EVALUATING AND TESTING RESOLUTIONS FOR NUCLEAR THREATS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PERPETRATED BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA: INCENTIVES FOR DENUCLEARIZATION TESTED ON THE LIBYA AND IRAN MODELS
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Current United Nations Sanctions Resolutions (UNSCR) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have slightly hindered the nation’s ability to procure, proliferate, and test essential resources and elements of its nuclear weapons program. Although nine UNSCRs have been adopted since 2006, the DPRK’s nuclear program has further developed, despite pressure from the United Nations and international community calling on the nation to denuclearize. As of December 2020, the DPRK has continued its proliferation of materials and resources to build and sustain its nuclear program and has not agreed to denuclearization agreements and negotiations. The overarching objective of UNSCRs is to eventually influence the DPRK to denuclearize, although UNSCRs have only accomplished its secondary goal of delaying nuclear progression by making it more difficult for the DPRK to acquire the necessary materials to build and sustain its nuclear program. In short, the three proposals this study offers are: incentivize the DPRK to rejoin the negotiating table to achieve partial or full denuclearization, establish a diplomatic relationship with the DPRK, and incentivize UN Member States and DPRK trade partners to halt trade with the DPRK. The predicted methods rely on reestablishing diplomatic talks or relationships, such as resuming summit discussions with the United States or United Nations (or another nation/world body) and incentivizing the DPRK to return to negotiations. Incentives include offering the DPRK economic reward; for example, proposing membership into world market organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, in exchange for denuclearization. Incentivizing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons for economic prosperity could increase the likelihood that the DPRK will denuclearize, as the nation’s economy is one of the world’s lowest. As such, the purpose of this study is to examine the nine UNSCRs currently in place and test the three proposals on the Libya and Iran denuclearization models as testing the proposals on the DPRK is not possible. Results of the study conclude that the three proposals tested against experiences and lessons drawn from Libya and Iran are feasible and practical options for moving forward in achieving denuclearization of the DPRK.