VIRTUAL NUCLEAR POWERS, NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES AND ILLICIT NUCLEAR TRADE: HOW THE SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOW-HOW AND MANUFACTURING CAPABILITIES IS UNDERMINING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
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Date
2015-06-01
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Johns Hopkins University
Abstract
This study investigates how the spread of technological know-how and nuclear technology resulted in the emergence of new threats to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Currently, the world has to deal with the perils of latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to the NPT while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program.
The first chapter argues that nuclear cooperation under the auspices of the NPT resulted in the emergence of virtual nuclear powers (VNPs) - countries that are able to develop nuclear weapons but stop before assembling them. This study concludes that in reaction to the emergence of VNPs, nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not only imposing harsh conditions on the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS), but also prioritizing the non-proliferation pillar of the agreement, undermining the grand bargain that sustains the treaty.
The second chapter investigates whether the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine poses a growing risk to the nonproliferation regime. The lack of regulation concerning naval propulsion reactors (NPRs) might work as a good excuse for a country that is willing to produce weapons grade uranium and resume its nuclear weapons program. After all, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) designated for NPRs are exempt from the IAEA safeguards. The case study based on open sources concludes, however, that domestic and international legal constraints impede the development of a nuclear weapons program in Brazil.
The last chapter of the paper looks into the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions on nuclear proliferant states involved in illicit nuclear trade. Investigating North Korea and Iran, this study tests the hypothesis that sanctions might slow down the development of nuclear programs but do not prevent the engagement of states in illicit nuclear trade because the spread of technological know-how and manufacturing capabilities in the past decades had a major impact on the nuclear weapons and missile programs of several developing countries. The research concludes that they are able to support one another directly at the state-to-state level or indirectly through private sector supply networks. Illicit trade is also facilitated by lax export controls and uneven implementation of sanctions.
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virtual nuclear powers