

THE
PROTAGORAS OF PLATO

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HENRY DRISLER, LL.D.

JAY PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN COLUMBIA COLLEGE

THE
PROTAGORAS OF PLATO

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

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τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπόν εύρειν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ^{τοῦ} πολλοῦ χρόνου εὑρημένης; . . . —PLATO

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PREFACE.

THE present edition of the “Protagoras” has been undertaken at the invitation of Professor Drisler, although I had a few years ago, at the suggestion of another distinguished scholar, occupied myself in gaining a critical acquaintance with the text, in gathering materials for a commentary from the Greek sources, and in reviewing again the general character of those Platonic dialogues of which the “Protagoras” may be considered the type. The standing of this piece in the Platonic canon is so undisputed as to relieve me of the necessity of saying anything in this place about the Platonic question, which would indeed be *κύρια δείπειν δεδαρμένην*. Brevity has been aimed at, in both Notes and Introduction. The analysis presented in § II. of the Introduction will, I trust, exhibit a satisfactory tracing of the unity and connection of the thought. Of the commentaries of others, from which information has been derived, Sauppe stands in the first line; but Ast, Heindorf, Stallbaum, Kroschel, Deuschle, and others, have not been neglected. At the same time, I have endeavored in each case to expressly note my obligation to the particular editor or editors.

As for the text, it is based on the recent critical edition of Schanz (Leipsic, Tauchnitz, 1880). A selection from the elaborate but well-sifted critical apparatus of Schanz has been made, and especially all cases in which the present text differs

from the two leading MSS.—viz., the famous Oxford MS. “B” (altera manus b) and the Venetus “T” (altera manus t)—have been noted. Furthermore, the authors of the most important emendations and conjectures, as Stephanus, Bekker, Heindorf, Ast, Dobrée, Cobet, Kroschel, etc., have been quoted in foot-notes under the text, and from these it will be seen that in the present edition, in a number of instances, the readings of the MSS., of Sauppe, Hirschig, Kroschel, and others have been preferred to those of Schanz. A Greek and English Index, which refers to the Notes, has been prepared.

My particular thanks are due to Professor Drisler for the use of books from his library and for useful suggestions in the preparation of the work generally. I also beg leave to express my profound obligations to the following scholars:

1. To Professor Bonitz, of Berlin, whose lectures in the winter of 1873–74 on the history of Greek philosophy have been to me an enduring stimulus towards kindred reading and study.
2. To Professor Paul Schuster,* of Leipsic, whose lectures on “Plato’s Life and Writings” it was my privilege to attend in the summer of 1874.
3. To Professor Gildersleeve, of Baltimore, to whom, in the perception of syntax and idiom, I owe more than to any other teacher, and whose example, method, and instruction I will always cherish in grateful remembrance.

E. G. SIHLER.

NEW YORK, *August*, 1881.

* Schuster, the talented editor of Heraclitus’s fragments, who was promoted to an extraordinary professorship at Leipsic at the nomination of Ritschl—a man in whom the accomplishments of philologist, metaphysician, and poet were blended—was cut off in the flower of life and in the spring-time of his chosen work, in 1877, by brain-fever.

INTRODUCTION.

ONE of the most notable features in the character and career of Socrates is the fact that he had among his many hearers and disciples men so utterly different in personal character, in motives and aims; men whose careers afterwards so utterly separated. Think of the bon-vivant and glib man of the world Aristippus, and again of the ascetic and almost coarse Antisthenes; or consider the little resemblance between the calm, orderly, practical Xenophon and the author of the *Phaedrus*; or what a chasm of difference between the devoted enthusiast Chaerephon and the cold and relentless doctrinaire Critias, the son of Callaeschrus. Though some others might lay claim to equal devotion to the master, no one has so splendidly and effectively painted him on a long series of classic canvases as the son of Ariston.¹ But while one may, in a certain sense, call almost all of Plato's performances *apologies* of the master, a line must be drawn between those pieces which exhibit in a measure the historical Socrates, and those in which the departed master is merely the ideal type of inquiry and the literary mouth-piece of Plato's own thoughts. The former group is often called that of the *Socratic Dialogues* proper: it includes, by more or less general consent, the Lesser

¹ There is no need here of introducing the principal data of Plato's life. In addition to Diogenes Laërtius, lib. iii., there may be mentioned: Grote, *Plato*, etc., i. 113–131; C. Steinhart, *Platons Leben* (1873); C. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie* (1839), pp. 1–83; E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. ii., translated by Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin (London, 1876). Steinhart's book contains the fullest treatment of the subject, as well as the most sympathetic.

Hippias, Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, and Protagoras.¹

Of all these, the *Protagoras* is, without doubt, the finest performance from a literary point of view, and has been as much favored in the regular course of classic reading abroad² as it seems to have been neglected in America. Cicero, in the course of his rhetorical training, wrote out a Latin version of the dialogue, of which translation, however, but four meagre fragments are preserved. Schleiermacher, probably the most eminent restorer of Platonic reading in modern times after the Florentines of the fifteenth century, calls our dialogue “a rather complicated one, and which, perhaps, has been more praised than thoroughly understood.” Still, since his day, so many scholars have analyzed the economy in art and thought of this dialogue that the latter part of Schleiermacher’s judgment may probably be modified, while the former part may be confidently upheld.

§ I.

Πρωταγόρας ἢ Σοφισταί.—This is the double title found in Diog. Laërt. iii. 59; but it is certain that Plato did not himself give this double title to the dialogue.³ The second title has, no doubt, been added by the literature-scholars of the Alexandrian and later times, such as Aristophanes of Byzantium, Thrasylus the favorite of Tiberius, and others. But in the present instance the summary of contents intended to be conveyed by the second title is at least misleading; for the dialogue is far from being a fully equipped polemic against the Sophists, or a delineation of their doctrine, as will be seen below §§ II. and III. Plato is far from treating the Sophists,

¹ The *Apology* and *Crito* may probably be classed as *occasional compositions*. Cf. Zeller, ii., Engl. transl., p. 120.

² Cf. the editions by Ast, Heindorf, Stallbaum (new edition by Kroschel, 1865), Deuschle (3d edition by Cron, Leipsic, 1877), the very fine edition by Sauppe (3d ed. 1873, Weidmann, Berlin), by F. Wildauer (Innsbruck, 1857), E. Jahn (Vienna, 1864), Wayte (University Press).

³ Such other double titles are Λάχης ἢ περὶ ἀνδρείας, Λύσις ἢ περὶ φιλίας, Χαρμιδῆς ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης, Εὐθύφρων ἢ περὶ δίσιου, etc.

as a class, with the incisive bitterness of later productions, as the *Gorgias* or in the *Republic*, where the life of the Sophist is placed lower than all others excepting that of the tyrant. Still, we must say something of the Sophists in general, and of Protagoras in particular.

The “Sophists” were a class of men who appeared at about the same time, not being descended from one specific locality (as the inventors of some particular industry might be), but coming from different parts of Greece—Abdera on the Thracian coast, Ceos and Paros in the Archipelago, from Sicily, from Chalcedon, from the Peloponnesus. Flourishing in the last generation of the fifth century B.C., they were bearers and propagators of a more elaborate culture and training than the traditional routine of Greek education had been offering, and made a profession of it. This, in the case of many, was quite lucrative, and they were eagerly sought by younger men, especially at Athens, where the strength or plausibility of individual ratiocination and pleading was coming to be a more powerful lever and source of power before the *ἐκκλησία*, as well as before the several courts, than traditional maxims and the force of age and experience, as one may see from Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Euripides.

From the modern standpoint of professional pursuits, we cannot, of course, judge them as harshly as Plato did (cf. Grote, *History of Greece*, chap. lxvii.). At the same time, we must try to appreciate intelligently the way in which Socrates and his pupil Plato seem to have principally judged them and their work: i. e. *from the standpoint of dialectic thoroughness and accuracy of thought, that intellectual aim which Socrates tried to establish for himself and others.* Here we cannot deny that their aims and methods were a wrong path and a deceptive allurement; that what distinct philosophic view they had ran counter to that of Socrates, especially in the advocacy of subjectivism.

Protagoras of Abdera was born about 480 B.C. There was a later tradition (Diog. Laërt. ix. 53), according to which he was first a porter, and rose by dint of his talents and industry.

He certainly was at Athens before 445, and so great was his reputation at that time that Pericles intrusted him with drawing up a constitution for the colony sent to Thurii. After 445 he spent some time in Magna Graecia and Sicily as an instructor and lecturer. For a second time he came to Athens about 433 or 431, to which time the dramatic date of the *Protagoras* may be assigned. Protagoras taught the theory of discourse and effective reasoning, drilling his pupils by setting them to pleading for and against the same theme in turn (Diog. Laërt. ix. 53), choosing especially general truths for the subject matter of this exercise. His rhetorical attainments seem to have been based on some more accurate inquiry into the structure of speech; e. g. he made out several *moods* of statement: εὐχωλή, ἐρώτησις, ἀπόκρισις, ἐντολή¹—a kind of rhetorical grammar. In his ὁρθοέπεια, he seems to have occupied himself about distinctions of gender, tenses, and the like. His fees for a full course of instruction were large: one hundred minae (about \$1800) were paid to him, according to Diog. Laërt. ix. 52—a rate of professional remuneration which far surpassed that of men eminent in other professions, as the sculptor Phidias. In the latter part of his life, Protagoras is said to have been forbidden to stay at Athens on account of his book about the gods. Of this book the following words are preserved in Diog. Laërt. ix. 51: περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, εἴδεις ᾧς εἰσίν, εἴδεις ᾧς οὐκ εἰσίν. πολλὰ γάρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ή τε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὅν δ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. He seems to have gone to Sicily again. His death is placed about 411 or 410. The position of Protagoras in the history of Greek thought is a negative one. In the present place, I may limit myself to a brief statement: Plato has made it the subject of an elaborate controversy in a later dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, but does not touch upon it in the present composition at all. Protagoras professed that the sole source of cognition was sensuous perception, and that (individual) man was the standard of all things, both in affirmation and negation, the

¹ Two other traditions on this matter are found in Diog. Laërt. l. c.

sentient subject the only judge; objective cognition, however, was out of the question, sensuous perception being both varying in a number of persons, and not consistent in the development of one and the same person. The statements of mathematics, too, were purely subjective, and effective or real refutation of statements was impossible.

Gorgias of Leontini, in Sicily, came to Athens on a political mission in 427 B.C. The novelty and style of his discourse made a sensation, and he became a famous and prosperous teacher of rhetoric. The fee of one hundred minae is stated in connection with his instruction too. He developed a poetic type of prose discourse, the principal element of which seems to have been a certain rhythm. Agathon's speech in Plato's *Symposium* is a fair type of his style.¹ Prodicus of Ceos directed his attention to a nicer perception of literature and literary practice, especially in the discrimination of synonyms, a service which Socrates himself seems to have appreciated more than Plato. Some scholars trace his influence even in Thucydides. On Prodicus, cf. Plato, *Cratyl.* 384 b; *Charm.* p. 163; *Meno*, 96 d; *Theaet.* 151 b.

Hippias of Elis was a man who aimed at encyclopedic attainments and universal accomplishments, and seems to have had early opportunities to distinguish himself at the neighbouring Olympia. He discoursed on astronomy, mathematics, physics, as well as on historical antiquities and on poets. His work was lucrative. In *Hipp. Major*, 282 d, e, sqq., it is stated that in a Sicilian tour his receipts in a short time amounted to two and a half talents (about \$2700), although at the same time Protagoras himself was doing acceptable service in the island. Among the lesser Sophists were Polus of Agrigentum, a pupil of Gorgias, and figuring in the dialogue of that name; Euenus of Paros, whose course on ἀρετὴ cost five minae (\$90) (Plato, *Apol.* 20 a, sqq.); Thrasy-machus of Chalcedon, who appears in the *Republic*; and the dialectic

¹ For strictures on technical rhetoric, the *Phaedrus*, rather than the *Gorgias*, of Plato should be consulted.

jugglers Dionysodorus and Euthydemus. It would seem (in spite of Grote's defence) that in the second and third generations the quality of the professional "Sophists" greatly degenerated (cf. Lysias ap. Dionys. Hal. *Judicium de Lysia*, p. 521: ἔγώ δὲ ήκω οὐ μικρολογησόμενος, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων μαχούμενος. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ταῦτα ἔργα μὲν εἶναι σοφιστῶν λίαν ἀχρήστων καὶ σφόδρα βίου δεομένων).

On the subject of the "Sophists" in general, compare Grote, l.c.; C. F. Hermann, pp. 179–231; Steinhart, *Leben Plato's*, p. 61 sqq., and note 92 on p. 288 sq.; Schwegler, *Gesch. der gr. Phil.* (1870, 2d ed.), pp. 90–101; Westermann, *Gesch. der gr. Beredsamkeit*, § 80; James F. Ferrier, *Lectures on Greek Phil.* (2d ed. 1875); M. Schanz, *Beiträge zur vorsokratischen Philosophie aus Plato: I. die Sophisten* (Göttingen, 1867).

§ II.

We will now attempt to present the *thought* of the *Protagoras*, stripped, as far as possible, of all personal, historical, and dramatic elements. It is commonly found that men, especially younger men, proceed to action without any clear or definite conception of their real aim, or of the stake involved; they following mainly popular opinion or fashion (310 b; 314 c), as young Hippocrates does in his eagerness to put himself under the tuition of Protagoras. But the latter fails to state at once and concisely what he proposed to effect, and comes to the point only after considerable parade and irrelevant discourse: to teach efficiency in private and public administration (318 e; 319 a)—whereas the inquiry of Socrates had been stated promptly and concisely (318 a). But is this excellence (*ἀρετή*) really teachable? For it is seen that the Athenians, in all professional action proposed, prefer the judgment of professional experts; but in all general questions of public policy and administration (319) the judgment of all classes of citizens is equally listened to—a practice which seems to rest on the silent assumption that this latter faculty or excellence is not teachable. Again, it is seen that eminent public men generally fail to transmit their own capacity to those nearest to them (319 e; 320 c).

1. The reply is made that *ἀρετή* really *is* teachable. For if we compare the position of man among the other animals, we perceive his purely physical equipment of strength or force to be comparatively slender, but see in him the faculty of industrial application and invention as his principal means of self-preservation. But as for the higher form of human life, in organized society, we find that to be based on the universal possession of the principal *moral faculties* (of moral feeling and regard for others, *αιδώς*, and of the sense of justice, *δίκη*). This universal possession is a matter generally understood; and the participation of all citizens in general questions of policy and administration is based on this assumption, and every one claims for himself the possession of these faculties.

Again, if we take the practice of moral exhortation, of blaming and of *punishment*, is it not based on the presumption that man is capable of self-management morally, and of improving in this regard (320 c; 324 d)?

Moreover, it may be stated that the universal practice of *education* in its several stages and branches aims at moral ideals (poets), at self-restraint and order (music), at endurance and promptness of execution (gymnastic training), at civil probity and patriotism (laws), and at the sense of responsibility (board of review, *εἰνθῆται*), (324 d; 326 c).

As to the objection about the inferior sons of eminent men, the following is to be said: while a certain measure of moral capacity is a universal possession, there is such a thing as being a *virtuoso*; and neither the sons nor the fathers of such are generally of the same quality. At the same time, there may be those who, by their instruction, are able to raise or increase this modicum of practical excellence and faculty of correct action. Such a teacher of *ἀρετή* Protagoras professes to be (326 e; 328 d).

2. But is the practice of monologue by one and the same interlocutor really sufficient for getting below the surface of the subject, and for the development of more accurate thought (328 d; 329 d)? What is moral excellence (*ἀρετή*)? Is it a homogeneous unity? What are its relations to the several vir-

ties, as justice, self-restraint, regard for religious obligations, &c.? These would seem parts organic, but not homogeneous, *tj.* virtue, with separate and different functions, like the several parts of the human face. But it is seen further on that ὁσιότης and δικαιοσύνη have very close affinity. This the opponent admits with a somewhat bad grace, adding the conventional phrase “if you will have it so.” But by the other side it is urged that true dialectic excludes such modes of assent. “Well, then,” is the rejoinder, “*resemblance* is so very relative.”

But, pressing the same point in another instance, the following is urged (332 a): Take *σωφροσύνη* and *σοφία*: their common opposite is *ἀφροσύνη*. Now, all strict (contradictory) opposites consist of one pair of correlatives only, hence the (positive) opposite of *ἀφροσύνη* is substantially one and the same thing; the affinity of the two virtues *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* is therefore a close and definite one (333 b).

The general subject of *ἀρετή* being then taken up from another point of view (333 d, e), the convertibility of the *good* and the *useful* is to be shown; but the point is eluded by the opponent, who gives a long passage of his own on the relativity of the useful (334 a-c). By Socrates the necessity of brief and concise question and reply is urged again as the true method of dialectic. (After a long but purely *dramatic interlude*, the subject is resumed in 339 a.)

3. A *poetic quotation* is now brought forward by the opponent, the contents of which have some bearing on the general theme of the discourse, viz.: the nature of *ἀρετή*, and man's capacity of attaining to it. Both sides present an interpretation of it, differing much and hopelessly in their several conceptions of the passage (339 a; 347 a). Socrates winds up this phase of the discourse by *disapproving in principle* (347 c, sqq.) of *such methods of discussion as being foreign to the spirit of true dialectic*.

4. The entire subject is now taken up anew and in a manner more agreeable to the exigencies of true dialectic (348 c, sqq.), in which the manager of the inquiry seeks no personal

triumph, but endeavors to sift that which as yet baffles the understanding, which labor would proceed more fruitfully in joint endeavor. The point, then (349 b), is this: What is the relation between the several virtues? It is now granted by the opponent (349 d) that the four virtues *σοφία*, *σωφροσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *όσπετης* are connected by a bond of substantial affinity; but *ἀνδρεΐα* seems to stand somewhat by itself. But it would seem that those are the most *confident* (*θαρραλέοι*) who have the best knowledge, in the several ways of encountering danger. On the other hand, the convertibility of *being confident* and *being courageous* is not admitted by Protagoras (350 c; 351 b).

The subject is then taken up from another point of view. The *good* is *pleasant* and the *evil* is *painful*: the meaning of these terms is really coextensive, exceptions being only apparently so. The governing factor in human action, normally (352 b), is *knowledge* (*ἐπιστήμη*). But is it not a matter of common experience that men often act against their knowledge, and allow themselves to be overcome by pleasure? But this is an apparent inconsistency only; nothing pleasurable is evil (353 c, sqq.) in itself, but only so far as it has painful consequences; and, on the other hand, many painful things are good, not in themselves, but in so far as they have good and wholesome consequences; pleasure and pain being the criteria of good and of evil (354 c). Now, all men act in accordance with *their understanding* of the good (pleasurable) and evil (painful) (355 a, sqq.); and when people are "overcome by pleasure," they are actually "overcome" by the good. This seems paradox, but it is a correct statement. The man who is "overcome" by pleasure errs not so much in action as in the judgment, the knowledge, on which his action is based. He is mentally short-sighted, his perception is faulty; for, looking at the immediately pleasurable, he fails to perceive the distant evil which is going to overbalance the present good (pleasurable), its source. Correction, then, is found to be merely the capacity of measuring the present over against the more distant, and choosing that which contains more per-

manent good. This faculty of mensuration, the estimate of proportions, is the intellectual factor which ought to govern life. This faculty is really a branch of knowledge, while incorrect action, on the other hand, reduces itself to *ἀμαθία* (357 d): to underestimate things worth a great deal, and *vice versa* (358 c).

From this point the discussion is brought around again to *courage*. No one, according to the preceding, chooses that which he considers evil to himself (358 e). Courage, too, comes under the general definition of *ἀρετή*, as an *ἐπιστήμη*: courageous men go to meet terrible things, not in so far as the latter themselves are evil, but in so far as they, their ultimate consequences, are boons (e. g. liberty, glory, etc.), thus estimating the *δεινά* aright. On the other hand, ignorance of these matters is—*δειλία* (360 c), incapacity of making a true estimate of *δεινά* and *μη δεινά*. This is the limit of the discussion: the subject is not advanced any further. A summary of the discussion is presented near the end in the words (360 e) *πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, η ἀρετή*.

NOTE.—The *Protagoras*, so far as the thought goes, marks an advancement on the other Socratic dialogues. The *Laches*, *Lysis*, etc., deal with some portion only of the general subject treated in the *Protagoras*. Besides, they are more occupied, in proportion, in the *ἔλεγχος*—i. e., in the destructive analysis of opinion and judgment, crude, conventional, subjective, superficial—than in presenting anything positive. The ethical thoughts in the *Protagoras* substantially agree with those advanced by Socrates in Xenoph. *Mem.* III.-IV. To such passages I have endeavored to call attention at convenient points in the Notes.

As for the *Gorgias*, the subject-matter of which has some points of resemblance, Zeller says (p. 121, Engl. ed.): “If we compare the argument of the *Gorgias* (495 sqq.) against the identity of Good and Pleasure with that of the *Protagoras* (354 b, sqq.), which leaves this identity still as an hypothesis, it is clear that the latter must be earlier than the former, and, consequently, than all the dialogues succeeding it.” So far Zeller. One of the most striking features is the coloring, the general tone, of the *Gorgias*, full of acerbity, and tinged with an almost personal bitterness. It really is the *Second Apology* of Socrates. If we weigh this point only, and think of the ease and general good-nature of most of the Socratic dialogues, the suggestion presents itself very strongly

that *Protagoras* is to be dated before the death of Socrates. But, *adhuc sub judice lis est.*

Grote treats the doctrine advanced in the *Protagoras* as simply Platonic, and seems to disregard the palpable fact that it is all purely Socratic thought. In following C. F. Hermann and Zeller, one will be likely to appreciate more correctly the *Protagoras*, and the entire class of productions to which it belongs, than by following Grote.

As for the *Meno* of Plato, it seems certain to me that it is a later piece. While the theme or text of the discussion appears to be nearly the same, and while one is inclined to suppose, at first, that Plato has consciously treated over again the question of the *Protagoras*, one thing is certain: Plato has advanced considerably in his own philosophic thought from the standpoint of the *Protagoras*. The doctrine of *áνάμνησις*, the employment of the Pythagorean doctrines of the soul in his own way, the theory of Ideas—all these things had fully matured in his mind when he wrote the *Meno*.

§ III.

1. The *Protagoras* is eminently a dramatic composition. The persons in the course of the dialogue reveal their several characters naturally, and in a manner well suggested by the development of the action. On the other hand, the action is largely promoted or retarded by the individuality of the several interlocutors.

Nothing could more forcibly, in the exposition, suggest the indirect power of the great Sophist's reputation than the deportment of young Hippocrates. He is so impatient to meet Protagoras as to forget all conventional rules of demeanor, and to neglect his own insufficient repose after an exhausting trip on the preceding day. Still he is ingenuous; as the day breaks (312 a), his blushes betray his embarrassment to his adviser. The incidents of their arrival at Callias's house are sketched very vividly; the doorkeeper (312 c, sq.) is so exasperated by the continuous influx of Sophists that he at first bangs the door in their faces. The surroundings of the great Sophist himself show the high esteem in which he is held. He walks up and down the prostöon, accompanied by his young host Callias, and some of the most distinguished young men of the town. A large number of lesser persons walk close behind to catch every word, and very deferentially and

carefully do they open their ranks whenever Protagoras turns, and fall in again behind him.

Hippias of Elis, in a chamber opposite, is lecturing to another set of friends of culture, friends of science like the physician Eryxias and the intellectual gourmand Phaedrus. Altogether, the number of *κῶφα πρόσωπα* who give embellishment and variety to the stage is very large in this piece.

A third group (315 d) is collected around Prodicus, who is still on his couch, apparently ailing. The words uttered by him are not distinctly audible to the two visitors, from the resonance of his deep voice against the walls of his chamber.

2. Protagoras (316 b), instead of coming at once to the point of his visitors' inquiry, gives an account of his own professional principles and career at considerable length, and further on cannot refrain from some side thrusts (318 d) at other Sophists who were claimants of public favor. In the first part of his own discourse, he, with a certain dignity and unctuousness, presents his thoughts in the garb of a myth. He begins to betray some irritation under the close grasp of Socrates' dialectic in 331 c, and further on in 333 d, and attempts, by an unbroken excursus, to maintain his own brilliancy and congenial mode of discourse (334 a-c). After this, when Socrates again insists on terse and concise exchange of question and answer, the difficulties of the situation increase, and an abrupt termination of the dialogue seems imminent.

3. In an *Interlude* this dramatic knot is untied. The host, Callias, favors his distinguished guest, Protagoras. Socrates has an eager partisan in Alcibiades. The cool and unbiased Critias, as well as the pompous Hippias, each interposes, in a characteristic way, in order to reconcile the main combatants. At last the universal desire of the company present, rather than his own inclination, moves Protagoras to heed the request of Socrates, and to proceed in a manner more congenial to the latter.

4. As for Prodicus, he, in the course of the interpretation of the Simonides passage, is entrapped by the wary Socrates

(340 d, sqq.) in a manner which gives Protagoras a welcome opportunity to triumph over his brother Sophist (340 d). The *εἰρωνεία*, the mock self-debasement, of Socrates is a vein running through the entire piece; he really deals most effective blows to his opponent while claiming no definite knowledge for himself. Still, the treatment which he extends to his principal opponent is more sincerely respectful at bottom than his handling of Prodicus and of Hippias.

The dialogue concludes by an "all's well that ends well." Socrates expresses his satisfaction, and a readiness at some future time to go on with Protagoras in common inquiry (361 d). Protagoras, on his side, parts from Socrates with good-will and professions of very high esteem. He compliments Socrates, not only on his fine intellectual powers, but also on his generous disposition. Thus the main combatants part with mutual regard, and the piece comes to an end.

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

ἢ σοφισταί· [ἐνδεικτικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ,
ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

309 Πόθεν, ὡς Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρώην ἴδοντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, Introduction. ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃς γένος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ πῶγωνος ἥδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος. 5

ΣΩ. Εἴτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμύρου ἐπαινέτης Β εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἦν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται; 10

ΣΩ. Εὗ, ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γάρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄποπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γάρ ἐκείνου οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά. 15

С ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἀν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κἀκεῖνον τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γάρ δίπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλως ἐν γε τῷδε τῷ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολύ γε.

13 ἔρχομαι Vindob. suppl. 7, ἔρχομαι BT 15 αὐτοῦ T, αὐτοῦ B

ΕΤ. Τί φῆς; ἀστῷ ἢ ξένῳ;

ΣΩ. Ξένῳ.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπῷ;

ΣΩ. Ἀβδηρίτῃ.

5 ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλός τις δὲ ξένος ἔδοξεν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου νίέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δὲ οὐ μέλλει, ὡς μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτερον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

10 ΕΤ. Ἀλλ’ ἢ σοφῷ τινι ἡμῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει;

ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δίγου τῶν γε νῦν, εἰς σοι δοκεῖ Δ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. Ὡς τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν;

ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ἥδη ἡμέραν.

15 ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἥκεις;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας.

310

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;

20 ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἴσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.

ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.

ΣΩ. Διπλῇ ἀν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἀλλ’ οὖν ἀκούετε.

Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὅρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης δὲ Ἀπολλοδόρου νίός, Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός,

25 Prologue and Exposition. τὴν θύραν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, ^B καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέψεξε τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω θεῖεν ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον 30 ἀγγέλεις; Οὐδέν γ’, ηδὲ δὲ δεῖ, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε. Εὖ ἀν λέγοις, ην δὲ ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκουν; Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἥκει, στὰς παρ’ ἐμοί. Πρώην,

7 σοφώτερον Ficinus, σοφώτατον BT 10 πάρει TB, παρεῖ B 22 διπλῇ B, διπλῇ T

ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι; Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ἐσπέ-
ρας γε. καὶ ἡμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκύμποδος ἐκαθέζετο
παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε
ὸψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόνης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος
ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξούμην αὐ- 5
τόν, ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἥλθον καὶ
δεδειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε μοι
ἀδελφὸς λέγει, ὅτι ἥκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχεί-
D ρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἵεναι, ἐπειτά μοι λίαν πόρρω ἔδοξε
τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστά με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ 10
ὑπνος ἀνῆκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. καὶ
ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτόησιν, Τί
οῦν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας;
καὶ δὲς γελάσας, Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε
μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, 15
ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀν αὐτῷ διδῷς ἀργύριον καὶ πειθῆς ἐκεῖνον,
ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὃς, ὡς Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί,
Ε ἐν τούτῳ εἴη· ὡς οὗτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποιμι οὐδὲν οὔτε
τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα
ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γάρ ἡμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός 20
εἰμι, ἡμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδὲ ἀκί-
κοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γάρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδίμησεν.
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἀνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ
φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ'
311 αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἥκουσα, 25
παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἰππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἵωμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·
Μήπω γ', ὡγαθέ, [ἐκεῖσε ἵωμεν], πρὶν γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ
δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιούντες αὐτοῦ
διατρίψωμεν, ὡς ἀν φῶς γένηται· εἴτα ἵωμεν. καὶ γάρ
τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, 30
καταληψόμενα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῆμεν· καὶ

8 ἀδελφὸς Bekker, ἀδελφὸς BT 18 εἴη B, τοι T 29 ἵωμεν T, το-
μεν B

ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἰπποκράτους τῆς ρώμης διεσκό-
πουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἡρώτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὃ Ἰππό-
κρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς λέναι, ἀργύριον
τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφι-
ξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις παρὰ
τὸν σαυτοῦ ὅμώνυμον ἐλθῶν Ἰπποκράτη τὸν Κῷον, τὸν
τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν
ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἥρετο, Εἰπέ μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὃ Ἰππό-
κρατες, Ἰπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; C

10 Knowledge Εἶπον ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς λατρῷ. 'Ως τίς γενησό-
an essential μενος; 'Ως λατρός, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλει-
element of correct τον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπε-
action. νόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκεί-
νοις, εἴ τίς σε ἥρετο· τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι

15 ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδίᾳ; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω;
Εἶπον ἄν ὡς ἀγαλματοποιοῖς. 'Ως τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐ-
τός; Δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαλματοποιός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ D
δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον
ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἐτοῖμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἀν μὲν ἐξικ-
20 νῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ
δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν τις
ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο·
εἴπέ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι
τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ
25 ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρω-
ταγόρου ἀκούομεν, ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ
περὶ Όμήρου ποιητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκού-
ομεν; Σοφιστὴν δή τοι δινομάζουσί γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸν
ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη. 'Ως σοφιστῇ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες
30 τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τίς σε προσέ-
ροιτο· αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχει παρὰ τὸν
Πρωταγόραν; καὶ δις εἴπειν ἐρυθριάσας—ἢδη γάρ ὑπέφαι- 312
νέν τι ἡμέρας, ὕστε καταφανῇ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι— Εἰ μέν τι

τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστὴς γενησόμενος.

Σὺ δέ, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἀν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς "Ελληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. 'Αλλ' ἄρα, ὡς Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ

B Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἴαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γάρ σὺ ἔκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἴδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη 10 μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

Οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; "Οτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ πα-

C Application ρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρί, ὡς φῆς, σοφιστῇ· ὅ of this principle τι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστιν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἀν εἰ 15 ple to the case οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παρα- of young Hippocrates. δίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὕτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὕτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. Οἷμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι. Λέγε

δῆ, τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστὴν; 'Ἐγὼ μέν, ἦ δὲ ὅς, ὥσπερ τοῦ- νομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκ- 20 οῦν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων

D καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες, εἴποιμεν ἄν που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπερ- γασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο 25 ἔροιτο, δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστιν; τί ἄν ἀποκρι- ναίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἄν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἦ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; "Ισως ἄν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἵκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γάρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται. 30 περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὥσπερ ὁ κιθα-

5 ὑπολαμβάνεις B, ὑπολαμβάνης T 6 οὐα περ ἡ παρὰ T, οὐα περὶ B
22 σοφῶν Tb, σοφιστῶν B 27 εἰ εἴποιμεν Schanz 28 τοῦ ποιῆσαι t,
τοῦ τὸ ποιῆσαι BT 30 ἡ ἀπόκρισις T, ἡ ἀποκρίσεως B

ριστής δεινὸν δῆπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὕπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κινητίσεως· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Εἶν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; *ἦ* δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὕπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται; Εἰκός γε. Τί δῆ ἐστιν τοῦτο, περὶ 5 οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μανητὴν ποιεῖ; Μὰ Δλ̄, ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπον μετὰ τοῦτο· Τί οὖν; οἰσθα εἰς οἵνα τινα 313 κίνδυνον ἔρχει ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ, διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γε- 10 νέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἀν περιεσκέψω, εἰτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὐ, καὶ εἰς συμβούλην τούς τε φίλους ἀν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς· δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖ, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν φά πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ σὰ ἢ εὗ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ 15 αὐτοῦ γενομένου, περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ B ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἑταίρων οὐδενί, εἰτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἐσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῆς, ὅρθριος ἥκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγουν οὐδὲ συμβούλην ποιεῖ, εἴτε χρὴ 20 ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἐτοίμος δὲ εἰ ἀναλίσκειν τά

Special risk of Hippocratis. τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἥδη διεγνωκάς, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρᾳ, δὲν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φῆς, οὔτε διείλεξαι οὐ- C δεπώποτε, σοφιστὴν δὲ δινομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστήν, δὲ τί 25 ποτ' ἐστιν, φαίνει ἀγνοῶν, φῶ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν; καὶ δὲς ἀκούσας, "Εοικεν, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐξ ᾧ σὺ λέγεις. "Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ Ἰππόκρατες, δὲ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὧν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ᾧ ψυχὴ τρέφεται; Φαίνεται γάρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις· τρέφεται δέ, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, 30 ψυχὴ τίνι; Μαθήμασιν δῆπου, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ δημιώς γε μή, ὃ ἑταῖρε, δὲ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἀ πωλεῖ ἔξαπατήσει ήμᾶς, D

1 δῆπου T, δὲ εἰ που B 3 δῆλον T Vindob. suppl. 7 18 ὅρθριος: ὅρθριον BT 20 αὐτῷ T αὐτῷ B 29 τρέφεται δέ, φῶ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίνι B'T 30 δῆπου, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ B'T

Δῶσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἐμπορός τε καὶ
κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ᾧ ἀγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε
αὐτοὶ ἵσασιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαι-
νοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὡνούμενοι παρ' αὐ-
τῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἢ λατρὸς ὦν. οὔτω δὲ 5
καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πω-
λοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν
μὲν πάντα ἢ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἀν τινες, ὃ ἄριστε, καὶ
τούτων ἀγνοοῦσιν ᾧ πωλοῦσιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν
Ἐπρὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ὡνούμενοι παρ' αὐ- 10
τῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντίληψις ὥν. εἰ
μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ
πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὡνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρω-
ταγόρους καὶ παρ' ἄλλους ὅτουον· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὃ μακάριε,
314 μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. καὶ γὰρ 15
δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὡιῆ ἢ
ἐν τῇ τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ
τοῦ καπήλου [καὶ ἐμπόρου] ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις
ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὸν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἢ
φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν συμβουλεύσασθαι, 20
παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίσχοντα, ὅ τι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέ ον
καὶ ὅ τι μή, καὶ ὄπόσον καὶ ὄπότε· ὕστε ἐν τῇ ὡιῇ οὐ μέ-
Βγας ὁ κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ
ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμήν, τὸ μάθημα
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα [καὶ μαθόντα] ἀπιέναι ἢ βε- 25
βλαμένον ἢ ὀφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμενα καὶ μετὰ
τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὕστε τοσοῦτον
πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὕσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν
καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἐπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις
ἀνακοινωσάμενα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι 30
Cέστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος· οἷμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον
τὸν Κεῖον· καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προ-

18 καὶ ἐμπόρου bracketed by Sauppe.

Σύρωφ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περί τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα,
 The main δις ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὄδον ἐνέπεσεν· ἵν' οὖν μὴ
 drama begins. ἀτελῆς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως
 The stage and ἐσίοιμεν, ἐπιστάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγό-
 the persons. μὲνα, ἔως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλους. δοκεῖ
 οὖν μοι, δις θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυ- D
 νεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοι-
 τῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν,
 ἀνοίξας καὶ ἴδων ἡμᾶς, "Εα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ
 10 αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προ-
 θύμως ὡς οὗτος τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούσο-
 μεν, καὶ δις ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν,
 "Ω ἀνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ;
 'Αλλ' ὡγαδέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἥκομεν οὔτε
 15 σοφισταί ἐσμεν· ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ τοι δεό- E
 μενοι ἰδεῖν ἡλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν· μόγις οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν
 ἀνθρωπος ἀνέψξεν τὴν θύραν.

'Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσῆλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν
 τῷ προστῷ περιπατοῦντα, ἔξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπάτουν
 20 ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκους καὶ δ ἀδελ-
 φὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὄμοιμήτριος, Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρ- 315
 μίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα δ ἔτερος τῶν
 Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλους καὶ
 'Αντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὃσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν
 25 Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφι-
 στὴς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἱ ὄπισθεν ἡκολούθουν ἐπακού-
 οντες τῶν λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς
 ἄγει ἔξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ᾧ διεξέρ-
 χεται, κηλῶν τῷ φωνῇ ὕσπερ Ὁρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φω-
 30 νὴν ἐπονται κεκηλημένοι· ἡσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων B
 ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἐγωγε ἴδων

12 ἐγκεκλειμένης B, ἐγκεκλεισμένης T 15 τοι: τι BT 17 ἀνθρωπος
 Bekker, ἀνθρωπος BT 22 ἔτερος: ἔταῖρος BT 26 οἱ ὄπισθεν: ὄπι-
 σθεν BT 28 ἐξ ἐκάστων T, εξακοστῶν B | τῶν πόλεων B, πόλεων T

ἥσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλαβοῦντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ πρόστεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιόντες ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ δίπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα. 5

Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰςενόησα ἔφη "Ομηρος, Ἰππίαν τὸν Σ' Ἡλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστάψῳ ἐν Θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ καὶ Φαιδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ" Ανδρῶν ὁ Ἀνδροτίλωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. 10 ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων [ἀστρονομικὰ] ἄπτα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἰππίαν, ὃ δὲ ἐν Θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξήγει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον. ἐπεδίμει Δ γάρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματι τινι, 15 πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμείῳ ἐχρῆτο Ἰππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων δὲ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. δὲ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ 20 αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν Ε ἐγῷμαι, καλόν τε κάγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δὲ οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι δύνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἀν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυγχάνει 25 ὅν. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ Ἀδειμάντῳ ἀμφοτέρῳ, ὃ τε Κύπιδος καὶ δὲ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὃν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαζεῖν ξένωντεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου·—316 πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος·—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῇ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

14 εἰσεῖδον: εἴσιδον BT 15 ἄρα καὶ: ἄρα T | κιος B, κῖος T 19 στρώμασιν B, στρώμασι T 30 ἀνὴρ Bekker, ἀνὴρ BT

Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὃς φῆσ-
 Hippocrates introduced to
 Protagoras.
 The latter dis-
 5 courses on his
 own position
 in the profes-
 sion.

σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλ-
 λαῖσχρος.

‘Ημεῖς οὖν ώς εἰσήλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρῳ ἄττα
 διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆ-
 μεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὡς Β
 Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἥλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ
 ‘Ιπποκράτης οὗτος. Πότερον, ἔφη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι
 10 διαλεχθῆναι ἦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; ‘Ημῖν μέν, ἦν δὲ
 ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δέ, οὐ ἔνεκα ἥλθομεν, αὐτὸς
 σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δή ἐστιν, ἔφη, οὐ ἔνεκα ἥκετε; ‘Ιπποκρά-
 της δέδει ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου νίνις,
 οὐκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν
 15 δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἥλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι C
 δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἱεταί οἱ
 μάλιστ’ ἀν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ’ οὖν ἥδη σὺ
 σκύπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνοις οἱεὶ δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι
 πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ’ ἄλλων. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθεῖ, ὡς
 20 Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. Ξένον γάρ ἄνδρα καὶ ίόντα εἰς πό-
 λεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελ-
 τίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰ-
 κείων καὶ δινέιων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων ἔαυτῷ
 συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἔαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, D
 25 χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα· οὐ γάρ σμικροὶ
 περὶ αὐτὰ φύσονται τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι τε καὶ
 ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι
 παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν
 ἄνδρων, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποι-
 30 εῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἷον Ὅμη-
 ρον τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς
 τε καὶ χρησμῶδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὄρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον·

6 διαθεασάμενοι Β, διαθεσασάμενοι Τ 9 μόνοι μόνῳ Schanz after
 Cobet 17 μάλιστα ἀν Stephanus, μάλιστ’ ἀν Hirschig, μάλιστα ΒΤ

ἐνίους δέ τινας γῆσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικήν, οἷον Ἱκκος τε
Ἐός Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὅν οὐδενὸς ἥττων σοφιστὴς
Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεὺς·
μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιή-
σατο, μέγας ὅν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ 5
ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες
τὸν φύσιον ταῖς τέχναις ταῦταις παραπετάσμασιν ἔχρη-
σιν σαντο· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἀπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ ἔνυμφέ-
ρομαι· ἥγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτι διαπράξασθαι ὁ ἐβουλή-
θησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαζεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν 10
ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὥσπερ ἔνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστιν τὰ προσχή-
ματα· ἐπεὶ οἱ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται,
ἄλλ' ἄττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν
ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶντι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ
Βεῖναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσ- 15
μενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἥγοῦν-
ται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον
εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλή-
λυθα, καὶ ὄμολογῷ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώ-
πους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην οἷμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ 20
ὄμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταῦτη
C ἔσκεψαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ
τὸ ὄμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι. καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἥδη
εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυμπαντα πολλά μοὶ
ἐστιν· οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἀν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν 25
πατήρ εἴην· ὥστε πολύ μοι ἥδιστον ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε,
περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λό-
γον ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ ἐγώ — ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι
αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππίᾳ ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλ-
D λωπίσασθαι, ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εῖμεν — Τί οὖν, 30
ἔφην ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ
τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη,

συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθιζόμενοι διαλέγησθε; Εδόκει χρῆναι· ἀσμενοί δὲ πάντες ὑμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππίᾳ· ἐκεῖ γάρ τοποῦ πῆρχε τὰ βάθρα. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκι-^Ε βιάδης ἡκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθίζομενα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὅτι Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἴδε πάρει-
 10 Statement of σιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιοῦ
the case of πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον
Hippocrates. ὅτι Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι ἀρχὴ ἐστιν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα,
ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἰπποκράτης γάρ ὅδε τυγ-³¹⁸
χάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅτι οὖν αὐτῷ
15 ἀποβήσεται, ἐάν σοι συνῆ, ὑδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. το-
σοῦτος ὁ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγό-
ρας εἶπεν· Ὡς νεανίσκε, ἐσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐάν ἐμοὶ συνῆς,
ἥ ἄν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι οἰκαδε βελτίονι γεγο-
νότι, καὶ [ἐν] τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτα ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέ-
20 ρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τῷ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον·
“Ω Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ
εἰκός, ἐπεὶ καν σύ, καίπερ τηλικοῦτος ὧν καὶ οὔτως σοφός,
εἴ τις σε διδάξειεν ὁ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων
ἄν γένοιο· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὔτως, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα
25 μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἰπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν
τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπι-
δημοῦντος, Ζεύξιππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος
παρ’ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτα
ταῦτα, ἅπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ξυνῶν αὐτῷ βελτίων
30 ἐσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει· εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο· τί δὴ φῆς βελτίω
ἐσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν; εἴποι ἄν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος,
ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν· καν εἰ Ὁρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγ-
γενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταῦτα ταῦτα, ἅπερ σοῦ, ἐπα-
νέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅ τι βελτίων καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐσται συγγιγ-

νόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἴποι ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ Δ εἰπὲ τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἰπποκράτης ὃδε Πρωταγόρας συγγενόμενος, ἢ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρᾳ συγγένηται, βελτίων ἀπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἔκάστης οὗτος ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ 5 τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, Σύ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾶς, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται, ἀπερ ἀν ἐπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενέτονος τῶν σοφιστῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λαβῶνται τοὺς 10 νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἀκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκουσι—καὶ ἂμα εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δὲ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ μά-15 θημά ἐστιν εὑθουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἀν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῦ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως 319 τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἀν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν 20 ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. Αὐτὸν μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, δὲ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

“Η καλόν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἀπερ νοῦ. Can ἀρετὴ really be taught? ἐγὼ γάρ τοῦτο, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ὥμην δι-25 δακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως δακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως δακτὸν εἶναι μηδὲ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιος εἴμι εὔπειν. ἐγὼ γάρ Ἀθηναίους, ὕσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἐλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. δρῶ οὖν, ὅταν 30 συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέῃ πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ

5 ἐπιδώσει: ἐπιδώσοι BT 26 ὅπως ἀν ἀπιστῶ BT

περὶ ναυπηγίας, τὸνς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως, οἵσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, δν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται

Professional knowledge and judgment superior in professional matters, θηριούργὸν εἶναι, καν πάντα καλὸς ἥ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἔως ἂν ἦ αὐτὸς ἀποστῆ ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἥ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἥ ἔξαρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν 10 οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως [διοικήσεως] δέη βουλεύσασθαι, D συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὄμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὄμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννῆς, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ διντος διδασκάλου οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ, ἐπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, E ἀλλὰ ίδια ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν 20 ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἀ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὗ ἐπαίδευσεν, 320 ἀ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν, οὕτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὕτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ περιιόντες νέμονται but personal excellence not considered transmissible by means of instruction. Examples. παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρετοῖ περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτοῦ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων δ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῷ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, 30 ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἔξ μῆνας γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους εἴχω λέγειν, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίω

ἐποίησαν οὕτε τῶν οἰκείων οὕτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν,
ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδα-
κτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος,
κάμπτομαι καὶ οἷμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σε πολ-
λῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαζηκέναι, τὰ δὲ 5
αὐτὸν ἔξηνται. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπι-
C δεῖξαι, ώς διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φῦσιν ήσης, ἀλλ' ἐπί-
δειξον. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φῦσιν ήσης· ἀλλὰ πό-

τερον οὐδὲν, ώς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῆνον
Protogoras proposes to show that ἀρετὴ can be taught.
Presentation through a myth. λέγων ἐπιδεῖξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξέλθω; πολλοὶ οὖν 10
αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων, ὁποτέ-
ρως βούλοιτο, οὕτως διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν
μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῆνον οὐδὲν λέγειν.
"Ἡ γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἥσαν,

D θινητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἥν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις 15
χρόνος ἥλθεν είμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς
ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ
γῇ κεράννυσται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον,
προσέταξαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεῖ κοσμῆσαι τε καὶ νεῖμαι
δινάμεις ἔκαστοις ώς πρέπει. Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται 20
Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νείμαι, νείμαντος δ' ἐμοῦ, ἔφη, ἐπίσκε-
ψαι· καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἴσχὺν
ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει·
τὰ δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ' ἀσπλον διδόντος φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐ-
τοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἂ μὲν γάρ αὐτῶν 25
σμικρότητι ἥμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἰκησιν
321 ἔνεμεν· ἂ δὲ ἥνξε μεγένει, τῷδε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσωζεν· καὶ
τᾶλλα οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλά-
βειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀιστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλλη-
λοφῦσιν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας 30
εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκναῖς τε θριζῖν καὶ
στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ίκανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς

6 αὐτὸν Τ, αὐτὸν Β 10 ἡ λόγῳ διεξέλθων ΒΤ 22 νέμει Τ, νείμαι Β
23 τοὺς δ' ἀσθενέστερους: τοὺς δὲ ΒΤ 27 τῷδε Β, τῷ δὲ Τ

δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς εὐνὰς ἴοντιν θπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ
ταῦτα στρωμνὴ οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἔκάστῳ· καὶ ὑποδῶν
τὰ μὲν ὄπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ [θριξὶν καὶ] δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ
ἀναιμοῖς. τοὺντεῦθεν τρόφας ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἔξεπόριζεν,
5 τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς,
τοῖς δὲ ρίζας· ἔστι δὲ οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῷων ἄλ-
λων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν δλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς δὲ
ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῷ γέ-
νει πορίζων. ἄτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὁ Ἐπιμη-
10 θεὺς ἐλαζεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις· λοιπὸν δὴ C
ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἡπόρει ὅ
τι χρήσαιτο. ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπι-
σκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὑρᾶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα ἐμελῶς
πάντων ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρωπὸν γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδη-
15 τον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄσπλον· ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἡ είμαρμένη
ἡμέρα παρῆν, ἐν ᾧ ἔδει καὶ ἀνθρωπὸν ἔξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς
φῶς. ἀπορίᾳ οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς, ἥντινα σωτη- D
ρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὔροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς
τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ — ἀμύχανον γάρ ἦν ἄνευ
20 πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητίν τῷ ἥ χρησίμην γενέσθαι — καὶ οὕτω
δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν
ἀνθρωπὸς ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γάρ
παρὰ τῷ Διῷ· τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν
τοῦ Διὸς οἰκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ
25 Διὼς φυλακαὶ φοβερὰὶ ἤσαν· εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ E
Ἡφαίστου οἰκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνείτην, λαθῶν
εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέφας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ
Ἡφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀν-
θρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου
30 γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ [δὶ' Ἐπιμηθέα] ὕστερον, ἢπερ λέ- 322
γεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, πρῶτον

2 οἰκία B, οἰκεῖά T ὑποδῶν Cobet, ὑπὸ ποδῶν BT 4 ἄλλοις T, ἀλ-
λήλοις B 10 τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὰ ἄλογα T | διακοσμητὸν B

μὲν [διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν] ζῷων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, καὶ ἐπεχείρει βαμούς τε ἴδρυεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ δινόματα ταχὺ διηρᾶρώσατο τῷ τέχνῃ, καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμάτας καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὔρετο. οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευα- 5
 Β σμένοι κατ’ ἄρχας ἀνθρώποι φύκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἥσαν· ἀπώλυτο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῷ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἵκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὕπω 10 εἶχον, ἃς μέρος πολεμική. ἐξήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ’ οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἥδικουν ἀλλήλους ἄτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεῦς οὖν δείσας περὶ Σ τῷ γένει ήμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, ‘Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα 15 εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν’ εἰεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν ‘Ἐρμῆς Δία, τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὕδε· εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἵκανος ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ 20 ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω Ζῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, ἐφη δὲ Ζεύς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γάρ ἀν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ δλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὁσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον 25 γε Ζεὺς παρ’ ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

Universal possession of
aīdōs and
dīkē a neces-
sary condi-
tion for the
permanence
of social or-
der.

Οὕτω δή, ω̄ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, δλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβου- 30 λῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν δλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ Ε ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φής· εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς 323 συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἰωσιν, ἥν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης

πᾶσαν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὡς Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτίᾳ.

"Ινα δὲ μὴ οἴη ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὅντι ἥγοῦνται πάντες 5 ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἵν γάρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐάν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην, ἢν μὴ ἔστιν, ἢ καταγελῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες 10 ιουνθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ

Capacity of
moral judg-
ment pre-
sumed for all
men.

15 ἄλλη πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἔστιν, ἐάν οὗτος αὐτὸς καζ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ληηῇ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, δὲ εἰς σωφροσύνην ἥγοῦντο εἶναι, τάληῃ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μα-
nίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαί-
ους, ἐάν τε ὅσιν ἐάν τε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιού-
μενον δικαιοσύνην· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὅντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς C
γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ 20 ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἥγεισθαι παντὶ με-
τεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἥγοῦν-
ται εἶναι οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ
ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι φῶ ἀν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτο
σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι. ὅσα γάρ ἥγοῦνται

25 Physical
shortcomings
removed from
reprehension,
because they
are fixed.

ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῳ, D
οὐδὲν ἔνυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι
τοι ὅσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεούσιν· οἵον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς
ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος,

30 ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, οἷμαι, ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἰονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ

ἀνθρώποις, ἐάν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τάνατία τούτων

But morality must be capable of development and improvement, because it is made the object of criticism.
 κακά, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἱ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ
 αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὥν ἐστιν ἐν
 καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν
 τὸ ἑναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔντα δὴ 5
 πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς
 ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ
 γάρ ἐνέλεις ἐννοησαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὡς Σώκρατες,
 τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἱ γε
 ἄνθρωποι ἥγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν. οὐδεὶς 10
 γάρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τοῦτο τὸν νοῦν ἔχων
 Β καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα, ὅτι ἡδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὕσπερ θηρίου
 ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολά-
 ζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἔνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—
 οὐ γάρ ἀν τού γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλ- 15
 λοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε
 ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα· καὶ τοιαύτην διάνοιαν
 ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν
 ἔνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν,
 Κ ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ 20
 καὶ κολάζονται οἱ τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἀν οἴωνται ἀδι-
 κεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ
 τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἥγουμένων παρα-
 σκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν. ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως
 ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως· καὶ σκυτοτόμου 25
 συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι διδακτὸν καὶ παρα-
 Δ σκευαστὸν ἥγοῦνται ἀρετήν, ἀποδέδεικτά σοι, ὡς Σώκρατες,
 ἵκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται.

"Ετι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἦν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἀνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα 30
 τοὺς αὐτῶν νίκης διδάσκουσιν, ἀ διδασκάλων ἔχεται, καὶ

11 πρὸς τούτῳ BT 15 τό γε T, τότε B 25 οἱ σοὶ T, οἵσι οἱ B
 28 γ' ἐμοὶ T, γέ μοι B 29 λοιπὴ BT, λοιπὴ ἡ Heindorf 31 αὐτῶν T,
 αὐτῶν B

σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἦν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοί, οὐδενὸς

βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι, ὃ Σώκρατος,
Why do men of signal excellence not transmit it to their sons?
τες, οὐκέτι μῆδόν σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον. ᾧδε
γάρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι ἔν, η̄ οὐκ ἔστιν, Ε
οῦ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν,
εἰπερ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γάρ αὗτη

λύεται ἡ ἀπορία, ἦν σὺν ἀπορεῖς, ἡ ἀλλοδι οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν
γάρ ἔστιν καὶ τοῦτό ἔστιν τὸ ἔν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία
οὐδὲ κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὄσιον 325

10 εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἔν αὐτὸν προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς
ἀρετῆν· εἰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐδὲ πάντας μετέχειν καὶ μετὰ
τούτου πάντ' ἀνδρα, ἐάν τι καὶ ἄλλο βούληται μανθάνειν
ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἀνεν δὲ τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ
μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ κολαζεῖν, καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα

15 καὶ γυναῖκα, ἔωσπερ ἀν κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, δις
δ' ἀν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνία-
τον ὅντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν·

εἰ, οὕτω μὲν ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀν-
δρες εἰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς ὑιεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή,

20 σκέψαι ὡς θαυμασίως ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. ὅτι μὲν
γάρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸν ἥγοῦνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀπεδείξα-
μεν· διδακτοῦ δὲ ὅντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα

τοὺς ὑιεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἐάν
μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ τε ζημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ
25 καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετήν, καὶ C
πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν
ξυλλήβδην τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπάλ, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδά-

σκονται οὐδὲ ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν;
Of course moral excellence is aimed at in the education of the latter,
Oἵεσθαι γε χρή, ὃ Σώκρατες. Ἐκ παιδῶν
σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὕπερ ἀν ζῶσι, καὶ
διδάσκονται καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὴν θᾶττον
συνῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μῆτηρ
καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαιμά- D

χονται, ὅπως βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ
έργον καὶ λόγον ἐιδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι,
in all the different stages: ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν
καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον,
τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει· καὶ 5

during infancy, ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται·—εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλου
διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν
ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς

Ε διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ 10
in school, κινητήσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὴν αὖ γράμματα μάθωσιν
both in reading the good καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὥσπερ
authors τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατίθεασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν
βάζρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ 15

326 ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ μὲν νοοῦντες εἰσιν, πολλὰ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν
and in musical instruments, ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ δρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἵ τ' αὖ κινητήσεως 20
λοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ τούτους, ἐπειδὴν κινητίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν
Β ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κινητήσεως τὰ ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦνται ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα 25
ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυζμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὡσπιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· παῖς γάρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυζμέας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτους εἰς στίας παιδοτρίβουν πέμποντες, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίων 30
and in gymnastic training; ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῷ διαινοίᾳ χρηστῷ οὐσῃ,

С καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεις τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ Β, τάδε μὲν—τάδε δὲ Τ 13 συνήσειν Τ, συνοίσειν Β

σιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι *μάλιστα*·
 and of all
 these influ-
 ences emi-
 nent men's
 5 sons get the
 greatest allot-
 ment.

μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι· καὶ οἱ
 τούτων νίεῖς, πρφαίτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς
 ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, δψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάτ-
 τονται. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶ-
 σιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει
 μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν [κατὰ παρά-D
 δειγμα], ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν, ἀλλ'
 Education
 10 through influ-
 ences of riper
 years: moral
 aim of laws
 and public in-
 stitutions.

ἀτεχνῶς ὕσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω
 δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες
 γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον
 διδόασιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν
 ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις
 νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν
 15 νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν
 καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὃς δὲ ἀν ἐκτὸς βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει,
 καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτη καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοι πολ-
 λαχοῦ, ὡς εὐδυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐδῦναι. τοσαύτης Ε
 οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴδιᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ,
 20 θαυμάζεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν
 ἀρετὴ; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ
 διδακτόν.

Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ νίεῖς φαῦλοι
 γίγνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γάρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ
 25 ἀληθῆ ἔχω ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ
 πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, 327
 But, with all
 this, different
 degrees of
 moral results
 prevail.
 30 πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι,
 οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ γάρ δὴ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως — ἐν-
 θυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὄτιον καὶ
 μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν
 πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἥμεν, ὅποιός τις ἐδύνατο

1 δυνάμενοι μάλιστα Heindorf, δυνάμενοι BT 3 εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς
 ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι BT, πρφαίτατα τῆς ἡλικίας εἰς δ. Hirschig 13 ὡς BT
 17 ὄνομα τῇ Tb, ὄνοματι B 26 πόλις Bt, πολίτης T

ἔκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἵδιά καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθάνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδὲ ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνητῶν· λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἷμαι ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη⁵ καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προσύμμαχος λέγει καὶ διδάσκει [καὶ] τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα. εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσι ταῦτα προσύμματα καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἶχομεν ἀλλήλους There is such a thing as special endowment and Aptness, and so an eminent man's son may be inferior in moral excellence.

διδάσκειν, οἵει ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς¹⁰ νίεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἡ τῶν φαύλων; οἷμαι μὲν οὖν, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς αὐλῆσιν, σῦτος ἀν ἐλλόγιμος ηὐξύνθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἀν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δὲ ἀν¹⁵ φαύλου ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἀν πάντες ἥσαν ἴκανοί ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπιτίθοντας. οὕτως οἴουν καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἀνθρώπος τῶν ἐν ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου²⁰

D This condition of imperfection, however, is still far superior to the condition of brutal savages. τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἵς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴεν ἄγριοι τινες, οἵους περ πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης²⁵ δε ποιητὴς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίφ. ἡ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἄν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδᾳ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι' ἄν Εποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐντάδε ανθρώπων πονηρίαν· νῦν δὲ³⁰ τρυφᾶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὃσον δύνανται ἔκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς σοι φαίνεται

5 ἡμῖν Stephanus, ἡμῖν BT 19 ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις BT 29 ἐντύχοις B, ἐντύχαις T

εῖναι· ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν,

There can be such a thing as a certain degree of universal acquirement without special instruction.

οὐδέ ἀν εἰς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἄν, οἶμαι, εἰ ζητοῖς 328 τίς ἀν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν νίεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἢν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οὗτος τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὅντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἀν διδάξειεν; οὐ ράδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ράδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς 10 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἀλλὰ καν εἰ διάγονος ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν. ὃν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἰς εἶναι, καὶ B διαφερόντως ἀν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνησαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κάγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι· ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀπέδωκεν δὲ γὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας, ὅσου ἀν φῆ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον C κατέθηκε.

Toioūtōn σοι, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῆθον καὶ λόγον είρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Conclusion of the argument of Protagoras. οὕτως ἥγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους νίεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου νίεῖς, Παράλου καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἡλικιῶται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶνδε δὲ οὐπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γάρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.

Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος

ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον

13 οὐησαὶ Dobree, νοησαὶ BT 19 ἀποδέδωκεν BT, ἀπέδωκεν Kroschel

κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐβλεπον ώς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπι-
θυμῶν ἀκούειν · ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἡ συζύμην ὅτι τῷ
Effect of the
same on Soc-
rates (Socrat-
ic irony).
περεὶ συναγέέρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἰπ-
ποκράτην· Ω πᾶς Ἀπολλοδόρου, ώς χάριν σοι 5

Εἴχω ὅτι προὔτρεψάς με ὥδε ἀφικέσθαι· πολλοῦ γάρ ποιοῦ-
μαι ἀκηκοέναι ἢ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρου. ἔγωγε ἐν μὲν τῷ
Brief excur-
sus on the su-
periority of
the dialectical
method in ar-
gumentation.
ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρω-
πίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνον-
ται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρόν τι μοι 10
ἐμποδών, δὲ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως
ἐπεκδίδαξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδί-
δαξεν. καὶ γάρ εἰ μέν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων συγγένοιτο
329 ὄτιοῦν τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἀν καὶ τούτους* τοιούτους
λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν 15
εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι, ὕσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχου-
σιν οὕτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὕτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις καὶ
σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὕσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα
πληγέντα μακρὸν ἡχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται
τις, καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον 20
Β κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν
μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ώς αὐτὸς δῆλος, ἱκανὸς
δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρύμενος
περιμεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἢ ὀλίγοις
ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ 25
τινος ἐνδεής είμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. τὴν
ἀρετὴν φῆς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώ-
C πων, πειθοίμην ἀν καὶ σοὶ [πείθομαι]. ὃ δ' ἐξαύμασά σου
λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες
γάρ ὅτι δὲ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειν 30
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο
ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ

1 τι BT, ἔτι Hertlein 14 τοιούτονς BT 19 ἀποτείνει T, ἀποτίνει B
23 ἀποκρίνεσθαι T 27 ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἀν καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι BT

πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἐν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν
 Socrates re- αὐτὰ δίελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν
 quires a defi- μέν τι ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ
 nition of δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὄσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ'
 ἀρετή: is it 5 simple or composite? ἐστὶν ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον πάντα δυόματα τοῦ Δ
 autōn ἐνὸς δύντος· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δὲ ἐπιποθῶ.

'Αλλὰ ἥρδιον τοῦτο γ', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι,
 ὅτι ἐνὸς δύντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια ἐστιν ἂ ἔρωτᾶς. Πότερον,
 10 ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ
 ρῖς καὶ διφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὤτα, ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει [τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἑτέρων] ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ
 It is compos- δλον, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; Ἐκείνως
 ite, and its μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προ- E
 parts are het- σώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον πρόσωπον.
 15 having sepa- Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν
 rate functions. οἵ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ
 μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, ἐάνπερ τις ἐν λάβῃ,
 ἄπαντα ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν,
 ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὐδενά. Ἔστιν γάρ οὖν καὶ
 20 ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; 330
 Πάντων μάλιστα δύπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστον γε ἡ σοφία
 τῶν μορίων. Ἔκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἄλλο,
 τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἔκαστον ἰδίαν
 ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου; οὐκ ἐστιν διφθαλμὸς οὗτον
 25 τὰ ὤτα, οὐδὲ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων
 οὐδέν ἐστιν οὗτον τὸ ἔτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε
 κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἅρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ
 ἐστιν τὸ ἔτερον οὗτον τὸ ἔτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις B
 αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἶπερ τῷ παραδείγματί
 30 γε ἔοικεν; Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγώ εἶπον· Οὐδέντεν ἄρα
 ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλ' οἷον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ
 οἷον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδὲ οἷον ἀνδρεία, οὐδὲ οἷον σωφροσύνη,
 οὐδὲ οἷον ὄσιότης. Οὐκέτι ἔφη. Φέρε δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ

30 ἔφη B, ἔφη ἔχει ὁ Σώκρατες T

σκεψάμεθα ποιῶν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἔκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ
 C τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τι ἐστιν ἢ οὐδέν
 Δικαιοσύνη. πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;
 Κάμοι, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; εἰ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· Ὡς Πρωτα-
 γόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δῆ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, 5
 δὲ ὡνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον ἐστιν
 ἢ ἀδικον; Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ
 δὲ τίν ἀν ψῆφον ζεῖτο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἀλλην; Τὴν αὐ-
 τήν, ἔφη. Ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιου
 D εἶναι, φαίνη ἀν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκ- 10
 οῦν καὶ σύ; Ναί, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο·
 οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν
 Οσιότης. ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. Ναί, ἢ δὲ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν φατὲ
 καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμά τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἄν· ἢ οὐ; Καὶ τοῦτο
 συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον 15
 πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὄσιον; ἀγανακτήσαιμ
 ἀν ἔγωγ, ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ ἄν· εὐφήμει, ω
 Ε ἀνθρωπε· σχολῆ μεντάν τι ἄλλο ὄσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε
 ἡ ὄσιότης ὄσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὔτως ἀν ἀποκρί-
 ναιο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 20

Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· πῶς οὖν δλίγον
 πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἄρού οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατίκουσα; ἐδύ-
 ξατέ μοι φάναι *τὰ* τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὔτως ἔχοντα
 Socrates re- πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν
 serves his οἷον τὸ ἔτερον· εἴποιμ ἄν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν 25
 own position, ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἥκουσας, δτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἵει εἰπεῖν
 331 τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρί-
 νατο, Ἐγὼ δὲ ἡρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ω
 Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῆς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἔτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ
 ἔτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σδες οὗτος δὲ λόγος ἐστίν; τί ἀν 30
 αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ω Σώκρατες, ὄμολογεῖτο.
 Τί οὖν, ω Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὄμο-
 λογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄσιότης

οῖον δίκαιου εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οῖον ὅσιον,
 ἀλλ' οῖον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δὲ ὄσιότης οῖον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον; τί
 αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμενα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ
 γε ἔμαυτοῦ φαίην ἀν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον
 εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ
 δέ, εἴ με ἐψήξ, ταῦτα ἀν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην,
 ὅτι ἥτοι ταῦτόν γ' ἐστὶν δικαιότης ὄσιότητι ἢ
 ὅτι ὄμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη οῖον
 10 ὄσιότης καὶ ἡ ὄσιότης οῖον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ διακω-
 λύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἡ καὶ σὸν συνδοκεῖ οὕτως. Οὐ πάνυ
 μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε σ
 συγχωρῆσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄσιότη-
 τα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι.
 15 ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἐστω ἡμῖν
 καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὄσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἵνα δ'
 ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι
 δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δὲ ἐμέ τε καὶ
 σέ τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον
 20 Slight person- βέλτιστ' ἀν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ εἴ ἀφέλοι
 al friction. αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢ δὲ δεῖ, προσέοικέν τι δ
 δικαιοσύνη ὄσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν ὄτῳοῦν ἀμῆ γέ πῃ
 προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἐστιν ὅπῃ προσέ-
 οικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἄλλα
 25 Protagoras ἀ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἀ
 insists on the τότε ἔφαμεν ἀλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι
 relativity of τὸ ἔτερον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου
 resemblance, μόρια, ἀμῆ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἐστιν τὸ ἔτερον οῖον τὸ
 ἔτερον· ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ καν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ Ε
 30 βούλοιο, ὡς ἀπαντά ἐστιν ὄμοια ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ
 δόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὄμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν
 τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, καν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ [τὸ δόμοιον].
 καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ

3 ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ΒΤ 17 οὐδὲν Τ, οὐδὲ δίκαιον ΒΤ 23 ὅπῃ: ὃ μὴ ΒΤ

δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι
σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἄλλήλους; Οὐ πάτιν, ἔφη, οὔτως, οὐ μέντοι
332 οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μήν,
and the point
is dropped.
ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν
πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἔάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο 5
ῶν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψάμεν.

Ἄφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἐφη. Τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ
Socrates in-
troduces the
notion of the
contrast, and
establishes it
by induction.
πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἔφη. Πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἀνθρώποι
δρῶσι τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι 10
δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ [εἰ] τούναντίον
[ἐπραττον]; Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σω-
Β φροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ δρῶσι
πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω
πράττοντες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τούναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ 15
ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν
ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως
σωφροσύνη; Ὡμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἵσχει πράττεται,
ἵσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει.
Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, 20
C βραδέως; Ἐφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ^{τοῦ} αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;
Συνέφη. Φέρε δή, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν; Συνεχώρει.
Each notion
has but one
contrast.
Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν; 25
Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν; Ἐστιν.
Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν; Οὐκ
ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι δξὺ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τούτῳ μὴ
ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν,
ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον
D καὶ οὐ πολλά; Συνωμολόγει. Ιδε δή, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἀναλο- 30
γισώμενα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ^{τοῦ}
μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή; Ὡμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ
δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; Ἐφη.
ὅ τοδε B, τὸ δὲ T 7 οὐ: οὐδὲ BΤ 11 ἡ εἰ τούναντίον ἐπραττον BΤ

‘Ωμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὁ ἀν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνιως πραττομένῳ;’ Εφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνιως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνιως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως εἰ πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτ’ ἄν; Ναί. Πράττεται

Now ἀφροσύνη is the contrast of σωφροσύνη and of σοφία as

δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναί. Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὅντων; Ναί. Ἐναντίον ἄρ’ ἔστιν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη; Φαίνεται. Μέ-
well.

10 μνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι; Συνωμολόγει. ‘Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημί. Πότερον εὖν, ὥς 333

Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναν-

τίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν φῷ ἐλέγετο ἔτερον εἶναι

15 Hence σοφία and σωφροσύνη must be assumed to be σωφροσύνης σοφίᾳ, μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὕτοι γάρ

οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γάρ

20 συνάρθουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γάρ ἀν συνάρθουσιν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, Β πλείοσι δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἐνὶ ὅντι σοφίᾳ ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐτὸν φαίνεται· ἢ γάρ, ὥς Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ,
ἢ ἄλλως πως;

‘Ωμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ’ ἀκόντως. Οὐκοῦν 25 ἐν ἀν εἴη ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐτὸν εἴσανη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης σχεδόν τι ταῦτὸν ὅν. Ιτε δή, ἵνι δὲ ἐγώ, ὥς Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψόμεθα. ἄρα τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ; Αἰσχυνοίμην ἀν 30 ἐγώγ, ἔφη, ὥς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὄμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.

9 μέμνησαι: μέμνημαι ΒΤ 12 πότερον οὖν Τ, πρότερον οὐκοῦν Β

Ἄλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἴτε μή. τὸν γάρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἔξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἵσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔξετάζεσθαι.

D Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ὥμην ὁ Πρωταγόρας· 5
Protagoras τὸν γάρ λόγον ἡτιάτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι· ἔπειτα
nettled. μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

"Ιὕτι δή, ἔφην ἔγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; "Εστω, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σω-

Can σωφρο-
σύνη be in-
volved in
ἀδικίᾳ?
There may be
a regard for
that which is
good for the
E ἀδικῶν. Is
the good the
useful?

φρονεῖν λέγεις εῦ φρονεῖν; "Εφη. Τὸ δὲ εὗ 10
φρονεῖν εῦ βουλεύεσθαι [δtti ἀδικοῦσιν];
"Εστω, ἔφη. Πότερον, ἦν δὲ ἔγώ, εἰ εὗ πράτ-

τουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ εὗ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι; Λέγω. "Αρ' οὖν, ἦν δὲ ἔγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, ἃ ἐστιν ὡφέλιμα τοῖς 15
ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δλ', ἔφη, κἄν μὴ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ὡφέλιμα ἦ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.
καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἡδη τετραχύνθαι

τε καὶ ἀγωνιāν καὶ παρατετάσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἔπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος 20

334 ἡρέμα ἡρόμην. Πότερον, ἦν δὲ ἔγώ, λέγεις, ὡς Πρωταγόρα,

Protagoras
insists on the
relativity of
the useful,
which point
he amply il-
lustrates sat-
isfying at the
same time his
love of rhetor-
ical display.

ἀ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἂ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὡφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἵδε ἂ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία 25
καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὡφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα,
ἴπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν·
τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδέσι, δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ 30

Β βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος, πάντων τῶν φυτῶν
ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δὲ ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρούς τους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα

19 παρατετάσθαι Kock, παρατετάχθαι BT 29 οὐδενὶ BT

ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν
ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν
ἄλλων ζφών πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που ἀγωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί
5 ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς
μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς
δὲ ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἱατροὶ C
πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χοησθαι ἔλαιώ,
ἀλλ’ ἡ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι,
10 ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς
αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις
τε καὶ ὅψοις.

Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν

He is reward- ὡς εὗ λέγοι· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὡ Πρωταγόρα,
15 ed by ap- ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὧν ἀνθρωπος, D
plause. καὶ ἐάν τις μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι

περὶ οὗ ἦν ἡ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος
ών, φίου ἦν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον
Soocrates now φιλέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν,
20 insists on pre- ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς
cise and brief ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι
answers. ἐπεσθαι. Πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρί-
νεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδα-
μῶς, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. Ἀλλ’ ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη. Ναί, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. E

25 Socrates ap- Πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
peals to the τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; Ἀκίκοα
versatility of γοῦν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἵος τ’ εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ
his opponent, ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ
deprecating λέγειν, ἐάν βούλῃ, οὕτως, ὥστε τὸν λόγον
at the same μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸν βραχέα οὕτως, ὥστε
time his own μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν μέλ- 335
30 limited facul- λεις ἴμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἐτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ
ty of discus- πρός με, τῷ βραχυλογίᾳ. Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς

ἥδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο
ἐποίουν δὲ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευν με δια-
λέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἀν βελτίων
Protogoras λέγεσθαι, οὗτοι οὐδενὸς ἀν βελτίων
refuses this ἐφαινόμην οὐδὲ ἀν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα
request defi- ἐν τοῖς "Ελλησιν. καὶ ἐγώ — ἔγνων γάρ ὅτι 5
nitely. οὐκ ἥρεσεν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς

Β ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος
διαλέγεσθαι — ἡγησάμενος οὖν οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι
[Dramatic παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, Ἀλλά τοι, ἔφην,
complica- ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ 10
tion.] σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι,
ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι
ἔπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται
περὶ σοῦ, φῆς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν
C βραχυλογίᾳ οἵος τ’ εἴ τινας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γάρ 15
εἴ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἀν
οἵος τ’ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα
δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέ-
λεις καὶ ἐμοὶ τις ἀσχολία ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἀν οἵος τ’ εἴην σοι
Socrates pro- παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους — ἐλ- 20
poses to de- θεῖν γάρ ποι με δεῖ — εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀν
part. ἵσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἥκουν.

Kαὶ ἄμα ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μου
D The host in- ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς
terposes, and χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δὲ ἀριστερῇ ἀντελάβετο 25
begs Socrates τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτού, καὶ εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἀφήσο-
το remain. μέν σε, ὦ Σάκρατες· ἐὰν γάρ σὺ ξέλθης, οὐχ
ὅμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖ-
ναι ήμιν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδὲ ἀν ἐνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαμι ἢ σοῦ τε
καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων· ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. 30
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον — ἥδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἔξιών — Ὡ παῖ Ιπ-
πονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ
Ε καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἀν χαρίζεσθαι

σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δὲ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ δέοισθαι
μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεράψῳ δρομῇ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι, η τῶν

Socrates re-
joins with his
own inability
to keep pace
with Protag-
oras in
μακρολογίᾳ.

δολιχοδρόμων τῷ η τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διατεῖν

τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι. εἴποιμι ἀν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ 336

μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτῷ δέομαι θέοντις τούτοις

ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι

δέει θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα

θέοντας, τούτου δέουσ συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν

γάρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως.

10 εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου
δέουσ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρωτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ
αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἴ δὲ μή,

τίς ὁ τρύπος ἐσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γάρ ^B

ἐγωγ' φύμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις

διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημητηρεῖν. Ἀλλ' ὄρպες,

ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωτα-

γόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε ἔξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως

βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ὅπως ἀν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ.

‘Υπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη,

20 Alcibiades
now takes the
part of Soc-
rates, and at-
tacks Protag-
oras's fashion
of discourse

ώ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γάρ ὅδε διολογεῖ

μὴ μετεῖναι ὅτι μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ

Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οὗσ τ' εἶναι ^C

καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι

θαυμάζοιμ ἀν εἴ τῷ αὐτῷ παραχωρεῖ.

εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας διολογεῖ φαυλότε-

ρος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἔξαρκεῖ

Σωκράτει· εἴ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρω-

τῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν

λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων

30 διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἔως ἀν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ^D

ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων· ἐπεὶ

Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει

11 δέον: δέοι BT 16 δοκεῖ Bt, δεῖ T 17 αὐτῷ τε BT 32 ἐγγυῶμαι t,
ἐγγυῶ καὶ BT

καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἔκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· Ὡ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία, Καλλίας μὲν 5 Critias now speaks, suggesting a common amicable E agreement without any partisanship. δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἄν δρμῆσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρῳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν ξυνουσίαν. 10

337 Εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὥς Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν Prodicus approves of this, introducing at the same time his hobby of synonyms. τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἵσους δὲ μή. ἐστιν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτόν· κοινῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι 15 δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἵσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἐκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαζεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὥς Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Β Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν 20 γὰρ καὶ ἐλένοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἔχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἀν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἀν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούοντιν εὐδοκιμοῦτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῦσθε· εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν 25 ἀκούοντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις Σ παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς τ' αὖθις ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἀν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα· εὐφραινεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι η ἄλλο ἡδὺ 30 πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, Ὡ ἄνδρες,

ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ
οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ δέ
νόμῳ· τὸ γάρ ὅμοῖον τῷ ὅμοιῷ φύσει συγγενές
ἐστιν, δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὥν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. ἡμᾶς οὖν
αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν ποιαγμάτων εἰδέναι,
σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ'
αὐτὸν τοῦτο οὐν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλά-
δος εἰς αὐτὸν τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ
αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ δλβιώ-
τατον οἴκου τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιωματος
ἀξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὕσπερ τοὺς φαυλο-
τάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφερεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὃ
10 each modifying his own fashion somewhat. He also proposes that an umpire be appointed.

15 Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς
ὕσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, 338
καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν
τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ὅδύν Πρωταγορα, ἀλλ' ἵφεῖναι
καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπεστεροι
20 καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν
πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ
πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι
ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν. ὃς οὖν ποιήσετε καὶ πείθεσθε μοι
ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ὑμῖν
25 φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου.

30 Ταῦτα ἥρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν, καὶ ἐμὲ
τε δέ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφῆσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι
ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν
εἴη βραβευτὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γάρ
χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν δὲ αἰρεθεῖς, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀν-
τεῖχοι τὸν χείρων τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε
ὅμοιος, οὐδὲ οὗτως ὁρθῶς· δέ γάρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ

1 ἡμᾶς Heindorf, ὑμᾶς BT 20 ἡμῖν: ὑμῖν BT 21 κάλων t, κάλον B,
κάλον T 23 ποιήσετε—πείθεσθε BT, ποιήσετε—πείσεσθε apogr. E

С ποιήσει, ὅστε ἐκ περιπτοῦ ὑρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα
ἡμῖν αἴρησεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἔγῳμαι,
ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώ-
τερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἴρησεσθε μὲν μηδὲν
βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε 5
γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην
αἴρεσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει.
ἀλλ' οὐτωσὶ ἐνέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' δὲ προσυμεῖσθε
συιουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ
μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος 10

μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἄμα πειράσομαι
Δ αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅπόσ' ἂν οὗτος
βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοί-
ως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόσθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸ ἐρω- 15
τώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα
αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφέρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ
Ε οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἔνεκα ἔνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάν-
τες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι·
καὶ οἱ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤζελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἦναγκά- 20
σθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἴκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ,
πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος. ἥρξατο
οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὐτωσί πως.

'Ηγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγι-

339 Protogoras calls attention to the importance of correctly interpreting poetry. He selects a poem of Simonides. στον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν 25
δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἵον τ'
εἶναι συνιέναι ἂ τε ὁρῶντος πεποίηται καὶ ἀ μή,
καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λό-
γον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα
περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέν, περὶ οὕπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ 30
νῦν δὴ διελεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηγμέ-
νον δέ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ

3 ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε BT, ἀδύνατον δὲ ὑμῖν ἵστε Badham 13 ὅπόσ'
B, ὅπως T 31 νυνδὴ διελεγόμεθα Stallbaum, νῦν διαλεγόμεθα BT

πον Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ Θετ-
ταλοῦ, ὅτι

ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαζέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, Β
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ
5 φόγου τετυγμένον.

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ ἐγὼ εἴ-
πον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαι τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχά-
Simonides νει μεμεληκός τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
was inconsis- πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ
tent in δρᾶς, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, *καλῶς* τε καὶ
blaming Pit- δρᾶς. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ
tacus, be- ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ δ ποιητής; Οὐ κα-
cause the lat- λῶς, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. "Ορα δή, ἔφη, βέλτιον. 'Αλλ',
ter really ὡγαθέ, ἔσκεψαι ἵκανῶς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι
meant the 15 προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει που·
same thing.

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν
φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι δι αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κάκεῖνα τὰ ἔμ-
20 προσθεν; Οἶδα, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα
ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; Φαίνεται ἔμοιγε. καὶ ἂμα μέντοι
ἔφοβούμην μή τι λέγοι. 'Ατάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνε-
ται; Πῶς γάρ ἀν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δ
ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὃς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέ-
25 θετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀληθεῖᾳ, δλί-
γον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελά-
θετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν
ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φησιν ἀποδέ-
χεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὑπότε τὸν
0 ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμ-
φεται, ὥστε ἥτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὑστερον οὐκ δρᾶς λέγει.
εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἐπαινούν Ε

10 ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ Bekker, ἐγώ τε καὶ Β 20 ταῦτα ΒΤ 27 ταῦτα
Β, ταῦτα Β 30 αὐτῷ Τ, αὐτῷ Β 31 πότερον Β, πότερον Τ

τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγα-

applause.

θοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλιγ-

γίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τάληθῆ,
ἴνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, 5

Socrates calls τρέπομι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐ-

upon Prodi-

τόν, Ὡ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμω-

νούς for aid. νιδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἰ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί.

δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ, ὡσπερ ἔφη Ὁμηρος τὸν
Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σι- 10
μέντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα·

φίλε κασίγνητε, σιθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν.

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν
Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γάρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σι- 15
μωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἢ τό τε βούλε-

τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταῦτὸν ὅν, καὶ ἂ

νῦν δὴ εἰπεις πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκύπει, εἰ σοι
συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γάρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐ-

τὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι 20·
τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταῦτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι

С καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; Ὡλλο νὴ Δὲ, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης
τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεκόντατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθεύᾳ

γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη; Ὡληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. 25

Difference Τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μίμφεται, οὐχ
between εἶναι ὡς οἱέται Πρωταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἐαυτῷ λέ-

and γενέσθαι. γοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γάρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς

Ἐλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, τὸ γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ὡσπερ ὁ Σιμωνί-
δης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἐστιν δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, 30
ὡς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ
μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει
ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. καὶ ἵσως ἀν φαίη Πρόδικος

5 ἐγγένηται: ἰκγένηται BT 29 χαλεπόν Schanz

ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν Δ
χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς
ἱδρῶτα θεῖναι· ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ρηϊδίην
δὴπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

5 'Ο μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήνεσέν με· δὲ
Πρωταγόρας, Τὸν ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον
ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ δὲ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Κακὸν
ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμὶ τις
γελοῖος ἴατρος· ἵψανος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. 'Αλλ' ε
10 οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Πῶς δή; ἢν δὲ ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη,
ἀμάρτια εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τι φησιν εἶναι τὴν
ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, δὲ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν
δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν
γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε.
15 κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ή Προδίκου σοφία θεία 341

Prodicus is τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἥτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη,
made to cover ή καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν
himself with little glory ἔμπειρος ὃν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνει, οὐχ
through his excessive and confident οὐδὲ τὸ μαθητής εἶναι
synonym-mongering. Προδίκου τουτού· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ
μανθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἵσως οὐχ
οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν, ὥσπερ σὺ
ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με
οὗτοὶ νοοῦστε ἕκαστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον
25 τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ,
ἐρωτᾶ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν. τὸ γὰρ β
δεινόν, φησίν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἕκαστοτε
δεινοῦ πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ δεινῆς ὑγιείας,
ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου καὶ δεινῆς πενίας,
30 ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὅντος. ἵσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτὸν
οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἄλλο
τι δὲ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις· ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον
γάρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν· τί ἔλεγεν, ὁ οὐ
Πρόδικε, τὸ χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ'

ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ὡς Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιπτακὸν λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ δύνειδίζειν τῷ Πιπτακῷ, ὅτι τὰ δύναμata οὐκ ἡπίστατο δρᾶς 5 διαιρεῖν ἀτε Δέσβιος ὥν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος; Ἀκούεις δῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου Δ τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ δὴ Πρωταγόρας, Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ 10 ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον ἦ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἵμαι, ἔφην, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, εἰ οὗτος τὸ ἔσει τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὴ γε 15 Ε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἔστιν εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ρῆμα· λέγει γάρ δὴ

Σεὸς ἀν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι γέρας

οὐ δῆπον τοῦτο γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἶτα τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Σεῷ τοῦτο γέρας 20 ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γάρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἂ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖται Socrates' own σθαί Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἐνέλω σοι 342 exegesis. εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μονούσιαν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσο- 25 μαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μονούσιαν ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ δὲ Ἱππίας ἐκελευθέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

'Εγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ἂ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γάρ 30 ἔστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ Β τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν· ἀλλ' ἔξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι,

ίνα μὴ κατάδηλοι ὡσιν ὅτι σοφίᾳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν,
 True philosophy, i.e. brevity and conciseness cultivated in Crete
 ὥσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς,
 ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ πε-
 ριεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσθεῖεν φῆ περίεισιν,
 πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν. νῦν δὲ ἀποκρυψάμε-
 νοι ἐκεῖνο ἔξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡτά τε κατάγνυνται
 μιμούμενοι αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἴμαντας περιειλίττονται σ
 καὶ φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς
 10 φοροῦσιν, ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς
 Λακεδαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴν βούλωνται
 ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς, καὶ ἥδη
 ἄχρωνται λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι
 τῶν τε λακωνίζοντων τούτων καὶ ἐάν τις ἄλλος ξένος ὃν
 15 ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς λανθάνοντες τοὺς
 ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις
 πόλεις ἔξιναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρῆτες, ἵνα μὴ ἀπομαθάνωσιν
 ἢ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ
 μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 20 γυναικες. γνοῖτε δ' ἄν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαί-
 δευνται, ὥδε· εἰ γάρ ἐξέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλο-
 τάτῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει
 25 of the same kind was the wisdom of the Seven Wise Men in general, and this saying of Pittacus. The latter saying
 30 Simonides endeavored to refute.
 αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἐπειτα, ὅπου
 ἀν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ρῆμα ἄξιον
 λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ ἐει-
 νὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδια-
 λεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν
 αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ κατανευοήκασι καὶ
 τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλόν
 ἐστιν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι
 τοιαῦτα οἵνον τ' εἶναι ρήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελέως
 πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ
 3 ἀνδρείᾳ Τ, ἀνδρεῖοι Β 4 φῆ περίεισι Ηευσδε, οι περίεισι Β, ὥιπερ εἰσὶν Τ

343 Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιττακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριητεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεύς, καὶ ἔβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἑρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι 5 ἄν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὖσαν, ρήματα βραχέα Βἀξιομνημόνευτα ἑκάστῳ εἰρημένα ὅτι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελθόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράφαντες ταῦτα, ἢ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶντι σαντόν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν. 10

Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ἵδια περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ρῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν Σέμμεναι. δοῦν Σιμωνίδης, ἃτε φιλότιμος ὥν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, 15 ἔγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ρῆμα ὕσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀξιλητὴν καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ρῆμα καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτὸν ἅπαν τὸ ἄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται. 20

Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸν κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἄσματος μανικὸν ἀν D Grammatical points advanced to support Socrates' interpretation. φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἔνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ρῆμα ὕσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην, λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὡς Πιττακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐκ 30 ἀληθείᾳ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀληθειαν, ὡς Εἴρα δοντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ

7 εἰρημένα BT, εἰρημένα ὅτι sine oītoī Kroschel 24 ἐνέβαλε τὸ: ἐνεβάλετο BT

ἀγαθῶν μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς· εὐηθεῖς γάρ τοῦτό γε φανείη ἀν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἀλαζέως, οὐτωσί πως ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν λέγοντα τὸν Πιττακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον, εἰπόντα ὡς ἀνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὡς Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ γάρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι³⁴⁴ μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαζέως. οὕτω 10 φαίνεται [τὸ] πρὸς λόγον τὸ μέν ἔμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαζέως δρῦσθως ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὗ πεποίηται· πάνυ γάρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως³⁴⁵ 15 ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἀν εἴη αὐτὸν οὕτω διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὄλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ Πιττακέον ρήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

Δέγει γάρ μετὰ τοῦτο διλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἀν εἰ λέγοι 20 λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαζέως, Further com- οἶόν τε μέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά· γενόμενον^C
mentary in detail. δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα^C ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὡς Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεός ἀν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ^D 25 γέρας,

ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἐστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
δν ἀν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίον ἀρχῇ;
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· δὲ μὲν γάρ ἰδιώτης ἀεὶ καθήρηται· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἀν καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι ἀν τις, ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὅντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἀν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ αεὶ ἀμήχανον^D

δντα ού· καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμῶν ἐπιπεσῶν
ἀμήχανον ἀν ποιήσειν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελ-
θοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἀν θείη, καὶ ἵατρὸν ταῦτα ταῦτα. τῷ μὲν
γάρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου
ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

5

ἀντὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐσθλός·

Ετῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη·
ώστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν
ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ, οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι·
σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν 10
γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν, δυνατὸν δὲ [ἐσθλόν], ἔμμεναι δὲ
ἀδύνατον·

πράξιας μὲν γάρ εὗ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δὲ εἰ κακῶς.

345 τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, καὶ τίς ἄνδρα 15
ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τούτων μάθησις.

Introduction
of Socrates'
own Ethical
Theory.
ἐπιστήμη in
Ethics.

τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἵατρὸν ποιεῖ; δῆλον
ὅτι ἡ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς Θεραπείας μάθησις.
κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἀν κακὸς ἵατρὸς
γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι φῆ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει 20
ἵατρῷ εἶναι, ἐπειτα ἀγαθῷ ἵατρῷ· οὗτος γάρ

ἀν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἵατρικῆς ἴδιῶται οὐκ ἀν
ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἵατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες
Βούτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἵατρὸς ἀν
γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἵατρός. οὕτω 25
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἀν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ^τ
χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς
περιπτώματος· αὕτη γάρ μόνη ἐστὶν κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης
στερηθῆναι· δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἀν ποτε γένοιτο κακός·
ἔστιν γάρ ἀεί· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν 30
πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι. Ὅστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄσματος
C πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἴδον
τε [διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν], γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἴον τε,

11 ἐσθλόν delevit Schneidewin 19 κακὸς δὲ BT, κακὸς δὲ εἰ Ast

καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ
ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὖς ἀν οἵ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιττακὸν εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ
ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δῆλοι· φησὶ γάρ·

5 τοῦνεκεν οὖ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν
αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρ-
πὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

10 ἐπειδὴ οὐκέν εὐρών ἀπαγγελέω,
φησίν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται Δ
τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ρήματι·

πάντας δὲ ἵπαινημι καὶ φιλέω
ἔκδων ὅστις ἐρδη

15 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δὲ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχον-
ται·

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸν τοῦτ' εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ
οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαι-

20 Further So-
cratic Ethics:
none do the
evil from their
own choice.

τεῦν, δος ἀν ἔκδων μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς δύντων
τινῶν οὐλέκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ
σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν σοφῶν Ε
ἀνδρῶν ἡγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξα-

μαρτάνειν οὐδὲν αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἔκόντα
ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὗ ἵσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ
25 κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἀκοντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ Σιμωνίδης
οὐχ δος ἀν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἔκδων, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ξαντοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἔκδων. ἡγεῖτο
γὰρ ἀνδρα καλὸν κάγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν
φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην [φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν], 346
30 οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρᾳ ἢ πατέρᾳ ἀλλόκοτον
ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονη-
ρούς, ὅταν τοιοῦτον τι αὐτοῖς συμβῇ, ὥσπερ ἀσμένους

10 ἐπειδὴ BT, ἐπί Θ' vel ἐπὶ δ' Bergk (ἐπὶ δὴ μιν εὐρών Sauppe) 32 τοι-
οῦτόν τι Β, τι τοιοῦτον Τ

δρᾶν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ ὀνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, Β ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἑκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς 5 ἐπικρύπτεσθαι· τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι δργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἔαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἔαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἔαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δέ, οἷμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ 10 ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ οὐκόν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ, ὃ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε ψέγω· ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψυχος, ἐπεὶ

ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἢ 15
μηδ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς τὸ δυνησίπολιν
δίκαν ὑγιῆς ἀνήρ·

οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι.
οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος·

τῶν γὰρ ἡλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα, 20
ὅστε εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἀν ἐκείνους μεμφόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.
Δού τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, οἵς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοῖον γὰρ ἀν εἴη πολλαχῷ· ἀλλ' 25
ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν· καὶ οὐδὲ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὑρυεδοῦς
ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὑρῶν
ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι,
ἀλλά μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἀν ἢ μέσος καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῇ, ὡς 30
ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιττακὸν

7 πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες Β, πατρίδι διαδικηθέντες Τ 16 τὸ δυνησίπολιν
G. Hermann, γε ὀνήσει πόλιν ΒΤ 18 οὐ μιν Schleiermacher, οὐ μὴν ΒΤ

λέγων τὸ πάντας δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἕκών (ἐν-ε
ταῦθα δῆ ἐν τῷ ἕκών διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἄκων δὲ ἐστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.
σὲ οὖν, καὶ εὶ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὃ Πιττακέ,
5 οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. νῦν δέ—σφόδρα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῶν ³⁴⁷
μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε
ἐγὼ ψέγω.

Ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ην δ' ἐγώ,
Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ἄσμα.

10 Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὗ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ
σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἀσμάτος διεληλυθέναι· ἐστι μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ
Iippias would parade himself, but is repressed by Alcibiades. ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εῦ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπι-
δεῖξω, ἀν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναί, ^B ἔφη, ὃ Ἰππία, εἰσαῦθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιον
τοῦ ἀσμάτος διεληλυθέναι· ἐστιν, ἀ ώμολογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωτα-
γόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εὶς ἐπι-
βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εὶ δὲ δὴ βούλε-
ται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἔτερον. καὶ ἐγὼ
εἴπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρᾳ ὄπότερον αὐτῷ

20 Socrates condemns in principle all philosophizing on passages taken from the poets. ηδίον· εὶ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἀσμάτων τε ^C καὶ ἐπῶν ἔάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγώ
σε ἡρώτησα, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, ἥδεως ἀν ἐπὶ^D τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σου σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ
δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὅμοιό-

25 τατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων
καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνα-
σθαι ἀλλήλοις δὶ ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ
τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαι-
δευσίας, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοῦ μισθού-
30 μενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνὴν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ^D
ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κάγανοι
συμπόται [πεπαιδευμένοι] εἰσίν, οὐκ ἀν ἴδοις οὕτ' αὐλη-
τρίδας οὔτε ὄρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς

αύτοῖς ἵκανον δὲ συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ Εἰς ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει ἑαυτῶν κοσμίως, κανὸν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν, οἵοίπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἶναι, 5 οὐδὲν δέονται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὓς οὕτε ἀνερέσθαι οἴνον τὸν τέλεσθαι περὶ ὃν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοί Superiority of τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν the dialectical ταῦτα φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν τοεῖν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερα, method. περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ἀδυνάτου σφίσιν 10

ἔξελέγξαι - ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἐῶσιν χαίρειν, 348 αὐτὸι δὲ ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν διὰ ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδύνοντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς διὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς 15 ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας - κανὸν μὲν βούλη ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἐτοῖμός εἰμι σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος - ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχεις, περὶ ὃν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμενα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. 20

Β Λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει δὲ Πρωταγόρας ὅποτερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν δὲ

Protagoras 'Αλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέφας, "Ω Protogoras is silent. Al- Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρω- cibiades stirs him up, and he agrees to go on. Καλλίας ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐδέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον 25 ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γάρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὗτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐδέλει δια-

λέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ Σ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέγηται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἀν βούληται ἄλλῳ. καὶ δὲ οἱ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἐδοξεῖν, τοῦ τε 30 'Αλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προύτράπετο

9 ταῦτα Β, ταῦτα Τ 10, 11 διαλεγόμενοι ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἔξελέγξαι ΒΤ, ἀδυνάτου σφίσιν ἔξελέγξαι Αστ.

εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρι-
νούμενος.

Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, Ὡ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι μέ-

Socrates ex- σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ
5 presses his ἔκαστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἥγοῦμαι γάρ
gratification. πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν "Ομηρον τὸ

σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ δ τοῦ ἐνόησεν. D

εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἀνθρωποι πρὸς

Ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δὲ εἴπερ

10 τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιών ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεῖ-

ῶτον βεβαιώσεται, ἔως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὕσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔνεκα

τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλω τινί, ἥγού-

μενός σε βέλτιστ' ἀν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

περὶ ὧν εἰκός σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ E

15 ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; δέ γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς

οἵτινει καλὸς κάγανός εἶναι, ὕσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν

ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ

αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οὕτως τέ εἰ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς.

καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην

20 τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν

ὑποκρηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς "Ελληνας, σοφιστὴν 349

ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς δι-

δάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἀρνυσθαι.|| πῶς

οὖν οὐ σε χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ

25 The theme
is taken up
anew: Are
the single vir-
tues separate
and heteroge-
neous parts of
30 an organic
whole, or are
they homoge-
neous compo-
nents?

ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὔ.

καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἀπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρώ-

τῶν περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιτινυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ

μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδια-

σκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγῷ μαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα

τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ B

δικαιοσύνη καὶ διστόης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε

δύντα δινόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἐστιν, ἢ ἔκά-

στιψ τῶν δινόματων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος

7 ὅτου BT 10, 11 περὶ ὧν B, περιών T, ἐπιδείξηται: βεβαιώσηται BT

οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον οὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἔκαστον, οὐκ ὁν
οῖον τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἔτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ
δινόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἔκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν
C δύναμάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι
ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὅμοιά ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις 5
καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου
μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὗ μόριά ἐστιν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια,
ἰδίαν ἔκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εὶ μέν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι
ὧσπερ τότε, φάσι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς
ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πῃ ἄλλῃ νῦν 10
D φήσῃς· οὐ γάρ ἀν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου
ταῦτα ἔλεγες.

'Αλλ' ἔγώ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα
μόρια μέν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς
παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ 15
The latter
seems proba-
ble, excepting
in the case of
ἀνδρεία.
τῶν διαφέρον πάντων τούτων. ὥδε δὲ γνώσει
πολὺ διαφέρει τοις ταῖς ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὐρήσεις γάρ πολλοὺς
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνο-
σιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστά-
τους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. "Εχε δή, ἔφην ἔγώ· 20
Εἴτιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀν-
δρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ή ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἵτας γ', ἔφη,
ἐφ' ἂ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ιέναι. Φέρε δή, τὴν ἀρετὴν
καλόν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδά-
σκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ 25
μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον οὖν, ην δὲ ἔγώ, τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ
αἰσχρόν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, η ὅλον καλόν; "Ολον που κα-
λὸν ὡς οἶνόν τε μάλιστα. Οἰσθα οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα

But it has
been shown
that ἀνδρεία
too must be
connected
with ἐπιστήμη.
κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; "Εγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολ-
υμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται η δὲ ἄλ- 30
λο τι; "Οτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
ἴππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ
ἰππικοὶ η οἱ ἄφιπποι; Οἱ ιππικοί. Τίνες δὲ

πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μῆ; Οἱ πελταστικοὶ· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. Ἡδη δέ τινας ^Β 5 ἔωρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας ὅντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; Ἐγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν; Αἰσχρὸν μεντὸν, ἔφη, εἴη ἡ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοι εἰσιν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔλεγες 10 τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ [τοὺς] θαρραλέους εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὅντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεὶ ^C αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοι εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὅντες ἀνδρεύτατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν 15 λόγον ἡ σοφία ἀν ἀνδρείᾳ εἴη;

Οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀ ἔλεγόν τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ ^{Excursus on dialectic method. Conversion of judgments.} καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἡρωτήθην· εἰ γάρ με τοῦτ' ἥρου, εἴπον ἀν ὅτι οὐ πάντες· τὸν δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ^D ἐμὸν ὄμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὁρῶς ὡμολόγησα. ἐπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὅντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπιστα-^E 25 μένων ἄλλων, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔει τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ταῦτὸν εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τὴν ισχὺν οἰησίης ἀν εἶναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ εἰ οὕτω μετιὼν ἔριο με εἰ οἱ ισχυροὶ δυνατοί εἰσιν, φαίην ἀν· ἐπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίειν δυνατώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν μὴ ^F 30 ἐπισταμένων παλαίειν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἀν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμοῦ ὄμολογήσαντος ἔξειν ἀν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις,

9 πῶς λέγεις ^{BΤ}, πῶς ἔλεγες ^{Hirschig} 20 τοῦτ' ^{Hirschig}, τότε ^{BΤ}
28 οἱ ισχυροὶ ^T, ισχυροὶ ^B 29 εἰ οἱ ^t, οἱει ^B, οὔει ^T

λέγειν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὄμολογίαν ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἰσχύς.
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ὄμολογῷ τοὺς δυνατοὺς
 ἰσχυροὺς εἶναι, τοὺς μέντοι ἰσχυροὺς δυνατούς· οὐ γὰρ
 351 ταῦτὸν εἶναι δύναμίν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ⁵
 ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας τε
 καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ, ἰσχὺν δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν
 σωμάτων. οὕτω δὲ κάκεῖ οὐ ταῦτὸν εἶναι θάρσος τε καὶ
 ἀνδρείαν· ὥστε συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους
 εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι τοὺς γε θαρραλέους ἀνδρείους πάντας·
 θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ 10
 Β ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία
 δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.

Λέγεις δέ τινας, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 εὗ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; "Εφη. "Αρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρω-

What is πος ἀν εὗ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος 15
 ἀγαθόν and ζψη; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἡδέως βιωὺς τὸν
 κακόν? βίον τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὗ ἀν σοι δοκοῦ οὕτως
 βεβιωκέναι; "Εμοιγ', ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγα-

C θόν, τὸ δὲ ἀηδῶς κακόν. Εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζψη
 ἡδόμενος. Τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ 20
 πολλοί, ἡδὲ ἄττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθά; ἐγὼ
 γὰρ λέγω, καθ' δὲ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά,
 μὴ εἰ τι ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἀποβίησται ἄλλο; καὶ αὗθις αὖ τὰ
 ἀνιαρὰ ὥστας οὔτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρά, κακά; Οὐκ

D The ἀγαθά oīda, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ 25
 are a species έρωτᾶς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα
 of the ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἄπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά·
 and the κακά ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπό-
 of the ἀνιαρά. κρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι,

ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἐστι 30
 μὲν ἂν τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγαθά, ἐστι δὲ αὖ καὶ ἂν τῶν
 ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστι κακά, ἐστι δὲ ἂν ἐστιν, καὶ τρίτον ἂν οὐδέ-
 τερα, οὕτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθά. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ,

οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν; Πάνυ γ', Ε
ἔφη. Τοῦτο τούννυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ
ἀγαθά, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἔρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
"Ωσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάστοτε, ὥστι Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα
5 αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγου δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ
τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρηστεῖν· εἰ
δὲ μή, τότε ἡδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ'
ἔγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἔγὼ ἡγῶμαι;
Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γάρ καὶ κατάρχεις τοῦ
10 λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἔγώ, τῆδε πη καταφανὲς ἀνήδην 352
γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀνθρωπὸν σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἰδούς ἢ
πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων,
ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι· ἵθι δή μοι
ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον,
15 ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἔγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποδῶ
πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος δότι οὔτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φύεις, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἵθι
δή μοι, ὥστι Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον·
πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ
20
What is the
proper posi-
tion and func-
tion of ἐπι-
στήμη?
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν
τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδὲ ἀρχικὸν
εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος δια-
νοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ
25 ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο
τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε
δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φύσον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ Κ
τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης
ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι
30 It should con-
trol all human
action;
περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπι-
στήμη καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ
έάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ τις τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ
ἀν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν

ἢ ἀν ἐπιστήμην κελεύῃ, ἀλλ' ἵκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄμα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ

Δέκμοί σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπέων πραγμάτων. Κα- 5 λῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἵσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλα πολλούς φασι γιγνώ- σκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐπέλειν πράττειν, ἔξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους 10 δὴ ἐγὼ ἡρόμην ὃ τί ποτε αὐτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασὶν ἡττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὕν

E νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπό τινος τούτων κρατουμέ-
νους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἷμα,
ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὁρῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἀνθρω- 15
ποι. Ἰδι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
353 πους καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ
βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἵσως γὰρ ἀν λε-
γόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὁρῶς λέγετε, ὡς ἀνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ 20
ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἀν ἡμᾶς· ὡς Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρα-
τες, εἰ μὴ ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ
τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατον ἡμῖν.
Τί δέ, ὡς Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν
δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ ὃ τι ἀν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; 25
ΒΟῖμαι, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, εἶναι τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἔξευρεῖν
περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τὰλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ'
ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ
ἡγήσασθαι, ἢ οἷμαι ἀν ἐγωγε κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι,
ἔπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐώ χαίρειν. Ἀλλ', 20
ἔφη, ὁρῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέρανε ὥσπερ ἥρξω.

C Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατὲ

1 ἢ B, ἢ T, ἀν Sauppe, ἢ ἢ B, ἀν T 19 ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν: ἐπιγινώσκειν
BT 22 ἄλλα T, ἄλλο B

τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἴποιμ' ἀν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· ἀκούετε δή· πειρα-

Psychological analysis of the οὐκοῦν ἥττα- σόμενα γάρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σοῦ.

σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι

ἡδέων δυντων, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν; Φαῖεν ἄν. Οὐκοῦν ἐροίμενος ἀν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν· πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῆ φατὲ εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι

10 Men choose a course of action on the supposition that the object is good for the subject; and vice versa. The regard for the ἡδονὴν ταῦτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει D καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ καν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἀν κακὰ εἴη, ὅτι παθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὅπησον; ἄροιδούμενος ἀν αὐτοὺς, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ἄλλο τι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἢ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς παραχρῆμα ἐργασίαν κακά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ὕστερον E γιγνόμενα, νόσους τε καὶ τᾶλλα. Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη δ' Πρωταγόρας, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀν ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι. Οὐκοῦν νόσους ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ, καὶ πενίας ποιοῦντα ἀνίας ποιεῖ; δομολογοῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. Συνέφη δ' Πρω- 354 ταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, ὑμῖν, ὡς φαμεν 25 ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ δυντα, ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτῆς καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστε- pleasurable and for the reverse really always determines action.

ρεῖ; δομολογοῖεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν ἀμφοῖν.

Oὐκοῦν πάλιν αὖ αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐναντίον εἰ ἐροί- μενα· ὡς ἄνθρωποι οἱ λέγοντες αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἄρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε, οἷον τά τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καύσεών τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ

16 ὅτι παθόντα Stallbaum, ὅτι παρόντα Hermann, ὅτι μαθόντα BT 28 πάλιν αὖ Schanz, πάλιν ἀν BT 31 στρατείας T, στρατιάς B

φαρμακειῶν καὶ λιμοκτονιῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ
 Β μέν ἐστιν, ἀνιαρὰ δέ; φαῖεν ἄν; Συνεδόκει. Πότερον
 οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα
 ὁδύνας τὰς ἐσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγηδόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν
 ὕστερον χρόνον ὑγίειαί τε ἀπ' αὐτῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξίαι 5
 τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρίαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ
 καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. Συνεδόκει. Ταῦτα δὲ
 ἀγαθά ἐστι δί' ἄλλο τι, ἢ ὅτι εἰς ὥδονάς ἀποτελευτῇ καὶ
 λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο
 Σ τέλος λέγειν, εἰς δὲ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, 10
 ἄλλ' ἢ ὥδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἄν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι.
 Οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη δὲ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν
 ὥδονήν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὅν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς
 κακόν; Συνεδόκει. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγεῖσθ̄ εἶναι κακόν, τὴν
 λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ὥδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν 15
 τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μείζονων ὥδονῶν ἀποστερῇ
 ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν
 Δ αὐτῷ ὥδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν
 καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἄν
 καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, 20
 ἐφη δὲ Πρωταγόρας. "Ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ
 λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ὥδονάς τῶν λυπῶν παρα-
 σκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν 25
 Ε καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς δὲ ἐγὼ λέγω,
 ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις,
 δὲ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε,
 ὃ ἄνθρωποι, τίνος οὖν δίποτε ἔνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου
 λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῷ; συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἄν ἔγωγε. 30
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ράδιον ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο,
 δὲ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ὥδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ

1 φαρμακειῶν Τ, φαρμάκων Β 11 ἄλλ' ἢ Stephanus, ἄλλ' ΒΤ 16 λέγετε
 Τ, λέγεται Β

εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι
ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν 355

If this is correct, it must be said that man never acts against his conception of the good,
ηδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶνται τὸν βίον ἀνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε, ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώ-

10 σκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἔξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ B ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὗδις αὐτὸν λέγετε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων διὰ τούτων ἄνθρωπος τάγαθὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενος. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν,

15 κατάδηλον ἔσται, ἵνα μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἐπειτα αὗδις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ

and the ἡττᾶ-
20 σθαι ἡδονῶν
resolves itself
into ἡττᾶσθαι
ἀγαθοῦ: only
it is really
choosing less-
er good in-
stead of great-
er good.
ἀνιαρῷ. Θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν, ὅτι γιγνώ- C
σκων διὰ τούτων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται,
διὰ τί, ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος
ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι
ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν
ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἐκείνῳ δὴ ἀπο-

κρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἡττώμενος—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει· τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἀν οὖν τύχῃ δὲ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστὴς ὁν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἦ γελοῖον λέγετε πρᾶγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων D
30 ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. || ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἀξίων ὅντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν

3 ἢ ἄλλο BΤ 10 ἄνθρωπος Sauppe, ἄνθρωπος BΤ—αὐτὰ T, αὐτὸ B

17 προσαγορεύωμεν B, προσαγορεύομεν T 19 λέγωμεν T, λέγομεν B

22 τοῦ T, τούτου B 26 λέγωμεν: λέγομεν BΤ

τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων; φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γάρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. κατὰ τί δέ, φήσει ἵσως, ἀνάξια ἐστιν τάγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μεῖζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ 5 Επλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω [ἢ]; οὐχ ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δῆλον ἄρα, φήσει, ὅτι τὸ ἥττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μεῖζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν δὴ τὰ δύνματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἀνθρω- 10

Correct ac-
tion then re-
solves itself
into that

356 choice of good
which is based
upon the
knowledge of
the greater,
i. e. the more
remote and ul-
timate good.

πος πράττει, τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἥττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη δὴ ἀξία ἡδονῆς πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἄλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ 15 ἄλλήλων καὶ ἐλλειψίς; ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ μεῖζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἄλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ 20 λυπηροῦ, μῶν ἄλλῳ τῷ, φαίνην ἀν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῆς καὶ βλύπη; οὐ γάρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἴσταναι ἀνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπε πότερα πλείω ἐστίν. ἐάν μὲν γάρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα 25 ἴστη, τὰ μεῖζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐάν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐάν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐάν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐάν τε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐάν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἦ ἀν 30

С ταῦτ' ἐνῃ· ἐάν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα· μή πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει, φαίνην ἄν, ταῦτα, ὡς ἀνθρωποι; οἴδε ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ. "Οτε

δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τύδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄφει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζω, πόρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὐ; Φήσουσι. Καὶ τὰ παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσάντως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ *αἱ* ἵσαι ἐγγύθεν μὲν

5 μείζονες, πόρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; Φαῖεν ἄν. Εἰ οὖν

It is a kind of refined power of perception, and a certain skill in weighing and measuring.
 ἐν τούτῳ ὑμῖν ἦν τὸ εὗ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν D μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἀν 10 ἥμιν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἄρα γέ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἥμας ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἵρεσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἀν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ 15 φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἱσυχίαν ἀν ἐποίησεν εἴχειν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἐσωσεν ἀν τὸν βίον; ἄροτέν ἀν ὅμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἥμας τὴν μετρητικὴν σώζειν ἀν τέχνην, ἢ ἄλλην; Τὴν μετρητικήν, ὁμολόγει. Τί δέ, εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ 20 ἀρτίου αἵρεσει ἥμιν ἦν γέ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου, δπότε τὸ πλέον ὁρθῶς ἔδει ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὅπότε τὸ ἐλάττον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἔτερον πρὸς τὸ ἔτερον, εἴτ' ἐγγὺς εἴτε πύρρω εἶη, τί ἀν ἐσωζειν ἥμιν τὸν βίον; ἄροτέν ἀν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἄροτέν ἀν οὐ μετρητικὴ τις, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς 25 τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἄρα ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθμητική; ὅμολογοῖεν ἀν ἥμιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ οὐ; Ἐδόκουν ἀν καὶ τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅμολογειν. Εἶνεν, ὡς ἄνθρωποι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὁρθῇ τῇ αἵρεσει ἐφάνη ἥμιν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου 30 οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πυρρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἄρα πρῶτον B

4 ἵσαι BT 10 ἢ ἡ: ἡ BT 11 αὕτη T, αὐτὴ B 15 δηλά σασα T,
δηλώσας B 23 οὐκ ἐπιστήμη: ἐπιστήμη BT 26 ἡ ἀριθμητική: ἀριθμητική B, ἀριθμητικῇ T

μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἴσοτητος πρὸς ἄλλήλας σκέψις; Ἐλλ' ἀνάγκη.

Hence it comes within the sphere of knowledge. Hence it comes within the sphere of theory and knowledge. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκη δύπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν. "Ητις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη, εἰσαῦθις σκε-

5 ψόμενα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον ἔξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἥν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ ὧν ἥρεσθε νήμας. ἥρεσθε C δέ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἥνικα ὑμεῖς ἄλλήλοις ὡμολογοῦμεν ἐπι- στήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρείττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου 10 ἀν ἐνῷ, καὶ ὑδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ὑδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὡμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τοῦτο Hence "yielding to pleasurable sensations" is a want of knowledge. ἥρεσθε νήμας· ὡς Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ὑδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι, 15 ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; ἔπιπτε νήμα· εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἀν ἡμῶν·

τοῦν δὲ ἀν ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελά- σεσθε. καὶ γάρ ὑμεῖς ὡμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείᾳ 20 ἔξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὑδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς ἔξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ὡμο- λογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ή δὲ ἔξαμαρτανθμένη πρᾶξις Ε ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθίᾳ πράττε- 25 ται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὑδονῆς ἡττω εἶναι, ἀμαθίᾳ ή μεγίστη· ἡς Πρωταγόρας δέ φησὶν ἱατρὸς This want should be removed by moral instruc- τὸ οἰεσθαι ἄλλο τι ᷂ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς 30 πούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὅντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ

5 αὕτη: ἡ αὕτη BT 16 ἀλλὰ T, ἀλλο B 23 εἰς τὸ: ἡς τὸ BT 30 αὐ- τοὶ BT, αὐτοὶ ἵτε Madvig

ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἴδιᾳ
καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἀν ἡμεν · ὑμᾶς 358
δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, ^{*} Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε
—κοινὸς γάρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—πότερον δοκῶν ὑμῖν
ἀληθῆ λέγειν η̄ ψεύδεσθαι. Ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν
ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ην δὲ ἐγώ, τὸ
Applause and μὲν ἥδυ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν.
approval. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομά-
10 των παραιτοῦμαι. εἴτε γάρ ἥδυ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε
χαρτόν, εἴτε δόπτεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομά-
ζων, ὃ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς δὲ βούλομαι
ἀπόκριναι. Γελάσας οὖν δὲ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ
οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί δὲ δῆ, ὃ ἀνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἱ
5 ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως,
ἄρ' οὐ καλὰ [καὶ ὡφέλιμοι]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν
τε καὶ ὡφέλιμον; Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἥδυ
ἀγαθόν ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰδέμενος ἄλλα
βελτίω εἶναι, η̄ ἀ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἐπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, C
20 ξένον τὰ βελτίω · οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ'
ἔστιν η̄ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἔαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι η̄ σοφία.
Συνεδόκει πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δῆ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε
λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγ-
μάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει.
25 Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν ἔρχε-
ται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἀ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἀ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐξέλειν οὐναι D
ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ
ἔτερον αἴρεσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἴρησται ἐξόν τὸ ἔλατ-
30 τον. Ἀπαντα ταῦτα συνεδόκει ἅπασιν ήμιν. Τί οὖν;
ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ ^{*τι} δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ
ἐγώ; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὃ Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τιὰ λέγω

19 ἀ οἴοιει καὶ δύναται BT 20 αὐτοῦ BT 25 ἀλλ' ὅτι B 30 συνδο-
κεῖ BT 31 καλεῖτε τι Heindorf, καλεῖτε BT

κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φύβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἰππίᾳ δέος τε καὶ φύβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προ-
Ε δίκω δὲ δέος, φύβος δὲ οὐ. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥστη
Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν
ἐστιν, ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα λέναι ἂ δέ- 5
δοικεν, ἔξον ἐπὶ ἂ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων;
ἄ γάρ δέδοικεν, ὡμολόγηται ἡγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἂ δὲ
ἡγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὕτε λέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὕτε λαμβάνειν
359 ἐκόντα. Ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

Οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ὥστη Πρόδικέ 10
τε καὶ Ἰππίᾳ, ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε, ἂ τὸ
πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ ἂ τὸ
Application of these results to the definition of ἀνδρεία. πρῶτον παντάπασι· τότε μὲν γάρ δὴ πέντε
δυντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ
ἔτερον οἷον τὸ ἔτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔκαστον 15
ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἂ τὸ
Ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γάρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιει-
κῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνυ πολὺ²⁰
B διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, γνώσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη
τεκμηρίω τῷδε· εὑρήσεις γάρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους
ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν δυντας καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστο-
τάτους καὶ ἀμάθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· φη γνώσει ὅτι
πολὺ διαφέρει ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς.
καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθὺς τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι
μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεῖντον διεξῆλθον. ηρόμην δὲ οὖν 25
τοῦτον, εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· δέ, καὶ
C ὕτας γέ, ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα
ἀποκρινόμενος; Ὁμολόγει. Ἰδι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰπε ἡμῖν,
ἐπὶ τίνα λέγεις ὕτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ ἔφη ἄπερ
οἱ δειλοί; Οὐκέτη. Οὐκοῦν ἔφη ἔτερα. Ναί, ἢ δέ ος. 30
Πότερον οἵ μὲν δειλοί ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἵ δὲ
ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; Λέγεται δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὕτως

16 ἂ B, δ T 18 πάνυ πολὺ B, πάνυ T 19 γνώσεσθε BT 32 δειλά
BT

νπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλησῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ συ ἐπὶ τί φῆς ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρεῖ·

⁵ Ανδρεία then is an acquaintance with the formidable together with the knowledge that an ultimate good will accrue.

οὐς; ἀρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά, ὥγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἦ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; Ἐλλὰ τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ

ξελεγεις τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι ὅτι ἀδύνα-

τον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀλησῆς λέγεις·

ώστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὁρῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἂ

10 λόγει. Ἐλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἄ γε θαρροῦσιν πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται,

καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. Ἐλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρα-

τες, πᾶν γε τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἄ οἴ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται

καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν

15 ιέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν δν

ιέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλόν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ

ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς

πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Ἐλησῆ λέγεις,

καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ὁρῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ

20 ποτέρους φῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ιέναι, καλὸν δν 360

καὶ ἀγαθόν; Τοὺς δειλούς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; Ὡμολόγηται γοῦν,

ἔφη. Ἀρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ιέναι

ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδίον; Ἐλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο

25 ἐὰν ὡμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμο-

λογίας. // Τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ

ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδίον ἔρχεται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὡμολογεῖν. ^β

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται,

ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ἐλησῆ,

30 ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἀρ' οὐ καλά; Ὡμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ

καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ [καὶ οἱ

9 εὐρέθη Τ, εὐρέθη ἡ Β 12 οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι Β, ἀνάνδρεῖοι Τ 20 ποτέρους Τ, ποτέρου Β—φῆς εἰς: φῆσεις ΒΤ 24 κάλλιόν Stephanus, καλόν ΒΤ 25 διαφθεροῦμεν Τ, διαφεροῦμεν Β

Σαρσεῖς] καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι τούνναντίον αἰσχρούς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ Σάρρη Σαρροῦσιν; Ὡμολόγει.

Again, both C foolhardiness and cowardice are based on want of knowledge. Θαρροῦσιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ηδὲ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δὲ ὁ δειλοί εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, 5 δειλίαν ηδὲ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; Δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμα-

θίαν ἐφάνησαν δοντες; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτην ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοί εἰσιν; Ὡμολόγει. Δι' ὃ δὲ δειλοί εἰσιν, δειλία δομολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη. Οὐκοῦν 10 ηδὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἀν εἴη; Ἐπέ-
D νευσεν. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ηδὲ ἔγω, ἐναντίον ἀνδρεία δειλίᾳ.

"Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ηδὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῆς τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ ἐστίν; Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; Πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. 15 Ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν,
Protogoras ill-pleased with his defeat. ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ; οὐκέτι ἐνταῦ-
θα οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἡθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε· καὶ ἔγω
εἶπον· Τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῆς ἢ
ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον. 20

E "Εν γ', ἔφην ἔγω, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴσι σοι ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τινες ἀνθρώποι ἀμαθέστατοι μέν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ. Φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι 25 δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Οὕτοι, ηδὲ δέ ἔγω, ἄλλου ἐνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς

Socrates, on the other hand, now agrees that ἀρετὴ can be taught. καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ηδὲ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό, ηδὲ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ 30 κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὐδὲ ἔγω τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἔγω

6 δεινῶν: δειλῶν ΒΤ 23 ἔφη Β, ἔτι Τ—τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον Τ, τὸ ἀπο-
κρινόμενον Β 27 ἄλλον Β, ἀλλ οὐ Τ

μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἀν ὅτι ἀτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὡς Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὸν μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τάγαντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη B

καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὡς τρόπῳ μά-
Conclusion : Fundamental λιστ' ἀν διδακτὸν φανέντη ἡ ἀρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
importance 10 ἄλλο τι ἦν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρω-
of knowledge ταγύρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἀν ἦν
διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανῆσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλοι, ὡς σὺ
σπεύδεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἐσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὅν.
Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τού-
15 ναντίον ἐοικεν σπεύδοντι, δλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι C
αὐτὸν ἡ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἀν ἥκιστα εἴη διδακτόν.
ἔγω οὖν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἀνω κάτω
ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ
γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἀν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς
20 ἔξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁ τι ἐστιν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπι-
σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ
πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψῃ
σφίλη ἔξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἡμέλησεν D
ἡμᾶν, ὡς φῆς σύ. ἥρεστεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μόνῳ ὁ Προ-
25 Mutual com- μηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ὡς χρώμενος
pliments. ἔγω καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ
ἡμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ
ἐθέλοις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἀν ἥδιστα
ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Ἐγὼ μέν,
30 ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν δι-
έξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτε τᾶλλα οἷμαι κακὸς εἶναι E
ἀνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἥκιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ
σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἴρηται, ὅτι ὡν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ

5 ἀρετὴ Bt, ἡ ἀρετὴ T 10 ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ BT 27 εἰ σὺ T, εἴσοι B

μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ
λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἡσυμάζοιμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαῆσις, ὅταν
362 βούλῃ, διέξιμεν· νῦν δὲ ὥρα ἥδη καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι τρέπε-
Departure of σῖσαι. ’Αλλ’, ήν δὲ ἐγώ, οὗτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ 5
Socrates. σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἴπερ ἔφην θέναι
πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέ-
μεινα.

Ταῦτ’ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆγμεν.

4 διέξιμεν Bt, διέξειμεν B

The poem of Simonides in Schneidewin's arrangement.

Στροφὴ ἄ.

"Ανδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαζέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νύῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τε-
τυγμένον.

(Five lines are wanting.)

'Αντιστρ. ἄ.

Οὐδέ μοι ἐμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ'
ἐσθλὸν ἔμεναι.
Σεῖς ἀν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ
κακὸν ἔμειναι,

δν ἀν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.

Πράξαις γάρ εὗ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, καὶ

τοὺπιπλεῖστον ἄριστοι, τούς κε Σεοὶ φιλέωσιν.

'Επωδὸς ἄ.

"Εμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ,
ὅς ἀν μὴ κακὸς ἦ

μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς γ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ.

Οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι·

οὐ γάρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος·

τῶν γάρ ἡλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.

Πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφὴ β.'

Τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν
διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυέδοντας δοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα
χθονός·

ἔπειτ' ὕμιν εύρων ἀπαγγελέω.

Πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,

ἐκῶν δοτις ἔρδη

μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκα δ' οὐδὲ Σεοὶ μάχονται.

NOTES

NOTES.

Πρωταγόρας ἡ σοφισταί· [ἐνδεικτικός]. The double title, as in the other dialogues of Plato, is probably due to the classifiers of Alexandria, and to Thrasyllus, the contemporary and confidant of Tiberius. The arrangement of the dialogues in tetralogies by Thrasyllus has come down to us in the best MSS., as in the Clarkianus, e. g., of Oxford; cf. "Novae Commentationes Platonicae," by M. Schanz, Würzburg, 1871, p. 111 sq. Other double titles are Θεατητος ἡ περὶ ἐπιστήμης, Χαριόδης ἡ περὶ σωφροσύνης, Φιληβος ἡ περὶ ἡδονῆς. The other dialogues grouped with the Protagoras as a tetralogy are the Euthydemus, the Gorgias, and the Meno. As for the technical epithet *ἐνδεικτικός* (embodying a demonstration), it is used with the Protagoras only; but it is no more appropriate with the Protagoras than *ἡθικός* or *πειραστικός* would have been.

τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου πρόσωπα. The persons are cited in the order of their successive appearance in the course of the dialogue.

309, A. **πόθεν . . . φαίνει.** Current form of greeting, not curiosity; cf. Lys. 203 a: *ποῖ δὴ πορεύει καὶ πόθεν*; also Phaedr. 227 a: *φαίνεσθαι*, of *coming*, as in Aristoph. Vesp. 267: *οὐ φαίνεται δεῦρο πρὸς τὸ πλήθος*.—For obligatory coming *ἀπαντᾶν* is generally used.

ἢ δῆλα δή. *ἢ* elliptic, introducing the second part of a question, *ἄλλο τι*, or something similar, being understood; cf. Apol. 24 c: *ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ*.—For the balancing character of the question, cf. the current phrase *ἄλλως τε καί*.

κυνηγεσίου. For the metaphor cf. Sophist. 222 d: *τῷ τῶν ἑρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔουκας, οὕπω προσέσχες*.

τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὕραν. Cf. Symp. 213, 216 c-d: *ὅρᾶτε γάρ ὅτι Σωκράτης ἑρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ δεῖ περὶ τούτους ἐστί, κ.τ.ξ.*, but add 316 e: *εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παιζῶν πάντα τὸν βίον . . . διατελεῖ*; also 219 b sqq.; Xen. Mem. I. 2, 24; Plat. Men. 76 c: *εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν*.

πρώην, properly “the day before yesterday,” *the other day*.

ώς . . . εἰρήσθαι, *to speak in confidence*. As for the perf., comp. the German, “Im Vertrauen gesagt,” let it be said.

πάγωνος ήδη *ντοπιμπλάμενος*, “*cui per genas plurima lanugo jam serpit*”—Ficinus. Jowett less accurately, “and he had got a beard like a man.” As for Alc. being called *ἀνήρ*, cf. Charm. 154 d, with regard to the youth Charmides: *ώς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, κ.τ.ξ.* *εἴτα* has concessive force.

‘Ομήρου ἐπαινέτης, Od. κ 279. Hermes appearing to Odysseus to help him with the herb “moly.” *πρῶτον ὑπηρήψη, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἥβη*. Cf. Charm. 161 a: ‘Ομήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν.

B. δς ἔφη. We generally use the present in quotations from extant authors, the past being really more personal and vivid; cf. Men. 76 d: *ἔφη Πίνδαρος*, Lach. 291 b: “Ομηρός που ἔφη. The present occurs below 339 a, Hipp. min. 364 e.

ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, paratactic epenthesis, as below 314 c: *δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, οὐ θυρωρός*.

ὑπὲρ ἔμοῦ εἰπε, βοηθῶν ἔμοι. Not pleonastic, but *βοηθῶν* adds the emergency in which Alcibiades spoke in behalf of Socrates. Socrates was hard pressed.

ἐθέλω here auxiliary as in Engl. for future. Similarly Herodotus uses *ἔρχομαι* c. inf.

παρόντος, concessive.

οὕτε προσείχον . . . ἐπελανθανόμην τε, neque—et. The second member adds a higher degree. See collections of examples in Stallbaum’s note.

C. οὐ γάρ . . . καλλίονι. Plut. Alcib. 1: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κάλλους Ἀλκιβιάδου οὐδὲν ἴσως δεῖ λέγειν, πλὴν ὅτι καὶ παῖδα καὶ μειράκιον καὶ ἄνδρα πάσχει συνανθῆσαν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ ὥρᾳ τοῦ σώματος ἐράσμιον καὶ ήδην παρέσχεν*. Lysis and Charmides, too, were youths of great beauty, but of greater *σωφροσύνη*.

ἄστρῳ, political term, *civis*. *ἄστρή* likewise of an Attic woman of full birth.

οὕτω καλός τις, *so handsome a person*.

τοῦ Κλεινίου. Greek society had no *nomina gentilia*.

τὸ σοφώτερον κάλλιον. Sportive irony which may be observed throughout the dialogue. Schleiermacher, Introd. III. ed. 1855, p. 153.

D. Πρωταγόρας. Deliberate and emphatic position at the end of the sentence.

ῳ τί λέγεις. ὥ of special excitement different from the ὥ of current address.

Προταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν, is in town, combination of past and present.

καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα. ἄρα in colloquial inference: *I understand, I see.*

310, A. **τί οὖν οὐδὲ διηγήσω.** *Do tell us all about the conversation.* “In questions with *τί οὐ* the aorist is used, an emphatic demand being contained in the surprise that the action has not yet taken place.”—Krüger, § 53, 6, 2; Goodwin, M. T. § 19, n. 6.

εἰ μῆ σέ τι κωλύει. A phrase of good-breeding, cf. below 317 c: *εἴ τι βούλεσθε;* Lach. 187 c: *ἡδομένοις ἀν εἰη;* 187 d: *εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μήτη διαφέρει,* Charm. 155 a.

ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παιδα τουτονί, possibly an ἀκόλουθος of the speaker. Perhaps, too, an Attic boy, Xen. Mem. II. 3, 16: *οὐ γάρ καὶ ὀδοῦ παραχωρῆσαι τὸν νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρῳ συντυγχάνοντι πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καὶ καθήμενον ὑπαναστῆσαι.* Perhaps the scene of the present conversation is to be suggested—a wrestling-school.

χάριν εἴσομαι, cf. the German “Dank wissen.” χάριν εἰδέναι and ἔχειν, of sentiment and obligation; χάριν διδόναι, ἀποδοῦναι, of the act of thanking.

ἔτι βαθέος ὅρθρου. Crito, 43 a: *ὅρθρος βαθύς.* Perhaps degrees of light are associated with the motion of the sun, deep night, *Hoher Tag.* high noon

Ιπποκράτης is mentioned in this dialogue only; his very name, however, suggests descent and breeding, Aristoph. Nub. 63 sqq.

ἢ μὲν γάρ ἵππον προσετίθει πρὸς τοῦνομα,

Ξάνθιππον ἢ Χάριππον ἢ Καλλιππίδην . . .

further characterization is given below, 316 b. His aims were practical, like those of most young men of his class. “Sophistas autem duces videlicet illos ad honorem et potentiam, cupidissimus audiendi.” Groen van Prinsterer, “Prosopographia Platonica,” p. 226.

B. **Ιπποκράτης . . . οὗτος,** not the *οὗτος* of interpellation, but *that is H.*, as the editors have noted after Heindorf.

στὰς παρ' ἔμοι. Ficinus has missed the sense, “Protagoras venit et prope me divertit.” παρ’ ἔμοι implies the result of the motion, as below, 320 a: *καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος.*

μῆ τι νεώτερον, no bad news, *I hope;* cf. Latin, “inauditum insitatum, novae res,” a change in settled affairs implying a disturbance. “Ceterum νεώτερον poni constat pro νεόν, quod ita

usurpatur, Eurip. Med. 37."—Heindorf. *νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν*, Thucyd. I. 132, 5.

εὐ ἀν λέγοις, Sauppe, "Das wäre ja schön." Thus Theact. replies to the compliment of Socrates, Theact. 145 b: *εὐ ἀν ἔχοι*.

C. ἐπιψηλαφήσας τὸν σκίμποδος, to assist the imagination of the reader, *grasped for my lounge*. The *σκίμπους* was a κλωίδιον εἰτελές.

ἐξ Οινόης (Pape, "Lex. der Griech. Eigennamen"). There were two, the one near Marathon, the other on the Boeotian frontier. The latter, of course, is meant in the present passage.

μέλλων τοι φράξειν. These words seem to imply that Hippocrates was a daily companion of Socrates, a regular attendant on his discourses, hence the desire to excuse himself.

ὑπό τινος, here of the hindering cause, *prae*.

D. ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. οὕτω esp. after participles of temporal significance: 314 c, *διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίουμεν* ... 326 d, *ὑπογράψαντες* ... οὕτω διδόσατι.

καὶ ἔγω γιγνώσκων, not "perceiving" (*γνούς*), but *being acquainted with*, Theact. 144 c: *σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν*.

μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρ., i. e. = *ἀδικός ἐστι περὶ σε*; the present of condition or permanent result; cf. Kr. 53, 1, 3: *φεύγειν, ἀλίσκεσθαι, νικᾶν, κρατεῖν, ἡττᾶσθαι*. Cf. Dem. VI. 17: *ἀδικεῖ πολὺν ἥδη χρόνον*. Similarly *ἀσεβεῖν*.

ἄν αὐτῷ διδῷς ... καὶ πείθης ἐκεῖνον. *ἐκεῖνον* refers to Protagoras too; it is added because *πείθης* requires a different case from *διδῷς*.

εἰ ... ἐν τούτῳ εἴη ..., if it were *contained in* that, dependent from that; cf. below, 313 a: *ἐν φάντασθαι*. The ideal form of the wish exhibits the profound devotion of Hippocrates to Protagoras.

E. *αὐτὰ ταῦτα*. Accus. of specification with *ἥκω*.

ὅτε τὸ πρότερον. Cf. Introduction, § I.

τί οὐ βαδίζομεν, impatient form of exhortation; cf. above the aor., 310 a: *τί ... οὐ διηγήσω*. Questions with *τί οὐ* refer to action, with *πῶς οὐ* generally refer to thought.

311, A. *καταλύει ... παρὰ Καλλίᾳ*. As to the present, see note on *ἀδικεῖ* above, 310 d, *Is stopping at the house of Callias*.

ἐξαναστῶμεν [from *ἐξανίστασθαι*], *let us get up and step out into the court*.

τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει. Largely, no doubt, because his professional intercourse exacted fees; Socrates, on the

contrary, was always on the street. This very reserve of Protagoras and other sophists seems to have stimulated the curiosity of the general public; cf. Eupolis, Κόλακες, fragm. 10 (Meineke).

B. ἀποπειρώμενος . . . τῆς ρώμης, *testing his muscle*, vid. as regards φρόνησις, the phrase probably that of a wrestling-master; tropical language derived from the palaestra is very common in Plato: Euthydemus, 278 c, ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, Rep. II, 362 d, τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι; ib. VIII. 544 b, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβήν παρέχειν; below, Prot. 336 c, ἐκρούων τὸν λόγον.

ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; *looking forward to meeting what sort of man and to what kind of development for yourself?* ὡς c. part. expresses subjective attitude of the agent; cf. Gildersleeve on Justin Martyr, A. c. 4, 19.

εἰ ἐπενόεις . . . εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο. Notice the *unreal* form of the protasis; it is not even to be assumed that the young Athenian gentleman should choose the dependent career of a δημιονργός.

'Ιπποκράτη, the well-known founder of systematic medicine in antiquity; he flourished about 430 B.C., and died in Thessaly; cf. Phaedr. 270 c.

C. Πολύκλειτον . . . Φειδίαν. The former was distinguished by the perfection of his representation of human figures, especially as *ἀθληταί*; the latter held a position at Athens under Pericles, such as Michel Angelo held under Leo X. at Rome. He died at Athens, having suffered before his death an unjust persecution, which probably was aimed mainly against his patron Pericles. Cf. Aristoph. Pac. 605 sq.:

πρῶτα μὲν γάρ ἦρξεν ἄτης Φειδίας πράξας κακῶς·
εἶτα Περικλέης φοβηθεὶς μὴ μετάσχου τῆς τύχης, κ.τ.ξ.

His most famous works were the great Athena on the Acropolis, of gold and ivory, and the Zeus at Olympia.

This mode of illustrating a principle or concept, which Socrates was wont to practise, by *bringing up* concrete instances, is called *ἐπαγωγή*. Cf. Gorgias, 553 c (Zeuxis).

D. ἀν μὲν ἔξικνήται. Anticipatory construction. *ἴξικν.*=suffice, cf. *ἰκ-ανός*. The apodosis with *ἴξικν.* is not expressed; cf. 325 c.

εἴ . . . τίς . . . ἔροιτο . . . τὶ ἀν . . . ἀποκριναίμεθα; Ficinus: "Si quis interrogaret . . . quid illi responderemus?" This rendering is not quite accurate; more exactly: *si quis interroget, . . . quid illi respondeamus?*

E. σοφιστὴν . . . δνομάζουσί . . . τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι . . . δνομάζειν used pregnantly, including λέγειν. Cf. Lysias, VII. 18: *περὶ ᾧ ν*

ἀποκρυπτόμεθα μηδέν εἰδέναι. Sauppe quotes Phileb. 13 b : *πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις.*

ἔρχόμεθα τελοῦντες. (Future.) Cf. the common English periphrasis of the future : below, 313 a, and Theaet. 198 e : *ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος.* Herodotus, who abounds in periphrases, employs this one too : II. 11, *ὡς ἔρχομαι φράσων*; II. 35, *ἔρχομαι μηκυνέων*; III. 6, IV. 99, III. 80 sqq.

312, A. **ὑπέφαυνέν τι ἡμέρας.** A dramatic reminder to refresh the imagination of the reader; cf. above, 310 c, and Phaedr. 259 a, 279 b, and the *παιδαγωγοί* at the end of the Lysis.

οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο . . . παρέχων; On the subject-matter cf. Lach. 197 d : *καὶ γάρ πρέπει, ὡς Σώκρατες, σοφιστῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὅν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῦ ἀντῆς προιστάναι.*

εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας, to the Greek public.

εἴπερ (si quidem), almost causal in force.

μὴ οὐ . . . υπολαμβάνεις. Some negative verb is to be supplied before *μὴ*. *οὐ* belongs to *τοιαύτην*. Cf. Krüger, § 67, 11. As to the indicative, cf. Goodwin, M. T. § 46, note 5, a : *μή* with the present indicative expresses a fear that something *is now going on*. Jowett's translation is rather free.

B. **ἄλλ' οἷαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμμ. κ.τ.έ.** Cf. below, 326 d sqq. *ἐπὶ τέχνῃ*, for professional purposes.

ὡς τὸν ἴδιώτην . . . πρέπει. What verb to be understood after *ἴδιώτην* and *Ἐλεύθερον?* *πρέπει* is *not* personally construed here.

C. **ἀνδρί . . . σοφιστῇ.** *σοφιστῇ* is predicative apposition with *ἀνδρί*.

οἱ σοφιστῆς, generically.

οὗτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὗτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. Sauppe (more precisely than Kroschel and Deuschle) : "The designation of the sophist as a 'thing' has something derisive and sportive; Aristoph. Eccles. 441 : *γυναικα δὲ εἶναι πρᾶγμ' ἔφη νοιβυνστικὸν καὶ χρηματοποίον.*" Sauppe, among other passages, quotes Demosth. 35, 15 : *Λάκριτος, μέγα πρᾶγμα, Ἰσοκράτονς μαθητῆς.* And also Phaedr. 240 a : *κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῳ.*

ῶσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει. The assumed etymology *σοφ-*, *ἰστ-*, *το* *know wisdom.* On the matter, see Schanz, "Die Sophisten," p. 5. The Cratylus abounds in similar naïve etymologies; cf. also Phaedrus.

D. **τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ, κ.τ.έ.** *τῶν σοφῶν* gen. of *τὰ σοφά*. *τί* accus. of specification.

δεινὸν λέγειν. δεινὸς of distinguished ability in any department; cf. *ἰκανός* and *δυνατός*.

E. ἦ δῆλον ὅτι. ἦ elliptic as above, 309 a.

313, A. εἰ . . . ἔδει . . . πολλὰ ἀν περιεσκέψω . . . φίλους ἀν παρεκάλεις. *περιεσκέψω* is an unreal apodosis with reference to the present in this passage; cf. below, Prot. 355 d: ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄν . . . ἡ δὲ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἄκυρον μὲν ἀν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα. Sauppe suggests that the *momentary* character of the action causes the construction. On the other hand the *imperf.* with *ἄν* is sometimes met for unreal apodoses referring to the past; below, 357 d: εἰ . . . εἴπομεν . . . κατεγελᾶτε ἀν ἥμῶν; Gorg. 471 a, Demosth. 18, 28: ἐθεώρουν ἄν, εἰ μὴ ταῦτ' ἐγράφη; ib. § 20, οὐκ ἄν ἀμφότερα εἶχε.

ἢ εὐ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν. Infin. epexegeticus after *πάντ' ἐστί*. Similar construction after *διαφέρειν*, Phaedr. 264 c: ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει . . . πρῶτον ἡ ὕστατόν τι λέγεσθαι. For the subject-matter, cf. Lach. 185 a.

B. εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ. Cf. the German “ob—oder auch nicht.”

τῷ ἀφίκομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ. A tinge of scorn is unmistakable. συνεστέον, that you must needs be introduced to P.; from συνίστασθαι; cf. the correlatives *συνεῖναι*, *συνονσία*, *συνονσιαστής*.

C. ω μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν; From 313 a, *Ti οὖν*—to this point there is an unbroken flow of speech without a single stop—a strong expression of the feeling of Socrates on the subject. Jowett's translation fails to express this.

ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων. *ἔμπορος*, the merchant, *κάπηλος*, the retailer, peddler, etc. It was a point which Socrates especially reprehended in the “Sophists,” that they took fees for their instruction; cf. Xen. Mem. I. c. 6. Soph. 231 d, the sophist as a species is called *νέων καὶ πλούσιων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής*.

ὄπως γε μῆ. Supply *όρα*, or some such verb.

D. περιάγοντες, *hawking about*.

τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 6, 13: καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τὸν μὲν ἀργυρίον τῷ βούλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.

E. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων. “Plato rarely construes *τυγχάνειν* without the participle, Rep. II. 369 b, Tim. 61 c.”—Sauppe. But in the present passage *ἄν* may have easily been lost after *ἐπιστήμων* or *τούτων*.

ὅ τι χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν. In Gorg. 464 b sqq. there is a close

analogy of this thought. True πολιτικὴ and δικαιοσύνη are paired off with γυμναστικὴ and ἴαστρικὴ. On the other hand are placed κολακεία and its counterpart ὁψοποική.

314, A. κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς. Plato is fond of such doublets which express his wealth of diction rather than any fine discrimination of synonyms. (Similarly Demosthenes.) Cf. below, 316 d : πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι. Critias, 116 c : ἐφίτυσαν καὶ ἐγέννησαν. Phaedr. 245 d : πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. Lysis, 216 d : διολισθαίνει καὶ διαδένεται ἡμᾶς.

καὶ γὰρ, elliptic: And (so you will in fact) for.

κίνδυνος, *risk*. κίνδυνος is the current term for *commercial risk*, Dem. private orations, *passim*.

καταθέμενον οἰκάδε, pregnant: *Take home and deposit it there*.

τὸν ἐπαίσθια, the expert. On the synonyms of knowing in Greek, cf. Schmidt, "Griech. Synonymik," I. p. 297.

B. νέοι ὕστε . . . διελέσθαι. We would expect νεώτεροι. νέοι used pregnantly. Ast cites Xen. Mem. III. 13, 3 : ψυχρὸν ὕστε λούσασθαι, and Heindorf quotes Eurip. Androm. 80 : γέρων ἐκεῖνος ὕστε σ' ὥφελεῖν παρών.

C. οἷμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον. Scil. *αὐτόθι εἶναι*. More commonly οἷμαι is loosely thrown in epenthetically.

δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα. Acc. absol. of ἔδοξεν, instead of ἐπεὶ ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ταῦτα. The relation of acc. absol. elsewhere is generally concessive. Kr. 56, 9, 6. A very great variety of acc. absol. is found in Thucydides, who cultivates all shifts of brachylogy with especial favor: e. g. παράσχον, I. 120, 3 ; ὑπάρχον, I. 124, 1; εἰρημένον, I. 140, 2 ; λεγόμενον, II. 47, 3.

ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγένόμεθα. Prepos. with dat. of result of motion, cf. the metaph. phrase ὑπό τινι γενέσθαι, and below, στάντες ἐν τ. π.

διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως, cf. above, 230 d, ἀναστὰς οὕτω.

D. κατήκουεν, *overheard*.


κινδυνεύει . . . ἄχθεσθαι. ἄχθεσθαι=inf. of the imperf.

ἐκρούναμεν. [To knocking frequently was added the call for the porter παῖ παῖ! Aristoph. Av. 57, Ran. 38.

οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ. Kroschel compares Cic. de Senect. c. 10: nemo, inquit, adhuc convenire me voluit cui fuerim occupatus.

E. δεόμενοι. Wanting to; stronger than βούλεσθαι, cf. below, 331 c : οὐδὲν δέ ομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο . . . ἐλέγχεσθαι.

ἐν τῷ προστάῳ. The colonnade surrounding the court. See illustration.



Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου. For seven generations these two names were held in succession by the heads of this great Attic house. In splendor the Alcmaeonidae alone seem to have rivalled them; cf. Herod. VII. 151, and Plat. Apol. 20 a. The support which Callias gave to the professional men of culture seems to have proceeded principally from ostentation and love of display. Eupolis places the scene of his play, the Κόλακες (427 B.C.), in the house of Callias. In his house, too, the Convivium written by Xenophon takes place. As early as 415 his lavish habits seem to have perceptibly diminished his resources; cf. Aristoph. Av. 284 sqq.:


(Euelp.) *Καλλίας ἄρ' οὗτος σύρνις ἐστίν· ὡς πτερορρυνεῖ.*

(Peithet.) *ἄτε γάρ ὃν γενναῖος ὑπό τε συκοφαντῶν τιλλεται,
αἵ τε Σήλειαι προσεκτίλλονται αὐτοῦ τὰ πτερά.*

The profligacy of his private life is implied in Aristoph. Ran. 428 sq. The scenic date of the dialogue is to be put down (Introd.) about 432, and Callias appears as sole master of his father's house. Still Hippoönus died some ten years after only. Such anachronisms are frequent in Plato, and exhibit his artistic freedom of arrangement.

315, A. **Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους**, half-brother of Callias. The mother of Paralus had first been the wife of (*συνψκει*) Hippoönus, by whom she had Callias; then she married Pericles, by whom (Plut. Pericl. c. 24) she had Xanthippus and Paralus. Still later she contracted a marriage with a third party.

Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, brother of Plato's mother; cf. the dialogue bearing his name.



ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, for professional purposes, looking forward to the career of a sophist.

ἔξ ἑκάστων. Distributive: from the several cities. Cf. *ἑκάστοτε* and *άει* with participles, as well as alone.

κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὄρφεύς, οἱ δὲ . . . ἔπονται. Extension of the simile with a demonstr., dropping the relative construction, as in Homer, *passim*, e. g. Od. χ 384.

B. **χορὸν . . . ηὐλαβοῦντο, χορόν** collective noun.

ἐπειδὴ . . . ἀναστρέψοι. Repeated action in the past. Turn it into present construction.

ἄει, every time. Cf. above: *ἴξ ἑκάστων.* As for the admiration enjoyed by Protagoras and other eminent Sophists, comp. Plat. Rep. X. 600 d: *ώστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι.*

τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόστα, ἔφη "Ομῆρος. (Od. λ 601, in the visit to the lower world.) We must be careful not to over-refine on a fragment of quotation. It is merely a sportive reminiscence from Homer, the Greek's Bible. The employment of archaisms often expresses a certain sportive dignity, as it might in modern parlance in a conversational narrative, "I lifted up my eyes and beheld," or something to that effect. The German editors, more or less imagine that they perceive "the sting of the allusion" to the fate or character of Sisyphus, Tantalus, etc.

C. **Ἐρυξίμαχός τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ,** a prominent physician and a lover of science, as the present scene shows, also a prominent *persona* in the "Symposium;" cf. also Phaedr. 268 a.

Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούστιος, called a friend of Eryximachus in Phaedr. 268 a. He, with Socrates, are the only interlocutors in the dialogue bearing his name. According to that dialogue he was a great reader and an ardent admirer of the most recent literary performances. He was one of those men who make authors popular, while their critical acumen is but mediocre. His health seems to have been delicate, and he took constitutional walks, etc.

ἐν θρόνῳ, while his hearers sit on *βάθρα* (above).

διέκρινεν καὶ διεξήγει. *He passed upon, and gave analyses of, the points asked.*

Τάνταλον. Namely, Prodicus. Probably grouped with Tantalus, because he seems to have suffered from some chronic or incurable disease.

D. **πεποίηκεν.** Socrates is telling of it all on the same day when he observed all this.

ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισίν, κ.τ.ξ. Ast makes some fanciful observations, and Stallbaum, at least, says: *describuntur mores mollis et delicatuli hominis.* But comp. Plut. Moral. 967 B sqq. Dübner: ὕσπερ οὖν ὁ Πρόδικον τὸν σοφιστήν, ἡ Φιλήταν τὸν ποιητήν, ἀξιῶν πολιτεύεσθαι . . . νοσώδεις καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κλινοπετεῖς. Add 317 e.

Παυσανίας. Cf. Groen van Prinsterer, "Prosopographia Platonica," p. 206, while Pausanias's relation to Agathon would seem to have been sustained, from the "Symposium." His encomium of ἔρως, Symp. 180 c sqq., must allow the inference that Pausanias condemned unnatural ἔρως.

E. Ἀγάθωνα. Agathon, the elegant dandy and poet of the "Ανθος, of later years, host in Plato's "Symposium." He is characteristically introduced in the beginning of Aristoph. Thesmophoriazusae, where Euripides considers him the person most likely to appear like a woman in an assembly of women.

λιπαρῶς ἔχων (=γλίχεσθαι). *ἔχω* with adverbs of condition and attitude; cf. below, 335: λιπαρῶς ἔχω . . . τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι; Apol. 17 d: ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.

316, A. **ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν**, because it took but a few moments to observe what has been described at some length from 315 a to 316 a.

ὅς καλός, ὡς φῆς σύ. At the beginning of the dialogue, 309 a, the *ἴταιρος* is addressed.

καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρον. The association of Critias and of Alcibiades with Socrates may to some extent be placed among those things which caused the persecution and death of the latter. The Athenian democracy of 400–399 B.C. justly looked upon both men as the principal malefactors of the commonwealth in the past twenty years, but it was wrong and unjust to make Socrates responsible for their peculiar development. Xenophon, Mem. I. 2, 12 sqq., explains that these two men had noted the self-control of Socrates, and his mental sway over others, and desired to obtain an eminent degree of efficiency in discourse and management of affairs, but (I. 2, 16) as for imitating the *life* of Socrates, they would have preferred death to that.

B. **πρὸς σέ τοι ἥλθομεν.** We would expect *ἥκομεν* or some perfect; but cf. Krüger, § 53, 6, 1: "Being the most absolute of the past tenses, the aorist can stand synonymous even with the perfect and pluperfect." Cf. below, *ἥκετε*.

μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. Perhaps

μόνοι β. This at least would make the opposition of *καὶ μετὰ τ. ἀ.* more symmetrical. Ficinus: *numquid seorsum ab aliis mecum loqui vultis? an coram omnibus?* Schanz conjectures *μόνοι* before *μόνη*.

ἐστὶν . . . τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Gen. partitive used predicatively.

οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαιμονος. Possibly to suggest that good fees might eventually be expected.

C. **τὸῦτο δὲ οἴεται οἱ μάλιστ^ι ἀν γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένειοτο.** The *ἀν* after *μάλιστα*, a conjecture made by Stephanus and Sauppe. The equivalent of the present construction in oratio recta, no doubt, was an *ideal* construction of the hypothesis.

ἥδη σὺ σκόπει. *ἥδη* is more than our simple *now*: *We have now come to a point where you must see whether*, etc.

D. **τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα.** So in all MSS.; it would be bold therefore to suggest an interpolation. It is really not so much an anacoluthon as a compact restatement of the somewhat prolix subject of *εὐλαβεῖσθαι*.

φόμι μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν. *μέν* really goes with *παλαιάν*. Kühner, "Ausführl. Gr. Gramm." II. p. 809.

τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον. *Orpheus and Musaeus and their school.* These legendary persons are similarly viewed in Diogenes Laertius, Prooemium.

Ικκος of Tarentum; Plato Legg. VIII. 839 e, distinguished as Olympian victor, and for the monastic purity of his life. His name became proverbial ("Ικκον δεῖπνον").

Ἡρόδικος of Selymbria (about forty miles west of Byzantium, on the northern coast of the Propontis) was a travelling physician and a hygienist in the modern sense of the word; Plato Phaedr. 227 d, Rep. III. 406 a.

Ἀγαθοκλῆς and Pythoclides. The latter the teacher of the former according to Schol. Plat. Alcib. I. 218. Agathocles in his turn was called the teacher of Damon, the music-master of Pericles, Plut. Pericl. c. 4. Groen van Prinsterer surmises that Plutarch made out Damon a "sophist" from the analogy of the present passage, Prosop. Plat. p. 186.

317, A. **κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι.** Adverbial phrase like *ἐκων εἶναι*. Cf. Classen on Thucyd. VI. 12, 1.

τοὺς δυναμένους . . . πράττειν. Participle used substantively, like *οἱ λέγοντες* (=ρήτορες) in Demosth.: the leading men in public life.

ἐπεί, attached to *τοὺς δυναμένους*, i. e. *these only* are to be mentioned, *for the masses merely, etc.*

διαγγέλλωσι, *whatever password they start;* *διαγγέλλειν*, esp. in military use, Xen. Anab. passim.

ὑμνοῦσιν, *thoughtlessly repeat (as singing and humming are apt to go).*

ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι. A good illustration of the different force of the present and of the aorist; in the present apposition the present is conative. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 167: *ἢ ῥαδίως φεύγων ἀν ἀποφύγοι δίκην . . .* Ach. 177: *δεῖ γάρ με φεύγοντ' ἐκφυγεῖν Ἀχαρνέας . . .*;

πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, *is a great folly in the very undertaking.* Jowett, inaccurately, “Is the very height of folly.” Cf. *ἀμονσία* and *ἀλογία* in Plat. Lysis, 206 a, b.

B. **τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἄπασαν** δόδον ἐλήγυθα. We would at first expect *τούτοις* instead of *τούτων*, but the latter genitive really contains a *condensed comparison* = *τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ τούτων [όδῳ]*. Sauppe takes it differently. *ἄπασαν* adverbial with *ἐναντίαν*.

τὸ ὄμολογεῖν, κ.τ.λ., in apposition with *εὐλάβειαν ταύτην*.

ἄλλας, scil. δόδοις.

C. **πολλά . . . ἔτη ἥδη εἰμί.** Present of extension.

οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ, *must not be strained too much in biographic inquiry, especially when his age is compared with that of Socrates.*

E. **εἴ τι βούλεσθε.** A *phrase of good-breeding* (different from *εἰ βούλει*, 331 c), *if it is convenient to you.*

D. **τί οὖν . . . οὐ . . . ἐκαλέσαμεν.** Aorist of *impatient request*, cf. above, 310 a, on *τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω*.

ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; The person after verbs of hearing in gen. being really the *source*. (In 310 e, *ἀκήκοα οὐδένεν*, we must supply *αὐτοῦ*.)

καὶ αὐτοί, without waiting for the slaves to do so—showing their eagerness.

προϋπήρχε. Cf. the Germ. *vorhanden*. *ὑπάρχειν* generally includes the sense of *being available*.

E. **νῦν δὴ ἄν . . . λέγοις.** A mild form of request, Krüger, § 54, 3, 8. Deuschle quotes *χωροῖς ἄν εἰσω*, Soph. Philoct. 674, and other passages.

Γοργία, ἔσται, έάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἵδι τ' ἐσόμεθα;

τοσοῦτος ὅ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. A reflection on Protagoras's prolixity before.

ἐπιδιδόντα. Not intransitive at bottom (cf. *εἰσβάλλειν*); but the material object remains unexpressed. Cf. the Germ. *zunehmen*.

B. *κάν.* The *άν* goes with *γένοιο*, below, where it is repeated; the *άν* having a tendency to act as avant-courier of the coming optative, at the earliest possible moment.

ώσπερ ἀν εἰ αὐτίκα. The argument, as above, 311 b sqq., Zeuxippus and Orthagoras being substituted for Hippocrates, Phidias, and Polyclitus: *αὐτίκα*, to use the first illustration that presents itself.

Ζευξίππου. “Zeuxis, originally nothing but a petting abbreviation of Zeuxippus.”—Sauppe. His most famous rival was Parrhasius (story of painted grapes attracting birds, etc.). Zeuxis's most famous painting was a “Helen in the Temple of Hera Lacinia at Agrigentum.”

C. **ἐπανέροιτο**, should follow up the matter (*ἀνά*) and add (*ἐπι*) the inquiry . . .

Ορθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ. The Theban flute- (clarinet-) players were famous, and their professional services at Athens seem to have been a current thing. See Aristoph. Ach. 862 sqq.

D. **χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος**, patronizing air. His later discomfiture under the searching test of Socratic dialectic becomes all the more striking.

ἄπερ ἀν ἐπαθεν. To Protagoras, the possibility of young Hippocrates putting himself under the instruction of any of the other Sophists is entirely out of the question.

λωβῶντας. Properly of maiming and of bodily maltreatment.

E. **εἰς τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν.** This passage is one of the loci classici for information about Hippias. Cf. Schanz, “Sophisten,” p. 49 sq.; Hipp. min. 366 sqq.

ὅπως. Purely relative.

319, A. **ἐπομαί**, as in Engl. vernacular, from the sphere of way and motion (“to follow=understand”); cf. *ὁδός*, *ἴέναι*, *περιμέναι*, in similar employment. Politic. 280 b: *οὐχ ἔσπου τοῖς λεχθεῖσι, ὡς φαίνει.*

τὸ ἐπάγγελμα, ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομα. The announcement which I (regularly) make.

οὐ γάρ . . . ἀλλο, κ.τ.ξ., to soften the harshness of the preceding; cf. below, 336 d: *χρὶ γάρ ἔκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι*.

B. **δῆτας [ἄν]** ἀπιστῶ. Heindorf objected to the *ἄν*; the subjunctive really is deliberative.

δίκαιός είμι εἰπεῖν. Personal constr.=*δεῖ με εἰπεῖν*. The tendency towards personal construction is greater in Greek than in Latin.

φημί. Emphatic; *I assert.*

C. **δὴν ἔκεινοι μὴ οἴονται.** *μὴ* in generic statements involving contingency.

τῶν γενναίων. Gen. partitive used predicatively. Cf. *τῶν ἐπιχωρίων* in 316 b.

καταθορυβηθείς, *shouted down.* *Ὥρυζος*, the regular form of disapproval by the sovereign *δῆμος* in the assembly; cf. Dem. 37, 50; 5, 15; Plat. Apol. 30 b: *μὴ ὥρυζεῖτε, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.*

οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφέλκυσσωσιν. Cf. Aristoph. Ach. 54 sqq.:

(Herald) . . . *οἱ τοξόται!*

56. (Dicaeopolis) *ἄνδρες πρυτάνεις ἀδικεῖτε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.*

Add Aristoph. Eq. 665; Eccles. 258: *τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπάγοντες . . .* Cf. also the rough experience of Plato's brother Glauco, Xen. Mem. III. 6, 1.

ἐν τέχνῃ. Gorg. 455 b: *δῆλον γάρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι . . .*

D. **πλούσιος πένης, κ.τ.ξ.** Kroschel compares Cic. Tusc. V. 39: at vero bona mala, aequa iniqua, magna parva poterat.

ἐπιπλήγττει . . . στι. The latter introduces the contents of the *ἐπιπλήγττειν*, which is used *pregnantly*.

ἔπειτα, after the participle; here with *concessive* force, as *εἴτα* frequently. Germ. *dann doch*.

E. **μὴ τοίνυν στι . . . ἀλλά,** non solum non, sed etiam. Krüger, § 67, 14, 3: *μὴ [εἴπης] στι*, let alone that—not only not. After the *ἀλλά*, *καί* is understood; the same omission frequently found after *οὐ μόνον*.

320, A. **ἀ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν.** Accusative of specification; cf. above, 312 d.

νέμονται ὕσπερ ἄφετοι. *νέμονται*=proleptic metaphor drawn from the comparison immediately following: “they graze like (sacred cattle) turned *adrift*,” i. e., without the benefit of regular instruction and careful guardianship. Cf. Critias, 119 d: *ἄφέτων ὕντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερῷ*; Rep. VI. 498 c: *ἄφέτους*

νέμεσθαι. What was sacred to a god must not be bound, e. g., human victims destined for sacrifice, Eurip. Iph. Taur. 637: *φυλάσσοτε' αὐτούς, πρόσπολοι, δεσμῶν ἄτερ.*

εἰ δὲ βούλει, added epenthetically, without determining the construction; if you like=allow me (to present the following instance); cf. below, 353 b: *εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, τῷ χαίρειν.* Men. 71 e: *εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἴ δὲ βούλει, δούλου.* The earlier part of the Laches starts with the same fact of experience, neither Lysimachus nor Melesias having at all received from their fathers the distinguished excellence of the latter.

ἐπιτροπεύων. Note the force of the present: *while acting as guardian.*

μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ οὐδὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου. These words are dramatically improbable. Socrates could not have spoken so before Alcibiades.

καταθέμενος. Cf. the English phrase *placing (in a school,* e. g.).

B. *ὅ τι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ, what to do with him.* *χρῆσθαι even without an object:* *τί οὖν χρησώμεθα;* Plat. Lysis, 213 c.

κάμπτομαι, I give in (properly, bend), recede from my position. The opposite is *καρτεροῦν*, Lach. 192 e.

C. *ἢ λόγῳ διεξέλθω;* The change from *διεξέλθων* is a conjecture of Hirschig's; Schanz has now adopted it. A few of the minor MSS., too, have this reading. The *μῦθον λέγειν* constitutes an *ἐπίδειξις*, but the *λόγος* proper is a *διελθεῖν*, an analysis. Cf. also below, 329 c: *διελθέν μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ.*

The Myth of Protagoras. This myth probably is Plato's earliest attempt in this form of literary composition, through which he has given such agreeable relief and variety to many of his dialogues. The myth is found in all periods and types of Plato's dialogues; cf. Gorg. 523 a sqq., Phaedr. 240 a sqq., Phaedo, 107 sqq., Rep. X. 614–621, Critias, 109 b sqq., Tim. 26 b sqq., etc. Many critics agree in assuming that we have in the present myth a faithful reproduction of Protagorean style. Other sophists seem to have adopted this means of conveying instruction as agreeable, impressive, and entertaining; cf. Prodicus and his famous myth on Hercules, Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21.

ἢν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, as tales generally begin, both in ancient and modern times.

θνητὰ δὲ γένη. Not merely of men.

D. *γῆς ἔνδον.* “*ἔνδον* with the gen. in prose is elsewhere found

in Antiphon only, who favors archaic expression, 5, § 45 : *ενδον ὅν αὐτοῦ καὶ μή πεφοβημένος*.”—Sauppe.

ώς πρέπει. *πρέποι* not necessary. Cf. Heindorf's note.

παραιτεῖται. Generally in requests including something negative, or precluding something positive.

E. τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα, as hares, antelopes, etc.

προσῆπτεν . . . ὥπλιζε. Notice the symmetry of construction. How compactly would a Thucydides have said the same thing!

πτηνὸν φυγὴν . . . κατάγειον οἰκησιν, *winged flight, subterranean mansion*, elegant poetical phrase.

ηὗξε μεγέθει. Prolepsis.

τῷδε instead of *τούτῳ*. “The datives *σμικρότητι* with *ἴημπισχε* and *Θριξὶ* with *ἀμφιενήν*, instead of the accusatives (*Sympos.* 219 b); furthermore, *αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο* after *τοῖς δ'*, and *αὐτὰ ἔσωζε* after *ἄ δέ*, are tinges of poetic and archaic expression.”—Sauppe. “Ceterum peritos vix attinet monere quantum in hac narratione tum singula . . . tum totius orationis color habitusque a Platonis stilo discordet.”—Heindorf.

321, A. **μή τι γένος ἀστωθείη, be extinguished.** *ἀστώω* in the present passage only in Plato. Cf. Goethe's remark, how lavish Nature is in the consumption of individuals, how tenacious in the maintenance of the species.

πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὄρας. Cf. the rationalizing etymology, Cratyl. 410 c: *αἱ ὄραι . . . ὄρα γάρ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ὄριζεν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς.*

ἴκανοις μὲν . . . δυνατοῖς δέ. Notice the rhythm.

B. The same teleological view of the creation and equipment of living beings was held by Socrates, emphatically including man, however. Xen. Mem. I. 6, 14: *οὐ γάρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον ὅτι παρὰ ταῦλα ζῷα ὡσπερ Θεοὶ ἀνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες;*

πολυγονίαν, as the herring, e. g.

οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὁν. Litotes=possessing but a moderate amount of wisdom.

C. **ἢπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο.** Cf. note, above, on 320 a: *οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ.* The entire passage is referred to in Aristotle, “De Part. Animal.” IV. 10, p. 687 a, 23.

D. **περὶ τὸν βίον, scil. victum, βιοτόν.**

ταύτῃ ἔσχεν. Ingressive aorist.

οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει. “Prometheo, cum in Vulcani Minervaeque of-

ficiam intrare posset, non tamen illud quoque permissum ut et Jovis arcem intraret" (Heindorf), which view is followed by Sauppe. Stallbaum suggests that the εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα was too near.

E. ἐν φέφιλοτεχνεύτην. *In which they were wont to follow their favorite pursuit of skilled art.*

καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορίᾳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου. Cf. the magnificent lines in Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 447 sqq.

322, A. μετῆλθεν, overtook. The present would be=pursued.

θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, had a share in the lot (life) of the gods, namely, culture, etc.; cf. Phaedr. 230: ζῆσον θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.

θεόντις ἐνόμισεν. Ingressive aorist. *Established belief in gods.*

B. ἀπώλλυντο, were suffering decimation; cf. below, διεφθείροντο. πολιτικὴν . . . τέχνην, the craft of living together in organized society.

δείσας, becoming apprehensive.

C. περὶ τῷ γένει. Cf. above, 314 a: περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις.

Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα. ἄγοντα shows that the objects Αἰδώς and Δίκη are conceived as personifications.

κοσμοί τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. φιλίας, genitive objective after συναγωγοί. The latter word is found in only one other passage in Plato, Tim. 31 c: δεσμὸν . . . ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινὰ ἀμφοῖν ξυναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. The phrase is highly poetical, and Sauppe suggests a poetical reminiscence.

τίνα . . . τρόπον δοίη . . . νείμω; Transition from oratio obliqua to oratio recta, cf. Xen. Anab. I. 3, 20: καν μὲν γέ ἐκεῖ, τὴν δίκην ἔφη χριζειν ἐπιθεῖναι αὐτῷ. ήν δὲ φύγη, ήμεῖς ἐκεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα βουλευόμεθα.

D. τόν μὴ δυνάμενον . . . κτείνειν. Indirect statement of the law κτεινόντων. The ethical doctrine here advanced by Plato is based on an assumption still controverted by materialists and physicists. αἰδώς and δίκη are substantially what we would now call *conscience*, or the *innate* capacity and tendency of moral feeling and moral judgment. For the opposite view, cf. Hor. Sat. I. 3, 98 sqq.: *padding*

Átque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et aequi.

Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,

Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter

Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro

Pugnabant armis, quae post fabricaverat usus;

Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,

Nominaque invenere: dehinc absistere bello

Oppida coeperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.

δλίγοις οῖονται μετεῖναι. *οῖονται* = *placet illis*, in the sense of decide, as *δοκεῖν τινι* frequently, *hold that (but) few shall share*.

ἔαν τις . . . συμβουλεύῃ, tries to give advice, as the context shows.

323, A. **ἢν δεὶ διὰ δικαιοσύνης . . . λέναι.** Cf. the etymology of Latin *versari* in *aliqua re*; (Germ., “sich auf dem Gebiete von etwas bewegen.”) *διά* with genitive here not instrumental, but of motion within a limit. Heindorf quotes Legg. I. 632 c: *φύλακας . . . τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δύξης ιόντας.* Xen. Cyrop. II. 2, 4: *πονηρία διὰ τῶν παραντίκα ἡδονῶν πορευομένη*.

μετέχειν . . . μὴ εἶναι, both dependent from *προσῆκον*, slightly zeugmatic. Sauppe suggests supplying *ἀναγκαῖον* *ὄν* from *προσῆκον*, to go with the second infinitive. Immediately below, *ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς* *ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην* is a similar brachylogy, *good as a flute-player, or in any other branch, etc.*

ἢν μὴ ἔστιν. Accusative of specification; supply *ἀγαθός* from the preceding.

B. **τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον.** *μὴ* in all generic (and, by inference, hypothetical) statements, = *ὅστις ἀν μὴ προσποίηται*.

C. **ὦς ἀναγκαῖον.** Possibly *ὄν* lost after it by “haplographia.” *ἐν ἀνθρώποις, in human society.*

ἔξ ἐπιμελείας, as the result of careful attention.

D. **τοὺς αἰσχροὺς** *ἢ σμικρούς.* Cf. the Homeric opposite: *καλὴ μεγάλη τε.*

ταῦτα . . . ἵσασιν ὅτι . . . γίγνεται. *ταῦτα*, anticipation of the subject of the subclause, a current means of emphasizing; cf. above, 323 b: *ἴσαν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἴστιν.* And below: *ἔθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν . . . τί ποτε δύναται.* Cf. Krüger, § 61, 6, 2.

324, A. **πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς.** *ἐναντίος* in substantive construction; but a little above, 323 b, *τὰ καλὰ καὶ τάναντία τούτοις*, it is in its native (adjective) construction.

αὐτό σε διδάξει. The subject-matter, the very premises, etc., not strictly referable to *τὸ κολάζειν*, as Sauppe notes.

B. **ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται.** We see what an old song it is to decry the compensatory view of punishment

as barbaric. On the other hand, it ought to be consoling to those who advocate punishment solely for prevention to see how ancient this thought of progress really is.

παιδευτήν. Generally in the dialogue and elsewhere in this connection διδακτόν is used.

C. οἱ σοὶ πολῖται. *Tui cives.* Above, 316 b, merely ὁ ἴμετερος. εἰκότως, *rationally, consistently.*

D. ἦν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοί. Not so much an accusative of specification as a cognate accusative. Cf. Hom. Il. XV. 641: *νίνε ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετάς.*

οὐκέτι μῦθον σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον. The same opposition is found in Gorg. 523 a: ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγον, ὅν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὃς ἔγώ οἶμαι, ἔγώ δὲ λόγον. But in the present passage the opposition is merely between bare statement and embellishment.

E. **λύεται ἡ ἀπορία,** *the difficulty is explained;* cf. the opposite English vernacular of a “knotty subject.”

325, A. ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεύω εἶναι. προσαγορεύω pregnant, as above, 311 e: *σοφιστὴν . . . διομάζοντι . . . τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι.* Throughout this argumentation of Protagoras the anacolutha, etc., incidental to conversational style, have been well expressed by Plato. (Cf. Sauppe's note.)

B. **ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί.** The first ἀγαθοί has been added to the reading of the MSS. Sauppe's attempt to illustrate the MS. reading from other sources is not satisfactory. Deuschle suggests the present reading. The main argument for the same, however, is found in the passage below, 328 e: *γένεται ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.*

θεραπευτοῦ = above, 324 c: *παρασκευαστόν.*

θάνατος ἡ ζημία. The order of words in this phrase is generally fixed.

C. **φυγαί . . . δημεύστεις . . . ἀνατροπαί.** The plural distributive, *in each case.*

ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον, more commonly *τάχιστα.*

D. **διαμάχονται,** *struggle in rivalry.*

ὅπως, here purely relative, as is seen by the antecedent *τούτον.*

τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δέ, κ.τ.ξ., general rules, general truths, whereas τόδε μὲν καλὸν, κ.τ.λ., of concrete matters actually done or to be done.

ἔαν μὲν ἔκῶν πείθηται . . . Aposiopesis, namely, *εἰς ἔχει,* or something to that effect (cf. above, 311 d). In the present passage the

aposiopesis occurs in the first member of the disjunctive statement. For an aposiopesis in the second member, cf. Theaet. 143 d : εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην . . . τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε . . . ἀνηρώτων—νῦν δέ . . .

εἰς διδασκάλων. Cf. the famous passage in Aristoph. Nub. 961 sqq. : λέξω τοίνυν τὴν ἀρχαίαν παιδείαν ὡς διέκειτο, κ.τ.έ.

326, A. **ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν.** Thus Niceratus was compelled by his father, Nicias, to learn all of Homer by heart, Xen. Symp. 3, 5. It seems, too, that at family gatherings, banquets, and the like, the boys were called upon to declaim selections; Aristoph. Pac. 1265 sqq.

ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ . . . νουθετήστεις, as, for instance, the elegies of Solon, Theognis, Phocylides, the didactic poems of Hesiod, especially the *"Εργα κ. Ἡ."*

ἴνα δὲ παῖς ζηλῶν μυμῆται, κ.τ.έ. This practical view is met with elsewhere frequently. Thus Aeschylus in the contest before Bacchus in the Ranae of Aristophanes, 1008: ἀπόκριναι μοι, τίνος οὐνεκα χρὴ θαυμάζειν ἄνδρα ποιητὴν; (Eurip.) δεξιότητος καὶ νουθεσίας, ὅτι βελτίους τε ποιοῦμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. Plato, in his work on the (ideal) organization of society, the *Poλιτεία*, in his maturer years, has ex professo discussed literature, in its educational aspect at great length, Rep. II., and has severely criticised Homer from this point of view, p. 391: ἀμφότερα δὲ μηλέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν τοὺς νέους ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσι καὶ ἥρωες ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν βελτίους.

B. **εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες.** ἐντείνω, adapting a text to music or rhythm, and vice versa; Aristoph. Nub. 969: ἐντειναμένους τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἦν οἱ πατέρες παρέδωκαν.

τοὺς ρυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι, κ.τ.έ. Cf. the special discussion of this subject by Plato later, in the Rep. III. 398 sq. The Lydian and Ionian mood he calls soft, the Doric and Phrygian robust and severe. Of instruments he approves of the lyre and cithara only, rejecting the flute (clarinet).

εὐρυθμότεροι, κ.τ.έ. Cf. Plato, Rep. II. 400 e.

εἰς παιδοτρίβου, namely, the palaestra, where boys and youths were more frequently met than elsewhere. Cf. the beginning of Plat. Lysis (the palaestra of Miccus), and the scenery of the Charmides (palaestra of Taureas). This part of regular education received additional importance from the preparation for the contests at Olympia, Delphi, etc.

C. τῆς ἡλικίας. Genitive partitive with *πρωϊαίτατα*.

D. καὶ κατὰ τούτους ξῆν. Cf. the imaginary conversation of Socrates with *οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως*, Crito, 50 sqq.

~~γράμμας~~, to make them write straight and even.

ὧς, demonstrative; rare in Attic prose, common in Ionic (Homeric). Cf. Sauppe's note.

E. εὐθόναι. All officials (excepting, of course, the *δικασταῖ* of the vast tribunals) were subject to scrutiny by the board of audit (*λογισταῖ* and *εὐθυνοῖ*) at the end of their term of office. Some officials were held accountable to the special bodies by which they had been returned, as, e. g., the *φυλάρχαι* to the *φυλαῖ*, etc., and all were subject to a vote of confirmation or of disapproval at the beginning of each prytany, ten times a year. Cf. C. F. Hermann, "Staatsalterthümer."

διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων, κ.τ.ξ. Compare the starting-point in the discussion of the Laches, 179 c, d: It is a fact that eminent ability is generally not handed down to sons from or by their fathers, hence the concern of Lysimachus, son of Aristides, and of Melesias, son of Thucydides, in training and education.

φαῦλοι. The nearest synonym is *ἀβέλτερος*; both signify a negative quality—worthlessness.

τοῦτο αὖ. In the second place, after the argument about virtue being teachable has been concluded.

327, A. ιδιωτεύειν, be ignorant of, have no concern in it; every one must, in a certain sense, be a *craftsman* in these general moral attainments.

καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληγτε τὸν μὴ καλῶς. Hirschig proposes to bracket *καὶ* before *ἐδίδασκε*, conceiving the phrase, no doubt, as a mere ἐν διὰ δνοῖν; but the two verbs present a gradation. The accusative, *τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα*, it is true, is determined by *ἐδίδασκε*, as Sauppe notes.

B. ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη. The genitive *ἀλλήλων*, strictly speaking, is a genitive objective in the present construction; for the justice and virtue *mutually practised* is a profitable thing to us.

οἵτε ἄν. The *ἄν* goes with *γίγνεσθαι*, below, which contains the apodosis, in indirect statement, of the protasis (unreal condition), *εἰ εἴχομεν*.

C. ἐλλόγιμος ηὔκηθη. Current prolepsis. *αὐξάνεσθαι* is thus used seven times in Plato (Ast, lex.); cf. the English *wax=grow*, etc. Heindorf quotes Aristoph. Vesp, 1023: *ἀρθείς μέγας*.

ἰκανός, sufficient, passable; *ikarós* from *iknēomai* (*ausreichen*). *ikarós* frequently is raised from its etymological meaning into more positive force, while *deinós* is somewhat toned down.

τῶν ἐν ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις. Reading of Schanz, instead of *ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις*. Sauppe and others, who maintain the MS. reading, take the phrase as a compact one—civilized society. Stallbaum took umbrage at *καὶ ἀνθρώποις*, and Doederlein suggested *ἐν τρόποις*; cf. Rep. VII. 541 a.

D. **ἄγριοί τινες**, a set of savages.

οἵοι περ οὓς πέρισσοι Φερεκράτης . . . ἐδίδαξεν. According to Athenaeus, V. p. 218 d, this comedy was given at Athens (in 420 B.C.) in the archonship of Aristion (Meineke, "Fragm. Com." ed. min. I. p. 87). Of course this date does not harmonize with the dramatic date of the present dialogue. Plato never balks at anachronisms when they suit his literary opportunities. Cf. the copious discussion of this feature by Zeller, "Berlin Academy Transactions," 1873. As for the play of "The Savages," the context shows that the *μισάνθρωποι* must not be confounded with the *ἄγριοι*, but that the brutality of the latter induced the former to take a milder view of the corruptions in civilized society. The fragments preserved of the play are very few, and suggest but little of the plot of the piece. *διδάσκειν* is an ex parte designation of a dramatic exhibition, viz., from the rehearsing. Generally, the poet himself undertook this, receiving his fee from the state, and thus was called the *διδάσκαλος*. Pherecrates was a notable poet of the Old Comedy. Fragments of seventeen distinct plays of his are preserved in Meineke's collection.

σφόδρα goes with *ἀγαπήσαις ἄν.*

Εὐρυβάτω καὶ Φρυνώδᾳ, types of wickedness, whose names became proverbial; cf. "Dick Turpin," and the like. Suidas, s. v. (I.): *ἄνδρα φασὶ τοῦτον Ἐφέσιον εἶναι, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματα παρὰ Κροίσου ὥστε στρατιὰν συναγαγεῖν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν εἰς τοὺς Πέρσας, προδότην γενούμενον ἐγχειρίσαι τῷ Κύρῳ τὰ χρήματα τοῦ Κροίσου, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τοὺς πονηροὺς Εὐρυβάτους καλεῖσθαι.*

E. **τρυφᾶς**, *you are dainty*; Ficinus's *deliciosior videris* being more accurate than Jowett's *You are discontented*.

Ἐλληνίζειν, of speaking Greek, from which the adverb *ἐλληνιστί*. Cf. *βαρβαρίζειν*, *βαρβαριστί*.

328, B. **ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ**. Cf. Diog. Laert. IX. 8, 3. A. Gellius, V. 10, tells the famous story how Protagoras lost fifty per cent.

of his fee from his pupil Euathlus; cf. also Laches, 186 c, where Socrates says: *ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἷοί τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε κάγαδόν.*

ἀπέδωκεν and below, *κατέθηκεν*. Empirical aorists.

C. *μῦθον καὶ λόγον, a tale and a demonstration.*

τῶνδε δὲ οὕπω ἄξιον, κ.τ.έ. In this remark of Protagoras's, Plato has somewhat mitigated the violation of dramatic probability into which he had been carried by the argument above, 320 A.

D. *τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα.* The former contains the main stricture from the Socratic standpoint. Cf. *τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα*, e.

ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον. *ἐπὶ* in this use = the accusative of extent. Thucydides is distinguished by his copious use of this preposition, both temporally and locally. Stallbaum connects *ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον* with *κεκηλημένος*, Heindorf and Sauppe take it with *ἔβλεπον*. Which is preferable?

κεκηλημένος. The same metaphor above, 315 a: *κηλῶν τῷ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς.* While the passage is ironical to some extent, it is not sarcastic.

ώσπερεὶ συναγείρας continues the metaphorical phrase: *Collecting (rousing) myself as it were.*

E. *ῳδεὶς ἀφικέσθαι.* *ῳδεὶς* for *δεῦρο* is poetical.

ἥ ἀγαθοὶ . . . ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται. Cf. above, 325 b.

ἐπεκδιδάξει, give additional, exhaustive instruction.

συγγένοιτο, should become a pupil.

329, A. *ώσπερ βιβλία . . . ώσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα.* These two comparisons, at first sight, seem to be inconsistent with one another, so much so that C. F. Hermann in his text has inserted *οὐχ* before *ώσπερ βιβλία*. But the rhetorical soliloquies of the Sophist's discourse, against which the present criticism is directed, resemble both books and brazen pots (or bells); the former in their constitutional inability to further the subject-matter by questions and answers, and the latter by the endless ring of their declamation. Hermann probably missed the *tertium comparationis* in the case of the books, which is not their *silence* as such. Cf. also the story of the invention of letters, etc., in the Phaedrus, 275 sq.

δόλιχον . . . τοῦ λόγου. Metaphor from the long-distance race at Olympia and elsewhere, twelve times the distance of a stadium ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles), or more. *ὑπερπηδᾶν, ὑπερθεῖν, κατατρέχειν*, are fre-

hinc n. grecum

quently used in metaphorical sense in Plato; cf. Ast, Lex. Plat.: *πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος*, Theaet. 173 a.

B. *σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἴμι πάντ' ἔχειν*. The infinitive *ἔχειν* is *ερεχεγέσις* (=ώστε πάντ' *ἔχειν*), not object, of *ἐνδεής είμι*.

εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο is supplementary, not correlative, to *ἐνδεής είμι*.

πειθοῖμην. The additional *πείθομαι* of the MSS. is probably due to dittographia.

C. *τούτο μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον*. *Hoc quod mancum quasi est in animo meo, plenum perfectumque rede*.—Heindorf.

διελθε . . . τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. above, 320 c: *μᾶζον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ή λόγῳ διεξέλθω*;

D. *τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος*. *ἐνὸς ὄντος* predicative=ö *ἐν ξστι*.

δ *ἔτι* *ἐπιποθῶ*. *ἔτι* and *ἐπί* not a tautology. Cf. Charmides, 174 a: *τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ*. At this point Socrates suggests a point of inquiry which would lead to the further positive development of the subject.

ἀλλὰ ράθιον. The interlocutor of Socrates is made by Plato to assume the air of easy confidence, so that the embarrassment of the same further on will appear all the more striking.

330, A. *δύναμιν*. Here rather *function* than force—viz., with reference to its objects.

B. *εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματι . . . ἔοικεν*. Ast takes *ἔοικεν* as absolute and impersonal; probably *αὐτό* is to be understood. In the modern idiom we would change the relation, making *παράδειγμα* the subject, if the example resembles (the subject-matter), *if the example is adequate, holds good*.

κοινῆ σκεψώμεθα, ποιῶν τι αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔκαστον. Cf. the general statement of Xen. Mem. IV. 6, 1: *σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τι ἔκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ’ ἔληγε*.

C. ή *δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τι ἔστιν, κ.τ.έ.* The first point is, that the term *δικαιοσύνη* covers a reality, that it is not a mere generalization; cf. 332 a: *ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς*; 358 d: *καλεῖτε τι δέος καὶ φόβον*; Xen. Mem. IV. 2, 22: *οἰσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδώδεις καλονύμενοις*;

τίν’ ἀν ψῆφον θεῖο; metaphorical phrase from balloting (*What side should you take?*), or from judicial decisions, *ψῆφοι* being used in both.

τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοί; *ἐμοί* the dative after similarity. There would also be possible the construction *τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐγώ*; cf. Krüger,

Synt. 48, 13, 9: "After verbs of similarity and resemblance there occurs the brachylogy mentioned in § 47, 27, 5," etc.

D. δσιότητά τινα. Almost personal treatment of the concept.

εὐφήμει, ὡς ἄνθρωπε, *bona verba, quaeo* — Ficinus. The original force of the phrase, no doubt, means that a remark is judged as wicked; later, however, it seems to have meant simply, *hush! peace!* Cf. Sympos. 214 d, Socrates to Alcib.: οὐκ εὐφημήσεις;

E. σχολῆ μέντ' ἀν τι . . . εἴη, εἰ μὴ . . . ἔσται. Change of construction, expressing the increasing *earnestness* of the speaker. The protasis *monitory*; cf. Prof. Gildersleeve, in "Trans. of Am. Philol. Association, 1876," p. 9 sqq.

εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτ' εἴποι, κ.τ.έ. Socrates' preference of the dialectic mode of discourse seems to have been so great that he seems even to have managed imaginary interlocutors, or ideal sharers in the dialogue, with the greatest volubility. Cf. further below, 355 c: ἐὰν οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, κ.τ.έ.; 356 a: εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι, κ.τ.έ., and the fine representation of the *νόμοι*, Crito, 50 a sqq.

331, A. σὸς οὗτος δ λόγος; *is that your statement?* Are you the author of this view? Cf. Eurip. Melanippa Sap. Frigm. 6: κούκ
ἐμδὲς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα, κ.τ.έ.

B. ἔγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίνην, κ.τ.έ. Cf. the similar subject treated in Euthyphro, 11 e sq.: ιδὲ γάρ εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὄστιον.

ταῦτὸν . . . δσιότητι, *idem ac pietatem.* Cf. construction above, 330 c.

C. εἰ γὰρ βούλει, κ.τ.έ. Protagoras shows in this phrase that he is not very much in earnest in his assent, that he simply yields the point to get on. But such is not dialectic progression in the judgment of Socrates, and hence his sharp phrase, *μή μοι*, which always betrays some passion, "I'll none of that!" Ficinus very tamely: Haud haec admitto. Cf. Aristoph. Eq. 19 sqq.:

(Nicias)	πῶς ἀν οὖν ποτε εἴποιμ' ἀν αὐτὸ δῆτα κομψευριπικῶς;
	(Dem.) μὴ μοί γε, μὴ μοι, μὴ διασκανδισθεῖσης.

εἴ τις τὸ εὶ ἀφέλοι. Socrates does not mean to say that the element of hypothesis must be utterly eliminated from normal dialectic—he himself abounds in it—but he desires to condemn in principle the practice of provisional assent or dissent.

D. καὶ γὰρ ὄτιον ὄτιον. By this addition Protagoras endeav-

ors to cancel the effect of his admission. Perhaps, too, we have here a faint suggestion of the metaphysical tenets of Protagoras, according to which definiteness and permanence, both of sensuous impressions and of consequent human judgment about anything, were impossible. Hence the practical consequence which he drew: *δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικεμένους ἀλλήλοις.*

E. κἀντα ἐλέγχοις . . . ὡς ἄπαντα, κ.τ.έ. Not “and you might prove this, that all things resemble one another,” but *and you might prove that these* (namely, *τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια*) *all resemble one another*, *ταῦτα* really being not the direct object of *ἐλέγχοις*, but an anticipation of the subject of the clause dependent from *ἐλέγχοις*.

οὗτω σοι . . . ἔχει, namely, *ἵγει συ οὕτως ἔχειν*, κ.τ.έ.

332, A. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Cf. above, 330 c: *ἢ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τι ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα;* Does the term *ἀφροσύνη* cover something, a real substance, or is it a mere word? Cf. Phaedo, 103 c: *Θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;*

πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι δρθῶς τε καὶ ὀφελίμως. Not “do upright and useful acts,” but *follow their (respective) pursuits in a proper and useful manner.* As for the primary meaning of *δρθός*, cf. the Engl. “upright.” See distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν* treated at length by J. H. H. Schmidt, “Synonymik der Griech. Sprache,” I. p. 407 sq.

σωφρονεῖν. One of the most characteristic terms of Greek ethics, and which can hardly be reproduced by any single English term; cf. the discussion and the several definitions in the Charmides.

B. οἱ μὴ δρθῶς πράττοντες. *μή* with generic participle, as in most negative generic statements, here equivalent to *οἵτινες ἀν μὴ δρθῶς πράττωσιν*, involving the protasis of a general supposition.

εἴ τι ισχῦι . . . ἀσθενείᾳ, κ.τ.έ. Socratic induction (*ἐπαγωγή*). The datives are strictly instrumental, as is seen below from their equivalent (c): *ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ=ώσαντως.*

C. *συνέφη.* Here the narrative is getting somewhat dry, of course. Notice how Plato avoids repeating the same term for assent: *συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη—ἔφη—ώμολόγει—ἰδόκει—ἔφη—συνέφη—συνεχώρει (ποικιλία).* Cf. Krüger, § 64, 5, 4.

Τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον, κ.τ.έ. *μή = num, not, I dare say.*

D. ἀναλογισώμεθα. Cf. the Engl. “reckon up.” Sauppe cites Rep. X. 618, d: ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ρηθέντα.

333, A. λύσωμεν. λύειν not of analysis here, but of the solution of problems and difficulties. The two statements (*λόγοι*) referred to have not any difficulty in themselves, individually, but relatively, if compared with one another. They cannot both stand together.

τὸ ἐν . . . εἶναι. The article here is deictic.

οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς. οὐ πάνυ (litotes) milder than πάνυ οὐ, but strong through litotes; cf. above, of Epimetheus, 321 b: οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὡν. μουσικῶς, properly, consistently; cf. below, in the fragment from Simonides, 339 c: οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται.

συνάρδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν, doublet of expression without any special discrimination of synonyms; cf. above, 314 a: περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς.

πῶς . . . συνάρδοιεν, εἴπερ = si quidem = since.

B. ἐνὶ ὄντι. The gender of the copula ὄντι attracted by the predicate ἐνί.

ἢ γάρ, namely οὕτως ἔχει.

καὶ μάλ’ ἀκόντως. The καὶ not pleonastic, but emphatic; *he agreed, and that right unwillingly—with a very bad grace.*

τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐφάνη. Socrates calls attention to the result of the inquiry in the first case, where Protagoras had yielded with an εἰ γάρ βούλει, 331 c. In the present case his assent has been compelled much more decisively. As for the present identification, in point of ethics, of *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη*, cf. Xen. Mem. III. 9, 4: σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι, σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε, whence it seems that *σοφία* has more of a positive, and *σωφροσύνη* rather a negative, function.

μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν. Cf. ἀπειπεῖν, Phaedr. 228 a. Of physical and mental labor, *give out, give up.*

καὶ τὰ λοιπά. There now remains to be discussed the homogeneous character and function of ἀνδρεία as compared with the other specific virtues, and with the *intellectual character* of virtue in general.

C. σωφρονεῖν δτι= [δ τι] ἀδικεῖ. δτι not causal but limitative, *qua injuste agit.*

ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν. The basis of the *ἐπεὶ* must be gathered from the preceding, Αἰσχυνοίμην ἀντίγωγ', κ.τ.ξ.—namely, “and I make this *as a merely personal statement*,” since, etc.; elliptical use of *ἐπεὶ*. In such relations *ἐπεὶ* often has almost a concessive force, as below, 335 c: ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἔβουλόμην ἀντίος τ' εἶναι.

συμβάνει μέντοι ίσως, κ.τ.ξ., because the holder of a view or argument often cannot well be separated from the latter, and the personal element cannot be entirely avoided. In Charmides, 166 b, c, Critias, being hard pushed by Socrates, complains: ἐμὲ . . . ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἕάσας περὶ οὐδὸν λόγος ἐστίν. But Socrates defends himself against the imputation of personal bias, and claims that a common benefit accrues from his inquiries: ἡ οὐ κοινὸν οἵτινες ἀγαθῶν εἴναι σχεόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἔκαστον τῶν οὗτων ὅπως ἔχει; As a matter of fact, however, a great deal of personal rancor *did* follow from the intercourse with Socrates, in the case of many whose intellectual defeat was felt by them as a personal grievance. See Apol. 21 d, e, 23, a, c, etc.

D. **ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἥμιν ὁ Πρωταγόρας.** καλλωπίζεσθαι, *to act daintily*; similarly *σεμνύνεσθαι*, *trumphant*, and *θρύπτεσθαι*, e. g.; Phaedr. 228 c: ἐθρύπτετο, ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπινυμῶν λέγειν. *ἥμιν* is dative us ethicis.

ἔστω, ἔφη, exhibits the unwillingness of Protagoras to go on with the argument: *We'll assume that*, i. e., so as to go on.

ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀγαθά, αἱ ἔστιν ἀφέλιμα. This fairly expresses the view of Socrates, and students of philosophy have generally alleged against him that he either failed to specify the real contents of the *ἀγαθόν*, or that he did not carry it beyond a general utilitarian conception. From this point of view, too, he disapproved of carrying theoretical pursuits beyond the limit of utility, as mathematics, astronomy, and the like: τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσ-ξυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν, ὃ τι μὲν ὀφελοίη ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔφη ὄρᾶν, Xen. Mem. IV. 7, 3.

E. **τετραχύνθας τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν.** Ficinus condenses: *subirasci*. *τραχύνω* has a close etymological and lexical counterpart in *exasperate*; *ἀγωνιᾶν*, *to labor*, “to exert one's self severely,” “to be in trouble.”

παρατετάσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι must be taken together. The reading of the MSS. *παρατετάχθαι* is very well in itself (it is maintained by Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle); but Kock's emendation, *παρατετάσθαι*, which has been adopted with Schanz, seems

to agree much better with the context: Protagoras is not drawn up ready (like an army) to go on with answering, but rather *worn out* with regard to answering, tired of it, and eager to go on with his own uninterrupted ἐπίδειξις.

334, A. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἴδ', α, κ.τ.έ. Digression of Protagoras on the relativity of the useful. The Sophist breaks away again from the narrow fetters of Socratic διαλέγεσθαι, which repressed his own more congenial mode of discourse. The incident is dramatic, proceeding from the character of Protagoras; at the same time, a thought is brought forward which is not entirely foreign to the subject-matter, Xen. Mem. III. 8, 4 sqq.

B. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον . . . The basis of the ἐπεῖ is to be sought in the general statement; καὶ οὕτως γε λεκτέον, or something to that effect, being understood.

ἀγωγόν (*conducive*), profitable. Cf. the etymology of the opposite, ἐμποδών, impede, and the German *förderlich*.

ποικίλον . . . παντοδαπόν. The sense of ποικίλον is a *unity* with many aspects, that of παντοδαπόν a *compound* from many sources.

ταῦτὴν τοῦτο, emphatic restatement of the subject.

C. οἵς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, namely, ὁ ἀσθενῶν understood, concord κατὰ σύνεσιν (being generic) with τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν.

αἰσθήσεις, *sensations*.

διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν. Stallbaum professes not to see the sense of this, and reads διὰ τῶν χυμῶν (through the sense of taste); but Sauppe: "Nothing similar seems to occur with the ancients; at the same time, one may well suppose that in the case of fish, e. g., the perfume of oil may have this effect."

ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὐ λέγοι. ἀνεθορύβησαν pregnant—namely, λέγοντες, or ἐμφαίνοντες, ὡς . . . λέγοι, oratio obliqua; Socrates does not commit himself to the same judgment.

ἐπιλήσμων τις ὕν. Socratic irony. Cf. below the judgment of his admirer, Alcibiades: οὐχ ὅτι παιᾶει καὶ φῆσιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι, 336 d.

D. μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι, *majore voce uti*. φθέγγεσθαι from the standpoint of the hearer, as to sound, cf. αὐδᾶν, φωνεῖν. Cf. Schmidt, "Synonymik," I. p. 54.

σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις. The unbroken and flowing ἐπιδειξις of rhetorical delivery and Socratic inquiry do not go to-

gether; similarly, Hipp. min. 364 b: ὥκνουν γάρ ιπανερέσθαι . . . καὶ μὴ ἐμποδὼν εἴην ἑρωτῶν τῷ ἀποδεῖξει.

E. καὶ αὐτός, namely, μακρὰ λέγειν, κ.τ.έ.

μακρὰ λέγειν . . . καὶ αὖ βραχέα οὔτως, κ.τ.έ. A similar faculty claimed by Gorgias, Gorg. 449 c: καὶ γάρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὅν φημί, μηδένα ἀν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ ταύτα εἰπεῖν. Socrates therefore begs of him to use the latter. Ast quotes Phaedr. 267 b, where Tisias and Gorgias are noted as the “inventors” [*ἀνεῦρον*] both of terseness and of fulness of discourse.

335, A. πολλοῖς ἦδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην, *against many already have I taken the field of discussion* (rather than discourse, on account of the plural, λόγοι). ἀγών’ properly the contest in games. The English “to be pitted against,” has a less noble sphere of derivation. The dative, πολλοῖς, probably after the compact phrase εἰς ἀγῶνα ἀφικνεῖσθαι, in the sense of μάχεσθαι, πολεμεῖν, or Homeric μάρνασθαι, all of which generally take the personal dative.

ἐποίουν . . . διελεγόμην. Unreal protasis in the past, as the apodosis, ἀν ἐγένετο, shows; referring to *continuous habit*.

ἐγένετο. Pregnant or absolute, *had been established*. Stallbaum’s proposal, ἐλέγετο, does not seem to have found much acceptance.

B. δτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι. “The optative of the future is generally found in the oratio obliqua only, after an historical tense, although here, too, the indicative is very common.”—Krüger, 53, 7, 10, and 54, 6, 2.

ἐν ταῖς συνονσίαις. As for the plural, cf. below, 336 b: τῶν διαλόγων.

C. ἐβουλόμην ἀν . . . συνονσίᾳ ἐγίγνετο. Unreal forms of hypothesis implied; the speaker looks upon the cooptivation of the discourse as impossible.

ἀσχολία. Cf. the etymology of *negotium*.

ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους. Cf. above, 329 a, ἀποτείνειν and κατατείνειν.

D. ὁ Καλλίας. Dramatic propriety, he being the host.

οὐχ ὄμοιώς. Litotes, *not at all so efficiently*.

οὐδὲ ἀν ἐνός. οὐδεῖς in tmesis much more emphatic than as compound; cf. below, 243 d: οὐδὲ ἀν πρὸς ἔνα λόγον.

ῶς ἔξιών. ξειμι here with its future force.

σοῦ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Here in its primary, not in any technical,

sense, *descendi cupiditas*.—Ast. Similarly Lysis, 213. d, with reference to the boy Lysis: ἡσθεὶς τῷ φιλοσοφίᾳ, where Ficinus, inaccurately, “illius philosophiam nimium delectatus;” add Rep. III. 376 b: τό γε φιλομαθές καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτον.

E. Κρίσων τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ, nobilis σταδιοδόρομος; ter deinceps cursu vicit, Olymp. 83, 84, 85.—Stallbaum.

δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι. These words have been bracketed by Groen van Prinsterer, “Prosopographia Platonica,” and after him by Hirschig and other editors, but they may be very properly retained; point thus: *Krίσων τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρομεῖ, ἀκμάζοντι, Crison, the runner of Himera, when in his prime; ἀκμάζοντι* must be taken predicatively, of course.

δολιχοδρόμων. Cf. above, 329 a.

336, A. **Θεάσασθαι.** The metaphor sustained, the sphere being that of an ἄγων. Similar phraseology, Theaet. 171 d: *καταθέομεν, παραθέομεν.* A little below the matter is repeated: *κυρίοις δνόμασι, εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς.*

συγκαθεῖναι. Intransitive, as many compounds of *iéναι*, 338 a. Theaet. 168 b: *ἴλεω τῷ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει.* Rep. VIII. 566 a: *οἱ δὲ γέροντες ἔνγκαθεύντες τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπλανται.* Krüger, § 52, 2, 8; Sauppe. For a similar metaphor of *starting* in a race, cf. Aristoph. Eq. 1159:

(Sausage-seller.) *ἄφες ἀπὸ βαλβίδων ἐμέ τε καὶ τουτονί,
ἴνα σ' εὖ ποιῆμεν ἐξ ἵσου.*

(Demos.) *δρᾶν ταῦτα χρόνον.
ἀπιτον.*

B. **ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς.** Colloquial phrase; the Engl. vernacular, *Don't you see?* Kroschel quotes Hipparch. 227 d: *ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς, ἡ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄπτι ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὡφελεῖσθαι.* Aristoph. Thesm. 496: *ταῦθ', ὁρᾶς, οὐπώποτ' εἶπεν.*

ὑπολαβὴν οὖν δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης. This is the succor to which Socrates refers at the beginning of the dialogue, 309 b: *πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἔμοις ἐπέξει, κ.τ.λ.* Similarly in the Hipp. min., 373 a, Eudicus, appealed to by Socrates, induces Hippias to abstain from *μακρολογία*, and to conform to Socrates' method of discourse. The interposition of Alcibiades is very opportune, for it brings a criticism to bear on Protagoras so direct and forcible that the reserve and courtesy of Socrates himself would not have ventured upon it.

C. **ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους.** Metaphor drawn from boxing, avoid-

ing, i. e., parrying, a blow by striking the opponent's fist aside. *ἐκκρούειν* in this sense only in the present passage in Plato, but frequent in the orators. Cf. below, 339 c: ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς.

D. οὐχ ὅτι παίζει. Cf. Sympos. 218 d (Alcibiades speaks): εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφόδρα ἔαντῷ εἴωθότως ἐλεξεν.

ἐπιεικέστερα. The compound *ἐπιεικές* more of practical propriety (fairness), *εἰκός* more of purely logical propriety. Cf. *ἐπιείκεια*.

τρὸς Πρωταγόρου, *on the side of Protagoras, a partisan of Protagoras.* A brief but excellent characterization of the man's temperament in this regard is found in Plut. Vit. Alcib. c. 2: Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον ἴσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον.

337, A. δ Πρόδικος, κ.τ.έ. The mode of introducing Prodicus seems a little forced, and is so, no doubt, just as that of Hippias below. At the same time, we must keep in mind that these figures, together with that of the leading sophist, serve as foils to set off all the more effectively the figure and dialectic procedure of the protagonist Socrates. There is not enough space allotted to these secondary figures in the dialogue for a *purely dramatic development* of their peculiarities. In the present case the synonyms come upon us a little too suddenly and liberally. As for the rest, cf. Lach. 197 c: τῷ Προδίκῳ . . . ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα διαιρεῖν. For another distinction of synonyms (in the mouth of Critias) cf. Charmides, 163.

κοινούς . . . ἵσοις. Prodicus was not particularly fortunate in his strictures on words and their uses in this instance. *κοινὸς καὶ ἵσος* continued to be a set phrase for *fairness and impartiality*. Dem. πρὸς Ἀφοβον (III.) § 1: ἀν περ ἵσοι καὶ κοινοὶ γένησθε ἥμῶν ἀκροαταί.

B. ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν, κ.τ.έ., rendered by Cicero as follows: *nunc a vobis, o Protagora et Socrates, postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri et inter vos de hujuscemodi rebus controversemini, non concertetis;* Cicero, Fragm. p. 55, ed. Baiter et Kayser. Prisc. VIII. 7, 35.

εὐδοκιμεῖν is very nearly the same as our *to be appreciated, to enjoy the good opinion*, etc. *εὐδοκιμεῖν* and *ἐπαινεῖσθαι*, of course, do not exclude each other.

C. παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων. δόξα here is strictly that of the subjects who practise the ἐπαινεῖν.

εὐφραίνεσθαι and ἡδεσθαι as representing, the former the more refined and mental pleasure, the latter the pleasure of sensation; cf. εὐφροσύνη and ἡδονή. The specific sense of the latter is even more strongly expressed in the plural, αἱ ἡδοναῖ.

αὐτῇ τῇ διαινοΐᾳ . . . αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. With the mind *directly*, with the body *directly*, excluding one another.

πάσχοντα. πάσχειν τι = *affici aliqua re*.

πολλοὶ πάνυ . . . ἀπεδέχοντο. Cf. above, 334 c: οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὐ λέγοι, of Protagoras; and also below, after Hippias's parade, 338 b: ταῦτα ἥρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν. All this is added purposely by Plato, to put the ultimate victory of Socrates in a still stronger light.

ὦ ἄνδρες . . . οἱ παρόντες. Hippias addresses himself to the entire company directly, not to Protagoras or Socrates or Callias especially, nor at once; this probably agrees with his love of applause, and with his attempt to have his good offices in the controversy accepted by all.

D. φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ. The pet doctrine of Hippias. What bearing it was to have on the matter in hand is not at once patent. Perhaps he means to suggest that, their dignity and standing being really equal, it was all the more proper to come to an amicable understanding. The same depreciation of law, as something purely conventional, subjective, and changing, is exhibited by Hippias in Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 5, whereas Socrates, ib. 12, says: φημὶ . . . ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι; Cf. also the attitude of Socrates in the Crito. The φύσει δίκαιον, of course, always reduces itself to the *right of the stronger*, and is thus maintained by Callicles in the Gorgias, as in 483 d: ή δέ γε, οἵμαι, φύσις αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸι δίκαιόν εστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατώτερου, and he criticises law as a fanciful contrivance to curb and override this superior *law of nature*. The same view is held by Thrasymachus, in the Republic, I., and by the Athenians in the famous discourse with the Melians, as presented by Thucydides, V. sub finem. And these questions will generally come to the surface in all ethical discussions, especially with regard to political science.

ὅ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὡν . . . ἀνθρώπων, a reminiscence from Pindar (Fragm. 146, Bgk. ed. II.), Gorg. 484 b:

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
Σνατῶν τε καὶ ἀδανάτων
ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ διαισθατὸν
ὑπερτάτα χειρόν.

Cf. the beautiful excursus on this topic by Herodotus, III. 38, which he winds up with the remark: *καὶ ὅρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.* In Phaedr. 272 d, Plato makes a distinction between those who have a *natural* faculty for justice, and those who acquire it by *τροφή*.

φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναν. The supreme assurance and self-esteem of Hippias come out strongly elsewhere too, e. g., Xen. Mem. IV. 4, 7: *περὶ . . . τοῦ δικαίου πάννον οἵμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἀούτε σὺ οὔτ' ἀν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναται ἀντειπεῖν.*

κατ' αὐτὸν τούτο. *Hoc ipso nomine*, Heindorf; *de hoc ipso*, Ficinus; *and as such*, Jowett; viz., agreeably to that very claim and dignity—of being the wisest.

εἰς αὐτὸν τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας, namely, Athens. The *πρυτανεῖον* here is not the hall, where the executive board of the Senate dined at public expense, together with public benefactors, etc. (Plat. Apol. 36 a), but *πυρὸς ταμεῖον*, *ἐνθα ἦν ἀσβεστον πύρ καὶ ηγχοντο* (Suidas). Within the last generation men like Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Euenus, etc., had visited Athens for longer or shorter periods. Cf. also the words of Pericles, given to him by Thucydides in a speech very near in date to that of the present dialogue, Thucyd. III. 41, 1: *ἔννελών τε λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευσιν εἶναι.*

Ε. συμβῆναι ὑπᾶς ὕσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν. Cf. *θανεῖν ὑπό τινος, διακεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος, etc.* Plat. Soph. 242 e: *τοτὲ μὲν ἐν εἶναι φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπὸ Ἀφροδίτης . . . τοτὲ δέ, κ.τ.έ.* Hom. Il. P. 428: *ἐν κονίγσι πεσόντος ὑφ' Ἔκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο.* *συμβαίνειν* is here a neutral verb, its active correspondent (Thuc. 2, 29) being *συμβιβάζειν*, immediately below.—Sauppe.

338, A. **φαίνωνται**, not *seem*, but *present themselves before us* as on the stage or in a public contest.

πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα . . . τεμεῖν. Metaphorical diction drawn from ships and sailing. Cf. Aristoph. Ran. 997 sqq.:

ἀλλ' ὅπως ᾖ γεννάδα
μὴ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀντιλέξεις,
ἀλλὰ συστείλας ἀκροίστι
χοώμενος τοῖς ιστίοις,
εἴτα μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ἀξεις

καὶ φυλάξεις
ἥμικ' ἀν τὸ πινεῦμα λεῖον
καὶ καθεστηκός λάβησ.

And Eq. 756:

νῦν δή σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξείναι σεαυτοῦ.

The fulness and poetical character of Hippias's remarks entirely exceed the occasion.

B. Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη, refused. The οὐκ "adherescent," *negavit*, as below, e: *πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἥθελεν, noluit*.

βραβευτήν, properly the awardee of the prize at games, judge of contest, umpire; cf. *ῥαβδοῦχος*, marshal, above. The other form, βραβέος, occurs once in Plat. Legg. XII. 949 a: *ἄνθλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβέας*.

ὅ γάρ ὅμοιος . . . ποιήσει. Transition from oratio obliqua to oratio recta, colloquial; cf. above, 322 c.

C. ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἔμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. *τὸ γ' ἡμόν, for my part.* Gorg. 458 d: *τὸ γ' ἔμὸν οὐδέν εἰπερ ἐθέλει Γόργιας.*

οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, . . . οὗτος ὁ ποσχέτω, the demonstrative, expressing the speaker's nodding with his head, as it were, is not superfluous; partly because Socrates addresses himself at this moment to his host and the general company, and partly on account of the opposition to ἔγώ.

ἄμα πειράσομαι . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι, which Schleiermacher conceived as the main purpose and scope of the entire dialogue—viz., the exposition of correct philosophical method, διαλέγεσθαι in its specific sense; cf. above, 336 b, its opposite, *τὸ ὅμηρορεῖν*.

E. ἐπιστατήσετε, courteous periphrasis of the imperative, as above, c, *aἰρήσεσθε*, and a, *ποιήσετε*. Cf. Goodwin, M. T. § 25, note 5.

ἔδοκει πᾶσιν . . . ποιητέον εἶναι, not *ποιῆσαι*, because it is not the πάντες who are primarily engaged in the execution—πάντες ἐπιστατήσετε being a mere courtesy—but Socrates and Protagoras.

ἐπειδὰν ίκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ. Not strict construction, but *repraesentatio* of direct statement.

339, A. περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι. The introduction of the entire episode of the discussion of the Simonidean passage, at first sight, seems somewhat irrelevant; but it has a proper place in the economy of the dialogue, only it must be borne in mind that the episode has a negative import—viz., to show ὡς οὐ χρὴ διαλέγεσθαι, to borrow from the phrase of Socrates above, 338 d. As a matter

of actual practice, morality was largely learned from the poets in the ἐγκύλιος παιδεία of boys; cf. above, *ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα*, 325 e. Cf. also Aristoph. Ran. 1007 sqq.:

(Aeschylus) ἀπόκριναι μοι, τίνος οὖνεκα χρὴ θαυμάζειν ἄνδρα ποιητήν;
 (Euripides) δεξιώτητος καὶ νουθεσίας, ὅτι βελτίους τε ποιοῦμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

As for Socrates himself, he by no means disapproved of referring to poets, e. g. in moral discussion, for illustration and elucidation of some point; cf. Xen. Mem. I. 2, 20, where he quotes from Hesiod and from Epicharmus. This, however, was something different from basing ethical theory on the words of a poet. The sophists at Athens certainly found a well-prepared field in their practice of literary criticism.

ἢ τε ὁρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἡ μῆ. Of course, comparative estimates of different poets were also given, of which we have a reflection in Aristoph. Nub. 1361 sqq. Young Pheidippides, after having been under the influence of the new learning, sets up an entirely different canon of poetical excellence, opposed to that one which his father had entertained hitherto. Simonides and Aeschylus are called poor poets, whereas Euripides is made the leading one.

λέγει γάρ που (*πού* with regard to the accuracy of recollecting the words) πρὸς Σκόπαν, *says in the poem directed to Scopas*. "Dedicate" would not be quite accurate in the case of Simonides, because such poems were written by order, as most of Pindar's were, for a definite occasion generally. The present poem of Simonides, in its occasion and spirit, does not ill agree with the judgment of Simonides indirectly given by Aristoph. Pac. 699: κέρδονς ἔκατι καν ἐπὶ φιέσ επέοι. Sauppe and Blass judge, from the general tenor of the passages quoted, that the piece was not an ἐπινίκιον, but a σκόλιον, or after-dinner piece, sung at an entertainment of the Thessalian gentleman by a chorus. (Sauppe, Einleitung, p. 22.) It is evident, from the general drift of the Simonidean lines quoted, that the poet found it a difficult task to praise a man like Scopas at all, and that in a certain manner he excused himself to the public for undertaking the task. The interesting tradition about Simonides' niggardly treatment at the hands of his patron, and how he was saved from impending destruction through Castor and Pollux, is related at length by Cicero, De Oratore, II. 351 sqq.

B. *τετράγωνον*. Cf. "square" in English vernacular, "square"

dealing, and the like. The editors quote Aristotle, Rhet. III. 11: *τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά· ἄμφω γάρ τέλεια. ἄνευ φύγου τετυγμένον* evidently continues the metaphor, *wrought without a flaw*.

τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. μέλειν τινί τινος, impersonal; cf. Plat. Apol. 24 c; cf. Lach. 187 c: *μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἡγούμενα, ὡς εἰκός, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων*, where the material object is construed a little differently. See also Apol. 25 c.

C. ἐμμελέως, namely *εἰρήσθαι*, to be gathered from *εἰρημένον* in the next line, especially if *νέμεται* (Sauppe, Kroschel) is here = *νομίζεται*.

τὸ Πιττάκελον. Cf. below, 343 b. Protagoras urges inconsistency against Simonides for his dissent from Pittacus.

μή τι λέγοι, *lest he made a point* (adverse to my view).

D. **τοῦ ποιήματος.** Gen. partitive after *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*.

E. **πολλοῖς θρύβον παρέσχεν.** Cf. note on 337 c: *πολλοὶ πάνυ . . . ἀπεδέξαντο*. Elsewhere, too, Plato records the effect of the performances of Socrates' opponents upon the hearers, e. g. Euthydem. 276 d: *ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν οἱ ἔρασται τοῖν ἀνδροῖν*.

ώσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς. Socratic irony; cf. above, 328 d, and Euthydem. 303 a: *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἐκείμην ἄφωνος . . .*

τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής. Compact construction, in which Thucydides abounds, and the use of which he carries to the utmost limits, e. g. VII. 34, 6: *διὰ . . . τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἀπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐξ τὸ πέλαγος.*

340, A. **δοκῶ οὖν μοι . . . παρακαλεῖν σέ.** *δοκεῖν* in personal construction not only in the intellectual sense, but also in that of *decision*, growing out of it, e. g. Phaedr. 230 e: *ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακεῖσθαι*.

πολιορκούμενον, *besieged*, i. e., hard pressed, the metaphorical phrase being maintained immediately below; *ἐκπέρση* itself derived from reminiscence of the Homeric passage a little farther below, Il. φ 309 sq.: *ἐπεὶ τάχα ἀστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος | ἐκπέρσει.*

εἰπόντα, in Il. φ 308.

τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς. *μουσικός* and *μουσική* refer to culture and accomplishments in general, intellectual training; thus, *μουσικὴν ἐπίστασθαι* in Aristoph. Eq. 188, to have education, and ibid. 191: *ἡ δημαρχαγία γάρ οὐ πρὸς μουσικοῦ | ἐτ' ἔστιν ἄνδρος . . .* Cf. the opposite, *ἄμουσος*.

τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς, which specimens are quoted as showing the supreme nicety in Prodicus's discrimination of synonyms.

C. **τὸ αὐτὸν ἔαντῳ λέγοντα**, dependent from *μέμφεται*. The participle is found after this verb, not insomuch as *μέμφεσθαι* is a verb of emotion, the object clauses after which generally have *ὅτι*, but *μέμφεται* here would seem to stand *pregnantly*, including a verb like *ὑπολαβών*, or something to that effect. Cf. Krüger, § 56, 7, 1–2.

Ἐλεγεν, *called, understood to be.*

τὸ χαλεπόν. There is no need of bracketing *τό*, which is deictic with reference to the passage above from which *χαλεπόν* is taken.

γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν is epexegetical with *τοῦτο*.

D. **καθ' Ἡσίοδον**, the famous sentence of the Ascrean farmer, "Εργα κ. Ἡμ. 289 sqq.: τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ίδρωτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν | ἀδάνατοι· μαρδὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἷμος ἐξ αὐτήν, | καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δὲ εἰς ἄκρον ἰκηται | ὥριδή δὲ ἐπειτα πέλει χαλεπή περ ιοῦσα . . .

αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον. The road to excellence being conceived as a steep ascent, as in Longfellow's "Excelsior" (Lat. *fastigium*). The Hesiodean passage is quoted in full by Socrates in Xen. Mem. II. 1, 20.

τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα (cf. above, 340 a: *τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα*) is criticism or elucidation which tends to restore or *uphold* something; in modern technical language=conservative criticism.

Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, *I have done a poor stroke of work, then.* The primary sense of the dative with passives (Krüger, § 48, 15, 3) is not so much purely instrumental as possessive, the interest or stake of the subject in the action being palpable.

εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἱατρός, κ.τ.έ. Sauppe and Deuschle refer the phrase to a proverbial expression, as in Herod. III. 53: *μὴ τῷ κακῷ τὸ κακὸν ἴω.* Thucyd. V. 65: *κακὸν κακῷ ιάσασθαι.*

E. **κινδυνεύειν.** *κινδυνεύει* has almost entirely lost its etymological sense in such constructions, and been reduced to a *modul auxiliary*, often coming near in shade to the optative with *ἄν*.

341. **ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου.** Simonides was highly thought of by Plato as a poet, cf. Rep. I. p. 331 e, where a point of ethical definition is established with a reference to some passage in Simonides.—Bernhardy, "Griech. Lit." I. 1, p. 706. Of course the present praise of synomimics as ancient is ironical.

ἄπειρος . . . οὐχ ὥσπερ ἔγω ἔμπειρος. Epic fulness, characteristic of Greek expression in general. Heindorf compares Aristoph. Eq. 784: *ἐπὶ ταῖσι πέτραις οὐ φροντίζει σκληρῶς σε καθήμενον οὕτως | οὐχ ὥσπερ ἔγω ῥαψάμενός σοι τοντὶ φέρω.*

διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτοῦ. The other passages containing similar statements on the part of Socrates (Charmides, 163 d; Cratyl. 384 b) are discussed by Schanz, "Sophisten," p. 41 sq. As for the rest, the general inference may probably be made that the historical Socrates entertained a somewhat higher regard for Prodicus than Plato himself. Cf. also Lach. 197 d: *ὅς δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.* We can easily understand that Socrates, in his constant occupation of defining concepts, had frequent need of synonymous discrimination, as, e. g., in Xen. Mem. III. 9, 14, where he defines the difference between *εὐπραξία* and *εὐδαιμονία*.

B. εἰ οὐκ εἰσχύνομαι. It seems that Prodicus, in his studies of words and their uses, went out of his way to attack established and current phraseology, basing his exceptions on etymology.

δεινοῦ πλούτου, κ.τ.ε. Exclamatory genitives implying cause.—Krüger, § 47, 3, 1. Cf. Aristoph. Ach. 64: *ἀκβάτανα τοῦ σχήματος.*

τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνήν, the dialect, which was Ionic (Ceos). The ease with which Prodicus allows himself to be entrapped, however great his delight may have been to operate in his accustomed grooves, is, to say the least, somewhat wanting in dramatic probability.

C. εἰ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, *heard him saying*, i. e., *understood him to say.* *ἤκουεν* in its tense is strict construction, because going with *μέμφεται*, the *present quotation of authors*, as it might be called; although the Greeks, differently from our own practice, used the more vivid variety of past tenses also in quotations and incidental discussions. Cf. note on 309 a, above: *Ομύρου . . . ὃς ἐφη*, and immediately below: *ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἡ πίστα το διαιρεῖν*, and e: *φησί, . . . ἀπένειμε.*

καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος. We must never forget that *βάρβαρος*, in its etymological force (*onomatopoetic word*), means not more and not less than *unintelligible*, or here, *in a dialect hard to understand*, as the Aeolic dialect of Lesbos might be called, perhaps, from the standpoint of the Attic. Still, we feel that Plato strains things somewhat when he puts these things into the mouth of Prodicus. Plato simply tries to prepare the

ultimate stultification of Prodicus as reasonably as possible, but, if anywhere, it is here that the attempt borders on the limits of a farce.

D. ἀλλὰ παίζειν. Thus Socrates draws himself out and leaves poor Prodicus in the lurch. It would seem hard for Socrates to preserve his gravity at this point.

τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. *βοηθεῖν* generally implies the emergency of danger, etc., *to succor*; differently from *συμμαχεῖν* or *ἐπιμαχεῖν*.

E. εὗτα τὸν θεόν φησιν. The force of *εὗτα* is concessive. Cf. the German *dann doch*, i. e., the preceding being granted, still he, after (all) that he says, etc. Cf. 309 a: *εὗτα τί τοῦτο;*

ἀκόλαστον . . . ἄν τινα . . . οὐδαμῶς Κείον. “Ceorum civitatem claram fuisse ob morum probitatem, severitatem institutorum, reipublicae administrationem, docuit Boeckh, in Min. et Legg. p. 109,” etc. “Itaque *Κείος* recto opponitur nunc *ἀκολάστῳ*.”—Stallbaum.

342, A. **λαβεῖν μου . . . δπως ἔχω, δ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν,** *to test me what attitude I hold with regard to poetry, as you call it*; probably an allusion to the name of Protagoras's book, or special instruction on *δρθοέπεια*. Cf. also above, 338 e: *περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι.*

ἔγώ τοίνυν, κ.τ.έ., down to 343 b. This long introduction, the ostensible purpose of which is to classify and determine the saying of Pittacus, is really somewhat of a parody on the prolix and rather grand introduction of Protagoras about the general class and species of intellectual pursuits to which his own work belonged, above, 316 d: *ἔγώ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, κ.τ.έ.*

B. **πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν.** *γῆς* evidently is a genitive partitive, the question being, however, as to its dependence. Sauppe claims that taking *γῆς* with *πλεῖστοι* is against the usage of the language. Kroschel and Stallbaum, however, favor connecting *γῆς* with *πλεῖστοι*, quoting Krüger, § 47, 28, 7, who cites the present passage with the same view of the construction.

σχηματίζονται, make believe, assume the attitude. Cf. the German *sich stellen*.

τῷ μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ. These truths of Greek politics had been more than ever vindicated at the probable date of Plato's writing these words—viz., a few years after the end of the Peloponnesian War (404).

τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι (distributive, *in the several cities*) **λακωνίζοντας**, boxing, and giving much time to harden the body by athletic exercise, and also in many superficial and trifling modes of imitation. Cf. Aristoph. Av. 1280 sqq.:

πρὸν μὲν γάρ οἰκίσαι σε τήνδε τὴν πόλιν,
λακωνομάνουν ἄπαντες ἀνθρώποι τότε,
ἐκόμων, ἐπείνων ἐρρύπων ἐσωκράτων
ἐσκυταλιοφόρουν . . .

This was the class at Athens who severely criticised the ultra-democratic policy of Pericles, and the social and moral effect of the same upon the character of the citizens.

καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτα τε κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς. Gorg. 515 e : τῶν τὰ ὅτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. Perhaps, from the latter passage, *tá* should be restored in the present passage of the Protagoras before *ὅτα*, where it would easily drop out by “haplographia.” As to the general tendency of the passage, compare also Xen. Con. VIII. 39 : ἐρευνητέον δὲ καὶ ποῖα λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀσκοῦντες κράτιστοι δοκοῦσιν ἡγεμόνες εἶναι.

C. **ἡδη ἄχθωνται**, *reach the point of being disgusted.*

ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι. Xen. Rep. Laced. XIV. 4 : ὅπως μὴ ῥᾳδιονυργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίπλαιντο. Cf. Aristoph. Av. 1013 sq. : ὕσπερ ἐν λακεδαιμονιῷ ξενηλατεῖται. According to Theopompus (Schol. to this passage), the original cause for **ξενηλασία** at Sparta was a famine. As for the subject-matter, the very success of Sparta in the issue of the Peloponnesian War broke down a great deal of the ancient and severe spirit in the social habits of Sparta (Lysander). The same success prompted renewed inquiry elsewhere into the causes of Spartan prowess.

D. **οὐδένα ἔωσιν τῶν νέων . . . ἔξιένται.** Kroschel quotes Plut. Lycurg. 27 : οὐδὲ ἀποδημεῖν ἔδωκε (Lycurgus) τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ πλανᾶσθαι ξενικὰ συνάγοντας ἵθη καὶ μιμήματα βίων ἀπαιδεύτων καὶ πολιτευμάτων διαφόρων.

ἄλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. On the equality of female education at Sparta, cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. I. 4. A sample of shrewdness of Spartan women is Gorgo, daughter of Cleomenes, wife of Leonidas, Herod. V. 51, VII. 239. Cf. the famous saying, Plut. Moral. I. 299 : ἄλλῃ προσαναδιδοῦσα τῷ παιδὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα, καὶ παρακελευομένη· Τέκνον, ἔφη, η τάν, η ἐπὶ τᾶς.

E. **ἐνέβαλε.** Empiric aorist; cf. above, 828 b-c : ἀπέδωκεν . . . κατέθηκεν.

βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον. About this type of brief and con-

cise retort (since called *Laconic*), cf. Plut. Moral. 618, 19, Didot, de Garrulitate, c. 17: *τὸ μετ' εὐστροφίας δέν πρὸς τὰς ἀπαντήσεις ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς περιγίνεται σωπῆς*. Plutarch also refers to the present passage in the *Protagoras*: *καὶ γάρ Πλάτων τὸν τοιούτον ἐπαινεῖ, δεινοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς ἐουκέναι λέγων . . .* In other modes of speech, too, the Spartans practised great brevity; cf. the official report from the Spartan fleet, Xen. Hell. I. 1, 23, Buechsen-schuetz: "Ερρει τὰ κᾶλα. Μίνδαρος ἀπέσσνα. πεινῶντι τῶνδρες. ἀπορίομες τί χρὴ δρᾶν."

τὸ λακωνίζειν . . . φιλογυμναστεῖν. Of course, this is mere irony; as to the real habits and tendency of Sparta in this regard, cf. Lach. 182 e: *Λακεδαιμονίους, οὓς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι ἀν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῦεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.*

343, A. **Θαλῆς . . . Χίλων.** Those appearing in Plut. Moral. 173 sq. (*Septem Sapientum Convivium*) are Thales, Periander, Solon, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Pittacus. In the present passage, Myson takes the place of Periander, and Plato consequently belongs to *τῶν οὐ προσιεμένων τὸν Περιάνδρον*, Plut. Vita Sol. c. 12. As for Myson, cf. Diog. Laert. I. 9, 2: *μέμνηται γάρ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὗτος* (i. e. Plato) *ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀντὶ Περιάνδρου θεῖς αὐτόν.*

ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνησόνευτα, something like those of Benjamin Franklin. These men were shining representatives of that practical wisdom in the conduct of life which is based on utilitarian principles. The judgment of Dicaearchus, probably, is the most accurate, Diog. Laert. I. 1, 14: *ὁ δὲ Δικαίαρχος οὔτε σοφοὺς (in a technical sense) οὔτε φιλοσόφους φησὶν αὐτοὺς γεγονέναι, συνετοὺς δέ τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς.* Thus the apothegm *γνῶθι σαντόν* is ascribed to Thales; to Chilon: *ἔγγνα, πάρα δὲ ἄτα;* to Pittacus: *καιρὸν γνῶθι;* *Ἄρχῃ ἄνδρα δεικνύει;* to Bias: *οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοί;* to Cleobulus: *μέτρον ἄριστον;* to Periander: *μελέτη τὸ πᾶν.*

B. **κοινῇ ἔννελθόντες.** Greek tradition loved to bring eminent men together, or connect them in an unbroken chain of *διαδοχαί*. Of course, even the chronology is opposed to any such assumption, Pittacus, e. g., flourishing about 615 B.C., Solon about 590 B.C., Thales about 550 B.C., etc.

βραχυλογία τις Δακωνική. Cf. Thucyd. IV. 17, 2 (Spartan envoys at Athens): *τὸν δὲ λόγον μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθόδες μητκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιχώριον οὖν ἡμῖν οὖν βραχέες ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι . . .*

C. φιλότιμος . . . ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, not “ambitious to acquire wisdom,” but who claimed a high position on the score of his wisdom. ἐπὶ with the dative with the terms for emotions and conceits as well as for the respective expressions of the same. Krüger, § 68, 41, 6, where he quotes from Isocrates: μὴ φαίνου φιλοτιμούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡ καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς διαπράξασθαι δυνατόν ἔστιν, κ.τ.ξ.

εἰ καθέλοι. Metaphor anticipated from following comparison. καθαιρεῖν of war, Thucyd. I. 77, 6: εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἄρξατε.

κολούσται αὐτό. “κολούειν quod proprio significat mutilare amputare, hoc loco elevandi vel affligendi vi positum est.”—Kro-schel. Cf. “to cripple,” “to disable.”

ὅς μοι φαίνεται, a deliberate addition on the part of Socrates, not merely a conversational phrase. In a matter which admits so little of strictly dialectical progression as the elucidation of a passage from poets, Socrates suggests that his statements are simply individual impressions. But he would not add such a modification in διαλέγεσθαι proper, as he understood it.

ἐπισκεψώμεθα, review; cf. above, 321 c: ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος.

D. ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. μέν generally prepares an opposite of some sort, or some correlative with which it pairs off; further lines of Simonides, however, containing this correlative, are not given; critics generally assume, both from this defect, and from an inquiry into metrical *responsio*, that five lines are now wanting in the Simonidean quotation after the first two lines.

ἀμφισβητοῦντα εἰπεῖν still governed by ὑπολαβόντα.

γενέσθαι μέν. The construction of μέν with γενέσθαι by Socrates is, no doubt, forced and arbitrary, and cannot stand with a neutral and purely grammatical view of the passage.

E. εὐῆθες γάρ τούτῳ . . . φανείη, namely, to take ἀλαθέως with ἀγαθόν. In spite of this criticism, critics generally are still “naïve” enough to dissent from Socrates, and to take ἀλαθέως not with χαλεπόν, but with ἀγαθόν, especially as the term ἀγαθός, in its practical application in a political, social, moral sense, was really very expansive and indistinct.

ὑπέρβατον δεῖ λεῖναι. Commentators remark on the passage as containing the earliest notation known to us of the “hyperbaton” in a technical sense. Quintil. VIII. 6, 26: “Hyperbaton quoque, i. e., verbi transgressionem, quoniam frequenter ratio comparationis et decor poscit, non immerito inter virtutes habemus.”

Longinus de subl. c. 22 (in Ernesti, "Lexicon Technologiae," etc., s. v.): λέξεων ἡ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκυημένη τάξις.

οὐτωσὶ πως ὑπείποντα, *interpreting, understanding Pittacus somewhat in this fashion.* "Sententiam subjicere."—Ast. "Orationi alterius aliquid subjicere."—Viger. ed. Hermann, ed. III. p. 673.

εἰπόντα δὲ ἄνθρωποι. The subject of εἰπόντα, of course, is Πιττακόν understood; we would expect τὸν μέν . . . ; the words καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον are really superfluous, and the construction of αὐτὸν Πιττακόν is carried across them as if they were a mere parenthesis.

344, A. ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον. κεῖσθαι verbum neutrum, and serving as passive of τιθῆμι.

ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται, *that it is so meant*, and, immediately below, εἰρημένων, *the points*; λέγω (λόγος, λογίζομαι) being the most intellectual among the Greek synonyms for speech.

B. μακρὸν ἀν εἶη. The same phrase in Latin in the absolute form of the indicative, *longum est.*

παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχος, *pre-eminently a refutation, first and foremost a refutation.* "Formula παντὸς μᾶλλον quac imprimis apud Platonem est frequens, et magnum affirmandi vim habet, reddi potest, omnino, ut nihil supra. Ut Plato Crit. c. 10: ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἡμῖν ἐλέγετο," κ.τ.ξ.—Viger. ed. Hermann, ed. III. p. 415, n. The English "nothing more so" has a similar force.

ώς ἀν εἰ λέγοι λόγον. As if he would (let us suppose) go outside of the limits of poetry (εἰπη), and present the matter as a simple proposition, without any adornment, etc.

C. ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. A negative statement after a negative phrase (*οὐκ ἔστι*); μὴ after οὐκ ἔστι, as is common after negative verbs and phrases in general, as e. g., ἀπιστεῖν, κωλύειν, ἀπολύειν, Thuc. I. 128, 3; εἴργειν, φοβεῖσθαι, ἐλλείπειν, Aesch. Prom. 1066. As for the argument, the point is to show that ἀγαθὸν εἶναι must be looked upon as something technical: the *virtuous* as a *virtuoso*; cf. a little below the opposite *ἰδιώτης*.

ἀμήχανος, here *passive* compound: that which cannot be met or opposed by any contrivance; whereas below, d, εὐμήχανον and ἀμήχανον have active sense.

D. καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην. The helmsman is a favorite illustration with Plato; cf. Leg. I. 640 c: ἡ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς τοῦδ', ὅτι μεθύων κυβερνήτης καὶ πᾶς παντὸς ἄρχων ἀνατρέπει πάντα εἴτε πλοῖα εἴτε ἄρματα, κ.τ.ξ.

καὶ ιατρόν, used for illustration, e. g. *Theaet.* 167 a sqq.

κακῷ, predicative dative by attraction.

καὶ παρὰ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ. In Xenophon (*Mem.* I. 2, 19), Socrates, discussing the question whether acquired excellence may decrease or be lost, gives two anonymous passages from poets, the second one of which is identical with the present quotation. It may have been a favorite quotation with the common master of Plato and Xenophon.

E. τὸ δ' ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ introduces an opposite statement, = *nay*, or *whereas*. Sauppe, Deuschle, and Stallbaum cite, e. g., *Apol.* 23 a : οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἀλλὰ λογοτέλεος εἰναι· τὸ δὲ δὲ κινδυνεύει τῷ θνητῷ ὁ θεός σοφός εἶναι.

345, A. **τίς . . . ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξις.** It is evident that Socrates' conception of *εὖ πράττειν* differs materially from that of the poem. Simonides takes it with reference to single acts (aorist), Socrates of a systematic course of correct action, viz., to be a virtuoso in some specific department of action.

οἱ ιατρικῆς ίδιωται, *who have no professional acquaintance with medical science.*

B. **αὗτη γάρ μόνη ἔστι κακὴ πρᾶξις . . . στερηθῆναι.** Here we have Socratic ethics pure and simple, apparently deduced from Simonides. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* III. 9, 4 : νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὕτε σοφοὺς οὕτε σώφρονας εἶναι. The real point of Simonides is that the principal weight of responsibility for correct action, as well as the credit for correct action, lay not so much in man as in accidents foreign to his own resolutions.

C. **ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοι . . . οὓς ἀν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.** Socrates omits adding any commentary of his own to this part of the Simonidean passage; the reason being that it cannot at all be made in any way to support the ethical view which Socrates is bringing forward. As regards the sentiment in the words of Simonides, cf. *Pindar, Pyth.* I. 41 :

ἐκ θεῶν γάρ μαχαναὶ πᾶσαι βροτέαις ἀρεταῖς
καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ χερσὶ βιαταὶ περίγλωσσοὶ τ' ἔφνυ.

κενεάν, proleptic and predicative with *μοῖραν*. *I will not vainly set my share of time (my allotment of life) upon a hope which cannot be realized.*—Sauppe.

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον is epexegesis after *ἀλπιδα* in the preceding line.

ἔπειθ' *ὑμῖν εὐρὼν ἀπαγγελέω.* **ἔπειθ'** must be taken with *εὐρών*.

The line is ironical. Bergk proposes *ἐπί τινα δ' or ἐπὶ δὲ in tmesi*, no doubt with *ἀγγελέω*.

D. τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ρήματι. It is a pity that Plato has not quoted, too, the five lines after the first two lines of the actual quotation. If he had, one would probably be better enabled to judge whether the principal sentiment and bias of the piece is really what Socrates is trying to make it out to be. It is, however, quite improbable in itself that the Thessalian squire, Scopas, would have received with any particular relish a poem of that sort, although it seems, indeed, that Simonides addressed himself to the general public as much as he did to Scopas.

οὐ γάρ οὗτος ἀπαίδευτος. Cf. the criticism above, 343 e: εἴηθες γάρ τοῦτό γε φανεῖ ἀν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδος.

.ώς ὅντων τινῶν οἱ ἔκοντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. Here again we have a characteristic ethical tenet of Socrates: i. e., that nobody did *evil*, as far as his knowledge and understanding was concerned; but if he did so it was merely apparent, for the subject always limited his action to what he conceived to be good (*for himself*). In the same vein Socrates argues against the affidavit of the prosecution in his trial, Apol. 25 d sqq.

E. δτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . ἔξαμπαρτάνειν. “An ancient poet (possibly Solon; Bergk, “Poet. Lyr.” p. 1356, ed. III.) had said: οὐδεὶς ἔκών πόνηρος οὐδὲ ἄκων μάκαρ· (πόνηρος, then, is here = *loaded with trouble, unhappy*) and similarly, Epicharmus, in his ‘Ηρακλῆς παρὰ Φόλωφ’ (Lorenz, “Life and Writings of Epicharmus,” p. 241): Ἀλλὰ μὰν ἔγάνων ἀνάγκη ταῦτα πάντα ποιέω· οἴομαι δέ, οὐδεὶς ἔκών πόνηρος οὐδὲ ἄταν ἔχων. Possibly Plato had these lines in his mind, and took πονηρός in the moral sense, as Aristot. Eth. Nic. III. 5, and the author of the dialogue περὶ δικαίου, p. 374 a, do.”—Sauppe.

αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν. The active with the reflexive, rather than the middle voice, in abnormal action.

346, A. οἶον . . . συμβῆναι. The infinitive by attraction, the dominant force of the ruling verb *ἡγεῖτο* being extended to the relative subclause. “In indirect statement the infinitive sometimes occurs also after the (simple) relatives, and the conjunctions ως [ώσπερ], ὅτε, ἐπεί, ἐπειδή.”—Krüger, § 55, 4, 9.

ὅταν . . . συμβῇ. The more accurate construction after the ruling verb *ἡγεῖτο* would be *ὅτε συμβαίη*, but the substitution of the present construction in discussing *authors* occurs almost imperceptibly.

ἴνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν, κ.τ.ξ., i. e., they judge harshly and unfavorably to create the impression that it was some personal grievance, rather than their moral worthlessness, which caused their unpatriotic or unfilial conduct.

B. **καὶ ἂν τι δργυσθῶσιν . . . ἀδικηθέντες.** One can hardly fail to be reminded of the grave matter between Socrates and his native city with regard to his trial and condemnation, and the loyal sentiments so splendidly expressed in the Crito. But whether an actual allusion on the part of Plato to this matter is intended, it is impossible to state. Any inference as to the date of the composition of the Protagoras, based on this passage, would be turning in a circle. As a general thing, the purely Socratic dialogues in Plato's writings are singularly free from anything bearing upon the fate of Socrates, and are entirely without those traces of bitterness so frequent in other pieces, as the Gorgias, e. g. Cf. Steinhart, "Leben Plato's," p. 114.

καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο . . . ἐπαινέσαται. ἡγεῖσθαι here in the sense of decision = ἔδοξε αὐτῷ, from mercenary motives. (Susemihl, "Uebersetzung des Protagoras," note 137, treats this as an additional point of irony.) "The words of Pindar, Isthm. 2, 6, & Moīsa γάρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς πω τότ' ἦν οὐδὲ ἐργάτις, were generally understood as being directed against the art of Simonides prostituting itself for money."—Sauppe.

C. **ἀπάλαμνος**, according to Hesychius, as Kroschel observes, a synonym of **ἀμήχανος**. Sauppe illustrates from Theogn, 281, and Pindar, Olymp. 2, 57, according to which the compound, it seems, must be taken in an active sense=helpless, inactive, weak.

τῶν γὰρ . . . γενέθλα, for the breed of fools is endless.

εἴ τις χαίρει . . . ἐμπλησθείη. Not pure correlatives in conditional construction (ideal), because, as to the protasis, it is understood that there are actually many who are fond of blaming and criticising. *ἐμπλησθείη, he can get his fill.*

D. **τὰ μέσα,** namely, that which is half way between good and bad, the average quality, as it were. Cf. the current phrase, **μέσος πολιτης**, belonging to the middle classes, neither very poor nor very rich. The poet declares himself content with the absence of positive misdeeds.

τούτου γ' ἔνεκα, not "on that account," but for that matter.

τῇ φωνῇ . . . Μυτιληναίων. He has employed the dialect of the Mytileneans, i. e., the Lesbian, Aeolian. For the list of Aeolian cities in N. W. Asia Minor, cf. Herod. I. 149. In the Aeolian dia-

lect there are no contract verbs, but those on *-ao* are inflected like *ἴστημι*, those on *-eo* like *τίθημι*. *κάλημι, φίλημι, ὄφημι*, occur in the remnants of the dialect. Of course, the deliberate assumption by Simonides of the Aeolic dialect, as if the poet addressed himself to Pittacus (who flourished a hundred years before Simonides)—this suggestion is sheer sport on the part of Socrates.

E. *ἔκών*. The construction of *ἔκών* with *ἐπαίνημι* is just as arbitrary as that of *ἀλαζέως* and *μέν* above in the earlier part of the quotation. The principle of the Socratic interpretation is ostensibly grammatical and historical, but really dogmatical.

Σιαλαβεῖν, *make the punctuation, divide.* Aristotle reduces the obscurity of Heraclitus to the difficulty of *pointing*, and consequently of construing, correctly; Rhet. III. 5, where he uses *διαστίζω*.

347, A. *εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς*. Hippias estimates both preceding performances neither from a philosophical nor from a philological point of view, but from that of display merely, and in this frame of mind he proposes to add a performance of his own. The poem is to serve merely as a starting-point. Cf. Hipp. min. initio.

B. *καὶ οὐ Αλκιβιάδης*. The dramatic function of Alcibiades is exactly the same as on two occasions above: he assists Socrates to make the discourse go on in a manner congenial to the latter, where such decisive action was necessary which was not compatible with the reserve and dignity of Socrates himself.

εἰσαῦθις γε. *eiſ—* for postponement. Cf. the Germ. *auf ein andermal*.

C. *ἐάσωμεν, σκοπεῖσθαι* being understood from *σκοπούμενος*, below.

ἄγοραίων. The *ἄγοραίων* are the vulgar, whose acquirements and manners are gained, not through the refined influences of private conversation, but in the *ἄγορά*. Cf. Aristoph. Eq. 409 sq.

τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλήτριδας, *make the price of flute-girls rise in the market.* Still, one must not assume that such modes of entertainment were strictly limited to the *ἄγοραίων*. The present judgment of Plato is probably an outbreak of youthful intellectual enthusiasm, rather than an accurate statement of prevailing custom. Thus, at Agathon's entertainment (Symp. 176 e), there is an *αὐλήτρις* provided. Eryximachus, however, votes to dismiss her. . . . *ἴμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλους συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον . . .*

D. διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων . . . σύνεισιν, make the music of the latter the means of their mutual entertainment.

E. κοσμίως καν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίωσιν. Thus in the Symp. 223 c, Plato makes Socrates discourse and drink till dawn, and Socrates alone is able to hold his own and remain bright in spite of deep potations, while even Agathon and Aristophanes give in at last.

ἢν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν. Sauppe observes that the *συνονσίαι* are personified in this predicate of *λάβωνται*, and as for *ἀνδρῶν*, “verbum λαμβάνεσθαι, ut solent verba participandi, cum secundo casu junctum.” Dem. Aristogit. I. p. 779: *εἰ λάβοιτ’ εξουσίας*.—Ast. Cf. the vernacular, “to get hold of.”

οὖς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι. Cf. the classic passage on this point in Phaedr. 275 sqq. Having pointed out that literary composition has a tendency to weaken the retentive power of the mind, he goes on to claim that books cannot be accepted as a substitute for *viva voce* discourse: δόξαις μὲν ἀν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτὸν λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων βούλομενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτα δέ.

οἱ μὲν . . . ἔτερα. This should be taken into consideration when judging of Socrates' interpretation of the Simonidean passage. Socrates was, after all, not much in earnest in the entire matter, but desired to make the point by his entire divergence from the view of Protagoras, which he established with much ingenuity—that such discussions were not profitable in a philosophical inquiry. The entire point, therefore, made in the philological episode, as we might call it, is a negative one.

ἀδυνατοῦσιν . . . ἔξελέγξαι, cannot bring to any exhaustive (binding) demonstration. *ἀδυνατεῖν* is extremely frequent in Plato, occurring, according to Ast's Lex. Plat., not less than thirty-four times, of which two instances only are in dialogues of doubtful genuineness, Alcib. I. 118 e, and Hipp. maj. 283 c.

348, A. πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες. Cf. above, 311 b: καὶ ἵγια ἀποπειρώμενος . . . τῆς ρώμης.

δοκεῖ χρῆναι. Cf. above, 317 d: ἐδόκει χρῆναι.

καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητάς. Variation, 347 d, above: περὶ μὲν φύσιτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἔσωμεν.

παρέχειν ἀποκρίνομενος. It is not necessary to suggest the change ἀποκρινούμενος. For the intransitive use of *παρέχειν*, Sauppe quotes Gorg. 475 d, Theact. 191 a, and immediately below, *παράσχεις*.

τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. Cf. the Latin phrase “finem alicui rei impo-nere.”

B. ἔμοι γάρ οὐ δοκεῖ. γάρ here purely explicative and ex-egetical.

ἴνα . . . συνειδῶμεν. συνειδέναι here has nothing to do with consciousness, etc.; rather, *that we may share his sentiments on this point, know what he means to do, as he himself knows it.* Ficinus not quite accurately, “ut huic quidem haec ascribamus.”

C. ή ἡ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἐκάστοτε, relative and distributive in each case as occasion requires, differently from πάντοτε. Ficinus, not quite exact, “quae passim du-bito.” As to the subject-matter, cf. Socrates in the Laches, 194 b: βοήθησον, εἴ τιν' ἔχεις δύναμιν. τὰ μὲν δὴ γάρ ημέτερα ὥρᾳς ᾧς ἀπορα.

πάνυ λέγειν τι, *makes a point very decidedly.*

D. In Il. κ 224, Diomede proposes that two spies rather than one should be sent into the Trojan camp:

σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω καὶ τε πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνόησεν
ὅππως κέρδος ἔη· μοῦνος δὲ εἰς πέρ τε νοήσῃ,
ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δὲ τε μῆτις.

And a similar sentiment is that in Eurip. Iph. Taur. 673:

εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δοὺς ἄμεινον ἀν μάθοις.

E. ὅς γε οὐ μόνον, κ.τ.έ. Referring to the profession of Pro-tagoras, above, 328 b, c. The vein of irony is perceptible enough. ἀποκρυπτομένων, with regard to the passage above, 316 d.

349, A. **πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἀρνυσθαι** [μισθαρνεῖν]. Diog. Laert. IX. 8, 3: οὗτος πρῶτος εἰσεπράξατο μνᾶς ἐκατόν (1½ talents). Of Socrates, his admirer, Xenophon, says, Mem. I. 2, 60: οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.

B. **πέντε ὄντα δνόματα,** *five terms.* This question was first pro-posed above, 329 c, sqq., where *σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*, and *διστόης*, were first introduced together; *σοφία* (*ἐπιστήμη*) and *ἀνδρεία* being added, 330 b.

ἐπὶ ἐν πράγματι pertain to a single substance, normally and properly. Cf. Krüger, § 68, 41, 1: “*ἐπί* with the genitive refers more to an *accidental* and *looser* connection; in *ἐπί* with the da-tive, the sense of *native relation* (Zugehörigkeit) is more felt.”

οὐκ ὅν οἶον τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἔτερον. These words, of course, refer to the nearest subject, *πρᾶγμα*, being in distributive appo-

sition with the same, and not an accusative absolute, as it might seem at first impression.

C. οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, *I do not score it against you in my mind (ὑπό) at all . . .*

D. εὑρήσεις, “traveller’s future,” with gnomic force. “A general statement, too, may be expressed by the future, with regard to the prospective knowledge to be gained therefrom.”—Krüger, § 53, 7, 1.

ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. The modification of the superlative by διαφερόντως is extraordinary, and Cobet proposes to read ἀνδρείους δὲ διαφερόντως. Still, after the four preceding superlatives, the distinction given to ἀνδρειοτάτους is not so pleonastic as it might otherwise seem. Sauppe quotes Timaeus, p. 23 d: πόλις ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εἰνομωτάτη διαφερόντως.

E. **Θαρραλέος.** Socrates now proposes to bring forward the quality of being *confident*, the inherent connection of the same with knowledge and deliberation being more evident, and then to point out the quality of courage as being convertible with the former, although *confidence* has a wider sphere than *courage*.

τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως. Thus, in the Laches, the subject-matter of which dialogue turns entirely upon the definition of ἀνδρεία, Socrates says, 193 c: καὶ ὅσοι ἀν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν, κ.τ.έ.

350, A. **οἱ πελταστικοί.** Kroschel, in the preface (p. 19) to his edition, endeavors to use this passage to make a chronological point. He argues that Plato could not well have adduced the peltasts as a distinct tactical order in military practice before the remarkable successes of Iphicrates with these troops in 392 B.C. in the Corinthian War; but Sauppe calls attention to the fact that even Thucydides mentions Thracian peltasts, and that Xenophon (Anab.) distinguishes Thracian and Greek peltasts. Add also Xen. Mem. III. 9, 2.

B. **μανόμενοί εἰσιν.** The periphrasis is more than *μαίνονται*—it expresses a quality. Ficinus appropriately renders it, not *furentes*, but *furiōsi*.

πῶς οὖν . . . ἔλεγες, an emendation of Hirschig’s. The construction of τοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι after πᾶς λέγεις, the reading of the MSS., would not present any particular difficulty, but it would not go very well with the answer καὶ νῦν γε. And, furthermore, a little below, in c, Protagoras says, *ἄ ελεγον*.

D. τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους, current prolepsis of the subject of a sub-clause, so that it apparently becomes the object of the leading verb, instead of ὡς δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐ Θαρραλέοι εἰσίν . . .

τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιών. Protagoras attempts to avoid the point of Socrates' argument by trying to show that it proves too little in proving too much.

351, B. εὐτροφίας, "bona nutritio et educatio" (Ast). It occurs in Plato only in these two instances of the present passage.

ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως. It cannot be denied that this coincides with the general and popular view of the matter, where cool deliberation and the acts of highest courage are conceived to exclude each other. In Xen. Mem. III. 9, 1 sqq., Socrates grants that there is a difference in natural endowment and disposition with regard to courage, but insists πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ πρὸς ἀνδρίαν αὐξεσθαι. . .

λέγεις δέ τινας . . . τοὺς δέ. τινάς equivalent to τοὺς μέν.

ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἀν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ . . . ζώη; The apodosis of εἰ ζώη, of course, is not in δοκεῖ, here, but in the infinitive ζῆν, with which ἀν is to be connected. ἀν has a notable tendency in Greek, especially in the indirect statement of an ideal hypothesis, to run ahead of its verb, as it were.

C. ζῷη, namely, ἄνθρωπος, above, or τὶς.

ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω . . . ἀποβήστεται ἄλλο; The speaker starts out to make an indirect statement after λέγω, but, the vinculum of ὅτι being omitted, the eagerness of thought on the part of the speaker turns the statement into a question; or the question may be conceived as a check of the speaker on himself, the question being a less dogmatic form of statement than the direct proposition. In such little turns, Plato has very happily expressed the character of colloquial style.

ἀπλῶς with ἀποκριτέον. So absolutely, without any modification.

D. δοτι ἔστι μὲν ἄ. The classification of Protagoras:

1. Some pleasurable things are good;
2. Some pleasurable things are evil;
3. Some pleasurable things are neutral.

E. πρὸς λόγον. Cf. the English phrase "to stand to reason."

ἡγεμονεύειν, be the leader of the inquiry, i. e., be the questioner.

δίκαιος, scil. εἰ συ, κ.τ.έ. Personal construction instead of δικαίου ἐστί σε, κ.τ.έ. In sense, δίκαιος is probably stronger than πρέπει προσήκει οἵ δεῖ.

κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου, *you are the one who has introduced the discussion* (which is still going on). Perfect and present combined. Goodwin, M. and T. § 10, 1, 3.

352, A. **ῶσπερ εἰ**. The extent of the comparison is out of proportion to the thing compared (*καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον*), but Plato, like Homer, delights in elaborating a simile for its own sake. Metaphors and comparisons drawn from the human body, its functions and diseases, are very frequent with Plato: e. g., the πόλις ψύχης; φλεγμαίνοντα, Rep. I. 372 e; οὐ δήπον χωλὴν τὴν ἀνδρίαν νευρομοθετήκατον, Legg. I. 634 a, etc.; Rep. V. 495 d.

ἴθι δή . . . ἐπίδειξον. *ἴθι* with imperatives, as the English vernacular, “come on,” “show,” etc. Cf. below, e.

B. **τοῖς πολλοῖς . . . ἀρχικόν**. Socrates, of course, means ἐπιστήμη, not in any concrete or particular relation, but in its purely logical aspect, without reference to any special object. In Apol. 22 a, he calls it *τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν*.

C. **ῶσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδουν**. A similar sentiment is given about φιλοσοφία in general in Rep. V. 475 c: *τὴν δέ, ὕσπερ ὄρφανὴν ξυγγενῶν, ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι γῆσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν . . .*

D. **μὴ οὐχί, κ.τ.έ.** Negative statement after the negative phrase αἰσχρόν. *It is highly unbecoming for me, too, to deny that wisdom and knowledge are the most effective of all human things.*

E. **ἄν νῦν δή**. Attraction by the antecedent *τούτων*.

353, A. **ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν**. Infinitive by attraction after *φασίν*.

ὅ τι ἀν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν. *ὅ* is not the object after *τύχωσι* itself, which would require *οὐ*, but after *λέγουσις*, to be understood with *τύχωσι* from *λέγουσι*. Sauppe cites Crito, 45 d: *ὅτι ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι*.

B. **εἶναι τι ἡμῖν, κ.τ.έ.**, *that this is some service to us with regard to, etc.*

D. **εἰς τὸν ὑστερὸν χρόνον**. *εἰς* from the standpoint of the present, implying a result. Krüger, § 68, 21, 10.

πενίας. The plural of concrete instances, Krüger, § 44, 3, 4. Cf. below, 354 b: *ὑγίειαι, εὐεξίαι, σωτηρίαι, ἀρχαί, πλοῦτοι*.

ὅτι παθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὅπηρόν; A much controverted passage. The MS. reading is *ὅτι μαθόντα*. The phrases *τι μαθάν* and *τι παθάν* are familiar, the former being fairly equivalent to “What has come into his head, that . . . ?” and the latter to “What ails him, that . . . ?” The MS. reading as applying to the subject

understood, the pleasurable things, although the boldness of the personification implied might be overlooked, is out of place, and Stallbaum's *παθόντα* has been adopted by Sauppe and Schanz. But it is hard to see how ὅτι *παθόντα*, κ.τ.ξ., can be taken as nominative plural to go with the subject, and as introducing a question, and meaning "What ailed them, that . . .?"—or, more compactly, that "at all hazards," as Sauppe would have it. It would seem more simple to construe *παθόντα* as Kroschel does, and as Jowett takes it in his translation, viz., as accusative singular, with *τινά* to be understood, because they cause joy in some way or other in *him who experiences* them. Hermann's conjecture, ὅτι *παρόντα*, has been adopted by Jahn, while Deuschle still clings to the MS. reading *μαθόντα*.

354, A. ἀρα οὐ τὰ τοιάδε λέγετε; *Don't you mean to say something like the following?*

τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ιατρῶν θεραπείας. The verbal construction with *θεραπείας* establishes its relation to *ιατρῶν* much more clearly than the genitive *ιατρῶν* would have done.

λιμοκτονιῶν. The Greek phrase contains an hyperbole. Cf. the German *Hungercur*.

B. δόδυνας . . . ἀλγηθόντας. The former are the strokes of passing pain, *pangs*; the latter, the ailing of constant pain.

ἄλλων ἀρχαί. Genitive objective. That it should refer to commonwealths rather than to persons, as Ast and Kroschel claim, may be assumed; but it is mere assumption.

D. εἰ . . . καλεῖτε, . . . ἔχολτε ἄν . . . εἰπεῖν. The force of the hypothesis is evidently not ideal, but logical; but in the apodosis the statement of the result has been moderated through the optative with *ἄν*. That the latter must not be taken in an ideal sense, but merely as a milder substitute for the future, is evident from the following alternative, *ἄλλο' οὐχ ἔξετε*.

οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν (personal construction), scil. εἰπεῖν ἔξειν.

ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν, κ.τ.ξ. We would expect *ἄλλο . . . η καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος*; a positive statement in the form of a question = *παντάπασιν καὶ . . . ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος*. As for the absence of the *η*, comp. Rep. I. 337 c: *ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις . . .*;

E. εἴ με ἀνέροισθε. Socrates goes on addressing his imaginary interlocutors (*οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, 352 d) not only because he is fond of such fictitious dialogues, as Sauppe observes, but be-

cause he can carry on the discussion and develop the argument much better than if Protagoras himself would answer directly.

ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις, *My entire argument depends on this point* (as for the plural, *ἀποδεῖξεις*, it is a summary substitute for “the course of argument.” Cf. above, 335 d, *διάλογοι*). Cf. below, 356 d : *εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡτοῖς ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν*; and above, 313 a : *ἐν φῷ πάντῃ ἴστιν τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν*.

355. A. καταβιῶνται τὸν βίον, not “to conclude life,” but “to live one’s life to conclusion.”

ἄνευ λυπῶν. Modification of *ἡδέως*, scil. in negative pleasure, which consists in the absence of pain.

B. ἐκπληττόμενος specifies the preceding *ἀγόμενος*: led on by pleasure so as to lose full command of his faculties. Cf. Xen. Mem. II. 1, 4 sq.

καὶ αὐθὶς αὖ λέγετε. According to strict construction we would expect *ὅταν λέγητε*, but such an anacoluthon is quite natural in conversational style. (We add, “and that, too, is wrong.”)

C. μετεῖληφεν. The next subject to *μετεῖληφεν* would be *ἐκεῖνος*. Perhaps the original reading was *μετειλήφαμεν*. Cf. below, e, *μεταλάβωμεν*.

D. ἀξίων ὄντων, deserving.

E. ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν. Cf. Cic. de Finibus, I. 32 : nemo enim ipsam voluntatem quia voluptas sit aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequentur magni dolores eos qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt, neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum quia dolor sit, amet consecetur adipisci velit, sed quia nonnunquam ejusmodi tempora incident, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem.

356, Δ. τίς ἄλλη, κ.τ.ξ. The only criterion of value is the quantitative relation of the pleasurable and of the painful.

B. ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἀνθρωπος, an expert in weighing.

τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτά. Cic. de Finibus, I. 36 : ut aut voluptates omittantur majorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa, aut dolores suscipiantur majorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia.

C. μή πῃ ἄλλῃ ἔχει. Numquid aliter sese res habet.

Ὥ ἀνθρωποι. The fiction of the general public as interlocutors is still sustained.

φωναῖ. Greek *φωνή* comprises both *vox* and *sonus*; here it means the latter.

D. τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Here not *bene facere* but *recte agere*.

ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἄνω . . . καὶ κάτω, κ.τ.έ. We miss ἀν. Sauppe suggests that the force of ἀν with ἵφανη extends to these verbs. Still, ἀν could very easily have been lost, either after ἐπλάνα or before ἄνω, by “haplographia.”

μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα, viz., to blunder by taking (conceiving) the same things differently in succession, substituting one view of the same things for another of the same things.

πράξειν . . . αἱρέσειν. Summary statement of *life* in its two principal aspects, as above, πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν.

ἄκυρον . . . ἐποίησε would deprive it of its force. Generally, κύριος and ἄκυρος have a theoretical rather than a practical meaning: *valid, invalid*.

E. μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. As for ἐπί with dative, cf. note on 349 b.

ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου. σώζειν τὸν βίον, not in the sense of saving in a special emergency or delivering from a particular danger, but more in the sense of being the *guiding element* in life.

ἄρ' ἀν οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. Ellipsis of the verb with ἀν in apodosis of unreal condition is not uncommon, the repetition of the preceding verb generally being thereby avoided, e. g. Aristoph. Ach. 136:

(Ambassador.) χρόνου μὲν οὐκ ἀν ἡμεν ἐν Θράκη πολύν, . . .

(Dicaeop.) μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἀν, εἰ μισθόν γε μὴ 'φερεις πολύν.

Aesch. Agam. 935: τί δ' ἀν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάδ' ἤνυσσεν;

357, A. ἐπειδήπερ . . . τέχνη. Since the attainment is one which has excess and want for its object. τέχνη, a theoretical acquirement, from the Latin equivalent of which the seven “liberal arts,” B.A., M.A., etc., are derived. Cf. above, 318 c: ἐμβάλλοντιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες, κ.τ.έ. As for the subject-matter of the present passage, cf. Gorg. 500 a: ἄρο οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποια ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἥδεων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἡ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἔκαστον;

ἐν δρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει. Predicative position of the adjective, which Lucian took for one of the characteristics of pure Atticism, but overdid it so that it becomes a mere mannerism in his style.

B. πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις, viz., in concrete instances, not in abstract mathematical inquiry.

εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα, will examine another time; notion of motion being implied: we will postpone the examination to another time. Cf. above, 353 d: εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον.

D. **κατεγελᾶτε ἀν̄ ήμῶν.** Apodosis of unreal condition referring to past, as the context shows, possibly because the action of *καταγελᾶν*, differently from simple *γελᾶν*, cannot well be a momentary action. Immediately below, not *ἀν̄ ήμῶν καταγελάσητε*, as one might expect, but *ἀν̄ . . . καταγελᾶτε*. Stallbaum's explanation of the imperfect does not seem quite satisfactory to me: Imperfектum post aoristum positum hac sententia: quodsi antea statim volvis dixissemus esse inscientiam, nos risissetis et etiam nunc rideretis. His quotation of Apol. Socrat. p. 32 e, too, is wide of the mark: *ἄρ̄ οὖν ἀν̄ με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπραττον τὰ δημόσια*, which in nowise refers to the present, but simply means, "If I had made a habit of taking part in public business." The passages exhibiting the imperfect with *ἀν̄* of unreal action in the past must be examined individually; no general rule can be given.

εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, further on, following the matter up. Cf. above, 339 d: *δλίγον τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθών*; Sophista, 258 c: *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες*.

ἡ δὲ ἔξαμαρτανομένη πρᾶξις. Prolepsis. The article *ἡ* here is generic.

E. οὕτε αὐτοί. With this subject we may understand (from the following *πέμπετε*) a verb like *φοιτᾶτε* or *προσέρχεσθε*.

τούτων διδασκάλους. *τούτων*, genitive of *ταῦτα*, not of *οὗτοι*.

καὶ ίδια καὶ δημοσίᾳ. An allusion to the *ἐπάγγελμα* of Protagoras, 318 e: *εὐθυνλία περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων . . . καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως*.

358, A. τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. Schleiermacher and others are inclined to treat this ethical proposition as one not seriously meant on the part of Socrates (or Plato). But Grote (Plato, vol. II. ed. II. p. 87 sq.) has given a proper reply to this assumption: "Throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Socrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil."—And, besides, it should be noted that the ethical view brought forward is not so much a hedonistic, as a utilitarian principle. At the same time, its actual coincidence with many points of the later Epicurean ethics is striking. I have called attention to this above by a few quotations from Cicero de Finibus. It should be noted, too, that at that stage of Greek speculation there were blended in *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν* both the

substantive and the adjective relations—good and evil, and the good (boon) and the evil. At many points in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, Socrates recommends the pursuit of special virtues because they are more profitable than their opposites, e. g. of frugality and self-restraint (because it is more *useful* than dissipation), or of endurance, III. 12, 4.

παραιτοῦμαι. On the negative element in *παραιτεῖσθαι*, cf. note on p. 320 d, above: Προμηθέα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι . . .

B. ὅπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις . . . δνομάζων. Hipp. min. 369 a: σοφία . . . ἡ πανουργία ἡ ὅπιοῦν χαίρεις δνομάζων; Charmides, 163 e: πρᾶξιν ἡ ποίησιν ἡ ὅπως σὺ βούλει δνομάζειν; Phaedr. 273 c: Τισίας ἡ ἄλλος ὃς τις δή ποτ' ὁν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅπόθεν χαίρει δνομαζόμενος; Demosth. 40, 20: Βοιωτὸν ἡ Μαντίθεον ἡ ὅτι ποτ' ἄλλο χαίρει προσαγορευόμενος.

aι ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις. On *ἐπί* with genitive, cf. note on 349 b: ἐπὶ ἐνὶ τίναι.

C. ἔπειτα. Concessive. Cf. the Engl. “after all that,” Germ. “dann doch hinterher,” etc.

οὐδὲ τὸ ήττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ’ ἔστιν. The subject *τὸ . . . εἶναι* is emphatically repeated by *τοῦτ’*. “Saepius ponitur ut nobis videatur redundare (subjectum vero vel res de qua agitur ita iterando effertur).”—Ast; Lex. Plat., vol. I. p. 494, s. v.

ἄλλο τι οὖν. Namely, *η*. The grammatical connection worn away, so that *ἄλλο τι οὖν* becomes merely an adverbial phrase. Cf. above, 354 d.

ώς ξοικεν. Fully equivalent to *ἄρα* in inferences and résumé.

D. ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, *in* (the limits of) *human nature, not agreeable to human nature*.

καλεῖτε τι δέος καὶ φόβον; Cf. above, 332 a: ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; προσδοκίαν from προσδέχομαι.

E. ἀλλὰ τόδε. Namely, *διαφέρει*, Sauppe; *διαφέρει τι*, Kroschel. ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἔθελήσει . . .; As for the future, cf. above, 349 d: *εύρήσεις γάρ*.

359, A. ἡ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο. Anticipation, to go with *πῶς δρῶς ἔχει*.

τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασι. Namely, in 329 d.

C. ἐπὶ τίνα . . .; “The rarer plural also in Phaedo, 58 c: *τίνα ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα*; 102 a: *τίνα δή ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα*.”—Sauppe.

οὐκ ἔφη. Negavit.

τὰ θαρραλέα. A kind of metonymy. Cf. above, *τὰ σοφά*, in the phrase 312 c: *τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα*.

D. τὰ μή. Namely, δεινά. μή with the article in generic statements; here=ἄτινα ἀν μή δεινά ὅσιν.

E. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. αὐτίκα in illustrations—namely, to choose the next illustration that presents itself. Lach. 195 b: ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, κ.τ.έ. Cf. the Germ. *Gleich zum Beispiel*.

πότερον . . . καλὸν ὅν. Not an accusative absolute, but still dependent on the preceding πόλεμον as its apposition. The copula ὅν is neuter by attraction of the predicate καλόν.

360, B. αἰσχροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, κ.τ.έ. Cognate accusative, which generally has a specific attribute attached, however, and is not a mere variation for the simple verb. Cf. Krüger, § 46, 1: "It would be tautology if the accusative merely contained the same notion as the verb and no more," etc.

D. ἐναντίον ἀνδρείᾳ δειλίᾳ. The same contrivance of argument as above, 332 a sq.

σοφία. Here fully=ἐπιστήμη, and not absolute.

ἐπένευσεν . . . πάνυ μόγις . . . ἐπένευσεν . . . ἐσίγα. The sensitiveness of Protagoras is well maintained almost throughout the dialogue.

E. φιλονικεῖν . . . τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναν. φιλονικεῖν here pregnant=φιλονικῶν ζητεῖν, or some such combination.

πῶς ποτ' ἔχει . . . ἡ ἀρετὴ. A summary of the positive element of the present dialogue.

361, A. τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου. Equivalent to the ideal protasis *εἰ τοῦτο φανερὸν γένοιτο*.

B. πάντα χρήματα ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη. Which is predicate? Without examining the context, one cannot decide, because neither noun introduces itself as the subject through an article; but looking a little farther, we see that πάντα χρήματα is explained by ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, κ.τ.έ., whereby it becomes evident that ἐπιστήμη is the predicate, and πάντα χρήματα the subject.

ὅλον. Adverbial. Cf. above, 359: *πᾶν γε τούταντιον*.

C. ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι=σπεύδειν. "A construction very common in Plato; as Apol. 27 a: ἔοικε γάρ ὕσπερ αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι"—Sauppe.

καθορῶν, implying mental grasp=intelligere.

πολλάκις. Namely, of the chance, possibly.

E. διέξοδον. Verbal substantive of διεξελθεῖν, analysis.

ελλογίμων, corum qui *in* (insignium virorum) *numero* habentur.

362, Δ. οἽπερ ἔφην, 335 c. ,

ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες. Cf. above, 310 a: πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. As to the ostensible practical point of the entire conversation—viz., what Hippocrates was to learn or look forward to—nothing further is said about it. Such entire dismissal of the practical object of the discussion is not always found in the Platonic dialogue, e. g. in the Laches. The solicitude of Lysimachus and Melesias about the education of their boys is maintained at the end, Lach. 201 c: αὔριον ἔωθεν ἀφίκον οἴκαδε, καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἵνα βούλευσώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων· τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνονσίαν διαλέγωμεν.

GREEK INDEX.

A

ἀγοραῖος, 347, c.
ἀγωγός, 334, b.
ἀγῶν, *εἰς ἀγῶνα ἀφικνεῖσθαι*, 335, a.
ἀγωνῖαν, 333, e.
ἀδικεῖν, 310, d.
ἀδυνατεῖν, 347, e.
ἄκυρος, 356, d.
ἄν, tendency to precede its verb in ideal apodosis, 318, b; struck out, 319, b; construction, 327, b; in moderated affirmation, 310, a; restoration of, suggested, 356, d; ellipsis of its verb, 356, e.
ἀναλογίζεσθαι, 332, d.
ἀνθρώπος, *ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, 323, c.
ἀπάλαμνος, 346, c.
ἀποκάμψιν, 333, b.
ἀποπληρῶν, 329, c.
ἀποτείνειν, 335, c.
ἄρα, 309, d. -
ἀστός, 309, c.
ἀντίκα, in illustration, 318, b; 359, e.
αὐτός, 337, c; *αὐτό*, 324, a.

B

βασέος *օρθρού*, 310, a.
βάρβαρος, 341, c.
βίος, 321, d.
βοηθεῖν, 341, d.
βούλομαι, 317, c.
βραβευτής, 338, b.

G

γάρ, explicative, 348, b.
γιγνώσκειν, 310, d.

Δ

δεινός, 312, d.
δεῖσθαι, with infinitive, 314, e; 331, c.
διά τινος λέναι, 323, a.
διαγγέλλειν, 317, a.
διαλαμβάνειν, 346, c.
διαιμάχεσθαι, 325, d.
διέξοδος, 361, e.
δίκαιον εἶναι, with infinitive, 319, b; 351, e.
δοκεῖν, 338, e; 340, a; 354, d.
δῷλος, 329, a.
δύναμις, 330, a.

E

ἐθέλειν, in periphrasis, 309, b.
εἰ, see conditional construction.
εἰς, 347, b; 353, d; 357, d.
εἴτα, in concessive relation, 309, a; 341, e.
εἴτε—εἴτε, 313, b.
ἔκ, 323, c.
ἔκαστος, 315, a.
ἔκκρονειν, 336, c.
ἔκμανθάνειν, 325, c.
“Ἐλλην, 312, a.
ἐλληνίζειν, 327, e.
ἐν τινι εἶναι, 310, d; 313, a; 354, e.
ἐναντίος, 324, a.
ἐνδόν, with genitive, 320, d.
ἐντείνειν, 326, b.
ἐξανιστάναι, 310, a; *ἐξανίστασθαι*, 311, a.
ἐξελέγχειν, 347, c.
ἐπατέειν, 314, a.
ἐπανόρθωμα, 340, d.

- ἐπεί*, *nam*, 317, a; 333, c; 334, b; 338, c.
ἐπειδὰν Στῆττον, 325, c.
ἐπειτα, with concessive reference implied, 319, e; 358, c.
ἐπεκόνδασκειν, 328, e.
ἐπεσθαι, 319, a.
ἐπί, with accusative, 328, d.
ἐπί, with dative, 349, b; 356, e; with terms for emotions and conceits, 343, c.
ἐπί, with genitive, 349, b; 358, b.
ἐπιδημεῖν, 309, d.
ἐπιδιδύναι, 318, a.
ἐπισκέπτεσθαι, 321, c; 343, c.
ἐπιστήμη, ethical function of, 353, b.
εὐδοκιμεῖν, 337, b.
εὐθῦναι, 326, e.
εὐτροφία, 351, a.
εὐφημεῖν, 330, d.
εὐφραίνεσθαι, 337, c.
ἐχω, with adverbs, 315, e.
- H
- ἢ, ellipsis of, 354, d; 358, c.
 ἢ, elliptic, 309, a.
ἢδεσθαι, 337, c.
ἢδη, 316, c; 342, c.
- Θ
- Σάνατος ἡ ζημία*, 325, b.
- Ι
- ἰδιωτεύειν*, 327, a.
ἴθι, with imperative, 352, a.
ἰκανός, 327, c.
- Κ
- καθαιρεῖν*, 343, c.
καθορᾶν, 361, c.
καὶ—*καὶ*, 327, a.
καὶ, emphatic, 338, b.
καλλωπίζεσθαι, 333, d.
κάμπτεσθαι, 320, b.
καταβῖναι, 355, a.
καταθορυβεῖν, 319, c.
κατατίθεσθαι, 320, a.
- κεῖσθαι*, as verbum neutrum, 344, a.
κηλεῖν, 328, d.
κινδυνεύειν, as modal auxiliary, 314, d; 340, e.
κίνδυνος, 314, a.
κοινός καὶ ἴσος, 337, a.
κολούειν, 343, c.
κυβερνήτης, 344, c.
- Λ
- λαμβάνεσθαι τινος*, 347, e.
λέγω, specific force of, 344, a; *λέγειν τι*, 348, e.
λιμοκτονία, 354, a.
λόγου λέγειν, 344, b.
λόγω *διεξελθεῖν*; 320, c; 329, c.
λύειν [ἀπορίαν], 324, e; 333, a.
- Μ
- μέλειν τινί τινος*, 339, b.
μέμφεσθαι, 340, c.
μέν, in hyperbaton, 316, d.
μέσος, 346, d.
μεταλαμβάνειν, 356, d.
μή, elliptic, 312, a.
μή, in generic statements, 319, c; 323, b; 332, b; 359, d.
μή μοι! 331, c.
μή, num, 332, c.
μὴ ὅτι—ἄλλα, 319, e.
μὴ οὐ, 312, a; 352, d; 344, e.
μουσική, 340, a; *μουσικῶς*, 333, a.
μῆδος and *λόγος*, 324, d; 328, c.
- Ν
- νεώτερον*, 310, b.
- Ξ
- ξενηλασία*, 342, c.
- Ο
- όδύνη*, 354, b.
οἶσθαι, construction, 314, c; equal to *δοκεῖν τινι*, 322, c.
ὅπως, final, elliptic, 312, c.
ὅπως, purely relative, 318, c.
ὅρᾶς? 336, b.
οὐδείς, in tmesis, 335, d.

οὐκ, adherescent, 359, c ; 388, b.
οὐτε—τε, 309, b.
οὐτως, after participles, 310, d ; 314, e.

Π

παντοδαπός, 334, b.
παντὸς μᾶλλον, 344, b.
πάννυ, οὐ πάννυ, 333, a.
παραιτεῖσθαι, 320, d ; 358, a.
παρατείνω, 333, e.
παρέχειν, intransitive, 348, a.
πάσχειν, ὅτι *παθόντα*, 353, d.
πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, 348, a.
περί, with dative, 314, a ; 322, c.
ποικίλος, 334, b.
πολίτης, 324, c.
πολιτική τέχνη, 322, b.
πόνηρος and *πονηρός*, 345, e.
πρᾶγμα, with personal reference, 312, c.
πρᾶξις, ἀγαθή, 345, a.
πράττειν and *ποιεῖν*, εὗ *πράττειν*, 356, d.
πρὸς λόγον, 351, e.
προύπαρχειν, 317, d.
πρυτανεῖον, 337, d.
πρώην, 309, a.

Σ

σοφία, in relative sense, 360, d.
συγγίγνεσθαι, 328, e.
συγκαθεῖναι, intransitive, 336, a.
συνειδέναι, 348, b.
συνίστασθαι, 313, b.
σχηματίζεσθαι, 342, b.

7*

σώζειν τὸν βίον, 356, e.
σωφρονεῖν, 332, a.

Τ

τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι, 348, a.
τετράγωνος, 339, b.
τέχνη, 312, b ; 315, a ; 319, c ; 357, a.
τὸ δ' ἔστιν, 344, e.
τραχύνω, 333, e.
τρυφᾶν, 327, e.
τυγχάνω, construction, 313, d.

Υ

ὑπειπεῖν, 343, e.
ὑπό, prae, 310, c.
ὑπόλογον τίθεσθαι, 349, c.

Φ

φαίνεσθαι=ἥκειν, 309, a ; to present
 one's self, 338, a.
φέγγεσθαι, 334, d.
φιλοσοφία, 335, d.
φωνή, 356, d.

Χ

χαίρειν ὀνομάζοντα and *ὀνομαζόμε-
 νον*, 358, b.
χάρις εἰδέναι, 310, a.
χρῆσθαι, 320, b.

Ω

ὦ, 309, d.
ὦς, demonstrative, 326, d.
ὦς, with participle, 311, b.
ὦς εἰρῆσθαι, 309, a.

ENGLISH INDEX.

A

- Accusative absolute, 314, c.
Accusative, cognate, 319, a; 324, d; 360, b.
Accusative of specification, 310, e; 312, d; 320, a; 323, a; 333, c.
Active with the reflexive, 345, e.
Adjective in adverbial apposition, 317, b.
Aeolian dialect, 346, d.
Aeschylus, 321, e.
Agathocles and Pythoclides, 316, d.
Agathon, 315, e; 347, c, e.
Alcibiades and Critias, 316, a; beauty of Alcibiades, 309, a, c; dramatic function of Alcibiades, 347, b; 336, b.
Anacoluthon, 351, c; 355, b.
Anticipation of subject of sub-clause, 323, d; 331, e; 359, a.
Aorist, 316, b; empirical, 328, b, c; 342, e; ingressive, 321, d; 322, a, b; of impatient request, 310, a; 317, d; -present and aorist, 322, a.
Aposiopesis, 325, d.
Applause, 334, c; 337, c; 338, b.
Argument, digression from, 334, a; personal element in, 333, c.
Aristophanes, 336 a; 338, a; 339, a; 340, a; 341, b; 342, b; 347, e; 356, e.
Aristotle, 321, c; 346, e.
Article, deictic, 333, a; 340, c; generic, 312, c; 357, d; 359, d; restoration of $\tau\alpha$ suggested, 342, b.
Asyndeton, 319, d.

- Athenian assembly, a custom of, 319, c.
Athens the capital of intelligence, 337, d.
Atticism, 357, a.
Attraction of copula by predicate, 333, b.
Authors, tenses in quotation of, 309, b; 341, c; 346, a.

B

- Balancing element in epic diction, 341, a.
Bergk, conjecture of, 345, c.
Bernhardy, 341, a.
Books, not sufficient for development of thought, 347, e; weaken memory, *ibid.*
Brachylogy, 323, a.

C

- Callias, 314, e.
Cattle, sacred, 320, a.
Ceos, 341, e.
Charmides, uncle of Plato, 315, a.
Chronological determination, 346, b; 350, a.
Cicero, 337, b; 355, d; 356, d.
Cobet, 349, d.
Collective noun, 315, b.
Comparison, 317, b; 329, a.
Compounds, passive and active, 344, c.
Conditional construction discussed, 311, b, d; 313, a; 316, c; 318, d; 327, b; 330, e; 332, b; 335, a, c; 346, c; 351, b; 356, d; 357, d; 361, a.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>Confidence and courage, 349, e.
 Construction, change of, 330, e ;
 351, c ; compact, 339, e ; <i>κατὰ σύνεσιν</i>, 334, c.
 Conversational style, 325, a.
 Courage, popular view of, 351, b.
 Crison of Himera, 335, e.
 Critias and Alcibiades, 316, a.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <p>Dative, after words expressing resemblance, 330, c ; 331, b ; by attraction, 344, d ; with passives, 340, d.
 Discourse, expanded style of, 334, e.
 Doublets in diction, 314, a ; 333, a.
 Dramatic, function of minor figures, 336, b ; probability, violation of, 320, a ; 337, a ; propriety, 335, d ; reminder, 310, c ; 312, a.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">E</p> <p>Emendation suggested, 355, c.
 Eminent men brought together in Greek tradition, 343, b.
 Enthesis, 309, b ; 320, a.
 Eryximachus, 315, c ; 347, c.
 Ethics, opposition of nature and conventional code, 337, d ; subjective, 337, d ; utilitarian, 355, d ; 356, b ; 358, a.
 Examination of official conduct, 326, e.
 Excellence, transmission of, 326, c.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <p>Ficinus, Marsilius, 310, b.
 Fighting, construction of verbs of, 335, a.
 Flute-girls, 347, b.
 Future, optative, 335, b ; travellers, with gnomic force, 349, d.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <p>Genitive, exclamatory, 341, b ; objective, 327, b ; 354, b ; partitive, 316, b ; 319, c ; 326, c ; 339, d ; 342, b.</p> | <p>Gildersleeve, 330, e.
 Gods, privileges of, 322, a.
 Goodwin, 310, a.
 Gorgias, 334, e.
 Grammatical exegesis, arbitrary, 343, d, e ; 346, e.
 Groen van Prinsterer, 335, c.
 Grote, 358, a.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">H</p> <p>Hearing, verbs of, 317, d.
 Heraclitus, 346, e.
 Hermann, C. F., emendation of, discussed, 329, a ; 353, d.
 Herodicus of Selymbria, 317, d.
 Herodotus, 337, d ; 346, d.
 Hesiod, 340, d.
 Hippias, 315, c ; 337, c, d ; 347, a.
 Hippocrates, the young Athenian, 310, a, c ; 316, b ; of Cos, 311, b.
 Hirschig, emendation of, 350, b.
 Homer, 326, a.
 Homeric quotation, 309, a ; 315, b ; 348, d.
 Horace, his deduction of morality, 322, d.
 House, Attic, 314, e.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">I</p> <p>Iccus, 316, d.
 Imagination assisted, 310, c.
 Imperative, periphrasis of, 338, e ; strengthened, 352.
 Imperfect, 322, b.
 Induction, Socratic, 332, b.
 Infinitive, adverbial, 317, a ; as indirect statement of imperative, 322, d ; by attraction, 346, a ; 353, a ; epexegetical, 313, a ; 329, a.
 Interlocutors, imaginary, 330, e ; 354, e ; 356, e.
 Ionic dialect, 341, b.
 Irony, 309, c ; 334, c ; 339, c ; 348, e.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">K</p> <p>Knowing, verbs of, 314, a.
 Kock, emendation by, 333, e.</p> |
|---|---|

- L**
- Laches, subject-matter of the, 349, e.
 Laconists, 342, b.
 "Law and Nature," 337, d.
 Life, comprehensive statement of, 356, d.
 Litotes, 321, b; 335, d.
 Longfellow, 340, c.
- M**
- Metaphor, anticipated, 343, c; derived from balloting, 330, c; from boxing, 336, c; from foot-race, 339, a; 336, a; from human body, 352, a; from mythology, 328, d; from sailing, 338, a; from war, 340, a; from wrestling, 311, b; sustained, 328, d; 336, a.
- N**
- Nature, teleological view of, 321, a, b.
 "Nature and Law," 337, a.
 Neutral verbs, 337, e.
- O**
- Opposite, contradictory, in argument, 332, a; 360, d.
 Optative with *αὐτοῦ* for mild form of request, 317, e; see conditional construction.
Oratio obliqua, transition from, to *oratio recta*, 322, c; 338, b.
 Orpheus and Musaeus, 316, d.
 Orthagoras the flute-player, 318, c.
- P**
- Palaestra, 326, b.
 Paralus, 315, a.
 Participle used substantively, 317, a; with adjective force, 350, b.
 Peltasts, 350, a.
 Pericles, 342, b.
 Periphrasis of future, 311, e.
 Personification, 347, e.
 Phaedrus, 315, c.
 Pherecrites, 327, d.
- Ph**
- Phidias, 311, c.
 Philosophy, depreciation of, 352, c.
 Phrynondas and Eurybates, 327, d.
 Pindar, 337, d; 345, c.
 Pittacus, 339, c.
 Plato, estimate of Simonides, 341, a; of Prodicus, *ibid.*; fond of elaborate simile, 347, c; intellectual enthusiasm of, 347, c.
 Plural, collective, 335, b; 336, b; distributive, 325, c; of concrete instances, 353, d.
 Poetical style, 322, c.
 Poetry, employment of, as basis for philosophic discussion condemned, 347, c; learned by heart, 326, a.
 Poets as teachers of morality, 339, a.
 Positive of adjectives used pregnantly, 309, d; 314, b.
 Pregnant use of verbs, 311, c; 314, a; 319, d; 325, a; 334, c; 340, c; 360, e.
 Present, and aorist, 317, a; conative, 322, c; force of, 320, a; of condition or permanent result, 310, d; 311, a; of extension, 317, b.
 Prodicus, 315, c; 337, a; 341, a.
 Prolepsis, 320, e; 327, c; 350, d; 357, d.
 Punishment, theory of, 324, b.
- Q**
- Quotation of authors, tenses in, 309, b; 341, c; 346, a.
- R**
- Relative, attraction of, by antecedent, 352, e.
 Relativity, 324, a; 331, d.
 Repeated action, 315, b.
 Repetition, avoidance of, 332, c.
Repraesentatio of direct construction, 338, e.
 Request, mild form of, 317, e.
 Restatement of subject, 334, b; 358, c.

S	Schleiermacher's conception of the Protagoras, 338, c. <i>Scopas</i> , 345, d. Seven Wise Men, 343, a. Simile, extension of, 315, a; 352, a. Simonides, episode of the Simonidean quotation, 339, a; imputations against, 339, a; 346, b. Socrates, characteristical ethical tenet, 345, d; fundamental theme of his ethics, 345, b; his stricture on prolixity, 328, d; 342, a; logical method of argument, 330, b, c; 332, a, b; strength of character of, 347, e; subjective remark of, 343, c; utilitarian element in ethics of, 333, d; view of method of philosophie discourse, 338, c. <i>Sophists</i> , alleged beginnings of, 316, d; etymology, 312, c; fees, 313, c. <i>Spartans</i> , brevity of speech, 343, b; explanation of their power, 342, a, c.	Stallbaum, 334, c; 335, a. <i>Steinhart</i> , 346, b. Subjunctive, deliberative, 319, b. Substantive, verbal construction of, 354, a. Superlative with additional modifier, 349, d. <i>Susemihl</i> , 346, b. Synonyms, 337, a.
		T
		Thucydides, 328, d; 337, d; 339, e. Title, double, of the <i>Protagoras</i> , p. 71 of this edition.
		U
		Utilitarian ethics, 358, a.
		V
		Virtue, concrete, terms for, 349, b; the virtuous as a virtuoso, 344, c.
		W
		Wickedness, types of, 327, d.
		Z
		<i>Zeuxippus</i> , 318, b.



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