

NONVIOLENT STRATEGY & DEMOCRATIC SECURITY:  
HOW NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS PROMOTE & PROTECT DEMOCRATIC  
VALUES

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## Abstract

Nonviolent movements are not only useful in protecting democratic integrity against foreign influence, but they are also beneficial in the promotion and insulation of democratic values in nations that have not yet reached full democratic potential. Through cases studies in Eastern Europe and the United States, this thesis presents an analysis of the offensive and defensive capabilities of nonviolent movements to promote and protect democratic institutions through the use of nonviolent tactics and social media. Based on previous examples of nonviolence in action, it also offers an application of civil resistance as a viable national defense strategy to combat future complex threats. The findings aim to progress the knowledge on a largely misunderstood strategy, concluding that despite recent criticisms on the impact of movements, nonviolence has the potential to improve society and stabilize conflicts through long-term activism.

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## Introduction

Gezi Park was one of the last remaining public green spaces near Taksim Square due to the urbanization of Istanbul. Because of its prime location, the park was set to fall victim to another project of high-rise apartment buildings. Some of the locals filed lawsuits in the courts but failed, some attempted to project attention to the issue through the media, but no outlet would go against the prime minister.<sup>1</sup> A small number of protestors set up tents to camp out at the park to prevent the bulldozers from encroaching further. On May 30, 2013, Turkish police raided the park. They burnt down the tents and pepper-sprayed the peaceful protestors. The attacks by the police were filmed by onlookers and distributed throughout all of the social media platforms, and this time the events backfired. Tens of thousands of Turks flocked to the square and set up camps with tents, food, a clinic and a library.<sup>2</sup> Surrounding businesses offered their Wi-fi to the protestors in order to document the events. Throughout the coming weeks across all of Turkey, police clashed with protestors using water cannons, rubber bullets, and pepper spray.<sup>3</sup> On July 3<sup>rd</sup>, a Turkish court ordered the cancellation of the project in Gezi Park.<sup>4</sup>

The events in Turkey during the summer of 2013 is a fascinating case study of regime response to protest and activist response to repression. The events at Gezi Park, however, offer a baseline of lessons for civil resistance strategy. Technology and social media are heavily ingrained in daily life and most people use it to share pictures or

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<sup>1</sup> Tufekci, Zeynep. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Amnesty International. "Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey". Amnesty International. London, UK. 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Ayla Jean Yackley. "UPDATE 3-Turkish Court Blocks Disputed Park Project." Reuters. July 03, 2013. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/turkey-court-taksim/update-3-turkish-court-blocks-disputed-park-project-idUKL5N0F93C120130703>.

messages and to interact with a diverse group of other users. When faced with dire issues such as those activists at Gezi Park, social media becomes an outlet for change and a lens through which the entire world can view progression. Yet, the entire movement was established on a few people using the nonviolent strategy of occupation to protect Gezi Park. If four or five people can use nonviolence as a catalyst for change, what are the possibilities of nonviolent strategy when accepted by hundreds or thousands?

The central theme of this thesis is that *nonviolent movements are not only useful in protecting democratic integrity against foreign influence, but they are also beneficial in the promotion and insulation of democratic values in nations that have not yet reached full democratic potential*. In this context, democratic values are seen as activists fighting for free speech, freedom of assembly, fair and contested elections, and valued political participation. Nonviolent movements and civil resistance are not new strategies nor are they lacking in scholarly examinations. However, in the last decade there has been a renewed focus and eagerness to study the impact of nonviolent movements sparked by the events of the Arab Spring which took place across North Africa and the Middle East beginning in 2010. During that period, hundreds of thousands of people used nonviolent protests to challenge the status quo of corruption and economic inequality in hopes for a democratic future. It has been widely noted that since the Arab Spring took place and the successes that came along with it, each of the countries that experienced an uprising, except for Tunisia, have reversed back to their old forms of government, but even Tunisia is in a state vulnerable to democratic backsliding.<sup>5</sup> Plenty of research has been done on the political spectrum to analyze why that reversal has occurred and the exact conditions

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<sup>5</sup> Dokhi Fassihian, and Theo Wilson. "Tunisian Democracy Stands at the Precipice." Freedom House. February 05, 2018. <https://freedomhouse.org/blog/tunisian-democracy-stands-precipice>.

that are needed for prolonged success after a nonviolent movement has taken place. Yet many times the potential and outcomes of movements are misunderstood by scholars and journalists alike who are quick to dismiss the impact that a movement can have, seen or unseen, on society and government institutions.

What exactly is nonviolent action? Gene Sharp, a nonviolent theorist defines it to be “understood as the waging of conflict by methods of protest, noncooperation, and intervention without physical violence. Nonviolent action is identified by what people do, not by what they believe.”<sup>6</sup> Sharp’s list of 198 nonviolent actions include actions such as humorous skits, marches and parades, boycotts, and hunger strikes among others.<sup>7</sup> “Civil resistance” is also a term used throughout the coming chapters as an alternative for “nonviolent action” but encompasses the same meaning.

It is important to examine the scope of potential and impact that nonviolent movements have on the future because they are likely to become more and more common throughout the world. Across the world, people are becoming more disillusioned with democratic institutions, and on the opposite end of the spectrum, those in authoritarian nations have looked to progress aspects of societies to have more political input and tackle corruption. Global Trends reports by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence forecast increasing vulnerabilities and expectations of government institutions to improve on social injustices and properly handle conflicts that arise from events such as climate change or the widening economic gap.<sup>8</sup> To that end, it is not only

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<sup>6</sup> Gene Sharp. *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance In Conflicts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. xii.

<sup>7</sup> Gene Sharp. “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” In *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973.

<sup>8</sup> Marvin Gonzalez. “Global Trends.” How People Govern, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [www.dni.gov/index.php/key-global-trends/how-people-govern](http://www.dni.gov/index.php/key-global-trends/how-people-govern).



important for activists and outsiders to understand the impact of nonviolence in improving society, but that it is also a viable and successful alternative to the use of violence. Rather than engaging in insurgent-style conflicts to challenge leadership, scholarly literature and case studies suggest that nonviolence is the superior mechanism as a catalyst for institutional change.

Much of the literature on nonviolent strategy solely focuses on the offensive capabilities of movements, such as aiming to oust a corrupt politician or to progress debates on racial injustices. While it is an important form of strategy, there is also a defensive aspect of civil resistance that is sometimes overlooked but is also important to understand when correlating citizen responses to future conflicts. One of the underlying topics this portfolio touches on is Russian geopolitical strategy which entails tactics such as hybrid warfare to destabilize democracies and the Kremlin's use of soft power to influence Eastern European politics. Chapter 3 goes into detail on those efforts and proposes case studies in which nonviolent strategy had been a successful insulation and defense mechanism against Russian influence, as well as a case of Belarus where influence overpowered the desire for a mass movement. However, keeping that agenda in mind, Chapters 1 & 2 construct a foundation on which a progression from offensive movements in the United States and Eastern Europe can be made to Chapter 3 where both regions are under threat from Russian influence and how nonviolence is a viable strategy to defend against it.

Nonviolence can also be applied as a national defense strategy against physical threats. History books only give mention to the military forces that defended against the Nazi invasions in Europe during World War II, but nonviolent civil resistance helped

entire nations defend against the attacks. Courageous people in Denmark and Norway defended their country against invasions and saved thousands of lives through their efforts.<sup>9</sup> Teachers in Norway were critical in efforts to resist against the Nazi takeover of schools in hopes of dismantling all Norwegian identity.<sup>10</sup> In Denmark, hundreds of thousands of Danes gathered together at music festivals to sing songs and defend their cultural identity as subtle defiance to the German occupation.<sup>11</sup> A little over thirty years later, people in the Baltic States mirrored the same actions at music festivals to resist against Soviet Occupation. Nonviolent resistance and action are proven, valuable mechanisms to contest against regimes and institutions that seem too powerful to be challenged.

Contrarily, it should be examined why violent insurgencies and terrorism are not as successful in sparking political change as movements that are nonviolent. The *CIA Guide to Analysis of Insurgency* describes an insurgency as “primarily a political competition for legitimacy, but the violent aspect of the struggle most often alerts observers to the insurgency’s existence.”<sup>12</sup> Terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic of insurgencies as “politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets” to pursue the insurgent group’s goals.<sup>13</sup> Terrorist groups on the other hand target civilians as a way to pursue their political goals in hopes that the government will make some form of

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<sup>9</sup> "What Is Civil Resistance?" The International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/about/civil-resistance/>.

<sup>10</sup> "Norwegian Teachers Prevent Nazi Takeover of Education, 1942." Global Nonviolent Action Database. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/norwegian-teachers-prevent-nazi-takeover-education-1942>.

<sup>11</sup> "Danish Citizens Resist the Nazis, 1940-1945." Global Nonviolent Action Database. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/danish-citizens-resist-nazis-1940-1945>.

<sup>12</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012." United States Government, 2012.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

concessions.<sup>14</sup> In both cases, violence is usually the focal point to achieving the desired goals. To understand why nonviolent movements are more successful to that end, the correspondent inference theory developed by Austrian psychologist Fritz Heider can be used to explain the correlation between the actions and the outcome. Simply put, it is less likely for a terrorist group to gain policy changes when they attack civilians because the targeted government is likely to deduce that the goal is to inflict as much damage as possible instead of the goal of policy change. Therefore, it is much less likely that policy concessions will be made or that anyone will truly understand the motivations of the terrorist or insurgent groups.

To come back to nonviolent movements using the same theory, most successful movements have a clear and stated goal in which can be spread to their supporters and the target actor through means such as social media, pamphlets, or meetings. Commitment to nonviolence is essential in projecting to supporters, outsiders, and the targeted actor how the goals will be achieved. In this case, policy concessions are more likely to occur because the target can interpret and correlate nonviolent action to the motives. Of course, this does not mean nonviolent movements will be successful every time simply because they use nonviolence. Those that do not understand nonviolent strategy may also misinterpret nonviolent action in correlating to a different goal than what the movement actually wishes. When activists use tactics such as sit-ins or street protests as a strategy of disruption, outsiders may correlate the objectives of the movements to the inconvenience.

Still, it is important that nonviolence be used in the place of violent aggression to achieve a goal. An example to support that notion is the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and

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<sup>14</sup> Max Abrahms. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 42-78.

the events leading up to it. In the 1960's and 1970's there were attempts by guerilla groups to oust Shah Reza Pahlavi's regime through assassinations and armed insurrections. Those groups such as the fedayeen and Mujahedin believed that armed resistance was the only means to overthrow a repressive regime. However, after years of prolonged struggle and a major counterinsurgency effort by the Shah in 1976, the guerilla movements were decimated. A year later, Iranians shifted their strategy to one of nonviolence and massive protests. Although they were met with the same prolonged struggle and repression by the Shah, in 1978 supporters of the nonviolent protests significantly outnumbered the security forces and in 1979 they were successful at ousting the Shah. The Iranian Revolution is a case study where a group used violence unsuccessfully to achieve a goal, but a short time later transitioned to nonviolence to successfully reach the same goal. While the differing outcomes are more complex than simply labeling it as a matter of increased support in the latter strategy, the participation in the nonviolent campaign was estimated at around two million whereas the violent campaign only achieved a maximum of fifty thousand.<sup>15</sup> As the subsequent chapters will note, nonviolence allows for a broader range of participation and a more resilient campaign in the face of repression compared to cases of military aggression and violence.

This portfolio has three main sections. The first section highlights existing literature on nonviolent strategy examining why it is the preferred means for change over violent insurgencies, what makes a movement successful, and the diversity of tactics presented under nonviolent strategy. Case studies of the Otpor movement in Serbia in 1998 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 offer similar examples of

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<sup>15</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security*, no.1: 7-44. 2008.

movements on a larger scale with the goals of overthrowing an existing regime while outlining nonviolent tactics in use. The second chapter analyzes the impact nonviolent movements can have in an already-democratic state, the United States. Lastly, the third chapter focuses on the defensive aspects of civil resistance, such as how it can be used to defend national identity and strengthen democratic institutions in democracies while also insulating a movement's goals in an authoritarian state.

Chapter 1 analyzes the impact that nonviolent movements have in a democracy such as the United States. Comparing it to the movements in Eastern Europe, this section argues that similar revolutions to oust a corrupt leader could not take place through movements in a democracy as it had in Serbia and Ukraine. The mass protests after the 2016 U.S Presidential Election are analyzed in this sense, where hundreds of thousands of people across the country protested the election of Donald Trump, yet he remained in power. In democracies, it is highly unlikely that a mass movement could oust a sitting president because there are legitimate political channels through which the impeachment process goes through. However, that is not to say that if a politician or a president were to inhibit a peaceful transition of power or the legal institutions did not properly impose their duties that the American people would not have the power to create a revolution.

In authoritarian states and dictatorships, the people do not have the legitimate channels such as courts to put checks on a corrupt president. In Ukraine, most of the political institutions were corrupt, including the courts, and were under the reign of Leonid Kuchma, so the people had to create their own path to change in the country.

The second section of Chapter 1 discusses the importance of grassroots movements and the role that social media plays in activism. Critics have been quick to

dismiss the impact of movements such as Occupy Wall Street or Black Lives Matter because neither of those instituted major policy or social changes such as major progressions in economic equality or the immediate reversal of racism. This section argues that scholars and critics measure a movement's success through the wrong lenses. If a movement is not "revolutionary" within weeks or months, it is deemed a failure. However, not every movement needs to be revolutionary to be impactful. Bringing attention to a certain cultural or social issue now might spark a discussion which brings changes five years after the movement had occurred. Lastly, it is argued that social media does play a beneficial role in bringing attention to prominent issues as well as being an outlet for bringing like-minded people together for a movement, much like in the Gezi Park Protests.

Nonviolent strategy has proven to be the dominant form of resistance over violent action mainly due to the broad population it attracts and the array of strategy it offers activists. The first section of this chapter goes into detail on what exactly makes nonviolent strategy the logical position over violent insurgencies or violent movements and how that choice can impact the outcome. Citing works from nonviolent strategy scholars such as Gene Sharp and Chenoweth and Stephan provide the basis for understanding the effect of movements in Chapter 1 as well as the potential of movements in the third Chapter.

The case studies used in Chapter 2 were the Otpor movement in Serbia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine which were both examples of nonviolent movements having the goal of promoting democracy in their respective countries and both achieved the goals through ousting the existing leaders and sparking new democratic elections.

Why choose these two specific cases? First, the Otpor movement is one of the best examples of nonviolent strategy in action. Through their leadership, revolving tactics, and commitment to nonviolence among other factors has led civil resistance scholars to point out the efficiency with which the movement worked. It is important to highlight Otpor because their strategy can be a critical learning point for future activists with hopes of improving their country and the same tactics can be utilized for any scale of goals from grassroots to revolutionary. The Orange Revolution is also an important example because it shows the importance that social media can play in a movement. Technology allowed the activists to form their own independent media channels to bypass state-run propaganda misrepresenting their campaign. Lastly, in both cases, defections were important aspects in which the activists used to their advantage for success. The findings of this chapter simply reiterate the importance and potential that nonviolent strategy has in authoritarian or dictatorial states. By providing scholarship on nonviolent strategy combined with the case studies in Serbia and Ukraine, it highlights that the skills of activists can overcome seemingly undefeatable regimes.

The final chapter of the portfolio analyzes the defensive capabilities that are sometimes overlooked in civil resistance. This section looks at how nonviolent movements protect national identity through the tactics that are inherent to nonviolent strategy. An older case study of the Singing Revolution in the Baltics in the late 1980's is given to demonstrate how Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians used nonviolence to defend their culture from the Soviet occupation. Progressing to recent movements in Ukraine, the same concept is analyzed where Ukrainian activists were able to insulate their goals of democracy from outside interventions by the Kremlin in Russia.

Specifically, the Kremlin's use of soft power over Ukraine and its ties to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, how that may have influenced the Euromaidan protests, and how the church and activists resisted Russian influence. In the case of Belarus, some national factors came into play where a Color Revolution failed to take place because of the insulation provided to the Lukashenko regime by Vladimir Putin.

The last section of Chapter 3 argues the potential that civil resistance has in the United States. Much of American culture as well as defense spending focuses on military might to defend against foreign threats, but in the case of hybrid warfare used by Russia to destabilize democracies, it is a threat that cannot be counteracted by military force. Instead, an example is given where a community in Baltimore with a history of activism was able to discover a false narrative spread by a Russian Twitter account and quickly dismissed the claims. This section argues that many communities are already practicing and skilled in using grassroots activism, so it is not out of the question to believe that civil resistance has a future in the United States. The lead-up to the Obama campaign is analyzed in Chapter 1 where massive grassroots movements throughout the country came together to propel their presidential candidate to victory and that same level of offensive capabilities can be translated to defensive resistance against threats such as hybrid warfare. It also briefly touches on what the future of nonviolent movements may look like in the future and argues that social media will continue to have influence in the mobilization and planning of movements, but the activists themselves are the most important factor in determining the outcome.



Nonviolent strategy in itself is a creative tool to address some of the most important issues in a society. Some activists aim to produce tangible results such as disrupting the everyday activities of a business that harm the environment and others look to address cultural or political matters where the outcomes may be more difficult for an outsider to recognize. Nothing about nonviolent strategy is simple or easy, but the tactics that are presented to nonviolent activists make it one of the best strategies to combat future conflicts. There is no denying that military force is needed for the national security of countries, but when evaluating the benefits of nonviolent strategy, it presents a viable alternative to some conventional forms of defense policy which may not be suited to take on future issues. This portfolio aims to take a creative outlook at the benefits of nonviolence on multiple levels which can be applied to a broader discussion on how citizens will use their power in the future to hold government institutions accountable in solving conflicts, but also how nonviolence can be used for citizens to solve issues themselves.

## Chapter 1: Modern Movements in the United States: Redefining Success, Revolution versus Reality

### Introduction

On January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Donald Trump became the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States, with the inauguration ceremony beginning a new four-year term. A day of elation for the Trump administration and those who supported the campaign was quickly overshadowed by massive protests in the streets of Washington, DC, opposing the newly

elected President and his policies.<sup>16</sup> Despite the outcry of millions of people across the country questioning Trump's ability to lead, there had to be some level of acceptance that the candidate won through free and contested elections. However, months later, the intelligence community reported with "high confidence" that Russia interfered in the 2016 election, undermining American's confidence in the democratic process of the election and potentially shifting the election in Trump's favor.<sup>17</sup> At the time of writing, it is still questioned how much influence Russia had on the election, but they were successful at sparking concerns of legitimacy within the American people. Similar events occurred in Ukraine in 2004 when the Ukrainian people came out in masses to protest against the presidential elections which were manipulated in favor of the incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.<sup>18</sup> The protests sparked the Ukrainian Supreme Court to order a revote. Years earlier in Serbia, the Otpor movement ousted the corrupt President Slobodan Milosevic. Could the events in Ukraine and Serbia, where a leader is removed from the actions of massive protests, ever be replicated in a democracy such as the United States?

The simple answer is no, not in the sense where protestors have a direct impact on the outcome of ousting a president. In countries with responsible legal and governmental institutions, there is the ability to investigate and possibly remove corrupt leaders through the court systems. However, in places like Ukraine and Serbia where the courts were under the influence of the leader in question, the people had to take it upon themselves to

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<sup>16</sup> John Woodrow Cox, Peter Jamison, Aaron C. Davis, and Tara Bahrapour. "Inauguration Day 2017: Pomp and Chaos Collide as Trump Becomes President." *The Washington Post*. January 20, 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Michael V. Hayden. "The Transition." In *the Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies*, 77-114. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2018.

<sup>18</sup> Anders Åslund, and Michael McFaul. *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

act in place of the legal institutions. Government structure could also be presented as an argument, as democracies do not have “votes of no confidence” as in Parliamentary systems, the political means when a leader is unfit which forces new elections to be held.<sup>19</sup> Free elections are one of the most valued aspects of a democracy, with checks and balances on authority being another, all things which were lacking in the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring. Looking through the lens of legitimacy may lead to a deeper understanding of why those events occurred and what types of movements are possible in the United States, from grassroots movements to influence on national elections.

The most common outcomes of movements are that of Occupy Wall Street, the Women’s March, and the inauguration day protests, where activists and protestors aired grievances, but produce indirect outcomes such as attention to the issues or short-term political pressure. In a non-democracy, the movement itself would be seen as a victory for freedom of expression and assembly, but movements in a democracy tend to be measured on a different scale of tangible outcomes. While the events of Ukraine and Serbia are unlikely to be replicated in the United States, the next question is what are the best ways for movements to facilitate change?

From an analysis of case studies of the more recent social movements in the United States, there is little consensus of how success is defined and what the movements actually achieve. The argument of this thesis is that modern social movements and those critiquing them expect an immediate, Ukrainian-level revolution every time, but the indirect and incremental successes can have just as much of an impact.

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<sup>19</sup> Andrew Heard. "Just What Is a Vote of Confidence? The Curious Case of May 10, 2005." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique* 40, no. 2: 395-416. 2007.

This paper will first examine at the perceived legitimacy that comes along with democracy, how that may promote or hinder activism and what impact it has on creating channels for change. Some general comparisons will be made between legitimacy in democracy and the lack of legitimacy in some other forms of government. Next, recent examples of social movements in the United States will be analyzed to determine how far-reaching and impactful modern movements can be. Lastly, it will critique some of the arguments made against “internet activism” and show how social media has played a major part in each of the recent movements.

### Methodology

This section uses case studies of social movements in the United States including Occupy Wall Street, the LGBT rights movement, the 2008 election of Barack Obama, and the student movements at Harvard University and the University of Missouri. These case studies were chosen because of the similarities of social media and modern mobilization, but they also offer insights into what the public and scholars perceive as successes and failures. Most importantly, each movement had varying degrees of aspiration, which offers analysis across a broad spectrum. These case studies also provide a lens through which to view the trends of future social movements in the United States. The opening section regarding legitimacy and movements is compared to the nonviolent movements which took place in Ukraine and Serbia which are analyzed further in Chapter 2.

### Political Legitimacy & Citizen Response

Gene Sharp stated, “The social view of power sees rulers or other command systems, despite appearances, to be dependent on the population’s goodwill, decisions, and support. As such, power rises continually from many parts of society. Political power

is therefore fragile.”<sup>20</sup> To go along with the fragility of political power is legitimacy. Johnstad stated, “Legitimacy is in other words fundamentally a matter of perception: a regime is legitimate if and only if it is regarded as being legitimate by sufficient numbers of people.”<sup>21</sup> How do these notions of political power and legitimacy correlate to nonviolent movements in democracy? First, democracies are usually lauded for high levels of political legitimacy from the population and on the world stage. Therefore, leaders can usually rely on the support of the population which keeps them in power. When a politician begins to lose support, the people make changes through elections. With the heightened levels of legitimacy also comes obstacles for nonviolent movements because it is harder for them to mobilize a large, diverse group of people to protest the wrongdoings of government.<sup>22</sup> It is also more likely that the authorities will have more freedom to use violence against protestors with the support of the general population<sup>23</sup> because the protestors are seen as “radicals” in a functioning society. However, that is not to say that nonviolent movements are unlikely to happen in the strongest democracies. Populations are constantly looking for ways to improve and progress society even if the standards are already high.

The events in Ukraine, Serbia, and the Arab Spring were all examples of government leaders or institutions being deemed illegitimate by a “sufficient” number of people which sparked the massive revolutions. Similarly, the 2016 presidential election in the United States was questioned for its legitimacy which created a massive amount of

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<sup>20</sup> Gene Sharp. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*. Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005. 28.

<sup>21</sup> Petter Grahl Johnstad. "When the Time Is Right: Regime Legitimacy as a Predictor of Nonviolent Protest Outcome." *Peace & Change* 37, no. 4: 516-543. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2012. 519.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

support for protests throughout the country. Yet, just as the government relies on legitimacy for support, movements need legitimacy as well. It is critical for a movement to employ nonviolent tactics because it not only broadens the pool of supporters but also conveys legitimacy to the international community, and in many cases, international actors are more likely to support nonviolent movements over violent movements.

### Democracy, Legitimacy, & the United States

Elections may be the most important measure of legitimacy in a democracy which is why many nonviolent movements are sparked from electoral events. Anderson et al. state, “Democratic elections are designed to create unequal outcomes, for some to win, others have to lose.”<sup>24</sup> Despite the unequal outcomes, Hollyer et al. explain that democratic political positions are filled by “contested elections”, whereas authoritarian regimes tend to contain some levels of fixed elections and dictatorships solely rely on fixed elections, if there are elections at all.<sup>25</sup> While it is true for all elections, that someone has to lose, the outcomes of democratic elections are generally accepted by everyone, even the loser, because the elections are deemed fair and contested. Free elections also generate some inherent levels of government legitimacy, that the position was filled through a proper electoral process.<sup>26</sup> When the integrity of an election is questioned, such as the 2016 Presidential Election, legitimacy decreases which resulted in

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<sup>24</sup> C.J. Anderson, Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., Listhuag, O., *Loser's Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2005. Abstract.

<sup>25</sup> J. Hollyer, R., Rosendorff, B. P., & Vreeland, J. R. “Democracy and Transparency”. *Journal of Politics*, 73(4), 1191-1205. 2011.

<sup>26</sup> C.J. Anderson, Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., Listhuag, O., *Loser's Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2005.

thousands of Americans throughout the country protesting against Donald Trump, his policies, and the fairness of the election itself.<sup>27</sup>

Because political elections in democracies are generally accepted by the population as being fair and open, it would be hard for a movement to gather the support from the larger population to deem an election illegitimate. As Anderson et al. state, "For citizens and elites alike, winning an election means getting a greater share of preferred policies, and there is no reason to expect many regrets about such an outcome or, more importantly, the process that produced it."<sup>28</sup> Although movements in a democracy might not have the political power to influence the impeachment process, they can have significant impacts on policy decisions and social changes. The next sections will illustrate how social movements have sparked changes at the grassroots and national levels and have used elections as an outlet to facilitate political transformation.

### Occupy Wall Street Movement

In September 2011, Manhattan's Zuccotti Park gradually filled with young, energetic activists. The goal: to disrupt daily activities. The target: Wall Street. Seven years earlier and 4,660 miles away, Kiev's Independence Square experienced similar events in the Orange Revolution where activists opposed the corrupted presidential elections. Occupy Wall Street opposed economic inequality plaguing the United States, where 1 percent of the population earned a quarter of the nation's income.<sup>29</sup> Despite the many differing circumstances surrounding both movements, from government structure to movement goals, they each were founded among the principles of nonviolence. While

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<sup>27</sup> Christopher Mele and Annie Correal. "Not Our President: Protests Spread After Donald Trump's Election." The New York Times. November 10, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> C.J. Anderson, Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., Listhuag, O., *Loser's Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2005. 3

<sup>29</sup> Amy Dean. "Occupy Wall Street." Harvard International Review 33, no. 4: 12-15, 2012.

the Orange Revolution did achieve its goal of bringing new elections, it did not have many long-term impacts. Occupy Wall Street, however, did not achieve the changes to the economy or eradicate economic inequality, but it sparked concern and similar Occupy movements throughout the world bringing attention to important economic issues.<sup>30</sup>

Occupy Wall Street was a modern example of how social movements take place in the Western world and the important role of social media as a communication and mobilization tool. Technology and social media have become a focal point of many modern movements acting as a catalyst for sharing ideas and giving a voice to those who may have once been powerless. The movement started with the Twitter hashtag #OccupyWallStreet, which brought the message to hundreds of people, and eventually, to thousands of people across the country and the world.<sup>31</sup> The movement set out to create massive disruptions on the daily activities, a nonviolent tactic categorized by Gene Sharp,<sup>32</sup> of business men and women on Wall Street. Disruption gives a strategic advantage to the movement because it presents immediate problems for the opposition, let the daily activities be disrupted or risk the backlash from removing the protestors.<sup>33</sup>

With the help of social media, Occupy Wall Street's message was spread throughout the country, but so were the activities of the authorities. During one period of the protests, police began arresting protestors and there was one incident of an officer using pepper spray against two women partaking peacefully in the movement.<sup>34</sup> Because

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<sup>30</sup> Megan Leonhardt. "Occupy Wall Street: Lasting Effects of the Movement on Its 5th Anniversary | Money." Time. September 16, 2016.

<sup>31</sup> Chan S. Suh, Ion Bogdan Vasi, and Paul Y. Chang. "How Social Media Matter: Repression and the Diffusion of the Occupy Wall Street Movement." Social Science Research 65: 282-93. 2017.

<sup>32</sup> Gene Sharp. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*. Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.



the protestors adhered to their strategy of nonviolence, the actions by the police were seen as unnecessary and helped the movement gain more supporters. As Chenoweth and Stephan note, it is hard to legitimize violence and oppression against nonviolent protestors, many times sparking support for the movement from people who would have otherwise been noncommittal.<sup>35</sup> The actions by the authorities brought in massive amounts of new activists, not only opposing Wall Street, but also the arrests of activists. What exactly did the Occupy Wall Street movement achieve in light of protests and support?

### The Impact: Attention, Not Revolution

Looking through the lens of what Gene Sharp labeled tactics that made nonviolent movements successful, Occupy Wall Street did everything right. It followed similar tactics of nonviolence as the Arab Spring, Serbia, and Ukraine, all of which achieved at least some part of their goals. Each movement had an identity, a symbol, a motive, were disruptive, and most importantly, were nonviolent.<sup>36</sup> Despite those tactics and mass support from the younger population, once the Occupy Wall Street protests ended, the activists failed to achieve any policy changes. Despite the massive protests throughout the country, once they ended, there were no changes in policy.<sup>37</sup> The Orange Revolution and the Otpor movement (analyzed in Chapter 2) each reached their goals and the changes were a direct outcome of the movements. Occupy Wall Street, however, brought attention to a national issue, but facilitated no direct impacts as a result. Was the movement itself a failure or were some smaller achievements overlooked?

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<sup>35</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security*, no.1: 7-44. 2008.

<sup>36</sup> Gene Sharp. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973.

<sup>37</sup> Nathan Heller. "Is There Any Point to Protesting?" *The New Yorker*. August 16, 2017.

Mark and Paul Engler stated that the failure for the movement to bring any major changes to policies in the United States were because the “vision was so broad and its ambitions so great, the movement lent itself to disappointment. After all, participants aspired to nothing less than a revolutionary shift in America’s economic structure and a grassroots reinvention of political democracy.”<sup>38</sup> Yet, there are a number of movements that have achieved grassroots reinventions of their respective political structures. “Revolutionary” shifts are possible but lends itself to an unrealistic measurement of movements, which also lead to critiques of the efficacy of nonviolent movements as a whole.

Nathan Heller examined the impacts of recent protests in the United States in an article in *The New Yorker*,<sup>39</sup> asking the question if protests are productive or if they have become “a bit of social theatre”?<sup>40</sup> Like many other journalists, Heller cites the most recent examples of Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and the Women’s March which all garnered extremely large amounts of support and took to the streets to protest specific issues, yet none achieved a “revolutionary shift” or any definitive changes as a result. Saul Alinsky and Edward Chambers, nonviolence theorists, believed that “Everyday people need incremental successes over months and sometimes years.”<sup>41</sup> The problem, they state, is that modern movements want and expect immediate changes, and when those things do not happen, the movement is considered a failure.<sup>42</sup> Heller cites Turkish sociologist Zeynep Tufekci when describing the difference between older

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<sup>38</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017. 162.

<sup>39</sup> Nathan Heller. "Is There Any Point to Protesting?" *The New Yorker*. August 16, 2017.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Edward T. Chambers. *Roots for Radicals: Organizing for Power, Action, and Justice*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003. 78.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

movements such as the Civil Rights movement which were deliberate and carefully planned, but modern movements, with the help of social media, sometimes become diluted in strategy and messaging.<sup>43</sup> Yet, even as recent movements have lacked revolution, Heller points to the Women's March as having some aspects of success such as creating solidarity and showing how many people may be of a similar mindset. But in a democracy, movements may be best served to target changes through political channels.

Another explanation for the perceived failure of modern movements can be described by what the Engler's call the "ecology of change".<sup>44</sup> The disruptive nonviolent tactics theorized Gene Sharp have the ability to be a catalyst for great changes, but also have the possibility of turning civil groups against each other. In other words, some people may agree with the activist's message, just not necessarily the tactics. Mark and Paul Engler state that a movement being solely "disruptive" is not enough to spark to long-term changes.<sup>45</sup> In line with Heller's view, modern movements may be too focused on the short-term and the theatrical, whereas the successful movements tend to be dynamic and focused on long-term goals. The disruptive and the theatrical can be useful in having attention brought to the movement's issue, but other steps are needed such as a plan to facilitate political debate and create long-term progress. That is why the Otpor movement in Serbia is largely valued among nonviolent scholars for its hybrid strategy, creating an essence of humor and theater to help mobilization and a direct-action plan for democratization.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Nathan Heller. "Is There Any Point to Protesting?" The New Yorker. August 16, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. Chapter 3.

### Impact Through Policy

While many of the recent social movements have been criticized for bringing nothing other than attention to their specific issues, nonviolent movements throughout history have spurred numerous policy changes on an array of issues. Amenta et al. aimed to answer the question of how much impact social movements have on shaping policies in the United States and if they can be expected to continually have lasting impacts.<sup>47</sup> They theorized that the “main potential political consequences of movements at the structural level are the extension of democratic rights and practices and the formation of new political parties.”<sup>48</sup> At the lower levels of government, movements can influence policy decisions, but even if their desired outcome is not reached, they can still create political discourse through their activism, i.e. the Women’s March. The LGBT movement outlined in the coming sections highlights how activists can impact policy on the highest levels through persistence and public support.

However, just as the revolutions of the Arab Spring and Eastern Europe sought to create a better society through activism, many of the changes had to take place through political institutions. In those cases, activists needed an extra first step of mobilizing a movement in hopes of having free elections through which the changes could be made. Usually, in a democracy, the first step is skipped, but the premise is still the same, elections and political channels are the best way to progress issues. Chapter 2 analyzes the Orange Revolution and the Otpor movement both in which had to target corruption at the highest levels first before having any opportunity of achieving changes. In the United States, there are legitimate political channels that movements have the ability to go

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<sup>47</sup> Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 289.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 289.

through, such as voting for candidates who support important issues, contacting local politicians, and even pressing politicians to consider certain movements or topics.

If a movement's goal is not directly achieved from the movement itself, political elections give activists the next best opportunity to implement change. Amenta et. al. state, "Important intermediate influence can come through elections and political parties, as the willingness of officials to aid the constituents of social movements often turns on electoral considerations."<sup>49</sup> The elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump were both cases in which there was a desire from supporters to shift the direction of the country and presidential candidates are the symbol for change at the highest level.

#### Presidential Elections & Social Movements: 2008 & 2016

The 2008 Presidential Election which saw Barack Obama become the first African American President in United States history was an example of how modern changes come from elections. The election had been labeled the "social media election" because of President Obama's campaign targeted to the younger population through the use of Facebook and Twitter, which prompted voting and political volunteering rates to increase.<sup>50</sup> The campaign team not only "revived" the youth vote, but it also used social media to facilitate grassroots movements throughout the country, focused on targeting changes through the highest level, the president.<sup>51</sup> The election created its own massive social and cultural movement with the help of technology, showing the impact that social media can have on a campaign and a movement to dictate a "positive" outcome.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 291.

<sup>50</sup> Victoria Carty. *Wired and mobilizing: Social movements, new technology, and electoral politics*. New York, NY: Routledge. 2011.

<sup>51</sup> Stephanie Takaragawa and Victoria Carty. "The 2008 U.S. Presidential Election and New Digital Technologies: Political Campaigns as Social Movements and the Significance of Collective Identity." *Tamara Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry* 10, no. 4: 73-89. 2012.

Most social and cultural movements are started at the grassroots levels, attempting to create change from the bottom up. The 2008 election used a top-down approach, starting at the highest levels of the campaign which gave them the access and the ability to reach supporters, but “the campaign was energized and diffused in a bottom-up fashion.”<sup>52</sup> Meaning that Barack Obama would not have gained nearly the amount of support without the massive number of volunteers working at the grassroots level. The election, along with other successful movements, showed the willingness and belief at the grassroots level. President Obama, in essence, created his own social movement which had major influence in his election as President.

One of the key successes of the Obama campaign was that social media gave him the ability to access voters and hear their issues. His willingness to take on the issues seen as the most important drove people to the voting booths in his favor. As with most political elections, the candidates are elected because the citizens believe they will tackle the most important issues, hence the ever-present partisanship. This gives a significant political advantage to any movement that is able to mobilize support around a certain topic and leads the members of the movement to actively vote for their respective candidate. Social media can play an especially large role in diffusing information on candidates and what issues they do and do not support.<sup>53</sup> Chapter 3 further analyzes the role of social media, but as Tufekci<sup>54</sup> notes, it is essentially its own community where like-minded individuals meet which can be largely beneficial to political candidates for mobilizing support.

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>53</sup> Chang Sup Park, "Does Twitter Motivate Involvement in Politics? Tweeting Opinion Leadership and Political Engagement", *Computers in Human Behavior*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 1641-1648, 2013.

<sup>54</sup> Zeynep Tufekci. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

Similar events took place with the 2016 presidential election, where candidate Donald Trump used Twitter to mobilize citizens unhappy with the current state of government. President Trump used attention-grabbing Tweets to the delight of supporters, and in turn, received much more media coverage than any of his opponents.<sup>55</sup> The “Make America Great Campaign” generated its own movement in support of Trump with the help of social media, highlighting the issues within the government and the country and captivating voters.<sup>56</sup> The movement ultimately received enough attention and support that it achieved the desired outcome of Donald Trump becoming the 45<sup>th</sup> President of the United States.

As social media continually rises as one of the most prominent ways for politicians and presidential candidates to reach supporters and potential voters, campaigns are themselves becoming social movements. People mobilize to vote for a candidate who they think will take up the most pressing issues in hopes for creating changes, something in which social and cultural movements may not be able to achieve on their own.

#### LGBT Influence Through Public Support

The LGBT rights movements in the 1990’s sparked what might have been one of the biggest revolutionary victories in the United States. In 1990, less than one-third of Americans condoned same-sex marriage and the prospect of it ever being acceptable was unimaginable.<sup>57</sup> Politicians at the highest levels were adamantly against any policies

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<sup>55</sup> Thomas E. Patterson. “News Coverage of the 2016 Presidential Primaries: Horse Race Reporting Has Consequences”. Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy. July 11, 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Karen Tumulty. "How Donald Trump Came up with 'Make America Great Again'." The Washington Post. January 18, 2017

<sup>57</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

favoring same-sex marriages and when Vermont allowed civil unions in 1999, Republican Gary Bauer called the decision “in some ways worse than terrorism”.<sup>58</sup> In order for the LGBT community to achieve the same rights as every other human being, they needed to spread their message, mobilize support, and change the existing policies. To many, the mountain would be too hard to climb, but activists usually have a different sense of optimism in the face of obstacles.

The multiple movements that sparked the political changes were not reliant on civil disobedience and massive street protests like many of the recent movements have been criticized for.<sup>59</sup> They combined a mixture of social, cultural, religious, political and legal activism which brought the message to the world. As the movements continually advocated for same-sex rights throughout the country and the world, public opinion in the United States drastically transitioned from total opposition to public support. The movements began winning more legal decisions in federal and state courts and achieved victories with a number of states allowing same-sex marriages. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that state bans on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, a revolutionary win for LGBT activists<sup>60</sup>. Yet, the most important aspect of the movement’s victory was not that they changed the minds of the courts, but they gained support of the public and had the backing of companies such as Google, Nike, Adidas, and Facebook.<sup>61</sup> Politicians had two choices, adapt to the movement or risk not getting reelected.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid. Page 88.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Joseph Liu. "Same-Sex Marriage, State by State." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. June 26, 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Christina Kahrl. "Why Recent Declarations from Adidas, Nike Are Important." ESPN. February 26, 2016. [http://www.espn.com/espn/story/\\_/id/14843071/why-recent-declarations-support-lgbt-rights-adidas-nike-important](http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/14843071/why-recent-declarations-support-lgbt-rights-adidas-nike-important)



All movements need support to be successful, but in democracies in particular, social movements play an extremely important role in shaping public opinion. Support for the Obama campaign came through people spreading the campaign's messages and eventually reaching a wide enough audience that believed in his message propel him to the presidency elected. The LGBT movements worked to gain support of the public's belief in same-sex equality which then translated into favorable policy changes.

Just as much of a movement's success can come from the events that they indirectly influence than those in which they may directly impact. The main changes can be indirectly influenced through public support, then to political elections, and then possibly achieve the desired outcome, but everything starts with a clear goal and determination. The "incremental successes" that Alinsky and Chambers referred to are extremely important in understanding that movements might not cause direct and immediate changes. The LGBT movements took years from their outset of mobilization, then to go through the courts and political processes, and finally achieve victory. Presidential campaigns take months and millions of dollars to build their support base and create a momentous movement. The following sections examine how social media impacts activism and messaging where starting out small can turn into major achievements.

### "Slacktivism"?

The use of social media by modern uprisings and movements has received much attention by scholars over the past decade. The events of the Arab Spring in particular highlighted the ways in which social media is used to the benefits of social movements. However, with the new generation of activists relying intently on social media, its use in movements has had its fair share of criticism. Critics have called the recent uses of social

media “slacktivism”, defined by Christensen as “activities that enhance the feel-good factor of the participants but have no impact on real life political outcomes.”<sup>62</sup> Refer back to Heller’s illustration of “social theatre”. Christensen’s study on activists in Finland found that internet activists are “highly interested in political matters” but they also believe that the “political system is responsive to their demands.”<sup>63</sup> Similarly, Kwak et al. explained that those who see social media has having an impact on politics and those who believe that engaging in political discussions or ideas on social media are forms of participation are likely to continue doing so.<sup>64</sup> However, both Christensen and Kwak et al. also found evidence suggesting that “internet activists” tend to be engaged in a broad range of activism and online participation can promote offline participation as well.<sup>6566</sup>

Why is it important to analyze the critiques contained in the “slacktivist” theory? Movements such as the Arab Spring would not have begun or succeeded had activists simply shared political expressions on Facebook and Twitter. Combining online and offline activism can work collectively to create positive outcomes such as the Arab Spring. It is also important not to discourage or undermine the efforts of sharing issues on social media as the next section highlights that a simple message can create a larger outcome. However, activists should also understand the connection between online and

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<sup>62</sup> Henrik Serup Christensen. "Simply Slacktivism?" *Ejournal Of Edemocracy & Open Government*4, no. 1: 1-23. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2012, 1.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. 12.

<sup>64</sup> Nojin Kwak, Daniel S Lane, Brian E Weeks, Dam Hee Kim, Slgi S Lee, Sarah Bachleda, Perceptions of Social Media for Politics: Testing the Slacktivism Hypothesis, *Human Communication Research*, Volume 44, Issue 2, Pages 197–221. 2018.

<sup>65</sup> Henrik Serup Christensen. "Simply Slacktivism?" *Ejournal Of Edemocracy & Open Government*4, no. 1: 1-23. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2012, 1.

<sup>66</sup> Nojin Kwak, Daniel S Lane, Brian E Weeks, Dam Hee Kim, Slgi S Lee, Sarah Bachleda, Perceptions of Social Media for Politics: Testing the Slacktivism Hypothesis, *Human Communication Research*, Volume 44, Issue 2, Pages 197–221. 2018.

offline engagement as well so as not to expect that politicians will always take into consideration issues shared on social media.

Yet, maybe the most influential aspect of social media is that it is an outlet for movements to spread their messages and mobilize a following. As was the case with the unprovoked attack by a police officer on peaceful activists of the Occupy Wall Street movement, it can also be mechanism of safety for activists to where actions of the authorities can be monitored by millions of people.<sup>67</sup> Suh et al. found that not only can social media mobilize new activists in the face of repression, but it can also have a “mediating and moderating effect on repression as well.”<sup>68</sup> Meaning that social media can make regimes and authority figures aware that their actions are being monitored daily, which might possibly influence them to be use the least amount of violence as possible, or become familiarized with popular issues. Chapter 2 shows a similar impact in the case of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine where activists were able to share the events of the movement with each other and the international community allowing foreign governments to watch the events of the uprising unfold. One of the activists credited media outlets and social media in preventing a crackdown on protestors<sup>69</sup>, but it also allowed those foreign governments to understand the events which led them not to recognize the corrupt elections.

### Social Media & Student Movements

While the case study of the Orange Revolution presents the use of social media on a larger scale, it can be an integral part of smaller-scale grassroots student movements,

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<sup>67</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>68</sup> Chan S. Suh, Ion Bogdan Vasi, and Paul Y. Chang. "How Social Media Matter: Repression and the Diffusion of the Occupy Wall Street Movement." *Social Science Research* 65: 282-93. 2017. 290.

<sup>69</sup> Matthew J. Duffy. "Code Orange: How the Internet, cell phones and new technologies helped shape the Ukrainian Revolution of 2004." *Atlanta Review of Journalism History* 9, 69-84. 2010.

highlighting a wide variety of issues that take place at colleges and universities. The “I, Too, Am” movements were a series of online photo campaigns started by a Harvard student in 2014 to display the everyday oppression that African American students face on campuses throughout the country.<sup>70</sup> Using platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr, the movement reached college students throughout the United States and eventually spread around the world, including students in Canada, Brazil, and England.<sup>71</sup> It allowed students at Harvard and Oxford to create a “counterspace” to come together as a community and share their experiences but also to share ideas to progress the issues.<sup>72</sup> Social media allowed them to engage in the counterspace and form innovative ways to highlight the racial issues on campus. The “I, Too, Am Harvard” movement garnered enough support that the movement’s organizers gained access to school administrators which presented the opportunity for them to engage in a discussion on how to improve racial issues on campus.<sup>73</sup>

Similar to the movements at Harvard and Oxford, in 2015, students at the University of Missouri took to Twitter to express their discontent with the administration’s negligence to act on racist events that routinely took place on campus.<sup>74</sup> A graduate student named Jonathan Butler started a hunger strike as a form of protest, demanding that the President of the University Timothy Wolfe step down.<sup>75</sup> Members of the football team also took to Twitter to express support for Butler and stated that they

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<sup>70</sup> George Mwangi, Chrystal A., Genia M. Bettencourt, and Victoria K. Malaney. "Collegians creating (counter)space online: A critical discourse analysis of the I, Too, Am social media movement." *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education* 11, no. 2: 146-163. 2018.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Grace Yan, Ann Pegoraro, and Nicholas M. Watanabe. 2018. "Student-Athletes' Organization of Activism at the University of Missouri: Resource Mobilization on Twitter." *Journal of Sport Management* 32, no. 1: 24-37. 2018.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

would not play until Butler started eating. Twitter exploded with support for the students and national media outlets such as ESPN, CNN, and NPR covered the events.<sup>76</sup> In the following days, Wolfe and the Chancellor of the University, R. Bowen Loftin resigned.<sup>77</sup> While outcomes of that magnitude are rare, especially in the midst of protest, it shows the effect that social media can have in magnifying “local” issues and bringing them to the forefront of national attention. It gives activists an outlet to express ideas and motivate changes, with the potential that any issue could resonate with a group sharing similar concerns and create outcomes that might have never been imaginable.

### Measures of Success

In today’s world, movements are measured by direct, efficient, and immediate impacts, and anything else is considered a failure. Chenoweth and Stephan partially define a nonviolent movement’s success as the outcome being directly impacted by the movement itself.<sup>78</sup> Scholars critique movements based on those factors and activists create movements with the belief that revolutionary impacts need to be immediate. Yet, as with the student movement at Harvard, changes do not need to be revolutionary to be impactful or even change the dynamics surrounding certain issues. Bringing attention to issues through social media may be all it takes to spark a conversation and lead to bigger changes. The smaller, incremental wins can generate larger changes over time. The problem with modern movements is not that they rely too much on social media or that they are too theatrical, it is that they believe revolution is the only acceptable outcome. All movements need ambition and desired goals, but the smaller victories should not be

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> John Eligon and Richard Pérez-Peña. "University of Missouri Protests Spur a Day of Change." *The New York Times*. November 09, 2015.

<sup>78</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, (2011).

overlooked, and the timeline for success should be measured in years, not weeks or months.

## Conclusion

Some make the argument that a movement is only successful if it achieves the desired outcome to the fullest extent. Scholars critique the use of social media in movements stating that it makes activists lazy, adding to the recent “failures” of Occupy Wall Street and the Black Lives Matter movement. Protests in Washington, D.C. after the inauguration in May of 2017 did nothing but voice displeasure with the President. Yet, the lens through which these movements and tactics have been looked at fail to see some of the indirect benefits that may come from them. Social movements now shape movements of the future and encourage young activists to fight for important issues. If the LGBT movement disbanded after one year of fighting for their rights, they would have never received the massive support of the public and influential companies. If students at Harvard University and the University of Missouri believed that taking up issues through social media made them lazy or would have had no impact, they never would have begun a discussion of racial issues or have been presented the opportunity for dialogue the administration.

The case studies examined above have presented the value of movements in the United States and how they are used as offensive mechanisms to promote and progress issues. This paper asked the question to what extent can social movements impact politics in shaping policy changes and electing leaders? When legitimate political institutions are available, activists hold significant power to dictate what issues are important and everyday citizens have the opportunity to elect leaders that will fight for their values. As Gene Sharp stated, rulers rely on the support of the people, and political power, whether

it be democratic or dictatorial, is fragile. While the opportunity to elect leaders freely is not available in all societies as Chapter 2 develops an analysis of two momentous nonviolent movements to oppose authoritarian leaders, ordinary people across the world have recognized the power that they hold despite unfavorable conditions. It is also important to understand the role that social media has in movements as the specific case studies in this Chapter have showed some of the benefits on a smaller scale, the subsequent chapters will show the impact that it has in protecting activists and democracy itself. While the means and structural factors are inherently different, uprisings in authoritarian countries and social movements in democracies have many of the same goals: progress. Examining the development and progression in each case allows for a cross-sectional analysis which can improve the understanding of movements as a whole and how scholars critique the outcomes.

### Future Studies

Future studies may aspire to advance on the work of Kwak et al.<sup>79</sup> on how activists across the world under different forms of government view social media, high-impact versus low-impact, low-threshold versus high-threshold? Low-threshold activism is engaging in things such as signing online petitions where high-threshold activism is participating in a street protest or a sit-in. Kwak et al. found that those who engage in low-threshold acts on social media are likely to take part in high-threshold acts offline, but further research can be done to compare the actions of activists in democracies versus in authoritarian countries where internet access may be more restricted or the costs of participating in offline protests are higher such as being subjected to arrests or aggression

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<sup>79</sup> Nojin Kwak, Daniel S Lane, Brian E Weeks, Dam Hee Kim, Slgi S Lee, Sarah Bachleda, Perceptions of Social Media for Politics: Testing the Slacktivism Hypothesis, *Human Communication Research*, Volume 44, Issue 2, Pages 197–221. 2018.

by the authorities. An examination of that criteria would again advance the understanding of movements in different societies and also help project what the role social media will play in future scenarios.

## Chapter 2: Democratic Promotion through Nonviolence

### Introduction

Kiev's Independence Square was filled with millions of people singing "Razom nas bahato! Nas ne podolaty!" meaning "Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!"<sup>80</sup> This was the Ukrainian people's response to the fraudulent election that took place in 2004. The people had power in numbers and despite the frigid temperatures, they organized mass nonviolent protests throughout the country in what would be called the "Orange Revolution". It was a nonviolent uprising in which the people of Ukraine hoped to oust sitting president Viktor Yanukovych and replace him with Viktor Yushchenko. In the moment, the Orange Revolution presented an opportunity for change, but it would not last. However, the failure was not in the movement, but rather the structural conditions in Ukraine.

Over the past 20 years, the world has seen an increase in nonviolent revolutions to achieve social change from the events of the Arab Spring, to the color revolutions in Belarus and Serbia. Nonviolent protests have happened for hundreds of years and they will continue to be a mechanism for change for future generations. This paper analyzes what makes a nonviolent uprising successful, how the events surrounding a movement that can hinder its impact, and examples of nonviolent strategy being affective against a repressive regime.

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<sup>80</sup> Adrian Karatnycky. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 2005.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-revolution>



## Definitions of Success & Nonviolence

First, it is important to define what nonviolence is and what it is not. Bartkowski defines it as “a form of political conflict in which ordinary people choose to stand up to oppressive structures...with the use of various tactics of nonviolent action such as strikes, boycotts, protests, and civil disobedience.”<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, it is “the absence of collective acts intended to use violence against an adversary.”<sup>82</sup> Many will highlight the term “absence” in the definition which is why nonviolence is frequently mistaken for passive resistance, inaction, or the avoidance of conflict, however it is the opposite.<sup>83</sup> It is strategic *action* that involves some levels of risk and confrontation to achieve the desired outcome.

It is also important to understand what constitutes a success for a nonviolent uprising because there are varying degrees to which a movement achieves its goals. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan<sup>84</sup> used a definition derived from Robert Pape (1997)<sup>85</sup>, which contained two criteria, 1) the movement needed full achievement of its stated goals within a year of peak activity and 2) it needed a discernable effect on the outcome, meaning that any change was a direct result of the movement.<sup>86</sup> This definition provides a measuring system that focuses solely on the impact of the movement rather than outlying events which may affect the outcome and dilute the movement’s perceived effectiveness.

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<sup>81</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. eds. *Recovering Nonviolent History. Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013. 4.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, Chapter 1 Notes.

<sup>83</sup> Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

<sup>84</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, (2011) 14.

<sup>85</sup> Robert A. Pape. *Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work*. *International Security* 22, no. 2: 90-136. 1997.

<sup>86</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, (2011) 14.

## Schools of Thought

For any nonviolent movement to have an opportunity for success it must be supported by the population and be strategic. Nonviolence is a strategy, but that alone does not guarantee success. Nonviolent uprisings are not new, but the tactics used change from generation to generation, learning from previous revolutions and building on previous strategies. One of the many strengths from mobilizing a nonviolent uprising is that it allows for creativity in actions and employing different methods can enhance a group's chances for success. Gene Sharp, a theorist of nonviolent strategy, authored a list of 198 nonviolent actions which a group can use as weapon.<sup>87</sup> The list includes methods such as mock elections, displaying of flags and colors, marches, and the use of humor.<sup>88</sup> It is important to note that nonviolent protests can take shape in many different forms, ranging from small acts of defiance to large-scale marches. Sharp divided the actions into three categories, 1) Protest and persuasion, 2) Noncooperation, and 3) Nonviolent intervention.<sup>89</sup> Each category requires differing amounts of resources and risks but can be tailored to a specific movement's messaging and overall goals.

Sharp, along with other scholars, realized the impact that nonviolent demonstrations could have in creating change. Mahatma Ghandi and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. were the most successful activists to use nonviolence as a catalyst for social change. Their protests took multiple forms from large scale marches, such as Ghandi's

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<sup>87</sup> Gene Sharp. "198 Methods of Nonviolent Action," In *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

salt *satyagraha*, to Dr. King's sit-ins and boycotts.<sup>90</sup> Both leaders shaped the way scholars have studied and activists have utilized nonviolent tactics in social movements.

A combination of influences from Sharp's list and Saul Alinsky's book *Rules for Radicals*<sup>91</sup> have been used to successfully mobilize nonviolent revolutions. While Sharp focused on the nonviolent tactics, Alinsky focused on the grass roots organization aspect. For an organization to succeed in achieving change, Alinsky stated, they must realize that change takes time and the "desire for instant and dramatic change"<sup>92</sup> can derail any traction a movement might accumulate. This raises the question; what factors go into making a sustained movement that has the blueprint for success? From those in the Alinsky school of thought, a successful movement is a prolonged set of organized actions in which create long term progress.<sup>93</sup> Modern day "protests" lack many of the factors to create long-term changes because they cause short bursts of disruption but fail to have their issue resonate over a long period of time. While the success of each uprising varies on different factors, organization and tactics are the two keys that make a movement sustainable.

### Why Nonviolent Campaigns Succeed

Nonviolent movements have proven to have more success than violent movements in achieving prolonged change in all regions of the world.<sup>94</sup> In one study done the authors found that nonviolent movements were successful 53 percent of the time

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<sup>90</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>91</sup> Saul Alinsky. *Rules for Radicals*. Random House Publishing, 1971.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. Prologue.

<sup>93</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>94</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security*, no. 1: 7-44. 2008.

compared to only 26 percent for violent movements.<sup>95</sup> What factors contribute to nonviolent uprisings being more successful? First, nonviolence increases a movements legitimacy, domestically and internationally leading to higher participation rates.<sup>96</sup> When a movement uses nonviolent tactics, it opens its audience to a diverse set of people, young, old, handicapped, etc. willing to participate because the tactics can take many forms and there is less risk involved than in violent movements. The same study showed that as participation increases, the probability of success increases.<sup>97</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan furthered that study with findings stating “no campaigns failed once they’d achieved the active and sustained participation of just 3.5% of the population”<sup>98</sup>, becoming what is known in nonviolent strategy circles as the 3.5 percent rule. Additionally, campaigns that relied solely on nonviolent tactics were four times larger than violent campaigns and much more representative of the population.<sup>99</sup>

A second point of precedence for nonviolent movements over violent movements is that they take on average six years less to run their course, three years versus nine years respectively.<sup>100</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan also found that the likelihood a country will become a democracy five years after a successful nonviolent campaign is close to 60% compared to only 6% for violent campaigns.<sup>101</sup> A third important point is that large nonviolent campaigns were found to be substantially more likely than violent campaigns

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Erica Chenoweth. “Civil Resistance and the 3.5% Rule.” Presentation: TEDxBoulder. September 21, 2013.

[https://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at-tedx-boulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-5-rule/#\\_edn3](https://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at-tedx-boulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-5-rule/#_edn3)

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Mathew Burrows and Maria J. Stephan. *Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?* Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2015.

<sup>101</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Stephan, Maria. *Why Civil Resistance Works*, (New York: Columbia University Press), Chapter 8: pp. 201-220. 2011.

to induce defections from security forces, drastically increasing the movement's chances for success.<sup>102</sup> Other loyalty shifts from religious groups, economic elites, or political elites may be just as important as security forces defections, depending on the specific circumstances and goals of each nonviolent campaign.<sup>103</sup>

Those factors highlight the significance of a campaign being committed to nonviolent tactics. It is harder for a regime to legitimize the use of violence against a nonviolent group, especially if the activists can maximize the “backfire” of the repression. Backfire, when used in nonviolent strategy, is the event in which a repressive action or event has the “opposite impact from the one intended by the oppressor.”<sup>104</sup> When activists can expose the oppression through outlets such as social media, it can increase international and domestic sympathy for the movement as well as increasing the potential for defections.<sup>105</sup> Gene Sharp saw the value of nonviolent tactics in repressive situations stating that dictatorships are well-versed in suppressing armed attacks which also allows the regime to justify a “police state”, but nonviolent movements have the ability to surprise a regime by using tactics that violent regimes are usually not prepared to counteract.<sup>106</sup>

### Innovative Tactics

David Galula, a counterinsurgency theorist, once stated “disorder – the normal state of nature – is cheap to create and very costly to prevent.”<sup>107</sup> The more diverse a movement's tactics and the more disorder the movement can create, the harder it is for

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. “Repression & Backfire”. Class Lecture, Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore, MD. October 10, 2018.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017, 6.

<sup>107</sup> David Galula and John A. Nagl. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006, 6.

the regime to predict and prevent. Many movements, violent and nonviolent, fail because they lack innovation. They repeat the same tactics throughout the entire movement which the regime becomes accustomed to, and the media loses interest because there is no progression.<sup>108</sup> However, nonviolent tactical diversity gives a campaign the upper hand, especially as Sharp noted, against a regime with little experience in countering those actions. Relative to innovation, there is a direct relationship between nonviolence and the diversification of the activists themselves, in turn giving the campaign an inherent ability to generate creative tactics.<sup>109</sup> Gallagher Cunningham et al. proposed another advantage of tactical diversification whereas a movement can tailor tactics to their specific goals as well as the resources available.<sup>110</sup> Most movements have a core group of ardent supporters that fully commit their time to the campaign, but a majority of activists are unlikely to participate in every action the movement takes simply because they have other commitments such as jobs or families.<sup>111</sup> When a movement can diversify their actions, especially utilizing low-resource tactics (time & commitment), people may be more inclined to participate in an event more suited for them.

Revolving tactics limit the opposition's ability to counteract a specific set of actions and allows the movement to "adapt" to the opposition's responses.<sup>112</sup> While concentrated tactics such as protests can be useful in disrupting daily activities, they are

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<sup>108</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 73. 2017.

<sup>109</sup> Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

<sup>110</sup> Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Marianne Dahl, and Anne Frugé. "Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion." *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 3: 591-605. 2017.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

relatively easy for the state to “target”.<sup>113</sup> The dispersal of tactics, such as Otpor’s utilization of hundreds of small actions across Serbia, make it more difficult to prevent and adds a layer of resilience to the campaign.<sup>114</sup>

One innovative tactic difficult for a regime to circumvent is humor. When combined with other tactics, humor can challenge the opposition while also showing the population that what seems an indestructible source of power, the regime and authorities, can be “humiliated”.<sup>115</sup> Yet, using humor has more benefits than delegitimizing an oppressor, it can also be very useful in mobilizing participants simply because it enhances the aspects of nonviolence. Humor inherently contributes to what Vinthagen described as “normative regulation”, the process through which “activists recast nonviolence as normal and violence as abnormal”, by appealing to emotions such as openness and playfulness.<sup>116</sup> That openness is also a contributing factor to a movement’s willingness to have a progressive dialogue with the opposing entity, something rarely seen among violent campaigns.<sup>117</sup> Lastly, as will be demonstrated in the following analysis of the Otpor movement, humor can be a tool as a significant influence of backfire against a regime’s actions.

## Methodology

This section focuses on two case studies in Eastern Europe: The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine and the Otpor movement in Serbia. Comparative case studies allow for an examination of the relevant similarities and differences that

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Maiken Sørensen. "Laughing on the Way to Social Change: Humor and Nonviolent Action Theory." *Peace & Change* vol. 42. no. 1: 128-156. 2017.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 144.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

occur within in each scenario.<sup>118</sup> In the cases of Serbia and Ukraine, the outcomes of the uprisings are similar, but each case took different paths to achieve the desired outcome.

The Otpor movement was a highlight of nonviolent strategy being used successfully against an oppressor. Throughout the entire cycle of the campaign, the activists calculated each action to maximize potential and reduce risks, creating a strategy that subsequent movements sought to emulate. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution was successful in garnering worldwide attention through the use of the internet and mass protests, achieving the goal of new elections, but the desired changes were unable to be sustained. Both cases have general structural similarities, but Serbia has fared much better in the aftermath of the uprisings compared to Ukraine.

#### The Otpor Movement in Serbia 1998-2000

Serbia experienced one of the most successful nonviolent uprisings from 1998 to 2000. The Otpor movement, meaning “resistance” in Serbian, was created in 1998 with the hopes of overthrowing Slobodan Milosevic and his repressive regime.<sup>119</sup> The group had hoped to learn from and build on the previous protests in the country which achieved very little in the way of change. What factors made Otpor innovative and successful? The leaders of the movement understood that the tactics of prior years had not worked, so they set out to create what has been labeled as a “hybrid organization”, encompassing a mixture between mass protests and structural organizations.<sup>120</sup> The group created a momentum-driven movement that successfully employed a mission of disciplined disruption. They were able to gain the mass support of the population because of their

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<sup>118</sup> Louise G. White. “Alternative Research Designs,” in *Political Analysis: Technique and Practice*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Australia: Thomson Wadsworth, 1999.

<sup>119</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. Chapter 3 “The Hybrid”.



innovative nonviolent tactics which made the movement relatable to those Serbians who would not usually be inclined to participate in such a campaign. Otpor sold the idea that the people of Serbia had an opportunity to make the changes so many desperately wanted.

### Tactics

Another common misconception of nonviolent movements is that they need to have a “charismatic leader” at the forefront of the campaign.<sup>121</sup> What made Otpor unique, and successful, was the decentralized structure of the movement. The core leaders of the group set the standards for the movement, but they strategically did not place one person as the face of the campaign. Instead, they continually rotated the person who would speak to the media so the attention would not solely be on one member and become the main target of the regime.<sup>122</sup> The group also allowed its members around the country to carry out their ideas of protest and disruption, regardless of how big or small, as long as it remained nonviolent. They were able to do this because the leaders were adept at “frontloading, meaning that from the outset of Otpor’s creation the guidelines were set and the mechanisms were in place for all branches of the movement to follow the outline.<sup>123</sup> The movement had an identity, strictly nonviolent with a clear vision of their goals.

One of the methods of nonviolence and persuasion on Gene Sharp’s list was the use of slogans and symbols as a means of “Communication with a Wider Audience”.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Kurt Schock. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

<sup>122</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Gene Sharp. “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” In *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973.

The leaders of Otpor were perceptive to the group's image and message of nonviolence, so they created the symbol of the clenched fist which would become Otpor's logo. The symbol had a historic resemblance to past revolutionaries, but it also had cultural appeal as it appeared on a popular Serbian television show.<sup>125</sup> The group added the word "Resistance!" to the logo and made stickers and t-shirts which were placed throughout the country and were distributed to its members. The clenched fist resonated with much of the younger population of Serbia eager to change the future. The movement now had momentum.

The next step was to facilitate the small, nonviolent actions that would take place in hopes to undermine Slobodan's authority. Because the group had a commitment to nonviolence and knew they could not overthrow the regime with force, they turned to humor. Nenad Belcevic, a member of Otpor's press department explained their use of humor, "When you are fighting against a brutal force, it is best to put up passive resistance and make funny jokes to show how stupid the regime is. And the Milosevic regime didn't know how to react to it."<sup>126</sup> One of the most famous pranks carried out by Otpor activists was when they put a barrel with Milosevic's image in the street with a baseball bat next to it. There were signs that encouraged people to put a coin in the barrel for "Milosevic's retirement fund" or if they did not have coins because of Milosevic's flawed policies, they should hit the barrel with the bat.<sup>127</sup> The police could not find any activists to arrest so they took the barrel instead. Aside from the humorous activities, the

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<sup>125</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 2017.

<sup>126</sup> Olena Nikolayenko. "Origins of the Movement's Strategy: The Case of the Serbian Youth Movement Otpor." *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* vol. 34. no. 2: 140-58. 2013.

<sup>127</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books, 67. 2017.

activists carried out a wide range of protests. They held public marches and demonstrations, continued display of public symbols, initiated strikes and boycotts, and were involved in political discussions.<sup>128</sup>

With all of their combined tactics and massive following, Otpor quickly became more popular than any political party and influenced the opposition parties to create a unified opposition called the Democratic Opposition of Serbia to run against Milosevic in the upcoming election.<sup>129</sup> As the election neared, the regime tried to crackdown on the group labeling it an “illegal terrorist organization”, arresting many members of the movement without warrant.<sup>130</sup> Over the two year period of Otpor’s campaign, Serbian authorities arrested more than fifteen hundred activists.<sup>131</sup> However, the crackdowns by the regime backfired and led more Serbians joining the movement.

### Defections

A last factor which propelled the movement to success was their attempts to induce defections of security forces and politicians. Otpor succeeded in the first step of spreading the message for a brighter future, so when election day came on September 24, 2000, there was a record turnout to vote on a new president.<sup>132</sup> The opposing candidate to Milosevic, Vojislav Koštunica surpassed the fifty percent threshold to win the presidency, however, as expected, Milosevic refused to accept the outcome.<sup>133</sup> The next step was to increase the pressure on Milosevic. Hundreds of thousands of people were set

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<sup>128</sup> Lester R. Kurtz. “Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. 2010.

<sup>129</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books. 2017.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books. 2017.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

to protest in Belgrade, but the question was would the authorities use violence against the protestors?

The Otpor leaders were silently reaching out to security forces throughout the entire campaign, especially enhancing relationships with local police through being arrested, of course.<sup>134</sup> They also took advantage of the cleavages between the military and Milosevic as they felt less valued than the interior police<sup>135</sup>, members of Otpor sympathized with them and sent care packages and cigarettes.<sup>136</sup> Those mended relationships worked in the activists favor when police commanders refused to obey orders from the regime to use force against the protestors.<sup>137</sup>

## Outcome

Over the next few days, Milosevic would step down as president signaling a victory for Otpor and the people of Serbia. The movement achieved the objectives it had set two years prior. Otpor itself was not the sole entity responsible for the ousting of Milosevic, but it was the catalyst for other groups to join together with the movement in working towards a brighter future. External geopolitical factors severely delegitimized the Milosevic regime and provided an opportunity for Otpor to take advantage of the weakening Serbian political structure. Milosevic's failures in peacefully ending the conflict in the region prompted NATO intervention and differing forms of Western pressure, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, deteriorated the Serbian

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<sup>134</sup> Anika Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 411-429. 2006.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Mark Engler and Paul Engler. *This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Nation Books. 2017.

<sup>137</sup> Anika Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 411-429. 2006.

economy.<sup>138</sup> Those factors, along with Milosevic's attempts at centralizing power, led to a lack of public support within the population<sup>139</sup>, which Otpor used to build their opposition. However, without the strategies of Otpor, it is difficult to imagine the regime would have been tested and ousted leading to a more prolonged and devastating tenure. Although Serbia struggled in the aftermath of the Milosevic regime, the Otpor movement had a lasting impact on the political and cultural stature of the country. Citizens are much more aware and inclined to participate in politics in hopes of continually moving the country forward and recent elections have been mostly free and respected.<sup>140</sup> The Economist's 2018 Democracy Index ranked Serbia has a "flawed democracy" defined as countries having "free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected"<sup>141</sup>, a significant improvement of the Serbia from previous decades.

#### The Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004-2005

Four years after the events of Otpor in Serbia, Eastern Europe experienced another uprising against a corrupt political structure. With only Romania separating the two countries, activists in Ukraine hoped to emulate a similar movement to that of Otpor. The Orange Revolution was a nonviolent uprising that took place in Ukraine from November 2004 to January 2005. It was an event of mass protest following the framework of the previous color revolutions that had taken place in post-communist Eastern Europe, challenging the fraudulent elections in 2004 which saw Victor

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<sup>138</sup> Thomas Carothers. "Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2001.

<sup>139</sup> Olena Nikolayenko. "Origins of the Movement's Strategy: The Case of the Serbian Youth Movement Otpor." *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* vol. 34. no. 2: 140-58. 2013.

<sup>140</sup> "Freedom in the World: Serbia 2018." Freedom House. May 29, 2018.  
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/serbia>

<sup>141</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Me too? Political participation, protest and democracy". Democracy Index 2018.

Yanukovych elected prime minister.<sup>142</sup> The goal of the Orange Revolution was to overturn the election results, overthrow the then-President Leonid Kuchma regime, and direct Ukraine to a relationship with the West. When the election results were announced, thousands of people, largely consisting of youths, gathered in Maidan Square to contest the outcome despite warnings from the regime against public protesting.<sup>143</sup> The protestors set up a city of tents to occupy the square and over the next month would accumulate hundreds of thousands of supporters from around the country, using mass protest as a strategy to disrupt the everyday operations of the government.

### Tactics

Both the leaders of the revolution and popular opponent Viktor Yuschenko stressed the importance of nonviolence against a regime who would view the slightest actions as a provocation. Instead, leading up to the events at Maidan, the activists turned to humor using Yanukovych's criminal record as the blueprint. In one instance, young activists dressed up as prisoners seemingly just released from prison and campaigned in support of Yanukovych.<sup>144</sup> The skit was then turned into a cartoon which was distributed and worked in favor Viktor Yuschenko.<sup>145</sup> The revolution also needed an identity other than its dislike for Yanukovych. Similar to Otpor's use of the clenched fist as their symbol, the activists in Ukraine used the color orange, which was the color Yuschenko

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<sup>142</sup> David Lane. "The Orange Revolution: 'People's Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup?" *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* vol. 10. no. 4: 525-549. 2008.

<sup>143</sup> Taras Kuzio. "Chapter 3: Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution." In *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

used in campaign, and created the slogan “Back to Europe!” signaling to mend the country’s relationship with the West.<sup>146</sup>

The leaders of the Orange Revolution looked back upon the failed protests for a murdered journalist from two years earlier where the activists only turned out in a small number and became aggressive.<sup>147</sup> The leaders concluded that for any chances of success, they needed to do the exact opposite, mobilize mass support and remain peaceful. When the election results were announced, popular opponent Viktor Yushenko called on Ukrainians to gather in Maidan Square to contest the outcome despite warnings from the regime against public protesting.<sup>148</sup> In the coming days, hundreds of thousands of protestors came to the square and set up a city of tents to occupy Maidan, using mass protest as a strategy to disrupt the everyday operations of the government. Their goal was to block government buildings creating a defacto shutdown hoping that the regime and the opponents would be forced into negotiations. The Pora civic youth group, which means “It’s Time” in Ukrainian, were largely responsible for the activities of the revolution and the commitment to nonviolence, as they received training and advice from Otpor and activists in Georgia.<sup>149</sup> The group patrolled the tent city diffusing potential altercations, prohibiting drugs and alcohol and handing out pamphlets stating “Remain unprovoked. We will win. We are strong because we are calm.”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Anika Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 411-429. 2006.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Taras Kuzio. "Chapter 3: Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution." In *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

<sup>150</sup> Anika Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic. “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 411-429. 2006.

Ukrainians stayed in Maidan square for seventeen days despite the freezing temperatures, with the help from all types of groups, the military provided tents<sup>151</sup>, taxi drivers transported activists to and from the square, and restaurants provided free meals.<sup>152</sup> Yet with the youthfulness of the activists also came a proficiency in technology and communication. Media outlets fell victim to strict censorship from the regime during Kuchma's reign with severe repercussions for forming any opinion against Kuchma himself.<sup>153</sup> However, in the years leading up to the Orange Revolution the media became bolder in reporting both sides of the on goings in Ukraine and some outlets broadcast the events taking place in Maidan. The "collapse" of regime censorship at the hands of media outlets refusing to obey gave a significant boost to activists as their actions reached all corners of the country.<sup>154</sup> With the help of NGO's, it also brought the events of Maidan to the international community which would act as a monitoring system in case of any unwarranted violence against the activists. Tech-savvy youths took advantage of a regime, and a country as a whole, inexperienced with the workings of the internet. They easily worked around restrictions on websites and used it to communicate with other activists about when and where future events would take place.<sup>155</sup> The disobedience of the media was just one of the entities once-loyal to Kuchma which would switch loyalties to the activists.

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<sup>151</sup> Nadia Diuk. "Chapter 4: The Triumph of Civil Society." In *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

<sup>152</sup> Hans van Zon. "Why the Orange Revolution Succeeded." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* vol. 6. no. 3: 373-402. 2005.

<sup>153</sup> Olena Prytula. "Chapter 6: The Ukrainian Media Rebellion." In *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.



## Defections

Aside from the tactics of mass protest and disruption, the sustained nonviolence of the activists proved to be beneficial on multiple fronts, particularly inducing defections. One of the strategies used by activists was to appeal to the families of the military officers, showing that they were all on the same side for the betterment of Ukraine. As the relationship between Kuchma and his security forces declined, some military leaders defected to the side of the movement which generated powerful contacts.<sup>156</sup> The goal was to influence lower-level military officers to refuse to obey Kuchma's orders and eventually work its way up to the standing leaders.<sup>157</sup> There were also efforts to shift alliances from local police and Ukrainian intelligence officers. The relationships made between the activists and the authorities proved to be useful as the Minister of Defense stated they would side with people and not the Kuchma regime.<sup>158</sup> When a general ordered live ammunition for Ukrainian troops, army and intelligence officers notified Western diplomats of the potential attack showing President Kuchma that their loyalty had shifted.<sup>159</sup> The momentum fell to the activists.

## Outcome

The goal of the Orange Revolution was to overturn the fraudulent election and instill a new leader. The Ukrainian Supreme Court deemed the contested election unfair and called for a new election which saw Viktor Yushenko become Prime Minister. The movement achieved the goal of a new election, but it ultimately had no major impact on the country's transition to democracy. In fact, much of the accomplishments of the

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<sup>156</sup> Anika Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39: 411-429. 2006.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Hans van Zon. "Why the Orange Revolution Succeeded." *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* vol. 6. no. 3: 373-402. 2005.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

Orange Revolutions were reversed in 2010 when Viktor Yanukovich was again elected as President of Ukraine. The uprising opened the country to the possibility of democracy and to a better relationship with the Western world but did not make any inherent institutional changes, which was the root of the problem.<sup>160</sup> It can also be questioned if the new elections were a direct result of the movement or if it was a combination of international pressure sparked by the movement. Based on Chenoweth and Stephan's definition, the Orange Revolution cannot be labeled a failure because it did achieve part of its goal. However, from Saul Alinsky's standpoint, the revolution failed because it generated no long-term progression. Although, the failures may be attributed to the institutional flaws of the Ukrainian government system, not necessarily the tactics of the uprising itself. Furthermore, Ukraine experienced another revolution in 2014 known as Euromaidan, yet the movement was very different from that of 2004 as activists and security forces clashed ending in multiple fatalities on both sides.

## Discussion

Comparatively, both uprisings in Serbia and Ukraine achieved their goal of regime change but had differing levels of success after the uprisings ended. Why was this the case? The answer lies within the cultural and institutional factors within each country. One important point to make is that regime change does not necessarily result in democracy. Samuel Huntington stated that "nondemocratic regimes are more likely to be replaced by other nondemocratic regimes than by democratic ones."<sup>161</sup> Many scholars have argued that given a country's social and institutional characteristics, it is more or

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<sup>160</sup> Paul D'Anieri. "What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of the Orange Revolution." *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 5: 82. 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Samuel P. Huntington. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 35 1991.

less likely to be open to a democracy.<sup>162</sup> In the case of Serbia, there were social and institutional factors already in place to facilitate a transition to democracy. Two decades later, Serbia achieved democracy, arguably a direct result of the events of the Otpor movement.

Five years after the people of Ukraine ousted Viktor Yanukovich in the Orange Revolution, he was again elected in 2010 without protest.<sup>163</sup> The Ukrainian people felt as if both candidates in the 2010 election were bad for the country so there was no promise of a new regime without widespread corruption.<sup>164</sup> Ultimately, there were inherent flaws within the Ukrainian government which would transfer from regime to regime. However, Ukraine has recently made slight improvements with Freedom House categorizing it as a “Nation in Transition”.<sup>165</sup>

The Otpor movement and the Orange Revolution employed similar tactics of symbolism, mass protest, and most importantly nonviolence. Both movements are examples of situations where, to the outside world, the conditions seem to outweigh the skills. Meaning that the powerful regimes seem incapable of being challenged and better yet overthrown. To the activists themselves, the future of their country was at stake and at that point, nothing was impossible. While both movements benefitted from defections and international support, the activists themselves were the catalyst for the subsequent events, applauded for their willingness to learn from previous failed movements and their tactical creativity.

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<sup>162</sup> Ryan Kennedy. "Fading Colours? A Synthetic Comparative Case Study of the Impact of "Colour Revolutions"." *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 3: 273-292. 2014.

<sup>163</sup> Adam Meirowitz and Joshua A. Tucker. "People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest." *American Journal of Political Science* vol. 57. no. 2: 478-490. 2013.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ukraine Freedom House. "Ukraine." January 30, 2018. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/ukraine>

Each movement is one of many examples of activists overcoming restrictive conditions and each has been used a blueprint for movements that followed. While the hybrid efforts of Otpor are seen as the “highlight” of nonviolent movements in recent years, the Orange Revolution brings its own lessons in successful mass protest and sustaining nonviolence in the face of instigation.

### Future Studies

Both of the case studies examined above show how impactful a nonviolent movement can be in sparking change on the large scale. This current chapter raises the questions of how activists overcame unfavorable conditions, what tactics they used, and which were most beneficial to their success? In a world of ever-changing geopolitics and diplomacy, future research may be conducted to analyze how nongovernmental organizations might aid movements in the future. While this Chapter took specific focus on the actions of the activists in Otpor and the Orange Revolution, other articles have examined the role that NGO’s had played in both movements. Many times, those organizations are instrumental in helping activists with communications, food and shelter, and medical aid. There have also been movements that have had to work without the assistance of NGO’s. Future research could take a predictive perspective to analyze how a movement in a country such as Russia, which has labeled some nongovernmental organizations as foreign agents, would continue to work together. It would ask questions such as do NGO’s currently play a major role in activism efforts? Will they continue to be important or have activists found other means of assistance? How do NGO’s and activists respond governments that restrict the scope of those organizations? Research has been done to show the efforts of NGO’s but analysis that would look at the future would help many unfamiliar with nonviolent strategy understand the many complex parts and

obstacles that activists face, not only in countries where free speech is promoted, but especially where access to the internet and foreign organizations is limited.

## Chapter 3: Civil Resistance & the Protection of Democracy against the Russian Threat

### Introduction

In 2018, for the first time in three years, democracy rates around the world did not decline and political participation rates improved in almost every region.<sup>166</sup> However, perceptions and trust in the functioning of democratic institutions fell drastically in 2018 as well as the deterioration of free speech and freedom of expression.<sup>167</sup> Through the use of social media and the confidence that improvements could be made in those institutions, populations were more likely to engage in public protests and nonviolent movements in democracies and nondemocracies alike.<sup>168</sup> Chapters 1 and 2 of this portfolio examined the offensive aspects of nonviolent movements promoting democracies in the case studies of Serbia and Ukraine, and in the United States, how nonviolent movements were used to strengthen democratic integrity and social values. While much of the literature on nonviolent movements and action focuses on those offensive tactics of overthrowing a corrupt leader or improving racial discussions in society, little research has been done to analyze the defensive prospects that come with nonviolent movements.

As Russia has increased their use of modern hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe and the West to bolster their image and regional prowess, much of the goal is aimed at destabilizing democratic institutions and preventing the promotion of democracy. As

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<sup>166</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Me too? Political participation, protest and democracy." Democracy Index 2018.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

Babayan states, “Russia continues to perceive the countries of the former Soviet Union as its inalienable spheres of influence and Western policies, including democracy promotion, as a threat to that influence.”<sup>169</sup> Through hybrid warfare and geopolitical and geoeconomic means, Russia wants to “safeguard” its interests.<sup>170</sup> How do nonviolent movements and actions play into this equation? Maciej Bartkowski, a scholar of nonviolent strategy, outlined six tactics of how nonviolent movements in democracies can specifically defend against population-centric hybrid warfare.<sup>171</sup> Much of what makes nonviolent movements successful against those tactics are the inherent factors that are needed for a movement to be successful overall. Bartkowski’s research can be taken a step further, whereas in countries labeled as authoritarian nations, such as Ukraine, have already used nonviolent resistance, seemingly unknowingly, to defend against Russia’s interference in political events. The central theme of this thesis is highlighted specifically in this chapter as nonviolence is used as a mechanism that can defend democratic institutions in the United States against Russian hybrid warfare and promote democratic values in cases such as the Singing Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine.

### Methodology

This chapter will analyze three case studies of how nonviolent movements can be used as a defensive mechanism for democratic stability and promotion. The first case study will revisit the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, looking at the movement from the perspective of Russian involvement in the political events during the period and how the activists played a critical role in insulating their democratic goals from Russian

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<sup>169</sup> Nelli Babayan. "The Return of the Empire? Russias Counteraction to Transatlantic Democracy Promotion in Its near Abroad." *Democratization* 22, no. 3: 2015.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. "Resistance to Russia’s Populace-Centric Warfare." Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018.

influence. Next, a study of Belarus in 2006 will examine why the country failed to produce its own version of a Color Revolution, taking into account national factors, nonviolent strategy, and Russian influence over the country. An analysis of modern versions of Russia's hybrid warfare, using a case study of the United States, will look at the potential that nonviolent movements have in protecting one of the main targets of Russia's hybrid attacks, and the national factors that which impact Bartkowski's nonviolent strategies for a democracy. Lastly, a case study of the Baltics in the late 1980's and early 1990's is a highlight of how those national factors can be useful in the strengthening of a nonviolent movement.

#### Definition of Hybrid Warfare

There are many definitions of hybrid warfare as it contains a multitude of tools and can differ depending on the target and levels of intensity. Many scholars disagree about existing definitions as they think hybrid warfare is too simple of a name to encompass the complexities of the strategy. However, the modern version of Russia's hybrid war was built upon Soviet Cold War strategies with the same general goals to influence policy and weaken the target. Ratiu and Munteanu define that version of hybrid warfare as the combination of "conventional, irregular and informational warfare, the hybrid warfare exploits the vulnerabilities of the potential opponent, and, even more, seek to obtain support of the civilian population in a specific region."<sup>172</sup> In recent years, hybrid warfare, similar to many conflicts, has taken on a form of nontraditional means to exert power rather than the conventional "boots on the ground" warfare strategy. It is an "economic" approach to the use of force as Russia has understood that it cannot compete

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172 Aurelian Ratiu and Alexandra Munteanu. "Hybrid Warfare and the Russian Federation Informational Strategy to Influence Civilian Population in Ukraine." *Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre* 23 (3): 192–200. 2018

with other military powers in conventional warfare, so it has turned to other tactics to achieve the same goals.<sup>173</sup> The complexity and proficiency with which Russia has used the modern tactics have made it extremely difficult to prevent and mitigate, forcing countries and international organizations to have creativity in their responses to the threat.<sup>174</sup>

### The Tactics of Hybrid Warfare

The uniqueness of hybrid warfare is in that it comes in many different forms and can target many sectors of society at once. An important aspect of the strategy is *information warfare* to sow discord and influence events in the target country through cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns (*dezinformatsiya*), manipulation of media and/or political assets, or support for organizations that suits Russia's interests.<sup>175</sup> A common tactic is to use social media as an outlet for *dezinformatsiya* or to promote highly charged political issues to deepen the divide between sectors of a country. The use of hybrid warfare against the United States will be detailed in a subsequent section, but Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats once stated, "We continue to see a pervasive messaging campaign by Russia to try to weaken and divide the United States"<sup>176</sup>, but that similar tactic has been replicated countless times as a way to strengthen Russia's image.

Other tactics besides *dezinformatsiya* and cyber threats are the use of proxy groups, means of economic influence, clandestine measures, and means of political

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<sup>173</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis. "Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It." Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Service United States House of Representatives. The RAND Corporation. March 22, 2017.

<sup>174</sup> Rihards Kols. "NATO Must Meet Russia's Hybrid Warfare Challenge." Atlantic Council. July 3, 2018. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-must-meet-russia-s-hybrid-warfare-challenge>.

<sup>175</sup> Seth G. Jones. "Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare." Nuclear Stability in a Post-Arms Control World | Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 08, 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive-us-strategy-combat-russian-information-warfare>.

<sup>176</sup> Michael Wines and Julian E. Barnes. "How the U.S. is Fighting Russian Election Interference." The New York Times. August 2, 2018.



influence.<sup>177</sup> The use of proxy groups is similar to pushing political issues on social media. Russia will support the proxies to increase their interests, such as anti-European Union groups or far right-wing organizations as a means to divide.<sup>178</sup> Hybrid warfare, in essence, can also be a form of geopolitics or geoeconomics. Geoeconomics is “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests.”<sup>179</sup> Russia has become adept in that strategy as well. As they own some portion of Ukraine’s energy supply, Russia will shut off a section of energy to Ukrainians if they feel Ukraine is leaning too close to the West.<sup>180</sup> They have also embargoed imported wine and mineral water from Georgia as the country expressed desire to be closer to Europe, a threat to Russian prospects of expanded power.<sup>181</sup> Clandestine measures, such as executing tactics from within the targeted country and political influence are two of the other tactics Russia uses to promote their preferred political candidate and agenda.<sup>182</sup> Examples of those tactics being used will be shown in case studies such as Russia’s support for the contested president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich and how its meddling in the 2016 United States presidential election to bolster the image of Donald Trump.

An important caveat to note is that information warfare can also be coined in a slightly different term as *population-centric warfare*. The goals are very much the same, “to sow public discord, widen partisanship, and exacerbate societal cleavages, often by

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<sup>177</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis. “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It.” Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Service United States House of Representatives. The RAND Corporation. March 22, 2017.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Christopher S. Chivvis. “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It.” Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Service United States House of Representatives. The RAND Corporation. March 22, 2017.

bringing people to the streets and manufacturing protests around divisive issues”<sup>183</sup>, but the term *population-centric* can be useful later on in the examination of how civil resistance can be used to counteract the hybrid strategy. In other words, how Russia’s own strategy can be turned into a defense mechanism against them. As Maciej Bartkowski, a scholar on nonviolence states, “*population-centric warfare* renders military countermeasures (such as deploying tanks, launching missiles, or scrambling fighter jets) irrelevant.”<sup>184</sup>

#### Civil Resistance: Protection and Promotion of Democracy

Peter Ackerman states, “Civil resistance occurs when people cannot make progress on fundamental issues of life, liberty, and property solely by conventional politics...Instead, a popular movement or campaign chooses to battle with nonviolent methods, while the antagonist relies on its institutional authority.”<sup>185</sup> This definition can be thought of in terms of promoting democratic values in a dictatorship or autocracy, or for the progression of social and cultural values in a democracy. Yet, some of the modern threats that face nations and civil society, such as hybrid warfare, require a new set of tools to defend those values. That is where a slightly different, and updated, perspective of civil resistance comes to the forefront of nonviolent strategy.

Maciej Bartkowski’s “The Case for Civil Resistance to Russia’s Populace-Centric Warfare” explains those modern strategies from the viewpoint of democratic

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<sup>183</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. “Resistance to Russia’s Populace-Centric Warfare.” Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018. 6.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Peter Ackerman. “Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?” Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics. St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 15-18 March 2007.

protection.<sup>186</sup> Perhaps why Vladimir Putin has seen revolutions as a threat to his stronghold on power is that “civil resistance is compatible with democratic norms and offers a proportional response to non-military but still damaging actions undertaken by an adversary.”<sup>187</sup> As Putin has cracked down on public protests in Russia and has tried to intervene in revolutions that have taken place throughout Eastern Europe, it is not only the progression of democracy that makes it threatening, but also that civil resistance has proven to be an effective counterbalance to the means of hybrid warfare. There are two overarching strategies in this realm of civil resistance, offensive and defensive, both with similar goals of protecting democracy. Defensive strategies, which are aimed at strengthening democratic institutions in the face of a hybrid threat include seeking out the truth and sorting through propaganda, uniting society around common aspirations, building a culture of acceptance of civil resistance and engagement, and the advancement civil resistance education.<sup>188</sup> Offensive strategies are aimed to put pressure on the opponent through the engagement of the society of the attacking state, increasing the types of nonviolent actions, and building resistance on an international level.<sup>189</sup>

As laid out in the definition of hybrid warfare, the main goal is to weaken and destabilize the target country. The weaker the global powers seem, such as the United States, and the more unstable Eastern European countries are viewed as, the more room Vladimir Putin and Russia have to influence regional and global politics.<sup>190</sup> Given the tactics of civil resistance and the goals of hybrid warfare, why is civil resistance the best

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<sup>186</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. “Resistance to Russia’s Populace-Centric Warfare.” Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Steven Pifer. “What Does Russia Want? How Do We Respond?” Brookings.edu. May 10, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/what-does-russia-want-how-do-we-respond/>.

strategy to defend against the modern threats? As it takes on a twofold approach of offensive and defensive strategies, while inherently promoting the exact thing that hybrid warfare aims to threaten, unity, civil resistance is well-suited to protect as well as promote democratic institutions and values. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent case studies, unity is the nucleus for the success of any type of movement, which makes it more difficult for the opposition to create fissures among the intended target. The second important factor that is attributed to successful movements is their desire to build legitimacy and credibility through presenting evidence-based facts as well as overcoming misleading information about the campaign from the media and the regime. Many times a movement will be largely nonviolent with few instances of fighting or violence and the media will focus solely on the one violent action and mislabel a nonviolent movement as a whole as illegitimate.<sup>191</sup> A combination of unity and truth-based practices can be useful in defending against the modern tactics of hybrid warfare, but in the case of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, those strategies were not only used to achieve their goals but to overcome Russian support for the opposition. Bartkowski has an entire book dedicated to cases of nonviolent resistance, *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*<sup>192</sup>, and a countless number of movements were formed through strong civic institutions dedicated to nonviolence as a strategy. Not only does it show how nonviolent tactics are formed in even the most militaristic settings, it highlights the success that nonviolence has had in the last one hundred years.

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<sup>191</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. "Framing Civil resistance: Misconceptions, Controversies, Skills and Conditions." Class Lecture, Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore, MD. September 12, 2018.

<sup>192</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, CO. 2013.

## Ukraine: Civil Resistance against Russian Influence

Russian interference and influence in Ukraine and much of Eastern Europe is not a new phenomenon. Before the term *hybrid warfare* was coined and aside from military actions in Crimea, Russia has used “soft power” to promote its social and cultural influence in Ukraine.<sup>193</sup> In this context, soft power is “the ability of a polity to exercise international cultural leadership in terms of “setting the agenda” for global norms and being perceived as attractive within the framework of those values and rationalities.”<sup>194</sup> The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Euromaidan protests in 2014 were both cases of which Russia used soft power in attempts to “safeguard” their interests in the country. Ukraine’s newfound independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about a tumultuous period of political transition and struggle. Ratiu and Munteanu used the term frequently used by authors to describe Ukraine’s position in the world as *statelessness* because of their inability to form a cultural and political identity after their independence.<sup>195</sup> Adding to the instability are the “national factors”, the regional divide between Ukrainians. The Western portion of the country consists of mostly ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian as the official language and lean on side of strengthening ties with the West and joining the European Union and NATO.<sup>196</sup> The Eastern portion has a majority of ethnic Russian who speak Russian as the official language and tend to be anti-West and pro-Russia.<sup>197</sup> Ukraine’s *statelessness* makes it

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<sup>193</sup> Victoria Hudson. "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a Potential 'Tool' of Russian Soft Power in the Wake of Ukraine's 2013 Euromaidan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 9: 1355-380. 2018.

<sup>194</sup> Victoria Hudson. “‘Forced to Friendship’? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of Soft Power and the Implications for Audience Attraction in Ukraine.” *Politics* 35, no. 3/4: 330–46. 2015.

<sup>195</sup> Aurelian Ratiu and Alexandra Munteanu. “Hybrid Warfare and the Russian Federation Informational Strategy to Influence Civilian Population in Ukraine.” *Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre* 23 (3): 193. 2018.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

caught between heading towards the European Union or Russia, a constant state of transition. Russia's use of hybrid warfare in the country hoped to be a catalyst for the latter.

The Orange Revolution saw hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians protest the fraudulent election of President Viktor Yanukovich. However, not only were structural conditions working against the protesters, Russian influence was against them as well. Russia's fear was that the popular opponent, Viktor Yushenko, would move Ukraine closer to the West and undermine Russia's influence over the country and the region. Russia then turned to soft power, hybrid, tactics to promote Yanukovich through two strategies, heavy Russian participation in the public relations of the presidential campaign and to use information to influence the Ukrainian public that economic cooperation between the two countries would be most beneficial.<sup>198</sup> Russian strategy was particularly focused on "emphasizing" the divide between eastern and western Ukraine, two regions with differing ideologies, by promoting the Russian-friendly east region and blocking influence from the western region.<sup>199</sup> Without detailing the political shortcomings of the Russian strategy, their involvement in the Orange Revolution was seen as "the Kremlin's greatest foreign relations blunder since 1991."<sup>200</sup>

Whatever the failures of the Russian strategy were, the importance of the nonviolent movement cannot be overlooked. The movement itself was largely responsible for the insulation against Russian influence and the protection of their goals of democratic elections. One of the other main reasons for the revolution was the anti-

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<sup>198</sup> Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov. "Chapter 8: Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution." In *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. Chapter 8.

oligarch, anti-corruption sentiment among the Ukrainian people. Russian propaganda in Ukraine of promoting Yanukovich's economic success and depicting Russian politics of an example of how things should be run in Ukraine, while criticizing western politics, were able to be deciphered by the activists as just that, propaganda.<sup>201</sup> The last resort by Russian media was to suggest that the United States, the European Union, and Poland had organized the revolution as a conspiracy. The ability of the movements organizers to create unity among Ukrainians was critical to their success in defending against propaganda and creating their own independent media stations in search of the truth of the elections and the events of the revolution. When comparing the efforts of the Ukrainian activists to the tactics given by Bartkowski, the movement aimed to strengthen democratic institutions in a non-democratic society by using defensive civil resistance.

#### Euromaidan, Soft Power, and Civil Resistance.

The Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in 2014 were similar to the Orange Revolution in that they were both anti-Yanukovich movements, however, Euromaidan experienced a day of violent clashes between authorities and protestors. Those clashes left four police officers and forty-eight protestors dead.<sup>202</sup> What started out as a nonviolent protest turned into an event heard of throughout the world for all of the wrong reasons. Yet, weeks later, the protestors had achieved their goal through rather nonconventional means when Viktor Yanukovich fled to Russia and democratic elections were held where pro-Western parties won the majority.<sup>203</sup> The point of this section is not critique the activists responses to the violence by authorities or to determine

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Mattathias Schwartz. "Who Killed the Kiev Protesters? A 3-D Model Holds the Clues." The New York Times. May 30, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/magazine/ukraine-protest-video.html?login=email&auth=login-email>.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

what they might have done wrong, but rather to analyze how Russia again played into the equation and for a second time in a decade, were defeated by a people's movement.

After the violent day of February 20<sup>th</sup>, Ukrainians found themselves in the middle of a storm of propaganda about which side started the violence, the activists or the authorities. The Washington Post reported the violence was by Russian military members, and Russian social media accounts promoted propaganda calling the revolution a "coup".<sup>204</sup>

There was also a level of Russian soft power that aimed to win the hearts of Ukrainians through national factors and religion. Hudson analyzed how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC(MP)) could have been used as a tool of Russian soft power leading up to and during the Euromaidan protests.<sup>205</sup> Without going into great detail about the religious demographic of Ukraine which Hudson wonderfully explores, the UOC(MP) has major influence over the population as Ukraine is a very religious country and the church's leaders were held in high status among the people with a great degree of influence.<sup>206</sup> While the UOC(MP) has a strong, independent role to make decisions in the country, there are still deep roots connected to the Russian Orthodox Church through the Moscow faction of the UOC(MP).<sup>207</sup> The clerics of the Moscow faction largely echo the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin's political sentiments and protection of the Russian language, while the Kiev faction leans toward Western influences.<sup>208</sup> To touch on the issue of national factors which play a role into the

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Victoria Hudson. "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a Potential 'Tool' of Russian Soft Power in the Wake of Ukraine's 2013 Euromaidan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 9: 1355-380. 2018.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.



support and success of movements, there is a generational gap between the clerics of the Kiev faction which are younger and have experienced the independent Ukraine and the older Moscow faction.<sup>209</sup>

Russian soft power through the UOC(MP) could have been a determining factor in the events of Euromaidan, with many clerics having a close relationship to the contested Yanukovych administration. While the UOC(MP) leader Metropolitan Volodymyr had private expressed interest in integration with the European Union, clerics of the Moscow faction had openly criticized the Euromaidan protests.<sup>210</sup> Leaked documents showed Russia's direct efforts to contact the leader of the Moscow faction and send him pro-Russian talking points to be said at a national celebration and broadcast on Ukrainian television.<sup>211</sup> Yet, after some delay, Metropolitan Volodymyr had decided to follow other churches and support the Euromaidan protestors, which would turn out to be a major benefit in protecting the Ukrainian activists from the cold winter temperatures by opening churches and priests positioning themselves between the activists and riot police.<sup>212</sup> It is important to note again the leaders and clerics of the UOC(MP) had a major influence on the views of the Ukrainian population. While this is an example of the use of soft power rather than direct tactics of hybrid warfare to influence the outcome of the revolution, the activists still had to defend against institutional conditions which opposed their goals. On one hand, factions of the UOC(MP) worked against them in alignment with Moscow and the Yanukovych administration, the activists did create unity

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> T.A. Olszanski. "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's Stance on the Revolution and War". OSW Commentary, Centre for Eastern European Studies. 2014.

<sup>211</sup> Hosaka Sanshiro. "The Kremlin's 'Active Measures' Failed in 2013: That's When Russia Remembered Its Last Resort--Crimea." *Demokratizatsiya* 26 (3): 321–64. 2018.

<sup>212</sup> Victoria Hudson. "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a Potential 'Tool' of Russian Soft Power in the Wake of Ukraine's 2013 Euromaidan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 70, no. 9: 1355-380. 2018.

and support to maintain and achieve their goals of democratic elections. Months later in the conflict in Donbas and Crimea, Ukrainian activists took an offensive role and reached out to their friends in Russia where thousands of Russians then gathered into the streets to protest Russia's intervention in the region.<sup>213</sup>

Two main points can be made about the Euromaidan protests. First, without the unity of the protestors mobilizing around the common goal of democratic elections, it would have been easier for the UOC(MP) to influence the more pro-Russian agenda and opposition to the movement. An argument can be made that because the protestors remained nonviolent for the first weeks of the protest, it was easier for them to gain support of the leaders of the churches around Ukraine which gave them shelter and sometimes acted as a peaceful mediator. Second, national factors did play a role in the outcome of the movement. Regional sentiment of pro-West and pro-Russia might could have created deep rifts among the population, but the activists were able to keep the unity between them. Also, the culture of civil resistance, experienced in the Orange Revolution in 2004, gave the protestors a blueprint of what was successful and what failed. They were experienced in Russian and opposition propaganda undermining the movements as violent or as entities of Western promotion of a coup.

#### Failed Revolution in Belarus: National Factors

The Color Revolutions were a series of nonviolent uprisings that took place in Eastern Europe hoping to facilitate regime change and promote democratic practices. The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were all in attempts to mirror the events in their

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<sup>213</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. "Resistance to Russia's Populace-Centric Warfare." Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018.

neighboring countries and to overthrow the respective authoritarian regimes.<sup>214</sup> Each of those countries experienced some levels of success as a result of the movements.<sup>215</sup> In 2006, the Belarusian people hoped to recreate their own Color Revolution to overthrow President Aleksander Lukashenko. However, Belarus, along with the other countries in the “second generation” of color revolutions, had little success as the movements were mostly suppressed before they could get started.<sup>216</sup>

Two factors can be highlighted reasoning the failure for the movement in Belarus to gain momentum and promote democracy, national factors and regime insulation of Belarus from experiencing a revolution. As Lukashenko famously stated, “there will be no rose, orange, or banana revolution in Belarus.”<sup>217</sup> Although a revolution in Belarus seems out of the realm of possibilities, a theoretical approach using nonviolence can be made to outlining how a successful movement might look like in the country. When the presidential election took place in March 2006, activists whom learned from the leaders of movements in Serbia and Ukraine, took to the streets of Minsk to protest the fraudulently re-elected Lukashenka.<sup>218</sup> 10,000 protestors took part in the movement, but it failed to gain any more momentum despite most Belarusians being aware of the events.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson. “The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign Policy.” *Problems of Post-Communism* 57 (2): 21–36. 2010.

<sup>215</sup> Elena Korosteleva. “Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus’ Response to the ‘Colour Revolutions’”. *Democratization* 19, no 1: 37-59. 2012.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid. 44.

<sup>218</sup> Elena Korosteleva. “Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus’ Response to the ‘Colour Revolutions’”. *Democratization* 19, no 1: 37-59. 2012.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

Again in 2010 after the Presidential elections, thousands of protestors marched in the streets of Minsk with hundreds of activists being arrested and beaten.<sup>220</sup>

In 2015, Siarhei Bohdan, a writer for Belarus Digest, explained the sentiment of the larger Belarusian people on why a revolution would be “impossible”.<sup>221</sup> She stated that while some activists in Belarus looked to the Euromaidan protests for inspiration of an uprisings, the rest of the population looked at the instability and the “risk of state collapse, civil strife, and Russian interference seems too high.”<sup>222</sup> She argued that Belarus, along with the West, were more concerned with maintaining an independent Belarus than promoting democracy. Furthermore, Lucan Way suggested two categories which influence “electoral turnovers”, and in the case of Belarus in 2006, worked against the revolution, “(i) the strength of a country’s ties with the West; and (ii) the strength of the incumbent regime’s autocratic party or state.”<sup>223</sup> At the time, the relationship between Belarus and the West was essentially nonexistent as Lukashenko leaned much more towards the Kremlin and Russian subsidies for their economy.<sup>224</sup> The Lukashenko regime also kept a stronghold over the workings of the country, insulating it from the West and pro-democratic NGO’s, as the country was referred to as “Europe’s last dictatorship”.<sup>225</sup>

The other two major factors that make it difficult for movements to have success in Belarus are the propaganda tactics and the absence of political opposition allowed to

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<sup>220</sup> Paulina Pospieszna. "Belarus's and Ukraine's Quest for Democracy." In *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*, 1-32. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014.

<sup>221</sup> Siarhei Bohdan. "'A Revolution Is Impossible in Belarus'." *Belarus Digest*. The Guardian. March 25, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/25/belarus-revolution-impossible-alexander-lukashenko>.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Lucan Way. "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3: 55-69. 2008.

<sup>224</sup> Lucan A Way. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine." *World Politics* 57, no. 2: 231-61. 2005.

<sup>225</sup> Paulina Pospieszna. "Belarus's and Ukraine's Quest for Democracy." In *Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine*, 1-32. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014.

run in the elections against Lukashenko. One of the reasons why it was hard to unite the entire population around a movement for democracy was that the propaganda of the regime painted Lukashenko as the “father of the nation” and a symbol of stability within the country.<sup>226</sup> As Bohdan stated, many Belarusians saw a stray from the status quo of inviting economic turmoil and political instability. Lastly, those who do want the country to venture towards democracy do not have a candidate that has a viable chance of gaining power. In Ukraine, the opposition candidates supported by the activists were all members of parliament. In Belarus however, the opposition to Lukashenko cannot be elected and are not allowed any channels of communication with possible supporters.<sup>227</sup>

Although Bohdan and many scholars are quick to label a revolution in a given country as “impossible” because of the conditions, most nonviolent theorists see future potential rather than past failures. As Peter Ackerman describes it, “Civil resistance occurs when people cannot make progress on fundamental issues of life, liberty, and property solely by conventional politics...Instead, a popular movement or campaign chooses to battle with nonviolent methods, while the antagonist relies on its institutional authority.”<sup>228</sup> This was certainly the case in Belarus, as there were no political outlets through which to promote democratic values and the Lukashenko regime relied on its authority to suppress the opposition and pro-democratic movements. Yet, using Bartkowski’s strategies, albeit to promote democracy in an authoritarian society, the two protests in 2006 and 2010 that showed signs that the people would fight against the

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Peter Ackerman. “Skills or Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?” Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics. St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 15-18 March 2007.

injustices of the regime could be built upon to create changes.<sup>229</sup> The activists would need to find a way to make the regime's suppression of the movements backfire, such as using social media through "underground" opposition NGO's to document the arrests and beatings of journalists, activists, and political opposition.<sup>230</sup> They would need to work against the propaganda by showing how the regime suppresses the work of legitimate NGO's and only allows and promotes expression that are in line with President Lukashenko. Activists would also need to create their own ways to promote opposition candidates while uniting the opposition and their supporters. Lastly, the Belarusian people would need to show the international community that they are committed to a democratic future in hopes that they could gain international support. The next case of the Singing Revolution offers a different perspective where people were able to mobilize together successfully to overcome the Soviet occupation.

#### The Singing Revolution & a Culture of Nonviolence

As Estonian journalist Heinz Valk once said of the nonviolent culture in the Baltics, "It is impossible to even imagine in Estonia's city streets the riots, barricades, burning automobiles and similar features of mass revolt by large nations. This is not our way!"<sup>231</sup> The term national factors have been used multiple times to depict the sentiment of the population, such as east versus west ideologies in Ukraine and institutional conditions that have worked against the activists in Belarus. In the case of the Singing Revolution in the late 1980's, a culture of nonviolence was a critical national factor that propelled the Baltic region to independence from the Soviet Union. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1998 to 1992, activists used nonviolent action and culture as the basis of

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Guntis Sīmidchens, *The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture In the Baltic Singing Revolution*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013.

the movement to defend their national identity against the threat of Soviet takeover and to promote a democratic Baltic region.<sup>232</sup> Through music festivals which doubled as political demonstrations, the Baltic people defied Soviet restrictions of free speech and the ban of national symbols such as flags, when the festival attendees sang old folk songs and flew their national flags.<sup>233</sup> On August 23, 1989, two million people across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined hands in peaceful protest to span across all the countries capital cities.<sup>234</sup> Those events combined with the liberal policies of Mikhail Gorbachev created an opening for the people to promote and enact their own democratic practices and Estonia created their own parallel congress to the “Soviet structure”.<sup>235</sup> The nonviolent identity was a critical factor in the unity of hundreds of thousands of people and in the instance where pro-Soviet, anti-independence protestors marched to the Estonian parliament building with the threat of a violent outbreak, thousands of Estonian citizens surrounded the protestors and let them leave peacefully.<sup>236</sup>

Could similar events occur in the case of future occupations of nations or territories? The Baltic states continue to value the potential of civil resistance in the event that a country such as Russia would ever venture into the region again. Lithuania has instituted nonviolence as a formal national defense strategy, but other countries could benefit from taking a similar approach. Ukraine, for example, is constantly under threat of Russian invasion into its eastern territories. Some Ukrainians in the region have used nonviolence to oppose Russian troops (see Bartkowski 2018), but as the country has

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<sup>232</sup> Stephen Zunes. “Estonia’s Singing Revolution (1986-1991)”. International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. 2009.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> "History." The Baltic Way. <http://www.thebalticway.eu/en/history/>.

<sup>235</sup> Esther B Fein. "Upheaval in the East; Estonian Congress Calls for a Republic." *The New York Times*, March 12, 1990.

<sup>236</sup> Guntis Sīmidchens, *The Power of Song: Nonviolent National Culture In the Baltic Singing Revolution*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013.

already experienced multiple nonviolent uprisings, there is significant potential for the strategy to take on an expanded defense role similar to the Singing Revolution.

#### Civil Resistance Potential in the United States

The Baltics valued civil resistance not only for the promotion of democracy but for its ability as a national defense mechanism. National surveys taken in Poland and Ukraine showed a majority of the population would defend their countries by partaking in nonviolent activities over military activities.<sup>237</sup> Nonviolent movements in the United States have occurred for decades to promote social and cultural values as well as to strengthen democratic institutions, but the military culture in the US may overshadow the power that movements can have. That is not to say the Baltics, Nordic or Eastern European countries do not place an importance on military strategy to defend their independence, but as the United States faces the modern threat of hybrid warfare from Russia, the question is worth asking, what is the potential of civil resistance as a defense mechanism in the United States? Leading up to and after the 2016 Presidential Election, Russia had taken on the strategy of *dezinformatsiya* in the United States to deepen political hostilities between supporters of both candidates while also promoting divisive social issues, targeting LGBTQ rights, immigration, and race issues.<sup>238</sup> Instead of being in control of the media environment like in Ukraine and Belarus, the Kremlin uses sophisticated technology such as hacker groups which use bots to reach US social media users through Facebook, Twitter, and Google.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. "Resistance to Russia's Populace-Centric Warfare." Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018.

<sup>238</sup> Young Mie Kim and Jordan Hsu et al. "The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets behind Divisive Issue Campaigns on Facebook." *Political Communication* 35, no. 4: 515-41. 2018.

<sup>239</sup> Alina Polyakova. "What Do Russian Disinformation Campaigns Look Like, and How Can We Protect Our Elections?" Brookings.edu. October 10, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings->



As Putin has seen the value in protest potential, Russia has attempted to manufacture protests in the United States by using fake social media accounts.<sup>240</sup> One of its attempts at manufacturing a protest in Baltimore failed because of the determination of the community. The Facebook page Blacktivist tried to incite a protest on the first anniversary of the death of Freddie Gray while accounts on Twitter tried similar tactics.<sup>241</sup> However, grassroots organizers in Baltimore were quick to question the accounts as for being outsiders trying to influence a deeply rooted issue within the community. Bartkowski used this example to show how a community that accepted grassroots movements to promote change and were united together around common issues could search for the truth in disinformation.

While that type of civil resistance was successful at the local level, it is much more difficult to replicate at the national levels. Because many Americans have been disillusioned with the working of democratic institutions and a lack of trust within politicians, political sentiment is deepened and much of the disinformation may be taken at face value. Yet, simply an increased emphasis on the education of the history and potential of nonviolent resistance could strengthen US defense against hybrid warfare. A minority report on Russia's interference in US democracy made for the United States Senate dedicated an entire chapter on how the Baltic and Nordic states are adept at defending their institutions against Russian propaganda.<sup>242</sup> The report attributes the

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now/2018/10/03/what-do-russian-disinformation-campaigns-look-like-and-how-can-we-protect-our-elections/.

<sup>240</sup> Maciej Bartkowski. "Resistance to Russia's Populace-Centric Warfare." Free Russia Foundation. Washington, D.C. 2018.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> "Putin's Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security." A Minority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate." US Senate. January 10, 2018.

<https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf>

strong insulation from Russian propaganda to the “extraordinary educational systems that emphasize critical thinking”<sup>243</sup>, suggesting that “Disinformation is ineffective against a well-educated citizenry.”<sup>244</sup> The example given of the events in Baltimore is the perfect case to highlight that claim. But as Bartkowski points out about the report, it does not account for the fact that civic engagement and organizing have been embedded in those Nordic countries for decades. They have experience using nonviolent resistance as a defensive tactic such as the Danish against the Nazis and Estonians against the Soviet Union.

The report does however value the potential of civic engagement and response to hybrid warfare. It outlined a variety of tactics European countries have used to defend against disinformation, such as bolstering cybersecurity, emboldening joint sanctions against malicious actors, and diversifying geopolitical realities<sup>245</sup>, but the authors realized those tactics are not enough. They recommend and state that “education ministries, civil society, and independent new organizations” are the most effective means by which to counter hybrid warfare, and civic engagement, combined with the security and political decisions, can properly defend democratic institutions.

Can civil resistance be implemented as a national defense strategy in the United States? The strategy would need to be made into policy at the highest levels, but even as the Nordic and Baltic countries have embraced civil resistance, very few countries have formally integrated the strategy into their national defense policies. Switzerland and Lithuania are two countries that have expanded civil resistance mechanism in the defense

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid. 109.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid. 112

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

strategies.<sup>246</sup> While the United States will probably rely heavily on military and cybersecurity tactics to counter hybrid warfare, civil resistance can, in time, be a secondary strategy that fights against disinformation. The last decade has seen younger generations in the US become more vocal in their displeasure of injustices and more emphatic in their efforts to promote certain issues through grassroots organizing. The previous chapter highlighted those movements such as the grassroots focus that propelled Barack Obama to the presidency and student-led organizations which policy and social changes. Military efficiency is valuable in protecting national security, but hybrid warfare is a modern threat that renders military actions powerless. However, there is a role for democratic governments and institutions to play in promoting civic engagement and regaining power over those entities who wish to destabilize democracies. Those in government must first acknowledge and understand the threats to undermine American democracy by outside forces, then broader institutions such as academia and defense sectors, which must also accept the proposals of nonviolent strategy, can impact the narrative on how to improve vigilance against destabilization efforts. In other words, grassroots movements are a critical cornerstone for democratic defense, but larger institutions can rebalance the entire strategy on strengthening democracy through civil engagement in the future.

The Obama campaign was a case of how US citizens could mobilize on the national and grassroots level to promote a goal and in fact, for the belief that it would strengthen democracy. The idea of civil resistance takes on a different goal, but the blueprint is loosely in place for it to continue taking on a larger role in national security.

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<sup>246</sup> Jan Osburg, "Unconventional Options for the Defense of the Baltic States: The Swiss Approach". The RAND Corporation. 2016.

The difficulty is in convincing Americans that nonviolence is valuable and that the mobilization efforts for national security render the same benefits such as mobilizing for a president or in promoting social values.

### Future of Movements

The previous sections detailed how people power can be used to defend and promote democracy from foreign influences and what tactics are used on both sides. Technology is becoming one of the premier tactics that influence how people work together and also how adversarial entities attempt to destabilize democracies. In 2007, Estonia removed a Soviet World War II memorial out of the center of the capital city Tallinn into a military cemetery. The move was met with protests of many ethnic Russians living in Estonia and the Russian government itself warned against it.<sup>247</sup> In the coming days, Estonia's internet, government and banking systems were all severely disrupted.<sup>248</sup> Many Estonian's blamed Russia for the attack in a geopolitical protest, but Russia denied all involvement.<sup>249</sup> In 2016, evidence suggests Russia entered into the Democratic National Committee's email servers of the Democratic political party in the United States.<sup>250</sup> Technology can be used to attack democracy, but it can also be a weapon of the people to promote it, just as sit-ins, street protests, humor, and boycotts.

Zeynep Tufekci used the term "digitally networked public sphere" to describe the connectedness of online and offline interactions impacting the way movements

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<sup>247</sup> Samuli Haataja. "The 2007 Cyber Attacks against Estonia and International Law on the Use of Force: An Informational Approach." *Law, Innovation and Technology* 9, no. 2: 159-89. 2017.

<sup>248</sup> Joshua Davis. "Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe." *Wired*. June 05, 2017. <https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/>.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>250</sup> Scott J. Shackelford, Bruce Schneier, Michael Sulmeyer, Anne Boustead, Ben Buchanan, Amanda N. Craig Deckard, Trey Herr, and Jessica Malekos Smith. "Making Democracy Harder to Hack." *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 50 (3): 629-68. 2017.

operate.<sup>251</sup> Going back to the pillars of nonviolent movements, strategy and creativity, social media has the capacity to expand a movement's arsenal of tactics because of the broad base of activists it brings together. A common misconception of the role of technology in movements as mentioned in Chapter 2 is termed "slacktivism", where activists share ideas online but possess no real-world outcome.<sup>252</sup> However, as Tufekci notes, technology and social media enhance the engagement online but also in the forms of protests in public spaces such as city squares and parks.<sup>253</sup> It would be remiss to analyze the future role that technology has in movements without talking about the impact it had in the mobilization of the Arab Spring. Even in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, many of the mainstream media outlets were either controlled by the regime of the Kremlin, but tech-savvy activists found ways to create their own independent media sources to relay events to others. At the outset of the protests of the Arab Spring, social media, especially Twitter, allowed young activists to join in political conversations online and find like-minded people who they could share their ideas with.<sup>254</sup> Those ideas can quickly turn into a cohesive movement especially when people from all parts of a country can find others with the same goals. On December 17<sup>th</sup>, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi a young Tunisian activist set himself on fire in front of local government offices to protest "police interference and the lack of economic

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<sup>251</sup> Zeynep Tufekci. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

<sup>252</sup> Henrik Serup Christensen. "Simply Slacktivism?" *Ejournal Of Edemocracy & Open Government*4, no. 1: 1-23. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2012, 1.

<sup>253</sup> Zeynep Tufekci. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

opportunities.”<sup>255</sup> By that time, millions of Tunisians were on Facebook and shared the video which became the catalyst for the Jasmine Revolution.<sup>256</sup>

Social media seems to be on a direct path to influence movements even further in the future. While the internet can be used as an outlet of propaganda, i.e. hybrid warfare, the Arab Spring is an example of the promotion of democracy through social media. Just as physical repression of activists can backfire against a regime, so can the suppression and censorship of social media. Ethan Zuckerman call it the “cute cat theory”. The theory suggests that social media outlets such as Facebook which are nonpolitical realms have political power in that it is hard for governments to censor the large number of users who seemingly just want to share “cute cat” pictures.<sup>257</sup> Because of those users who would rather see pictures of cute cats than political events, millions of people can tell whether or not content is being censored by the government because it is difficult to suppress only “offensive” content without also censoring the “cute cat” aspect as well.<sup>258</sup> In the words of Tufekci “Attention is oxygen for movements.”<sup>259</sup>

It should be noted that as integral a role social media played in the Arab Spring and will play in future movements, the advent of Facebook and Twitter did not cause revolutions to happen, rather they helped to enhance people power through coordination and mobilization.<sup>260</sup> So even in places like China where social media is heavily restricted,

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<sup>255</sup> Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin. “Rethinking the ‘Arab Spring’: The Root Causes of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution and Egyptian January 25 Revolution.” *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 13 (June): 2018. 70.

<sup>256</sup> Ethan Zuckerman. “Cute Cats to the Rescue? Participatory Media and Political Expression”. Center for Civic Media. MIT Press. 2013.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Zeynep Tufekci. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

people still find ways to promote unpopular ideas. Simply put, it is the activists that are the driving force of movements with technology being a beneficial additive.

## Conclusion

Democracy across the world is and has been in a period of vulnerability. State actors like Russia aim to destabilize democracies through outside influence, whether it be hacking political emails in the United States or shutting down the largest banking system in Estonia. Faith in democracy as a system has declined from within in what were seen as strong democracies, the US, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and more.<sup>261</sup> But as analyzed in the above cases and countless more, people can be the driving force to insulate democracy from domestic and foreign threats, i.e. propaganda, they can strengthen democratic institutions by fighting social injustices and corruption, and they can promote democracy in authoritarian countries. Civil resistance has proven to be a unique and creative strategy that has a future to work in tandem with other national defense sectors and countries such as Switzerland and Lithuania have already incorporated it as a strategy.

It is difficult to predict what the future of civil resistance and nonviolent movements look like because many times the movements themselves thrive on being unpredictable. Many of the leaders during the Arab Spring had little notion that uprisings would occur nonetheless be as powerful as they turned out to be. The United States and senior leaders in the Obama administration were taken by surprise at the momentum of the uprisings as well.<sup>262</sup> Technology and social media will continue to bring like-minded people together which always has the potential to create something powerful and even

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<sup>261</sup> Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk. "The signs of deconsolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4: 57-68. 2008.

<sup>262</sup> Michael McFaul. *From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018.

revolutionary like the Arab Spring. However, as some countries and threatened leaders become more adept at using technology to maintain their power and minimize the chances of experiencing their own Arab Spring or Color Revolution, activists will need to invent more ways to circumvent the conditions. As the Kremlin found in their multiple attempts at intervention in Ukrainian politics, people power should not be underestimated.

## Conclusion

Power is the basic premise which Gene Sharp's creative theorizing identifies as underlying all aspects of nonviolent strategy. Throughout his numerous works, he reverts back to the idea that political power is pluralistic rather than monolithic. In his words, "governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources."<sup>263</sup> The three chapters of this portfolio reaffirm Sharpe's notion that without the support of the people, governments lose their authority and power and that nonviolent movements have the capacity to shift the dynamics of power.

Even in the most repressive dictatorships, take for example modern-day North Korea where freedom of speech and expression are severely restricted, much of the world sees the dynamic as a strictly monolithic form of power. Yet, to those who view problems through a visionary lens such as Sharp, the people who live under dictatorial rule hold their own sources of power through noncooperation. The case studies presented throughout the three chapters illustrate how activists believed in the pluralistic forms of

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<sup>263</sup> Gene Sharp. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973. 8



power and used it successfully, and sometimes unsuccessfully, to challenge government leaders and decisions.

The first chapter takes a different perspective from the subsequent two in examining nonviolent movements in a democracy such as the United States. Given that there are legitimate institutional channels through which presidents, politicians, and leaders are held accountable, this section asked the question of what impact movements have in promoting social and cultural issues as well as the criticisms surrounding modern movements. The argument is made that in a democracy such as the U.S, similar events that took place in Serbia and Ukraine to oust a leader are unlikely to happen given the legal mechanisms in place for checks and balances. However, the one caveat is that the United States has not experienced a president that has refused to cede leadership duties or engage in a peaceful transition of power. If the legal institutions failed to solve the issue, the American people have the capabilities to recreate a revolution such as those in Eastern Europe.

The second section of chapter two asked how the success of modern movements are measured as well as examining some of the critiques of the role that social media plays in the outcome. The term “slacktivism” has become popular to describe people who believe that they are promoting real political changes by simply posting on social media sites but not engaging in other more hands-on activism actions. However, a study done by Christensen found that people who participate in forms of online activism also tended to participate in traditional forms of activism as well.<sup>264</sup> The critiques that online engagement is simply a form of “slacktivism” is also connected to the ways in which

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<sup>264</sup> Henrik Serup Christensen. "Simply Slacktivism?" *Ejournal Of Edemocracy & Open Government*4, no. 1: 1-23. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, 2012, 1.

some journalists and academics unfamiliar with nonviolent strategy measure the success of a movement. As stated in Chapter 1, Chenoweth and Stephan defined success of a movement as having “full achievement of stated goals within a year of peak activity” and the movement “had a discernable effect on the outcome”.<sup>265</sup> Therefore, it is easy to see why many have viewed recent movements in the United States such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter as being failures because they did not solve economic inequality or eradicate racism. Nathan Heller called recent movements “social theatre” and online activism is seen in a similar way, short-term, theatrical bursts of displeasure but no direct impact in making changes. Yet, a definition such as Chenoweth and Stephan’s is likely used to measure prolonged movements which developed tactics over the course of months or years. When analyzing social and cultural movements, there needs to be a slight shift in the measurement by both activists and outsiders. Because modern movements, and society as a whole, tend to gravitate towards actions with flare and expect immediate outcomes, the long-term impacts are usually overlooked. Cases such as the “I, Too, Am Harvard” movement in which students used social media to highlight racial issues across colleges and universities are an example where simply bringing attention to an important issue can create a dialogue and the opportunity for changes to occur over time.

Using existing literature, Chapter 2 outlined the primacy that nonviolent tactics have over violent tactics. Factors such as enticing a wider audience because of less commitment, the array of tactics that present themselves to activists such as public protests, marches, humor, comedy, and boycotts among numerous others, increased

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<sup>265</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, (2011) 14.

movement legitimacy, and higher probabilities for democracy after the movement has ended all contribute to nonviolence being the superior mechanisms of change over violence. Gene Sharp and Saul Alinsky's efforts in studying nonviolent strategy have combined to create the proper blueprint that a movement needs to be successful, Sharp focusing on the 198 nonviolent actions and Alinsky on grassroots organizing. The other important point in understanding nonviolent strategy is the use of revolving tactics by a movement whereas the regime cannot easily predict the next action which gives the activists an advantage as the authorities are usually unprepared to immediately counter the actions. Revolving tactics also allow for activists to become creative and innovative in developing new actions which can entice those outside of the movement to join because of the levels of interaction and idea sharing.

Analyzing case studies of the Otpor movement in Serbia in 1998 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the findings suggest that despite relatively similar conditions, a movement's ability to tailor its tactics to the opponent is a critical factor in which opens the opportunity for success. Both Otpor and the Orange Revolution had hopes for democracy through ousting the corrupt leaders, but Otpor took a more dynamic or "hybrid" approach in building up smaller actions throughout the country to the eventual culmination of hundreds of thousands of Serbians marching in the streets of Belgrade. The Orange Revolution took a slightly different approach where the initial tactics were of mass street protests and noncooperation and then the activists branched out to using other actions such as humor. Had the activists in Serbia went directly to street protests, they might not have had the support to attain the amount of resources needed to sustain the campaign. If the activists in Ukraine were methodical in their

buildup like the Serbians, the Yanukovych regime may have had time to insulate itself from the coming revolution.

A few other important points can be made from the two case studies. Much as the literature suggests, international support and defections may be the two most important factors after commitment to nonviolence and mobilization in guiding a movement to success. Both Otpor and the Ukrainian student group Pora received funding from international organizations to promote democracy.<sup>266</sup> An especially useful aspect in the success of the Orange Revolution was the aid that activists received from NGO's in setting up independent media networks in order to circulate the events of the movement across Ukraine and to the international community. The normal media outlets, many run by the Kremlin, showed very little of the movement or depicted it as a coup attempt on the government. Defections in both cases by security forces were also beneficial in shifting the power away from the regime to the activists while helping to minimize the risk of violence by both sides.

The findings in this chapter simply outline the primacy that nonviolence has to achieve political changes over more radical tactics such as insurgencies. While nonviolence does not necessarily mean policy concessions will always be made or that nonviolence is a form of negotiation, both sides may be more willing to engage in long-term dialogue, something that terrorist groups rarely achieve.<sup>267</sup> As mentioned in the introduction with correspondent inference theory, the commitment to nonviolence by both the activists in Serbia and Ukraine had a profound impact on the international community's willingness to offer support.

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<sup>266</sup> Andrew Wilson. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the Westpass:[\*]." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19 (1): 21–32. 2006.

<sup>267</sup> Max Abrahms. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 42–78.

The final chapter analyzes the defensive capabilities of nonviolent movements using examples where people have insulated their movements and their countries from outside influences. The overarching theme of this chapter, partially incorporated into Chapter 1, is the impact of Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the tactics the Kremlin utilizes to undermine existing democracies. Through what is termed *hybrid warfare*, Russia has used tactics such as propaganda, media manipulation, and cyberspace to deepen the divide of the population in democracies such as the United States. This modern form of warfare has made it increasingly difficult for countries to not only understand but to counteract because they rely on military tactics as a form of defense. In this case, thinking about solutions needs to be expanded to other means of defense and civil resistance is a plausible alternative to combat hybrid warfare.

The case of the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine 2014 shows how the Kremlin can use soft power to influence politics such as through the Ukrainian Orthodox Church but also how activists and institutions can insulate themselves from interferences. Ten years earlier, the activists of the Orange Revolution facilitated ways to work around propaganda. In Euromaidan, the activist's goals and nonviolent tactics made it easier for some of the leaders of the Church to side with the activists instead of the regime. Had the activists taken to insurgent tactics, it is highly unlikely that the Church leaders would have been so willing to support them and because the Church had such influence over the views of the population, it would have minimized the activist's hopes for change. This section also highlights the Singing Revolution in the Baltics in the late 1980's where the people used music festivals to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to protect their national identity from the Soviet occupation. Euromaidan was similar to this in that there

was a struggle of blurred national identity because of Russian influence, but in both cases, activists were able to insulate themselves from foreign influences and protect their goals.

Lastly, the argument is made that nonviolent civil resistance does have a future in the United States as a defense mechanism against the tactics of hybrid warfare. The U.S has decades of experience in nonviolent movements in offensive capacities, so the foundation is set to have civil resistance be successful on a national level. Much of American culture is based on national pride through military primacy and the belief that every conflict can be solved through military might. Hybrid warfare and propaganda is a different type of conflict. In highly-connected communities with experience of activism at the grassroots level such as the example in Baltimore, it is easier for the community to sift through disinformation. The Barack Obama presidential campaign in 2008 also showed the propensity that people have to use massive grassroots activism to promote a certain topic. For civil resistance to have a similar effect, there needs to be a culture of acceptance for activism and increased education to highlight the benefits of nonviolent civil resistance as an alternative to military power.

There are four main points to be gained from this thesis. The first is that nonviolence is the superior mechanism to violent tactics to enact changes and that civil action can be both offensive and defensive in nature. The second is that activism is important for the strength and legitimacy of democracy itself through promoting social and cultural issues but also being an instrument to hold leaders accountable aside from the normal institutions. In authoritarian countries where the institutions themselves are not legitimate, the people have the power to take checks and balances into their own

hands and hope to improve their countries through activism. Third, the measurements of success for movements need to be considered based on intensity of goals as well as timeline. Those unfamiliar with nonviolent strategy are quick to disregard the impact of a movement if it is not revolutionary and activists themselves may be disheartened with the tactics if the goals are not achieved within weeks. Yet, nonviolent scholars have emphasized the sentiment that most movements are successful with patience. Sometimes simply bringing attention to a current issue can open a dialogue and spark ideas for solutions in the future. Chenoweth and Stephan's definition of success is a proper starting point for evaluating movements, and while the indirect outcomes are difficult to measure, the likes of an Occupy Wall Street cannot be analyzed by the same metrics as an Orange or Jasmine Revolution. Lastly, social media will continue to be a helpful and important tool for activists to mobilize, but the people are the main feature that determine whether a movement will be successful.

The same basic characteristics will always be needed for movements, a clear goal and support for that goal, but the tools that activists use will also continue to shift and become more creative. As the curiosity and interest grows in nonviolent movements, particularly sparked in this modern period by the Arab Spring, people will become more informed with the potential and benefits that nonviolence has in creating change. The future will almost certainly consist of more frequent and diverse forms of activism where the people grasp the power that they have to challenge their leaders and build a more ideal future for themselves and their children.

While it is difficult to predict the course of action that any given movement will take or the outcome it will achieve, there are still some benefits in theorizing what a

hypothetical nonviolent uprising in North Korea or Russia would look like. Both countries are extremely unique in their current positions on the world stage and creating hypothetical scenarios based on the previous experiences of movements would advance knowledge on how people could respond to a modern dictatorship in North Korea and a government adept at silencing democracy promoters in Russia. North Korea is seemingly occupied with combating foreign threats and restricting the freedom of their citizens, but would the regime foresee an uprising against it, and would they have the capabilities to properly respond to a massive movement? What role, if any, would technology play for activists given the extremely limited amount of technological capabilities for the population? In Russia, how creative could activists get with their tactics to keep a regime always prepared for a coup attempt off-guard? An analysis of these hypothetical situations might not offer any groundbreaking perspectives into nonviolent theory, but it would challenge the existing theories in a way that is creative and applicable to modern oppressors.

Lastly, another area of future research that is sometimes briefly touched upon in evaluating movements but can be advanced further is the progression of prospective democracy after the movement has ended. As mentioned in the Introduction, all of the countries, except for Tunisia, that experienced mass movements during the Arab Spring have experienced some levels of regression to the original forms of government. Political analysis has been done on why the regression has occurred, possibly proposing some theories directly related to the movement itself, but there is room for future research on what role activists play after the movement. In Chapter 1, one of the highlighted factors of primacy for nonviolence was that a nation has the likelihood of around 60 percent to



become a democracy after the movement had ended. However, in some cases such as the Arab Spring and Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, the countries never reach that outcome. If activists can impact the political spectrum in such a way that the progression has started, what role should they play in making sure that the goal is reached beyond participation in the movement? Research in this area could not only be applied to movements with the hopes for democracy, but any movement that aims to progress some component of society in maximizing the results of the movement itself.

Nonviolent movements are not constrained to one part of the world or as resistance to a certain form of government. When used creatively and effectively, the tactics of nonviolence have proven to be applicable to a wide range of issues, but the people must first understand and accept the power that they have to challenge leaders in building a better future. Whether it is on the grassroots level in a democracy, protests on a national level in an authoritarian regime, or civil resistance as a defense strategy, it is important to progress society's understanding of the untapped potential that nonviolent strategy has in solving the complexities of future conflicts. The findings in this thesis are a basic starting point in which creative thinkers can build upon and invent a blueprint from previous cases to apply to future issues which will require solutions beyond conventional strategy.

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