U.S. POLITICAL AND WARFARE STRATEGY EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS
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The intent of this thesis is to analyze failures in the United States (U.S.) military instrument of national power during interventions and occupations. Insurgencies, terror organizations, and emerging near-peer geopolitical competitors are asserting influence to undermine U.S. influence and geopolitical dominance. U.S. policymakers and Department of Defense (DoD) commanders lack the ability to consolidate gains into political endstates through current policies and planning methodologies. This thesis analyzes issues from tactical to strategic echelons and delivers a conceptual framework to effectively operationalize the military instrument of national power. DoD doctrine for planning focuses on mission and operational variables through the Joint Planning Process (JPP) or the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Both methodologies enable commanders and staff in creating courses of action and are successful when solely massing effective combat power. Consequently, JPP and MDMP are ineffective tools to create plans for military democratic intervention strategies and efforts. This thesis additionally focuses on continued disconnects between policymakers and commanders, the lack of understanding critical mission and operational variables, and flaws in the military instrument of national power, which degrade long-term stability in warfare. This topic is vital to conceptualize solutions and improve the understanding of ongoing terror network challenges and emerging near peer threats in multi-domain operations. These issues degrade the ability to consolidate tactical and operational gains into grand strategy objectives, which ultimately lead to stagnation and recession of the democratic state.