THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION: INSIGHTS FROM AN UNLIKELY COMPARISON OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

by
Junjie Zhang

A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Government

Baltimore, Maryland
December 2021

© 2021 Junjie Zhang
All Rights Reserved
Abstract

Corruption is a complex issue. For the national government, the governance of corruption is a tough challenge. It requires a lot of money and energy, but the effect is not apparent. This thesis tries to sort out the three most essential factors from many factors that affect corruption. The main elements are ideology, a sound judicial punishment system, and a stable economy to study plans to reduce corruption.

Advisors: Kathryn Hill, Dorothea Wolfson

Readers: Sarah O’Byrne, Kevin Scott
# Table of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………… ii

Chapter one Introduction: What is corruption……………………………………………………1

Chapter two Role of Ideology………………………………………14

Chapter three Independent judiciary………………………………35

Chapter four Economic stability…………………………………….62

Chapter five Conclusion How do these three elements influence the corruption…………………………………………………………82

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….91

Curriculum Vita………………………………………………………………………100
Chapter 1 What is corruption

Introduction:

When discussing the topic of resisting corruption, we must first clarify what corruption is. The definition of corruption itself may be relatively complicated because it covers a wide range. This thesis mainly discusses political corruption, including corruption in the administrative, judicial, and government departments. Other types of corruption, such as trade union corruption, are outside the scope of this paper. Political corruption is the use of power by government officials or other stakeholders to seek illegal personal gains. There are many forms of corruption, including bribery, lobbying, extortion, nepotism, parochialism, sponsorship, and peddling of power.

At the same time, corruption itself can cause a chain reaction, leading to other vicious events that endanger social stability, including violent crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking. Corruption may also cause other criminal acts. The abuse of government power by those in power, such as suppressing political opponents and using the police to suppress protests and demonstrations, will also be considered atrocity, a form of political corruption. Over time, the definition of corruption in different countries.

When working for government or public sector representatives, it is unethical for government officials to accept gifts because any gift can be understood as a plan to induce government officials to favor certain opinions. In many cases, depending upon the circumstances, gifts can be seen as an exchange for seeking certain benefits. This might include gifts and job promotion or securing a contract at a lower price, work, or reduced work content. However, institutional corruption is different from this corruption based on apparent personal interests. Institutional corruption also includes the unreasonable design of the system itself, which brings enormous power rent-seeking space for officials.
This means that rent-seeking spaces with enormous power cannot rely on the law and external parties. The pressure to manage it is more of an endogenous problem. The illegal behavior of public officials only constitutes political corruption when they are directly related to their official duties, are based on the law, or involve influential transactions. Of course, corruption standards will also vary from country to country or jurisdiction. Political funding activities that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some cases, government officials have broad or unclear powers, which makes it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal activities in many cases. For example, legal, political contributions in the United States are corrupt practices in China because of the differences between countries and jurisdictions.

**Defining Corruption:**

There are considerable difficulties in defining corruption because corruption is more complicated than ordinary principal-agent problems. Unlike many other types of illegal or immoral behaviors, corruption itself brings extremely high political costs. Different existing scholars have very different definitions of corruption. Dinsha Mistree and Arjuna Dibley proposed that “Corruption should therefore be redefined as an event that occurs when an actor seeks an unauthorized benefit from an organization in a manner that could compromise the public's trust in that organization.”¹ This thesis believes that such a definition is relatively accurate because, Generally speaking, corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for personal gain, but this is not the essence of corruption; it is just the appearance of corruption. The reason why corruption has such enormous harm is that the corrupt behavior of government officials will damage the credibility of the government. The second reason is that corruption has a substantial negative impact on the efficiency of society and the government.

---

After all, corruption can block the operation of the government and society. The third is that corruption damages social justice and is often combined with instability. The government is the superstructure and representative of society and the country. When injustice occurs in the government, its negative impact will quickly affect every component of society. Corruption in society may lead to the emergence of criminal groups to assist them in drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, forced prostitution, false accusations, etc. This is the precursor of social disorder, so the harm caused by corruption is complex and far-reaching.

For a national government, no matter what level the employee is in, the corrupt behavior will ultimately damage the public's trust in the government. For any government, how to deal with the relationship with the people is the most important thing. Corruption cannot be treated like ordinary illegal behavior because corrupt behavior can harm economic and political interests, and more importantly, it is incorrect. When corruption is raging in the national government, there will be a lot of political bribery, including buying and selling officials and widespread illegal political donations. When the government is flooded with corruption, it has a negative impact no matter which party or politician group. At the same time, because corruption involves a lot of funds, the funds are not running smoothly in the government, and many funds that need to be spent on infrastructure construction or policy implementation have entered the pockets of officials. The inaction and inefficiency of a government are very dangerous. When this stagnation and inefficiency accumulate to a certain level, it may cause social dissatisfaction and allow citizens to use violent and non-violent means to protest. Due to information asymmetry, citizens often have doubts about the government's behavior and funding.

When faced with such a situation, the government's correct response should be to open and transparent government information, and corrupt behavior undoubtedly worsens the relationship between citizens and the government. Other scholars believe that “in fact, a
systemic problem in which whole social systems are implicated, and which is generated in large part by dysfunctions in systems themselves.”

In this scholar's view, he believes that corruption is a systemic social problem, which is essentially an endogenous problem created by the society itself, which means that corruption is not a corruption problem carried out by individual officials for private interests. It is a social problem, and a social problem means corruption itself is an endogenous problem. This thesis believes that corruption is indeed a systemic problem involving the entire social system, and the system itself may indeed have obstacles. However, such obstacles can be avoided through reasonable policies and the national government's proper planning for the social system. Corruption is a systemic social problem, but this cannot be used as a justification for corruption. As mentioned above, corruption may damage social justice, and damage to social justice may lead to adverse effects that will quickly damage every component of society. Society and government are an inseparable whole, and government often exists in society as the superstructure of society or as a model for society. When the government is full of corruption, all parts of society will be affected, and when society is also full of corruption, it will affect the government. There is a mutual influence between government and society. Because the government and society are made up of people, and government officials must play a role in the government and society, this thesis believes that corruption is understood from this perspective as an endogenous social problem. Of course, corruption can be understood as an economic problem.

Gephardt, Malte pointed out that “corruption is a crime of calculation, not of passion. True, both saints resist all temptations and honest officials who resist most. However, when bribes are large, the chances of being caught small, and the penalties, many officials will

---

suicomb if caught meager.”

Thinking about corruption from the perspective of rational choice can also be understood as a game. When the cost of breaking the law is high, and the amount of bribes is low, it is unreasonable to think from a rational point of view that government workers will not commit illegal acts because no one will go to jail for relatively low bribes.

Similarly, when the situation is as mentioned above, that is, in the reverse case, the amount of bribes is high, and the cost of breaking the law is low, then most government officials will choose corruption. So here is a question that is discussed, that is, the rationality of the system. This thesis believes that it is very reasonable to understand corruption from the perspective of rational choice. Therefore, the government should start with the design of the system to prevent and control corruption, and it is essential to reduce the space for official power rent-seeking. For officials, corruption should be a high-risk option.

Therefore, most officials will not accept corruption in compliance with the rules. However, when the punishment measures are not perfected, officials have massive power to rent-seeking space. In this case, officials are more inclined to choose corruption. The understanding of corruption itself should be based on rationality. The theories and principles of economics can be used to analyze the problem of corruption. Risks and benefits are relative.

At the same time, some scholars believe that “When it comes to corruption, destabilizing it’s taken for granted’ quality might help us to identify better where corruption hurts and whom. This means understanding what corruption means for different people, who can define an act as corrupt or not, and who is included in or excluded from discourses of

---

3 Gephart, Malte. “Contextualizing Conceptions of Corruption: Challenges for the International Anti-Corruption Campaign.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2009
Corruption is often taken for granted. Different countries and regions have different levels of acceptance of corruption. Many times, corruption will be labeled as a gift. So, this is considered culturally acceptable. Of course, this thesis believes that such a statement is an excuse to justify corruption, which is untenable. The dividing line between gift-giving and corruption can be drawn. There are many ways to draw boundaries. For example, it is an efficient way to limit the number of gifts. Certain vital positions, such as officials who have the power to allocate many national resources, cannot accept gifts of any kind. The number of gifts received by officials should also be limited, and federal laws can also require government employees to report the value and type of gifts they receive.

According to the different definitions of corruption by the above scholars, this thesis finally believes that corruption is a kind of illegal use of different elements of society, politics, and the economy. The definition of illegal use in this thesis is the unlawful use of the power granted by the government to allocate social, political, and economic resources to obtain the interests of individuals or interest groups represented by individuals under the premise that national laws are formulated and perfected. Corruption has an internal source of social problems. Because the government is also an essential part of society, when government officials have problems, the entire social system has problems. Corruption is politically asymmetrical.

In most cases, the information held by government officials and the public is asymmetric. Many government departments do not disclose some vital information held by opaque companies on the grounds of confidentiality. Open and opaque behavior increases the differences between citizens and the government, which ultimately affects the government's credibility. Corruption also possesses economic rationality. When officials' corruption

---

4 Harrison, Elizabeth. “Corruption.” (Development in Practice, 2007), 672.
benefits are high and risks are low, many government officials will eventually choose corruption. On the contrary, officials are more inclined to abide by laws and rules when the benefits are low, and risks are high.

**Comparing Corruption Across Countries:**

After discussing the definition of corruption, itself, what needs to be introduced is the object and method of studying corruption. Corruption is a broad topic, and there are considerable differences in corruption in different countries. It should be noted here that corruption should be studied in the actual context of specific actual cases. Because in all existing countries, countries can be classified using corruption as a reference standard. “All countries can be divided into three categories: advanced countries, emerging countries, and developing countries.” The probability of government corruption in developed countries is relatively low.

The national government is relatively clean, and the corruption probability of government officials is relatively low. The second is developing countries; that is, compared with developed countries, developing countries have a much higher chance of corruption, and the overall system of the national government is much further behind. Officials have much more room for rent-seeking power. Because of the unreasonable system setting in developing countries, some officials will have too much power. At the same time, there is no adequate supervision institution, and there is no political force for checks and balances, resulting in officials often using power illegally. However, from another perspective, developing countries have relatively rapid economic development.

---

Corruption and economic development coexist in these countries. Therefore, the economic backwardness caused by corruption will be affected by rapid economic development to a certain extent. Finally, there are underdeveloped countries. For these countries, corruption is like stubborn cancer rooted in the entire country's operating system. This cancer will worsen at any time, causing the entire country's political system to collapse and be eradicated. It is said that corruption is only a relatively serious problem of their government. Because in developing countries, it is often the case that drug lords, warlords, etc., do not become national leaders through formal channels but only govern through violence and military conquest. In such a country, corrupt politicians get rich secretly through kickbacks, bribery, and special favors outside the rule of law or directly use funds under their control for themselves and their associates. In addition, these illegal rulers often transfer most of their interests to foreign countries to prevent losing power at home.

For these countries, the national government's ability, the integration ability of the territories under its jurisdiction, and the management ability have serious problems. Drug trafficking is rampant in many independent countries, and warlords rule the country separately, so corruption is inevitable. However, anti-corruption is not the most important thing for these countries that are still in chaos, so the discussion of corruption in underdeveloped countries is not the focus of this thesis. This thesis will focus on the study and discussion of corruption in developing countries and developed countries.

This thesis finds that when a country enters a period of stability, the government has considerable control. Anti-corruption in chaotic underdeveloped countries will firstly have no noticeable effect. Secondly, even if a certain degree of effect has been achieved, anti-corruption will not significantly affect underdeveloped countries. Therefore, this thesis uses the case study method to compare the corruption issues between the developed countries'
camps and the developing countries' camps. The selected cases are China and the United States.

The reason for choosing these two countries for analysis and comparison is because the political systems of these two countries are represented. The liberal democracy of the United States is the political system and mentality of almost all developed countries. Liberal democracy plays a vital role in the United States, Western European countries, and most advanced counties, and liberal democracy as a product is also top-rated in emerging countries. Many emerging countries try to imitate advanced countries' political systems and ideologies to make the country more prosperous and developed. Although the results vary significantly due to differences between countries, liberal democracy is still very representative.

Therefore, the anti-corruption effect of the United States can essentially represent the effect of governing the country in most developed countries. In contrast, Chinese authoritarianism (socialism with Chinese characteristics) is not as popular as liberal democracy in the United States. However, with China's increasing strength and international influence, China's authoritarianism follows the One Belt One Road project which has gained more and more international attention, and China also regards authoritarianism as a symbol of China's soft power. Although no country has tried to imitate China's successful path, the prospects for the future seem very reliable.

**China:**

China has a unique political system that is highly centralized. China has increasingly exported political ideologies to other countries through the Belt and Road projects in recent years. Similarly, these two countries are both superpowers, but they have entirely different
political systems at the same time. Therefore, the way these two countries deal with corruption may become an avenue for other countries in the world to address corruption.

As a one-party country with socialism albeit with Chinese characteristics as its central ideology, China is a relatively highly centralized country. Anti-corruption has been one of the essential goals of the Chinese government in the past ten years. After China's reform and opening in 1980, China's economy proliferating an economic growth miracle, developing from a poorer developing country to the world's second-largest economy. Rapid economic growth has been accompanied by severe corruption though.

In recent years, the Chinese government has tried many policies to curb growing structural corruption, reducing resistance to China's economic growth. This thesis believes that China is developing towards a promising trend in the anti-corruption process. Economic development is still placed in a significant position by the Chinese government. The governance of corruption is also more perfect and in-depth. On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the United States also plays the role of a leader in the Western free world. Its ideology is dominated by liberal democracy.

The United States:

The U.S. government is based on the separation of powers. There are fundamental differences China and the U.S. In terms of anti-corruption analysis, the United States, as a developed country, has extreme national economic strength and has been prosperous for a long time. Therefore, the United States has a relatively robust anti-corruption system which is reflected in an overall low corruption rate in its government. This thesis examines China and the United States because the two countries have many similarities.
As the world's largest and second-largest economy, both China and the United States have muscular economic strength but, they are also different in ideology and their basic forms of governance.

The U.S. political system is strong on measures of anti-corruption which reflects how the United States has a long history of economic development and that the United States has a well-tested anti-corruption system. Liberal democracy in the United States may operate relatively smoothly in developed countries, but this research finds that it is not working smoothly in other developing countries. Take India as an example. India and China have many similarities. The two countries, for example, have huge populations and each have a long history. Economic reforms were carried out at the same time in the 1980s in both, but India's development speed is slower than China's, but it has exposed more corruption problems. The reason why India is placed here for comparison is to illustrate the non-replicability of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy may have succeeded in many advanced countries, but when liberal democracy is applied to emerging countries like India, the effect will be worse than expected. It also shows here that although China has not studied the political system of liberal democracy, China has found its path, namely, Chinese authoritarianism. Chinese authoritarianism does not have more political superiority than liberal democracy, but the comparison here can show that liberal democracy is not the only choice for the political system.

This research effort finds out that the political form of liberal democracy may not be superior to others with respect to the issue of anti-corruption and what needs to be explored is those factors that do directly impact anti-corruption efforts. This thesis examines three such elements, ideology, the need for the government to improve disciplinary measures, and its financial strength.
Chapter 2 explains how ideology affects the country's ability to solve corruption problems. Ideology is an encompassing concept. In the actual application process, ideology includes school education, family education, corporate training—the whole process of a citizen's personal growth in shaping his or her perceptions. Citizens' cognition and understanding of corruption itself will primarily affect the level of government corruption. Developed countries and other countries with lower levels of corruption have one thing in common: citizens have received relatively complete anti-corruption education.

In Chapter 3, the thesis elaborates on the need for the government to have strong disciplinary measures. If ideology is to restrain officials against corruption morally, then perfect disciplinary measures, such as the law, are likely to be another critical factor. Using morality to restrain officials from corruption is difficult to control and manage, and the law should be the guarantee and bottom line. When officials are suspected of corruption, the officials also violate the law, and the violations should naturally be sanctioned. Therefore, it is essential to ensure the independence and integrity of the judicial system.

First, when the judicial system is integrated with the public service and legislative system, it is difficult to be fair in officials' punishment because officials often bribe officials of the judicial system to avoid punishment and investigation. In order to avoid corruption and shielding behavior within the government, the judicial system's independence is a necessary condition to prevent official corruption. At the same time, the judicial system's integrity needs to be maintained by high salaries and lifetime appointments.

Compared with the executive and legislative departments, officials in the judicial department have more minor powers and fewer people. If judicial independence is to be maintained, judges in the judicial system need to have relatively sufficient salaries to increase officials' resistance to financial interests. At the same time, the lifelong system of judges
allows the judicial system to make inaccurate judgments without being influenced by political pressure. Chapter 4 assesses the last element of the national government's fight against corruption, i.e. financial strength, reflected in many aspects, such as officials' salaries, insurance, and education benefits.

As well as the relatively generous pension after retirement, the government must be able to make these payments to ensure that government officials can maintain a relatively prosperous life. When the government cannot ensure the salaries will ensure basic living security for government officials, corruption is relatively likely to occur. This thesis identifies and assesses three elements to control corruption i.e. ideology the independence and perfection of the judicial system, and the relatively muscular financial strength of the national government.

Of these three elements, the state’s relatively financial strength of the government should be the most important because this last element is the foundation of the first two elements. In terms of i.e. (ideology, school education, family education, and corporate and government training at all levels) this can require a large amount of capital investment. At the same time, for officials of the judicial system, in order to maintain judicial independence and incorruptibility, judicial officials must have sufficient income to fight against the erosion of power and interests.

The analysis in Chapter 4 points out that the relatively incorruptible judicial system in the US government is like that in the country. That is, the relatively generous income of judicial officials is directly related to lower levels of corruption. In this way, this thesis argues that the government's financial strength is the third element of the national government's fight against corruption and the foundation of the first two elements.
Chapter 2 Role of Ideology

Abstract:(blueprint)

This essay has four sections: introduction, literature review, and my research, which includes two case studies and a conclusion. In the introduction section, this essay mainly discusses the US and China's anti-corruption situation by listing the current laws and institutions. The literature review has listed the current views about the US and China's anti-corruption by analyzing different policies in different sectors. It has also revealed the defective part of the current study. My research part mainly discusses the importance of ideology in solving corruption issues and the methodology in enhancing anti-corruption ideology. My research part has also contained two case studies. In conclusion, it has revealed the paper's conclusion and listed the potential problems that need to be considered.

Introduction: The US and China anti-corruption

According to the corruption perceptions index, "China scored 42 out of 100 which ranked 78 out of 180 nations, while the United States scored 67 out of 100 which ranked 25 out of 180 nations". This shows that, United States has gained a higher CPI score than China, and the US government is more transparent than the Chinese government. This thesis chooses the data provided by Transparency International because Transparency International is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental, and it also cooperates and shares data with many similar institutions in the world. Transparency International can provide relatively objective data and possess sufficient data samples to reduce the deviation to the greatest possible extent. The index, which ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, uses a scale of zero to 100, where zero is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.

---

6 Corruption Perceptions Index, China, United States
Corruption is a general concept that covers many sectors, including "judicial, police, public services, land administration, tax administration, customs administration, public procurement, natural resources, legislation, and civil society." These branches are contained in the executive, legislature, judicial government, and China and United States government have tackled corruption differently.

In the United States, the US government has potential risks in public services and customs administration. In contrast, the Chinese government has high risks in every sector including judicial, police, public services, and civil society. With the discussion above, this thesis has already illustrated the corruption situation of both nations. However, the real problem is why the government needs to engage in and whether corruption negatively influences both nations' political systems. In the United States, corruption does not impose colossal business risk for foreign investors, which is why foreign direct investment has played a crucial role in American GDP. There is no considerable risk because the US has established a competitive market and many business opportunities.

Moreover, “the laws prohibit money laundering, abuse of office, extortion, and commercial bribery.” Also, the US government actively and effectively has established an anti-corruption legislative network. Above all, it is not hard to determine that the corruption issue is not significant in the US government because the US government has already done so much work and established a mature system to prohibit corruption.

In China, foreign direct investment has enormous risks. The Chinese government, which Xi Jinping leads, has launched an anti-corruption campaign that has led thousands of government officials to get arrested. However, corruption continues to have a negative influence on the business environment. "Guanxi" is the common word when the merchants

---

7 China Corruption Report, United States, China
established connections, relationships, and trading system based on gifts, banqueting or small favors.  

To deal with the classic despotism, the Chinese government offers a comprehensive legal system in the public and private sectors. Simultaneously, the laws state that facilitation payments, money laundering, active and passive bribery, and gifts in the public and the private sector are illegal. However, anti-corruption laws are inconsistently and selectively enforced. The point is that both countries have established anti-corruption systems; however, the US government has implemented the laws consistently and for all people, and the Chinese government has enforced laws in the other way. “Judicial corruption, in both political and personal forms, is closely associated with two major characteristics of China's judicial institutions — political dependence and lack of accountability.” China's judicial system lacks complete supervision and accountability. And at the same time, it is too dependent on politics, so Chinese laws often fail to exert practical effects.

Moreover, the US political system has a lower possibility of corruption since the US political system was built on the separation of powers. All three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, have checks and balance with each other; in that case, it is hard to encroach on other branches' power. The essence of the separation of powers is to cut the big power into several smaller parts to achieve the purpose of mutual checks and balances and mutual supervision. At the same time, it can solve the integration, expression, and realization of different social interests. When a branch becomes corrupt, officials from another branch will intervene in the investigation to achieve the effect of mutual supervision.

There is no such system of separation of powers in China, and the CCP politburo standing committee consists of the government's top leadership. There is only one central

---


10 Gong, Ting. "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China." (China Review 4, 2004), 34
government, and all the local governments are constructed in a hierarchy. The local
governments need to obey all the orders from the politburo standing committee. With the
brief introduction above, a question needs to be answered: How do China and United States' political systems influence anti-corruption policy, and which nation's policy is more effective in anti-corruption. In the following paragraphs, the essay mainly discusses the literature review of this research question.

The literature review contains many scholars' works that have already analyzed this research question in many different branches including executive, judicial, and legislative. They have concluded different reasons, including the separation system, the hierarchy system, and the level of transparency. However, all these scholars neglect one crucial factor: ideology, which always plays a vital role in decreasing corruption. The US and China's political systems have different ideologies on corruption, and ideology helps the US government solve corruption issues more effectively. Moreover, education plays a crucial role in strengthening people's ideologies. The education level of anti-corruption and the efficiency of anti-corruption policies are positively correlated. In this essay, it uses the case study method to prove this statement, and it contains two cases.

**Literature review and What is more:**

The United States’ political system has separated its powers into three branches—legislative, executive, and judicial. In Boylan and Cheryl's thesis, they state that "Federal corruption prosecutions are positively correlated with both corruption and prosecutorial effort. Federal prosecution data provide a potentially biased and unreliable measure of state public corruption". This thesis utilizes a survey of State House reporters to measure

---

corruption in state government and analyze how federal prosecutors prioritize corruption investigations. Meanwhile, it also analyzed the reliability and validity of the corruption measure, which played a vital role in inferring the above conclusion since the US political system needs to have a corruption measure that is objective, reliable, and validated. If the corruption standards are vague and useless, the political system cannot assess the corruption and solve the corruption.

Additionally, the thesis tried to figure the relationships among corruption level, federal prosecutorial effort, and the number of federal prosecutions. In that case, it is not hard to figure out national prosecution data may not be reliable and valuable. It is apparent that if there are more corruptions and prosecutorial efforts, there will be more federal corruption prosecution. Still, this does not mean that federal corruption prosecution can decrease the rate of state public corruption. The thesis concludes that American states' current public corruption measurements are not practical using statistics and professional methods.

In contrast, the Chinese political officials may not have the same professional skills as political science scholars. In China, land administration has always been the crucial part of public corruption because the Chinese communist government states that Chinese citizens do not have the right to own the land. Citizens only have the right to live in an apartment or house, and citizens need to pay for the living rights. For instance, if the consumer wants to purchase an apartment, the consumer can pay the money towards sales. Then the Chinese government will offer a consumer premises permit, which indicates that consumers have the living right to that apartment. Chinese citizens have the right to lease or sell an apartment; however, the difference between owning land and living right is that citizens in China can only hold a house or apartment for seventy years.

In other words, the premises permit will expire, and the Chinese government will take the consumers' home back seventy years later. This unique law has made the urban land
become a precious asset for all the merchants. Furthermore, the Chinese government has a specific department to allocate the urban land. In the thesis of Cai, Hongbin, J. Vernon Henderson, scholars have concluded that "Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or "two-stage" auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials". The auction is the traditional way of trading land in China. The thesis compares two-stage auctions with traditional auctions. With the comparison and contrast with two types of auctions, the conclusion is that the officials resist such reform that English auctions seem slightly clean or appear clean compared to the two-stage auction.

Two-stage auctions has disadvantages in that they may lead to less competitive bidding and substantially smaller revenue than English auctions in China's land market. In conclusion, the reform ends with failure because it does not prevent corruption in the public sector; moreover, it may aggregate the situation of corruption. The government tries to utilize a straightforward and simple method to solve public corruption. Comparing with the United States, China does not have a professional attitude to use statistics or other scientific methods to gain scholars' support. In this essay, it believes that is why the Chinese political system cannot solve corruption in the public sector in the appropriate way.

In the Judicial branch, the United States and China may have a more significant difference in solving the corruption. In China, the scholar Gong concludes that "Judicial corruption, in both political and personal forms, is closely associated with two major characteristics of China's judicial institutions — political dependence and lack of accountability." These are the biggest reasons that China has severe corruption in the

---

13 Gong, Ting. "Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China." (China Review 4, 2004), 34
judicial branch. In the thesis, the scholar tries to utilize the matrix to assess the reason for judicial corruption. He illustrates that the relationship between judicial independence and judicial accountability that the matrix reveals that judicial independence and judicial accountability are positively correlated with political corruption and personal corruption.

In China, judicial officials may yield to external political or economic pressure when the pressure threatens their legal standards and professional integrity. Meanwhile, judicial officials do not need to strictly accountable for what they do because the Chinese judiciary department permits judicial officials to gain welfares and profits from individual corrupt activities in some ways.

The point is that the Chinese government has never stated that judicial officials will not be punished if they have corruption issues. Moreover, the Chinese judiciary department has structurally deficient problems that there exist enormous opportunities for corruption. The political and economic pressure will make sure the government will not punish the judicial officials. Scholars deem that the Chinese judiciary system is still located in the initial stage, while China has a long history that people should govern the country but not laws. Although the Chinese communist party has established a judicial department in the government, traditional culture is rooted in the Chinese officials' minds. It is tough to change their minds into that the state should be governed under the laws.

With China's development, the Chinese government has realized that a modern country should be governed under the laws but not people. Thus, China has experienced a big transition time right now that Chinese officials and the general public in China realized the importance of laws. However, it needed time to transition from people to laws, subjective to objective.
In contrast, United States does much better in dealing with judicial corruption. Firstly, the United States judicial branch is highly independent, and judicial accountability is extreme. United States has a slight advantage in dealing with corruption that the whole US political system establishes on the separation of powers. In Mark's thesis, he has stated that "judiciary corruption included erosion of rights, protections, securities; illegitimate judicial decisions and undermined the rule of law and all of these factors were fatal towards democracy leadership in the United States." Mark lists several kinds of judicial corruption and indicates that judiciary corruption corrodes the culture of law and erodes democratic ideas, which are best settled by fair procedures. Listing all types of judiciary corruption in the United States reveals that the judiciary corruption can immediately break and crush the US political system. The price is extremely high, and the reason why judiciary corruption has seldomly happened in the US political system.

The first reason is that there are huge checks and balances among the institutions; in that case, all the decisions that judiciary officials has made are monitored. The second reason is that the price is so high that the judiciary officials must pay a high price once they are revealed corruption, and they can lose their jobs and faces long-term sentences. Therefore, both internal and external factors have ensured that judiciary officials will not corrupt the jobs.

By comparison and contrast with the United States and China, United States is obviously better than China in dealing with judicial corruption. The outcome is simple and straightforward, but the reasons are complicated. Two countries have different histories and cultures, which shapes the political system in both nations. Also, the judiciary system varies from each nation, and it is hard to change each country's mode. The outcome is explicit right

---

now that the US political system has an advantage in dealing with judiciary corruption, but China cannot gain any experience from the United States. It is impossible to transform the Chinese political system into a separation of powers and vice versa. The only way that China may gain specific experiences from the US political system focuses on the political dependence and lack of accountability. However, the Chinese government needs to figure out its way to solve the issues. Overall, there is no shortcut in dealing with judiciary corruption.

After analyzing many critical elements of corruption, some scholars find out that transparency plays a crucial role in decreasing corruption. In China, the government has a horrible reputation for lacking transparency, and the whole administrative process seems to work in an autocratic way. Since Chinese government-controls and manipulates follow of information to maintain the power. However, with China's high-speed development in the past few decades, the Chinese government has achieved an important goal after the reform and opening-up policies.

The Chinese government has already elevated the level of transparency. Though the Chinese government's transparency remains low, it slightly changes in the past few decades. Lee and Lio's thesis states, "foreign capital and investors improved governance performance and reduced provincial governments' corruption. Furthermore, FDI not originating from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan has a greater impact on provincial governments, representing a greater shock to the Chinese governments". By using the dynamic panel data model and fixed-effect model, the scholars tries to estimate the impact of FDI on Chinese government performance and local government corruption. The conclusion reveals that foreign direct investment can reduce corruption in China. The reason is that most foreign investors from China are from developed countries and these foreign investors bring

---

complete and transparent ideology to China. The host countries start to accept new values and ideologies from the different models of business practices.

On the other hand, United States pay more attention to transparency that "local governments view transparency as a means of (re)connecting with a citizenry that, by many accounts, has grown distant. By improving the public's access to government information, the expectation is that seeds for more responsive and trustworthy local government will be sown". This thesis do an overview of the current research to connect transparency and responsiveness with the American government's trust. It is no doubt that the US government has a higher level of transparency than the Chinese government. The United States realizes that transparency will not be enough to establish the local government's trust; in that case, the US government tries to utilize the professional way to assess the current system's validity.

In contrast, FDI can also have a negative influence on anti-corruption. Multinational corporations are the main form of foreign investment. According to Boling Zhu, foreign direct investment bring transparency to China for sure, but the FDI may not reduce corruption but elevate corruption. He states that “a generalization oversimplifies the consequences of MNC activity in host countries. The entry and presence of MNCS may contribute to rent creation in developing countries, thereby leading to a high level of corruption". The author utilizes a case study on China and used original data in a corruption case to prove his point.

In this essay, it believes that every coin has two sides: corruption is a complicated issue that FDI may bring positive influence towards the Chinese government, such as new values, new thoughts, and higher transparency level. However, it can also negatively impact the Chinese government or create a new form of corruption. With the above discussion, it is not

16 Porumbescu, Gregory A. "Using Transparency to Enhance Responsiveness and Trust in Local Government: Can It Work?" (State & Local Government Review 47,2015),206
hard to determine that the US government seems to have done a better job in solving the corruption. In this essay, it deems that the US political system renders strength to the American government in solving the corruption. The history, ideology, institution seems to have a better sense in dealing with corruption.

Nowadays, the United States, a developed country, has already established a mature political system; however, the US government still have severe trust issues in the state government. An American scholar points out, "trust in state government varies considerably across states. the effects of political polarization, corruption, income inequality have statistically significant effects on trust in state government".18 His statement indicates that state government has a severe trust issue, and it varies from state to state. Some states may do a good job, and some may do a bad. Both nations have many challenges in dealing with corruption.

With the above literature review, the current scholars have already analyzed the US and China's corruption from the executive branch, judiciary branch, local government, central government, transparency. However, these scholars miss a vital sector that is ideology, and ideology plays a vital role in decreasing corruption. This essay believes that all forms of government, department, and court form with people. Individuals consist of all types of institutions. In this essay, it believes that the essential thing in solving corruption is to make all individuals believe that corruption is wrong thing to do and corruption should be zero tolerance. There is a premise in solving corruption: it is impossible to eliminate corruption, but it is possible to keep the corruption rate low. Denmark, Finland should be the example to learn because these nations have the cleanest government worldwide.

My research

Hughes Robert has defined the meaning of corruption "This term has no precise meaning but is popularly associated with the abuse of power for personal gain. Within the popular conception of corruption, not only legal wrongdoing but also behaviors that are seen as immoral can be considered corruption". This scholar's definition of corruption differs from the definition of corruption in this thesis, but here is a critical factor that illegal and unethical behavior can be regarded as corruption. Illegal behavior is easy to define, but how to determine unethical behavior and how to correct unethical behavior. This thesis believes that ideology can be an essential tool to correct unethical behavior. Morality is more embodied in citizens' understanding of the values of things. When citizens deviate from corrupt values, corruption may increase. Ideology plays a crucial role in solving corruption; however, it is hard to define or measure the ideology.

Ideology is a vague word that can include sense, virtue, moral code, or culture. Also, the national government cannot count these items either. However, there is a specific method to improve virtue or morality, which is education. The education level of anti-corruption can be measured in many ways.

Education contains school education, family life education, and corporate training. People should learn anti-corruption in every place in their life. This thesis believes that if the general republic has a stronger sense of anti-corruption and the nation's government has less corruption. Sense and virtue of anti-corruption should be the independent variable, and the rate of corruption should be the dependent variable. Education is the method to elevate the sense of anticorruption, and that is the method to decrease the rate of corruption.

In this essay, it has already concluded that the United States government has a significant advantage in dealing with corruption over than Chinese government. It is not hard to

---

19 Hughes, Robert. "CORRUPTION." In Passage of Change: Law,( Society and Governance in the Pacific,2010),35
determine a traditional nepotism ideology existing in China based on the previous work. When scholars write thesis about China, the essay always fill the words like guanxi(connection) haochu(favor); in that case, people believe in nepotism. Government run the whole system under nepotism. The ideology of nepotism creates tremendous pressure in dealing with corruption. In contrast, US citizens believes in the check and balance and the system of separation of powers. Thus, it will be easier to solve corruption under democratic leadership. It will be much easier to make US citizens believed that corruption is the wrong thing to do.

Ideology will be the essence of this research, and education will be the methodology to achieve a stronger sense of anti-corruption. This research will compare all types of education procedures between the United States and China to determine the relationship between the ideologies and efficiency of anti-corruption policies.

The logic is that a stronger sense of anti-corruption(ideology) helps create a political system with more checks and balances to restrict power. A political system that establishes checks and balances has a more precautionary system of anti-corruption. The anti-corruption policies in the system of separation of powers are more efficient than others. Therefore, we can conclude that efficient anti-corruption policies originate from more robust anti-corruption(ideology).

On the other hand, a stronger sense of anti-corruption(ideology) can create a circumstance that there is zero-tolerance for corruption. The circumstance has covered every corner of society. In that case, the government officials have lower possibilities to corrupt, and government officials have a severe attitude to execute anti-corruption policies. However, how do countries achieve this stronger sense? The answer is education. This thesis will utilize three case studies to prove the above statements.
With all three kinds of education of ideologies school education, family life education, and corporate training, the first case should discuss school education because school education is the central part of education. People spend at least twelve years in school, including primary, middle, and high school. Children have studied in the school for a long time, and schools are main places where children receive an education. Moreover, schools are the first stage for people to involve in society and Children need to learn how to fit in the society in the school. In this essay, it needs an objective standard to compare the education level of anti-corruption.

According to OECD(better policies for better lives), it have listed few approaches to incorporate education for anti-corruption. There are ten approaches "introduce a specific course, rewrite existing curriculum frameworks and develop teacher and student materials for each subject to incorporate learning outcomes, develop teaching materials that support the achievement of existing outcomes within existing subjects." 20 With the above standard, US and China's education systems can be compared in tackling corruption.

**Case one: School education**

In the United States, primary and secondary education focuses on essential academic learning, vocational skills, and socialization skills, introducing children to a wide range of knowledge and behavioral adjustments. It is important to pay attention to socialization skills that mainly conclude the courses like public integrity or corporate with classmates and society. For instance, the fay school from Boston in Southborough, Massachusetts, has a curriculum like wellness and social studies. Although the course itself does not state that it is mainly about anti-corruption, the course overview has mainly taught honesty, integrity, and other traits. One single example may not make sense; however, the socialization courses have

---

20 Oecd.org. 2021
nearly been covered in every single school in the United States. "Nearly every single state education department request primary and secondary schools offer socialization courses." 21 In that case, the United States education system choose the first approach in the OECD suggestion, which introduces a specific course.

Moreover, in primary, secondary, or college education, American history courses have a focus on the idea of separation of powers, which is a political doctrine originating from the works of Montesquieu. The ideology of checks and balances heavily influence the writing of the United States Constitution. The founding fathers, Hamilton, Jefferson, have also played a crucial role in the American history courses; in that case, all US citizens know about the US government is of the people, by the people, for the people. US citizens are also aware that people need to be vigilant towards the government because government probably encroaches on the rights and powers of US citizens.

In Contrast, the Chinese educational system may not have the same socialization courses as the United States. In China, the primary schools' curriculum consists of Chinese, math, physical education, music, drawing, and elementary instruction in nature, history, and geography. Chinese education system pays much attention to natural science even in primary school. Also, the Chinese educational system provides practical work experiences around the school to cultivate a sense of community. There are socialization courses in China; however, the socialization courses are not the same as those in the United States. The courses are more like general knowledge of politics and moral training, which has taught students the love of the motherland.

Moreover, primary schools have always taught students the love and faith of the communist party and love each other. The socialization classes in Chinese primary school have consisted of moral training and political loyalty. There is a particular signal or mark in a

21 "State Board Of Education - Learning Standards". 2004
Chinese education system that every student in China needs to wear a red scarf, representing the corner of the Chinese national flag. However, there is no course to teach students about public integrity in the past few decades. Nowadays, President Xi has reformed the Chinese education system in many ways. In socialization courses, Xi announces that all Chinese primary and secondary schools need to open courses about Chinese traditional virtues, Chinese humanistic spirit. The Chinese virtues and spirit have contained traits "innovative thinking, keeping pace with the times, down-to-earth, seeking truth from facts, the aesthetic pursuit of both form and spirit, the blending of scenes, and the life philosophy." 22

It is not hard to figure out that all these words seem vague and broad. There is no direct relation with public integrity, and the Chinese education system focuses more on politics and traditional values. However, students do not receive the class about anti-corruption or other relative traits. Additionally, the Chinese education system chooses the second approach in the OECD suggestion, which rewrites existing curriculum frameworks and develops teacher and student materials for each subject to incorporate learning outcomes.

With the above discussion, the US and China have established curriculums to incorporate education for anti-corruption; however, US education has established the curriculums relating to anti-corruption and public integrity. The Chinese educational system utilizes socialization courses as political propaganda but does not educate students in anti-corruption. The Chinese school education system and courses may explain the circumstance of Chinese government corruption. In the early years of Chinese students, public integrity and anti-corruption have neglected or vanished from the Chinese education system. That is why the ideology of nepotism is rooted in the Chinese government officials' minds.

22 The Ministry of Education issued "Revolutionary Traditions into Primary and Secondary Schools Curriculum Teaching Material Guide.2021
**Case two: family life education**

Unlike school education, family education is a type of informal education that is the one within the family since the child was born. If parents use the appropriate way to educate children, children will be educated in an excellent way to create a great personality. In other words, family education is the first and best stage to cultivate public integrity, including the sense of anti-corruption. Although many parents know that it is essential to cultivate Children's personality and cultural views, few have achieved the final goal. According to the scholar Suyahman, he states that "anti-corruption culture-based family education model using humanistic communication should build on the family members' awareness by means of emphasizing on the mutual consciousness to appreciate and to respect each other thereby creating the harmonization of collective life." 23

With the above statement, many factors, including family members' behavior, discipline, justice, transparency, and cooperation, these factors will be judged and evaluated to determine which nation's family life education has a better influence to cultivate public integrity and anti-corruption.

In the United States, there are ten family education content areas, including families and individuals in societal contexts, internal dynamics of families, human growth and development across the lifespan, human sexuality, interpersonal relationships, family resource management, parent education and guidance, family law and public policy, professional ethics and practice, family life education methodology. It is not hard to find out that US family education content areas have almost covered every aspect of children's lives.

---

23 Initiating an anticorruption culture-based family education model using humanistic communication.2021
institutions, such as the educational, governmental, religious, health care, and occupational institutions in society." 24 The social relation is a broad range which can include government, religions. It is the first step to let children understand how these institutions corporate with each other and why corruption has a negative influence on the government.

Moreover, anti-corruption education can be executed in practical ways in family resource management and family law, and public policy. According to the CFLE, it has defined the meaning of family resource management and family law and public policy that state: "An understanding of the decisions individuals and families make about developing and allocating resources including money, to meet their goals for family resource management. An understanding of legal issues, policies, and laws influencing the well-being of families." 25 In this essay, it believes that these two sectors are the best way to show the harmfulness of corruption that children will have a clear view to figure out that corruption can be harmful towards their rights. Once the children feel bad about corruption, they will have a better sense of corruption.

Above all, United States family life education has covered nearly every sector of children's life. In other words, United States family education has a comparative advantage in educating the anti-corruption because there are many areas of family education connecting with social relations, laws, source managements. US family education can teach children in a theoretical way and practical way. American children have a better sense of anti-corruption.

In contrast, the Chinese family education system may not have an advantage in the sector of anti-corruption. Typically, Chinese family education usually contains moral education, academic education, physical education, and aesthetic education. However, Chinese parents prioritize academic education in the first position. When children start

---

primary school, Chinese parents always purchase huge scholarly and exciting books for their children, including happy math, happy Chinese, and happy history. The essence is that Chinese parents want to make sure that their children have a better listening, speaking, writing, and calculating ability than their classmates. Chinese parents love to show off when their children have revealed excellent academic performance, and Chinese parents consistently reward their children when they received good grades on the test.

According to the Chinese scholars Xiong Xin and Zhang Ce, they state that "As for the cultivation of children's interest, now more and more parents gradually have realized that it is vital for their children to own any special acquirement. As a result, Chinese parents are engaged in starting to train their children's artistic talent blindly." Scholar believes that these scholars' statements are simple and straightforward that Chinese family education focus put so much passion and energy towards children's academic education.

With the above statement, Chinese family life education prioritizes academic education above other education. In conclusion, Chinese students tend to gain better academic performance in school to gain rewards. In that case, Chinese students may have an advantage in reading, writing, and calculating, but their abilities in other sectors are fragile. Also, Chinese family education uses a reward strategy to encourage their children, which may lead to materialism.

It may create a tendency to consider material possessions and physical comfort as more important than spiritual values. When these children grow up, they probably do not care about justice or public integrity in working. Because promotion or other material possessions are the priority of their lives, in that case, the nepotism which trade power with money with their friends or relatives will root in their ideology.

---

By comparing the US and China family education, US family education does a better job in teaching children about public integrity and anti-corruption. Moreover, Chinese family education does not teach or educate children to prevent corruption, and the education may promote the ideology of corruption. It is a clear difference in comparing the US and China family education. Family education has more influence on children when compares with school education because children usually grow up with their parents, and parents’ behaviors and language can easily influence children.

Education like China is likely to cause many adverse effects; not only will it have a substantial negative impact on children's spiritual values, but it also causes the neglect of fairness and justice at work. Too much emphasis on academic education is likely to cultivate refined egoists in Chinese education. The so-called exquisite egoist refers to high intelligence, secular, sophisticated, good at acting, knowing how to cooperate, and better at using the system to achieve their own goals. When such people hold power, they will be more harmful than ordinary corrupt officials. The cause of self-interest can be traced back to the child's birth. After the constant training of elementary school, middle school, high school, and university, children will become better and better at hiding themselves and achieving their goals.

Moreover, such a focus on education will affect children's values and cognition and even affect children's lives. According to Jie Zhang “the Confucian ethic of filial piety was negatively associated with suicide; (2) the Confucian ethic of harmony moderated the estimated net effect of adverse life events on suicide; and (3) the Confucian ethic of subordination was positively linked with suicide.” This thesis also discussed the

Zhang, Jie, and Eric Y. Liu. “Confucianism and Youth Suicide in Rural China.” 95.
implications of our study for future research. The subordination here will not only limit the child's nature. However, the child's long-term repression will make them "wear a mask," and such hypocrisy and exquisiteness will be after entering the government and public service departments. It will become extremely dangerous.

**Conclusion:**

In this essay, it has already analyzed how education changes the ideology of general republics in anti-corruption. However, changing citizens’ ideology will be a long-term process. Countries need to spend a considerable amount of money and time to achieve this goal. Moreover, changing the general republic’s ideology cannot solve corruption in all sectors; but it will significantly diminish the rate of corruption. There are three key factors to solve the corruption in both countries. The most significant factor is solid economic power, and this is the premise of solving the corruption. If a nation has trapped in economic depression or remains at a low level of the economy, this nation will not solve the corruption issue. Anti-corruption will only be achieved in the developed economy. In this essay, it has already listed one possible solution to anti-corruption. Still, corruption itself is a complicated issue that will never be solved in few years.

By comparing the US and China’s political system, it is no doubt that the United States has done a better job in anti-corruption. The above statement of ideology will be counted as one corner of the “anti-corruption triangle.” The anti-corruption triangle means that there are three crucial factors to solve the corruption issue. If all three crucial factors have been achieved, the nation can control the corruption rate at a low level. The other two factors are complete anti-corruption laws and high economic level.
Chapter 3 Independent Judiciary

Introduction:

Corruption is a big problem. This thesis aims to find a solution to judicial corruption by analyzing how the judicial institutions in China and the United States address the problem of judicial corruption. In RT I, the paper mainly describes how ideology affects the country’s ability to solve corruption problems. There are three essential elements in tackling corruption. The first is ideology, including school education, family education, and corporate training, to improve citizens’ awareness of corruption. The second is that there needs to be a complete punishment mechanism. A sound disciplinary mechanism means that government officials cannot have massive power in rent-seeking space. The law will restrict all officials’ actions rather than using their power without restrictions. A sound judicial system often maintains the disciplinary mechanism, and the law can be the best tool to supervise and punish officials for illegal activities.

The primary way is to use the law to punish corrupt officials for deterring officials from complying with the law, so judicial impartiality is essential. The justice of justice needs to be established on the premise that there is no judicial corruption. The third point is to have a relatively developed economy. Officials holding public positions in government agencies must have a sufficiently high income to avoid the temptation of profits and wealth to lead to corruption. In other words, if public officials are struggling to live, the problem of corruption is almost impossible to solve. The above three elements must be met to reduce the country’s corruption rate to the lowest level. This thesis focuses on the second point.

China’s judiciary branch is not independent of the government. On the contrary, China’s judiciary branch is dependent on every other sector of the government. China’s Judiciary branch is one of the most important political tools of the Chinese Communist Party. China
has two highest-level judicial institutions: “the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.” Together, these two institutions form the Chinese judiciary. The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission has courts and prosecutors and constitutes highest judicial institution in the country in the traditional sense.

In contrast, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s role is “to supervise the exercise of power by party members and leading cadres, uphold the constitution and laws, and supervise and inspect public officials' performance of their duties, upholding public rights, clean governance, and ethics.” All judicial branch’ public officials are all Communist Party members. This means that they are all under the supervision of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

China's judiciary is at risk for high levels of commercial corruption because there is no independent judiciary. In addition, Chinese judges regularly receive theoretical guidance from the government and the Communist Party, especially when politically sensitive cases are involved. China's local courts are particularly vulnerable to economic and political influences, and the entire operation of the courts operates in an opaque manner. Chinese judges still have inadequate professional ability, which is likely to lead to biased and vague decisions. “When China's judicial system faces some special state machinery, such as government departments, state-owned enterprises, and the military, many judgments are obviously biased.”

Compared with China's judicial system, the U.S. judicial system has a much more robust anti-corruption system. The reason is simple. The U.S. government is based on a system of

---

28 Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China
https://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/


30 Li, Ling, 453.
separation of powers. The judicial system is entirely independent of Congress and the government. Therefore, in judging cases, the influence of politics or parties can be avoided to the greatest extent. There is a fundamental reason for this: The United States has a sound system of judicial independence.

First, “the term of office of federal judges is life-long, and the remuneration of federal judges will not decrease during the term of office. The remuneration of judges is relatively generous.” The U.S. Constitution stipulates both the lifetime tenure system and the constitutional salary guarantee. The U.S. judiciary has one of the most important powers that is the power of judicial review. Life-long appointments and judicial review minimizes the influence of the president, Congress, or interest groups on judges. Together they allow a judge to evaluate facts and law without the intrusion of politics.

In addition, federal judges are highly professional and have received a good education before taking office. Therefore, the American judicial system has sufficient professional competence, something that does not appears in the Chinese judicial system. In addition, “the U.S. government is a federal system, each state has its judicial system, and most states appoint judges through elections.” This can effectively avoid nepotism in the state government and prevent the governor from treating the position of judges as politics.

However, the U.S. judicial system is not perfect and judicial corruption occasionally occurs. The causes of judicial corruption in the United States include the lack of judicial ethics, political contributions, and the inability of the courts to achieve complete depoliticization. Overall, due to the relatively sound system and perfect guarantee mechanism, the judicial corruption in the United States is much lower than that in China.

32 Wheeler, Russell,19
How do the judicial institutions of China and the United States deal with judicial corruption, what are the reasons for judicial corruption, do we have a suitable countermeasure? This thesis believes that judicial corruption is a part of political corruption. However, in a country where the three powers are separated, judicial power and administrative power belong to different branches and are entirely independent. But the judicial branch is still part of the federal government, and all judges are government employees and have government-given powers. Therefore, judicial corruption should be included in the discussion of political corruption.

There is another key factor: transparency, which means court openness and public participation. Transparency plays a vital role in reducing judicial corruption. The judicial systems of the United States and China are very different, and the two judicial systems also have different levels of transparency. However, neither of these two countries have done enough in this aspect, so this thesis will use case studies to analyze the relationship between transparency, public participation, and judicial corruption in specific cases and believe that public participation can effectively reduce judicial corruption.

**Literature Review:**

This literature review is divided into two parts. The first part is about how the Chinese judicial system responds to judicial corruption, and the second part is about how the American judicial system responds to judicial corruption.

**Chinese Judicial system**

China's judicial system is relatively incomplete, and its overall integrity, and continuity need to be strengthened. According to Yu Hua Wang, "underfunded courts are more likely to be perceived as corrupt, and further propose direct measures of court funding and perceived judicial fairness.”

---

people's access to the court system, thereby making ordinary people's life and property safety unable to be protected. In addition, if the court often has insufficient funds, it may endanger the efficiency of the judicial system. Since there are often insufficient funds, the judicial system often wastes much time raising funds, preventing the courts from focusing most of their energy on penalizing cases. Finally, due to insufficient funds, the courts are more likely to be corrupted by economic interests, which will eventually lead to China's judicial system only defending the wealthy.

In addition, the qualitative interviews and quantitative analysis conducted by Yu Hua is important. Yu Hua states that "unlike previous studies which have used corruption scandals as a proxy to measure judicial corruption, I utilize a direct measure, perceived judicial corruption, based on surveys of ordinary citizens and business managers."\(^{34}\) It is very much in line with the actual situation in China because it is impossible to collect authentic information in ordinary ways. Therefore, this combined method can reduce bias to a certain extent, thereby increasing the reliability of the research.

China's judicial system is very corrupt. Although China's anti-corruption measures are very severe (including the death penalty), China's judicial corruption has not been effectively curbed. According to the Dui Hua Foundation, “a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization, China in 2013 executed an estimated 2,400 prisoners -- more than the rest of the world combined."\(^{35}\) Even if China has such strict laws, judicial corruption in China is still rampant.

In the process of anti-corruption, some scholars have studied the relationship between China's anti-corruption punitive measures and anti-corruption effects. Studies have found that

---

\(^{34}\) Wang, Yuhua.\(^{49}\)

“if the punishment is increased blindly, the Chinese anti-corruption system may involuntarily reduce the frequency of investigations.”\textsuperscript{36}

After that, “it is vital to establish a reward mechanism for anti-corruption officials”\textsuperscript{37}, whether money or politics. Anti-corruption is a high-risk job, so it is essential to establish a reward mechanism based on the risk matching of its work, giving impetus to anti-corruption officials. Finally, it is very important to have a certain proportion of officials with strong anti-corruption motives in China's anti-corruption system. These officials maybe those who have been threatened or attacked by corrupt officials.

According to the Zhu Jiangnan, "I first form a corruption-investigation game based on Tsebelis's model on crimes and sanctions. Next, I extend the basic model by linking the two players' payoffs. "\textsuperscript{38}This model based on game theory can clearly show officials' gains and losses. Research methods based on game theory have many advantages. First, the tabular presentation method can list the gains and losses of each decision made by corrupt officials. It can also show the gains and losses of every anti-corruption official. In the table, each decision of the corrupt official will be judged risk and benefit. For example, if a corrupt official chooses to be corrupt, the risk is to enter prison for a long time, and the benefit is obtaining huge illegal property. Corrupt officials do not choose corruption. The risk is that they will not have enough resources to enjoy a comfortable life, and the benefit is that they can secure jobs.

There are many reasons for judicial corruption in China, such as the insufficient funds of the courts, but these are not the core reasons. The core reason for China's judicial corruption

\textsuperscript{36} "Beijing Calls For An International "Fox" Hunt". 2021. Nikkei Asia.
\textsuperscript{37} Wang, Yuhua,53.
is that the Chinese judicial system is dependent on politics. The Chinese judicial system is
different from the United States. China has not established a separation of powers, and the
Chinese judicial system has no judicial review power. Due to the lack of this vital power, the
Chinese judicial system strongly depends on politics, which is a structural dependence.
Because of this dependence, Chinese judicial officials' legal standards and professional ethics
have succumbed to political and economic pressures. Second, the lack of an accountability
system is also a significant reason for China's judicial corruption.

The structural defects of the judicial institution itself have led to many personal
corruptions of judicial officials because these officials are not responsible for their actions.
Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of the CPC Central
Committee and the highest-ranking official in China's judicial system, can abuse his power at
will because there is no official or institution to supervise him.

In addition, China's judicial decisions often involve the distribution of wealth and power,
which also means that there are many opportunities for corruption in the judicial institutions,
and corrupt judicial institutions will lead to impunity for various corrupt activities without
any sanctions.

One study finds that "argues that corruption is not simply an extended consequence of
China's hybrid economic system; rather, it is a systemic malady with roots and modes
running deep beneath certain institutional conditions." With political dependence, China's
judicial system is in a relatively backward state, and it is tough to change the status quo of

---

China's judicial system. This is because there are many problems in the Chinese judicial system, and the reasons for these problems are complicated.

Most people believe that “China's judicial corruption is a violation of judicial behavior by a few black sheep rather than an overall structural defect.” This erroneous understanding prevents Chinese judicial officials from conducting in-depth investigations of judicial corruption and hinders a correct understanding of the operation of the courts.

As above, this thesis also clarifies that China's judicial corruption is an institutionalized activity, and it is a corruption with structural defects. However, the difference is that this thesis believes: "judicial corruption in China is an institutionalized activity systemically inherent in the particular decision-making mechanism guided by the Chinese Communist Party's instrumental rule-by-law ideal." This means that the Chinese judicial system is more like a powerful political tool, not an independent branch.

As China's judicial corruption has risen, the new Chinese government under Xi Jinping's leadership has put judicial system reform on the agenda. Li, Anthony points out that “since Xi Jinping took office as the leader of the Communist Party of China, legal reform has been one of the most prominent issues on the agenda of the new Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.” China's judicial system reform has Chinese characteristics because it contains two aspects: strengthening the internal party discipline of the Chinese Communist Party will be the priority. The second is to delegate a large amount of judicial reform power to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

---

40 Li, Ling, 859.
Unlike Western countries, China's judicial system has two branches. One is the highest judicial platform with the law as a tool headed by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and the other is the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which oversees the Communist Party of China and internal party discipline. In fact, since all officials at all levels in the Chinese judicial system are the Communist Party, this department in charge of internal party discipline has enormous powers.

In contrast, the Department of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, which oversees the Chinese judicial system, does not have much real power. On the contrary, it is more like a political tool of the Communist Party of China. However, this situation is changing. The Xi administration recognizes the shortcomings of China's judicial system. Therefore, an essential aspect of legal reform is to transfer all the responsibilities of local courts' personnel appointment and removal, finance, and property management to the province government. This move mainly aims to concentrate power in provincial courts against the rampant local protectionism in China's local courts.

In addition, the Xi administration “abolished a large number of redundant judicial institutions to make management more rapid and transparent.” This is also a plan to increase the efficiency of the judicial system and alleviate the problem of insufficient funds for the judicial institutions. There is another reason for centralizing power in provincial courts. The lack of professional competence of officials in local courts in China often makes it impossible to resolve cases within the scope of management.

The Xi Jinping government puts China's judicial reform first. China's judicial system seems to have achieved excellent results under the reform of the Xi Jinping government. However, some scholars pointed out that the reform of the Chinese judicial system seems to

---

43 Li, Anthony H. F,69.
be an excuse used by the Xi Jinping government to centralize power. After the judicial reform, the Chinese judicial system has undergone much streamlining, and the overall efficiency has been improved.

However, many judicial positions in China have been abolished, which may be considered a political struggle in some sense. As scholars have pointed out, "Tyrannical leaders may misuse anti-corruption operations to focus on opponents throughout internal power conflicts for strengthening their power base." Consolidating the strength of the ruling alliance has always been the most important task for Chinese officials, regardless of how to reform the judicial system. The role played by the Chinese Communist Party in the judicial system has never been neglected because the Chinese judiciary is not independent and has no power to interpret the constitution. If this premise remains unchanged, the Communist Party will continue to play an essential role in the judicial system.

In addition, this thesis points out that: "throughout provincial leadership staff renewal rates in China, the impetus to raise awareness of anti-corruption is most deep-seated when resigning party secretaries and their executives are part of rival powerful groups, as intra-elite power conflict is likely to be the most acute." This may be strong evidence for further centralization of power with the Xi Jinping government, and the reason is simple. The primary purpose of judicial reform is to curb rampant judicial corruption and the Anti-corruption policies can also have a significant impact on politics. Provincial executives are potential powerful enemies in the government. The rational use of anti-corruption policies will be an excellent opportunity to reduce potential political enemies.

United States Judicial system:

---

44 Ionescu, Luminita. “Does Xi JinPing’s anti-corruption campaign really support support clean and transparent government and market efficiency?” (Geopolitics, History, and International Relations,2018),168.
45 Ionescu, Luminita,169.
The US judicial system is relatively mature and stable. The US government is based on the separation of powers and is fundamentally different from the Chinese judicial system, because the US judicial system has the power to interpret the Constitution. Some scholars pointed out: "The ethical obligations of the judiciary extend far beyond the basic essentials of honesty, impartiality, and fairness." This means that the American judicial system has higher requirements on the morality of judges. Compared with the Chinese judicial system, the emphasis is on discipline.

American judges must not only avoid abuse of power and wrongdoing but also must avoid any improper or suspicious behavior in private life. This thesis points out a core point of view. Although American judicial institutions have outstanding performance in a judicial capacity and judicial ethics, these judges still need to continue to improve their performance in these areas. The case of Kids for cash has revealed the importance of judicial ethics.

The reason is that the high ethical performance of judges in the judicial system stems from the insistence on the integrity of those selected for important judicial positions. Moreover, this insistence on integrity is a guarantee for the implementation of the anti-corruption policy of the US judicial system. The moral requirements may not be so high for ordinary Americans because they do not have such a heavy responsibility. In addition to essential judicial ability and judicial ethics, judges need to have high moral standards in their private lives.

However, in a corrupt environment under a political background that cannot be fully identified, this cognition and concept have shortcomings and defects. Some scholars believe that "Corruption in a democracy, I argue, involves duplicitous violations of the democratic

---

norm of inclusion." In addition, this scholar distinguishes the meaning of tolerance and opposition in the different government agencies, fields, and associations that constitute the United States as a democratic country A conclusion: That is, the corruption of democracy usually means the lack of democracy itself.

The scholar used the most traditional method of case studies to demonstrate his views. He states, "One very recent example comes from Oklahoma, where three judges of the Supreme Court of that state were found to have been involved in a bribery situation of the worst sort." Abuse of power has a highly negative influence on judicial ethics. The result was that this led to the impeachment and dismissal of one of the judges, and the resignation of the other judge. The third judge was not removed from office just because his term as judge expired. Their corrupt behavior is not only a typical judicial corruption that has caused a massive loss to the credibility of the American judicial system. However, more importantly, their corrupt behavior has caused significant damage to the democracy itself that the US government relies on and emphasizes.

Although the United States is a government based on the separation of powers, there are cases of political prejudice intervening in anti-corruption in the American judicial system. The case of "Bush v. gore, it may be another representative case in which the Court intervened in an election dispute and seized power from it." Opposing judicial corruption is something that every national government must do because the harm caused by judicial corruption is enormous. However, anti-corruption laws are often used as a political means to attack political opponents and protect allies.

---

48 Warren, Mark E, 334.
49 Larry Kramer, "Constitutional Law and American Democracy" (MBS Direct, 2010), 83.
Should the federal anti-corruption laws continue to be enforced under such circumstances? The Gordon gave his own opinion that "Biased prosecutors will be willing to file weaker cases against political opponents than against allies."\(^\text{50}\) This means that if the judicial prosecutor himself has a political bias or personal views, he has imposed the anti-corruption cases. It cannot be regarded as a pure anti-corruption case because the judgment given by a politically biased prosecutor is based on personal opinions and political bias rather than pure evidence and testimony. When the prosecutors themselves are politically biased, the anti-corruption law is a tool for these judicial officials to wipe out their political opponents, not a law that safeguards democracy and justice.

With above discussion, the Gordon, Sanford C’s research method is to establish a model of interaction between corrupt officials and prosecutors. This model predicts when the case involves partisan prejudice, the number of judgments obtained by the indicted political opponents is much higher than the judgments against members of the same party. According to Gordon, Sanford C, “partisan prejudice does cause unfairness and bias in anti-corruption cases.”\(^\text{51}\) The anti-corruption law itself is based on opposing injustice.

Ensuring that the anti-corruption law will not become another powerful political tool is an issue that the US judicial system should focus on. Like China’s judicial system, “anti-corruption laws have become a political tool to varying degrees.”\(^\text{52}\) It is no doubt that the problem of China’s judicial system is much more severe. The fundamental reason is that China’s judicial system is not independent. It is built in the shadow of politics and party affiliation.

After discussing the possibility that the US anti-corruption law may become a political tool, another factor in the US judicial system deserves consideration and reflection. That is

\(^{50}\) Gordon, Sanford C. "Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions." (The American Political Science Review, 2009), 540.

\(^{51}\) Gordon, Sanford C, 543.

\(^{52}\) Gordon, Sanford C, 544.
the aspect of regulating political campaign donations. Most countries with democratic polities value political donations. That is because political donations are prone to corruption and the simplest and fastest way to exchange wealth for power. At this point, there is also a vast difference between the US and China's political systems because China does not have political contributions, and all political contributions in China will be considered bribery. China's political system does not require political contributions because the promotion of Chinese officials does not openly campaign for this process.

United States superiors entirely determine the promotion and demotion of officials, and the people have no right to intervene. Of course, China also has similar problems. In the Chinese military, there was a situation where cash was used to buy officer positions, which can also be regarded as a kind of political donation.

The author of this thesis also adopted a case study method. In the Buckley v. Valeo(1976), the Supreme Court found that limits on election spending, as required by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, were unconstitutional; popularly describing that money is a speech tool."53 The Supreme Court held that money is not a speech tool; it is a form of speech in itself. The court traced the origin of money and finally demonstrated that money is a case of speech. Scholars believe that "By its bipolarization of the principles between a broadened definition of speech (money) vs. a narrowed definition of corruption, it limited the contours of reform, and in essence shut down future debate outside of these narrow confines, in essence, constraining speech while it argued to protect speech."54

Based on the above literature, existing scholars have analyzed many aspects of the judicial systems in China and the United States, including judicial ethics, political contributions, the possibility of anti-corruption laws becoming political tools, insufficient

53 https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/1/
court funds, and lack of accountability systems, and a series of factors that may cause judicial corruption. However, this thesis believes that these scholars have overlooked a critical point: transparency, which makes the case public and public participation. The judicial systems in China and the United States must improve all aspects of trial procedures, information systems, ethical standards, and fund management by promoting judicial openness, increasing public participation, strengthening social supervision and media supervision.

This thesis has six crucial recommendations: First, the legal agency should publish an annual report on trial, funding, management, and government affairs. Second, publicize legal interpretations and judicial guidance. Third, let the public know about the proceedings. Fourth, publicize the property and income of judges and senior court staff. Fifth, strengthen the supervision of the work of courts by social organizations. Sixth, media work (including the press office set up in the judicial organs and the training of journalists).

**Methodology/Data**

In this chapter, case studies are evaluated. For China, the case of Zhou Yongkang is selected. Zhou Yongkang’s case was chosen because he is former secretary of the Central Political and Legal Committee. This position is responsible for the management of the Supreme People's Court of China and all the police in China. Simply put, he is the highest-level official in the Chinese judicial system. He is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which means that he is the highest-level cadre of the Chinese Communist Party. However, the highest-ranking official of the Communist Party was sentenced to life imprisonment for corruption, and Zhou Yongkang’s imprisonment also meant the beginning of China's anti-corruption plan. Therefore, this thesis believes that Zhou Yongkang's case is a turning point in China's judicial corruption and even the entire corruption plan of the Chinese Communist Party.
In sharp contrast to the situation of judicial corruption in China, judicial corruption in the United States is relatively less, and there has not been a case as shocking as the Zhou Yongkang case. In the U.S. government, scandals often occur in the executive and legislative bodies. In contrast, corruption and scandals in the judiciary are far less common. Therefore, this thesis will select the judicial corruption scandal of kids for cash as the case study. The reason is that the scope of the case is vast, and the impact caused is terrible.

Two judges (Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella) of the General Court of Wilkes-Barre Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, “accepted bribes from a private for-profit detention center, abused trial power, and sentenced 2,500 minor crimes to detention centers and received a rebate of 2.6 million U.S. dollars.”\textsuperscript{55} The reason for choosing this case is that this case is a typical judicial corruption case. This case has also been adapted into a movie to expand its influence. The lives of 2500 teenagers have been lost because of this judicial corruption case. These teenagers’ lives have been changed, and this change cannot be compensated.

**Data Presentation:**

Case one: Zhou Yongkang's case

In Zhou Yongkang's case, after Xi Jinping was elected as the general secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee in 2012 and joined his colleague, the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Wang Qishan, to launch a large-scale anti-corruption campaign. Many of Zhou Yongkang's secretaries and some of his subordinates were arrested.

\textsuperscript{55} Davis, Wendy N. "Town Without Pity: For Years, a Judge in Pennsylvania Jailed Kids Illegally. Whether It Was for 'tough Love' or Just Cold Cash, Where Were the Lawyers?" ABA Journal 95, no. 9 (2009): 50-55.
and imprisoned. The case progressed until 2014 when Chinese officials released news that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection conducted a case review of Zhou Yongkang.

At the end of 2014, Zhou Yongkang was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party. He was also transferred from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to the Central Political and Legal Committee. Because of his special status, he became the first Politburo Standing Committee member to be expelled from the party. In the summer of 2015, Tianjin No. 1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to life imprisonment for committing bribery, abuse of power, and deliberately divulging state secrets.

As explained above, Zhou Yongkang's special status shows that his case did not happen independently. More accurately, it should be that all Zhou Yongkang clique is corrupt, and Zhou Yongkang himself is the highest point and the greatest interest in this clique. In the 1990s, “Zhou Yongkang was the head of China National Petroleum Corporation, and this position gave him access to a large number of national wealth and energy contracts.” In the 21st century, he was transferred to the top cadre of Sichuan Province. During his tenure as the top cadre in Sichuan, “He and his family have obtained huge benefits. Zhou Yongkang's son won a contract to sell equipment to China's state-owned oil fields and gas stations because of the benefits brought by his father's position. His son's mother-in-law owns China National Petroleum Corporation.” She controls many shares in pipelines and pumps. His sister-in-law has invested heavily in mines, real estate, and energy projects. Of course, these are all due to the benefits of Zhou Yongkang's previous position. According to Keliher Macabe, "All

---


57 Meidan, Michal,47.
told, they controlled stakes in at least thirty-seven companies, seventeen of which were in energy investments related to CNPC, and nine were in Sichuan.”

In addition to bringing substantial economic benefits to him and himself, the position also brought huge political benefits to him. “Some of Zhou Yongkang's subordinates were later promoted together because of Zhou Yongkang's own promotion, thus forming a complete interest group.” There is no doubt that this thesis believes that this is a typical example of political nepotism, and this political nepotism is the most significant difficulty faced by judicial corruption. In addition to accepting bribes, Zhou Yongkang himself also has felony charges of murder and live organ harvesting. In 1999, Zhou Yongkang's original wife, Wang Shuhua, was hit and killed by a Chinese military vehicle while going out for a walk.

“The former deputy governor of Sichuan Province, Guo Yongxiang, who was also a subordinate of Zhou Yongkang, may also plan to kill Wang Shuhua.” During Zhou Yongkang's tenure as secretary of the Central Political and Legal Committee, the 610 Office under his leadership was involved in live harvesting and buying and selling organs from executed prisoners. The 610 offices of the CCP's extra-legal organization led by Zhou Yongkang is a triad organization within the state power and higher than the power of any government's departments. It is a triad organization that can manipulate and control all power resources, and it is not included in its constitution and power structure arrangements. However, its "exercises" powers that state agencies can only exercise and many powers that even state agencies cannot exercise at all. Therefore, in summary, the Zhou Yongkang case involved many bribery acts and brought Zhou Yongkang's interest group.

60 KAN, KARITA, 89.
Zhou Yongkang himself was also charged with felony murder and live organ harvesting with a lot of economic benefits. However, these violations of party discipline and Chinese laws have not been investigated by any Chinese prosecutors or courts because Zhou Yongkang himself belongs to the Chinese judicial system. The person in charge, Zhou Yongkang himself, was investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and was more often considered to be the result of the defeat of the political struggle with Xi Jinping.

According to Keliher Macabe, "Such examples illustrate how corruption has become a key aspect of China's political culture. The paying of bribes, cultivation of networks, and use of political position for private gain are as much a part of being an official as is carrying a Party membership card."\(^{61}\) This thesis believes that the Zhou Yongkang case is not only the beginning of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption plan. At the same time, the Zhou Yongkang case reveals the core reason for China's judicial corruption. In essence, it is not a court, and it is not based on the law to make judgments.

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is the disciplinary supervision organization within the Communist Party of China. In essence, it does not have the power to utilize justice. It uses internal party discipline to supervise and review party members. China's judicial system has always been too closely linked to the political system. The Chinese judicial system does not have the ability to be independent, and it is impossible to achieve independence.

**Case two: Kids for Cash scandal**

The kid-for-cash scandal emerged on the judicial kickback of two judges at the Wilkes-Barre Luzerne County Court in Pennsylvania. In 2008, Judges Michael Conahan and Marc Siavarera were convicted of accepting bribes in exchange for a severe sentence of

\(^{61}\) KELIHER, MACABE, and HSINCHAO WU, 17.
misdemeanor and juvenile crime to increase the occupancy rate of profitable detention centers. Mark Ciavarella arranged thousands of young people to serve long-term sentences in youth centers, but Mark's sentence was too severe. After the scandal was exposed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned hundreds of rulings on illegal activities in Lucerne County. The Juvenile Law Center filed a lawsuit against the judge and many other parties. Eventually, the Pennsylvania legislature established a committee to investigate the county's Juvenile justice issues excessive penalties.

The cause of this case is that the Pennsylvania Conduct Committee received many complaints about Michael Conahan between 2004 and 2008. However, according to Wendy's thesis, she pointed out that "While some parents and local advocates complained that Ciavarella treated juveniles too harshly, many in the local community and the schools supported him." Thus, the Judicial Conduct Committee finally admitted that it did not investigate any of them, nor did it inquire about any materials involved in the case. However, the case took a turn for the worse in 2006, and the FBI had received news about Conahan's bribery and nepotism.

In early 2007, since the Philadelphia Juvenile Law Center received several requests for assistance from teenagers, another investigation was launched into Lucerne County's improper judgment. The center's lawyers determined that Hundreds of cases were tried without the defendant's defense from an appropriate lawyer. In April 2008, the center petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to seek relief for suspected violations of the rights of young citizens. However, the final application for relief was denied. Finally, in January 2009, allegations of corruption against Conahan and Mark Ciavarella surfaced.

---

62 Davis, Wendy N. "TOWN WITHOUT PITY: For Years, a Judge in Pennsylvania Jailed Kids Illegally. (ABA Journals,2009),54.
In the end, in 2010, Conahan pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to blackmail and was sentenced to 17.5 years of federal imprisonment. Ciavarella chose to stand trial the following year. He was convicted of 12 of 39 crimes and sentenced to 28 years in federal prison. Therefore, in this case, the for-profit detention center bribes the judges to gain its own profits, and the two judges are the bribery parties.

**Discussion**

This thesis believes that the problems presented in the Zhou Yongkang case mentioned above are in line with the views put forward by Gongting. The core reason for China's judicial corruption lies in the dependence of China's judicial system on politics. China's judicial system is different from that of the United States because China's judicial system lacks the most critical judicial review power. For this reason, China's judicial system strongly relies on politics. To be more precise, the Chinese judicial system strongly relies on the Communist Party of China. This is a structural dependence.

The structural deficiencies of the judiciary itself are the biggest problem, leading to many personal corruptions of judicial officials because these officials are irresponsible for their actions. In Zhou Yongkang's case, a very serious problem was revealed. China's judicial corruption and the distribution of power and wealth are extremely complicated, creating many opportunities for corruption in the judiciary. “When Zhou Yongkang was a senior cadre in Sichuan Province and China National Petroleum Corporation, he used his position and authority to bring many improper benefits to himself, his family, and subordinates, and his corruption was not investigated in time.”

It was because the officials who supervised him were colleagues at the same level. All provincial governments in China have provincial

63 Li, Anthony H. F.,64.
disciplinary committee secretaries sent by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to supervise all cadres at the provincial level.

In other words, during Zhou Yongkang “as secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, the official who supervised his corruption was the secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection.”64 These officials who worked with him almost every day, and this method of supervision was very weak and ineffective. This is like the problem of roommates in college dormitories supervising each other for underage drinking. In fact, due to the special nature of the work of Chinese senior officials, it is almost impossible for China's judicial institutions to supervise the corruption of provincial officials.

Because all the leading officials of the provincial courts, public security bureaus in China are Subordinates of these provincial party secretaries. In other words, all the officials who could supervise Zhou Yongkang at the time were his subordinates, and this kind of supervision method was almost completely ineffective in practical applications. This is easy to understand, just as it is difficult for an employee to supervise his boss in a company. China's primary process for officials, especially senior officials, is like this.

In daily work, the secretary of a Chinese provincial party committee is usually supervised by the secretary of the provincial discipline inspection committee and the secretary of the political and legal committee at the same level as him, and this kind of supervision is mainly based on the requirements of discipline and ethics. The corruption problem itself is hidden. This same level of supervision simply cannot understand whether officials are involved in corruption.

And there is a more serious situation, that is, if the responsible official at the provincial level and all the officials at the same level who supervise him reach a consensus or

64 Li, Anthony H. F. ,67.
agreement, then there will be no officials and institutions to supervise him. In Zhou Yongkang's case, “Zhou Yongkang bribed all his officials at the same level, including those responsible for supervising him.”65 Then the whole Sichuan province formed a complete interest group, and he also used the same technique when he worked for China National Petroleum Corporation. Two large interest groups were formed in the process that he assumed these two positions. As Zhou Yongkang himself was promoted to the Central Political and Legal Committee secretary, his subordinates and colleagues of the two large interest groups also followed suit.

In other words, if they are classified as an interest group, these officials can abuse their power without supervision and gain a lot of political and economic benefits for themselves. This is the main reason why China's judicial institutions are structurally dependent on Chinese parties and politics.

However, the entire process of this case does not conform to the views of Ionescu, Luminita. He believes that “China's judicial reform under Xi Jinping's government is a new strategy of Xi Jinping's centralization of power.”66 After Xi Jinping took office, many judicial officials were removed or dismissed. Imprisonment can be understood as a kind of political struggle, and judicial reform will become a tool for full-time leaders and a tool to consolidate the ruling coalition. This scholar believes that provincial administrators are potential powerful enemies of the Xi Jinping government. These government executives belong to hostile and powerful groups as the power within the elite.

Conflicts may be the most serious, so the rational use of anti-corruption policies will be an excellent opportunity to reduce potential political enemies. In Zhou Yongkang's case, it can be seen that “China's judicial institutions and judicial corruption have reached a

65 Ionescu, Luminita, 170.
66 KELIHER, MACABE, and HSINCHAO WU., 19.
dangerous level.” If a thorough reform is not carried out, the problem of judicial corruption will never be resolved. Judicial corruption in China is undoubtedly closely related to politics. Politics and party affiliation are unavoidable factors in China's judicial corruption. But the judgment on the problem should not be so absolute. Zhou Yongkang was the former secretary of the Political and Legal Committee. This also means that China's judicial institutions are flooded with colleagues and subordinates in Zhou Yongkang's interest group. “After Zhou Yongkang was imprisoned, most of these subordinates also had corruption problems, so these corrupt subordinates should be punished by law.” In addition, judicial corruption in China is a systemic issue and must be changed systematically. If there is only a tiny amount or gradual reform, it will not solve such rampant judicial corruption.

Similarly, China's political culture is different from any other country globally, so it is difficult for China to use the concept of separation of powers to carry out anti-corruption work. Therefore, the Xi Jinping government still need to use the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission as means and strategies to carry out reforms. China's judicial institutions still have intense partisanship and political factors, but this does not mean that China's judicial corruption cannot be alleviated. In fact, the Xi Jinping government separated the relationship between the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the provincial government.

After the reform, the officials of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection at all levels of the provincial government were not subordinates to the secretaries of the provincial, municipal and provincial party committees. Committee officials have also been effectively supervised. At the same time, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection separated the

---

67 Ionescu, Luminita.,169.
68 Ionescu, Luminita.,171.
departments of the State Supervision Commission, and the State Supervision Commission used the law to supervise officials at all levels in China. When the regulatory agencies are not merged with governments at all levels, it also means that the intensity and effectiveness of the supervision are effectively guaranteed. Therefore, in conjunction with Zhou Yongkang's case, this thesis believes that Ionescu, Luminita's views are not accurate enough, and his opinions may bring readers into a more complicated situation.

In the kids for cash case, this thesis believes that this case is in line with Thoron Gray and Warren Mark's point of view. “The American judicial system has higher moral requirements and standards for judicial practitioners.”

American judges should avoid abuse of power and all wrongdoing and avoid any improper or suspicious behavior in their private life. The requirement for the morality of American judges to set such high standards is to prevent scandals like kids for cash. Moreover, the two judges in the Kids for cash case were not reported and sentenced for moral corruption in their private lives. They completely violated the requirements for public officials of the judiciary. Their behavior is typical of taking bribes. The misdemeanor and heavy sentence of a young man also completely violated judicial ethics.

Thus, the two judges in the kids for cash case, they said they violated the law and morality at the same time. At the same time, Warren Mark also pointed out that “the corruption of judicial officials damaged the credibility of the US judicial system and caused significant damage to the democracy itself on which the US government relies.” This thesis believes that the kids for cash case can have a huge impact on American society and attract the media's attention because the case has caused great harm to the democracy itself on which

---

69 Thoron, Gray, 47.
70 Warren, Mark, 334.
the US government relies. Because of the bribery behavior of the two judges, the lives of thousands of teenagers in the county have undergone tremendous changes.

However, the kids for cash case does not support Gordon and Sanford's point of view. He argued that “biased prosecutors are more willing to file weaker cases against political opponents than against allies.” This means that if the judicial prosecutor himself has political prejudice or personal views, he has already implemented an anti-corruption issue; it cannot be regarded as a purely anti-corruption case. Because the judgment of a politically biased prosecutor is based on personal views and political prejudice but not pure evidence and testimony. But in this case, the corruption of the two judges was discovered and reported because of political intervention. Including the intervention of the FBI and the Philadelphia juvenile law center, the United States' three-power separation system renders strength to government agencies to supervise the judiciary, ensuring the fairness of the judicial branch. Perhaps in a few cases, political prejudice interferes with the judiciary's impartial rulings. Still, in general, political intervention is essential for the supervision of the judicial officials who made positive contributions.

This thesis believes that the main reason for the differences between real cases and previous literature review is that there will always be inevitable differences between literature reviews and real cases. For example, in the case of Zhou Yongkang, it exposed a wide range of judicial corruption issues. Thus, it is easy for scholars to make wrong judgments, that is, only by completely separating party and political factors from judicial institutions can judicial corruption be eradicated from the source.

However, in actual cases, it is almost impossible to remove the influence of party affiliation and politics on the judiciary in China. However, under the existing system, it is still

---

71 Gordon, Sanford C.540.
possible to strengthen the control by dividing the power of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the provincial government in China. In the case of Kids for Cash, scholars’ doubts about the political influence of the U.S. judiciary were denied because incidental cases of political influence cannot deny the ability of the separation of powers to supervise officials of the U.S. judiciary. In fact, it is to transfer powers. Clear divisions and mutual checks and balances can ensure the justice of the U.S. judiciary branch.

Conclusion:

The research topic of this thesis is how do the judicial institutions of China and the United States deal with judicial corruption, what are the reasons for judicial corruption, do we have a suitable countermeasure? Different country's judicial institutions are very different, and each has its unique corruption problem. Therefore, the way to solve the problem should be based on the actual conditions of the two countries and formulate targeted solutions. In China, the only feasible plan is to strengthen the supervision of Chinese officials by dividing the power of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Chinese provincial government under the existing system. The core of this plan is to divide the power of the government.

In the United States, because there is a complete judicial institution and a mature supervision mechanism, the U.S. judicial institution needs more transparency, making the case public and public participation. The U.S. judicial system must improve judicial procedures, information systems, ethical standards, and fund management by promoting judicial openness, increasing public participation, and strengthening social and media supervision. According to the actual situation of the two countries, a targeted solution is the conclusion of this thesis.
In future research projects, the thesis may also explore the relationship between the level of national economic development and political corruption. There are differences in financial strength between China and the United States. However, this gap has been narrowing in the past ten years. The country's economic development level changes are directly related to the country's political level, but what kind of connection exists requires further exploration.

**Chapter 4 Economic stability:**

**Introduction:**

Two critical factors related corruption, ideology and judicial corruption, were addressed in the previous chapters. In chapter two, how ideology affects the country's ability to solve corruption problems is addressed along with how ideology is an encompassing term. Ideology includes school education, family education, corporate training, almost everything in the actual application of that system or set of ideas. The process of a citizen's personal growth is acting as the process of shaping his perceptions.

Citizens' cognition and understanding of corruption itself will primarily affect the level of government corruption. Developed countries and countries with lower levels of corruption have one thing in common: citizens have received a relatively complete anti-corruption education. Chapter 3 elaborates on the need for the government to have disciplinary measures. If ideology is to restrain officials against corruption morally, then the law to apply disciplinary measures is, another critical factor. Using morality to restrain officials from corruption is difficult to control and manage, but the law can and should be the absolute guarantee and bottom line.

When officials are suspected of corruption, the officials are usually being accused of violating the law, and the violations should be investigated through a judicial process.
Therefore, it is imperative to ensure the independence and integrity of the judicial system. For example, if the judicial system is integrated with the public service and legislative system, it is difficult to be fair in an official's punishment because officials often bribe the officials of the judicial system to avoid punishment and investigation.

In order to avoid corruption and shielding behavior within the government, the judicial system's independence is a necessary condition to prevent official corruption. At the same time, the judicial system's integrity can be maintained by high salaries and lifetime appointments. Compared with the executive and legislative departments, judicial departments have more limited powers and involve fewer government officials. If judicial independence is to be maintained, judges in the judicial system need to have relatively sufficient salaries to increase officials' resistance to financial interests. At the same time, the lifelong system of judges to render judgments without being influenced by political pressure.

This chapter focuses on the last element of the national government's fight against corruption: having relatively strong financial independence, which can be reflected in many aspects, such as officials' salaries, insurance, and education benefits. As well as the relatively generous pension after retirement, the government must be able to pay these payments to ensure that government officials can maintain a relatively prosperous life. There is no need to involve too much energy for basic living security.

When the government cannot pay salaries that ensure costs of the basic life for its government officials, corruption is relatively likely to occur. In the context of the three elements of controlling corruption noted above, i.e., ideology, disciplinary measures and the independence of the judicial system, and the relatively muscular financial strength of the national government. The states' financial strength should be the most important. This is because this last element is the foundation of the first two elements. For example, in terms of
ideology, school education, family education, and corporate and government training at all levels require a large amount of capital investment.

At the same time, for officials of the judicial system, in order to maintain judicial independence and incorruptibility, judicial officials must have sufficient income to fight against the erosion of power and interests. The analysis in chapter two points out that the relatively incorruptible judicial system in the US government is similar to that in the United States. The relatively generous income of judicial officials is directly related. Therefore, the government's financial strength is the third element of the national government's fight against corruption and the foundation of the first two elements.

However, a question arises here. When the national government is relatively poor, or the national strength is relatively weak, is the corruption in these countries unsolvable? Because according to the CPI table, “almost all of the 183 countries assessed for the relatively backward CPI index are countries with fragile economic foundations.”72 That is to say, developing countries and underdeveloped countries are often combined with high corruption rates.

In developed countries with a solid economic foundation, the corruption rate of the national government is relatively low. This phenomenon indicates that the corruption problem is fundamentally a poverty problem; If the poverty problem is solved, does it mean that the corruption problem can be solved? The question is a highly complex issue. According to the CPI pointed out, "In 2018, the correlation between per capita GDP and integrity in Asian countries was calculated. The correlation result is 0.8971. The correlation

72 Corruption Perceptions Index, China, United States
coefficient ranges from -1 to 1, and -1 represents a complete negative correlation. 0 is not entirely uncorrelated; 1 is an entirely positive correlation.”

The table shows that the absolute value of the correlation coefficient is more significant than 0.8, which means that there is a strong correlation. The correlation coefficient 0.8971 shows a strong positive correlation between the GDPs per capita in Asia and the integrity of government.

For example, Asian countries can be divided into developed countries, developing countries, and poor countries with lagging development. South Korea, Japan, Singapore is developed countries, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, India are developing countries, and Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and other less developed countries. Among these three types of countries, what needs attention is the difference between developing countries and underdeveloped countries. Although economic growth and corruption coexist in developing countries, corruption is not severe enough to cause economic development to stagnate.

Moreover, with the continuous decline of economic development, corruption has become a severe obstacle to development in developing countries where development is lagging. Under such circumstances, the anti-corruption process of developing countries encounters massive resistance. Moreover, the reasons are very complicated, including low remuneration for government officials, relatively more opportunities for abuse of power, sizeable rent-seeking space for power, and lack of judicial supervision by government officials. Furthermore, the phenomenon of income inequality in developing countries is grave.

If the government focuses on bringing the national economy into a development track for developing countries, it is possible to be relatively free from this vicious circle. Of course, economic development may only be one of the solutions, but perhaps it is the most likely to

73 China Corruption Report, United States, China
succeed. This thesis believes that promoting the growth of national economic strength is directly related to the government's control of corruption. If underdeveloped and developing countries will develop their national economic strength and persistently crackdown and rectify corruption, domestic corruption may be improved.

The ideal state should be that corruption in the national government is curbed while reducing obstacles to economic development. Sustained economic growth will bring more legal channels for the country to obtain wealth while providing more resources, opportunities, and opportunities. The system guarantees, thereby effectively reducing the occurrence of corruption. This chapter focuses on China and the United States as case studies because these two countries are both superpowers and represent completely different political systems. As a one-party country with socialism with Chinese characteristics as its central ideology, China is a relatively highly centralized country.

Anti-corruption has been one of the critical goals of the Chinese government in the past ten years. After China's reform and opening-up in 1980, China's economy has proliferated, creating a miracle, developing from a poorer developing country to the world's second-largest economy. Rapid economic growth has been accompanied by severe corruption. In recent years, the Chinese government has tried many policies to curb growing structural corruption, reducing resistance to China's economic growth. This thesis believes that China is developing towards a promising trend in the anti-corruption process. Economic development is still placed in a significant position by the Chinese government. The governance of corruption is also more perfect and in-depth.

On the other hand, as the world's largest economy, the United States also plays the role of a leader in the Western free world. Its ideology is dominated by liberal democracy. The US government is built based on the separation of powers, and there are fundamental differences
in the forms. In terms of anti-corruption analysis, the United States, as a developed country, has extreme national economic strength and has been prosperous for a long time. Therefore, the United States has a relatively complete anti-corruption system.

The overall government corruption rate is still at a relatively low stage. This chapter uses China and the United States as the object of the case study because the two countries have many similarities. At the same time, as the world's largest and second-largest economy, both China and the United States have muscular economic strength. However, they are also different in ideology and government form.

Using the case comparison method, this chapter will study the relationship between national economic strength and national corruption. This thesis believes that the national economic strength is positively related to the corruption of the national government. The more muscular national economic strength, the less the corruption of the national government.

**Literature review:**

The literature review of this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a specific analysis of the relationship between economic development and government corruption in developing countries led by China. The second part is a specific analysis of the relationship between economic development and government corruption in developing countries led by United States. Western developed countries alliance to explore the relationship between developed countries' economies and government corruption.

**China's economic development and corruption:**

In the past few decades, China's economy grew rapidly, from a relatively backward developing country in Asia to the second-largest economy in the world. For a country like China with a vast population base, such rapid economic growth can be said to be a miracle
but creating a miracle itself means a considerable price. There are many costs to pay. For example, China's environmental pollution is severe, and the corruption of the Chinese government has become more and more rampant during the period of China's economic reform.

Shuntian Yao stated, “implicit corruption and explicit corruption. We explain how the granting of privileges has directly created implicit corruption in China's socialist market economy.” With mutual collision, this privileged group uses its deep-rooted monopoly power to almost monopolize a large amount of wealth in China. Here is a question of who constitutes this same privileged group.

The scholar stated, “many children of the top CCP leaders-the princelings-have been chosen as candidates. The princelings, beginning from a young age, have enjoyed various privileges, from attending the top universities to choosing the best occupations.” Composed of relatives, CCP has become China's only ruling party since 1949. In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the leaders' children became a new group of the privileged class in China.

Although China carried out economic reforms and opening-up in 1980, it has not changed. The interests of this privileged group in China only occupy a small part of the Chinese population, but they have enormous wealth and power. From an economic point of view, the Chinese government will provide many unique benefits to high-level officials, such as the officials themselves who have Full-time drivers, cars, doctors, and housekeeping services.

---


75 Yao, Shuntian, 281.
The officials themselves have three secretaries to meet the needs of life and work, and the government will reimburse almost all the expenses of the officials' lives. Although most countries will provide government service personnel Special benefits, the benefits of Chinese officials are undoubtedly the highest and the most. However, such benefits will not appear out of thin air. The enormous benefits given by the Chinese government to senior officials are based on the exploitation of the benefits of lower-level working people. Possessing great power and giving themselves and their family members outstanding benefits, but their contribution to society and the country is not proportional to the power they gain.

The scholar stated that “We call this ‘corruption’ because it leads to social unfairness and destroys economic efficiency.” Thus, in a sense, if we do not carry out thorough political reforms to remove privileges and break the original method of dividing interests, China's corruption problem will be challenging to solve. In other words, although the rapid economic growth has brought considerable dividends to China, if the Chinese government wants more ordinary people in China to truly feel part of the dividend, the Chinese government must solve the problem at this fundamental level.

This chapter argues that China wants to reduce corruption to develop. The rising standard of living in a country for all citizens can best start from breaking up interest groups. For the country's economic growth, the citizens, not the specific interest groups, should first enjoy the rising standard of living.

The harmfulness of corruption is evidenced by the structural anti-corruption policies in recent years. With improvements in the judicial system, the corruption of the Chinese government may be on the decline.

---

76 Yao, Shuntian, 287.
Corruption in China is also directly related to its economic policies. China has profound income inequality. In order to combat such inequality, the wealth redistribution policy has become an effective way for the Chinese government to alleviate inequality. However, Chinese scholar Zengyi Mu states that “fiscal redistribution as a remedy of the failure of market allocation fails to restrain income inequality.” In fact, when Chinese officials implement wealth redistribution policies, it will exacerbate social inequality due to corruption; not only does it fail to alleviate the problem of social inequality, but it exacerbates inequality.

After 1980, China transformed from a planned economy to a market economy. When the government introduced policies to correct the wealth inequality caused by the market transformation, higher personal income taxes, and more expenditures were the mainstream methods of China's wealth redistribution policy.

However, such policies have brought enormous power and rent-seeking space to government officials, which has led to mass corruption. When Chinese government officials benefit from such corruption, government officials will be more inclined to introduce higher tax policies and gain more control over the public sector.

Of course, the purpose of officials is not for income redistribution itself but from the policy. China grabs many benefits. The three factors of income inequality, corruption, and intervention by government officials have formed a self-reinforcing mechanism. The core is the corruption of officials, which directly affects the implementation of government wealth redistribution.

---

In addition, in the process of China's reform and opening up, the Chinese government began to realize that there had been misunderstandings in the past management of state-owned assets. The Chinese government managed China's state-owned enterprises in a government way. However, it is inappropriate to run China's state-owned enterprises in a government way because it may lack market competitiveness. After implementing the dual-track system, the Chinese government reformed all other small state-owned enterprises to adapt to new economic circumstances.

Based on the market economy, Chinese enterprises began to adapt. However, in the process, Chinese state-owned enterprises sold their shares to provide a benchmark, the price of publicly traded stocks, to measure pricing. However, as some scholars point out, “Underpricing is correlated with deal attributes associated with misgovernance and corruption. Sales by ‘disguised’ owners that misrepresent their state ownership to elude regulatory scrutiny are discounted 5-7 percentage points more than sales by other owners.” Chinese state-owned enterprises try to imitate the Western method of selling equity, which is not a problem.

However, Chinese state-owned enterprises selling corporate stocks is not transparent, which has created substantial rent-seeking space for Chinese government officials. Buyers and sellers colluded privately to inflate the price of stocks, and the price difference in the middle eventually flowed into Chinese officials. In the pocket. As scholars pointed out, “aggregate ownership transfers improve profitability, though not in cases where the transfers

---

themselves were corrupted.”  

For the Chinese government, reform and opening up transform from a planned economy to a market economy.

Chinese reform and opening-up is not only a change in the national economic model. It is a fundamental change in ideology, and ideology variety is complicated for the government of any country. Thus, the Chinese government did not have sufficient experience and ability to deal with the market economy's substantial business opportunities and challenges in the entire reform process. The Chinese government is inexperienced in regulating the market economy and setting rules to prevent officials from abusing their power for profit.

However, some scholars believe that corruption does not necessarily only hurt economic growth because some countries have achieved rapid growth despite rampant corruption. China is such a country. Before the reform and opening-up, China's economy was in a very low state. Due to its weak overall economic strength and the country's full implementation of a planned economy, Chinese officials' overall probability of corruption was relatively low. What takes off together with the Chinese economy is the probability of corruption of Chinese officials.

Although anti-corruption has always been placed in a significant position by the Chinese government, according to cpi data, “China ranks 83rd among 183 countries for eight consecutive years.” Although the data show that the Chinese government's probability of corruption has increased, the effect is not significant.

Although the probability of corruption remains high, China's economic growth has also maintained an alarming rate. Thus, Shao minLi mentioned, “This thesis sheds light on this issue by examining the role of trust in the corruption—efficiency relationship. It argues that

---

79 Fisman, Raymond, and Yongxiang Wang, 19.
80 Corruption Perceptions Index, China, United States
in countries with a relatively low level of trust, corruption tends to be more predatory and inefficient than corruption in countries with a relatively high level of trust, which tends to be less predatory.”

In other words, some scholars believe that trust plays a unique role in corruption and economic development, and its lack is also corruption. When it occurs in countries with low levels of trust, corruption will be more aggressive because the government is opaquer than before, and citizens are more skeptical of the government.

In China, citizens have a considerable degree of trust in the government. The trust may originate from China's rapid economic growth has made Chinese citizens truly feel the improvement in the quality of life, so relatively speaking, there is no such thing as a corruption of officials. The Chinese government has been propagating the harshness of its anti-corruption measures, and the people are relatively convinced.

The impact of U.S. corruption on the economy:

The U.S. government is built on liberal democracy. As the leader of the west, the U.S. government has a relatively long experience in government management. Therefore, the U.S. government appears more mature in terms of overall organizational structure and policy formulation. In addition, The United States has a long period of experience in capital accumulation and operation, and it has operated a market economy much earlier than China.

According to Noel D. Johnson, “We find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states.”

Scholars have a somewhat different analysis of corruption, taking a more specific perspective.


First, corruption is not conducive to economic growth is a hypothesis itself, although many people have proved this hypothesis. But corruption may affect different countries in different ways, as demonstrated above, corruption can have a powerful negative impact on some relatively poor and backward countries. However, it may have a slight impact on some wealthier and more authoritarian countries.

The coalition within the government leads to collective corruption. Businesspeople and politicians may unite into a community of interests to form a complete interest chain. Therefore, it may be complicated to analyze the impact of corruption on economic growth directly.

Thus, scholars proposed, “We restrict our attention to the cost of corruption in U.S. states because the question is important in and of itself and because this allows us to address many of the empirical shortcomings that plague the cross-country literature.” 83 The empirical shortcomings here mean that various states' corruption in the United States needs to be investigated and started relatively better. Once you understand the corruption in each state, you can continue to have enough experience in a wider range of corruption investigations.

Perhaps narrowing the scope is a wise choice when it is difficult to find answers to abstract and overly broad questions. The link between economic development and corruption may be difficult to find. However, the cost of corruption in each state in the United States is common data and can be found simultaneously. Through the data, “it is found that corruption hurts the growth and investment of the states in the United States. This may be consistent with the assumption, but the results based on quantitative data are more trustworthy than pure assumptions.”84

83 Johnson, Noel D., Courtney L. LaFountain, and Steven Yamarik,381.
84 Johnson, Noel D., Courtney L. LaFountain, and Steven Yamarik,387.
In developing countries led by China, when there is serious corruption within the country, the citizens of these countries are often forced to choose to engage in private enterprises or start their entrepreneurial activities. Because the national government controls, the large enterprises are not efficient enough. Of course, some developing countries, such as China, have companies that are controlled by many countries.

These companies have excellent corporate welfare benefits. Compared with private enterprises and individual entrepreneurship, the work of these companies is relatively stable. However, Chinese citizens are more often engaged in high-risk personal entrepreneurship. The reason is simple. The recruitment of these state-owned enterprises is inherently corrupt. Suppose the civilians have not graduated from a good university in China or have no contact (relationship) with the company's management.

In that case, ordinary young people in China cannot find a job in these state-owned enterprises. Scholars in developed countries dominated by the United States found that “we use federal convictions of state and local officials and the Small Business Administration's firm formation data to test whether corruption within the United States forces some people into business venturing. We find that business venturing within the United States is caused in part by corruption.”85

Mitchell believes that the participation of American citizens in personal adventure-based entrepreneurship may be related to the poor state system and severe corruption in the United States. When citizens cannot obtain fair competition in state-owned enterprises or the public sector, when the government becomes corrupt, citizens will naturally choose to start their businesses because that means more opportunities and freedom.

This analysis finds that corruption does stimulate the economy in a certain sense. When corruption keeps American citizens out of the public sector, American citizens will naturally gain more economic freedom in the free market. The rapid influx of citizens into the free market has become an essential source of stimulus to the U.S. economy, but this has a big problem. Most citizens who participate in personal entrepreneurship end up in bankruptcy and loss because entrepreneurship contains enormous risks in the risky personal style.

Moreover, this cannot make up for the economic losses caused by government corruption, so corruption to stimulate the U.S. economy may be an exquisite scam in essence.

Corruption in the United States is also related to the region. Some scholars believe that “the capital cities of the 50 states in the United States are relatively more prone to corruption.”\textsuperscript{86} The population distribution in the U.S. state is uneven. Filipe Campante and Quoc-Anh Do state that “state-level politics were particularly prone to corruption because state capitals are often far from the major metropolitan centers, and thus face a lower level of scrutiny by citizens and by the media.”\textsuperscript{87} The capitals of states in the United States are often in small cities.

In these small cities, they tend not to attract the attention of large-scale media. Only small newspapers and media will report news related to the state government. Geographically speaking, residents in cities closer to the state government pay more attention to politics. However, voters far away from the capital have much less knowledge and interest in state politics. When there is a problem with the accountability mechanism in the government, then corruption will naturally occur, but it is inversely proportional to the low media attention.

On the contrary, the city where the state government is located and its state-level campaign funds have more funds; that is to say, the distribution of state-level campaign funds

\textsuperscript{86} Mitchell, David T., and Noel D. Campbell.,1141.
is not evenly balanced. With more funds and weaker accountability, the result is naturally that state government officials have huge power rent-seeking space. Thus, from the perspective of the state government, it can be found that corruption in the public sector has a significant impact on the state government's economy. The impact of the company is mainly negative.

Discussion:

This analysis finds that the scholars mentioned above are entirely wrong in their judgment that corruption may stimulate economic growth. There has never been any benign corruption. In the long run, corruption will hinder economic development because the government system reform is slow, and the intensity is not in place to provide convenience and help to enterprises and capital officials. Such behavior is still shameful predatory corruption, and corruption cannot be justified as a necessary factor for economic development for any reason.

If the government ignores the corruption of officials, then the corruption itself will escalate with the deepening of economic development. If the government does not introduce the necessary measures and policies, then spontaneous corruption will gradually deepen within the government and the economy.

When the economy develops to a certain extent, the phenomenon of corruption will spread throughout the market economy and the government, entirely out of control, and eventually lead to the collapse of the system and social unrest. When studying corruption cases in developing countries, it can be found that when the government ignores corruption and has rapid economic development at a particular stage of the country and region, the economic growth of these countries is volatile.

Moreover, to obtain some economic growth in a short period of time and make the national government pay the price of corruption, the price is too high because corruption will
quickly lower the government's credibility and weaken the legitimacy of politics. Therefore, countries with serious corruption often cause severe turbulence due to short-term economic development difficulties.

In contrast, in countries with low levels of corruption, the people are only dissatisfied with the ineffective governance of the government, and the specific behaviors only remain in Protests, and votes rarely escalate into more intense commotion.

However, this chapter finds that the damage of corruption to the national government is long-term and irreversible. Social inequality will increase, the per capita income gap will increase significantly, and social class conflicts may intensify. At the same time, as mentioned above, the interest groups within the government and the privileged class will also have massive conflicts and games.

Such games are not dominated by the market but are irrational games carried out by interest groups to occupy more interests. That is a zero-sum game. The same irrational game will spread rapidly in the government and society, leading to social division, inequality, and crises of trust, leading to a vicious circle. In this vicious circle, no specific interest group can always become the winner of the competition.

It may have achieved some results in a short period of time, but such a victory is extremely short-lived, but the zero-sum game does exist for a long time. Therefore, when a particular interest group in the government is in a position of relative advantage, this interest group will deprive its competitors of the interests in various legal or illegal ways.

Conversely, those inferior competitors will follow suit when they are in a strong position. When corruption is out of control, corruption will make society's resources more and more invested in the irrational competition, and this kind of competition will significantly increase
the internal consumption of society's total resources. If the situation is serious, the country will face the danger of disorder at any time.

Andrew Wedeman has stated that “Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan's governments were highly corrupt during the economic boom in the 1960s and 1990s and pointed out that although the ruling officials of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan formed development alliances with the business community, they ostensibly did not affect these countries and regions. Economic development, but the remaining problems are severe.”

In fact, political corruption will aggravate political instability, social strata will antagonize, and at the same time, many monopolistic consortia will be created, which in turn will intensify the democratization process. Later, political corruption and official-business cooperation. In other words, neither socialism led by China nor liberal democracy led by the United States cannot accept this trend.

Recognizing this, one can understand why in East and Southeast Asian countries, the game of interest groups under the democratic polities often presents a fierce state rarely seen in Europe and the United States. It can be said that fierce struggle is not a product of democracies but a period of transition. The sequelae are caused by corruption. Of course, in some underdeveloped countries such as Africa and Latin America, there have been widespread degenerative corruption models in these countries. Some people even call this mode of governance kleptocracy.

When the government is laissez-faire on corruption, this kind of predatory behavior will become routine. When this unreasonable plundering mechanism is established, maximizing the extraction of economic resources is considered a legal act. It is not difficult to understand

that these developing countries have suddenly fallen into the economy after years of rapid economic growth. And society collapsed.

Here is a question that needs to be considered. As a developing country, why did China not have the above situation when there was severe corruption. This examination identifies that one of the secrets of China's successful reform and opening-up is that it has been achieved before corruption becomes serious.

In other words, China's economic development speed is faster than the speed of corruption escalation. Of course, we must also affirm that in China's transition to a market economy, corruption in the process of economic reform and development has increased with continuous growth. This is also an undeniable fact. In particular, the state-owned assets and government-regulated industries and industrial sectors are open to the outside world. In areas such as macro-control and finance, the concentration of power has also exacerbated corruption.

This analysis suggests that if China can establish a property rights protection system, strengthen the government's power accountability mechanism, increase transparency in government work processes, and standardize work processes at the same time. The corruption problem aggravated by the Chinese government due to economic transformation will indeed become a staged issue.

On the contrary, if the above points are not done, the corruption problem of the Chinese government will gradually deteriorate with the acceleration of economic transformation, which will seriously slow down the development of China's economy. At the same time, regarding China's anti-corruption efforts since the reform and opening, this thesis believes that China's discipline inspection and supervision organs and judicial organs cannot be considered weaker than the punishment within the Chinese government.
Responsibilities must be dealt with more severely. Considerable results have been achieved, but the problem now lies in the fact that the corruption problem since 1990 has achieved specific results due to the high-pressure anti-corruption situation of the Chinese government. However, China's economic development is extremely rapid, so China's intensification of anti-corruption in China is predictable. Thus, high-pressure anti-corruption and economic growth will coexist for some time in the future. Only when corrupt officials in China are genuinely aware of the seriousness of punishment can the effect of punishment be indeed revealed.

Of course, for the U.S. government, the relationship between economic development and corruption cannot be underestimated. There is objectively a gap between the rich and the poor between the U.S. states, and for the state government's capital, it is also a place that is prone to corruption. When the state government has enormous power and sufficient campaign funds, and the corresponding accountability mechanism is not perfect, the rent-seeking space for government officials will naturally increase.

The United States, as a developed country and a representative country of liberal democracy, has a complete mechanism that enables the U.S. government to control a large amount of endogenous corruption under the supervision of the law. The system of separation of powers makes the U.S. government fight Corruption has a relative advantage. Similarly, the United States has a long history of being a country under the rule of law, and such a history is scarce in developing countries led by China. However, for the corruption that still exists, it is undeniable in the state government that it still deserves the attention of the U.S. government and society. For the United States, corruption also does not have any positive impact on the market economy. The idea that corruption will make the U.S. economy take off in a certain sense is absurd and unrealistic.
Chapter five Conclusion: How do these three elements influence corruption

Based on the above, this thesis finds that in Chapter 2, by measuring a country's anti-corruption education level, the country's ideological level can be accurately quantified to compare the level of anti-corruption education. Set up a complete standard, a quantifiable standard. By subdividing education into school education and family education, the above makes a targeted case study based on the actual situation in China and the United States. Studies have shown that the United States pays more attention to socialization skills in school education.

Many schools will offer socialization courses. At the same time, each state's education department will also force such studies, and more importantly, all courses in the education of students. China pays attention to the ideology of propaganda checks and balances and the idea of separation of powers in the U.S. government, which also makes American citizens always keep a vigilant view of the government.

In contrast, China's education system pays more attention to subject education. The primary purpose is to enhance students' specific academic performance in each subject, and corresponding socialized course are lacking. In addition, among the social courses that China has opened, these have strong Chinese characteristics, including moral cultivation and political common sense, especially political common sense. Chinese primary and middle school students are forced to love the Communist Party of China.

And the government, but these are far from anti-corruption education and can even be regarded as large-scale political propaganda. In terms of family education, the content of family education in the United States is relatively complete. The academic performance of children in school is only part of family education. Family education in the United States
covers almost all aspects of children's growth. Families and individuals in the social context are considered families. As part of education, parents will combine theory and practice to educate their children. Chinese family education has hardly any performance in anti-corruption education.

The main reason is that Chinese family education puts a lot of energy on academic education. Parents always buy a lot of educational books for their children. When children have good academic performance, parents will use material rewards to encourage them. Therefore, children will tend to think that material wealth is more important than spiritual value. Consequently, it is concluded that there are considerable differences in family education and school education between China and the United States, and the United States has a clear advantage in anti-corruption education.

In response to this situation, this thesis believes that curriculum should be diversified in school education for China and similar developing countries. In addition to focusing on academic education, social courses should also be necessary because students need to understand their role in society and their responsibilities. The local government should manage curriculum settings. The evaluation of social courses should be mandatory because it is too important.

Regarding family education, the government should carry out a lot of publicity in education other than academic education to promote the importance of virtue and social education. At the same time, the government should also fund family education consultation rooms to provide parents with more professional consultations and improve parents' education—the ability and performance of the child in the process.

Changing civic ideology is an extremely long process, requiring a lot of money and time investment, and there may be low-efficiency situations. Still, such investment is
worthwhile for the government because ideological changes can fundamentally reduce corruption incidence, which the other two factors cannot achieve. Schools and family education already have sufficiently complete curriculum arrangements and supporting facilities for the United States and similarly developed countries. The United States and other developed countries can focus on corporate training as the last in education for education. First, in addition to government departments and public service departments in the public sector, comprehensive corporate training is also required in the private sector.

Anti-corruption training is essential for young people who are about to start. Of course, the cost of training should be borne by government departments and enterprises. This is different from the skills activity of enterprises. It is not to improve the professional ability of employees, but it is essential and is a crucial step in preventing corruption. This thesis found in Chapter 3 that if the government wants to establish perfect disciplinary measures, it needs a perfect judicial system. If a judicial system wants to use judicial power to control corruption, it must first ensure its integrity.

At this point, judicial corruption is necessary. The problem to be solved is also the judicial system of China and the United States as the object of the case study. The thesis found that China's judicial system is not independent, and China's judicial system also has two highest-level judicial institutions. One is a traditional judicial institution, and the other focuses more on political management and review within the Communist Party. The United States, on the other hand, has a completely independent judiciary, which is not subject to the constraints of Congress and the President.

It can use the power of constitutional review and avoid the influence of politics and political parties to the greatest extent in hearing cases. The conclusion is that China's judicial system is relatively backward, and the overall integrity, continuity, and perfect accountability
system need to be strengthened. In contrast, the U.S. judicial system is generally more mature and stable, the rule of law is longer, and the experience is more abundant. In the U.S. government, the distribution of power is relatively more reasonable. In response to this conclusion, this thesis suggests that because the judicial institutions of different countries are quite different, solving the problem should also be based on the country's actual situation to develop a targeted solution.

For China, the only feasible plan is to strengthen the supervision of Chinese officials through the cooperation of the Central Disciplinary Commission and the Chinese provincial government to regulate the division of powers under the current system. There are corresponding disciplinary review committees to supervise. Some scholars believe that "judicial corruption in China is an institutionalized activity systemically inherent in the particular decision-making mechanism guided by the Chinese Communist Party's instrumental rule-by-law ideal." This thesis believes that this understanding is not accurate enough. Or rather one-sided. The Communist Party of China is the core of the Chinese government, and the shadow of the Communist Party of China can be seen in almost any level of government.

It should be noted that the judicial system must be completely separated from the Communist Party of China. In the actual operation process It is impossible and unrealistic. For a country like China, the traditional way of reforming a country under the rule of law cannot be used to carry out judicial reforms. Here we must accept the premise that China's politics and the rule of law cannot be separated, but at the same, time this does not mean that China's judicial corruption cannot be resolved. As mentioned above, the current Central

Disciplinary Commission's institutions are still being used in cooperation with provincial governments.

The focus is on regulating the division of powers and strengthening the supervision of officials at all levels. For developing countries with similar situations in China, they should find a set of reforms that suit their own country. The blind use of the current system of developing or other developed countries may cause problems. The core lies in the existing judicial system. Improve the overall process and enhance the accountability of officials. For the United States, as it already has a complete judicial institution and a mature supervision system, the U.S. judicial institution needs to increase transparency and make cases more public. Public pay comprehensive in order to improve judicial procedures, information systems, and fund management.

The biggest gain for Chapter 3 is to formulate targeted countermeasures based on conditions of the judicial systems of different countries. Differentiated and targeted management can make different countries practical. The situation has rapidly improved the integrity of the judicial system and strengthened the accountability of the judicial system. Scholars pointed out that "The ethical obligations of the judiciary extend far beyond the basic essentials of honesty, impartiality, and fairness." It is important, but transparency is a more important factor for the United States, which already has complete judicial procedures. If the system has been perfected, increasing transparency is the best strategy to reduce judicial corruption.

For developed countries like the United States, there should be corresponding bottlenecks. The judicial system has been perfect, and the supervision system has also become mature. For this situation, this thesis believes that developed countries should

---

achieve increased transparency against judicial corruption. However, the specific ways to increase transparency should still be decided by the actual conditions of different countries.

This thesis found in Chapter 4 the relationship between national economic power and national corruption. The stronger the economic power, the less the country's corruption. At the same time, corruption hurts economic development. As above, the research subjects are still the United States and China. For China, China's rapid economic growth has made Chinese citizens feel the improvement in the quality of life, so there is no great resistance to the corruption of Chinese citizens by officials.

At the same time, the Chinese government's attitude towards corruption has always been severely opposed. The Chinese government has relatively strong credibility among its people. For the United States, the relationship between economic development and corruption is very delicate. Still, economic development has allowed the government to breed more corruption, but corruption itself does not contribute to economic development. Based on these findings, it is concluded that there is no concept of benign corruption for both developed and developing countries.

Corruption is a by-product produced in economic growth, and this by-product is of no benefit to the national economy. In response to this conclusion, this thesis suggests that the country should adjust the severity of corruption according to its economic conditions and corruption. For China, China's rapid economic growth has grown from a relatively backward developing country to the second-largest economy in the world. With its weak economic foundation and huge population base, China has achieved rapid economic growth in a brief period. Growth means that a miracle has been created.

What is rapidly growing along with the Chinese economy is the rate of corruption within the Chinese government. Some scholars pointed out that "This thesis sheds light on this issue
by examining the role of trust in the corruption—efficiency relationship. It argues that in countries with a relatively low level of trust, corruption tends to be more predatory and inefficient than corruption in countries with a relatively high level of trust, which tends to be less predatory. "91 This means that China's corruption does not affect China's economic growth. In a sense, corruption may also stimulate economic growth.

This thesis believes that this understanding is one-sided, although Chinese citizens have a considerable degree of government. However, this thesis believes that trust is only one of the smaller factors. Compared with the huge harm of corruption, trust is not enough to fight corruption. However, as a developing country like China, the relationship between economic development and corruption is even greater. In many countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia, the game of interest groups in democracies often presents fierce and vicious competition that is rarely seen in Europe and the United States. Corruption often seriously interferes with the country's economic development and becomes a stumbling block to the economic development of democracies.

Also, as a developing country, China's economy has not been affected by corruption mainly because China's economic development has exceeded the rate of corruption of Chinese officials. Overall, the harm caused by corruption in China is not obvious. To discuss economic development and corruption. The relationship between corruption must be clear. Corruption will hinder economic development in the long run and will never become a necessary factor for economic development. For the United States, the impact of corruption on the economy is much lower because the United States' economic development has been long enough relatively. The ability to control corruption is also much stronger. Of course, because the gap between states in the United States is also huge, the serious corruption of the

91 Li, Shaomin, and Jun (Judy) Wu. “Why Some Countries Thrive despite Corruption: The Role of Trust in the Corruption—Efficiency Relationship.”
state government and the huge rent-seeking space for power is what the U.S. government must pay attention to, and the government should reduce its power.

From the perspective of the group renting space. For countries like the United States, the problems should be similar. Economic development has entered a relatively slow stage. At the same time, the probability of corruption is also due to the country's perfect mechanism and the rich experience of the government in governing the country. But similarly, developed countries like the United States should put the governance of corruption in an important position because corruption may become serious at any time.

Fighting corruption is a complicated task, and the national government should be fully prepared. The energy and time to fight it. At the same time, fighting corruption is a critical task because corruption may subvert the government and plunge the country into chaos. In this process, the three factors mentioned above, The Role of Ideology, an Independent Judiciary, and Economic Stability in Fighting Corruption: Can make the country reduce the probability of corruption, but this is not absolute. The specific method needs to change the strategy according to the country's specific conditions.

This thesis believes that successful anti-corruption does not necessarily require democracy, but democracy is conducive to anti-corruption. China is an authoritarian country. Throughout the anti-corruption process, democracy has hardly seen the role played by it. However, China still relies on powerful state institutions to control the probability of corruption. China depends on party affiliation and strict centralized rule. But at the same time, democracy is conducive to anti-corruption. The US government, based on democracy, has created a unique system of separation of powers. Relying on a system of checks and balances and mutual supervision, the United States has fundamentally reduced the possibility
of corruption. Democracy is not a necessary factor for anti-corruption, but it is indeed a favorable factor.

At the same time, this thesis believes that external agencies play a minimal role in a country’s anti-corruption efforts. For a centralized country like China, the most that external agencies can do is score and evaluate. External agencies can hardly play any role in anti-corruption. For liberal democracies like the United States, the part of external agencies is also very limited. They are more of a policy reference and evaluation, and specific anti-corruption work still depends on the government.
Bibliography


Curriculum Vita

Junjie was born on Dec. 10, 1997 in Shanghai, China and grew up with his parents, the biggest city in China. He attended Syracuse University, where he received his bachelor’s degree in international relations and economics in 2020. He lives in Arlington Virginia.