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dc.contributor.authorFernandez, Marcelo Ariel
dc.creator
dc.date
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-30T17:55:15Z
dc.date.available2021-10-30T17:55:15Z
dc.date.created
dc.date.issued2018-06-01
dc.identifier
dc.identifier.citationFernandez, Marcelo Ariel (2018) Essays in Market Design. Dissertation (Ph.D.), California Institute of Technology. doi:10.7907/PXYF-WS15. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312018-141046982en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/65832
dc.description.abstractThe deferred acceptance mechanism has been widely adopted across centralized matching markets, despite the fact that it provides participants with opportunities to “game the system.” Accounting for the lack of information that participants typically have in these markets in practice, I introduce a new notion of behavior under uncertainty that captures participants’ aversion to experience regret. I show that participants optimally choose not to manipulate the deferred acceptance mechanism in order to avoid regret. Moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism within an interesting class (quantile-stable) to induce honesty from participants in this way.en_US
dc.format
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rights
dc.subjectMarket designen_US
dc.subjectDeferred acceptanceen_US
dc.subjectGale-Shapleyen_US
dc.subjectRegreten_US
dc.subjectRegret-Freeen_US
dc.subjectRegret-FreeTruth-Tellingen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectStable mechanismsen_US
dc.subjecttwo-sided matchingen_US
dc.titleDeferred acceptance and regret-free truth-tellingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.date.updated
dc.rights.license
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dc.date.modified2020-07-31
dc.subject.jelD47, C78, D81, D82, D91en_US


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