BETWEEN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE US: WHY DOES AUTHORITARIANISM PREVAIL IN KAZAKHSTAN?

by
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Abstract

The significance of the external influence of Russia and China on the strengthening of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan has yet to be revealed due to the lack of a theory of the interaction of external influence and domestic political regimes. In my research, I sought to show that the authoritarian regimes of the Eurasian states have a common political legacy that unites the states that have joined them into a single political world. Their main actors are the supporting states interested in preserving kindred regimes throughout the common political space. Using tracing process analysis, I have mapped out causal relationships through the survival mechanism of kinship regimes and restoration of interdependence between pivotal and non-pivotal actors that determine how key states, such as Russia and China, react to external factors—geopolitical threats.

The most important conclusion of my research is that the weakening of an authoritarian regime in one of the non-pivotal states poses a threat to regimes in core states such as China and Russia and triggers their survival reaction through increased foreign policy towards non-core states. In addition, my research has shown that political regimes that share a common legacy are interdependent and that the external influence of the central states of a common political space is primary in maintaining internal regimes throughout its entire length. Therefore, pivotal states of other political legacies can influence political regime change when the causal mechanism fails.

Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Vali Nasr

Secondary Reader: Dr. Francis Fukuyama

Secondary Reader: Dr. Peter Lewis
Preface

Thirty years have passed since Kazakhstan gained independence. Although the multiply increased GDP, the people live even worse than at the beginning of independence, having meager incomes. The level of freedom has practically returned to the Soviet level with local features. The sole power is just as authoritarian and indisputable as the power of the CPSU. The influence of Russia and China reduces a sovereign country to the level of a union republic within an authoritarian empire. The ensuing total disappointment from independence led to ideological devastation among the people. The replacement of one Dictator by his weak likeness three years ago and the authoritarian power of the old Dictator still felt among the people led to disappointment with the new president and the "New Kazakhstan" he proclaimed. Even though the old Dictator is officially gone, the whole country still feels his total power. This feeling led to mass protests in 2019 and the bloody events of January 2022. Not only do three generations feel deceived, but the fourth generation is just entering adulthood.

January 2022 in Kazakhstan, coupled with Russia's military invasion of Ukraine in February of the same year, threw off all the pseudo-democratic masks of authoritarian regimes in the countries of the Eurasian space. Emptiness reigns in the minds and souls of ordinary people. Some see the coming of Russia as their future, associating it with a return to the USSR, which gives a false dream of greater social justice. Others see the future in strengthening the national-religious component in the state, opposing this idea to the previous two. Few people believe in the advent of democratic values, seeing the continued support of the "strongholds of democracy" to the authoritarian regime of Kazakhstan and other Eurasian countries. One thing is clear; ordinary people have little faith in the idea of a "New Kazakhstan," proclaimed by the new president, who is associated as a dependent person. The people have little understanding of the way out of the
situation when Russia and China appear to be the true masters of the country, and any changes toward democracy can be quickly suppressed by their armies.

However, a clear realization of the country's greater dependence on external authoritarian regimes may help formulate a more practical attitude of all stakeholders in democracy in Kazakhstan.
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I cannot express enough gratitude to my mother, Kulnara Kassenova, who always believed that someday I would still pursue my dream and finally get a doctorate in an American university. Thank you, Mom, for your patience and faith!
Dedication

To my father, Satybaldy Sazanov, a doctor, academician, well-known statesman, musician, poet, and one of the founders of the banking system of Kazakhstan. An orphan who made himself.

The embodiment of honesty and incorruptibility there, where it was almost impossible.
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Part I—Conceptual Framework
Chapter I: Introduction

On January 5, 2022, about five thousand (25 thousand unofficial) Russian troops under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) promptly landed in major cities of Kazakhstan. The Russian intervention aimed to ensure the Kazakh army's loyalty to its president in suppressing mass anti-government demonstrations that demanded a change in the authoritarian political regime. The military of Kazakhstan, having almost laid down its arms until then, began a brutal crackdown on protesters after a clear manifestation of the determination of Russia and its allies to prevent revolution in Kazakhstan.

While skyrocketing energy prices provoked demonstrations across the country, their natural causes were rising poverty, inequality, and soaring unemployment. The demonstrators took over government buildings, and the army shifted to the protesters' side. The regime was ready to collapse when the CSTO troops entered Kazakhstan and orchestrated a violent suppression of the riots. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's military intervention, China offered to help quell what China calls a “color revolution” (Xi Jinping 2022)¹ in Kazakhstan. The January 2022 Revolution events marked the complete failure of possible democratization in Kazakhstan. They showed both Russia and China's unique influence and particular interest in the country.

From 1991 to 2000, Kazakhstan was at the forefront of democratic reforms among most countries of the former USSR. At the same time, the influence of the West on Kazakhstan was much stronger than the influence of the then still weak Russia and China. However, since mid-nineties, internal democratic reforms have been wholly curtailed by introducing an utterly supra-authoritarian notion of the lifetime Leader of the Nation to the Constitution of Kazakhstan

Weak democratic institutions and traditions have been destroyed, and institutions of the traditional communist legacy with its authoritarian ideology have been revived.

The change in the internal dynamics of democratization in Kazakhstan coincided with restoring the geopolitical power of neighboring Russia and China. Their influence grew as the authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, and Kazakhstan strengthened. According to Francis Fukuyama, Russia and China “were the vanguard of a broader authoritarian wave that turned back democratic gains across the globe” (2022). Since the 2000s, significant manifestations of the suppression of democratization through external influence from Russia have become more frequent in the post-Soviet space. Its military threats/actions have been directed against countries that chose the democratic development path. In the same period, Chinese pressure on democratization has taken economic support for authoritarian regimes, including Kazakhstan.

Nevertheless, the events of recent years forced a showdown of the departure from democratic reforms causing a high degree of discontent among the people. In 2011, Kazakhstan began to be shaken by regular mass protests, culminating in the events of January 2022, demanding a complete change of the authoritarian regime, which the government suppressed with increasing brutality. Almost 250 people were reported dead after being mercilessly shot by the internal troops.

Despite the growing dissatisfaction within the country due to the deteriorating domestic political situation and the economic situation, the "new Kazakhstan" with the “new president” did not happen. Neither state-administrative nor domestic political life has undergone any notable changes.

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changes. Having suppressed domestic political protests with the help of Russia, the state-repressive apparatus threw more than a thousand demonstrators into the dungeons. Earlier, the authorities resorted to using the army to quell the riots. As a result of subsequent clashes, according to official figures, 225 people were killed (2022).4

Moreover, immediately after the cruel suppression of democratic protests, an extraordinary congress of the ruling “Nur-Otan” party unanimously elected a new president as its new Chairman instead of the former (Ibid.)5.

Literally, within a month after the start of the protests in Kazakhstan, the new President was able to concentrate all power in his hands. He restored the entire authoritarian vertical of power created earlier which the outgoing President Nazarbayev tried to split before his departure (Ibid.)6.

Firstly, the new President took the post of Chairman of the Security Council, which includes all the power ministers of the country. Secondly, he led the ruling party. It is these positions that the former President left behind as a counterbalance to his protege. Occupying the post of head of the Security Council required changes to the constitution. Both statuses (the head of the security council and the Nation’s Leader) were assigned to the former President by constitutional laws (RK Const. 2000, N 83-II)7.

Both were lifetime ones. Almost the entire bureaucracy and oligarchs quickly integrated into the vertical system of subordination to the new president. The rapid restoration of the vertical power system with a new president has demonstrated that power in authoritarian regimes like Kazakhstan is not personified. All the changes were accompanied by constitutional provisions and

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4 RBC.RU. 2022. “Protests in Kazakhstan. How Kazakhstan has changed a month after the protests.” RBC.RU., 02 Feb 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/02/2022/61f7e0a99a794706603d03f7
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z000000083_#z0.
immediate approval by the parliament in January 2022. In turn, constitutional changes in the conditions of dual power became possible only thanks to a third external force. The forceful intervention of Russia and the CSTO ended the almost three-year period of dual power in Kazakhstan, catalyzing the people's discontent and bringing the country to the brink of democratic reforms.

Now it is difficult to say how the events in the internal political life of the country could have developed and whether they could have overthrown the authoritarian regime. One thing is clear: the people took to the squares and took active steps to overthrow the government, demanding the resignation of both the incumbent President and the "Leader of the Nation." The demonstrators demanded democratic change, limits on the power of the President, and fair elections at all levels. Quarrel between the clans played, in this case, only into the hands of the democratic mood of the people, which they wanted to use. Nevertheless, the external interference of Russia and China in the internal political processes of Kazakhstan led to the fact that the existing regime survived and brutally suppressed democratic demonstrations.

The following questions arise from the January 2022 Revolution events: why did the President of Kazakhstan appeal to Russia in terms of military intervention, and why did he seek foreign policy support to suppress the uprising, first, from China? Besides, what were the motives for Russia and China to support the current regime and not the democratic demands of the people?

Therefore, to understand why the course toward democracy failed in Kazakhstan, I will try to answer to the main research questions: what role have external forces—particularly Russia and China—played in the persistence of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan and why they were interested in that? Also, was there a window of opportunity for changes, and are there conditions for their occurrence in the future? For that, it is necessary to understand the nature of motivation both Russia
and China had in preventing changes to the authoritarian political regime in Kazakhstan and analyze how decisive was their influence in this support.

To answer these questions, I proceed from the proposal that the importance of external factors in the dynamics of changes in the political regime in Kazakhstan is the most significant. While the traditional approach focuses on internal factors, I will not focus on internal factors as existing without the causal influence of external factors. The research will discuss the external factors influencing the dynamics of internal implications. To identify the mechanism of external influence, I will focus on the influence of the great powers, Russia, China, and the United States, as the primary agents of influence. Kazakhstan's most vital external pressure originated from these three countries' two competing political systems.

Concluding the recent case of the democratic resentment failure, my main argument is that the chief reason for the failure to change the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan is the external pressure from Russia and China, which share similar political traditions, institutions, and types of regimes with Kazakhstan. Likewise, the main reason for the abandonment of democratic reforms in Kazakhstan after mid-nineties is the same. Neighbors' interest in preserving the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan stems from the vital necessity to maintain a single political legacy (SPL) throughout their common political space (CPS). Turn towards democracy and disruption of the authoritarian path are viewed as a significant threat to their authoritarian regimes.

As part of my leading theory, I present three building blocks to my main argument. Based on the previous, my first building block concludes that intervention of Russia/China is dictated by the uniqueness of the current regimes (SPL) and by the affinity of the common political statehoods throughout the CPS. External influence is decisive in preserving and altering internal political traditions/ regimes. Hence, the second building block asserts that maintaining and dominating the
SPL throughout the CPS is necessary to survive regimes in pivotal states. The CPS, as a field of causal pathways, acts not through the primary type of actor, the nation-state (Goldstein 1999, 10-19; Russet et al. 2000, 10-19), but mainly through the so-called pivotal the CPS nation-states such as Russia and China. Hence, my third building block is that change of a regime type in a non-pivotal country is possible when their pivotal countries’ kindred regimes face internal problems. Otherwise, the pivotal states, as the main actors, exert strong influence to sustain the kindred regimes in the non-pivotal states throughout their CPS.

Hence, to answer the main research questions and based on the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan, I put forward the central hypothesis of this thesis: the dominating external influence of both Russia and China on Kazakhstan is governed by their kindred regimes’ uniqueness and their regimes’ interconnectedness (fear that a failure in one of them will lead to the failure of all kindred regimes throughout the common region).

This hypothesis determines the concepts, which must be defined in the following sections of this research. These concepts: kindred regimes’ uniqueness (SPL), common region’s interconnectedness (CPS), and stemming from these two concepts their states/ regimes’ interaction.

To define above concepts, I implemented a literature review in the following section. Its analysis aims at gathering information on what other scholars have so far chosen as their similar conceptualizations and operationalizations. With the help of the literature review, I hope to either confirm or rule out potential variables in the causal relationships I am going to examine. The literature review’s another purpose is to find evidence for my central hypothesis to support its validity as well as stemming from the hypothesis conclusions.

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In addition, at the end of the theoretical analysis of the measured variables of the three factors, I will interpret the causal foundations of the January 2022 Revolution in an applied context. To do this, analyzing one of the factors at the end of each chapter, I will present their practical justification for the concept I propose. Thus, the “January 2022 Uprising” will be the main plot of my research, permeating the entire Thesis.
Chapter II: Literature Review

Before embarking on a literature review that confirms or refutes my observations, it is necessary to voice the main points of my central hypothesis. They will serve as the basis for a full-fledged theory explaining the latest geopolitical events on the territory of Kazakhstan and its neighboring countries in the region.

So, the main components of the central hypothesis of this Thesis are:
1) the supra-authoritarian nature of the three states' political systems; 2) their regimes and states’ interconnectedness with each other; and 3) the way these states interact because of the two previous features. Therefore, my literature review will be based on the existing academic literature regarding these three components of my central hypothesis.

1. Supra-Authoritarianism.

The most relevant academic literature on authoritarian regimes is clustered around personalistic versus structural primacies and the regime's formal versus informal nature.

Researchers generally acknowledge that both political traditions and political legacy have a significant influence on the typology of existing regimes. For example, the Latin American version of the presidential government, which is regarded as an example of a democratic-constitutional format, is based on long-term traditions of democratic political culture in its region (Arato A. 2000, No.3)\(^9\).

In general, the traditions and legacy of Soviet authoritarianism are considered the main reasons for the strengthening of supra-authoritarianism not only in Kazakhstan but also in most countries of the former USSR (Evseev 2013, 101)\(^10\). Existing research points out the


institutionalized political legacy of the Eurasian authoritarian regimes. Therefore, to understand how the types of authoritarian regimes in the countries under study are related to the principles of external influence between them, it is necessary to understand the essential components of these regimes.

A. Personalistic Formal Primacy

As noted by some researchers, "super-authoritarianism" has not yet been thoroughly studied and operationalized today (Holmes S. 1994, 123-126)\(^1\). One of the first to touch upon the issues of authoritarianism as a separate theoretical discipline was Juan J. Linz (1975)\(^2\). The criteria of authoritarianism he proposed allowed him to doubt the democratic nature of the presidential government system. Assertion of authority regardless of public consent, the reliance of a single leader on informal groups of supporters, and the lack of reliance on formal institutions – all characterize true non-constitutional presidentialism. Unlike parliamentary regimes, it does not depend on electoral majorities for survival (Juan J. Linz 1990, 51-69)\(^3\). In effect, Linz forwarded an idea of the personalistic character of the presidential system, having blamed a likelihood of a personal desire to evolve a presidential regime into an authoritarian one.

Francis Fukuyama noted the deeply personalistic nature of the authoritarian regimes of the states of the post-communist space and their consequent weakness. According to Fukuyama, the

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high concentration of personalist rule causes a crisis of internal legitimacy within the ruling elites themselves. The absence of ideological dominance in the regime itself can cause both an internal political crisis and the regime's collapse: “When we speak of a crisis of legitimacy in an authoritarian system, then, we speak of a crisis within those elites whose cohesion is essential for the regime to act effectively” (Fukuyama 1992, 16)\textsuperscript{14}.

Stephen D. Wrage (D. Wrage 1998, 380–382)\textsuperscript{15} states that Juan Linz finds confirmation in post-Soviet politics:” The collapse of the USSR and the entire communist bloc made it possible to single out a new type of political heredity: a communist legacy." He argues that the post-Soviet type of presidential system demonstrates tendencies towards strengthening personalist regimes.

Petr Shtykov singles out the "authoritarian presidency of the Eurasian type" as the fundamental constitutional and legal idea of political systems (2018, 120)\textsuperscript{16}. That allows the development of the main features of a particular model of presidential government, characteristic of the countries of the former Soviet camp. Russia and Kazakhstan stand out among the most typical representatives. He includes the Central Asian countries in a broader, Eurasian type of "non-democratic presidential rule" based on the legal framework (Ibid., 109)\textsuperscript{17}. His typology of authoritarian regimes singles out the Eurasian type from other authoritarian regimes, based on an analysis of the constitutional provisions that are characteristic exclusively for the fundamental laws of these countries.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 109.
Partlett W. (2015, 85–86)\(^{18}\) also singles out "Eurasian" type presidencies as a core characteristic of the constitutional legal idea as opposed to the Western system of presidential government with a strict separation of all branches of power.

The distinctive features of political systems in the Eurasian region are also observed by Fortin J. (2013, 91-112)\(^ {19}\), where super-presidential constitutions were adopted together with authoritarian regimes. The post-communist countries' constitutions have a high correlation between the degree of authoritarianism and their constitutional foundations. It reflects an intense concentration of power in the hands of their presidents (ed. by Ph. Harfst, I. Kubbe, T. Poguntke 2017, 205–226)\(^ {20}\).

However, the existing analysis needs to reveal the mechanism of constitutionalization of the regional (Eurasian) traditions of personal power, which are initially regarded as informal. For example, G. Golosov argued that the institutional legacy of authoritarian regimes initially adopted formal democratic procedures was corrupted by the informal authoritarian legacy (1998, 128)\(^ {21}\).

Thus, identifying the adaptation mechanism of informal authoritarian traditions into the constitutional field of these countries remains the primary task to understand the nature of the Eurasian regimes. Despite the widespread presence of solid informal foundations of personal power, their constitutional consolidation is decisive in Eurasian supra-authoritarianism. In this regard,


constitutionally enshrined personal power is placed at the very top of the supra-authoritarian pyramid of power in society, especially in some countries of the former USSR.

Thus, the most exciting work for my research is that Henry E. Hale attempted to institutionalize authoritarianism through constitutional analysis (2015)\textsuperscript{22}. For example, Hale begins by classifying constitutional regimes into three types: presidential, divided executive, and parliamentarian (Hale H. 2015, 76–82)\textsuperscript{23}. He refers to most of the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes as belonging to the presidential format, which differs from democratic presidentialism by having a right of veto over the legislative and executive branches of government (Shugart, Carey 1992, 126)\textsuperscript{24}. Other research goes further, highlighting three features of this concept:

1. super-strong executive power that controls the legislative and other branches of government (Robinson N. 2003, 149–166)\textsuperscript{25}.

2. a strong president at the top of a rigid vertical and controlling all state resources system (Matsuzato K. 2006, 317–345)\textsuperscript{26}.

3. informal-personalist politics, where client relations prevail over official / legally approved (Beliaev M. 2006, 375–398)\textsuperscript{27}.


\textsuperscript{23} (Ibid, 76-82).


In addition, some researchers consider super-presidency an alternative semi-presidential category (Fish M. 2005, 205)\(^{28}\). In contrast, others single out super-presidency as an additional, fourth subtype in the classical typology model. At the same time, they cite specific presidential autocracies that fall under this category: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (Beliaev M. Op. cit.)\(^{29}\).

However, the history of personal authoritarian regimes in Eurasian countries often features authoritarianism that is not based on the highest government posts of the main three branches of government. Often, full power in the countries of the Eurasian region was held in the hands of charismatic leaders who ruled their countries, not having the highest state-executive posts. It applied to military and transitional leaders who became de facto dictators in their countries.

A precise specification of authoritarianism from the point of view of its constituent interchangeable components still needs to be present in the academic literature. The autocrats' survival happens due to the institutional diversity of authoritarian regimes, including juntas, politburos, and family councils (Gandhi 2008, Ch. 1)\(^{30}\).

The institution of the principate is closest to non-presidential authoritarianism in the Eurasian states. References to traditional values, national traditions, and spiritual heritage are standard in cases of strengthening the institution of the principate. Against this background, the ideology of a special, unlike anything, World within national-state boundaries is being encouraged. This ideology of a "special path" served as the basis for a specific type of government, which became the principate.


A. Tokarev interprets such key concepts to characterize the principate as "the power of the tribune, the Roman world, the idea of the Roman triumph, and the genius of the emperor." (2011, 13)\textsuperscript{31}. In the interpretation of the authoritarian regimes of the Eurasian region, the same sacralized concepts are typical: Leader of the Nation (Kazakhstan); Ridge of the Nation (Turkmenistan); Great Leader (Bolshevik Russia); Father of the Nation (USSR); Great Pilot (PRC); Russian World (Russia); Middle State (China), Sacred Mission (Russia), Etc. Also, the power of the Princeps was a mixture of republican and imperial traditions, a system of political dualism, or "diarchy" of the power of the senate and the emperor according to Th. Mommsen (1887)\textsuperscript{32}. The difference between the Eurasian principate and modern types of authoritarian leaderism lies in the interweaving and introduction of informal power into the formal political power structures in the country.

The presented literature accurately reflects the characteristics of most authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space but needs to reflect their factual specificity and uniqueness. It also confirms that the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes belong to super-presidential regimes, which the formally legalized institute of principate complements. However, there is a need to explain the origins and reasons for the external interference of Russia and China in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states in the context of authoritarianism. Also, the relationship between constitutional and informal institutions of power in the authoritarian power vertical in these countries has yet to be fully understood.

For example, Hale's relationship between informal and constitutional institutions is controversial. Hale puts constitutional formalized power above informal power while rightly


\textsuperscript{32}Mommsen Theodor. 1887-1888. Roman constitutional law. Publisher: S. Herzel, Leipzig. [Mommsen Theodor. Römisches Staatsrecht.].
arguing that all institutions of power rarely enforce constitutional provisions. Hence, the presented studies ultimately need to conceptualize informal institutions.

To solve this problem, I will test the causal relationship between formal (constitutional) and informal institutions, having conceptualized the notion of the latter. The correct conceptualization of the notion of informal institutions can help to understand the unique supra-authoritarianism of the studied regimes and the origins of external interference between them.

**B. Structural Informal Primacy**

Nevertheless, the existing literature on the institutions of constitutional authoritarianism needs to consider its repeating continuity in the countries under discussion, with numerous cases of cancellation or significant modification of constitutional super-presidential provisions when changing the sole ruler. Super-presidential constitutionalism plays a considerable role in the strengthening of authoritarian rule. It does not create a causal effect for authoritarianism, but it is its consequence. The causal effect, the fundamental factor of the Eurasian phenomenon of authoritarianism, is the institution of unconstitutional power, which is based on strong political traditions and institutions of power traditional for this region. At the same time, the informal primacy variables of super-authoritarianism need thorough conceptualizing and operationalizing.

Under authoritarian regimes, the executive branch manages to subjugate all other branches of government, despite the constitutions being formally democratic (Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Melton J. P. 141–164)\(^{33}\). The researchers of the Comparative Constitutions Project ([https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org](https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org)) believe that the reason for this is the presence of informal and unconstitutional foundations on which authoritarian power relies (Ibid., 160-161)\(^{34}\).

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\(^{34}\)Ibid., 161.
One of the exciting concepts of the causal factors of this authoritarian phenomenon is the authoritarian legacy of informal relations. Merkel V. and Croissant A. (2002, 6-17)\(^{35}\) consider informality stemming from the political and economic problems of the post-authoritarian phase accumulated from the previous authoritarian periods. According to the authors, these persistent problems are the reasons for the emergence of informal political practices and authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space. Both reasons are legacies of the past and can be generalized into a single factor of political legacies.

Vali Nasr, in his extensive analysis of the nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East, argues that the persistence of authoritarian regimes is based on several factors. He names such interdependent and interconnected factors for the survival of authoritarianism as internal political consolidation, foreign political pressure designed to provoke internal cohesion, and the presence of ideological dominant and imitative democratic institutions (Nasr 2000, 173)\(^{36}\).

At the same time, Vali Nasr makes a close link between authoritarianism's persistence and the legitimacy crisis that ruling regimes face. In this context, he identifies the mobilization of sectarian identities and manipulation as crucial mechanisms for the survival of an authoritarian regime. The agent of connecting this mechanism is not the state but the authoritarian regime (Ibid., 174)\(^{37}\).

In addition, Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari argue that the very idea of democracy in authoritarian states (Iran) is not foreign. Democracy can result from the formation of state political


\(^{37}\)Ibid., 174.
processes from a historical perspective. Therefore, such a political legacy can become the pillar for
democratic processes based on internal institutions and ideas (Vali & Gheissari 2006, Ch.1)\textsuperscript{38}.

In discussing the importance of matching institutions and political legacies, it is interesting
to see Peter Lewis' observations on the reasons for the rise of authoritarianism in sub-Saharan
Africa. For example, Lewis’ studies of electoral processes in some countries of the region showed
that the presence of democratic institutions does not guarantee a democratic change of power due to
the imitation nature of these institutions (Lewis 2019, 76-85)\textsuperscript{39}. Such observations testify to the
widespread prevalence of imitative democratic institutions worldwide and their likely dependence
on the political legacy of authoritarianism in these countries (Lewis, 2003, 131-44)\textsuperscript{40}.

Scholars such as Ken Jowitt (1992)\textsuperscript{41} have held the legacy of Communist Party rule
responsible for the perpetuation of authoritarianism in the political culture of post-Soviet countries.
At the same time, G. Derlugyan (2000, 21)\textsuperscript{42} considers legacy in the form of de-formalized (after
the collapse of the USSR) Soviet party nomenklatura. Dispersed along territorial (Soviet Union and
autonomous republics) and departmental lines, the surviving Soviet nomenklatura of both types was
informally institutionalized within decentralized borders. Thus, the informal institutions of power
continued to influence domestic political processes in the post-Soviet period, successfully
competing with the new formal institutions.

Ch. 1. ISBN: 9780195189674.

76-85.


\textsuperscript{42} Derlugyan, G. M. 2000. "The collapse of the Soviet system and its potential consequences: bankruptcy, segmentation,
Medushevsky (2012, 46) highlights the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia, in which informal agreements and informal groups are the primary agents of influence of authoritarian rule. He singles out the informal decision-making mechanism as the main one, which begins to prevail because of the erosion of democratic decision-making mechanisms by constitutional institutions. He explains this erosion as a choice between the order of authoritarianism and the political instability of democracy. However, he needs to explain the causal mechanism of this choice, replacing it with an electoral formalization resulting in an imperial type of presidential power. In his study, the definition of informal relationships needs to be fully theorized and conceptualized as a category of authoritarian primacy.

Moreover, Andrey Medushevsky (Ibid., 46) argues that the reasons for the authoritarianism of the Central Asian republics are the return to their historical political traditions. The latter includes regional features such as tribal, clan, and religious characteristics.

A more detailed analysis of post-Soviet informal institutions was made by V. Merkel and A. Croissant, who called the main characteristic of post-Soviet regimes the "damage effect." With this effect, liberal constitutional norms are violated by informal institutions and illegal political practices (Ibid., 20).

For example, other researchers of non-formal institutions and political traditions conceptualized clanization in the post-Soviet space (Graham T. 1995, 4).

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44 Ibid., 46.


Others insist that the roots of informal clan structures lie not in the political and institutional foundations of the authoritarian political system of the USSR but in the structural properties of Soviet society (Wedel J. 1998, 104)\textsuperscript{47}.

Wedel points to the shadow type of development of Soviet society as a peculiar relationship between informal and formal institutions back in Soviet society. She argues that the peculiarities of the political regime created the Soviet type of legacy, where informal relations are deeply structured in society, providing clan (clientelist) multi-level relations between the state and society. Therefore, if the state model does not try to build a civil society based on existing political traditions, the duality of regimes will continue to persist. Even democratic opposition forces, in her opinion, were also rooted in the clan structure of informal traditions (Ibid.)\textsuperscript{48}.

Therefore, I am going to single out another side of the factor of Eurasian supra-authoritarianism as its informal structural component. This informal type is divided into two observable variables: ideological (parties) and other formalized institutions of informal power.

An analysis of the literature on informal institutions shows that they can be causative factors of authoritarianism. This research also indicates the logic of further conceptualizing the notion of political legacy to identify the causal mechanisms of transformation more accurately in authoritarian regimes.

Thus, the studied literature points to two main components of Eurasian authoritarian rule: formal personalistic and informal structural. In addition, formal personalism is represented not only by the institute of super-presidency but also by the principate. The personalistic component is


\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., p. 104.
formal since the primacy of the individual in the power structure of the political systems of these countries is legally fixed.

At the same time, the informal structural component of authoritarianism is represented by the ideological institution (party) and other traditional power institutions embodied in different formal institutions. The lack of legislative primacy over all branches of power in the structure of these countries' political systems explains this component's informality. Thus, the structural component has an informal primacy in the power structure of Eurasian supra-authoritarianism.

2. Interconnectedness Factor

Before proceeding to the analysis of the variables of the external influence factor, it is necessary to deal with the outgoing factor, which is formed by independent variables. It primarily influences the formation of the foreign policy of states, coupled with the processes taking place in the internal political structure. In my study, this external factor is the international system and the states' relative strength and capability. This international system is a Common Political Space (CPS), uniting Eurasian countries of an authoritarian type. The CPS states interconnectedness factor and its independent variables are one of the study subjects in this dissertation.

The concept of kinship with the political systems of Russia, Kazakhstan, and other post-Soviet countries is widely represented in academic and popular literature. In general, the similarity of their political systems to the Chinese is discussed mainly in the context of the post-communist legacy and communist political traditions.

The opinion about the homogeneity of the political regimes of the countries of the former communist camp, including the three countries listed above, has long dominated the existing scientific literature. All three states are classified as super-authoritarian countries of the Eurasian
type. However, studies of the degree of influence of these countries on each other's internal political processes and their causes still need to be understood.

In my analysis of the political systems of the three countries, I share the duality of the existence of the nation-states themselves and the regimes ruling in them. Unlike liberal democracies, the ruling regime in the countries under study does not reflect the essence of the state they govern. If all three states reflect a republican political system with a democratic distribution of the branches of power, then their ruling regimes are autocracies of a monarchical type. Therefore, international relations between them are dual and contradictory.

Regarding the influence of initial factors on foreign policy, the international system and its structure represent independent variables, and the factor of the internal political structure represents intermediate variables. The influence of the international system determines both foreign policy and domestic factors. The foreign policy of states depends on their position in the international system and the relative strength and capability of states in that system (Rose 1998, 144-72).

For all their institutional diversity, these regimes are strongly interconnected in two forms: they are essentially mutually dependent and co-dependent. Moreover, mutual horizontal dependence concerns authoritarian regimes, and vertical co-dependence concerns authoritarian states. Therefore, the factor of interconnectedness between them is subdivided into two characteristic features: the horizontal interdependence of regimes and the vertical co-dependence of states.

Since the regimes are strongly homogeneous in all countries, they are supra-sovereign, and the variable that measures it is called the Supra-Sovereignty Variable. Their inter-dependence is horizontal in nature. In addition, these Eurasian states are heterogeneous in size and national priorities. Therefore, their interstate relations reflect hierarchical vertical subordination or

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dominance. The variable that measures this co-dependency in interstate relations is the Limited Sovereignty variable.

A. Supra-Sovereignty Variable

Antonov and Galushko put forward the concept of a "common space" of neo-authoritarianism that goes beyond most post-Soviet states' cultural and social differences and political borders (2018, 20–29)\(^{50}\). According to the authors, this common political space manifests a synchronous reproduction of the regional authoritarian heritage and its authoritarian practices of restrictive legislation. These researchers believe that the modern political regimes of the region have revived the common traditions of the authoritarian legacy of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Gelman (2015)\(^{51}\) classifies post-Soviet political regimes into a single category distinct from other authoritarian regimes.

Other researchers note the surprising similarity of features of authoritarianism in some post-Soviet countries due to historical and cultural factors. David Lewis questioned whether the external regional environment and the internal one plays a role in shaping regional authoritarianism (2016)\(^{52}\). Alex Cooley considers many international, regional blocs, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to be reminiscent of a "league of authoritarian gentlemen" and seeking to oppose liberal values (2013)\(^{53}\) collectively.

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Marlene Laruelle emphasizes the influence of the so-called Eurasian political doctrine on the resurgence of authoritarianism. It is based on the assertion of the cultural, civilizational, and geographical unity of the peoples of the former USSR. Marlene Laruelle believes that the cultural constant is the basis of both the post-Soviet countries' imperial (supranational) self-consciousness and political clashes for creating a shared cultural space (2008) 54.

In general, these views largely coincide and characterize the presence of a particular Eurasian type of authoritarian political system based on a shared history of political traditions and a single regional affiliation. For example, Sartori G. (1991, pp. 243–257) 55 highlights the intra-regional variability of the post-Soviet space and defines an inherently undemocratic and regional type of presidential government in the form of 12 former Soviet republics.

Mark Morge Howard has argued that the Soviet regime is the most complex and disruptive of political traditions and civil society of all other authoritarian regimes, arguing that the Soviet political legacy "creates problems for political representation" at present (2000: No. 325) 56.

M. Brenes and V. Jackson suggest a common typology with the countries of Eurasia and China, arguing that "Russia's catastrophic invasion of Ukraine only strengthened this conventional wisdom. Although its origins have nothing to do with China, the war prompted Washington to see these two great powers as homogeneous" (2022) 57.

Alexander Cooley (2015, 49–63) has argued that pressure from the West to promote democracy in former authoritarian countries has elicited a proportional response from those authoritarian regimes. Moreover, they used the same tool as the West, globalization, to counteract the spread of democracy, primarily through pseudo-democratic institutions worldwide. He specifically uses the case of the former Soviet Union, where his theory has found strong evidence.

Larry Diamond presents another critical piece of literature (2015, 141–155) that criticizes the Western interpretation of democracy as somewhat hypocritical and, therefore, highly vulnerable to the tricks of authoritarian regimes. These regimes are masterful at using ambiguous contradictions to discredit the very idea of democracy. It has affected not only the countries in transition but also the democracies, as many have retreated from democratic values and are deeply rooted in authoritarian practices. In my research, his results are helpful for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between "traditional" and democratic values. I want to develop these ideas further to analyze the structure of Kazakhstan's "traditional institutions" that go back to the indigenous roots and the Soviet political-administrative system. The views of Larry Diamond are also crucial for analyzing the impact of Western foreign policy on the countries of the former Soviet Union, especially Kazakhstan, and its unwitting encouragement to strengthen further the authoritarian regime that is favorable for business.

b. Limited Sovereignty Variable.

Existing research on the post-communist space points to another vital aspect of authoritarianism: co-dependence. It is based on limiting the sovereignty of non-core states of a common political space in front of the supporting ones. Moreover, limited state sovereignty is

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firmly present in the supporting states' structure in the form of national-state and national-cultural autonomies.

The existence of de facto suzerainty of the countries of Central Asia concerning Russia and China is an imperial legacy of state-building on the part of the latter. Paul Stronski notes that Russia has always considered the Eurasian region the last frontier of its influence and vital interests (2018)60. At the same time, the tributary system, traditional for the Chinese state world order, or the "Tsefeng tyzhi" system, is a system of relations with neighboring states, which will be full-fledged only if the dominant role of China is recognized (Chu 1994, 177)61.

One of the first to present an analysis of Brezhnev's foreign policy doctrine as a concept of "limited sovereignty" was Stephen Glazer (1971, 169–117)62. According to this doctrine, the USSR denied its Eastern European satellites the right to full sovereignty. In the event of a threat of a change in the general political system in one of the countries close in terms of regime, the Soviet Union defended its right to military intervention. Robert Jones argues that despite the name, the doctrine existed long before Brezhnev's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and is the quintessence of the Soviet dualist approach to sovereignty in the USSR (1990)63. He also believed that this doctrine may develop a new (third) axis in the future, despite the reverse changes in the USSR in the late 1980s (Ibid., 230-256)64.

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64Ibid., 230-256
At the same time, studies of the existing literature on the topic of suzerain relations between Eurasian states show that the desire for hierarchical unity of states proceeds mutually. On the one hand, Russia and China are the main driving forces of Eurasian integration (Lukin 2020, 46–59). On the other hand, Oleg Antonov and Artem Galushko believe that the countries of Central Asia, which share many authoritarian tendencies, are striving to unite, thereby making these specific manifestations of authoritarianism more legitimate and more acceptable in the international arena.

The reverse centripetal vector of the former colonies towards the progenitor countries is explained by the desire to preserve the authoritarian regime in the shadow of more powerful autocracies. N. Matala believes that the imitation of democracy is equally necessary for Eurasian autocracies' survival and international legitimation (2020). In this regard, synchronized actions are needed to strengthen survival and international legitimacy. Thus, it is argued that the main driver of the unification processes between the Eurasian authoritarian countries is the desire to strengthen the legitimacy of authoritarian systems in the world.

Thus, the existing literature and its studies on the kinship of authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space confirm my concept of the uniqueness of regimes based on a Single Political Legacy (the concept of kindred regimes) existing within the same region (Common Political Space). However, more studies are needed in the existing literature for further reflection and practical application of these advanced concepts. In the existing literature, explaining why authoritarian traditions have not yet been revived in all countries of the former USSR is necessary. Also, in the

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academic literature, it was necessary to analyze the similarities between authoritarianism in China and some countries of the former USSR.

Therefore, my task is to present an analysis of the "Eurasian concept" in the context of the decisive external influence on the internal political processes of such states as Russia, China, and Kazakhstan. The concept I propose of a "common political world" of authoritarian regimes and practices transcends state borders and dominates cultural and social differences. I will analyze the interconnectedness variables presented above within this framework: interdependent supra-sovereignty of regimes and co-dependent limited sovereignty of states.

3. Interaction of the Regimes

The literature on authoritarian influence is not as numerous and varied as that on democratic influence in international relations. Nevertheless, the latter analysis helps to identify the main directions this study could develop, acting as a fundamental logical algorithm for the concept of external influence from authoritarian countries. Therefore, for this study on the influence of authoritarian regimes, it is essential to consider the existing literature on both democratic and authoritarian influence.

A. External Influence vs. Internal Causes

Most of the studies that have been done attribute the failure of democracy to two causal mechanisms. The first argues that only internal factors influence the dynamics of democratization in a country. Others believe that both internal and external factors influence the dynamics of democratization in a country (Silander 2005, 21)67. However, the primary literature on the failure of democracy has so far concentrated on analyzing internal factors.

Therefore, this only partially explains some of the changes in political dynamics. Some researchers pointed it out (O'Donnell et al., 1986a; Diamond et al., 1989)\textsuperscript{68} “Most of the studies were comprehensive, but these perspectives contained one important flaw: the neglect of international factors in democracy building” - (Silander 2017, Section 5)\textsuperscript{69}.

One of the new areas of study of the degree of influence of external factors on choosing a political regime is the field of comparative politics. While much of the research within this approach has been on internal influences, research on externalities requires a deeper approach. For example, Haig and Harrop initiated an analysis of government in a global context (2005)\textsuperscript{70}. Some tried to explain external relations' influence on the state's nature in the global context (Haynes J. 2003, 1040)\textsuperscript{71}. Also, the impact of internal socio-political institutions on the state itself and its reaction is assessed by international experts through the mechanism of external influence (Steves F. 2001, 339-352)\textsuperscript{72}.

Similarly, in “Comparative Politics - An Introduction” by Calvert (1993)\textsuperscript{73}, the degree of external influence is considered in terms of its impact on internal factors: socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors. Using comparative political science helps reveal existing approaches to analyzing the disclosure of internal factors. These are path dependence and historical institutionalism approaches used to analyze the dependence of the political processes of the present on the future.


\textsuperscript{73}Calvert, Peter A. R. 1993. \textit{An Introduction to Comparative Politics}. https://DOI:10.1017/cbo9781139015530.
However, the issues of theoretical analysis and precise definitions of international factors and mechanisms of external influence on internal processes still need to be disclosed (Teorell J. 2010, 220). Keohane R. and Nye J. suggest that political influence from developed and powerful states may impact democracy building in other states since they have open systems (Keohane R.O., Nye J.S. 1977, 28-29).

Francis Fukuyama denounces the existence of the threat as a motivating reason for the reaction of external interference from the competing political systems. He considers the effectiveness of promotion only as the completion of an effective policy of spreading the values and ideology of an alternative political world. Fukuyama does not support the extremes of either preemptive intervention or reliance on proliferation policies. External forceful intervention should only complete the successful diffusion effect (2006, 69-78).

B. Diffusion

Regarding the types of external influences, there are two main approaches to explaining them in the academic literature: dissemination and promotion (Silander and Daniel, 2005, No 73).

The first step towards conceptualizing the international factors of democratization concerns the concept of diffusion. Early diffusion researchers (Rosenau 1969; Keohane & Nye 1977; Almond 1989, 237-59) argue that states are open systems, not closed political organisms. Therefore, internal factors are subject to external influences through diffusion.

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Rosenau (1969, 45)\(^79\) defines various international interactions: as penetrating, reactive and competitive. Within the concept of diffusion, it is customary to analyze the influence of external agents, factors, and structures on the internal processes of democracy in each country.

The concept of connections and permeating systems, introduced by the addiction school, explained the more significant influence of the rich countries of the West on developing countries. In this regard, Lust and Waldner (2017, 26–28)\(^80\) attempt to highlight several aspects of theorizing international factors of external influence in their Theories of Democratic Change: international levers and connections, international diffusion, foreign aid, international organizations, and international election observation.

C. Promotion

In the context of democracy promotion, Pridham's (1991, 249)\(^81\) study found a link between the promotion of global democracy and the transition to democracy. These studies argue that international factors play a decisive role in the transition to democracy in European countries between the 70s and 90s (Pridham 1997, 7–29)\(^82\). Various methods and ways of promoting democracy under conditions of contagion, control, and consent have been used to compare external influences over large geographic areas (Whitehead 2001, 421)\(^83\).


https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321061107_Unwelcome_Change_Coming_to_Terms_with_Backsli
ding


Complementing the democracy promotion factor is the conditional cooperation regime outlined by Schmitter (2001, 26–46). This point of view helped to understand better the international factors that influence the processes of democracy through participants, motives, and procedures. Conditional cooperation includes a way of exercising influence through control and containment.

The first mechanism includes military, economic and political intervention. The second is either non-coercive influence on the part of actors to spread a political idea or encourage the promotion of democratic values. The concept of conditional cooperation is necessary both for analyzing the progress of democracy and for analyzing its failure. Such an approach may interpret the promotion of authoritarianism as contradictory to the retreat from democracy.

In turn, the promotion of external influence included an analysis of the state's role as an actor in international relations. For example, realists believe that the interests of nation-states determine the international order. The struggle for security and power determines all their actions (Bull 1977; Morgenthau 1978; Waltz 1979). On the contrary, liberals imagine that a complex system of state and non-state actors determines the world order. The confluence of these actors' interests creates institutions and mechanisms for advancing their interests in the international arena (Hoffmann 1987; Lebow & Risse-Kappen 1995).

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Based on case studies like the January events, the concept I propose assumes external influence as overwhelming in the revival and strengthening of the traditions of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. Therefore, this study assumes that external influence is decisive in choosing the type of political regime by such a country of Eurasian authoritarianism as Kazakhstan.

As a result, for this study, in which I am trying to establish the causal relationships that led to the January military invasion of the CSTO forces in Kazakhstan, I will focus only on the promotion effect. My task will also be identifying the components of the promotion effect between authoritarian countries.

D. Common Political Space

The collapse of the Soviet bloc, which coincided with globalization in the economy, technology, culture, and political processes, demonstrated the growth of international interdependence. It has been noted that "…globalization is associated with new patterns of global stratification, in which some states, societies, and communities are woven into the global order…" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton 1999, 7–8). The blurring of borders has made internal political, economic, and cultural structures unstable to the external influence of political processes. The fragmentation of the mutual influence of countries into similar political and financial systems and cultural values began to be based on a single historical heritage and geographical proximity.

Advocates of the concept of externality argue that the higher the proportion of democratic neighbors, the higher the likelihood of democracy surviving, and vice versa (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 911-933). Also, in the literature on the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991,

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it has been argued that external influence in globalization does not allow for geographical, political, or ideological remoteness.

Empirical studies show the plausibility of this concept but require further theoretical substantiation. It also needs to explain the influence of authoritarian space on the survival of authoritarian regimes.

E. Pivotal Actors

There still needs to be a clear understanding of the essence of international factors, including the structural-agency component at the international level. Although recently, some researchers have begun to propose a new mechanism for managing democratization processes, changing the approach from structurally oriented factors of influence to an actor-oriented approach. However, all existing methods are considered insignificant in the context of international factors. Also, the identified factors are based on the existing mechanism of external influence, which assumes that the objects of influence are only internal structures/intuitions or actors. On the contrary, my theory aims to identify significant external influences that have the most critical impact on the anti-authoritarian process in Kazakhstan through the most significant actors.

Some researchers (Pridham 2000, 36-64; Schmitter 2001, 28) are setting the course for studying a more precise definition of external influences before examining their extent. Thus, they define two possible external factors of influence: a collective term for various types of international

phenomena and a multi-level set of factors in the form of the state, institutional structures, and various actors.

Essential in their study is the awareness of the interdependence of domestic and international politics. It was believed that global political and economic structures are supranational and serve as a means of influence between strong and weak actors. James Rosenau defined (1969, 45) this interdependence as "any repetitive sequence of behavior that occurs in one system and responds to it in another." Also, some researchers emphasize that, as in the first and second waves of democratization, dissemination agents are the primary means of spreading external influence (Huntington 1991, 579-616).

In this context, an exciting aspect of the existing research on external influence in contemporary literature is the promotion of democracy. Studies of this externality are based on traditional views on the formation of foreign policy, focusing on the motives and methods of international actors.

In other words, the promotion of democracy is motivated by the influence of foreign policy actors on internal structures: nations and national governments. Moreover, identifying powerful supranational actors is critical to promoting democracy on a global scale (Schimmelfennig 2002, 29). The European Union, the OSCE, and a global power such as the U.S. are international actors that promote democracy by influencing governments and peoples.

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F. Russia

Vladislav Inozemtsev and Alexander Abalov (2020) consider the political structure of Russia through the prism of its history. They emphasize the unique character of the Russian political system, the World's last empire. They argue that it has so far reproduced and will continue to reproduce imperial strategies and behavioral tactics in the future. They conclude that Russia remains a threat to its neighbors and its federal political structure. In drawing these conclusions from their book, I also want to expand on how this threat to Russia's neighbors materializes into increased authoritarianism in Kazakhstan.

G. China

There are also numerous articles, books, and monographs on China's authoritarian influence on the political systems of various countries. For example, Jonathan D. Spence, in his "Searching for Modern China" (1991), and Daniel Bell, in his "China's New Confucianism" (2008), attempt to find the roots of modern China in the history of ancient Chinese traditions and the ideology of Confucianism. They draw a clear line between Chinese authoritarianism and the authoritarianism of other countries. They also highlight the differences and characteristics of the Chinese type, which laid the foundations for China's success in economic growth and poverty reduction.

Charles Edel and David O. Shullman (2021) describe how Beijing's money and technology are fueling repression around the World. They analyzed Chinese leader Xi Jinping's July 2021 speech to senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials when he stated that China should do

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more to share the party's "story" of success with the rest of the World. He also proclaims the need to increase the influence of the country and the party in the international arena. He emphasized that the virtues of the authoritarian model of government should be extended to the whole World.

**H. Objectives are Drawn from the Review**

Based on the current findings of the existing literature, my study suggests further theorizing the mechanism of external actors' influence on the process of political change within the country in terms of determining consistent causal relationships. It is necessary for the following reasons.

First, establishing causal mechanisms is necessary for aspects of external influence on the change in the political system in any country to remain empirical conclusions. Secondly, to predict and manage these processes, it is necessary to show an accurate picture of the cause-and-effect relationship between the choice of any political regime. Finally, understanding the theoretical foundations of the essence of democratic processes will make it possible to regulate the components of international influence used today, potentially negatively impacting them.

Thus, my analysis of Eurasian authoritarianism and its possible input and intermediate factors reveals the causes of external influence (output factor) on the definition of regime type. It aims to illustrate studies of external forces, types, and causal relationships with the components of authoritarian promotion in the Eurasian region.

Finally, it reveals the external influence on internal changes through the survival mechanism, considering the relationship between external, internal, and intermediate variables.

Hall and Taylor, as historical institutionalists, have proposed a window of opportunity for sociopolitical change (1996). However, they apply this approach based on changes in internal institutions caused by internal factors.

At the same time, the concept of a critical moment is part of the theory of path dependence within the framework of comparative historical analysis. According to this concept, critical moments come in conditions of political uncertainty when the mechanism of functioning of traditional institutions gives an inevitable failure (Capoccia 2015, 147–179). At these moments, a window of opportunity opens if political agents (actors) can choose an alternative model of political institutions. Given the continued persistence of the new political order and institutions, new political traditions may develop (Torfing 2009, 70–83).

In contrast to the proponents for Path Dependency and New Institutionalism, some researchers argue that political institutions can be both a source of inertia and change (Olsen 2009, 3-32).

Other external influence studies have found a causal relationship between changes in the international system and the internal development of democracy (Boix 2011, 814–815). Moreover, ideologically competitive regimes are directly correlated with authoritarian propaganda, even in democratic countries. At the same time, the static conditions and institutional inertia of the

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continuity of political traditions in both the liberal and authoritarian political space have led to a
more effective external influence of kindred regimes on internal factors. However, these empirical
studies emphasize the low effectiveness of the external influence of democratic regimes on
democratization processes concerning non-democratic objects of influence (Gunitsky 2014, 561-97;
Gleditsch 2007, 293-309)103.

On the contrary, studies in the context of democracy promotion have been able to highlight
external influences in the interests of various actors. The promotion of interests involves changing
political structures (institutions and traditions) and values (ideologies) in a state subject to outside
influence (Silander 2005, 83)104.

In the context of the importance of the external influence that a critical state can exert on
another CPS country seeking regime change, Vali Nasr (2013)105 questioned America's current
stance on being sidelined from world affairs. He stressed the importance of both dissemination
methods and promotion methods in disseminating democratic values: "We have yet to decide how
we will put foreign policy in the right perspective, in the context of our domestic interests and
agenda, and in the context of what we think of our military power and military power and how we

Olcott M. B. (2005, 229)\textsuperscript{107} believes that the systematic influence of external factors makes political changes possible. She also believes that America's refusal to promote democracy in Central Asia has contributed to authoritarianism there. On the contrary, according to Aleksey Malashenko (2011, 93)\textsuperscript{108}, Russia continues to strengthen its support for the region's kindred authoritarian regimes, opposing their liberalization in every possible way. Moscow sees the democratic changes as a signal for rapprochement with the West and these countries to fall out of Russia's orbit of influence. Unfortunately, Malashenko sees no real opportunities to change the authoritarian regime in these countries.

The pivotal Eurasian states' geopolitical weakness is one factor in the window of opportunity for a change in the political regime. The collapse of the USSR began precisely because of problems in the metropolis itself. The civil war in Russia over the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev in the 1980s created centrifugal forces in the empire. The most indicative is the first example of a centrifugal challenge to the empire - the proclamation of independence by Lithuania on March 11, 1990.

However, not all former republics of the USSR are included in modern Eurasian political and economic blocs, despite the common Soviet past. The most rapid change in the Soviet legacy was experienced by the Baltic republics, the first to secede from the USSR. The reasons for the successful change of the CPS are the political traditions that historically dominated each of their former republics, different from the Eurasian ones. However, one should consider the moment of


weakness in pivotal Russia and the determination of the West to embrace these countries into their own CPS immediately.

At the same time: "more than fifteen years have passed since the states of Central Asia became independent, but during this time, they have not been able to create political institutions that could be considered democratic that would ensure the transfer of power in a way that society would consider legitimate" (Ibid., Olcott)\(^{109}\). In my opinion, the main reason for this unchanging continuity is the historically deep political tradition of the SPL in the Central Asian region.

Does this mean that for countries of Common Political Space, no window of opportunity opens with the weakness of the main centers of CPS? Modern academic literature still needs to give a systematic answer to this question. Thus, Vladimir Gelman (2018)\(^{110}\) admits that: "The degree of governability of the post-Soviet states, notorious for the poor quality of public administration, is also unknown: scientists and specialists do not know how these states can react to various external shocks, and whether this reaction will affect (and if so, how) on the dynamics of political regimes.'" However, after analyzing the transit systems, he noted that "the development of democracy becomes irreversible only when it creates conditions for a full-fledged rotation of the ruling elites, and not "cartel agreements" on the partial reshuffling of the "winning coalitions," as in Ukraine or Moldova.

In promoting traditions and values alternative to authoritarianism, it is essential to understand how the pivotal actors of competing political systems should act. Francis Fukuyama argues that it is in America's interest to continue to promote its values abroad and, contrary to realist prescriptions, to limit cooperation with authoritarian regimes in every possible way. At the same

\(^{109}\) Ibid., Olcott.
time, as part of the promotion, military intervention should be used only as a last resort and as a supplement to other measures of influence (Fukuyama 2006, 69-78)\textsuperscript{111}.

In addition, Francis Fukuyama clearly emphasizes that such measures can positively result during critical junctures while weakening the pivotal actors of the same political space. "A Russian defeat will make possible a "new birth of freedom," and get us out of our funk about the declining state of global democracy," writes Fukuyama in the aftermath of the Russian incursion into Ukraine (2022)\textsuperscript{112}.

In the context of the previous, it is necessary to understand under what conditions in Kazakhstan a change in domestic political tradition from an authoritarian to a democratic one can take place in the face of external pressure. To do this, I want to show that when CPS pivotal countries experience ideological and institutional weaknesses, a new political regime should be promoted by the rival CPS pivotal states (USA) in non-pivotal CPS states (Kazakhstan).

5. Conclusion

A review of the existing literature about external influences on democratization processes showed an essential change in the systematic research approach on this topic. Thus, external influence factors have become necessary for causing internal changes. Moreover, many studies have intertwined internal and external factors, "leaving scientists with a wide range of potential explanatory factors to consider" (Silander 2017, par. 5)\textsuperscript{113}.

Also, most existing work on external influences is about democratic states. At the same time, the belief that authoritarian states exert similar external influence led to a new theoretical


framework. It explains why recent democratization attempts have failed to strengthen authoritarianism in Kazakhstan.

My findings aimed at a broader application. Even though I am developing a theory that attempts to explain the Kazakh case, this theory may explain other similar cases throughout Eurasia.

Understanding the process of external influence on internal factors will help identify alternative external influence factors necessary for successful democratization within the country. It will help determine the proper set of policies called for the successful democratization of a non-democratic country from external forces. Finally, this study can fill a gap in research on the conceptualization of the theoretical justification for the commitment of various states to specific political systems and regimes in the context of the global world order.
Chapter III: Theory Building

1. Theoretical Framework

In my study on authoritarian continuity and survival in Kazakhstan, I want to show that solid political traditions and legacy resurrected authoritarianism in the post-Soviet period. Secondly, this revival relates to the considerable influence on Kazakhstan of such authoritarian countries as Russia and China, all belonging to a common political space.

At the same time, the influence between countries on the revival and maintenance of authoritarianism throughout the space is mutual. Both pivotal and non-pivotal countries are interested in maintaining authoritarianism based on the common reason for authoritarian regimes – their survival. Only the combined efforts of authoritarian regimes contribute to their survival, and the response to threats to survival in one of the countries is a forceful invasion.

Therefore, my thesis is focused on yet unknown transformations within the cases of external influence between the countries of the Eurasian space, characterized by an authoritarian political system. Thus, my research aims to reveal the historical and socio-political processes that create these effects of external influence.

To conduct a successful qualitative study, I intend to use data from cases of specific external influences between the countries of the studied space to test the theoretical models outlined above. Goertz and Mahoney believe the research mechanism involves in-depth tracing processes concerning each case (2012)\(^\text{114}\). To do this, I will rely on several context-sensitive data sources to identify pathways linking independent factors and dependent variables (Collier et al. 2004, 229–

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If the causal relationships found are the same, then the causal relationship under study will be plausible for the region under study and the period under study (George and Bennett, 2005; Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Bennett and Cheke, 2015). For a complete study of causal relationships, I will use theoretical models that determine the choice of evidence (study cases) and competing explanations (hypotheses) (E. González-Ocantos 2020, 105). The theoretical model I have proposed shows the path of a causal relationship that determines the type of external influence between the region's countries and the mechanisms that activate these relationships.

My theoretical model includes three parameters around which the studied effects of external influence are activated. Like Gonzalez-Ocantos, I single out three parameters around which my theoretical model is built: actors of influence with their logic of behavior, the operation spaces of these actors, and the consequences of the interaction between them.

2. Concept Building

In defining a theoretical framework, it is necessary to define "the boundaries and characteristics of the area in which the result we are trying to explain is generated" (Ibid. 2020, 229-266).

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The above three parameters of the field of action, according to Gonzales-Ocantos I have designated as the following:

First, within the framework of the model, I identified "the actors, as well as their preferences, action logic, and resources" (Ibid). Significant actors are China and Russia, which I call the pivotal states. Other states, like Kazakhstan, are not significant actors, which I call non-pivotal states. The logic of their actions, preferences, and resources of influence is the subject of further research in the framework of causal connections and the results of influence that are of interest to this study.

Further, within the framework of my theoretical model, I conceptualize the space of action of actors, including where external influence processes occur between actors. In this context, I conceptualize the space of action as a common political space, uniting authoritarian regimes of a single political type.

It is important to note that the conceptualization of the action space must contain "rules ... as well as institutional features that restrict or enable behavior" (Ibid). In this case, the institutional features of the input factors, such as supra-authoritarianism of the Eurasian type, limit the external influence between them when the existence of the variables of the authoritarian regime is stable. The same is true that they increase the impact when the variables of the authoritarian regime in one of them are weakened.

Thirdly, my theoretical model explores the interaction between significant and insignificant actors of influence within the scope of causal relationships between them. The output factor with

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118 Ibid. 2020, 108.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
dependent variables in the model I proposed is the factor of interaction between the pivotal and non-pivotal countries of the common political space.

In this regard, the opinion in the academic literature is indicative that interactions within space are strategic. Actors with the most robust institutional characteristics of both input and intermediate factors exert the type of influence on other actors, which implies the obligatory similarity of regimes between them and coercion to similarity in the event of a change in one of them. This conceptualization is consistent with Lake and Powell (1999)\(^{121}\), who argue that the most stable actors choose their actions toward other actors based on what they expect them to do.

The factor of the Supra-Authoritarianism of the authoritarian regimes of the Eurasian region can only be analyzed by conceptualizing the concept of legacy, which is present in the works of most researchers in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, before operationalizing the alleged factors of influence of the central hypothesis, it is necessary to conceptualize the notion of legacy correctly. The proposed concepts of this study are the regime's uniqueness (Single Political Legacy), kindred regimes throughout the region (Common Political Space) and dominating external influence (pivotal countries).

Based on the proposed hypothesis' findings of the studied literature, the proposed concept is as follows: the external influence is the overriding paradigm/influence aim that both Russia and China have maintained regarding both regime preservation and containment from competing regimes' influence in Kazakhstan.

The SPL and the CPS notions that I proposed are decisive in changing the paradigm of causal relationships from internal factors of influence to external ones. I define a common political space as a group of states united by similar political systems, economic relations, and social

structures. At the same time, the political legacy is the stability and continuity of political traditions based on a similar ideology of the socio-political contract for the formation of statehood. It is characterized by continuity both on the internal and external levels. In turn, the continuity of the relevant socio-political institutions develops within a strictly defined ideological framework on which certain political traditions are formed.

In the causal paradigm presented, a new set of external factors provides a more substantial explanation for the influence of pivotal countries. Therefore, my next conceptual block is built around the Common Political Space, which unites similar authoritarian regimes in the Eurasian region. Therefore, the primary input factor determining the specificity of the output interaction factor is the factor of interconnectedness. In the new paradigm of cause-and-effect relationships, it is the main input factor with independent variables, effectively transforming the variables of the internal factor of supra-authoritarianism into intermediate ones.

The pivotal centers are the most powerful states that are pan-national political formations (the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the People's Republic of China) on which kindred regimes of nation-states are guided. In Kazakhstan's case, Russia, and China's interest in maintaining an authoritarian regime in the country of their influence stemming from the vital need to preserve a single political legacy throughout their common political space.

3. Operationalization/ Causal Pathways

The method of my qualitative analysis, which is result-oriented, is process tracing - establishing a causal mechanism and a causal chain between independent and dependent variables.

Tracing a process has three parts: structuring theories, variables, and competing explanations and observed effects; searching for causal processes or connections on the example of
practical cases; determining logical relationships between the identified components of the causal path based on the proposed theory.

Careful analysis of significant events/cases is required to move from a causal condition to an intended outcome and to observe changes in dependent variables. The events must logically connect cause and effect and repeat with a similar algorithm, ceteris paribus.

Causal pathways involve steps in a causal chain and mechanisms (Waldner 2014, 126–52)\textsuperscript{122}. In the theoretical model presented in this study, causal steps include such significant events as the weakening of the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan, as measured by the weakening of the Eurasian-type supra-authoritarianism variables. These events are necessary to move from the causal condition to the result we are interested in (Gonzalez-Ocantos 2020, 106)\textsuperscript{123} - the type of external influence caused by China and Russia and to monitor the change in such an intermediate variable as the supra-authoritarian institutions’ continuity of the political regimes of Russia, China, and Kazakhstan.

In this study, cases such as external interventions by China and Russia in Kazakhstan during the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries should provide a logical description of the situation within Kazakhstan that causes this type of the external influence. For example, the weakening of the authoritarian political regime in Kazakhstan leads to a weakening of the relationship between the political regimes of the three countries and forces Russia and China to take action to support the kindred regime in Kazakhstan. Thus, my research aims to identify the historical and socio-political processes that produce these external effects.


The second component of causal pathways is the mechanisms that "make the system in question work" (Bunge 2004, 182)\textsuperscript{124}. Mechanisms are "not relations between variables, but actors, their relations, and …. the results of their actions" (Hedstrom 2008, 320)\textsuperscript{125}. Mechanisms explain observed socio-political processes in terms of psychological reasons why actors transmit "either physical force or information that influences the behavior of other agents or organizations" in causal relationships (Waldner 2012, 76)\textsuperscript{126}.

Here, the mechanism explains the increase in external interference from the pivotal states by perceiving a threat. It also explains the integrity of all authoritarian regimes in the event of the collapse of one of them. In the academic literature, George and Bennett explain this connection as "unobservable … social or psychological processes through which agents with causal powers act" (2005, 137)\textsuperscript{127}. Therefore, this perceived threat is influencing the behavior of the main actors (Waldner 2012, 76)\textsuperscript{128} seeking to maintain their regimes in Russia and China and therefore making efforts to preserve the weakening authoritarianism in Kazakhstan through increased external pressure in early 2022.

The mechanisms that enable the causal chain of external effects are the fear/threat of losing sovereignty that triggers output interaction factor variables and the desire to preserve a single political legacy and regime throughout CPS that triggers increased pressure of interconnectedness.


factor variables through intermediate variables of supra-authoritarianism. They act as a fundamental cause and effect and, simultaneously, a phenomenon of authoritarianism.

In addition to the externalities already explored, understanding the causal relationships of external influence is essential to understanding the dynamics of anti-democratization in Kazakhstan. Since the main actors, Russia, and China, share the political tradition of Kazakhstan, the degree of their external influence on internal factors in Kazakhstan is more significant than that of the West.

Thus, with the help of the process tracing analysis, I will outline the causal relationship between the factors of external influence from China and Russia on the internal political processes in Kazakhstan. The January events demonstrate Russia and China's significant impact on recent Kazakhstan events. To explain this, I put forward the theory that all three countries share a single political legacy. The community of nation-states replaces the concept of a multi-level empire. Altogether they create a Common Political Space or a Single Political World.

Therefore, I will divide the analyzed observations’ causal effects of external influence into two primary causal factors: among operating actors - the countries of influence:

- The supra-authoritarian regime of these countries, based on their deep political traditions or legacy,
- The supra-sovereign international system (CPS) is based on its regimes’ interdependence and the alleged (limited) sovereignty, or co-dependence of its states.

Hence, the output factor is the regime interaction within the CPS, which arises in the face of the threat of foreign political traditions in any country of the Eurasian type of political legacy. All three factors have measurable variables, which will be laid out in the following sections of this Thesis.

Thus, a causal relationship between factors influencing the promotion type of external influence arises based on three parameters of the presented theoretical model:
• acting agents - countries of influence united by a single political regime,
• spaces where political processes take place - a common political space that unites interdependent countries with a shared political legacy,
• external influence arising between these countries based on the fear of losing /the desire to preserve the existing regimes in a common space.

Since this study is interested in the reasons for the persistence and strengthening of authoritarianism, which culminated in January 2022, it is necessary to check the significance of external factors in the dynamics of political regime change in Kazakhstan. Despite several other reasons, my research focuses on the most significant external factors that influenced the rise of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. While the traditional approach focuses on internal factors, the presented approach focuses on external factors.

The study will discuss external factors influencing the dynamics of internal consequences. To determine the mechanism of external influence, I will focus on the promotional influence of the great powers, Russia, China, and the United States, as the primary agents of influence. The most critical overall external pressure on Kazakhstan came from the competing political systems of the three countries. This part of my research also uses the field of comparative politics in the study of externalities to strengthen the theory's conceptual framework.

Therefore, given the importance of interaction between states in this study, I will focus on why some conditions have more influence than others. Also, what are the main force variables of the interaction factor operating at the interstate level, and how do internal factors perceive various types of external influences?
4. The Novelty of the Proposed Theory

1. Most existing theories of Eurasian authoritarianism consider the so-called common space that includes most of the former Soviet republics of the USSR. However, this concept needs to explain why some republics of the former USSR could revive and strengthen similar authoritarian practices while others were not. It means that the revived authoritarian traditions are not limited to the USSR. China is an organic part of the Eurasian supra-authoritarianism. China and some former post-Soviet countries entered a separate political world based on a legacy wider than Soviet political traditions.

2. The novelty of the proposed theory of a unified political world lies in the primacy of political legacy over all other unifying characteristics of authoritarian political systems. Moreover, this theory recognizes the geographical, cultural, or other bases that unite these regimes.

3. In addition, the presented theory explains the apparent diversity of the Eurasian authoritarian regimes by the dynamism of their four main components, depending on the symbiosis of internal and external conditions. That is, they are all the same in terms of the existing four main components, which in a single period may not coincide. Therefore, the main descriptive characteristic is not the hybridity of the authoritarian regimes of the three states but their dynamism.

4. The presented theory can be used as a tool for accurate forecasting of both foreign and domestic political processes in the Eurasian political authoritarian world. Understanding the mechanism of transition from one form of authoritarianism to another and their activation makes it possible to predict the internal political situation in any authoritarian country. In addition, understanding this mechanism makes it possible to predict the foreign policies of Russia and China towards Kazakhstan and each other.
5. China and Russia will remain strategic partners in general world affairs if they exercise mutual control over the Central Asian region. The general strategic partnership of both countries will not be violated under any circumstances until they are united by successful control over the Central Asian region.

6. An essential characteristic of the Eurasian supra-authoritarian regimes is high adaptability and survival. This high survival rate in any given country is due to four major variable factors beyond authoritarianism. In addition, two variables of the intermediate factor of interconnectedness explain the strengthening of the collective authoritarian space and their mutual support for each other. During the activation of the intermediate factor, the mechanism of survival and preservation is triggered, which triggers the output interaction factor in the event of a threat/fear of failure.

7. The Common Political Space of Eurasia, based on the mutual dependence of regimes and the limited sovereignty, or co-dependence, of states, has a sophisticated architecture for the regime's survival. In the event of a vacuum of the supra-authoritarian power of the center in the regions, then there is a legitimate replacement of this role by the regional authorities. Fragmentation of authoritarianism throughout its national centers is necessary during a severe power crisis when the authoritarian metropolis can fall to anti-authoritarian forces. In this case, the surviving authoritarian regimes of the national regions are called to restore authoritarianism both in the center and throughout the entire authoritarian space, using their national-regional resources.

8. The proposed division of the Eurasian countries into pivotal and non-pivotal emphasizes the following characteristics of their actions among themselves. Thus, the launch of the conservation mechanism is carried out by supra-authoritarian regimes of non-pivotal countries and leads to the strengthening and further institutionalizing of the CPS. At the same time, the
mechanism of threat/fear of failure of the input and intermediate factors is triggered by the regimes of the pivotal countries, causing the action of the output interaction factor.

9. The change of the political legacy is possible only when the authoritarian regime is replaced for an extended period by a non-authoritarian regime. Both are only possible with the direct external participation of the competing CPS's pivotal country. In this regard, such a type of diffuse influence as a complete rejection of the legitimization of the existing institutions and regimes of the supra-authoritarian Eurasian regimes is a prerequisite.

5. Conclusion

The Eurasian type of authoritarianism includes a state-legal institution based on political traditions forced to develop in the conditions of a republican model of government. Moreover, traditional authoritarianism is forced to evolve within the declared values of the liberal democratic system. This evolution has led to the creation of formal and non-formal components of an authoritarian regime. They aim to preserve and strengthen the authoritarian system and are auxiliary to each other. During the weakening of one of the components of authoritarianism, one of the other components inevitably strengthens to preserve the authoritarian system.

The considerable role of informal variables in the structure of the political system of the Eurasian countries, coupled with an abundance of non-constitutional supports of super-presidency, inevitably leads to systemic conflict and the weakening of the authoritarian system. Francis Fukuyama noted that the weaknesses of authoritarianism are embedded in the core of the Eurasian pivotal states. For example, he states that “the concentration of power in the hands of a single leader at the top all but guarantees low-quality decision making, and over time will produce truly catastrophic consequences” (2022)129.

That is why imitation democracies of authoritarian states that do not enjoy the rule of law are unstable. However, authoritarianism is more stable than an authoritarian state, outliving its formations. That is because of its support by authoritarian traditions and the entire authoritarian political World. States mutate and evolve in the system of political worlds, where regimes’ behaviors are the mechanism for maintaining authoritarianism, and the state is its institution.
Part II—Factors of Influence
Chapter IV: Supra-Authoritarianism

I. Intermediate Variables

1. Types of Variables

A comparative analysis of the constitutions of Russia, China, and Kazakhstan and the development of their political systems show that a combination of constitutional Primacy and a strong presence of informal traditions of authoritarian power characterizes their authoritarian regimes. Formally enshrined in constitutions/legal acts or informally in their power structures, power institutions reinforce Eurasian authoritarianism as a factor of Supra-authoritarianism unique for the region in all countries of a single political space based on a single political legacy. As the main components of the supra-authoritarian factor, these institutions are their studied, measured variables.

The formality of any variable lies in its constitutional Primacy. All other variables that do not have constitutional Primacy over all other branches of government are informal. Moreover, informal variables can have a legislative or regulatory framework. However, in the absence of constitutional Primacy, they only play a supporting role for the Primate Variable. Therefore, in the context of supra-authoritarianism, the formality of any of its variables is considered from the point of view of the presence of its constitutional Primacy. Formal Primacy is the supra-legal status of any institution of power over all other branches of government, enshrined in the constitution.

In the absence of constitutional consolidation of the Primate but the presence of a supra-systemic status of any institution of power, we are talking about the informal Primacy of power. That is, informal Primacy arises in the case of the actual Supra-systemic status of one variable over all others. This supra-systemic status can be enshrined in legal acts and laws in the constitution but does not have a Constitutional enshrinement as a Primate.
Thus, Eurasian Authoritarianism is characterized by the formal fixing of the Primacy of one of the four variables of supra-authoritarianism in the Basic Law, the constitution. Any of the four variables becomes formal when it acquires constitutional Primacy. Moreover, in each period, constitutional or supra-systemic informal Primacy should have only one Primate variable to avoid conflict between them. At the same time, all other variables must perform auxiliary functions.

Also, the studied variables are divided into personalistic and structural. The personalist variables are those in which absolute power is concentrated around a single person: the Super Presidency and the Principate. Structural variables are collective structures around which absolute power in the state is concentrated: parallel (shadow) institutions of power that control the existing branches of power; and ideological parties that receive the status of supra-systemic ruling ones.

2. Mechanisms for the Preservation of Eurasian Supra-authoritarianism

In a situation of simultaneous Primacy (formal or informal) for more than one variable, a full-scale socio-political crisis of Authoritarianism arises. In the absence of either formal or informal Primacy among all variables, a full-scale socio-political crisis of authoritarianism also sets in. Therefore, the regime's stability is ensured by a soft transition of any Primate to one of the variables. It may be a Primate transition from a formal variable to an informal one or vice versa. Also, it can be a transition of Primacy from structural to personalistic or vice versa. For the stable functioning of a supra-authoritarian regime, it is essential to ensure two parameters: a smooth transition of the Primate from one variable to another and the subordination of all other variables to one Primate.

Gelman’s in-depth analysis of transit systems showed that the development of democracy becomes irreversible only when it creates conditions for a full-fledged rotation of the ruling elites,
and not “cartel agreements” on the partial reshuffling of “winning coalitions, like in Ukraine or Moldova” (2021)\textsuperscript{130}.

The same principle of the need to preserve the continuity of Authoritarianism in the Eurasian political regimes is applied for a smooth rotation between its four forms. To this principle, the transitions occurring according to one algorithm from structural Authoritarianism to personalist and vice versa are due. Failure to comply with this principle in all three countries would inevitably lead to the collapse of the authoritarian order. Violation of this principle in the USSR in the 1980s led to the collapse of the USSR and in 2019-22 in Kazakhstan led to the threat of the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Only the pivotal states' external intervention led to the authoritarian regime's salvation, which immediately abolished the situation of dual power. In the case of China, the continued rotation of top government posts and the preservation of Primacy as one of the authoritarian variables, as well as the smooth change of Primacy between variables until 2018, have contributed to the stability of the authoritarian regime so far.

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of 4 variables of the Eurasian type of supra-authoritarian factor: two of them personalistic and two of them structural. Personalistic and structural primates are variable and are measured by the following parameters, respectively:

- constitutional laws, legal acts/decrees fixing the Primate status of variables.
- quantity and quality of structural variables that perform an auxiliary role.

3. Legacy of Eurasian Authoritarianism

The legacy of supra-authoritarianism goes back, at least to their imperial statehood. The crisis of the absolute personal authoritarianism of tsarist Russia and imperial China led to the

\textsuperscript{130} Gelman, Vladimir. 2021. \textit{Authoritarian Russia: Escape from freedom, or why democracy does not take root in our country}. Howard Roark. ISBN 978-5-906067-06-7. / Гельман, Владимир. Авторитарная Россия: Бегство от свободы, или, почему у нас не приживается демократия.].
collapse of both empires. Despite the declared plans for democratization, the new authorities set the goal of regaining control over the entire territories of the former empires. Therefore, they were forced to move to a multinational federal structure of the states. However, the desire to restore power throughout its entire political space led to the inevitable strengthening of authoritarianism. Stages of group/personal authoritarianism took place during periods of restoration of control over the entire political space.

First, ensuring and restoring control over the entire political space is possible only if a supra-authoritarian regime dominates this space. Secondly, the maintenance of a supra-authoritarian regime is carried out by alternating domination in the state of one of its primary four forms. Thirdly, this alternation is insurance against social upheavals for the preservation of the regime. Therefore, the framework of authoritarian political traditions limits the dynamics of the development of the socio-political system in states of the Eurasian type. Therefore, the task of this section is to analyze the variables of the supra-authoritarian factor and the mechanism of their substitution.

Forms of authoritarian rule have changed throughout the region's history to ensure the stability of authoritarian rule. For example, the fall of the absolute tsarist autocracy in the Russian Empire was replaced by the dictatorship of the ruling party in the USSR in 1917-34. The class dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed in 1924–36, and the regime of war communism was, in fact, a form of absolute party authoritarianism. Party rule, an informal form of structural authoritarianism, was necessary to mimic a democratic institution.

Nevertheless, informally present in all branches of formal power, the Communist Party received a particular constitutional form in 1936. This year was a turning point in the complete consolidation of central power throughout the political space of the USSR. First, a constitutional requirement was introduced for the complete loyalty of all citizens to the party leadership and its
leader. Second, the 1936 Constitution established central government through complete duplication and subordination of republican constitutions to the federal constitution.

The complete consolidation of central power in 1934-1936 made it possible to move from the informal structural Primacy of the Communist Party to the informal personalistic Primacy of Stalin. The leader's personality cult during this period ensured the irrationality of the ideology of maintaining centralized power throughout the Eurasian space and in the USSR. Strong ideological support also propped up the Stalinist personalistic principle, strengthening super-authoritarianism in the USSR.

Later, the dictatorship of the ruling party gradually degenerated into the personal dictatorship of the Stalinist Principate in 1934–53. The power of the party Primate replaced the Principate after Stalin's death in 1953–85. However, all shifts were carried out in symbiosis with the support of other forms of Authoritarianism. After 1985, Gorbachev tried to move towards a personalist form of super-presidential rule as opposed to other authoritarian forms. This attempt led not only to the regime's collapse but also to the collapse of the imperial state itself in 1991.

Thus, the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1934, or the "Congress of Victors," stated that there was no longer any opposition in the party (Stalin 1939, 423-486)131. However, the fall of empires and states does not mean the fall of an authoritarian regime. The party's fall is replaced by personified Authoritarianism of both super-presidential and authoritarian types. For example, Volkogonov stated: "Stalinism is a form of Thermidor... and its transformation into the dictatorship of one dominant personality" (1989; 82, 125–126)132. The social

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content of Stalinism was the total domination of the bureaucracy (the party), which could not survive without a despot uniting it, an absolute leader (Medushevsky 2015, 543). This form of bureaucratic authoritarian rule unites the USSR with the PRC. Until now, this system of party administration, represented by a significant bureaucratic apparatus, dominated the PRC.

Many researchers agree with the interpretation of China's political system as governed by a liberal-authoritarian regime that combines economic liberalism and political Authoritarianism (Kokarev 2005, 8–27). At the same time, Chinese researchers often characterize the regime as “post-totalitarian technocratic neo-authoritarianism” (Xiao Gongqin). Preserving totalitarian levers of mobilization control in all public life characterizes it. Mobilization characteristics are complemented by the priority of technocratic approaches over ideological ones in decision-making and declaring the priority of national tasks over narrow party or other institutional-corporate ones (Berger 2008, 7-19).

It should be noted that the personalistic and structural types of supra-authoritarianism alternate with each other. The reason is that the personalistic forms of the Eurasian authoritarian regimes are dominating, while the structural ones are transitory. The latter forms are necessary for the temporary imitation of democratic government, necessary after the stage of rigid personal

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authoritarianism. Therefore, the culmination of the party's structural form of authoritarian rule is the transition to a personalistic form.

So, after Stalin died in 1953, de-Stalinization began with the debunking of the personality cult. There was also a separation of executive and party power following the attempted constitutional reform of 1962. Complete decentralization failed, but the foundation was laid for separating Soviet and party power. Moreover, the formal power of the party apparatus was strengthened.

In contrast to the PRC, the proposed principle of rotation and limited rule of the top party leadership was rejected in the USSR in the late 1980s. Preservation of permanence in the party leadership is the most significant difference and the reason for preserving the PRC and the collapse of the USSR.

Thus, the combination of the position of the General Secretary of the Party with the highest legislative position of the Chairman (Presidium of the Supreme Council) deprived the General Secretary of the Party of an extra-systemic status. By that, another parameter was violated - the supra-systematic nature of top management. Moreover, by equating the supreme executive power with supra-systemic power, the 1977 Constitution laid the foundation for the transition from party dictatorship to the dictatorship of the presidential government. It undermined the fundamental basis for maintaining the unity of the USSR.

In the post-communist era, the triumphant march of authoritarianism began under the legacy of the constitutions of most of the autonomies of the USSR, starting with Russia and Kazakhstan. An attempt to strengthen personal supra-authoritarianism, which failed in the late USSR, began a triumphal procession in the post-Soviet countries. This time, the already thoroughly discredited and
previously destroyed structural party-ideological Primacy did not prevent the consolidation of personalistic forms of supra-authoritarian power in Russia and Kazakhstan.

Moreover, if the antagonism between the two variables of the supra-authoritarian factor led to its crisis in the USSR, then the continued Primacy of the party from 1982 to 2012 in the PRC contributed to the strengthening of the factor. However, China followed its neighbors in Primate's transition to a super-presidential variable 20 years later. As for the institution of the Principate, in all countries, it appeared and disappeared at different periods as a transitional institution of authoritarian power.


All these amendments were aimed at tightening personalistic forms of authoritarian power, such as:

- the abolition of restrictions on the terms of stay in the highest executive position,
- an extension of the term of office of the President,
- an increase in the term of office, the assignment of the status of the leader of the Nation,
- conferring supreme authority on the parallel status of the leader,
- granting immunity to the ruler and his family,
- establishing a life-long indefinite allowance for the ruler and his family,
- constitutional consolidation of alternative centers of power,
- the presence of a sole body with the right of constitutional control,
- Consolidating ideological (one-party) Primacy in the constitution under personalist control.
II. Personalist Variables

1. Super Presidential Primacy

The special status of the absolute was enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020, while in Kazakhstan, a similar status was enshrined ten years earlier - in 2010. In this respect, this status differs from the normative notion of super-presidency that existed before it. The normative notion of the absolute is the next step after super-presidential power has been consolidated. Thus, the manifestation of common political traditions and mutual influence did not necessarily come from the supporting states. The psychology of a single political space was confirmed by the centripetal movement of even small states, like Kazakhstan, despite the advantages of small-town rule.

Presidentialism as a political system with solid executive power exists in many countries, including Western democracies. However, presidential power in the studied countries has significant differences. Eurasian political Authoritarianism is distinguished by significant features that have historical parallels with their progenitor states. They represent traditions of local absolutism with imported Western political state institutions. "…the Eurasian variety consists of several constitutional provisions found exclusively in the region's most authoritarian regimes" (Shtykov 2018, 125).

In addition to the informal nature of absolutism, the presidential power of the Eurasian type is characterized by the constitutional consolidation of this informal power due to several characteristics: the exclusive right of veto, complete and absolute irresponsibility, and the divinity

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of the source. The most important characteristic is the consolidation of all these characteristics in constitutions.

Moreover, if “the institution of the president is not an element of the system of separation of powers” (Shtykov, Ibid.), the institution of the absolute personality is outside the constitution. The constitutions of these countries only reinforce the recognition of illegitimate absolutes, recognizing their impotence and subordination to the fundamental law. At the same time, in this duality lies a profound inconsistency and conflict between the two supremacist branches of power: the super-presidency and the principate. As the history of Kazakhstan and Russia shows, this contradiction can lead to the complete collapse of states.

At the same time, one of the justifications for the idea of normative consolidation of the power of the absolute is the need to overcome the problems caused by authoritarian rule. The super-presidency not only did not overcome but even exacerbated the situation, worsening the work of institutions and increasing public discontent. Chronologically, the standardization of principate absolutism occurred after the standardization of the super-presidency. It is due to the need for a longer-term continuity of the political regime and traditions, which the super-presidency cannot cope with.

The constitutional formula about the "unity of power" (for example, in Kazakhstan and several other states of Eurasia) involves eliminating alternative centers of power with a formal assumption and constitutional consolidation. The result is restoring an authoritarian regime while creating a plebiscitary regime as an imperial presidency. Concentrating power in all the countries of the Central Asian region is based on blurring the boundaries between constitutional norms and norms of administrative law. Administrative law is withdrawn from the sphere of public law and public control with the help of legislation on state security, the regulatory and supervisory role of
the state, the expansion of discretionary powers of administrative institutions, and the establishment of a cult of law enforcement agencies.

The embodiment of the principles of national unity and state sovereignty takes the President's power beyond the system of public control. The separation of powers is characterized by giving the head of state a privileged social status and a personalistic style of government. Presidential power is the only source of final solutions to even the most straightforward problems.

Constitutional coups to establish the supremacy of presidential power were carried out in Kazakhstan, Russia, and China. Moreover, all these coups were committed after the collapse of the communist space, which indicates that supra-authoritarianism is the result of a single political legacy. To date, all these countries have constitutions that formalize the pre-eminent role of the president. They consolidate the supremacy of the president, standing above the legislative, judicial, and executive powers.

In Eurasian political systems, the institution of the president stands outside the horizontal system of separation of powers. It violates the system of checks and balances (O'Donnell G. A. 1998; 112-126, 119). The main measurable characteristics of the super-presidency are constitutionally, legislatively, and normatively fixed provisions on:

- the special status of the head of state.
- no limitation of occupied terms or zeroing of existing ones.
- exclusive right of veto or control over all branches of state power.
- supra-systematic status of presidential power.
- lack of responsibility for acts and legal immunity for the President personally and members of his family.

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- non-alternative and imitation elections.
- controlled referendums on renewal of powers.
- controlled constitutional referendums and courts that remove democratic restrictions.

A. Russia


1) Article 81, part 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 put a two-term limit on holding the post of President of the Russian Federation. In November 1998, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, by its decision, stopped Yeltsin's attempt to run for a third term in 2000 (1998. No. 134-O & paragraph 3 of Section 2)\(^{139}\). However, on March 11, 2020, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted amendments to Article 81, part 3, abolishing the restriction for Putin to participate in the next elections. Putin's two previous terms were nullified by passing a bill to nullify Putin's two previous terms according to Draft Law No. 885214–7. Putin's term in office from 2012 to 2024 was reset to zero, and he received the right to be elected both in 2024 and 2030. Such a manipulation of the electoral right gave constitutional recognition to the institution of super-presidency in Russia.

2) In addition, Putin was the President of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to today, holding this position for almost 20 years or four terms. It became possible because, until 2020, Article 81 Part 3 contained a clause that the same person cannot be the President of Russia "for more than two consecutive terms." This reservation allowed Putin to be elected President after 2008, in 2012, for two more terms.

\(^{139}\) RF’s Constitutional Court Determination №. 134-O (November 5, 1998) "On the case of the interpretation of Article 81 (Part 3) and paragraph 3 of Section Two "Final and Transitional Provisions" of the Constitution of the Russian Federation."
3) In addition, the Constitutional Amendment Act of December 2008 changed the president's term of office from 4 to 6 years. It allowed Putin to increase his tenure in the highest state post by another four years (No. 6-FKZ of 12/30/2008)\textsuperscript{140}.

4) The dominant role of the president over the regions was also strengthened through the adoption of a law in December 2004 on the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections. According to this law, the heads of regions began to be elected from lists of candidates formed by the president. Moreover, the president received the right to dismiss the heads of regions directly.

5) In September 2000, the President of the Russian Federation received additional leverage from the heads of the country's constituent entities by including their heads in the members of the State Council created under him.

B. Kazakhstan


- a referendum on extending the powers of the President until 2000, held in April 1995.
- constitutional referendum, which adopted the new Constitution of Kazakhstan in August 1995.
- constitutional amendments removing the upper age limit of 65 years and increasing the presidential term of office to 7 years (Law No. 284-I, 1998)\textsuperscript{141} of October 1998.

\textsuperscript{140} RF’s Constitutional Court Determination №. 134-O (November 5, 1998) "On the case of the interpretation of Article 81 (Part 3) and paragraph 3 of Section Two "Final and Transitional Provisions" of the Constitution of the Russian Federation."

- nullification by the Constitutional Court a posteriori of June 20, 2000, of the previous two presidential terms by decision of the Constitutional Court to give legality to the third term.
- amendments to paragraph 5 of article 42 of the country's constitution in 2007, limiting presidential powers to two consecutive terms. This change completely abolished the limits on the number of presidential terms personally for the First President. This amendment legitimized the third presidential term for Nazarbaev and made it possible to participate in the elections two more times.

In Kazakhstan, the first case of an authoritarian constitutional coup d’État began in the post-Soviet space. In 1995, Nazarbayev staged a coup d'état through a fake referendum, destroying the 1993 pro-democratic constitution. The independence of all branches of power was destroyed, and the presidential power received absolute power over all branches of power, placing itself outside the system of separation of powers. The authoritarian power, which seemed to have sunk into oblivion with the collapse of the Soviet Union, began its path of reverse ascent. Further manipulation of the constitution was undertaken to strengthen the super-presidential Primacy in the country and the Primacy of the Principate in the future:

1) The new Constitution of Kazakhstan, adopted at the end of August 1995 based on a referendum, legalized this provision, making the presidential power virtually independent and standing above other branches - legislative, executive, and judicial (Evseev V. 2013, 103).142

2) In 2010, amendments to constitutional laws were adopted that finally turned presidential rule into a super-presidency regime:

- "About elections"

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- "On the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,"
- "On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,"
- Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes.

3) These amendments gave Nazarbayev the status of the First President - the leader of the Nation. Recognition of his historical mission for the country.

4) Nazarbayev received complete and eternal immunity for himself and his family members.

5) Allocation of unlimited and non-transparent funds to maintain personal and family members.

6) In addition, "The First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Elbasy (leader of the nation Nazarbayev), by his historical mission, has the right to lead the Security Council as chairman for life" (RK Const. art. 46/Par. 4, 2010; RK Const. №. 289-IV, 2010).

7) In addition to the lifelong status, the constitutional amendments gave Nazarbayev lifelong immunity as the founder of an independent Kazakhstan and guaranteed him the invariability of his status.

8) In addition, Nazarbayev remained the head of the Security Council of Kazakhstan, the Chairman of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, the Chairman of the ruling Nur-Otan party, and a member of the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan.

C. China

The Chinese model is like the Russian and Kazakh models of authoritarianism. All three countries are heirs of a single progenitor state and, in some places, federal parts. China also lacks democratic traditions, and the dominant political tradition is the Eurasian model of authoritarianism.

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143RK Const. art. 46, Par. 4 (April 14, 2010) “On the Special Status of the First President”.
RK Const. №. 289-IV (June 14, 2010) “On Leader of the Nation”.
Therefore, twenty years later, China also went in the direction of strengthening super-presidential authoritarianism.

The rise of despotic authoritarianism in contemporary China has repeated the same logic in neighboring Eurasian countries. Moreover, if Kazakhstan was at the forefront of the formal strengthening of authoritarianism in 2010, then China was the second among these countries. Xi Jinping received the status of the core of the national ideology of the PRC in 2016, marking the beginning of the constitutional strengthening of authoritarianism. In 2018, a constitutional reform was carried out that legally consolidated authoritarianism, removing the two-time restriction on the post of President of the PRC. The adoption of these amendments was a logical continuation of the strengthening of the vertical of power. The top executive position complements the Chairman of the Communist Party of China. Similar amendments to the country's fundamental law in Russia were made in 2020 when amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation also emphasized the special status of Putin and removed all restrictions on his tenure as president.

The post of Chairman (President) of the PRC, as the post of head of state, was established with the adoption of the 1954 Constitution of the PRC. In 1975, the position of head of state was abolished and restored with the adoption of the new Constitution of 1982. From 1954 to 2023, the position of the President of the People's Republic of China was relatively nominal in the hierarchy of state power, without carrying an actual dominant role. No president has served more than two terms, even though the two-term limit was enshrined in the 1982 Constitution.

The position of the president itself served instead as an addition to the position of the actual head of state - the Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee. That is, the authoritarian power in the PRC has never been super-presidential until 2023. However, Xi Jinping's rise to power marked a gradual transition from a symbiosis of a personalist Principate to a super-
presidential rule. The first step was constitutional amendments to abolish the term limit for the head of state at the 3rd Plenum of the National People's Congress (NPC) annual session in March 2018.

Deputies of the National People's Congress adopted amendments to more than 20 articles of the country's constitution. The main characteristics of the Super-presidential variable are:

1) The absence of restrictions on the terms of office of the President (Chairman) of the PRC in the country's constitution.
2) The absence of a precise mechanism for re-election to the post of head of state enshrined in the constitution.
3) Amendment to the text of the constitution of the name and idea of Xi Jinping on “the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era” (archived 03/11/2018).144
4) Amendment on the creation of a new anti-corruption body - the State Committee for Supervision, as another support to the absolute power of the super-presidential board.

2. Primacy of the Principate

Another institution of personified authoritarianism is the institution of the Principate. It is an institution of authoritarianism based on the usurpation of actual power in the state, bypassing the formal institutions of power. The power of the Princeps (lat. informal leader for life) is based on controlling the highest civil (lifelong people / national leader) and military power as an alternative to state power. State institutions of power lose their political significance as Princeps control their elections. The institution of the Principate acquires the most exceptional political significance in a period of transition or war when state power is weakening. Its measured characteristics:

- exceptional political/spiritual status (Leader of the Nation, Spiritual Leader, Etc.).

- exclusive (aforementioned) legal status (lifelong personal immunity and for the whole clan/clan).
- control over civil electoral processes.
- lifetime exclusive status.
- control over the military-repressive apparatus.
- the auxiliary role of structural variables through which personalistic control of power is exercised.

All these provisions are enshrined directly or indirectly in the constitution by special laws, legal acts, and amendments.

Unlike the super-presidency, the institution of the Principate is not officially the highest state post in the power structure of the Eurasian authoritarian regimes. However, the power of the Princeps is formalized by statutes that de facto establish his Primacy in an authoritarian regime. The most common type of princely dominance is formal control over the main power structures of the country. Total control by force allows "Princeps" to dominate the presidential power and distance themselves from responsibility in making political decisions. As a rule, the institute of super-presidency combines the qualities of both presidential and trailing power. Therefore, they are interchangeable but not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the institution of the Principate often conflicts with all other variables of power if it goes beyond the complement of other ultra-authoritarian institutions.

The Principate, being a form of an institution of power since ancient times, combines the autocratic functions of one person with a formal republican political system. The modern interpretation of the Princeps, or first among equals, is represented by such terms as the leader of the Nation, the Fuhrer, the Supreme Leader, Etc. Their supreme power is based on the concentration
in the hands of the highest civil and military positions. If such consolidation occurs within the framework of the institution of the super-presidency, then the latter is incredibly strengthened. At the same time, the concentration of higher civil and military positions, on the one hand, occurs outside the institution of the official supreme state power and during the transition period.

This forceful formal domination is possible only in an authoritarian political system. Suppose it is not possible to turn a republic into a monarchy. In this case, the institution of the Principate serves to weaken the entire system of authoritarian power, coming into conflict with other components of authoritarianism.

However, a distinctive feature of the Eurasian countries is that there can be a president or princeps at the top of the constitutional pyramid of power. The Princeps may be an official who controls the state's power, party-ideological or legislative structures. Typically, the institution of the Principate is activated during transitional periods between autocratic personalist and structural power or vice versa. In the first case, such a transition between two supra-authoritarian variables occurs at a time of absolute power and in the face of the threat of anti-authoritarian reforms. In the second case, such a transition occurs as a strengthening of the personalistic absolute. Similar facts have occurred during transition periods during the transfer of power, for example, in Kazakhstan in 2019-2022; in China since 2018; and in Russia in 2008-2012, and again from 2020.

A. Kazakhstan

Outgoing super-president Nazarbayev attempted to establish a Principate in Kazakhstan in 2019. Control over the state was supposed to be exercised through leadership in the shadow state structures and the leading party. In addition, Nazarbayev personally, regardless of status, was subject to the status of the First President and Leader of the Nation enshrined in the constitution. Thus, the 2019-2022 Nazarbayev Principate was characterized by the following parameters:
1) Leadership in the Security Council (1991–2022), which controls all the country’s law enforcement agencies and military (2019).


3) Membership in the Constitutional Council (2019–23) to oversee changes to the constitution.

4) Chairmanship of the ruling political party Nur Otan (2007–2022), which included all officials and the ruling class.

5) The status of the leader of the Nation and the Founder of an independent state.

6) Non-jurisdiction and over-systematic nature of Nazarbayev personally and members of his family.

7) Complete and non-transparent state maintenance of the leader of the Nation and his family.

8) The personality cult of Nazarbayev and his activities.

B. Russia

The Putin Principate period was implemented in Russia between 2008–2012. Then Putin was forced to submit to temporary constitutional restrictions on being elected President more than twice in a row. However, during this period, Putin retained the fullness of supra-authoritarian power through the Primacy of the Principate variable. One of the former leaders of the opposition Liberal Democrats noted that “…a strict sequence is striking…a one-party system, an obedient parliament, the primacy of statehood over a person, Leaderism" (Yakovlev A. 2005, No. 2)\textsuperscript{145}. Specifically, Putin has retained his top position in the hierarchy through direct control over two significant structural variables and presidential power:

1) Chairmanship of the ruling “United Russia” party in 2008-2012 when the previously non-partisan Putin was elected its head. For this purpose, the Charter of the Party was preliminarily changed at the IX Party Congress (2012)\textsuperscript{146}.

2) Chairmanship of the Russian Security Council in which Putin has been Chairman of the Russian Security Council since its inception in March 1992.

3) Chairmanship in the Government of the Russian Federation, in which all members were also members of the ruling party, and the power ministers were subordinate to the head of the Security Council.

C. China

Although the supremacy of the role of the CPC was enshrined in the first Constitution of the PRC, the independent role of an authoritarian leader has always had an unconstitutional (informal) phenomenon, as in other countries of Eurasia. First, it was carried out indirectly through the country’s fundamental law without formal enshrinement in the constitution. Secondly, the leader’s unique role was carried out directly through the party leadership, which had a status formally enshrined in the constitution.

The party's first leader, Mao Zedong, was the country's leader for life. Mao's lifelong status as absolute ruler was secured through the posts of Supreme Commander and Head of the Military Council (later the Central Military Council of the People’s Republic of China) of the CPC Central Committee. In addition, the personality of Mao Zedong was deified in the 1960s at the height of the Cultural Revolution.

The Personalist Principate, led by Mao Zedong, included:

\textsuperscript{146}RIA News. “History of the All-Russian political party "United Russia". \textit{RIA News}, April 24, 2012.
- the post of Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee – de facto Leader of both the party and the country in 1943-76.
- the position of Chairman (General Secretary) of the CPC Central Committee – the head of the Communist Party, which was assigned the status of hegemon of the state and people in the Constitution of the PRC in 1943-76.
- deification of the status and personality cult of Mao Zedong with traditional informal epithets “Great Pilot,” “Supreme Leader of the Nation”.
- comprehensive national mobilization campaigns: “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” “Great Leap Forward,” “Cultural Revolution”.
- mass repressions against political opponents within the country (Spence J. 2001, 451).147
- official consolidation of the “ideas of Mao Zedong” as an ideological basis (Simonovskaya, L. V., Yuriev V. F. 1974, 504-514).149
- the auxiliary role of structural variables (CPC and parallel institutions) through which power control was exercised.

If examples of the Principate in Chinese history are the period of Mao Zedong’s lifelong rule, then the reign of Xi Jinping is an example of super-presidential Primacy. However, the latter’s

formation also began with Xi Jinping’s Principate. Xi Jinping’s personalist authoritarianism has formed a super-presidential Primacy since 2018, securing the right to be elected to the highest public office without restriction (McGregor R., Blanchett. J. 2021, Introduction)\(^ {150}\). At the same time, the Xi Principate existed as a preparatory phase from 2012 to 2018–22. During this time, Xi Jinping also controlled all power in the country through the highest positions in the CPC Central Committee, the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, and the PRC Central Military Council. In particular, the Xi Principate is characterized by the following parameters:

- proclaiming itself the “core” of the CPC Central Committee in 2016.
- called on all party members to “guard” his status as the main backbone and undisputed leader of the CPC Central Committee in 2019.
- the release of the “two charms” strategy (两个维护) in early 2019.
- the deification of the personality and safety of Xi Jinping as the guarantor of the authority of the CPC Central Committee (2019)\(^ {151}\).
- the auxiliary role of structural variables (CPC and parallel institutions) through which power control was exercised.

### III. Structural Variables

Structural authoritarian institutions in authoritarian countries of the Eurasian type are institutions of power with a deep historical tradition and party-ideological institutions. On the one hand, various state organizations are created to control the official branches of government. On the

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other hand, these are Western party-ideological constructs that have taken root well on the authoritarian soil of the Eurasian political system.

They are structural institutions of authoritarian power integrated into the Eurasian political system to support personalist authoritarian regimes. They are not only auxiliary but also alternative institutions in maintaining Authoritarianism. Even though they can be integrated into the legal field of political systems, they are based on informal traditions. Since these institutions are not among the three main branches of power in the West and Eurasian countries, they represent the informal Primacy of the supra-authoritarian factor. His measured variables for this study are:

1) parallel shadow state institutions,

2) party-ideological constructions.

In the algorithm of causation, I suggested that structural institutions play an auxiliary role in determining the factor of supra-authoritarianism. Together with the formal Primacy of super-presidency and principate, the informal Primacy forms the supra-authoritarian factor of the Eurasian regime. It is activated during transitional periods when the leaders of an authoritarian regime change and when the constitutional foundations of a super-presidency or principate lose their force or are canceled. During a crisis of personalistic variables, one of the variables of informal Primacy comes into play based on local political traditions and authoritarian legacies.

Empirical analysis of transitional periods in the studied countries shows that the constitutional abolition of personal variables does not generate democratic changes in the state or society. Despite the temporary turbulence of authoritarian regimes when leaders change, authoritarian traditions remain unshakable and find the power to strengthen a new round of authoritarianism. The regime remains the same even when the authoritarian leader changes because political traditions and traditional players remain unchanged. During transitional periods, the
mechanism of replacing personality variables with structural ones is activated to ensure the preservation of supra-authoritarianism in the countries under study. In any case, any personalistic form of a supra-authoritarian regime in the history of the Eurasian countries ended in continuous socio-political upheavals.

1. Variable Shadow (Parallel) Institutions

Structural-authoritarian institutions are officially fixed state-political institutions based on long-standing political traditions of statehood in the region. They are based on the traditional actual relations between the authorities and the people, which constitute the political legacy of the region's countries. They can closely intersect, supplement, replace or discredit the central formal-democratic institutions of the Western type, turning them into institutions with the imitation of democracy. Therefore, these structural institutions can be called parallel state institutions, existing along with the central democratic institutions of the separation of powers of the Western type.

Some researchers note informal institutions that play a significant role in the public administration system. Just as in Russia and Kazakhstan, the parallel existence of formal (Western) and informal (mainly shadow) institutions has been introduced into public life at all levels. Moreover, this is part of the political tradition in Russia, Kazakhstan, and China. In this case, it is subject to the system of "Chinese ethnic consciousness," which recognizes the supremacy of the regime of "informal" connections (Gotlib 2008, 45–53)\textsuperscript{152}.

In authoritarian countries with weak democratic traditions, shadow parallel institutions continue to shape genuine relationships at all levels of society. In this case, they continue the traditions firmly rooted in society. Consequently, the legacy of traditional values, or their

inconsistency with formal rules, determines the latter's effectiveness. The stronger the traditional informal structural institutions, the weaker the formal institutions of power and their influence on the state. With a significant divergence between parallel traditional and mainstream democratic institutions, a significant gap is formed between the state and society, filled by the dominant ideology imposed on society. Therefore, during the crisis of both personalistic and parallel shadow institutions, the party-ideological institution occupies the niche of maintaining the supra-authoritarian regime.

In the case of Kazakhstan, China, and Russia, the parallel institutions reflect traditions of supra-authoritarianism. All of them are countries with a deep historical tradition of state authoritarianism. These institutions contrast with the central formal institutions, which are meant to be democratic. Therefore, in Eurasian autocracies, traditional institutions make official state institutions ineffective by imitating civil society. Some researchers call them informal (Omarova A. 2007, 31)\textsuperscript{153}. Informal institutions are based on powerful cultural and political traditions: the Soviet legacy, Islam, and the traditional way of life.

In the case of the countries under study, all democratic institutions legitimize authoritarian regimes in the modern world dominated by Western world order models. At the same time, parallel and ideological institutions operate effectively within these countries, hiding behind or lining up in the structure of central formal institutions. Imitation of the work of the parliament, political parties, courts, democratic constitution, and other democratic institutions allows some researchers to call these countries imitation democracies (Medushevsky 2012, 47)\textsuperscript{154}.


Such political systems are purely authoritarian, combining the imitation of imported democratic institutions controlled by shadowy traditional institutions. Therefore, most Eurasian countries are authoritarian shadow states with imitation declared democracy.

Comparative analysis of the measured variable of informal dominance shows its identity in all three countries studied. The type, quantity, and quality of influence on political processes allow us to measure the variable.

A. Russia

1) The State Council of the Russian Federation, which exists in parallel with the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federation, was established in 1991. The State Council is a constitutional body formed by a decree of the President and fully controlled by him. The primary authoritarian function of the State Council is to coordinate all branches of power and all state bodies, thereby abolishing the principle of the democratic separation of powers.

The State Council replaces the Federation Council in everyday life and levels the principles of federalism and parliamentarism. The State Council consists of representatives of the executive branch. It is the governing body of federalism and parliamentarism because it is the governing body and mainly consists of representatives of the executive branch. Thus, he equally levels the parliament or that part of the parliament responsible for regional interests within the country. On the other hand, it poses a threat to federalism.

In December 2020, the status of the State Council was enshrined in the constitution. Amendments to the Basic Law consolidated the powers of the President to form it, continuing to further strengthen the vertical of power through the State Council (2020).  

The State Council of the Russian Federation is an example of the continuation of the political legacy of the State Council of the Russian Empire (1810–1917). They are similar both in their functions and organizational structure. The head of the State Council of the Russian Federation was the Russian emperor, just as the head of the State Council of the Russian Federation was the President of the Russian Federation.

2) The Security Council of the Russian Federation (SC) is a constitutional state-deliberative body under the President of the Russian Federation. The Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation ex officio is the President of the Russian Federation. The duties of the Security Council of the Russian Federation include exercising the functions of the President of the Russian Federation "in governing the state, shaping the internal, foreign and military security policy, maintaining the state sovereignty of Russia (2020)\textsuperscript{156}. Members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation are personally elected and may be heads of any branch of government. They are obliged to obey the head of the Security Council, thereby violating the democratic principle of the separation of powers.

The Security Council of the Russian Federation and the State Council of the Russian Federation are good examples of the substitution of informal structural institutions of power for the super-presidency at the top of the authoritarian power vertical in Russia. Thus, Putin's cession of the presidency in 2008 due to constitutional restrictions on a third term did not deprive Putin of his de facto status as supreme head of state. During his tenure as head of government (2008-2012), Putin served as head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since 1999 and completely abolished the functioning of the State Council of the Russian Federation, the position of head of

which body is assigned to the head of state. The latter weakened the power of the head of state compared to the head of the Security Council.

**B. Kazakhstan**

1) The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, since 1995, is a consultative and advisory body created under the President and headed by him, endowed with constitutional status and powers since 2007 and the right to appoint their representatives to the upper house of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan. Thus, a third of the members of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2022 was appointed by direct presidential decree, which further strengthened the authoritarian vertical of power.

2) The Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan is another state body that occupies a higher functional level in the informal power hierarchy than the formal branches of power. Its main functions are control over all law enforcement agencies in the military sphere, national security, and internal socio-political stability. The generally accepted rule is that the President of the country is also the head of the Security Council. In 2017, an attempt was made to use this body as an alternative center of supreme power in an authoritarian system by passing constitutional law on the Security Council of the Republic. According to this law, the First President - Elbasy, received the right to head the Security Council “for life” due to his historical mission (2018). This law allowed Nazarbayev to remain in power for life as Chairman of the Security Council, even if he lost his presidency. Thanks to these constitutional amendments, dual power remained in the country for almost three years (2019-2022), leading to an acute power crisis.

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C. China

The entire political system of China has a dual character, expressed in a system of mixed party-state administration through formal state and informal institutions. In the PRC, from the very beginning, the combination of key positions by the supreme head of the executive power has been practiced. At the same time, a combination of the head of the executive, party, and military forms of power in the country is mandatory. The Secretary-General holds the positions of head of state (Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the PRC) and military (Chairman of the Central Military Council of the PRC).

1) The Politburo of the CPC Central Committee is the oversight body of the Communist Party of China headed by the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Since the members of the Politburo are the highest state leaders of all branches of government, this body also has unlimited power. It is the highest informal body, built into the constitutional field, but located outside and above the democratic format of the separation of powers.

2) In addition, there is the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee, which is the governing body of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and consists of 7 members (from 5 to 9 at different times). Membership in the PC of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee is assigned to the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, the head of government and the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, the Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Council of China, and other top officials of China. The head of the party is the head of the Standing Committee, and the heads of the executive and legislative branches are officially subordinate to him. The head of the CPC, through the leadership of the Standing Committee, has supreme authority over all branches of government.
3) The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) is another undemocratic division of power that has replaced China's supreme legislative body. This body regulates the adoption of most legislative acts. It is another parallel body that implements legislation along with the NPC following the constitution. This committee replaces the NPC. In addition to lawmaking, the NPC ratifies international treaties in international relations. The NPC has the right to decide on pardons, mobilization in the country, and the introduction of a state of emergency. Between sessions, the NPC has the right to declare war for defense or, if necessary, implement international treaties on joint defense.

4) The People's Political Consultative Council of China is an organization of the Patriotic United Front of the Chinese People, which includes representatives of all satellite parties under the leadership of the CCP and other public organizations. The functions of this body include political consultations and democratic control. It is another body of political control over the multi-party system existing by law as an element of political democracy.

5) The Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China is the highest state body for the leadership of all of China's armed forces. The role of this body as an informal institution was demonstrated in the 70-the 90s. Deng Xiaoping, who combined the positions of the chairs of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Military Commission (CMC), was the country's de facto ruler. At that time, the Chairman of the Central Military Council controlled, corrected, and directed the activities of the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee/Chairman of the People's Republic of China. During this period, there was a dual power in the country. A similar period of dual power was established from 2002 to 2005 when Hu Jintao served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee/President of the People's Republic of China and Jiang Zemin served as Chairman of the CMC.
Since 2005, all three bodies have been headed by one person, which ensures an undeniable and authoritarian strong vertical of power in the state. At the same time, two of the three institutions of power are informal (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Council), and only one (NPC) is a formal institution of power. Thus, the real power of informal shadow institutions of power was demonstrated without complete control over which supra-authoritarian power is undermined.

6) The Security Council of China is a party body aimed at maintaining authoritarian power. Created and led by Xi Jinping during the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013. Coordinates and makes critical decisions for all law enforcement agencies and the country's secret services.

2. Party-Ideological Variable

A. Strengthening Party Authoritarianism in the USSR

Successful authoritarian counter-reforms are rooted in authoritarian political traditions. The collapse of the USSR, with subsequent attempts to democratize the newly formed states, repeated the collapse of the Russian Empire. At the initial stage of formation in the USSR and then in the Russian Federation, there was a short period of democratization. The same is true for the process of federalization. In both cases, the gradual restoration of authoritarian traditions in almost the entire space of the collapsed empires took place in approximately the same way and according to similar mechanisms.

The fall of one of the most authoritarian-absolutist states in the world, the Russian Empire, led to many political upheavals, such as civil war and national liberation movements. The Bolsheviks won over the imperialist colonial peoples, giving the most influential nations equal status and the right to secede from the USSR freely. These provisions were enshrined in the first
Constitution of the USSR in 1924. By recognizing the sovereignty of nationalities, the communists could secure a temporary superiority over their political rivals who advocated the restoration of the Russian Empire.

However, the regime shifts from tsarist to communist did not change Moscow's territorial claims to the entire legacy of the Russian Empire. Only by following the political legacy of the Russian Empire could the communists retain power in the same territory. The original Constitution of the USSR, which the communists were forced to adopt, supported a simulated federal structure. It also advocated a gradual evolution "from class dictatorship to democratic Western parliamentarism. It meant the extension of civil rights to the peasantry (Medushevsky 2015, 521)\textsuperscript{158}."

As soon as the power of the communists was consolidated, they began a crusade to limit the sovereignty of nations. First, this was done by changing the constitutions of the Union republics. “Condemning the concept of a single and indivisible Russian Empire for tactical reasons, they are pursuing a course towards its restoration in a new form” (Ibid.)\textsuperscript{159}.

The first Constitution of the RSFSR of 1924 created a powerful supranational and supra-federal center—the Presidium of the RSFSR. Although the union bodies had complete independence in resolving issues of local importance, all other constitutional changes were aimed at limiting the independence of the legislation of the union republics in all respects.

The cementing institution that temporarily replaced legislative revisionism (1924–37) and sublimated tsarist authoritarian power was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Some researchers note the formal nature of the constitution and all institutions of state power as a tribute


\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
to Western political traditions (Carr E. 1958, 557)\textsuperscript{160}. The adoption of state decisions was outside the constitutional system, as in the days of tsarist Russia. The main despotic body at the initial stage of the creation of the USSR was the Communist Party as a whole.

However, with the physical elimination of the first revolutionaries and ideologists, despotic power immediately passed into the hands of the General Secretary, who was not part of the system of formal state power and its branches. Also, from the point of view of legislation, neither the party nor its leader had power over any branch of state power. The General Secretary of the CPSU played the same role as the tsar concerning his states.

The monopoly of the Communist Party on total power proved necessary to exercise effective control over all the people of the USSR. The struggle of the Central Committee of the CPSU to suppress the national cells of the party by creating and strengthening supranational institutions was necessary to avoid the collapse of the USSR. In the policy of centralization, the party and the autocracy used the same methods: "Russification of national cultures, on the one hand, the inclusion of national elites in the central political elite, on the other" (Kappeler 1993, 306-310)\textsuperscript{161}. The authoritarian power of the party was identical to the authoritarian power of the imperial autocracy and pursued the same goals - preserving a single political heritage throughout the political space of imperial Eurasia. They were confirmed by the fact that the USSR collapsed a month after the legal dissolution of the CPSU in 1991.

They are characterized by authoritarian rule, the formality of institutions and branches of constitutional state power, and the desire to create a supranational and non-national state (imperial).


However, the main character is the parallelism of the system of effective traditional informal and imported formal institutions of state power. The former plays the role of a supremacist, while the latter exists to legitimize the former. Moreover, the role of the former is legislatively enshrined in the constitution, contradicting the latter and leveling their functionality at the constitutional level. Thus, nominal constitutionalism consists "not only in hiding reality but also in creating another reality - in the conventional justification for the extralegal use of state power as the most effective resolution of national conflicts" (Medushevsky 2015, 525).162

One of the indications that the entire central political platform of the communists was aimed at restoring control and preserving the CPSU coincides with the assessments of studies of ongoing processes. Some studies (Nove 1975, 41)163 indicate that totalitarianism was necessary to preserve and maintain the artificial unity of the multinational state. So “... in modern Western works on Stalinism everyone points to the terror machine as the main tool for uniting and concentrating party power in the state” (Medushevsky 2015, 543).164

**B. Weakening of Party Authoritarianism in the USSR**

The 1977 Constitution further secured the party's leading role. It was declared that the CPSU is the "core of the political" and state system, determines the prospects for the development of society, and directs domestic and foreign policy; that is, it is endowed with all the signs of state sovereignty (1977).165 However, the legislative consolidation of the party's status in the Constitution of 1977 entailed the loss of its essential leadership role. Its abolition at the end of the 80s led to the

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complete collapse of the party. The problem was that the CPSU lost its informal "divine" status and became part of the legislative branches of power responsible for their actions. Having infiltrated the formal system of separation of the branches of power, the CPSU lost its mediating and controlling role over other branches.

The basis of the legitimacy of authoritarianism was the constitutional consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat through the party instrument, and power was attributed only to the party elite. The constitutional reforms deprived the party of the exclusivity of power, giving power to all the people. Further, another part of the autocratic variable was canceled - the dictatorship of the proletariat, leading to the country's collapse. The intra-party struggle led to the constitutional consolidation of the party's leading role in the state, which was enshrined in Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution. The 1977 constitution, "which did not contain any legal restrictions on the power of the party," nevertheless eliminated the most important component of Eurasian-type Authoritarianism – the desire for "the restoration of Stalinism, but with guarantees against mass repressions" (Medushevsky 2015, 551)\(^\text{166}\).

There is an analogy with the legislative design of absolutism as a manifestation of the public and God's will in its leading role in society in imperial Russia. Like the constitutional legalization of party leadership, monarchical constitutionalism opposed absolute despotism. Both the monarchy and the party were designated as the bearers of sovereignty and the source of constitutional norms. However, the principle of the contract also meant that the rules of law began to apply to the bearers themselves. Thus, "... the principle of socialist legality, therefore, extends entirely to the Communist Party" (1982)\(^\text{167}\). Thus, the principle of the supra-systematic traditional shadow power of the party


and the monarchy was violated, turning them into subjects and objects of constitutional law. It is no coincidence that these changes took place shortly before the fall of the monarchy and the party responsible for the social upheavals that preceded the collapse.

C. Chinese Communist Party

For millennia, China has been dominated by an imperial political system. They were replaced in the 20th century by the totalitarian regimes of the Kuomintang and the communists. The despotic power of the emperor was unlimited. However, even at the same time, the role of the enormous state bureaucracy remained huge in ensuring the preservation of the state system and the ruling regime. Thus, even in imperial China, there was a tradition of generational change of officials, a tradition of generational change in the Communist Party of China and all its state organs. As Francis Fukuyama noted that the “Chinese Communist Party imposed many rules on itself: mandatory retirement ages for party cadres, strict meritocratic standards for recruitment and promotion, and above all a 10-year term limit for the party’s most-senior leadership…. a system of collective leadership precisely to avoid the dominance of a single obsessive leader” (2022)\(^{168}\).

Later, the Communist ideology repeated the ideas of the ancient spiritual and moral philosophy of Confucianism, which puts the absolute priority of the collective over the individual and does not recognize the independent existence of the latter over the former. In addition, the supremacy of the role of the CCP was enshrined in the first Constitution of the PRC.

D. Kazakhstan

The authoritarian government in Kazakhstan has provided more robust support to the party-ideological institution as part of the informal structural institution of Authoritarianism. The ruling party, "Nur-Otan" ("Amanat"), from the moment of its creation in 1999 until 2022, was headed by

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the President of Kazakhstan. At the same time (legally and in fact), the head of the ruling party, the
Kazakh regime represented by the presidential power, was a harsher form of Authoritarianism than
the Russian one before 2019. Like the United Russia party, Kazakhstan's Nur-Otan party of power
is the leading party in power, designed to strengthen the presidential vertical of power further.

It is confirmed by the administrative efforts of the authorities to ensure the de facto
dominance of one party while maintaining the traditional dominance of the multi-party system.
Thus, the tools for ensuring the dominance of the variable of structural-party-ideological Primacy
were:

1) The procedure for the early dissolution of the parliament with the subsequent amendment

2) Change of the legislation is selective with alternation of majoritarian and proportional
systems. This measure was practiced when changing the positions of the ruling party.

3) Amendments to legislative acts (2002, 2009) obliging the party to be guided by the
constitution when carrying out constitutional changes in tightening Authoritarianism.

An attempt to use the institute of the party-ideological institute was made in 2019 by the
outgoing ex-president. He retained the post of Chairman of the ruling party, creating unacceptable
dual power in the country. The Kazakh autocrat had full power in the country, controlling the
central structural shadow institutions. During this period, the incumbent President remained only a
figurehead. At the same time, the autocrat retained constitutional control over the parliament
through the party-ideological institution and, in general, law enforcement agencies through the
institution of the Security Council.

Moreover, only external support from the authoritarian regimes of China and Russia allowed
the second president to remain in office. An attempt by force to remove the President from power
by the current autocrat, who took advantage of popular uprisings, was stopped only by external forces. Russia and China remain key states that share the same political legacy as Kazakhstan and are interested in the stability of a kindred regime. That provoked their foreign policy moves, forcing them to intervene strongly in the country's affairs, including military force.

E. Russia

The All-Russian political party "United Russia" (ER) is unlike the CPSU. Created in 2001 by regional leaders, it has neither an advanced political heritage nor the all-encompassing authority of an actual authoritarian party-ideological construct for the entire society. Although United Russia is the leading "party of power," it does not reflect the ideology that unites society or its moods.

1) Created for the needs of the ruling elite, United Russia is just one of many parties that enjoy administrative support from the authorities to ensure their leading role in the legislature.

2) In the spring of 2005, a law was passed that changed the rules for electing the State Duma: the norm was canceled according to which half of the lower house was elected by lists and the second half by single-member districts. Now the entire chamber is elected exclusively from party lists. The beneficiaries of the reform of the Duma are large federal parties and, above all, United Russia. It is expanding its influence in the regions: by the beginning of 2007, 70 of 86 regional leaders have party cards. The parties dominating the regional parliaments get the right to propose their candidates to the President for submission for approval to the positions of governors. Most regional parliaments are dominated by United Russia, which is finally taking on the appearance of the ruling party.

3) Today, the ER is one of the structural institutions of power used to support authoritarianism in the event of a weakening of its personified variables. It is no coincidence that the autocrat Putin became the Leader of United Russia for the period the transfer of the presidential
post in 2008-2012 to ensure control over the main legislative body of the country - the State Duma of the Russian Federation. As Chairman of United Russia between 2008 and 2012, he controlled the State Duma through a parliamentary and constitutional majority (2011)\textsuperscript{169}. It also controlled the Federation Council of the Russian Federation during this period through:

- the constitutional majority (more than 3/4) of the total number of members of the Federation Council,
- the majority (more than 2/3) of the total number of deputies of the State Duma in 2011.

According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the adoption of constitutional laws requires a constitutional majority in the State Duma and the Federation Council. And for the removal of the President from office, at least 2/3 in both cases. By providing this party instrument of the majority, the party's leader can control the state's authoritarian power.

4) Another characteristic of party-ideological dominance is the mass entry of governors into the ruling party. In addition, in the absence of a pronounced ideology, the leading party members are united by loyalty to the existing personalist Primacy in the state.

\textbf{F. China}

In China, the National People's Congress (NPC) was subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this authoritarian power structure. As the main legislative body of the People's Republic of China, the NPC confirmed its formal character. In the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, informal autocratic control is exercised through the institution of the Security Council. In the case of China, the system of total control is carried out through the institution of the Commission of the CCP Central Committee for Discipline Inspection. According to Nikanorov A. 2011. “United Russia wins an absolute majority.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 12. \textsuperscript{169}

to the new law on state security, the Commission for Discipline reports directly to the head of the Council of People's Commissars, turning into a kind of Soviet NKVD - a powerful punitive body.

However, the leading party-ideological institution that ensures authoritarianism in China remains the CCP, as it was in the USSR until 1977. Michael Bonnin characterizes Chinese-style authoritarianism as totalitarian (2013)\(^{170}\) since the CCP has a monopoly on the management of society. And not so much in the ideological field but in the sphere of monopolization by the state administration (Gordon 2004, 151–168)\(^{171}\). It is confirmed by the fact of the destruction of the political opposition by recognizing its activities as illegal. To consolidate ideological power in exchange for the absence of political opposition, the party promises to compensate for significant economic growth, freedom of activity, and an increase in the welfare of the entire population.

In the hierarchy of Chinese Authoritarianism, the Communist Party is the core of the entire political system, at the top of the power pyramid at the same time. This central body controls all social processes:

1) The dominant role of the Communist Party is enshrined in the constitution, where the CCP stands outside the existing three branches of state power: legislative, judicial, and executive.

2) Unlike the Soviet Constitution of 1977, the Chinese version of the constitutionalization of the ruling party is supported by another shadow structural institution, such as the "People's Political Consultative Conference of China" (PPC), which provides control over all other parties and ideologies.

3) The leading role of the CPC is also assigned to all public and state organizations.


4) The initial official interpretation of the regime was enshrined as a democratic dictatorship of the people. It was like the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union. In addition, the CCP was the spokesman for the will of the people.

At the same time, the decisions of the Communist Party of China are not of a directive nature for the whole society but are binding, which indicates the totalitarian nature of power in the country. Party committees, which perform supervisory functions, permeate all levels of public life. The leaders of party committees either unite or exercise control over the heads of departments. The party itself plays a significant role in all spheres of public life. The unlimited power of the CCP, enshrined in the constitution, outside the system of state power and relying on law enforcement agencies, testifies to the authoritarianism of the Eurasian type in the PRC.

Counterfactual analysis is another argument in favor of the importance of a constitutional basis. It legitimizes authoritarian power to reveal causal relationships without this constitutional basis. That is, Gorbachev's attempt to build a super-presidential Primacy without the support of the structural variables of power as the leading party-ideological institution and parallel institutions of power led to the complete collapse of the authoritarian system in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The same thing happened during the duality of authoritarian power in Kazakhstan between 2019-22, when the system's collapse in January 2022 was prevented only with the help of the external intervention of the pivotal countries of the common authoritarian space. Immediately after the suppression of anti-presidential unrest, the new President of Kazakhstan began to abolish the constitutional consolidation of the institution of the Principate.
IV. “January 2022 Uprising”:

Supra-Authoritarian Background

1. Resurgence of Supra-Authoritarianism

Supra-authoritarianism in Kazakhstan, in principle, has never ceased to exist. The Soviet party nomenklatura was transformed into a local elite, which, having abandoned the communist ideology, retained, and further used the former authoritarian institutions. The short period of democratic hopes after the collapse of the USSR and the independence of Kazakhstan in December 1991 was immediately replaced by a course toward tightening the personalist component of supra-authoritarian power in Kazakhstan two years later.

The course towards building a rigid personalistic vertical of power in Kazakhstan, which began in 1993, confirms my statement about the sequence of constant alternation of components (variables) of supra-authoritarianism, the fluctuations of which are aimed at the survival of an authoritarian regime of the Eurasian type. In this context, the statement of Zvyagelskaya that "the acquisition of independence by the states of Central Asia was accompanied by the process of formation of authoritarian regimes" (2011)\(^1\), can quite reasonably be replaced by the phrase about the "process of restoring power" of supra-authoritarian regimes in each of most of the former parts of the USSR.

Gorbachev's attempt to replace the party-ideological component with a personalist one by destroying the former led to the most vital internal political contradictions and the regime's inability to maintain a single empire. The collapse of the personalist party-ideological component of the supra-authoritarianism of the late USSR led to the collapse of statehood but not of the regime itself.

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The surviving national elites of the collapsed state was engaged in restoring supra-authoritarianism by strengthening the personalist component. Zvyagelskaya argues that the ideology of liberal values, which replaced the communist ideology destroyed by Gorbachev, became "a bargaining chip in an exciting race for profit and influence" (Ibid., 226).¹⁷³

Nevertheless, the revival of the Primacy of personalistic supra-authoritarianism in Kazakhstan would not have been possible without the revival of auxiliary structural components at the stage of formation of an independent state. Moreover, in Kazakhstan, the connection between the party-ideological variable and the traditional institutions of society had a direct connection. In fact, in Kazakhstan, local traditional institutions were interweaving, like clans oriented towards influential personalities, with parties and shadow institutions of state power.

The legacy of personalism and structural authoritarianism manifested itself in the national specificity of political traditions, in which liberal democratic traditions were weakly present. A. Zubov believes that authoritarian power in dominant parties and in clans is ensured not by ideology but by the dominance of the individual heading this party in the hierarchy of state power, regardless of social groups (Zubov 1991, 24)¹⁷⁴. For example, the “Asar” party, which challenged the presidential party in power, “Nur-Otan”, the second most popular party between 2003-2006, was led by the President's eldest daughter and the regional clan on which she relied. The party was promptly liquidated before the failed coup d'état attempted by her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, in 2007.

At the same time, the strengthening of the structural component, which took place in the conditions of the initial party-ideological vacuum, took place against the background of the populist declaration of the regime's commitment to the democratization and liberalization of society. The

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¹⁷³ Ibid., 226.
ideas of the legal society could not do without strengthening party participation in political
processes and the country’s transition to a multi-party system. The declared universal imperatives of
observance of human rights, the elective power of political freedoms, the constitutionally fixed
separation of all branches of power, and the rule of law took place against the background of the
actual strengthening of authoritarianism. Evseev argued that "local elites… imitated elements of
democracy", while the US and Europe… tried to ignore this, mistaking tribal organizations for
political parties, and state-controlled structures for non-governmental organizations" (Evseev 2013,
101-107).175.

In any case, the resurgence of supra-authoritarianism in Kazakhstan since 1993 has taken
place in several stages. It has also been subject to internal political conflicts between the four
components of the supra-authoritarian factor.

2. Stages of the Resurgence

The first stage (1991–1993) is a transitional stage from a part of the imperial type of
autonomous statehood to a declared statehood of a sovereign type. The general weakness of
authoritarian power, coupled with liberal democratic attitudes, led to adopting the only democratic
Constitution in 1993. Its main initiator of adoption was the legislative body of the new country, the
Supreme Council, which represented the essential counterbalance to the executive power in the
transition period.

In the second stage (1994–95), personalist authoritarianism began to emerge in Kazakhstan
in connection with the adoption of the following acts:

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175 Evseev, Vladimir Valerievich. 2013. “Authoritarianism in Central Asia (on the example of Kazakhstan)”. *Bulletin of
1) Law of 1995 "On temporary delegation of additional powers to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and heads of local administrations" until January 1, 2005.

2) a referendum in April 1995 to extend the powers of the President until December 1, 2001.

3) The new Constitution, adopted in August 1995, legalized the extension of the powers of the President and took the first step towards forming a super-presidential power standing above all branches of power.

4) Adoption of Art. 61 of the new Constitution, in which the President of the country received a priority right over the Parliament to carry out legislative activities.

5) The right to appoint members of the Supreme Court by the President, according to the new Constitution, placed presidential Primacy over the judicial branch of power.

6) The body of control over the supreme executive power was destroyed by transforming the Constitutional Court into an advisory body - the Constitutional Council.

The third stage (1996-1998) is another round of strengthening the personalist super-presidential component of authoritarianism with the introduction of changes to the country's Constitution in October 1998 in the form of lengthening the presidential term from 5 to 7 years and the abolition of the upper age limit (65-year threshold) to elect a president.

The fourth stage (1999–2007) marked a hitherto unprecedented increase in authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. On May 18, 2007, at a joint session of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan" was adopted (2007)\(^{176}\).

According to these amendments to the Basic Law:

1) President Nazarbayev was now able to be elected president without any restrictions.

2) the parliament, entirely controlled by the president, received the authority to form two-thirds of the composition of the Constitutional Council, two-thirds of the composition of the Central Election Commission, and two-thirds of the Accounts Committee.

3) The ban on state funding of public associations has been lifted.

4) the president will not be able to suspend his activities in a political party for the period of exercising his powers.

The fourth stage is also characterized by strengthening the structural component beyond authoritarianism in the form of the consolidation of clan parties around the ruling “Nur-Otan” party. This strengthening occurred mainly in 2004–07 when the first internal political conflict between clans in the power struggle occurred. The immediate consolidation of the auxiliary structural variable around the super President resulted in tight control over all parties and clans in the country.

The fifth stage (2008-2012) ended with the subsequent strengthening of the super-presidential variable in June 2010 with the constitutional consolidation of the status of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - the Leader of the Nation. The constitutional laws "On the Special Status of the First President" on April 14, 2010, and "On Leader of the Nation" on June 14, 2010, were passed.

Also at the fifth stage, the strengthening of the structural component beyond authoritarianism was continued through the dissolution of the Parliament per the presidential decree "On the dissolution of the Mazhilis (Lower House of the Parliament) of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the fourth convocation and the appointment of early elections of deputies of the Mazhilis of the Republic of Kazakhstan" dated November 2011. In the early parliamentary elections held in January 2012, only parties loyal to the government received seats in Parliament. Moreover, the ruling party in power had 81% of the vote.
However, the formal multi-party system only imitated the political struggle and led to a socio-political crisis and social explosions without a consolidating mass of ideology. The traditional clan structure of society in the conditions of rigid consolidation of parties around the ruling one led to contradictions within the authoritarian regime itself. The discontent of the masses and the regional clans led to a full-scale crisis in May 2011 in the west of Kazakhstan. Mass demonstrations in the cities of the country's western region ended in bloody suppression through mass executions of protesters. The constructed model of the authoritarian vertical was "a structure of a closed type, which has practically exhausted its internal resource" (Syroyezhkin 2011, 161), carrying internal contradictions.

The sixth stage (2013-19) is the simultaneous strengthening of both variables of the personalistic component of super-authoritarianism with a significant tilt towards the Principate, concentrated around one person. During this period, there was a massive concentration of formalized and informal power around one person, regardless of their position. A widespread personality cult of Nazarbayev is being established with elements of sacralization and missionary work. During this period, steps began to weaken the institution of the super-presidency when the country's Constitution was amended to reduce the presidential term from 7 to 5 years. These amendments were introduced to limit the power of the future President since, for Nazarbayev personally, the rule on the number of re-elections was constitutionally excluded.

The seventh stage (March 2019 - January 2022) was a transitional stage beyond authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. A turning point, indicating a high degree of pre-existing contradictions between the personalistic variables of super-authoritarianism, came after Nazarbayev.

stepped down as President in March 2019. The stage from March-June 2019 to January 2022 is the stage of the duumvirate and the growing struggle between the two personalistic variables. Nazarbayev retained the posts of lifelong head of the Security Council, Leader of the ruling “Nur-Otan” party, and membership in the Constitutional Council. In addition, through his relatives, the former President retained formal and informal levers of control in almost all government bodies of the country.

The main reason for the events of January 2022 was the internal contradictions between the regime variables, which resulted in an open struggle for power in 2019-2022. In the absence of an influential auxiliary party-ideological variable instead of a pocket ruling party, during the transition to the Principate, the mechanism for transferring power between variables beyond authoritarianism was disrupted. The failure of the mechanism for the transfer of power between variables resulted in a full-blown crisis of a direct clash between the institutions of the super-presidency and the Principate in January 2022. The development of events in the transitional stage confirms the inherent failure mechanism in authoritarian personalism, especially during power transfer.

3. The “January 2022” Intermezzo

2019 was a turning point for Kazakhstan, as there was a transition of power in the country in March 2019, which caused a sharp surge in civil and political activity in the republic. Various protests organized by citizens were held on various economic, social, and political issues. The main issues that provoked the most massive protests were dissatisfaction with early presidential elections and disagreement with their results.
From January 1, 2019, to January 7, 2022, according to the ACLED database (2019-2022)\textsuperscript{178}, there were 2904 different types of protests across the country in Kazakhstan, of which 77.5\% were peaceful protests.

The high level of dissatisfaction with the situation in the country is caused by social inequality and a decrease in the incomes of the population, which were catalyzed by a non-democratic transition of power.

Many elite groups in our system, tied to the distribution of budgetary funds, are interested in maintaining the current political status quo and the distribution of budgetary flows. The business lives off the budget. As for the protest groups, they have not yet found common ground. The opposition has no moral resources, and the authorities, too - the old ideologies have exhausted themselves.

The most massive actions in 2019 took place on May 1 and May 9 against early, undemocratically appointed, presidential elections; and on the voting day of June 9 and the following days, when the protesters declared their disagreement with the course of the elections and their results (Tokayev was predictably declared the winner).

The strongest were two waves of protests during the 2019–2022 duumvirate period. The first accompanied the transition of power from the all-powerful dictator to the new president in 2019, and the second occurred in January 2022. Both massive waves of uprisings had slogans of a complete, rather than imitation, the overthrow of the authoritarian government, and marauding elements accompanied both. The latter quietly integrated into the peaceful waves of protest, provoking armed conflicts, and attacking state infrastructure and security facilities. They have

organized groups that deliberately provoked armed conflicts, causing the authorities to act illegally against all the rebels.

Some pretexts for a social explosion were artificially caused by the same state or oligarchic structures, which the people of the former president still control. For example, a sharp triple increase in gas prices in western Kazakhstan in early January 2022 was initiated by a quasi-state oil and gas company controlled by the son-in-law of the former president. It was from the strikes of oil workers in the western regions, where there was a threefold increase in gas prices, that a wave of protest demonstrations began throughout Kazakhstan.

There is a widespread unofficial version that the former president himself gave orders to provoke popular uprisings against the backdrop of real grandiose socio-economic and political problems. If this is true, then the version is confirmed that the first president left his post not of his own free will but because of pressure from the presidents of Russia and China. One of the reasons for this pressure is the desire of the latter to disavow the immense dissatisfaction of the masses with the rule of one dictator that has been going on for 30 years. The long reign of an aging dictator against a deteriorating economy and growing authoritarianism should have reduced the intensity of protest in society.

In this regard, the external factors that influenced the protest moods in Kazakhstan are called the change of democratic change of leaders in Ukraine and Armenia in 2019. At the same time, the real fight against corruption and authoritarianism in these countries was the most potent catalyst for protest at the backdrop of the horrific position of Kazakhstan itself in these areas.

At the same time, the manipulation of energy prices two days before the uprising and in the dead of winter led to massive protests and social upheaval across Kazakhstan. The rebels demanded
the removal by the new government of the old elite groups tied to the distribution of budgetary flows in their favor, contributing to even greater impoverishment of the people.

The coincidence of inter-elite and inter-class struggle during the period of the political Duumvirate continued throughout the entire period, inevitably leading to the collapse of the entire authoritarian system. January 2022 was the culmination of contradictions that could have ended in a change in the political paradigm of society and the regime's collapse if not for the direct military intervention of all the Eurasian authoritarian states. Like a century and a half ago in Central Europe, Russia acted as a strangler of freedom: "At the same time, in the eyes of European socialists and nationalists, Russia became a strangler of freedom" (2023)\(^1\)\(^7\).\(^9\)

As proof of the version of inter-elite struggle that deliberately provoked inter-class conflict in January 2022, immediately after the suppression of the uprising, the new president arrested, under various pretexts, Nazarbayev's closest relatives, including his high-ranking nephews in the security forces. In addition, the head of the National Security Committee, his deputies, and other security officials, who were directly accused of organizing a coup d'état in January 2002, was arrested. Other high-ranking security officials were removed from their posts, including the Minister of Defense, who was accused of sabotaging presidential orders to suppress protests.

Additional evidence that the old president Nazarbayev was at the head of the elite conspiracy was that the new president Tokayev began to deprive him of most of his privileges and duties, initiating yet another change in the country's constitution.

\(^1\)\(^7\) Trenin, Dmitry. 2023. *New balance of power: Russia in search of foreign policy balance.* Publishing house Alpina Publisher.
Chapter V: Interconnectedness

I. Legacy of the Interconnectedness Factor

1. Origins of the Factor

Much of the region's political history is characterized by the dominance of empires with supranational characteristics. It began in the 13th century when a single Mongol Empire was created, uniting the territories of modern China, post-Soviet countries, and many other countries in the region. At the same time, from its foundation, the Mongol Empire was not unitary, having a federal structure. Despite a single imperial center, the empire was divided into four main parts: supranational empires within a single mega-empire.

For the next 700 years, the borders of the four empires remained virtually unchanged along the outer perimeter and inner borders of the medieval mega-empire. Along these borders, intra-Eurasian political regions were formed: Russia and Northern Eurasia, Central Asia, China and Mongolia, and the Middle East. The modern territory of Kazakhstan was on the border of Northern Eurasia and Central Asia. In addition, throughout the region's history, all four imperial entities existed as supranational empires with semi-autonomous state entities within each of them.

Neoclassical realists believe that in the external influence of international systems on the position of states, decision-makers beliefs and values influence the relationship between relative power and foreign policy (Gideon 1998, 144-72)180.

In addition, neoclassical realists emphasize the importance of ideas in determining states' foreign policy. Moreover, they argue that the power of ideas in different historical periods

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influences countries' foreign policy. Therefore, to understand the essence of the foreign policy of any state, it is necessary to understand the essence of the guiding ideas and the actual ruling ideology (Kitchen 2010, 117-43).\footnote{Kitchen, Nicholas. 2010. “Systemic pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation.” Review of International Studies, 36, no. 1: 117–43. \url{http://doi:10.1017/S0260210509990532}.}

At the same time, the elites and the population had a common origin and a supranational mentality that prevailed at the international level. Such psychology and adherence to the main actors' political traditions ensured the regimes' supra-sovereignty throughout the Eurasian region's political space. In turn, this supra-sovereignty was based on supranational political thinking and traditions, as well as on the autonomy of the state-political structure. This factor still ensures robust integration processes in the post-Soviet space, especially between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, on the one hand, and between Russia, China, and Central Asia, on the other.

\section*{2. Ideology of Security}

Neoclassical realism considers the demand for security as the main reason for the state's desire for power in an anarchic international system. Power is seen as a tool to achieve the main goal, security. In this context, the state's actions in the international arena are a determining factor in ensuring security (Firoozabadi & Ashkezari 2016, No. 6).\footnote{Firoozabadi, Jalal Dehghani & Mojtaba Zare Ashkezari. 2016. “Neo-classical Realism in International Relations.” Asian Social Science; Vol. 12, No. 6. Canadian Center of Science and Education. DOI: 10.5539/ass.v12n6p95.}

The idea of the indivisibility of a common space throughout the entire territory of the Russian Empire (RE), as well as the idea of collecting lands during periods of the temporary collapse of this empire, dates to the times of the Golden Horde, which was the first unified state territorially covering almost the entire populated territory of the Russian Empire (RE) and the
USSR. It was the first supranational state, one of the four parts of the Mongolian Mega Empire, uniting almost all the republics of the Soviet Union. Many researchers believe that the idea of collecting the lands that were part of the Golden Horde arose with its collapse.

The concept of "gathering Russian lands" was continued with the policy of the Grand Dukes of Moscow from the 14th century. They began to extend their patronage to the Russian lands, divided into many principalities. This process was completed by the beginning of the 16th century when the first "collective" stage was completed.

Numerous states formed on the ruins of the first world empire in the Eurasian expanses, including the Moscow kingdom and the Kazakh Khanate, joined the struggle to collect all the lands of the first empire. Like the Moscow Tsardom, they made this political platform the main political tradition of the newly formed space. This race lasted more than 300 years and ended with the complete unification of the entire populated territory of the progenitor empire under the auspices of Moscow in the new form as the RE. Nevertheless, we are interested in medieval history only from the point of view of understanding the deep sources of the established political traditions and continuity on the territory of the former communist countries. From the point of view of the analysis of independent variables of the external factor of Interconnectedness, this study focuses on the legacy of the later multinational states - the USSR and the PRC.

In the autumn of 1918, a process began, which some authors call "a new gathering of Russian lands," this time under the rule of the Bolsheviks. The concept of "gathering Russian lands" is historically associated with the policy of the Grand Dukes of Moscow (1996)\textsuperscript{183}. From the 14th century, their patronage began to spread to Russian lands, fragmented into many principalities. By

\textsuperscript{183} Anisimov E.V. 1996. “Historical Roots of Imperial Thinking in Russia”. Slavic-Eurasian Research Center. Institute of Russian History, RAS. / [Анисимов, Е. В. Исторические Корни Имперского Мышления в России.].
https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/Proceed97/Anisimov.html.
1922, the Bolsheviks could control almost all the territories of the former tsarist empire. By 1940, the entire territory of the Russian Empire, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Bessarabia.

The concept of "gathering Russian lands" has historically been the doctrinal policy of the Grand Dukes of Moscow since the 14th century. They began to extend their patronage to the Russian lands, divided into many principalities. This process was completed at the beginning of the 16th century. The formation of the Russian centralized state had a positive impact on the development of the country. For a hundred years (1500-1600), the country's territory doubled to 4 million square meters. Oleg Kropotov noted that the population has nearly doubled to over 11 million (2016)\textsuperscript{184}.

The change of regime from tsarist to communist did not change Russia's territorial claims to the entire legacy of the Russian Empire. Only by declaring themselves followers of the political legacy of the Russian Empire were the communists able to maintain power in the same territory. Attempts to proclaim independence met with rebuff both from the "whites," who fought for a "united and indivisible Russia," and from the "reds," who saw the growth of nationalism as a threat to the gains of the revolution.

Thus, the Bolsheviks were presented not only as defenders of the "gains of the revolution" but also as defenders of the interests of the Russian nation. The program of the "Eurasian" movement, which arose in exile in 1921, published in 1926, suggested that the Russian people used

Bolshevism to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia and restore its sovereign greatness (Karsavin 1926, Part 8).185

The incredible similarity of both events and borders in the intermediate epochs with a difference of a hundred years is striking. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 were marked by the complete collapse of both empires. At the same time, if the bloodshed of the First World War predetermined a general civil war on the remnants of the Russian Empire, then the results of the Cold War extended inter-ethnic and inter-political conflicts that smoldered for three decades in the same space.

For the most part, the new USSR has been on a unified and stable course during the last decade of reconstruction. Almost all administrative and executive structures, numerous multilateral and bilateral initiatives, agreements, and institutions have already been created in the union ministries and the union government. Almost all union executive and administrative structures of the former USSR were recreated with the existing functional component parallel to each republic's internal executive and administrative structures. Both the regimes and most of the population of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia do not resist the empire's revival under Russia's auspices.

The process of federalizing the RSFSR and then the USSR at the beginning of the construction of the Soviet state was sharply criticized by Putin, who took a course towards restoring not even the USSR, but the unitary Russian Empire. According to him, Moscow freely transferred territories and populations to the outlying republics, further dividing the country. Putin constantly

emphasizes that the collapse of the USSR was the most significant geopolitical catastrophe, and that the restoration of the USSR is its central political platform.

The tradition of transferring the national lands of their colonies, together with the population fixed there, was widely practiced by the Mongol rulers within the Mongol Empire. The "gifting of lands" or conquered territories, together with the taxable population, to their children and loyal surroundings was forced to ensure the exercise of tighter control. Forced allocation, especially geographically remote outskirts in the semblance of states and their different resolution, gave rise to new national formations. It was the political platform, created back in the Mongol Empire, that until now determined the existence of a single political tradition throughout the space. It gave rise to the political legacy that unites all the countries of the Eurasian space and determines both the failure of democracy and the dominance of authoritarianism on the territory of all CPS countries.

However, this political platform can only exist within the empire and in constant confrontation with the outside world, manifesting itself in a consciously expansionist approach to economic development and political course. That is why the small states of this space are only federative parts of a single political space. In the event of absolute political independence from this space, they can do away with this political platform and go beyond the boundaries of a single political legacy. In this case, there is a high risk of external interference from larger states of a single authoritarian political space.

The federalization of the colonies under the Soviets repeated the logic of the political traditions of the medieval founding empire, the progenitor state. According to this political tradition, autonomy is seen not as sovereignty but as a system of multi-level vassalage from the mother country to the colonies with different statuses. That is why autonomy in the USSR was
multi-level, multi-niche. The level of autonomy is not symbolized by sovereignty, and the concept of statehood survival is supranational.

At the same time, the metropolitan power gives autonomy not to national colonies as state entities but to their regimes in exchange for complete loyalty not to the metropolis but to the ruling regime. The concept of limited sovereignty involves the creation of clone regimes on national fringes to provide more manual control over national colonies through the medium of regimes. It becomes convenient as local elites more easily govern territories using nationalist connections and win more obedience from the local population, effectively extinguishing the nationalist ideology most effective against the regime. That is why internationalism or anti-nationalism was the ideological flagship of the USSR in exchange for gifts and resources for the political elite. In addition, his impunity in repressing his population was very effective for control.

The examples of Moscow's military support to maintain the loyalty of the authorities of the Chechen autonomy to Moscow, Kadyrov in 2000, and Kazakhstan to Tokayev in January 2022 are indicative. Examples of practical use are also widely manifested in the Russian Empire, where the national elites integrated into the Russian nobility while maintaining the autonomy of their khanates, emirates, Etc. This tradition originated in the Mongol Empire with its system of khanates, principalities, and "hetmanates" (Ukrainian semi-autonomous states).

At the same time, the metropolitan power guaranteed military support to its loyal regimes in case they could not resist the local opposition, skillfully using and encouraging the clan's struggle for power. The clans, in turn, competed over who would show even greater loyalty to the imperial center. The one who endures the more significant obligations will receive the power. Moreover, the authoritarianism of the Eurasian type cannot sustain itself organically due to the scarcity of resources and the inability to generate a productive economy. Such a system is necessary to ensure
tight control over the regions. The elites adhere to the main party-ideological line of an imperial nature while remaining loyal to the regime.

In this respect, a national-regional autonomous system is necessary to preserve the authoritarian regime, which is fragmented as multiple clones in these regions throughout the empire. Supra-authoritarianism always has the possibility of a revival in the imperial center and throughout the country after its consolidation in the regions. Therefore, the fragmentation of statehood into national-state autonomies means the fragmentation and cloning of the Eurasian authoritarian regime to increase the stability and survival of political traditions and institutions.

Therefore, the pivotal countries strive to maintain regimes on each outskirt to preserve regime survival. Otherwise, the entire system of the multi-level foundation of authoritarianism will collapse. The loss of one brick means the collapse of the system. Since federalization is interpreted not as an autonomous status but, as such, as a relic of the regime and the state, the territorial integrity in each CPS country is its territorial integrity; therefore, this means that every state joins the CPS.

With the weakening of the center of the metropolis within Russia itself, because of military failures on the Ukrainian front, there is a consolidation of authoritarianism in national autonomies. So, for example, the authoritarian leaders of Chechnya and Tatarstan adopted the titles of the Fathers of the Nation, enshrined in changes in their republican constitutions: “Rais” (Islamic President) in Tatarstan on February 6, 2023; in “Mehk-Da” (Father of the Nation) on February 9, 2023, in Chechnya. Thus, the adopted amendments to the constitution of the Chechen Republic include the new name of the position of the head of the republic: "Mekhk-Da,"; the authority of "Mekhk-Da" to take measures to ensure the security and territorial integrity of Chechnya (2023)\(^\text{186}\).

Adopting an amendment on responsibility for the security and territorial integrity of the republic, assigned to the head of the region, declares its actual independence. Despite the opposition of the federal authorities to such amendments, Chechnya has approved them in a symbolic way against the backdrop of a year-long setback in the war with Ukraine.

In addition, the Common Political Legacy is one of the other significant reasons for Russia's strong commitment to supporting authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space. This theory argues that states with a shared political history face the most critical task of preserving their authentic political systems and political regimes throughout, without exception, the space of the dominant political legacy. That is why maintaining a parallel with inherited regimes is at the forefront of the foreign policy course of the main centers of geopolitical attraction of the common political space. Moreover, the failure of any authoritarian regime in the common political space is considered unacceptable for the survival of the entire political space, according to political legacy theory.

The federalization of space depends on the degree of economic solvency of the center. With the impoverishment of the resource base in the conditions of the impossibility of further extensive expansion, the stage of weakening the institutions that support the viability of the institutions of power of the regime begins. It also happened during Brzezinski's policy of containment. When the USSR was restrained in its expansion, it lost its resource power and disintegrated. However, authoritarianism immediately created the CIS and elites to avoid direct aggression from Russia, pledged a unique relationship with Russia, and created a common economic space. Those who did not obey were removed, and those who were not removed received direct military aggression from Russia.

However, the metropolis was not interested in more successful economic development and welfare of the colonies. However, interested only in exploiting its resources, the colonial policy
creates a vicious circle, the way out of which is the system's collapse. The highest economic level in a colony is seen as a challenge to the mother country and punished by force. A military invasion, destruction of infrastructure, and looting are examples of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It should be noted that immediately before the invasion, the average level of wages in Ukraine exceeded the average in Russia. Namely, the average salary is the best indicator of the well-being of the average citizen in the face of significant income disparities, wealth stratification, and the dominance of the public sector in the economy.

3. Ideology of Dominance

However, security is not the only goal of any state in the international order. Neoclassical realists argue that states try to change the international system based on their national interests and by increasing their power. Consequently, pivotal states pursue a more active and dominant foreign policy in international relations (Rose 1998, 144-72)⁴⁸⁷.

The ideological factor on which the institutional basis of authoritarianism of the Eurasian type is built is the idea of total and continuous domination over the entire space of the former empire. This idea arose from the need to preserve the continuity of political traditions as a factor in the regime's survival in all its parts. Violating the dominance of political traditions in one of the parts of the common political space means the threat of the regime's fall in all its parts. The authoritarianism of the Eurasian type has a supranational, supra-religious, and supra-state character, which denies the sovereignty of all parts within this space, considering them to be an integral part of a single supra-national organism. The supranational character is directly connected and underlies the foreign policy of all three states.

The system of multi-level sovereign vassalage in a common authoritarian space, which already existed in the Mongol Empire, allowed the supra-authoritarian regime and its institutions to survive in a single Muscovite principality. The relocation of the imperial center to one of the national-state autonomies occurred in a situation of a long absence of the opportunity to consolidate power in the first one. It happened at the end of the 14th century with the total defeat of the capital of the Golden Horde and the subsequent gradual transfer of central power to one of the most influential regions of the empire, Moscow. It was the gathering of all the lands of the Golden Horde that became the main ideological driver in the foreign policy of the Muscovite kingdom.

The ancient roots go back to the 13th century when a single political statehood was created, covering modern Russia, China, and all Central Asia. While remaining unchanged, the authoritarianism of the Eurasian type assumed different ideological forms. At the beginning of the creation of the first medieval states on the ruins of the first Eurasian empire, the geopolitics of Eurasia was dominated by the idea of collecting lands by the Russian Empire.

Under the communists, it was replaced by the idea of world revolution. Thus, the Bolsheviks continued the political traditions of the Russian Empire in "gathering lands." Despite the early distortions of the revolutionary time by the attempts of the Com-Intern to kindle the centers of world revolution throughout the world, in the second half of the 1930s, official state rhetoric was concentrated only on the territory of the countries neighboring the USSR.

However, the unofficial rhetoric of Eurasian authoritarianism has not always been limited to the Eurasian political space. In this regard, Putin’s statement is indicative, consonant with the statements of the leaders of the communist era: “The borders of Russia do not end anywhere” (2016)188. This political doctrine has its roots as far back as the time of the Mongol imperial

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conquests within the framework of the doctrine of "one statehood stretching to the last great sea" (from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans).

The collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 republics in 1991 did not weaken either the relations between most of them or their interconnectedness and interdependence. Many interstate and supranational economic, cultural, political, and military-political structures were created. There is a single information space between Russia and Kazakhstan, and the Russian language in Kazakhstan is no less common than the Kazakh. The USSR did not collapse but became a more complex system of semi-sovereign state formations with greater autonomy than the union republics within the USSR.

As large countries in the common authoritarian space, the Russian Federation and the PRC have multi-sovereign vertical and horizontal federal structures of their statehood. The RF continues the tradition of the USSR's many powers, while the PRC has maintained a similar tradition during its founding. The main difference between the two countries systems of multi-sovereignty was the Chinese version's static and closed nature, as opposed to the all-encompassing openness of the USSR. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China denied even imaginary sovereignty to national entities, representing a closed system of a unitary type of political sovereignty. On the contrary, the Constitution of the USSR recognized the imaginary sovereignty of the most significant national formations, legally assuming both the separation of the union republics and the inclusion of new ones in the USSR.

The difference at this point reflected the conditions of the formation of both countries. The USSR was formed without major geopolitical allies and to win over the Bolshevik government was forced to grant a greater degree of independence to the large colonies. China was formed with the support of the USSR, which, on the contrary, contributed to the suppression of any centrifugal
national forces in China in favor of an intensive center. The federative-union structure of the USSR, with geopolitical difficulties, contributed to its collapse. However, with a geopolitical rise, it could easily include such countries as Bulgaria and Mongolia.

The Eurasian type of authoritarianism is a complex combination of official and shadow institutions of power, maintaining a balance between which is necessary for the stable functioning of an authoritarian regime. In addition, for the stable functioning of an authoritarian political regime of the Eurasian type, it is necessary to maintain a balance between the two main factors within each of them. As for the supra-sovereignty factor, it is necessary to maintain a balance between its components - supranational and a sufficient level of internal autonomy of semi-sovereign states. At the same time, a sufficient level of semi-autonomy is regulated by a system of balance between informal and formal institutions of vertical authoritarianism. More strengthening of one of the institutions concerning others necessarily leads to an imbalance and puts the regime on the brink of collapse.

II. Independent Variables of Interconnectedness

Factor

To understand how important the factor of the Interconnectedness of the shared political space of Eurasia is for the preservation of authoritarian regimes it is necessary to analyze the components of the factor and its variables. Empirical observations of the political statehoods/regimes of non-core Eurasian Legacy states reflect these states’ de facto autonomous, weak sovereignty.

The supra-sovereign of political statehoods/regimes that implement the de facto autonomous nature of the sovereign states of one CPS is based on the presence of one progenitor state, a single
empire. It manifests itself in the presence of interstate organizational superstructures, including union ministries, in the main areas of public life within the CPS.

At the same time, the primacy of informal institutions over law confirms the existing imitation structure of the official statehood of the Eurasian countries as part of the general pattern of traditional legacy. The traditional models of the informal balance of power, or the Eurasian type of political heritage, are manifested in a special type of state building in the region. Consequently, another important factor of influence in the foreign policy of the countries under study determines the essence of their foreign policy.

This factor is based on their shared legacy of one parent state, one empire, and a shared ideological legitimacy. Namely, the second factor is the supra-sovereign nature of the CPS or the supposed sovereignties of the Eurasian nation-states, whose variables are

1) The supra-nationality of the supra-authoritarian regime of the countries of the Eurasian CPS is measured by the number of supranational organizational superstructures in the main areas of public life within the CPS (unions, blocs, unions, economic and other social interstate organizations), which are dominated by supporting states,

2) The limited Sovereignty of the nation-states of the Eurasian CPS, as measured by the quantity and quality of autonomous federative structures in the pivotal states and the dependent relations between the pivotal and non-axial states of one CPS.

1. The Supra-Sovereignty Variable

Suppose the PRC is a supranational empire of a formal state, an empire. In this case, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political process on its territory is an example of the informal continuation of the existence of a supranational empire. In addition, the latter are excellent examples of the supra-sovereignty factor and its variables under study.
Therefore, the current political processes, referred to by many researchers of the post-Soviet space as the reconstruction of the new USSR, are, in fact, an informal continuation of the life of the empire. These processes have been occurring with the increasing force since the early 2000s.

All this time, for the most part, the restructuring of almost all administrative and executive structures in the form of union ministries and the union government has been going on at a complete and steady pace. Numerous multilateral and bilateral initiatives, agreements, and institutions are currently being implemented. Almost all union executive and administrative structures of the former USSR were recreated with the existing functional component parallel to each republic's internal executive and administrative structures.

Currently, the following supra- and inter-ethnic organizations operate on the territory of the former USSR:

- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), since 1991 (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). The CIS is a commonwealth of states formed at once after the USSR ceased to be a single subject of international law. However, the CIS was called upon to create an informal structure uniting the former republics of the USSR.

- Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), since 1992 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan).

- Union State of Russia and Belarus since 1996.

- The Commonwealth of Unrecognized States, since 2000 (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), is another example of a supranational political entity, loyal to the center and formally independent, representing parts of the republics that broke away from a single space.

- Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), 2001-2014.
- Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), since 2014 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia).

1) CIS

The most revealing post-Soviet entity is the CIS. It is an informal interstate institution originally intended to replace the formal institution of the empire temporarily. Within the framework of the CIS, unified command and control of military-strategic forces were maintained, as well as unified control over nuclear weapons. In addition, within the framework of the CIS, a procedure for the nuclear disarmament of Kazakhstan and Ukraine was carried out.

The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States of the CIS as a regional interstate organization was declared immediately after the dissolution of the USSR on December 8, 1991, in the Belovezhskaya Agreement. The creation of the CIS occurred on December 21, 1991 (Plokhii 2014, 356–365)\textsuperscript{189}, when 11 (12 a year later) former Soviet republics of the USSR adopted the Alma-Ata Declaration (1991)\textsuperscript{190} among the other Alma-Ata Protocols.

Notably, the main drivers of creating a common political-economic and cultural-ideological space were the heads of the authoritarian regimes of non-pivotal countries. For example, among other things, Nazarbayev initiated the creation of a common military-political space by proposing the creation of a “common defense space” of the CIS (Alexandrov 1999, 229)\textsuperscript{191}.

Thus, at the dawn of the creation of the CIS, all 12 former republics of the USSR, except the 3 Baltic republics, were part of the Commonwealth and received legitimation of their official


sovereignty, including the creation of their armed forces, through agreements within the CIS (2008)\textsuperscript{192}.

The supreme executive body of the CIS is the Council of CIS Heads of State (2014)\textsuperscript{193}.

Other bodies of the CIS are:

- Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CIS.
- Economic Council of the CIS.
- Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS.
- Council of Ministers of Internal Affairs of the CIS member states.
- Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS.
- Council of Commanders of the Border Troops of the CIS.
- The Council of Heads of Security Agencies and Special Services of the CIS Member States.
- Joint Air Defense System of the CIS.
- Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS.
- Economic Court.
- CIS Statistical Committee.
- Financial and Banking Council of the CIS.
- Antiterrorist Center of the CIS Member States.
- Interstate Bank.
- Interstate Fund for Humanitarian Cooperation of the CIS.


- Interstate Economic Committee of the CIS.
- CIS Security Council for Combating Terrorism.

2) CSTO

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an international military-political organization of a regional type. It was created in 1992 as the Collective Security Treaty (CST), and in 2002 it was transformed into a full-fledged international organization - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO bodies are:
- CSTO Secretariat.
- Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF).

3) EAEU

The Eurasian Economic Union is an international, regional organization with an international legal personality. This organization was created within the framework of the Common Economic Space (CES), proclaimed, and confirmed by agreements between the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2003.

The creation of the EAEU within the framework of the CES concept took place in two stages. The first was the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2001-2014; the second stage was its transformation into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015.

Unlike the CIS, the EAEU is an international organization with an international legal personality.

a) The supreme bodies of the EAEU are:
- Supreme Eurasian Economic Council,
- Eurasian Economic Council,
b) The completed/declared stages of international economic integration are:
- Free Trade Zones
- Customs unions
- General Markets
- Economic Union
- Economic and Monetary Union

4) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

An example of a supranational organization of the mega-imperial type is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Established as the "Shanghai Five" in 1996, the organization was transformed into an international organization in 2001. In addition, the founding states were China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in 1996, with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001. India and Pakistan became full members of the SCO in 2017 and Iran in 2022.

Today, the SCO is an international supra/interstate organization of a multifunctional and intermediate type in the military-political and economic structure to ensure security in all these areas (Zimonin V. 2008, 202)\(^\text{194}\). However, the initial goals of the SCO were proclaimed to be the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the Central Asian region with the adoption in 2001 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism.

The working bodies of the SCO are:
- Supreme Eurasian Economic Council

- Secretariat in Beijing.
- Council of Heads of State (CHS).
- Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA).
- Meetings of heads of ministries and departments.
- Council of National Coordinators (CNC).
- Regional anti-terrorist structure (RATS).
- Interbank Association (IBO).

2. Limited Sovereignty Variable

A. Evolution of Limited Sovereignty of States.

The autonomy and limited sovereignty of de jure independent states like Kazakhstan can only be understood with the history of its evolution within supra-state empires like the USSR. Kazakhstan, like the other 13 republics of the USSR, except for Russia, gradually developed towards strengthening its semi-autonomous status and reducing its limited sovereignty. The conscious assistance of the mother country in the development of the evolution of the sovereignty of its federal parts, at first glance, contradicts the logic of the imperial state.

However, the traditions of the political system of the Eurasian type are primarily aimed at maintaining the authoritarian regime throughout the entire space of its distribution. Therefore, granting additional sovereignty to the subjects of the Federation in practice is an expansion of the powers of the authoritarian leaders of national entities. Strengthening the sovereignty of autonomies is not the strengthening of peoples but of authoritarian regimes in nation-states, which contributes to the preservation of the entire authoritarian system of the empire.
At the same time, strengthening the sovereignty of "appointed" regimes does not weaken the degree of dependence of nation-states on the empire. The formal sovereignty of nation-states does not reflect the actual degree of informal interdependence of authoritarian regimes in each country. Authoritarian power is supranational and quickly passes from one structure to another, whether intranational or extranational. The supranational character of Eurasian-type authoritarianism allows for the evolution of the autonomous sovereignty of national state formations. The strengthening or weakening of national sovereignty is aimed at maintaining authoritarianism throughout a single political space.

The dynamics of the national sovereignty of Kazakhstan within the USSR and, further, within the informal political structures of the post-Soviet period is a direct example of the interdependence of authoritarian regimes in the countries of the post-Soviet space. Having evolved from an autonomous republic within the RSFSR to a union republic within the USSR and then into an independent state, Kazakhstan retained the most significant ties with the imperial metropolis of Russia. Moreover, the country gained formal independence not due to centrifugal efforts, but due to an internal struggle between the emerging democratic forces and the authoritarian regime in Russia itself. It is no coincidence that Russia, led by a nascent democratic government, left the USSR, whose republics supported the stability of authoritarian regimes.

That is why the central leadership of the USSR counted on the help of the authoritarian national republics in the struggle against the national Russian Federation in the late 80s. That is, independent solid statehoods headed by authoritarian regimes are strong support for the imperial authoritarian regime of the Eurasian type. Moreover, this is precisely why the collapse of the Soviet Union was a defensive reaction of authoritarianism to the preservation of its federal parts in the face of a powerful threat from one of them.
In the early 1990s, the center of authoritarianism shifted to the Central Asian republics, and the collapse of the USSR ensured its preservation throughout space and its gradual strengthening back in Russia. It is no coincidence that Kazakhstan was the main initiator of the creation of all interstate and supranational structures in the post-Soviet space. That is, the phenomenon of autonomy in the USSR is substantiated by the logic of maintaining an authoritarian supranational regime in the countries of the Eurasian political space.

B. Stages of Evolution

In the first stage, the union republics of the USSR were considered sovereign according to the Constitution of the USSR of 1924. Each republic exercised internal power independently but within limits established by the union center. The fourth paragraph of the second chapter of the Constitution gave the right to secede from the USSR. The union republics had limited sovereignty within and within the powers permitted by the union center (Logvinova 2016, no. 3: 39-53).195

The second stage in the evolution of autonomies took place with the adoption of the Constitution of 1936, where, according to the new article 18-a of the Basic Law, the union republics received the right to enter foreign relations with foreign states. Article 60 of the USSR Constitution allowed the union republics to create representative offices in foreign countries.

The third stage consolidated the strengthening of the republics' sovereignty beyond the limits specified in Article 73 of the 1977 Constitution. The limited degree of sovereignty was weakened by granting the republics the right to enter foreign relations "within the limits of their competence" following Article 80 of the Constitution.

The right to self-determination, provided for in all constitutions of the Soviet period, allowed the union republics to secede from the USSR formally and painlessly. After the USSR's collapse, the Russian Federation's internal structure also changed when the autonomous republics evolved towards expanding their sovereignty.

Autonomous Soviet socialist republics were one of the forms of autonomy for the national minorities that inhabited the territory of the Union. (Constitution of the USSR 1977, No. 41: 617)

The constitutions of the union republics, which included autonomous republics, established the right to an agreed withdrawal from their composition. They enjoyed political autonomy with their constitution, supreme organs of state power, legislation, government, supreme judiciary, and citizenship. De jure, they were nation-states (2019).

The right to transform the status from an autonomous to a united sovereign republic was exercised, for example, by Kazakhstan in 1936. At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR, all autonomous republics of the RSFSR raised their status to the republics of the union level in the USSR, but already within the Russian Federation. The only difference is that in the Russian Federation, the republics did not have the right to secede from the Russian Federation, as the union republics of the USSR had.

So, according to the Constitution of Russia of 1993, the Russian Federation consists of 89 equal subjects - republics, territories, regions, federal cities, autonomous districts, and autonomous regions. The status of the republics is enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 as a "state" (Part 2, Article 5 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation), which has its

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constitution and legislation. The republics have their constitutions, fixing their state status, reflected in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (part 2, article 5, part 1, article 66 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

Unlike the USSR and the Russian Federation, the PRC is not a federal but a unitary state. However, the presence of national autonomies makes the state-administrative structure of the PRC related to the USSR and the Russian Federation. Autonomies are vested in all formal branches of government, which have full autonomy delegated to them by the central government from Beijing (2007). There are 55 national minorities in China, of which 44 have autonomous territories and limited autonomy in the legislative, administrative, and judicial spheres.

Another significant difference is the question of the right to secede from a unitary state as the People's Republic of China, by analogy with the law of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation or the USSR. Despite the similarity of the structure of national autonomies, formed on the principle of ethnic settlement, the autonomous regions of China do not have the right to secede from the PRC (Liu, Qusen 2020, 666–678).

C. Limited Sovereignty of the Eurasian States:

1) Administrative-territorial division of the RSFSR in 1930:

- 11 autonomous républiques.
- 7 territoires.
- 6 régions.
- 14 autonomous régions.
- 2 national districts.

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2) Administrative-territorial structure of the USSR:
   - 15 allied states.
   - 20 autonomous republics.

3) Administrative-territorial division of the RSFSR in 1991:
   - 16 autonomous républiques.
   - 6 territoires.
   - 49 régions.
   - 5 autonomous régions.
   - 10 autonomous national regions.

4) Administrative and territorial structure of the Russian Federation after 1993:
   - 21 Republic.
   - 9 territories.
   - 46 regions.
   - 1 autonomous region.
   - 4 autonomous national districts.

5) CPS Quasi-State Sovereignties:
   - Pridnestrovian People's Republic
   - People's Republic of Abkhazia
   - People's Republic of South Ossetia
   - Donetsk People's Republic
   - Lugansk People's Republic

6) Limited Sovereignty of Autonomies in the PRC:
   - 5 autonomous regions at the provincial level.
- 30 autonomous régions.
- 120 autonomous régions.

III. “January 2022 Uprising”:

Interconnectedness Background

1. The Legacy of Interconnections

The external Interconnectedness Factor is the main input factor with independent variables that exert external systemic pressure on the Factor of Interaction with dependent variables of foreign policy through the internal factor of Supra-Authoritarianism with its intermediate. The influence of this external factor is essential for the survival of a supra-authoritarian regime of the Eurasian type.

The formation of independent Kazakhstan in December 1991 was unrelated to the national liberation struggle or the destruction of state political institutions. Kazakhstan had had state sovereignty since 1936, when it received the status of a "union" republic within the USSR, like the other 14 republics. However, the de facto position reflected its autonomous status with very limited sovereignty, less than that of the Eastern European communist countries.

Thus, Kazakhstan gained independence due to the collapse of the imperial supranational state due to deep contradictions between the main variables of the factor of supra-authoritarianism. However, the collapse of the supra-authoritarian state did not mean the collapse of the supra-authoritarian regime itself, which survived in most of the former Soviet republics. I have already voiced the idea that the complex national-autonomous structure in the USSR was the guarantor of the survival of the supra-national state and the authoritarian regime itself.

The Soviet empire, recreated in the conditions of the most complex internal political struggle after the Russian empire’s failure in the First World War, relied not on the people but on
the new authoritarian national elites. The victory of the Bolsheviks over the Social Democrats became possible only after Lenin promised to give national sovereignty to the major nations of the former empire. In the context of the crisis of personalism of the super-presidential (monarchist) type of authoritarian power in the Russian empire, its new primacy in the USSR was a party-ideological variable of structural supra-authoritarianism. With this variable's help, imperial statehood was fully recreated by 1936, marked by the transition to Stalin's personalist principate of supra-authoritarianism.

The simultaneous weakening of limited sovereignty in the USSR is proof that the interconnectedness factor is a necessary input factor for maintaining supra-authoritarianism. So, it was in 1936 that Kazakhstan received a higher union status in the USSR, like some other republics. Moreover, the constant and evolutionary strengthening of the sovereignty of national autonomies in the USSR was universal and depended on the actual strengthening of national elites.

Therefore, despite the enormous and unlimited power of Stalin's principate, which he achieved by 1936, the "father of the nation" not only did not weaken but, in every possible way, increased the sovereignty of national autonomies. After the Second World War, the registration of the status of 15 officially equal union republics and Russia was completed.

The bloodless collapse of the USSR in 1991 was carried out thanks to the preservation of identical regimes in most national-state entities. Moreover, most of the union republics, having denounced the USSR in December 1991, simultaneously announced the creation of a supranational entity as the CIS. Throughout the post-Soviet period, authoritarian elites demonstrated a desire for rapprochement and joint action. Armed interventions by Russia took place only in the direction of the former Soviet republics and autonomies, which tried to change the authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic one.
The close relationship of the authoritarian regimes of the countries of the Eurasian political space is also confirmed by their simultaneous attack on the emerging democracy after the collapse of the USSR. Thus, in the temporary triumph of democracy in Russia, Nazarbayev did not dare to oppose the adoption of a democratic Constitution in August 1993 by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. However, the anti-constitutional coup in Russia in September-October 1993, with the shooting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation by tanks and the establishment of presidential rule, opened the way for autocrats throughout the CIS. After the beginning of the strengthening of authoritarian power in the Russian Federation, the authoritarian power in Kazakhstan began to strengthen with the anti-constitutional coup in 1995 and the dispersal of the only democratic Parliament in the history of Kazakhstan. So, E. Seilekhanov believes that "a negative impact on the development of democratization processes in the post-Soviet space had ... political and ideological dependence on Russia" (Seilekhanov 2006, 62).

Moreover, since the first days of independence, Kazakhstan has been the main initiator of all financial, economic, and military-political unions between the countries of the former USSR. Kazakhstan is a vivid example of the still existing limited sovereignty under the patronage of two masters - Russia and China. The conscious desire Kazakhstan for alliances with Russia and China is nothing more than the desire for maintaining an authoritarian regime, but not a state. This desire is due to the lack of its complete legitimacy and, consequently, its instability within the country. The need to obtain external legitimation from kindred regimes and the need for external military support was confirmed during the internal political crisis due to clan struggles in early 2022.

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However, in the face of the weak legitimacy in Kazakhstan, external support for the new president of Kazakhstan strengthened the position of Russia's dominance in the region, making Kazakhstan directly dependent on it.

At the same time, the Factor of Interconnectedness carries the need to reform the region's political system due to the abundance of interethnic problems provoked by the Limited Sovereignty variable within the states of the region, as well as interstate contradictions provoked by the Supra-Sovereignty variable.

2. Constant Pressure State

It should be noted that Kazakhstan is under constant pressure from Russia as a state. The inability to operate in a legal or socio-political paradigm different from Eurasian political doctrine without Russia's discontent led to the stagnation of the political rudiments of democracy in Kazakhstan.

Any rapprochement with America or Western countries, any attempt to establish ties with the Western world in areas tabooed by Russia, leads to a sharply adverse reaction from the latter. Such taboo areas are liberal-democratic values, free demonstrations, military-political cooperation, and strategic areas of the economy (uranium industry, military-industrial complex). There is an informal ban on the deployment of biological laboratories, the sale of strategic raw materials, the refusal of information broadcasting from Russia, and criticism of this country's foreign policy.

Therefore, the possibility of developing liberal economic freedoms in Kazakhstan is strictly monitored by the Russian authoritarian regime and the public. In case of violation of one of the taboos, massive informational aggression begins in the country's direction with threats to territorial integrity and complete loss of sovereignty. Such information attacks have been carried out by
Russia since the first days and constantly remind the country's leadership to stay within a single creative vector of development.

To the extent that a local authoritarian regime can perform the functions of such control expected by Moscow, Russia's foreign policy is limited to diffusion elements until January 2022. However, as soon as the local regime in Kazakhstan ceases to control the situation and ensure its protection, as in January 2022, then external military aggression by Russia immediately occurs. The January 2022 Uprising was so powerful and massive that the regime in Moscow immediately decided to intervene.

3. The “January 2022” Intermezzo

According to the latest Democracy Index, Kazakhstan, Russia, and China have been on the list of authoritarian countries since the index was founded in 2006. Not surprisingly, a similar situation is observed in all the other four countries of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. So, if in 2006 Kazakhstan had a rating of 3.62, then in 2022 - 3.08. The fall in the democracy index in Russia was even more dramatic - from 5.02 in 2006 to 2.28 in 2022. At the same time, China, which avoided collapse after the fall of the communist world, did not stop being an authoritarian state even for a short time - 2.97 in 2006 and 1.94 in 2022 (EIU 2022)\(^{201}\).

The Economic Intelligence Unit data supports my findings that the influence between authoritarian regimes is equally mutual. That is, a more authoritarian regime of a non-pivotal state can influence the radicalization of the authoritarianism of a pivotal state of a single political space. For example, the fact that Nazarbayev significantly influenced the radicalization of both Putin and other heads of post-Soviet states is beyond doubt. As the most experienced and ambitious party

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leader of all the Eurasian autocrats, he was their informal and formal leader. At the dawn of his career, Putin openly declared great respect for the experience and mentorship of his Nazarbayev.

A widely known fact that Nazarbayev publicly urged Putin to change the Russian constitution to remove the two-term limit in 2007. It was then that, in a live television interview with the “Vesti” news program on the leading Russian TV channel “Rossiya”, Nazarbayev said: "Probably, Vladimir Vladimirovich will not like this statement of mine, but I appeal to all Russians and the leadership of Russia, and the Duma (Parliament), and the government, I want to say that everyone should make sure that he extends his stay for a third term" (2007).202

He also stressed that his opinion on the need to change the constitution and allow a third term for Putin is shared by other regional leaders, including the leadership of China. He made it clear that after consulting with them, he was authorized to convey the collective position of the Eurasian autocrats to Putin as the most authoritative of them.

In addition, Nazarbayev ridiculed the value of the democratic turnover of the presidency, urging him not to pay attention to what Europe or the United States has to say about this. "The president must do what his people and his state need," Nazarbayev said, emphasizing the "secondary …and of no importance" position of the United States on this issue (Ibid.).203

Nazarbayev, who received the constitutional right to be elected president without restrictions three months before this interview in May 2007, began to promote such authoritarian measures in every possible way to his colleagues in the Eurasian space.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Putin immediately rushed to the aid of Tokayev in January 2022. At the same time, Putin's aggression was directed not so much against the opposing clan of

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203 Ibid.
Nazarbayev but against peaceful protesters. Even though in January 2002, the Nazarbayev clan threatened the incumbent President Tokayev, Putin's aggressive defense was directed not against Nazarbayev but against the peacefully protesting masses. That is, although in January 2002, the Nazarbayev clan posed a threat to the incumbent President Tokayev, Putin was clearly more worried about peaceful demonstrators.

As to the position of China in the January 2022 Uprising, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a telephone conversation dated January 10, 2022, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, said that both states "should never allow chaos or war to erupt in the region. The two sides should continue to deepen coordination and cooperation, oppose interference by external forces in the internal affairs of Central Asian countries, and guard against "color revolutions" and the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism." He also highlighted that both China and Russia "should support the SOC (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and the CSTO in strengthening coordination and cooperation to jointly and effectively address various challenges to regional security" (2022)²⁰⁴.

In his exclusive interview, Xiaoci was quoted by the Global Times as saying that "China is willing to enhance cooperation with the law-enforcement and security departments of the Central Asian country, broaden bilateral collaboration in countering external interference, safeguard the political systems and state powers of the two countries, and guard against and oppose any plots of "color revolution" (2022)²⁰⁵.

The main point remains that both Putin and Xi Jinping are also Nazarbayev's main guarantors against the persecution of the new president Tokayev. The protection of Xi Jinping and Putin allows the Nazarbayev clan to still cause problems for Tokayev and does not allow him to defeat this clan ultimately. As they say, Putin and Xi Jinping's unofficial defense of Nazarbayev against Tokayev is justified by the same logic as their official defense of Tokayev against democratic forces.

This situation exacerbates the internal contradictions in society even more and inevitably threatens a new round of a full-scale socio-political crisis in the nearest future of Kazakhstan.
Chapter VI: Interaction

I. Legacy of Interaction Factor

1. Origins of Interactions

External influence from China and Russia is dictated by the proximity of the current regimes and the same political traditions in countries receiving external influence. External influence is crucial in maintaining and changing domestic political traditions/ regimes. The CPS operates not through the primary type of actor, the nation-state (Goldstein 1999; Russet et al. 2000, 10-19)\textsuperscript{206}, but mainly through so-called pivotal nation-states such as Russia and China.

The triggers for external influence from the pivotal states are threats to the stability of kindred regimes in countries of influence based on the continuity of a single political legacy throughout the common political space. These threats trigger the mechanism of survival through foreign intervention and strategic agreements.

Another trigger of external influence is the desire of large states to dominate other states based on political traditions. Foreign policy is the actions of pivotal states towards non-pivotal ones aimed at dominating them by filtering their influence through the internal institutions of supra-authoritarianism. Preserving a single type of regime throughout shared space ensures the preservation of the dominance of the pivotal countries over the non-pivotal ones. At the same time, the disruption of the interconnectedness mechanism in the international system due to the weakening of the authoritarian regime in one of them leads to a survival reaction. Any change in the system’s pressure algorithm between systemic and mediated internal variables leads to an increase in external influence between them.

Therefore, the main object of study is the so-called actors in the chain of cause-and-effect relationships and their reaction to the threats that arise for them in the field of cause-and-effect relationships. In this case, the actors are the pivotal states - Russia and China, the causal effects are changes in the intermediate variables of the internal factor, changes the pressure from the independent variables of the input factor, and the final effects are the strengthening of the dependent variables of the output interaction factor. In this theoretical model of cause-and-effect relationships, the threat to the survival of interconnected political regimes in a shared political space provokes a strong reaction from the pivotal states.

In the context of the above model, the self-identification of key and non-key actors are attractive. Thus, Russia officially identifies itself as the legal successor of the USSR and the "defender of the Fatherland" throughout the post-Soviet space. The Constitution of the Russian Federation states that Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, and the state is obliged to protect the interests and rights of compatriots abroad. That is why any threat of a change in the authoritarian political regime in any of the countries of the former USSR immediately causes an increased military reaction from Russia.

Chinese state philosophy adheres to a milder historical tradition of foreign policy expansion. The form of political vassalage differs from the mandatory inclusion of neighboring states within its borders. China considers it sufficient to strengthen the internal political order so that dependent states remain in its sphere of influence without being part of it. Thus, strategic treaties are the most used instrument of China's foreign policy influence and expansion.

Both states are the closest natural geopolitical and strategic allies, especially in control of Central Asia and Siberia. Notable is the official characterization of cooperation between the countries, for example, the character of relations between Russia and China, cited by the Chairman
of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin: "forever friends, never enemies." (V. Vorobyov 2017, 16)\textsuperscript{207}

Given the aggressive reaction of the pivotal states to domestic political changes in the non-pivotal states, the regimes of the latter cannot afford to weaken authoritarianism in their countries. At the same time, almost all supranational structures among the three states have been initiated by Kazakhstan: unions, agreements, commonwealths, and integration mechanisms. For the autocratic regime of Kazakhstan, the support of key countries with kindred regimes is a guarantee of maintaining its political power in the country. According to the President of Kazakhstan, internal upheavals and revolutions inevitably lead to territorial losses. Therefore, the stability of the regime is considered by him a state priority (2020)\textsuperscript{208}.

2. History of Interactions

Both Eurasian empires began to touch their borders in the Far East in the middle of the 17th century and Central Asia in the middle of the 19th century. Although China was already present in the eastern part of the region in the middle of the 18th century and Russia in the north-western part of the region, their power in Central Asia was more nominal than actual. Only in the middle of the 19th century, when both empires came into geographical contact in the region's center, did they manage to strengthen their power over it through joint efforts. However, for another century, both empires were forced to jointly suppress the unrest in this region, pursuing the same goal of maintaining their imperial integrity.

The Qing Empire of China, established in the middle of the 17th century, was able to strengthen its power in mainland China only by 1722. Since then, the Chinese Empire has embarked


on full-scale colonial conquests outside mainland China. The "Ten Great Campaigns" organized by Emperor Qianlun to the region of Central Asia in 1750–90 led to its conquest.

A series of Kazakh Chinese wars of 1756, 1757, and 1767, accompanied by invasions of Chinese troops into the Kazakh khanates, led to their recognition of Chinese suzerainty and the official recognition of their loyalty and, in return, they were promised full self-government.

The initial entry of the eastern part of Greater Central Asia into the Chinese Qing Empire in the middle of the 18th century was associated with the defeat of the Dzungar Khanate, then China's main rival. Subsequently, the military actions of China against the Kazakh khanates were provoked by the partial occupation by the Kazakhs of the lands of the Dzungar Khanate, which China defeated in the 50s of the XVIII century. China demanded recognition of China's suzerainty by the loose Kazakh states, which arbitrarily occupied the territories destroyed by the Chinese, the former Dzungar state. Consequently, China began to view the existence of independent Kazakh states as a threat to its power in the region. However, the acceptance of the suzerainty of the Russian Empire by the Kazakh Khanate in 1762 "reassured" the Chinese government of maintaining the kindred regime’s control in the region. These developments also reduced the threat of security pressure to the Chinese part of Central Asia from their kindred Central Asian states.

Initially, one of the leading foreign policy tasks of the Qing Empire in the West was to ensure the inviolability of its dominance in Dzungaria and East Turkestan, as well as to keep under its control those parts of the territorial legacy of Dzungaria, which was considered "their own." The first condition put forward by the Qing court to the foreign rulers with whom it came into contact was "to keep its people in check." In other words, the Qing Empire stood for maintaining the status quo that had developed due to the capture of Dzungaria and East Turkestan, as well as for the
unilateral proclamation of the Qing House as the recipient of the entire legacy of the Dzungar Khanate.

The next stage of a more significant regional consolidation came in the middle of the 18th century when the freed territory of the Inner Asia saw rebirth of several Muslim states. The Muslim separatism, which shook the province throughout the beginning and middle of the 19th century, and invasions from the Central Asian states considerably threatened China. Hence, China's reconquest of the emerging Muslim states was completed only by 1878.

At the same time, proclaimed in 1721, the Russian Empire began a large-scale expansion into the Central Asian region only in the first half of the 19th century. The military actions of the tsarist troops against the last khan of the Kazakh Khanate took place from 1837 to 1847 with its complete liquidation. By 1850, the northern steppe of Central Asia was annexed entirely to Tsarist Russia. It allowed the Russian Empire to begin the military conquest of the southern part of the region, which ended in 1885. The Kokand Khanate, which occupied the southern part of Kazakhstan, was defeated, and its territory became part of the Turkestan General-Governorship. After a series of wars, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva were turned into protectorates of the Russian Empire, which existed until its collapse in 1917.

Thus, the aggressive expansions of both empires in the Central Asian region continued for over three decades from the middle of the 19th century. They ended with the Petersburg (Ili) Treaty of 1881, according to which the state borders were delimited, which finally determined the division of Greater Central Asia between the two Eurasian empires.

Thus, from the beginning of the 18th century, the rapidly growing empires of Manchu, China, and tsarist Russia came into contact in Central Asia. Russia approached the northern and western borders of Central Asia, and China approached from the East. The contact of the
Manchurian Empire with the Russian Empire in Central Asia did not occur until a hundred years later when Russian troops completed the conquest of "Russian" Turkestan between 1776–1881. Finally, both supporting states formed a common geopolitical space by the end of the 19th century, completing the conquest of the entire region of Greater Central Asia. From then on, this vast geopolitical space included the territories of Qing China and the Russian Empire, including entire Central Asia.

3. Reasons for Interactions

A. Dominance

The initial Dzungarian aggression against China in the early 18th century, China's retaliatory destruction of the last nomadic Empire, and subsequent mutual military aggression between the Central Asian states and China had disastrous consequences for weakening the Muslim states in the western part of Greater Central Asia (GCA). Both sides felt an external threat emanating from each other. Two points must be considered here.

Firstly, Chinese expansion became possible due to the subsequent defeat of the Dzungar Khanate and the Muslims in East Turkestan by 1756 due to Chinese military aggression.

Secondly, the Chinese Empire occupied the territories of the Muslim states of East Turkestan and invaded Kazakhstan in the middle of the 18th century in connection with the fall of the Dzungar Empire. It led to retaliatory aggression towards China on the part of the Muslim states of Central Asia.

Third, Chinese expansion facilitated Russian expansion from the early 18th century into the region, as the Kazakh khanates were weakened by Chinese pressure. Moreover, since the Kazakh khanates were part of the Muslim states of Central Asia, Russian expansion led to its clash with the rest of the region’s Muslim states.
Fourthly, Russian expansion toward the Muslim states of Central Asia was provoked by the strengthening of Britain on the southern borders of the region and the threat of its penetration into the GCA.

**B. Threats to Security**

The expansion of China into the territory of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the middle of the 18th century also showed a reverse side when the unification of all Central Asian states against Chinese expansion stopped it. The holy war declared by the Afghan Emir against China in 1830 prevented Qing China's planned invasion of Kokand. At the same time, the Kokand and Kazakh khanates were the subject of concern of the Qing Empire for its power in the eastern part of the GCA. Moreover, only the liquidation of these states by Russia gave guarantees for the security of Chinese power in East Turkestan (2006)\(^{209}\).

Both empires were concerned about the vast Muslim region at their borders, threatening their strategic security. These threats came from both the Muslim states of the region and competing global geopolitical players such as the British Empire, which came close to the borders of Central Asia from the southeast. As a result, the strategic security threats emanating from the region where the interests of the three world empires converge became the basis for their further expansion.

For the Qing Empire, the existence of independent states of Central Asia posed a threat to its dominance in East Turkestan. For the Russian Empire, gaining independence from East Turkestan and the south of Central Asia posed a threat to the spread of separatism in the Kazakh steppes and its dominance in Southern Siberia. The British Empire was constantly threatened by its dominance in India from the Muslim states of Afghanistan and southern Central Asia, as it had been for

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centuries. Additional threats came from these empires, capable of coming close to their state borders, capturing the still independent regions of Central Asia.

None of the empires agreed that some parts of Central Asia remain independent, fearing the danger of the spread of separatism from independents to dependents. These fears stemmed from the enormous degree of ethnocultural, religious, historical, and geopolitical community of the population of the Central Asian region.

II. Foreign Policy of Pivotal States

1. Strategic Partnership

A. 19th Century

During the conquest of the vast Central Asian region, it became clear that the vital interests of the two empires, Russian and Chinese, had common strategic interests. Moreover, establishing the power of both empires in the region took place under the conditions of full consent and cooperation between them. At the same time, the strategic interests of these two empires completely contradicted the interests of the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Japanese Empire, which simultaneously was geopolitical opponents of Russia and China.

China turned out to be the weakest link in this geopolitical cooperation between the two empires, which took place from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century. The Qing Empire and the early People’s Republic of China could not influence the development of the situation either in the region or outside of Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang). China gained a foothold in Eastern Turkestan in the Russian Empire only with Western Turkestan, or modern Central Asia. The consequences of the entry of the western part of Greater Central Asia into Russia in the 19th century became catastrophic for the fate of its eastern part.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Yettishar and the British Empire provoked the Russian military offensive in June 1871 and the defeat of the Ili Sultanate as a preventive measure to prevent the unification of all Muslim states (1871)\(^{210}\). However, the Russian authorities immediately emphasized that this invasion was aimed at temporarily subjugating the region until the restoration of Chinese power in the region (Ibid 1871, 127-128)\(^{211}\). Thus, the Russian military invasion was provoked not by the desire for dominance but by preserving kindred ruling regime in the region.

As a result, the Russian-occupied Ili Sultanate fell under temporary Russian jurisdiction. However, on the eve of the invasion, Emperor of the Russian Empire Alexander II, through his ambassador to China, assured the Chinese authorities that the upcoming takeover was in the interests of the Chinese central government:

“Our intervention in the affairs of Western China has the only goal - to help the Chinese restore their power in the occupied western provinces of the Empire” (Prokhorov A. 1975, 154-288)\(^{212}\).

Imperial China, worried about attempts by Western countries to penetrate the territory of East Turkestan already in the mid-70s of the XIX century, sent a massive punitive army there. The Manchu government considered this military invasion to be the implementation of the "historic mission of the dynasty" in its western territory, necessary to fulfill at any cost (1896)\(^{213}\).

However, in 1878, Chinese troops defeated the Yettishar emirate, reasserting their rule over most of Xinjiang with the help of Russia, which fought for Chinese interests against the British.

\(^{210}\) TsG VIA (Central State Military Historical Archive), f (fund). VUA (Military Registration Archive), d. 6823, ll. 117, 244, 255.

\(^{211}\) Ibid., op. 258/908, 1871, file 258/908. 18, ll. 127 - 128.


Empire. The peaceful transfer of the Ili region by Russia to China was carried out immediately after the establishment of Chinese power in the territory of Yettishar. Moreover, the tsarist authorities planned a military invasion of Yettishar to overthrow the Muslim regime there if the Chinese troops were unable to defeat the enemy (Moiseev 2003, Ch. 5).  

Several treaties were signed between Russia and China in Livadia in 1879 and Petersburg in 1881, which delimited the border between the empires and provided for the destruction of the Ili Sultanate by Russia and the transfer of most of its territory to China (1958). With the defeat of two independent Muslim states, the Yettishar Emirate and the Ili Sultanate, a full-fledged Chinese province of Xinjiang was created in East Turkestan in 1884, and the population underwent Sinicization.  

Notably, only joint Russian and Chinese military efforts throughout Greater Central Asia in the middle of the 19th century succeeded in taking complete control over the entire region. The establishment of Xinjiang Province in 1884 coincided with the more confident advance of the Russian Empire into West Turkestan shortly before. For nearly a century since the conquest, Xinjiang existed under martial law and was ruled primarily by Chinese military authorities through a military governorate established in 1760. The full inclusion of civil administration of the region by the Chinese authorities could only begin after 124 years.

B. 20th Century

After the fall of the Qing Empire in 1912, resulting from the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–1913, China entered a series of civil wars and Japanese aggression. The country broke into several

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independent provinces controlled by warlords and leaders of nation-states. At the same time, the struggle for power in the country unfolded between the two main parties - the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC), both having fought against the Muslim separatists and the Japanese occupiers.

Nevertheless, both sides fought to restore the unified integrity of the former Empire, but already under republican rule. For the sake of the common goal of uniting all the lands of the former Empire under the auspices of Beijing, even such irreconcilable enemies as the Kuomintang and the CPC periodically united. The struggle to restore the country's territorial integrity continued until 1949. It continues today as Beijing sees Taiwan as an integral part of a unified China.

Despite the eventual consolidation of the Chinese colonial power in Xinjiang by the end of the 19th century, the beginning of the 20th century was again marked by a series of uprisings. The uprisings covered all the major cities of East Turkestan, the most serious of which occurred in 1912-13.

Beginning in 1931, the national liberation struggle in Xinjiang continued for almost 20 years. Taking advantage of the collapse of the Empire and the civil war, the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang were able to form several short-lived state entities. Perhaps some of them would have been able to defend their independence if not for the Soviet Union.

The USSR was not interested in creating a Muslim state near its southeastern borders or deteriorating relations with China. In addition, the presence of the entire vast Central Asian region within the boundaries of one state was considered by Soviet strategists to be no less dangerous than the presence of an independent state related to other Central Asian Turks at their borders.

Thus, the East Turkestan Islamic Republic (ETIR), created in 1932 by Turkic nationalists and the Muslim military, was destroyed by Soviet troops with the widespread use of bombing by
military aircraft in 1935. After the defeat of the Muslim military, the Soviet special forces of the NKVD launched large-scale brutal repressions against the indigenous population of the rebellious region (2013)\textsuperscript{216}. It is noteworthy that the USSR agreed with the Chinese warlords who replaced the missing central government in Xinjiang. General Shen Shicai fought both the Japanese militarists and the ETIR.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union's support for General Shen Shicai, nominally subordinate to the Kuomintang, was based on his tough anti-Muslim and anti-liberation stance towards the peoples of East Turkestan. Since the Kuomintang government did not control Xinjiang, the USSR provided all possible support to ensure Chinese control. The State Bank of the USSR ensured the local currency's stability, and the government supplied the war-torn province with weapons, ammunition, and food. The USSR even built an aircraft factory in the province of Hami to provide Chinese authorities with military aircraft.

2. Security Threats

The history of geopolitical rivalry between different great powers in the region dates back many centuries prior. For over two thousand years, Central Asia served as a gateway to both East and West for numerous disastrous invasions to Russia and China. From the 15th to the 18th century, power in Central and East Asia was contested between China and the Dzungar Empire, which occupied half of present-day China at its height.

The collapse of the latter gave way to the greatest in the history of Chinese expansion westward in the 16th and 19th centuries. During this time, four large-scale wars between the two

great medieval empires were waged with different degrees of success. Moreover, the first wars were fought for Dzungar's control over China itself, including the siege of Beijing in 1449 (Longfei Feng 2009, 13)\textsuperscript{217}, the seizer of Mongolia in 1688 (Rybakov 2000, V.3)\textsuperscript{218} and the conquest of Tibet in 1717-20 (Desideri 2010, 252)\textsuperscript{219}. That is, the stage of the ideology of Chinese dominance followed the stage of the ideology of maintaining China's security from threats from its neighbors.

China was the first of the two pivotal states whose expansion affected Central Asia. With the defeat of the nomadic Dzungar Empire, which occupied the entire territory of Xinjiang and Tibet, the Qing Empire established its power in the conquered territory in 1760 (2000)\textsuperscript{220}.

After the collapse of the Dzungar Empire, the struggle for its legacy began between the Muslim states of Central Asia, including the Kazakh states and China. For almost a hundred years, the weak power of the Qing Empire in East Turkestan was contested by the neighboring Muslim independent states from West Turkestan. Numerous uprisings in 1816, 1825, 1830, 1847, 1855, 1856, 1857, and 1864 against the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang were directly inspired by the territory of the latter (1948)\textsuperscript{221}. The constant raids of the Muslim states of Western Turkestan on the


territory of Xinjiang and the direct invasion in 1830 constantly threatened Chinese power in this region (1959)\textsuperscript{222}. For a century since the inclusion of Eastern Turkestan into the Chinese Empire, the latter's power in the region was unstable and somewhat illusory.

Therefore, the strategic need for mutual control arose due to the constant threat from the Islamist and national liberation movements on both sides of the border between the two empires. In particular, the Kokand Khanate was a sponsor of many Uighur uprisings in the middle of the 19th century. In addition, it threatened Russian power in the northern part of Central Asia.

Since the Chinese advance into East Turkestan, the independent states of Central Asia have been a source of destabilization of imperial power in the region. From the side of the Kokand Khanate in 1826–1827, the holy war of Muslims against Chinese rule in the region was inspired. Almost all the peoples of Central Asia participated in the Ghazawat against China. Although the Ghazawat-inspired rebellion failed, several Chinese armies were defeated, and the rebellious Muslims temporarily captured the main cities of East Turkestan.

In 1830, the Kokand Khanate launched a direct invasion of East Turkestan, occupying the region's main cities but ending the occupation of the region due to external threats to the Khanate itself from other countries. Nevertheless, Kokand achieved significant trade preferences from China, which was trying to stop the Kokand aggression. In addition, the Manchu government was forced to pay tribute to the Kokand Khanate to keep the Uyghur separatists who settled on its territory in check.

Uighur separatists based in the Kokand Khanate took advantage of the Chinese internal political crisis of 1845 by invading East Turkestan. A series of Central Asian-backed Uighur separatist incursions into East Turkestan continued in 1947, 55, 56, and 57. Despite their failure,

these partially successful invasions demonstrated the weakness of China's central authority in the region. Therefore, the local uprising that followed in 1864 led to the creation of independent states: the Yettishar emirate in 1872, which controlled most of Xinjiang, and the Ili Sultanate in 1867.

The strengthening of Chinese power over East Turkestan became possible only after the defeat of the states of West Turkestan and the incorporation of entire West Turkestan into the Russian Empire. So, in 1867, the Turkestan Governor-Generalship was established, and in 1874, the Turkestan Military District was created. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, the independent Muslim states of both Western and Eastern Turkestan were liquidated by the joint efforts of the Russian and Chinese empires. Neither the Chinese nor the Russian empires had the ability or desire to gain control over the entire Central Asian region independently. The geopolitical, trade, and economic interests of both empires needed mutual support in the region (Paramonov 2018, 128-129)\(^\text{223}\).

The vital interest of both empires in joint and equal control over the entire region was confirmed by the peaceful transfer of the Ili region, after the military suppression of its independent status, by the Russian Empire to Qing China in 1881 (2004)\(^\text{224}\). Central Asia became the center of geopolitical cooperation between the two empires from the moment of their contact, and control over it became the basis of their geopolitical power. As the heir to the great nomadic empires, China has preserved its political traditions, viewing free Central Asia as a threat to the security of the Chinese Empire. In his book, Aleksey Volynets describes one of the members of the imperial


family, Grand Duke Chun, that without the return of Xinjiang, "Inner China will become like teeth without lips" (2017)\textsuperscript{225}. 

In general, researchers agree that both Russia and China acted together in Central Asia when, by 1876, the Qing Empire was ready to begin the return of Xinjiang (Voskresensky et al. 1999, 156-160)\textsuperscript{226}. The Russian Empire demonstrated in every possible way that it was ready not to impede the return of those lands that the Chinese government considered its own. 

An even more weighty argument in favor of the security threat from the independent states of Central Asia was the fear of both Russia and China of external interference by Western powers. 

Thus, the Russian military and diplomats were convinced that Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire sought to create a united Muslim state in the region (Guber et al. 1951, 140)\textsuperscript{227}. 

In addition, the Russian authorities also viewed the existence of independent Muslim states in Chinese Turkestan as threatening their possession of Russian Turkestan. They feared both the unification of all independent East Turkestan states with Kokand and the recapture by the latter of Russian conquests in the region (Moiseev 2000, 90-93)\textsuperscript{228}.


The efforts of the British Empire to maintain sovereignty in the newly formed Muslim state in East Turkestan were perceived by the Chinese authorities as a threat to their sovereignty and stability. East Turkestan, for the Qing authorities, was an indispensable component in the security architecture of the entire Chinese state. For example, the Chinese governor in Xinjiang, Zuo Zongtang, considered the loss of Chinese power in Xinjiang as a threat to the loss of Mongolia and the capital of Beijing itself. Confronting the spread of the influence of the British Empire or Russia in the West of China was the most crucial trigger for the Chinese military incursion into the region in 1876–81 (Voskresensky 1999, 156-160)²²⁹.

Neither the Qing Empire nor the Russian Empire in the 19th century nor the USSR, with the PRC in the 20th century, was interested in gaining independence for any part of Central Asia. At the same time, they were all interested in limited control over the entire region due to the impossibility of exercising it over such a vast region singlehandedly. Therefore, as the historical events of the 19th and 20th centuries show, Russia and China constantly helped each other in maintaining control over each of their Central Asian parts.

### 3. Single Ideological Space

So, the geopolitical cooperation between Russia and China in the 19th century continued into the 20th century. Moreover, this cooperation was based first on a purely geopolitical basis and, from the middle of the 20th century, on a purely ideological basis. So, for example, if the war between Japan and China began on July 7, 1937, then on August 21, 1937, the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact was signed, after which the communist USSR immediately began to provide military and economic assistance to the Kuomintang government. Moreover, in addition to the supply of military aircraft and other equipment, Soviet military pilots fought on the side of China.

Geopolitical cooperation between China and Russia was based not only on communist ideology, as is now commonly believed. The previous stable cooperation between the Soviet communists and the Nationalist Kuomintang government in China confirms it. Thus, during the period of Kuomintang domination in China, the USSR, in an agreement dated 08.14.1945, provided guarantees of support for its power and non-interference in the internal affairs of China. China and Russia pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and not to participate in opposing coalitions.

Nevertheless, as soon as the Kuomintang government took an anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese position in 1943-44, the USSR organized part of Xinjiang to be torn away from China. With the assistance of the USSR in 1943, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization "Azat Tashkilaty" and the Military Revolutionary Committee were organized, which announced the beginning of an armed uprising. Soviet troops became its curator. Left in Xinjiang to organize armed resistance against the Chinese authorities, and with all non-Chinese nationalities, they achieved complete clearance of the area from the Chinese armed forces. It made it possible to announce the creation in November 1944 of the East Turkestan Republic with its capital in Ghulja. In 1945, the National Army of East Turkestan was also organized, commanded by the Soviet Major General Polinov, and appointed by the Directorate of the Special Forces of the NKVD.

After the Communists defeated the Kuomintang in the civil war in 1949, the USSR contributed to the inclusion of the ETR into the PRC 1949. The reactionary members of the VTR government, who disagreed with the loss of independence, were destroyed, and the military units of the ETR became part of the revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Disagreeing with the betrayal of the USSR and joining the PRC, the Kazakh military units of the ETR fought until 1951.
Godfrey Lias points out that they were destroyed with the active help of units formed with the help of the USSR and the PLA (1956)\textsuperscript{230}.

However, in August-September 1945, the Soviet troops, having defeated the Japanese army in Manchuria, established their control over this area. After that, the USSR complied with the terms of the agreement, contributing to the establishment of the Kuomintang administration in Manchuria and refusing to let the troops of the Communist Party of China (CCP) go there. That once again confirmed the union of two large countries, based not so much on ideology as belonging to a single type of political regime, where ideology only plays an auxiliary role.

When the Kuomintang lost the civil war to the CCP, the communist government of the USSR supported the CCP's rise to power in China due to the civil war in 1949. Many researchers, like A. Ledovsky, were convinced that the Chinese Communist Party mainly relied on the USSR for an armed seizure of power (2005)\textsuperscript{231}.

Many other researchers regarded the military intervention of the USSR as decisive in obtaining independence for China and the victory of the communist regime in it (Vladimirov 1971, 63 et al.)\textsuperscript{232}. In addition, to strengthen the West's natural geopolitical enemy in the face of China, the USSR helped it create raw materials production in 1949–56. With the help of the USSR, the industry was nationalized, agriculture was collectivized, and total socialist construction was launched.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{230} Lias, Godfrey. 1956. \textit{Exodus of the Kazakhs}. London: Evan Brothers Limited. \url{http://pratyeka.org/books/kazak-exodus/}
\item \textsuperscript{231} Ledovsky A. M. 2005. \textit{The USSR, the USA, and the Chinese revolution through the eyes of an eyewitness 1946-1949}. Moscow.: IFES RAS. / [Ледовский, А. М. СССР, США и китайская революция глазами очевидца.].
\end{itemize}
The 30-year Soviet Chinese "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" was formally valid until April 11, 1980. Some researchers argue that the decision to transfer East Turkestan to China ultimately was already enshrined in a secret agreement between the CCP as early as 1945 (Elleman 1997, 237). This treaty was openly ratified between the USSR and the PRC on February 14, 1950.

It ensured non-interference in internal affairs and a strategic alliance with neighboring states. East Turkestan, as an independent region, ceased to exist in 1954 with the formation of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), becoming an integral part of the PRC. The territory of the ETR itself was turned into the Ili-Kazakh autonomous region as a subdistrict of the XUAR (1945).

The ideology of communism was only an additional element in the geopolitical union of the two pivotal states between 1949 and 1980. More than a century and a half of geopolitical cooperation between China and Russia in Central Asia were based on the similarity of the political legacy and the similar authoritarian type of political system. The delimitation of the entire border between the already three countries, begun in 1964 between the USSR and China, continued smoothly even after the collapse of the communist ideology: until 2004 with Russia and until 2002 with Kazakhstan.

4. Mechanisms of external influence reaction

Causal mechanisms are the processes or pathways by which a result occurs. The causal hypothesis I proposed at the beginning of the study should explain the result to which these linkages

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lead. The previous chapters give a detailed analysis of the input and output factors with their variables. This study chapter aims to identify the causes of the outcomes and the causal mechanisms through which they occur.

A. Response to external geopolitical threats

The uniqueness of the authoritarian regime is based on a shared political legacy and common political traditions of a single state formation of the regimes of the three countries under study. The institutional interconnectedness of authoritarian states throughout the common space of these countries is based on the fear of the survival of their legacy in the common geopolitical space. The two input factors are the uniqueness of regimes (intermediate factor) and the interconnectedness (external independent factor) of political systems and states. Consequently, the interaction of pivotal states is an output factor (military interventions and strategic treaties/agreements), in which foreign policy types are dependent variables of the latter.

Cause-and-effect relationships between factors work through the mechanism of regime survival and restoration of interconnectedness between actors, and the mechanisms dictate the behavior of actors. The weakening of the parameters of intermediate variables that filter the systemic pressure of external systemic factors has an impact on the strengthening of dependent variables in states' foreign policy. Increased external pressure is aimed at bringing the internal political institutions of states, or mediating variables, into internal conformity.

This thesis's central hypothesis is that Russia and China's dominant external influence on Kazakhstan is due to the uniqueness of their kindred regimes and the interconnectedness of their states. Fear that the failure of one of them will lead to the fall of other authoritarian regimes throughout the CPS, as well as the desire to maintain dominance in it, are the defining triggers of external pressure.
The threat of weakening one of the factors in one of the non-core states (a supra-authoritarian regime and the interconnectedness of states) causes a survival reaction in the form of strengthening the foreign policy of the pivotal states in relation to the non-pivotal ones. Moreover, this strengthening manifest itself through the promotion of active military intervention when the mechanism of cause-and-effect relationships in the incoming factors fails.

Key countries (Russia and China) have a more significant impact on the dynamics of political traditions because of promotion in the countries of their CPS (Kazakhstan) than key countries (USA) from competing CPS to the same countries (Kazakhstan). In other words, due to diffusion, external influence factors could be more effective among countries of different political spaces. At the same time, promotion is more effective among countries within a common political space.

As for the features of external influence, as can be seen from numerous cases of external influence with the listed threats, violence is an essential institution of political regulation in the Eurasian region. Accounting for geopolitical threats arising inside or outside the CPS, the pivotal states have always resorted to force: military actions and their formalization in agreements / strategic treaties. Even the region's recent history shows that both key countries relied heavily on the force. For example, the USSR has always resorted to military interventions in the countries of the "communist space" in the face of geopolitical threats.

Therefore, the result of interest to us concentrates only on the main variables of the external influence factor: military interventions and the treaties/agreements that frame them. Both variables are consistent with the concepts of promotion and diffusion in the academic literature regarding external influence.
B. Conditions for the reaction activation

The conditions for the activation of reactions of forceful external influence are violations in
the algorithm of connections and the hierarchy of the functioning of intermediate variables of the
factor of supra-authoritarian domestic political institutions. Another reason is the change in reaction
of external factor of systemic pressure due to external threats from the pivotal countries competing
with the CPS. Thus, the foreign policy of states depends on their position in the international system
and the relative strength and capabilities of these states.

In particular, the relative power of states in the international system is an independent
variable that exerts systemic pressure on states through mediating variables. In this case, the
mediating variables are internal institutional factors. The strengthening of external threats towards
any CPS state leads to an increase in the systemic pressure of the dominant CPS countries in the
form of a reaction of military influence on this country. That is, the results of foreign policy are the
behavior of states in the form of a change in the dependent variables of external interaction.

According to neoclassical realists, the foreign policy of states is determined by the following
three sets of variables (Firoozabadi and Ashkezari 2016, 98)235:

a) Assessing the threats and opportunities of the international political system by pivotal
states like Russia or China. In the presence of a threat of change in domestic political factors or an
external threat, the position of the pivotal states in the CPS (independent variables) determines the
strength of foreign policy.

b) Strategic adaptation on four key factors:

\[\text{Firoozabadi, Jalal Dehghani & Mojtaba Zare Ashkezari. 2016. “Neo-classical Realism in International Relations.”}
\textit{Asian Social Science}; \textit{Vol. 12, No. 6: 98. Canadian Center of Science and Education. DOI:}
\textit{10.5539/ass.v12n6p95.} \]
- Decisions are made by pivotal states that respond to international threats with military methods.

- their allies are the elites of all countries within the CPS, which are united by a supranational character.

- non-pivotal states are concerning co-dependence with the pivotal ones. Therefore, the pivotal states determine the format of foreign policy between them.

- regime institutions are more important than national statehood; the only way to change the position of internal actors of non-pivotal states is the conditions for the weakening of regimes in pivotal states.

(c) Three factors drive domestic resource mobilization:

- pivotal states mobilize their relative power, while non-pivotal states mobilize the relative strength of regime kinship within the CPS.

- the regime mobilizes its structural institutions for its preservation during periods of weakening of the personalistic ones. Therefore, during the period of confrontation between the two types of variables, a weakening of the regime occurs.

- the determining factor in the bargaining between the regime and other socio-political groups is the external intervention of the pivotal player of one or another CPS, which has greater relative strength than the other pivotal player.

**IV. Dependent Variables**

The variables of the reaction of the pivotal states in the event of both a violation of the mechanism of functioning of domestic political institutions and changes in the international system in the form of external threats (to security and domination) are:
1. International treaties / strategic agreements, fixed by the two pillar states to control the Central Asian region and Kazakhstan.

2. Military actions of the supporting states to ensure control over the Central Asian region and Kazakhstan.

1. International Strategic Treaties

A. Russian-Chinese delimitation of Central Asia (1958)\textsuperscript{236} Between 1851-1881:

1) Kuldzha Treaty of 1851:

- assertion of Chinese and Russian domination on the borders of the two empires,
- preventing the influence of the British Empire in the region,
- opening of Russian consulates and trade missions in Xinjiang.

2) Beijing Treaty of 1860:

- settlement of political contradictions,
- recognition of the borders formed because of mutual expansions in Central Asia,
- the beginning of the demarcation of modern borders between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and China

3) Chuguchak Protocol of 1864:

- official recognition by China of the withdrawal of southeastern Kazakhstan (Semirechye) and Kyrgyzstan to Russia,

4) Treaty on the Ili region (Petersburg Treaty) 12(24).02.1881:

- a trilateral agreement between the UK, Russia, and China,
- refusal of the British Empire to support Muslim states in the region,

- official recognition of the continued control of the Qing Empire over the Ili region,
- transfer of 80% of the Ili region to China and 20% to Russia,
- determination of the procedure for solving border issues between the two empires,
- the completion of the demarcation of the border between the Russian-Qing border corresponds to the modern border between the PRC and the ROK.

**B. Bilateral Sino-Russian/Soviet Treaties (Ibid.)**

1) Secret (Moscow) Agreement dated May 22, 1896:

- the obligation never to fight – this promise is kept despite repeated armed conflicts of varying intensity,
- a strategic geopolitical alliance against “common” enemies (Japan, the West)\(^{238}\) (Galenovich 2003, 9).

*Causes:*

- the beginning of a series of wars and provocations by Japan in the Far East in 1894,
- Japan attacked China in 1895.

*The results of external promotion:*

- China and Russia forced Japan to abandon the previously captured Liaodong Peninsula (Narochnitsky 1956, 702-704)\(^{239}\).

2) Beijing Agreement, May 1924:

- established general principles for resolving all issues,

\(^{237}\) Ibid.


- restored diplomatic relations between the two powers already in the status of republics,
- confirmed the new nature of relations “based on equality, reciprocity, and justice and in the spirit of the declarations of the Soviet government in 1919 and 1920.”

*Causes:*

- an ongoing series of wars and provocations of Japan in the Far East, starting in 1894.
- Japanese occupation of the Russian Far East in 1920–1922

*Results:*

- military-technical assistance of the USSR to China,
- the USSR renounced the privileges of the era of empires, such as concessions under previous agreements (the CER became a joint Soviet Chinese commercial enterprise).

3) Nanjing Treaty on non-aggression 08.21.1937

- it was envisaged that the USSR would provide genuine assistance to China in the fight against aggressors,
- ensured the establishment of relations of the military-political union of the two neighboring peoples at a critical moment in their history.

*Causes:*

- Japanese occupation of three northeastern provinces (Manchuria and others) in 1931 (2013).²⁴⁰

- the beginning of the total phase of the Japanese Chinese war in June 1937
(Meliksetov 2004, 526–529)\textsuperscript{241}.

Results:
- full-scale military-technical assistance, financial assistance, diplomatic assistance from the Soviet Union,
- full-scale military assistance to Japan.

4) Soviet-Chinese Treaty (30 years) on friendship and alliance, 08.14.1945:
- the USSR provided guarantees of support to the current Kuomintang government,
- mutual non-interference in internal affairs,
- a military alliance against Japan,
- a mutual obligation to wage war against Japan to a victorious end,
- a mutual obligation not to enter alliances/coalitions with a third party,
- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Causes:
- a mutual interest in eliminating the military Threat from Japan,
- the ongoing occupation of part of China.

The results of external promotion:
- the defeat of Japanese troops in Manchuria,
- the Soviet administration contributed to the establishment of the Kuomintang administration there,

- the refusal of the Soviet military administration in November 1945 from the squadron of the 7th American fleet to allow the landing of the Kuomintang troops in Port Arthur and Dalniy in order to avoid an aggravation of the civil war with the communists.

- continuation of a bilateral full-fledged geopolitical and strategic union.

Causes:
- the establishment of a new ideological status in China – the communist system.

Results:
- China’s support for armed confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

The bilateral geopolitical interaction of the three countries is confirmed by numerous agreements on partnership and strategic cooperation in the post-Soviet period. The systematic formalization and legal consolidation in the Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation were signed between China and Russia in 2001 and between China and Kazakhstan in 1999.

6) Russian-Chinese (Moscow) Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, 07.16.2001:
- the development of cooperation in trade and economic, military-technical, scientific-technical, energy, transport, and other fields is envisaged,
- the intention to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism,
- refusing to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other,
- the parties do not have mutual territorial claims.
Causes:

- new ideological status of the Russian Federation,
- the need for a final delimitation of borders.

The results of external influence:

- the final delimitation of the Russian Chinese border,
- strengthening the alliance against US influence (2001)\textsuperscript{242}
- strengthened supranational integration mechanisms for mutual control of the states of Central Asia.


- the obligation not to participate in alliances and blocs, not to conclude agreements with third states that damage the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side,
- the obligation not to allow the use of its territory by third states to the detriment of the state sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other party,
- prevent the creation and activities on its territory of organizations and groups that harm the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the other side,
- implementation of military and military-technical cooperation.

Causes:

- confirmation of the territorial integrity of the newly independent state of Kazakhstan,

The results of external influence:

- complete delimitation of borders between Kazakhstan and China,
- strengthening of supranational integration structures,
- strengthening cooperation in all areas.

2. Military actions to preserve/restore SPL in CPS

A. Russia

During the entire 19th century, during the period of the most significant expansion of the Russian Empire, 18 out of 35 full-scale military operations were concentrated in the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Of all 29 military conflicts of the Soviet era 1918-1991, twenty-two were military incursions by the USSR to either restore their political legacy or prevent a Soviet-style regime change. The area of these 22 invasions was the territories of states belonging to a single political regime of the communist bloc.

With the collapse of the USSR, during 1986-91, the central government carried out five full-scale military incursions into the union republics to preserve the “constitutional order” (2017)243: Almaty/Karaganda in 1986; Tbilisi in 1989; Baku in 1990; Vilnius in 1991.

During the 31 years of its existence, from 1991 to 2022, the Russian Federation carried out 15 hostilities, of which 13 were incursions of the Russian armed forces into the territory of the former Soviet republics or the territory of the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation.

The latest hostilities to restore/preserve kindred authoritarian regimes took place in January 2022 during the CSTO invasion of Kazakhstan; and have been taking place since February 2022 during the Russian military invasion of Ukraine.

B. China

The formation of the Qing Empire began precisely with the confrontation with the Dzungar Khanate, which controlled the whole of Inner Asia at the beginning of the 17th century. Both states considered themselves heirs of the Mongol Empire and disputed authority over all of China. In essence, the series of Oirat-Manchu wars that lasted three-quarters of a century between 1688-1759 was an “internal war” and a gathering of the Mongol legacy of the Yuan Dynasty throughout the Empire. Having defeated Dzungaria, the Qing established hegemony over the entire territory of Inner Asia, including Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Moreover, the Chinese concept of a dynasty is synonymous with the formation of a state (Doronin 2002, 157; Dmitriev&Kuzmin 2014, 5–17) and all the states of a multi-ethnic empire are hereditarily vassal parts of the central power represented by the ruling dynasty.

In total, there were three large-scale Manchu-Dzungar wars for power over all of China: the first Oirat-Manchu war (1688-1697), the second Oirat-Manchu war (1715-1739), the third Oirat-Manchu war (1755-1759). Moreover, the last war is divided into two stages: the second stage of 1757-59 is Qing China’s military action against the Muslim rebels of East Turkistan (Rybakov 2000, V.3).

The reaction to the threats posed by the geopolitical rival in the face of the Dzungar Khanate was its destruction in a series of three Oirat-Manchurian wars. According to Chernyshev, the

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destruction of the Dzungars related to the desire to get rid of their geopolitical rival, who competed for control over the entire Central Asian region (1990)\textsuperscript{246}.

Three Dzungar-Manchurian wars are included in the Ten Great Military Campaigns of Emperor Qian-Lun, initiated by China in response to threats to its hegemony throughout the Empire. The Central Asian vector of military expansion was aimed at “expanding the Qing-controlled zone in Central Asia.” The remaining seven campaigns of 1787-1792 were more devoted to the defense and pacification of the “already established frontiers” along the rest of China’s frontier perimeter (F. Mote 1999, 936-939)\textsuperscript{247}.

The company’s most successful ten military campaigns were three in th” Central Asian region to restore common political traditions in the vast region.

Chinese military incursions into Central Asia in the 18\textsuperscript{th}–20\textsuperscript{th} centuries:

- “Ten Great Campaigns” organized by Emperor Qian Lun in Central Asia in 1750-90 led to its complete conquest (2002)\textsuperscript{248},

- a series of Kazakh Chinese wars of 1756, 1757, 1767,

- Chinese conquest of the formed Muslim states of East Turkestan, completed by 1878,

- holy war (Ghazawat) of the Central Asian states in response to Chinese expansion in East Turkestan,


- military expeditions to suppress numerous uprisings of 1816, 1825, 1830, 1847, 1855, 1856, 1857, and 1864 in the region (1949)\textsuperscript{249},

- in 1830, the threat of a full-scale military invasion from China to Western Turkestan forced the Kokand Khanate to organize Ghazawat against China,

- a series of Central Asian-backed Uyghur separatist incursions into East Turkistan continued in 1847, 55, 56, and 57,

- re-occupation of East Turkestan because of large-scale military operations in 1877,

- the introduction of additional military forces into the region and the formation of Xinjiang province with a military district in 1884,

- military expeditions against ETIR in 1931-34 in alliance with the USSR against interests in England. There are at least four (4) full-scale military conflicts, with six (6) major military battles that took place in Xinjiang from 1931 to 1934 involving the USSR and China,

- military expeditions against the ETR in 1944-1949 in alliance with the USSR against the interests of Western countries,

- the suppression by the Chinese military police of the uprising of the Islamists of the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan in 2007 in the Aktin district,

- military suppression of the mass uprising of East Turkestan Muslims against the central regime in July 2009.

\textsuperscript{249} Tikhonov D.I. 1949. The nature of the national liberation movements in Xinjiang in the 19th century and the first third of the 20th century. Moscow: Publishing House of Soviet Oriental Studies. / [Тихонов Д. И. Характер национально-освободительных движений в Синьцзяне в 19 в. и первой трети 20 в.].

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3. Reasons for violation of causal relationships

A. Threat to regimes’ preservation

External pressure and threats from Russia to Central Asia are taking place to maintain internal authoritarian regimes and keep them in a common political space. A similar perception of the threat of NATO expansion in Ukraine provoked the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine in February 2022. Despite being deeply entangled in the conflict in Eastern Europe, Russia still threatens Kazakhstan. The widely held and so far, unofficial position of the Russian establishment was expressed on March 24, 2022, by the deputy of the Moscow City Duma from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Sergey Savostyanov, stating the following: “The demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine will ensure the sustainable security of the peoples of Ukraine, Russia and all of Europe. For a full-fledged process of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation, in addition to Ukraine, I consider it expedient to include the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Poland, Moldova, and Kazakhstan into the denazification and demilitarization zone.” (2022)250.

B. Aspiration for Dominance

A possible defeat in Ukraine and, in general, in the Western European direction of Russia will only strengthen its expansionist and revanchist aspirations in the East: in Kazakhstan and Georgia. In addition, this defeat will strengthen the vector and sympathy of the “Asian path” of development and the essence of Russia. As has happened more than once in the history of Russia, a defeat in the European vector of expansion led to an immediate increase in military expansion to the East to divert the population from defeat and restore the imperial dignity and honor of the state. Thus, after the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia increased its pressure in the Caucasus and Central

250 KazTAG. “The Rosdeputy called for "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Kazakhstan following the example of Ukraine.” Almaty: Kazakh Telegraph Agency. KazTAG, March 26, 2022.
Asia, transferring to these areas most of the military units from the western direction and finally including them in its Empire.

One of the critical reasons for the ongoing aggression of Russia is the need to satisfy the military elite and the army in performing their tasks. In addition, the army’s involvement in victorious battles is necessary to level anti-government sentiments in the army itself. For example, after the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War of 1853–56, it completed the final conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia in the second half of the 19th century. After the defeat in the war with Japan and the shocking revolutions of 1905–07, the Russian Empire saw the restoration of its imperial honor in the military support of Pan-Slavism and provoked a war with the European powers in 1914–18. Also, the defeat in the First World War led to the collapse of the Empire and the loss of Western Ukraine and Belarus because of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as of March 3, 1918. That only increased the military pressure of the already Bolshevik Moscow on Central Asia and the Caucasus in 1918–38 (1981)\(^{251}\).

V. “January 2022 Uprising”:

**Military Intervention & Strategic Influence Background**

1. *Mechanisms of Promotion Activation*

External intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 took place under cover of the pan-Eurasian military organization CSTO. Obvious to all, the Russian intervention, however, received a significant degree of legitimacy as a military intervention by an internationally recognized military organization. Even though Russia used the CSTO tool for the first time, it effectively used "an institution under its control to carry out its policy," says F. Lukyanov (2022)\(^{252}\).

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Nevertheless, the invasion of the collective Eurasian authoritarian space once again confirms the thesis of the constant systemic impact of the independent variables of the Eurasian international factor of interconnectedness on the internal factors of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan. The failure in 2019-2022 in the peaceful replacement of the Super-presidential power with the power of the Principate led to the activation of the survival mechanism in the event of continued systemic pressure from the Eurasian political space. This mechanism activated the immediate reaction of the military invasion of pivotal Russia and the armed forces of all Eurasian countries.

The variables of the interconnectedness factor in this particular case are presented both by the CSTO itself and by Article 4 of this organization, which states that "In the event of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against any of the participating States, all other the participating States, at the request of that participating State, will immediately provide it with the necessary assistance, including military assistance, as well as support with the means at their disposal, in order to exercise the right to collective defense following Article 51 of the UN Charter" (CSTO 2012, art. 4)253.

The activation of the variable of forceful external intervention in January 2022 is also considered from the point of view of saving one authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan and another authoritarian regime from Russia. The defeat of peaceful demonstrations, coupled with opposing clans, accompanied by the most brutal execution of peaceful pro-democratic protesters, is indisputable confirmation of this.

Moscow immediately withdrew all CSTO armed forces after the uprising was crushed and the local authoritarian regime was preserved. Against a year-long war in Ukraine, this conclusion

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testifies to Moscow's interest in maintaining a kindred regime rather than occupying the country itself. The Russian authoritarian regime does not want the slightest weakening of the regime in Kazakhstan or dialogue with the opposition. Moreover, the authoritarian regime in Russia sees any protests a kindred regime in Kazakhstan as a direct threat and protests its regime in Russia.

From the point of view of activating external influence by the mechanism of maintaining the regime, D. Trenin considers the rescue of both the autocrat of Belarus Lukashenko in the summer of 2020 and Tokayev in January 2022 as links in the same chain in ensuring the security of the authoritarian regime in Russia itself (2023)\(^{254}\).

From the point of view of the activation of external influence by the mechanism of the dominance of the pivotal country, the external invasion of the CSTO forces is aimed not only at maintaining Tokayev's power but also at ensuring the preservation and strengthening of Russia's dominance over Kazakhstan. So, John Herbst believes that "Moscow's position in Central Asia would decline if a popular revolt produced a reform-minded government" (2022)\(^{255}\).

2. The “January 2022” Intermezzo

The main events unfolded in the city of Almaty on January 4-5, which was captured on the night of January 5. The protesters seized and destroyed the buildings of the leading television channels in the city, the building of the Almaty Police Department, the Almaty airport, banks, district police departments, the residence of the First President, the city administration, and the National Security Committee. The last buildings were completely burned down. The city had armed clashes with armored personnel carriers, explosive weapons, and machine guns. In some parts of the


city and the region, government forces' armed resistance continued until official power was
restored. A day later, the local authorities and security forces left the city, leaving it at the mercy of
the protesters.

Similar events took place throughout almost all of Kazakhstan. Despite the Internet and
communications blackouts, there were shots of some army units going over to the rebels' side. By
the evening of January 5, the city was in the rebels' grip and plunged into anarchy.

On the evening of January 5, Tokayev turned to the CSTO leaders to request assistance in
suppressing the uprising: "Relying on the collective security treaty, today I turned to the heads of
the CSTO states to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat. It is no longer a threat; this
is an undermining of the integrity of the state…" (2022)\(^{256}\). Tokayev explained the request for the
deployment of CSTO troops as the need to confront "terrorist gangs trained abroad" (2022)\(^{257}\).

The CSTO armed forces were introduced immediately, and already on the night of January
5-6, they began to seize the main strategic facilities, like airports, and take others under protection.
However, the main result of introducing the CSTO forces was a clear demonstration of Putin's
support for Tokayev, not Nazarbayev. Thus, the elites received a clear signal of which side Russia
took and immediately stopped their resistance or sabotage. Also, the army, police, and all law
enforcement agencies that have withdrawn from the political struggle received a clear signal on
whose side they should act. Therefore, on the morning of January 6, the country's armed forces and
internal troops began an operation to restore official power.

\(^{256}\) Novaja Gazeta. (2022). Tokayev appealed to the leaders of the CSTO countries with a request "to assist Kazakhstan
in overcoming the terrorist threat." January 6, 2022. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2022/01/05/tokaev-
obratilisia-k-lederam-stran-odkb-s-prosboi-okazat-pomoshch-kazakhstanu-v-preodolenii-terroristicheskoi-
ugrozy-news

\(^{257}\) RBC News. 2022. The President of Kazakhstan addressed the CSTO leaders with a request for support. January 5,
2022. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/01/2022/61d5e5cb9a7947499455195e
Part III—New Path
Chapter VII: Window of Opportunity

I. Path Dependency vs New Path Creation

The presented multi-level system of the behavior of states in the system of international relations, in addition to its historical, institutional, and traditional continuity, also has substantial internal contradictions. The continuity of the path inevitably comes into conflict with the possibility of creating a new path. Thus, the possibility of changing authoritarian regimes goes through two stages:

1. The emergence of critical junctures in a multi-level system due to the institutional features of authoritarianism,

2. Using the window of opportunity for the pivotal and non-pivotal states.

I. Critical Junctures

A. Origins of Controversy

According to path dependence, the evolution of domestic political changes is determined by the institutional structure given by path dependence. The fundamental change includes an element of destruction of these institutions (Schumpeter 1942, 83)\textsuperscript{258}.

The evolution of the development of personalistic and supporting structural variables inevitably leads to their contradictions. Each of them seeks to strengthen and contradict the other, weakening the other. Obtaining the absolute power of any variable is a necessary condition for the survival of the supra-authoritarian system itself. The desire to obtain this absolute power inevitably leads to conflict between them and, consequently, to their mutual weakening. At the same time, weakening the intermediate variables of internal institutions of power leads to weakening the dependent variables of the foreign policy factor. This chain of violation of cause-and-effect

relationships leads to the emergence of critical junctures in the independent system variables of the factor of the external international system.

Critical moments arise when there are failures in institutional mechanisms programmed by the oscillatory movement of factors within authoritarian regimes. It occurs at moments of failure of the mechanism for transferring authoritarian primacy between intermediate variables beyond authoritarianism. As the process tracing analysis shows, such a failure occurs on an ongoing basis since functional contradictions are embedded within authoritarian institutions.

If this happens in a non-pivotal country, then such a failure provokes a reaction of forceful external intervention on the part of a pivotal country with a related regime. However, when such a failure in the mechanism of transmission of the authoritarian primacy between intermediate variables occurs in pivotal countries, it creates critical nodes. At critical nodes, the reaction of external influence of independent variables of the factor of the international system shows an oscillatory and unstable character. During this period, the international institutional environment changes and ceases to support the appropriate conditions for maintaining the continuity of authoritarianism in it.

The constitutional framework has always supported institutional continuity in Eurasian countries, even though it exists partially in informal types. To do this, the primary texts of the Constitutions were constantly changing, emphasizing the power of not law but the right of force in Eurasia. During the existence of the USSR, four constitutions were adopted. That is, during the 73 years of the existence of the Soviet state, four fundamental laws of the country were adopted. Their adoption completed the stages of changing the types of supra-authoritarian absolutes, framing the
actual situation. The adoption of all constitutions was accompanied by massive repressions and suppression of political opponents (Medushevsky 2018, 53).259

1) For example, the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918 was accompanied by a civil war, the dissolution of the legislature (the Constituent Assembly), and the elimination of the multi-party system. It was then that the transition from the personalistic primacy of the Tsar to the structural primacy of Lenin's Principate took place.

2) The Constitution of 1924, the restoration of Soviet power over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire. Then there was a transition from the primacy of the Principate to the structural primacy of the Communist Party.

3) The Constitution of 1936 marked the preparation of the political trials and the era of the Great Terror. All of this was necessary to transition to the primacy of Stalin's Principate.

4) The 1977 Constitution began the process of fighting the liberalization of the Khrushchev Thaw period and strengthening the personalist primacy of Brezhnev and the struggle against the structural primacy of the Communist Party.

B. Ideological Paradigm

Regardless of the structural and ideological variables in the hierarchy, in addition to authoritarianism, the idea that guides the actors play a huge role in motivating the behavior of actors in a system of internal and external factors. As Medushevsky noted, from a legal point of view, one can speak of the Eurasian continuity of the legitimizing formula. Its main goal has always been an

attempt to justify ideologically driven state-building and the right of one of the variables to absolute power (2015)\textsuperscript{260}.

Each stage in the development of supra-authoritarianism corresponded not only to the primacy of one of the variables but also to the ideological priority of this variable over the previously declared right. Therefore, for example, the paradigm of Eurasian authoritarianism before 1977 is a structural ideological variable that was supreme over the law. It was in the Constitution of the USSR of 1977 that the monopoly of the Communist Party on power in the country was abolished. "Thus, at all stages of the development of the political system, the priority of ideology over law is traced, manifested in the constitutional consolidation of the main ideological dogmas" (Ibid., 553)\textsuperscript{261}.

The refusal of the Communist Party from the monopoly during the years of “perestroika” led to the complete collapse of the ideological variable (Khudoley 2018, 73)\textsuperscript{262}. Critical junctures in the paradigm of the priority of ideology over law in Eurasian countries arise due to internal contradictions between the idea of authoritarianism and the people who must accept it. At first, the factor that provoked the change was a significant weakening of ideology due to a long-term discrepancy between the goals set by the party and their practical implementation. This discrepancy was due to the need for more established institutions and the general utopian nature of the tasks set. Attempts to legitimize the status of hegemons (parties and monarchies) associated with this weakness further weakened absolute authoritarianism. Thus, the weakening of the ideology took

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid., 553.
\end{thebibliography}
place throughout the existence of the USSR. The resulting failure to pursue a militaristic foreign policy led to the partial transformation of the world revolution into the idea of defending socialism in one country in the 1920s. However, the declaration of a world revolution remained in the Constitution of 1936. However, they abandoned the idea of preserving the army as an instrument of the world revolution and not only.

Nevertheless, Soviet foreign policy from the 1930s continued to organize revolutionary uprisings in other countries through the Com-Intern. In the 1950s, the ideological doctrine was again forced to change towards a "peaceful coexistence" policy with capitalism. It came into direct conflict with the doctrine of the establishment of socialism throughout the world. That led to the weakening of the position of the Communist Party. The Cold War and the American-Soviet rivalry for influence over the rest of the world led to the complete collapse of the communist ideology by the mid-80s.

One of the most important reasons for the most robust crisis of supra-authoritarianism in the USSR was the crisis of the paradigm of the priority of ideology over the law, personified in the rejection of the primacy of the Communist Party. However, even more, catastrophic for the entire system beyond authoritarianism was the refusal of the USSR to dominate and protect the non-pivotal countries of the single communist space. The USSR withdrew any support for all communist regimes in the new CPSU program of 1986 (Gorbachev 1987, 150–151)\textsuperscript{263}. The result was the complete fall of the authoritarian regimes kindred to the USSR in all non-pivotal countries of the single communist space. All supranational structures like the military Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) ceased to exist, and the entire system of

interdependency and co-dependency was destroyed. Therefore, within five years, the USSR also ceased to exist.

2. Path Creation

Historical comparative analysis shows that a "Window of Opportunity" arises when the regime is weakened, accompanied by internal contradictions. However, changing the political path is possible only with the active participation of competing for political systems. Thus, a window of opportunity for a fundamental change in the political regime of a non-core country appears now of the emergence of critical nodes in the core countries.

However, fundamental changes require more than this easing. There is always a factor of external intervention by the supporting state to maintain the regime. Therefore, regime change in non-pivotal countries depends on the relative strength and capability of the pivotal states of the competing political systems. In the case of the greater relative strength of the pivotal state of an unrelated regime, a window of opportunity arises both for them and for opponents of the regime inside the country.

A window of opportunity to change the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan emerged with the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The collapse of the USSR and the independence of the fourteen republics of the former USSR became possible due to the emergence of contradictions between two variables of supra-authoritarianism: the personalist presidential one in the person of President Gorbachev and the structural-ideological one, on the one hand. On the other hand, there are two variables of supra-sovereignty: supranational and autonomy of the constituent parts of the USSR, including the contradictions between Russia and the USSR. The internal conflict between supra-authoritarianism variables led to dual power in Moscow and multi-power in all the union republics.
In addition, in the union republics, an additional structural variable in the form of national clans of national groupings joined the struggle.

The weakening of the position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) created an inability to resolve the political anarchy that arose in a power vacuum. The primacy of the structural ideological variable was utterly violated in 1977 by securing the leading role of the CPSU in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Thus, the party's unofficial (shadow) status in the structure of factors of Eurasian super-authoritarianism was violated. The official status reduced the party to the level of one of the branches of power and not an ideological superstructure over society, depriving it of its supra-structural status and reducing it to the level of one of the political players. The final blow to the structural primacy of authoritarianism in the USSR was delivered on March 15, 1990, by the constitutional abolition of the ideological and political monopoly of the CPSU.

A change of regime in one of the countries of the single political space causes the threat of loss of sovereignty by all countries, both central and non-core. Thus, a change in the political regime in a non-axial country violates the strict hierarchy of the supra-sovereign factor, threatening the integrity of the supranational structure of space and violating autonomy within the supporting state. Thus, the declaration of sovereignty by the Estonian parliament on November 16, 1988, led to the so-called sovereignty parade of 1988-91, which ended the USSR. Thus, the fourteen republics of the collapsed USSR, having for the first time received absolute sovereignty from Russia in 1991, immediately provoked centrifugal movements within the Russian Federation. Between November 16, 1988, and December 15, 1990, all fifteen union republics declared their sovereignty.

At the same time, the "parade of sovereignties" of the Soviet republics provoked the "parade of sovereignties" of the autonomous republics within Russia proper in July-December 1990. The elevation of the status of the autonomous republics to a union within the Russian Federation
significantly weakened Russia's integrity, threatening it with immediate disintegration. Thus, the parade of sovereignties within Russia was not limited to raising its internal status. Republics such as Chechnya and Tatarstan declared their full sovereignty by refusing to sign a new federal treaty on March 31, 1992. Chechnya went even further by undertaking an armed seizure of power in its republic. Moscow was forced to wage a multi-year war against Chechnya in 1994–96 and 1999–2009 to keep the republic within the Russian Federation.

One of the main reasons for the desire to keep Chechnya within the Russian Federation was the fear that with the success of the Chechen Republic in gaining independence, all other union republics within the Russian Federation would follow them. Military successes in Chechnya allowed the federal center to tighten the constitutional limitation of the sovereignties of the republics of the Russian Federation. For example, on June 7, 2000, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation stated the constitutional illegality of the "two-level sovereignty" of the Russian Federation and its subjects (Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of June 7, 2000, N 10-P)²⁶⁴.

The threat of a military invasion of Tatarstan, using the example of Chechnya, forced the leadership of Tatarstan to sign agreements in 1994 and 2007 that finally limited the sovereignty of Tatarstan to the level of a de facto autonomous republic within the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless, the logic of an authoritarian regime cannot stop only at limiting the sovereignties of only the autonomous formations of the supporting countries. For thirty years of de jure independent Kazakhstan, Russia has tried to limit its de jure sovereignty. One of the recent attempts is the statements by Lukashenko and Putin at the CSTO summit on 10.28.2022 about the need to include Kazakhstan in the Union State between the Russian Federation and Belarus.

Therefore, in the event of a regime change in one of the countries of the shared space, there is a threat not only to the regime in the pivotal country but also to its territorial integrity. So, on the territory of Ukraine in the war against the Russian army, there are several military formations consisting of people from the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation in the Caucasus. According to the statements of the commanders of these units and the authorities of Ukraine, their goal is to transfer the armed struggle to Russia's territory and the Caucasus's separation from the Russian Federation (2022)²⁶⁵.

In general, the liberalization of domestic politics in the states of Central Asia is a sign of the authoritarian regime in Moscow that they are moving away from Russia and closer to the West (Malashenko)²⁶⁶. Russia's external aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022; against Georgia in the mid-1990s and 2008 occurred precisely because of periods of weakening authoritarian regimes in these countries. The Moscow regime imposed authoritarian regimes on any territory it could control. All quasi-state formations created in the occupied territories have highly authoritarian regimes.

At the CSTO summit on November 28, 2022, the President of Belarus refused to satisfy the demands of the President of Armenia to the CSTO to support Armenia in the military conflict with Azerbaijan. The main reason for the refusal was that "Azerbaijan today is headed by absolutely our man - Ilham Aliyev" (2022)²⁶⁷. That is, the proximity of the authoritarian regime of Azerbaijan and

the CSTO countries is more important than even belonging to the military bloc of Armenia with a democratically elected president.

Moreover, Lukashenko also stressed that if Kazakhstan wanted to avoid internal turmoil and political regime change, it should join the Union State with Russia and Belarus. According to him, in January 2022, Kazakhstan learned a "good lesson," and both the CSTO and the standard security services proved that they could suppress democratic uprisings in the former CSTO states, which is a "single defense space" (2022).268

According to the President of Belarus, the new Chairman of the CSTO since November 2022, the primary paradigm for the existence of the CSTO was outlined. The organization has been declared a united institution of violence against the spread of political transformations that are alternative to the authoritarian regime. Everything that contradicts the authoritarian political regime will be called a terrorist movement.

However, this struggle between the variables of two super-authoritarian factors led to the collapse of the USSR and opened a window of opportunity for Kazakhstan. The authoritarian regime used this short window of opportunity to restore the pre-Soviet primacy of authoritarian power in most countries of the former USSR. The next logical step towards strengthening authoritarianism is restoring complete control of a single authoritarian regime in the common political space.

Thus, from 1991 to 2000, a window of opportunity appeared in Kazakhstan to break the Eurasian political legacy. However, due to the extreme rigidity of change and the institutional and ideological endurance of the authoritarian regime, the success of the democratic course required a

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more powerful (encouraging) extension of external pressure from the competing Western
democratic regimes in Kazakhstan.

II. Window of Opportunity for Kazakhstan

When personalized power—not necessarily the power of one person, but a power based on
informal practices and personal relationships—weakens for one reason or another, dormant
institutions such as parties/clans/criminal groups emerge to maintain the authoritarian system.

However, with the weakening of the personified presence, inactive institutions can take
power for a long time only with a robust ideological attitude due to established political traditions.
In addition, since the institution of personified relations plays a dominant role in the regime,
structural institutions play a supporting role.

Any window of opportunity for internal democratically oriented actors provokes more
vigorous opposition from external actors in the form of anchor states in the same political space.
Therefore, in the Eurasian space states, when the authoritarian mechanism collapses, the autocracies
of the supporting countries come into play to restore authoritarianism.

The window of opportunity itself is a brief period of opportunity for change, predetermined
by the established institutions of political regimes. Therefore, the nascent democratic forces cannot
yet rely on solid democratic institutions. At the same time, weakened for various reasons,
authoritarian players support the entire arsenal of democratic institutions that have already taken
shape and are deeply rooted in society. Therefore, "the political weather in Central Asia may
change, and significantly, but the authoritarian "climate" will remain the same." (Malashenko 2011,
94)269.

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International Peace, May-August. №3–4 (52): 78–95. / [Малащенко, Алексей. “Обреченные на вечность и
At the same time, based on the Giddens’ structural theory (1979)\textsuperscript{270}, it can be argued that social (political) actors create all structures (institutions). These same actors are responsible for developing new paths. If the concepts of the agency are interpreted in a political plane, then actors are responsible for introducing new paths and changing path dependencies. In addition, within the framework of the theory presented in this dissertation, the change of path dependence and the creation of a new path occurs through the main actors (DiMaggio 1998, 3-20)\textsuperscript{271}.

Therefore, the implementation of a window of opportunity for a change in the political regime in the Eurasian space is possible only if the ability of the supporting states of the common political space, such as Russia, to direct military invasion is weakened. An additional condition is the active participation of the supporting states of alternative political regimes, such as the United States, in changing the political regime in Kazakhstan. Only in this case countries like Kazakhstan could change their political tradition.

Moreover, within the framework of a single political space, authoritarian players showed a solid propensity to cooperate, in contrast to democratic players. Thus, Kazakhstan became the initiator and inspirer of restoring the authoritarian space and their cooperation throughout the space.

A window of opportunity arises when key states fail to pursue an aggressive foreign policy through military incursions and imposed strategic agreements.

Unfortunately, the existing window of opportunity in Kazakhstan in the 1990s was not used by external competing geopolitical actors. “The US and Europe have refused to interfere in the


private affairs of the Central Asian countries, especially in their democratization. Nation building (in Central Asia) was not their priority” (Olcott 2005, 229)

Over the past 30 years, a supra-authoritarian system has been created in Kazakhstan, profoundly based on the sole personified power of a particular person. A disguised monarchy was established in Kazakhstan, the only difference being that it focused on one person. The absence of a formal inheritance of power created a dissonance between the super-vertical regime and its stability during the period of transfer of power. However, formed after the change of the official head of state, a duumvirate of power arose in the country. The irreconcilable contradiction included the exorbitantly strengthened institution of the Principate of the Leader of the Nation, on the one hand, and the super vertical power of the second president, on the other.

At the same time, both sides of power were personalistic in nature on a constitutional basis. According to the hierarchy of authoritarian power proposed in previous chapters, only one of the variables is superior. Auxiliaries are the personalist principate, structural ideology, and informal structural institutions. They play only an auxiliary role in maintaining authoritarianism in the country while weakening the formal personalist super-presidency.

The purposeful strengthening of the institution of the Principate began in Kazakhstan long before the change of official power in 2019. Therefore, the two institutions of personalistic dictatorial power immediately entered a confrontation with the change of the president, inevitably weakening the authoritarian power. Socio-economic severe problems due to the activities of the authoritarian government have served as a trigger for mass anti-government protests since 2019. The basis of the revolutionary actions of the masses was dissatisfaction with the political regime in the country. The main slogans of the speakers were the demands that not only the president but also

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the Principate himself, the leader of the nation, should leave power. The main dissatisfaction of the
democratic-minded demonstrators was caused by the nation's leader, the main personification of the
authoritarian regime.

The dual power and the contradictions connected with it weakened the strength of the
regime and its consolidation with the punitive and repressive authorities. The military and police
began to go over to the demonstrators' side en masse, and the president was forced to call for the
preservation of the current regime. Moscow was happy to use the army to demonstrate support for
the current president of Kazakhstan, first, to all branches of authoritarian power in the country.
Notably, the armed forces of all authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space participated in the
invasion.

China also expressed support for the current authoritarian regime and its readiness to help
suppress any protests of the current authoritarian regime using the tools of the SCO. All opposing
authoritarian forces have been forced to rally around the incumbent President of Kazakhstan in the
face of such solid external support. The decisive actions of the two supporting states of the common
political space with Kazakhstan ended the internal confrontation between the elites, who united to
suppress the democratic forces.

The absence of a CPS, or a community of semi-autonomous countries around a pivotal one,
is detrimental to the latter. Therefore, both the USSR and Russia sought to create a belt of satellites
around themselves to satisfy one of the two main functions of a supra-authoritarian regime - the
possibility of permanent domination.

Hence comes the understanding that the destruction of the security belt of modern Russia in
the form of the CIS will affect the collapse of the Russian Federation itself. At the same time, the
exit of Kazakhstan from the Eurasian CPS for Russia and China will knock out the basis for the
already ongoing strategic cooperation between the two empires. Kazakhstan is the connecting reason for the long-term strategic union of the two countries. Furthermore, maintaining control over Central Asia as a buffer zone is the strategic reason for maintaining the supra-authoritarian Eurasian regime in these two countries.

III. US Foreign Policy Proposals

The main message of American foreign policy regarding resurgent authoritarianism in Kazakhstan can be summed up by Francis Fukuyama's statement that “supporters of liberal democracy must not give in to a fatalism that tacitly accepts the Russian-Chinese line that such democracies are in inevitable decline” (2022)273. Hence, while a window of opportunity is necessary for Kazakhstan to break away from its authoritarian legacy, an active and sound promotion policy by the US in Kazakhstan is vital to change its path forever.

One of the most compelling aspects of the effect of promotion to non-pivotal countries of the authoritarian space is the total denial of legitimization by the competing liberal democratic spaces. The absence of numerous international treaties and strategic agreements between them is an essential element of promotion. Such a refusal by countries personifying internationally accepted republican political institutions de-legitimizes authoritarian ruling regimes. Moreover, if aggressive delegitimization is not destructive for pivotal countries, it is very destructive for non-pivotal countries.

Moreover, external intervention does not mean being limited only by the effect of promotion from the pivotal countries of competing political worlds. As was already noted, the promotion effect is the most effective on the part of the pivotal states of their CPS. At the same time, the diffusion policy is the most effective policy for the competing political worlds.

Nevertheless, this type of external policy is suitable for the general stability of the authoritarian space. Aggressive promotion should lead the foreign policy of the pivotal state of the competing political worlds in a time of critical junctures in the Eurasian space. Thus, the full inclusion of non-pivotal countries into the alternate political space is possible by adding a very active promotional element when a window of opportunity opens.

Also, to contain the growth of authoritarianism within the most pivotal state like Russia, it is necessary to contain Russia within its borders. External militaristic expansion is an integral part of the Eurasian type of authoritarianism. The inability to carry it out has a destructive effect on the regime.

Therefore, for the failure of authoritarianism within the pivotal state, it is necessary to promote democracy in at least one non-pivotal CPS country. The firm promotion of authoritarianism in the non-pivotal countries of the Eurasian authoritarian space violates both the security within the space and the impossibility of dominating it. A supra-authoritarian regime cannot exist within only national borders. Its existence is possible only in the supranational political space.

The strengthening of authoritarian regimes in individual countries inevitably leads to strengthening authoritarian alliances between these countries. In turn, strengthening authoritarian alliances inevitably leads to the onset of an authoritarian ideology and influence on transit and democratic countries. As a result, the strengthening of authoritarian blocs leads not only to a weakening of stability and security in the world but also to a threat to liberal democratic values worldwide. Francis Fukuyama stressed that it is in America's interest to continue to promote good governance abroad (2006)\(^\text{274}\) and to promote liberal democratic values.

For the external influence of pivotal states to be effective in promoting their values in countries of competing political spaces, it must have the following features:

1. It must be based on the ideological values in demand in the country of alleged influence. Thus, the collapse of the USSR in the early 90s was due to the failure of the communist ideology and the ideological institution of authoritarianism in the form of the CPSU. The confrontation between the branches of authoritarian power led to the regime's collapse. It opened the way to the perception not only of the liberal-democratic ideology but also of their institutions.

At the same time, the strengthening of authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space coincided with the growing support of the West for the non-pivotal countries of the Eurasian political space. Belief in the obedience of authoritarian regimes in the presence of a weak link to numerous political and economic interactions with the West undermined the value of democratic liberalism among the population of authoritarian countries. The declared commitment to human rights, coupled with the full support of authoritarian regimes in general, led to a distrust of Western ideology on the part of internal players in authoritarian countries. As Vali Nasr highlights that “the United States’ disengagement threatens to leave a political vacuum that will be filled by sectarian rivalries, paving the way for a more violent and unstable region” (2022)275.

2. Influence must be consistent, unambiguous, and stable concerning the countries themselves and domestic agents in the country. Any support for the country of influence, including economic and political, is used almost entirely to strengthen and legitimize the authoritarian authorities of the country. First, the component of super-presidential power is strengthened since, in an authoritarian system, any foreign policy or economic success is personified with the highest state power. It is due to the underdevelopment of other political institutions and traditions.

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The belief of realists in need to cooperate with autocrats to maintain control over them turned out to be profoundly mistaken, according to Fukuyama (Ibid.)\textsuperscript{276}. Indeed, an analysis of the development of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes shows that the authoritarian regimes managed to use cooperation with the West to legitimize themselves at home and in the international arena.

3. Liberal democratic values should take precedence over economic interests. The latter are loosely and erroneously interpreted as national interests while promoting liberal-democratic values above all else should be accurate. The US has the right to promote its values, especially since they are universal in terms of humanity.

International institutions can become effective agents of international legitimacy only when they genuinely comply with the basic principles of liberal democracy in their relations with authoritarian countries. At the same time, if these institutions pander to authoritarian regimes, they, on the contrary, contribute to the international legitimization of authoritarian regimes and their strengthening.

Such instruments as international institutions have shown slight effectiveness in promoting liberal democratic ideology in post-Soviet countries. They were often used to legitimize authoritarian regimes and support their inefficient and corrupt schemes. International institutions still need to adapt to the regional characteristics of many countries. Therefore, Washington should abandon the universalization of international institutions and promote those based on "regional and functional principles" (Ibid)\textsuperscript{277}.

4. External active influence in a non-pivotal country can only be activated during internal contradictions in the pivotal states. The importance of the influence of pivotal countries on non-


\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
pivotal countries belonging to the same CPS cannot be underestimated. The influence of the type of diffusion is effective in ordinary times and prepares the necessary ideological base. It can only be accepted if the traditional ideology, which serves as the foundation for existing traditional institutions, fails. Nevertheless, the globalization of human society still leads to the universalization of the rule of human rights and liberal democratic values as the basic needs of individuals. Therefore, they can be accepted in all political spaces, especially in non-pivotal countries.

Nevertheless, introducing institutions corresponding to this ideology in the political space with other traditions is possible only if the existing institutions are weakened. The collapse of the USSR was an ideal moment for the onset of critical nodes with non-functioning traditional institutions. However, the West has yet to take the next necessary step in the form of a more decisive inclusion of non-pivotal countries into its orbit of influence. Moreover, the support of the growing authoritarian regimes gave rise to their legitimization and gave them time to recover in pivotal countries like Russia and China.

Stronger and more unconditional support for democratic movements in non-pivotal countries like Kazakhstan, including military support, was needed to introduce democratic institutions in the early 1990s. Neither Russia nor China had the opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Kazakhstan due to their internal problems. First, in the first and second half of the 1990s, Russia was preoccupied with the problems of internal separatism. At the same time, China still needed to have such a powerful influence on the territory of the former USSR to introduce armed forces there. The attack on the democratic forces in Kazakhstan went on throughout the first decade of independence and was distinguished by caution and uncertainty on the part of the authoritarian authorities. Any external intervention during the first decade could change the situation. It is valid for the refusal to legitimize the ever-growing authoritarian power.
5. External influence from the pivotal countries of competing political worlds can only be effective with military support and intervention. However, military intervention by external forces will be effective only when the pivotal state does not have the strength to intervene in the internal political processes of a non-pivotal country and when a revolutionary situation has matured in the latter. A revolutionary situation arises when the institutions of authoritarianism conflict during the onset of critical junctures.

IV. “January 2022 Uprising”

The crisis of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan, which worsened in January 2022, was internal only indirectly in the form of a conflict of intermediate variables of supra-authoritarianism. The direct conflict was over the influence of external forces and values of alternative political spaces: on the one hand, Russia, and China, and on the other, the United States. In this case, it is the systemic pressure of the international political systems, in which Russia has applied its favorite technique of the policy of advance as a rapid armed intervention.

However, Russia's military intervention in 2022 was made possible by more qualitative systemic pressure in the form of diffusion of the Eurasian political world than similar pressure from the United States over the past 30 years.

The main problem is the weak legitimacy of liberal democratic values due to the inconsistency of US foreign policy towards countries such as Kazakhstan. Western countries' lack of firm adherence to their declared values in relation to the authoritarian regimes of the Eurasian region led to the collapse of Western ideology among the previously democratically minded broad social strata in the region. It also contributed not only to the discrediting of liberal democratic values but also increased the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, significantly strengthening their power in the region.
It is confirmed by the recent potentially high efficiency of the policy of diffusion of alternative political spaces concerning Kazakhstan. Thus, on January 7, 2011, President Nazarbayev rejected the formally proposed by the parliament to submit to the republican referendum amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan to extend presidential powers without popular elections. It happened under pressure from the United States and the EU, which condemned this attempt and put pressure on the president, interpreting this attempt as a rollback from the democratic course. Following consistent US criticism, the RK Constitutional Council declared the proposed law to replace elections with a referendum unconstitutional on January 31, 2011. It forced the dictator to resort to less obvious authoritarian practices like early presidential elections held in April 2011.

In the context of the supra-authoritarian crisis in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan against the backdrop of Russia's military invasion of Ukraine, increased systemic pressure from the liberal democratic political world seems to be the most correct. Coupled with the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the collapse of the Eurasian nation-building ideology, the West needs to pursue a more consistent foreign policy to promote universal human values.

Moreover, the West should not only consistently insist but also promote the region's democratization in every possible way. This policy should be based on the understanding that the survival of the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan inevitably leads to the strengthening and integration of authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, and other countries of the Eurasian political world.
Chapter VIII: Alternative Case Study

1. QCA Methodology

For complete proof of my proposed theory of political worlds and the importance of external pressure on the definition of domestic political regimes, I will use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method. Using this QCA method, I will analyze several study cases in the context of the interaction of internal political processes with external political pressures. It will help explain why the persistence of authoritarian regimes is possible in countries like Kazakhstan and why this has become impossible in the case of Mongolia.

Using the example of Kazakhstan, the proposed theory argues that the established specific political legacy, institutions, and traditions in this state are identical to those in China and Russia. Existing in conditions of constant external pressure from the super-authoritarian political world surrounding Kazakhstan, the political regime in Kazakhstan is forced to remain super-authoritarian. That is, if the dynamics of the development of internal factors are disrupted, and the external pressure of the international system continues, the course toward democracy remains suppressed by external forces.

To prove the proposed theory, I propose to use an additional case study on the example of the dynamics of the development of the political regime in Mongolia in the conditions of a presumably common political heritage with Kazakhstan and existence surrounded by a common super-authoritarian political space with two pivotal authoritarian countries. In this context, my task will be to examine the validity of the conclusion drawn in the Kazakh case study about the type of external influence of the pivotal countries due to the pressure of the international system and internal political processes in Mongolia.
To do this, I will identify a set of factors or conditions that may or may not be identical to the factors analyzed in Kazakhstan. The importance of this QCA analysis lies in identifying key factors whose presence or absence may affect the outcomes in the case of Mongolia. Mongolia is currently a free democracy with a parliamentary-presidential form of government. Parties come to power through elections, and the president is directly elected for one term. Why, it would seem, in a country with the same initial data as Kazakhstan, as a typical Soviet past and close neighborhood, democracy had a chance to be established, but not in Kazakhstan? Why, despite establishing a democratic regime in Mongolia, did the country not feel the direct military invasions from Russia or China, and the attempt to overthrow the authoritarian leader in Kazakhstan caused a direct military invasion?

The answer to this question is necessary to confirm the theory in case of inconsistency of the initial factors/variables between Mongolia and Kazakhstan or to refute it if they are consistent. Therefore, the objective of this case study will be a comparative qualitative analysis of internal and external factors in the case of Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

A detailed analysis of the internal factor with intermediate variables and the external factor with independent variables identified in Kazakhstan, Russia, and China shows their almost complete discrepancy with similar factors in Mongolia.

2. The Ideological Context of the Causal Mechanism

In the case of Mongolia, there is a lack of a trigger mechanism for the cause-and-effect chain of fear for security as the primary mechanism for triggering external influence from the pivotal states.

The absence of fear of losing sovereignty from Mongolia and, as a result, the absence of a security ideology, which is justified by:
1) The affinity of the historical religious and ideological component in the form of Buddhism, as a state pre-communist ideology, between Mongolia and China. Unlike Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Caucasus are Muslim countries.

2) The isolation of the geopolitical position in Mongolia from other political worlds and the absence of borders with other countries. As a result, Mongolia's enormous economic and geopolitical dependence on Russia and China - the only countries bordering on it- are disproportionately more powerful.

Thus, with the renewal of the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation in 1994 between China and Mongolia, the former became the most significant economic partner in trade and investments. For example, Mongolia sends 100% of its main export items, such as crude oil, iron ore, copper, zinc concentrates, and 92% of hard coal, to China. A stable term has even appeared in the country as having a "resource curse and export dependence on China" (2002)\textsuperscript{278}.

Thus, the total volume of Mongolian exports to China is up to 80% of the country's total country exports, and the share of imports from China is up to 50%. Such economic dependence on one country creates additional growth traps for the country's growing economy (2011)\textsuperscript{279}. Prior to this, during the communist period, up to 90% of trade and investment in Mongolia was with the Soviet bloc, according to some researchers (2005)\textsuperscript{280}.


At the same time, the current President of Mongolia justifies his friendly relations with Russian dictator Putin by the country's colossal dependence on Russia: "We are almost completely dependent on Russia for oil and electricity, so we need to work closely" (2022)\(^{281}\).

In addition to substantial economic dependence, Mongolia has enormous political dependence on Russia. According to "Young Mongolians and the World in 2021" most Mongolians believe Russia is the only guarantor of Mongolian independence (2021)\(^{282}\). That is why most of the population generally sympathizes with Russia and believes it is necessary to adhere to neutrality and avoid condemning the latter for its aggression towards Ukraine.

3. Political Legacy of the Mongolian State

1) The legacy of significant military confrontation between Mongolia, on the one hand, and the pivotal Eurasian countries, on the other hand, over the past 300-400 years is absent.

2) The presence of worse economic welfare/poverty and the same level of corruption in state bodies that do not pose an ideological threat to the pivotal countries.

The ideological, traditional-historical dependence on Russia and China and the resulting business practices and economic policies have led to colossal corruption, an unstable economy, and growing poverty in Mongolia. Comparison with the economies and well-being of neighboring authoritarian countries leads to an alarmingly growing disillusionment with democratic values among the country's population. Thus, only 9.3% of surveyed Mongols are satisfied with democracy, as opposed to 35% favoring strong authoritarian leaders (2022)\(^{283}\). Experts believe that


dissatisfaction with democracy is caused by distrust in the political institutions of the state, which do not fulfill their promises even though they are considered democratically elected.

After 30 years of democratic existence of the Mongolian political system, the country maintains a high level of corruption on par with Kazakhstan, higher than Russia, and slightly inferior to China. At the same time, more than 30% of the population lives below the poverty line (2020)\textsuperscript{284}.

That is, there is no need for China and Russia to pursue a policy of advancing through military intervention to overthrow the democratic government in Mongolia. They have enough methods of diffusion policy through economic leverage to reverse the development of democracy. In addition, neither China nor Russia is afraid of any policy of promotion from the democratic countries towards Mongolia without having to prevent it. In short, both pivotal countries of Eurasian supra-authoritarianism do not feel threatened by the externality and weakness of the Mongolian political regime and statehood.

\textit{4. Factor of Interconnectedness}

An analysis of the external factor of the interconnectedness of the states of the Eurasian political space shows the practical absence of such variables as the supra-sovereignty of the political regime in Mongolia and the limited autonomous sovereignty of the political state:

1) The absence of a variable limited state sovereignty of the autonomous type of Mongolia is dictated by the de jure fully sovereign status of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) since 1924. The MPR was a satellite of the USSR and acted as a buffer state between the latter and the PRC, just as it is between China and Russia now. That is, Mongolia was not an autonomous entity that completely copied the state-political structure with the apparatus of the bureaucracy and the

national authoritarian elite, like all other non-pivotal countries of the post-Soviet world. The lack of autonomy status of any pivotal countries during the communist period and the continued geopolitical status of a buffer state between Russia and China have also added in.

2) The latter, in turn, explains the absence of a supra-sovereign political regime in a country that had sufficient freedom to preserve the traditional political heritage while demonstrating general loyalty to pivotal states like the USSR.

For example, some researchers believe that one of the reasons for the success of democracy in Mongolia after 1990 was the lack of large-scale historical experience of violence and mass repression by the Mongolian elites against their people, who refused to carry them out. Thus, for example, the mass repressions of the 1930s against the Buddhist clergy and party elite in Mongolia were organized by the USSR and carried out by law enforcement agencies recruited from the Soviet military. Similar trends make Mongolia more like the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (2023)²⁸⁵.

Likewise, prior to the Xinhai Revolution in China, the Mongol principalities enjoyed broad state autonomy without creating an integrated imperial national elite or bureaucracy. Therefore, the Mongolian state did not create a national elite with a bureaucracy integrated with the imperial ones or an imperial national tradition with institutions.

According to the Mongolian writer Baasansuren Tugalkhuugiin, “Naughty people with their own vision, fighters for independence were hanged in Beijing until 1911, after 1921 they were shot in Moscow (Ibid)²⁸⁶.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.
5. Factor of Supra-Authoritarianism

1) Weak traditions of authoritarian power in Mongolia and fragmentation of the country into many small khanates since the 16th century. Such tribal fragmentation of state power is reminiscent of today's clan-oligarchic system, which is more like Kyrgyzstan. Unlike Mongolia, the tradition of absolute state power has not been interrupted in Kazakhstan since ancient times.

While noting the reasons for the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Mongolia in the post-communist era, some researchers lean towards such prosaic reasons as the lack of economic resources necessary to exercise authoritarian control over all political players throughout the vast state. This lack of economic resources makes Mongolia look like a Central Asian country like Kyrgyzstan (Ibid). According to Margarita Zavadskaya, the lack of sufficient state capacity contributed to the fragmentation of the elites into various clan-oligarchic groups represented in the country's parliament, which contributed to the formation of the image of the presence of democracy in Mongolia. The opposite example is Russia and Kazakhstan, which had enough resources to consolidate state power around one group/person and establish a rigid vertical of power.

2) Inclusion into Qing China on the rights of autonomy, but without its complete introduction into the system of the state-bureaucratic apparatus, which became the basis for the developed structural component of supra-authoritarianism in Kazakhstan during the communist period.

The absence of a national authoritarian bureaucracy gave Mongolia a more significant window of opportunity than its Central Asian neighbors to carry out democratic reforms in the face of a weakened China and Russia in the early 1990s.

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287 Ibid.
3) The absence of deep traditions of authoritarianism in both the pre-communist and communist periods. As a result, the underdevelopment of all variables beyond authoritarianism in Mongolia with the dominance of the structural variable of authoritarianism in the form of tribal associations and religious monasteries in the Middle Ages, the MPRP under communism, and the clan-oligarchic system in the post-communist period.

4) The authoritarianism of structural primacy is manifested in the occupation of most seats in parliament by the two ruling parties, which represent clan-oligarchic groups.

The formal turnover of power and the multi-party system, which were established after the collapse of the communist bloc, which are the leading indicators of the triumph of democracy in Mongolia, turn out to be only demonstrative. Many critics argue that the party's political struggle with the change of ruling parties does not mean a fundamental change in the ruling elite. So, although Mongolia has been recognized as a democracy since the early 1990s, the country was ruled by the former communist elite, which changed its sign from the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) to the Mongolian People's Party. The second most important party in the country, the Democratic Party, was in power between 1996–2000.

In any case, despite the presence of 17 parties in the country, during the entire post-communist period, almost 100% of the seats in parliament are divided between only these two parties. Replacing each other in all key government posts, representatives of these two parties have been ruling the country together for more than 30 years. Rare disagreements led to violent clashes with human casualties in 2006 and 2008 (2008), reminiscent of a clan struggle involving the regional masses as the final argument in Kyrgyzstan.

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Baansuren Tugalkhuugiin, a Mongolian writer and journalist, argues that there is no fundamental difference between the two parties and that it is one party with two branches. In his interview with the Central Asian Monitor, he stated that both parties "protect the interests of 20-30 families. Common interests and wallets unite the leaders of both parties. These two parties work together in the parliamentary and presidential elections. They introduce favorable provisions into the Electoral Law. The districts are divided among themselves. They appoint obedient people to the Electoral Commission. Keep law enforcement, police, and intelligence under control, and buy votes. They buy everything they can buy. They are sold to foreigners; they give them gold and subsoil wealth" (2019)²⁸⁹.

Many Mongolian activists blame such a development of democracy for the deterioration of the perception of democracy and civil rights by the ordinary people, and experts such as Rossabi assess it in Mongolia as not existing yet. According to him, democracy in Mongolia "hasn't really set in" and to regard Mongolia as a bastion of democracy in the region is "fallacious" (2005)²⁹⁰.

He is echoed by Sanchir Zhargalsokhan, a member of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, who argues that “The political system of Mongolia resembles a feudal system, parties are associated with business groups in the country” (2011)²⁹¹. He also accuses the parties of protecting oligarchic interests, petty and pervasive corruption, and venality, and buying votes and seats in parliament.

6. Scoring the Factors

The assessment of the current political system in Mongolia is far from unambiguous. Many critics argue that the current government is gradually weakening democratic institutions. In this regard, one can draw a direct analogy with the short periods of democratic reversal in Russia or Kazakhstan in the early 1990s. Due to a weaker resource base, the democratic period in Mongolia lasts much longer, as in economically backward Kyrgyzstan.

Nevertheless, the structural primacy of the party-clan type in Mongolia has not saved the progressive movement towards strengthening the authoritarianism of state power in recent times. The country's elite has taken the following steps towards strengthening both structural and personalist authoritarianism in recent times:

1) Adoption of legislative amendments to strengthen the executive power over the judiciary in 2019. Under these amendments, the National Security Council, which includes the president, prime minister, and parliament speaker, early dismisses judges and heads of anti-corruption agencies (2019). The amendments were adopted by a majority vote in parliament (85–92.7 percent). Thanks to these amendments, the current president was able to stop a corruption investigation, one of the defendants of which was himself. He fired the prosecutor general, the supreme judge, and the entire leadership of the Anti-Corruption Agency the very next day after adopting the amendments to the law.

2) The practical absence of a difference between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. About a quarter of Mongolian legislators are representatives of the executive branch and

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government members—appointments to the judiciary based on the principle of loyalty to the president (2022). 

3) Non-democratic separation of powers with a symbiosis of the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. Historian-orientalist Anastasia Tsedenbal believes that “The government is formed from the members of the parliament itself. It turns out such a dense symbiosis of the legislative and executive powers. This is not an ideal system of checks and balances” (2023).

4) Attempts to pass a bill designed to strengthen control over NGOs and NPOs to counteract their functions of controlling the activities of state bodies (2019).

5) Electoral rules are changing towards the leading parties, making it difficult for smaller parties (2020).

6) even though Mongolia is a parliamentary republic, there is an increase in the president's status towards an absolutist personalist primacy, like a khan (2019).

7. Interpreting the Findings

1) In Mongolia, no homogeneous political regime of a personality type would catalyze external aggression from Russia or China.

2) Mongolia does not have a long tradition of absolute authoritarianism. From the 16th century, Mongolia was divided into many tribal non-centralized principalities. Undeveloped

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personalist authoritarianism, while maintaining structural primacy, creates a window of opportunity for Mongolia more than Kazakhstan had.

3) Geopolitically, Mongolia belongs to East Asia but not Central Asia. However, the clan-tribal structural primacy of power makes Mongolia more like Kyrgyzstan than Kazakhstan.

4) Mongolia, like the countries of Eastern Europe, was part of the satellite belt without historically entering the Eurasian CPS.

5) Historically, Mongolia was an autonomous part of China from the 16th to the 20th centuries, but without the introduction of state-political bureaucracy and colonial institutions into it. It gave a more profound tradition of clan society.

6) In addition to this, almost 80 years of Russian/USSR protectorate, without the introduction of national-autonomous political institutions and weak integration with the authoritarian elite of the USSR, only changed the clan-structural primacy to the clan-party one. Nevertheless, today we can observe the beginnings of the creation of shadow state institutions as another structural component of Eurasian authoritarianism.

7) The growing economic dependence of Mongolia on China, with continued sympathy for Russia, makes the former like Poland, which was part of the Russian Empire. At the same time, the unique geopolitical location makes Mongolia like Hungary, as part of the former alternative empire (Austria-Hungary). However, since the 20th century, it has become part of the Communist bloc.

8. Conclusion

The change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one in Mongolia in the early 1990s did not cause military intervention by China or Russia due to the differences between internal and external factors, which revealed a comparative qualitative analysis of the internal and external factors of Mongolia and Kazakhstan. That is, Mongolia is not one of the countries of Eurasian
Authoritarianism and has a different political legacy from these countries while remaining a satellite of the Eurasian political world.
Chapter IX: Epilogue

Even though Washington stepped aside from participation in determining the political
course of Central Asia after leaving Afghanistan, its role was unwittingly continued in the form of
absolute evil in the geopolitical mythmaking of authoritarian propaganda. There will always be a
role of the West in the fight of the Kazakh people for freedom, wishes for it the West or not.

Although the "January 2022 Uprising" did not have "the hand" of Washington, Russia, and
China will always deem it to be. The struggle of the people for fundamental universal human
values, on which the Eurasian autocrats have attached negative labels, turning the word
"democracy" into a household word, will always be accused of the "participation" of the West.

For example, Prism Political Risk Management Analyst Ben Godwin told RFE/RL that
Moscow accuses the West of organizing a mass uprising in Kazakhstan and that "Russia does not
want to occupy Kazakhstan. The purpose of the intervention was to demonstrate that Russia is the
guarantor of authoritarian regimes around the world" and that "China is perfectly happy for Russia
to play that role" (2022)298.

Also, some researchers like Standish have emphasized that the threat of the fall of the
authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan is "unlikely to derail the broader dynamic between the two
powers, who find themselves increasingly aligned against the United States" (Ibid.)299.

The geopolitical game on the Heartland chessboard so well described by Mackinder,
Hopkirk, and Brzezinski continues. The Eurasian political world moved, stalemating the West in
Ukraine in 2014 and creating Zugzwang for democratic forces in Kazakhstan in January 2022.

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298 Standish, Reid. 2022. Crisis in Kazakhstan Pushes China, Russia Closer Together. Radio Free Europe Radia Liberty,
299 Ibid.
Having become bogged down or defeated on its western borders, Russia inevitably attacks its eastern borders in Central Asia, moving from Mittelspiel to Endspiel. This game has been played by Russia and supported by China for the past 200 years.

For example, having suffered a defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56, Russia immediately switched to a full-scale attack in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Having restored imperial prestige with its victories and having strengthened its economic power at the expense of the conquered territories, Russia again set about conquests in the West. Turkey was defeated, and all the restrictions imposed on Russia after Crimea were nullified. The Polish uprising was bloodily suppressed, and the First World War was unleashed, which, repeating the whole game anew, eventually led to the expansion of the authoritarian world from the Sea of Japan to the Rhine. As a result, this geopolitical composition brought victory to the autocrats in each game played during the last two centuries on the entire world chessboard.

In today's geopolitical chess game unfolding before our eyes, the question of whether autocrats should be allowed to carry out a similar winning etude composition in the presence of weapons of mass destruction and increasing risks in a globalized world remains rhetorical.
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