DETERMINING THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-EXTREMISM POLICIES TO ADDRESS RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN WESTERN MILITARIES: A CASE STUDY

by
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A research study submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies

Baltimore, Maryland
December 2020

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Abstract

As a phenomenon of radicalism, right-wing extremism (RWE) is a multifaceted ideology, disruptive political movement, expression of hyper-conservative traditional social beliefs and values, and a disturbing form of fringe violence due to its byzantine and parochial nature. Western militaries struggle with RWE in their ranks because they reflect the societies which they serve. This qualitative comparative case study looks at the strength of anti-extremism policies designed to address RWE in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany. Using content analysis, it examines military regulations, government policies, and criminal code to identify shortfalls in existing policy. Using a theoretical process model, it evaluates the rigor of each policy to address RWE, evaluates their clarity for use, and examines the willingness of each study country to act. Finally, this study uses examples of RWE cases from each study country to determine if current policy sufficiently addresses the RWE threat. This study makes recommendations on the ideal language a policy should include to address the full scope of RWE threats Western militaries face today.

Research Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sarah Clark

Faculty Reviewers: Dr. Joana Cook and Dr. Jason Fritz

Acknowledgements

First, I must thank my husband, Alan, because without his support and "think sessions," this research study would not exist. I owe him much gratitude for everything he has done to support me throughout my entire career; indeed, I would not be where I am or even in this master's program without his unwavering belief in me. Second, I would like to thank Dr. Elena Mastors. You are an indispensable source of clarity and academic wisdom and I truly cannot thank you enough for pushing me and always being there for a discussion. I found my passion for this topic because of your encouragement of my potential.

Table of Contents

Page

Abstract……..ii

Acknowledgments……iii

Table of Contents……..iv

List of Tables…….v

List of Figures……..vii

Introduction……1

Literature Review……...2

Methodology……10

Part I: Content Analysis Findings……17

Part II: Process Model Testing Results and Case Application……19

Discussion and Analysis……...……...31

Conclusion……...34

Appendix A: Study Country Policy Document Tables……36

Appendix B: Expanded Content Analysis Findings and Analysis……...39

Appendix C: Expanded Process Model Testing Results Findings and Analysis…….47

Appendix D: Content Analysis Code Tree……..55

References……57

Curriculum Vitae…….73

List of Tables

Page

Table 1: Content Analysis Summary Table……19

Table 2: United States Process Model Summary Testing Results……..……19

Table 3: United States Case No. 1: Staff Sergeant Steven Carrillo……20

Table 4: United States Case No. 2: Lance Corporal Vasillios Pistolis……21

Table 5: United Kingdom Process Model Summary Testing Results……..……...22

Table 6: United Kingdom Case No. 1: Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen……..23

Table 7: United Kingdom Case No. 2: Private Mark Barrett……..24

Table 8: Canada Process Model Summary Testing Results……..……..25

Table 9: Canada Case No. 1: Leading Seaman Boris Mihajlovic……25

Table 10: Canada Case No. 2: Master Corporal Corey Hurren……...27

Table 11: Germany Process Model Summary Testing Results……..…….28

Table 12: Germany Case No. 1: First Lieutenant Franco "Franco A." Albrecht…….28

Table 13: Germany Case No. 2: "Little Sheep" (Unidentified *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) Sergeant Major)……30

Table 14: United States Policy Documents…….36

Table 15: United Kingdom Policy Documents……37

Table 16: Canada Policy Documents……...37

Table 17: Germany Policy Documents……38

Table 18: United States Process Model Testing……..47

Table 19: United Kingdom Process Model Testing……50

Table 20: Canada Process Model Testing……51

Table 21: Germany Process Model Testing……53

Table 22: Content Analysis Code Tree and Legend……55

List of Figures

Page

Figure 1: Proposed Typology of Right-Wing Extremism…….……..11

Figure 2: Proposed Theoretical Three-Step Process Model……14

Introduction

Western militaries are institutions built upon the consolidation of republican ideals, patriotism, and the concept of the unbridled defense of nations and their way of life. As such, they are generally more conservative, often slow to change, and frequently nostalgic for a time of past martial glory. Because of this conservatism, right-wing extremist (RWE) views can sometimes find a convenient foothold within the ranks despite Western militaries' ascription to egalitarianism and a unified principle to serve the good of the people. Likewise, as reflections of their societies, Western militaries struggle to manage RWE activity in their midst. Presently, with the upsurge of populism throughout the West, growing partisanship, and festering social dynamics that cross demographics, religion, sexual identity, and socioeconomic lines, RWE is on the rise in Western societies (Koehler 2016; Perliger 2020; Wodak 2015). As such, Western militaries are experiencing unprecedented levels of RWE in their ranks. This threatens the trust their societies place in them, reduces internal cohesion, and ultimately violates the good order and discipline upon which their effectiveness lies (Koehler 2019).

This comparative case study looks at the strength of anti-extremism policies in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany designed to address RWE. To do so, it examines the following research question: How effective are anti-extremism policies in addressing right-wing extremism in Western militaries? To determine policy effectiveness, this study uses content analysis to analyze military regulations, government policies, and criminal code to identify shortfalls in existing policy. To validate potential shortfalls, it evaluates the rigor of each policy using a process model which assesses the policy's ability to capture the full scope of RWE, evaluates their clarity, and examines the demonstrated

willingness of each study country to follow through and act on known cases of military RWE. Finally, this study uses real-world examples of RWE cases in each study country as a mechanism to determine if existing policy sufficiently addresses the threat RWE poses in the ranks of each country's military.

Literature Review

Right-Wing Extremism as a form of radicalism is a broad field of study across many academic disciplines. Research in RWE includes how best to define RWE, which terms apply, what typologies clearly portray RWE, and what parameters help explain RWE as a psychological behavior, ideology, and output activity. Alongside discussions of RWE behavior is a deep field of research into the authoritarian nature of RWE as a form of political ideology, as well as discourse, rhetoric, and framing analysis to understand the language, context, and intent of RWE perspectives and propaganda. Finally, there is significant effort to understand RWE as a manifestation of political violence and terrorism, with coinciding research examining how to counter RWE radicalization and violence. Despite the scope of existing research, however, there are still gaps in the literature regarding the fundamental ways policies designed to address RWE can be assessed as well as how RWE promulgates within military culture.

Right-Wing Extremism Terms and Definitions

To begin, research dedicated to RWE uses a variety of terms with researchers often adopting a preferred term for the sake of simplicity. This practice treats the host of available descriptions to refer to RWE as interchangeable and frames RWE as a collective belief structure. For example, Tucker (2017) utilizes the term "alt-right" to refer to the populist rise

he observes within American society, but later in his work, *Right-Wing Collectivism*, lists a scope of terms including "Nazism, fascism, alt-right, white supremacy, white nationalism, neo-reaction, [… and] (borrowed from Ludwig von Mises), right-Hegelianism" which he presents as completely exchangeable when discussing right-wing activity (2017, 13). This scope of terms serves as an ideal starting point for attempting to cast a net across the vast field of right-wing research, but his focus on Caucasian forms of ethnonationalist supremacism fails to account for the threat of non-Caucasian organizations equally represented in the right-wing movement. As such, this study adopts a more general application of right-wing ethnonationalist and supremacist terms because ethnic hate and racism is empirically unconstrained.

In addition to a variety of descriptive terms, the field of RWE research also debates the definition of RWE. The number of proposed RWE definitions varies widely, something which Mudde documented in his formative 1995 study of RWE definitions. Further, definitions tend to shift along cross-cultural boundaries because forms of RWE manifest disparately across countries. While it is common for studies to claim there is no single definition of RWE, Carter (2018) disagrees and asserts there is enough research to determine an agreeable set of parameters. In her review of definitions and typological analysis, Carter argues consensus exists to propose a minimal definition as, "An ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism" (2018, 174). This definition backs away from more specific terms, such as white supremacism, and instead uses more rooted forms of supremacist thought such as authoritarianism and exclusionary nationalism to capture non-Caucasian and gendered supremacism, while still effectively covering anti-Semitic belief structures.

Likewise, Jackson's definition of RWE is also broad, defining RWE as "an amorphous category that includes conservative or regressive forms of extremism based on a desire to preserve existing political structures or return to previous structures" (2020, 9). This definition is expansive in its scope of extremist strains it can cover, however its focus on preserving or returning to past forms of power structures excludes non-Caucasian forms of supremacism and nationalism that are present in Western societies (Jackson 2020, 9).

Meanwhile, definitions of RWE contain cultural nuances specific to the country in study. This tendency is evident particularly in German research, which focuses on the fascist, supremacist, and neo-Nazi elements of RWE (Koehler 2014, 51), while Canadian research is unique in recognizing gender and sexuality (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 4). Because of its broad nature, this study uses Carter's minimal definition as it suitably captures a wider swath of RWE activities reflected in the ranks of Western militaries, while remaining flexible enough to allow for emergent forms of RWE as the ideology expands and evolves over time.

RWE Typologies

Alongside efforts to define RWE is the task of determining an RWE typology that characterizes the scope of existing groups. This again tends to reflect cultural boundaries, as not all types are represented across Western societies. Jackson's typology classifies RWE into an overlapping triad of racist, nativist, and antigovernment extremism; he then subdivides antigovernment into two subcategories: sovereign citizens and the patriot/militia movement (2020, 13). Jackson notes the overlap is due to the blending of contentious political and social issues between RWE belief systems (2020, 19). However, Jackson's typology excludes groups centered on male supremacy, fundamentalist religious beliefs, and the antiabortion movement which other scholars, such as Perliger, consider critical (2020,

13). Indeed, Perliger's counter-typology classifies American far-right groups into "four social movement industries: white supremacy, antigovernment, fundamentalist, and pro-life" (2020, 18). Groups in these categories "embrace xenophobic, segregationist, racist, and antidemocratic inclinations" based on ideological commitment to "extreme nationalism and nativist sentiments" (2020, 14, 18). However, Perliger's typology, while presented as broad and "maximal," fails to account for non-Caucasian forms of supremacism but is unique in identifying pro-life as a category (2020, 18). Finally, Atkins and Atkins (2011) present a complex typology that best captures fundamentalism, arguing for categories divided into American white supremacist and neo-Nazi movements; Christian Identity, Christian reconstructionism, and other right-wing religious movements; and anti-American government extremists. Ultimately, the RWE typology debate plays out strongest in American research which reflects the complexity of RWE in the United States, but there is a utility to focusing on creating categorical understanding of RWE through representational schema. This is because RWE is taking on an increasingly international mold with RWE spreading between Western societies, making it necessary and appropriate to apply a schema to research examining RWE in countries other than the United States (Perliger 2020, 3).

RWE and Authoritarianism

Perhaps the foremost assessment of RWE within political philosophy is the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and other expatriate researchers from the Frankfurt School and Institute of Social Research in the United States and Germany (Weiss 2020, 46; Kiess and Decker 2016, 12-13). Adorno and Horkheimer's collaborative studies on authoritarianism led them to coin a variety of analytical terms, including "the authority-bound personality" and "pathic nationalism," which they felt undergirded the fascist foundation of RWE (Weiss

2020, 50; Kiess, Decker, and Brahler 2016, 13). Meanwhile, Adorno's 1967 lecture *Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism* built the case for viewing right-wing extremism through fascist political theory.

While this lays the foundation to historically associate RWE with fascism, Adorno and Horkheimer's work could be considered dated because it primarily sought to explain actual National Socialism during the Nazi era in Germany, and then later tracked resurgent sentiment post-war (Weiss 2020, 43-44). However, Tucker (2017) carries the argument forward to present day, stating in blunt terms that RWE is a "political ethos that is properly identified as fascist" (2). Other contemporary interpretations of RWE's authoritarian nature seek to blend RWE's political manifestations with elements of behavioral psychology, particularly how "anti-democratic attitudes" correlate within individual personalities to enable adoption of extreme right-wing views (Kiess and Decker 2016, 13). These observational angles, which build off Altemeyer's (1981) right-wing authoritarianism scale, place context on RWE's authoritarian, ethnonationalist-centric belief structures.

RWE as a Form of Terrorism and Political Violence

The study of right-wing terrorism and RWE as an expression of political violence is expansive. Research examines the predispositions of ideological footings for individual motivations to crime and violence (Kerodal, Freilich, and Chermak 2016), how right-wing terrorism seems to occur in cyclic response to elections and major political developments (Johnson 2012, 200), the social identity parameters surrounding the ideas of inequality that govern prejudices and drive a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (Zick et al. 2008), and how RWE as a form of political violence is evolving rapidly (Koehler 2016, Perliger 2020).

One aspect of RWE violence that separates it as a form of extremism is the common trend to classify acts of violence carried out with RWE motivations as hate crimes (Koehler 2016, 89), however research increasingly calls for RWE political violence to be viewed as the terrorism that it is, correcting the past political motivation to portray RWE as less of a threat than other forms of extremism (Koehler 2016; Perliger 2020).

The Role of Civil-Military Relations

While there are civil-military implications, particularly in relation to policy enforcement and personnel behavior standards, for any discussion surrounding anti-extremism policies in Western militaries, the unique cultural aspects that shape and define the bounds of the civilian-military relationship make a full examination of their impacts beyond the scope of this study.

Defining Strong and Effective Policy

Meanwhile, determining a policy is strong or effective enough can be a highly subjective undertaking that may be tinged by political or personal bias, limited experience, and cultural influences. However, in order to advocate for a policy review that takes a broad view of RWE so as to capture all possible variations of association, activism, and violence within a country's military, this study must address methods for assessing policies – specifically for how to determine if a country's anti-extremism policies and regulations meet the criteria for sufficiently addressing RWE. Of note, this study will define the act of "addressing" as "having a readiness or capability for dealing (as with a person or a problem) skillfully and smoothly" (Merriam Webster 2020). So, while there are presently no identifiable studies that specifically examine RWE policy strength and effectiveness, there is

a significant body of research into the success, failure, or effectiveness of counter violent extremism (CVE) policies.

Primary within the research on measuring CVE effectiveness, Gielen (2019) conducts an extremely thorough review of prevailing CVE policy analysis and advocates that a "realist" method of evaluation for CVE policies allows for a "systematic" approach, resulting in an advantageous methodology that provides the strongest critical assessment of policies (1152). The "realist method" Gielen promotes urges the reviewer to ask a series of questions surrounding a policy: "What works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?" (2019, 1152). Likewise, there is general research into policy strength and effectiveness that aims to build methodological frameworks for assessing policies. Begley et al. (2019) suggest measuring policy success or failure based on a framework of identifying "targets, aims and processes" for a policy that are divorced from "general assessments of achievements" (200). This framework builds on McConnell's (2010) triadic framework of policy as involving "processes, programs, and politics" that can be measured along a "spectrum of success, resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success, or failure" (345).

Likewise, when considering the relationship between a policy and its effect, public policy research promotes the use of a variety of frameworks and evaluation methods. The "ROAMEF" model ("rationale, objectives, appraisal, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback") promotes an evaluation framework that is often used within public health policy to enable rational policy development (Charlesworth, Or, and Spencelayh 2016). Similarly, policy impact assessments promote an evidence-based approach which attempts to document changes, both "potential (ex-ante) and actual (post-ante)," as a form of measuring policy effectiveness (Oliver and Parolin 2018). Lastly, social policy research examines policy

effectiveness through types of outcomes, with critical advocates on both sides of a debate between a culminative approach, which quantifies inputs, tracks their application, and measures outputs as change (Arrow 2006), and the comprehensive approach which calls for greater examination of the role of choice and obligations (Sen 2009; Samson et al. 2015, 2).

Gaps in RWE Research

Finally, studies focused specifically on RWE in Western militaries are sparse despite a common history of RWE activity and a documented rise of association, sentiment, and acts of RWE-motivated violence by service members. Research related to RWE in the military tends to focus more on the popularity of RWE amongst veterans, which can be driven by overall conservatism, or as Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013) document, potential rifts in identity that result from social ruptures with society. Research specifically examining RWE activity in the military is highly limited, with more focus on the potential societal impacts when RWE is prevalent in military culture. Indeed, Ralston, Motta, and Spindel (2020) explore the relationship between the American public and perceptions of RWE in the military, presenting concerning findings that RWE's threat is significantly underappreciated. However, the most notable attempts to address RWE in the military are currently amongst German researchers, with Bötticher's (2013) review of German military policies and institutional responses to extremism and Koehler's (2019) report on RWE prevalence and military CVE strategies in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

This study seeks to fill the gap in RWE research focused on anti-extremism policy strength (as opposed to CVE strategy efficacy). The difference between the two is important. Research on CVE documents successes and failures in various CVE strategies, and comparative studies between different countries is quite robust. However, testing the strength

of policy language to determine if the tools available to control RWE are theoretically sound, while using real-world RWE cases as a grounding measure, is a novel approach. This study uses this approach to bridge the divide from a strictly CVE review mindset to a pragmatic functional analysis perspective.

Methodology Overview

This research study consists of two parts designed to identify and assess the strength of existing anti-extremism policy language as measured against a selection of cases involving RWE-related infractions by military service members in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany [hereafter referred to as the "study countries"]. Part I is a descriptive and summative content analysis of the applicable military regulations, general government policies, and criminal codes used to address extremism within the study countries' military populations. Using these results, the second part of the study applied the policy language content analysis to a theoretical three-step process model using six cases of infractions to test for policy strength. The study provides recommendations based on the outcomes of these process model tests.

Study Typology

Based on the typologies identified in the literature review, this study adopts a modified version of Jackson's typology because its minimal construction is the most applicable to RWE outside the United States. This study modifies his typology by adding a category for fundamentalist extremism and adjusts his racism category to a generalized position on supremacism to capture more unique RWE groups, such as the involuntary celibate "Incel" movement, that are relevant to the scope of anti-extremism policies for

Western militaries. Figure 1, below, provides a schematic representation of the typology used for this study.



Figure 1. Proposed Typology of Right-Wing Extremism

Part I: Process and Purpose

Content analysis was used to identify key language indicators within the policies, regulations, and criminal code intended to address cases of extremism in a specific study country's military. Content analysis is a technique for analyzing qualitative data of varying levels of structure and similarity or dissimilarity enabling the discovery of explicit, latent, and symbolic meaning. The study utilized Dedoose™ research analytic software to perform qualitative content coding and data analysis of applicable text-based documents. Using a

code tree intended to identify references to RWE, definitions of extremism or terrorism activity, and other pertinent qualitative content, Dedoose™ enabled summative content extraction and analysis across the body of documents included in the study. The relevant policies, regulations, and criminal code were individually assessed through in-line text analysis and analyzed with mixed methodology analytics to isolate any relevant trends, patterns, and potential inconsistencies in base documents as compared by study country or specific document type.

Part II: Process and Purpose

Theoretical Process Model Overview

This study establishes the framework for the three-step process model by combining aspects of Gielen's realist-driven approach with elements from Begley et al. and McConnell's methodologies, as discussed in the literature review. Specifically, it takes Begley et al.'s targets and aims and McConnell's spectrum of success and constructs a framework built on logical questioning. The process model provides a method of assessment to test a study country's policies against a series of "strength questions" meant to identify weak, moderate, and strong manifestations of policy language. A process model is ideal because it acts as a reasoning system to compare "relative order of magnitude" outcomes of a set symbolic value system (Forbus 2008, 364). In this case, the rating system of weak, moderate, and strong criterion for language phrasing serves as a reason-based value system of pragmatic probabilities. This enables weighted evaluation of each policy and results in a uniform standard rather than a subjective system of analysis.

The three-step process model, shown below in Figure 2, begins with a "RWE Strain Litmus Test" which serves as a starting point for testing the "thoroughness" of a policy. The intent is to determine if the policy under analysis addresses all types of RWE based on the schema from Figure 1. The study identifies thoroughness as critical because it provides a way to measure whether a policy acknowledges the full scope of the issue. In the context of the study, this meant acknowledging the full threat of RWE and not reacting only to a specific strain (for example, only supremacism or nativism) while omitting the rest. The implications of omission could either be intentional (choosing to exclude a specific type of RWE for political reasons, for example), ignorant (failure to include due to lack of cognizance), or willfully ignorant (focusing on a specific type of RWE based on presumption of a certain type as a greater threat).

Regardless, the litmus test provides the first line of assessment for determining a policy's strength based on the number of RWE strains it explicitly addressed in clear language differentiating between forms of RWE. For example, if a policy stated members of the military were prohibited from membership in groups advocating for ethnic superiority, anti-Semitism, or gender superiority (supremacism), violence against immigrants or those of foreign descent (nativism), violence against those of another religion (fundamentalism), or advocating the overthrow of the government (anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE), the study determined the policy clearly differentiated between RWE. The strongest policies identified all four strains of RWE, moderately strong policies identified three of the four strains of RWE, and the weakest policies focused solely on a specific type of RWE or did not define RWE based on typology at all. RWE identification is essential because failing to recognize all forms introduces the possibility an RWE infraction is not prosecutable under

the assessed policy, thus leaving a form of RWE room to expand in the ranks of a study country's military.

The second strength test determines if the policy provides a clear way to act on an RWE infraction. This step examines the severity of punishment available to administer, to ascertain if there is an adequate mechanism in place or if no pathway exists to handle the RWE infraction. Therefore, this strength test appraises the degree of administrative and statutory criminal consequences in place to discipline a military member found guilty of an RWE infraction. The strongest policies included both legal or criminally punitive actions and administrative actions (for lesser infractions), moderately strong policies only included administrative consequences, and the weakest policies did not provide for clear consequences of any kind and simply rebuked RWE as poor behavior and established a normative standard for conduct.

Finally, the third strength test evaluates whether the organization responsible for handling the RWE infraction (for example, the service branch of the member involved, such as the U.S. Army) displayed the will to act when an RWE infraction occurred. The purpose of this test is to determine if the policy strength was not at fault for addressing an incident but instead a culture of non-compliance or poor awareness within the organization. For this test, the strongest policies displayed evidence in the case application the organization responsible for handling the RWE infraction acted routinely on incidents according to established procedural guidelines. Moderately strong policies were those where the responsible organization acted but did not comply with established standards. The weakest policies were those where the organization responsible for acting did not do so despite having knowledge

of RWE infractions, regardless of established procedure.



Figure 2. Theoretical Three-Step Process Model

Policy Testing and Case Application Overview

Finally, the purpose of the case application to the process model in part II is to test the relevant policy language identified in the content analysis phase against real-world evidence. Using examples of military RWE incidents, two per each country included in the study, part II determines if existing policy was sufficient for handling the RWE infraction. If the policy language or its application was deficient, then adjustments to the actual policy language or the implementation of additional parameters addressing behavior-based inefficiencies are recommended.

Case Study Selection and Sampling Process

This study involved two separate, purposive sampling strategies used to identify the country-level case study bounding parameters with which to examine RWE in the military, as well as the RWE infraction cases used to test the theoretical process model. The study identified the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany using criterion-based selection to meet a series of specific requirements. These criteria included: 1) style of government as a form of Western constitutional democracy; 2) the country is believed to be experiencing a rise in overall RWE activity as a result of nationalist, populist, or other authoritarian-driven social sentiment; and, 3) popular news reporting identified RWE infractions involving the country's military; or 4) popular news reporting identified significant discussions of proposed changes in policy related to military personnel conduct.

Since 2015 there has been a rise in populist sentiment in the United States and an increase in RWE activity (SPLC 2020). Further, the United States House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel held testimony in February 2020 titled "Alarming Incidents of White Supremacy in the Military – How to Stop It?" where the Anti-Defamation League, the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, SPLC, and other government agencies provided in-person and written testimony documenting a trending increase in cases of RWE involving military service members across all branches of the United States military (House Armed Services Committee 2020). Likewise, beginning in 2019, Canada experienced a series of high-profile incidents of RWE involving members of the Canadian Armed Forces, while the Canadian military also undertook an expansive update in 2020 to its *Hateful Conduct* personnel policy because of these incidents. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has been sharply divided since its national referendum to leave the

European Union in 2016, with a pronounced rise in populist sentiment. This is accompanied by a concerning increase in overall RWE-related activity within the country (The Soufan Center 2020). Finally, Germany has experienced a tumultuous level of populist furor as part of backlash against the European refugee crisis. Further, Germany's military had a series of scandalous cases of RWE infractions starting in 2019 amongst its special operations forces, leading to the disbandment of an entire unit, the *Kommando Specialkräfte* (Bennhold 2020).

Six RWE infraction cases were also identified using critical case sampling methods because they provide specific evidence of sufficient detail to enable application of the process model strength tests. While the study used certain criteria to reject potential case examples, such as those involving veterans, each RWE infraction case was selected because enough information regarding the circumstances and procedural handling of the incidents were available to the public either through official government statements, or reliable investigative journalism.

Part I: Policy Document Content Analysis

The first part of this study is the qualitative content analysis of eighteen policy documents: either military regulations, general government policies, or statutory criminal code from the study countries. This study selected documents for analysis because they serve as anti-extremism policy or guidance, and as such are applicable in relevant circumstances to an RWE infraction by a military member of a study country.[1] Using Dedoose™ analytical

[1] Many codes of military law include broadly applicable general articles, such as Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the United States, Section 19 of the Manual of Service Law for the United Kingdom, and Article 103.60 of the Queen's Regulations & Orders for Canada that could be used to prosecute RWE as an offense against "the good order and discipline" of the military (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice 2019; Government of the United Kingdom 2016; Government of Canada 2019). However, the general rather than specific nature of these provisions undercuts their utility as it increases the amount of will required

software, this study applied a code tree built to identify primary and secondary tiers of content indicators to each document to determine the degree and to what detail each one addressed concepts of RWE, extremism, and terrorism.

Primary content indicators involved direct references to aspects of RWE, including definitions of RWE types, activities, and targets. Secondary content indicators included references to extremism and terrorism in generalized terms, as well as observations of implicit bias and wording that introduced "optionality." Optionality was a concern because these language choices possibly shift the intent and focus of the policy document and could impact its proper utilization or enforcement against an infraction. This study defined implicit bias language as language that by either specific word choice or argumentative presupposition conveyed a prejudiced thought or belief in favor of a singular interpretation of a concept of terrorism, extremism, or a foundational ideology of political violence. An example of implicit bias is stating that a form of extremism or terrorism is worse than another form, such as claiming Islamist extremism and terrorism is more of a threat than right or left-wing extremism or terrorism. Optionality is defined as "available to be chosen but not obligatory" (Lexico 2020). Stating that a behavior, such as extremism, must be discouraged because it does not reflect the values of an organization or the responsibilities of military service is an example of optional language. The summary table below briefly outlines the

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for a commander to act on initiative and provides only a vague pathway to action for a commander to address RWE as a serious offense. Therefore, this study does not assess these articles because of the inherent structural challenges these laws present.

Meanwhile, German military law differs from the other study countries in that the *Wehrdisziplinarordnung* (WDO) or Military Disciplinary Code does not provide a similar general article ("*Wehrdisziplinarordnung*" n.d.). However, §8 (Support for the basic democratic order) and §23 (Misconduct) under First Section Common Rules, Duties and Rights of Soldiers, of the Soldier's Act of 2001 contain language that could serve as means of administrative punishment of RWE infractions ("§ 23 - *Soldatengesetz*" n.d.; "§ 8 – *Soldatengesetz*" n.d.).

content analysis results for each country against key primary and secondary content indicators. Appendix B provides an expanded discussion of the findings.

Table 1. Content Analysis Summary

	United States	United Kingdom	Canada	Germany
Defines RWE	Yes	No	Yes	Partially
Supremacist	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Nativist	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Fundamentalist	Yes	No	Yes	No
Anti-Government, Militia, Patriot Movement	Partially	No	No	No
Articulates Process	Partially	No	Yes	No
None Specified	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes
Administrative	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Statutory	Partially	Yes	Yes	Yes
Implicit Bias	No	Yes	No	Partially
Optionality	Yes	Yes	Partially	No

Part II: Process Model Testing Results and Case Application

The tables summarize the results of the three-step theoretical process model's application to each study country's policy documents, followed by tables providing the pertinent details of the RWE cases for each country and the results of the case application process.

United States

Table 2. United States Process Model Summary Testing Results

	Test #1: RWE Litmus	Test #2: Pathway to Act	Test #3: Usage
DODI 1325.06 (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Weak / Strong	Weak
AFH-1 (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
MCO 5354.1E (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Weak to Moderate	Weak to Moderate

AR 600-20 (Military Regulation)	Strong	Strong	Not measurable
Navy Regulations and OPNAV Instructions (Military Regulations)	OPNAV Instructions: Moderate Navy Regulations: Strong*	OPNAV Instructions: Moderate Navy Regulations: Not applicable	Weak

United States: Case Applications

Table 3. United States Case No. 1: Staff Sergeant Steven Carrillo

Military Service Type	Active Duty, U.S. Air Force
Date of Infraction(s)	May 29, 2020 and June 6, 2020
Infraction	May 29, 2020: shot and killed David Underwood in a drive-by shooting in Oakland, California; June 6, 2020: ambushed and killed Sgt. Gutzwiller and attempted to murder Sheriff's deputies Spencer, Ramponi, Officer Rodriguez, and Officer Estey using firearms and a pipe bomb. Prior to apprehension, used his own blood to paint Boogaloo movement popular messaging on vehicles in the vicinity of his capture (Losey 2020; Dazio 2020; Mossberg and Waldrop 2020; California v. Steven Carrillo 20CR02599 Santa Cruz Superior 2020).
RWE Group Association	Boogaloo Movement
RWE Ideology	Anti-Government, Militia, Patriot Movement
Current Status	August 28, 2020: plead "not guilty" to 19 counts of murder, attempted murder, and miscellaneous firearms and explosives charges; faces both federal and state charges; will likely face two criminal trials (Gartrell 2020 ; KPIX 5 2020).
Case Application	
AFH-1, MCO 5354.1E, and DODI 1325.06	AFH-1 does not acknowledge anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE, and therefore does not provide any support for the USAF to preemptively identify a case like Carrillo's radicalization to the Boogaloo Movement before full commitment to an act of violence. If Carrillo displayed any indicators or warning signs before his killing spree, his superiors would not have sufficient military regulations available to address his behavior or place emphasis on the threat of anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE within his unit. Likewise, MCO 5354.1E incorporates the same ambiguity as AFH-1 when addressing RWE, leaving a loophole for anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE.

	DODI 1325.06, as the higher echelon advisory regulation, also does not cover anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE. While the instruction provides commanders with guidelines that include administrative counseling, education, and unit training to identify and discourage extremist behaviors in a unit, the lack of inclusion of all forms of RWE means cases similar to Carrillo's will continue to be unaddressed.
AR 600-20	If the USAF utilized the newly revised AR 600-20 regulation, with its full inclusion of all forms of RWE as well as its more robust directed guidance to commanders for identifying and handling RWE cases in their unit ranks, Carrillo's case would in theory have been effectively addressed if his unit acted on any indicators and warnings he displayed.
Navy Regulations and Instructions	OPNAV Instructions such as 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1 have the same policy weaknesses as AFH-1 and DODI 1325.06, leaving a case such as Carrillo's unaddressable; but, when combined with the strengthened language from Article 1167, 1990 Navy Regulations, it would be possible for the USAF to identify Carrillo's anti-government radicalization and take action. However, while Article 1167 does provide stronger language covering anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE, it was added to the Navy Regulations in 1997 and subsequent updates to OPNAVINSTR 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1 do not include the expanded definition of extremism Article 1167 provides. Therefore, while still in effect, the 2017 update to 3120.32D CH-1 and the 1999 version of 1620.1B supersede Article 1167 in currency and likely application to RWE infractions, reducing the likelihood Article 1167 would be applied to a case similar to Carrillo's.

Table 4. United States Case No. 2: Lance Corporal Vasillios Pistolis

Military Service Type	Active Duty, U.S. Marine Corps
Date of Infraction(s)	August 12, 2017 and summer 2017
Infraction	Beat a transgendered protestor, Emily Gorcenski, and two other counter-protestors at the Unite the Right Rally on August 12, 2017 in Charlottesville, VA; served as the Atomwaffen Division chapter leader for North Carolina for the summer of 2017 before departing AD to join another extremist group (Thompson, Winston, and Hanrahan 2018).
RWE Group Association	Atomwaffen Division
RWE Ideology	Supremacist
Current Status	Court-martialed for disobeying orders and making false statements in 2018; sentenced to a reduction in rank, imprisonment for a month, and

	docked pay; August 1, 2018, separated from service (Thompson and Winston 2018).
Case Application	
DODI 1325.06, AFH-1, AR 600-20, Navy Regulations and Instructions, and MCO 5354.1E	All U.S. military regulations sufficiently address the supremacist RWE Pistolis adhered to and effectively restricted his involvement in the Atomwaffen Division. In Pistolis' case, the USMC had strong enough policies available to identify and confront his RWE behavior (which significantly predated his participation in the Unite the Right Rally in 2017). However, the USMC displayed an organizational unwillingness to implement regulations restricting and punishing extremist behavior. This reluctance is evident in the court martial charges the USMC brought against Pistolis. The lack of charges related to Pistolis' extremist behavior is contrary to the evidence the USMC had available. ProPublica had photographic documentation of Pistolis beating a protestor at the Unite the Right rally which it published in its coverage of the event; further, the USMC could access Pistolis' own social media posts admitting to the act. Both pieces of evidence provided proof of his involvement in a prohibited extremist activity – attending a supremacist rally, as well as an act of violent assault. Despite discharging Pistolis, the USMC's reluctance to treat his case as extremism reflects a culture of overall non-compliance.

United Kingdom

Table 5. United Kingdom Process Model Summary Testing Results

	Test #1: RWE Litmus	**Test #2: Pathway to Act**	**Test #3: Usage**
Queen's Regulations and Orders (Military Regulation)	Weak	Weak	Moderate
***Prevent Strategy* (2011) (Government Policy)**	Weak	Weak	Moderate
Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office (Government Policy)	Not applicable	Strong	Strong

United Kingdom: Case Applications

Table 6. United Kingdom Case No. 1: Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen

Military Service Type	Active Duty, British Army
Date of Infraction(s)	September 2017 (date of police raid on personal dwelling)
Infraction	Served as a recruiter for National Action inside British Army; harbored a large cache of RWE propaganda, memorabilia, and stockpiled weapons in his home; participated for several years in online engagement and social media espousing supremacist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, and nativist beliefs; built a crude electromagnetic pulse device to use in a "race war" his terror group was planning on instigating after they converted low-population rural communities in the British countryside to a "national socialist community" base of operations (Dearden 2018; Dearden 2018).
RWE Group Association	National Action
RWE Ideology	Supremacist
Current Status	April 2018: sentenced to eight years in prison for violating the Home Office's proscription of National Action as a terrorist organization (Siddique 2018).
Case Application	
Queen's Regulations & Orders, Prevent Strategy (2011), and Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office	Given that the Queen's Regulations & Orders, *Prevent Strategy*, and Proscribed Terrorist Organisations regulations all specifically identify National Action as a proscribed organization, they address Vehvilainen's case sufficiently at face value. However, because of the way all three define RWE as a blanket term and rely on the Home Office's formal designation of a specific group to enable their leverage against an RWE infraction, they are all insufficient to address British military RWE incidents associated with groups outside the scope of proscribed organizations. Because of this pro-forma legal obstacle to their use, the British military is unable to take more proactive measures against RWE in its ranks other than to refer service members to radicalization intervention programs managed inside the Home Office's *Prevent* and *Channel* programs. This gap in policy scope increases the likelihood units will not address RWE infractions due to a lack of administrative policy tools, other than general administrative punishments for order and discipline, that fall below the threshold of criminal charges available to them.

Table 7. United Kingdom Case No. 2: Private Mark Barrett

Military Service Type	Active Duty, British Army
Date of Infraction(s)	September 2017 (date of detention on his Army base in Cyprus)
Infraction	Lance Corporal Vehvilainen recruited Barrett to join National Action (they were members of the same unit, the Royal Anglian Regiment); charged with a single count of membership in a proscribed organization contrary to the Terrorism Act 2000; had National Action and neo-Nazi paraphernalia in his possession when detained in Cyprus (Dearden 2017; Dearden 2018).
RWE Group Association	National Action
RWE Ideology	Supremacist
Current Status	April 13, 2018: Acquitted by the Birmingham Crown Court of membership in National Action; separated from service following the trial (Vernalls 2018).
Case Application	
Queen's Regulations & Orders, Prevent Strategy (2011), and Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office	While Barrett's case is similar to Vehvilainen's in almost every way, in that the British military was more enabled to act along with British law enforcement authorities because his alleged involvement in RWE was tied to a clearly proscribed organization, his case differs in that he was not found guilty of membership. However, he was still separated from the military based on his association with criminal proceedings, which indicates the British military can resolve potential RWE infractions with alternative solutions if the formal regulations on extremism association do not support leverage of consequences. Even so, Barrett's case did require criminal charges being preferred before the British military acted to separate. This sets a high standard and reinforces a gap for lower-level policy tools to address RWE infractions below the threshold of criminal activity. Further, to better address a culture of RWE or endemic racism in the ranks, the policy tools need to explicitly be designed for extremism; the effect, otherwise, is a lack of uniform enforcement.

Canada

Table 8. Canada Process Model Summary Testing Results

	Test #1: RWE Litmus	Test #2: Pathway to Act	Test #3: Usage
Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Vol. II (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
CAO 11-82 (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Strong	Not measurable
CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20 (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Strong	Not measurable
DAOD 5019-0 (Military Regulation)	Moderate	Strong	Not measurable

Canada: Case Applications

Table 9. Canada Case No. 1: Leading Seaman Boris Mihajlovic

Military Service Type	Active Reservist, Royal Canadian Navy (Reserve)
Date of Infraction(s)	Multiple years; joined Blood and Honour in 2012, site administrator for Iron March website as early as 2016
Infraction	Identified as a site administrator for the now defunct "Iron March" website in a 2019 hack; also, one of the most prolific contributors to the online forum; pro-fascist content, advocated for a "race war," voiced support for the destruction of the Canadian military, and offered to sell other members AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades, and other military-grade weapons; the hack also revealed ties with Combat 18, the armed branch of Blood and Honour (Rocha and Yates 2019; Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies 2020).
RWE Group Association	Unaffiliated online supremacism (Iron March website) Blood and Honour / Combat 18
RWE Ideology	Supremacist
Current Status	June 12, 2020: Reinstated to active service after the Royal Canadian Navy completed an initial investigation; July 24, 2020: Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center filed an inquiry with the Canadian National Defence Department objecting to the return to service decision; August 6, 2020: Reinstatement decision is the subject of a Royal Canadian Navy command-level review (Rocha and Yates 2020 ; Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies 2020).

Case Application	
Queen's Regulations & Orders for CAF, Vol. II	As the Queen's Regulations & Orders only recognizes stronger sentencing for service member's convicted of hate crimes, the regulation only provides a mechanism for Mihajlovic's unit to act on his supremacist activity if it had involved an act of violence. As the QR&O is the only regulation that predates Mihajlovic's RWE infractions, it did not serve as a strong enough policy in his case. This is evident in the fact that Mihajlovic allegedly admitted his involvement with Blood and Honour and Combat 18 to a unit superior shortly after his enlistment in 2016; however, he was only advised to break ties with the group (Rocha and Yates 2019). The CAF's more specific extremism policies, CAO 11-82, CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, and the update to DAOD 5019-0 were not yet in effect, which leaves the possibility the superior did not have the policy tools necessary to handle Mihajlovic's admission to RWE involvement. However, it could equally be the case the unit superior was demonstrating a lack of willingness to address the RWE incident with stronger enforcement, but the lack of strict policy within the QR&O at the time obfuscates this potential.
CAO 11-82, CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, DAOD 5019-0	With the July 2020 update to the CAF's "Hateful Conduct Policy," CAO 11-82, CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, and DAOD 5019-0 contain language strong enough to address a clear case of supremacist RWE behavior such as Mihajlovic's. This policy strength includes the additional entrance screening requirements the CAF is implementing for new recruits alongside the application of its new hateful conduct policies to current service members. These changes, in theory, would be sufficient to identify the type of preexistent supremacist behavior Mihajlovic participated in prior to enlisting, as his case documents RWE association starting in his early teen years (Rocha and Yates 2019). While the Canadian military was screening for flagged behavior when Mihajlovic entered the service, the language added to the CAF's policies on extremism in 2020 provide clearer guidance for background investigators to identify preexisting RWE behaviors and bar access to military service for cases like Mihajlovic. Separately, the CAF is undergoing a change in organizational willingness to address cases of RWE. These changes are evident in the way the CAF has handled Mihajlovic's reinstatement case, bringing it back for review in August 2020 after internal and external advocates demanded investigation into his return to active service. That the Royal Canadian Navy chose to reinstate him in July 2020, despite a clear, broader command climate of intent to deal more strongly with RWE incidents and behavior, speaks to an organizational culture of leniency for RWE. The decision to reinstate him is shocking given the sentiment Mihajlovic expressed on Iron March, advocating for the destruction of the Canadian military as well as his apparent attempts to sell military-grade weapons to other extremists on the site. However, the Ministry of Defence's intervention and the Canadian Navy's subsequent initiation of a

	command-level review indicates organizational change may be occurring alongside the greater emphasis on hateful conduct within the entire CAF.

Table 10. Canada Case No. 2: Master Corporal Corey Hurren

Military Service Type	Reservist, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Rangers
Date of Infraction(s)	July 2, 2020
Infraction	Attempted to militantly confront Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau by crashing his vehicle through the pedestrian entrance at the viceregal state residence of Canada, Rideau Hall (where PM Trudeau resides), in Ottawa, Canada; was heavily armed and carrying a two-page letter outlining right-wing beliefs and conspiracy-theory driven accusations against the Trudeau administration and the PM's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic when apprehended on the residential grounds (Boutilier and Quan 2020; Brewster and Ling 2020; Tunney and Ling 2020).
RWE Group Association	QAnon
RWE Ideology	Anti-Government, Militia, Patriot Movement
Current Status	Incarcerated and awaiting trial for 22 charges involving firearms violations, being armed with a weapon in a restricted area, and issuing a threat of bodily harm or danger to the prime minister; next hearing is scheduled for November 6, 2020; has been discharged from the CAF (Tunney 2020; Global News 2020; CP24 News 2020; North Shore News 2020).
Case Application	
Queen's Regulations & Orders for CAF, Vol. II	As the Queen's Regulations and Orders do not address anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE, the orders provide no basis to handle a case of extremism such as Hurren's. While Hurren's reservist status could be viewed as a complication to the ability to leverage military regulations against right-wing behavior displayed during periods of civilian status, it is possible to combine sections of the National Defence Act of 1985 to the CAF Code of Service regulations to establish military jurisdiction (Brewster 2020). However, this extended process is complicated and presents a significant legal burden to military units attempting to regulate anti-government sentiment within their ranks that would not be the case if the QR&O more explicitly addressed the full scope of RWE.
CAO 11-82, CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, DAOD 5019-0	Even with the expansion of the CAF's hateful conduct policies, the exclusion of anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE in the new policies precludes military units from taking proactive measures against cases such as Hurren's. While the policies give more robust procedures for commanders to leverage administrative, disciplinary, and

	if need be, referral to criminal proceedings, this only applies to RWE infractions involving supremacism, nativism, or fundamentalism. This oversight in the policy update presents a loophole for anti-government RWE sentiment to only be addressed after an act of violence has occurred or been attempted, such as Hurren's case, because the Canadian government can then prefer charges against the offender based on criminal code. However, this threshold of a violent act is an ineffective and reactive method to manage RWE.

Germany

Table 11. Germany Process Model Summary Testing Results

	Test #1: RWE Litmus	**Test #2: Pathway to Act**	**Test #3: Usage**
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organisations **(Government Policy)**	Weak	Moderate	Moderate
German Criminal Code, 1998	Not applicable	Not applicable	Moderate

Germany: Case Applications

Table 12. Germany Case No. 1: First Lieutenant Franco "Franco A." Albrecht

Military Service Type	Active Duty, *Bundeswehr* (German Army)
Date of Infraction(s)	November 2015 (falsely applied for asylum posing as a Syrian refugee); February 2017 (arrested and then deliberately released by Austrian authorities at Vienna international airport attempting to retrieve a firearm and ammunition he cached in an airport bathroom; the release was to further an undercover investigation into his follow-on activities); April 26, 2017 (arrested again following police investigation) (DW News 2017; DW News 2018).
Infraction	Masqueraded as a Syrian refugee starting in 2015 while still serving on active duty; intended to carry out a series of high-profile assassinations of pro-asylum politicians while posing as a refugee to instigate a backlash against refugees and other Muslim immigrants; German authorities and defense leadership found *Wehrmacht* memorabilia and other Nazi paraphernalia while searching his barracks after his arrest; investigators discovered the *Bundeswehr* had to issue Albrecht a warning for turning in

	a master's thesis with supremacist content while studying as a student at a French military academy in 2014 (DW News 2017; DW News 2018).
RWE Group Association	No formal group affiliation
RWE Ideology	Supremacist / Nativist
Current Status	December 2017: the German Federal Court of Justice dismissed the initial criminal case, citing insufficient evidence to prove intent to commit a terrorist attack; German prosecutors brought a second indictment, including charges of planning an act of violence (based on a "hit list" discovered during the investigation into communications with two collaborators), and miscellaneous firearms and explosives violations; discharged from service in 2017 while incarcerated and awaiting final charges; November 2017: released and placed under house arrest with charges pending; June 2019: case is still awaiting trial (DW News 2017; DW News 2018 ; *Deutsche Presseagentur* 2018).
Case Application	
Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organisations **and German Criminal Code, 1998**	As a government policy outlining prohibited expressions of RWE and association with designated unconstitutional organizations, the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz's* official publication provides a basis of guidance to the German military of how German criminal code prohibits forms of RWE involving supremacism such as Albrecht's. However, Albrecht's case is significantly complex because it involves his duplicitous enrollment into an asylum program over a hundred kilometers away from his designated duty station, his collaboration to assassinate government officials, the display of prohibited memorabilia in his assigned barracks room, and his history of RWE sentiment documented in his first master's thesis draft rejected for supremacist content. The number of breakdowns in the system for Albrecht's case to transpire is quite extreme. If his barracks was subjected to inspection, which is a customary practice in Western militaries, the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*'s government policy provides sufficient guidance to his unit that the memorabilia in his barracks room was in violation of section 86a of the German Criminal Code, which would initiate an investigation. However, more egregiously, the mishandling of his master's thesis topic where the German military did not act on the displayed RWE sentiment but instead administratively counseled Albrecht to change the thesis displays an organizational unwillingness to address RWE in the ranks and indicates the German military requires stronger policy emphasis. While the German military is presently undergoing an internal RWE review and initiating hundreds of investigations through its counterintelligence unit now that cases such as Albrecht's have come to light, there are still gaps in policy for handling RWE infractions that fall below the threshold of criminal activity. Ultimately, Germany's military justice system, with its administrative disciplinary actions carried out by troop service courts and all other actions against German soldiers carried out through the formal criminal justice system, does not appear to have

	robust enough lower-level mechanisms to handle RWE infractions to identify cases of supremacism like Albrecht's before they escalate to preparation for acts of violence.

Table 13. Germany Case No. 2: "Little Sheep" (Unidentified *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) Sergeant Major)

Military Service Type	Active Duty, *Bundeswehr*
Date of Infraction(s)	Multiple years (under investigation since 2017); May 2020 (police raid on dwelling)
Infraction	Stole munitions and explosives (PETN charges, a detonator and fuse, thousands of rounds of ammunition) from his unit, the KSK; stockpiled other weapons (AK-47, a silencer, knives and a crossbow), and buried them in his garden; had banned Nazi memorabilia, including an SS songbook, in his home; reported in 2017 for harboring RWE sentiments following an informal gathering at a shooting range where KSK members, including "Little Sheep," demonstrated Nazi gestures and performed neo-Nazi songs (Woodyatt 2020; Bennhold 2020; BBC News 2020).
RWE Group Association	No formal group affiliation
RWE Ideology	Supremacist
Current Status	Arrested and under criminal investigation, case and trial pending formal prosecutorial charges; July 1, 2020: after determining rampant right-wing association throughout the entire unit, the German Defense Minister disbanded the KSK (Sahinkaya 2020; Bennhold 2020).
Case Application	
***Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organisations* and German Criminal Code, 1998**	"Little Sheep's" case is as complex as Albrecht's in terms of the series of breakdowns in military procedures which unfolded to allow for his illegal theft of so much military-grade explosives, stockpiling of weapons, and overt ascription to RWE, however what is most concerning about his case is how rife his military unit was found to be with overt supremacist activities. "Little Sheep's" case points to a dilemma of what can be done when a problem assails an entire institution. While the German Ministry of Defence dealt with the dilemma by dissolving the entire unit, it does present a question of how to rectify such sweeping levels of organizational unwillingness to address RWE in the ranks for the future, as eliminating units is an unsustainable solution. While German criminal code and the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*'s government policy at face value are more than sufficiently strong to address "Little Sheep's" case, there are still gaps in policy to enable lower-level tools to effectively address RWE infractions in the ranks, as well as some form of system of accountability to prevent an entire unit from being overrun again.

Discussion and Analysis

Overall, no study country demonstrated a policy measuring "strong" in every process model step, although the United States' updated AR 600-20 regulation has the most potential to be the strongest anti-extremism policy in use. This is because AR 600-20 effectively addressed all forms of RWE and provided clear guidance and expected standards for implementation. However, given how new the policy is, and the United States' history of failures to address RWE in the ranks despite regulatory guidance, the overall strength of AR 600-20 is dependent on the organizational willingness of the U.S. Army to use the policy to its fullest extent. Meanwhile, the remainder of the United States' regulations, along with the other study countries, fell short of achieving effective policy strength ratings because they failed to address the full scope of RWE threatening Western militaries, and historically lack enforcement of regulations against RWE in the ranks. While Canada's updated policies contain an emphasis on removing RWE within the ranks, setting them apart from the rest of the cases, the policies are new, and time is necessary to determine if they will be implemented with regularity.

Conversely, the United Kingdom faces a two-fold problem with the strength of its policies. First, the British military is reliant on broader government policies for anti-extremism regulations to manage RWE within its ranks. This dependency on the proscription system, codified in British criminal code and exercised through the powers of the Home Office, leaves the possibility the British military will be unable to act against RWE infractions that do not involve a formally proscribed organization. Second, the key government policy this system is dependent on, the 2011 *Prevent Strategy*, lacks any formal definition of RWE, and is excessively biased in its focus against Islamist extremism. By

failing to define RWE, and instead treating the term as a generalized, all-encompassing reference, the policy is inherently limited in its ability to address emergent RWE threats or those falling outside the perception of policy makers' cognizance of RWE while the extensive bias in the policy further weakens its foundations and overall utility.

Finally, Germany's system of designated unconstitutional organizations and history of sensitivity to RWE should provide a stronger basis for identifying and eliminating RWE in the ranks of its military. However, Germany's policies addressed RWE with a single focus on those forms that share ideological beliefs with National Socialism, making Germany's efforts to curb RWE limited with such a biased concentration on a specific strain of RWE. This failure to acknowledge other forms leaves Germany unprepared to deal with the increasing internationalization of RWE. Likewise, despite the policies in place to address this form of RWE, Germany's military failed to act over many years and is now faced with an institution-wide review and purge due to long-term lack of enforcement. While Germany's policies failed the overall strength test, the policies it has in place were more than sufficient to handle the specific RWE involved in both its cases, which reinforces Germany's real issue is a crisis of organizational willingness to act. The *Bundeswehr*'s failure to address the known activity within the KSK and "Little Sheep's" case has affected the integrity of an entire institution and created a rift in the German public's trust. Indeed, the dissolution of an entire unit due to penetration of RWE ideology reduces a critical capability in the German military's readiness and represents the harsh reality of what unchecked RWE behavior can do to the military's ranks.

Meanwhile, while this study sought to reduce the possibility of bias and rigor issues with regard to the foundational policy documents used for content analysis and process

model testing for each country, it is possible the study did not include all relevant policy documents for the United Kingdom and Germany. Every attempt was made to thoroughly identify relevant military regulations for each study country; however, the United Kingdom and Germany do not make their military regulations easily searchable for the public. In the case of the United Kingdom, the Queen's Regulations and Orders were identifiable, but beyond that, no further military regulations or documents were locatable. However, extensive research into how the United Kingdom dealt with extremism confirmed the British military is covered by the Home Office's *Prevent* program, but it is unknown if there are more pertinent internal military regulations dealing with command guidance on extremism. Meanwhile, Germany's system of civilian justice oversight of the military, institutionalized in the 1950s, made the use of criminal code as a primary policy document for addressing extremism in the military appropriate for the study. However, if there are further military regulations providing more detailed command guidance on handling extremism in the ranks, they were unidentifiable despite extensive research. It is possible regulations are available to the public but were unidentifiable due to a moderate German language barrier; however, German government websites provided a built-in option to translate all content to English and extensive research into all locatable, relevant official German websites did not locate any pertinent military regulations.

Likewise, this study identified the most robust RWE infraction cases available to the public. However, the United Kingdom does not release the details of active or current RWE infractions in its military. Therefore, the only two RWE cases available for the study involved two individuals from the same overall incident, with the details only being available due to a criminal trial for proscription offences. Ideally, the study would have incorporated a

second, separate RWE infraction for the case application in part II, but no such case was identifiable. Therefore, the study's rigor was slightly reduced by the use of two RWE cases stemming from the same incident.

Lastly, while the study does not have any cognizant instances of bias, the researcher is an active duty U.S. Army officer. As such, the researcher has professional experience with the policies involved in the United States section, which led to a more nuanced ability to assess the content analysis of each document and to apply the process model to the policies and selected RWE cases for part II of the study. However, the researcher did not anticipate the U.S. Army's updated command policy would rate the strongest of the study; the fact that AR 600-20 came out of the process model with such a rating does not reflect any personal bias on the researcher's part to support a U.S. Army policy. In fact, the researcher expected the policy to rate much weaker in the process model and as compared against other study countries' policies.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this study found Western democracies generally fail to address all forms of RWE threatening their societies, leaving them vulnerable to the growth of different strains of RWE which are increasingly more rampant and internationally connected between Western countries than ever before (Perliger 2020). While a select few Western military regulations addressed all forms of RWE, this was not the case across the whole of a study country's policies which indicates a lack of uniform perception of the overall threat. The strongest anti-extremism policies must address all four key strains of RWE if they are to be capable of confronting the changing, evolving nature of existing RWE, and those that are emergent. Furthermore, the degree of implicit bias and lack of enforcement of existing anti-

extremism policies displayed across the study speaks to foundational cultural issues with acknowledging the threat RWE presents to Western militaries and reinforces the aggregate strength of a policy lies not only in how well it deals with the issue at hand, but in the policy's enactment. While the countries involved in this study need to rectify the general omission of anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE in their policies, as well as more concretely address fundamentalist RWE, they more urgently need to resolve their general denial that RWE is a threat inside their military institutions. Across the board, the countries involved in this study publicly insist that the existence of RWE in their military's ranks is low, almost nonexistent, but the problem is profoundly understudied and there are no reliable statistics for how penetrated each study country is with regard to RWE.

Further, a key aspect of this study is the premise it treats the utility of strict, exact wording in policies as a factor of how effective they will be. This study assumes strict wording is better because of the inherent clarity it provides. However, another study can examine if a more general approach is better.

Likewise, additional studies are necessary to truly determine the actual scope of the problem before any Western democracy can claim RWE is a low-level phenomenon in their military. The pace of RWE acts of violence, swelling number and size of RWE groups in each country, and the push of populist sentiment across Western society writ large speaks to a much more endemic and concerning problem. In other words, the size of the threat is unknown, but the indicators that RWE is more ingrained in Western militaries than policy makers wish to believe are there.

Appendix A: Study Country Policy Document Tables

The following tables provide the policy documents this study examined for each study country and identifies the specific sub-documents or sections this study analyzed for the content analysis portion of part I of the study.

For the United States, this study analyzed the following seven policy documents:

Table 14. United States Policy Documents

Primary Document	Sub-Document or Section	Type
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1325.06		*Military Regulation*
Army Regulation (AR) 600-20,	- Paragraph 4-12	*Military Regulation*
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5354.1E	- Section 0107	*Military Regulation*
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1620.1B	- Section 3.5.8	*Military Regulation*
OPNAVINST 3120.32D CH-1, *Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy*	- Section 5.1.41(c)	*Military Regulation*
United States Navy Regulations, 1990	- Article 1167	*Military Regulation*
Air Force Handbook (AFH) 1	- Section 6.39.4 - Section 17.5.1	*Military Regulation*

For the United Kingdom, this study analyzed the following three policy documents:

Table 15. United Kingdom Policy Documents

Primary Document	Sub-Document or Section	Type
Queen's Regulation's for the Army	- Chapter 5, Part 2, Section 5.085(c) - Chapter 9, Section 9.404(b)(1)	*Military Regulation*
Prevent Strategy (June 2011)	- Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for Scotland (April 2019) - Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for Wales and England (April 2019) - Channel Duty Guidance (2015)	*Government Policy*
Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office		*Government Policy*

For Canada, this study analyzed the following six policy documents:

Table 16. Canada Policy Documents

Primary Document	Sub-Document or Section	Type
Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Armed Forces, Vol. II	- Chapter 104, Section 2, Article 104.14	*Military Regulations*
Canadian Army Order (CAO) 11-82, *Hateful Conduct*		*Military Regulation*
Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF Mil Pers Instr) 01/20, *Hateful Conduct*		*Military Regulation*
Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5019-0, *Conduct and Performance Deficiencies*		*Military Regulation*

For Germany, this study analyzed the following two policy documents:

Table 17. Germany Policy Documents

Primary Document	Sub-Document or Section	Type
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organisations		*Government Policy*
German Criminal Code, 1998	- Section 46(2), *Principles of Sentencing* - Section 81, *High Treason Against the Federation* - Section 83, *Preparation of an Enterprise Directed at High Treason* - Section 84, *Continuation of a Political Party Declared Unconstitutional* - Section 86, *Dissemination of Propaganda Material of Unconstitutional Organisations* - Section 86a, *Using Symbols of Unconstitutional Organisations* - Section 129a, *Forming Terrorist Organisations* - Section 130, *Incitement to Hatred*	*Criminal Code*

Appendix B: Expanded Content Analysis Findings and Analysis

United States Content Analysis Findings

Primary Findings: Military Regulations

For the United States military regulations, all documents incorporated the base definition for RWE activities and association from DODI 1325.06, "Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," which defined RWE as,

> Military personnel must not actively advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes, including those that advance, encourage, or advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin or those that advance, encourage, or advocate the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. (9)

As a result, every military regulation, except for two, failed to account for all forms of RWE because this definition excludes anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE. The two regulations that do account for all RWE strains are Article 1167, "Supremacist Activities," Chapter 11, United States Navy Regulations, 1990, which states,

> No person in the naval service shall participate in any organization that espouses supremacists causes; attempts to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocates the use of force or violence *against the government of the United States or the government of any state, territory, district, or possession thereof, of the government of any subdivision therein*; or otherwise engages in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. (19) (emphasis added)

The second regulation, AR 600-20, accounts for anti-government, militia, and patriot group association by adding, "Expressing a duty to engage in violence against DoD or the United States in support of a terrorist or extremist cause" (Army Command Policy 2020, 30).

Meanwhile, in defining forms of RWE activities and association, all military regulations contained language fully identifying all possible types of association or activities, including physical participation (attending rallies, being active members in a group or organization, holding leadership roles in associations), speech and dialogue (advocacy and hate speech), and accounted for the role of social media and online activities as a form of participation and venue for hate speech and extremist dialogue.

Secondary Findings: Military Regulations

This study did not identify any instances of implicit bias in United States military regulations indicative of a latent prejudice towards other forms of extremism as more threatening or serious than RWE. However, a number of military regulations displayed instances of optional language, using phrases such as "should" or "may choose" in sections of the documents dedicated to providing guidance to those responsible for implementing the policy or regulation in the event of an infraction. This window of optionality in the language phrasing may lessen the likelihood of action by not adopting a more stringent requirement to act in the faith of the policy or regulation.

United Kingdom Content Analysis Findings

Primary Key Findings: Military Regulations

For the United Kingdom military regulations, the Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1972, does not define or address extremism in any specific terms and instead lists prohibited forms of behavior or engagement with extremist groups the United Kingdom Home Office designates as proscribed.

Secondary Findings: Military Regulations

This study did not identify any cases of implicit bias in relevant policy language in the Queen's Regulations. However, the guidance dedicated to reinforcing that armed forces members are subject to the restrictions of the Home Office's proscription of organizations, section 5.085(c), begins with phrasing that is relatively weak in emphasis on the seriousness of association with or active involvement in extremism, as it simply states that doing so is "inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service for personnel." Thus, the section does not seem to treat extremist activity or association of any nature as serious or grave and introduces enforcement optionality with the wording choice of extremist association only being "inconsistent" with military service.

Primary Findings: Government Policies

For the United Kingdom government policies, all documents referred to RWE as a threat to the United Kingdom's security but did not formally provide a definition for what constitutes RWE. Only one document, the 2011 *Prevent Strategy*, included any specific reference to a type of RWE, stating in section 5.36 that "extreme right-wing groups" have a "white supremacist ideology." However, the entire document provides only a single reference and does not expand upon what the British government considers "white supremacism" to be; furthermore, this limited and vague reference means that the United Kingdom fails to recognize any other form of RWE. Further, at no point does any document attempt to define the types of victims or targets RWE adherents might attack or commit aggressions against, which is a departure from every other country in the study.

Secondary Findings: Government Policies

In terms of secondary content, the United Kingdom government policies contained the highest level of biased language of any other country in the case study. Of the five documents that fell within the category of government policies and regulations, all five contained implicit bias phrases that either attempted to downgrade the threat of RWE in comparison to Islamist extremism or directly stated Islamist extremism embodied the greater threat to the United Kingdom and therefore was a higher priority. However, four of the five documents are derivatives of the base document, the 2011 *Prevent Strategy*, so their use of implicit bias phrasing is because they borrow exact language from *Prevent* without any modifications.

In the *Prevent Strategy*, the most flagrant biased phrases included the following from section 7.1, "*Prevent* should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to prioritise according to the risks to our national security. Its principle focus will therefore remain terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and related groups" (2011, 44). This phrase, and variants like it, is repeated in *Prevent* approximately eighteen times throughout the policy. Even more telling, every time *Prevent* acknowledges RWE as a threat, it immediately follows with a negating statement arguing that Al Qa'ida is a greater threat overall. Of the four times *Prevent* directly recognizes that RWE represents a threat to the United Kingdom, the document counters the admission within one or two sentences in proximity, attempting to redirect the priority back on to Islamist extremism. This bias is even more notable when examining the radicalization and recruitment sections; according to *Prevent*, Islamist extremism radicalizes and recruits, while RWE "draws people in." This framing attempts to downplay the spread of RWE as less sinister than Islamist extremism, and makes more sense

when considered alongside section 5.42, which claims the United Kingdom has an overall absence of RWE organizations and formal groups.

Canada Content Analysis Findings

Primary Findings: Military Regulations

For Canada's military regulations, all documents used the base definition for "hateful conduct" in DAOD 5019-0, "Conduct and Performance Deficiencies," which defined RWE activities and targets as,

> An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability. (2020)

This definition, while thorough in how it identifies the variety of ways RWE can manifest as well as the types of targets it can be aimed at, covers supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist RWE, but fails to address anti-government, militia, and patriot movement-driven RWE. Additionally, section 203.3(a)(ii) of Article 104.14 in Volume II, Discipline, Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, references supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist RWE types of targets when it provides harsher sentencing guidelines for armed forces members convicted of hate crime violations (13).

Meanwhile, the Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF Mil Pers Instr) 01/20 "Hateful Conduct," which the Canadian service branches base their expanded guidance for extremism association off, also thoroughly defines all possible forms of RWE association or types of RWE activity, including physical participation, speech and dialogue, and extends coverage of the policy to digital media and online activities.

Secondary Findings: Military Regulations

This study did not identify any of implicit bias in Canada's military regulations, nor were there any observed incidents of optional language that could undermine the reasonable application of the policy or regulation to RWE infractions.

Germany Content Analysis Findings

Primary Findings: Government Policies

German government policy is unique regarding the banning and restriction of organizations, particularly those with neo-Nazi supremacist beliefs, due to the country's relationship with its National Socialist past. This is evident in the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) published policy *Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organizations*, which contains statutory guidance drawn from German criminal code to advise on how the German state restricts expressions of RWE, and provides a list of right-wing organizations Germany considers "unconstitutional." However, despite significant discussion about the threat of RWE, slanted heavily towards supremacist forms, the regulation does not utilize a base definition of RWE. The publication instead relies on a form of RWE expression (signs, symbols, dialogue that specifically references National Socialist-associated beliefs) to define RWE. In addition, the policy document does not formally define what constitutes a RWE target, but does make a small reference in the preface to how right-wing extremists can be emboldened to conduct attacks against "socially underprivileged and minority groups" (3). At no point, however, does the policy document reference another form of RWE as a threat, or recognize any other form of RWE besides supremacism and nativism. It is notable, though, that the policy lists 49

different banned organizations all of which have supremacist and nativist foundational beliefs.

Secondary Findings: Government Policies

Section 5, "General Identification of Features of Right-Wing Extremists," of the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* policy document is an extremely interesting section dedicated to the discussion of what right-wing extremists do and do not look like to the casual observer. While the document acknowledges right-wing extremists cannot be identified solely on physical appearance (but claims this used to be the case to a certain degree), the section still attempts to frame sartorial choices as an indicator, particularly with discussion focused on how right-wing extremists use clothing choices to convey messages overtly and subtly as part of a shared identity (64). This section, while not overtly employing implicit bias in the same manner as other policy documents in this case study, does incorporate some elements of bias with its assumption of RWE expressions and behaviors.

Primary Findings: Criminal Code

German criminal code takes an equally unique approach to how it criminalizes various types of behavior related to RWE. As shown with German government policy, the state places particular priority on propaganda and the display of banned symbols and signs. Section 86 of the German criminal code specifically references, in slightly distancing language, that dissemination of propaganda in support of supremacist organizations is considered a criminal act, stating, "propaganda materials the contents of which are intended to further the aims of *a former National Socialist organisation*, [emphasis added] shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine" (47). This is notable because it is

the only criminal code in the case study to identify a specific strain of RWE as criminal but is understandable in the context of the country's history. However, while the criminal code does recognize a form of RWE, it is the only strain the German state identifies explicitly. German criminal code does not otherwise restrict other forms of RWE, except through generalized application of other statutes dedicated to terrorism, incitement to hatred, and treason (which based on the language utilized can be substituted for sedition that could be associated with anti-government, militia, and patriot group RWE). Meanwhile, section 46(2), "Principles of Sentencing," provides for harsher sentencing for crimes believed to be motivated by supremacist or nativist beliefs.

Secondary Findings: Criminal Code

This study did not identify any instances of distinct implicit bias in German criminal code, nor optional language. However, as stated previously the German state's tendency to focus solely on National Socialist forms of RWE, which does cover most supremacist and some nativist-leaning groups that intermix supremacist language in their beliefs, means that other forms of RWE such as pure nativism, fundamentalism, and anti-government, militia, and patriot group strains do not receive any consideration as threats. Therefore, Germany's extreme focus on supremacism itself constitutes a certain degree of implicit bias.

Appendix C: Expanded Process Model Testing Results Findings and Analysis

United States

Table 18. United States Process Model Testing

DODI 1325.06 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not explicitly cover anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE, but cites that Title 18, U.S.C. §2385 (advocating overthrow of the Government) applies to service members.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Weak / Strong*. Mostly weak because it primarily establishes a normative standard for service branches to follow; directs service branch chiefs to establish procedures to implement the instruction's guidance. However, Enclosure 3 of the instruction provides procedural guidelines advising that commanders have the authority to apply administrative, disciplinary, and criminal actions against military personnel who violate the prohibited activities clause in the instruction, making the policy stronger, but this allowance is not in the primary body of the document.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Weak*. In February 2020, the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel held a hearing regarding the increase in RWE incidents in the United States military where it heard congressional testimony from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and other hate and extremism watchdog organizations. Testimony noted the DoD lacked a comprehensive handling process and uniform emphasis on dealing with RWE in the military ranks. Furthermore, according the same testimony, DoD leadership demonstrated a normative response to RWE incidents, and served only to abrogate RWE events and claim the behavior "had no place" in the military, but failed to take more proactive, concrete steps to remove the behavior from the ranks (Beirich 2020).
AFH-1 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not address anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Moderate*. Explicitly states Air Force service members found in violation of the regulation are subject to disciplinary action under UCMJ Article 92.

Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. The USAF appeared to struggle to determine how to fully address known association with RWE despite language in regulations prohibiting active involvement in RWE organizations. An August 2017 Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) legal opinion on prohibited activities declared "mere membership" in extremist groups of any nature was not prohibited for service members. This set a baseline standard that designated membership in an extremist organization did not constitute a form of active participation. However, USAF has displayed a willingness to apply AFH-1 to more clear cases of RWE, such as a 2019 case where a Master Sergeant was demoted and recommended for separation after it became known he was a member of Identity Evropa, a white supremacist organization (OpJAGAF 2017; Beirich 2020).
MCO 5354.1E (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not cover anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Weak to Moderate*. Section on prohibited extremism activities advises violation of the regulation can result in administrative or disciplinary actions under Article 92, UCMJ. However, guidelines directing handling procedures of suspected prohibited activities violations states a normative standard for resolving issues at the lowest command level and advises the process to report falls under Equal Opportunity complaint procedures instead of treating extremism incidents as a serious offense of its own magnitude.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Weak to Moderate*. It appears the USMC initiates investigations when it is alerted of RWE incidents; however, there is a lack of transparency in how the service resolves most cases and whether investigations result in separation from service or only light punishments and return to service status.
AR 600-20 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Strong*. Identifies all four strains of RWE and contains amplifying characteristics of each type to provide for an expansive array of RWE organizations.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Strong*. Provides extended guidance for commander's options and required responsibilities for handling RWE incidents, including a robust number of administrative consequences. However, provides only limited

	guidance for legal or punitive actions to take, advising service members that their activities *may* be reported to law enforcement authorities.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: Not Measurable. AR 600-20 was updated to be more expansive and include stricter guidelines for extremism activities in July 2020; as such, the policy cannot be evaluated. Prior to the update, the language was much less inclusive and therefore did not support application to RWE infractions that fell beyond the scope of primarily supremacist activity. The July update increases the ability of the policy language to address all forms of RWE, however the policy has not been in effect long enough to determine its use against infractions. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army's history of ensuring all RWE infractions are fully investigated and addressed is not strong, according to February 2020 congressional testimony by the ADL, SPLC, and the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism.
Navy Regulations and OPNAV Instructions (Military Regulations)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	OPNAVINST 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1: Strength: *Moderate*. All three regulations identify supremacism, and additional language addresses nativism and fundamentalism. None of the regulations cover anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE. Article 1167, 1990 Regulations: *Strong.* Specifically adds language to address all four strains of RWE.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	OPNAVINST 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1: Strength: *Moderate*. 1620.1B reissues guidance from DODI 1325.06, providing for administrative consequences. 3120.32D CH-1 acknowledges administrative punishments available via the U.S. Navy Equal Opportunity program. Neither regulation acknowledges potential for legal or punitive actions against RWE infractions of criminal magnitude. Article 1167, 1990 Regulations: Not applicable. Article 1167 is an interim change to the Navy's definition of supremacist activities and does not contain language discussing RWE infraction handling procedures.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Weak*. The U.S. Navy has a history of failing to fully address RWE infractions even when the service is alerted to activities. A key example is former Navy Seal Matt Buschbacher; according to February 2020 congressional testimony, the SPLC alerted the USN Buschbacher was involved with the neo-Nazi National Alliance conference of 2002. Despite notification, the USN allowed Buschbacher to continue service and ultimately honorably discharged him (Beirich 2020).

Table 19. United Kingdom Process Model Testing

Queen's Regulations and Orders (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Weak*. Does not identify any strains of RWE and only refers to extremism as a general term in reference to proscribed organizations.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Weak*. Primarily establishes a normative standard that membership, involvement, or association with a Home Office-designated proscribed organization is inconsistent with military service. Provides for commanding officers to issue warnings to personnel in violation of the regulation (as a primary means of handling the infraction) and allows for administrative discharge only in "aggravated cases."
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. The British Army reportedly disseminated an "XRW" chart after the arrest of four service members in connection with the proscribed right-wing group National Action. The chart was designed to help leadership identify potential RWE cases within their ranks but received heavy criticism after it was leaked to the public. The Ministry of Defence acknowledged the chart and confirmed it was part of the military's efforts to spot, assess, and curb RWE cases (Di Stefano 2019). Furthermore, the British military has reportedly referred five additional service members to the government's *Prevent* program to address potential RWE radicalization (Koehler 2019, 10). However, despite these positive examples, the British military also has severe endemic racism that indicate less than routine handling of RWE infractions. In January 2019, a former British soldier of Fijian heritage won a successful racial discrimination suit against the MOD and was awarded £490,000 because of the racist command climate he experienced (Mark 2020).
Prevent Strategy (2011) (Government Policy)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Weak*. Does not identify any strains of RWE; instead, uses "extreme right-wing terrorism" as a blanket term throughout entire policy without further defining what constitutes right-wing terrorism.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Weak*. Does not address the military as a sector in need of specific Prevent resources, instead focusing on specific "at-risk" communities, schools, the NHS, the prison system, and overseas application. Relies on local law enforcement, as well as a policy of "citizen vigilance," to identify extremism cases of all kinds, including RWE. While the policy outlines a system of oversight committees and their handling procedures for cases, its agnostic approach does not provide clarity on how to deal with specific

	cases involving the military or is not transparent about the process if one exists.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. According to Home Office referral statistics, the number of referrals for RWE cases increased two-fold from 2016 – 2018 after the proscription of National Action, and in 2018-2019 the number of referrals was almost at parity with those for Islamist extremism (1,389 right-wing referrals to 1,404 Islamist referrals) (The Soufan Center 2020).
Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office (Government Policy)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Not applicable*. Outlines the British legal definition of terrorism and proscription criteria which are both suitable, if necessary, to cover RWE. Formally proscribes three RWE groups, National Action, its derivatives NS131 and Scottish Dawn, Sonnenkrieg Division, and Feuerkrieg Division, recognizing their specific strains of supremacism and nativism RWE ideologies. Does not designate any fundamentalist or anti-government, militia, patriot movement groups but this does not reflect lack of scope to address either RWE strain.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Strong*. Provides clear guidance on what constitutes a proscription offence involving a proscribed organization, including forms of support and advocacy for a group, assistance, and the wear of clothing, insignia, or public displays of flags, logos and other signs expressing images in support of a group. Provides for criminal statutory consequences for proscription offences.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Strong*. Since designating the first RWE group as a proscribed organization in 2016, the United Kingdom has pursued eight criminal trials for individuals found to be involved in proscription offences, including two involving service members.

Canada

Table 20. Canada Process Model Testing

Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Vol. II (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Provides increased sentencing considerations for crimes involving supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist-motivated hate offences. Does not contain language formally addressing anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE.

Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Moderate*. Provides sentencing guidelines for administrative and legal punitive actions against infractions, but only those that clearly meet the standard for hate crimes.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. While the CAF has demonstrated a renewed emphasis on tackling hateful conduct within its ranks, Canadian legal experts have noted that the CAF did not pursue criminal proceedings against RWE infractions in the past, indicating a potential cultural or organizational unwillingness to use regulations to their fullest extent (Burke 2019). However, given that the QR&O only pertains to increased sentencing guidelines for convicted hate crimes, the regulation on its own is a limited tool for addressing RWE in the ranks.
CAO 11-82 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE. Of note, treats RWE as a hate crime (as denoted by the regulation title, "Hateful Conduct") but does not consider RWE infractions as potential terrorism.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Strong*. Provides extremely clear guidance on administrative and disciplinary actions to take, including requirements for reporting instructions and incident data information tracking. Provides consideration for RWE infractions that meet threshold for criminal proceedings and advises on separation and discharge actions to take in response.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: Not measurable. CAO 11-82 was not finalized and issued until the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) expanded DAOD 5019-0 to include stronger regulations for hateful conduct. As a result, there is limited scope to gauge the Canadian Army's organizational willingness to implement the regulation but there is a strong emphasis and normative standard being formed based off the new regulation.
CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE. Of note, treats RWE as a hate crime (as denoted by the policy title, "Hateful Conduct") but does not consider RWE infractions as potential terrorism.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Strong*. Outlines a three-tiered intervention framework. Designates reporting and incident data information tracking requirements.

	Stipulates required actions for commanding officers to take when dealing with a hateful conduct (RWE infraction) event, including administrative consequences, disciplinary proceedings, and actions to take complementary to legal/punitive proceedings.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: Not measurable. CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20 was not finalized and issued until the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) expanded DAOD 5019-0 to include stronger regulations for hateful conduct. There is limited scope to gauge CAF's willingness to implement the regulation but public statements in response to several high-profile RWE infractions since the regulation was adopted indicate the CAF will use the regulation with routine application.
DAOD 5019-0 (Military Regulation)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Moderate*. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Strong*. While portions of the regulation set a normative standard, the regulation outlines administrative, disciplinary, and potential legal/punitive actions that can result from non-compliance with the policy.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: Not measurable. DAOD 5019-0 was not updated with expanded "hateful conduct" language addressing extremism activities until July 2020. However, since its enactment, the Defence Ministry has displaced a high-level of organizational willingness to implement the policy because of several high-profile RWE incidents in 2020 and ongoing cases of infractions from previous years.

Germany

Table 21. Germany Process Model Testing

***Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organisations* (Government Policy)**	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: *Weak*. Only addresses supremacist and nativist RWE. Does not contain language recognizing fundamentalist or anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: *Moderate*. Articulates all relevant statutory regulations in German criminal code that are applicable to RWE infractions involved in the display or wear of signs and symbols of banned organizations, as well as the current

	list of all organizations and political parties Germany has designed as unconstitutional as a result of right-wing (National Socialist) beliefs. However, as a government policy does not account for any administrative actions available to the state to handle infractions below the level of criminal charges.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. The German government, responsible for the punishment of German soldiers found in criminal violation of regulations restricting association with RWE due to the nature of the military court system, routinely investigates and acts against known cases of RWE. For infractions falling below the threshold of criminal charges, German military has an intermittent history of addressing RWE infractions but due to a series of high-profile RWE infractions over the last three years, has increased its implementation of regulations.
German Criminal Code, 1998 (Criminal Code)	
Strength Test #1: RWE Litmus Test	Strength: Not applicable. Sections of German criminal code variously address different forms of RWE through treason and sedition, incitement to hatred, use of symbols and dissemination of propaganda of unconstitutional organizations, and terrorism clauses. While language specifically recognizes a "former National Socialist party" as unconstitutional, identifying supremacist RWE, the overall language of German criminal code is broad and generalized for maximum legal application.
Strength Test #2: Mechanism / Pathway to Act	Strength: Not applicable, as criminal code constitutes a mechanism or pathway to act. However, because Germany does not have a separate military criminal court system much like other Western democracies (instead, it has a system of "troop service courts" which adjudicate disciplinary or lesser administrative infractions), infractions involving RWE may be dealt with directly in the German criminal justice system because of Germany's unique statutory provisions regarding unconstitutional organizations.
Strength Test #3: Usage / Implementation	Strength: *Moderate*. The German state has displayed a routine willingness to implement German criminal code against soldiers who commit infractions meeting the threshold of criminal charges, however the German military has only recently taken a stronger stance on dealing with RWE in the ranks as a result of scandals. The German Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) has significantly expanded its number of investigations into soldiers with suspected RWE ties or beliefs since 2017, however it is unclear how many of MAD's positive identification of RWE cases are resulting in separations or referrals to the German criminal justice system (Center for Analysis of the Radical Right 2020; *Bundesamt für den Militärischen Abschirmdiesnt* 2020).

Appendix D: Content Analysis Code Tree

Table 22. Content Analysis Code Tree and Legend

Primary Content
Reference to RWE
Child Code: Anti-Government / Patriot / Militia RWE
Child Code: Does not define RWE/treats as blanket term
Child Code: Does not refer to Anti-Government / Patriot / Militia RWE
Child Code: Does not refer to Fundamentalist RWE
Child Code: Does not refer to Nativist / Anti-Foreign RWE
Child Code: Fundamentalist RWE
Child Code: Nativist / Anti-Foreign RWE
Child Code: Racist / Supremacist RWE
Definition of RWE activity or association
Child Code: Does not include physical action / conduct
Child Code: Does not include speech / dialogue
Child Code: Includes physical actions / conduct and speech / dialogue
Child Code: Only refers to hate crime
Child Code: Only refers to hate speech activities or dissemination
Child Code: Only refers to radicalisation
Child Code: Only refers to terrorism
Definition of RWE target
Child Code: Does not include fundamentalism
Child Code: Does not include nativism
Child Code: Does not include racism / supremacism
Child Code: Does not include sedition, treason
Child Code: Includes racism / supremacism, nativism (anti-foreign stances), fundamentalism, and sedition
Identifies RWE tattoos as prohibited
Defines activity or association with extremism in non-specific terms
Child Code: Refers to physical actions / speech / dialogue
Secondary Content
Articulates RWE infraction handling process
Articulates punishment or consequences for involvement in extremism
Implicit bias
Child Code: Islamist extremism focused
Child Code: Refers only to hate speech / dialogue
Weak language / optionality language
Child Code: Distancing language that frames RWE as less of a domestic issue
Does not identify need to address RWE ideology

Does not identify the military as a sector/institution at risk of radicalisation
Strict use of terrorism language / suggests extremism and terrorism interchangeable
Child Code: Refers to extremism but retains a primary focus on terrorism as root issue
Terrorism used as blanket term
Reference to supporting criminal code, regulation, or policy (military or general government policy)

Legend:
Parent / Root Code

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Curriculum Vitae

Kerri Weiss was born in Billings, Montana on January 22, 1986. In 2003, Kerri enlisted in the Montana Army National Guard as a helicopter mechanic with a "Split Option" (where enlistees attend Basic Training during the summer between their junior and senior years of high school), and attended Basic Training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Upon graduating from Charles M. Russell High School in May 2004, Kerri received a congressional nomination to attend the United States Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. After graduating from USMAPS, Kerri received a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship to attend Montana State University where she studied Political Science with a concentration in International Relations, Military Science, and was a student in the University Honors Program.

After graduating with honors from MSU in May 2009, Kerri received a commission in the United States Army as a Second Lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Corps. Kerri has served in the U.S. Army on active duty since 2009, and was recently promoted to the rank of Major. Kerri is enrolled at Johns Hopkins University under the U.S. Army's Advanced Civil Schools program which provides active duty service members with the opportunity to attend graduate school. Her next duty assignment following graduation from Johns Hopkins University is to the United States Theater Special Operations Command – Europe in Stuttgart, Germany.

While enrolled in the Global Security Studies program, Kerri has researched and written about counterterrorism, security operations, and Islamist extremism in Africa, cyber warfare between Israel and Hezbollah, Russia's hypersonic weapons program, and right-wing extremism in the United States Special Operations community, among many other topics.