ASSESING THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE SINO-RUSSIAN DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

by
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Abstract: China and Russia’s bilateral defense relationship has strengthened significantly in recent years. The steady growth in Sino-Russian military ties has sparked a considerable debate in the academic and policymaking communities over whether the Sino-Russian defense relationship has become a de-facto military “alliance.” However, largely absent from this discussion are assessments of the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense relationship. This study utilizes Alexander Korololev’s framework for measuring alliance institutionalization to determine the level of institutionalization between China and Russia’s militaries, concluding that Beijing and Moscow’s armed forces are on the verge of “deep institutionalization.”

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Introduction

China and Russia’s growing defense relationship has generated significant consternation in the United States, which cited both Beijing and Moscow as long-term strategic competitors in its 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Both states pose serious security challenges to the United States, its allies and partners, and the U.S.-supported liberal international order. As defense ties between China and Russia deepen, a debate has emerged in the academic and policy communities over whether the relationship has become a military alliance. A Chinese-Russian military alliance - or something approximating one - would pose a severe threat to global security and stability. Understanding the extent to which China and Russia’s defense relationship meets the criteria of a military alliance is critical for the security of the United States and its allies. The following study will specifically examine the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense relationship.

A Growing Sino-Russian Entente

China and Russia’s bilateral relationship has strengthened considerably in recent years, driven by both countries’ “mutual understanding that their respective core interests are better served by closer cooperation.”\(^1\) Beijing and Moscow both have a vested interest in promoting the legitimacy of their regimes, the primacy of state sovereignty in

international affairs, and the unacceptability of Western ‘interference’ in their domestic affairs.\(^2\) Most importantly, China and Russia share a mutual perception that the United States poses an existential threat to their respective political regimes. Since 2014, the convergence of China and Russia’s geopolitical interests has been accelerated by the deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and increasing tensions between Washington and Beijing and over China’s increasing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific as well as economic and human rights issues.\(^3\)

China and Russia have strengthened ties across nearly every aspect of their relationship. The bilateral relationship is now stronger than at any point since the Sino-Soviet “unbreakable friendship” in the mid-20\(^{th}\) century.\(^4\) At a June 2018 at a summit in Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced bilateral relations are at “an all-time high,” while General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping described the relationship as “the highest-level…and strategically most significant relationship between major countries in the world.”\(^5\) In June 2019, General Secretary Xi and President Putin further growth in China and Russia’s bilateral ties, announcing an


upgrade of the Sino-Russian relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in a new era.”

Deepening Defense Ties

The most important component of China and Russia’s growing ties is their bilateral defense relationship. Beijing and Moscow have prioritized strengthening bilateral military-to-military ties by bolstering high-level defense contacts, conducting bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and increasing defense industrial cooperation. In October 2018, General Secretary Xi highlighted the growth in Sino-Russian defense ties during a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, observing that, “cooperation between the two militaries has been deepened continuously and positive achievements have been made in areas including joint drills, real combat training and military competition in recent years.” General Secretary Xi further emphasized the importance Sino-Russian defense ties have for the broader bilateral relationship, stating that "both militaries can work to deal with common security threats, create a benign external environment for their respective state development and national rejuvenation, continue to improve cooperation, and provide a solid foundation for the development of China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.”

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March 2018, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu remarked that, “Russian- Chinese [military] relations today has reached principally new unprecedented level, and have become a critical factor in keeping peace and international security.”

**Literature Review**

**A Sino-Russian Military Alliance?**

The steady growth in Sino-Russian military-to-military relations has sparked considerable debate in the academic and policymaking communities over whether the Sino-Russian defense relationship has become a de-facto military “alliance”. Stephen Blank forcefully asserts that a Sino-Russian military alliance “is exactly what has come to be.”

Graham Allison describes the relationship as a “functional military alliance,” while Nemetz describes Sino-Russo defense ties as an “ominous anti-American alliance.”

Others argue that long-held historical enmity between Beijing and Moscow as well divergence on key national interests, including economic differences and mutual concern over the potential military and geopolitical threat posed by the other, make Sino-Russo military alliance unlikely. Leon Aron writes that “the history of relations between the two countries is fraught, and they play vastly different roles in the world economy,

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making a divergence in their objectives all but unavoidable.”¹² Meick similarly assesses that, “the development of a formal alliance is unlikely due to continued policy and strategic differences as well as areas of distrust.”¹³ In September 2018, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis remarked that “I see little in the long term that aligns Russia and China.”¹⁴

A Gap in the Discussion

Surprisingly, alliance theory itself has been glaringly absent from this discussion. Recent publications on Sino-Russian defense ties have largely evaluated specific aspects of the relationship, failing to provide a comprehensive alliance framework through which to assess the overall depth of China and Russia’s military relationship and identify it on the alliance spectrum. One scholar argues that, “while there have been many descriptions and examinations of the empirical dimensions to Russia-PRC strategic ties…few have focused specifically on developing an analytical framework for systematically explaining the specific cooperative-competitive contours of the relationship.”¹⁵ For example, a recent assessment of Sino-Russian defense relations authored by Ethan Meick examines three aspects of the relationship, high-level military contacts, military exercises, and military-technical cooperation, Watts, Leberd and Englebrekt examine two criteria,

military exercises and arms sales.\textsuperscript{16} As Korolev notes, in both cases “the selection of the specific aspects that received consideration is rather ad hoc and does not sufficiently demonstrate how much, and how consistently, China-Russia military cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{17} To better understand Sino-Russian defense ties, it is necessary to ground evaluations of the relationship within alliance theory.

**Towards an Alliance Framework**

The concept of “alliances” is central to the discipline of international relations in both practice and theory. As Ken Booth notes, “Alliances have been pervasive features in both the theory of international politics and in the practice of foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{18} Accordingly, alliance theory has received significant attention from both scholars and foreign policy practitioners alike.

 Definitions of military alliances vary across the body of alliance theory literature. Some scholars espouse narrow definitions of alliances, arguing that a necessary feature of an alliance is a formal treaty explicitly outlining security commitments between two or more states. Leeds and Anac simply define alliances as “a formal agreement among independent states to cooperate militarily.”\textsuperscript{19} Morrow argues that “an alliance entails a formal commitment between the parties wherein certain specific obligations are written


Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”

Other scholars define alliances more broadly. Tertrais contends that “A broader definition of military alliances would include those that do not imply a security guarantee,” and are instead defined by “the recognition of common security interests as well as provisions for strong military cooperation to various degrees.” Walt advances a similar but slightly more precise definition of alliance – “a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states.” Walt asserts that the principal feature of any alliance, formal or informal, “is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specific set of circumstances.”

Weitzman broadly defines alliances as “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to the signatories.”

Typologies of military alliances also vary widely, reflecting sharp differences in the nature of alliance commitments and intra-alliance military cooperation. When forming an alliance, states make decisions regarding both the military obligations they are willing to incur as well as the depth and parameters of peacetime military cooperation. As Leeds and Anac note, “Leaders choose a level of formality and

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20 Ibid, 64.
26 Leeds and Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance,” 185, 186.
peacetime military coordination when committing to an alliance.”  

Benson and Clinton similarly assert that “Alliances vary in the breadth of the circumstances to which the obligations of a military alliance have application...as well as the costliness of the obligations to which the signatories commit themselves when they join the alliance.”

Alliance theorists agree that the form and substance of military alliances vary along these two axes, hereafter referred to as the “scope” and “institutionalization” of an alliance. Scope refers to “the breadth of the circumstances to which the obligations of a military alliance have application,” while institutionalization refers to “the degree to which the alliance agreement imposes peacetime and related costs on the signatories.”

Alliance theory accounts for variance in the scope of military alliances. As Walt notes, “The form of collaboration and the nature of the commitment varies widely, however. An alliance may be either offensive or defensive, for example, intended either to provide the means for an attack on some third party or intended as a mutual guarantee in the event that another state attacks one of the alliance members.”

Particularly useful in categorizing the obligations that determine the scope of military alliances is the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP). ATOP identifies five primary alliance obligations: “promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict - which ATOP further differentiates between commitments to defensive and offensive support, promises to remain neutral in the event of a conflict, promises to refrain from military conflict with one another, or promises to consult/cooperate in the event of

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27 Ibid, 186.
29 Ibid, 870.
international crises that create a potential for military conflict. ATOP labels these obligations DEFENSE, OFFENSE, NEUTRAL, NONAGG, and CONSUL. These obligations are not mutually exclusive. Thus, an alliance agreement that includes a non-aggression clause as well as a mechanism for mutual consultations in the event of war would be a NONAGG/CONSUL agreement.” 31

Alliance theorists also acknowledge that military alliances vary in their level of institutionalization – the depth of peacetime military cooperation stipulated in and formalized by the alliance agreement. As Walt notes, “At one extreme, formal alliances such as NATO are highly institutionalized, with elaborate decision-making procedures and an extensive supporting bureaucracy…at the other extreme are largely ad hoc coalitions…limited partnerships in which each member acted relatively independently.” 32

Alliance theory holds that institutionalization imposes costs on alliance members. Benson and Clinton argue “alliance commitments themselves impose varying levels of costs on alliance members beyond those associated with the risks of conflict.” 33 Thus, it follows that higher institutionalization incurs greater costs while lower institutionalization incurs lower costs. For example, “Defensive commitments that formalize joint military planning as well as requirements for peacetime military integration, the provision of aid, and military basing impose deeper costs on the alliance members than agreements that only contain defensive obligations.” 34

Alliance scholarship has generally maintained that greater institutionalization increases the effectiveness of an alliance. Leeds and Anac argue that, “greater peacetime

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34 Ibid, 868.
military coordination [institutionalization] should increase the value of an alliance, making the whole greater than the sum of its fighting effectiveness. This, in turn, should increase the incentives for allies to assist each other in conflict.”

Morrow similarly posits that while greater institutionalization imposes greater peacetime costs on alliance members, it also increases allied cohesion and warfighting capability in wartime.

Despite the significant body of academic work on military alliances, few formal frameworks exist or measuring the level of an alliance’s institutionalization. However, in his 2018 article “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation”, Alexander Korolev proposes an empirical framework for measuring alliance institutionalization (See Table 1). He identifies eight characteristics of alliances that are divided into two groups, “moderate institutionalization” and “deep institutionalization.” He writes that,

“both clusters address institutional arrangements and reflect the operational mechanics and the degree of institutionalization of an inter-military relation. The first cluster represents a moderate institutionalization of inter-military contacts, whereas cluster two represents deep institutionalization, which is a more advanced stage of alliance development and implies higher demands in terms of the interoperability of military forces and defense policy compatibility. It is reasonable to assume that a functioning alliance reaches a moderate degree of institutionalization before it moves into deep institutionalization, for which powerful incentives and political will are necessary.”

Table 1: Korolev’s Stages and Criteria of Alliance Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderate Institutionalization</th>
<th>1) Alliance treaty or agreement; 2) Mechanism of regular consultations; 3) military-technical cooperation; 4) regular military drills; 5) confidence building measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep Institutionalization</td>
<td>6) Integrated military command; 7) Joint troop placements and/or military bases exchange; 8) Common defense policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Utilizing this framework, Korolev assesses that China and Russia’s military relationship is “on the verge of an alliance.”\(^{38}\) However, Korolev’s conclusion that the relationship is “on the verge of an alliance,” falls outside of the alliance framework that he himself crafted. As he notes, “one can still argue…what a true alliance means in contemporary international politics,”\(^ {39}\) meaning his assertion that the relationship “is on the verge of an alliance,” fails to explicitly define exactly how institutionalized the relationship actually is. Moreover, since Korolev published his article in 2018, significant developments have occurred in China and Russia’s defense relationship that merit revisiting the level of institutionalization between the two countries’ defense establishments.

\(^{38}\) Ibid, 15.
\(^{39}\) Ibid, 15.
Hypothesis & Methods

This study seeks to address this gap by utilizing Korolev’s framework of alliance institutionalization to assess the degree of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense security partnership. Using Korolev’s alliance institutionalization framework, the following analysis collects evidence to determine whether the Sino-Russian defense relationships meets the criteria outlined by Korolev.

As previously noted, Korolev divides alliance institutionalization into two clusters, moderate institutionalization and deep institutionalization. Korolev argues that moderate institutionalization is measured by five indicators. The first is an “official alliance treaty or other formal agreement of military coordination in the event of a crisis or when either party is facing an external attack or another type of threat.” Korolev caveats this criteria by stating, “since alliance treaties vary considerably in terms of the precision of commitments, and moreover, at times, states can act as alliance members without binding treaties, this criterion is not sufficient.” Thus, Korolev’s second criteria is the mechanism of inter-military consultations. Korolev notes that, “such mechanisms enhance mutual understanding and increases the predictability of intra-alliance dynamics.”

The third criteria is military-technical cooperation (MTC). Korolev writes that in its beginning stages, “military-technical exchanges can be more of a structure for the
parties to purchase military equipment or technological expertise from each other. As MTC moves into more advanced stages, however, it becomes more intertwined and is increasingly characterized by long-term projects for the joint design and production of arms and their components.”\textsuperscript{43} He asserts that MTC requires significant trust between allies, and “requires a high level of coordination between multiple institutions (research centers, manufacturers, and various government agencies), shared procedures, and the standardization of training.”\textsuperscript{44}

The fourth criteria is regular joint military exercises. Korolev notes that regular military exercises help allies “achieve a certain degree of military force compatibility and interoperability,” and also send “important signals, admonitions, or assurances to certain countries or groups of countries.”\textsuperscript{45} The fifth criterion is inter-military confidence building measures (CBM), CBM include agreements such as border-securitization measures, demilitarization measures, establishing mechanisms for deconfliction, information sharing agreements, and others.\textsuperscript{46}

Deep institutionalization is categorized by three criteria, “an integrated military command, joint troop placement or an exchange of military bases, and a common defense policy.” Korolev notes that these criteria “require extensive and costly investments in joint action and indicate a much deeper military institutionalization. They also reflect the highest level of joint preparation for war. Decisions to enter this level of cooperation require strong incentives and strong resolve on the part of policymakers.”\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{47} Korolev, 5.
The data used to measure China and Russia’s defense relationship against these criteria is collected from international agreements signed by China and Russia, official Chinese and Russian government statements, policy documents and state media reports, open source news reporting, think-tank reports, and academic journals.

**Data**

**Moderate Institutionalization: Alliance Treaty or Agreement**

Korolev writes that “the existence of a treaty is considered important and is often the first mark to look for when assessing an alliance relation.”

In 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, often referred to as “the Big Treaty.” The treaty, in effect until 2021, significantly upgraded the bilateral relationship and laid the foundation for the subsequent growth in Sino-Russia ties. The treaty, which clearly establishes a non-aggression and consultation pact, can also be seen as containing an implicit commitment to mutual defense.

Article 2, 8, and 9 of the treaty clearly establish it as a non-aggression and consultation pact. Article 2 commits the two parties to a policy of mutual non-aggression, stating that “contracting parties will neither resort to the use of force; or the threat of force nor take economic and other means to bring pressure to bear against the other.” Article 8 prohibits either party from joining an alliance or undertaking any actions that jeopardizes the security of the other; stating that “The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any block nor shall they embark on any such action,

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48 Ibid, 4.
including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.” Article 9 establishes a joint consultation mechanism, stating in response to a security threat to either state that “the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.”

The treaty does not include an explicit *causus foederis*, a mutual defense clause that is the defining feature of formal military alliances. Without a clear mutual defense clause, some scholars assert that the treaty falls short of a defense pact. Korolev argues that the treaty, “does not explicitly define external threats or include a clear *causus foederis* clause…and therefore fails to qualify as a defense pact.” Similarly, Alexander Lukin writes that Alexander Lukin asserts that “the treaty did not create any alliance, let alone a military one. It contains no commitments regarding joint defense against aggression.”

However, the treaty can be seen as including an *implicit* obligation for mutual defense. Vasily Kashin asserts that “while the treaty did not create any obligations for mutual defense, it clearly required both sides to consider some sort of joint action in the case of a threat from a third party.” Specifically, Article 9’s stipulation that China and Russia hold consultations “in order to eliminate such threats,” can be interpreted as an implicit obligation for the parties to assist each other in the event of a military attack or the outbreak of war. Korolev writes that Article 9 “can be viewed as carrying certain

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50 Ibid.
52 Ibid, 5.
features of an implicit defense pact,”\textsuperscript{54} while Franz Stefan-Gady notes that the provision “could be construed as an implicit commitment to mutual defense.”\textsuperscript{55} Thus, the author agrees with Korolev’s assertion that the treaty sits "at the borderline between a non-aggression/consultation pact and a defense pact."\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Mechanism of Regular Consultations}

China and Russia have developed an institutionalized and multilevel system of bilateral and multilateral security consultations. (See Appendix 1). This system was born as the result of the 1993 signing of the “Military Cooperation Agreement” by China and Russia’s defense ministries.\textsuperscript{57} The agreement called for China and Russia to “carry out military cooperation on…military and political consultations” including, “official visits by ministers of defense and other military leaders” and “working meetings of defense ministers and other representatives parties.”\textsuperscript{58} The Military Cooperation Agreement laid the groundwork for the establishment of subsequent formal consultations, including the Annual Strategic Consultation among Chiefs of the General Staff in 1997, the Russia-China Consultation on the National Security Issues in 2004, and the China-Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue in 2014 (See Appendix 1). Alexander Korolev estimates that China and Russia hold 20-30 bilateral security consultations per year, including multiple high-level defense contacts per year (See Table 2).\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{54} Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 5.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
Table 2: China-Russia High-Level Military-to-Military Contacts, 2003-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Contacts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These contacts do not include presidential summits, meetings between border security forces, and multilateral summits (unless a meeting between military officials occurred on the sidelines). High-level contacts are defined as "officials and officers holding a leadership position and corresponding rank in the military services at or above deputy commander of a particular service and assistant to the chief of the general staff department ("joint staff department" in the PLA context as of its reorganization in late 2015)." Meick, 9.
Military-Technical Cooperation

Military-technical cooperation (MTC) is a critical and growing aspect of China and Russia’s military relationship. Since the early 1990s, Sino-Russian MTC “has evolved from a one-sided relationship largely predicated on Chinese purchases of Russian weapons systems into an increasingly interdependent relationship characterized by long-term joint production of military equipment and the transfer of more advanced weapons systems.”

Like other components of Sino-Russian defense relations, MTC has deepened significantly in recent years, prompting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to

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comment in 2014 that “we can now talk about the emerging technological alliance between the two countries.”

Bilateral MTC began in 1992 when China and Russia signed the Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement. The agreement established a legal framework for MTC between the two countries and led to the formation of the Mixed Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (MICMTC), China and Russia’s formal annual platform for coordinating bilateral MTC. Through the mid-2000s, Sino-Russian MTC was characterized by large Russian arms sales to China. From 1992-2006, China imported roughly $26 billion in Russian weaponry, accounting for nearly 80 percent of its arms imports. Chinese purchases included export variants of Russia’s Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, S-300 missile defense systems, and Su-27 and Su-30 multirole fighters.

During this period, Russian arms transfers to China during this period served both countries’ strategic interests. As the author described in a previous article,

“The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had ravaged the Russian economy, leaving Russian defense firms desperately in need of foreign export markets to remain viable. Meanwhile, Beijing’s ambitious drive to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), deemed necessary by Chinese Communist Party for regime survival, had been severely curtailed by Western arms embargos levied on China in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thus, Russian arms

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66 Ibid.
transfers to China served both countries vital national interests, granting the PLA access to the military technology it needed to modernize while providing Russia’s defense firms the revenue they required to stay viable. 

Table 3: Russian Arms Exports to China, 1992-2019


Note: Trend Indicator Values are “based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.” (SIPRI Arms Transfer Database)

However, the mid-to-late 2000’s saw a decline in Sino-Russian MTC. The annual meeting of the MICMTC was cancelled in 2006-2007. Furthermore, from 2006-2010, there were no significant arms transfers between Beijing and Moscow. The slowdown in

MTC had multiple causes. Beijing had become unhappy with the quality of the weaponry it imported from Russia as well as Russian contract negotiation policies.69 More importantly, “China’s defense industrial base had matured to the point that it could satisfy many of the PLA’s requirements domestically. With its basic military requirements met at home, China increasingly looked to Russia to purchase more advanced weapons systems and their underlying technology to further the PLA’s modernization.”70 However, Russia refused to sell its most advanced military equipment to China due to fears regarding Beijing’s growing military strength vis-à-vis Moscow and concerns regarding Beijing’s intellectual property theft of Russian military technology and unlicensed reverse-engineering of Russian weapons systems.71

Starting in 2008, Sino-Russian MTC began to improve. Regular meetings of the joint commission were reinstated, and on December 11th China and Russia signed the Agreement of Intellectual Property in Military Technical Cooperation.72 It was not until 2014, however, that Sino-Russian MTC began to significantly ramp up. Russia, isolated from the international community following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, undertook a major strategic orientation away from the West and towards Beijing. As a result, the nature of Sino-Russian MTC changed considerably, becoming a more reciprocal and interdependent relationship as Moscow became increasingly dependent on Beijing.

In subsequent years, Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation rapidly deepened. Russia resumed arms sales to China, including the sale of advanced equipment that Russia was previously unwilling to transfer to Beijing. From 2014-2018, Russia accounted for 70 percent of China’s arms imports. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing began undertaking long-term joint production of weapons systems. Notable arms sales and joint-weapons development projects include:

Arms Sales:

- **S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense system**: In 2015 Russia announced the sale of two regiments of its most advanced air defense system, the S-400, to China for an estimated $3 billion. The sale is notable because Russia was previously hesitant to sell the S-400 to Beijing. Russia completed delivery of the first regimental set in May 2018, and began delivery of the second set in July 2019. The sale reportedly includes a training course provided by Russia to Chinese operators of the S-400.

- **Su-35 multi-role air-superiority fighter**: In November 2015, China signed a $2.5 billion contract for 24 Su-35 planes. The Su-35 is an “upgraded, twin-engine, multirole air superiority fighter.” Russia was
previously hesitant to sell China the Su-35 due to concerns China would reverse engineer the Su-35’s powerful AL-41FS engine.\(^7\) Russia completely the delivery of the Su-35 to China in April 2019. The sale also included the “delivery of ground support equipment and reserve aircraft engines.\(^8\)

**Joint Weapons Development Projects:**

- **Missile-Attack Early-Warning System:** In October 2019, President Putin announced that Russia’s defense industry is helping the PLA build a modern missile-attack early-warning system. At least one $60 million contract has reportedly been signed for a Russian defense firm to develop software for a future PLA early-warning missile defense network.\(^9\)

- **Next Generation Heavy Lift Helicopter:** In June 2015 China and Russia signed an, “intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a heavy helicopter.”\(^10\) The agreement stipulated that Chinese company Avicopter would partner with Russian Helicopters to develop the helicopter. Avicopter was reportedly responsible for “the process organization, as well as design, testing, certification, and series production

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\(^7\) Ibid.  
of the rotorcraft,” while Russian Helicopters’ contributed “several subsystems and technology transfer” to the project.\(^{83}\)

- **Lada-class Submarine:** In December 2012, China and Russia “signed a framework agreement for joint construction of four Lada-class (Project 677E) diesel-electric attack submarines (the Russian export version is known as Amur-1650).”\(^{84}\) In October 2014, the first Lada-class was reportedly delivered to China.\(^{85}\)

- **GAZ “Tigr” infantry mobility vehicle:** In 2011, The Russian Military Industrial Company began to assemble its GAZ “Tigr” all terrain, multipurpose infantry mobility vehicles in China.\(^{86}\)

China has also become a critical source of some military and dual-use technologies for Moscow after the imposition of Western sanctions and arms embargoes on Russia post-Crimea. China can offer Russia electronic components, composite materials, UAV technology, and engines for warships that Moscow can’t procure from the West.\(^{87}\) As a result, the bilateral MTC relationship has become much more reciprocal than it was previously.\(^{88}\)

This growth in Sino-Russian MTC reflects the overall strengthening of the bilateral military-to-military relationship. MTC has progressed to a point where Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “We can now even talk about the emerging

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83 Russian Aviation Insider, ““Russian Government Approved Russo-Chinese Helicopter Development.”
84 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China Submarine Capabilities.” [https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-submarine-capabilities/](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-submarine-capabilities/).
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. 9.
88 Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 9-10; Meick, 16-17.
technological alliance between the two countries.” The sale and joint development of advanced weapons systems requires significant trust between the collaborating parties. Korolev notes that, “the proper organization of MTC requires a high level of coordination between multiple institutions (research centers, manufacturers, and various government agencies), shared procedures, and the standardization of training.”

**Regular Military Drills**

Joint military exercises are arguably the most important aspect of China and Russia’s military relationship (for a full list of Sino-Russian joint military exercises, see Appendix 2). In 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s 2015 remarked that, “The most important issue of the Russian-Chinese military cooperation are the joint military exercises.” Joint military exercises contribute to China’s and Russia’s security partnership in three critical ways. First, they help Beijing and Moscow’s armed forces (particularly the PLA) improve their tactical and operational capabilities as well as increasing their interoperability, enhancing their ability to conduct joint operations. Second, the exercises serve a mutual reassurance function, affirming China and Russia’s “commitment to military cooperation as an important dimension of their evolving relationship.” Third, joint military exercises signal to third parties, particularly the

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89 Ibid, 9.
93 Ibid, 4.
United States, China and Russia’s strong commitment to supporting each other’s security interests to international audiences.  

Currently, Moscow and Beijing maintain two principal recurring joint exercise programs, the Peace Mission counter-terrorism exercises, and the Joint Sea naval exercises. China and Russia have also participated in a number of exercises outside of the Peace Mission and Joint Sea frameworks, including Russia’s annual large-scale strategic military exercises. Since the first Sino-Russian joint military exercises was held in 2003, the frequency, complexity, and geographic scope of subsequent exercises has dramatically increased. 

*Peace Mission:* Since 2005, China and Russia have participated in a recurring joint military exercise known as “Peace Mission.” Held under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Peace Mission is an anti-terrorism exercise designed to strengthen the ability of SCO members to combat “terrorism, extremism, and separatism.”

The exercise typically consists of three phases, joint consultations and operational planning, troop transportation and deployment, and combat operations. As “Peace Mission” has matured, the exercises have become increasingly complex, featuring more challenging operations, greater interoperability, and more advanced weapons systems. Though the Peace Mission exercises are nominally anti-terrorism operations, many analysts contend

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94 Meick, 6.
that the exercises resemble conventional military operations. During Peace Mission 2016, for example, participants conducted a wide range of joint air-ground exercises involving a wide array of advanced weapons including air-to-ground precision strikes.98

*Joint Sea:* Since 2012, China and Russia have conducted Joint Sea, an annual bilateral naval exercise. Joint Sea provides a forum for the Chinese and Russian navies to gain operational experience by engaging in a wide range of joint activities. Since its inception, Joint Sea has increased in both complexity and geographic scope. For example, Joint Sea 2016 included a complex air-sea amphibious exercise conducted by Chinese and Russian naval forces.99 During Joint Sea 2019, held from April 29 to May 4, the Chinese and Russian navies conducted a joint sea-based live-fire air defense exercise for the first time in addition to holding various live-fire exercises, search and rescue operations, communications exercises, and anti-submarine warfare exercises.100 Further, Joint Sea exercises have expanded into sensitive waters that hold strategic value for either Moscow or Beijing, included the Mediterranean Sea (2015), the South China Sea (2016), and the Baltic Sea (2017).101 However, there are limits to the effectiveness of the Joint Sea program. The exercises place little emphasis on interoperability, restricting the ability of the Chinese and Russian navies to

98 Ibid, 95.
practice conducting joint operations against a real-world adversary. In addition, Joint Sea exercises are limited in terms of scope and duration compared to typical U.S. and allied naval exercises, limited the operational benefits of the Joint Sea program for the Chinese and Russian militaries.\footnote{Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations,” 89.}

Aerospace Security Exercises: In 2016, China and Russia expanded added missile defense to their portfolio of bilateral military exercises, holding Aerospace Security 2016—the first computer-simulated missile defense exercise between China and Russia—to signal opposition to U.S.-South Korean discussions about deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea.\(^\text{106}\) The five day exercise aimed to improve interoperability between Russian and Chinese missile and air defense groups and involved “defending territory against accidental and provocative ballistic and missile strikes.”\(^\text{107}\) China and Russia conducted a follow-on exercise, Aerospace Security 2017, in December 2017.\(^\text{108}\) The decision to launch the Aerospace Security program reflects a growing level of convergence between China and Russia on countering U.S. missile defense.

Confidence Building Measures

Confidence building measures between China and Russia have focused on resolving their historical border disputes and reducing security concerns. In the late 1980s, China and the then-Soviet Union began negotiations to resolve their long-standing


border disputes.\textsuperscript{109} In 1991, the two states signed an agreement demarcating the eastern portion of the border, followed by a supplementary agreement in 2004.\textsuperscript{110} A 1994 agreement signed by China and the Russian Federation demarcated the western portion of the border.\textsuperscript{111} In 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Russian Foreign Minister. Sergei Lavrov signed the “additional protocol on the eastern part of borders,” formally ending their decades long border disputes.

Success in the border negotiations fostered good will between China and Russia that allowed the two states to establish confidence building measures relating to military and security affairs (see Appendix 3) Korolev writes that “it was the multiple border negotiations from which the subsequent trust-building measures…gradually developed.”\textsuperscript{112} For example, the signing of the 1994 border agreement was complemented by the signing of the “Agreement on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other and Not Targeting Strategic Nuclear Weapons at Each Other.”\textsuperscript{113} In 2009, the two countries signed an “Agreement on Mutual Notification of the Launch of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles.”\textsuperscript{114}

These confidence building measures do not suggest that China and Russia have completely eliminated their historical mistrust of each other. However, they do

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid, 13.
\end{itemize}
demonstrate a willingness on the part of Beijing and Moscow to reduce bilateral tensions in order to strengthen their strategic partnership.\textsuperscript{115}

**Deep Institutionalization: Integrated Military Command**

China and Russia have made significant strides in their ability to integrate their military forces and conduct joint operations. Although open source information is limited, reporting on China and Russia’s recent military interactions demonstrates the growing interoperability of their military forces and an increasingly integrated military command capability. A number of recent Sino-Russian military interactions highlight the growing ability of China and Russia’s militaries to operate jointly.

- **Kavkaz-2020:** During Russia’s annual large scale strategic military exercise, “Kavkaz-2020”, Russian troops trained Chinese forces to use Russian “command and communication” equipment, demonstrating an increased capacity for integrated military command.\textsuperscript{116}

- **Tsentr-2019:** During 2019 iteration of Russia’s annual strategic exercise, dubbed “Tsenter-2019,” “dropped live ordinance together with Russian jets.”\textsuperscript{117}

- **2019 Joint Bomber Patrol:** On July 23, 2019, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Russian Air Force conducted their first

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 13.
joint strategic bomber patrol, highlighting the increasing interoperability of China and Russia’s military forces. Two PLAAF Xian H-6K bombers were joined by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MS bombers on the long-range aerial patrol, reportedly violating South Korea’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ) in the process. Notably, South Korea’s Ministry of Defense stated that the Chinese and Russian aircraft “engaged in coordinated maneuvering” while flying in the KADIZ.\textsuperscript{118} Wu Qian, spokesman for China’s Ministry of Defense, stated that the patrol was aimed at “upgrading joint operation capacity” while Russia’s Ministry of Defense indicated that the patrol was intended to “strengthen global strategic stability”.\textsuperscript{119}

- **Joint Sea 2019:** China and Russia conducted a joint sea-based live-fire air defense exercise for the first time as part of the bilateral Joint Sea-2019 military exercise. A spokesman for China’s Ministry of Defense noted that the exercise was intended to improve “joint maritime defensive operations” between China and Russia. The exercise, which required close coordination between Chinese and Russian ships and command organs, demonstrates both the increasing interoperability of China and Russia’s


\textsuperscript{119} U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 4, Section 2, “An Uneasy Entente: China-Russia Relations in a New Era of Strategic Competition with the United States,” 322.
military forces as well as their growing ability to integrate their command structures.\textsuperscript{120}

- \textit{Vostok 2018}: During Vostok 2018, China and Russia’s air forces operated in a unified formation for the first time, marking significant progress in their ability to operate jointly.\textsuperscript{121}

- \textit{Joint Sea 2016}: During Joint Sea 2016, Chinese and Russian naval forces utilized a “joint command information system” for the first time.\textsuperscript{122}

- \textit{Joint Sea 2015}: During Joint Sea 2015, Beijing and Moscow established a joint command center for their warships participating in the exercise.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{Joint Troop Placements/Military Base Exchanges}

Currently, there is no publicly available evidence that China and Russia have exchanged military bases or jointly deployed military forces.

\textbf{Common Defense Policy}

While it is hard to confirm via open sources the extent to which China and Russia share a common defense policy, recent Sino-Russian military activities in the Asia-


\textsuperscript{122} Meick, 8.

Pacific suggest that China and Russia are closely aligning their defense policies. Most notable was the joint Sino-Russian long-range air patrol in July 2019. Dmitri Trenin noted it is likely that “such patrols will become a regular feature.”\textsuperscript{124} The month prior, two Russian bombers made an unprecedented flight circling the island of Taiwan. Given China’s sensitivity to foreign militaries operating in the Taiwan Strait, U.S. Admiral Philip Davidson, then Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, remarked that “the fact that the Chinese did not challenge those flights suggests that they had the tacit approval of Beijing.”\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, in June 2016, a PLAN frigate rendezvoused with three Russian naval vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited island chain in the East China Sea claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. Ownership of the islands, which are administered by Japan, is the source of a long-standing dispute between China and Japan.\textsuperscript{126} While these episodes do not indicate the emergence of unified Sino-Russian defense policies, they demonstrate that Beijing and Moscow are coordinating their military activities in strategically significant regions. Furthermore, Korolev notes that these military interactions show “a strong basis for a further enhancement that can be utilized in a time of need.”\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{127} Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance,” 15.
Analysis

The data demonstrates that China and Russia’s defense relationship meets all five criteria of moderate alliance institutionalization. The 2001 “Big Treaty” signed by the two countries qualifies clearly as a non-aggression/consultation pact, and can be interpreted as containing an implicit commitment to mutual defense. Beijing and Moscow have established multiple high-level defense consultations on bi-lateral security interests, regional security, and counterterrorism. Bilateral military-technical cooperation is characterized by the Russian sale of increasingly advanced weapons systems to China as well as the joint production of sophisticated weapons systems and defense technology. The two militaries have established regular military exercises that continue to expand in their complexity, geographic scope, and level of interoperability demonstrated. They have also signed a number of confidence building agreements designed mostly to de-escalate mutual security concerns and diffuse long-standing border disagreements.

In analyzing the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense relationship, it is useful to compare Sino-Russian defense ties to formal U.S. alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. The NATO alliance is widely regarded as the prime example of a deeply institutionalized alliance, providing a useful benchmark for evaluating how closely the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense partnership resembles a “true” military alliance.

In assessing the criteria of “moderate alliance institutionalization”, two. Aspects of China and Russia’s defense relationship, “mechanisms of regular consultations” and “military-technical cooperation”, are particularly robust. China and Russia have

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established an extensive system of regular defense consultations. This system extends
top-down throughout Beijing and Moscow’s respective defense establishments, from “top
decision makers (today, Putin and Xi) and their administrative apparatuses to defense
ministries and their subdivisions to regional military districts and border garrisons to
military educational institutions.” These consultations build mutual understanding
between Chinese and Russian defense officials and military officers, facilitate arms
packages, prepare bilateral and joint exercises, and provide venues to discuss bilateral
military cooperation as well as critical regional and global security concerns. The
number and breadth of these consultations have continued to grow in response to changes
in China and Russia’s security environments. For example, the Northeast Asia Security
Dialogue, formed in response to the “growing number of negative trends in the
development of the regional situation,” has increased the frequency of meetings in
response to regional events such as the United States 2017 decision to deploy the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system to South Korea. Looking
forward, China’s 2019 defense white paper affirmed the critical role bilateral
consultations will continue to play in the bilateral defense relationship, calling for the
“sound development of exchange mechanisms at all levels” and “expanded cooperation in
high-level exchanges” between China and Russia’s militaries.

129 Ibid, 6.
132 Korolev, 8.
133 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in the
Military-technical cooperation between China and Russia is deeply institutionalized. Bilateral institutions such as the MICTIC have facilitated Russia’s post-Crimea resumption of large-scale transfers of military to China, including advanced weapons systems Moscow was previously hesitant to sell Beijing. In addition, China and Russia have used these institutions to catalyze the joint production of major weapons systems while seeking to “jointly develop dual-use technologies including next-generation telecommunications, robotics and artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and Internet and data governance.”

The recent growth in bilateral MTC reflects China and Russia’s “complementary needs and capabilities that they can leverage to advance their great-power pursuits.” As a result of their respective geopolitical disputes with the West, both Beijing and Moscow have limited access to advanced Western defense technologies, increasing the importance of bilateral military-technical cooperation for the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces and the People’s Liberation Army. China and Russia’s respective defense industrial bases also have complementary strengths that they can leverage to strengthen their respective militaries. As the author previously noted in a Defense360 article, “Beijing has become a critical source of key military and dual-use technologies for Russia as a result of sanctions that prevent it from purchasing similar technologies from the West. Russia is now dependent on China to provide critical items including electronic components for its aerospace programs, composite materials, UAV

technology, and marine diesel engines for the Russian Navy.”¹³⁷ In October 2019, Premier of China’s State Council Li Keqiang articulated this trend, stating the necessity for China and Russia to “deepen cooperation in scientific and technological innovation, give full play to complementary advantages, and fully tap the potential of cooperation between the two countries in basic research, applied research, and industrialization of scientific and technological achievements.”¹³⁸

Thus, the scope of China and Russia’s mechanisms of regular consultations and the depth of their bilateral MTC approaches and in some cases likely surpasses the level of MTC among NATO partners. However, two different criteria of moderate institutionalization, alliance treaty or agreement, regular military drills, and confidence building measures, reveals that the Sino-Russian defense partnership falls short of the level of institutionalization demonstrated by NATO countries.

The author’s analysis of the 2001 “Big Treaty” concluded that it contained an implicit obligation for mutual defense. This implicit obligation falls well short of the explicit commitment for mutual defense outlined in NATO’s founding treaty. Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949, stipulates that

“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,

¹³⁷ Meick, 15; Korolev, 9-10.
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Sino-Russian joint military exercises also fail to measure up to their U.S. equivalents. Evaluating the efficacy of the “Peace Mission” exercise series, Paul Schwartz writes that “the level of interoperability, though improved, still remained relatively limited, especially in comparison with comparable exercise held within Western alliances.” Assessing the Sino-Russian maritime exercises, he notes that the Joint Sea naval exercises are “significantly shorter than the typical U.S./allied naval exercise,” and “also tend to be smaller than their U.S./allied counterparts.”

Where China and Russia’s defense partnership least resembles U.S. formal alliances are in the criteria for “deep alliance institutionalization.” While recent Sino-Russian military activities and joint military exercises have demonstrated a nascent capability for the PLA and Russian Defense Forces to integrate their military forces, NATO’s military forces feature a fully integrated command structure. Furthermore, while there is no evidence of China and Russia engaging in joint troop placement or exchanging military bases, NATO forces “maintain 6,800 posts across seven commands” stretched across NATO territory. Lastly, while China and Russia have signaled their support for each other’s key security interests, the relationship lacks NATO’s formal

140 Schwartz, 96.
141 Ibid 97.
143 Ibid.
institutions for crafting common defense policies. The North Atlantic Council, “the principal political decision-making body and oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance,”144 determines NATO defense policy through “consensus decision-making” in which “consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached.”145 This means that when NATO policy is announced “it is therefore the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance.”146

Thus, the evidence makes clear that while China and Russia’s defense relationship meets all the criteria of moderate alliance institutionalization to various extents, it has only recently reached the nascent stages of “deep institutionalization.” Thus, it is accurate to say that, rather than being “on the verge of an alliance,” as Korolev writes, the Sino-Russian defense relationship is “on the verge of deep institutionalization.”

**Conclusion**

China and Russia’s mutual security concerns and the convergence of their geostrategic interests make it highly likely that their bilateral defense relationship will continue to deepen in the near future. It may one day even become a “formal” military alliance.147 However, it is clear that for the time being, rather than resembling a deeply institutionalized, NATO-style alliance, the relationship stands “on the verge of deep institutionalization.”

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145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
It is likely that experts will continue to debate what constitutes a military alliance and whether China and Russia’s military-to-military relationship constitutes a true alliance. For example, some may note that the level of institutionalization in China and Russia’s defense relationship remains a far cry from the level of institutionalization between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),\textsuperscript{148} while others will highlight that the relationship is more institutionalized than other alliances such as the U.S.-Thailand alliance.\textsuperscript{149} However, it is undeniable that Beijing and Moscow have established a deep, multifaceted defense relationship, that will likely continue to develop in the near future.

China and Russia’s defense relationship will most likely continue to grow in the near future. It will be important for future studies to continue to monitor the growth in the bilateral relationship using Korolev’s criteria. However, points of friction exist in the relationship that may undermine continued defense cooperation. For example, tensions might arise between Beijing and Moscow over Beijing’s growing influence in Central Asia, or China’s desire to become an “Arctic Power.” Most importantly, the “Big Treaty” expires in 2021. The nature of the Sino-Russian defense relationship for the next two decades will likely be shaped by its replacement.

\textsuperscript{148} Paul N. Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations.”
\textsuperscript{149} Rensselar Lee and Arytom Lukin, \textit{Russia’s Far East: New Dynamics in Asia Pacific and Beyond}, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016, 117-120.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institutional Level</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992 - China-Russia Intergovernmental Joint</strong></td>
<td>“Usually co-chaired by China’s vice chairman of the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Russia’s defense minister. Regular participants also include Russian deputy defense ministers, China’s defense minister, and other key officials and personnel; held annually except for 2006-2007.” 150</td>
<td>Discuss arms sales and broader defense industrial cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Military Technology Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993 – Regular Meetings Between the Defense Ministers of Russia and China</strong></td>
<td>Defense Ministers; held annually.</td>
<td>Discuss general strategic issues and military strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997 - Annual Strategic Consultation among Chiefs of the General Staff</strong> 151</td>
<td>Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Department and the PLA Joint Staff Department; held annually.</td>
<td>Discuss practical issues of military cooperation including military technical cooperation and joint military exercises; practical implementation of military agreements reached at higher levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 – Consultations held through the SCO: 1) SCO’s Annual Summits; 2) Meetings of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure; 3) SCO Defense Ministers Meeting</strong> 152</td>
<td>Heads of State of SCO member countries, Defense Ministers, various military officials and experts; each consultation held yearly.</td>
<td>Discuss issues of regional security and stability in Central Asia; conduct intelligence sharing; plan joint military exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004 – China-Russia Consultation on National Security Issues</strong> 153</td>
<td>Heads of Russia’s Security Council and the heads of China’s State Council; held annually from 2004-2009, since 2009 held four times a year.</td>
<td>Discuss China and Russia’s immediate national interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014 – China-Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue</strong> 154</td>
<td>Deputy Foreign Ministers and diplomats and military experts of different ranks; held every two or three months.</td>
<td>Facilitate effectiveness security cooperation in Northeast Asia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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150 Meick, 17.
151 Ibid, 18.
152 Korolev, 7.
153 Ibid, 7.
154 Ibid, 7.
## Appendix 2: China-Russia Military Exercises, 2003-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Weapons Systems/Units Involved</th>
<th>Exercise Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apprehension of Illegal Border Crossing Exercise</strong>&lt;sup&gt;155&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Heilongjiang Province, China</td>
<td>Not Reported</td>
<td>Border units from China and Russia</td>
<td>Border security exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition-2003</strong></td>
<td>August 6-12, 2003</td>
<td>China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (SCO)</td>
<td>Xinjiang, China; Ucharal and Ili, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,200 (700 Chinese)</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included fighters, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles (China sent riflemen, infantry, artillery, armed police, and support forces)”&lt;sup&gt;156&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Anti-terror exercise. It was the first exercise of its kind within the framework of the SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Mission-2005</strong></td>
<td>August 18-25, 2005</td>
<td>China, Russia (SCO)</td>
<td>Vladivostok, Russia; Weifang and Qingdao, Shandong Province, China</td>
<td>Total: 10,000 Chinese: 8,000 Russian: 2,000</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included fighters, early-warning aircraft, helicopters, destroyers, frigates, tanks, artillery, and light armored vehicles (China sent Su-27 fighters, helicopters, light armored vehicles)”</td>
<td>Ostensibly an anti-terrorism exercise. “The first phase of the exercise involved respective military forces’ staff officers conducting strategic exercises”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>155</sup> Meick, 24.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, 24.
| Peace Mission-2007 | Aug 9-17, 2007 | (SCO) China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan | Chelyabinsk, Russia; Urumqi, Xinjiang, China | Total: 7,000, Chinese: 1,600 Russian: 2,000 | “Major systems from all participants included fighter-bombers, helicopters, supply aircraft, and tanks (China sent eight JH-7 fighter-bombers, 32 helicopters, transport aircraft, and army, air force, and integrated support groups)” | Exercise focused on anti-terrorism drills. The exercise was the first time entire PLA organizational units conduct joint military exercises outside of China. |

159 Meick, 24.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Exercise Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatio-2007</td>
<td>September 4-6, 2007</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>1,000 Chinese: 600</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included helicopters and armored vehicles (China sent Snow Leopard Commando force of the People’s Armed Police [PAP] and Russia sent its Warrior Special Force unit)”</td>
<td>Antiterrorism exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Blockade Exercise</td>
<td>February 26, 2009</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Heihe, China; Blagoveschesnk, Russia</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Border security exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurak-Antiterror - 2009</td>
<td>April 17-19, 2009</td>
<td>(SCO) China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Fakhrabad, Tajikistan</td>
<td>Total: 1,000</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included attack aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles”</td>
<td>Antiterrorism exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogorodsk Disaster Relief Exercise</td>
<td>May 19-22, 2009</td>
<td>China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Noginsk and Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>Total: 200 Chinese: 20</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included 50 Mi-8 and Ka-32 aircraft”</td>
<td>Exercise focused on disaster relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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163 Ibid, 25.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Peace Mission-2009</strong></th>
<th>July 24-26, 2009</th>
<th>(SCO) China, Russia</th>
<th>Taonan, Jilin Province, China</th>
<th>Total: 2,600</th>
<th>“Major systems from all participants included fighters, attack aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles (China sent 20 fighters, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, helicopters, and tanks)”</th>
<th>Anti-terror exercise intended to “to verify operation plans and capabilities to respond to unexpected incidents under the unstable environment of countries and regions.” Included, large-scale conventional drills involving combined arms operations against terrorists in an urban setting.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>River/Port Emergencies Exercises</strong></td>
<td>Aug 18 and 31, 2009</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Heihe, China; Blagoveshchensk, Russia</td>
<td>Total: 240</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>River/port security exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Shield-2009</strong></td>
<td>Sept 18, 2009</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>“China sent two frigates and a supply ship; Russia sent three warships”</td>
<td>Maritime maneuver exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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165 Ibid, 25
167 Meick, 25.
168 Ibid, 25.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Peace Mission-2010</strong></th>
<th><strong>September 10-25, 2010</strong></th>
<th>(SCO) China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Zhambyl region, Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Total: 5,000 Chinese: 1,000 Russian: 1,000</th>
<th>“Major systems from all participants included combat aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, and tanks (China sent two J-10 fighters, four H-6 bombers, tanks, and ground force, air force, and logistics combat groups)”</th>
<th>Exercise included joint maneuvers and drills including conducting breakouts, and using suppressing fire at night.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Sea-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>April 22-27, 2012</strong></td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Waters off of Qingdao, China</td>
<td>Total: 10,000 Chinese: 4,000 Russian: 6,000</td>
<td>“China sent 16 surface ships, two submarines, 13 aircraft, and five helicopters; Russia sent four surface ships, three support ships, and four helicopters, and a naval task force”</td>
<td>First Sino-Russian maritime exercise, included anti-submarine operations and simulated rescue of hijacked vessels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Mission-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>June 8-14, 2012</strong></td>
<td>(SCO) China, Russia, Tajikistan</td>
<td>Khujand, Tajikistan</td>
<td>Total: 2,000 Chinese: 369 Chinese</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included combat”</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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169 Ibid, 25.
171 Meick, 25.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation-2013</th>
<th>June 10-20, 2013</th>
<th>China, Russia</th>
<th>Beijing, China</th>
<th>Total: 75</th>
<th>“China sent Snow Leopard Commando force of the People’s Armed Police [PAP] and Russia sent a special operations unit”</th>
<th>Anti-terrorism exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan,</td>
<td>Russian: 350 aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles (China sent six helicopters, a motorized infantry company, and an artillery squad)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Sea-2013</th>
<th>July 5-12, 2013</th>
<th>China, Russia</th>
<th>Peter the Great Gulf, Russia</th>
<th>Total: 4,000</th>
<th>“China sent six surface ships, three helicopters, and one special operations unit; Russia sent 12 surface ships, one submarine, three fixed-wing aircraft, two helicopters, and a special operations unit”</th>
<th>Exercise included antisubmarine warfare, close maneuvering, and the simulated takeover of an enemy ship.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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174 Meick, 25.
175 Ibid, 26.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Peace Mission-2013</strong></th>
<th><strong>Joint Sea-2014</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SCO) China, Russia</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherbarkul, Russia</td>
<td>Waters near Shanghai, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Not reported</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese: 600 Russian: 900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included fighter-bombers, helicopters, UAVs, artillery, armored tanks, and special forces units (China sent JH-7A fighter-bombers, helicopters, gunships, tanks, self-propelled guns, and army, air force, and logistics groups)”(^{178})</td>
<td>“China sent six surface ships, two submarines, seven fixed-wing aircraft, four helicopters, and a marine commando unit; Russia sent six surface ships, two fixed-wing aircraft, two helicopters, and a marine commando unit”(^{179})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{178}\) Meick, 26.  
\(^{179}\) Meick, 26.
### Peace Mission-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 24-29, 2014</td>
<td>(SCO) China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan</td>
<td>Zhurihe Town, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, China</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>“Major systems from all participants included fighters, helicopters, UAVs, tanks, and ground vehicles (China sent J-10 and J-11 fighters, JH-7 fighter-bombers, early warning aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs)”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Border Defense Cooperation-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 31, 2014</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Sino-Russian border area near Jilin Province, China</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Joint Sea-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 11-21, 2015 (Phase 1), Aug 20-28, 2015 (Phase II)</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea (Phase 1). Peter the Great Gulf; waters off Clerk Cape; and the Sea of Japan (Phase II)</td>
<td>Not reported (Phase 1). Total not reported; 400 marines (200 Chinese, 200 Russian) (Phase II)</td>
<td>“China sent two frigates and one replenishment ship; Russia sent six surface ships” (Phase 1). “China sent seven surface ships, five fixed-wing aircraft, six helicopters, and 21 amphibious vehicles; Russia sent 16 surface ships, two submarines, 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Interna**nal Army Games-2015** | Augus**t 1-15, 2015.** | 17 countries including China and Russia | Held on 11 different firing ranges across Russia | 2,000 | Major systems from China and Russia included tanks, artillery, and air-defense systems | Internation**al military sports evented hosted annually by Russian**

**Aerospace Security-2016** | May 23-28, 2016 | China, Russia | Moscow, Russia | Not reported | Not reported | First computer-simulated missile defense exercise between China and Russia.

**Cooperation-2016** | July 3-14, 2016 | China, Russia | Moscow, Russia | Total: 100 | “Major systems from all participants included helicopters and armored vehicles (China sent Falcon Commando and Snow Leopard Commando forces of the People’s Armed Police [PAP] and Anti-terrorism exercise

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182 Ibid, 27.
**Internatio
nal Army
Games-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participating Countries</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Troops Participating</th>
<th>Systems Participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 30 – Augus t 13, 2016</td>
<td>22 countries including China and Russia</td>
<td>Held on 15 different sites across Russia and Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Total: 3,000 chinese: 1,000</td>
<td>Major systems from China and Russia included tanks, fighter jets, airborne troops, and naval ships (China sent a frigate)</td>
<td>2016 iteration of the International Army Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Joint Sea-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participating Countries</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Troops Participating</th>
<th>Systems Participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| September 12-20, 2016 | China, Russia        | South China Sea                  | Total Not Reported: 256 marines participated
Chinese: 160
Russian, 90 | “China sent 10 surface ships, two submarines, 11 fixed-wing aircraft, and eight helicopters; Russia sent three surface ships, two supply ships, two helicopters, and amphibious vehicles” | Exercise included the first Sino-Russian drills on “three-dimensional seizing and controlling of islands and reefs” (involving coordinated air, sea, and land operations) among other drills covering amphibious operations, air defense, |

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184 Meick, 27.
### Peace Mission-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Peace Mission-2016 | Septem
| Balykchy, Kyrgyzstan | 1,100 (270 Chinese, 500 Russian) **Major systems from all participants included fighter-bombers, bombers, helicopters, UAVs, and armored vehicles (China sent Z-9 helicopters and armored vehicles)**

“The drills focused on joint anti-terrorism operations in mountainous terrain and used tactics including surrounding and destroying an enemy using air support for ground operations, non-combatant evacuation operations,

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186 Meick, 8-9.
187 Ibid, 27.
and air-to-ground precision strikes.”\textsuperscript{188}

| Joint Sea-2017 | July 23-28, 2017 (Phase I); September 22-26, 2017 (Phase II) | China, Russia | Baltic Sea | Not reported | “China sent a destroyer, a frigate, and a support ship; Russia sent an anti-submarine ship, a frigate, a rescue ship, a deep submersible rescue vehicle, two ship-borne helicopters and marines”\textsuperscript{189} | Exercise focused on high-end maritime warfighting drills. First time China and Russia’s navy conducted joint submarine rescue exercises and joint anti-submarine exercises. |
| Internatio nal Army Games-2017\textsuperscript{190} | July 29 – August 12 | 22 countries including China and Russia | Held on 22 sites in Russia, China, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan | 1,200 | Major systems from China and Russia included tanks, fighter jets, artillery, airborne troops, and naval ships | 2017 iteration of the International Army Games |

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, 10.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Location Details</th>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Systems</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aerospace Security-2017</strong></td>
<td>December 2017</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Exercise included cooperation between Russia and China’s to repel a simulated missile attack by a third-party country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Army Games-2018</strong></td>
<td>July 28 – August 11, 2018</td>
<td>32 countries including China and Russia</td>
<td>Held across China, Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Armenia, and Iran</td>
<td>189 teams from the 32 countries participated</td>
<td>Major systems from China and Russia included tanks, fighter jets, bombers, artillery, airborne troops, and naval ships.</td>
<td>2018 Iteration of the International Army Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace Mission-2018</strong></td>
<td>August 24 – August 29, 2018</td>
<td>China, Russia, India, Pakistan, India, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Cherbarkulsy Training Ground, Russia</td>
<td>Total: 3,000 Chinese: ~700-750 Russian: 1,700</td>
<td>China sent forces including “an armored detachment, a mixed artillery battery, a detachment of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and a special operations</td>
<td>The exercise focused on “Mountain Joint Anti-Terrorism, containing three stages: strategic consultatio, joint anti-terrorism operations preparation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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During the exercise, Russia utilized Su-24 attack aircraft, and Tiger armored attack vehicles.\(^{194}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vostok-2018(^ {196})</th>
<th>September 11-17, 2018</th>
<th>China, Russia, and Mongolia</th>
<th>Eastern Siberia, Russia</th>
<th>Total: ~300,000 + Chinese: 3,200 Russian: 297,000</th>
<th>Major systems from China included 900 tanks and armored vehicles from the People’s Liberation Army’s Northern Theater Command as well as six fixed-wing aircraft and 24 helicopters. Russian forces involved reportedly included over 1,000 aircraft, 1,100 tanks and over 50 combat ships</th>
<th>Exercise designed to simulate a large-scale conventional campaign to half an enemy invasion. Notably, Chinese and Russian air forces operated in a unified formation for the first time.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Sea-2019(^ {197})</td>
<td>April 29-30, 2019</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Yellow Sea</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>China sent a destroyer and two frigates;</td>
<td>Exercise included joint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{194}\) Ibid.


| International Army Games-2019<sup>198</sup> | Aug 3-17, 2019 | 39 countries including China and Russia | Held across 10 participating countries | 5,000+ | China sent tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and aircraft including fighters and fighter-bombers | Multination armed forces competition held by Russia |

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Russia sent a cruiser, a destroyer, and a corvette maneuvers, live-fire exercises, search and rescue operations as well as anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare drills. Notably, the exercise was the first time the Chinese and Russian navies conducted a joint sea-based live-fire air defense drill.

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| **Tsentr-2019**<sup>199</sup> | **September 16-21, 2019** | **China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan** | **Eight ranges across Russia’s Orenburg region and the Caspian Sea** | **128,000 total**<br>**Chinese: 1,600**<br>**Russian: Over 100,000** | **China sent 1,600 troops, over 300 weapon systems and ~30 aircraft and helicopters from the PLA’s Western Theatre Command participated including Type 96A main battle tanks, H-6K strategic bombers, JH-7A and J-11 fighter jets, Il-76 and Y-9 transport planes and Z-10 attack helicopters. Russia dispatched forces troops from its Central Military District and the Caspian Flotilla as well as paratroopers and military transport aircraft of the Aerospace Force** | **Large scale conventional warfare exercise** |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ASEAN Counterterrorism Drill</strong>&lt;sup&gt;200&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Nove&lt;br&gt; mber 13-21, 2019</th>
<th>The 10 ASEAN countries plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States</th>
<th>Guilin, China</th>
<th>Total: ~800 troops</th>
<th>Reportedly, “10 aircraft and over 60 armored vehicles” participated in the exercise.&lt;sup&gt;201&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>The drill was aimed at “deepening the exchanges and cooperation among the militaries of the countries and enhancing their capabilities to jointly tackle various security challenges.”&lt;sup&gt;202&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mosi Naval Drill</strong></td>
<td>Nove&lt;br&gt; mber 25 – 29, 2019</td>
<td>China, Russia, South Africa</td>
<td>Held in waters off of Cape Town, South Africa</td>
<td>China sent the Type 054A guided-missile frigate Weifang, Russia sent Russia the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov, a Sliva-class rescue tug and a tanker</td>
<td>Exercise focused on promoting navigation security and maritime economic security and included “surface gunnery exercises, cross-deck helicopter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>202</sup> *Xinhua,* “ADMM-Plus Countries Wrap Up Counter-Terror Drill.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Maritime Security Belt</strong>&lt;sup&gt;204&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th><strong>International Army Games 2020</strong>&lt;sup&gt;205&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decem ber 27 – 30, 2019</td>
<td>Augus t 23 – Septe mber 5, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, Russia, Iran</td>
<td>30 countries participated including China and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held in the Sea of Oman and the Northern Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Held in Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet reported</td>
<td>Total: 5,000 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China sent a guided destroyer. Russia sent a frigate, tanker, and rescue tug boat from its Baltic Fleet.</td>
<td>2012 Iteration of the Internation al Army Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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| Kavkaz 2020<sup>206</sup> | September 21-26, 2020. | China, Russia, Armenia, Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, Belarus | Astrakahn Region, Russia as well as waters near the Caspian and Black seas | China dispatched troops from the PLA’s Western Theatre Command, including “ground troops, armored vehicles and light weaponry.”<sup>207</sup> | The exercise focused “on defensive tactics, joint attack, encirclement, and battlefield command and control.”<sup>208</sup> |

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid.
## Appendix 3: Key Chinese-Russian Confidence Building Measures (CBM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBM</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1991 Agreement on the Eastern Sector of the National Boundaries</td>
<td>Demarcated the eastern portion of the Sino-Russian border&lt;sup&gt;209&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on the Guiding Principle for Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces and the Strengthening of Trust in the Border Region</td>
<td>Designed to foster a “common border of trust” between China and Russia. The two sides “re-affirmed that they would reduce the armed forces along the border to the lowest level commensurate with friendly relations.”&lt;sup&gt;210&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities</td>
<td>The agreement called for “safeguards against an accidental missile launch, bans on the use of eye-damaging lasers, the ending of electronic jamming of communications, and the establishment of an early-warning system against inadvertent intrusion of the other’s borders by aircraft and ships.”&lt;sup&gt;211&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1994 Western Border Agreement</td>
<td>Demarcated the western portion of the Sino-Russian border&lt;sup&gt;212&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1994 Agreement on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Each Other and Not Targeting Strategic Nuclear Weapons at Each Other</td>
<td>China and Russia pledged to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons against the other and to target their strategic nuclear weapons away from each other. After the signing of this CBM bilateral relations were upgraded from “good neighborliness” to “constructive cooperation”&lt;sup&gt;213&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1995 Agreement on Cooperation in Border Defense</td>
<td>Signed by “China’s Ministry of National Defense and the Russian Federal Border Guard Administration”&lt;sup&gt;214&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid, 85.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid, 86.


<sup>213</sup> Korolev, 13.

<sup>214</sup> Jing-dong Yuan, “Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures,” 86.
| **April 1996 Shanghai Agreement** | The agreement “provided for the pledge of nonaggression, nonuse of force, notifications preceding military exercises and other military maneuvers, and limits on the number and types of exercises permitted within the 100-kilometer” CBM zone^215 |
| **May 1997 Moscow Agreement** | The agreement focused on “the reduction of regular troops, though not border guards or strategic forces, within a 100-kilometer zone on either side of the former Sino-Soviet boundary”^216 |
| **1998 China-Russia Protocol on Border Defense Information Exchange** | Agreement establishing new information sharing on border defense^217 |
| **2004 Agreement on the Eastern Segment of the China-Russia Border** | Resolved questions regarding the eastern portion of the Sino-Russian border leftover from the 1991 agreement. ^218 |
| **2008 Additional Protocol on the Eastern Part of Borders** | Finalized the complete demarcation of the Sino-Russian border^219 |
| **2009 Agreement on Mutual Notification about Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles** | “Established a new level of information sharing.”^220 |

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^216 Ibid, 87.
^217 Korolev, 13.
^219 Ibid.
^220 Korolev, 13.
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CV

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