THE WESTERN DETERRENCE POLICY REGIME AGAINST A RESURGENT RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: FAILURES AND A WAY AHEAD FOR THE FUTURE
Deskin, Rachael Marie
MetadataShow full item record
Aggressive Russian foreign policy and accompanying military actions have destabilized Europe’s periphery in the post-Cold War security environment. The occupation and annexation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the annexation of Crimea and the continued conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine prove that the West’s Deterrence Policy regime is ineffective. This thesis analyzes how and why the Western Deterrence Policy regime against Russia has failed and examines prospects for the future. To gain an understanding of this issue, this thesis portfolio will review Western foreign and security policy mistakes through a Spiral and Deterrence Model analysis and analyze how the West found itself in the current security dilemma with Russia due to NATO and United States’ (US) actions. The result will be a way-ahead for the European Union (EU), as the best-suited actor to successfully deter Russia, so it can create successful a Deterrence Policy regime against Russia by making necessary changes to its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The first chapter in this portfolio analyzes how the US ineffectively created policy towards Russia through the Deterrence Model instead of the Spiral Model. As a result of misapplied Deterrence Model policies, Russia reacted via the Spiral Model and a post-Cold War security dilemma ensued as a result of Russia’s perception of these seemingly offensive Western policies. The second chapter examines why NATO, and thus the US, has failed in the deterrence of Russia because a deeply rooted mistrust between the US/NATO and Russia effectively precludes any sort of meaningful relationship. The US is unwilling to face Russia head on, and, as such, Europe has no recourse due to a lack of real military power. This portfolio concludes that, since NATO, and thus the US, cannot successfully create or signal policy created correctly via the Deterrence or Spiral Model due to a historical and deeply rooted mistrust, and since the US and NATO are unwilling to utilize force to response to aggressive Russian military action on Europe’s periphery, the EU must act. This portfolio closes with recommendations that will enable the EU to not only escape its current integration dilemma with Russia, but also to become a successful deterrent to Russia. The EU must first become a real security actor on the international stage by deliberately evolving its strategic culture to allow for the use of both hard and soft power and by making real progress on pooling and sharing programs that require an increase in defense spending in an effort to modernize and equip European forces.