specifically concerning capital flows. In the Nigerian case, the internal / external dialectic is represented by the various vertical negotiations of power between state political institutions and the economic ideologies of external international financial institutions. To further explain these relationships, let us briefly examine how transnational capital interests, SAP, and their related loans impacted development in South East Asia.

As African nations were reeling from the effects of sovereign loans and SAP in the late twentieth century, their Asian counterparts were lauded the world over as economic miracles and development “Tigers.” The divergent outcomes of these regions call into question the idea that economic development is solely contingent on governments choosing to adopt a set of policies to reform economic vitality. Although the liberal free-market policy recommendations affixed to loans and SAP proved disappointing in Africa, such reforms in Asia appeared at least moderately effective, if not wholly successful. One postulate explaining the Africa-Asia contrast focuses on the personal characteristics and agency of their respective political leadership. On the one hand, Africa was led by undisciplined authoritarian rulers, while its Asian counterparts exhibited prudence and pragmatism. Though a gross oversimplification, one way to compare how foreign

\textsuperscript{293} Ibid.
capital impacted internal institutions in Africa and Asia, is through juxtaposing their leaders and leadership outcomes. The critical difference lies most prominently with the dialectic between their internal institutional political makeup and the degree of external economic influence. In other words, we must ask, how do institutional structural constraints shape economic choices? In short, institutional constraints in Africa were far more rigid than in South East Asia.

By the 1980s, most of Africa had accumulated incredible foreign debt. Additionally, the West had begun enticing Africa with development capital as a means to further its ideological position in the war against communism. Thus, the power dynamics and international economic influence in Africa can be immediately observed. This external influence was vastly dissimilar in Asia. Brautigam argues, “Southeast Asia's lead over Sub-Saharan Africa is not simply a response to good policies undertaken in the past two decades, but also reflects the different ways in which each area first engaged with the capitalist world.” Meaning, any similarities between the two regions in terms of economic policy, structure, or objective poverty levels used to fortify comparative frameworks, actually mask several deeper institutional contrasts in terms of influences of international economic arrangements. For example, South East Asia was already well integrated into the historical trading networks of Asia and Europe.

Further, there is a significant strand of development literature that places Asia at the center of modern capital development and the global economy. Accordingly, Asia’s historical position in the capitalist world gave the region’s economic actors a substantial foundation to


develop an internal institutional economic identity. Subsequently, at every stage following, Asia’s institutional head start in economic development was extended and maintained. Take the occurrence of import-substituting industrialization. This economic strategy surfaced in South East Asia during the late nineteenth century. In contrast, in Africa, such development models were not, and could not be introduced until decades later well into the twentieth century. Therefore, the form corruption took in Nigeria had more negative outcomes from a public perspective versus the form corruption took in several Asian contexts.

Due in large part to the aforementioned institutional constraints, Nigeria’s political actors had to behave differently from their counterparts in Asia. The leaders are not necessarily misguided, morally reprehensible, or inherently corrupt. Instead, they are individuals responding to a variety of distinct sets of problems, incentives, and power relationships. Therefore, if the internal institutional makeup of Nigeria was far more rigid and constraining in the context of the external economic power matrix, then the individual or collective interests of Nigerian leaders are systematically at odds with the broader public or national interest. This division then leads to an incongruence of action that positively benefits the interests of those in power, on the one hand, and negatively impacts their constituents on the other.

Several Asian examples of internal institutional order speak to this point more directly. In Indonesia, Thorbecke argues, “centralized institutions of government, revolutionary origins, and domination by a single ethnic group had all inclined those in power to adopt policies reflecting an encompassing national interest.”

296 In Thailand, Khan describes an “Openness and

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competitiveness of politics that facilitated competitive clientelism and allowed entry to industry and increased market capacity.” 297 Similarly, Johnson explains how the Japanese State played an extraordinary role in development via economic intervention by directing the energies of business. Johnson credits the Japanese economic miracle to conscious and consistent governmental policies. “Industrial policy is not an alternative to the market, but what the state does when it intentionally alters incentives within markets in order to influence the behavior of civilian producers, consumers, and investors towards growth.” 298 Thus, Japan’s practices of Keiretsu and Zaibatsu were forms of corruption and government pathology; however, because they resulted in positive economic outcomes, they are rarely regarded as such. Kang further details the vital role of statist economics in South Korea. “Corruption was rampant in Korea, and the state intervened in the way that it did because in doing so was in the interest of a small group of business and political elites. The production of public goods was often the byproduct of actors competing to gain the private benefits of state resources.” 299 Here Kang is not pointing to an absence of corruption in Asia, but similar to Thorbecke, Khan, and Johnson, Kang reveals that when corruption coincides with growth, it is seldom acknowledged. The critical element in the overview of these Asian cases is understanding how corruption fits into the internal institutional logic of the country’s respective economic policies and programs in a way that fostered growth.

Ostensibly, SAP-related loans and austerity measures benefited Asia. However, the above cases have shown how the relative strength of the state and the business sector have an impact on a country’s development trajectory. Truthfully, Asia largely possessed strong enough institutional

297 Khan. Rents, Rent-seeking and Economic Development
298 Johnson MITI and the Japanese Miracle
299 Kang, Crony Capitalism
frameworks to overcome the would be disastrous policies of free-market liberalization under
SAP. Stiglitz contends, “Business government coordination was attributed to the success in Asia
in ensuring macro-economic stability.” He further concedes that the government does play a
crucial active role in allowing for deep, efficient, and robust financial systems to emerge and
create growth and stability. ³⁰⁰ Wade similarly interprets the Asian economic miracles stressing
“the importance of state intervention to protect and support promising infant industries up to the
point where they can compete in export markets.” ³⁰¹

Asia’s growth occurred in many ways despite, not because of SAP. The consistent
variable amongst all development regions, however, remains the interplay of internal institutional
political composition and external economic influence. “To understand policy-making in
developing countries, one must first account for certain configurations of government and
business elites…the particular political challenges faced by individual leaders…and another
source of constraints is the international system.” ³⁰² Stallings also argues that paradigms about
external influence have been too quickly abandoned. Though stated differently, Stallings
encapsulates the dialectic of power that orders the internal / external modalities that explain
development outcomes and corruption.³⁰³

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³⁰⁰ J. Stiglitz, Sound Finance and Sustainable Development in Asia. Keynote address to the Asian
Development Forum, Manila, (March 1998)

Asian Industrialization, (Princeton University Press 1990)

³⁰² Kang, Crony Capitalism

³⁰³ See Barbara Stallings, "International Influences on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural
processes of linkage and leverage.
Ironically, in Asia, the ideology of Liberalism only became useful when methods were put in place locally that was actually in opposition to Liberal principles and free-market doctrine. In reality, government protection, intervention, and organization, as seen with modes of rent-seeking, clientelism, cronyism, and corruption throughout Asia, prevailed. The governments of the Asian Tigers created an ecosystem of incentives and institutional policies designed to promote exports and shield infant local industries from foreign competition. By protecting local industries and providing the full might of government support, these governments designed an internal enabling environment that protected and produced local long term investments. In contrast, Nigeria’s weak federal composition, lack of nationalist solidarity, social, ethnic fragmentation of leadership, and fragile political institutions all combined to encourage conflict and, ultimately, the pursuit of very narrow group interests in the formation of TCM.

When examining TCM formation against external economic influences, what resulted was varied pronunciations of power through capital, which created opportunities for corruption. Imagine if Nigeria was able to organically nurture local agricultural and energy sectors as Japan was? The likely result would be long term growth and a fully functional and balanced export economy that ricochets and reverberates throughout the region. The imposition of liberal free marketization, therefore, disallowed Nigeria’s institutions and structures from developing an internal economic logic from which it could naturally flourish. Not only could we have witnessed an alternate development outcome in Nigeria, but there would also likely be an alternate ruling class or business elite that ordered society away from public abuses of power and corruption.
The growth of the Asian Tiger economies was only possible with the confluence of a range of specific circumstances motivated by the distinct power dynamic in the internal/external exchange. Whether the comparative scope is across regions like South East Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, or within them like Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, an improved understanding of development outcomes and corruption demands a particular kind of analysis. A unified examination of internal institutional political features alongside external economic influences, which include transnational capital interests, free-market liberal ideology, and global development policies, must be pursued.

CONCLUSION

Surrounding the process and discussions of instructed economic development lies the question, “How well equipped are poor people to superintend their own development?” Modernizers confronted with poor societies typically ask ‘what can we do for them?’ But there is yet another question that members of rich societies might ask, ‘What have we been doing to them?’ In the contemporary free-market system of transnational capital, the economic interests of the developing are routinely eclipsed by those of the developed. The line from global economic practices and development schemes to institutional consequences of corruption locally, epitomizes the linkages argued for Nigeria in this chapter as it relates to global economy and political corruption.

Nigeria’s integration into a contemporary world economy does not necessarily reflect a singular form of capitalism at one single time. Instead, the consequences for Nigeria are


305 Immewarhr presents such a line of inquiry to raise the possibility of a causal relationship between the wealth of some and the poverty of others. Consequently, the dynamic between capitalist's victors and vanquished is directly, perhaps causally, related. See Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small, 180.
reflective of the transformation of capitalism and how its mode of imposition had damaging consequences. Development-led free-market capitalism promoted a specific form of capital accumulation, which highlighted transnational capital interest through both the thought leadership of Mont Pelerin and the developmental policy of international financial institutions like the IMF. Together these variables formed external capital constraints upon Nigeria’s political institutions and redefined the role of Nigeria’s political actors.

Ultimately, the intellectual outcry and rally call of the early Mont Pelerin society meetings of the 1940s, to “remake liberalism all over again,” succeeded. Nigeria was told by the liberal economic power brokers across the globe to become rich. Unfortunately, Nigeria listened, but the only thing that trickled down from the liberal capitalist economic system was despair, not prosperity. Neoliberalism, as a contemporary world economic orthodoxy, created an enabling environment for Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician to further evolve in the wake of static statist economic programs. That is not to say that these agents solely emerged as a result of inputs from the world economy. Rather, the economic mandate for free market expansion and the associated liberal development policies reshaped the internal configuration of Nigeria and transformed its power players. Without these external inputs, Nigeria's altered economic landscape might appear vastly different than it does today—possibly precluding the emergence of TCM in the first place.  

As a direct result of Nigeria’s experience with FDI and SAP, TCM began to recognize and perceive the state apparatus as a vehicle for capital accrual. Consequently, the state became regarded as the primary venue for corruption via wealth accumulation, distribution, and

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evacuation. This transformation was the direct result of the liberal free-market mandate of the world economic order. For without the power pressures from institutionalized financial bodies, Nigeria’s economy and institutions may have evolved in a manner that more fully reflected its market realities. Instead, Nigeria was externally managed and maneuvered by agents of economic Liberalism who ordered the state to abide by global policy dictates of liberalization and participate in the marketization of the world economy. Amongst myriad elements that contribute to Nigeria’s economic condition, the four specific external economic variables presented in this chapter directly produced a locus of power that, in part, shaped and constructed the Capitalist Militician and led to the wholesale advancement of political corruption.

The preceding investigation of liberal economic ideology, development policies, the interests of transnational capitalist stakeholders within the development of the contemporary world economy, and TCM discussed within this chapter, highlight the more significant methodological link being claimed throughout this study. That is, the connection of exogenous and endogenous analysis in terms of economic inputs to political outputs, outcomes, and consequences. In recounting the analyses of Marx, Proudhon, Bratsis, Poulantzas, Huntington, and Standing, whom each identify a correlation between corruption and capitalism and the power negotiations therein, I have presented material evidence concerning Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician that directly represents this dynamic. The dynamic relationship between political and economic variables exceeds the boundaries of scholarship presented in the traditional internal-external dichotomy.

Huntington, Bayart, and Inikori all concede to the primacy of the global economic landscape when analyzing corruption. I have therefore grounded this chapter in a similar mode of
analysis through methodological unification of proximate external and internal rationalities instigated by global economic Liberalism and imperialist global capitalism in the twentieth century on the one hand, and the evolution of a triad power agent known as the Capitalist Militician on the other.

This chapter has presented an alternate external analysis of corruption in Nigeria that extends the typical Dependency model, which exclusively examines oil and the resource exploitation economics that coincide with it. In contrast, this chapter has identified and evaluated four external variables motivated by transnational capital interests that exist within an exogenous endogenous co-evolutionary framework of corruption analysis. However, the exogenous variables that instigate TCM do not exist in isolation. Rather they work in conjunction with specific internal conditions that together, constitutively shape political power, the making of TCM, and the development of corruption in Nigeria. The following chapter will explore the group of internal variables that contribute to my corruption analysis of Nigeria and complete the co-evolutionary explanatory framework presented in this study.
CHAPTER FOUR
ENDOGENOUS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION

NIGERIA’S INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATION

The role of transnational capital and external capital stakeholder’s interests have thus far been critically significant in the discussion of TCM and corruption. However, these external variables did not occur in isolation. Rather, they materialized in conjunction with specific internal conditions that together influenced and instigated the appearance of TCM. This chapter will investigate a particular set of endogenous elements that are equally significant pieces of Nigeria’s corruption puzzle and help explicate the rise of TCM.

TCM remains the fulcrum to understanding and analyzing corruption in Nigeria. This study contends that the figure emerged from the constitutive combination of 1) the construction of a contemporary capitalist world economy and the residue of its statecraft mandates, and 2) the post-civil war transformation of Nigeria’s political and economic institutions. However, a more detailed understanding of the inputs of the latter, in terms of TCM’s development, power, influence, and positioning, will allow us to fully connect the external and internal modalities that, together, combine to explain corruption’s proliferation in Nigeria.

Generally, this chapter analyzes three internal components that comprise TCM; Political, Military, and Capital, and in doing so, reveals endogenous moments that animate the rise of TCM. More specifically, this chapter examines four primary endogenous variables of Nigeria’s political institutions that more thoroughly uncover TCM’s historical military, political, and capital antecedents. They include, 1) Institutional underdevelopment, 2) Institutional incoherence, 3) Institutional political materialism, and 4) Institutional capital consciousness.
Before exploring each of these conditions, the next section will begin with a discussion of the internal history behind TCM’s evolution, tracking the figure’s initial emergence, subsequent development, and contemporary appearance in Nigeria. The chapter will conclude with a more detailed exploration of specific instances of TCM’s abuse of power and corruption.

Former Nigerian head of state Yakuba Gowon alludes to the initial emergence of TCM when commenting on the military’s insertion and entanglement into politics. According to Gowon, there must have been alternate motivations for soldiers joining the military in post-war Nigeria beyond mere circumstance or civic duty. He states clearly,

“Much has been written about the long stay in power of the Nigerian Military since the demise of the First Republic. The political and military imbroglio that followed, led and saw the leadership of this country thrust upon the military. The circumstances that brought about military coups in Nigeria and thus brought the military into politics are responsible for the cycle of coups and counter coups that followed then till the later 1990s. This has led me to the inexorable conclusion that the musical chairs of coups and counter coups that followed after me could only be explained for reasons other than simply for the defense of the country.”

With this in mind, I contend that TCM’s emergence was activated in Nigeria, post-civil war, as the formal entanglement of military and politics in Nigeria began in 1970. There is a crucial component to note of Nigeria’s military rule and involvement in government during this early post-war era of politics and power shifts. Although Nigeria held a “Head of State” position, as occupied by Mohammed, Obasanjo, and Buhari. Nigeria also held another government leadership position known as the “Head of the Federal Military Government.” This figure served as the head of Nigeria’s “Supreme Military Council,” later known as the “Armed Forces Ruling Council.”

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The significance is twofold. First, it marks a component of TCM’s origin of power, as the existence of this council represents a larger ruling military contingent above the head of state, that could organize or orchestrate coups and power shifts collectively. Therefore, when Buhari or Obasanjo are appointed heads of state post-coup, it is this council that is mainly making such power determinations, or at minimum cosigning power transitions.

The second point of significance is that these councils were composed of all military officers, some of whom served as representative military governors of local regions, while others served as military administrative heads of federal ministries. Collectively, the Supreme Military Council served at minimum as a de facto executive council or presidential cabinet, and maximally as an insulated political-military party with the power to appoint and support ruling candidates. A very early diffusion of power across positions for TCM is evident. The assembly and action of the council also mark one of the first institutionally organized moments of the military’s integration into Nigerian politics. The following brief history more directly illustrates the post-war military to politics connection as intimated by Gowon. It tracks particular moments of the construction of TCM’s eventual mantle of power.

TCM IN NIGERIA’S CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL HISTORY

On January 15, 1970, Biafra, Nigeria’s Eastern Region and failed secessionist state, capitulated. The early 1970s saw the gradual reintegration of the Eastern Region into the Nigerian Federation. However, by 1974, then president Gowon broke his promise of returning the nation to civilian rule and instead maintained military power. This would prove to be the first significant instance of decades-long military-led political action, all of which were punctuated by a consistent and repeated refusal of democratic power transitions. In July of 1975, a successful
military coup resulted in General Murtala Muhammed’s take over of the top military and political position in government.

The Muhammed presidential era began with optimism as he began his tenure by also pledging towards peaceful power transitions. Muhammed began with the continuation of the federal system of government in establishing constitutional laws guaranteeing fundamental human rights, maximum democratic participation, and an orderly return to civilian rule. However, once again, in 1976, there was an attempted coup by military officer Buka Dimka. Though unsuccessful, the attempt was tremendously bloody, resulting in the eventual murder of president Muhammed. Following, General Olusegun Obasanjo was chosen to serve as Nigeria's new ruler. Obasanjo similarly promised to continue the political course initiated by Muhammed and Gowon before him. However, once in power, Obasanjo began to introduce measures that restricted public opposition to his regime. He implemented mechanisms to control union activity, nationalized most of the nation's land, and increased oil industry regulation. By 1978, a new constitution was written in Nigeria that was once again intended to facilitate Nigeria's return to civilian rule, with elections to be held the following year.

Shehu Shagari was named the new president in the 1979 elections. When Shagari stayed in power through his term and was re-elected in 1983, this marked the first time in the history of independent Nigeria that successive elections were held in the country. Now, after a decade of military politics, coups, and power grabs, Nigeria seemed to be gaining some political continuity. However, stability was temporary, as both the public and the military questioned the validity of Shagari's election. Accusations of election rigging and military interference were publicly levied, and violence soon erupted in several areas until president Shagari was deposed in a bloodless
coup. Shagari was placed under house arrest, and General Muhammadu Buhari was appointed the new leader of the Nigerian Federation.

Though the Supreme Military Council appointed him in 1984, Buhari's reign was short-lived as yet another coup took place on August 27, 1985. This time General Ibrahim Babangida was named Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Head of State. The occupation of these two positions enabled Babangida to plunge the already sinking nation into a greater political and economic downturn. In response to his rule, there was an attempted coup by Mamman Vatsa who was unsuccessful and was ultimately executed along with his followers. On April 22, 1990, another coup was attempted by Gideon Orkar, which also failed. A new constitution was drafted in that year, and the country was once more scheduled to return to civilian rule by 1992. The first elections of this would be democratic transition were annulled. However, later in 1993, another election was held, and the winner was declared to be Moshood Abiola. Unexpectedly, or perhaps expectedly, Head of State General Babangida annulled the results of these held elections as well; elections which to this day are widely believed to be the first and only fair presidential elections held in the history of Nigeria. A political crisis followed as hundreds were killed in demonstrations across the country. The military government ordered the arrest of several thousand protestors as well as the shutdown of any opposition newspapers. After months of instability, Babangida finally resigned in 1993, and Ernest Shonekan, a civilian, was appointed president in efforts to make good on the promised civilian transition of 1992. Shonekan's rule, however, would be the shortest in Nigeria's history, lasting less than three months. Following, General Sani Abacha, Babangida's defense minister, overthrew Shonekan in
November 1993, claimed power, and brought the military back to the forefront of Nigeria's presidential politics.

General Abacha's rule encompassed totalitarianism and complete despotism. Initially, he, too, as did nearly all military heads of state before him, promised to return the government to civilian rule. Abacha requested two years to activate this transition. However, in perhaps the most visibly corrupt era of all, Abacha proceeded to dismantle all elected institutions, terminate all national and state assemblies, close independent publications, ban all political activity, suspend the constitution, and loot over four billion dollars worth of Nigeria's assets during his first few years in power.

On March 1, 1995, in response to Abacha’s reign, a coup was planned and attempted by Lawan Gwadabe. Gwadabe failed, was arrested, and he, along with his instigators, was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment apiece, while other political dissidents were sentenced to death by hanging. The brutal actions of Abacha stunned the world and led to the suspension of Nigeria from the British Commonwealth. On December 21, 1997, another coup on the Abacha government failed. Without any real threat to power or viable military challenge to his position, Abacha became the only nominated candidate for the presidency in the would-be 1998 transition to civilian rule. In response, demonstrations and riots again erupted throughout Nigeria, killing thousands as violence once more returned to politics and presidential elections. Shortly after that, on June 8, 1998, Abacha died unexpectedly of a heart attack at the age of 54.

After Abacha's death, General Abdulsalam Abubakar took his place and attempted to stabilize the leadership in Nigeria. He set up a one-year transition action program that aimed to lead the country back to democracy and civilian rule by May 1999. Olusegun Obasanjo, who
recall, led the 1976 military government, would go on to win those transition elections of 1999. Following Obasanjo's inauguration, Nigeria was readmitted to the Commonwealth, and the hopeful rebuilding and preservation of a fully democratic state followed. Obasanjo served two terms in office until 2007, whereby Umaru Yar'Adua was sworn in as president. He, however, died in office and was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan in 2010. Jonathan served the remainder of Yar'Adua's presidential term and would serve another term until he was defeated in a general election by retired general Muhammad Buhari. Buhari assumed office in May 2015 and is currently serving his second term as president.\(^{308}\)

The overview of Nigeria’s heads of state post-independence serves a few purposes. First, it immediately indicates specific trends and shifts in power that reveal how TCM began to take shape in post-civil war Nigeria. Second, the three decades of coups, counter-coups, attempted coups, takeovers, and power struggles from the top produced and ultimately reproduced a specific kind of military executive and head of state. Nigeria’s leaders accrued a distinct set of tactically informed skills that migrated frontline fighting on the battlefield, to political combat in the halls of government. Retired General Bamaiyi confirms this transformation of military and political power as he asserts, “Coup making acquired a life of its own and was turned to an industry fueled by greed, power, and inordinate ambition of officers.”\(^{309}\) To this end, resources, capital, and control were all prerequisites for any leader to assume power. That is just it, any leader or soldier with enough power, control, and resources could usurp, or at least attempt to secure, the ultimate mantle of power. Of the thirteen executives and heads of state in Nigeria’s

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\(^{308}\) See Table 1 for complete view of Nigeria's leadership composition and transition from 1970 - 2015

post-war history, only one (Shoneken) was a genuine civilian absent direct military ties or influence; his presidency lasted a mere 83 days. There are definite patterns and combinations where politics and military intersect throughout Nigeria’s modern political history.

**MILITARY AND IN DEMOCRACY: A BLURRED LINE**

There is a final trend to note when examining the executive shifts of power in Nigeria and the series of seemingly uninterrupted and “unmilitary” democratic transitions of the twenty-first century. From 1999 to present, there were four presidential power transitions with legitimate plebiscitary elections that appear to be civilian and distinctly non-military when compared to previous transitions of leadership. However, a closer look will reveal how entrenched the military remained in twenty-first-century Nigerian politics.

**Twentieth-Century Democratic Transition 1:**

In 1999, General Abbubakar transferred power to Obasanjo, the elected president of a “civilian” democratic regime. However, this is the same General Obasanjo that served as military head of state in the late 1970s and held numerous other military government positions in Nigeria’s first two republics. Though retired from military service when he assumed office in 1999, Obasanjo maintained the same circle, brain trust, and consortium with whom he associated and served as an active general. There is a rich history of the downfalls and failings of Obasanjo’s administration. However, the grandest of which is his unsuccessful attempt at legislating and legalizing a third term. His intention to remain in power as head of state was public knowledge. By the end of his second term, Obasanjo attempted to pass a constitutional amendment allowing for three-term presidencies in Nigeria. Former House of Representative
member Uche Onyeagucha openly confirmed that Obasanjo offered each member of congress N50 million to amend the constitution in his favor to extend his presidency.  

_Twentieth-Century Democratic Transition 2:_

At this point in 2007, after failed legislative attempts at extending his presidency, Obasanjo understood that customary modes of military force were no longer viable. Recall after the atrocities of General Abacha in the mid to late 1990s, Nigeria was kicked out of the British commonwealth and was under tremendous international scrutiny. Although Obasanjo could not afford to proceed with a standard forceful military response, he was, however, able to rely on the same military tactical means towards a similar end. What does this imply? There is wide speculation and, in many instances open acknowledgment, that after failing to secure a third term as president, Obasanjo assembled and administered a “Puppet Presidency” in choosing a successor(s) that he could dominate and control. He began by his suggestion of an ailing Yar’adua for president, a man who was thought to be gravely ill before the election, and who would ultimately pass away two years after the inauguration. Most importantly, Yar’adua just happened to be the younger brother of Obasanjo’s military comrade Shehu Yar’adua.

_Twentieth-Century Democratic Transition 3:_

Obasanjo’s maneuver concluded with the appointment of a vice president, and ultimately the interim and elected president, Goodluck Jonathan, who assumed the post after Yar’adua’s death. Jonathan’s political ascent was sudden and publicly regarded as peculiar. The underlying assumption is that his rise to power was planned and instigated as a calculated scheme concocted

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310 Uche Onyeagucha, Nigeria Congressman, Political Economy Symposium Talk, (Lagos December 2017)
311 John, Iliffe. _Obasanjo, Nigeria and the World._ (Boydell & Brewer, 2011)
312 Ibid.
by retired General Obasanjo to perpetuate himself in power through a puppet presidency.\textsuperscript{313} While Yar’adua and Jonathan campaigned and won the 2007 presidential election in Nigeria, there is much skepticism as to the validity of those elections, i.e., the degree to which Obasanjo was directly responsible or influential in not only selecting those on the party ticket but also in determining the outcome.\textsuperscript{314}

\textit{Twentieth-Century Democratic Transition 4:}

After nearly a decade and a half of the Obasanjo presidential era (including the alleged “puppet presidencies” of Yar’adua and Jonathan), the public sought change and a shift away from politics of old, into a new age of government and leadership. Naturally, former General and military head of state Buhari runs on an incredibly ironic “CHANGE Begins With Me” campaign, is elected, and begins serving the first of his two terms in 2015. So the military carousel of leadership continued in modern Nigerian politics. However, this time the generals are retired civilians “elected” to office, as opposed to active soldiers appointed to power. The seeds of power sewn by military political leadership postwar constructed a political agent that, once fully activated by capital motivations, emerged as a wholesale broker of state power in what I have identified as TCM.

There is minimal difference between Nigeria’s late twentieth and early twenty-first century political eras of executive power, save a veneer of democratic politics used to perpetuate the institution of the military that has been embedded in Nigeria’s political ecosystem since independence. That is, once TCM arrived post-war, the figure remained in Nigeria. To this end,

\textsuperscript{313} IBID.

former president Gowon recently commented on the military’s presence in contemporary Nigerian politics, “The Nigerian military lost its reputation of professionalism, discipline, and patriotism as a result of their misguided adventure into politics….No military person retired or serving should be involved and considered for the forthcoming leadership of this country.”

Yet history has shown otherwise as a military officer expressed during an interview, “Normally most soldiers will want to stay in government even after retirement. Obasanjo is not unique. It is because of our interruption of democracy. The influence during military regime is the same influence after we retire.” During a separate interview, another soldier similarly notes, “Senior officers after retirement look to hold on to power with appointment in government. They are used to eating the national cake, so they don’t want to share that arrangement.”

Clearly, with the reprise of military leadership cloaked in civilian garb, the entrenchment of the military in Nigerian politics is undeniable and persistent. This analysis primarily considers the military’s political presence at the high level of executive. It does not take a full inventory of the dozens of governors, senators, ministers, commissioners, and political participants that have been military, former military, or military adjacent and who have been deeply involved in Nigeria’s government from 1970 - 2015. Assuredly, there are multiple officers turned politicians and numerous Capitalist Militicians that have existed throughout Nigeria’s several Republics in federal, state, and local capacities who continue to occupy public positions to this day. That the military’s infiltration into politics has been a long-lasting and indelible one is undeniable.

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315 Gowon in Vindication of A General
316 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Corporal, Years of Service - 10
317 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Warrant Officer, Years of Service - 33
How does this established military presence in Nigeria’s political history relate to corruption? A comprehensive account of the major scandals and improprieties spearheaded by Nigeria’s military heads of state, from Gowon in the 1970s to Buhari presently, would indeed chronicle a robust, detailed timeline of misconduct and abuse of power. However, the point here is not necessarily identifying that there was corruption under TCM figure over a specific period. However, instead, identifying how the increased power and position of TCM resulted in a commensurate increase in corruption, both in amount and level of sophistication, is of greater importance.

The Suitcase Cement Scandal of 1975, the 1985 Asian Importer Transfer Scandal with the Johnson Mathey Bank of London, Babangida and Abacha’s entire tenure of looting, cronyism, and abuse during the 1990s and the several multinational corporate and sovereign scandals uncovered during Obasanjo’s post-millennium presidencies may all individually or collectively shed light on the kind of malpractices that occurred. The focus for this study, however, lies more prominently on how the military, vis-a-vis TCM, institutionalized corruption in Nigeria and amplified corrupt acts of small-time bribery into large scale racketeering. The broader goal is to understand how local institutional looting in politics graduated and turned into a globalized kleptocratic State. I have identified in the preceding, the compounded political power transitions that chronicle TCM’s historical and contemporary presence by examining the manner through which the military combined with politics in post-war Nigeria. However in order

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318 Although a chronology of the different forms and methods of corruption through Nigeria’s modern history has been detailed and discussed in chapter 2.
to answer the question of “how” corruption, with regard to the emergence of TCM, the exploration of four internal institutional conditions is required.\footnote{The four endogenous conditions identified are 1) Institutional underdevelopment, 2) Institutional incoherence, 3) Institutional political materialism, and 4) Institutional capital consciousness.}

**FOUR ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS**

**(1) Institutional Underdevelopment**

The first internal condition identifies institutional underdevelopment, but it also reflects how TCM directly and repeatedly inspired political unrest and incited a politically epileptic Nigerian State. Therefore, in analyzing this component of TCM’s emergence, a primary point of interrogation is: “How did the military become political? Furthermore, how did their insertion into politics disrupt the process of state formation and institutional development?

By 1970, the military characteristic of force pervaded government and political institutions in Nigeria and began to lay the groundwork for the construction of a new, now independent, Nigerian State. Despite the post-civil war position of a unified federally capable nation, Nigeria’s institutions were mostly underdeveloped. The dysfunction and underdevelopment is a critical internal component of TCM’s emergence, namely because, the ambitions of Nigeria’s centralized federal power was greatly misaligned with the country’s actual ability to rule centrally. The primary source of this institutional deficiency and underdevelopment, I argue, is the absence of national war and external threat. Exploring this relationship of war-making and state-making further distinguishes Nigeria’s underdeveloped institutions and highlights the role TCM played in that process.

Charles Tilly famously asserts of state-building, “War made the state and the state made war.” However, in the Nigerian case, the absence of war made the statesmen, and the statesmen
made the absence of war a source of wealth. At the center of Tilly's argument are war and coercion. Specifically, Tilly believes that state structures appear as a byproduct of ruler's efforts to acquire the means of war, and second by insisting that war relations among states strongly affected the entire process of state formation. Origins of state formation derive from concentrated capital, concentrated coercion, preparation for war, and position within the international system. Thus, external security threats are necessary for building effective institutions. Additionally, nationalism generated by external conflicts leads to more positive institutional outcomes. However, Nigeria developed in a distinctly new environment, one relatively devoid of the sort of international conflicts that previous developing nations had to take into account. Herbst argues,

“The vast majority of states in Africa gained independence without having to resort to combat and have not faced an external security threat since independence. The continent seemingly destined for war given the colonially imposed boundaries and weak political authorities, has not seen one international state vs state boundary change since the dawn of the independence era in the late1950s, and very few countries face even the prospect of such national conflict with their neighbors.”

Although there are many examples of intra-conflict, civil war, and rebel group fighting across borders, national conflict on the scale seen in Europe and Asia were generally absent in Africa. Therefore, the critical role that war once played in state formation, where political arrangements that were not viable, and economic policies that were not effective were either reformed or replaced, never fully applied in Nigeria. Instead, in Nigeria, the origins of formalized state formation vis-a-vis TCM did derive from concentrated capital, coercion, and position. However, these concentrations did not occur in preparation for war, as Tilly suggests.

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Instead, the configuration of formal institutions and its control agents resulted from the survival needs of military rulers at the center of state politics internally, and their responses to the changing global economic environment externally.

The civil war within Nigeria, and the geopolitical, ideological war to safeguard democracy outside Nigeria, together transformed the military man into the statesman. This statesmen adapted his aggressive nature of warfare to defend his newly assumed power position by installing institutional principles based on military tactics of aggression and maneuver in Nigerian politics that safeguarded and promoted his interest through abuses of power and corruption. TCM further explored political and economic articulations of power without the need to contend with external threats or state preservation logic. Rather, power preservation and personal attainment influenced behavior. Thus, if traditionally war made the state, in Nigeria, the absence of war helped make the statesman. However, Nigeria’s statesman was a military agent that imported functional and behavioral logics that proved incongruous when activated in political institutional environments.

A brief regional comparison further highlights the state-making dynamic present in Nigeria. Herbst comments, “Two of the most successful states in the Third World today, South Korea and Taiwan, are largely ‘warfare states’ that have been molded, in part, by the near constant threat of external aggression. Because warfare has independent effects on economic policies, administrative structures, and the citizenry’s relationship to the state, can countries establish in times of peace what war enabled other countries to do?”322 Herbst argues that state-building without the external threat of war is comparatively less complete than with it, as the

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322 Ibid.
creation of centralized, efficient institutions and the development of nationalism are often absent. He further notes that the international economic community would have to develop policies to allow new non-warfare state survival. Herbst describes Nigeria’s case precisely, in that neither nationalism nor efficient central institutions developed post-independence. Further, Nigeria experienced the exact opposite relationship to the international economic community, where policy prescriptions and development strategies of the World Bank and IMF facilitated institutional disfunction, not development.

Tilly and Herbst each make essential arguments about state-building and war. Tilly’s work, however, is most appropriately applied here in combination with that of Spruyt, who adapts Tilly’s model. For Spruyt, the formation of France, particularly as a modern state, appears to have had little to do with war, but more to do with the specific survival needs of rulers and their responses to changing economic environments. Spruyt’s analysis more closely exemplifies the development of state capacity and state formation in Nigeria, where internal political institutions took shape in response to shifting external economic environments. Specifically, significant examples of transformative state-building in Nigeria emanated most distinctly from the evolution of its statesmen.

The civil war served as the primary threat to the Nigerian State, and therefore, caused the initial ascension of the military’s presence into politics. The conclusion of internal conflict in 1970 begat the continuation of command as officers transitioned from state agents of authority

\[323\] Spruyt examines the formation of the French state and argues that the emergence of European sovereign states was not the result of war. Instead, Spruyt argues that formal state development arose because of a particular conjuncture of social and political interests in Europe. See Hendrik Spruyt, “War Trade and State Formation” (Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics 2009) 18.

\[324\] Spruyt, War Trade and State Formation
and security to agents of policy and politics. Within this newly assumed role, military officers brought new weapons to the political arena and changed the complexion of state politics and government institutions permanently. For example, the Gowon administration, once in power, was the first substantive military regime that began to fashion the Nigerian State in the direct image of the military. Officers and generals not only permeated the institutional and bureaucratic fabric of government but also transformed the functionality of the state, as the civilian mindset and mentality were supplanted by military forcefulness. Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to divorce the military from politics and power.

From a Weberian point of view, the military is the foremost bureaucratic organization, whereby hierarchy and a distinct chain of command take precedence over all other considerations. Similarly, the Nigerian military was designed and expected to be apolitical. The regime of Gowon, however, instigated a shift and was the first military regime to come face to face with the problem of discipline, and the coinciding reality of a military that was becoming instead, distinctly and profoundly, political. Nigeria’s military transformation not only precluded the development of centralized institutions, but also armed military officers with a level of political power, which would ultimately be transformed once more by the demands of external transnational capital interests, thereby producing TCM.

Post-independence Nigeria was a disconnected federation of states with unified power aspirations. Although Nigeria deliberately attempted to install modes of power on a federal level, many of the methods arose as a consequence of external development strategies of state-led industrialization. That is, many of Nigeria’s attempts at centralizing power were enacted by passing development programs that required centralized institutional structures to facilitate them
in the first place. Nigeria thought itself institutionally capable when in actuality, the country’s institutions were no more functional and formally developed by the end of the twentieth century to effectively implement central policies, than the immediate post-independence institutions of 1960 were. Nigeria’s institutional underdevelopment allowed an opening through which a power position like TCM could form. The formation began with the military’s insertion into politics, which disallowed traditional state formation, including the ability to manage and implement the many development economic policies pushed upon Nigeria throughout the twentieth century. Put simply, Nigeria’s institutional underdevelopment and inability to centrally manage federal programs and international economic policy is a leading source of TCM’s external activation of power.325

2) Institutional Incoherence

The defining query of the preceding section on institutional underdevelopment and stagnant state formation was, "How did the Nigerian military become political?" The question that further reflects the military politics combination and best characterizes this section is, "How did Nigerian politics become militarized?"

Post-civil war, Nigeria’s State leadership hoped to install political stability by maintaining power in the short term and abdicating power in favor of civilian rule in the long term. The military’s temporary arrangement in politics proved permanent. By 1970, as the formal combination of military and politics commenced, the line between the two quickly eroded. The military influence upon Nigeria’s political institution was vast, namely with respect to Nigeria’s...
position in a global economic community that expected a certain level of institutional coherence, which the military politics combination significantly lacked. Due to the undefined nature of leadership and power, TCM emerged as external capital variables reordered the existing military politics power nexus to include capital power.\textsuperscript{326}

The incoherence of Nigeria’s political institution began prewar but became magnified by 1970. At this time, the military officers' corps became highly involved throughout all levels of Nigeria's politics as several senior officers were appointed as de facto government bureaucrats and local politicians. According to former military Chief of Army Staff, General Bamaiyi, “The core of the problem is the erosion of discipline in the Nigerian army and how patronage creeped into the military because of the adventure into politics and power.”\textsuperscript{327} It was bad enough that junior officers were used to arrest Major Generals, but that these same juniors were compensated with appointments as local governors made things even worse. Namely, because majors of such rank are not trained to lead anything more than a company of about 100 men, let alone become the leading executive of an entire parastatal, or the chief executive of a state with potentially millions of constituents.

Such practices destabilized the political and institutional power structure in Nigeria and consequently emboldened soldiers of any rank with the notion that power can be attained and usurped. Political appointments were treated as military assignments and postings, not as political positions of leadership. As a result, officers swayed the pendulum of power with takeovers and coups, all of which had immediate military roots and deep long-standing

\textsuperscript{326} Capital power in this sense references the management, facilitation, and allocation of external capital flows and external capitalist interests.

\textsuperscript{327} Bamaiyi Vindication of A General, 59.
sociopolitical implications and consequences. General Bamaiyi continues, “Where I had envisioned camaraderie honor and respect in the military, I found secrets lies and backstabbing. I found corruption where there should have been transparency and openness.”

With the plethora of uniformed soldiers in the political arena now serving administrative functions, an organizational shift began to occur, and a distinctly military character invaded Nigeria’s federal and local bureaucracies. Nigeria politics became militarized, in part, by the sheer and straightforward nature of the structural composition of the armed forces. Military rule is inherently defined by arbitrariness. Whether logic and forethought guide an order or not, obedience is the only acceptable response. Therefore the highest-ranking officers who give order, are seldom held to any open system of accountability. Additionally, there is no parliamentary oversight or national assembly through which the military may become vulnerable or liable. The military entered a political arena that was devoid of customary public checks and balances, and therefore, absent any institutional safeguards for power asymmetry and abuse of power position.

More importantly, the military arrived in Nigeria’s political environment, not seeking out the coherence of the political system, but unapologetically and forcefully applying their coded military logic. This incongruence of military and political institutions naturally opens up the flood gates for abuses of all kinds to ensue. Because corruption flourishes in situations of unaccountability, the primary consequence of the capricious nature of military action and interaction became precisely that, corruption. Renowned Nigerian attorney James Ezike further notes in an interview, “We have had the military in power since the overthrow of Shagari. Our

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328 See Bamaiyi Vindication of A General, 4, which reinforces a key element of corruption and causation in relation to TCM. Corruption was not created by TCM, rather through TCM it was cultivated, massively advanced, and institutionalized.
elections are conquests and have nothing to do with the sovereignty or the will of the people. The Nigerian judiciary during the military regime, abdicated their duty by mouthing that a military decree was superior to the constitution.” Such military traits, attitudes, and beliefs were pervasive across Nigeria’s government institutions.

The militarization of politics was further evident in terms of regulation and accountability. The typical government logic of bicameralism, checks and balances, or some sort of institutional oversight was conspicuously absent. Instead, military dynamics served as shields of power and weapons of control to those servicemen atop the pyramid. Therefore, unlike civilians who could eventually be called to account for behavior and misbehaviors in office, TCM ultimately discovered that any such regulatory threat did not exist. Moreover, if there was insurgency within the rank and file, the response was the immediate overthrow of power in the form of coups.

Further, due to the highly sensitive nature of the military as it relates to national security, the insistence on capital punishment or imprisonment, even years after the fact, proved unlikely. The only body able to regulate the military was the military. Accordingly, a coherent method of institutional regulation did not exist. Furthermore, with every successive coup and counter-coup, TCM indeed began to understand better how to best maneuver in both military and political arenas, avoiding culpability in either. Consequently, appointments of power and leadership, political favors, and economic incentives were used as inducements to repress any form of would-be dissent.

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329 James Ezike, My Thoughts on Nigeria (Lagos, Nigeria, 2017) v.
In the years following the Gowon regime of the early 1970s, and certainly by the end of the Abacha presidency in 1998, the entrenchment of the military in politics was absolute. At the turn of the twenty-first century, after a thirty-year carousel of military heads of state, Nigeria was to pivot away from the military and embrace civilian rule. However, the influence of the military in Nigerian politics proved far more institutionally embedded than was ever presumed. Former military Generals entered democratic politics and continued to occupy the highest political position of power in government. Imagine a country that identifies as democratic and models its governance after a US legislature, complete with elected representation. Nevertheless, former military heads of state rule and administer control through a historical network of institutional power and political influence; this might be the very definition of incoherence. As noted by General Bamaiyi when discussing what was to be the final military hand over at the turn of the century,

“When General Abbubakar took over in 1999 he and I had a discussion about the military and how Nigerians hated it. We agreed to make a clean break by ensuring the next president would be someone without a military background. I didn’t see the difference between present military rule and the coming of another military man. As it turned out there was no change in Nigeria’s government under Obasanjo because he had a large number of retired military personnel in his cabinet. It was a military government designed to do nothing but take orders from the Commander in Chief.” 330

Nigeria’s institutional incoherence is a clear result of the linkages between the military and politics and is a phenomenon similarly identified historically in other regions. Latin America offers many such examples of military officers holding public political positions of power and leadership: Medici in Brazil, Pinochet in Chile, and Noriega in Panama, for example. Several

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330 Bamaiyi, Vindication of A General, 125.
studies additionally reveal that politicized military dynamics can often result in corruption. For instance,

“Greater military participation in politics can undermine transparency in the awarding of military contracts, thus increasing rent-generating potential of such disbursements. Further, greater military role in politics can result in corruption in the recruitment of military personnel, postings, and in the approval of defense contractors. A politicized military can further diminish accountability that is afforded by a democracy and help foster corruption. There is a positive conclusive link between military in politics and corruption in the economy.”

The prevalence of military and politics is not a phenomenon new or distinct to Nigeria. It is evident from the history of ancient and modern state systems that the military plays a crucial role in the organization of the state. Recall the association of war-making and state-making argued by Tilly. Additionally, the typical role of the military in modern democratic governments is to protect the state from internal and external aggression. However, what is distinct in the Nigerian case, is the role of the military was extended from protection, to include politics, policy, and profit-making. When one public agent occupies all of these roles, what becomes of the state? In Nigeria, the result has been the militarization of politics and the subsequent institutional incoherence. The ensuing consequence, therefore, was the improper and insufficient mediation and management of external capital flows. Absent full federal institutional capacity with clearly defined coherent lines of demarcation regarding function and fiat, TCM was able to ascend in Nigeria and occupy a position of absolute control that resulted in increased abuses of capital, power, and systematic corruption.

3) Institutional Political Materialism

The third critical internal variable is the evolution of institutional political materialism in Nigeria. Although resources and capital are typical requisites for securing power and maneuvering position in a political arena, in Nigeria, capital promoted abusive materialism that eventually extended beyond the logic of political goal attainment and transformed into a logic of wealth procurement and social superiority. Indeed, Nigeria’s political institution was never fully fortified, and further, possessed many abusive and corrupt practices surrounding capital exchange. Without the proper institutional composition, development, or coherence, Nigeria exhibited a significant inability to mediate the relationship between public positions, public resources, and capital flows. Consequently, Nigeria’s political military agents evolved into capitalists as the position of power they occupied became primarily defined by the flow and exchange of transnational capital and the management of external capitalist interests. The rise of TCM, therefore, was predicated by a particular kind of materialism that defined Nigeria’s political institution. The State was subsequently regarded as a vehicle for capital accumulation, allocation, and abuse, by the interposition of external capital variables.

The first two internal institutional conditions discussed the military’s integration into politics. However, the linkage of TCM fully congeals only when the element of capital is added to the equation. David Enweremadu’s discussion of “straddling” begins to allude to the capital composition of TCM, as he explains the institutional intersection of economics and politics. Enweremadu observes this phenomenon in Nigeria, where businessmen are consistently and simultaneously politicians who, “Exacerbate the confusions between public and private spheres, arising from the necessity for political elites to redistribute part of the resources stolen to
maintain their political clientele.” In building upon this premise that business people and politicians are the same in Nigeria. It follows, if politicians (P) and military officers (M) are the same, then businessmen (B) and military officers (either active or retired) are equally the same as well. Alternatively, if M are P, and if P are B, then M are P are B. Put more simply by an officer during an interview, “Many of us enter military to then join politics because if your in service of country it is a natural line to cross. Then dont forget the business side. As a military man you can use any resource you want to take action to package yourself in business and improve your pocket”

Such a level of capital awareness results is a dangerous combination of business elite, political elite, and military power existing in one singular form in Nigeria. The overlap of military, politics, and economics is significant as “Military elites unabashedly looted state property, diverted state funds into their private accounts, and awarded questionable contracts to companies owned by them and their cronies. Accumulating wealth was all that mattered, and no effort or means was spared in pursuance of that ignoble goal.” Enweremadu continues,

“The notion of public office as an opportunity to “chop” is also generalized and is now a stable pattern of behavior which govern the actions of individuals at all levels in the Nigerian society, [they] all see their various positions as an opportunity to “chop” and if possible, to give other members of their reference group (family, clan, ethnic group, party etc.) means to “chop” also.”

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333 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Lance Corporal, Years of Service - 16


335 Ibid. p57
One interview with a military officer directly underscores Enweremadu’s claims as the respondent revealed the utility of the military institution alongside public office, “They say soldier come soldier go, barrack remain. But there’s no secret that while soldier dey, soldier go chop! Sometime he chop small other time if he dey for top, but soldier, he never go chop finish.” Another officer further expressed the long lasting capital penchant of soldiers.

“An aspect of military officers, when they see there is nothing to do after retirement, after they have already chopped money, they still need to feel big. So many increase the looting before they even leave their position so that can live like big man. The money is used as influence and that is why the same people are still in power until tomorrow. Even after they retire from military, they can still go back to loot more. This is the new attitude of officers. To loot! Most soldiers are not here to do soldiering work, they are here for wealth and money, and that is all.”

Capital practices become particularly precarious when traditional networks for rent-seeking, clientelism, and allocation are unified in a triad, and a unitary state actor of these three spaces promotes a singular interest. The claim, therefore, is Nigeria’s military politician is also a businessman in control of capital. As a result, a comprehensive ruler evolved in Nigeria in what I have labeled the Capitalist Militician. The following, however, will further detail how various factors contribute to the creation of TCM and animate the rise of corruption from both internal institutional materialist and external capitalist levels.

Nigeria’s institutional materialism began with internal capital serving as a means to secure power. During Nigeria’s military transitions, basic capital accumulation was a political prerequisite of power and manifested itself in several forms. For example, as early as the post-

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336 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Private , Years of Service - 2
337 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - General (Retired) , Years of Service - 35+
338 Basic accumulation refers to the flow and exchange of internal capital towards power preservation logic as is typically seen across Africa and other developing regions where the military ascends to political leadership.
independence era of mass pluralism, political parties and coalitions emerged in Nigeria with the capital backing of business elites. After the civil war, the constitutional provisions governing the formation and registration of political parties and election to public offices on their platforms were restrictive. Attainment of public office was improbable without a substantial financial pledge, which was often several times larger than the total legitimate remuneration a successful candidate could reasonably expect to earn in his or her four-year tenure in office. That is, the capital requirements to attain office exponentially exceeded the financial reimbursement of that position. As a result, public figures who attained office through such financial backing were now compelled to recompense, in some form or fashion, the capital contributions that placed them in power.

Clientelism, therefore, existed pre-civil war in the infant stages of Nigeria’s political independence. However, the exact dynamic was replicated and intensified with the military’s foray into Nigerian politics due to the undefined nature of the military’s role and position in the political arena. As most members of the Nigerian political elite were also military elites, capital accumulation became a matter of urgent necessity for them to gain power or retain power rapidly. With every coup, attempted coup, and counter-coup, the resource race towards securing power increased. Further, these waves of contestation did not occur at regular cyclical intervals, as seen in typical political systems. For example, a standard political cycle ordinarily covers four to six year terms and identifies specific plotted points of campaigning and financing towards an election. But the military’s conception of politics and political transitions was vastly different in the Nigerian model; it was accelerated. So as capital became a weapon of political warfare, the nexus of power ebbed and flowed quite frequently, and often on a whim, as the multiple political
power plays were all enforced and reinforced by securing capital as a resource. Consequently, the accumulation of capital occurred continuously, without reason or respite, towards the constant contestation of power and political position in a reinforcing way. Capital became the means by which to secure power and power the means by which to secure more capital/self-enrichment.

It is imperative to remember, while such flows of capital were in part, internally motivated, the activation of TCM only occurs in the context of the incentives and constraints external capital variables placed upon Nigeria’s political institution. To clarify, in post-civil war Nigeria, the remnants of battle and crimes of warfare set the stage for political abuses of power and capital exchange. According to General Bamaiyi, “The long stay of the military in power eroded the professionalism of the military and made the pursuit of power, influence, and wealth the primary goal of many officers.” For example, specific acts of corruption at this time included, the misappropriation of salaries and allowances of soldiers killed in action, the extreme inflation of military procurement contracts, the continued payment and repayment of inflated contract fees, the misallocation of military funds for phantom provisions, the looting of public and private properties in occupied territories, and the looting of millions of pounds from financial institutions to fund war efforts. The chart below speaks to the role of internal capital and the institutional materialism it created.

This chart illustrates the drastic increases in military spending beginning in 1970 that coincides with the ascent of TCM in Nigeria. As capital accumulative logics emerged, so to did the amount of military spending. As amounts decreased, starting in 1980, capital accumulation methods shifted as more sophisticated institutional methods of accumulation arose.

339 Bamaiyi, Vindication of A General, 11.

340 Hoover Archives, Nigeria Subject Collection. Herskovitz Library, Military Misallocation.


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Institutional materialism is yet another consequence of the military politics nexus observed in post-war Nigeria. There are five specific reasons the military was unable to manage Nigeria’s internal capital flows; size, scope, sophistication, succession, and superiority. 1) The sheer size of the federal pie was unfathomable to contain, especially in relation to any appropriation budget allocated to the military prewar. 2) The scope of financial authority was also far too immense to properly absorb and direct. 3) The required fiscal sophistication was absent in Nigeria; instead military leaders inexperienced management of capital increased the likelihood and ease of capital abuse. 4) Capital was the primary tool to protect or promote power successions of oneself, and one's aligned interests. 5) Finally, and most importantly, due to their administrative and bureaucratic roles in government, military agents became inserted into civil society as they closely intermingled with the public at large. This civil interaction ultimately ignited another layer of capital accumulation that had more to do with purely capitalist motives of profit, surplus, and social superiority than it did political power preservation or institutional leveraging.

In thinking about the size, scope, sophistication, succession, and superiority of TCM’s absorption of state capital and fiscal oversight, one early example typifies the evolution of the kind of power abuses described above. Obasanjo's regime deliberately used the knowledge gained in prosecuting corruption to duplicate the same methods, including forms of budgetary bending and misappropriation. Ironically, the Obasanjo regime was initially acknowledged as
crusaders against fiscal irresponsibility. In the first instance, Obasanjo waged a very noisy war against corruption and lack of fiscal discipline. Specifically, Obasanjo launched a collection of asset probes of top public officers at the federal and state levels, which revealed many scandalous cases of fraudulent and unlawful enrichment on the part of many high-ranking military officials. Obasanjo further called for the dismissal from office of ten out of twelve state governors, many federal and state public corporations, and hundreds of lesser functionaries. These probes, and the subsequent dismissals, however, ultimately served as heuristic tools of learning for Obasanjo’s regime. In identifying the means and manner in which former officers were in abuse of their position, Obasanjo decoded the rules guiding the rigging of the system.

Consequently, he and his military leaders were able to methodically and deliberately manipulate said system towards personal gain. Moreover, in doing so, they were able to leverage the size, manage the scope, advance the sophistication, promote the succession of power, and ascend in social superiority, all through capital abuse and corruption. The accumulative capital component fostered a foundation of institutional materialism that placed military politicians closely adjacent to capital. Once the exogenous demands of transnational capital flows were introduced to the equation, the institutionalization of corruption via the emergence of TCM followed.

4) Institutional Capital Consciousness.

The final internal condition closely correlates with the last. As military officers blended into politics and assumed the demands of public leadership, they produced a level of institutional materialism that eventually transformed into the establishment of an institutional capitalist consciousness that grew amongst the masses. TCM’s relationship with external capitalist
interests had a damaging effect on the broader social system in Nigeria. As external capital flows entered the country, there was a significant joint public-private awareness, and consciousness surrounding the role capital began to play politically, economically, and socially.

The military politics nexus meant that officers were professionally and socially integrated into broader public circles. These professional civilian communities observed then mimicked the abusive behavior of TCM. Research in this study has identified a significant link between TCM’s acts of corruption concerning capital exchange, and the broader public’s impression of similar modes of behavior, whereby the former was a direct influence upon the latter. The institutional capitalist consciousness TCM personified additionally led to a hero effect, whereby the public regarded the figure's accumulative action as both representational and aspirational. In many ways, the external vertical power relationship that redefined capital for TCM was reproduced internally. The Nigerian public received cues on the nature, form, and accumulation of capital from the top down. Capital was seen as an object of accumulation and an instrument of power, so the message for Nigerians was exceedingly apparent. The state was the primary venue for capital attainment. Thus, political materialism in Nigeria’s political institution morphed into a sort of imbued consciousness to the public, whose relationship to capital accumulation was redefined as capital was publicly perceived through the eyes of TCM. The degree of institutional capital consciousness is most apparent following the military political transitions through the end of the twentieth century.

342 See Chapter 5 where data will be presented to directly illustrate this effect.

343 See Ake, Democracy and Development. Ake similarly discusses material culture, or an increased materialism in underdeveloped countries as a consequence of globalization.
The diffusion began during the short 20-month regime of Buhari during the early 1980s. Buhari launched a targeted anti-corruption campaign, complete with wholesale austerity guidelines across the federation. However, a strong contingent of military leaders had become accustomed to the capital-rich environment they helped create. Consequently, the military leadership revolted and overthrew Buhari. After this power transition, Babangida and his new cabal began the socialization of corruption and the diffusion of TCM’s capital consciousness from politics (military) to the people.

The main distinguishing feature of corruption in the new Babangida regime was the pervasive culture of impunity. Many of his acolytes, however high or low in public state positions, could loot the treasury without sanction, provided they remained loyal and committed to their leader. Essentially Babangida introduced a “Settlement Strategy”; a model guided by the belief and presupposition that if enough Nigerians became corrupted, there should be nobody to speak out on the issue of corruption or create large scale public dissent. To some extent, the strategy was successful as many civilians from all walks of life scrambled to jump on the Babangida regime’s corruption gravy train. By emphasizing capital accumulation and directly controlling capital allocation, Babangida transformed corruption into a blunt force instrument of state and social policy.

Moreover, in doing so, Babangida created a mindset of corruption that became permanent in Nigeria. Attorney James Ezike reinforces the environment that began to grow during this period stating,

“We do not have a federation, what we have is a unitary system of government and allocation of revenue which the federal government [military] takes most of. That is why Abuja has grown five times faster than Washington DC did for over two hundred years. Because that is
the headquarters for corruption. There is so much money from the hand of the federal
government and that is why people are fighting to be in power.” 344

Similarly, former Congressman Onyeagucha plainly expressed, “The allocative function
of the government is frightening. The president controls 52% of Nigerian revenue while states
share the other 48%. Every head of state is a billionaire and many more ranked soldiers are
millionaires.” 345

After Babangida came General Sani Abacha, whose brand of corruption and manner of
capital accumulation was far more internally focused than any of his predecessors. During
Abacha’s regime, the state served as a family operated company where all members received
shares. Instead of a come one come all capital explosion, Abacha perpetuated corruption as an
incubated life source. The state apparatus was relegated into the background as critical ministries
were operated under the nose and with the extended hand of Abacha himself. Ministers were
utterly powerless as Abacha dissolved political parties and essentially sacked and renamed local
and federal government bodies. In short, General Abacha, who was a product of corruption from
the previous military regimes, continued the same line of abuse and perpetrated himself in the
most absolute form of power the presidency in Nigeria had ever seen.

Further, Abacha’s rampant corruption among the military ruling class cabal has, over
time, reinforced the consciousness implanted by Babangida and taught the public a dangerously
descriptive lesson; being honest and law-abiding does not pay. Consequently, ordinary people
have learned lessons from the top military rulers. They have then tried to replicate the corrupt
practices of those leaders, but at comparatively low levels of government and moments of social

344 Ezike, My Thoughts on Nigeria, 41.
345 Uche Onyeagucha, Nigeria Congressman, Political Economy Symposium
exchange, whereby petty acts of bribery, speculation, or embezzlement are normalized as status quo. It is in this sense that corruption as a way of life of TCM became the way of life for Nigerians. One soldier commented during an elite interview,

“Anyone going into politics today is going to enrich their pocket, including former soldiers. But everyone in politics now thinks they can behave like a soldier, they think they can loot. They say there is structure in democracy, but then why is there more corruption now? They wish to rule like us and loot like us.”

The polity thus learned from politics. Diversion of resources, abuses of power, and other forms of capital accumulation resonated across Nigeria’s social systems. This is an unmistakable example of corruption’s proliferation and the establishment of an institutional capital consciousness. Further, Congressman Onyeagucha argues of this corrupt social mindfulness that has been installed in Nigeria,

“Anyone in Nigeria that finds himself in a position of power is automatically looked upon as elite. So then the elite are the problem, but not in the human sense. There are no elite people just elite positions and the accumulation mindset attached to those positions that follows and has infected the Nigerian public. So Nigeria cannot have leaders, we instead have positions of power that are occupied abused, absconded and appropriated.”

TCM is the manifestation of elite positions of power. Overall, the structural logic of the monopoly of military, political, and economic power in Nigeria by the uniformed power elite, designed, controlled, and operated institutions to function primarily in the interest of members of this ruling class. Moreover, as this ruling class became increasingly visible, so too did the means through which they secured their position. As a result, social expectations became adjusted to not

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346 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Colonel (Retired), Years of Service - 35+

347 See Uche Onyeagucha, Nigeria Congressman, Political Economy Symposium. The elite positions described directly reflect the same positional power structure of TCM, as the figure exists across and throughout government.
only accept such acts of corruption, but to welcome, and in some cases, admire and applaud them.

As TCM began to penetrate the economy and society of Nigeria, so too did their capital consciousness. If capitalist processes of production, accumulation, and consumption all manifest corruption of the state, the same psychology lead to behaviorism of corruption and abuse that was exported to the public on a large scale. Corruption, therefore, travels throughout all economic sectors, around all professional industries, and within all stratifications of society.

One soldier alludes to this dynamic directly explaining,

“As a soldier, going into business makes things easy. A soldier is engaged in all jobs, even those we are not supposed to do. A soldier can have his hand in all things, even local trading or local business. Society feels military men are very disciplined so it helps us have that power. They [the public] see the uniform and they cannot dupe you, they must respect the uniform. And that respect will give access to secure your business. But some say that since soldier is corrupt they too try to behave so. But you cannot out soldier the soldier. We are trained, we know how to very deceitful, after all, we are soldiers.”

In this sense, TCM is more than just a figure or a ruler. TCM, to a degree, informs public psychological and behavioral characteristics and influences social action and interactions in Nigeria. Therefore, while TCM is the military head of state and political actor in a specific sense, i.e. Generals Babangida, Obasanjo, Buhari etc. TCM also indirectly informs a social consciousness that reproduces corrupt behavior on a local level in state politicians, judges, police officers, entrepreneurs, school teachers, priests, bankers, and bakers.

The behavioral influence begins with the figure, and then expands beyond as a consciousness that permeates and promotes a particular capital mindset throughout society. TCM in Nigeria is indeed a real and material actor but is additionally an entire ecosystem of power,

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348 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Warrant Officer, Years of Service - 33
manifested in the social consciousness, exported from public office and politics, and transferred to the mindset and societal perspective of the masses. Institutional capitalist consciousness in the form of abusive power and corrupt behavior were exported from TCM and the state to the public. During another elite interview, an officer commented on this diffusion of corrupt consciousness within the context of Nigeria’s oil economy, noting, “Oil was king and the money was too much. Nigeria was like Christmas for other African countries. And after so many years oil is still number one. All you hear is oil and gas, oil and gas. Every Nigerian seeks that reward. Mark it down! Everybody wants a piece of the cake. So now there is Democracy they feel as though they can have it.” The response confirms where corrupt practice persist and continue in Nigeria after military rule, and in some instances exist in far more extreme patterns. Corrupt public behavior was learned and inherited from society’s experience with TCM and the figure’s multiple formations and re-formations.

In order to better contextualize the impactful consequence of the above-mentioned internal analysis, the next section focuses on particular instances of capital exchange from external capital flows and foreign direct investments surrounding TCM’s corrupt actions and abuses of power. Specifically, I examine the role of capital both in the context of economic development projects and relating to the administration of Nigeria’s oil economy.

**TCM, FOREIGN CAPITAL, AND NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

Capital exchange is clearly of significant importance to the rise of TCM. However, it is equally critical to comprehend where this capital and the impulse to attain it originated. Although the actions of TCM were internally developed and adapted over time, as seen with the

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349 Elite Interview, Nigerian Army Officer, 2016. Rank - Colonel (Retired), Years of Service - 35+
establishment of institutional materialism and institutional capital consciousness as previously
discussed, the motivating feature and instigating element of TCM’s rise, point distinctly to
external capital considerations on two fronts. First, the requirements of capital accumulation
driven by Western development mandates provided the backdrop against which local institutions
were instructed to adapt, develop, and integrate. How global instructions were manifest on the
state level is of vital importance to understand the role of TCM and the figure’s link to
corruption. Second, the material interests of the time were further maximized and intensified
with the petroleum boom of the 1970s and, with it, the resource economics that followed in
Nigeria. Namely, during the period when petroleum production multiplied, and capital
accumulation skyrocketed. In exploring these external factors, the motivating influence of global
capitalist interests on the making of Nigeria’s Capital Militician as a byproduct of global capital
accumulation becomes more evident.

Development projects and sector-specific growth programs inspired by international calls
for industrialization and modernization were always doomed to fail in Nigeria. A complete lack
of budgetary discipline and financial accountability are important characteristics of TCM that
notably appeared, first in the Gowon regime of the early 1970s, and later in all subsequent
military regimes to follow. For instance, there was no year in Gowon’s nine-year rule when the
Ministry of Defense did not overshoot its approved estimates of expenditure by several million
pounds sterling or Naira. Nor was there a year without defense going through the inconvenient
process of passing through the executive council or supreme military council, a supplementary
appropriation decree. The Ministry of Defense, with the convenience, if not the active
encouragement of the military government, also consistently ignored the Auditor-General’s
queries concerning vast unauthorized and illegal expenditures every year. What began perhaps as administrative oversights, negligence, recklessness, and ineptitude, soon morphed into purposeful acts of fiscal misuse of power and deliberate corruption.

Budgetary abuses in Nigeria worsened over time, across all public and civil sectors. However, there are a few areas of extreme misappropriation to note. The power sector in Nigeria, for instance, is directly linked to acts of corruption. Not only because of the seemingly overwhelming evidence of repeated institutional improprieties over time; but more-so, because electricity is the most versatile and widely used form of energy in Nigeria. According to a study on Nigeria’s Electricity Sector Corruption,

“Only 12.5% of the population of 170 million people have access to distributed electricity; despite the allocation of nearly $20 billion of investment in the last two decades. Specifically, Obasanjo’s administration spent $10 billion on Nigeria’s National Integrated Power Project with zero results to show in terms of power generation.”

Other available estimates reveal that more than one-tenth of Nigerian households and companies engage in consistent bribery and payoffs for their electricity services.”

In a separate study conducted by Nigeria’s SocioEconomic Rights and Accountability Project, other instances of misappropriation were examined. For example, in 2003, the Federal Government budgeted a whopping $16 billion for proposed energy reforms by then Minister of Power Liyel Imoke. The funds went largely unaccounted for as the proposed reforms were never implemented. Imoke is alleged to have personally collected nearly $8 million solely for the signing of energy contracts, most of which were never launched, let alone completed. There is further, another $540 million missing from $1.675 billion of signature bonuses and advance

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351 SERAP Nigeria Study, “From Darkness to Darkness: How Nigerians are Paying the Price for Corruption in the Electricity Sector” (Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 2017)
payments to develop projects under the Ministry of Power. Finally, scholars estimate 3.1 million barrels of oil missing from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) declarations about its joint ventures, compared with the figures released by NNPC’s international partners. Thus, there is not only money and capital unaccounted for, but in some instances, the resource itself is absconded and leveraged towards TCM’s financial gain.

Nigeria’s public sector fiscal abuses go back several decades. Although the figures in the examples above speak to more contemporary misuse of power and position in the energy sector, the underlying acts have been consistent over time and across the public landscape. These acts were perpetrated by Nigeria’s military government and TCM agents that once directly oversaw the management of public projects. Chart 2 below, offers detailed examples of unfinished, abandoned projects and provides empirical evidence of not only acts of budgetary abuse in Nigeria but further illustrates that Nigeria lacked the institutional ability and efficiency to manage state-led development programs properly.

**CHART 2: Public Sector Development Projects during the 1980s and 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Year of Approval</th>
<th>Amount in Millions</th>
<th>Percentage of Disbursement</th>
<th>Completion Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAMBRA/Enugu Rural Infrastructure Project</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$122.55</td>
<td>63.70</td>
<td>Inadequate counterpart funding unsatisfactory performance local contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo/Delta water supply project</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$188.11</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>75% complete loan exhaust with cost over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan water supply project</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$39</td>
<td>75.96</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry development project Ondo/Ogun</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$104</td>
<td>38.12</td>
<td>Inadequate local counterpart contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Agricultural ^ Co0operative Bank NACB institutional strengthening project</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$69.15</td>
<td>66.81</td>
<td>Poor management/irregular audit reports and quarterly progress reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savanna sugar Rehabilitation</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$68.7</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>Not Initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Year of Approval</td>
<td>Amount in Millions</td>
<td>Percentage of Disbursement</td>
<td>Completion Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia Valley irrigation</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$55.26</td>
<td>Notice of Cancellation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Resources Study</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$40.8</td>
<td>26.84</td>
<td>Default in Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacita Sugar Expansion</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$101.22</td>
<td>78.51</td>
<td>On Going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau State Water supply</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>49.87</td>
<td>Not Initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi State Health</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$33.855</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85% completed loan exhausted with cost overruns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi township water supply</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$67.425</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Completed Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara /Kogi/Niger Health project</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$19.62</td>
<td>65.34</td>
<td>Inadequate counterpart funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-State health service rehabilitation Kebbi/Ondo/Ogun</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$82.89</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>Inadequate counterpart funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River State Rice</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$2.07</td>
<td>72.46</td>
<td>Loan cancelled notice given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line of credit to Nigeria Industrial Development Bank</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$120</td>
<td>84.91</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Basin Irrigation Planning Study</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$5.52</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Loan cancelled October 1996 being inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal vaccine and drug production</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$0.78</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Loan cancelled October 1996 being inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan- Ilorin High way</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$1.17</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Unsigned canceled in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Exports Support</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$2.25</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Loan cancelled in may 1996 government request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Note and Security paper</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$85.59</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Unsigned cancelled in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe Water Supply</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$76.65</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Unsigned loan cancelled in May 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Newswatch, October 19, 1991

Overall, of the 22 projects covered by this chart, only one was completed. All the others are marred by one irregularity or the other, with several projects receiving allocations without commencement, completion, or worse - certain projects were potentially partially funded after cancellation! Suffice to conclude that such projects will never be completed. Several will likely
be renamed and relaunched under new project titles and adjusted terms, with similar empty outcomes and incomplete results.\textsuperscript{352}

The energy sector has a sordid history of corporate fraud and financial malfeasance as the total estimated financial loss to Nigeria from corruption in this sector, starting from the oil boom to date, is over N20trillion.\textsuperscript{353} According to Rao, specific acts of corruption in this sector include theft, false accounting, fraud, bribery, misappropriation of funds, soliciting of inducements, deception, collusion, and taking advantage of deficiencies in the regulatory regime.\textsuperscript{354} Corruption in the energy sector ranges from petty abuse at the level of meter reading/readers, to grand larceny by the executives who award lucrative contracts and concessions in purchase agreements. Thus, the inherent danger, combined with the overly centralized and loosely regulated framework, creates an environment ripe for corruption to thrive.\textsuperscript{355}

This brief sectoral overview of TCM’s entry into Nigeria’s political economy from a fiscal and capital standpoint represents the dynamics of misappropriation and budgetary abuses that have occurred in public sectors. It is important to note that the military functioned, for much of the prewar period, with its internal financial structures, rules, processes, and guidelines. However, in ascending to the federal public level, the pre-existing institutional inefficiencies resulted in large-scale abuses of power and fiscal irresponsibility.


\textsuperscript{353} BEDC Corruption Electricity Index


\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.
Overall the global economic policy mandate put forth to advance a capitalist world economy that called for developing states in Africa, such as Nigeria, to accept and promote a particular economic ideology and development policy is evident. As a byproduct of such expectations and executions, Nigeria then required a specific designation, orientation, and operation of its national institutional power structure in a manner that would most expeditiously accelerate the implementation of these development policies. These policies lent themselves to industrialization projects that were administered and managed by TCM. As the new custodian of development and development capital, TCM inserted itself into not only politics but also economic policy-making and managing. Nigeria was implored to ascend and develop. This process thus required state-specific policy and resulted in the empowerment of Nigeria’s political leadership (military) to turn the country’s policy dial to and fro. Because institutional mechanisms to manage development economics were undefined, political agents of power in Nigeria were left to mediate external capitalist interests. TCM was, therefore, directly inserted into the economic terrains of accumulation, circulation, production, and industrialization. TCM then developed a highly capitalist disposition and began to use the institutional system and platform of power for their self-enrichment.

From a policy standpoint, Nigeria was explicitly urged to disrupt their natural production processes of agriculture to redirect and reallocate resources towards industrial pursuits. Again, post-independence, such industries were either under-developed or non-existent in Nigeria. Thus, the reallocation of resources, to this end, resulted in a wave of unintended capital redistribution, as would-be receiving industries had no formal means for resource retention. Chart 3 below presents Nigeria’s reallocation model more specifically.
The chart further illuminates the changing sectoral structure of GDP in the Nigerian economy based largely on the aforementioned policy directives and economic development initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s that shifted resources and production away from agriculture towards more industrial economic pursuits.

CHART 3 SECTORAL GDP STRUCTURE 1960 - 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy (Oil)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>47.52</td>
<td>36.26</td>
<td>34.58</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>37.22</td>
<td>38.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building &amp; Construction</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade &amp; Finance</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>12.78</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>13.91</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The confluence of these factors set the stage for a series of economic consequences, including exorbitant capital flows and capital flight, which, when combined with the internal militarization of politics, caused the rise of TCM. The complete picture of external capital inputs that activated TCM crystalizes once the global oil boom of the 1970s is also fully taken into account.

**TCM, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND NIGERIA’S OIL**

If the making of the capitalist world economy and the economic policies that promoted its mandate form the external engine that powered the rise of Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician and corruption, then the oil boom of the 1970s was quite literally, premium gasoline. The immediate post-civil war period in Nigeria coincided with the era of the petroleum boom when production grew astronomically, and the revenue from its sales grew even more drastically. Nigeria’s treasury became so inundated with petrol-dollars that president Gowon famously declared publicly that money was not Nigeria’s problem, but how to spend it. Given this apparent over-abundance of foreign injected cash and the neophyte nature of those in charge of its aggregation and allocation, it is not surprising, therefore, that there was an extreme escalation in the incidence of corruption. A closer examination of Nigeria’s oil economics will delineate a more definite link.

In the late 1950s, petroleum products were barely significant in Nigeria, totaling less than 2% of all exports. Between 1960 and 1973, oil output exploded, and by 1980 government oil-revenues accelerated from 66 million Naira in 1970 to over 10 billion in 1980.\(^{357}\) The oil boom for Nigeria began as a result of a global energy crisis caused by a Middle Eastern embargo on oil.

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\(^{357}\) UNDP Nigeria Annual Report, 2006
exports designed to punish Western support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war against Egypt. The price of crude subsequently rose from $3 per barrel to $12 per barrel in 1974. The energy and transport ramifications were enormous. In response, Britain and the rest of the western world turned to alternative oil-producing markets, Nigeria being primary amongst them. The oil price shocks of the 1970s resulted in a massive transfer of foreign wealth to Nigeria. Public expenditure increased substantially, as did the country's access to international capital markets. At this exact moment, TCM began to cement their hold on Nigerian politics as Obasanjo’s regime redefined the military’s role in government, the oil led capital infusion only accelerated their ascendency. By 1973 Nigeria had made an almost total shift away from the traded and diversified agricultural sector to the non-traded sector of petroleum. Tables 2 and 3 further represent Nigeria’s oil position during this time.358

Also important to note about the oil boom is that under existing legislation, all oil reserves were state property. Therefore, all oil multinationals were forced to form joint ventures with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in connection with oil exploration, exploitation, and production. Notably, Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Petroleum, which the head of state typically directed, often instructed the NNPC. During this historical period, TCM occupied such leadership roles. Additionally, ownership of oil resources was vested in the federal government accounts in the Central Bank of Nigeria rather than in the state or community where the resources were located. As a result, all revenue earned from oil production was pooled federally for distribution among the constituent governments based on an agreed revenue allocation formula. The chart above further illustrates the federal surpluses and account balances.

358 See Tables
in Nigeria largely, due to oil receipts. At the time, the formula followed: federal 43.0%, states 30.0%, local governments 20.0% and special fund 7.0%. Further, oil-producing states are allocated an additional 13%, which is shared based on the volume of oil produced in each state. Oil, as a resource, was essentially incubated by the state to serve its capital accumulation and allocation desires.

Additionally, as detailed previously, the vast majority of government structures and institutions were manned by newly minted political, military officers. Consequently, there was a severe lack of transparency and grave mismanagement that pervaded both state and local government institutions, allowing for extreme resource and capital abuse to persist. The joint venture model meant that the Nigerian government, more precisely TCM, maintained not only access to the petrol dollars flooding the state, but further presided over the allocation and distribution of this capital. Further, TCM often apportioned individual ownership stakes to themselves and their supporters. Such that a leading Nigerian journalist proclaimed, “Show me the list of the Nigerian oil block owners, and I will show you that ex-military officers own 80 percent.”

Based on Nigeria’s new domestic economic model, and considering the supranational pressures for Nigeria to ascend to modern development, President Mohammed spent and borrowed billions of dollars to fund grand-scale modernization projects. However, such spending and borrowing in a mono-economy proved exceedingly problematic when the oil boom took a negative turn at the end of the 1970s. When oil revenues dried up by the early 1980s, Nigeria

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359 Pinto, World Bank Economic Review
360 Ibid.
experienced rising inflation, strict rationing of foreign exchange, and the possibility of debt rescheduling. The next formal mechanism for capital accumulation then became boosting the external debt stock against production estimates in Nigeria from the 1979 level of $6.8 billion to about $15 billion.\textsuperscript{362}

By the mid-1980s, domestic inflation became so high that even basic foodstuffs proved too expensive for consumers, and Nigeria had to default on numerous debts. To create more jobs for Nigerians, the government forced out the thousands of West African workers who had immigrated to the country to take advantage of the employment in the formerly booming economy. The economic decline was so severe that by 1989, Nigeria was labeled a low-income country and qualified for World Bank assistance.\textsuperscript{363}

During the period from the oil boom to bust, while market volatility resulted in economic stagnation for the country, Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician profited immensely. The world capitalist model empowered Nigeria’s leaders by activating an unforeseen level of access to capital and by freeing them from restraints imposed under any principle of accountability. The military's political rule became the military's economic rule. Nigeria thus transformed into a corrupt kleptocracy or, “Institutionalized robbery of the state by its very custodians.”\textsuperscript{364}

While oil revenues ultimately stabilized, defense spending became the new and lucrative opportunity for capital accumulation and allocation. In this manner, military control and distribution of capital became that much more absolute, as defense spending and budgeting skyrocketed. It said that the most significant modern corruption opportunities are those exploited

\textsuperscript{362} Pinto, World Bank Economic Review
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.
by inflating procurement contract values and creating “phantom” defense contracts. In a report by Transparency International, security contracts are used as vehicles for money laundering. Such processes have been institutionalized and facilitated via weak or corrupt Nigerian banks, with illicit financial flows hidden in property in the UK, United States, South Africa, and Dubai.\(^{365}\)

Increased levels in Defense spending signifies not only the institutional expansion of capital exchange and corrupt practices committed by TCM but also represents a decidedly contemporary activation of power by the actor. In installing a renewed mode of accumulation, TCM instigated further issues of capital flight, currency devaluation, and dollarization of the local economy, which bear its own grave negatively impactful economic consequences. Transnational satellites of capital produced an external economic power dynamic that actuated the competence, capacity, and capabilities of TCM. The figure was now configured to abuse internal political power and leverage positions of influence for personal gain through the institutionalization of corrupt acts of capital exchange and allocation.

**CONCLUSION**

The four endogenous conditions discussed in this chapter exist and function in conjunction with the four exogenous variables examined in chapter three. Together they explain how external capitalist interests transformed Nigeria’s political actor. As this actor’s position and power became reordered in Nigeria’s political and economic institutions, TCM was constructed. TCM’s subsequent accumulative actions formed and facilitated new methods of corruption.

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Specifically, TCM established more modern means of capital exchange and capital transfer within the public-private dialectic.

My contention is not that Nigeria’s institutions were devoid of capital and absent expressions of corruption and capital exchange by 1970. Quite the contrary, there are several examples of capital accumulation that support institutional materialism in Nigeria. In the greater context of TCM, capital has taken several forms and has been activated in various ways throughout Nigeria’s political economy of development. Whether as a variable that orders internal political power, or as an external ideology or development policy, external capital has truly animated the action, activity, and ascent of TCM in Nigeria. I have argued the making of this figure and its contributions to resource abuse and corruption are contingent on its unique relationship to capital, both internally and externally. Through this process, the accumulative logic of Nigeria’s political agents became transformed through the mediation of external capitalist variables against internal institutional conditions.

Furthermore, with respect to the internal institutional conditions presented, TCM identification is not a function of detecting a particular combination of internal characteristics or shared identifiers across regions. Comparable variables like regime type, government leadership, an abundance of natural resources, geographic positioning, amount of foreign direct investment, or otherwise, are not unique noteworthy elements that designate TCM. Only by investigating how external economic factors influence internal political institutions in a particular development context, specifically, the relationship of foreign capital interest to domestic political power can one comprehend the making of TCM, and discover the pathway for corruption’s rise.
TCM is unique to Nigeria because of the specific manner in which transnational capital collided with, converged upon, constrained, and configured political institutions. This exact formation is exclusive to Nigeria. That is not to say that comparable cases with a similar dialectic of capital and corruption cannot exist. Nevertheless, where such examples may be identified, TCM can best serve as a conceptual tool to link the observed actors with specific conditions that brought about their existence, of which they are the direct composites.

Chapters 3 and 4 analyze exogenous and endogenous variables together, however this analysis is not to be interpreted in a strictly sequential manner. That is, the internal and external mechanisms outlined in this chapter, and the previous chapter are not necessarily successional only. Instead, they are mutually constitutive, whereby the development of one reinforces the other in significant ways. Hence, the exploration of particular mechanisms like the military politics nexus, or the absence of war, does not most readily uncover significant links to corruption. Rather, the key to this study’s corruption analysis is comprehending how exogenous variables interact, produce, and order endogenous variables, and vice versa. The co-evolutionary framework employed in this study presents mechanisms that are mutually constitutive and combinational. Each variable depicts a specific external or internal element of TCM’s construction of power, position, and behavior. Together, the variables are synthesized and clarify the progression of corruption in Nigeria. The focus, however, is not only on the actions or the behaviors of TCM. Rather, the focus primarily lies with comprehending the interactions of those external factors that produce the actor, the power formation of the position, and the internal reordering of the institutions.
### TABLE 1
**NIGERIA’S LEADERS 1970 - 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Political Transition</th>
<th>Name of Individual</th>
<th>Political Description</th>
<th>Capitalist Militician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yakuba Gowon</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Murataala Mohammed</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Olusogun Obasanjo</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State - First Rule</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Shehu Shagari</td>
<td>Lifelong Politician, served as Federal Minister and High Commissioner seven times - all under Military rulers.</td>
<td>Yes <em>(while not in the military, is of military)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Muhammed Buhari</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State - First Rule</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ibrahim Babangida</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ernest Shonekan</td>
<td>Civilian President, lasted less than 90 days.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Sani Abacha</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Abdulsalami Abubakar</td>
<td>General, Military Head of State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DEMOCRATIC RULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Political Transition</th>
<th>Name of Individual</th>
<th>Political Description</th>
<th>Capitalist Militician</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Olusogun Obasanjo</td>
<td>Retired General, Former Military Head of State, President</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Umaru Musa Yar’Adua</td>
<td>Former Governor and Politician during 2nd Republic, Younger brother of Shehu Yar’Adua - Army Major General and Chief of Staff under Obasanjo’s 1976 military government.</td>
<td>Yes <em>(while not in the military, is of military)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Goodluck Jonathan</td>
<td>Deputy Governor, entered politics in 1999, Assumed Puppet President of Obasanjo</td>
<td>Yes <em>(while not in the military, is of military)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Muhammedu Buhari</td>
<td>Retired General, Former Military Head of State, President</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table illustrates Nigeria’s Oil shift in production and exports as a percentage of the country’s GDP from 1970 through 1984.\textsuperscript{366}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Nigeria Shift in Oil Production as GDP 1970 - 1984}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Oil Production as Percentage of GDP & Oil Exports as Percentage of Total Exports & Current Account Balance as Percentage of GDP \\
\hline
1970 & 8.1 & 57.5 & -3.8 \\
1971 & 11.1 & 74.5 & -3.3 \\
1972 & 13.4 & 81.9 & -2.4 \\
1973 & 16.6 & 85.0 & -0.1 \\
1974 & 31.9 & 92.9 & 16.9 \\
1975 & 20.4 & 93.2 & 0.1 \\
1976 & 22.9 & 93.3 & -0.8 \\
1977 & 22.6 & 93.4 & -2.1 \\
1978 & 22.6 & 90.5 & -7.2 \\
1979 & 26.3 & 93.4 & 2.5 \\
1980 & 19.4 & 96.1 & 5.8 \\
1981 & 22.2 & 96.9 & -6.7 \\
1982 & 19.1 & 98.6 & -8.6 \\
1983 & 15.2 & 96.3 & -5.0 \\
1984 & 12.9 & 96.3 & 0.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

### Table 3
**Nigeria Shift in Oil Production as Account Balances 1970 - 1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government Surplus / Deficit (million naira)</th>
<th>Government Surplus/Deficit as Percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Oil Receipts as percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Current Account Balance as Percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Changes in Public External Debt as Percentage of GDP</th>
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<td>-1.6</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>-3.54</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.64</td>
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The table further illustrates the extreme capital flows that resulted from increased oil production in Nigeria between 1970 and 1984. During years of heightened production there is an observable proportional increase in government surplus and in oil as a percentage of Nigeria’s GDP.367

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CHAPTER 5
CORRUPTION AND THE CO-EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY OF TCM
THROUGH MILITARY AND NON MILITARY VOICES

The role of the military has been erroneously extended where it has become exceedingly
difficult to divorce the military from politics and power. My own experience in the military, which
I have recounted in some detail, leads me to the conclusion that everything must be done to keep
the military completely out of politics and out of power. 368

- Ishaya Bamaiyi
Lieutenant General (Retired), Nigerian Army and Former Chief of Army Staff

No military person retired or serving should be involved and considered for the forthcoming
leadership of this country. 369

- Yakuba Gowon
General (Retired), Nigerian Army and Former Head of State

INTRODUCTION

To understand the story of corruption in Nigeria, one must understand the ascent,
persistence, and abolition of military rule. As seen in the above quotes, in their own words, the
military’s insertion into politics kindled a series of circumstances and negative outcomes that
sent Nigeria down a dangerous road of corruption. That pathway, I argue, was worsened with the
influence of external capital flows and further exacerbated with the attempted installment of
democracy and removal of the military element in politics. Bamayi and Gowon are correct to
wish for the permanent eviction of the military from politics. Nigeria’s military agent, whom I
have identified as TCM, has played and continues to play far too pivotal a role for simple
displacement to remedy the corruption condition in Nigeria. In this chapter, my research provides
a direct and more audible account of TCM and the rise of corruption than has been offered
previously.

368 Bamaiyi, The Vindication of a General
369 Ibid. by Gowon, Foreward
The preceding chapters have examined the emergence of TCM through the constitutive evolution of exogenous and endogenous factors. First, a series of four exogenous variables that signify transnational capitalist stakeholder’s interests transformed Nigeria’s political institution by forming a new political power structure through a series of capital incentives and constraints placed before the institutional actor. Second, a group of four endogenous institutional conditions established the internal modalities that both influenced and instructed the behavior of the institutional actor within the internal and external power dialectic. Together, these exogenous and endogenous inputs produced a new institutional actor in Nigeria who simultaneously occupied an elite public position that activated military, political, and capital power.

In this chapter, I further unpack the construction of Nigeria’s combinational agent and present qualitative and quantitative data that helps delineate how TCM transformed corruption. The following aims to empirically illustrate the ways through which corruption developed in Nigeria from 1970-2015, as a result of the co-evolutionary pathway of TCM’s emergence by attending to the following research questions related to these themes: Who / What is TCM? How was the figure constructed? How did the figure’s power position impact Nigeria’s contemporary corruption condition?

In chapter 4, I define TCM historically by outlining the figure’s political, military, and capital characteristics. The analytical description of TCM was formulated by identifying the range of reference for its root terms and the categories to which they belong and modifying their meanings to include specific obligatory components of distinction. The core meaning of TCM is 1) an accumulator and distributor of capital, 2) a member of the military, and 3) a political figure. These identifiers become more specific and reference TCM as 1) an actor’s particular power
relationship to external and internal capital, 2) a member of the rank and file and/or member of the military matrix that can activate military power, 3) a holder of political office, elected or appointed, with access and/or influence in public institutions. Herein lies the criteria of a Capitalist Militician.

Further, I have not claimed, nor do I intend to represent that ALL members of the military are Capitalist Militicians, however being in the military or of the military is a necessary condition. TCM signifies a particular public figure with specific interactions and characteristics developed over a specific time. Namely, this figure evolved during the post-civil-war political siege that saw soldiers dominate and transform the political arena, as external capital interests shaped their internal power structures.

The distribution of TCM is also plural. Therefore, there is not necessarily only one TCM at any given time. Rather, there can be several Capitalist Militicians operating in connection or isolation in different public roles. Additionally, while TCM refers to elite positions of power, these positions are not necessarily composed of distinctly elite members of society. Education, class, gender, ethnicity, and religion, for example, do not necessarily order TCM, although patterns concerning each are observable. TCM can also exist throughout society in an abstract sense. Specifically, TCM’s corrupt presence and actions, over time, have created a corrupt public consciousness. Which has, in turn, produced corrupt actors across all segments and stratifications of Nigeria’s society.

In total, my research and findings address eight prevailing variables argued throughout this study that aims to explain how four internal and four external factors collectively and connectively provoked a reordering of power and position in Nigeria’s political institution.
Specifically, these factors formed an actor distinctly motivated by capital, which resulted in abuses of power and corruption.

The following research provides evidence towards four primary conclusions. First, corruption is regarded as public acts of capital exchange relegated to public institutions and positions of public authority such as political office, military service, police, and government officials. There are open acknowledgments and understandings of corruption on this macro level. Conversely, more local micro pronouncements of social corruption are far less acknowledged or accepted as corruption, reinforcing the conception of corruption used throughout this study. Second, the confirmation of a military-political-capital intersected agent of power, control, and corruption - (TCM). Although not identified or explicitly defined, the data reinforces the analytical postulate and designation of TCM figure as a tri-level agent that is perceived to be present currently and historically. Third, capital is the distinguishing variable in characterizing not only TCM but also the forms of corruption that emanated from the actor’s emergence. Understanding the internal and external characteristics of capital allows for a comprehensive explanation of corruption in Nigeria to commence. Fourth, with the formal elimination of the military from public institutions, there remains a diffuse social consciousness of corruption that has filtered from the top down, from military and political arena down to civilians and society. This dynamic most directly implicates TCM as an originating and facilitating force that has given rise to Nigeria’s corruption condition.

This study applies a dual logic of explanatory analysis, beginning with the exploration of exogenous economic capitalist development, and concluding with an examination of reconfigured internal political institutions and power arrangements. Rather than full affirmation
or falsification of previously established theory, which this framework may achieve as a by-product, this study aims to develop a reimagined theoretical framework for studying corruption by combining internal and external mechanisms and unifying qualitative and quantitative analytical modes of examination.

METHODS

In this chapter I introduce research findings from two strands of investigation from my fieldwork: a quantitative survey analysis and a qualitative series of individual elite interviews. I reviewed data sets for critical findings and distinguishing patterns on both corruption and TCM, from macro and micro levels of investigation that reflect the other portions of my research. This chapter, therefore, serves as a qualitative and quantitative verification analysis.

The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods employed in this study is intended to provide an empirical baseline against which much of the interpretive and subjective analysis can unfold to bring full meaning and understanding to the research question about the political economy of corruption in Nigeria, and the research thesis regarding TCM. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied iteratively to create a research outcome stronger than either method individually might achieve. By combining methods, the exploration of complex aspects, associations, and relationships of corruption analysis are more readily achieved. A purely quantitative model of corruption might not serve a maximum function, as the nature of this study, one that historically explores TCM figure, likely precludes solely objective measures, as the actor in question is a newly identified concept. Similarly, a purely qualitative study would rely too heavily on subjective interpretive analysis, which could result in conclusions that may shift depending on intervening factors or alternate observable conditions.
That is, there would be no way to identify TCM in a purely quantitative sense, nor could one completely quantify the actor’s role in corruption in a singularly qualitative manner. As such, the application of mixed methods proves more analytically optimal than not.

Each data method is further explained in the attached appendices. Appendix A outlines and presents the co-evolutionary model of analysis that orders the analytic framework of this study. Appendix B explains the collection methods and research process of qualitative interview data. Appendix C details the collection methods and research process of quantitative survey data. Appendix D indicates methods of supplemental data aggregation. Together, the appendices explain, aggregate, and collate the data referenced in this chapter and throughout this study.

RESULTS

Nigeria’s corruption puzzle is best evaluated when analyzing how external variables impact internal conditions and how internal conditions influence responses to external variables. To this end, the data reveals a similar combinational story of Nigeria’s corruption condition. Over many hours of military interviews, and after administering hundreds of surveys, the co-evolutionary pathway of corruption’s advance is confirmed with a singular truth that appears throughout the data. Nigeria’s corruption spiral began when the military combined with politics, was accelerated with the advent of foreign capital, and reached its zenith with the attempted dismantling of that very institutional combination. My findings additionally confirm two other realities, each the byproduct of this actuality. First, military officers, almost unanimously, express disapproval of their abrogation from power. In many ways, this reality has amplified their abuses of power and exploitation of capital from the point they entered politics to present. Second, the military, due to their long-standing administrative association and bureaucratic commingling
with civilian populations, has imbued the public with a consciousness of corruption. This awareness is consistently represented throughout the survey data. The following linkage points confirm my observations and represent my findings in greater detail.

**TCM to Corruption Link**

Corruption has been defined in this study through a public-private dialectic with TCM identified as the instigating actor involved in political expressions of power & capital abuse. Survey data reveals a solid general understanding of acts of corruption defined in a public and private framework. Further, responses identifying corruption inclined primarily towards actions that reflect public positions of power such as: “mismanagement of funds,” “accepting a bribe,” and “misuse of public resources.” Public perception or conception of corruption is shown to exist mainly in the macro sense with acts that surround public institutions. While micro activity and day to day interaction of civilians amongst one and other are less likely to be regarded as corruption when compared to large scale public activities involving positions of power and authority. Interestingly, while corruption remains visible on all levels of society, it is mostly identified in broader public contexts of action and interaction. Corruption is predominantly acknowledged as a political, institutional, and bureaucratic complication as opposed to a local societal one.

The link between the military and corruption is also apparent both presently and historically. Surveys directly asked participants to quantify the association of the military to

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370 Survey Data set. 2015-2017. The surveys began by establishing a baseline comprehension of corruption in terms of those behaviors and elements that define it. Twelve fields were presented as contributory, out of which 10 displayed universal acceptance across all respondents. Two choices, (“the use of public resource for personal gain” and “Abuse of power”), though not unanimously selected, revealed a 91% and 94% attribution respectively.

371 This initial finding becomes expansive as subsequent data reveals a secondary relationship regarding the public private designation of corruption which will be discussed later in the chapter.
corruption over time. Historically 61% identified a significant association, 37% extreme, and 2% low association. Presently, 79% of respondents identified a significant association, 16% extreme, and 5% low. These results provide compelling evidence of a military to corruption nexus. The responses also display and reinforce a pattern. Historically, the link of the military to corruption was more “extreme” (37% to 16%). However, the link presently is “higher” now than in the past (79% to 61%). Meaning, the perceived link between military to corruption was most apparent during the despotic rule of Babangida and Abacha in the 1980s and 1990s. Although that form of military rule has since been dissolved, respondents reported a high connection between military and corruption despite the military’s longtime abdication of power. If corruption mainly exists in political public office and that same public position mainly controls capital, then for the military connection to corruption to remain, there must be a surviving subsisting military link to both politics and capital. In other words, the public latently suggests the presence of TCM without actually being informed of the specific label.

Participants were instructed to select five out of a possible sixteen elements most directly associated with causes of corruption. The top five responses given, in descending order were: Greed-96%, Abuse of Power-89%, Politicians-81%, Military-63%, Poor Leadership-57%. Once again, just as with defining corruption, the data displays bias towards macro-level variables when explaining the causes of corruption. Greed is a general descriptor, but the remaining top responses all indicate public institutional components. What is fascinating is while almost all respondents selected “greed” as a cause of corruption, almost none selected “culture” or

372 See Appendix C
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
“tribalism.” The next most selected elements that cause corruption after “poor leadership” were “police” and “poor law enforcement.” Additionally, the respondents were instructed to select a top-five out of sixteen. However, in ascribing cause, the low rankings of “culture” and “tribalism” - last and second to last respectively - are quite telling. Mainly because these findings counter scholarship that points to historical socio-cultural configurations to explain corruption, the cultural conclusions drawn by researchers such as Joseph and Obadare could then be called into question and scrutinized.

I additionally instructed participants to identify various institutions on a scale of “not corrupt” to “all corrupt.” The responses reveal that corruption is perceived as existing everywhere in all sectors with all people. However, primarily, corruption was identified in specific public sectors where TCM resides. For example, public servant positions were those most frequently identified as egregiously corrupt and corruptible. They included members of the Military and Politicians, who were most frequently labeled as comprehensively [all] corrupt. While Government officials were most frequently labeled as “most corrupt.” No group was void of corruption or labeled “not corrupt.”

What is further intriguing about this set of data is the institution/group with the most variable selection is Business Executives, Military members and Politicians are reported to be more corrupt than Business Executives. On one hand the public identifies corrupt actions of TCM, but on the other, may not as immediately identify a direct link to capital processes through business relations. TCM, therefore, as an accumulator of capital, is not fundamentally considered

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375 Ibid.
part of labor and production but is more-so associated with acts of pure profit maximization and surplus.

The awareness of the specific public institution most responsible for corruption was also apparent during military interviews, as the majority of interviewees believe the military to be most directly and most deeply involved in corruption over time. To clarify action and intention, the interviewees were asked to affirm or deny the military’s involvement in corrupt practices both presently and historically. The responses evidence a clear affirmation and understanding of the military’s role in acts of corruption and abuses of power. Further, while the societal perception of corruption relegates acts to visible public positions, military officers maintained a much more inclusive view. Soldiers repeatedly acknowledged the military’s role in corruption historically, and presently, several actually took responsibility for establishing corruption as an institutional logic commenting, “Yes there was corruption in military but there was a system.” 376

Officers also consistently point to the larger non-military civilian public as engaging in a more culpable or reprehensible version of corruption. One officer explains, “Now, there is lawlessness and anarchy. Democracy has no control. Everyone behaves as they wish without consequence.”377

These responses reveal not only a clear understanding of corruption and those actions that sustain its presence, but also announce quite plainly, the connection of the military to

376 See Apendix B Interview Index.
When re-examining the various conceptions of corruption presented in the introduction, both Rose-Ackerman’s rational choice framework for corruption and Rotberg’s public service institutional models are insightful here. Conversely, the moral expectation model of Gold has minimal application. The data aligns most closely with Pippidi’s notion, that corruption in developing societies is inherently political. As such, the research indicates that corruption in Nigeria is observed, interpreted, and understood, mainly in the capital context of public political positions and institutions.

377 Ibid.
corruption and of the military to control. Most interviewees spoke of this connection as an inherent aspect of soldiering, absent the assumed negative connotation. Thus, there is without question a substantial line to be drawn from TCM to corruption in Nigeria. Corruption was, in effect, the language of the politicized capital incentivized military regime. Further, specific responses reflect the very nature of TCM argued here. One soldier spoke of how capital was used as an influence for actors to remain above the law and in long term positions of power. Another interviewee spoke candidly about dispensing capital to the state and allocating capital throughout levels of government. Here TCM is very clearly a capital custodian who uses the resource strategically towards preservation of power. On the other hand, during an interview with a retired soldier, they explained how capital accumulation has come to equally define high rank, low rank, and no rank soldiers all the same. Corruption became the institutional characteristic of TCM as looting, for example, was described as a means to achieve wealth and advantage in addition to power and position. \(^{378}\)

The interviewees also provide colloquial representations of corruption associated with the military. “Soldier chop, he never go chop finish,” refers not only to the consumption of resources or “chopping” which means “eating,” but more importantly “Never go chop finish,” represents the accumulative characteristic of soldiers and the maximization element of surplus accumulation. Corruption does not exist in this context solely for profit or advantage, but more-so, accumulation occurs for the sake of accumulating. Collectively, the interview responses directly connect military officers, both as a specific actor and as a political institution, to politics, politics to power, power to capital, and capital to corruption. This

\(^{378}\) See Appendix B
combinational chain is best understood beginning with the following military and politics link.

**Military and Politics Institutional Link**

Endogenous conditions factor prominently in my research, namely the state of institutional underdevelopment and incoherence. To that end, the composition of TCM is first rooted in the military politics nexus as the military has become an undoubtedly political institution whereby military actors are equally statesmen securing offices, as they are servicemen securing the state. The line of distinction has not only blurred; it has all but disappeared.

My research supports a direct and unmistakable connection between the Nigerian military and Nigerian politics. Most military interviewees also identified a powerful link between the two institutions. The majority of soldiers attested that they would look to assume political or government positions upon retirement. Minimally, the respondents showed a high interest in remaining involved in government, as several considered their current military position to be a state or public position in the first place. During military interviews, participants were asked to quantify the association of the military to politics. Data suggests a stronger historical connection due to the visible political leadership positions held post-independence. Apart from this association however, this line of questioning evoked some of the most unequivocal responses recorded.

When questioned of the military to politics link, most officers seemed puzzled by the suggestion that there was the possibility of unconnectedness. Answers ranged from, “Yes the

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379 See Endogenous conditions 1&2 as discussed in chapter 4.
military and politics are clearly connected.” And “The military obviously knows how to handle politics and government, there is a very strong connection. One officer in particular nearly concluded the interview when asked of any military link to politics, and scoffed, “What do you mean? Don’t you know the political system in Nigeria was built by the military!”

In total, the interviews reveal a perceived direct link between the military and politics. Whether national or local, there appears to be a strong and intrinsic combination of the two institutions. Several interviewees regarded the two as synonymous and referenced the link in collective group terms. Very few responses individualized the link referring to specific soldiers and specific roles in politics, such as the presidency. Such impressions are vital as they further establish the notion of elite positions of political power as opposed to solely, elite, powerful, and political people.

Juxtaposing military with politics further exhibits how a position in the military facilitates political aspirations, as the underlying power motivations behind such pursuits were also discussed. In this sense, direct reference is made to TCM. First by name, as “Obasanjo,” “Buhari,” and “Abacha” were all mentioned as representative of the military politics link. Then by action, as references to corruption were expressed colloquially as the identified leaders were described as “eating the national cake” or “using resources to take action,” both of which are synonymous with “public good for private gain,” or corruption.

The military and political association is extremely apparent from my research, as the military has not only entered politics, namely at high federal levels, but has dominated it. The line between military and state institutions has become nearly indistinguishable as nearly all

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380 See Appendix B.
soldiers self-identified as members of both. In the process of the military and politics combination, the influence goes in both directions. The military had become politicized just as much as politics had become militarized. As I progressed in my discussion with members of this group, the topic of capital, wealth, and business quickly arose.

**Endogenous Capital Link**

Institutional links to capital are pivotal to understand TCM’s power construction. In several ways, capital is the catalyzing element for corruption in Nigeria and is the critical characteristic of distinction for TCM as it defines the actor and subsequent action. TCM’s particular relationship to capital differentiates and orders the figure apart from other comparative actors, as capital is not only a resource for power but ultimately becomes an impulse towards profit and resource accumulation. From the endogenous view, the capital link is institutional and reflects both consciousness and materialism.\(^{381}\)

Data indicates a strong association between politics and capital as the majority surveyed believe Politicians not only control capital but are the most prodigious accumulators, who consequently, attain the highest degree of wealth. When asked to designate the group most in control of the capital, 96% responded politicians, 3% responded government officials, and 1% responded businesspeople.\(^{382}\) The absence of the military here may seem dubious. However, these numbers are significant as they speak to the level and sophistication of corrupt actors. The data reflects the military’s evolution into politics and economics. So much so that retired military officials of incredible wealth and influence may more immediately be classified as politicians.

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\(^{381}\) See Exogenous Institutional conditions 3 and 4 as discussed in chapter 4.

\(^{382}\) See Appendix C.
and business people, even though they continue to represent and exemplify the influence of the military.

Surveys also asked participants to determine which group accumulates the most capital and wealth in Nigeria. The vast majority once again selected politicians. The conclusion that capital is most controlled and accumulated by politicians, of whom many are members of the military, especially at the highest level of politics, only helps buttress the concept of TCM. Additionally, note that business people did not rank as the number one group in control of capital. Even though the wealthiest African in the world, Aliko Dangote is a Nigerian businessman whose wealth exceeds ten billion dollars, and is integral to several production and manufacturing sectors within the Nigerian economy.

Further, several other Nigerian billionaires operate specifically, and solely, in the business sector. That notwithstanding, the public, with an overwhelming majority, point to politicians and government officials as being the custodians of wealth and capital. This observation likely references documented scandals of corruption and power abuse by those holding high ranking visible political positions. When comparing, for example, budgetary totals of various federal ministries, to allocations, or examining the many industrial contracts awarded, allocated, then abandoned, politicians selection as the most dominant group in control of capital is unsurprising. The perception that politicians coordinate wealth and capital on a more substantial level than do business people is not to say that the latter is devoid of corruptible actors performing corrupt acts. However, it does reinforce the notion of a political, military, capitalist agent. Furthermore, my data supports the existence of internal institutional materialism and consciousness that have
directed business and capital exchange and further reinforces the role of TCM as a mediator of
capital, a steward of business operation, and an accumulator of wealth in Nigeria.383

Survey data further reinforces this conclusion, as participants were instructed to quantify
the direct association of the military to capital. The responses illustrated an even more significant
military link to capital than that of politics: 64% identify and high link, 23% extreme, and 13%
low.384 In two separate lines of questioning, participants indicate equally high connections
between politicians and capital, and military and capital, which further buttresses the perceived
presence of a Capitalist Milician figure. Moreover, this also highlights the capital component as
most distinguishing.

Corresponding questions were later posed during military interviews. Here the response
data similarly reveals a direct and unmistakable connection between military and capital. The
majority of soldiers interviewed reported active participation in non-service related capital-
building business activities, and those that did not participate confirmed a keen interest. When
asked to discuss capital in and around the military, officers very openly obliged. “I have so much
interest in doing other business work,” one replied, and continued, “Being in the military gives
me more opportunity to move in business. You see, many soldiers are interested in business
money-making opportunities. A soldier can be engaged in all jobs, even those we are not
supposed to do.”385

383 It is important to note that politicians in the Nigerian context also include civil servants, institutional
bureaucrats, or low-level political actors. While administrative corruption is certainly impactful and part of the abusive
history of public institutions, the link between such actors and immense capital is not the likely connection suggested
by the data. Instead, the numbers point to a higher more visible political office, like the presidency or other public
political leadership positions, when associating politics to capital.

384 See Appendix C

385 See Appendix B
Other conversations revealed that capital and wealth building was an impetus for joining the military in the first place. “I joined military because there was no job in the country at that time. At least in military one can develop himself and link into business.” Additionally, most soldiers expressed a desire to “engage in money making opportunities” and represented themselves as “open for business.” One officer even openly inquired of my interest in joining a business operation during the interview and propositioned an arrangement involving trading opportunities for importing and exporting goods abroad through his service contacts at a customs port.

These interview responses indicate a solid connection between the military and capital/capital accumulation. Whether large scale or local, there appears to be an intrinsic link that proves undeniable. While the interviewees did not self identify as “business executives,” they did recognize a connection to business practices and the capitalist pursuits represented by business leaders. Interviewees specifically identified the military as an institutional venue for business. Particularly, one soldier went so far as to represent the uniform and the position as direct social and economic currency. Whereby being a member of the military can influence trade practices, facilitate production or capital exchange, and at a minimum, immediately demand a level of respect or acknowledgment of the power membership to the group represents, even in business settings.

There is an intrinsic institutional and individual military link to capital whereby a soldier is simultaneously politically and economically minded. In this combination, incentives to acquire capital have reshaped and reconfigured the military, namely as they entered public political

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386 Ibid.
institutions. One retired officer reminded me during the interview of a quote by then-president Gowon, who once famously bragged while in office as military head of state, “Money is not the problem, but how to spend it!” This exemplifies the military’s new capitalist identity as one defined by surplus, waste, and corruption. It was not enough for military actors to dominate and lead society by law-making and statecraft; it was additionally necessary to be equally economically dominant. The logic of the military politician became capital accumulation for accumulation’s sake, resulting in a highly visible material characteristic and capital consciousness. The activation of capital, despite the aforementioned internal links, was most significantly impactful in the external context.

**Exogenous Capital Link**

Transnational capitalist interests, I argue, act as unique organizing features in TCM’s development. By imposing economic strategies and development policies that placed TCM as a mediator of capital and a proprietor of economic function, TCM was positioned in an environment ripe with opportunities for surplus, waste, and abuse. External variables ordered internal action and behavior of TCM, who then created an abusive capital logic of malfeasance and corruption. This is not to say, absent external incentives, corruption would not exist in Nigerian politics. Rather, as discussed in chapter 3, external capital constraints directly configured political institutions in Nigeria where actors were required to negotiate foreign power verticals. Ultimately, capitalist interest outside Nigeria became capitalist interest inside Nigeria,
all mediated by an undefined institutional position of power. In this process, TCM remains every bit a soldier, complete with a military mind and aggressive action. Yet it is only from this military foundation that the other contributing elements of politics and capital are able to coexist, conjoin, and condition corruption led by TCM.

TCM received full implemented development mandates of state coordination. Several interview responses speak to this dynamic. For example, “The military built all the infrastructure of this country.” And “The military built the Nigerian economy.” Intimate perceptions of state-led economic growth and represent the assumed guardianship of the economy by Nigeria’s political leadership, inclusive of industrialization projects and the accompanying capital flows that such programs demanded. However, as has been shown in previous chapters, the infancy of political and economic institutions precluded proper adaptation of external development policy. The result was even more uncertain undefined political processes and positions, which, when adding the enormous amount of excess and capital flows, resulted in abusive behavior where corruption and capital leveraging developed. Such findings are commensurate with those of Bridenthal's where foreign capital directly influences political institutions, or, Pippedi’s prediction of how moments of economic and political development create a breeding ground for corruption.

The interview responses also suggest that the guardianship of economic function expressed by officers is one reserved for the military alone. Interestingly, nearly all

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387 "Undefined is applied in the Huntingtonian sense where external capital and development interest reconfigure institutions in a way that leaves positions of power undefined and ripe for abuse. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.

388 In this sense, the exogenous capital link directly reflects Exogenous variables 1 and 2 as discussed in chp 3 and Endogenous conditions 3 and 4 as discussed in chp4.

389 Appendix B
interviewees considered the military economy in a far more positive light than the civilian democratic one. It is further interesting that the political economy connection is prominently maintained in the eyes of military officers interviewed. For example, statements such as, “The situation in this country is at a low point, not like before when the military made our economy boom!” And, “Military kept all things secure, people, government, economy, all secure under military.” Reveal a clear assumed superiority of the military, and a sense of institutional exceptionalism that had no business being challenged, let alone displaced. The military’s role as capital mediator and economic proprietor is a direct consequence of transnational capitalist interest in the form of international development policies. In this sense, external capital variables act as organizing features of TCM construction and function. Additionally, there is a clear interpretation of “personal economy or capital” as opposed to public or state economy, as some officers affirmed that soldiers were in a better economic position, or taken better care of, during the era of the military government. There is not only a clear preference for a military-controlled economic system, but a presupposition that the system is naturally advantageous, and thus comprehensively superior.

Officers interviewed immediately associate positive economic outcomes to military rule as if the latter were directly responsible for the former. The military, therefore, becomes self-identified mediators of capital and proprietors of economic function. That is, military governance was solely responsible for the economic well being of the country, a responsibility that implanted a capital and capitalist awareness amongst members of the military through the belief of state-led economic progress adopted directly from transnational capitalist interests and development.

\[390\] See Appendix B
policy. Furthermore, as economic guardians, TCM assumed positions of capital allocation, which, with the increased flow of capital into Nigeria, morphed into motivation for one’s own self economy, ascent, and profit.

Where lower-ranking officers spoke in generalities about the state of the economy, higher-ranking officers with longer tenure, i.e., were in service during military rule pre-1999, all spoke in specific language that points to the military’s control and stewardship of the economy, inclusive of development policy and programs. One officer with 33 years of service explicitly states that the military was responsible for Nigeria’s infrastructural development. This awareness points out two things; first, there is the acknowledgment of the military’s role beyond purely defense and security duties. The military is referenced here, in Tilly terms of “making the state.” Second, there is an implicit association or connection to not only capital but its application and allocation. The repeated notions of “building this country” speak to this directly.

The military interviews additionally uncovered critical aspects of the psyche of TCM concerning corruption in this context. If the TCM’s power position was a built-in feature of economic function, all in response to external mandates of development, then an institutional logic to corruption was created whereby it served as a tool for state development, and ultimately personal attainment. Throughout the interviews, corruption is never uttered or expressed as a negative or unfavorable phenomenon. Rather, military participants consistently referenced corruption as a means to an end or as a natural consequence associated to economic development and state-building. Responses that include phrases such as, “Military looted, but without military that money would have been squandered”, “Yes there was corruption, but
there was a system,” And,“The military was able to embezzle but, there was impact.” Speak to this directly, so that military corruption was bound and systematized with a particular order to corruption and resource abuse.

TCM further reflects Standing’s and Bratsis’ postulate of Rentier Capitalist emerging from the corrupting effect of transnational capital, as well as Bayart’s hypothesis of “Politics of Belly,” whereby transnational networks of criminalization promote political power and corruption. These findings serve as a counter to Joseph’s prebendalism argument that claims public office has been constructed historically from colonialism, as the venue for patron-client corruption. The data here conversely suggests that the corruptibility of politics and public office were established, more meaningfully, from the constraining effects of transnational capitalist interests in the mid-twentieth century. Similarly, TCM also serves as a counter to cultural arguments that describe corruption in terms of internal social, behavioral elements. Here we see where foreign capital imbued and bestowed a specific economic identity and relationship to capital accumulation upon TCM, and by extension, society.

TCM negotiated external power relationships with capital stakeholders and interpreted the global call to capitalism in an undefined political environment. The undefined integration of new leadership groups into political institutions is precisely the caution levied by Huntington concerning modernization and global economic development. The result was an undefined institutional position of power, operating in an undefined economic environment, who had an undefined relationship to the multiplicity of capital interest and foreign investments into Nigeria. The empiric modes of analysis in this study reinforce that external

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391 Ibid.
constraints helped shape the emergence of a new institutional actor, complete with a revised mindset, method, and mode of corruption relating to Nigeria’s state-building, economic development, and capital flows. The military politics link engendered a group of institutional characteristics that were acted upon and transformed by external capital. Once present, TCM engaged in practices and behaviors that facilitated corruption’s progression. There is an overriding linkage between the emergence of TCM’s and the development of corruption in Nigeria.

**Linkage between Emergence of TCM and Development of Corruption**

Since the rise of the TCM, from 1970 onward, corruption in Nigeria has increased in degree and evolved in form. TCM formally emerged in politics post-civil war. The figure's arrival coincided with the start of formalized and regularized political corruption in Nigeria. Once activated, TCM transformed Nigeria’s contemporary State into institutionalized kleptocratic governance instigated by external capital variables. My research shows a similar evolutionary pathway for corruption. While public servants are strongly associated with corruption, they are minimally associated with visible low-level forms of its practice, such as bribery. The data suggests, rather, that military and political abuses operate at a much higher level of sophistication and organization. Meaning, over time, the form of corruption has worsened and intensified.

When asked to identify which group was most likely to solicit a bribe, 61% of survey responses identified police, 29% identified politicians or government officials, and less than 1%

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392 The linkage therefore represents the association of endogenous conditions 1 and 2 as discussed in chp 4 and all 4 exogenous variables as discussed in chp 3.
identified the military. These results can symbolize several conclusions. The most obvious being, of the public institutions listed, the military is least linked to corruption. However, that conclusion would be contrary to the data set as a whole and would contradict the other specific findings from this study’s empirical discoveries and theoretical postulates. A second conclusion is that police and politicians are far more overt and visible in their bribery and corruption. Perhaps, but the survey did not allow for particular differentiations amongst groups. However, a separate conclusion resolves the comparatively low score of the military relating to solicitations and bribery.

The data here more likely speaks to the level of sophistication and advancement associated with military forms of corruption. Meaning, if bribery is a low-level act of corruption, and embezzlement, misappropriation, clientelism, and the like, are more advanced acts of corruption, then it rationally follows that the military would not appear nearly as visible as say a local police officer. Therefore the visibility of corruption, in this sense, might be minimal concerning the military. However, degree and sophistication may reflect a higher incidence or visibility of corruption. This finding corresponds with the historical trajectory of TCM. Contemporary acts of corruption by TCM occur on a much higher plain, above public view. Additionally, direct public interaction with military or politicians is minimal. However, day to day interaction with the police is far more commonplace. Beyond the visibility of corruption, this finding also references potential instances of corruption. Moreover, if similar questions referencing institutional modes of corruption were posed to high-level multinational government stakeholders, the military and politicians would likely score far higher than local police.

393 See Appendix C
My research further reveals that corruption became institutionalized by TCM over time. Survey respondents were asked to give a comparative assessment of corruption’s presence in Nigeria during military rule vs. during the present democratic system of government. 92% of respondents believe Nigeria is more corrupt today than 30 years prior, while 8% believe levels to be the same. This evidences the grave effects of over three decades of military rule. The aftershocks are enormous as corruption has become so extreme. According to this data, corruption has either not improved at all or has become worse. Initially, the responses here may appear inconsistent; would not corruption have been worse at the height of military rule, during the most pronounced era of TCM? No, not necessarily.

If the previous analysis of corruption in Nigeria via TCM maintains, then over time, conditions would get worse, not better. Particularly, if TCM progressed from the 1970s regime of embezzlement and bribery to an institutionalized multi-level form of cronyism and clientelism, then levels of corruption should ascend congruently. Additionally, TCM is not only a historical figure, but TCM also exists presently. Therefore levels of corruption in Nigeria presently should be perceived as higher. Capitalist Militicians such as Obasanjo and Buhari are the case in point as they have each operated in this role for nearly four decades. The matrix of power occupied in the 1970s and 1980s has allowed them to persist in contemporary public positions and develop corruption in a compounded way.

TCM leveraged its position of power and expanded modes of corruption within politics and economics using a particular institutional logic that followed individual or subgroup profit maximization, not a collective one. TCM, therefore, transformed acts of corruption

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394 Ibid.
from low-level bribery and budget-bending to sophisticated methods of high-level financial crime and institutionalized misallocation of capital. When thinking about the formalization of corruption in this way, Kang’s Crony Capitalism model more closely represents the institutionalization of corruption in Japan. While the Rentier Theory of Yates better aligns with the form of institutionalized corruption produced by TCM in Nigeria.

DISCUSSION

The linkages above, taken together, address definition and origination questions surrounding TCM. The findings further illustrate the evolution of the figure’s power position and explain how the making of the figure manifested renewed pathways for power abuse, capital exploitation, and corruption. TCM was gestated from exogenous circumstances of early development capitalism and then born out of the influence of liberal economic World Bank policy directives towards the establishment of a capitalist world economy. The external power dynamics then acted as constraints upon TCM, transforming undefined political leadership roles and exacerbating unexplained relationships to both power and capital. TCM then matured from endogenous institutional conditions of politicized military transitions and contestations of power to directly impact the rise of corruption in Nigeria. By understanding this evolutionary arc, TCM’s role as the fundamental object of significance for studying corruption in Nigeria becomes increasingly evident. TCM can be understood in terms of internal power and external influences, and the constitutive positioning of these elements as they relate to political, military, and capital components in the political economy of corruption’s proliferation in Nigeria from 1970 - 2015.
While the emergence of TCM began in post-civil war Nigeria when in 1970, a military officer assumed the highest public position in establishing a military government, the development of TCM continues to this day as the military is still profoundly entwined in politics. In this sense, TCM’s discovery in this study holds larger implications for understanding corruption in Nigeria over time. Currently, many continue to lament the state of the Nigerian economy and the heights of corruption. There may be something to be said that the devaluation and volatility of the Naira, coupled with currency fluctuations in foreign investment and capital reserves, has continued to deteriorate since the military formally left governance in 1999. Of course, if the preceding analysis in this chapter serves as a guide, and TCM figure and power position are substantiated, then the military never actually left politics. Furthermore, the economic downturns of the Nigerian economy could then be more easily explained alongside an examination of TCM’s actions and influences. Although technically resigned from politics, the physical vestiges of military power, and in several instances, the physical manifestation of the military actor, specifically, remain in Nigerian politics in the form of TCM. The prevailing sentiment of the military’s “return” to democratic politics, as is supported by the data, is only eclipsed and challenged by the notion that the military, despite their public abdication of power, never left politics, and thus never ceded economic control in Nigeria in the first place.

The data additionally reveals an unexpected finding. The intention behind the research project was to examine and explain corruption via the emergence of a public agent, TCM. My exploration provides evidence that explains corruption more broadly by exposing public-private linkages that connect TCM’s abusive action and corrupt activity to similar forms of
behavior in the greater public. Therefore, TCM not only transformed the manner and modes of institutional corruption, TCM further instructed the practice and provided the mechanisms for corruption in a broader social sense. Thus, the military’s long-standing presence in politics brought about a compounding brand of formalized macro institutionalized corruption as well as informal micro communal corruption.

Consequently, the long term effects of TCM occupying national positions of power reverberated throughout society. TCM, through highly visible and unchecked corrupt activities, reproduced and reinforced corrupt business and social systems in Nigeria, whereby corruption becomes the standard expected mode of public, social, and economic interaction. Therefore, my research identifies a corrupt consciousness in society that has been imbued by TCM. Corruption has become such a pervasive system of interaction that most people willfully participate, despite acknowledgment of its ill and adverse effects. There is a real ethos of corruption in Nigeria that has been inherited by civilians, over several decades, from the rise of TCM.

For example, survey participants were asked to agree or disagree with more nuanced situational examples of corruption. The vast majority disagreed with corrupt acts regardless of actors’ motivations. A near-equal majority confirmed to willingly, openly, and gladly participate in the same corrupt cycle given the opportunity. Only 14% of those surveyed agreed, “It is ok for a leader to acquire wealth through corruption if they use the money to help the community.” While 83% affirmed, “If offered a position of power or money through corrupt means, I would take it.” This stark divide speaks to the acknowledgment of corruption’s unyielding presence. Nigerians regard corruption from the perspective of public office and

See Appendix C
understand such actions to be harmful as they can differentiate right from wrong irrespective of motive. However, this ONLY applies concerning public office or public figures. Once corruption becomes micro and more social, it begins to lose its offense in the eyes of the public.

On one hand, the majority of survey participants do not agree that corruption is a normal way of life. However, on the other hand, a more overwhelming majority would readily accept positions of power or money if offered through corrupt means. This is not reflective of a sliding scale of values or morality. Rather, it represents the conspicuous perception of corruption as a public ill, perpetrated by an elite segment of society to which different rules apply. It is, in effect, a sliding scale of power in society.

Interviewees were also asked to comment on the continued presence of corruption outside of the context of the military. Their responses reinforce the public-private linkage of corruption. “They tried to learn from us, but they do not have that order or power,” said one officer. Another explains, “Anyone going into politics today is going to enrich their pocket, including former soldiers. But everyone in politics now thinks they can behave like a soldier, they think they can loot the same way we did.” These responses suggest corrupt public behavior was learned and inherited from society’s experience with TCM and his multiple formations and re-formations of power. The difference for the soldiers interviewed is, when the military “looted,” they also developed infrastructure and maintained institutional control and order. Conversely, under the new democratic regimes, “looting” occurs, but absent proper control and without formal modes that order development and organize capital. The intentionality of acts of corruption by TCM has been well established. However, we now also

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396 See Appendix B
see an “unintentionality” of the continued practice, via an inculcated consciousness of corruption. TCM can be credited with both direct acts of corruption as well as indirect psychological insemination of corruption into the fabric society.

TCM not only symbolizes corruption on the public/private level through direct action, but TCM also influences the presence of corruption indirectly, through the actions of others throughout Nigeria. Military colloquialisms for corruption, such as, “I never chop,” “settle me,” “dash me,” or “find something for me” have all entered society and can be readily observed in everyday interactions amongst citizens. Corruption has been distilled over time by TCM and slowly imbibed by society. Furthermore, hero gazing, mythologizing, and clear mimicking of TCM is widely observed and reflected in the data. Ironically this contemporary reality subverts the social capital model of Bayart, which claims Africans are historically imbued with a trickster and robber spirit. The model instead seems more applicable in Nigeria’s recent post-civil-war history where the rise of TCM, Nigeria’s ultimate symbol of imitation and simulation, emerged.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussions can prove highly relevant for future corruption scholarship. My research project has presented historical, descriptive, quantitive, qualitative, and causal analyses to designate, define and describe TCM conceptually, and address the many subsequent claims regarding the development and evolution of the figure alongside corruption in Nigeria. TCM’s origin story is now more comprehensible, and consequently, a complete picture of the development of corruption can be conveyed. The co-evolutionary framework for corruption analysis presented in this study will allow for future scholarship to uncover new
pathways for understanding, clarify extant modes of analysis, and more readily combine and connect once-competing methods into unified frameworks.
CONCLUSION

NIGERIA’S DISTINCT STATE OF CORRUPTION

“Compounded during the several years of military misrule, corruption became institutionalized and assaulted every facet of the country’s political and socio-economic life. Corruption has become so pervading and ravenous that it became the major explanation for all of Nigeria’s political and economic problems.”397 This sentiment is widely held throughout Nigerian corruption scholarship but has done little to advance our understanding of corruption’s rise. Nigeria’s visible development problems continue to been blamed on corruption, yet scholarship has not adequately examined corruption’s underlying growth process. Within the extensive corpus of corruption literature, several studies have struggled to identify the source of corruption’s evolution in Nigeria. Moreover, due to methodological characteristics presented in such studies, there is a tendency to incline towards single modes of analysis that prove insufficient. As a result, the literature on Nigerian corruption consistently misportrays how corruption manifested over time.

This study has realigned the paradigm. I have examined the political economy of corruption in Nigeria through the rise of TCM by employing a specific co-evolutionary method of internal and external analytical investigation. My research and analysis have shown how corruption in Nigeria became so distinctive, and how the development and rapid expansion of Nigerian corruption occurred from 1970-2015. I have explored how constitutive variables shaped TCM, a new political actor in Nigeria. I argue that the figure’s unique emergence,

composition, and relationship to capital explain how corruption evolved and spread during Nigeria's crucial transitionary post-civil war development period.

To understand corruption, therefore, we must understand TCM. Moreover, to understand TCM, we must first examine the role of global capital. Specifically, we must comprehend how external global capital significantly contributed to the conditions that formed TCM, from whom corruption developed, expanded, and progressed in Nigeria. Although I directly link the making of TCM to external capital and capitalist interests, TCM is not merely an epiphenomenal consequence of global capital. Rather, I argue, TCM was instigated within the context of a set of incentives and constraints that existed with respect to the relationship between global capital and Nigeria’s internal political institutions.

In exploring TCM, I reveal the direct pathway to the historical rise of corruption in Nigeria. The figure, I argue, is unique in composition and form. TCM, however, can be conceptually compared to other actors. Nevertheless, TCM should not be misconstrued as a reproducible figure that exists in other settings. That is, when examining TCM’s role in Nigeria’s corruption story, the figure’s construction and function are unique when contrasted to other actors in other settings. Chapters two, four, and five go into greater detail about the composition of TCM as a triumvirate figure who exists at the intersection of Nigeria’s highest levels of state/military power (security), economic power, and political power, and operates as a diffuse position, not as a single ruler. What differentiates TCM is not a unitary characteristic or attribute. Instead, what distinguishes TCM is the figure’s particular mode of construction, namely, the constitutive relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables that shape the unique
interaction between external capital and internal institutions, giving significant utility to the
former and redefining the configuration of the latter.

CO-EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY OF TCM AND CORRUPTION

Explaining TCM entails examining the relationship between the four primary exogenous
variables identified in chapter 3 that directly relate to global capital. They include 1) Twentieth-
century liberal economics and neoliberal ideology, 2) Globalized development policies, 3) Economic outcomes of uneven capitalist development, 4) Multinational corporations, foreign
direct investments, and natural resources. Each of these variables provides a specific incentive
or constraint for political leaders in Nigeria, and together create an external verticality of power,
whereby external global capitalists interests directly influence internal political agents.
Consequently, new relationships to capital, both externally and internally, were formed and
resulted in the transformation of Nigeria’s leading political actors, who emerged at the
intersection of political power, economic power, and state military power. Herein lies the
development of TCM, a singular triumvirate public figure that corruptly engages in malfeasance
and operates with impunity.

The first variable of external capitalist interest in Nigeria deals with the remaking of
liberalism, which largely defined the economic idea revolution of the twentieth century. While
free-market capitalism did not fully take root in a global policy sense until the 1970s, it was
widely and deliberately promoted starting in the late 1930s by organized communities of thought
like the Mont Pelerin Society. Tasked with reinstalling liberalism on a global scale, Mont Pelerin,
along with subsequent think-tanks that pushed a similar singular ideological agenda, launched
neoliberalism as a universal development program with the specific intention of uniformly
shaping the developing world. As an ideology, neoliberalism promoted market freedom, deregulation, and a shift away from state-led development. Conflictingly, its tenets were in direct opposition to the prevailing Keynesian economic ideology of the 1950s, during a time when Nigeria was progressing towards independence. There was, therefore, an incontrovertible clash between the economic ideology practiced in Nigeria and the economic ideology instructed for Nigeria. Over the ensuing decades, the resulting incongruence created an ideological constraint for Nigeria’s political actors and institutions.

On the one hand, state leadership was directly involved in economic policy and industrialization programs. On the other hand, Neoliberal ideology was instructing the state away from such significant involvement. The result was a political agent in Nigeria that was simultaneously directed to engage and disengage in economic development and capital accumulation. As Nigeria continued along with its development path post-civil war, the power relationship between its political actors and its institutions was undetermined. Adding the shifting and equivocal nature of external capitalist ideology, therefore, made the actor’s role that much more uncertain.

The second external variable builds on the first. As capitalist liberal ideology continued to advance in the mid to late twentieth century, stakeholders transformed liberal ideas into actual global development policies. What started as modernization templates for Nigeria’s “economic take-off”, including the infusion of external capital to promote growth and the abandonment of its natural agricultural production processes, later evolved into more draconian policies for development. Thus, in addition to the industrialization projects that superstructures like the

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398 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth
World Bank promoted, Nigeria’s economic development was primarily ordered by a particular set of external incentives (foreign aid) and external constraints (SAPs). By the end of the 1980s, Nigeria had received billions of dollars in foreign aid. In that same decade, Nigeria had additionally implemented several SAP policies that included foreign exchange and trade reform, business and agriculture regulations, and structural measures to stabilize resource allocation. Moreover, these external conditions were introduced in Nigeria without the proper institutional integrity to manage fiscal and monetary policies effectively. Consequently, TCM became both the implementor of economic development policy and the mediator of development capital. The power position of TCM now shifted to include not only political power but also economic power. A change that became permanent as capital accumulation and allocation began to define elite political public positions.

The third external variable follows directly from the last. With TCM at the center of Nigeria’s economic development programs, the adverse effects were immediate, and the development outcomes were significant. World Bank and IMF conditionalities created several market distortions. The SAP program required economic adjustment policies that included the aggressive depreciation of the Naira and the adoption of volatile interest rates, both of which contributed to massive unemployment. Ultimately, Nigeria’s institutions were incapable of enforcing and sustaining such policies as they were far too underdeveloped and decentralized. Additionally, TCM was similarly unprepared to manage economic development in Nigeria as the

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position was never constituted to command and control capital so closely. The massive flows of capital and the accompanying conditions of that capital were imported to Nigeria without the requisite institutional capacity to absorb and implement them. Thus, TCM was left to manage the administration of foreign loans and the implementation of SAP. Unsurprisingly, these development measures quickly failed.

Consequently, the rapid collapse of the Nigerian economy made state institutions the sole source of resource generation, capital accumulation, and distribution. Moreover, as TCM now occupied a new position that unified political, economic, and state power, they began to manage the state as a resource reservoir. Further, as manufacturing and production severely declined, the Nigerian capitalist class gravitated to TCM-led State as a source for capital accumulation through government contracts and other nonproductive services. The result was a dramatic increase in TCM’s access to capital. Moreover, TCM now encountered capital, both internally and externally, in a completely different way.

The final external variable concerns Nigeria’s oil. Notably, the capitalist interests of multinational corporations that converged around it. By 1970 the resource position of Nigeria dramatically shifted as oil became central to economic performance, and with it came specific external capital constraints and incentives. As oil revenues grew, Nigeria’s TCM-led institutions were inundated with petrodollars. Consequently, TCM was incentivized by external capital stakeholders who paid a hefty price per barrel during the boom of the early 1970s. The massive transfer of foreign wealth to Nigeria commenced as most of the petrodollars were funneled to Nigeria’s central bank directly. However, transnational capital stakeholders were now more committed than ever to ensuring that Nigeria’s economic policy and political processes remained
consistent with Neoliberal ideology to continue to facilitate their capital advantage in Nigeria. With Nigeria deeply inserted into global value chains, MNCs safeguarded and promoted free-market economic policies, which, amongst other consequences, contributed to TCM’s ability to pursue their economic self-interests through new modes of capital exchange and accumulation. Furthermore, oil revenue and the entire production process, while overseen on a federal level, were very much influenced by external stakeholders. TCM now had to contend with both development policy conditions and policy pressures from MNCs. Moreover, capital flows from oil combined with capital flows from foreign loans so that TCM once more became the mediator and allocator of massive inflows of foreign capital.

Together these four external variables are directly related to global flows of capital, which generated specific incentives and constraints that created a distinct relationship to capital for political agents in Nigeria, thereby transforming military politicians into Capitalist Militicians. TCM’s subsequent choices within the new political-institutional landscape fomented abusive and corrupt action. Specifically, the interests of external global capitalist stakeholders were manifested through international financial institutions that formed a vertical power relationship with TCM by mandating development policy and imposing a particular form of capital allocation in Nigeria. Internal agitations for capital exchange and resource distribution amongst TCM ruling coalition resulted in new avenues for corruption to arise in addition to the development of different forms of abuse in terms of power and position.

My research has explained how global capital incentivized or constrained political agents to pursue specific courses of action over others. The outcome of these actions and the structural transformation of political institutions created a new state actor, TCM, that developed new
pathways for corruption and formed new techniques for capital exchange. However, the exogenous variables that instigate TCM did not occur in isolation; rather, they worked in conjunction with specific internal conditions that together, constitutively shaped political power, the making of TCM, and the development of corruption. Therefore, understanding the rise of TCM further requires the supplemental examination of four primary endogenous variables of Nigeria’s political institution, as discussed in chapter 4. They include, 1) Institutional underdevelopment, 2) Institutional incoherence, 3) Institutional political materialism, and 4) Institutional capital consciousness.

The dysfunction and underdevelopment of Nigeria’s institutions is a critical internal component of TCM’s emergence. The primary source of this institutional deficiency, I argue, is the absence of national war and external threat. Building off Tilly’s argument on state-making, Nigeria’s inactivity in interstate war precluded the development of capable centralized state institutions. Ironically, deliberate modes to concentrate power on a federal level, many of which occurred as a consequence of external development strategies of state-led industrialization, were enacted without the institutional structures to facilitate it. That is, post-independence Nigeria was a disconnected federation of states with unified power aspirations. However, the ambitions of central power were not congruent with the country’s ability or capacity to centralize. As a result, a particular institutional logic of political functionality was improperly passed, promoted, and proclaimed. Nigeria presented itself as institutionally capable, mainly as a direct result of

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401 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States

402 Direct evidence of the many formations and reformations of republics and constitutions that were modeled after UK parliament and US system of democracy without strong institutional history or logic of either. Further constitution of 1999 was directly handed from military regime of Abbubakar to civilian regime of Obasanjo. At every turn Nigeria sought to centralize power federally, without the structures to effectively do so.

265
externally imposed development policies that were consistently premised on state functionality, namely, a state’s ability to act or purposefully refrain from action. When in actuality, by the late twentieth century, Nigeria’s institutions were no more functional and formally developed to effectively implement international neoliberal economic policy, than the immediate post-independence institutions of 1960 were.

The second internal variable is Nigeria’s lack of institutional coherence, specifically concerning the military politics combination. The military’s insertion into Nigerian politics began pre-independence as soldiers became more politically and ideologically aware after the British deployed them for WWII. In the following period between independence and civil war, the military further traversed into the political arena by leading government takeovers, which at the time were based on perceived domestic security threats. That is, post-civil war, Nigeria’s State leadership did not want to risk further instability by abdicating power to civilian rule. Instead, the military sought to safeguard the federation by maintaining power in the short term. Their presence, however, would not be temporary as the military position in politics developed significantly post-civil war. By 1970, the formal combination of institutions commenced. Nigeria’s political institution became militarized just as Nigeria’s military became politicized, and the line between the two quickly eroded. During this same period, Nigeria entered a global economic community that expected a certain level of state-led coordinated development and institutional coherence, which the military-political combination significantly lacked. Accordingly, without coherent and established institutions to carry out such strategies and industrialization programs, the military, which was now highly politicized, became the only institution left to mediate and manage the dictates of external capital stakeholders. The military-
political nexus significantly impacted the coherence of Nigeria’s institutions in that it precluded the development of formal centralized federal capacities with clearly defined lines of demarcation regarding function and fiat.

The third internal variable is the evolution of materialism in Nigeria’s political institution. As in every political system, resources and capital are requisites for securing power and position. In Nigeria, the rise of TCM and the figure's relationship to capital both promoted and resulted in abusive materialism that extended beyond the logic of political goal attainment and transformed into a logic of wealth procurement and social superiority. The accumulation and allocation of capital became a significant characteristic for both TCM and the institutional environment in which the figure exists. Nigeria’s political institution was not fortified, and further, lacked established processes and procedures to manage and regulate. Consequently, Nigeria’s institutional ability to mediate the relationship between public positions and the public was minimal. TCM’s economic interactions, therefore, invaded the private sector as they began to operate within and across different social spaces. TCM eventually occupied a public position that was both, primarily defined by the flow and exchange of capital, and structured with increased proximity to public resources and private interests alike. The rise of TCM brought with it a particular materialism that redefined the political institution in Nigeria, which operated as a vehicle for capital accumulation, allocation, and abuse.

The final variable related to Nigeria's political institutions is the growth of capitalist consciousness that grew amongst the masses. TCM’s relationship to external capitalist interests and subsequent management of internal capital had a damaging effect on the broader social system in Nigeria. First, the public observed then mimicked the abusive behavior of TCM.
Research in this study has identified a convincing link between TCM’s acts of corruption concerning capital exchange, and the broader public’s impression of similar modes of behavior, whereby the former was a direct influence upon the latter. Second, the capitalist consciousness TCM personified led to a hero effect. The public regarded the figure's accumulative action as both representational and aspirational. In many ways, the external vertical power relationship that redefined capital for TCM was reproduced internally, and the Nigerian public received cues on the nature of capital from the top down. Therefore, as capital was seen as an object of accumulation and an instrument of power, the message for Nigerians was exceedingly apparent. Attain as much as possible, from whomever possible, whenever possible, using whatever possible, wherever possible - with the primary venue being the state. In this sense, the arguments for the diffusion of social capital\(^\text{403}\) have more relevance to TCM’s formation than with colonialism, as is typically argued. Nevertheless, political materialism in Nigeria’s political institution morphed into a sort of imbued consciousness to the public, whose relationship to capital accumulation was redefined, as capital was publicly perceived through the eyes of TCM.

Together, the four endogenous conditions exist and function in conjunction with the four exogenous variables to explain how external capitalist interests transformed Nigeria’s political actor. Namely, external capital redefined politics by reconfiguring the power positions in Nigeria’s political institution. As actors got reordered, TCM was constructed. Moreover, TCM’s subsequent accumulative actions enabled, advanced, and expanded corruption. Specifically, TCM established new methods of capital exchange and capital transfer within the public-private dialectic.

\(^{403}\) See, Bayart, The State in Africa and Adebanwi, and Obadare, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria for detailed examples of social capital models of cultural history relating to Nigeria’s contemporary corruption.
As this study is not posing a strictly sequential argument, the internal and external mechanisms outlined above are not necessarily particularly ordered. Instead, they are mutually constitutive, whereby the development of one reinforces the other in significant ways. Therefore, examining single variables like oil or SAP policy does not produce the most significant explanatory outcome. Similarly, the exploration of particular mechanisms like the military politics nexus, or the absence of war, does not most readily uncover significant links to corruption. Rather, the key to corruption analysis is in comprehending how the relationship between both exogenous and endogenous variables is part of TCM’s dialectic of power and position. The focus, therefore, is not only on the actions or the behaviors of TCM. Instead, the focus primarily lies with understanding the relationship between the external construction of the actor, the formation of the position, and the reordering of the institutions.

**CONTRASTING CORRUPTION THROUGH A CO-EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK**

The framework for studying TCM reveals significant insights into the concept itself, particularly in contrast to other parallel figures. In aligning TCM with actors in other settings, consider, for example, Iran, Angola, Italy, or the Philippines. Each country has a specific constellation of external capital variables that interact with internal institutional conditions. Whether this interrelationship results in a version of TCM is not necessarily a meaningful outcome. Instead, the examination of the analytical framework, the internal-external dialectic, is of greater importance for discerning how corruption advances. TCM is the distinct outcome of the internal-external dynamic observed in Nigeria, to which there is no direct comparison. The massive amounts of transnational capital flowing through loans, investments, and resources are unique to Nigeria. The confluence of foreign capital also occurred at the particular moment when
globalized economic development policies converged upon Nigeria's position as a transitory state absent of interstate conflict. Furthermore, Nigeria possessed weak, underdeveloped institutions, complicated by immature decentralized processes. Therefore, corruption’s development in Nigeria is distinct to the development pathway of Nigeria more broadly, inclusive of its historical and contemporary internal and external inputs.

In this sense, the most distinctive features of TCM in Nigeria is that first, TCM operates according to the logic of capital accumulation, not simply for purposes related to the preservation of political power. Second, the duration and substitutability of the individual members of the TCM symbolize a figure that most accurately represents the position rather than the person. Therefore to compare autocratic dictators like Mobutu in Zaire, Gaddafi in Libya, Franco in Spain, or Stroessner in Paraguay is to misunderstand TCM by misidentifying the concept as a ruler, instead of a role. Although such leaders may share military intersectionality with politics and capital on the surface, these two primary differences remain. If a strong case of comparison for TCM is to be presented, oligarchs in Russia provide the most useful parallel.

When contrasting TCM with Russian oligarchs, it is critical to identify the similarity in their respective endogenous and exogenous frameworks of development. That is, just as external capital transformed internal institutions in Nigeria to create TCM and produce corruption. So too did external capital shift institutional configurations in Russia to produce new avenues for

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404 First, the extended decades-long rule of each ruler speaks to a different capital logic of political preservation and power than that of TCM. These military heads of state-operated primarily by a logic of power preservation, not of capital accumulation. Moreover, capital accumulation, though a component of power, is not the priority or ordering logic of these authoritarian rulers, whereas, for TCM, capital is paramount and takes precedence over other goal attainments.

405 Second, the nature of the prolonged rule of each head of state further speaks to the individualized nature of their respective power and position. For example, there has only been one Mobutu and one Gaddafi. However, there have been multiple Capitalist Militicians in Nigeria, many of whom exist concurrently.
corruption. In both cases, the political institution became a venue for capital accumulation and exchange and resulted in new modes of abusive behavior and corruption.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union by the end of the twentieth century, Russia began to privatize in a process that transferred massive amounts of wealth to Russia’s business elite. Specifically, Russian oligarchs emerged as a result of an international market liberalization ideology that was accepted by President Gorbachev. However, during this transitional period, since most of the former communist state institutions were failing. Several state assets were transferred to private businesspeople. Additionally, Russia’s transition to a market-based economy allowed the arbitraging of resources like oil and gas against world market prices for significant gains to commence. The smuggling of foreign goods for sale on the domestic black market also surged during this period. These are two examples of the many ways in which external capitalist interest/ideology transformed internal actors' relationship to capital and formed new processes of accumulation. Such processes were managed by oligarchs, who, it turns out, were primarily former government officials, their relatives, or close associates. The actors, therefore, leveraged former positions to quickly and cheaply acquire state assets, which were used as vehicles for extreme capital accumulation. Therefore in Russia, external capitalist interests, certainly in combination with ideological interests, reconfigured internal institutions in a way that introduced a new state agent of accumulation who operated in an undefined lawless system in pursuit of political power and private capital. Thus, although the exact formation of Russian oligarchs and Nigerian Capitalist Miltonicians are vastly different, the exogenous-

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endogenous framework through which each can be understood and from where new modes of corruption can be identified is strikingly similar. Particularly when analyzing this dialectic during transitional periods of state development.

**FUTURE IMPLICATIONS**

There are implications both for applying these concepts to other contexts as well as for the future of Nigeria. First, the exploration of TCM can be significantly instructive for current transitional developing countries. The Arab Spring, for example, saw the ousting of authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and the subsequent political transitions that transpired. Some scholarship contends that issues of abusive power and corruption by ruling regimes in Libya and Egypt, for example, motivated the Arab Spring in the first place. However, less than ten years later, corruption is reportedly perceived to be higher post-spring compared to pre-spring.\(^{408}\) Other scholars more closely align with the analytical framework of this study in arguing that global economic integration contributes to the demise of national authoritarianism on the one hand and the rise of corruption on the other. Specifically, Salamey contends, “Post-Arab Spring politics are a product of globalization’s economic and social liberalization. The global market and privatization have fundamentally deconstructed centralized autocratic rule over state and society while facilitating corruption and selective development.”\(^{409}\) In using the TCM framework as a guide, there is a definite linkage in the Arab Spring context of external capital interests in the form of economic liberalization, directly transforming internal institutions in a way that

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engenders new waves of corruption. In this sense, TCM’s study pursued throughout this work can immediately be instructive in the context of developing states.

The concepts in this study can further be applied to the future of Nigeria and the prospect of increased corruption. Nigeria has entered a new phase of economic development not wholly based on industrialization, but on technology. With this new wave of economic growth comes new avenues for capital to be inserted into the accumulative logic of Nigeria’s institutions. On the one hand, TCM can continue with its customary modes of capital accumulation, become anachronistic, and ultimately become less impactful with regard to corruption. This is evident in certain sectors such as entertainment with Nollywood, which currently operates outside of military and state influence, yet at $800million in annual revenue, represents Nigeria’s second-largest export sector after oil.\(^{410}\) There is nothing in TCM’s development history that suggests anything other than adaption and acclimatization. Therefore, on the other hand, TCM may more likely develop the technical ability to produce new forms of corruption within the new economic development environment. For example, in recent decades, Nigeria has witnessed massive technology-fueled fraud phishing scams aimed at extorting foreign capital. The schemes are based mainly on TCM's logic of state and political power and capital relating to the diffusion of a culture of illegality and a consciousness of corruption that has been observed amongst society since the rise of the TCM.

Most recently, Nigeria has developed a domestic technology ecosystem ripe with innovation that has attracted significant investment interest from transnational capital in the form


of private equity and venture capital funding. This perhaps is the next resource to be leveraged towards corruption, capital accumulation, and allocation. Alternatively, it is equally possible that TCM remains at the center of military, political, and capital elitism in Nigeria, continuing their mode of capital extraction and transfer from public office for private gain. Whichever form corruption takes in Nigeria’s future, this study has conclusively demonstrated and described how corruption became so distinct in Nigeria historically. By presenting an analytical framework centered on the discovery of a new institutional agent, TCM, the problem of corruption in Nigeria can now be far better understood, explained, and examined.

Moreover, concerning Nigeria’s development story of corruption, the framework and conclusion of this study prove most persuasive when compared to extant literature that aims to explain corruption in Nigeria. This study is unique in that it has employed a hybrid model of analysis with a co-evolutionary exogenous and endogenous framework for several reasons. First, historically, singular variable models have proven incomplete. Studies that examine corruption in Nigeria with frameworks that focus on a primary unit of analysis are customarily inadequate and display deficiencies in their ability to account for corruption over time. In the Nigerian case, colonialism has been used in this manner to explain the socio-cultural antecedents of corruption. This method is apparent in Joseph’s,\textsuperscript{412} prebendalism argument, and Adebanwi’s\textsuperscript{413} neopatrimonialism study. By focusing primarily on internal configurations that result from the historical residue of colonialism, such studies disregard the impact of the more extensive world

\textsuperscript{412} Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics
\textsuperscript{413} Adebanwi, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria
economic system and geopolitical environment might have on local political institutions and corruption.

The converse is equally valid. A competing group of Nigeria corruption studies focuses almost entirely on external economic variables that act upon Nigeria. For example, Karl presents a resource dependency argument that seeks to explain corruption through Nigeria’s oil economy by focusing only on foreign capital stakeholder’s interests. Similarly, Ebohon produces a rent-seeking model of Nigerian corruption rooted in the competitive landscape for energy resources and capitalist claims to it. External models of analysis tend to overlook significant internal features that either interrelate with the external or are its direct byproduct or consequence.

The many mono-causal models and single variable frameworks that aim to explain corruption in Nigeria, be it arguments highlighting colonialism, culture, tribalism, geography, or resources, all get the story wrong as they all operate from an incomplete causal vantage. Conversely, other multi-causal models, while presenting a more inclusive framework for corruption analysis, mostly display insufficient or incoherent connectivity of their respective endogenous and exogenous variables. For example, economic dependency-based models like Yates, sometimes incorporate state institutions in their analysis. Historical Institutional-based models like Bayart might likewise incorporate the global economic landscape in their investigation. Both methods appear integrated but present unfinished models that are methodologically limited, as their proposed synthesized analytical variables are often disjointed.

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414 See Karl, The Paradox of Plenty
415 See Ebohon, State and Rentier Capitalism in Nigeria
Corruption’s distinct emergence in Nigeria from 1970-2015 has been explained here through the historical examination of the making of TCM. However, there are equally essential insights concerning the prospect of TCM’s future in Nigeria as well. Although I mark the height of TCM era in the late 1980s to late 1990s, TCM’s reign has hardly run its course, and its influence is undoubtedly here to stay. Mainly evidenced by TCM’s continued leadership and involvement in Nigeria’s civilian democratic governments, corruption will likely continue to expand and evolve in Nigeria. Further, TCM can potentially redefine and remake itself from a renewed intersectionality of politics, military, and capital that responds to new forms of transnational capitalist interests and the presence of more contemporary capitalists stakeholders in Nigeria.

Although Nigeria’s many development and economic ills remain unsolved, this study effectively traces the rise of corruption. By applying the lessons herein, we can continue to track corruption’s development pathway through the continued evolution of Nigeria’s Capitalist Militician. As the figure grew, so too did corruption. Irrespective of form, this contemporary institutional capitalist in Nigeria will always pursue capital. Therefore, whether military head of state, democratically elected political leader, oil magnate, or rugged soldier counting Naira on a dark road between Lagos and Enugu, “You must pay them.”
APPENDIX A
MAPPING AND TRACKING CO-EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK

In investigating the development of corruption in Nigeria, scholarship has equally pursued internal mechanisms and external mechanisms alike. Typically, these studies maintain a dichotomous framing of “either-or” analysis. But how does one fully capture a reality such as corruption when multiple complex variables mutually evolve but are not mutually examined? That is, to achieve a complete understanding of corruption, both internal and external modes of analysis must be considered and investigated together.

This study proposes a co-evolutionary framework that synthesizes external capital variables identified in the form of transnational capitalist interests, ideology, and policy, along with internal institutional conditions. As the former acts upon the latter, a new power position is formed to attend to transnational capital incentives and constraints. Through this process, the new occupant of renewed institutional power engages in certain practices within the shifting institutional environment that influences both the internal institutions in which the figure presides, and the external power relationship of which the figure is presided over, resulting in reimagined modes of articulated power that result in capital abuse and corruption.

The co-evolutionary analysis in this dissertation borrows heavily from Ang’s model that depicts political and economic development in China. Accordingly, the framework proposed here has been constructed by first identifying Angs’ four steps for mapping coevolution, and conceptualizing the manner in which their elements interact to explain corruption in the Nigerian case.

\footnote{Ang, Yuen Yuen. How China Escaped the Poverty Trap, Cornell University Press, 2016 The 4 Steps to Mapping Coevolution is directly adapted from this work.}
STEP ONE - Identify two separate domains or “spheres of action” that coexist in a larger environment or evaluative system. The study of corruption naturally satisfies this step as scholarship has inherently identified the domains.

1. Domains of Significance - Exogenous (external) and Endogenous (internal)

STEP TWO - Identify a significant time period that contains impactful characteristics of each period. This may include dramatic shifts and structural breaks, extreme transitions, or watershed events. I discuss the periodization for this study at length in the Introductory chapter, the end of Nigeria’s civil war in 1970, and the military’s immediate insertion into politics, provided a natural entry point for analysis.


STEP THREE - Identify dominant traits and characteristics of each domain. In social science analysis, dominant traits normally are signified by qualitative historical changes. Accordingly, my work paid special attention and observed qualitative differences within the external and internal environments that have been identified by interpreting the function, operation, practice, and outcome of particular arrangements across a designated period of time.

3. Dominant Traits (Four External Capital Variables and Four Internal Institutional Conditions)

STEP FOUR - Identify mechanisms of mutual influence and significant junctures. After establishing the dominant traits of each domain, I took a step back to decipher whether
there was a mechanism that influenced both internal and external elements. Based on the information collected, and with a pre thought out theoretical construction of a remade military political actor in Nigeria, The Capitalist Militican emerged as the fulcrum to external variables and internal conditions as the figure both influences and is influenced by each at multiple junctures across the significant time period established.

4. Mechanism of Mutual Influence (Nigeria State Agent = TCM)

Through the mapping and tracking process above, I have produced a coevolutionary framework that attends to a distinctive shortfall of much scholarship on corruption. However, my study does not profess to have definitively, completely, and decisively proven each step of each element in the coevolutionary frame I have mapped out. Accordingly, my objective is not to present an all-encompassing chain of analysis. There are certainly elements left unexamined and relationships left unidentified. It would take an extraordinarily voluminous effort to capture the entire universe of causal and explanatory domains. Rather, my objective is to identify combinational points of analysis that constitutively reflect the realities of Nigeria’s corruption condition.

The co-evolutionary map below speaks to the intersectionality of external and internal domains of action that illustrate the complex interactions of variables and mechanisms for explaining corruption. This map is intended to serve a symbolic purpose by offering a visual illustration of how endogenous and exogenous domains collide and interact through cross currents of cause, effect, input, and output. Note the constitutive relationship of endogenous institutional conditions and exogenous capital variables flow directly across in either direction
and diagonally. However, all interactions are mediated, managed, and distilled through TCM, whose power and influence commensurately increases as the figure’s role expands.

**COEVOLUTIONARY MAP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENDOGENOUS</th>
<th>TCM</th>
<th>EXOGENOUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC LIBERAL IDEOLOGY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Biafran Civil War</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Enters Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of Bretton Woods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup &amp; Attempted Coups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mont Pelerin / Neoliberalism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oil Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Capital Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONAL INCOHERENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DEVELOPMENT POLICIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Proliferates Politics and Bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization and Industrialization Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Military Coups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneven Distribution of Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Loans and SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Capital Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONAL MATERIALISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>UNEVEN OUTCOMES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Dominates Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Devaluation of Currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military in Control of Capital Flows</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hyper Inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Managing Sectors and Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Erosion of Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Is Reservoir For Capital and Business</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereign Debt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital Allocation and Distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crony Capitalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF CORRUPTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FDI, MNC, NATURAL RESOURCES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military / Civilian Joint Pursuit of Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td>PetroDollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Government Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Capital Policy Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Oil Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Free Market Capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Massive Capital Flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent Seeking and Clientelism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational Capital Crimes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS</strong></td>
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APPENDIX B
QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION: MILITARY INTERVIEWS

I utilize qualitative research techniques that include semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and formatted questions. During the two years on the ground in Nigeria, I successfully conducted 62 one-on-one interviews with active and retired officers in the Nigerian military. The one on one personal interviews contributes vital sources of information. All interviews were conducted in English and transcribed in ‘word’ format from raw audio. Additionally, extensive notes were taken during interviews and throughout all stages of fieldwork. The information gathered from these interviews was subjective. However, an earnest attempt was made to present accounts from various perspectives and levels within the Nigerian military.

Military participants were selected without bias using a semi-randomization selection model considering three factors. First, although the military is comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Nigerian Army was given priority for several reasons. 1) The overwhelming majority of political actors, both historically and presently, came from this service branch. 2) The Army is the largest service branch both by membership and budget. 3) The Army was designed for security, law enforcement, and operation of the state, whereas the Navy and Air Force core obligations are medical support, rescue, and transportation.

Second, as the intention of the interviews was to ascertain specific characteristics, trends, and consistencies over time, participants include both active and retired members of Nigeria’s

\[\text{417} \text{ All former heads of state studied under TCM model have all been Army officers.}
\]

\[\text{418} \text{ Nigerian Army membership is over 100,00 while the Navy and Airforce combined is under 20,000. Army collects over 50% of Defense budget whit Airforce and Navy accounting for almost 40%.}
\]

\[\text{419} \text{ Army’s role in coups and government takeovers are well apparent.}
\]
military. Further, the extreme expansion of much of the corrupt activity in politics transpired decades prior. Consequently, interviewing service members who were active during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is of great importance to TCM analysis. Third, to secure a wide range of participants from the military hierarchy, respondents include both non-commissioned soldiers, ranking from Private Soldier to Master Warrant Officer, and commissioned soldiers ranking from Second Lieutenant to Four-Star General.  

With these factors in mind, participants were selected on a volunteer basis. I utilized various military networks starting with my network of established liaisons in the military at division outposts, HQ 81 and 82 Divisions in Lagos and Enugu respectively, as well as the Myhoung Barracks at the Army Military base hospital in Yaba, Lagos to gain access to a wide variety of officers. All interviews were conducted on site at the respective barracks or in adjacent military administrative offices to which I was given access. Each interview was closed door and individually conducted one on one. The average length of each interview was 38 minutes, the longest lasting just over 60 minutes and the shortest lasting just under 20 minutes.

Interview transcripts and written notes were analyzed through iterative listening and repeated re-reading, which allowed for an understanding of each interviewee’s viewpoint and perspective to come across. It also resulted in the establishment of links, corroboration, and contradictions of complex contextual factors of the many underlying relationships between relevant concepts such as economic development, capital accumulation, political institutions, and corruption. This data allowed me to more fully assess the nature of non-military functions as they relate to politics and economics or any aspirations to that end. Specifically, the military

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420 See table of military ranks in Nigeria
interviews enabled me to 1) examine the nexus of military and politics from an internal perspective, 2) assess the current and past capacity for capital accumulation and distribution while in service, or appraise the inclination to pursue such ends, and 3) gauge the extent and manner in which members of the military conceptualize corruption, past and present.

The following chart lists a small collection of military responses that were most critical and directly included in this study.\(^\text{421}\)

**KEY RESPONSES - ELITE MILITARY INTERVIEWS c.2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Response</th>
<th>Specific Indicator</th>
<th>Interviewee Rank</th>
<th>Years in Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 “Majority if not all of soldiers are interested in post service government service.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus post service</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Second Grade</td>
<td>22 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 “The political system of Nigeria has been established and is still influenced by the military.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus historically and presently</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>28 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 “Politics is dangerous game but it is better done by military.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>31 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 “Military inherently knows how to handle the government. Being in military makes going into politics much easier. In fact military and politics can be combined because there is a very strong connection between military and politics.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Connection</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>26 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 “Military and politics have to be connected. Of course soldier at the top are really connected and deep into politics. But we are all there.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus with specific mention of leadership links</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>18 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{421}\) All together, 39 specific quotations have been extracted and grouped here. However this is only a fraction of the entire universe of transcribed quotations either referenced or directly quoted in this study. A key observation is 16/39 responses that represent EXOGENOUS factors seem to be more aspirational or theoretical. These responses are more abstract in description often referencing intangible thoughts or beliefs on what soldiers can do or should do. Conversely, 23/39 responses that represent ENDOGENOUS factors seem to be more material or actual. These responses are more specific in description often referencing things that have been done, things that are, or things that more concrete signify action.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key Response</th>
<th>Specific Indicator</th>
<th>Interviewee Rank</th>
<th>Years in Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>“Normally most soldiers will want to stay in government even after retirement. Obasanjo is not unique. It is because of our interruption of democracy. The influence during military regime is the same influence after we retire.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus over time</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>“Senior officers after retirement look to hold on to power with appointment in government. They are used to eating the national cake, so they don’t want to share that arrangement.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus and corruption</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>33 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>“Being in military makes the road to politics so easy.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>28 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>“Most soldiers have the ambition to enter politics. Especially the high ranking officers. The low ranking is less interest because they do not have the same connections to money and power. But those that have, it makes things so easy. Any connection they make they can use, and many of their mates are greatly involved in government. So things are then very simple.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus with corruption, circles of power, and cronyism</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>32 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>“Many people and ex officers love to join politics because if your in service of country it is a natural line to cross. As a military man you can use any resource you want to take action.”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus as institutional parallel including resource abuse</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>“If given opportunity I would definitely go into politics, why not”</td>
<td>Military - Politics Nexus as individual ambition</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>“I have so much interest in doing other business work even as a soldier. Being in military gives me more opportunity to move in business. You see many soldiers are interested in business money making opportunities. A soldier can be engaged in all jobs, even those we are not supposed to do.”</td>
<td>Individual Relationship to Capital and Accumulation</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>13 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Response</td>
<td>Specific Indicator</td>
<td>Interviewee Rank</td>
<td>Years in Service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I thought maybe if I join the army I can get some of the soldiers incentives. When you compare other parastatals of Nigeria, the military has one of highest and consistent payment packages. But I would still like to become like a businessman and have a private business.”</td>
<td>Institutional Relationship to Capital and Accumulation</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>30 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“When I joined the military it was a noble profession but presently you see armed forces and it is used for business. And those soldiers at the top have much influence”</td>
<td>Combined Individual and Institutional Relationship to Capital</td>
<td>Second Leutenant</td>
<td>26 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“50% of military engages in some sort of business even while in service. I myself am open for more business but have no chance yet.”</td>
<td>Combined Individual and Institutional Relationship to Capital</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Being in military makes connecting to business much easier. As a soldier you get that exposure to business. Most soldiers would agree.”</td>
<td>Combined Individual and Institutional Relationship to Capital</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>26 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I joined military because there was no job in the country at that time. At least in military one can develop himself and go to school or link into business. My being a soldier makes business very easy. By the time I retire I will surely be a business man.”</td>
<td>Link to Capital as a Motivating Characteristic in Service</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>19 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Of course there is business interest outside of soldiering. The job does not permit that, but most have the idea and many engage.”</td>
<td>Informal Link to Capital and Accumulation</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“As a soldier, going into business makes things easy. Even local trading or business, they see the uniform and they cannot dupe you, they must respect the uniform. And that respect will give access to secure business.”</td>
<td>Institutional Relationship to Capital and Accumulation</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>14 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Response</td>
<td>Specific Indicator</td>
<td>Interviewee Rank</td>
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<td>20 “The economy was far better under military rule than now. Soldiers were properly taken care of, no questions asked.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital as Organizer of Economic Function</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>25 years</td>
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<td>21 “The economy of Nigeria was much better under military rule. The military built all the infrastructure of this country. The military made our economy boom! Nigeria was like Christmas for other African countries, during military rule. The military built the economy of Nigeria.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence and Economic Proprietorship Model of Military Control</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>33 years</td>
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<td>22 “The situation in this country is at a low point, the price of goods is high, currency value is low. It was never so bad under military.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital as Organizer of Economic (dys)Function</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td></td>
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<td>23 “This civilian rule is the worst! Now everyone behaves and acts without fear. Under military regime the power kept things proper, kept the economy flowing because there was that fear.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence and Economic Proprietorship Model of Military Control</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>26 years</td>
<td></td>
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<td>24 “Economy is worse now than under military rule. Military kept people secure, government secure, and economy secure. Military has control, civilians have no control.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence and Economic Proprietorship Model of Military Control</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>12 years</td>
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<td>25 “Military had no checks and balance or legislature. They do as they please to do. But with all of these civilian checks we have more corruption. In military corruption was at the top with the leaders. Now everyone wants to eat the cake, its corruption of the highest order.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence on TCM and Corruption as Ordering Feature</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>21 years</td>
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<td>Key Response</td>
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<td>“The law of corruption became the law of Nigeria. They do not want to resign from power because through the military came power and money in government. The motivation remains to continue to evade all the laws to cover up indecencies of the past.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence on TCM and Institutional Corruption</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>30 years</td>
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<td>“The military was able to embezzle in a major way but by very few heads. Military was able to impact, but the number in power now are so many and now they must share money and power amongst so many. It makes things worse now.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence on TCM as High Level Political Actors, and Corruption</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>19 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Yes there was corruption in military but there was a system. Now, there is lawlessness and anarchy in politics and economics. Country needs to be ruled in military form, uniform or not. Without military everything is escalated.”</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence on TCM as Ordering Feature</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>31 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>“In military rule there is order. They give you order and you carry it. Now the power is spread out too much. They say military looted, but without role of military all those monies would have been spread and squandered. Only by the military can Nigeria know what to do with that money. We are trained to kill, if you motivate us, we can do anything. If the job is to guard country or guard economy, we must do it”.</td>
<td>Transnational Capital Influence on TCM and Corruption as Ordering Feature</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Retired (over 35 years)</td>
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<td>“A soldier is engaged in all jobs, even those we are not supposed to do. So during military rule a soldier had his hand in all things. Society feels military men are very disciplined so it helps us get into position of power. But we can be very deceitful, after all, we are soldiers, we are trained.”</td>
<td>TCM Carried Out Corruption to Ensure Power</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>33 years</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>“They say soldier come soldier go, barrack remain. But theres no secret that while soldier dey, soldier go chop! Sometime he chop small other time if he dey for top, he never go chop finish.”</td>
<td>TCM Corruption With Reference to Capital Exchange and Accumulation</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>“As far as they are in power they remain above the law. The money was used as influence and that is why the same people are still there until tomorrow.”</td>
<td>TCM Carried Out Corruption to Ensure Power</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>“An aspect of military officers, when they see there is nothing to do after retirement they still feel big. So they start looting before they leave so that can live like big man. And then they go back to loot more. This is the new attitude of officers. To loot! Most of the new soldiers are not here to do work, they are here for wealth and money, thats all.”</td>
<td>TCM Corruption With Reference to Capital Exchange and Accumulation</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>“Under this democracy there is stealing and corruption everywhere. Democracy has no control. Everyone behaves as they wish without consequence. If military gave job, they gave it with fear and supervision. Now there is no inspection, no force, no supervision. The military would dispense money to the state, this democracy shares money anyhow”</td>
<td>TCM Managed External Constraints by Adopting Corrupt Behavior</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>“They tried to learn from us, but they do not have that order of power. Every one has power so no one has power. So economy breaks down. Most of the public enterprises are no more there, they have been privatized. In that privatization came monopolization and more corruption. There are no more government enterprises and no development in our country. So the Naira always continues to devalue.”</td>
<td>Long Term Effects of TCM Power and Corruption</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Response</td>
<td>Specific Indicator</td>
<td>Interviewee Rank</td>
<td>Years in Service</td>
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<td>“Everyone wants oil money or oil block but they do not have the same control as military. The power dynamic is spread out and that makes things ineffective.”</td>
<td>TCM Corruption Reproduced and Reinforced Corrupt Activity Throughout Society</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Second Grade</td>
<td>34 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Anyone going into politics today is going to enrich their pocket, including former soldiers. But everyone in politics now thinks they can behave like a soldier, they think they can loot. But we did not only loot, we developed this country. They say there is structure in democracy, but then why is there more corruption now?”</td>
<td>TCM Brought About Compounding Brand of Institutionalized Corruption</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Retired (over 35 years)</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The country wants to blame military. They talk about Abacha and IBB [Babangida], but lets talk about all the names with EFCC. If soldier is bad, then ordinary man became worse”</td>
<td>TCM Corruption Reproduced and Reinforced Corrupt Activity Throughout Society</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>33 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The problem was fuel and petroleum was seen as so rewarding, the money was too sweet. So we abandoned all public works and civil structures. And now its civilian government, they continue to ignore those same industries. Ask the common man on the road, anyone will say it. The fuel economy is still number one. And the rewards from it, the money is still too sweet. Whether you wear uniform or suit and tie.”</td>
<td>Long Term Effects of TCM Power and Corruption</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Retired (over 35 years)</td>
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APPENDIX C
QUANTITATE DATA COLLECTION: PUBLIC SURVEYS

I utilize quantitative data techniques that includes structured surveys and formatted questionnaires. Civilian participants were directly engaged during my field work in Nigeria. While in the field, I administered written surveys and polls amongst a cross section of the Nigerian population that included approximately 200 respondents comprised of university graduates, business professionals, local market workers, traders and general civilians. Participants were primarily engaged across metropolitan areas of Lagos including; Ikoyi, Victoria Island, Lekki, Ikeja, and Yaba. A secondary grouping of surveys was also administered in Abuja and Enugu respectively.

Public recruiting for participants was initiated openly in social gathering places such as malls, marketplaces, churches, business centers, and banks. The singular selection criteria was age; participants self reported as being twenty-one years old and above. My intention was to gauge the degree to which the public can 1) Understand and define the concept of corruption as it pertains to abuses of power and capture of capital in Nigeria; 2) identify a correlation or connection between corruption, capital, politics, and the military to evidence the existence of a Capitalist Militician figure or position of power, both contemporarily and historically, and 3), gauge the extent to which the public identifies a link between TCM and acts of political corruption.

All participants were asked to complete a 10-15 question survey, including multiple choice, true / false, fill in the blank, and ranking questions on corruption, capital, politics, and the military. Measures were taken to guard against selection and response biases. To this end,

422 See IRB approved survey questionnaire sample attached.
interval questions were uniformly structured with precise language and clear choices. Ethical considerations were taken into account during the preparation, compilation, and analysis of the data to ensure the quality and integrity of my research, which was conducted under the rubric of JHU IRB. All participating subjects engaged in the study with autonomy and confidentiality. The subjects further acted autonomously with the informed consent of participation. All participants and respondents engaged in the research with no danger of harm, and as independent and impartial contributors. The respect for the dignity of the research participants was prioritized, and protection of their privacy was assured as anonymity was paramount. No names or identifiable aliases were used in the collection of the data. All interview subjects were given numbers, while survey participants remained anonymous. There was no deception or duplicity about the aims or objectives of the research, as all communication was done with honesty and transparency. Collectively, the data confirm analytical premises that order the hypothesis and causal argument of the dissertation. Additionally, the data further reveals the fascinating dynamics present when contrasting the public and the military’s respective perceptions about corruption, economic development, and modes of governance.

423 See IRB approved survey consent form attached
Nigeria Political Economic Research Survey

**Information**
Age______ Male / Female ____________ Education Level ______________
Employment Sector (if not Employed N/A) ______________

**Check all that you regard as corruption**
Use of public resource for personal gain____  
Employment not based on merit____
Lack of Ethics______
Abuse of Power ______
Denying people Human Rights____
Mismanagement of funds_____
Misappropriation of funds_____
Offering a bribe_____
Accepting a bribe____
Acquiring money or resources dishonestly_______
Engaging in illegal activity______
Lying____

**Which Of The Following Cause Corruption (Check Only Top 5)**
Unemployment____
Lack of Education____
Lack of Rule of Law_____
Cultural Reasons____
Tribalism____
Poor Law Enforcement________
Immorality_______
Lack of Accountability_______
Military_______
Police_______
Businessmen___________
Politicians_______
Poor Leadership_______
Greed______
Poverty_______
Abuse of Power________

Qualitative data compiled for research purposes only. Nnamdi Igbokwe, Phd, Johns Hopkins University United States of America c.2017
Nigeria Political Economic Research Survey

Agree or Disagree

It is ok for a leader to acquire wealth through corruption if they use money to help the community. __________

There is no point to reporting corruption because nothing will happen to the accused.________

Corruption is the normal way of life, it is the way things work. ______

Corruption is beneficial provided you are not caught. ______

If offered a position of power or money through corrupt means, I would take it. ______

Circle ONE For Each Of The Following Questions

1) How Corrupt are different institutions / groups?
   - Police: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Politicians: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Military: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Appointed Gov Officials: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Business Executives: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Judges: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Religious Leaders: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt
   - Educators: Not Corrupt, Some Corrupt, Most Corrupt, All Corrupt

2) Which Group is Most likely to Solicit a bribe?
   Police, Military, Politician, Gov Official, Businessmen, Judges, Religious Leaders, Educators

Qualitative data compiled for research purposes only. Nnamdi Igboke, PhD, Johns Hopkins University United States of America c.2017

293
3) Have you ever paid bribe for public service?
Y / N

4) Have you ever paid bribe for private service?
Y / N

5) In Nigeria, What is the corruption level now compared to during military rule?
not corrupt  less corrupt  same corrupt  more corrupt

6) Who controls capital (money) in Nigeria?
Police  Military  Politician  Government Official  Businessmen

7) Who makes the most money in Nigeria?
Police  Military  Politician  Government Official  Businessmen

8) What is connection of Police to corruption today?
- None,  Low  High  Extreme
What is connection of Police to corruption historically?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

9) What is connection of Military to corruption today?
- None  Low  High  Extreme
What is connection of Military to corruption historically?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

10) What is connection of Gov Officials to corruption today?
- None  Low  High  Extreme
What is connection of Gov Officials to corruption historically?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

11) What is the connection Between Military and Politics?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

12) What is the connection Between Police and Politics?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

13) What is the connection Between Military and Money?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

14) What is the connection Between Police and Money?
- None  Low  High  Extreme

Qualitative data compiled for research purposes only. Nnamdi Igbooke, PhD, Johns Hopkins University, United States of America c.2017
APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA COLLECTION

Data collection was achieved through both primary and secondary sources. The primary data sources included archival records both onsite and in exclusive private library collections. The secondary data sources primarily included government publications, financial dossiers, economic surveys, research documents, and review articles. Further valuable insight was additionally gained from the analysis of research studies conducted by government agencies, economic commissions, civil society organizations and non government institutions. Statistical analysis of Nigeria Federal and Ministerial Fiscal histories and reporting documents. The focus was on National Electric Power Authority, Nigeria Communication Commission, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, and Central Bank of Nigeria records. Onsite archives consulted include library at University of Ibadan Department of Political Science, archives of Ibadan Social and Evaluation Research team, legal databases from National Archives in Ibadan, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Archives in Abuja, and media clipping archives from National Library of Nigeria in Abuja and Lagos of private national periodicals that include: This Day, Punch, and The Guardian.

Data analysis also encompassed an extensive review of three kinds; the first involved a review of collections from the Sheridan Libraries at Johns Hopkins University pertaining to capitalist development, the political economy of development, and modernization. Second, I consulted archives at the Melville Herskovits Library of African Studies at Northwestern University to uncover fiscal & budgetary histories of military-led regimes and economic records of financial crimes in Nigeria, as well as FDI records and structural adjustment documentation of the World Bank, IMF, OECD, Overseas Development Council (ODC), and International Finance
Third, I conducted research at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, where I spent time as a research fellow reviewing archives and repositories on twentieth century liberal capitalist development. I examined primary source material on the formation of nineteenth and twentieth century liberal global economic policy. I mainly investigated the orthodoxy of economic development policy in the twentieth century by consulting: The Register of Fredreich A Von Hayek Papers, Letters of the Great Britain Register of the Institute of Economic Affairs, and the Register of the Mont Pèlerin Society Records. Through this multiplicity of global economic and policy collections examined, I was able to uncover an exhaustive written history relating to the idea revolution that piloted a return to liberal economic policy.

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      Defense Committee: Angus Burgin, Erin Chung, Michael Degani, Michael
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2004  B.A.  Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston IL
      Cert  Comparative Politics of EU, L’Institut D’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Paris France
      2002- 2003

GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND AWARDS

2018  Silas Palmer Doctorate Research Fellowship, Stanford University Hoover Institution

2016  Doctoral Student Research Grant, The Johns Hopkins University

2005  MA Award - expedient degree completion - 9 months, The Johns Hopkins University

2004  Howell Academic Scholar Award, Northwestern University

2002  Nolan Academic Scholar Award, Northwestern University

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

The Johns Hopkins University
Fall 2015  Social Policy and Economic Inequality (Teaching Assistant)
Fall 2014  Introduction to American Politics (Teaching Assistant)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Field Work
2016 - 2018  Qualitative Interview Research in Nigeria
2017 - 2018  Quantitative Survey Research in Nigeria

Archival Work
2018  Hoover Institution and Archives (January - March)
2017  Herskovitz Library of African Studies (May-June)
2016 - 2017  National Archives, EFCC Archives, Federal Archives, Nigeria
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2013 - 2016  International Development and Sustainability Consultant, Contract
2010 - 2013  Global Macro Event Driven Hedge Fund, Director Investor Relations, SC Capital
2007 - 2010  Private Equity Research Specialist, R. Smith
2005 - 2007  Management Consultant, Nextpoint and Boston Consulting Group

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Igbo (Nigeria) - Native (IRL Scale)
Spanish - Limited Working Proficiency (IRL Scale)
French - Elementary Proficiency (IRL Scale)